In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 00-1473

LOU MAZZEI, TRUSTEE OF THE LOCAL 786

BUILDING MATERIAL TEAMSTERS AND 

HELPERS WELFARE FUND AND LOCAL 786 

BUILDING MATERIAL TEAMSTERS AND 

HELPERS PENSION FUND,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ROCK-N-AROUND TRUCKING, INC., 

an Illinois corporation,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 99 C 1975--David H. Coar, Judge.

Argued October 27, 2000--Decided April 6, 2001

 Before Easterbrook, Kanne, and Rovner, Circuit

Judges.

 Kanne, Circuit Judge. Lou Mazzei, Trustee of the

Local 786 Building Material Teamsters and Helpers

Welfare Fund and Local 786 Building Material

Teamsters and Helpers Pension Fund ("the Funds"),

filed suit against Rock N’ Around Trucking

("RNA"), claiming that pursuant to the terms of

the collective bargaining agreement (the "CBA")

RNA entered into with the International

Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 786 ("Local

786"), RNA owes the Funds $669,030 in

contributions on behalf of its owner-drivers. The

district court found that the CBA obligates RNA

to contribute to the Funds on behalf of its

owner-drivers. The court concluded, however, that

such contributions would violate section 302 of

the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29

U.S.C. sec. 186, because RNA’s owner-drivers are

independent contractors. Therefore, the court

granted RNA’s motion for summary judgment. Mazzei

now appeals the district court’s decision.

Because we agree with the district court’s

conclusion that the contributions called for in

the CBA are illegal under section 302 of the

LMRA, we affirm its decision granting RNA’s

motion for summary judgment. 
I. History

 RNA is an Illinois Corporation that provides

trucking services to the construction industry.

In April 1996, RNA entered into the CBA with the

Local 786, a labor union representing truck

drivers and yard employees engaged in the

processing and delivery of building materials.

The controversy in this case centers around what

obligation, if any, RNA has, under the terms of

the CBA, to contribute to the Funds on behalf of

its owner-drivers, those individuals who own and

drive their own trucks.

 Most of RNA’s hauling operations are performed

by owner-drivers. These individuals sign

"Equipment Leases" with RNA and operate under

RNA’s license to operate as a motor carrier./1

The lease term is for three years, though either

party may terminate the lease at any time without

penalty. Additionally, owner-drivers are free to

lease their services to other carriers during

this term, and they can refuse to work for RNA

for any reason. Owner-drivers working for RNA

store and maintain their own trucks, pay for

their own gas, pay their own taxes, and provide

their own insurance coverage. With regard to

compensation, owner-drivers are paid on a Form

1099 basis and receive a gross percentage of the

payments RNA receives from its customers, rather

than an hourly wage. 

 An owner-driver who accepts an assignment from

RNA is told the location and time of the pick-up

and/or delivery of his or her respective load.

When an owner-driver accepts an assignment from

RNA, that owner-driver is required by Illinois

law to place a sign on the side of the truck cab

that reads: "Leased To & Operated By Rock N’

Around Trucking, Inc." This sign must be covered

up or removed, however, whenever an owner-driver

is not performing work for RNA under RNA’s ILCC

license; and owner-drivers must return these

signs along with all other RNA materials at the

end of a lease term.

 The Funds are multiemployer benefit plans as

defined in 29 U.S.C. sec. 1003(37)(A), and

therefore, they are governed by the Employee

Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA").

29 U.S.C. sec. 1003(a). In the course of auditing

employers contributing to the Funds, Local 786

concluded that RNA owed $669,030 in delinquent

contributions on behalf of its owner-drivers.

Mazzei, a Trustee of the Funds, filed suit in the

Northern District of Illinois pursuant to section

502 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. sec. 1132, alleging that

RNA violated section 515 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. sec.

1145, by failing to make contributions required
by the CBA on behalf of its owner-drivers. RNA

disputed Mazzei’s claim, advancing three reasons

why it should not be required to make these

contributions: (1) the contract language is

ambiguous and does not require contributions; (2)

the owner-drivers signed waivers of

contributions, and thus, none are required; and

(3) the owner-operators are independent

contractors and not employees, thereby making the

contributions illegal. The parties filed crossmotions for summary judgment. The district court

granted RNA’s motion, finding that although the

CBA unambiguously obligates RNA to contribute to

the Funds for each of its owner-drivers, the form

of contribution called for in the CBA is illegal

under section 302 of the LMRA because RNA’s

owner-drivers are independent contractors. 29

U.S.C. sec. 186. Mazzei now appeals the court’s

decision, challenging its determination that the

owner-drivers are independent contractors instead

of employees and its conclusion that the

contributions called for in the CBA violate

federal law. 

II. Analysis 

A. Standard of Review

 We review the district court’s decision to

grant RNA’s motion for summary judgment de novo.

See Contreras v. Suncast Corp., 237 F.3d 756, 759

(7th Cir. 2001). Summary judgment is proper when

the "pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together

with the affidavits, if any, show that there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23,

106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). A

genuine issue of material fact exists, and

summary judgment is improper, if a reasonable

jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L.

Ed. 2d 202 (1986). In making this determination,

we review the record in the light most favorable

to the non-moving party, in this case Mazzei,

drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor.

See Amadio v. Ford Motor Co., 238 F.3d 919, 921

(7th Cir. 2001); see also Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. at 255.

B. RNA’s Obligation to Contribute

 Under the CBA

 Mazzei alleges that RNA’s failure to contribute

to the Funds on behalf of its owner-drivers

violates the terms of the CBA and section 515 of

ERISA. Section 515 "requires employers to comply

with the terms of their agreements to make
contributions to funds," Cent. States, Southeast

& Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Transp. Inc.,

183 F.3d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 1999), to the extent

that such terms are not inconsistent with the

law./2 See Cent. States, Southeast & Southwest

Areas Pension Fund v. Hartlage Truck Serv., Inc.,

991 F.2d 1357, 1360 (7th Cir. 1993). Thus, we

must first review the language of the CBA and

determine whether it obligates RNA to contribute

to the Funds on behalf of its owner-drivers. See

Ill. Conference of Teamsters & Employers Welfare

Fund v. Mrowicki, 44 F.3d 451, 458 (7th Cir.

1994). 

 The district court found that the terms of the

CBA unambiguously obligates RNA to contribute to

the Funds on behalf of its owner-drivers. See

Mazzei v. Rock-N-Around Trucking, Inc., No. 99 C

1975, 2000 WL 152137, *3-5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 4,

2000). RNA disputes the district court’s finding

with respect to this issue. Instead, RNA contends

that the CBA unambiguously establishes that RNA

does not have to contribute to the Funds on

behalf of its owner-drivers. 

 We review the district court’s interpretation of

the CBA de novo. See Cent. States, Southeast &

Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Kroger Co., 226

F.3d 903, 910 (7th Cir. 2000). We will enforce

the terms of a collective bargaining agreement if

those terms are unambiguous. See Young v. N.

Drury Lane Prod., 80 F.3d 203, 205 (7th Cir.

1996). The CBA is unambiguous if it "is

susceptible to only one reasonable

interpretation." Moriarty v. Svec, 164 F.3d 323,

330 (7th Cir. 1998). Furthermore, if we find no

ambiguity in the terms of the CBA, then, in

determining its meaning as a matter of law, we

need not review extrinsic evidence suggesting how

those terms should be interpreted. See Mrowicki,

44 F.3d at 459.

 Article 16 of the CBA, entitled "Health and

Welfare and Pension," obligates RNA to contribute

"into a trust . . . for the payment of Health and

Welfare or Pension benefits . . . for an employee

covered by this Agreement." In Article 1,

"employee" is defined as "the employee or

employees in the classifications of work covered"

by the CBA. While this definition does not

address whether RNA’s owner-drivers are

considered covered employees, Article 24,

entitled "Owner-Drivers," explains that "OwnerDrivers operating their own vehicles and who are

not certified carriers with proper Illinois

Commerce Commission authority are covered within

the terms and conditions of this Agreement,

including Union security, hours, wages, overtime,

Health & Welfare and Pension and working

conditions." CBA sec. 24.1 (emphasis added).
Article 24 clearly extends RNA’s responsibilities

under Article 16, Health and Welfare or Pension,

to the terms of employment for RNA’s ownerdrivers. Therefore, we find that there can be no

mistaking the fact that the CBA attempts to

impose an obligation on RNA to contribute to the

Funds for each of its owner-drivers. 

 Furthermore, we agree with the district court’s

determination that this interpretation of the CBA

is "straightforward and not inconsistent with

other provisions therein." Mazzei, 2000 WL

152137, at *5. RNA disagrees, arguing that

sections 24.1-4 and 24.3 conflict with our

interpretation and demonstrate that the terms of

the CBA do not obligate it to contribute to the

Funds on behalf of its non-certified ownerdrivers. Section 24.1-4 explains that noncertified owner-drivers, the group of individuals

at issue in this case 

shall receive the full wages, supplemental

allowance, and all working conditions provided in

this Agreement and shall receive as a minimum

salary after payment of all direct and indirect

operating expenses (including contributions to

the Health & Welfare Fund and Pension Fund) the

sum equal to the amount he would have received

for the time he would have worked as an hourly or

percentage rated driver.

CBA sec. 24.1-4. This provision concerns the

income of the owner-drivers and tells us nothing

about who must contribute to the Funds. Thus, it

is not in tension with our finding that 24.1

places the obligation to contribute to the Funds

on RNA. Section 24.3, which addresses the terms

of employment for a different group of drivers

than the owner-drivers at issue in this case,

states that

[c]ompanies who hire owner operators who are

members of the Union and are Certified Carriers

with proper Illinois Commerce Commission

authority and who drive their own trucks and

perform work exclusively for the Employer shall

be covered by Article 16- Health & Welfare and

Pension and it shall be the Employer’s

responsibility to make contributions on their

behalf. 

CBA sec. 24.3. RNA contends that the use of such

specific language in defining its duty with

respect to the certified owner-operators, in

contrast with the lack of such language in

section 24.1, is a clear indication that RNA has

no such duty with respect to the owner-drivers at

issue in this case. We do not agree. While

section 24.3 can be read to be a more specific

explanation of RNA’s obligation to contribute
than section 24.1, it does not contradict or

detract from the clear directive of 24.1

incorporating RNA’s obligations under Article 16

into the terms of employment for the noncertified owner-drivers at issue in this case.

Thus, we agree with the district court’s

conclusion that the CBA unambiguously requires

RNA to contribute to the Funds on behalf of its

owner-drivers.

C. Legality of the Contributions

Called for in the CBA

 Having found that the CBA obligates RNA to

contribute to the Funds on behalf of its ownerdrivers, we must now evaluate the legality of

these contributions under the LMRA. When Congress

was formulating the LMRA, it was concerned "with

corruption of collective bargaining through

bribery of employee representatives by employers,

with extortion by employee representatives, and

with the possible abuse by union officers of the

power which they might achieve if welfare funds

were left to their sole control." Arroyo v.

United States, 359 U.S. 419, 425-26, 79 S. Ct.

864, 3 L. Ed. 2d 915 (1959). To address these

concerns, Congress included section 302(a)(1) of

the LMRA, which prohibits employers from paying

"any representative of any of his employees." 29

U.S.C. sec. 186(a)(1). However, because Congress

had to balance its fears of misuse and bribery

with organized labor’s demand for a system of

employee welfare funds financed by employer

contributions and administered by union

officials, see Arroyo, 359 U.S. at 426, the LMRA

provides an exception to this prohibition "with

respect to money . . . paid to a trust fund

established by such representative, for the sole

and exclusive benefit of the employees of such

employer." 29 U.S.C. sec. 186(c)(5). This

exception is limited, however, as it does not

allow an employer to contribute to a trust fund

"on behalf of," or "for the benefit of,"

individuals that are not employees of the

contributing employer. See Ill. Conference of

Teamsters & Employers Welfare Fund v. Mrowicki,

44 F.3d 451, 460 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Walsh v.

Schlecht, 429 U.S. 401, 407, 97 S. Ct. 679, 50 L.

Ed. 2d 641 (1977)). Nevertheless, in Walsh v.

Schlecht, 429 U.S. at 407, the Supreme Court held

that the LMRA permits employer trust fund

contributions, regardless of the employment

status of the employer’s workers, when the

amounts of such contributions are measured by the

number of hours worked by that employer’s workers

as opposed to being given simply "on behalf of"

or "for the benefit of" the employer’s workers.

Id.; see also Mrowicki, 44 F.3d at 461 (citing

Walsh, 429 U.S. at 407-10) ("[A] clause in a

collective bargaining agreement making an
employer liable for payment of trust fund

contributions based on the hours worked at a job

site by individuals other than its own employees

[does] not violate sec. 302 of the LMRA."); Todd

v. Benal Concrete Constr. Co., 710 F.2d 581, 583

(9th Cir. 1983) (explaining that in Walsh the

Court "held that contributions may reflect work

performed by employees of . . . independent

subcontractors, but only if the amounts are

’measured by’ the number of hours worked").

Therefore, we will first examine the manner in

which the CBA requires RNA to contribute to the

Funds to determine if such contributions are

permissible regardless of the employment status

of RNA’s owner-drivers. 

 Section 16.1 of the CBA obligates RNA to

contribute fixed weekly amounts, set out in

section 16.2, to a trust "for the payment of

Health and Welfare or Pension benefits . . . for

an employee covered by this Agreement, in

accordance with the requirements set forth in the

appropriate Appendix of this Article." Appendix

A of the CBA, entitled "Health and Welfare,"

explains that RNA is required to contribute the

amounts called for in section 16.2 to the Welfare

Fund "for each employee covered by this Agreement

who performs work on any two calendar days in any

calendar week, regardless of the number of hours

worked." CBA App. A (emphasis added). Similarly,

Appendix B, entitled "Pension," requires RNA to

contribute to the Pension Fund according to the

schedule in section 16.2 "for each employee who

performs work on any two days in any calendar

week, regardless of the number of hours worked."

CBA App. B (emphasis added). Thus, RNA’s

contributions are to be made "for each employee"

when that employee works at least two days of a

work week. The measure of these contributions has

no relation to the number of hours these

individuals actually work, however, as the

amounts are provided for in the CBA. Therefore,

this type of contribution is not like the

employer contributions the Supreme Court found to

be permissible under the LMRA in Walsh, which

were based on the number of hours worked by the

employer’s workers. See Walsh, 429 U.S. at 407-

10. 

 Because the contributions RNA is required to

make under the terms of the CBA are "for each

employee," and not like those upheld in Walsh,

the employment status of RNA’s owner-drivers will

determine the legality of the contributions under

the LMRA. As previously mentioned, employer

payments to a trust for the exclusive benefit of

that employer’s employees are permissible under

the LMRA. 29 U.S.C. sec. 186(c)(5). Thus, if

RNA’s owner-drivers are employees of RNA, the

contributions would fall under this exception and
be permissible under the LMRA. If the ownerdrivers are independent contractors, however,

because the LMRA "excludes any person having the

status of independent contractor from the

statutory definition of ’employee,’" Mrowicki, 44

F.3d at 460, then any RNA contribution to the

Funds on behalf of the owner-drivers would

violate section 302 of the LMRA. Thus, we must

determine whether these owner-drivers are

employees of RNA.

D. The Employment Status

 of RNA’s Owner-Drivers 

 In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden,

503 U.S. 318, 112 S. Ct. 1344, 117 L. Ed. 2d 581

(1992), the Supreme Court adopted "a common-law

test for determining who qualifies as an

’employee’ under ERISA." Id. at 323. While the

Court listed twelve factors to be considered when

making this determination, it noted that the

common law test had "no shorthand formula or

magic phrase that can be applied to find the

answer," and that "all of the incidents of the

relationship must be assessed and weighed with no

one factor being decisive." Id. at 324 (citations

omitted). Prior to the Court’s decision in

Darden, we applied our own five factor analysis

to determine an individual’s employment status.

See Knight v. United Farm Bureau Mut. Ins., 950

F.2d 377, 378-79 (7th Cir. 1991). Like the

Supreme Court’s approach in Darden, our analysis

recognizes that "’[o]f several factors to be

considered, the employer’s right to control is

the most important when determining whether an

individual is an employee or an independent contractor.’"

Compare EEOC v. N. Knox Sch. Corp., 154 F.3d 744,

747 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Knight, 950 F.2d at

378) with Darden, 503 U.S. at 323 ("In

determining whether a hired party is an employee

under the general common law of agency, we

consider the hiring party’s right to control the

manner and means by which the product is

accomplished.") (citations omitted). Since

Darden, we have concluded that the factors

described by the Court in that decision are

adequately subsumed within our five-factor

analysis. See Alexander v. Rush N. Shore Med.

Ctr., 101 F.3d 487, 492 n.1 (7th Cir. 1996).

Therefore, we will determine the employment

status of RNA’s owner-drivers within the

framework of our Knight analysis.

 In evaluating the employment status of RNA’s

owner-drivers, we must examine the following

factors:

(1) the extent of the employer’s control and

supervision over the worker, including directions

on scheduling and performance of work, (2) the
kind of occupation and nature of skill required,

including whether skills are obtained in the

workplace, (3) responsibility for the costs of

operation, such as equipment, supplies, fees,

licenses, workplace, and maintenance of

operations, (4) method and form of payment and

benefits, and (5) length of job commitment and/or

expectations.

Knight, 950 F.2d at 378-79. When a district court

uses our five-factor analysis to determine an

individual’s employment status, we review that

court’s factual determinations for clear error.

See Aberman v. J. Abouchar & Sons, Inc., 160 F.3d

1148, 1150 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Ost v. W.

Suburban Travelers Limousine, 88 F.3d 435, 438

(7th Cir. 1996). Because our analysis subsumes

the factors set out in Darden, see N. Knox Sch.

Corp., 154 F.3d at 747, we will also review the

factual determinations made by the district court

using the Supreme Court’s approach in Darden for

clear error. 

 Applying the first factor of our analysis, "the

extent of the employer’s control and supervision

over the worker, including directions on

scheduling and performance of work," it is clear

that RNA exerted very little control or

supervision over its owner-drivers. Mazzei

disagrees, contending that RNA’s ability to tell

owner-drivers where and when to pick up and/or

deliver a load of materials is an indication of

significant control. Although Mazzei accurately

describes RNA’s ability to instruct owner-drivers

who accept an assignment from RNA, the control

RNA exercises over its owner-drivers amounts to

little more than the basic level of supervision

required to ensure that the arrangement between

RNA and its owner-drivers is of some value to

RNA. Additionally, other facts further exhibit

the minimal amount of control RNA exercises over

its owner-drivers. First, these individuals own

and drive their own trucks. Second, although

owner-drivers sign a lease with RNA for a period

of three years, they can refuse to work for RNA

at any time and for any reason, they can work for

other companies at any time, and they can

terminate the lease with RNA at any time and for

any reason without penalty. In this respect,

RNA’s owner-drivers are similar to the limousine

drivers that we found to be independent

contractors in Ost v. W. Suburban Travelers

Limousine, 88 F.3d 435 (7th Cir. 1996). The

drivers in Ost, like RNA’s owner-drivers,

"supplied their own vehicles," and "were able to

choose to work whatever days they preferred, . .

. were free to refuse any assignments they wished

. . . and could work for dispatching services

other than West Suburban." Id. at 438. We held

that "each of these facts indicates that the
manner in which the drivers performed their

services for West Suburban was primarily within

their own control." Id. Thus, the control RNA

exercises over its owner-drivers, or the lack

thereof, is consistent with that found in an

employer-independent contractor relationship. 

 We have found that the second factor, "the kind

of occupation and nature of skill required,

including whether skills are obtained in the

workplace," favors "a finding of neither

independent contractor nor employee" when dealing

with individuals similar to RNA’s owner-drivers

"because professional drivers . . . could be

either employees or independent contractors." N.

Knox Sch. Corp., 154 F.3d at 749. 

 In terms of our third factor, "responsibility

for the costs of operation, such as equipment,

supplies, fees, licenses, workplace, and

maintenance of operations," the facts of this

case indicate that RNA’s owner-drivers are

independent contractors. In addition to owning

and driving their own trucks, owner-drivers

provide storage for their trucks, are responsible

for the maintenance of their trucks, pay for

their own gas, and pay for their trucks to be

insured. RNA’s owner-drivers are in this

respect, therefore, very much like the school bus

drivers we found to be independent contractors in

North Knox School Corp., 154 F.3d at 751. The bus

drivers in North Knox, like RNA’s owner-drivers,

"were required to supply their own buses and

absorb all costs such as insurance and

maintenance." Id. at 749. We found these facts to

be "a strong indication that the drivers were

independent contractors." Id. 

 The fourth factor of our analysis, "the method

and form of payment and benefits," also suggests

that RNA’s owner-drivers are independent

contractors. The owner-drivers are paid on a Form

1099 basis, which Mazzei acknowledges in his

brief is designated as non-employee compensation,

and which we have held "would be appropriate for

independent contractors." N. Knox Sch. Corp., 154

F.3d at 750. Additionally, the owner-drivers pay

their own taxes and receive a gross percentage of

the money paid to RNA by its clients as opposed

to receiving an hourly wage.

 Finally, "the length of job commitment and/or

expectations," also implies that RNA’s ownerdrivers are independent contractors. As we

mentioned earlier in examining the extent of

RNA’s control over its owner-drivers, these

individuals each sign an Equipment Lease with RNA

for a period of three years. However, being able

to: (1) cancel the lease at any time and for any

reason without penalty; (2) work whenever he or
she wants; and (3) work for whomever he or she

wants, can hardly be characterized as the type of

commitment consistent with that of an employeremployee relationship. 

 In arguing that the owner-drivers are employees,

Mazzei draws our attention to several sections of

the CBA that treat the owner-drivers as employees

of RNA. Specifically, Mazzei points to language

in the contract stating that RNA’s owner-drivers

are to receive overtime, vacation, and holiday

pay, and that they will have set starting times

and hours of work. Mazzei contends that

independent contractors do not receive these

types of benefits, and that these factors,

combined with RNA’s ability to instruct those

owner-drivers who accept assignments from RNA,

demonstrate that the owner-drivers are employees.

We find this argument to be unpersuasive.

"Contractual language alone cannot transform a

contractor/independent contractor relationship

into an employer/employee relationship." Todd v.

Benal Concrete Constr. Co., 710 F.2d 581, 584

(9th Cir. 1983). To determine the employment

status of an individual or group, we must, as we

have in this case, evaluate the actual employment

relationship. We have already explained that the

control exercised by RNA over its owner-drivers

is minimal. Additionally, Mazzei presents no

evidence that RNA’s owner-drivers have received

any of the payments mentioned in the sections of

the CBA he asks us to review. Without more, and

based on our above analysis, we conclude that the

owner-drivers working for RNA are independent

contractors 

 Given our determination that RNA’s owner-drivers

are independent contractors, the present case

bares a striking similarity to the Ninth

Circuit’s decision in Todd v. Benal Concrete

Construction Co., 710 F.2d 581. In Benal, the

terms of a collective bargaining agreement

explained that when individuals referred to as

owner-operators performed work for Benal that was

covered by the terms of the agreement, those

individuals "shall become employees." Id. at 582.

The practical effect of this language was that

Benal would thereafter be obligated to contribute

"on behalf of" these owner-operators to local

union trust funds. Reviewing not only the

language of the contract, but also the actual

working relationship between Benal and the owneroperators, the court determined that the owneroperators were independent contractors. Because

the contributions Benal was obligated to make

were not based on the hours worked by these nonemployees, like the contributions upheld in

Walsh, but instead were to be made "on behalf of"

the owner-operators, the court concluded that

Benal could not be required to make these
contributions, as they would violate section 302

of the LMRA. See id. at 584.

 Like Benal, RNA cannot be required to

contribute to the Funds for each of the ownerdrivers, whom we have determined are independent

contractors, when those contributions are not

based on the number of hours worked. Therefore,

we agree with the district court’s conclusion

that while the terms of the CBA require RNA to

contribute to the Funds on behalf of its ownerdrivers, the manner in which these contributions

are called for violates the LMRA because the

owner-drivers are independent contractors. 

III. Conclusion

 For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the

district court’s decision to grant RNA’s motion

for summary judgment.

/1 RNA is licensed by the Illinois Commerce

Commission (the "ILCC’) to operate as a motor

carrier. Some of RNA’s owner-drivers obtain their

own licenses from the Illinois Commerce

Commission. These owner-drivers operate under

their own licenses and do not sign leases with

RNA. The disputed contributions in this case,

however, deal only with those "non-certified"

owner-drivers working for RNA, and therefore, our

references to owner-drivers only include noncertified owner-drivers. 

/2 Section 515 states:

Every employer who is obligated to make

contributions to a multiemployer plan under the

terms of the plan or under the terms of a

collectively bargained agreement shall, to the

extent not inconsistent with law, make such

contributions in accordance with the terms and

conditions of such plan or such agreement.

29 U.S.C. sec. 1145.