Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

Cadle Properties of Illinois, Inc. v. Fortune Investments, LLC,

2021 IL App (1st) 200556

Appellate Court 

Caption

CADLE PROPERTIES OF ILLINOIS, INC., an Assignee of MB 

Financial Bank, N.A., Plaintiff-Appellee and Counter-Appellant, v. 

FORTUNE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Illinois Limited Liability 

Company; M. ABDUL MATHIN; ANAA HOLDINGS XI, LLC; 

BASS FINANCIAL CORPORATION; JPMORGAN CHASE 

BANK, N.A., an Assignee of MERS, as Nominee for Countrywide 

Bank, N.A.; NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC, as Assignee of 

MERS, as Nominee for Countrywide Bank, N.A.; BEN H. ARKES; 

PNC BANK, N.A.; TELESIS COMMUNITY CREDIT UNION; 

SKOKIE GARDENS CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION; and 

UNKNOWN OWNERS and NONRECORD CLAIMANTS (Fortune 

Investments, LLC, and M. Abdul Mathin, Defendants-Appellants and 

Counter-Appellees).

District & No. First District, First Division 

No. 1-20-0556

Filed June 7, 2021

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 15-CH-7186; the 

Hon. Daniel J. Kubasiak, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.
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Counsel on

Appeal

John D. Silk, of Rothschild, Barry & Myers, LLP, of Chicago, for 

appellants.

Robert G. Markoff and Douglas C. Giese, of Markoff Law, LLC, of 

Chicago, for appellee.

Panel JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Presiding Justice Walker and Justice Coghlan concurred in the 

judgment, and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 Fortune Investments, LLC (Fortune), borrowed $17 million from MB Financial Bank, N.A. 

(MB Financial), to construct a condominium development. Fortune’s owner, M. Abdul Mathin, 

guaranteed the loan and completion of the project. Fortune defaulted and MB Financial sued 

to foreclose. Cadle Properties of Illinois, Inc. (Cadle), purchased the loan from MB Financial 

and entered into a settlement agreement with Fortune, which provided, in part, that Cadle 

would not sue Fortune on the loan or Mathin on his guaranties until after all condominium 

units sold. (Fortune and Mathin will be referred to as “Mathin.”) Cadle also agreed to pay 

expenses related to the property, including real estate taxes, insurance, and utilities. 

¶ 2 Several years later, Cadle filed a verified complaint alleging that Fortune had breached the 

construction note and Mathin had defaulted on his payment and completion guaranties. (Cadle 

also sued to foreclose the mortgage, but the parties settled and dismissed that claim.) Mathin 

filed affirmative defenses and counterclaims alleging that Cadle’s filing of the lawsuit before 

all units had sold breached the settlement agreement. Specifically, Mathin alleges he 

transferred, but did not sell, 17 units to ANAA Holdings V, LLC (ANAA), a company owned 

by his wife but rather, refinanced to help Cadle pay off a loan. Mathin further alleges that Cadle 

failed to pay expenses as required by the settlement agreement.

¶ 3 After a bench trial, the court entered judgment for Cadle and awarded damages of 

$17,031,611.66. The court rejected Mathin’s affirmative defenses and counterclaims, finding 

Cadle filed its lawsuit after ownership of the 17 units changed from Fortune to ANAA, 

satisfying the condition precedent in the settlement agreement. As to expenses, the court found 

that all expenses were paid following a course of action to which the parties agreed or Mathin 

had not challenged.

¶ 4 Mathin contends the trial court erred in (i) entering judgment for Cadle based on finding 

all conditions precedent were met, (ii) entering judgment for Cadle on the note when it 

presented evidence regarding only the settlement agreement, (iii) calculating damages, and (iv) 

finding Cadle had paid all property expenses. Applying the manifest weight of the evidence 

standard, we affirm the trial court’s findings (i) that all units had been sold or transferred before 

Cadle filed its complaint, (ii) that expenses were paid in the manner agreed on by the parties, 

and (iii) on damages and the judgment. 
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¶ 5 BACKGROUND

¶ 6 In 2003, Fortune took out a $17 million construction loan from MB Financial, to develop 

Skokie Gardens Condominiums, a 70-unit residential development. A construction mortgage 

note secured the loan. Mathin, a member, manager, and agent of Fortune, signed the note and 

guaranteed payment of the loan and completion of the project. The note stated that interest 

would accrue at a variable annual interest rate equal to one-half of 1% over the rate of interest 

then most recently announced by MB Financial but would not be less than 5% per year.

¶ 7 About a year later, MB Financial sued to foreclose the mortgage. While that lawsuit 

progressed, MB Financial assigned all loan documents, including the note and guaranties, to 

Cadle for $15 million. Cadle borrowed $12 million from MB Financial to finance the purchase. 

MB Financial later assigned Cadle’s loan to Colfin Bulls Funding B, LLC (Colfin).

¶ 8 Cadle then entered into a settlement agreement with Fortune and Mathin to dismiss MB 

Financial’s foreclosure case. The settlement agreement stated that Fortune owed Cadle 

$18,618,026.01 and proceeds from unit sales would be applied to pay down the loan. Interest 

would accrue at an annual rate of prime, as published by the Wall Street Journal, plus 2%. 

Also relevant, the agreement limited when Cadle could sue to foreclose: 

“If the Debt is not paid in full to Cadle on or before October 15, 2006, both Fortune 

and Mathin will be responsible for any remaining amounts owed to Cadle, but only in 

the event, there is a deficiency after Cadle has sold any remaining unsold Units. Cadle 

shall not file an action against Fortune or Mathin under the Loan Documents for any

deficiency prior to October 14, 2006.” (A modification provided Cadle would not file

suit on the loan before October 2007.) 

In addition, Cadle would “pay all reasonable expenses associated with the Property, including,

but not limited to, real estate taxes, insurance, association/management fees, repair costs, and 

utility charges.” Charges Cadle paid would be added to the debt. 

¶ 9 In 2012, Cadle sued to foreclose. By letter agreement dated May 29, 2012, Cadle agreed to

release its security interest in 17 units and to dismiss the foreclosure lawsuit in exchange for a 

$1.2 million payment. Fortune borrowed $1.2 million from Pensam Logistics Partners

(Pensam), and Cadle used the $1.2 million to help pay off its loan with Colfin, which was 

demanding payment. According to Mathin, Pensam would not make a loan to Fortune, so he 

transferred the 17 units to ANAA, a company owned by his wife. The letter agreement stated 

that the $1.2 million payment would reduce the balance on the loan but would not be construed 

as satisfaction or release of the indebtedness, and the loan documents would otherwise remain 

in full force and effect.

¶ 10 In January 2015, Cadle sent letters to Fortune and Mathin, advising of default and 

demanding cure within 35 days. When they failed to cure, Cadle filed a three-count verified 

complaint. Cadle alleged Fortune breached its obligations under the note (count I) and Mathin 

defaulted on the payment and completion guaranties (count II). Cadle also sought to foreclose 

the mortgage (count III). Cadle requested damages of over $14.6 million as of April 23, 2015, 

together with per diem interest of $1793.32 accruing after that date.

¶ 11 Mathin filed three affirmative defenses: (i) the statute of limitations barred the complaint, 

(ii) Cadle failed to perform a condition precedent under the settlement agreement by filing the 

complaint before all units sold, and (iii) Cadle breached the settlement agreement by failing to 
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pay property expenses. Mathin also filed a counterclaim alleging Cadle breached the settlement 

agreement by filing the lawsuit before all units sold.

¶ 12 Having settled and dismissed count III on the mortgage foreclosure claim, a two-day bench 

trial proceeded on the remaining counts and the counterclaim. At trial, John Benetis, an account 

officer for Cadle, testified that when he took over the Fortune loan in 2013, the loan balance 

numbers were incorrect, so he went over the loan documents and payments and created a 

spreadsheet to reflect the amount Fortune owed accurately. Fortune had not paid the balance 

of the loan, and all units had either been sold or, as in the case of the 17 units, held by ANAA. 

On cross examination, Benetis acknowledged that, unlike other units, the 17 units were not 

sold individually with separate closing statements but instead, as a group, were turned over to 

ANAA in exchange for $1.2 million and Cadle’s agreement to release its lien on those units. 

Benetis also acknowledged that Cadle’s ledger book, entered into evidence, did not list a sales 

price for the 17 units. Cadle credited Fortune $70,588.24 ($1.2 million divided by 17) for each 

unit; other units had sold for $250,000 or more.

¶ 13 Benetis acknowledged that under the settlement agreement, Cadle would add to the debt 

reasonable property expenses it paid. But expenses were paid in various ways—either by Cadle 

directly, by Mathin, or out of the closings on units—and Mathin never objected to paying the 

expenses himself or out of the closing. To avoid confusion because all expenses were 

eventually paid, the expenses were not added to the debt. 

¶ 14 Relying on his spreadsheet, after all credits were applied, Benetis said Fortune owed Cadle 

$16,971,145.20. On August 28, 2017, the spreadsheet showed Fortune owed $12,226,231.36 

in principal and $3,172,316.58 in interest for a total of $15,398.04. Benetis added a per diem

interest of $1782.99 to derive his final tally. On cross-examination, Benetis acknowledged his

calculations were based on the 2006 settlement agreement and not on the loan documents, 

which Cadle never obtained from MB Financial. 

¶ 15 Mathin testified that, with Cadle’s approval, the 17 units were transferred to ANAA and 

not sold by Fortune, so the units could be refinanced to generate the $1.2 million Cadle needed 

to pay off its loan to Colfin. He asserted that the value of each unit far exceeded the $70,588.24 

Cadle credited to Fortune and they were refinanced rather than sold. He believed payment of 

the $1.2 million for the 17 units fully satisfied his obligations to Cadle on the debt, despite the 

language of the letter agreement stating the loan remained in full force and effect. 

¶ 16 Daniel Cadle, chairman of the board of the company, testified that his attorneys advised 

him that Fortune had sold all condominium units before Cadle filed its complaint. Over 

objection, the trial court entered into evidence an escrow trust disbursement statement for the 

May 2012 transaction from Chicago Title and Trust Company, listing ANAA as “Buyer” of 

the 17 units. Daniel Cadle testified he believed Fortune sold those units to ANAA, and while 

he knew of the units moving to ANAA at the time, he did not authorize it. 

¶ 17 Daniel Cadle testified that expenses were paid in one of three ways—by check from Cadle 

to Fortune, during closings on condominium units, or by Mathin. Neither Mathin nor Fortune 

complained about these methods and never accused Cadle of violating the settlement 

agreement.

¶ 18 On cross-examination, Daniel Cadle acknowledged the escrow trust disbursement 

statement does not list a seller or show payment of transfer stamps. He also acknowledged 

average sales price for units was $250,000, and not the $70,588.24. Cadle credited Fortune for 

each unit. Cadle applied the $1.2 million loan Fortune received from Pensam toward repaying 
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the Colfin loan, which was in default. On cross-examination, Daniel Cadle said he believed 

about $13 million of the nearly $17 million Fortune owed Cadle was in interest.

¶ 19 After closing arguments, the trial court entered a written opinion and order in favor of 

Cadle counts I and II and against Fortune on its counterclaim. The court found that Cadle 

presented credible evidence Fortune breached its obligations under the note and that the 

balance was due. As to the affirmative defense and counterclaim that not all units had been 

sold, the court found 

“documents were presented and entered into evidence that the 17 properties at issue 

were transferred on May 30, 2012, to ANAA Holdings V, LLC, a business owned by 

Mathin’s spouse. Mathin characterized this as a refinancing rather than a sale. 

Regardless of Mathin’s characterization, evidence and testimony support a sale and 

change in ownership of the 17 properties which overcomes Defendants’ condition 

precedent argument.”

¶ 20 As to Mathin’s assertion that Cadle breached the settlement agreement by not paying all 

expenses, the trial court found the 

“[t]estimony and evidence admitted established that all expenses were paid pursuant to 

a course of action either agreed upon by the parties or not challenged by Mathin at any 

time prior to this action. Regardless of the timing of the defense, the evidence 

confirmed that Plaintiff paid all reasonable expenses under the Settlement Agreement.” 

The trial court entered judgment for Cadle for $17,031,611.66, which included principal, 

interest, attorney’s fees, and court costs.

¶ 21 ANALYSIS 

¶ 22 Standard of Review

¶ 23 After a bench trial, we reverse a judgment only if it is against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. Gambino v. Boulevard Mortgage Corp., 398 Ill. App. 3d 21, 51 (2009). “ ‘A decision 

is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when an opposite conclusion is apparent or 

when the findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence.’ ” Wade 

v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., 2017 IL App (1st) 161765, ¶ 59 (quoting Eychaner v. Gross, 

202 Ill. 2d 228, 252 (2002)). “The manifest weight of the evidence standard affords great 

deference to the trial court because the trial court is in a superior position to determine and 

weigh the credibility of the witnesses, observe witnesses’ demeanor, and resolve conflicts in 

their testimony.” Id.

¶ 24 Were Conditions Precedent for Lawsuit Met?

¶ 25 The parties do not dispute that the 2006 settlement agreement imposed a condition 

precedent requiring all units be sold before Cadle could sue Fortune on the loan and Mathin on 

his guaranties. The parties also agree that in May 2012, the parties entered into a letter 

agreement, which provided that Cadle would release its lien on 17 units in exchange for $1.2 

million and, in connection with that transaction, that title to the 17 units changed from Fortune 

to ANAA. They disagree, however, as to whether the May 2012 transaction constituted a sale 

satisfying the condition precedent, as Cadle contends, or a refinance approved by Cadle, as 

Mathin contends. 
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¶ 26 Mathin asserts that the trial testimony supports a finding that the May 2012 transaction 

constituted a refinance. Mathin notes that Benetis called the transaction a “transfer,” and 

although Daniel Cadle testified that the transaction was a “sale” to which he did not consent, 

Cadle presented no documentary evidence to support that contention. Indeed, Mathin asserts 

that the documentary evidence supports a refinance. First, Mathin notes that the disbursement 

statement does not list a “seller” and, although it lists ANAA as the “buyer,” ANAA is referred 

to as a “borrower” elsewhere in the document. Further, the disbursement document shows 

nothing regarding payment of transfer taxes or prorations for assessments, insurance, or real 

estate taxes, as had the closing statement for sales of other units. And the disbursement 

document shows the title company issued only a loan policy when real estate sales usually 

require an owner’s policy. 

¶ 27 Mathin also asserts that Cadle’s ledger, which lists the status of all the units, establishes 

the transaction was a refinance. In particular, Mathin contends that while the ledger lists sales 

prices for most units ranging from $230,00 to $358,000, the sales prices for the 17 units are 

marked “na” and, instead, Cadle assigned a credit of $70,588.24 for each unit. Mathin asserts 

that Cadle’s different treatment of the 17 units in its own records shows the transaction was 

not a sale. He insists as well that treating the transaction as a sale defeats the purpose of the 

condition precedent in the settlement agreement. According to Mathin, the purpose was to 

reduce the amount Fortune owed under the loan as much as possible before liability kicked in 

and giving credit for $70,588.24 per unit rather than the average sales price of $250,000 

increased the amount of their liability.

¶ 28 The parties disagree about whether the May 2012 transaction constitutes a refinance or a 

sale, but neither defines those terms. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, a “refinancing” is 

“[a]n exchange of an old debt for a new debt, as by negotiating a different interest rate or term 

or by repaying the existing loan with money acquired from a new loan.” Black’s Law 

Dictionary 1533 (11th ed. 2019). And a “sale” is a “transfer of property or title for a price.” Id.

at 1603. So, in a refinancing, an owner retains title to property and replaces an old debt with a 

new debt. A sale, in contrast, requires a transfer of title.

¶ 29 Mathin concedes that before the May 2012 transaction, Fortune had title to the 17 units, 

and after the transaction, ANAA held title. A review of the Cook County Recorder website, of 

which we may take judicial notice (Kopnick v. JL Woode Management Co., 2017 IL App (1st) 

152054, ¶ 26), shows the units were conveyed by special warranty deed from Fortune to 

ANAA on May 31, 2012. That constituted a “transfer of *** title for a price” and supported 

the trial court’s finding of a sale. Had Fortune retained title to the units and acquired the loan 

from Pensam to repay its loan to Cadle, the transaction could be deemed a refinancing. Further, 

although Mathin contends the $70,588.24 credit Fortune received for each unit was not a fair 

market price to support his argument, he fails to explain why Fortune did not negotiate a higher 

price for the 17 units. Indeed, the record shows that before the May 2012 transaction, Fortune 

last sold a unit in May 2010 for $265,000. Fortune’s apparent inability to sell units in the 

intervening two years suggests the amount Cadle credited Fortune for not a single unit but for 

17 units was reasonable. 

¶ 30 Echoing his trial testimony, Mathin asserts that the transaction was a refinancing and 

Fortune transferred the units to ANAA, with Cadle’s consent, because Pensam would not loan 

$1.2 million to Fortune. And that, without that loan, Cadle could not have cured its default 

with Colfin. But no other witness supports the claim that the 17 units were transferred to 
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ANAA solely to refinance the units to benefit Cadle or that Cadle approved the conveyance. 

Benetis testified that all units had either been sold or transferred. Daniel Cadle testified he 

believed all units had sold and did not consent to Fortune transferring the 17 units to ANAA.

¶ 31 At best, the documentary evidence is inconclusive. As Mathin notes, the Chicago Title 

escrow trust disbursement statement lists ANAA as the “buyer” and does not list a seller. 

However, it is undisputed that title to the units changed. Cadle’s ledger indicates it treated the 

17 units collectively as contrasted to individual units sold to third parties.

¶ 32 In short, Mathin argues that the trial court incorrectly found the testimony and evidence of 

Cadle as more credible than his side’s testimony and evidence. This argument does not support 

finding the trial court’s decision as against the “manifest weight of the evidence.” We grant 

deference to the trial court’s decision because the trial court was in a superior position to 

determine and weigh witness credibility and demeanor and resolve conflicts in their testimony. 

Wade, 2017 IL App (1st) 161765, ¶ 59. The trial court found that the “evidence and testimony 

support a sale and change in ownership of the 17 properties which overcomes Defendants’ 

condition precedent argument.” This finding was not against the manifest weight of the 

evidence.

¶ 33 Admission of Disbursement Statement Into Evidence

¶ 34 Mathin contends the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the escrow trust 

disbursement statement into evidence. Specifically, Mathin argues the document was not part 

of the exhibit list, and Cadle and its attorneys waited until the second day of trial to “spring” it 

on him, rather than disclosing the night before when they discovered it. Mathin asserts this 

precluded him from preparing to cross-examine Cadle about it, to ask earlier witnesses about 

it, or to present other documents from that closing to dispute it. 

¶ 35 Illinois Rule of Evidence 402 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) states that “[a]ll relevant evidence is 

admissible, except as otherwise provided by law.” Relevant evidence is evidence tending to 

make the existence of a material fact more or less probable than it would be without the 

evidence. Wojcik v. City of Chicago, 299 Ill. App. 3d 964, 971 (1998). The relevance and 

admissibility of evidence at trial fall within the trial court’s discretion. Id. Absent an abuse of 

that discretion resulting in substantial prejudice, we leave the trial court’s decision alone. Id.

An abuse of discretion occurs where no reasonable person would take the position adopted by 

the trial court. Peach v. McGovern, 2019 IL 123156, ¶ 25. 

¶ 36 The disbursement statement related to whether the May 2012 transaction was a sale or 

refinancing. Cadle presented the document to refute Mathin’s testimony the day before calling 

the May 2012 transaction a refinancing and not a sale. Indeed, Mathin acknowledges its 

relevance, as he asserts it supports his contention the transaction was a refinancing and 

disproves Cadle’s assertion that it was a sale. Further, the trial court’s admitting it into evidence 

caused no prejudice. As the trial court noted, the document was produced in discovery and 

could have been used by either party. Moreover, the trial court permitted Mathin’s attorneys 

to recall him as a witness to ask about the document, and they declined. Given the document’s 

relevance to the key issue and the availability of the document to both parties, the trial court 

appropriately exercised its discretion by allowing Cadle to admit it into evidence.
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¶ 37 Breach of Note vs. Breach of Settlement Agreement

¶ 38 Mathin contends that the trial court erred in entering judgment for Cadle on the mortgage 

note when Cadle’s evidence related only to the settlement agreement. Mathin asserts that Cadle 

could have either sued under the settlement agreement or the note but should not have been 

permitted to sue under the note and then present evidence related only to the settlement 

agreement. For support, Mathin cites a line of cases holding that when the parties to a contract 

enter into a settlement agreement, the plaintiff may only sue under the settlement agreement.

Towne v. Town of Libertyville, 190 Ill. App. 3d 563, 570 (1989). Another line of cases holds 

that if a party’s breach goes to an essential element of the settlement, effectively amounting to 

a refusal to perform or an abandonment, the other party may elect to regard the agreement as 

rescinded and proceed on the original cause of action or may sue on the agreement for the 

breach. Hopkins v. Holt, 194 Ill. App. 3d 788, 796-97 (1990). 

¶ 39 Mathin contends Cadle should have been required to pick a lane—either sue under the note 

or the settlement agreement. In particular,Mathin asserts Benetis testified that when he was 

calculating the amount Fortune owed, he relied on the terms of the settlement agreement, not 

the loan. But key differences between the note and the settlement agreement significantly affect 

the damages calculation. Namely, under the settlement agreement (i) damages included costs 

not included in the note; (ii) the interest rate was prime plus 2%, while the note provided for 

an interest rate of prime plus 0.5%; and (iii) Cadle was required to pay property expenses under 

the settlement agreement but not the note. 

¶ 40 To prove breach of contract, a plaintiff must establish (i) the existence of a valid and 

enforceable contract, (ii) performance by the plaintiff, (iii) a breach by the defendant, and (iv) 

the defendant’s breach resulted in damages. Unterschuetz v. City of Chicago, 346 Ill. App. 3d 

65, 69 (2004). Mathin contends that Cadle established the existence of a contract—that is, the 

note and guaranties—but failed to establish a breach or resulting damages when it presented 

evidence related solely to the settlement agreement. We disagree. 

¶ 41 The settlement agreement states that the “Loan Documents, including the Note, guaranties 

and the Mortgage, shall remain in full force and effect. However, if any of the terms of this 

Agreement are in conflict with the terms of the Loan Documents, the terms of this Agreement 

shall control.” Thus, the note and guaranties remained in effect, and Cadle was permitted to 

sue for breaching them. But, if a conflict arose between the note and the settlement agreement, 

as it did regarding the applicable interest rate and the payment of expenses, the settlement 

agreement clarified it controlled. The trial court properly held that Fortune and Mathin 

breached their obligations under the note and guaranties and then—to calculate damages—

permitted Cadle to present witnesses and evidence on the terms of the settlement agreement.

¶ 42 Damages

¶ 43 Mathin argues that the trial court’s award of damages was manifestly erroneous and not 

supported by the evidence. According to Mathin, the trial court’s opinion indicates that over 

$12 million of the award is the principal balance due and just under $5 million is the interest 

due, but the evidence at trial showed the opposite—Daniel Cadle testified that $13 million of 

the $17 million Fortune owed was for interest. Mathin further describes the amount Cadle 

claimed due and owing throughout the trial to have been a “moving target.” Mathin contends 

Cadle did not meet its burden to establish a reasonable basis for computing damages, noting 
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that Benetis testified Cadle had issues with the accounting on the loan before he took over the 

loan in 2013. 

¶ 44 A breached contract entitles the injured party to be placed in the position he or she would 

have been had the contract been performed. Wilson v. DiCosola, 352 Ill. App. 3d 223, 225 

(2004). The plaintiff has the burden of establishing a reasonable basis for computing damages. 

Razor v. Hyundai Motor America, 222 Ill. 2d 75, 107 (2006). Damages must be proved with 

reasonable certainty and cannot be based on conjecture or speculation. Id. We consider an 

award of damages made after a bench trial under the manifest weight of the evidence standard. 

Chicago’s Pizza, Inc. v. Chicago’s Pizza Franchise Ltd. USA, 384 Ill. App. 3d 849, 859 (2008). 

A factual finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence when an opposite conclusion 

is apparent or when the findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the 

evidence. Eychaner, 202 Ill. 2d at 252. If there is an adequate basis in the record to support the 

trial court’s determination of damages, then we must affirm. 1472 N. Milwaukee, Ltd. v. 

Feinerman, 2013 IL App (1st) 121191, ¶ 13.

¶ 45 Benetis acknowledged Cadle’s records were inaccurate when he took over the loan. Still, 

he reviewed the loan documents and Fortune’s payment history and created a spreadsheet 

accurately reflecting the amount owed by Fortune. That spreadsheet showed that, as of August 

2017, Fortune owed more than $12 million in principal and $3 million in interest. Relying on 

the spreadsheet, Benetis testified that on August 28, 2017, Fortune owed a total of 

$15,398,548.04 and, after additional interest, $16,971,145.20 at the time of trial. We agree with 

Fortune that Benetis’s testimony and the documents he relied on conflicted with Daniel Cadle’s 

assertion that most of the amount owed was interest. But, as noted, the trial court appraises the 

credibility of the witnesses, determines the weight to be accorded their testimony, and resolves 

inconsistencies and conflicts. Wade, 2017 IL App (1st) 161765, ¶ 59. After considering the 

documentary evidence, weighing witnesses’ credibility, and resolving conflicts between 

Benetis’s and Daniel Cadle’s testimony, the trial court found Fortune owed Cadle 

$17,031,611.66, including $12,226,231.36 in principal, $4,744,915.60 in interest, plus 

attorney’s fees and court costs. That finding was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or unsupported 

by evidence.

¶ 46 Expenses

¶ 47 Mathin contends the trial court’s judgment in Cadle’s favor on its counterclaim was against 

the manifest weight of the evidence and should be reversed. Specifically, Mathin asserts that 

the documentary evidence and his testimony, along with the testimony of Benetis, show 

Fortune paid certain expenses Cadle never reimbursed. 

¶ 48 Benetis testified that Mathin never objected to paying the expenses himself or out of the 

closing, and all expenses were eventually repaid. Daniel Cadle similarly testified that the 

parties used various methods in dealing with the expenses and neither Mathin nor Fortune 

complained about these methods or accused Cadle of violating the settlement agreement. Aside 

from his testimony that Fortune was never reimbursed for various expenses, Mathin presented 

no evidence to support the counterclaim. The trial court’s finding that the “[t]estimony and 

evidence admitted established that all expenses were paid pursuant to a course of action either 

agreed upon by the parties or not challenged by Mathin” was not against the manifest weight 

of the evidence.
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¶ 49 Affirmed.