Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not 

be regarded as precedent or cited 

before any court except for the purpose 

of establishing the defense of res 

judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law 

of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

JAMES A. SHOAF GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Columbus, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

JAMES B. MARTIN

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

JAMES CHRISTIAN WARNER, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 03A01-1305-CR-213

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE BARTHOLOMEW CIRCUIT COURT

The Honorable Stephen R. Heimann, Judge

Cause No. 03C01-1303-FA-1870

January 10, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BARNES, Judge
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Case Summary

James Warner appeals his sentence for Class B felony possession of 

methamphetamine. We affirm.

Issues

Warner raises two issues, which we restate as:

I. whether the trial court abused its discretion in 

sentencing him; and

II. whether his sentence is inappropriate.

Facts

On August 16, 2012, Warner was manufacturing methamphetamine in a park 

campground in Bartholomew County with Lori McIntosh and McIntosh’s eight-year-old 

daughter. The State charged Warner with Class A felony dealing in methamphetamine 

and Class B felony possession of methamphetamine and alleged that he was an habitual 

offender. 

Warner pled guilty to Class B felony possession of methamphetamine, and the 

State dismissed the other charge and the habitual offender allegation. At Warner’s 

request, a combined sentencing hearing was held that day with charges filed under cause 

number 03C01-1201-FC-5410. The trial court’s written sentencing order provided:

The Court, having considered the written presentence

investigation report filed and having considered the testimony 

of defendant and comments of counsel, now finds no 

mitigating circumstances. The Court finds significant and 

serious aggravating circumstances as follows:

1. The defendant has a lengthy criminal history. 

He has 23 convictions of which 11 are felonies.
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2. The defendant has had opportunities for 

treatment outside a penal facility on numerous 

occasions, which have not been effective. 

3. The defendant has had opportunities to be 

placed on probation on numerous occasions and has 

violated a number of times. 

4. The nature and circumstances of the crimes in 

cause number 03C01-1210-FC-5410.

App. p. 67. The trial court sentenced Warner to twenty years with two years suspended 

to probation for the Class B felony possession of methamphetamine conviction. Warner 

now appeals. 

Analysis

I. Abuse of Discretion

Warner argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him. We 

evaluate a sentence under the current “advisory” sentencing scheme pursuant to 

Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 491 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g by Anglemyer v. 

State, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). The trial court must issue a sentencing statement that 

includes “reasonably detailed reasons or circumstances for imposing a particular 

sentence.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491. The reasons or omission of reasons given for 

choosing a sentence are reviewable on appeal for an abuse of discretion. Id. “The 

relative weight or value assignable to reasons properly found or those which should have 

been found is not subject to review for abuse.” Id. 

Warner contends that the trial court abused its discretion because it failed to list 

the factors it considered when sentencing him on the Class B felony possession of 
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methamphetamine charge. Although the trial court conducted a combined sentencing 

hearing and issued a combined sentencing order, the trial court clearly listed the 

aggravating circumstances it relied on to formulate Warner’s sentence for possession of 

methamphetamine. As we read the sentencing order, there is no indication that the nature 

and circumstances of either case was used to formulate the methamphetamine sentence. 

Thus we are not convinced that manner in which the aggravating factors were listed in 

the sentencing order amounted to an abuse of discretion. 

Warner also argues that the sentencing order was silent regarding whether the trial 

court considered his guilty plea as a mitigator. We disagree. The sentencing order 

specifically states that no mitigating circumstances were found. Further, as Warner 

points out, when a defendant gains a significant benefit from a plea bargain, a trial court 

is not required to find a guilty plea to be a mitigating circumstance. See, e.g., Brown v. 

State, 907 N.E.2d 591, 594 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Because the State dismissed a Class A 

felony charge and habitual offender enhancement in exchange for Warner’s guilty plea, 

we are not convinced that the trial court overlooked a significant mitigator. Without 

more, Warner has not established that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing 

him.

II. Inappropriateness

Warner also argues that his sentence is inappropriate. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) 

permits us to revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial 

court’s decision, we find that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the 

offenses and the character of the offender. Although Rule 7(B) does not require us to be 
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“extremely” deferential to a trial court’s sentencing decision, we still must give due 

consideration to that decision. Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2007). We also understand and recognize the unique perspective a trial court brings to its 

sentencing decisions. Id. “Additionally, a defendant bears the burden of persuading the 

appellate court that his or her sentence is inappropriate.” Id.

The principal role of Rule 7(B) review “should be to attempt to leaven the outliers, 

and identify some guiding principles for trial courts and those charged with improvement 

of the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.” 

Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). We “should focus on the forest—

the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number of 

counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count.” Id. Whether a sentence is 

inappropriate ultimately turns on the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the 

crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given 

case. Id. at 1224. When reviewing the appropriateness of a sentence under Rule 7(B), 

we may consider all aspects of the penal consequences imposed by the trial court in 

sentencing the defendant, including whether a portion of the sentence was suspended. 

Davidson v. State, 926 N.E.2d 1023, 1025 (Ind. 2010).

Warner’s argument focuses on whether he is the worst of the worst offenders

deserving of the maximum sentence for a Class B felony. Warner did not receive the 

maximum sentence of twenty years executed. Instead, two years of Warner’s twentyyear sentence were suspended to probation making his sentence less punitive. See id. 

Moreover: 
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In stating that maximum sentences are ordinarily appropriate 

for the worst offenders, we refer generally to the class of 

offenses and offenders that warrant the maximum 

punishment. But this encompasses a considerable variety of 

offenses and offenders. We concentrate less on comparing 

the facts of this case to others, whether real or hypothetical, 

and more on focusing on the nature, extent, and depravity of 

the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced, and 

what it reveals about the defendant’s character. 

Wells v. State, 904 N.E.2d 265, 274 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citation omitted), trans. denied.

Here, Warner was making methamphetamine at a public campground in the 

presence of an eight-year-old. The nature of the offense does not warrant the reduction of 

his sentence. As for his character, Warner has twenty-three convictions, eleven of which 

are felony convictions. Further, Warner admitted that he began using alcohol and 

marijuana when he was thirteen and, despite referrals to numerous treatment programs, 

he continues to abuse drugs. Warner also admitted to being on parole when he 

committed the offense and to violating probation twice. Warner’s character does not 

support the reduction of his sentence. 

Conclusion

Warner has not established that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing 

him or that his sentence is inappropriate. We affirm.

Affirmed.

ROBB, J., and BROWN, J., concur.