This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A15-0297

In the Matter of the Welfare of: A. M. A., Child.

Filed August 3, 2015

Affirmed

Reyes, Judge

Anoka County District Court

File Nos. 02JV141049; 02JV141050; 

02JV141051; 02JV141052; 02JV141053

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Susan J. Andrews, Assistant 

Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and 

Anthony C. Palumbo, Anoka County Attorney, Jon C. Audette, Assistant County 

Attorney, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and 

Larkin, Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

REYES, Judge

Appellant A.M.A. challenges an order of the district court certifying him to stand 

trial as an adult on felony charges of aggravated robbery and theft of a firearm. Because 

the district court properly applied the statutory certification factors and appropriately 

exercised its discretion in reaching its certification decision, we affirm.
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FACTS

On July 28, 2014, Coon Rapids police officers were dispatched to a SuperAmerica 

at around 4:00 a.m. after receiving a report that the gas station had been robbed. The gas 

station employee, D.K., told police that a black male, who appeared to be in his 20s, 

entered the store. The black male was wearing a dark baseball hat, dark clothing, and a 

bandana over his face, and carrying a knife and a metal bar. The male ordered employees 

to put money from the cash register into his backpack. Once the registers were cleared, 

the male grabbed his backpack and ran out of the gas station. 

On August 4, 2014, at around 2:00 a.m., Coon Rapids Police officers were 

dispatched to the same SuperAmerica and a Walgreens after receiving reports that 

robberies had occurred. J.M., a Walgreens employee, told officers that a black male, who 

appeared to be between the ages of 16 and 20, entered the store wearing a ski mask and 

dark clothing. The male pointed a handgun at J.M. and ordered him to empty the cash 

registers into a backpack. The male then ran out of the store with approximately $600 in 

cash. 

D.K. was again working when SuperAmerica was robbed for the second time. 

D.K. stated that, although the male was wearing a ski mask this time, she believed it was 

the same person from the previous robbery because she recognized his eyes. The male 

ordered the employees and customers in the gas station to the interior of the cash-register 

station and instructed the employees to empty the money from the cash registers into a 

backpack. The male took the backpack and fled the store.
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The next day, Coon Rapids police detectives went to appellant’s residence after 

they received a tip that he was involved in the robberies. Appellant spoke with the 

detectives outside of his home and denied any involvement in the robberies. The 

detectives asked appellant’s mother for permission to search appellant’s bedroom for 

items in connection with the robberies. The detectives discovered a BB gun and a 4.5 

millimeter Sig Sauer handgun in appellant’s room. They also recovered $500 in cash. 

These items were seized.

On August 15, 2014, at 12:09 p.m., T.J. reported to Coon Rapids police officers

that two handguns, including a semiautomatic pistol, and some ammunition, had been 

stolen from the trunk of his vehicle. At 10:54 p.m. that evening, officers were dispatched 

to a residence in Coon Rapids upon a report that a carjacking had just occurred. K.M. 

and her friends were having a bonfire in the backyard when she noticed a person 

approaching the gathering. As the person approached the bonfire he pointed a small 

handgun at K.M. and ordered her to give him her car keys. K.M. described the person as 

a black male, around 18 years old, wearing dark clothing and a hooded sweatshirt with

his face covered. 

The male pointed the gun at other people at the bonfire, stating he needed keys to 

a car. Another guest, K.C., eventually gave him her car keys. The male pointed his gun 

at K.C.’s back and ordered her to walk to the front of the house to show him her car. 

Once K.C. pointed out her car, the male got into the vehicle and drove away. 

The following day, Coon Rapids Police Officer Steve Beberg was driving to work 

when he observed someone hiding behind a vehicle in a residential driveway. Officer 
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Beberg got out of his vehicle, identified himself, and displayed his police badge. The 

person took off running. Officer Beberg recognized appellant and pursued him. Officer 

Beberg and other uniformed officers who had arrived at the scene were eventually able to 

stop and detain appellant. They later discovered one of T.J.’s handguns in the area where 

appellant was running. A search of appellant’s home revealed the other stolen gun and 

ammunition. 

The state filed separate juvenile delinquency petitions charging appellant with four 

counts of aggravated robbery in the first degree and one count of theft of a firearm. The 

state moved to certify appellant to stand trial as an adult on all charges. 

Pursuant to Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 18.05, subd. 3(D), appellant waived his right 

to have a probable-cause hearing and the district court determined that probable cause 

was established. The matter proceeded to a three-day contested certification hearing. 

The district court heard testimony from five people, including appellant’s father, a 

clinical psychologist, and a juvenile probation officer. 

Appellant’s father described appellant as a “good boy” growing up, and stated that 

he performed well in school. According to appellant’s father, appellant “went off” after 

he turned 16 years old. Appellant became depressed, performed poorly in school, started 

using marijuana, and hung out with new friends, of whom his parents did not approve. 

Appellant’s parents encouraged appellant to get counseling or to attend therapy, but he 

refused. Appellant’s father stated that he would allow appellant to live at home, support 

him, and hold him accountable if appellant was allowed to proceed on extendedjurisdiction juvenile (EJJ) status. 
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The psychologist recommended that appellant be certified to stand trial as an adult

on the basis of the seriousness of the offenses, appellant’s culpability, and his 

programming history. The probation officer also recommended that appellant be certified

to stand trial as an adult. 

In an order evaluating the evidence presented at the certification hearing and 

applying the six statutory certification factors, the district court determined that five 

factors favored adult certification. With respect to appellant’s programming history, the 

district court found that appellant “had one prior placement outside of the home prior to 

his current court detention status” and determined that this factor was neutral. The 

district court then concluded that “all factors favor certification,” noting that two of the 

certification factors were to be given greater weight. Because it found that the state had 

demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that retaining the proceeding in the 

juvenile court would not serve public safety, the district court ordered that appellant be 

certified for prosecution as an adult. This appeal followed.

D E C I S I O N

On review of a district court’s decision to certify a juvenile to adult court, we will

affirm unless the district court abused its discretion. In re Welfare of J.H., 844 N.W.2d 

28, 34 (Minn. 2014); see In re Welfare of S.J.T., 736 N.W.2d 341, 346 (Minn. App. 2007) 

(“A district court has considerable latitude in deciding whether to certify, and this court 

will not upset its decision unless its findings are clearly erroneous so as to constitute an 

abuse of discretion.” (quotation omitted)), review denied (Minn. Oct. 24, 2007). We 

apply a clearly erroneous standard to review factual findings and a de novo standard to
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review questions of law. J.H., 844 N.W.2d at 34-35. “We will not disturb a finding 

about whether public safety would be served by retaining the proceeding in juvenile court 

unless it is clearly erroneous.” Id. at 35.

I.

With respect to the aggravated robbery offenses, under Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, 

subd. 3 (2012), certification is presumptive because appellant was 17 years old at the time 

of the offenses, the charged offenses carry a presumptive prison sentence under the 

sentencing guidelines and applicable statutes,

1

and probable cause existed to believe that

appellant committed the offenses. Appellant may rebut the presumption of certification 

“by demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that retaining the proceeding in the 

juvenile court serves public safety.” See Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 3. If he does so, 

the juvenile court retains the case as an EJJ proceeding. See id., subd. 8(b) (2012). But if 

appellant fails to provide sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption, the matter must be 

certified. See id., subd. 3.

The district court must consider the following six factors in determining whether 

public safety would be served by certification:

(1) the seriousness of the alleged offense in terms of 

community protection, including the existence of any 

aggravating factors recognized by the Sentencing Guidelines, 

the use of a firearm, and the impact on any victim;

(2) the culpability of the child in committing the 

alleged offense, including the level of the child’s participation 

 

1 Under Minnesota’s Sentencing Guidelines, the presumptive sentence for first-degree 

aggravated robbery for someone with zero criminal history points is 48 months executed. 

Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.A (2012).
7

in planning and carrying out the offense and the existence of 

any mitigating factors recognized by the Sentencing 

Guidelines;

(3) the child’s prior record of delinquency;

(4) the child’s programming history, including the 

child’s past willingness to participate meaningfully in 

available programming; 

(5) the adequacy of the punishment or programming 

available in the juvenile justice system; and 

(6) the dispositional options available for the child.

Id., subd. 4 (2012). Of these factors, the district court must “give greater weight to the 

seriousness of the alleged offense and the child’s prior record of delinquency than to the 

other factors listed.” Id. The district court examined each of the factors in reaching its 

certification decision and found that “all factors favor[ed] [adult] certification.”

2

 On 

appeal, appellant concedes factors one and two but argues that he rebutted the 

presumption that the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth factors favored certification. We will 

address each disputed factor in turn.

A. Third factor: the child’s prior criminal history

Appellant argues that the district court incorrectly assessed the third factor, his 

prior criminal history, by improperly considering his “uncharged behavior cited in school 

records.” We agree.

A “prior record of delinquency” includes “records of petitions to juvenile court 

and the adjudication of alleged violations of the law by minors.” In re Welfare of N.J.S., 

753 N.W.2d 704, 710 (Minn. 2008). Thus, it was error for the district court to consider 

uncharged behavior reflected in school records when evaluating this factor. While the 

 

2 We note that the district court found the fourth factor—the child’s programming 

history—to be neutral. 
8

district court did note that appellant had prior offenses consisting of theft, possession of a 

weapon, and disorderly conduct, these offenses were adjudicated as petty offenses. And 

appellant was referred to diversion programs for those offenses. Because there is clear 

and convincing evidence that appellant’s prior history does not consist of “deeply 

ingrained, escalating criminal behavior,” see In re Welfare of H.S.H., 609 N.W.2d 259, 

263 (Minn. App. 2000), this factor does not support certification and this finding by the 

district court was erroneous. 

B. Fourth factor: the child’s programming history

Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 4(4), directs the district court to consider “the 

child’s programming history, including the child’s past willingness to participate 

meaningfully in available programming.” “Available programming” includes “the 

child’s attendance at programming events, completion of the events, and demonstrated 

behavioral changes correlated with the programming.” In re Welfare of P.C.T., 823 

N.W.2d 676, 683 (Minn. App. 2012), review denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 2013). This factor is 

not limited to consideration of only formal programming in the juvenile justice system. 

J.H., 844 N.W.2d at 39. Instead, “a specialized program provided either through the 

juvenile justice system, or through a non-juvenile justice system setting, that is designed 

to address a relevant behavioral or social need of the child may be considered by the 

court in assessing a child’s programming history.” Id. Appellant argues that the district 

court “abused its discretion when it failed to assign this factor any weight and then went 

on to conclude that ‘all factors favor certification.” 
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Appellant is correct in pointing out that the district court erroneously concluded 

that all factors favored certification when in fact it determined that this factor was 

neutral. However, there is evidence in the record to support the district court’s finding 

that this factor is neutral. Appellant’s limited programming history makes it difficult to 

determine whether appellant meaningfully participated in available programming. On the 

one hand, there is evidence that appellant attended two diversion hearings for his 

previous adjudications of petty offenses and that he completed community work service 

and sent letters of apology. On the other hand, appellant demonstrated defiant and 

uncooperative behavior during his detention in the juvenile center. The district court did 

not abuse its discretion in concluding that this factor is neutral. 

C. Fifth and sixth factors: the adequacy of the programming available 

and the dispositional options available for the child

The fifth public-safety factor involves “the adequacy of the punishment or 

programming available in the juvenile justice system,” Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, 

subd. 4(5), and the sixth public-safety factor considers the dispositional options available 

for the child, id., subd. 4(6). The district court analyzed these two factors together3and 

concluded that they weighed in favor of certification. In doing so, the district court relied 

on the psychologist’s evaluation. Because this finding is supported by the record and is 

not clearly erroneous, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that 

these factors weigh in favor of certification. 

 

3

These two factors are often considered together. See, e.g., In re Welfare of D.T.H., 572 

N.W.2d 742, 745 (Minn. App. 1997), review denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 1998). 
10

In sum, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it 

determined that appellant did not rebut the presumption in favor of certification by 

demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that public safety would be served by 

retaining the proceeding in juvenile court. See id., subd. 3. The district court completed 

an analysis and made written findings with respect to each factor, and expressly stated 

that it gave greater weight to the seriousness of the offense. See Vang v. State, 788 

N.W.2d 111, 116 (Minn. 2010) (stating that when certification is ordered, the district 

court “is not required to make specific findings on each factor” and is only required to 

demonstrate that it “fully investigated the matter and carefully considered its decision”). 

While the district court erred by including appellant’s uncharged conduct from his 

school records in its consideration of appellant’s prior criminal history, this error does not

warrant a reversal as there remain other statutory factors that weigh in favor of 

certification. See N.J.S., 753 N.W.2d at 710-11 (affirming certification even though 

district court erred by including juvenile’s uncharged incidents from school and 

institutional records in consideration of juvenile’s prior record of delinquency). Because 

the district court’s findings on four of the public-safety factors, including the seriousness 

of the offense, are not clearly erroneous and favor certification, the district court properly 

exercised its discretion when it certified appellant to be tried as an adult for the 

aggravated robbery offenses.

II.

The parties agree that certification on the theft charge is nonpresumptive. See 

Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 3. For nonpresumptive offenses, the state has the burden 
11

of proving “by clear and convincing evidence that retaining the proceeding in juvenile 

court does not serve public safety.” Id., subd. 2(6)(ii) (2012). Because the district court’s 

determination that four of the six factors weigh in favor of certification is supported by 

the record, as discussed above, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion when it also certified appellant to be tried as an adult on the theft charge.

Affirmed.