NOTATION VOTE

RESPONSE SHEET

TO: Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary
FROM: COMMISSIONER SVINICKI
SUBJECT: SECY-14-0112: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A PATH

FORWARD FOR CHEMICAL SECURITY

Approved Disapproved __ XX Abstain

Not Participating

COMMENTS: Below ___ Attached _XX__ None ___

NATURE

04/ 115
DATE
Entered on “STARS” Yes ./ N

fo)



Commissioner Baran’s Comments on SECY-14-0112

Under a memorandum of understanding with the Department of Homeland Security,
NRC has exclusive regulatory responsibility for the security of all “chemicals of interest”
in quantities of concern at category |, II, and III fuel cycle facilities. | appreciate the NRC
Staff's efforts to collect information from the fuel cycle facilities about the types and
locations of onsite chemicals and the security measures protecting them. The staff also
toured the sites to determine where chemicals were stored and to observe physical
security for those areas. The staff found that currently “for all sites, there were no
security gaps in the protection of chemicals from sabotage, theft, or diversion” because
the chemicals of interest were co-located with secured nuclear materials.

However, as the staff explains, the location of chemicals of concern at fuel cycle
facilities and the level of security for such chemicals can change over time. | agree with
the staff that, as the sole regulator of chemical security at these facilities, NRC has a
responsibility to maintain up-to-date knowledge of the quantities, locations, and level of
security of chemicals of concern. | believe that we have an ongoing duty to ensure that
these chemicals remain secure.

Therefore, | approve the staff's recommended Option 4. NRC should annually review

the inventories, locations, and adequacy of security of chemicals of interest possessed
by licensees at fuel cycle facilities and monitor any plans to add or remove inventories
of chemicals of interest. As the staff explains,

Based on this review, no action would be required if the chemical quantities are
maintained below certain threshold levels or if chemicals are located within the

security boundary at the site. Chemicals above threshold limits located outside
the license’s security boundary would result in additional review and additional

engagement with the licensee on how to achieve adequate protection for those
chemicals.

The staff should conduct confirmatory visits, as necessary. This approach will minimize
the resource burden on NRC and its licensees while fulfilling NRC’s responsibilities as a
regulator. The staff should notify the Commission if the results of the annual reviews or
confirmatory visits identify problems with chemical security at fuel cycle facilities.

| also agree with Commissioner Ostendorff that NRC should have a mechanism to
make our licensees aware of changes in the CFATS listing of chemicals of interest. An
Information Notice informing relevant licensees of changes to the CFATS list of
chemicals of interest would be a prudent measure.


NOTATION VOTE

RESPONSE SHEET
TO: Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary
FROM: COMMISSIONER OSTENDORFF
SUBJECT: SECY-14-0112: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A PATH

FORWARD FOR CHEMICAL SECURITY

Approved Disapproved X Abstain

Not Participating

COMMENTS:  Below__ Attached _X None __

LezeLkg

SIGNATURE

uhrht

DATE

Entered on “STARS” Yes_X__No___


Commissioner Svinicki’s Comments on SECY-14-0112
Recommendations for a Path Forward for Chemical Security

This paper provides the staff's response to the Commission’s prior direction in the Staff
Requirements Memorandum on SECY-11-0108, “Regulation of Chemical Security,” dated
February 15, 2012, wherein the Commission disapproved the staff's recommendation to
undertake a rulemaking to establish chemical-security requirements for NRC-licensed facilities
and instead directed the staff to gather information from all fuel cycle facilities (FCFs) to
determine which facilities possess chemicals in quantities of interest stored outside existing
security areas, the amounts and location of these chemicals, the current level of security for the
chemicals, and any security enhancements proposed to be implemented. Additionally, the NRC
staff interviewed site personnel to develop an understanding of safety and administrative
features that would support the security of chemicals in use at the sites.

The staff completed this data collection and analysis effort and found, for all sites, that there
were no security gaps in the protection of chemicals from sabotage, theft, or diversion. The
staff used the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) process to determine the tier of each
facility. NRC screened multiple facilities through this tiering process; none came out higher than
Tier 2. The staff consequently determined that facility security features such as fencing, vehicle
barriers, and access controls exceeded DHS requirements. NRC staff stated further that “[n]o
information gathered from subsequent site visits changed this conclusion.”

Through this exercise, the staff confirmed that “all FCFs store and use [chemicals of interest]
COls within their security footprint. NRC security regulations for nuclear material at FCFs
exceed DHS requirements for COls. Given the DHS-approved security measures for Tier 2 and
3 facilities, it is clear that all COls at NRC-regulated fuel cycle facilities are adequately
protected, having at least comparable protection to that required under [the Chemical Facility
Anti-Terrorism Standard] CFATS.”

As noted by the staff, all NRC-regulated facilities are required to comply with relevant safety and
environmental regulations promulgated by both Federal and State agencies that pertain to the
safe use, storage, and disposal of chemicals. For FCFs, the NRC’s current regulations address
chemical-safety risks associated with licensed materials, facility conditions which affect the
safety of licensed material, and hazardous chemicals produced from licensed material. On the
basis of the staff's evaluation, therefore, Options 2 through 5 lack a regulatory basis. |
disapprove them and approve Option 1.



NOTATION VOTE

RESPONSE SHEET

TO: Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary
FROM: Commissioner Baran
SUBJECT: SECY-14-0112: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A PATH

FORWARD FOR CHEMICAL SECURITY

Approved x Disapproved Abstain
Not Participating

COMMENTS: Below Attached _X None

LG bo
SJGNATURE

fir der
DATE

Entered on “STARS” Yes L No_


UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

April 16, 2015

SECRETARY

COMMISSION VOTING RECORD

DECISION ITEM: SECY-14-0112

TITLE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A PATH FORWARD FOR
CHEMICAL SECURITY

The Commission acted on the subject paper as recorded in the Staff Requirements
Memorandum (SRM) of April 16, 2015.

This Record contains a summary of voting on this matter together with the individual vote
sheets, views and comments of the Commission.

De te

Annette L. Vietti-Cook
Secretary of the Commission

_

Enclosures:
1. Voting Summary
2. Commissioner Vote Sheets

ce: Chairman Burns
Commissioner Svinicki
Commissioner Ostendorff
Commissioner Baran
OGC
EDO
PDR


Commissioner Ostendorff's Comments on SECY-14-0112,
“Recommendation for a Path Forward for Chemical Security”

| appreciate the staff's ongoing efforts to address the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS) Chemical Facility Anti-terrorism Standards (CFATS) applicability to
NRC and Agreement State facilities. Significant progress has been made since the
staff's 2011 Commission Paper, including signing a Memorandum of Understanding
with DHS and assessing all of our facilities of concern. Option 4, to maintain awareness
of chemical security at our facilities on an annual basis, imposes an additional burden
on the industry and staff without a defined increase in security. The robust NRC
security measures already in place, the lack of a regulatory gap between DHS CFATS
and NRC security measures, and our licensees’ security for chemicals of interest
already being at or above what is recommended in the CFATS strengthen my belief that
no further action is necessary at this time. Therefore, | disapprove Option 4 and
approve Option 1, maintain the current level of security, with an additional action
described below.

| agree with the staff that we should maintain awareness of changes in the DHS CFATS
listing of chemicals of interest and make our licensees aware of those changes. |
expect that changes would be rare. Our licensees have demonstrated that they
understand the need to keep quantities of chemicals of interest secure. The staff
informed us of two separate instances where licensees evaluated their new processes
that involved DHS CFATS chemicals of interest and self-identified the need to secure
the chemical inside the security perimeter. This implies that our licensees only need to
be informed of what chemicals of interest, and quantities, are on the DHS CFATS list.
Therefore, the staff should identify a mechanism (i.e., Information Notice) to inform
relevant licensees of changes to the DHS CFATS list of chemicals of interest.


Commissioner Burns’ Comments on SECY-14-0112:
“Recommendations for a Path Forward for Chemical Security”

| approve the staff's recommended Option 4 to the extent that the staff proposes to maintain
awareness of chemical inventories through an annual survey of chemical inventories possessed
by fuel cycle facility licensees. As Commissioner Ostendorff suggests, the staff should maintain
awareness of changes in the OHS CFATS listing of chemicals of interest and inform licensees
of those changes through, e.g., an Information Notice.

| believe this approach should result in a minimal burden on staff and licensee resources
commensurate with the NRC’s legitimate oversight interest. Given licensee performance to
date, | would expect the need to consider additional regulatory action rare. Staff should report
to the Commission in 2 to 3 years whether the survey approach has the expected benefits and

whether it should be continued.

in G. Burns
1 eh | 2015



NOTATION VOTE

RESPONSE SHEET

TO: Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary
FROM: Chairman Burns
SUBJECT: SECY-14-0112: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A PATH

FORWARD FOR CHEMICAL SECURITY

Approved __x Disapproved x __ Abstain

Not Participating

COMMENTS:  Below___ Attached X None__

SIGNATURE

1 April 2015
DATE

Entered on “STARS” Yes_x No ___


CHRM. BURNS

COMR. SVINICKI

COMR. BARAN

VOTING SUMMARY - SECY-14-0112

RECORDED VOTES

NOT
APRVD DISAPRVD ABSTAIN PARTICIP COMMENTS

X X X

X

X
COMR. OSTENDORFF Xx X
xX

DATE

4/1/15

4/3/15

11/17/14
1/12/15