NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 22-3110

__________

BEZALEL GROSSBERGER,

 Appellant

v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF ESSEX CCOUNTY; FAST OIL LLC; ROBERT CORMACK 

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-22-cv-05484)

District Judge: Honorable Susan D. Wigenton

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

June 1, 2023

Before: HARDIMAN, PORTER, and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed June 2, 2023)

___________

OPINION*

___________

PER CURIAM

Appellant Bezalel Grossberger filed an action in the District Court against the 

Superior Court of New Jersey for Essex County, Fast Oil LLC, and Robert Cormack. 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not

constitute binding precedent.
2

The District Court granted Grossberger’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, screened 

the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), and dismissed it with prejudice for 

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Grossberger filed 

a post-judgment motion, which the District Court properly construed as a motion for 

reconsideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and denied. This timely appeal ensued. 

For the following reasons, we will affirm. 

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review 

over a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Koval v. Wash. Cnty. 

Redevelopment Auth., 574 F.3d 238, 241 (3d Cir. 2009). We may affirm the District 

Court’s decision on any basis supported by the record. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 

246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).

It is difficult to discern the exact nature of Grossberger’s claims. The action stems 

from a suit he filed in the Essex County Superior Court against Fast Oil and Cormack, 

among others. In his federal complaint, Grossberger claims that the Superior Court 

denied his due process right of access to the courts by summarily acting on his pleadings 

without hearings and written rulings and by conspiring with Fast Oil and Cormack “to 

ensure they may continue to defraud” him. ECF No. 1 at 4-5.

The District Court determined that the complaint sought review of the Superior 

Court’s rulings and that the action was therefore barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,1

which precludes federal consideration of “cases brought by state-court losers complaining 

1 See D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 

263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923).
3

of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings 

commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon 

Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). The RookerFeldman doctrine is narrow, limited to cases where the complained-of injury stems 

directly from the state court’s proceedings. See Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox 

Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 167 (3d Cir. 2010). It is not clear that all of 

Grossberger’s claims come within the scope of the doctrine.2 Nevertheless, we agree 

with the District Court that the complaint is subject to dismissal. 

First, the claims against the Superior Court are barred by the Eleventh 

Amendment. See Karns v. Shanahan, 879 F.3d 504, 513 (3d Cir. 2018). Contrary to 

Grossberger’s argument on appeal, the complaint does not seek any “prospective, 

declaratory, or injunctive relief governing an officer’s future conduct” that could permit 

immunity to be waived under the doctrine of Ex parte Young. See MCI Telecomm. 

Corp. v. Bell Atl. Pa., 271 F.3d 491, 506 (3d Cir. 2001). Rather, it seeks 

retrospective relief in the form of a decree that the state court violated his right of access 

to the courts. See Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698 (3d Cir. 1996) 

2 Grossberger’s exhibits refer to an interlocutory order indicating proceedings at that time 

were ongoing, see ECF Nos. 1-4, 1-5. See Malhan v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of State, 938 F.3d 

453, 460 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding in case involving an interlocutory order “that RookerFeldman does not apply when state proceedings have neither ended nor led to orders 

reviewable by the United States Supreme Court”). He also complains in part about 

defendants Fast Oil and Cormack’s actions. See Great W. Mining & Min. Co. v. Fox 

Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 167 (3d Cir. 2010) (indicating that the doctrine does not 

apply “when the source of the injury is the defendant’s actions (and not the state court 

judgments)”). 
4

(explaining that a litigant’s request for relief is not prospective where “specific 

allegations target past conduct, and the . . . [litigant’s requested] remedy is not intended 

to halt a present, continuing violation of federal law”). Second, neither Fast Oil nor 

Cormack appears to be a state actor for purposes of the claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

See Benn v. Universal Health Sys., 371 F.3d 165, 169-70 (3d Cir. 2004). Accordingly, 

the claims were properly dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 

We also agree with the District Court that there was no need to provide 

Grossberger with leave to amend before dismissing his complaint because it is apparent 

that amendment would have been futile, see Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 

224, 236 (3d Cir. 2008), and that there was no basis for granting reconsideration, see

Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999)

(noting that the purpose of a Rule 59(e) motion “is to correct manifest errors of law or 

fact or to present newly discovered evidence” (citation omitted)). 

Based on the foregoing, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.3

3 Appellant’s “Motion to Proceed on Original Record,” which has been construed as a 

motion to expand the record, and his “Motion to Direct Defendant or Assume Original 

Jurisdiction” are denied.