(such as global positioning), and they will enable new missions in

logistics, space control, and multimission satellite clusters.

Microsatellites are a result of research in a variety of subsystem technologies. The enabling microsatellite technologies include

multifunctional structures for cableless power buses, integrated

power management, and lightweight interconnects; microelectromechanical systems for gyroscopes, scanning mirrors, and motors;

transmit/receive antenna modules for electronic steering arrays;

ultralight, thin film photovoltaic solar cells for energy storage;

micropropulsion using small impulse charges for fine control of

satellite constellations; automatic satellite docking mechanisms;

and radiation-hardened electronics.

A key element in developing these subsystems is the ability to

conduct space experiments. Although simulation and experiments

conducted on the ground are valuable, certain aspects of technology

must be demonstrated on orbit. This is particularly true when several

subsystems are integrated for the first time or when multiple elements must be tested simultaneously. A good example of an on-orbit

experiment that has been conducted recently is the AFRL MightySat

II. Launched in July 2000, this low-cost, adaptable platform featured

seven experiments, the most notable of which was a Fourier transform hyperspectral imager. The platform was active for over a year

and provided excellent data during that

time. Another currently active experiment

is the Materials on International Space

Station Experiment, which is a multiple

venture involving NASA, the Air Force,

and others. This experiment features

dozens of material samples that are

attached to the exterior of the International Space Station and allows for simultaneous, long-term evaluation of all of the materials under the same

space conditions. Future planned experiments include a microsatellite that will perform fully autonomous proximity operations around a

U.S. space object and a three-satellite formation that will begin to

investigate the concept of a virtual satellite formed by a network of

co-orbiting individual satellites.

Joint Battlespace Infosphere. No look into any element of military science, technology, and transformation would be complete

without the consideration of information technology as it relates to

command and control. The centerpiece of the Air Force science and

technology effort in this area is the joint battlespace infosphere

(JBI). The aim of this research is to evolve methods continuously for

presenting effective battlefield information to decisionmakers at

multiple levels. This involves a globally interoperable approach that

aggregates, integrates, fuses, and disseminates relevant information.

JBI can be envisioned as a federation of multiple servers, resting on a global grid and forming a virtual information space that all

users and systems can easily tap (using open-standard protocols) to

exchange information. It will yield rapidly deployable, agile information architectures that are also built for rapid technology insertion.

JBI should be thought of as a framework of information science and

technology, not a specific product. The framework will, in fact, produce multiple products.

The JBI science and technology program features a combination of software and hardware design/evaluation activities. These

activities focus on:

■ design and evaluation of various technical approaches for performing publish-subscribe-query functions

■ design and development of small software programs (fuselets) that

will aggregate, integrate, and disseminate relevant battlespace information

from distributed databases and different command and control systems

■ designs to bring organizational units (and their information systems) into and out of JBI within hours

■ design, testing, and integration of information assurance technology.

Some Challenges and Issues

Bringing the technologies discussed above to fruition is not

without challenges and issues. Some of these are discussed below. It

is also important to note that the technologies will evolve over different times and will not come into operational use simultaneously.

Finally, one must be aware that new technologies almost certainly

will require new tactics if they are to be fully utilized. This mutual

evolution of technology and tactics is an

absolute essential for true transformation.

UCAV roles and missions are still

being discovered and defined. Our ability

to build and fly machines such as these has

already been demonstrated and is clearly

feasible technically. Our ability to go to

war with them, especially as part of a modern airborne strike package, is in its

infancy and will require time, perhaps a decade, to evolve. The central technologies will not be aerodynamics, propulsion, weapons, or

sensors, but rather the information technologies associated with

software and command and control. Human interaction will continue to be a key technical issue. The number of vehicles controlled

by a single operator and the degree of vehicle autonomy authorized

will require continuing experimentation and feedback loops between

technologists and operators. The Air Force will continue to pay close

attention to the cost of UCAVs. Production UCAVs will most likely not

be exact replicas of the current X–45A. The desire for more range

and extended duration flight times will drive up size and weight.

Again, history has shown that size/weight and cost are closely

related; increases in the former invariably result in increases in the

latter. This will be a continuing challenge for UCAVs.

Small diameter bombs are the most mature of the technologies

discussed herein. GPS-guided munitions of this type are well on their

way to being fielded and will be a key part of future warfare involving the F/A–22, F–35, and UCAV. Miniature air-launched missiles,

however, are another matter. The issue here revolves more around

sensor and information technology than the traditional flight sciences. At the heart of the issue is the degree of autonomy that these

weapons will have. Continued flight experimentation, at a more significant rate than has been done in the past, is required for perhaps

several more years before Air Force officials will have the necessary

May 2003 Defense Horizons 5

mutual evolution of

technology and tactics is

an absolute essential for

true transformation
Donald C. Daniel is a distinguished research professor with the Center for

Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University.

Dr. Daniel may be contacted at danield@ndu.edu.

The Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) manages the Air

Force science and technology program. As shown in figure 2, AFRL

consists of 10 technical directorates:

■ Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR)

■ Air Vehicles

■ Directed Energy

■ Human Effectiveness

■ Information

■ Materials and Manufacturing

■ Munitions

■ Propulsion

■ Sensors

■ Space Vehicles.

The entire basic research program is managed by AFOSR. Each

of the technical directorates manages a portfolio of applied research

and advanced technology development in its area of expertise.

May 2003 Defense Horizons 2

Three Air Force Visionaries

General Henry H. (“Hap”) Arnold (1886–1950) is unquestionably the father of the Air Force. A 1907 graduate of West Point who ranked

closer to the bottom of his class than the top, he was taught to fly by the Wright brothers at Huffman Prairie (now part of Wright-Patterson

Air Force Base, Ohio) and earned the first military aviator’s badge. A protégé of Billy Mitchell, an extremely vocal, early advocate of air power,

Arnold rose steadily through the ranks to become Chief of the Army Air Corps in World War II. In 1944, he was promoted to five-star rank as

General of the Army. When the Air Force was created as a separate service after Arnold had retired, he was made General of the Air Force

by an act of Congress. He is the only person in Air Force history to date to achieve this rank.

Shortly before World War II, Arnold sought out and met Theodore von Karman and started a professional relationship with him that was

vital to linking science and technology to the Air Force. Possibly influenced by his early experiences with the Wright brothers or Billy

Mitchell—or by von Karman’s reputation as the world’s foremost aerodynamicist—Arnold initiated contact with von Karman and maintained

it for the remainder of his life.

In 1944, Arnold reached a profound conclusion that would forever link the future Air Force to science and technology. Specifically, he concluded that the most important lesson coming out of the war for future air forces was that national security could only be provided by preeminence in research. Subsequently, he tasked von Karman to lead a study to “look into every science and find basic developments that could

make U.S. airpower invincible.”

Theodore von Karman (1881–1963) was born in Budapest, Hungary. He studied under Ludwig Prandtl, the world’s foremost aerodynamicist

at the time, in Goettingen, Germany, receiving a doctorate in this specialty. He then moved to Aachen, Germany, where he subsequently supplanted his teacher and mentor as the world’s foremost aerodynamicist, deriving, among other things, modern supersonic aerodynamic theory.

In the late 1920s, the California Institute of Technology began pursuing von Karman to lead its newly established Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory. Von Karman immigrated to the United States in 1930 to lead this laboratory. In the following years, he taught, conducted

research, and built a broad following of graduate students, many of whom would become national leaders in prominent government and academic organizations. He also worked closely with the emerging aeronautical industry that was being attracted to southern California. In this

latter role, he founded the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and was instrumental in the founding of Aerojet General Corporation.

Von Karman and Arnold met in the late 1930s and formed a bond that lasted until Arnold’s death in 1950. Toward New Horizons (the study

that resulted from Arnold’s tasking of von Karman in 1944), more than any other single event, formed the vision for the nascent U.S. Air Force.

The lead essay by von Karman, “Science, The Key to Air Supremacy,” became the service blueprint. Von Karman’s famous statement first

appeared in this essay: “Scientific results cannot be used efficiently by soldiers who have no understanding of them, and scientists cannot

produce results useful for warfare without an understanding of operations.”

General Bernard Schriever (b. 1910), although not as well known as Arnold and von Karman, had an impact on the Air Force that is perhaps as significant. Born in Bremen, Germany, he immigrated to the United States as a boy. Educated at Texas A&M and Stanford in engineering, he was a bomber pilot in World War II, seeing combat in the Pacific.

After the war, Schriever was assigned to the Pentagon, where he became involved in scientific aspects of the newly created Air Force.

He later graduated from the National War College in Washington, DC, and was sent to southern California to establish a small office for the

development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and space systems. He subsequently led the development of every Air Force ICBM

that found its way into production or set the stage for later development. During this time, he also led the development and deployment of

many of the early defense space systems.

Schriever was an extremely forceful personality and, like most agents of change, got his way more often than not. He continued to rise

in rank, ultimately reaching four stars as the Commander of Air Force Systems Command. Although Schriever was not instrumental in the initial linkage of science and technology to the core of the Air Force, he was vital in sustaining and institutionalizing it.
Donald C. Daniel is a distinguished research professor with the Center for

Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University.

Dr. Daniel may be contacted at danield@ndu.edu.

The Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) manages the Air

Force science and technology program. As shown in figure 2, AFRL

consists of 10 technical directorates:

■ Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR)

■ Air Vehicles

■ Directed Energy

■ Human Effectiveness

■ Information

■ Materials and Manufacturing

■ Munitions

■ Propulsion

■ Sensors

■ Space Vehicles.

The entire basic research program is managed by AFOSR. Each

of the technical directorates manages a portfolio of applied research

and advanced technology development in its area of expertise.

May 2003 Defense Horizons 2

Three Air Force Visionaries

General Henry H. (“Hap”) Arnold (1886–1950) is unquestionably the father of the Air Force. A 1907 graduate of West Point who ranked

closer to the bottom of his class than the top, he was taught to fly by the Wright brothers at Huffman Prairie (now part of Wright-Patterson

Air Force Base, Ohio) and earned the first military aviator’s badge. A protégé of Billy Mitchell, an extremely vocal, early advocate of air power,

Arnold rose steadily through the ranks to become Chief of the Army Air Corps in World War II. In 1944, he was promoted to five-star rank as

General of the Army. When the Air Force was created as a separate service after Arnold had retired, he was made General of the Air Force

by an act of Congress. He is the only person in Air Force history to date to achieve this rank.

Shortly before World War II, Arnold sought out and met Theodore von Karman and started a professional relationship with him that was

vital to linking science and technology to the Air Force. Possibly influenced by his early experiences with the Wright brothers or Billy

Mitchell—or by von Karman’s reputation as the world’s foremost aerodynamicist—Arnold initiated contact with von Karman and maintained

it for the remainder of his life.

In 1944, Arnold reached a profound conclusion that would forever link the future Air Force to science and technology. Specifically, he concluded that the most important lesson coming out of the war for future air forces was that national security could only be provided by preeminence in research. Subsequently, he tasked von Karman to lead a study to “look into every science and find basic developments that could

make U.S. airpower invincible.”

Theodore von Karman (1881–1963) was born in Budapest, Hungary. He studied under Ludwig Prandtl, the world’s foremost aerodynamicist

at the time, in Goettingen, Germany, receiving a doctorate in this specialty. He then moved to Aachen, Germany, where he subsequently supplanted his teacher and mentor as the world’s foremost aerodynamicist, deriving, among other things, modern supersonic aerodynamic theory.

In the late 1920s, the California Institute of Technology began pursuing von Karman to lead its newly established Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory. Von Karman immigrated to the United States in 1930 to lead this laboratory. In the following years, he taught, conducted

research, and built a broad following of graduate students, many of whom would become national leaders in prominent government and academic organizations. He also worked closely with the emerging aeronautical industry that was being attracted to southern California. In this

latter role, he founded the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and was instrumental in the founding of Aerojet General Corporation.

Von Karman and Arnold met in the late 1930s and formed a bond that lasted until Arnold’s death in 1950. Toward New Horizons (the study

that resulted from Arnold’s tasking of von Karman in 1944), more than any other single event, formed the vision for the nascent U.S. Air Force.

The lead essay by von Karman, “Science, The Key to Air Supremacy,” became the service blueprint. Von Karman’s famous statement first

appeared in this essay: “Scientific results cannot be used efficiently by soldiers who have no understanding of them, and scientists cannot

produce results useful for warfare without an understanding of operations.”

General Bernard Schriever (b. 1910), although not as well known as Arnold and von Karman, had an impact on the Air Force that is perhaps as significant. Born in Bremen, Germany, he immigrated to the United States as a boy. Educated at Texas A&M and Stanford in engineering, he was a bomber pilot in World War II, seeing combat in the Pacific.

After the war, Schriever was assigned to the Pentagon, where he became involved in scientific aspects of the newly created Air Force.

He later graduated from the National War College in Washington, DC, and was sent to southern California to establish a small office for the

development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and space systems. He subsequently led the development of every Air Force ICBM

that found its way into production or set the stage for later development. During this time, he also led the development and deployment of

many of the early defense space systems.

Schriever was an extremely forceful personality and, like most agents of change, got his way more often than not. He continued to rise

in rank, ultimately reaching four stars as the Commander of Air Force Systems Command. Although Schriever was not instrumental in the initial linkage of science and technology to the core of the Air Force, he was vital in sustaining and institutionalizing it.
Donald C. Daniel is a distinguished research professor with the Center for

Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University.

Dr. Daniel may be contacted at danield@ndu.edu.

The Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) manages the Air

Force science and technology program. As shown in figure 2, AFRL

consists of 10 technical directorates:

■ Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR)

■ Air Vehicles

■ Directed Energy

■ Human Effectiveness

■ Information

■ Materials and Manufacturing

■ Munitions

■ Propulsion

■ Sensors

■ Space Vehicles.

The entire basic research program is managed by AFOSR. Each

of the technical directorates manages a portfolio of applied research

and advanced technology development in its area of expertise.

May 2003 Defense Horizons 2

Three Air Force Visionaries

General Henry H. (“Hap”) Arnold (1886–1950) is unquestionably the father of the Air Force. A 1907 graduate of West Point who ranked

closer to the bottom of his class than the top, he was taught to fly by the Wright brothers at Huffman Prairie (now part of Wright-Patterson

Air Force Base, Ohio) and earned the first military aviator’s badge. A protégé of Billy Mitchell, an extremely vocal, early advocate of air power,

Arnold rose steadily through the ranks to become Chief of the Army Air Corps in World War II. In 1944, he was promoted to five-star rank as

General of the Army. When the Air Force was created as a separate service after Arnold had retired, he was made General of the Air Force

by an act of Congress. He is the only person in Air Force history to date to achieve this rank.

Shortly before World War II, Arnold sought out and met Theodore von Karman and started a professional relationship with him that was

vital to linking science and technology to the Air Force. Possibly influenced by his early experiences with the Wright brothers or Billy

Mitchell—or by von Karman’s reputation as the world’s foremost aerodynamicist—Arnold initiated contact with von Karman and maintained

it for the remainder of his life.

In 1944, Arnold reached a profound conclusion that would forever link the future Air Force to science and technology. Specifically, he concluded that the most important lesson coming out of the war for future air forces was that national security could only be provided by preeminence in research. Subsequently, he tasked von Karman to lead a study to “look into every science and find basic developments that could

make U.S. airpower invincible.”

Theodore von Karman (1881–1963) was born in Budapest, Hungary. He studied under Ludwig Prandtl, the world’s foremost aerodynamicist

at the time, in Goettingen, Germany, receiving a doctorate in this specialty. He then moved to Aachen, Germany, where he subsequently supplanted his teacher and mentor as the world’s foremost aerodynamicist, deriving, among other things, modern supersonic aerodynamic theory.

In the late 1920s, the California Institute of Technology began pursuing von Karman to lead its newly established Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory. Von Karman immigrated to the United States in 1930 to lead this laboratory. In the following years, he taught, conducted

research, and built a broad following of graduate students, many of whom would become national leaders in prominent government and academic organizations. He also worked closely with the emerging aeronautical industry that was being attracted to southern California. In this

latter role, he founded the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and was instrumental in the founding of Aerojet General Corporation.

Von Karman and Arnold met in the late 1930s and formed a bond that lasted until Arnold’s death in 1950. Toward New Horizons (the study

that resulted from Arnold’s tasking of von Karman in 1944), more than any other single event, formed the vision for the nascent U.S. Air Force.

The lead essay by von Karman, “Science, The Key to Air Supremacy,” became the service blueprint. Von Karman’s famous statement first

appeared in this essay: “Scientific results cannot be used efficiently by soldiers who have no understanding of them, and scientists cannot

produce results useful for warfare without an understanding of operations.”

General Bernard Schriever (b. 1910), although not as well known as Arnold and von Karman, had an impact on the Air Force that is perhaps as significant. Born in Bremen, Germany, he immigrated to the United States as a boy. Educated at Texas A&M and Stanford in engineering, he was a bomber pilot in World War II, seeing combat in the Pacific.

After the war, Schriever was assigned to the Pentagon, where he became involved in scientific aspects of the newly created Air Force.

He later graduated from the National War College in Washington, DC, and was sent to southern California to establish a small office for the

development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and space systems. He subsequently led the development of every Air Force ICBM

that found its way into production or set the stage for later development. During this time, he also led the development and deployment of

many of the early defense space systems.

Schriever was an extremely forceful personality and, like most agents of change, got his way more often than not. He continued to rise

in rank, ultimately reaching four stars as the Commander of Air Force Systems Command. Although Schriever was not instrumental in the initial linkage of science and technology to the core of the Air Force, he was vital in sustaining and institutionalizing it.
(such as global positioning), and they will enable new missions in

logistics, space control, and multimission satellite clusters.

Microsatellites are a result of research in a variety of subsystem technologies. The enabling microsatellite technologies include

multifunctional structures for cableless power buses, integrated

power management, and lightweight interconnects; microelectromechanical systems for gyroscopes, scanning mirrors, and motors;

transmit/receive antenna modules for electronic steering arrays;

ultralight, thin film photovoltaic solar cells for energy storage;

micropropulsion using small impulse charges for fine control of

satellite constellations; automatic satellite docking mechanisms;

and radiation-hardened electronics.

A key element in developing these subsystems is the ability to

conduct space experiments. Although simulation and experiments

conducted on the ground are valuable, certain aspects of technology

must be demonstrated on orbit. This is particularly true when several

subsystems are integrated for the first time or when multiple elements must be tested simultaneously. A good example of an on-orbit

experiment that has been conducted recently is the AFRL MightySat

II. Launched in July 2000, this low-cost, adaptable platform featured

seven experiments, the most notable of which was a Fourier transform hyperspectral imager. The platform was active for over a year

and provided excellent data during that

time. Another currently active experiment

is the Materials on International Space

Station Experiment, which is a multiple

venture involving NASA, the Air Force,

and others. This experiment features

dozens of material samples that are

attached to the exterior of the International Space Station and allows for simultaneous, long-term evaluation of all of the materials under the same

space conditions. Future planned experiments include a microsatellite that will perform fully autonomous proximity operations around a

U.S. space object and a three-satellite formation that will begin to

investigate the concept of a virtual satellite formed by a network of

co-orbiting individual satellites.

Joint Battlespace Infosphere. No look into any element of military science, technology, and transformation would be complete

without the consideration of information technology as it relates to

command and control. The centerpiece of the Air Force science and

technology effort in this area is the joint battlespace infosphere

(JBI). The aim of this research is to evolve methods continuously for

presenting effective battlefield information to decisionmakers at

multiple levels. This involves a globally interoperable approach that

aggregates, integrates, fuses, and disseminates relevant information.

JBI can be envisioned as a federation of multiple servers, resting on a global grid and forming a virtual information space that all

users and systems can easily tap (using open-standard protocols) to

exchange information. It will yield rapidly deployable, agile information architectures that are also built for rapid technology insertion.

JBI should be thought of as a framework of information science and

technology, not a specific product. The framework will, in fact, produce multiple products.

The JBI science and technology program features a combination of software and hardware design/evaluation activities. These

activities focus on:

■ design and evaluation of various technical approaches for performing publish-subscribe-query functions

■ design and development of small software programs (fuselets) that

will aggregate, integrate, and disseminate relevant battlespace information

from distributed databases and different command and control systems

■ designs to bring organizational units (and their information systems) into and out of JBI within hours

■ design, testing, and integration of information assurance technology.

Some Challenges and Issues

Bringing the technologies discussed above to fruition is not

without challenges and issues. Some of these are discussed below. It

is also important to note that the technologies will evolve over different times and will not come into operational use simultaneously.

Finally, one must be aware that new technologies almost certainly

will require new tactics if they are to be fully utilized. This mutual

evolution of technology and tactics is an

absolute essential for true transformation.

UCAV roles and missions are still

being discovered and defined. Our ability

to build and fly machines such as these has

already been demonstrated and is clearly

feasible technically. Our ability to go to

war with them, especially as part of a modern airborne strike package, is in its

infancy and will require time, perhaps a decade, to evolve. The central technologies will not be aerodynamics, propulsion, weapons, or

sensors, but rather the information technologies associated with

software and command and control. Human interaction will continue to be a key technical issue. The number of vehicles controlled

by a single operator and the degree of vehicle autonomy authorized

will require continuing experimentation and feedback loops between

technologists and operators. The Air Force will continue to pay close

attention to the cost of UCAVs. Production UCAVs will most likely not

be exact replicas of the current X–45A. The desire for more range

and extended duration flight times will drive up size and weight.

Again, history has shown that size/weight and cost are closely

related; increases in the former invariably result in increases in the

latter. This will be a continuing challenge for UCAVs.

Small diameter bombs are the most mature of the technologies

discussed herein. GPS-guided munitions of this type are well on their

way to being fielded and will be a key part of future warfare involving the F/A–22, F–35, and UCAV. Miniature air-launched missiles,

however, are another matter. The issue here revolves more around

sensor and information technology than the traditional flight sciences. At the heart of the issue is the degree of autonomy that these

weapons will have. Continued flight experimentation, at a more significant rate than has been done in the past, is required for perhaps

several more years before Air Force officials will have the necessary

May 2003 Defense Horizons 5

mutual evolution of

technology and tactics is

an absolute essential for

true transformation
(such as global positioning), and they will enable new missions in

logistics, space control, and multimission satellite clusters.

Microsatellites are a result of research in a variety of subsystem technologies. The enabling microsatellite technologies include

multifunctional structures for cableless power buses, integrated

power management, and lightweight interconnects; microelectromechanical systems for gyroscopes, scanning mirrors, and motors;

transmit/receive antenna modules for electronic steering arrays;

ultralight, thin film photovoltaic solar cells for energy storage;

micropropulsion using small impulse charges for fine control of

satellite constellations; automatic satellite docking mechanisms;

and radiation-hardened electronics.

A key element in developing these subsystems is the ability to

conduct space experiments. Although simulation and experiments

conducted on the ground are valuable, certain aspects of technology

must be demonstrated on orbit. This is particularly true when several

subsystems are integrated for the first time or when multiple elements must be tested simultaneously. A good example of an on-orbit

experiment that has been conducted recently is the AFRL MightySat

II. Launched in July 2000, this low-cost, adaptable platform featured

seven experiments, the most notable of which was a Fourier transform hyperspectral imager. The platform was active for over a year

and provided excellent data during that

time. Another currently active experiment

is the Materials on International Space

Station Experiment, which is a multiple

venture involving NASA, the Air Force,

and others. This experiment features

dozens of material samples that are

attached to the exterior of the International Space Station and allows for simultaneous, long-term evaluation of all of the materials under the same

space conditions. Future planned experiments include a microsatellite that will perform fully autonomous proximity operations around a

U.S. space object and a three-satellite formation that will begin to

investigate the concept of a virtual satellite formed by a network of

co-orbiting individual satellites.

Joint Battlespace Infosphere. No look into any element of military science, technology, and transformation would be complete

without the consideration of information technology as it relates to

command and control. The centerpiece of the Air Force science and

technology effort in this area is the joint battlespace infosphere

(JBI). The aim of this research is to evolve methods continuously for

presenting effective battlefield information to decisionmakers at

multiple levels. This involves a globally interoperable approach that

aggregates, integrates, fuses, and disseminates relevant information.

JBI can be envisioned as a federation of multiple servers, resting on a global grid and forming a virtual information space that all

users and systems can easily tap (using open-standard protocols) to

exchange information. It will yield rapidly deployable, agile information architectures that are also built for rapid technology insertion.

JBI should be thought of as a framework of information science and

technology, not a specific product. The framework will, in fact, produce multiple products.

The JBI science and technology program features a combination of software and hardware design/evaluation activities. These

activities focus on:

■ design and evaluation of various technical approaches for performing publish-subscribe-query functions

■ design and development of small software programs (fuselets) that

will aggregate, integrate, and disseminate relevant battlespace information

from distributed databases and different command and control systems

■ designs to bring organizational units (and their information systems) into and out of JBI within hours

■ design, testing, and integration of information assurance technology.

Some Challenges and Issues

Bringing the technologies discussed above to fruition is not

without challenges and issues. Some of these are discussed below. It

is also important to note that the technologies will evolve over different times and will not come into operational use simultaneously.

Finally, one must be aware that new technologies almost certainly

will require new tactics if they are to be fully utilized. This mutual

evolution of technology and tactics is an

absolute essential for true transformation.

UCAV roles and missions are still

being discovered and defined. Our ability

to build and fly machines such as these has

already been demonstrated and is clearly

feasible technically. Our ability to go to

war with them, especially as part of a modern airborne strike package, is in its

infancy and will require time, perhaps a decade, to evolve. The central technologies will not be aerodynamics, propulsion, weapons, or

sensors, but rather the information technologies associated with

software and command and control. Human interaction will continue to be a key technical issue. The number of vehicles controlled

by a single operator and the degree of vehicle autonomy authorized

will require continuing experimentation and feedback loops between

technologists and operators. The Air Force will continue to pay close

attention to the cost of UCAVs. Production UCAVs will most likely not

be exact replicas of the current X–45A. The desire for more range

and extended duration flight times will drive up size and weight.

Again, history has shown that size/weight and cost are closely

related; increases in the former invariably result in increases in the

latter. This will be a continuing challenge for UCAVs.

Small diameter bombs are the most mature of the technologies

discussed herein. GPS-guided munitions of this type are well on their

way to being fielded and will be a key part of future warfare involving the F/A–22, F–35, and UCAV. Miniature air-launched missiles,

however, are another matter. The issue here revolves more around

sensor and information technology than the traditional flight sciences. At the heart of the issue is the degree of autonomy that these

weapons will have. Continued flight experimentation, at a more significant rate than has been done in the past, is required for perhaps

several more years before Air Force officials will have the necessary

May 2003 Defense Horizons 5

mutual evolution of

technology and tactics is

an absolute essential for

true transformation