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In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

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NO. 09-23-00226-CR

__________________

CRAIG BAREFIELD, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

__________________________________________________________________ 

On Appeal from the 1A District Court

Tyler County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 14,042

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Craig Barefield appeals the trial court’s revocation of his 

community supervision. Under a plea bargain agreement, Barefield pleaded guilty 

to the offense of manufacture and delivery of a controlled substance, namely 

phencyclidine (PCP), in an amount of four grams or more but less than two hundred

grams, a first-degree felony. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.112(d). On 

September 22, 2022, the trial court accepted the plea, but the trial court deferred 

adjudication of guilt and placed Barefield on community supervision for five years, 
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imposed a $500 fine, and ordered Barefield to pay $180 in restitution. The Order 

Imposing Conditions of Community Supervision ordered Barefield to comply with 

the following provisions, in relevant part:

2. Defendant shall avoid injurious or vicious habits; you are forbidden 

to use, possess, or consume any controlled substance, dangerous drugs, 

marijuana, alcohol or prescription drug not specifically prescribed to 

you by lawful prescription.

. . .

6. Defendant shall work faithfully at suitable employment as far as 

possible.

. . .

14. Defendant shall perform 40 hours of Community Service 

Restitution at a governmental, charitable, or non-profit organization as 

assigned by the Community Supervision Officer in charge of the case, 

at a rate of no less than 16 hours per month, beginning within thirty (30) 

days of today’s date and be responsible for any costs of supervision. 

On March 2, 2023, the State filed a motion to adjudicate guilt and revoke 

Barefield’s community supervision, alleging Barefield: (1) violated Condition 2 of 

the terms of his community supervision because he admitted to the usage of PCP 

and alcohol on February 22, 2023; (2) violated Condition 6 of the terms of his 

community supervision because he failed to obtain employment; and (3) violated 

Condition 14 of the terms of his community supervision because he failed to comply 

with the court’s order to perform community service and was forty hours in arrears.

At a hearing on the State’s motion to adjudicate and revoke Barefield’s community 

supervision, Barefield pleaded “not true” to the allegations in the motion. After 

hearing evidence, the trial court adjudicated Barefield guilty, and found the 
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allegations in the motion to revoke “true.” After hearing punishment evidence, the 

trial court sentenced Barefield to thirty years of confinement. On appeal, Barefield 

argues in three issues that the evidence was insufficient to support revocation on 

each of the alleged violations of his community supervision and that the trial court 

abused its discretion in sentencing Barefield to thirty years of confinement. We 

affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Standard of Review

When reviewing an order revoking community supervision, the sole question 

before this Court is whether the trial court abused its discretion. See Rickels v. State, 

202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). In a revocation proceeding, the State 

must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a 

condition of community supervision as alleged in the motion to revoke. Id. at 763-

64; Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). In the context of a 

revocation proceeding, “a preponderance of the evidence” means “th[e] greater 

weight of [] credible evidence which would create a reasonable belief that the 

defendant has violated a condition of his [community supervision].” Rickels, 202 

S.W.3d at 764.

In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a revocation, we view 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Jones v. State, 589 

S.W.2d 419, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). The trial court abuses its discretion only 
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if its decision “was so clearly wrong as to lie outside that zone within which 

reasonable persons might disagree.” Cantu v. State, 842 S.W.2d 667, 682 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1992) (citing Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1990) (op. on reh’g)). Revocation is appropriate when a preponderance of the 

evidence supports at least one of the State’s allegations that the defendant violated a 

condition of his community supervision. See Leonard v. State, 385 S.W.3d 570, 576 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2012). A single violation of a term of community supervision is 

sufficient to support the trial court’s decision to revoke community supervision. See 

Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). The trial court is the 

sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their 

testimony. Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Brooks v. 

State, 153 S.W.3d 124, 127 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2004, no pet.).

Issues on Appeal

In his appellate brief, Barefield states his issues as follows:

ISSUE # 1: The Trial Court erred in finding that the allegations in the 

First Motion to Proceed with Adjudication of Guilt are true, concerning 

Condition 6 “Failed to work faithfully at suitable employment”, 

because the State failed to meet its burden of proof on this allegation.

ISSUE #2: The Trial Court erred in finding that the allegations in the 

First Motion to Proceed with Adjudication of Guilt are true, concerning 

Condition 14 “Failed to perform 40 hours community service”, because 

the State failed to meet its burden of proof on this allegation.

ISSUE #3: The Trial Court’s finding that the allegations in the First 

Motion to Proceed with Adjudication of Guilt are true, concerning the 
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allegations regarding Condition 2 “failure to abstain from the use of 

narcotic or habit forming drugs”, and the subsequent judgment that 

Appellant was sentenced to 30 years in TDCJ, were an abuse of 

discretion.

Analysis

First, we will address his third issue. In his third issue, Barefield argues the 

trial court abused its discretion in finding true the allegations in the State’s motion 

to revoke regarding Condition 2. At the hearing, Jamie Glawson, Barefield’s 

probation officer, testified. Glawson testified that she was Barefield’s probation 

officer in April of 2023, when Barefield admitted to using PCP and alcohol in 

violation of his probation. According to Glawson, Barefield signed an “Admittance 

of Use” on May 22, 2023, and that form is a regular record Glawson keeps in the 

probation office. Glawson testified that on the form Barefield, the defendant at trial,

admitted to using PCP and alcohol, and both Barefield and Glawson signed the form.

The “Voluntary Admittance of Controlled Substance Usage” form was admitted as 

State’s Exhibit 2 without objection. The form reflects Barefield’s hand-written

initials next to hand-written checks next to the form’s choices of “PCP” and 

“Alcohol” under the category for “Controlled Substances Used” and the handwritten date of “2-16-23” next to both substances “PCP” and “Alcohol[.]” The form 

appears to have been signed and dated “2-22-23” by both Barefield and Glawson. 

Just above the signatures the form states the following typed language:
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I understand that the use of the above illegal substance is not only a 

direct violation of my terms and conditions of community supervision, 

but also a violation of statutory law. This admittance is given freely and 

voluntarily. No promises of any kind were offered to me in exchange 

for this admittance. Furthermore, my Community Supervision Officer 

has thoroughly explained to me the consequences of continued use of 

illegal substances, and that treatment and reporting requirements may 

be increased, if deemed appropriate.

Although no drug test results were admitted into evidence, Glawson testified that 

Barefield failed a drug test. Glawson agreed that after Barefield admitted to using 

drugs in February, a violation report was filed with the District Attorney’s Office.

As to the revocation based on the violation of Condition 2, Barefield argues 

on appeal that “the UA testing reports were not provided to the court[,]” this alleged

violation “was supported by the voluntary statement of Appellant only[,]” and the 

voluntary statement “which Appellant was apparently encouraged to sign” did not

notify him “that such admission would result in his incarceration for 30 years.” As 

part of issue three, Barefield also argues that the trial court abused its discretion 

when it “took a zero tolerance approach[]” and sentenced Barefield to thirty years of 

confinement.

“[A] defendant’s voluntary confession to violating the terms of his or her 

community supervision is, by itself, sufficient evidence to support a trial court’s 

decision to revoke community supervision.” Briggle v. State, No. 06-15-00041-CR, 

2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 10045, at **13-14, 20-21 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Sept. 25, 

2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (defendant’s admission, by 
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way of a signed admission of drug use admitted at trial with no objection, that she 

used methamphetamine while on community supervision and in violation of one of 

the conditions of her community supervision, was sufficient to support trial court’s 

decision to revoke community supervision) (citing Wade v. State, 83 S.W.3d 835, 

839-40 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, no pet.) (defendant’s confession to failing to 

pay fines and fees, without explanation of inability to pay, was sufficient to support 

trial court’s decision to revoke community supervision)); see also Cunningham v. 

State, 488 S.W.2d 117, 121-22 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (holding testimony of 

probation officer that defendant admitted using narcotics was sufficient to revoke 

probation for violation of condition that he abstain from use of narcotics); 

Whisemant v. State, No. 07-22-00288-CR, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 863, at **3-5 

(Tex. App.—Amarillo Feb. 9, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication) (admission of exhibits signed by defendant in which he admitted to 

using amphetamine, methamphetamine, marihuana, and alcohol provided sufficient 

evidence that defendant violated the conditions of community supervision); Swallow 

v. State, Nos. 14-21-00160-CR & 14-21-00161-CR, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 4614, 

at **6-10 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 7, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication) (two forms defendant signed admitting he used 

controlled substances on two occasions and his probation officer’s testimony that 

the defendant admitted to using controlled substances was sufficient evidence that 
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the defendant violated the conditions of his community supervision by using the 

controlled substances on two occasions); Keelin v. State, No. 07-13-00420-CR, 2014 

Tex. App. LEXIS 8936, at **5-7 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 13, 2014, pet. ref’d) 

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (in-person admission to supervision 

officer and signed admission of methamphetamine use sufficient to revoke 

community supervision); Hampton v. State, No. 07-00-0078-CR, 2000 Tex. App. 

LEXIS 4721, at **4-5 (Tex. App.—Amarillo July 18, 2000, no pet.) (oral admission 

of a violation of a term or condition of community supervision made to a 

probationer’s probation officer is, by itself, sufficient evidence to support a 

revocation of community supervision); Anthony v. State, 962 S.W.2d 242, 246 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth 1998, no pet.) (testimony of probation officer and social worker 

that defendant admitted to using cannabinoids was sufficient to support revocation 

on that basis); Hernandez v. State, 704 S.W.2d 909, 910 (Tex. App.—Waco 1986, 

no pet.) (evidence that defendant admitted to his probation officer that defendant had 

been drinking alcohol supported revocation of probation on that ground).

The trial court heard the probation officer’s testimony that while on 

community supervision, Barefield failed a drug test, confessed to using PCP and 

alcohol in violation of the terms of his community supervision, and that Barefield 

signed an admission of the violation. Barefield did not object to the testimony or the 

admission of the “Voluntary Admittance of Controlled Substance Usage” form or 
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argue that he signed it involuntarily. As part of his guilty plea, Barefield signed 

Written Plea Admonishments that stated the following:

DEFERRED ADJUDICATION: If the Court defers adjudicating your 

guilt and places you on probation, a violation of any condition of 

probation may result in proceedings being initiated whereby you are 

arrested and detained, as provided by law, for a hearing by the Court 

limited to a determination of whether to proceed with an adjudication 

of guilt on the original charge. No appeal may be taken from this 

determination. After adjudication of guilt, all proceedings including

pronouncement of sentence, granting of probation and your right to 

appeal continue as if adjudication of guilt had not been deferred. In 

addition, after adjudication of guilt, the punishment assessed may be 

any term within the range for the offense and is not limited to the term 

of probation.

Barefield also signed the Order Imposing Conditions of Community Supervision that 

provided the terms of his community supervision and advised him that the trial court 

had “the authority to revoke [Barefield’s] community supervision at any time during 

the period of supervision for any violation of the conditions.”

On this record, Barefield’s voluntary confession to violating the term of his 

community supervision order prohibiting him from “us[ing], possess[ing], or 

consum[ing] any controlled substance [or] alcohol” is, by itself, sufficient evidence 

to support the trial court’s decision to revoke Barefield’s community supervision. 

See Briggle, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 10045, at **13-14, 20-21; see also

Cunningham, 488 S.W.2d at 121-22; Anthony, 962 S.W.2d at 246; Hernandez, 704 

S.W.2d at 910. The trial court could have reasonably concluded that Barefield 

violated Condition 2 of his community supervision as alleged in the State’s motion 
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to revoke. See Briggle, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 10045, at **13-14, 20-21; see also

Cunningham, 488 S.W.2d at 121-22; Anthony, 962 S.W.2d at 246; Hernandez, 704 

S.W.2d at 910. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s 

ruling, we conclude that the State proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 

Barefield violated one or more conditions of his community supervision. See 

Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 763; Cobb, 851 S.W.2d at 874. 

We next address Barefield’s argument in issue three that the trial court abused 

its discretion by not considering placing Barefield in drug treatment or continuing 

him on community supervision instead of revoking his community supervision and 

sentencing him to thirty years of confinement. Once sufficient evidence was 

presented of a violation of a condition as set forth in the order the trial court used 

when it placed Barefield on community supervision, the trial court had broad 

discretion in choosing whether to continue, modify, or revoke his community 

supervision. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 42A.751(d), 42A.752(a), 

42A.755(a); Flournoy v. State, 589 S.W.2d 705, 708 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 

1979). Because there was sufficient evidence to support revocation as outlined 

above, the trial court had broad discretion in choosing the sentence, and we conclude

the sentence the trial court imposed was within the trial court’s discretion. See Tex. 

Penal Code Ann. § 12.32(a) (first-degree felony offense of manufacture or delivery 
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of a controlled substance carries a punishment range of confinement from five to 

ninety-nine years). We overrule Barefield’s third issue.

Because a single violation of a term of community supervision is sufficient to 

support the trial court’s decision to revoke community supervision, we need not 

address Barefield’s remaining issues on appeal challenging the sufficiency of the 

evidence that he failed to work faithfully at suitable employment and he failed to 

perform forty community service hours, as alleged in the State’s motion to revoke. 

See Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); see also Tex. R. 

App. P. 47.1.

We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Barefield’s 

unadjudicated community supervision and sentencing him to thirty years of 

confinement and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

AFFIRMED. 

 LEANNE JOHNSON

Justice

Submitted on November 28, 2023

Opinion Delivered January 24, 2024

Do Not Publish

Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ.