ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM 

ANNUAL REPORT 

Calendar Year 2014 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Office of Enforcement 

Washington, DC 20555 
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– CONTENTS – 

I. Program Overview .......................................................................................................... 1 

A. Mission and Authority ............................................................................................... 1 

B. Assessment of Escalated Enforcement Actions .................................................... 4 

1. Escalated Enforcement Trends .......................................................................... 6 

2. Civil Penalty Actions ........................................................................................... 8 

3. Notices of Violation without Civil Penalties .................................................... 11 

4. Enforcement Program Timeliness ................................................................... 12 

5. Alternative Dispute Resolution ........................................................................ 15 

C. Non-Escalated Enforcement .................................................................................. 17 

II. Enforcement Case Work ............................................................................................... 19 

A. Significant Enforcement Actions ........................................................................... 19 

B. Hearing Activities .................................................................................................... 21 

C. Enforcement Orders ................................................................................................ 21 

D. Enforcement Actions Supported by the Office of Investigations ....................... 22 

E. Actions Involving Individuals and Nonlicensee Organizations .......................... 22 

F. Enforcement Action Involving Discrimination ..................................................... 22 

G. Use of Judgment and Discretion in Determining Appropriate 

Enforcement Sanctions .......................................................................................... 23 

1. Discretion Involving Interim Enforcement Guidance ..................................... 23 

2. Discretion Involving No SDP Performance Deficiency .................................. 24 

3. Discretion Involving Violations Identified Because of Previous 

Enforcement Actions ........................................................................................ 24 

4. Discretion Involving Special Circumstances .................................................. 25 

5. Notices of Enforcement Discretion .................................................................. 26 

H. Withdrawn Actions .................................................................................................. 30 

III. Ongoing Activities ........................................................................................................ 31 

A. Enforcement Policy ................................................................................................. 31 

1. Enforcement Policy Revisions ......................................................................... 31 

2. Enforcement Guidance Memoranda ................................................................ 31 

B. Knowledge Management and Improvement Initiatives ........................................ 32 

C. Regional Accomplishments ................................................................................... 33 

D. Calendar Year 2015 Focus Areas ........................................................................... 34 
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– TABLES – 

Table 1 – Escalated Action Trends ................................................................................... 6

Table 2 – Civil Penalty Information ................................................................................... 9

Table 3 – Escalated Enforcement Actions by Region and Program Office ................ 35

Table 4 – Escalated Enforcement Actions by Type of Licensee, ................................. 36

Table 5 – Escalated Enforcement Action Trends by Type of Licensee ....................... 37

– FIGURES – 

Figure 1 – How the NRC Regulates .................................................................................... 1

Figure 2 – Escalated Enforcement by Type of Action (CY 2014) ..................................... 4

Figure 3 – Escalated Enforcement by Business Line (CY 2014) ..................................... 5

Figure 4 – Escalated Action Trends (CY 2010 to CY 2014) .............................................. 7

Figure 5 – Escalated Action Trends by Business Line (CY 2010 to CY 2014) ................ 8

Figure 6 – Civil Penalty Trends by Business Line (CY 2010 to CY 2014) ..................... 10

Figure 7 – Percentage of Civil Penalties by Business Line ........................................... 11

Figure 8 – Escalated Enforcement Associated with ROP SDP Findings ...................... 12

Figure 9 – Non-OI Case Timeliness Trends (Average Number of Days) ....................... 13

Figure 10 – OI Case Timeliness Trends (Average Number of Days) ............................. 14

Figure 11 – ADR Confirmatory Orders Issued (CY 2010 to CY 2014) ............................ 15

Figure 12 – Calendar Days from NRC Action to Issuance of Confirmatory Order ....... 16

Figure 13 – Non-Escalated Enforcement Trends (CY 2010 to CY 2014) ........................ 17

– APPENDICES – 

Appendix A - Summary of Cases Involving Civil Penalties ............................................A1

Appendix B - Summary of Escalated Notices of Violation without Civil Penalties .......B1

Appendix C - Summary of Orders .....................................................................................C1

Appendix D - Summary of Escalated Enforcement Actions Against Individuals .........D1

Appendix E - Summary of Escalated Enforcement Actions Against Nonlicensees ..... E1
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Executive Summary 

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) effectively carried out the agency’s 

Enforcement Policy and Program in calendar year (CY) 2014. NRC headquarters and 

regional offices continued to focus on appropriate and consistent enforcement of the 

agency’s regulations. 

Escalated Enforcement Action Data 

The Enforcement Policy defines an escalated enforcement action as a notice of violation 

(NOV) with a severity level (SL) of III or greater (SL I, II, and III NOVs); NOVs associated 

with an inspection finding that the significance determination process (SDP) evaluates as 

having low to moderate (white) or greater safety significance; civil penalties; NOVs to 

individuals; orders to modify, suspend, or revoke NRC licenses or the authority to engage in 

NRC-licensed activities; orders issued to impose civil penalties; and enforcement-related 

confirmatory orders (COs). During CY 2014, the NRC issued 83 escalated enforcement 

actions under traditional enforcement and the reactor oversight process (ROP). Twelve of 

these actions involved civil penalties totaling $135,100, 13 were enforcement orders, and 58 

were escalated NOVs without a proposed civil penalty. 

The total number of escalated enforcement actions increased in CY 2014 by 9 percent over 

CY 2013. This 1-year trend was largely the result of an increase in the number of escalated 

actions issued to nuclear materials user licensees. Over the past 5 years, the number of 

escalated enforcement actions issued by the agency has shown an overall declining trend; 

however, CY 2014 experienced a slight reversal to the trend of decreasing escalated 

enforcement actions taken. Section I of the annual report provides additional information on 

these trends. 

Noteworthy Program Accomplishments 

The Office of Enforcement (OE) issued two new enforcement guidance memoranda (EGMs) 

to help the staff in dispositioning specific enforcement actions. OE also assessed Region 

IV’s implementation of the agency’s enforcement program, with an emphasis on reactors 

and materials non-escalated enforcement. The agency continued to successfully use the 

Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) program and formally expanded the program to 

include certain cases with proposed civil penalties. 

Significant Cases 

In CY 2014, the agency processed a number of significant cases that required extensive 

coordination and cooperation between internal and external stakeholders. These significant 

cases included: (1) a revised CO issued to Chicago Bridge and Iron (formerly Shaw Nuclear 

Services), (2) an SL II violation with a proposed civil penalty issued to Geisser Engineering 

Corp., (3) two notices of violation associated with a yellow SDP finding issued to Arkansas 

Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2, relating to the dropped stator incident, (4) a CO with an 

associated civil penalty in the amount of $70,000 issued to River Bend Station, and (5) a CO 

to South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. and a prohibition order to a former employee for 

violations relating to the NRC’s access authorization requirements. 
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I. Program Overview 

A. Mission and Authority 

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) regulates 

the civilian uses of nuclear 

materials in the United States 

to protect public health and 

safety, the environment, and 

the common defense and 

security. The agency 

accomplishes this mission 

through: licensing of nuclear 

facilities and the possession, 

use, and disposal of nuclear 

materials; the development 

and implementation of 

requirements governing 

licensed activities; and 

inspection and enforcement 

activities to ensure 

compliance with these 

requirements. 

The NRC conducts various types of inspections and investigations designed to ensure that 

the activities it licenses are conducted in strict compliance with the Commission’s 

regulations, the terms of the licenses, and other requirements. 

The sources of the NRC’s enforcement authority are the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 

amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and the Energy Policy Act 

of 2005. These statutes give the NRC broad authority with respect to its enforcement 

program. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 expanded the definition of byproduct material, 

placing additional byproduct material under the NRC’s jurisdiction including both naturally 

occurring and accelerator-produced radioactive materials (NARM). The agency carries out 

its enforcement authority through Title 10, “Energy,” of the Code of Federal Regulations

(10 CFR) Part 2, “Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings and Issuance of 

Orders,” Subpart B, “Procedures for Imposing Requirements by Order, or for Modification, 

Suspension, or Revocation of a License, or for Imposing Civil Penalties.” The Administrative 

Dispute Resolution Act of 1996 provides the statutory framework for the Federal 

Government to use alternative dispute resolution (ADR). 

 

Figure 1 – How the NRC Regulates 
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The NRC Enforcement Policy establishes the general principles governing the NRC’s 

enforcement program and specifies a process for implementing the agency’s enforcement 

authority in response to violations of NRC requirements. This statement of policy is 

predicated on the NRC’s view that compliance with NRC requirements serves a key role in 

ensuring safety, maintaining security, and protecting the environment. The Enforcement 

Policy applies to all NRC licensees, to various categories of nonlicensees, and to individual 

employees of licensed and nonlicensed firms involved in NRC-regulated activities. 

The NRC enforces compliance as necessary. Enforcement actions serve as a deterrent, 

emphasize the importance of compliance with regulatory requirements, and encourage 

prompt identification and prompt, comprehensive correction of violations. In addition, 

because violations occur in a variety of activities and have varying levels of significance, the 

NRC Enforcement Policy contains graduated sanctions. 

Enforcement authority includes using notices of violation, civil penalties, demands for 

information, and orders to modify, suspend, or revoke a license. NRC staff may exercise 

discretion in determining the appropriate enforcement sanctions to be taken. Most violations 

are identified through inspections and investigations and are normally assigned a severity 

level (SL) ranging from SL IV for those of more than minor concern to SL I for the most 

significant. 

The reactor oversight process (ROP) supplements the enforcement process for operating 

nuclear reactors. A similar process has been implemented to assess findings at new reactor 

construction sites. Under the ROP, violations are not normally assigned an SL but instead 

are assigned “significance” by assessing their associated inspection findings through the 

ROP. Under this program, the NRC determines the risk significance of inspection findings 

using the significance determination process (SDP), which in turn assigns the colors of 

green, white, yellow, or red with increasing risk significance. Findings under the ROP may 

also include licensee failures to meet self-imposed standards. As such, an ROP finding may 

or may not involve a violation of a regulatory requirement. Violations and findings assigned 

a greater-than-Green color are considered escalated enforcement actions. While the ROP 

can process most violations at operating power reactors, it cannot address aspects of some 

violations; such violations require the NRC to follow the traditional enforcement process. 

Under the ROP, violations that result in actual safety or security consequences, affect the 

ability of the NRC to perform its regulatory oversight function, or involve willfulness are 

processed with the traditional Enforcement Policy. In addition, while ROP findings are not 

normally subject to civil penalties, the NRC does consider civil penalties for any violation that 

involves actual consequences. SL IV violations and violations associated with green ROP 

findings are normally dispositioned as noncited violations (NCVs). Inspection reports or 

inspection records document NCVs and briefly describe the corrective action that the 

licensee has taken or plans to take, if they are known at the time the NCV is documented. 

Additional information about the ROP is available at 

http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/index.html. 

OE develops policies and programs for the enforcement of NRC requirements. In addition, 

OE oversees NRC enforcement activities, giving programmatic and implementation 

guidance to regional and headquarters offices that conduct or are involved in enforcement 

activities, and strives to ensure consistency between regional and program office 

implementation of the agency’s enforcement program, particularly for more significant cases. 
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The NRC’s enforcement Web site is available at http://www.nrc.gov/aboutnrc/regulatory/enforcement.html and presents a variety of information, such as the 

Enforcement Policy; the Enforcement Manual; and current temporary enforcement guidance 

contained in enforcement guidance memoranda. This Web site also has information about 

escalated enforcement actions the NRC has issued to reactor and materials licensees, 

nonlicensees (vendors, contractors, and certificate holders), and individuals. In keeping with 

NRC practices and policies, details associated with most security-related actions and 

activities are not available on the NRC’s public Web site. 

 
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B. Assessment of Escalated Enforcement Actions 

Escalated enforcement actions include the following: 

• notices of violations (NOVs), including SL I, II, or III violations 

• NOVs associated with red, yellow, or white SDP findings (for operating reactor 

facilities) 

• civil penalty actions 

• enforcement orders (including confirmatory orders (COs) that result from the ADR 

process, and orders to suspend, revoke or modify an NRC license) 

Figure 2 – Escalated Enforcement by Type of Action (CY 2014)

During CY 2014, the NRC issued 83 escalated enforcement actions to licensees, 

nonlicensees, and individuals. Figure 2 shows the distribution of these actions, by the 

category of the action, for CY 2014. The most common type of escalated enforcement 

action was an NOV without a civil penalty, with 58 of the 83 escalated actions (or 70 

percent) issued during the year fitting this category. This percentage is consistent with the 

overall distribution of escalated enforcement actions during the past 5 years, where 

approximately 72 percent of all escalated actions issued between CY 2010 and CY 2014 

have been NOVs without a civil penalty. Generally speaking, a large percentage of NOVs 

without civil penalties is considered a positive outcome because it demonstrates that a 

majority of licensees identify and correct violations – a goal of the enforcement program. 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

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The remaining 30 percent of escalated enforcement actions were almost equally split 

between NOVs and orders with a civil penalty, and orders without a civil penalty. As shown 

in Table 1 (next page), the NRC issued 12 civil penalty actions (14 percent) and 13 orders 

without a civil penalty (16 percent). The 12 civil penalty actions included 9 NOVs, 2 orders 

imposing a civil penalty and 1 of the ADR COs issued in CY 2014. 

Figure 3 shows the distribution of enforcement actions based on the business line, or type of 

licensee to whom the NRC issued escalated enforcement actions in CY 2014. For this 

figure, individual actions were included in the appropriate category of licensee, instead of 

being counted separately. Tables 3 and 4 at the end of this report give further detail by 

identifying the region or program office that initiated the action, as well as additional detail 

on the type of licensee, nonlicensee, and individual involved. 

Figure 3 – Escalated Enforcement by Business Line (CY 2014) 

As shown in Figure 3, materials user licensees received the largest percentage of all 

escalated enforcement actions (53 percent) in CY 2014. This was followed by operating 

reactor licensees who received 43 percent of all escalated enforcement actions issued by 

the NRC. In CY 2014, the NRC issued two escalated actions to decommissioned sites, and 

one escalated action to a new reactor vendor. The new reactors enforcement action was 

evaluated and issued under the traditional enforcement process because the violation 

involved willfulness. The staff expects that most findings and performance deficiencies 

identified in the future will be evaluated under the Construction Reactor Oversight Process 

(cROP) at the Vogtle and Virgil C. Summer new construction sites. 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

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1. Escalated Enforcement Trends 

As previously noted, the NRC issued 83 escalated enforcement actions during CY 

2014. The 83 actions represent an approximate 9 percent increase from the number 

of actions issued in CY 2013. Table 1 shows a breakdown of the total number of 

escalated enforcement actions issued by the NRC over the past 5 years by type of 

enforcement action. Figure 4 (below) displays this information in graphical form. 

Table 1 – Escalated Action Trends

 CY 2014 CY 2013 CY 2012 CY 2011 CY 2010 Average 

Escalated NOVs 

(w/o CPs) 58 55 79 90 79 72 

NOVs and Orders 

w/ CPs 10 11 16 14 21 14 

Orders (w/o CPs) 13 10 19 6 15 13 

Orders Imposing 

CPs 2 0 0 0 1 1 

Total 83 76 114 110 116 100 

As shown in Table 1 above, the total number of escalated enforcement actions issued 

in CY 2014 is less than the 5-year average; however 2014 experienced a slight 

reversal from the significant decrease in the number of actions issued in CY 2013 

when compared to the three years prior. Figure 4 also suggests that there has been a 

continued decline in the number of escalated NOVs without a civil penalty issued since 

CY 2010, as well as an overall decrease in the number of orders and escalated 

actions with a civil penalty issued over the same 5-year period. 

To help explain the reasons for these trends, Figure 5 (below) provides escalated 

enforcement trends between CYs 2010 and 2014 based on business line. As shown 

in Figure 5, CY 2014’s increase in escalated actions when compared to CY 2013 may 

be attributed to an almost equal increase in the number of escalated enforcement 

actions issued to materials user licensees. The increase was offset by the fact that no 

escalated actions were issued to fuel facilities in CY 2014. When considering the past 

5 years, the data show that the overall declining trend in escalated actions has 

primarily resulted from a steady decrease in the number of escalated actions issued to 

both materials users and fuel facility licensees since CY 2010. During this period, the 

number of escalated actions issued to materials users decreased by approximately 35 

percent. 

The nuclear materials users’ 5-year trend has been largely caused by a decrease in 

enforcement actions issued to gauge user licensees (a 39 percent reduction from CY 

2010), hospitals (a 79 percent reduction from CY 2010), and radiographers (a 55 

percent reduction when compared to the period between CY 2009 and CY 2012). The 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

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staff’s analysis of the materials user trend has not been conclusive. However, two 

causal factors may have affected the trend in the expected direction, therefore 

accounting for a substantial portion of the change but likely not the entire change. 

During the first 2 years of the most recent 5-year period, the number of cases involving 

security-related increased controls violations was high because of the implementation 

of the additional requirements. Second, in 2011, the SL criteria of violations 

associated with certain gauge cases were changed from SL III to SL IV, reducing the 

number of escalated actions issued thereafter. The enforcement staff has not 

identified a reason for the decreasing trend in escalated actions issued to hospitals 

since 2010. 

The nuclear materials users’ 1-year increase may be attributed solely to gauge user 

licensees. In 2014, the NRC issued 17 escalated actions to gauge users, and was a 

notable increase from the 5 actions issued in 2013. However, the 17 escalated 

actions issued last year were more consistent with the 5-year average of 15 per year. 

A similar trend has been observed at fuel facilities and can be attributed to improved 

licensee performance in the area of problem identification and resolution, safety 

culture, as well as changes made as part of a major revision to the Enforcement Policy 

in CY 2010. In September 2010, the severity level examples for violations at fuel 

facilities were changed in the Policy to be more risk-informed, and this impacted the 

threshold for dispositioning violations as escalated actions at these facilities. 

Figure 4 – Escalated Action Trends (CY 2010 to CY 2014) 
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Figure 5 (below) also shows that the number of escalated enforcement actions issued 

to operating reactor licensees between CYs 2010 and 2014 has been mostly steady, 

generally ranging between 31 and 36 actions per year. However, an exception to this 

trend occurred in CY 2012 when the NRC issued 51 escalated actions to operating 

reactors. Of these violations, 21 were associated with white SDP findings under the 

ROP, and six were associated with yellow and red SDP findings (which increased 

significantly over previous CYs). Also, CY 2012 experienced an unusually high 

number of violations issued to licensed reactor operators because of the multiple 

cases involving deliberate misconduct and Internet usage at River Bend in CY 2011. 

Figure 5 – Escalated Action Trends by Business Line (CY 2010 to CY 2014) 

Tables 4 and 5 at the end of this report offer a more detailed breakdown of 

enforcement actions issued during CY 2014 by the type of licensee. 

2. Civil Penalty Actions

In CY 2014, the agency processed 12 enforcement actions that involved civil 

penalties. Five of the 12 civil penalty actions were associated with gauge user 

licensees, including one SL II violation issued to the Geisser Engineering Corporation. 

Four actions were associated with violations concerning physicians or hospitals. One 

of the 12 actions was associated with a settlement that followed an ADR mediation 

session. 
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Six of the 12 cases also involved “willfulness,” which is defined as either deliberate 

misconduct or careless disregard. The Commission is particularly concerned with the 

identification of willful violations. The NRC’s regulatory program is based on licensees 

and their contractors, employees, and agents acting with integrity and communicating 

with candor; therefore, the agency may consider a violation involving willfulness to be 

more egregious than the underlying violation, taken alone, would have been, and it 

may increase the SL accordingly. 

Table 2 – Civil Penalty Information

2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 Average 

No. of Proposed 

Civil Penalties 9 10 13 10 19 12 

No. of Imposed 

Civil Penalties* 3 1 3 3 1 2 

No. of Paid Civil 

Penalties 8 8 12 13 16 11 

Amount of 

Proposed Civil 

Penalties 

$56,700 $211,400 $404,700 $108,750 $663,700 $287,650 

Amount of 

Imposed Civil 

Penalties 

$85,400 $1,000 $14,000 $29,500 $10,000 $24,900 

Amount of Paid 

Civil Penalties $110,389 $176,500 $402,700 $130,529 $624,950 $289,014 

* Imposition cases and civil penalty (CP) amounts reflect CPs issued via an order and includes both (1) orders 

imposing a CP after a licensee does not pay a proposed CP, and (2) CPs agreed to in an alternative dispute 

resolution case that are included in the case confirmatory order. In the first scenario, the case is a subset of 

the proposed CP cases in that imposing the CP is the next step after a licensee does not pay a proposed 

CP. However, in the second scenario, an ADR settlement, potentially with a CP, can, and typically does, 

occur prior to any proposed CP. Consequently, neither addition nor subtraction of the “proposed” and 

“imposed” rows is appropriate. 

Table 2 compares civil penalty assessments proposed, imposed, and paid for the most 

recent five calendar years and the 5-year average. When reviewing the information in 

this table, it is important to note that an enforcement action may include more than one 

civil penalty or more than one violation. In addition, a civil penalty may be proposed in 

1 year and paid or imposed in another year. In some cases, the NRC has approved a 

civil penalty payment plan whereby a licensee is permitted to pay the civil penalty in 

regular installments. Finally, the amount of a proposed civil penalty may be reduced, 

for example, as a result of exercising discretion as part of a settlement agreement 

developed during ADR. 

The total number of civil penalties (proposed and imposed) issued in CY 2014 was 

similar to the number of civil penalties in issued in CY 2013, and was generally 

consistent with the average number issued over the last 5 years. However, the total 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

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civil penalty dollar amount decreased significantly (approximately 33 percent) in CY 

2014 when compared to CY 2013. The total civil penalty dollar amount was also about 

40 percent of the average preceding four years. 

While the number of civil penalties associated with ADR settlement agreements was 

the same as CY 2013 (one CP was imposed), the amount of the civil penalty was 

significantly larger. In this case, Entergy Operations agreed to pay a penalty of 

$70,000 as part of an ADR settlement agreement relating to violations at its River 

Bend Station facility. 

Figure 6 – Civil Penalty Trends by Business Line (CY 2010 to CY 2014) 

Figure 6 shows the total dollar amount of proposed and imposed civil penalties, by 

licensee business lines, in CY 2014 and the preceding 4 years. Figure 7 (next page) 

shows the share of the total civil penalty amounts issued over the past 5 years 

between each of the operating reactor, nuclear material users, fuel facility and other 

licensee business lines. Often certain business lines may peak in a particular year 

because of a single civil penalty (e.g., the Philadelphia VA Medical Center in 2010, 

and River Bend and Turkey Point in 2012). As a consequence, a single year often 

does not indicate a trend—an important factor to consider in assessing possible 

trends. 

Appendix A includes a brief description of each of the civil penalty actions for CY 2014. 

Security-related issues involving NOVs with civil penalties are not addressed in 
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Appendix A; however, the number of NOVs associated with security related issues is 

included in the data discussed in this report. 

Figure 7 – Percentage of Civil Penalties by Business Line 

3. Notices of Violation without Civil Penalties

In accordance with Section 2.3.4 of the Enforcement Policy, a civil penalty may not be 

warranted for escalated enforcement actions evaluated under traditional enforcement if 

certain criteria are met. For instance, (1) the identified violation is the first non-willful 

SL III violation identified in the past 2 years or two inspections at the licensee’s facility 

and the licensee took adequate corrective action to prevent its recurrence, or (2) this 

was not the first non-willful SL III violation identified in the past 2 years or two 

inspections, but the licensee self-identified the violation and took adequate corrective 

action to prevent its recurrence. Violations assessed under the SDP normally are not 

considered for civil penalties. However, civil penalties are considered for violations 

associated with ROP inspection findings that involve actual consequences. In 

addition, the agency may use enforcement discretion, when deemed appropriate, to 

refrain from proposing a civil penalty, regardless of the normal civil penalty 

assessment process described above. 

In CY 2014, the NRC issued 58 escalated NOVs without civil penalties. These actions 

were almost evenly split between materials user licensees (30 of 58) and operating 

reactor licensees (28 of 58). Eleven of the 30 NOVs issued to materials licensees 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

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were associated with gauge users. Of the operating reactors violations, 18 were 

associated with white SDP findings under the ROP, and two violations were related to 

yellow SDP findings. For a second consecutive year, no red SDP findings with 

associated violations were issued in CY 2014. Figure 8 (below) shows escalated NOV 

trends for SDP findings over the past 5 years. As indicated in Figure 8, the 20 

escalated enforcement actions associated with SDP findings that were issued in CY 

2014 represented an increase in the number issued when compared to CY 2013. 

Figure 8 – Escalated Enforcement Associated with ROP SDP Findings 

For the first time in five years, there were no escalated NOVs without civil penalties 

issued to fuel facility licensees. In the four years before 2014, fuel facility licensees 

averaged approximately four escalated NOVs each year. Appendix B to this report 

summarizes each of the NOVs without civil penalties issued to licensees, as well as 

the NOVs associated with SDP findings. Security related issues involving NOVs 

without civil penalties are not addressed in Appendix B; however, the number of NOVs 

associated with security related issues is included in the data discussed in this report. 

4. Enforcement Program Timeliness 

Escalated enforcement actions are issued in cases involving violations assessed at 

SL I, II, or III if they are dispositioned under the traditional enforcement process; and 

violations associated with white, yellow, or red findings for facilities participating in the 

ROP, as well as orders that impose sanctions. The timeliness associated with issuing 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

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escalated enforcement actions to reactor and materials licensees is an output measure 

(external goal) reported annually to Congress within the NRC’s Performance 

Accountability Report. The external goals were modified in 2012 to stress the 

importance of timely escalated enforcement actions and are: (1) 100 percent of 

non-Office of Investigations (non-OI) based cases are completed with an NRC 

processing time of less than or equal to 160 days; and (2) 100 percent of OI-based 

cases are completed with an NRC processing time of less than or equal to 330 days. 

Figure 9 – Non-OI Case Timeliness Trends (Average Number of Days)

In addition to the external goals, the NRC staff continues to use the additional 

timeliness measures (internal goals) for trending purposes and to provide information 

to support potential improvements to our processes. The internal goals are: 

(1) completing non-OI based cases in an average NRC processing time of less than or 

equal to 120 days; and (2) completing OI based cases in an average NRC processing 

time of less than or equal to 180 days. 

The NRC processing time starts on the latest of the following dates: (1) the inspection 

exit for non-OI cases; (2) the date of the OI memorandum forwarding the report to staff 

for OI related cases; (3) the date that the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) indicates 

that the NRC may proceed for cases either prosecuted or reviewed for an extended 

period of time by DOJ; or (4) the date of the Department of Labor decision that is the 

basis for the action. The cases are grouped together and treated as a single case 

whenever two or more enforcement action numbers are associated with one action. 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

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All non-OI related actions were issued in less than 160 processing days and, thus, met 

the external goals for dispositioning non-OI cases. However, one of the 15 OI-related 

enforcement actions was not issued in less than 330 processing days. Therefore, the 

staff did not meet the external goals for dispositioning OI-related enforcement actions 

in CY 2014. The case involved violations of the NRC’s personnel access authorization 

requirements at the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, and resulted in the issuance of 

a CO to the South Carolina Electric and Gas Company following a successful ADR 

mediation session. A regional senior enforcement officer independent of the case 

conducted a lessons-learned inquiry, and the staff is taking appropriate actions based 

on identified recommendations. 

Figure 9 (above) also shows that, on the average, the agency required 88 processing 

days to issue a non-OI related enforcement action. This is less than the goal of 120 

processing days and is consistent with trends for the past 5 years. 

Figure 10 – OI Case Timeliness Trends (Average Number of Days) 

Figure 10 shows the case processing timeliness trends for OI-related escalated 

enforcement actions for the five most recent CYs. The figure illustrates that, on 

average, the agency required 206 days to issue an OI-related enforcement action 

during CY 2014. This number is significantly greater than the internal goal of 180 

days, and reversed the steady decline in average processing time that was observed 

between 2011 and 2013. This negative (increasing) trend was affected by four cases 

with processing times of greater than 300 days. In all four instances, the cases 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

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involved complex circumstances and required a significant amount of time early in the 

process to determine the appropriate course of action. The staff will continue to 

monitor this trend and seek other ways to improve case processing timeliness. 

5. Alternative Dispute Resolution 

Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) refers to a variety of voluntary processes, such 

as mediation and facilitated dialogue that can be used to assist parties in resolving 

disputes and potential conflicts outside of courts using a neutral third party. The NRC 

employs mediation for its post-investigation ADR program, using a neutral third party 

with no decisionmaking authority to help the parties attempt to reach an agreement. 

The process is voluntary in terms of the decision to participate and the content of the 

final agreement. 

The term ''post-investigation ADR'' refers to the use of mediation after OI has 

completed its investigation and an enforcement panel has concluded that pursuit of an 

enforcement action appears to be warranted. In February 2013, the NRC expanded 

the scope of the use of post-investigation ADR for a one-year pilot period. Under the 

pilot program, post-investigation ADR included all escalated non-willful, traditional 

enforcement cases with proposed civil penalties (note that this does not include 

violations associated with findings assessed through the ROP). 

Figure 11 – ADR Confirmatory Orders Issued (CY 2010 to CY 2014)
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

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Under the NRC’s post-investigation ADR process, mediation may be offered at three 

points in the enforcement process: (1) before a predecisional enforcement 

conference; (2) after the initial enforcement action is taken, typically the issuance of an 

NOV or proposed imposition of a civil penalty; or (3) with the imposition of a civil 

penalty and before a hearing request. The staff believes that for certain escalated 

enforcement actions, mediation affords the staff an opportunity to institute broader or 

more comprehensive corrective actions to better ensure public health and safety than 

outcomes typically achieved through the traditional enforcement process. 

As Figure 11 (above) shows, the number of COs arising from the post-investigation 

ADR program average approximately six confirmatory orders per year. In CY 2014, 

the NRC participated in four post-investigation ADR mediations, three of which 

resulted in orders confirming the terms of the parties’ agreement. A fourth CO was 

issued in 2014 as a result of an ADR mediation held during 2013. In the past 5 years, 

more than 95 percent of the cases that engaged in post-investigation ADR resulted in 

a settlement agreement, with only one ADR mediation unable to reach a settlement. 

In this case, the parties signed an agreement in principle; however, the individual 

involved was unresponsive when requested to execute the consent and waiver form. 

Figure 12 – Calendar Days from NRC Action to Issuance of Confirmatory Order 

In CY 2014, the staff continued its focus on enhancing the post-investigation ADR 

program’s timeliness, transparency and overall effectiveness. While recent program 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

17 

enhancements initiated in CY 2012 continue to have a positive effect on the ADR 

process from the time an ADR offer is made (see Figure 12), over the past 4 years, the 

time taken to review OI investigative materials, bring a case to panel and issue a 

choice letter has steadily increased. OE plans to pursue ways to improve case 

timeliness by decreasing the time it takes to review a case and offer ADR. 

C. Non-Escalated Enforcement 

The Enforcement Program Annual Report has historically focused on escalated enforcement 

actions with little information regarding non-escalated enforcement provided. Non-escalated 

actions include SL IV NOVs and NCVs under traditional enforcement and NOVs and NCVs 

associated with Green SDP Findings under the ROP. In recent years, OE has recognized 

that the ability to trend data for non-escalated enforcement across the various programs 

needs to be improved. One of the primary challenges in tracking and trending nonescalated enforcement actions is that these actions are recorded in separate databases by 

the regions and program offices. Operating reactors information is recorded in the Reactor 

Program System (RPS), materials user non-escalated actions are stored in the web-based 

licensing (WBL) system, and new reactors construction data is maintained in the 

Construction Inspection Program Information Management System (CIPIMS). Effective use 

of these systems will allow for a more complete presentation of the agency’s use of nonescalated enforcement actions. Consequently, OE began gathering information from these 

systems, starting in CY 2013, in order to be able to provide improved trending. Figure 13 

provides information that was obtained from the RPS, WBL and CIPIMS systems. 

Figure 13 – Non-Escalated Enforcement Trends (CY 2010 to CY 2014)
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

18

As shown in Figure 13, operating reactors are issued approximately 700 to 900 nonescalated enforcement actions each year, and nuclear materials users received, on 

average, 130 to 175 non-escalated actions for the four most recent calendar years. New 

reactors licensees have been issued approximately eight non-escalated actions in the last 

three years. OE notes that information from CY 2014 may be artificially low because 

violations are recorded by the event date, and that there is often a time lag between this 

date, the date of the inspection report, and the date this information is recorded in RPS, 

WBL and CIPIMS. 

During CY 2013, the Government Accountability Office issued a reported titled “Nuclear 

Power: Analysis of Regional Differences and Improved Access to Information Could 

Strengthen NRC Oversight.” The report’s second finding related to the enforcement 

program generally, and stated that “differences exist across NRC regions in identifying and 

resolving findings, and NRC has taken some steps to address them.” More specifically, 

GAO discussed the fact that the regions in their identification of non-escalated findings, 

which equate to very low risk significance. GAO noted that some steps had been taken to 

address these differences but that a comprehensive review of the reasons had not been 

undertaken. The number of escalated findings, which equate to greater risk significance, 

was more similar across regions. Consequently, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 

(NRR), with the support of OE and the regions, started initiated a review to determine the 

cause, or causes, of the differences. The review and any appropriate follow-up action will 

continue in CY 2015. 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

19 

II. Enforcement Case Work 

A. Significant Enforcement Actions 

In CY 2014, the agency was involved in several significant enforcement actions that 

required coordination among internal stakeholders beyond the typical enforcement case and 

were noteworthy in some aspects. 

Geisser Engineering Corp. 

On March 20, 2014, the NRC issued a Severity Level II NOV and proposed Civil Penalty in 

the amount of $11,200 to Geisser Engineering Corp. (GEC) (ML14079A503). The action 

was based on a violation involving GEC's failure to file for reciprocity on 22 occasions 

between October 21, 2009, and June 23, 2011, prior to using portable gauges containing 

licensed material within the NRC’s jurisdiction in the State of Connecticut, and at the 

Newport Naval Station, Rhode Island. 

The NRC later issued an Order Imposing Civil Monetary Penalty on July 31, 2014, to GEC in 

the amount of $8,400. GEC had disputed the willful aspect of the violation and requested 

that the NRC consider mitigation of the proposed civil penalty because it would pose a 

financial hardship. After considering the GEC's response, as well as information regarding a 

civil penalty assessed against GEC by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the NRC 

decided to reduce GEC's civil penalty by 25 percent to $8,400. 

Chicago Bridge and Iron Company 

On August 7, 2013, the NRC Office of Investigations (OI) completed an investigation and 

concluded that three employees at the Shaw Modular Solutions (SMS) 1 Lake Charles, LA, 

fabrication facility (now owned and operated by the Chicago Bridge and Iron Company 

(CB&I)) deliberately subverted SMS welder qualifications requirements when: (1) a welder 

took welding qualifications tests for another coworker; (2) the coworker allowed the welder 

to take the qualifications tests on his behalf; and (3) the weld test administrator certified that 

the coworker passed his welder qualifications tests when he knew that the tests were 

performed by another person. The actions on the part of the three SMS employees caused 

the company to be in violation of 10 CFR 52.4, "Deliberate misconduct." 

On May 30, 2014, the staff participated in an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mediation 

session with CB&I. As the result of the mediation, CB&I agreed to take several measures to 

enhance the understanding of NRC requirements and the significance of willful violations for 

all company employees, including contractors and subcontractors, at all CB&I locations 

where NRC-regulated activities are performed. These measures built upon a previouslyissued Confirmatory Order (CO) and include improving quality control and processing for 

welding products; enhancing new employee training to highlight the errors behind the recent 

violations; and enhancing CB&I's nuclear safety culture monitoring program based on 

lessons from the recent violations. 

 

1 SMS was later acquired by the Chicago Bridge and Iron Company (CB&I) in 2013. 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

20

The NRC issued a CO to CB&I on September 25, 2014, to formalize the commitments made 

as a result of the ADR mediation session. 

River Bend Station 

On December 3, 2014, the NRC issued a CO to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy), 

to formalize commitments made as a result of an ADR mediation session held on 

September 22, 2014. Entergy agreed to a NOV and a civil penalty of $70,000 as part of the 

CO. The violation involved the willful actions of a security officer at Entergy's River Bend 

Station in March 2012. The NRC and Entergy agree that the actions of the unidentified 

security officer constituted a willful violation of the requirements of 10 CFR Part 73, “Physical 

Protection of Plants and Materials.” However, the NRC and Entergy disagreed on the 

specific aspects of the willful characterization of the violation. In light of the significant 

corrective actions Entergy had taken and the additional actions they committed to take to 

enhance their security program at River Bend and across the Entergy Nuclear Fleet, the 

NRC exercised enforcement discretion to reduce the severity level of the escalated 

enforcement sanction that was initially proposed in our preliminary determination. The 

NRC's rationale behind its decision to exercise enforcement discretion in characterizing the 

violation is incorporated in an attachment to the CO. Specific commitments that were made 

as part of the settlement agreement between Entergy and the NRC regarding the apparent 

violation of NRC security requirements are discussed in the non-public enclosures to the 

CO. 

Summer Nuclear Station 

On March 10, 2014, the NRC issued a CO to South Carolina Electric & Gas Company 

(SCE&G) to formalize commitments made as a result of ADR mediation. The commitments 

were made as part of a settlement agreement with SCE&G as a result of apparent violations 

of 10 CFR 73.56, “Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants” 

and 10 CFR 50.9, “Completeness and accuracy of information,” identified at the Virgil C. 

Summer Nuclear Station (Summer). The first violation involved the willful actions of the 

licensee’s access authorization staff, which caused the licensee’s access authorization 

program to fail to provide high assurance that individuals granted unescorted access were 

trustworthy and reliable, such that they did not constitute an unreasonable risk to public 

health and safety, as required by 10 CFR 73.56(c). Specifically, the licensee’s access 

authorization reviewing officials reviewed, adjudicated, and granted an individual unescorted 

access authorization by relying unreasonably on a falsified Personal History Questionnaire 

(PHQ) and fabricated court records to determine the individual’s trustworthiness and 

reliability. The second violation involved the willful failure to comply with the requirements of 

10 CFR 50.9(a) which, in part, state that “information required by statute or Commission 

regulations to be maintained shall be complete and accurate in all material respects.” In 

consideration of the commitments delineated in the CO, the NRC agreed to fully mitigate a 

civil penalty and the issuance an NOV. 

The NRC also issued an Order prohibiting participation in NRC-licensed activities for a 

period of 5 years to a former employee involved in this enforcement action. The former 

employee deliberately failed to report an arrest for arson in the PHQ criminal history 

information section as part of an application for unescorted access at Summer. This 

information was necessary for the access authorization staff to consider in making 

determinations regarding the individual’s trustworthiness and reliability. In addition, the 

former employee deliberately submitted information to the licensee that he knew to be 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

21 

incomplete or inaccurate, in violation of the requirements of 10 CFR 50.5(a)(2). Specifically, 

in response to a request by access authorization staff for documentation to support his 

assertion that arson charges against him had been dismissed, he submitted a forged 

document that purported to reflect the dismissal of those charges by a Mississippi county 

court. At the time he submitted this document, the arson charges against him were pending. 

University Nuclear and Diagnostics 

On May 13, 2014, the NRC issued a Severity Level III NOV to University Nuclear and 

Diagnostics LLC (UND) for a violation of 10 CFR 30.10(a), “Deliberate misconduct.” 

Specifically, a co-owner and president of UND deliberately failed to 1) calibrate a survey 

instrument and, thus, provided falsified survey instrument calibration records as required by 

10 CFR 35.61; 2) instructed its employees to document radiation survey results when the 

survey instrument was not working or not on site as required by 10 CFR 30.9; 3) failed to 

perform required contamination surveys as required its license; 4) and failed to perform an 

annual audit and falsified annual records as required by 10 CFR 30.9. The deliberate 

misconduct on the part of the co-owner and president caused an NRC licensee, Bradley D. 

Bastow, D.O., to be in violation of NRC requirements. Additionally, the NRC issued the 

co-owner and president of UND an Order prohibiting involvement in NRC-licensed activities 

for a period of 3 years. 

Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 

On June 23, 2014, the NRC issued an NOV to Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy) for a 

violation of 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures and 

Drawings," associated with a Yellow Significance Determination Process finding at Arkansas 

Nuclear One, Unit 1, and a Yellow Significance Determination Process finding at Arkansas 

Nuclear One, Unit 2, involving the March 31, 2013, Unit 1 stator drop that affected safetyrelated equipment on both units. Specifically, Entergy approved a design for the temporary 

hoisting assembly that was not supported by detailed drawings, specifications, evaluations, 

and/or certifications as required by Entergy Quality Procedure EN-MA-119, "Material 

Handling Program." As a result, on March 31, 2013, while lifting and transferring the main 

generator stator, the temporary overhead crane collapsed causing the 525-ton Unit 1 stator 

to fall on and extensively damage portions of the plant, including safety-related equipment. 

B. Hearing Activities 

On July 18, 2014, Mr. James Chaisson submitted a Request for Hearing in response to an 

"Order Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-Licensed Activities" issued on July 11, 2014 (see 

Enforcement Action Number IA-14-025). The request was filed with the Office of the 

Secretary initially via email, and subsequently via the Electronic Information Exchange on 

August 4, 2014. An Atomic Safety Licensing Board (ASLB) was established on August 13, 

2014, for appropriate action in accordance with 10 CFR § 2.346(i). A pre-hearing 

conference was later held on December 17, 2014; however, no formal proceeding was held 

before the ASLB in CY 2014. 

C. Enforcement Orders 

In CY 2014, the NRC issued 16 orders to licensees, nonlicensees, and individuals. These 

included three COs that were issued to confirm commitments associated with ADR 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

22

settlement agreements. One of the COs included a requirement to pay a civil penalty as a 

result of the settlement agreement. Two orders imposed civil penalties to materials user 

licensees. 

Six of the 16 orders were issued to individuals, and all were prohibited from involvement in 

NRC-licensed activities ranging from 1 to 5 years. 

As shown in Table 1, the number of orders the NRC issued in CY 2014 increased from 

CY 2013, in part, because of an increase in the number of orders to materials users. This 

increase, in effect, returned the number of orders issued on an annual basis to more normal 

levels. Appendix C includes a brief description of the enforcement orders issued in 2014. 

D. Enforcement Actions Supported by the Office of Investigations 

In CY 2014, an OI investigation supported 30 percent of the escalated enforcement actions 

(25 of the 83). This figure is greater than the percentage supported by OI investigations in 

CY 2013. The escalated actions supported by OI investigations include the following: 

• 7 of the 12 escalated NOVs and orders with civil penalties (58 percent) 

• 10 of the 58 escalated NOVs without civil penalties (17 percent) 

• 8 of the 13 enforcement orders without civil penalties (62 percent) 

The 25 enforcement actions supported by OI investigations are consistent with the average 

number of enforcement actions supported by OI investigations over the previous 4 years 

(CY 2010 through CY 2013). The percentage of enforcement actions supported by an OI 

investigation over the past 5 year period (CY 2010 through CY 2014) is approximately 27 

percent, and the 30 percent figure is representative of a slight increase in the percentage of 

enforcement actions supported by OI investigations observed over the past 3 years. 

E. Actions Involving Individuals and Nonlicensee Organizations 

In CY 2014, the agency issued 14 escalated enforcement actions to licensed and 

unlicensed individuals. This number is included in the total number of escalated 

enforcement actions (NOVs and orders) that the agency issued in 2014. Appendix C 

summarizes the orders that were issued to individuals and Appendix D summarizes the 

NOVs issued to individuals in CY 2014. These appendices do not include individual 

enforcement actions involving security related violations. The number of escalated actions 

issued to individuals in CY 2014 is approximately 20 percent greater than the average 

number of actions issued to individuals between CY 2010 and CY 2014 (11 per year). 

The agency issued one escalated enforcement action to a nonlicensee organization in 

CY 2014. Appendix E summarizes this action. 

F. Enforcement Action Involving Discrimination 

In CY 2014, there were no escalated enforcement actions resulting from a substantiated 

allegation of discrimination. Between CY 2010 and CY 2013, the NRC has handled, on 

average, one substantiated discrimination case each year; however it is not unprecedented 

to have a year where there was no escalated enforcement taken because of discrimination. 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

23 

G. Use of Judgment and Discretion in Determining Appropriate 

Enforcement Sanctions 

The NRC may choose to exercise discretion and either escalate or mitigate enforcement 

sanctions or otherwise refrain from taking enforcement action within its statutory authority. 

The exercise of discretion allows the NRC to determine actions that are appropriate for a 

particular case, consistent with the Enforcement Policy. After considering the general tenets 

of the Policy and the safety and security significance of a violation and its surrounding 

circumstances, the NRC may exercise judgment and discretion in determining the severity 

levels of violations and the appropriate enforcement sanctions. 

In CY 2014, the NRC exercised enforcement discretion in 31 cases to address violations of 

NRC requirements. This number reflects a 19 percent increase in the number of cases in 

which discretion was used from CY 2013 (26 cases) and a 35 percent decrease from CY 

2012 (47 cases). Although 2014 saw an increase in the number of cases where discretion 

was used when compared to 2013, this year could be viewed more accurately as part of a 

two-year decreasing trend caused, in large part, by a corresponding decrease in the use of 

discretion in accordance with EGM-09-004 to disposition violations of the naturally occurring 

and accelerator-produced radioactive materials (NARM) requirements. Below is a 

discussion of the significant cases dispositioned using enforcement discretion in CY 2014. 

1. Discretion Involving Interim Enforcement Guidance 

In 18 cases, the NRC used discretion in accordance with either the Interim 

Enforcement Policy related to fire protection and permanent implant brachytherapy 

issues (Sections 9.1 and 9.2 of the Policy) or an enforcement guidance memorandum 

(EGM). 

• The NRC dispositioned three violations using discretion in accordance with 

EGM-11-004, “Interim Guidance for Dispositioning Violations of Security 

Requirements for Portable Gauges,” dated April 28, 2011. Enforcement 

discretion in the form of a reduced severity level may be exercised for violations 

of 10 CFR 30.34(i) if certain criteria are met as described in EGM-11-004. 

Although the pilot program was completed, the provisions of this EGM will remain 

in effect until the Enforcement Policy is revised to incorporate the EGM. 

• The agency dispositioned two violations using discretion in accordance with 

EGM-09-004, “Interim Guidance for Dispositioning Violations of Naturally 

Occurring and Accelerator-Produced Radioactive Materials (NARM) 

Requirements,” dated May 13, 2009. Enforcement discretion may be exercised 

for violations of the NARM requirements if certain criteria are met as described in 

the EGM. The two cases that used this guidance represent a sharp decline over 

CY 2012 when the staff used this guidance to disposition 17 cases. Five cases 

used this guidance in CY 2013. 

• The NRC continued to perform fire protection inspections at power reactor sites 

to verify compliance with requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, “Fire 

Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 

1979.” Violations of these requirements that were identified at sites transitioning 

to the National Fire Protection Association Standard 805 (NFPA 805) and met 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

24

the criteria as stated in the Interim Enforcement Policy, “Enforcement Discretion 

for Certain Fire Protection Issues (10 CFR 50.48)” warranted enforcement 

discretion and notices of violation were not issued. Four documented cases 

involved this type of discretion. 

• In April 2013, the staff issued EGM-13-003, “Interim Guidance for Dispositioning 

Violations Involving 10 CFR 35.60 and 10 CFR 35.63 for the Calibration of 

Instrumentation to Measure the Activity of Rubidium-82 and the Determination of 

Rubidium-82 Patient Dosages.” The agency dispositioned three cases that met 

the criteria under this guidance. 

• The NRC dispositioned five violations using discretion in accordance with 

EGM-11-003, “Dispositioning Boiling Water Reactor Licensee Non-Compliance 

with Technical Specification Containment Requirements during Operations with a 

Potential for Draining the Reactor Vessel,” dated October 4, 2011. In CY 2013, 

only one case used this guidance. Enforcement discretion may be exercised for 

violations of certain technical specification requirements at boiling water reactors 

if certain criteria are met as described in EGM-11-003. 

• In July 2013, the staff issued an Interim Enforcement Policy, Section 9.2, 

“Enforcement Discretion for Permanent Implant Brachytherapy Medical Event 

Reporting (10 CFR 35.3045).” This section set forth criteria in which 

enforcement discretion may be used in certain medical event reporting scenarios. 

One documented case involved use of this type of discretion in CY 2014. 

 

2. Discretion Involving No SDP Performance Deficiency 

Section 2.2.4.d of the Enforcement Policy states that for operating power reactors, in 

the case of violations normally falling within the ROP SDP process, violations of NRC 

requirements for which there are no associated SDP performance deficiencies (e.g., a 

violation of TS which is not a performance deficiency) are normally dispositioned using 

discretion, similar to that described in Section 3.2 of this Policy. In 2014, five cases 

involved the use of discretion in accordance with Section 2.2.4.d of the Policy. Two of 

the cases involved TS violations relating to reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage 

requirements, and two additional cases involved TS violations attributable to 

equipment failures that were not considered avoidable. The fifth case was associated 

with an access control violation that was not a performance deficiency. 

3. Discretion Involving Violations Identified Because of Previous 

Enforcement Actions 

The staff may exercise enforcement discretion, in accordance with Section 3.3 of the 

Enforcement Policy, if the violation was identified by the licensee as part of the 

corrective action for a previous enforcement action and the violation has the same or 

similar root cause as the violation for which enforcement action was previously taken. 

In CY 2014, four violations, all relating to wrongdoing at the Chicago Bridge and Iron 

Company (CB&I), were dispositioned consistent with the guidance of Section 3.3 of the 

Policy. Specifically, three of the four cases involved inaccurate information relating to 

quality assurance records for new reactor construction modules, and one case 

involved discrimination of an employee for previously raising safety concerns. On 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

25 

September 25, 2014, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order (CO) to enhance actions 

that CB&I had previously agreed to take to further address issues relating to willful 

violations of NRC requirements and deliberate misconduct (see EA-13-196). All four 

apparent violations occurred prior to or during implementation of the corrective actions 

specified in the September 2014 CO. Therefore, the staff exercised enforcement 

discretion to not pursue escalated enforcement because the staff concluded that the 

root causes for the apparent violations were similar to the root causes of the violations 

that led to the issuance of the CO and the corrective actions being taken by CB&I. 

4. Discretion Involving Special Circumstances 

Four cases involved use of discretion to disposition violations in accordance with 

Section 3.5 of the Enforcement Policy, “Special Circumstances.” Below is a brief 

discussion of the cases dispositioned in CY 2014. 

• The NRC issued an Exercise of Enforcement Discretion letter to a federal agency 

for a violation involving an RSO who willfully failed to provide and require the use 

of extremity monitoring devices as required by 10 CFR 20.1502(a). The staff 

determined that enforcement discretion was warranted because the agency 

appropriately identified, evaluated, and issued a violation to the RSO (a 

permittee), and ensured corrective actions for the violation in accordance with the 

enforcement procedures described in the NRC Master Materials License. 

• The NRC identified an apparent violation concerning a construction company for 

possession of byproduct material without an NRC license, as required by 10 CFR 

30.3. The staff exercised discretion because (1) the company possessed the 

byproduct material for a period of less than 24 hours; (2) adequate safety and 

security controls were maintained while in the company’s possession; (3) there 

were no actual safety or security consequences of the unauthorized possession; 

(4) the device containing byproduct material was not used during this time; 

(5) the company acted in good faith to contact the NRC to understand its 

responsibilities for possession and use of the device; (6) the company took 

prompt corrective actions upon learning that it was in violation of NRC 

requirements; and (7) the company had no further plans to possess or use the 

byproduct material. 

• The NRC staff concluded that two cases warranted disposition of a violation in 

accordance with Section 3.5 of the Enforcement Policy because of inadequate 

guidance or lack of clear guidance. In one case, the staff identified that it had 

explicitly approved a licensee's secondary containment testing methodology, and 

then later determined that the methodology did not comply with TS requirements 

because the licensee did not test all secondary containment configurations. As a 

result, the NRC refrained from issuing an NOV in this case. The NRC also 

exercised discretion relating to the use of decommissioning trust funds for certain 

expenses. In this case, the licensee and its predecessors had informed the NRC 

on multiple occasions about the use of funds for spent fuel management; 

however use of these funds for this purpose did not comply with 10 CFR 

50.82(a). The interactions between the licensee and NRC appeared to have 

obfuscated the applicability of and limitations regarding compliance with NRC 

regulations and use of decommissioning trust funds. 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

26

5. Notices of Enforcement Discretion 

Occasionally, circumstances might arise in which a power reactor licensee’s 

compliance with a TS or other license condition would require a plant transient or 

performance testing, inspection, or other system realignment that is of greater risk than 

the current specific plant conditions. In these circumstances, the NRC staff may 

choose not to enforce the applicable requirements. The staff exercises this 

enforcement discretion, designated as a notice of enforcement discretion (NOED) in 

accordance with Section 3.8 of the Enforcement Policy, only if it is clearly satisfied that 

the action is consistent with protecting the public health and safety. The staff may also 

issue NOEDs in cases involving severe weather or other natural phenomena when it 

determines that exercising this discretion will not compromise safety. NOEDs require 

justification from a licensee or certificate holder that documents the safety basis for the 

request and provides whatever other information the staff deems necessary to issue 

an NOED. The NRC issued ten NOEDs during CY 2014. This was a significant 

increase from the four NOEDs issued in CY 2013. 

• NOED 14-1-01: The NRC verbally granted enforcement discretion on 

January 26, 2014, to Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., to not enforce 

compliance with the actions required in Millstone Power Station (MPS), Unit 3 

Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.1.2, “Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System,” Action 

C, to restore the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) pump to operable 

status within 72 hours. On January 23, 2014, during a planned surveillance test, 

the MPS Unit 3 TDAFW pump tripped on an over speed condition and was 

declared inoperable by plant operators. After review of the troubleshooting data, 

the most probable cause was identified by station personnel that insufficient force 

was being transferred via the linkage to the turbine steam supply control valve. 

Enforcement discretion was sought to allow for continued operation in violation of 

TS 3.7.1.2 in order to permit additional time for station personnel to make repairs, 

perform testing activities, and restore the TDAFW pump to operable status. The 

licensee originally requested an additional 72 hours beyond the TS completion 

time allowance to restore the TDAFW pump to an operable condition. Based on 

its review of information provided by the licensee, the NRC granted enforcement 

discretion to not enforce compliance with TS 3.7.1.2 for a period of 36 hours 

instead of the 72 hours the licensee had originally requested. 

• NOED 14-1-02: The NRC verbally granted enforcement discretion to PSEG 

Nuclear LLC on February 15, 2014, to not enforce compliance with the actions 

required in TS 3.8.1, “AC Sources - Operating” for Salem Unit 2. On 

February 13, 2014, the 24 Station Power Transformer (SPT) was declared 

inoperable due to elevated transformer combustible gas levels that indicated an 

active internal thermal fault. Because TS 3.8.1.1, Action a.3, required restoration 

of the 24 SPT to operable status within 72 hours and the estimated time to 

replace the transformer with an onsite available spare was estimated to take up 

to nine days, in total, PSEG requested enforcement discretion for six days 

beginning at the expiration of the TS Action Statement 3.8.1.1 on February 16. 

Based on its evaluation of the risk evaluations performed by PSEG and the NRC 

staff, as well as the compensatory measures put in place during the NOED, the 

NRC exercised discretion not to enforce compliance with TS 3.8.1.1 Action a.3, 

for an additional period of six days. 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

27 

• NOED 14-2-001: The NRC verbally granted enforcement discretion to Duke 

Energy Carolinas, LLC on March 6, 2014, to not enforce compliance with the 

actions required in Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS), Unit No. 1, TS 3.8.1, “AC 

Sources – Operating,” Required Action B.4; TS 3.7.8, “Nuclear Service Water 

System (NSWS),” Required Action A.1; TS 3.6.6, Containment Spray System,” 

Required Action A.1; and TS 3.7.5, “Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System,” 

Required Action B.1. On March 4, 2014, the licensee declared the 1A diesel 

generator (DG) inoperable for planned maintenance activities. Multiple TS LCOs 

were affected as a result of the inoperability of the 1A DG. While performing the 

planned maintenance, workers discovered that the bearing for a connecting rod 

had rotated approximately 25 degrees from its normal horizontal position (i.e., the 

bearing insert had rotated within the connecting rod). Based on this observation, 

the licensee decided to replace the bearing to allow for analysis of the cause of 

the rotation. Duke Energy determined that replacement of the bearing and 

returning the 1A DG to service could not be completed prior to the end of the TS 

LCO action statement on March 7. Based on its review of information provided 

by the licensee, the NRC exercised discretion to not enforce compliance with the 

completion times associated with the various TS Required Actions for a period of 

60 hours beyond the 72 hour TS LCO impacted by the repair until March 9, 2014. 

• NOED 14-1-03: On July 13, 2014, the NRC verbally granted enforcement 

discretion to Exelon Generation Co., LLC, to not enforce compliance with the 

required actions outlined in TS 3.3.2, “Emergency Core Cooling – Reactor 

Building Emergency Cooling and Reactor Building Spray Systems” for Three Mile 

Island Nuclear Station (TMI), Unit 1. The licensee identified a small leak (1 drop 

every 2 minutes) from a welded connection upstream on the high pressure 

injection (HPI) line side of an instrument root isolation valve during a plant walkthrough. TMI Unit 1 TS 3.3.2 states, “Components shall not be removed from 

service so that the affected system train is inoperable for more than 72 

consecutive hours. If the system is not restored within 72 hours, the licensee 

must place the reactor in a Hot Shutdown condition within six hours.” During 

early execution of repair activities, Exelon was unable to adequately isolate the 

leak to perform repairs. However, after considering other repair options, Exelon 

determined that a 46.5 hour extension past the TS return to service time 

requirement for ‘A’ train HPI would be needed to complete the repairs and a 

NOED was requested. Based on the risk evaluations performed by Exelon and 

the NRC, as well as the compensatory measures to be put in place during the 

NOED, the NRC exercised discretion not to enforce compliance with TS 3.3.2, for 

an additional period of 46.5 hours. 

• NOED 14-2-001: The NRC verbally granted enforcement discretion to Florida 

Power and Light Co. (FPL) on July 20, 2014, to not enforce compliance with the 

actions required in TS 3.7.4, for Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station, Units 3 

and 4. On July 20, Units 3 and 4 entered TS 3.7.4 Required Action for ultimate 

heat sink (UHS) average supply water temperatures exceeding 100°F. Turkey 

Point TSs state that, if the temperature was not restored to below 100°F, FPL 

would be required to place both units in Mode 3 within 12 hours, and in Mode 5 

within 36 hours. The licensee requested enforcement discretion to avoid a 

shutdown of both Turkey Point units, in part, because of a period of high system 

load demand when the operation of the units was essential for grid voltage 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

28

stability. The requested enforcement discretion would end after meeting one of 

the following conditions: (a) 10 days, or (b) the UHS temperature exceeds 103°F; 

or (c) the UHS peak temperature drops below 96°F for three consecutive days 

and is on a declining trend; or (d) receipt of approval of a related license 

amendment; or (e) if the loss of Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 will not result in a 

North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Emergency Alert Level 

(EEA) 3 alert. Based on its review of information provided by the licensee, 

including multiple analyses that demonstrated the continued operability of cooling 

canal temperatures as high as 104°F, the NRC exercised discretion to not 

enforce compliance with TS 3.7.4 until July 30, 2014. The NOED was later 

amended to expire on August 9, 2014. 

• NOED 14-4-001: The NRC verbally granted enforcement discretion to Pacific 

Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) on August 15, 2014, to not enforce 

compliance with the actions required in Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP), 

Unit 2, TS 3.8.1, “AC Sources – Operating,” Required Action H.2. On August 10, 

diesel generator 2-2 was removed from service for a maintenance outage. 

During the maintenance, a diesel fuel oil inlet to fuel header capscrew was 

discovered broken. An extent of condition review was performed and a similar 

capscrew was discovered to have an ultrasonic test (UT) indication on diesel 

generator 2-3. Diesel generator 2-3 was declared inoperable as a result of the 

UT indication. The capscrew on diesel generator 2-3 was replaced, but during 

preparations to return the diesel generator to service, a separate, unrelated 

failure of the engine driven fuel oil booster pump shaft seal occurred. PG&E 

requested enforcement discretion to permit additional time to make repairs and 

restore diesel generator 2-3 to operable status before starting a plant cooldown, 

as required. The licensee requested an additional 3 hours to restore diesel 

generator 2-3 such that the completion time of Required Action H.2 would expire 

at 9:31 a.m. on August 16, 2014. Based on its review, the NRC granted 

enforcement discretion to not enforce compliance with TS 3.8.1, Condition H, 

Required Action H.2. The NOED provided for an additional period of 3 hours, 

which expired at 9:31 a.m. on August 16, 2014. 

• NOED 14-2-002: The NRC verbally granted enforcement discretion to Duke 

Energy Carolinas, LLC (DEC) on August 21, 2014, to not enforce compliance 

with the actions required in McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1 TS LCO 3.8.1, AC 

Sources - Operating, Action B.4. On August 17, the 1B EDG was undergoing a 

24-hour surveillance test. During the test, cylinder 5L exhibited a knocking noise 

and a significant drop in cylinder exhaust temperature. As a result, the 

Operations Shift Manager directed a shutdown of the 1B EDG and aborted the 

test. On August 18, the EDG was stopped and declared inoperable. DEC 

determined the cause of the 1B EDG problem was the failure of an intake valve 

stem on cylinder 5L. Replacement of the piston, head assembly, cylinder liner, 

and pushrods required approximately 58 hours to complete. DEC also 

determined that a series of maintenance break-in runs would require an 

additional 32 hours followed by a 3-hour post-maintenance operability run. 

Consequently, the 72-hour LCO time requirement would have been exceeded, 

and the licensee requested an additional 48 hours to complete repairs and 

perform post-maintenance testing. Based on its review of information provided 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

29 

by DEC, the NRC exercised discretion to not enforce compliance with TS LCO 

3.8.1, Condition G, requirements for a period of 48 hours. 

• NOED 14-2-03: On August 21, 2014, the NRC verbally granted enforcement 

discretion to Southern Nuclear Operating Co. to not enforce compliance with the 

actions required in Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 2, TS 3.6, “Containment 

Systems.” The “2B” containment spray pump was removed from service on 

August 19, to perform routine preventive maintenance and testing activities, and 

removal of the pump from service placed Vogtle Unit 2 in TS LCO 3.6.6, 

Condition A, which required restoration to operable status within 72 hours. On 

August 20, during the post maintenance testing, Southern noted that the pump 

inboard seal was overheating and damaged. The identification of the pump 

inboard seal damage occurred 25 hours into the 72 hours TS required action 

completion time, which expired on August 22. Based on its review of information 

provided by the licensee, the NRC exercised discretion to not enforce 

compliance with TS 3.6.6 from August 22 to August 24, 2014. 

• NOED 14-1-04: The NRC granted enforcement discretion to Exelon Generation 

Co., LLC on August 23, 2014, to not enforce compliance with the actions 

required in TS 3.7.2, “Emergency Service Water (ESW) System,” Condition B for 

Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3. Condition B of TS 3.7.2 

requires that, when in Mode 1 with both ESW subsystems inoperable, the unit be 

placed in Mode 3 within 12 hours and Mode 4 within 36 hours. On August 23, 

both ESW systems were declared inoperable because any through wall leak in 

an American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Class III elbow is 

not compliant with the ASME code. Exelon requested an extension to allow an 

additional 48 hours for evaluation of possible repairs or the completion of 

calculations that would demonstrate that a through-wall leak in ESW piping would 

meet the eligibility requirements for an emergency, one-time relief request from 

the ASME code for evaluating leaks in low to moderate energy systems. Based 

on its review of information provided by the licensee, the NRC exercised 

discretion to not enforce compliance with TS 3.7.2 for an additional 48 hours. 

• NOED 14-4-002: The NRC granted enforcement discretion to Wolf Creek 

Nuclear Operating Corporation (WCNOC) on October 9, 2014, to not enforce 

compliance with the actions required in Wolf Creek Generating Station TS 3.8.1, 

“AC Sources – Operating,” Required Action B.4.1. On October 6, emergency 

diesel generator (EDG) B was declared inoperable when it tripped during a 24-

hour surveillance test. Operators discovered a fire in a relay cabinet, and quickly 

suppressed the fire. TS 3.8.1, Condition B, Required Action B.4.1, required 

WCNOC to restore EDG B to operable status within 72 hours. If this action was 

not met, TSs required the plant to be shut down. When repair efforts were 

completed, the licensee noted that the failed 24-hour surveillance would need to 

be completed as part of post-maintenance testing, and also recognized that the 

time needed to complete testing would exceed the time permitted by TSs. Based 

on the expected completion time of this test, WCNOC requested an additional 8 

hours beyond the time allowed by TSs to complete post-maintenance testing and 

restore the system to operable status. Based on its review of information, the 

NRC exercised discretion to not enforce compliance with TS 3.8.1 to provide an 

additional period of 8 hours to complete testing on October 9, 2014. 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

30

H. Withdrawn Actions 

Licensees can challenge enforcement actions for several reasons; for example, a 

licensee might dispute the requirements, the facts of the case, the agency’s 

application of the Enforcement Policy, or the significance of the violation. Licensees 

may provide clarifying information that was not available at the time of the inspection, 

and this may affect a finding of noncompliance. 

In addition, OE has established a metric for quality of enforcement actions based on 

the number of disputed and withdrawn nonescalated enforcement actions. The goal is 

fewer than four withdrawn nonescalated enforcement actions in a calendar year per 

region. This metric does not include violations that are withdrawn on the basis of 

supplemental information that was not available to an inspector before the assessment 

of an enforcement sanction. In CY 2014, the agency issued approximately 800 

nonescalated enforcement actions to reactor, materials, fuel facility and new reactor 

licensees. This number is generally consistent with the decreasing trend in the 

number of nonescalated enforcement actions issued annually in the past 3 years. Of 

these actions, eight nonescalated enforcement actions were disputed. While this 

number is less than the 11 disputed actions submitted in CY 2013, it is consistent with 

the average number of actions that have been disputed between CYs 2010 and 2014. 

In CY 2014, the NRC withdrew only two nonescalated actions. In both cases, the 

actions were withdrawn by the NRC after it had received additional information that 

was not available to the staff before issuance of the original action. While the two 

withdrawn actions represent an increase over the single nonescalated enforcement 

action withdrawn in CY 2013, the two actions are on par with the number of actions 

withdrawn each year between 2010 and 2014. As a result, the goal for disputed 

violations was met in CY 2014 indicating that NOVs and other nonescalated 

enforcement actions were prepared properly and accurately. 

In CY 2014, the agency issued 83 escalated enforcement actions and, as previously 

noted, one of these cases was formally disputed. On July 18, 2014, James Chaisson 

requested a hearing in response to the issuance of an "Order Prohibiting Involvement 

in NRC-Licensed Activities" issued on July 11, 2014. Resolution of this case was still 

pending as of the end of CY 2014. 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

31 

III. Ongoing Activities 

A. Enforcement Policy 

1. Enforcement Policy Revisions 

The NRC Enforcement Policy (Policy) is periodically revised to reflect regulatory 

changes, operating experience, and stakeholder input. On October 9, 2014, the NRC 

published a proposed revision to the Policy for a 45 day comment period in the Federal 

Register (79 FR 61107). On October 15, 2014, the Nuclear Energy Institute submitted 

a request (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System Accession No. 

ML14297A314) to extend the comment period for an additional 30 days. After taking 

this request under consideration, the staff extended the due date for public comments 

to December 22, 2014. The staff’s review of the public comments continued into early 

calendar year (CY) 2015. 

The proposed changes to the Policy include: 

• Revisions to the violation examples provided in Sections 6.3, “Materials 

Operations;” 6.4, “Licensed Reactor Operators;” 6.9, “Inaccurate and Incomplete 

Information or Failure to Make a Required Report;” 6.11, “Reactor, Independent 

Spent Fuel Storage Installation, Fuel Facility, and Special Nuclear Material 

Security;” and 6.14, “Fitness-for-Duty.” 

• Revisions associated with the implementation of the Construction Reactor 

Oversight Process (cROP). 

• Revisions associated with the using civil penalties in cases where companies 

willfully fail to file for reciprocity or obtain an NRC specific license. 

• Relocating Section 2.2.4.d, by creating new Section 3.10 “Operating Reactor 

Violations with No Performance Deficiencies.” 

• Revisions to the civil penalty assessment process to address an apparent conflict 

between the Policy and the Enforcement Manual. 

• Revisions to risk-inform information security violations. 

On January 21, 2015, the Commission approved expanding the ADR program to offer 

ADR as an option for non-willful (traditional) enforcement cases with the potential for 

civil penalties (not including violations associated with findings assessed through the 

Reactor Oversight Process). 

2. Enforcement Guidance Memoranda 

OE issues EGMs to provide guidance on the interpretation of specific provisions of the 

Enforcement Policy. Links to the full text of all publicly available EGMs is available on 

the NRC’s public Web site, and are contained in Appendix A to the NRC Enforcement 

Manual. The offices issued two EGMs during CY 2014, and are summarized below. 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

32

• March 13, 2014, EGM 14-001, “Interim Guidance for Dispositioning 10 CFR Part 

37 Violations With Respect to Large Components or Robust Structures 

Containing Category 1 or Category 2 Quantities of Material at Power Reactor 

Facilities Licensed Under 10 CFR Parts 50 and 52.” The purpose of this EGM is 

to provide guidance for dispositioning violations associated with 10 CFR, Part 37, 

“Physical Protection of Category 1 and Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive 

Material,” with respect to large components containing category 1 or category 2 

quantities of radioactive material, or category 1 and category 2 quantities of 

radioactive material stored in robust structures at power reactor facilities licensed 

under 10 CFR Parts 50 and 52. 

• October 2, 2014, EGM 14-002, “Dispositioning Westinghouse Pressurized Water 

Reactor Licensee Noncompliance with 10 CFR 50.59, “Changes, Tests, and 

Experiments,” for the Installation of Complex Programmable Logic Device 

(CPLD) Based Solid State Protection System (SSPS) Cards.” This EGM 

provides guidance on using enforcement discretion to disposition Westinghouse 

pressurized water reactor licensee noncompliance with 10 CFR 50.59 for plants 

that have installed CPLD-based circuit boards in the SSPS without meeting the 

requirements of 10 CFR 50.59(c)(2)(vi) or 10 CFR 50.59(d)(1). The SSPS circuit 

boards provide the coincidence logic to produce trip signals for the reactor 

protection system and actuation signals for the engineered safety features 

actuation systems. 

B. Knowledge Management and Improvement Initiatives 

In CY 2014, OE engaged in several knowledge-management and continuous improvement 

activities. Some of the ongoing activities being conducted to maintain an adequate 

knowledge base included supporting training, completing reviews and self assessments, 

developing internal office procedures, mentoring new staff members with more experienced 

staff, and conducting counterpart meetings. 

Enforcement Counterpart Meetings 

The regional and headquarters enforcement staff held a counterpart meeting from 

September 9 – 11, 2014, to discuss ways to improve the enforcement process and enhance 

communications among staff. The meeting resulted in a number of action items to improve 

the enforcement program. Examples included: (1) obtained regional enforcement 

coordinator feedback on proposed changes to the Enforcement Policy, including a 

discussion of the 2-year licensee performance look-back and whether or not escalated 

ROP-related violations are considered in the civil penalty assessment process; (2) reviewed 

lessons learned and explored possible improvements resulting from a recent case involving 

Virgil C. Summer; (3) discussed improvements to factual summaries prepared by the staff; 

and (4) looked at ways to improve coordination between OE, the regions and program 

offices with the Office of Investigations. 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

33 

Reviews and Self Assessments 

In CY 2014, OE completed one regional enforcement assessment. OE typically performs 

two regional enforcement program assessments each year; however, only one assessment 

was conducted to meet the budgetary guidelines implemented in fiscal year 2014. 

• In June 2014, a team of enforcement specialists from OE, Region I and Region III 

completed an assessment of Region IV’s enforcement program. The primary focus of 

the review was to ensure that the enforcement program is being consistently 

implemented in the region. The assessments also provided the opportunity to share 

“best practices” between the regions and to enhance knowledge management for the 

enforcement process. The assessments involved the review of non-escalated 

enforcement actions and processes, which do not normally involve headquarters. The 

team concluded that that Region IV maintains an effective enforcement program, 

although opportunities for improvements to enforcement documents were noted. The 

team also identified opportunities to heighten training and the transfer of knowledge to 

the regional inspection staff. 

A review of the assessment program will be conducted in CY 2015 and program 

modifications, if necessary, will be incorporated during future assessments. 

Continuous Improvement Initiatives 

The Enforcement Manual was revised during the year to provide additional guidance to the 

staff. The most recent revision was completed on December 5, 2014. 

OE continues to improve the internal procedures used to execute various aspects of the 

enforcement program. During CY2014, internal procedures associated with the ADR 

process were revised and updated, supporting both knowledge management goals and 

improving the enforcement staff’s effectiveness and efficiency. Additionally, a regional 

senior enforcement officer, independent of a case that did not meet the agency’s external 

timeliness goals, conducted a lessons-learned inquiry to recommend improvements to OI 

related case processing procedures. As a result, the staff is taking appropriate actions 

based on the identified recommendations. 

Training

Headquarters and regional enforcement staff conducted training for various members of the 

staff during 2014. The training focused on the documentation of Part 50, Appendix B, 

violations and the documentation of nonescalated enforcement actions. Staff members from 

headquarters and the region also shared other “best practices” at these training sessions. 

C. Regional Accomplishments 

In CY 2014, the regions conducted both routine and focused self assessments of the 

enforcement area to ensure effective performance and to identify opportunities for 

continuous improvement. The self-assessments encompassed both the reactor and 

materials arenas; considered performance associated with development and issuance of 

both non-escalated and escalated enforcement actions; and included activities that required 

a high degree of coordination with other NRC stakeholders. 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

34

Overall, the self-assessments showed that the regions were effectively implementing the 

Enforcement Program. Recommendations were made for any weaknesses identified. 

In addition to assessments, the enforcement staff (1) trained regional technical staff, in part, 

on the revised Enforcement Policy, recent EGMs, and proper enforcement documentation 

requirements for inspectors and (2) participated on inspector qualification review boards as 

necessary. 

D. Calendar Year 2015 Focus Areas 

During CY2015, OE plans to address several activity areas that include: (1) a proposed 

revision to the Enforcement Policy, (2) the development of interim enforcement policies and 

implementation guidance, (3) continuing to support agency efforts to understand regional 

differences with respect to enforcement (particularly in the area of non-escalated 

enforcement), and (4) continued development of enforcement staff expertise. 

• A proposed revision to the Enforcement Policy is being considered, which would likely 

include: clarification of whether SDP findings from the reactor oversight process should 

be included in licensee performance history when a traditional enforcement action is 

being processed for a potential civil penalty; revision to different areas of violation 

examples to clarify and reflect staff experience in specific areas; incorporation of an 

expanded scope for the ADR program; revisions associated with the implementation of 

cROP; and risk-informing information security violations. 

• Several interim enforcement policies and enforcement guidance memoranda will be 

considered in CY 2015. The relatively large amount of activity in this area will be a 

challenge with regard to resources, particularly when considered in conjunction with 

continued priority support for case work. In addition, action items identified during the 

2014 Enforcement Counterpart Meeting will be addressed during CY 2015. 

• OE will continue to support the agency effort to understand the differences between 

the regions regarding the number of non-escalated enforcement actions (which are 

primarily SDP Green NCVs), and will support the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 

in determining whether any agency action is appropriate. While OE has historically 

been less involved in non-escalated ROP enforcement actions since the majority of the 

issues result from the SDP criteria, OE will continue to provide oversight over all 

enforcement actions issued by the agency. 

• Although the average experience level of the enforcement staff is increasing, 

additional development opportunities will be utilized when possible. Continued 

turnover, particularly in the regional enforcement staff recently, has reduced the level 

of expertise available to support the inspection staff throughout the agency. The 

hiring, training, and development of internal procedures needs to continue to reduce 

reliance on a very limited number of individuals. 

• OE plans to enhance staff knowledge of the enforcement program, particularly 

associated with wrongdoing, in both the regions and headquarters offices by 

conducting joint OE ─ OGC/Materials Litigation and Enforcement Division 

management presentations in each region and multiple presentations at headquarters. 

 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

35 

Table 3 – Escalated Enforcement Actions by Region and Program Office

 

NOVs w/o Civil 

Penalties 

Orders w/o Civil 

Penalties 

NOVs and Orders 

w/ Civil Penalties Total 

REGION I 16 2 5 23 

REGION II 5 3 0 8 

REGION III 22 3 6 31 

REGION IV 14 2 1 17 

NRR 0 0 0 0 

NRO 0 1 0 1 

NSIR 1 0 0 1 

FSME 0 0 0 0 

NMSS 0 1 0 1 

OE 0 1 0 1 

OIP 0 0 0 0 

Total 58 13 12 83 

Key to Offices

• NRO – Office of New Reactors 

• NSIR – Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response 

• FSME – Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs 

• NMSS – Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards 

• OIP – Office of International Programs 

 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

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Table 4 – Escalated Enforcement Actions by Type of Licensee, 

Nonlicensee, or Individual

 

NOVs w/o 

Civil Penalties 

Orders w/o 

Civil Penalties 

NOVs and 

Orders w/ 

Civil Penalties Total 

Operating Reactor 22 4 1 27 

Gauge 11 1 5 17 

Radiographer 6 0 0 6 

Individual Actor - Reactors 3 2 0 5 

Individual Actor - Materials 2 3 0 5 

Hospital 3 0 1 4 

Academic 3 0 0 3 

Physician (M) 1 0 3 4 

Other 3 0 0 3 

Licensed Operator 3 1 0 4 

Irradiator 0 0 1 1 

Vendor - New Reactors 0 1 0 1 

Materials Distributor 1 0 0 1 

Non-Operating Reactor 0 0 1 1 

Decommissioned Reactor/Site 0 1 0 1 

Grand Total 58 13 12 83 

 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

37 

Table 5 – Escalated Enforcement Action Trends by Type of Licensee 

 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Average

Operating Reactor 29 28 40 30 27 31 

Gauge 28 16 11 5 17 15 

Hospital 19 12 11 8 4 11 

Radiographer 8 18 12 5 6 10 

Fuel Facility 13 7 4 3 0 5 

Individual Actor - Materials 6 3 8 2 5 5 

Irradiator 2 6 1 2 1 2 

Licensed Operator 0 3 7 2 4 3 

Physician (M) 1 2 0 3 4 2 

Individual Actor - Reactors 4 0 3 1 5 3 

Materials Distributor 0 3 5 2 1 2 

Academic 0 5 0 4 3 2 

Individual Actor - Fuel Facility 1 1 0 0 0 <1 

Vendor - New Reactors 0 0 0 3 1 <1 

Well Logger 2 1 0 1 0 <1 

Research Reactor 1 0 0 2 0 <1 

New Construction - Reactor 0 0 1 1 0 <1 

Import / Export 0 0 1 0 0 <1 

Unknown 0 1 0 0 0 <1 

Waste Disposal 0 0 0 1 0 <1 

Non-Operating Reactor 0 0 0 0 1 <1 

Vendor - Operating Reactors 0 0 1 0 0 <1 

Other 3 6 8 1 3 <1 

Decommissioned Reactor/Site 0 0 1 0 1 <1 

Total 117 112 114 76 83 100 

 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

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Enforcement Program Annual Report 

A1 

Appendix A – Summary of Cases Involving Civil Penalties*

Civil Penalties Issued To Operating Reactor Licensees

None 

Civil Penalties Issued To Materials Licensees

Valley Quarries, Inc. EA-13-215 

Chambersburg, PA 

On February 6, 2014, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil 

Penalty (NOV/CP) in the amount of $3,500 to Valley Quarries Inc. (VQI), for a Severity 

Level III Problem for three related violations. The three violations involved VQI's willful 

failure to: (1) secure the gauge containing radioactive materials to prevent from shifting 

during transport as required by 10 CFR 71.5; (2) control and maintain constant surveillance 

of the gauge that is in an unrestricted area as required by 10 CFR 20.1802; and (3) use two 

independent physical controls that form tangible barriers to secure the gauge from 

unauthorized removal in accordance with 30.34(i). Specifically, on May 3, 2013, VQI, a 

licensee of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, while working under reciprocity in a nonAgreement State, did not secure a portable gauge containing licensed materials to prevent 

shifting while transporting it in the back of a pickup truck over a public highway, an 

unrestricted area, in West Virginia. Consequently, the gauge fell out of the truck bed on a 

highway and was left unsecured in an area not controlled by the licensee. The gauge was 

found by a member of the public who subsequently returned it to the licensee through the 

Agreement State regulator. 

Geisser Engineering Corporation EA-13-105 

Riverside, RI 

On March 20, 2014 (ML14079A503), a Severity Level II NOV/CP in the amount of $11,200 

was issued to Geisser Engineering Corporation (GEC). The action was based on a violation 

involving GEC's failure to file for reciprocity, on 22 occasions between October 21, 2009, 

and June 23, 2011, prior to using portable gauges containing licensed material within NRC 

jurisdiction in the State of Connecticut, and at the Newport Naval Station, Rhode Island. 

GEC subsequently requested that the NRC mitigate the proposed civil penalty because it 

would pose a financial hardship to the company. After considering the GEC's response, as 

well as information regarding a civil penalty assessed against GEC by the Commonwealth of 

Massachusetts, the NRC decided to reduce GEC's civil penalty by 25 percent to $8,400. On 

July 31, 2014, the NRC issued an Order imposing the $8,400 civil monetary penalty to GEC. 

 

* Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

A2

Centro de Medicina Nuclear EA-13-059 

Santurce, PR 

On April 8, 2014, the NRC issued an Order Imposing Civil Monetary Penalty to Centro de 

Medicina Nuclear (CDM). The NRC issued the Order because CDM failed to respond to a 

November 5, 2013, NOV/CP in the amount of $7,000 that was issued to the licensee for 

failing to comply with the actions required by an earlier Order issued on August 7, 2012. 

The 2012 Order had revoked CDM’s license for nonpayment of its annual fee, and further 

ordered the licensee to decommission its facility and dispose of or transfer its licensed 

materials. As of December 31, 2014, the civil penalty had not been paid, and was referred 

to the Department of Treasury for collection. 

Metro Cardiovascular Diagnostics EA-14-072 

Florissant, Missouri 

On September 30, 2014, the NRC issued a NOV/CP in the amount of $3,500 to Metro 

Cardiovascular Diagnostics for a Severity Level III violation and a Severity Level III problem. 

The Severity Level III violation involved the licensee's nuclear medicine technologist (NMT) 

for willfully failing to check the radiation survey meter for current calibration status prior to 

performing radiation surveys on June 28, 2012, and November 20, 2012, as required by the 

licensee's waste disposal procedure. In addition, several radiation safety violations were 

included as a Severity Level III problem and involved the failure to: (1) calibrate the survey 

meter; (2) verify the linearity of the dose calibrator; (3) verify the efficiency of the well 

counter; (4) perform sealed source leak tests; (5) perform sealed source physical 

inventories; (6) maintain records of hazardous material training; (7) perform an annual audit; 

and (8) implement the radiation safety program. The radiation safety activities were required 

by licensee procedures and 10 CFR Parts 20, 35, and 71. 

Bradley D. Bastow, D. O. EA-14-116 

South Haven, MI 

On November 6, 2014, the NRC issued a NOV/CP in the amount of $7,000 to a medical 

licensee, Bradley D. Bastow, D. O., for a Severity Level III Problem involving failure to meet 

the terms of a Confirmatory Order. Specifically, on September 3, 2013, the NRC issued a 

Confirmatory Order (ML13241A320) to Bradley D. Bastow, D. O. as part of an alternative 

dispute resolution settlement agreement to resolve issues discovered during an inspection 

and an investigation conducted by the NRC Office of Investigations. In April 2014, the NRC 

performed a followup inspection and determined that the licensee either did not meet the 

terms of the Confirmatory Order or did not meet them in the time specified by the Order. Of 

particular concern was the failure to restore compliance to one of the initial violations that 

formed the basis of the Confirmatory Order (i.e., providing a calibrated and operable well 

counter or submitting a license amendment request for alternate instrumentation). Not 

having this instrumentation has a direct health and safety impact on the licensee’s staff and 

patients in that, without the instrumentation, the licensee staff are not able to provide 

accurate contamination readings. 

ATC Group Services, Inc. EA-13-251 

Indianapolis, IN 

On November 19, 2014, the NRC issued a NOV/CP in the amount of $3,500 to ATC Group 

Services, Inc., for a Severity Level III violation. The violation involved the failure to control 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

A3 

and maintain constant surveillance of licensed material that is in an unrestricted area and 

not in storage as required by 10 CFR 20.1802. Specifically, on November 18, 2013, a 

licensee employee left a portable gauge secured in the back of an open-bed truck with the 

vehicle doors unlocked and keys in the ignition. Subsequently, the vehicle was stolen. 

Despite the licensee’s efforts to recover the gauge, which included placing a publicly 

available advertisement offering a monetary reward, the gauge had not been recovered as 

of December 31, 2014. 

Dominion Engineering Associates, Inc. EA-14-030 

Fredericksburg, VA 

On December 18, 2014, the NRC issued a NOV/CP in the amount of $3,500 to Dominion 

Engineering Associates, Inc. (DEA), for a Severity Level III violation. The violation involved a 

willful failure to file NRC Form 241, “Report of Proposed Activities in Non-Agreement 

States,” at least 3 days prior to engaging in licensed activities within NRC jurisdiction, as 

required by 10 CFR 150.20. Specifically, between November 19, 2010, and April 17, 2013, 

DEA, a licensee of the Commonwealth of Virginia, used portable devices containing 

byproduct material within NRC jurisdiction in Washington, DC and at the Marine Corps Base 

Quantico in the Commonwealth of VA, areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction, on 

approximately 42 occasions without filing the required documentation with the NRC. 

Civil Penalties Issued To Fuel Cycle Facility Licensees

None 

Civil Penalties Issued To New Reactors Licensees

None 

Civil Penalties Issued To Decommissioning and Low Level Waste Licensees

None 

 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

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Enforcement Program Annual Report 

B1 

Appendix B – Summary of Escalated Notices of Violation without 

Civil Penalties*

Notices of Violation Issued to Operating Reactor Licensees

NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC EA-13-223 

Duane Arnold Energy Center 

On February 11, 2014, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) to NextEra Energy 

Duane Arnold, LLC for a violation of TS 3.5.3, “Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) 

System”, associated with a White SDP finding involving the failure of Duane Arnold 

personnel to perform an immediate operability determination in accordance with NextEra’s 

procedures. Specifically, on June 21, 2013, Duane Arnold personnel failed to consider a 

degraded speed indicator’s impact on RCIC operability. As a result, the RCIC system was 

inoperable from June 21, 2013, to August 24, 2013. 

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. EA-14-017 

Farley Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 

On February 14, 2014 the NRC issued a NOV associated with a White SDP finding to 

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. for a violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50.54(q)(2), “Emergency Plans,” involving the failure to maintain 

the effectiveness of their emergency plan. Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain a 

standard emergency classification scheme which included facility effluent parameters in that 

effluent parameter classification threshold values for RG1 (General Emergency) and RS1 

(Site Area Emergency) were significantly non-conservative at both Farley Unit 1 and 2. 

These monitors were being relied upon to continuously assess the impact of the release of 

radioactive materials as well as provide criteria for determining the need for notification and 

participation of local and state agencies. 

Entergy Operations, Inc. EA-13-233 

Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 

On March 28, 2014, the NRC issued a NOV to Entergy Operations, Inc. for a violation of 

10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, “Test Control,” associated with a White SDP 

finding involving the failure of Waterford personnel to establish an adequate test program to 

demonstrate that a safety-related component associated with the train B emergency diesel 

generator would perform satisfactorily in service. Specifically, prior to May 26, 2013, 

Waterford personnel failed to identify and perform adequate testing on the train B 

emergency diesel generator exhaust fan to demonstrate that the exhaust fan would perform 

satisfactorily in service. As a result, the train B emergency diesel generator was determined 

to be inoperable for a period of 25 days. 

 

* Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

B2

Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, LLC EA-13-247 

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 

On April 17, 2014, the NRC issued a NOV to Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, LLC 

(CENG) for a violation of 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," 

associated with a White SDP finding involving CENG’s failure to assure prompt identification 

and correction of conditions adverse to quality. Specifically, CENG failed to promptly correct 

two improperly sealed cable penetrations at Ginna between manhole 1 and battery room 'B'. 

As a result, certain flooding scenarios could have resulted in flooding the battery rooms and 

the eventual loss of all alternating current (AC) and direct current (DC) power with no 

capability for using installed plant equipment for decay heat removal. 

Omaha Public Power District EA-13-222 

Fort Calhoun Station 

On April 25, 2014, the NRC issued a NOV associated with a White Significance 

Determination Process (SDP) finding to Omaha Public Power District for a violation of 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, “Design Control,” involving the failure to assure 

that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis were correctly translated into 

specifications, drawings, procedures and instructions. Specifically, the licensee failed to 

fully incorporate applicable tornado missile protection design requirements for components 

needed to ensure the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition. 

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. EA-13-076 

Indian Point Energy Center 

On April 29, 2014, the NRC issued a Severity Level III NOV to Entergy Nuclear Operations, 

Inc. for a violation identified as a result of an investigation conducted by the NRC Office of 

Investigations. The violation involved a former Chemistry Manager at Indian Point Energy 

Center (IP) for deliberately entering false data into a chemistry database pertaining to an 

Emergency Diesel Generator fuel oil storage tank and the reserve fuel oil storage tank. The 

falsification of records caused the licensee to operate IP Units 2 and 3 in violation of 

technical specifications (TS) and to avert a dual-unit shut-down required by TS Limiting 

Condition for Operation (LCO) Applicability LCO 3.0.3. Additionally, a SL III NOV and an 

order were issued banning the former IP Chemistry Manager from participating in NRC 

activities for a period of 1 year for violating 10 CFR 50.5, “Deliberate Misconduct.” 

Tennessee Valley Authority EA-14-005 

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant 

On April 30, 2014, the NRC issued a NOV to Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), as a result 

of the failure to maintain plant staffing levels in accordance with the radiological emergency 

plan at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant. This White finding involved the failure of the licensee's 

process for maintaining minimum emergency response shift staffing to adequately maintain 

staffing of the Shift Technical Advisor and Incident Commander to ensure initial accident 

response in all key functional areas. Additionally, NRC identified two examples of a violation 

of 10 CFR 50.9 based on the licensee's failure to provide complete and accurate information 

associated with emergency response on-shift staffing requirements and a violation of 

10 CFR 50.90 for the failure to submit an application requesting an amendment to their 

operating license concerning on-shift staffing levels. On May 1, 2014, the NRC issued a 

Confirmatory Order to TVA to formalize commitments made as a result of an ADR mediation 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

B3 

session. The commitments were made by TVA as part of a settlement agreement between 

TVA and the NRC regarding the violation(s) of 50.9 and 50.90. TVA agreed to a number of 

corrective actions, including correcting the Conduct of Operations procedure to reflect 

adequate staffing levels and comprehensive fleet-wide and plant-specific corrective actions. 

Entergy Operations, Inc. EA-14-008 

Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 

On June 23, 2014, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Entergy Operations, Inc. 

(Entergy) for a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, 

Procedures and Drawings," associated with a Yellow Significance Determination Process 

finding at Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1, and a Yellow SDP finding at Arkansas Nuclear 

One, Unit 2, involving the March 31, 2013, Unit 1 stator drop that affected safety-related 

equipment on both units. Specifically, Entergy approved a design for the temporary hoisting 

assembly that was not supported by detailed drawings, specifications, evaluations, and/or 

certifications as required by Entergy Quality Procedure EN-MA-119, "Material Handling 

Program." As a result, on March 31, 2013, while lifting and transferring the main generator 

stator, the temporary overhead crane collapsed causing the 525-ton Unit 1 stator to fall on 

and extensively damage portions of the plant, including safety-related equipment. 

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation EA-14-024 

Wolf Creek Generating Station 

On July 1, 2014, the NRC issued a NOV associated with a White SDP finding to Wolf Creek 

Nuclear Operating Corporation for a violation identified at its Wolf Creek Nuclear Plant (Wolf 

Creek). The licensee’s failure involved 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), which required the licensee to 

maintain an emergency plan that uses adequate methods for assessing and monitoring the 

actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition. Specifically, 

a calculational error in Wolf Creek's Electronic Dose Calculation Program (i.e., computer 

software) resulted in inaccurate offsite doses for the main vent stack pathway. The 

computer software failed to account for the filtered pathway for iodine and particulates 

thereby overestimating the radiological release when the effluent radiation monitor was in 

the accident mode. 

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. EA-14-112 

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2 

On August 6, 2014 the NRC issued a NOV associated with a White SDP finding to Southern 

Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. for a violation of 10 CFR Part 50.54(q)(2), “Emergency 

Plans,” involving the failure to maintain the effectiveness of their emergency plan. 

Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain a standard emergency classification scheme, 

which included facility effluent parameters, in that effluent parameter classification threshold 

values for RG1 (General Emergency) and RS1 (Site Area Emergency) were significantly 

non-conservative at Vogtle Units 1 and 2. These monitors were being relied upon to 

continuously assess the impact of the release of radioactive materials, as well as provide 

criteria for determining the need for notification and participation of local and state agencies. 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

B4

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC. EA-14-091 

Oconee Nuclear Station 

On August 12, 2014, the NRC issued a NOV associated with a White SDP finding to Duke 

Energy Carolinas, LLC. for a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, 

“Corrective Action,” involving the failure to establish measures to promptly identify and 

correct a significant condition adverse to quality. Specifically, in 2004, the licensee 

implemented procedure NDE-995, "Ultrasonic Examination of Small Diameter Piping Butt 

Welds and Base Material for Thermal Fatigue Damage," to perform augmented in-service 

inspection program ultrasonic examinations, which did not provide measures to assure that 

high pressure injection nozzle component cracking would be identified and corrected. 

Consequently, in 2012, the licensee performed procedure NDE-995 on weld 1-RC-201-105, 

and did not identify any reportable indications; even though a greater than 50 percent 

through-wall circumferential crack was present in the weld. On November 11, 2013, the 

licensee identified the through-wall circumferential crack in weld 1-RC 201-105 after 

transitioning Unit 1 to Mode 3 to investigate non-isolable pressure boundary leakage. 

Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. EA-14-092 

Millstone Power Station, Unit 3 

On October 20, 2014, the NRC issued a NOV associated with a White SDP finding to 

Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. for a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion 

XVI, “Corrective Action,” involving the failure to identify and correct a significant condition 

adverse to quality for the Millstone 3 turbine-driven auxiliary feed water (TDAFW) pump. 

Specifically, the TDAFW pump experienced three over speed trips from August 11, 2013 to 

February 3, 2014, and Dominion did not identify that the pump was operating in an adverse 

configuration. The adverse configuration was due to the installation of an inappropriate cam 

follower bearing within the turbine control valve linkage. This discrepant condition rendered 

the TDAFW pump inoperable for periods of time exceeding the limiting condition for 

operation specified in the Millstone 3 TS 3.7.1.2, “Auxiliary Feedwater System.” 

Exelon Generation Company, LLC EA-14-100 

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant 

On October 27, 2014, the NRC issued a NOV to Exelon Generation Company, LLC for a 

violation of 10 CFR 50.54, "Conditions of Licenses," and risk significant planning standard 

10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) associated with a White SDP finding. This violation involved Calvert 

Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant (CCNPP) staff incorporating incorrect threshold values into its 

emergency action levels (EALs). Specifically, during the replacement of the Unit 2 main 

steam line radiation monitors, CCNPP's staff incorrectly calculated the associated EALs 

effluent threshold values for the Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency 

classifications. These thresholds were subsequently incorporated into Table R-1, "Effluent 

Monitor Classification Threshold" of the EALs. This calculation error could have resulted in 

an over-classification of an event, an unnecessary protective action recommendation, and 

could have caused offsite response organizations to implement unnecessary protective 

actions for the public. The finding is also associated with violations of NRC requirements 

specified in 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2), 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E. 

Immediate corrective actions taken to restore compliance included included entering the 

issue into the corrective action program, implementing appropriate compensatory actions, 

and initiating corrective actions to revise the EAL table. 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

B5 

Omaha Public Power District EA-14-187 

Fort Calhoun 

On November 25, 2014, the NRC issued a NOV associated with a White SDP finding to 

Omaha Public Power District (OPPD). The finding involved the failure to properly implement 

high energy line break and environmental qualification design requirements at the Fort 

Calhoun Station. OPPD was cited for a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion 

III, “Design Control,” involving the failure to assure that applicable regulatory requirements 

and the design basis were correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures and 

instructions. Specifically, the licensee failed to fully incorporate applicable design 

requirements to ensure that components subjected to a harsh environment maintained the 

capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition following a 

postulated high energy line break. 

Notices of Violation Issued to Materials Licensees

Tetra Tech, Inc. EA-13-227 

Newark, Delaware 

On February 24, 2014, the NRC issued a NOV to Tetra Tech, Inc. (Tetra Tech) for a 

Severity Level III violation. The violation involved a failure to confine possession and use of 

the byproduct material to the locations and purposes authorized in the license, as required 

by 10 CFR 30.34(c). Specifically, between June 7, 2006 and October 22, 2013, on multiple 

occasions, Tetra Tech personnel conducted maintenance of portable nuclear gauges that 

required detaching the source rod from the gauge and was not specifically licensed by the 

NRC or an Agreement State to perform such services. 

City of Kirksville EA-14-001 

Kirksville, Missouri 

On March 17, 2014, the NRC issued a NOV to the City of Kirksville, Missouri, for a Severity 

Level III violation involving the failure to transfer byproduct material to persons authorized to 

receive such byproduct material in accordance with 10 CFR 30.41(a) and (b)(5). 

Specifically, on or about December 2, 2013, the licensee transferred a specifically-licensed 

portable gauge to a company not authorized to receive such byproduct material under the 

terms of a specific or general license issued by the Commission or an Agreement State. 

Kuehne Company EA-13-244 

Delaware City, Delaware 

On March 20, 2014, the NRC issued a NOV to Kuehne Company (Kuehne) for a Severity 

Level III violation. The violation involved a failure to transfer or dispose of a device 

containing byproduct material to persons holding a specific license pursuant to 10 CFR 

Parts 30 and 32 or to an Agreement State, as required by 10 CFR 31.5(c)(8). Specifically, 

on October 31, 2013, a sealed source formerly possessed by Kuehne was found in a scrap 

yard located in Coatesville, Pennsylvania. Kuehne did not properly transfer or dispose of 

the device containing the source to a facility authorized to receive it. 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

B6

Dominion NDT Services, Inc. EA-14-026 

Richmond, VA 

On April 2, 2014, the NRC issued a NOV to Dominion NDT Services, Inc., (Dominion), for a 

Severity Level III violation. The violation involved the failure to file NRC Form 241, “Report of 

Proposed Activities in Non-Agreement States,” at least 3 days prior to engaging in licensed 

activities within NRC jurisdiction, as required by 10 CFR 150.20(b). Specifically, on 

January 11, 2013, September 28, 2013, and November 2, 2013, Dominion, a licensee of the 

Commonwealth of Virginia, performed industrial radiography activities at the Craney Island 

Naval Fuel Depot in Norfolk, Virginia, an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction, without filing 

the required documentation with the NRC. 

IUPUI/Indiana University Medical Center EA-14-028 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

On April 3, 2014, the NRC issued a NOV to IUPUI/Indiana University Medical Center for a 

Severity Level III violation involving the failure to secure from unauthorized removal or 

access licensed materials that are stored in controlled or unrestricted areas as required by 

10 CFR 20.1801. Specifically, on January 16, 2014, the licensee stored radioactive material 

in laboratories with doors that were not secured. 

ECS Carolinas, LLP EA-14-029 

Wilmington, North Carolina 

On April 23, 2014, the NRC issued a NOV to ECS Carolinas, LLP (ECS), for a Severity 

Level III Problem for two related violations. The violations involved ECS's failure to: (1) 

control and maintain constant surveillance of the gauge that is in an unrestricted area as 

required by 10 CFR 20.1802 and (2) use two independent physical controls that form 

tangible barriers to secure the gauge from unauthorized removal in accordance with 

30.34(i). Specifically, on May 23, 2011, an unsecured portable gauge was inadvertently left 

unattended and uncontrolled at a jobsite at the Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune. The 

unattended gauge was recognized and recovered by a Camp Lejeune contractor, who 

secured the gauge and subsequently returned to ECS approximately 3 hours later. 

University Nuclear and Diagnostics, LLC EA-13-026 

Davie, Florida 

On May 13, 2014, the NRC issued a Severity Level III NOV to University Nuclear and 

Diagnostics (UND), LLC for a violation involving deliberate misconduct. Specifically, UND 

deliberately failed to 1) calibrate a survey instrument yet provided falsified survey instrument 

calibration records dated as required by 10 CFR 35.61; 2) instructed its employees to 

document radiation survey results when the survey instrument was not working or not on 

site required by 10 CFR 30.9; 3) failed to perform required contamination surveys as 

required by License Condition 15.A of Amendment 1 of License 21-32316-01; 4) and failed 

to perform an annual audit and falsified annual records contrary to 10 CFR 30.9. The 

violation for engaging in deliberate misconduct also caused Bradley D. Bastow, D.O., the 

licensee, to be in violation of NRC requirements. 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

B7 

Saint Louis University EA-14-076 

St. Louis, Missouri 

On July 25, 2014, the NRC issued a NOV to Saint Louis University for a Severity Level III 

violation involving the failure to secure licensed materials that are stored in controlled or 

unrestricted areas from unauthorized removal or access as required by 10 CFR 20.1801. 

Specifically, on April 7, 2014, the licensee failed to lock the laboratory door used to secure 

and limit access to licensed materials. 

ConAgra Foods EA-14-075 

Trenton, Missouri 

On August 1, 2014, the NRC issued a NOV to ConAgra Foods for a Severity Level III 

Problem involving three violations. The first violation involved the failure to transfer or 

dispose of a device containing byproduct material only by export as provided by 10 CFR 

31.5(c)(7), by transfer to another general licensee as authorized in 10 CFR 31.5(c)(9), or to 

a person authorized to receive the device by a specific license as required by 10 CFR 

31.5(c)(8)(i). Specifically, on December 18, 2013, the licensee reported that two gauges 

and four exit signs were missing from their facility. The second violation involved the failure 

to furnish a report to the Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental 

Management Programs (FSME), within 30 days after the transfer of a device to a specific 

licensee or export. Specifically, between November 8, 2004, and December 8, 2004, the 

licensee transferred a generally licensed device to a specific licensee, the manufacturer, 

Industrial Dynamics, Inc., on November 8, 2004, and did not provide a report to FSME until 

December 18, 2013. The third violation involved the licensee holding devices that were not 

in use for longer than 2 years. 10 CFR 31.5(c)(15) provides an exception to the 2-year limit, 

if the general licensee performs quarterly physical inventories of these devices while they 

are in standby. However, as of April 21, 2014, the licensee held in its possession four 

generally licensed devices for greater than two years that were not in use and without 

conducting quarterly inventories. 

City of St. Peters EA-14-106 

St. Peters, Missouri 

On August 19, 2014, the NRC issued a NOV to the City of St. Peters, Missouri, for a 

Severity Level III violation. The violation involved the failure to ensure licensed material is 

only used by, or under the supervision and in the physical presence of, individuals who have 

successfully completed the manufacturer's training program for gauge users as required by 

NRC License Condition 12. Specifically, from approximately May through August 2009, the 

licensee allowed two individuals to use licensed material without supervision at temporary 

job sites, and the individuals had not completed the manufacturer's training for gauge users. 

Diagnostic Imaging Centers EA-14-108 

Overland Park, Kansas 

On August 26, 2014, the NRC issued a NOV to Diagnostic Imaging Centers for a Severity 

Level III violation involving the failure to ensure written directives are dated and signed by an 

authorized user before the administration of I-131 sodium iodide greater than 1.11 

megabecquerels (30 microcuries) as required by 10 CFR 35.40(a). Specifically, on 

September 3, 2008, and December 8, 2010, the licensee failed to have a written directive 

dated and signed by an authorized user before the administration of 5 millicuries of I-131 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

B8

sodium iodide. The written directives were signed by individuals who were not authorized 

users for this specific medical use. 

Truman Medical Center EA-14-115 

Kansas City, Missouri 

On October 8, 2014, the NRC issued a NOV to Truman Medical Center for a Severity Level 

III violation of 10 CFR 35.75(a) involving the release of individuals who had been 

administered unsealed byproduct material. The licensee failed to ensure that a member of 

the public would not receive an exposure likely to exceed 5 milliSievert (0.5 rem) from the 

released individual. Specifically, on June 27, 2011, and November 30, 2012, the licensee 

released individuals who had received I-131 sodium iodide administrations of 70 and 69.3 

millicuries, respectively, but the licensee's maximum outpatient release level of 54 millicuries 

was based on a calculated dose of 5 milliSievert (0.5 rem) to any other individual. 

Idahoan Foods, LLC EA-14-089 

Lewisville, Idaho 

On October 16, 2014, the NRC issued a NOV to Idahoan Foods, LLC, for a Severity Level III 

Problem for two related violations. The violations involved: 1) the inappropriate transfer of 

two devices containing byproduct material to an entity not authorized to receive the devices, 

contrary to 10 CFR 31.5(c)(8); and 2) the failure to appoint an individual responsible for 

ensuring compliance with the appropriate regulations and requirements related to byproduct 

material in violation of 10 CFR 31.5(c)(12). Specifically, on January 24, 2014, a generally 

licensed device containing byproduct material belonging to Idahoan Foods, LLC was found 

in a load of scrap metal at a recycling facility in the State of California. The facility was not 

authorized to receive the device. A second device containing byproduct material remains 

unaccounted for and was believed to be sold as scrap metal during 2012. Additionally, at 

the time of the purchase of these devices, the licensee did not appoint an individual with 

responsibility for complying with the applicable regulations and requirements related to the 

byproduct material. 

Wittnauer Worldwide, LP EA-13-240 

Bridgeton, MO 

On October 24, 2014, the NRC issued a NOV to Wittnauer Worldwide, LP for a Severity 

Level III violation. The violation involved the licensee's failure to complete decommissioning 

of the waste storage location within 24 months following the initiation of decommissioning as 

required by 10 CFR 30.36. Specifically, Wittnauer's license, which authorized possession 

only of waste material at a storage location in San Juan, Puerto Rico, expired on 

February 28, 2010, but the licensee did not complete decommissioning of the site until 

August 13, 2014, a period greater than 24 months. 

Kim Engineering, Inc. EA-14-167 

Silver Spring, MD 

On December 23, 2014, the NRC issued a NOV to Kim Engineering, Inc. (KEI), for a 

Severity Level III violation. The violation involved the failure to file NRC Form 241, "Report of 

Proposed Activities in Non-Agreement States," at least 3 days prior to engaging in licensed 

activities within NRC jurisdiction, as required by 10 CFR 150.20. Specifically between 

November 9, 2010, and July 7, 2014, KEI, a licensee of the State of Maryland, used portable 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

B9 

devices containing byproduct material within NRC jurisdiction in Washington D.C., and in 

areas of exclusive Federal jurisdiction in Maryland and Virginia on approximately 45 

occasions without filing the required documentation with the NRC. 

Notices of Violation Issued To Fuel Cycle Facility Licensees

None 

Notices of Violation Issued To New Reactors Licensees

None 

Notices of Violation Issued To Decommissioning and Low Level Waste 

Licensees

None 

Notices of Violation Issued to Individuals

Notices of violation issued to individuals are discussed in Appendix D 

 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

B10

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

C1 

Appendix C – Summary of Orders*

Orders Issued To Operating Reactor Licensees

South Carolina Electric & Gas Company EA-12-140 

Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station 

On March 10, 2014, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order (CO) to South Carolina Electric & 

Gas Company (SCE&G) to formalize commitments made as a result of an alternative 

dispute resolution (ADR) mediation session held on October 8, 2013. The commitments 

were made as part of a settlement agreement between SCE&G and the NRC regarding the 

apparent violations of 10 CFR 73.56, “Personnel access authorization requirements for 

nuclear power plants” and 10 CFR 50.9, “Completeness and accuracy of information.” The 

first violation involved the willful actions of the licensee’s access authorization staff, which 

caused the licensee’s access authorization program to fail to provide high assurance that 

individuals granted unescorted access are trustworthy and reliable, such that they do not 

constitute an unreasonable risk to public health and safety, as required by 10 CFR 73.56(c). 

Specifically, the licensee’s access authorization reviewing officials reviewed, adjudicated, 

and granted an individual unescorted access authorization by relying unreasonably on a 

falsified Personnel History Questionnaire and fabricated court record to determine their 

trustworthiness and reliability. The second violation involved the willful failure to comply with 

the requirements of 10 CFR 50.9(a) which, in part, state that “information required by statute 

or Commission regulations to be maintained shall be complete and accurate in all material 

respects.” In part, 10 CFR 73.56(o)(2)(i) requires the licensee to retain records of 

information that must be collected under subparts (d) and (e) of 10 CFR 73.56 that result in 

the granting of unescorted access for at least 5 years after the licensee terminates, or 

denies, an individual’s unescorted access or unescorted access authorization. As part of 

the ADR settlement agreement, SCE&G agreed that the issues described above resulted in 

an individual inappropriately being granted unescorted access to Summer Nuclear Station, 

which was inconsistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.56(c) and 10 CFR 50.9. 

SCE&G did not agree that the two violations were committed willfully. However, the NRC 

determined these violations to be willful. SCE&G completed a number corrective actions 

and enhancements in response to the incident, and agreed to complete additional actions, 

as fully discussed in the CO. The NRC concluded that the corrective actions and 

enhancements discussed by SCE&G were prompt and comprehensive and addressed the 

causes. In consideration of the commitments delineated in the CO, the NRC agreed to fully 

mitigate a civil penalty and issue a Notice of Violation (NOV). 

FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company EA-14-094 

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 

On June 30, 2014, a Confirmatory Order was issued to FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating 

Company (FENOC), confirming FENOC's commitment to submit a license amendment 

request to transition Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 to the National Fire 

Protection Association Standard 805. FENOC had originally planned to submit its 

 

* Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

C2

application on July 1, 2014. The NRC reviewed FENOC's justification for the delay, and 

accepted the proposed new submittal date of December 31, 2015. 

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. EA-14-013 

Palisades Nuclear Plant 

On July 21, 2014, the NRC issued a CO to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy), to 

formalize commitments made as a result of an ADR mediation session held on May 14, 

2014. The commitments were made as part of a settlement agreement between Entergy 

and the NRC regarding the apparent violation of 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix B, Paragraph 

II.B, "Qualification Requirements" and Palisades Security Plan Section 3.1. The violation 

involved the willful actions of the licensee's security staff, which failed to follow the security 

plan requirements when a security manager assigned a security operations supervisor to 

perform duties without confirming whether the supervisor had the appropriate qualifications. 

Entergy agreed that an individual inappropriately held a position for which he was not 

qualified, contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix B, Paragraph II.B, and 

the Palisades Security Plan, but disagreed that the violation was committed willfully. The 

NRC and Entergy agreed to disagree on the issue of willfulness. In response to the 

incident, Entergy completed a number corrective actions and enhancements, and agreed to 

complete additional corrective actions and enhancements, as fully discussed in the CO. In 

consideration of the corrective actions and commitments outlined in the CO, the NRC 

agreed not to issue a civil penalty or a NOV. 

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. EA-14-009 

River Bend Station 

On December 3, 2014, the NRC issued a CO to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy), 

to formalize commitments made as a result of an ADR mediation session held on 

September 22, 2014. Entergy agreed that a NOV and a civil penalty of $70,000 would be 

included in the CO. The specific commitments that were made as part of the settlement 

agreement between Entergy and the NRC regarding the apparent violation of NRC security 

requirements are discussed in the non-public enclosures to the CO. The violation involved 

the willful actions of an unidentified security officer which occurred at Entergy's River Bend 

Station on March 18, 2012. The NRC and Entergy agree that the actions of an unidentified 

security officer constitute a willful violation of 10 CFR Part 73 requirements. However, the 

NRC and Entergy disagreed on the specific aspects of the willful characterization of the 

violation. In light of the significant corrective actions Entergy has already taken and the 

additional actions they have committed to take to enhance their security program at River 

Bend and across the Entergy Nuclear Fleet, the NRC exercised enforcement discretion to 

reduce the severity level of the escalated enforcement sanction that was initially proposed in 

our preliminary determination. The NRC's rationale behind its decision to exercise 

enforcement discretion in characterizing the violation is incorporated in an attachment to the 

CO. The attachment to the CO and the NOV will not be made publicly available because it 

contains security-related information. 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

C3 

Orders Issued To Materials Licensees

Kruger Technologies, Inc. EA-14-113 

Lenexa, Kansas 

On October 28, 2014, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order to Kruger Technologies, Inc., 

confirming commitments reached as part of an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 

mediation session. The session was associated with the failure to secure a portable gauge 

with a minimum of two independent physical controls when not under control or constant 

surveillance as required by 10 CFR 30.34(i). Specifically, on May 21, 2014, an NRC 

inspector observed an unsecured portable gauge in the bed of a pickup truck parked in front 

of the licensee’s building. There were no licensee personnel in the immediate vicinity to 

provide control or constant surveillance of the gauge. The licensee will take a number of 

actions, including but not limited to: (1) revising the company-wide policy to describe 

implementation of NRC safety and security requirements for portable gauges; (2) ensuring 

all authorized gauge users are trained initially and annually on the revised company-wide 

policy; (3) increasing management oversight by establishing a process to periodically 

conduct field inspections; and (4) providing Radiation Safety Officer training for an additional 

authorized gauge user. In consideration of the commitments outlined in the Confirmatory 

Order, the NRC agreed to refrain from issuing a Notice of Violation or proposing a civil 

penalty for the apparent violation.

Orders Issued To Fuel Cycle Facility Licensees

None 

Orders Issued To New Reactors Licensees

None 

Orders Issued To Decommissioning and Low Level Waste Licensees

None 

Prohibition Orders Issued To Individuals

Mr. Michael P. Cooley IA-12-045 

On March 10, 2014, the NRC issued Mr. Michael P. Cooley an Order prohibiting involvement 

in NRC-licensed activities for a period of 5 years. While employed at Summer Nuclear 

Station, Mr. Cooley submitted a signed Personal History Questionnaire (PHQ) to the 

licensee access authorization staff as part of his application for Unescorted Access 

Authorization. Mr. Cooley deliberately failed to report an arrest for arson in the PHQ criminal 

history information section which was necessary for the access authorization staff to 

consider in making determinations regarding his trustworthiness and reliability. In addition, 

he deliberately submitted information to the licensee that he knew to be incomplete or 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

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inaccurate, in violation of the requirements of 10 CFR 50.5(a)(2). Specifically, in response 

to a request by access authorization staff for documentation to support his assertion that 

arson charges against him had been dismissed, he submitted a forged document that 

purported to reflect the dismissal of those charges by a Mississippi county court. At the time 

he submitted this document, the arson charges against him were pending. 

Mr. Armando N. Clavero IA-13-012 

On May 14, 2014, the NRC issued Armando N. Clavero, Co-owner and President of 

University Nuclear and Diagnostics (UND), LLC, an Order prohibiting involvement in NRClicensed activities for a period of 3 years. Specifically, Mr. Clavero deliberately did not 

perform a survey meter calibration, provided a falsified record of the survey meter 

calibration, and provided inaccurate information about performing the survey meter 

calibration both during the NRC investigation and during the predecisional enforcement 

conference. He also deliberately did not perform a sealed source survey in October or 

November 2011 and provided falsified records of a sealed source survey on a date when 

there was no survey meter. Mr. Clavero also did not ensure that the doctor's office had a 

working survey meter during the nearly 8 week period when a UND nuclear medicine 

technologist had sent the doctor's survey meter to UND for calibration and did not ensure 

that records provided to the doctor's office were complete and accurate in all material 

respects. 

Mr. Richard B. Smith IA-13-059 

On May 14, 2014, the NRC issued Richard B. Smith, a former senior reactor operator at 

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (Grand Gulf), an Order prohibiting involvement in NRC-licensed 

activities for a period of 5 years. Specifically, on July 18, 2013, Mr. Smith tested positive for 

an illegal substance during a random fitness-for-duty (FFD) test, a violation of 10 CFR Part 

55.53(d) and (j). Grand Gulf planned to reinstate Mr. Smith and allow him to perform 

licensed duties contingent on his successful completion of a substance abuse treatment 

program and the passing of additional medical evaluations. However, after receiving 

unescorted access by the licensee and prior to allowing him to perform licensed activities, 

Mr. Smith tested positive on a second FFD test resulting in a second violation of 10 CFR 

55.53(d) and (j). On December 11, 2013, the NRC terminated Mr. Smith's license. 

Mr. James Chaisson IA-14-025 

On July 11, 2014, the NRC issued a prohibition order to Mr. James Chaisson for failure to 

comply with a CO issued September 10, 2012 (ML12256B002), which memorialized the 

agreements and conditions established with him during an ADR mediation session with the 

NRC. On May 15, 2012, the NRC concluded that Mr. Chaisson engaged in deliberate 

misconduct in violation of 10 CFR 30.10(a)(1) and issued him an Order (ML12137A311) that 

prohibited him from working in NRC jurisdiction for 3 years. The May 2012 Order, in turn, 

became the basis of the ADR mediation, and was superseded by the September 10, 2012, 

CO. As of March 2014, Mr. Chaisson had failed to complete both the formal training and a 

written article required by the 2012 CO in addition to an 18-month prohibition from NRClicensed activities and other requirements. The July 11, 2014, Order supersedes the 2012 

Order and prohibits Mr. Chaisson from engaging in NRC-licensed activities for a minimum 

period of 3 years. The prohibition continues thereafter and until he provides reasonable 

assurance to the NRC that he can safely use radioactive materials in accordance with NRC 

requirements, including the completion of formal training and verbally attesting his corrective 
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

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actions to prevent deliberate misconduct. Additionally, for a period of 2 years subsequent to 

the NRC written determination of reasonable assurance, Mr. Chaisson must notify the NRC 

of his involvement in NRC-licensed activities, refrain from working for any NRC licensee in 

specified supervisory roles, and provide a copy of his order to his employers (a state 

licensee performing work in NRC jurisdiction or an NRC licensee). 

On July 18, 2014, Mr. Chaisson submitted a Request for Hearing in response to the July 

2014, Order. As of December 31, 2014, the Atomic Safety Licensing Board has not held 

any formal proceedings regarding Mr. Chaisson’s request. 

 
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Appendix D – Summary of Escalated Enforcement Actions 

Against Individuals*

Orders

Orders issued to individuals during 2014 are discussed in Appendix C. 

Notices of Violation 

Mr. John Amburgey IA-13-055 

On January 13, 2014, the NRC issued a Severity Level III Notice of Violation (NOV) to Mr. 

John Amburgey, formerly employed as a security officer at the Surry Power Station (SPS), 

for deliberate misconduct that caused SPS to be in violation of 10 CFR 73.55(i)(5)(ii), which 

states, in part, that licensees provide continuous surveillance, observation, and monitoring 

of the owner controlled area as described in their physical security plan. Specifically, coworkers detected the odor of alcohol on his breath and immediately reported this 

observation to site security supervision. In response, he was promptly for-cause tested for 

alcohol. Because his blood alcohol concentration exceeded the 10 CFR 26.103 limit of 0.04 

percent, SPS declared the test result for alcohol as a confirmed positive test and relieved 

him of duty. Based on the confirmed positive test, and the fact that he had been on duty 

approximately 5 hours into his shift as an armed security officer, SPS declared him unfit for 

duty and unable to effectively perform his assigned security duties. 

Mr. Lane McHugh IA-14-002 

On February 24, 2014, the NRC issued a NOV to Mr. Lane McHugh, a former licensed 

reactor operator at the Limerick Generating Station, for a Severity Level III violation of 

10 CFR 55.53(j). Specifically, on December 16, 2013, Mr. McHugh participated in the 

Exelon Generation Company's random fitness-for-duty (FFD) testing program and 

subsequently tested positive for alcohol. Exelon requested and the NRC granted the 

termination of his reactor operator license. 

Mr. Douglas D. Stouffer IA-14-004 

On April 14, 2014, the NRC issued a NOV to Mr. Douglas D. Stouffer, a licensed reactor 

operator at the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, for a Severity Level III violation of 

10 CFR 55.53(j). Specifically, on August 21, 2013, Mr. Stouffer participated in the Exelon 

Generation Company's random FFD testing program and subsequently tested positive for 

an illegal substance. 

Mr. Daniel L. Wilson IA-13-064 

 

* Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included
Enforcement Program Annual Report 

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On April 29, 2014, a Severity Level III NOV and an Order prohibiting involvement in NRClicensed activities for a period of 1 year was issued to Mr. Daniel Wilson, a former Chemistry 

Manager at Indian Point Energy Center (IP) for a violation of 10 CFR 50.5, “Deliberate 

Misconduct.” Specifically, this violation, identified as a result of an investigation by the NRC 

Office of Investigations, involved Mr. Wilson deliberately entering false data into a Chemistry 

database pertaining to an Emergency Diesel Generator fuel oil storage tank and the reserve 

fuel oil storage tank. Mr. Wilson's falsification of records caused the licensee to operate IP 

Units 2 and 3 in violation of technical specifications (TS) 5.5.11 (Unit 2) and 5.5.12 (Unit 3) 

and to avert a dual-unit shut-down required by TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 

Applicability LCO 3.0.3. 

Mr. Donald Kevin Brown IA-14-014 

On July 9, 2014, the NRC issued a NOV to Mr. Donald Kevin Brown, a former licensed 

reactor operator at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, for a Severity Level III violation of 

10 CFR 55.53(j) and 10 CFR 50.5(a)(1). Specifically, on April 23, 2013, Mr. Brown 

participated in the Entergy Operations, Inc. random FFD testing program and subsequently 

tested positive for an illegal substance. He also admitted during an interview with the NRC’s 

Office of Investigations to using an illegal drug on several occasions prior to the random 

FFD test. 

Mr. Gary Meekins IA-14-021 

On July 9, 2014, the NRC issued a NOV to Mr. Gary Meekins, a former licensed reactor 

operator at the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, for a Severity Level III violation of 

10 CFR 55.53(j) and 10 CFR 50.5(a)(1). Specifically, on February 28, 2014, Mr. Meekins 

participated in the PSEG Nuclear, LLC random FFD testing program and subsequently 

tested positive for an illegal substance. He also admitted, during an interview with the 

NRC's Office of Investigations, to using an illegal drug prior to the random FFD test and on 

an unspecified date in 2010. 

Mr. George Geisser, III IA-13-033 

On July 17, 2014, the NRC issued a Severity Level II NOV and an Order prohibiting Mr. 

George Geisser, III, President of Geisser Engineering Corporation (GEC), from involvement 

in NRC-licensed activities for a period of 3 years. Mr. Geisser engaged in deliberate 

misconduct in violation of 10 CFR 30.10(a)(1) by deliberately conducting and directing 

employees of GEC to use portable gauges in NRC jurisdiction without filing for reciprocity 

with the NRC thus causing GEC to violate the requirements set forth in 10 CFR 150.20. In 

addition, the Order requires Mr. Geisser to notify the NRC within 20 days following 

acceptance of his first employment offer involving NRC-licensed activities for a period of 

1 year after the 3-year prohibition has expired. 

Mr. Trey Brattin IA-14-007 

On July 24, 2014, the NRC issued a NOV to Mr. Trey Brattin for a Severity Level III violation 

of 10 CFR 30.10(a)(1), “Deliberate Misconduct.” Mr. Brattin’s actions caused his employer, 

TechCorr USA, LLC, to be in violation of 10 CFR 34.47(a) which requires dosimetry to be 

worn by an individual while performing radiographic operations. Specifically, at various 

times between July 2010 and January 2011, Mr. Brattin deliberately failed to wear, on the 
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trunk of his body, a direct reading dosimeter, an operating alarm rate meter, and a 

personnel dosimeter while conducting radiographic operations in Wyoming. 

Mr. Joseph S. Shepherd IA-14-028 

On September 15, 2014, the NRC issued a NOV to Mr. Joseph S. Shepherd, President and 

owner of Foss Therapy Services, for a Severity Level IV violation. The violation involved a 

failure to adhere to a condition set forth in NRC Order IA-13-038, dated December 20, 2013. 

Specifically, on March 14, 2014, Mr. Shepherd conducted licensed activities in the NRC’s 

jurisdiction at Pontifical Catholic University, Puerto Rico, without notifying the university that 

the NRC had issued 2 Orders regarding his involvement in NRC-regulated activities. A 

condition of Order IA-13-038 requires that Mr. Shepherd notify each customer in writing 

before conducting licensed activities to inform the customer that the NRC had issued Order 

IA-08-014 (dated September 8, 2008) and Order IA-13-038 (dated December 20, 2013) to 

him, and that these Orders would be made available upon request. 
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Appendix E – Summary of Escalated Enforcement Actions Against 

Nonlicensees 

(Vendors, Contractors and Certificate Holders)*

Confirmatory Orders 

Chicago Bridge and Iron Company EA-13-196 

Lake Charles, LA 

On September 25, 2014, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order (CO) to the Chicago Bridge 

and Iron Company (CB&I) to confirm commitments reached as part of an alternative dispute 

resolution (ADR) settlement agreement between CB&I and the NRC. An investigation 

completed by the NRC Office of Investigations (OI) on August 7, 2013, concluded that three 

employees at the Shaw Modular Solutions (SMS) Lake Charles, LA, fabrication facility (now 

owned and operated by CB&I) deliberately subverted SMS welder qualifications 

requirements when: (1) a welder took welding qualifications tests for another coworker; 

(2) the coworker allowed the welder to take the qualifications tests on his behalf; and (3) the 

weld test administrator certified that the coworker passed his welder qualifications tests 

when he knew that the tests were performed by another person. The actions on the part of 

the three SMS employees caused the company to be in violation of 10 CFR, Section 52.4, 

"Deliberate misconduct." Through mediation, CB&I agreed to take several measures to 

enhance the understanding of NRC requirements and the significance of willful violations for 

all company employees, including contractors and subcontractors, at all CB&I locations 

where NRC-regulated activities are performed. These measures build upon a previouslyissued CO and include improving quality control and processing for welding products; 

enhancing new employee training to highlight the errors behind the recent violations; and 

enhancing CB&I's nuclear safety culture monitoring program based on lessons from the 

recent violations.

 

* Please note that cases involving security-related issues are not included
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