# Diario Oficial C 291/2012

| | ISSN 1977-0928
  doi:10.3000/19770928.C_2012.291.spa |
| --- | --- |
| Diario Oficial
  de la Unión Europea | C 291 |
| | |
| Edición en lengua española | Comunicaciones e informaciones | 55o año27 de septiembre de 2012 |

ISSN 1977-0928

doi:10.3000/19770928.C_2012.291.spa

Diario Oficial

de la Unión Europea

C 291

Edición en lengua española

Comunicaciones e informaciones

55o año27 de septiembre de 2012

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| Número de información | Sumario | Página |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | IV   Información |
| | INFORMACIÓN PROCEDENTE DE LAS INSTITUCIONES, ÓRGANOS Y ORGANISMOS DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA |
| | Comisión Europea |
| 2012/C 291/01 | Tipo de cambio del euro | 1 |
| | INFORMACIONES RELATIVAS AL ESPACIO ECONÓMICO EUROPEO |
| | Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC |
| 2012/C 291/02 | Invitación a presentar observaciones en aplicación del artículo 1, apartado 2, de la Parte I del Protocolo 3 del Acuerdo entre los Estados de la AELC por el que se instituyen un Órgano de Vigilancia y un Tribunal de Justicia sobre ayudas estatales en relación con la creación de un fondo para vuelos chárter en Noruega | 2 |

Número de información

Sumario

Página

IV   Información

INFORMACIÓN PROCEDENTE DE LAS INSTITUCIONES, ÓRGANOS Y ORGANISMOS DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA

Comisión Europea

2012/C 291/01

Tipo de cambio del euro

1

INFORMACIONES RELATIVAS AL ESPACIO ECONÓMICO EUROPEO

Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC

2012/C 291/02

Invitación a presentar observaciones en aplicación del artículo 1, apartado 2, de la Parte I del Protocolo 3 del Acuerdo entre los Estados de la AELC por el que se instituyen un Órgano de Vigilancia y un Tribunal de Justicia sobre ayudas estatales en relación con la creación de un fondo para vuelos chárter en Noruega

2

| | V   Anuncios |
| --- | --- |
| | PROCEDIMIENTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS |
| | Oficina Europea de Selección de Personal (EPSO) |
| 2012/C 291/03 | Convocatoria de oposición general | 12 |
| | PROCEDIMIENTOS JURISDICCIONALES |
| | Tribunal de la AELC |
| 2012/C 291/04 | Solicitud de dictamen consultivo formulada al Tribunal de la AELC por el Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur, de fecha 6 de febrero de 2012, en el asunto HOB-vín ehf. contra la Compañía estatal de alcohol y tabaco de Islandia (ÁTVR) (Asunto E-2/12) | 13 |
| 2012/C 291/05 | Sentencia del Tribunal, de 12 de septiembre de 2011, en el Asunto E-16/10 — Philip Morris Norway AS contra el Estado noruego, representado por el Ministerio de Sanidad y Atención Sanitaria (Libre circulación de mercancías — Prohibición de la exposición visual de los productos del tabaco — Artículos 11 y 13 EEE — Medidas de efecto equivalente a las restricciones cuantitativas — Modalidades de venta — Protección de la salud pública — Proporcionalidad) | 14 |
| 2012/C 291/06 | Sentencia del Tribunal, de 14 de diciembre de 2011, en el Asunto E-3/11 — Pálmi Sigmarsson contra el Banco Central de Islandia (Libre circulación de capitales — Artículo 43 EEE — Restricciones nacionales a la circulación de capitales — Competencia de los órganos jurisdiccionales — Proporcionalidad — Seguridad jurídica) | 15 |
| 2012/C 291/07 | Sentencia del Tribunal, de 14 de diciembre de 2011, en el Asunto E-8/11 — Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC contra Islandia (Incumplimiento de sus obligaciones por una Parte Contratante — Directiva 2002/49/CE sobre evaluación y gestión del ruido ambiental) | 16 |

V   Anuncios

PROCEDIMIENTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS

Oficina Europea de Selección de Personal (EPSO)

2012/C 291/03

Convocatoria de oposición general

12

PROCEDIMIENTOS JURISDICCIONALES

Tribunal de la AELC

2012/C 291/04

Solicitud de dictamen consultivo formulada al Tribunal de la AELC por el Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur, de fecha 6 de febrero de 2012, en el asunto HOB-vín ehf. contra la Compañía estatal de alcohol y tabaco de Islandia (ÁTVR) (Asunto E-2/12)

13

2012/C 291/05

Sentencia del Tribunal, de 12 de septiembre de 2011, en el Asunto E-16/10 — Philip Morris Norway AS contra el Estado noruego, representado por el Ministerio de Sanidad y Atención Sanitaria (Libre circulación de mercancías — Prohibición de la exposición visual de los productos del tabaco — Artículos 11 y 13 EEE — Medidas de efecto equivalente a las restricciones cuantitativas — Modalidades de venta — Protección de la salud pública — Proporcionalidad)

(Libre circulación de mercancías — Prohibición de la exposición visual de los productos del tabaco — Artículos 11 y 13 EEE — Medidas de efecto equivalente a las restricciones cuantitativas — Modalidades de venta — Protección de la salud pública — Proporcionalidad)

14

2012/C 291/06

Sentencia del Tribunal, de 14 de diciembre de 2011, en el Asunto E-3/11 — Pálmi Sigmarsson contra el Banco Central de Islandia (Libre circulación de capitales — Artículo 43 EEE — Restricciones nacionales a la circulación de capitales — Competencia de los órganos jurisdiccionales — Proporcionalidad — Seguridad jurídica)

(Libre circulación de capitales — Artículo 43 EEE — Restricciones nacionales a la circulación de capitales — Competencia de los órganos jurisdiccionales — Proporcionalidad — Seguridad jurídica)

15

2012/C 291/07

Sentencia del Tribunal, de 14 de diciembre de 2011, en el Asunto E-8/11 — Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC contra Islandia (Incumplimiento de sus obligaciones por una Parte Contratante — Directiva 2002/49/CE sobre evaluación y gestión del ruido ambiental)

(Incumplimiento de sus obligaciones por una Parte Contratante — Directiva 2002/49/CE sobre evaluación y gestión del ruido ambiental)

16

| ES | |
| --- | --- |

ES

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IV Información

INFORMACIÓN PROCEDENTE DE LAS INSTITUCIONES, ÓRGANOS Y ORGANISMOS DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA

Comisión Europea

| 27.9.2012 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 291/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.9.2012

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 291/1

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Tipo de cambio del euro (1)

26 de septiembre de 2012

2012/C 291/01

1 euro =

| | Moneda | Tipo de cambio |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | dólar estadounidense | 1,2845 |
| JPY | yen japonés | 99,82 |
| DKK | corona danesa | 7,4561 |
| GBP | libra esterlina | 0,79490 |
| SEK | corona sueca | 8,4998 |
| CHF | franco suizo | 1,2088 |
| ISK | corona islandesa | |
| NOK | corona noruega | 7,4030 |
| BGN | lev búlgaro | 1,9558 |
| CZK | corona checa | 24,983 |
| HUF | forint húngaro | 285,78 |
| LTL | litas lituana | 3,4528 |
| LVL | lats letón | 0,6962 |
| PLN | zloty polaco | 4,1511 |
| RON | leu rumano | 4,5178 |
| TRY | lira turca | 2,3053 |
| AUD | dólar australiano | 1,2421 |
| CAD | dólar canadiense | 1,2633 |
| HKD | dólar de Hong Kong | 9,9600 |
| NZD | dólar neozelandés | 1,5675 |
| SGD | dólar de Singapur | 1,5844 |
| KRW | won de Corea del Sur | 1 438,77 |
| ZAR | rand sudafricano | 10,5700 |
| CNY | yuan renminbi | 8,0961 |
| HRK | kuna croata | 7,4515 |
| IDR | rupia indonesia | 12 324,62 |
| MYR | ringgit malayo | 3,9611 |
| PHP | peso filipino | 53,910 |
| RUB | rublo ruso | 40,1730 |
| THB | baht tailandés | 39,807 |
| BRL | real brasileño | 2,6118 |
| MXN | peso mexicano | 16,5957 |
| INR | rupia india | 68,7400 |

Moneda

Tipo de cambio

USD

dólar estadounidense

1,2845

JPY

yen japonés

99,82

DKK

corona danesa

7,4561

GBP

libra esterlina

0,79490

SEK

corona sueca

8,4998

CHF

franco suizo

1,2088

ISK

corona islandesa

NOK

corona noruega

7,4030

BGN

lev búlgaro

1,9558

CZK

corona checa

24,983

HUF

forint húngaro

285,78

LTL

litas lituana

3,4528

LVL

lats letón

0,6962

PLN

zloty polaco

4,1511

RON

leu rumano

4,5178

TRY

lira turca

2,3053

AUD

dólar australiano

1,2421

CAD

dólar canadiense

1,2633

HKD

dólar de Hong Kong

9,9600

NZD

dólar neozelandés

1,5675

SGD

dólar de Singapur

1,5844

KRW

won de Corea del Sur

1 438,77

ZAR

rand sudafricano

10,5700

CNY

yuan renminbi

8,0961

HRK

kuna croata

7,4515

IDR

rupia indonesia

12 324,62

MYR

ringgit malayo

3,9611

PHP

peso filipino

53,910

RUB

rublo ruso

40,1730

THB

baht tailandés

39,807

BRL

real brasileño

2,6118

MXN

peso mexicano

16,5957

INR

rupia india

68,7400

---

(1)  Fuente: tipo de cambio de referencia publicado por el Banco Central Europeo.

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INFORMACIONES RELATIVAS AL ESPACIO ECONÓMICO EUROPEO

Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC

| 27.9.2012 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 291/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.9.2012

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 291/2

---

Invitación a presentar observaciones en aplicación del artículo 1, apartado 2, de la Parte I del Protocolo 3 del Acuerdo entre los Estados de la AELC por el que se instituyen un Órgano de Vigilancia y un Tribunal de Justicia sobre ayudas estatales en relación con la creación de un fondo para vuelos chárter en Noruega

2012/C 291/02

Mediante Decisión no 246/12/COL, de 27 de junio de 2012, reproducida en la versión lingüística auténtica en las páginas siguientes al presente resumen, el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC («el Órgano») incoó el procedimiento establecido en el artículo 1, apartado 2, de la Parte I del Protocolo 3 del Acuerdo entre los Estados de la AELC por el que se instituyen un Órgano de Vigilancia y un Tribunal de Justicia. Las autoridades noruegas fueron informadas mediante una copia de la Decisión.

El Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC invita a los Estados de la AELC, a los Estados miembros de la UE y a los terceros interesados a que presenten sus observaciones sobre la medida en cuestión en un plazo de un mes a partir de la fecha de publicación de la presente comunicación, enviándolas a:

| Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC |
| --- |
| Registro |
| Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35 |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC

Registro

Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Dichas observaciones serán comunicadas a las autoridades noruegas. Los interesados que presenten observaciones podrán solicitar por escrito, exponiendo los motivos de su solicitud, que su identidad sea tratada de forma confidencial.

RESUMEN

Procedimiento

Las autoridades noruegas se dirigieron al Órgano en junio de 2011 en relación con su plan para crear un fondo charter para el norte de Noruega («el plan»). La Autoridad remitió sus comentarios al respecto en el transcurso de la fase de notificación previa.

Las autoridades noruegas notificaron formalmente el régimen con arreglo al artículo 1, apartado 3, de la Parte I del Protocolo 3, mediante carta de 2 de mayo de 2012.

Evaluación de la medida

El régimen consiste en el establecimiento de un fondo charter que concederá ayudas a los operadores turísticos que operan vuelos chárter a tres provincias del norte de Noruega: Nordland, Troms y Finnmark. El Fondo se capitalizará con fondos públicos concedidos por las provincias y será propiedad de las mismas.

El objetivo del régimen es incrementar la utilización de los aeropuertos del norte de Noruega, contribuyendo así al desarrollo económico de la región. Las provincias del Norte son zonas poco pobladas con una densidad de población media del 4,2 habitantes por km2, por lo que entran en la definición de regiones menos pobladas prevista en el capítulo de las directrices sobre ayudas estatales del Órgano sobre ayudas estatales regionales («Directrices sobre ayudas regionales») y se enfrentan a la despoblación.

En el pasado, se ha operado en algunas rutas del norte de Noruega, pero sin éxito. Según el sector, una razón podría ser las normas de anulación que se aplican a los vuelos chárter. Las cancelaciones tardías resultan muy costosas. El plazo para decidir si se cancela o no es varios meses antes de que se realicen las series de vuelos chárter. Si no se han vendido demasiados billetes, los operadores turísticos cancelan los vuelos por el riesgo de encontrarse con demasiadas plazas libres en lugar de esperar por si las ventas tardías hacen el vuelo rentable.

El régimen cubrirá los vuelos chárter a todos los aeropuertos del norte de Noruega con independencia del tamaño de las aeronaves y los aeropuertos.

Los beneficiarios del régimen pueden estar establecidos o no en el norte de Noruega y dentro o fuera del EEE.

La ayuda adoptará la forma de un pago de hasta el 25 % del total de los costes del vuelo chárter y se limitará solo a dichos costes. La ayuda se pagará a partir del fondo para vuelos chárter y a los operadores turísticos una vez se hayan realizado los vuelos al norte de Noruega. Los operadores turísticos deberán fijar un punto de equilibrio financiero en un índice de ocupación del 80 % (porcentaje de billetes vendidos), que es el umbral de rentabilidad del sector. La ayuda máxima (25 %) se concederá en caso de porcentajes de ocupación iguales o inferiores al 60 %. La intensidad de la ayuda disminuirá gradualmente hasta cero cuando los porcentajes de ocupación alcancen una media del 80 %.

El Órgano duda que un régimen que ofrece ayudas de funcionamiento a beneficiarios que puedan estar situados fuera de las regiones menos pobladas pueda considerarse compatible con las Directrices sobre ayudas regionales.

El Órgano entiende que el impacto económico indirecto que el régimen podría tener sobre las tres provincias puede contribuir a consolidar el establecimiento de población en la región. Sin embargo, no está convencido de que este objetivo no pueda alcanzarse por medios distintos a la utilización de ayudas de funcionamiento, que es el instrumento que más falsean la competencia. Por tanto, el Órgano duda de la conveniencia de conceder ayudas directas a operadores turísticos que probablemente estarán situados fuera de la región beneficiaria.

Conclusión

Habida cuenta de las consideraciones anteriores, el Órgano decidió incoar el procedimiento de investigación formal de conformidad con el artículo 6, apartado 1, de la parte II del Protocolo 3 del Acuerdo EEE. Se invita a las partes interesadas a que presenten sus observaciones en el plazo de un mes a partir de la publicación de la presente Decisión en el Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 246/12/COL

of 27 June 2012

to initiate the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement with regard to a Charter Fund for Northern Norway

(Norway)

THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY (‘THE AUTHORITY’),

HAVING REGARD to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Articles 61 to 63 and Protocol 26,

HAVING REGARD to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,

HAVING REGARD to Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to Article 1(3) of Part I and Article 4(4) and Article 6 of Part II,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Procedure

| (1) | The Norwegian authorities approached the Authority in June 2011 regarding their plan to establish a Charter Fund Scheme for Northern Norway (‘the Scheme’). A pre-notification document setting out the main elements of the Scheme was communicated on 24 June 2011 (Event No 602898). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

The Norwegian authorities approached the Authority in June 2011 regarding their plan to establish a Charter Fund Scheme for Northern Norway (‘the Scheme’). A pre-notification document setting out the main elements of the Scheme was communicated on 24 June 2011 (Event No 602898).

| (2) | The Authority provided some initial feedback on 5 August 2011 (Event No 605972). |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The Authority provided some initial feedback on 5 August 2011 (Event No 605972).

| (3) | After several exchanges of e-mail, the Authority, by e-mail dated 16 January 2012 (Event No 621292), informed the Norwegian authorities that the pre-notification phase could be considered as complete. It furthermore identified some issues which the notification should address and alleviate. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

After several exchanges of e-mail, the Authority, by e-mail dated 16 January 2012 (Event No 621292), informed the Norwegian authorities that the pre-notification phase could be considered as complete. It furthermore identified some issues which the notification should address and alleviate.

| (4) | The Norwegian authorities notified the Scheme, pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, by letter of 2 May 2012 (Event Nos 632837 and 322824). |
| --- | --- |

(4)

The Norwegian authorities notified the Scheme, pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, by letter of 2 May 2012 (Event Nos 632837 and 322824).

2.   The Scheme

2.1.   
  The objective and the scope of the Scheme

| (5) | The Scheme entails the establishment of a Charter Fund (‘the Charter Fund’) which will grant aid to tour operators flying air charter (1) to three counties in Northern Norway, Nordland, Troms and Finnmark. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

The Scheme entails the establishment of a Charter Fund (‘the Charter Fund’) which will grant aid to tour operators flying air charter (1) to three counties in Northern Norway, Nordland, Troms and Finnmark.

| (6) | The objective of the Scheme is to increase the use of the airports in Northern Norway and thereby to contribute to the economic development in the region. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

The objective of the Scheme is to increase the use of the airports in Northern Norway and thereby to contribute to the economic development in the region.

| (7) | The northern counties are low density population areas with an average population density of 4,2 inhabitants per km2 thereby falling within the definition of least populated regions as set out by the chapter of the Authority’s State Aid Guidelines on national regional aid (‘the Regional Aid Guidelines’) (2). Moreover, they face depopulation (3). |
| --- | --- |

(7)

The northern counties are low density population areas with an average population density of 4,2 inhabitants per km2 thereby falling within the definition of least populated regions as set out by the chapter of the Authority’s State Aid Guidelines on national regional aid (‘the Regional Aid Guidelines’) (2). Moreover, they face depopulation (3).

| (8) | The Charter Fund will be a non-profit company acting as a vehicle for granting aid. The fund will be capitalised with public money granted by the counties of Nordland, Troms and Finnmark and will be owned by the counties. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

The Charter Fund will be a non-profit company acting as a vehicle for granting aid. The fund will be capitalised with public money granted by the counties of Nordland, Troms and Finnmark and will be owned by the counties.

| (9) | The Scheme will cover charter flights to all airports in Northern Norway regardless of the size of the airplanes and the airports. The Norwegian authorities have however indicated that they expect only large airplanes to be concerned as they are the only ones suitable for charter flights. The following airports can currently handle large planes: Tromsø, Bodø, Harstad Narvik/Evenes, Alta, Kirkenes, Høybuktmoen, Bardufoss, Svalbard (4), Banak, Andøya (‘the Northern lights airports’). All these airports have excess capacity. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

The Scheme will cover charter flights to all airports in Northern Norway regardless of the size of the airplanes and the airports. The Norwegian authorities have however indicated that they expect only large airplanes to be concerned as they are the only ones suitable for charter flights. The following airports can currently handle large planes: Tromsø, Bodø, Harstad Narvik/Evenes, Alta, Kirkenes, Høybuktmoen, Bardufoss, Svalbard (4), Banak, Andøya (‘the Northern lights airports’). All these airports have excess capacity.

| (10) | A few routes have been operated to Northern Norway in the past but without success (5). According to the industry, a reason for this could be the cancellation rules applying to air charters. Cancellation at a late stage is very expensive. The deadline for deciding whether to cancel or not is several months before the operation of the air charter series. If the sale of tickets until that date is limited, the series is often cancelled. The tour operator would otherwise risk having to pay a cancellation fee or bear the loss corresponding to the empty seats. Several charter series have been cancelled due to limited sales up until the cancellation deadline. The industry believes that if the risk is reduced, many of the flights would go ahead. Such flights could even be profitable. However, tour operators seem to prefer to cancel flights due to the risk of empty seats rather than to wait and hope that late sales will make the flight profitable. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

A few routes have been operated to Northern Norway in the past but without success (5). According to the industry, a reason for this could be the cancellation rules applying to air charters. Cancellation at a late stage is very expensive. The deadline for deciding whether to cancel or not is several months before the operation of the air charter series. If the sale of tickets until that date is limited, the series is often cancelled. The tour operator would otherwise risk having to pay a cancellation fee or bear the loss corresponding to the empty seats. Several charter series have been cancelled due to limited sales up until the cancellation deadline. The industry believes that if the risk is reduced, many of the flights would go ahead. Such flights could even be profitable. However, tour operators seem to prefer to cancel flights due to the risk of empty seats rather than to wait and hope that late sales will make the flight profitable.

2.2.   
  The beneficiaries of the Scheme

| (11) | The beneficiaries of the Scheme may be located inside or outside Northern Norway and inside or outside the EEA. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

The beneficiaries of the Scheme may be located inside or outside Northern Norway and inside or outside the EEA.

| (12) | The aid applicant is the tour operator, i.e. the charterer and signature partner of the airline contract. The Norwegian authorities have however indicated that all applications must be supported by three parties:






  — | the tour operator who is the direct aid recipient, |
| --- | --- | --- |

(12)

The aid applicant is the tour operator, i.e. the charterer and signature partner of the airline contract. The Norwegian authorities have however indicated that all applications must be supported by three parties:

—

the tour operator who is the direct aid recipient,

| — | the destination provider which could be a destination management company, a hotel, a tourist office, or any other service provider. Aid from the Charter Fund will not be granted to ‘air only packages’. It must be demonstrated that the tour package includes a so-called ‘land arrangement’ in the target area with a value of at least NOK 800 (approx. EUR 106) per tourist, |
| --- | --- |

—

the destination provider which could be a destination management company, a hotel, a tourist office, or any other service provider. Aid from the Charter Fund will not be granted to ‘air only packages’. It must be demonstrated that the tour package includes a so-called ‘land arrangement’ in the target area with a value of at least NOK 800 (approx. EUR 106) per tourist,

| — | the airline outlining all costs, deadlines, penalties, obligations and responsibilities applicable to the charter series. |
| --- | --- |

—

the airline outlining all costs, deadlines, penalties, obligations and responsibilities applicable to the charter series.

| (13) | The panel in charge of selecting projects may reject an application if:






  — | fund limitations set by the board of directors of the Charter Fund for the period in question have been reached, |
| --- | --- | --- |

(13)

The panel in charge of selecting projects may reject an application if:

—

fund limitations set by the board of directors of the Charter Fund for the period in question have been reached,

| — | any of the supporting partners are believed to be unable to meet the expected commercial performance described in the application, |
| --- | --- |

—

any of the supporting partners are believed to be unable to meet the expected commercial performance described in the application,

| — | the application is incomplete or does not comply with published guidelines of the Charter Fund. |
| --- | --- |

—

the application is incomplete or does not comply with published guidelines of the Charter Fund.

| (14) | The Norwegian authorities anticipate that the Scheme will trigger 16 charter series with 7 flight rotations per charter series the first year. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

The Norwegian authorities anticipate that the Scheme will trigger 16 charter series with 7 flight rotations per charter series the first year.

2.3.   
  Form of the aid

| (15) | The aid will take the form of a payment of up to 25 % of the total charter costs and will be limited to the charter costs only (financial obligations under the contact with the airlines). Other costs borne by tour operators are not eligible costs. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

The aid will take the form of a payment of up to 25 % of the total charter costs and will be limited to the charter costs only (financial obligations under the contact with the airlines). Other costs borne by tour operators are not eligible costs.

| (16) | The aid will be paid out from the Charter Fund to the tour operators after the flights to Northern Norway have been conducted. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

The aid will be paid out from the Charter Fund to the tour operators after the flights to Northern Norway have been conducted.

| (17) | The aid will be calculated with reference to the average cabin factor of the operated flights under the charter series excluding empty legs (6). The cabin factor is the percentage of sold seats. The cabin factor will be determined according to the actual number of departing passengers divided by the maximum seat capacity of the aircraft. Passenger data will be based on the official numbers recorded by the Norwegian airport authorities. Empty legs will not be taken into account when calculating the average cabin factor but will be included when the total eligible costs for the charter series are calculated. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

The aid will be calculated with reference to the average cabin factor of the operated flights under the charter series excluding empty legs (6). The cabin factor is the percentage of sold seats. The cabin factor will be determined according to the actual number of departing passengers divided by the maximum seat capacity of the aircraft. Passenger data will be based on the official numbers recorded by the Norwegian airport authorities. Empty legs will not be taken into account when calculating the average cabin factor but will be included when the total eligible costs for the charter series are calculated.

| (18) | The tour operators will be required to set a break-even point at 80 % cabin factor which is the industrial break-even standard. Maximum support (25 %) will be given for cabin factors of 60 % or less. The aid intensity will gradually decrease to zero when cabin factors reach an average of 80 %. |
| --- | --- |

(18)

The tour operators will be required to set a break-even point at 80 % cabin factor which is the industrial break-even standard. Maximum support (25 %) will be given for cabin factors of 60 % or less. The aid intensity will gradually decrease to zero when cabin factors reach an average of 80 %.

| (19) | If the planes operated under a charter series reach between 60 % and 80 % cabin factor, the contribution paid by the Charter Fund will cover the tour operator’s losses connected to the charter series. The following figure illustrates how the Scheme will work: |
| --- | --- |

(19)

If the planes operated under a charter series reach between 60 % and 80 % cabin factor, the contribution paid by the Charter Fund will cover the tour operator’s losses connected to the charter series. The following figure illustrates how the Scheme will work:

Image

| (20) | As shown in the table above, if flights are operated with a cabin factor of less than 60 %, the tour operator will lose money, as the combination of sales revenues and an aid intensity of 25 % will not be enough to reach the break-even point. The Charter Fund will actually cover the tour operator’s losses only when the cabin factor lies between 60 % and 80 %. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

As shown in the table above, if flights are operated with a cabin factor of less than 60 %, the tour operator will lose money, as the combination of sales revenues and an aid intensity of 25 % will not be enough to reach the break-even point. The Charter Fund will actually cover the tour operator’s losses only when the cabin factor lies between 60 % and 80 %.

2.4.   
  Cumulation, monitoring and advertising

| (21) | Aid under the Scheme may be cumulated with other forms of aid. Funding of the same eligible costs under other schemes will be coordinated with the Scheme and the aid ceilings in the applicable guidelines will not be exceeded. Operating aid under the Scheme shall not be cumulated with de minimis support in respect of the same eligible expenses in order to circumvent the maximum aid intensities laid down in the Regional Aid Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

Aid under the Scheme may be cumulated with other forms of aid. Funding of the same eligible costs under other schemes will be coordinated with the Scheme and the aid ceilings in the applicable guidelines will not be exceeded. Operating aid under the Scheme shall not be cumulated with de minimis support in respect of the same eligible expenses in order to circumvent the maximum aid intensities laid down in the Regional Aid Guidelines.

| (22) | The Scheme will be published under a new subpage on Avinor’s homepage (7) and on http://www.visitnorthnorway.com. It will furthermore be advertised in international conferences. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

The Scheme will be published under a new subpage on Avinor’s homepage (7) and on http://www.visitnorthnorway.com. It will furthermore be advertised in international conferences.

| (23) | The Charter Fund undertakes to ensure that a list of tour operators receiving aid is published annually, in each instance indicating the source of public funding, the recipient company, the amount of aid paid out and the number of passengers concerned. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

The Charter Fund undertakes to ensure that a list of tour operators receiving aid is published annually, in each instance indicating the source of public funding, the recipient company, the amount of aid paid out and the number of passengers concerned.

| (24) | In the event that a tour operator fails to comply with the criteria set by the Charter Fund when the aid was granted, penalty mechanisms will be implemented. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

In the event that a tour operator fails to comply with the criteria set by the Charter Fund when the aid was granted, penalty mechanisms will be implemented.

2.5.   
  Duration and budget

| (25) | The Norwegian authorities have indicated that the Scheme will be in place for 10 years but will be re-notified if required by the revision of the Regional Aid Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

The Norwegian authorities have indicated that the Scheme will be in place for 10 years but will be re-notified if required by the revision of the Regional Aid Guidelines.

| (26) | The Norwegian authorities have said that the budget for the three first years will be of NOK 30 million. Thereinafter, capital will be injected only when necessary. However, the Charter Fund will never be capitalised with more than NOK 30 million. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

The Norwegian authorities have said that the budget for the three first years will be of NOK 30 million. Thereinafter, capital will be injected only when necessary. However, the Charter Fund will never be capitalised with more than NOK 30 million.

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of State aid

| (27) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
  ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between contracting parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’ |
| --- | --- |

(27)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between contracting parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

1.1.   
  Presence of State resources

| (28) | The aid measure must be granted by the State or through State resources. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

The aid measure must be granted by the State or through State resources.

| (29) | The Norwegian authorities have indicated that the Charter Fund will most likely be financed directly from the three northern counties’ budgets (it cannot be excluded that it may also at some stage be financed directly by the Norwegian State). |
| --- | --- |

(29)

The Norwegian authorities have indicated that the Charter Fund will most likely be financed directly from the three northern counties’ budgets (it cannot be excluded that it may also at some stage be financed directly by the Norwegian State).

| (30) | The Authority considers that the condition regarding use of State resources is met as the Scheme will be financed either by the counties or the State’s budgets (8). |
| --- | --- |

(30)

The Authority considers that the condition regarding use of State resources is met as the Scheme will be financed either by the counties or the State’s budgets (8).

1.2.   
  Favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods

| (31) | Firstly, the aid measure must confer on the beneficiaries advantages that relieve them of charges that are normally borne from their budget. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

Firstly, the aid measure must confer on the beneficiaries advantages that relieve them of charges that are normally borne from their budget.

| (32) | The tour operators benefiting from the Scheme will receive a direct grant which will reduce the amount they have lost on a given charter series. Similarly, the service providers located in the three northern counties gaining from an increase in the tourist population will also benefit indirectly from the Scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

The tour operators benefiting from the Scheme will receive a direct grant which will reduce the amount they have lost on a given charter series. Similarly, the service providers located in the three northern counties gaining from an increase in the tourist population will also benefit indirectly from the Scheme.

| (33) | Secondly, the aid measure must be selective in that it favours ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

Secondly, the aid measure must be selective in that it favours ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’.

| (34) | Only those tours operators that operate charter flights to Northern Norway will benefit directly from the Scheme. Similarly, only those operators that are located in the three northern counties will indirectly benefit from the Scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

Only those tours operators that operate charter flights to Northern Norway will benefit directly from the Scheme. Similarly, only those operators that are located in the three northern counties will indirectly benefit from the Scheme.

| (35) | The Authority therefore considers that the measure is indeed selective. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

The Authority therefore considers that the measure is indeed selective.

1.3.   
  Distortion of competition and effect on trade between contracting parties

| (36) | The aid measure must distort or threaten to distort competition and affect trade between the contracting parties to the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

The aid measure must distort or threaten to distort competition and affect trade between the contracting parties to the EEA Agreement.

| (37) | Aid is regarded as distorting competition if it is granted to an undertaking which carries out activities in competition with others. The aid beneficiaries of the Scheme are tour operators. Tour operators are active in a sector characterised by strong competition. Therefore, any aid granted under the Scheme may be regarded as distorting competition. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

Aid is regarded as distorting competition if it is granted to an undertaking which carries out activities in competition with others. The aid beneficiaries of the Scheme are tour operators. Tour operators are active in a sector characterised by strong competition. Therefore, any aid granted under the Scheme may be regarded as distorting competition.

| (38) | Furthermore, State aid to specific undertakings is regarded as affecting trade between the contracting parties if the recipient firm carries out an economic activity involving trade between the contracting parties. The State funding affects trade between contracting parties as it will be granted to operators offering holiday packages in different countries, which by definition is a cross-border activity. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

Furthermore, State aid to specific undertakings is regarded as affecting trade between the contracting parties if the recipient firm carries out an economic activity involving trade between the contracting parties. The State funding affects trade between contracting parties as it will be granted to operators offering holiday packages in different countries, which by definition is a cross-border activity.

| (39) | The Authority therefore considers that all the conditions set out in Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are met and that consequently the notified Scheme entails State aid. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

The Authority therefore considers that all the conditions set out in Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are met and that consequently the notified Scheme entails State aid.

2.   Procedural requirements

| (40) | The Regional Aid Guidelines (paragraph 81) provide that ‘operating aid schemes are not covered by the regional aid maps, and are assessed on a case-by-case basis on the basis of a notification by the EFTA State concerned pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement’. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

The Regional Aid Guidelines (paragraph 81) provide that ‘operating aid schemes are not covered by the regional aid maps, and are assessed on a case-by-case basis on the basis of a notification by the EFTA State concerned pursuant to Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement’.

| (41) | Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. (...) The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. (...) The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’.

| (42) | By submitting a notification of the Scheme on 2 May 2012 (Event No 632837), the Norwegian authorities complied with the requirement to do so set out in Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

By submitting a notification of the Scheme on 2 May 2012 (Event No 632837), the Norwegian authorities complied with the requirement to do so set out in Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3.

| (43) | By not implementing the notified Scheme, the Norwegian authorities have complied with the standstill obligation provided for under Article 3 of Part I of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

By not implementing the notified Scheme, the Norwegian authorities have complied with the standstill obligation provided for under Article 3 of Part I of Protocol 3.

3.   Compatibility of the aid

| (44) | The Regional Aid Guidelines (paragraph 1) provide: ‘on the basis of Article 61(3)(a) and Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement, State aid granted to promote the economic development of certain disadvantaged areas within the EEA may be considered to be compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. This kind of State aid is known as national regional aid. National regional aid consists of aid for investment granted to large companies, or in certain limited circumstances, operating aid, which in both cases are targeted on specific regions in order to redress regional disparities’. (Emphasis added.) |
| --- | --- |

(44)

The Regional Aid Guidelines (paragraph 1) provide: ‘on the basis of Article 61(3)(a) and Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement, State aid granted to promote the economic development of certain disadvantaged areas within the EEA may be considered to be compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. This kind of State aid is known as national regional aid. National regional aid consists of aid for investment granted to large companies, or in certain limited circumstances, operating aid, which in both cases are targeted on specific regions in order to redress regional disparities’. (Emphasis added.)

| (45) | In the case at hand, the aid granted is operating aid, i.e. aid which releases an undertaking from costs which it would normally have to bear in its day-to-day management or normal activities (9). |
| --- | --- |

(45)

In the case at hand, the aid granted is operating aid, i.e. aid which releases an undertaking from costs which it would normally have to bear in its day-to-day management or normal activities (9).

| (46) | The Regional Aid Guidelines (paragraph 69) furthermore provide:
  ‘(in derogation from the previous paragraph,) operating aid which is not both progressively reduced and limited in time may only be authorised in the least populated regions, in so far as it is intended to prevent or reduce the continuing depopulation of these regions (10). The least populated regions represent or belong to regions at NUTS-II level for Norway and NUTS IV level for Iceland with a population density of 8 inhabitants per km2 or less and extend to adjacent and contiguous smaller areas meeting the same population density criterion’. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

The Regional Aid Guidelines (paragraph 69) furthermore provide:

‘(in derogation from the previous paragraph,) operating aid which is not both progressively reduced and limited in time may only be authorised in the least populated regions, in so far as it is intended to prevent or reduce the continuing depopulation of these regions (10). The least populated regions represent or belong to regions at NUTS-II level for Norway and NUTS IV level for Iceland with a population density of 8 inhabitants per km2 or less and extend to adjacent and contiguous smaller areas meeting the same population density criterion’.

3.1.   
  The aid may only be authorised in the least populated regions

3.1.1.   The three northern counties belong to the least populated regions

| (47) | As provided by paragraph 69 of the Regional Aid Guidelines, the operating aid measure which is not progressively reduced and limited in time may only be granted in the least populated regions. The least populated regions are those regions with less than 8 inhabitants per km2
   (11). |
| --- | --- |

(47)

As provided by paragraph 69 of the Regional Aid Guidelines, the operating aid measure which is not progressively reduced and limited in time may only be granted in the least populated regions. The least populated regions are those regions with less than 8 inhabitants per km2
   (11).

| (48) | The three northern counties have a population density of 4,2 inhabitants per km2. They consequently meet the conditions set by the Regional Aid Guidelines to benefit from the more flexible compatibility assessment. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

The three northern counties have a population density of 4,2 inhabitants per km2. They consequently meet the conditions set by the Regional Aid Guidelines to benefit from the more flexible compatibility assessment.

3.1.2.   The direct beneficiaries of the Scheme are not necessarily located in the least populated regions

| (49) | However, the aid as such will be paid to tour operators which may be situated anywhere in the world. The direct beneficiary of the aid will therefore not necessarily be located in the least populated region. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

However, the aid as such will be paid to tour operators which may be situated anywhere in the world. The direct beneficiary of the aid will therefore not necessarily be located in the least populated region.

| (50) | During the pre-notification phase, the Authority expressed some concerns regarding the fact that the aid beneficiaries would not necessarily be located in the least populated regions. The companies located in the northern counties involved in the package sold by the tour operator would benefit from the increase in the tourist population but only in an indirect manner. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

During the pre-notification phase, the Authority expressed some concerns regarding the fact that the aid beneficiaries would not necessarily be located in the least populated regions. The companies located in the northern counties involved in the package sold by the tour operator would benefit from the increase in the tourist population but only in an indirect manner.

| (51) | The Norwegian authorities have argued that the link between the aid to the tour operator and the regional development was sufficient for the following reasons:






  — | the Scheme will apply to charter flights to Northern Norway exclusively, |
| --- | --- | --- |

(51)

The Norwegian authorities have argued that the link between the aid to the tour operator and the regional development was sufficient for the following reasons:

—

the Scheme will apply to charter flights to Northern Norway exclusively,

| — | only those packages including a ‘land arrangement’ would be eligible, and |
| --- | --- |

—

only those packages including a ‘land arrangement’ would be eligible, and

| — | the aid will be paid out from the Charter Fund to the tour operator after the flights to the target area have been conducted. |
| --- | --- |

—

the aid will be paid out from the Charter Fund to the tour operator after the flights to the target area have been conducted.

| (52) | The Norwegian authorities have argued that if indeed the direct beneficiaries of the aid will be tour operators who may be located outside the three northern counties, there will be many indirect beneficiaries of the Scheme in the region. They therefore consider that as the link between the direct beneficiaries of the aid — the tour operators — and the indirect beneficiaries — hotels, restaurants, etc. — is sufficiently strong, the Scheme may be held to be compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

The Norwegian authorities have argued that if indeed the direct beneficiaries of the aid will be tour operators who may be located outside the three northern counties, there will be many indirect beneficiaries of the Scheme in the region. They therefore consider that as the link between the direct beneficiaries of the aid — the tour operators — and the indirect beneficiaries — hotels, restaurants, etc. — is sufficiently strong, the Scheme may be held to be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (53) | The Authority, however, considers that the Regional Aid Guidelines were meant to encourage the granting of aid in the regions to be developed. Paragraph 1 of the Regional Aid Guidelines provides that ‘national regional aid consists of aid for investment granted to large companies, or in certain limited circumstances, operating aid, which in both cases are targeted on specific regions in order to redress regional disparities’. (Emphasis added.) |
| --- | --- |

(53)

The Authority, however, considers that the Regional Aid Guidelines were meant to encourage the granting of aid in the regions to be developed. Paragraph 1 of the Regional Aid Guidelines provides that ‘national regional aid consists of aid for investment granted to large companies, or in certain limited circumstances, operating aid, which in both cases are targeted on specific regions in order to redress regional disparities’. (Emphasis added.)

| (54) | Furthermore, paragraph 72 of the Regional Aid Guidelines states that ‘in order to verify the effects on trade and competition of operating aid schemes, EFTA States will be required to provide each year a single report in respect of each NUTS II region in which operating aid is granted which provides a breakdown of total expenditure, or estimated income forgone, for each operating aid scheme approved in the region concerned and identifies the ten largest beneficiaries of operating aid in the region concerned’. (Emphasis added.) |
| --- | --- |

(54)

Furthermore, paragraph 72 of the Regional Aid Guidelines states that ‘in order to verify the effects on trade and competition of operating aid schemes, EFTA States will be required to provide each year a single report in respect of each NUTS II region in which operating aid is granted which provides a breakdown of total expenditure, or estimated income forgone, for each operating aid scheme approved in the region concerned and identifies the ten largest beneficiaries of operating aid in the region concerned’. (Emphasis added.)

| (55) | The Authority therefore considers that the way the Regional Aid Guidelines were drafted indicates that the intention was that operating aid could only be granted in the regions concerned, here in the three northern counties. The Authority questions whether the fact that the undertakings in the regions concerned are only indirectly targeted by the Scheme constitutes a sufficiently strong link for the regional development of the area. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

The Authority therefore considers that the way the Regional Aid Guidelines were drafted indicates that the intention was that operating aid could only be granted in the regions concerned, here in the three northern counties. The Authority questions whether the fact that the undertakings in the regions concerned are only indirectly targeted by the Scheme constitutes a sufficiently strong link for the regional development of the area.

| (56) | Despite the supporting data put forward by the notifying party, the Authority still questions whether a scheme providing for the grant of operating aid to beneficiaries that may be situated outside the least populated regions may be held to be compatible with the Regional Aid Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

Despite the supporting data put forward by the notifying party, the Authority still questions whether a scheme providing for the grant of operating aid to beneficiaries that may be situated outside the least populated regions may be held to be compatible with the Regional Aid Guidelines.

3.2.   
  The aid must be necessary and appropriate to prevent or reduce continuing depopulation

| (57) | The Regional Aid Guidelines provide that it is up to the EFTA State to demonstrate that the Scheme is necessary and appropriate (paragraph 69). |
| --- | --- |

(57)

The Regional Aid Guidelines provide that it is up to the EFTA State to demonstrate that the Scheme is necessary and appropriate (paragraph 69).

| (58) | According to the Regional Aid Guidelines, the Norwegian authorities must demonstrate that the Scheme is necessary to prevent depopulation: that to reach the objective of preventing or reducing continuing depopulation, there is a need for a State intervention. The Norwegian authorities have explained that Northern Norway — which is one of Europe’s least populated areas — has always been extremely sparsely populated and has suffered from depopulation for decades. The Norwegian authorities therefore consider that it is necessary to take further measures to stabilise the settlement and to prevent further depopulation. They recognise that the establishment of the Charter Fund on its own will not solve the issue of depopulation but as a part of a general policy will increase the economic activity in the region and maintain and create new jobs. Employment opportunities and expected income are the most decisive factors influencing a person’s choice of residence. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

According to the Regional Aid Guidelines, the Norwegian authorities must demonstrate that the Scheme is necessary to prevent depopulation: that to reach the objective of preventing or reducing continuing depopulation, there is a need for a State intervention. The Norwegian authorities have explained that Northern Norway — which is one of Europe’s least populated areas — has always been extremely sparsely populated and has suffered from depopulation for decades. The Norwegian authorities therefore consider that it is necessary to take further measures to stabilise the settlement and to prevent further depopulation. They recognise that the establishment of the Charter Fund on its own will not solve the issue of depopulation but as a part of a general policy will increase the economic activity in the region and maintain and create new jobs. Employment opportunities and expected income are the most decisive factors influencing a person’s choice of residence.

| (59) | For the notified measure to be appropriate, the Norwegian authorities must demonstrate that to reach the objective of preventing or reducing continuing depopulation, the establishment of the Scheme is the best instrument as it is the one with the most chances of success and the least distortive effects. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

For the notified measure to be appropriate, the Norwegian authorities must demonstrate that to reach the objective of preventing or reducing continuing depopulation, the establishment of the Scheme is the best instrument as it is the one with the most chances of success and the least distortive effects.

| (60) | The Regional Aid Guidelines (paragraph 10) also provide that:
  ‘where, exceptionally, it is envisaged to grant individual ad hoc aid to a single firm or aid confined to one area of activity, it is the responsibility of the Member State to demonstrate that the project contributes towards a coherent regional development strategy’. (Emphasis added.) |
| --- | --- |

(60)

The Regional Aid Guidelines (paragraph 10) also provide that:

‘where, exceptionally, it is envisaged to grant individual ad hoc aid to a single firm or aid confined to one area of activity, it is the responsibility of the Member State to demonstrate that the project contributes towards a coherent regional development strategy’. (Emphasis added.)

| (61) | The notified Scheme will concern tour operators directly and the tourism industry and the local economy as a whole more indirectly. The Norwegian authorities have however indicated that the notified measure is part of a more general regional development policy. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

The notified Scheme will concern tour operators directly and the tourism industry and the local economy as a whole more indirectly. The Norwegian authorities have however indicated that the notified measure is part of a more general regional development policy.

| (62) | Thus, the High North is considered as a priority in terms of regional development. It is the government’s ambition to prevent depopulation and to encourage settlement in this region. Support for the tourism industry is seen as a key to the development of the region (12). To that effect, they have argued that the creation of employment possibilities is of particular interest to achieve the aim of preventing or reducing depopulation in the region. They have indicated that the High North has always been extremely sparsely populated and has suffered from depopulation for decades. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

Thus, the High North is considered as a priority in terms of regional development. It is the government’s ambition to prevent depopulation and to encourage settlement in this region. Support for the tourism industry is seen as a key to the development of the region (12). To that effect, they have argued that the creation of employment possibilities is of particular interest to achieve the aim of preventing or reducing depopulation in the region. They have indicated that the High North has always been extremely sparsely populated and has suffered from depopulation for decades.

| (63) | The Institute of Transport Economics estimated that in 2007, foreign air bound tourists used NOK 7 480 (approx. EUR 992) on prepaid purchases and NOK 6 730 (approx. EUR 892) on local purchases. It is estimated that travellers to Northern Norway will spend NOK 9 000 (approx. EUR 1 193) per person in 2012. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

The Institute of Transport Economics estimated that in 2007, foreign air bound tourists used NOK 7 480 (approx. EUR 992) on prepaid purchases and NOK 6 730 (approx. EUR 892) on local purchases. It is estimated that travellers to Northern Norway will spend NOK 9 000 (approx. EUR 1 193) per person in 2012.

| (64) | The Authority understands that the indirect economic impact the Scheme may have on the three northern counties may contribute to stabilising the settlement of population in the region. It is, however, not convinced that this objective could not be reached by another means than by using operating aid which is the most distortive instrument. Moreover, the Authority questions whether the objective of reducing depopulation could not be reached by an instrument that directly benefits the undertakings located in the target area. The Authority thus questions whether it is appropriate to grant direct aid to tour operators located outside the region to be aided. |
| --- | --- |

(64)

The Authority understands that the indirect economic impact the Scheme may have on the three northern counties may contribute to stabilising the settlement of population in the region. It is, however, not convinced that this objective could not be reached by another means than by using operating aid which is the most distortive instrument. Moreover, the Authority questions whether the objective of reducing depopulation could not be reached by an instrument that directly benefits the undertakings located in the target area. The Authority thus questions whether it is appropriate to grant direct aid to tour operators located outside the region to be aided.

3.3.   
  The aid must be proportionate to the objective of the Scheme

| (65) | According to Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement, aid granted in order to facilitate the development of certain economic areas may be considered to be compatible with the functioning of the Agreement ‘where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest’. In order to be compatible with the common market, the Scheme must be proportionate to the objective of the Scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

According to Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement, aid granted in order to facilitate the development of certain economic areas may be considered to be compatible with the functioning of the Agreement ‘where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest’. In order to be compatible with the common market, the Scheme must be proportionate to the objective of the Scheme.

| (66) | The Norwegian authorities have indicated that the Scheme has been designed so that only the necessary level of aid is granted. The aid will take the form of a payment of up to 25 % of the total charter costs which must be specified in accordance with generally accepted project accounting principles. If the planes operated under a charter series have somewhere between 60 % and 80 % cabin factor, the Charter Fund will reimburse the tour operator’s losses connected to the charter series. Maximum support (25 %) from the Charter Fund will be given at cabin factors of 60 % or less. The aid intensity will gradually decrease to zero when cabin factors reach an average of 80 %. At 80 % cabin factor, the tour operator has passed the break-even point and will therefore generate a profit (see above, Part I, Section 2.3). |
| --- | --- |

(66)

The Norwegian authorities have indicated that the Scheme has been designed so that only the necessary level of aid is granted. The aid will take the form of a payment of up to 25 % of the total charter costs which must be specified in accordance with generally accepted project accounting principles. If the planes operated under a charter series have somewhere between 60 % and 80 % cabin factor, the Charter Fund will reimburse the tour operator’s losses connected to the charter series. Maximum support (25 %) from the Charter Fund will be given at cabin factors of 60 % or less. The aid intensity will gradually decrease to zero when cabin factors reach an average of 80 %. At 80 % cabin factor, the tour operator has passed the break-even point and will therefore generate a profit (see above, Part I, Section 2.3).

| (67) | The Norwegian authorities have indicated that the risk reducing aspect of the Scheme will most likely lead to a cabin factor exceeding 60 % and that therefore it is unlikely that the aid intensity will correspond to 25 % of the charter costs. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

The Norwegian authorities have indicated that the risk reducing aspect of the Scheme will most likely lead to a cabin factor exceeding 60 % and that therefore it is unlikely that the aid intensity will correspond to 25 % of the charter costs.

| (68) | They have furthermore argued that the tourist industry being a major industry in the EEA, it is unlikely that the relatively small amounts of aid likely to be granted under the Scheme are liable to affect trade in a particularly negative way. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

They have furthermore argued that the tourist industry being a major industry in the EEA, it is unlikely that the relatively small amounts of aid likely to be granted under the Scheme are liable to affect trade in a particularly negative way.

| (69) | The Norwegian authorities have furthermore indicated that the Scheme will expire after 10 years of operation but that the Scheme will be re-notified if necessary due to the adoption by the Authority of new guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

The Norwegian authorities have furthermore indicated that the Scheme will expire after 10 years of operation but that the Scheme will be re-notified if necessary due to the adoption by the Authority of new guidelines.

| (70) | The Authority refers to paragraph 71 of the currently applicable Regional Aid Guidelines which provide: ‘In all cases, the need for and level of operating aid should be regularly re-examined to ensure its long-term relevance to the region concerned. The Authority will therefore only approve aid schemes for the duration of these guidelines’. (Emphasis added.) The Regional Aid Guidelines are applicable until 31 December 2012. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

The Authority refers to paragraph 71 of the currently applicable Regional Aid Guidelines which provide: ‘In all cases, the need for and level of operating aid should be regularly re-examined to ensure its long-term relevance to the region concerned. The Authority will therefore only approve aid schemes for the duration of these guidelines’. (Emphasis added.) The Regional Aid Guidelines are applicable until 31 December 2012.

| (71) | The Authority doubts that, should it consider that the Scheme is compatible with the EEA Agreement at the end of the formal investigation phase, it will be able to approve the Scheme beyond 31 December 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

The Authority doubts that, should it consider that the Scheme is compatible with the EEA Agreement at the end of the formal investigation phase, it will be able to approve the Scheme beyond 31 December 2013.

4.   Conclusion

| (72) | Based on the information submitted by the Norwegian authorities, the Authority considers that all the conditions set out in Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are met and that consequently the notified Scheme entails State aid. The Authority has doubts that the Scheme complies with Article 61(3) of the EEA Agreement, read in conjunction with the requirements laid down in the Authority’s Chapter of the State Aid Guidelines on national regional aid. The Authority, therefore, doubts that the above measures are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

Based on the information submitted by the Norwegian authorities, the Authority considers that all the conditions set out in Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are met and that consequently the notified Scheme entails State aid. The Authority has doubts that the Scheme complies with Article 61(3) of the EEA Agreement, read in conjunction with the requirements laid down in the Authority’s Chapter of the State Aid Guidelines on national regional aid. The Authority, therefore, doubts that the above measures are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (73) | Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures in question are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures in question are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (74) | In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit their comments within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit their comments within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision.

| (75) | In light of the foregoing considerations, within one month of receipt of this Decision, the Authority requests the Norwegian authorities to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the measure, |
| --- | --- |

(75)

In light of the foregoing considerations, within one month of receipt of this Decision, the Authority requests the Norwegian authorities to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the measure,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the Charter Fund Scheme for Northern Norway notified by the Norwegian authorities.

Article 2

The Norwegian authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure within one month from the notification of this Decision.

Article 3

The Norwegian authorities are requested to provide within one month from notification of this Decision all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the aid measure.

Article 4

This Decision is addressed to the Kingdom of Norway.

Article 5

Only the English language version of this Decision is authentic.

Done at Brussels, 27 June 2012.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Oda Helen SLETNES

President

Sabine MONAUNI-TÖMÖRDY

College Member

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(1)  A charter flight is defined as a non-scheduled flight. A charter series is charter flights between two destinations repeated over a limited period of time (for example, weekly flights between Bodø and London from February to April).

1

(2)  Available at: http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/legal-framework/state-aid-guidelines/

2

(3)  The three northernmost counties are NUTS II regions. The lowest population density can be found in Finnmark: 1,6 inhabitants per km2.

3

2

(4)  See Protocol 40 to the EEA Agreement.

4

(5)  In 2009, the Authority approved an aid scheme for route development from the second largest city in Northern Norway, Bodø, see Decision No 179/09/COL. The Route Development Fund Bodø has not yet granted any aid under the scheme.

5

(6)  Empty legs are flights operated in order to position an aircraft at the start and at the end of a charter series. The return flight on the first departure will be empty and the flight to pick up the last passengers will also be empty. Empty legs represent a considerable cost for short charter series.

6

(7)  Avinor AS is the State-owned company that operates most of the civil airports in Norway.

7

(8)  The Norwegian authorities have also mentioned the fact that the Charter Fund may, at some stage in the future, be co-financed by private undertakings. The assessment carried out by the Authority will not examine this possibility as this option seems to be relatively uncertain.

8

(9)  See Case T-384/04 SIDE v Commission [2008], ECR I-nyr, paragraph 99, Case T-162/06 Kronoply GmbH v Commission [2009], ECR II-nyr, paragraph 75.

9

SIDE

Commission

Kronoply GmbH

Commission

(10)  ‘It is the task of the EFTA State to demonstrate that the aid proposed is necessary and appropriate to prevent or reduce continuing depopulation’. (Emphasis added.)

10

(11)  See paragraph 22(a) of the Regional Aid Guidelines.

11

(12)  See The High North. Vision and policy instruments, the Government’s political platform for the period 2009 until 2013 and The Governments’ tourism strategy.

12

The High North. Vision and policy instruments, the Government’s political platform for the period 2009 until 2013

The Governments’ tourism strategy

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V Anuncios

PROCEDIMIENTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS

Oficina Europea de Selección de Personal (EPSO)

| 27.9.2012 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 291/12 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.9.2012

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 291/12

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CONVOCATORIA DE OPOSICIÓN GENERAL

2012/C 291/03

La Oficina Europea de Selección de Personal (EPSO) organiza la siguiente oposición general:

EPSO/AST/121/12 — Técnicos de conferencia (AST 3)

La convocatoria de oposición se publica en 23 lenguas en el Diario Oficial C 291 A de 27 de septiembre de 2012.

Para más información, consúltese el sitio Internet de EPSO: http://www.eu-careers.info

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PROCEDIMIENTOS JURISDICCIONALES

Tribunal de la AELC

| 27.9.2012 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 291/13 |
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27.9.2012

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 291/13

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Solicitud de dictamen consultivo formulada al Tribunal de la AELC por el Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur, de fecha 6 de febrero de 2012, en el asunto HOB-vín ehf. contra la Compañía estatal de alcohol y tabaco de Islandia (ÁTVR)

(Asunto E-2/12)

2012/C 291/04

Mediante carta de 6 de febrero de 2012, recibida en la Secretaría del Tribunal el 13 de febrero de 2012, se le ha presentado al Tribunal de la AELC una solicitud de dictamen consultivo formulada por el Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur (Tribunal de distrito de Reykjavík), en el asunto HOB-vín ehf. contra la Compañía estatal de alcohol y tabaco de Islandia (ÁTVR), sobre las cuestiones siguientes:

| 1) | ¿Es incompatible con el artículo 11 del Acuerdo sobre el Espacio Económico Europeo (EEE), que a una empresa del Estado, que disfruta del monopolio de la venta al por menor de bebidas alcohólicas en el territorio de un Estado del EEE, se le permita, en el marco de la normativa o de los reglamentos administrativos vigentes, negarse a aceptar la venta de bebidas alcohólicas legalmente fabricadas y comercializadas en otro Estado del EEE, con el argumento de que el envasado y el etiquetado de esos productos contiene información tendenciosa o no pertinente o que sugiere que el alcohol mejora las facultades físicas, mentales, sociales o sexuales, sin que dicha información se refiera únicamente al producto, su método de producción o sus características? |
| --- | --- |

1)

¿Es incompatible con el artículo 11 del Acuerdo sobre el Espacio Económico Europeo (EEE), que a una empresa del Estado, que disfruta del monopolio de la venta al por menor de bebidas alcohólicas en el territorio de un Estado del EEE, se le permita, en el marco de la normativa o de los reglamentos administrativos vigentes, negarse a aceptar la venta de bebidas alcohólicas legalmente fabricadas y comercializadas en otro Estado del EEE, con el argumento de que el envasado y el etiquetado de esos productos contiene información tendenciosa o no pertinente o que sugiere que el alcohol mejora las facultades físicas, mentales, sociales o sexuales, sin que dicha información se refiera únicamente al producto, su método de producción o sus características?

| 2) | ¿Es incompatible con el artículo 11 del Acuerdo EEE que un Estado del EEE incluya en su legislación o en su normativa administrativa, normas que exijan que en el envase de las bebidas alcohólicas se indique claramente que su contenido es alcohólico, y que un monopolio estatal puede negarse a autorizar la venta de tales productos, si el envase no cumpliera este requisito? |
| --- | --- |

2)

¿Es incompatible con el artículo 11 del Acuerdo EEE que un Estado del EEE incluya en su legislación o en su normativa administrativa, normas que exijan que en el envase de las bebidas alcohólicas se indique claramente que su contenido es alcohólico, y que un monopolio estatal puede negarse a autorizar la venta de tales productos, si el envase no cumpliera este requisito?

| 3) | En relación con las respuestas a la primera y segunda preguntas, ¿es importante que la legislación o la normativa administrativa se apliquen de igual manera a los productos nacionales y extranjeros? |
| --- | --- |

3)

En relación con las respuestas a la primera y segunda preguntas, ¿es importante que la legislación o la normativa administrativa se apliquen de igual manera a los productos nacionales y extranjeros?

| 4) | Si se considera que una disposición como la descrita en las preguntas primera y/o segunda constituye una restricción cuantitativa, o una medida de efectos equivalentes, en el sentido del artículo 11 del Acuerdo EEE, se solicita que el Tribunal de la AELC indique si una disposición de este tipo puede, no obstante, justificarse a tenor del artículo 13 del Acuerdo EEE. |
| --- | --- |

4)

Si se considera que una disposición como la descrita en las preguntas primera y/o segunda constituye una restricción cuantitativa, o una medida de efectos equivalentes, en el sentido del artículo 11 del Acuerdo EEE, se solicita que el Tribunal de la AELC indique si una disposición de este tipo puede, no obstante, justificarse a tenor del artículo 13 del Acuerdo EEE.

| 5) | Si se considera que una disposición como la descrita en las preguntas primera y/o segunda, basada en la legislación o en la normativa administrativa, es incompatible con el artículo 11 del Acuerdo EEE, se solicita que el Tribunal de la AELC indique si considera que se cumplen las condiciones de responsabilidad del Estado de acuerdo con la evaluación que el Tribunal de la AELC hace de este punto. |
| --- | --- |

5)

Si se considera que una disposición como la descrita en las preguntas primera y/o segunda, basada en la legislación o en la normativa administrativa, es incompatible con el artículo 11 del Acuerdo EEE, se solicita que el Tribunal de la AELC indique si considera que se cumplen las condiciones de responsabilidad del Estado de acuerdo con la evaluación que el Tribunal de la AELC hace de este punto.

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| 27.9.2012 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 291/14 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.9.2012

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 291/14

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SENTENCIA DEL TRIBUNAL

de 12 de septiembre de 2011

en el Asunto E-16/10

Philip Morris Norway AS contra el Estado noruego, representado por el Ministerio de Sanidad y Atención Sanitaria

(Libre circulación de mercancías — Prohibición de la exposición visual de los productos del tabaco — Artículos 11 y 13 EEE — Medidas de efecto equivalente a las restricciones cuantitativas — Modalidades de venta — Protección de la salud pública — Proporcionalidad)

2012/C 291/05

En el Asunto E-16/10 Philip Morris Norway AS contra el Estado noruego, representado por el Ministerio de Sanidad y Atención Sanitaria — SOLICITUD al Tribunal de Justicia, con arreglo al artículo 34 del Acuerdo entre los Estados de la AELC sobre el establecimiento de un Órgano de Vigilancia y un Tribunal de Justicia, del Tribunal de Distrito de Oslo (Oslo tingrett), relativa a la interpretación de los artículos 11 y 13 del Acuerdo sobre el Espacio Económico Europeo (EEE), y, en particular, si una norma que prohíbe la exposición visual de productos del tabaco en los comercios al por menor, como la que establece la legislación noruega, constituye una restricción ilegal con arreglo al artículo 11 del Acuerdo EEE, y, en caso de que se compruebe que existe tal restricción, cuáles son los criterios decisivos para determinar si dicha prohibición de exposición visual es proporcionada a efectos de la aplicación del artículo 13 del Acuerdo EEE– el Tribunal de la AELC, integrado por Carl Baudenbacher, Presidente, Thorgeir Örlygsson (Juez Ponente), y Per Christiansen, Jueces, dictó sentencia el 12 de septiembre de 2011, cuyo fallo es el siguiente:

| 1) | La prohibición de la exposición visual de los productos del tabaco, establecida por la legislación nacional de un país del EEE, tal como la que es objeto del presente asunto, constituye una medida de efecto equivalente a una restricción cuantitativa de las importaciones con arreglo al artículo 11 del Acuerdo EEE si la prohibición afecta de hecho a la comercialización de los productos importados de otros Estados EEE en mayor medida que la de productos importados que, hasta hace poco, se producían en Noruega. |
| --- | --- |

1)

La prohibición de la exposición visual de los productos del tabaco, establecida por la legislación nacional de un país del EEE, tal como la que es objeto del presente asunto, constituye una medida de efecto equivalente a una restricción cuantitativa de las importaciones con arreglo al artículo 11 del Acuerdo EEE si la prohibición afecta de hecho a la comercialización de los productos importados de otros Estados EEE en mayor medida que la de productos importados que, hasta hace poco, se producían en Noruega.

| 2) | Corresponde al órgano jurisdiccional nacional determinar los objetivos que persigue efectivamente la legislación en cuestión y decidir si el objetivo de salud pública de reducir el consumo de tabaco por el público en general pueden alcanzarse con medidas menos restrictivas que la prohibición de la exposición visual de los productos del tabaco. |
| --- | --- |

2)

Corresponde al órgano jurisdiccional nacional determinar los objetivos que persigue efectivamente la legislación en cuestión y decidir si el objetivo de salud pública de reducir el consumo de tabaco por el público en general pueden alcanzarse con medidas menos restrictivas que la prohibición de la exposición visual de los productos del tabaco.

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| 27.9.2012 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 291/15 |
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27.9.2012

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 291/15

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SENTENCIA DEL TRIBUNAL

de 14 de diciembre de 2011

en el Asunto E-3/11

Pálmi Sigmarsson contra el Banco Central de Islandia

(Libre circulación de capitales — Artículo 43 EEE — Restricciones nacionales a la circulación de capitales — Competencia de los órganos jurisdiccionales — Proporcionalidad — Seguridad jurídica)

2012/C 291/06

En el Asunto E-3/11 Pálmi Sigmarsson contra el Banco Central de Islandia — SOLICITUD al Tribunal de Justicia, con arreglo al artículo 34 del Acuerdo entre los Estados de la AELC sobre el establecimiento de un Órgano de Vigilancia y un Tribunal de Justicia, de Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur (Tribunal de Distrito de Reikiavik), relativa a la interpretación del artículo 43 del Acuerdo EEE–, el Tribunal de Justicia de la AELC, integrado por Carl Baudenbacher, Presidente, Per Christiansen (Juez Ponente) y Benedikt Bogason (ad hoc), Jueces, dictó sentencia el 14 de diciembre de 2011, cuyo fallo es el siguiente:

Una medida nacional que impida la introducción en Islandia de coronas islandesas compradas en el mercado offshore, es compatible con el artículo 43, apartados 2 y 4, del Acuerdo EEE en circunstancias como las del asunto pendiente ante el Tribunal.

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| 27.9.2012 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 291/16 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.9.2012

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 291/16

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SENTENCIA DEL TRIBUNAL

de 14 de diciembre de 2011

en el Asunto E-8/11

Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC contra Islandia

(Incumplimiento de sus obligaciones por una Parte Contratante — Directiva 2002/49/CE sobre evaluación y gestión del ruido ambiental)

2012/C 291/07

En el Asunto E-8/11, Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC/Islandia — SOLICITUD de una declaración de que, al no haberse asegurado de que sus autoridades competentes habían establecido y, en su caso, aprobado mapas estratégicos de ruido y elaborado planes de lucha contra el ruido para todos los grandes ejes viarios de su territorio por los que transitan más de seis millones de vehículos al año, y al no haber remitido al Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC la información relativa a los mapas estratégicos de ruido y los resúmenes de los planes de acción contemplados en el anexo VI de la Directiva, Islandia ha incumplido sus obligaciones derivadas del artículo 7, apartado 1, del artículo 8, apartado 1, y del artículo 10, del acto contemplado en el punto 32g del anexo XX del Acuerdo EEE (Directiva 2002/49/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 25 de junio de 2002, sobre evaluación y gestión del ruido ambiental), adaptado al Acuerdo EEE por su Protocolo 1–, el Tribunal de Justicia de la AELC, integrado por Carl Baudenbacher, Presidente y Juez Ponente, Per Christiansen y Páll Hreinsson, Jueces, dictó sentencia el 14 de diciembre de 2011, cuyo fallo es el siguiente:

El Tribunal:

| 1) | Declara que, al no haberse asegurado, dentro de los plazos establecidos, de que sus autoridades competentes habían establecido y, en su caso, aprobado mapas estratégicos de ruido y elaborado planes de lucha contra el ruido para todos los grandes ejes viarios de su territorio por los que transitan más de seis millones de vehículos al año, y al no haber remitido al Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC la información relativa a los mapas estratégicos de ruido y los resúmenes de los planes de acción contemplados en el anexo VI de la Directiva, Islandia ha incumplido sus obligaciones derivadas del artículo 7, apartado 1, del artículo 8, apartado 1, y del artículo 10, del acto contemplado en el punto 32g del anexo XX del Acuerdo EEE (Directiva 2002/49/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 25 de junio de 2002, sobre evaluación y gestión del ruido ambiental), adaptado al Acuerdo EEE por su Protocolo 1. |
| --- | --- |

1)

Declara que, al no haberse asegurado, dentro de los plazos establecidos, de que sus autoridades competentes habían establecido y, en su caso, aprobado mapas estratégicos de ruido y elaborado planes de lucha contra el ruido para todos los grandes ejes viarios de su territorio por los que transitan más de seis millones de vehículos al año, y al no haber remitido al Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC la información relativa a los mapas estratégicos de ruido y los resúmenes de los planes de acción contemplados en el anexo VI de la Directiva, Islandia ha incumplido sus obligaciones derivadas del artículo 7, apartado 1, del artículo 8, apartado 1, y del artículo 10, del acto contemplado en el punto 32g del anexo XX del Acuerdo EEE (Directiva 2002/49/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 25 de junio de 2002, sobre evaluación y gestión del ruido ambiental), adaptado al Acuerdo EEE por su Protocolo 1.

| 2) | Condena en costas a la República de Islandia. |
| --- | --- |

2)

Condena en costas a la República de Islandia.

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