[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 20-13067

Non-Argument Calendar

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WASEEM DAKER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL CARR, 

SAMUEL SCOTT OLENS, 

PATRICIA BETH ATTAWAY BURTON, 

JOSEPH DROLET, 

TINA M. PIPER, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

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2 Opinion of the Court 20-13067

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-01679-WMR

____________________

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, JILL PRYOR and 

BRANCH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Waseem Daker, a state prisoner, appeals pro se the sua 

sponte dismissal of his complaint against the Attorney General for 

the State of Georgia, staff attorneys, the State of Georgia, and the 

Georgia Department of Law. The district court dismissed Daker’s 

complaint for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). We 

affirm.

 Daker complained that state entities and officials violated 

his rights to access the courts and to due process under the First 

and Fourteenth Amendments. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Daker alleged that 

officials submitted proposed orders to state courts without serving

him with a copy and that the officials’ conduct resulted in their motions being granted, his motions being denied, or his cases being 

dismissed. Daker sought equitable relief and money damages.

Over Daker’s objections, the district court adopted a magistrate judge’s recommendation to dismiss the complaint. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b)(1). The district court ruled that the officials were 

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20-13067 Opinion of the Court 3

entitled to absolute immunity, that the State and its department 

were not persons subject to suit under section 1983, and that Daker 

failed to state a claim for monetary damages because his allegations 

“that he would have prevailed in his state court actions but for the 

[officials’] failure to serve him with their proposed orders . . . [were] 

entirely conclusory.” The district court also ruled that Daker failed 

to state a claim for equitable relief. The district court explained that

Daker had the remedy of appeal if the “proposed orders signed by 

the state court were entered in error,” but in the absence of such 

error, Daker suffered no injury and “lack[ed] standing to claim equitable relief.”

Daker has abandoned any challenge that he could have 

made to the dismissal of his claims against the State and the Department and of his claim againststate officials for money damages.

Arguments not raised on appeal are abandoned. Timson v. 

Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). And Daker does not 

dispute that the state entities were not persons subject to suit, see 

GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Ga., 687 F.3d 1244, 1254 (11th Cir. 2012),

or that the officials enjoyed absolute immunity from suit for money

damages, see Hart v. Hodges, 587 F.3d 1288, 1295–96 (11th Cir. 

2009).

The district court did not err by dismissing Daker’s claims 

against the officials for equitable relief. To establish standing, 

Daker had to satisfy three requirements: an injury in fact, causation, and redressability. Elend v. Basham, 471 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th 

Cir. 2006). “[F]or an injury to suffice for prospective relief,” Daker 

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had to allege that he faced “a real and immediate threat of future 

harm.” Id. at 1207. But Daker described past conduct by officials. 

His “past exposure to [alleged] illegal conduct does not in itself 

show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.” Id. (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983)) (alterations adopted and ellipses omitted).

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it sua 

sponte dismissed Daker’s complaint without giving him leave to 

amend his pleading. “A party may amend [his] pleading once as a 

matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is 

served.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); see Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 

1348–49 (11th Cir. 2004). But a district court need not give a pro se

plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint when amendment 

would be futile. L.S. ex rel. Hernandez v. Peterson, 982 F.3d 1323, 

1332 (11th Cir. 2020). Daker’s “allegations of possible future injury 

[were] not sufficient” to establish an injury in fact for purposes of 

standing. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 

(2013) (internal quotation marks omitted and alteration adopted). 

He assumed that state courts would grant relief that state officials

might request in proposed orders, but “it is just not possible for a 

litigant to prove in advance that the judicial system will lead to any 

particular result in his case.” Id. at 413–14 (quoting Whitmore v.

Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 159–60 (1990)). Without an allegation that 

an “injury is certainly impending,” Daker’s “alleged injury is . . . too 

speculative [to establish standing] for Article III purposes.” Id. at 

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409. Daker was not entitled to leave to amend his complaint because the district court could “rule out any possibility that an 

amended complaint would succeed in stating a claim.” Brown, 387 

F.3d at 1348 (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 

796 (2d Cir. 1999)). 

We AFFIRM the dismissal of Daker’s complaint.

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