APOLLO 13 MISSION 

HEAR IN^ 

BEFORE THE 

COMMITTEE ON 

AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

NINETY-FIRST CONGRESS 

SECOSD SESSION I 

APRIL 24, 1970 

Printed for the use @f the 

Commibtw on Aeronautical and Scpace Sciences 

44-195 0 

US. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

WASHINGTON : 1970 
COMMITTEE ON AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES 

CLINTON P. ANDERSON, New Mexico, Chairman 

RICHARD B. RUSSELL, Georgia 

WARREN G. MAGNUSON, Washington 

STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri 

JOHN STENNIS, Mississippi 

STEPHEN M. YOUNG, Ohio 

THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut 

HOWARD W. CANNON, Nevada 

SPESSARD L. HOLLAND, Florida 

MARGARET CHASE SMITH, Maine 

CARL T. CURTIS, Nebreska 

MARK 0. HATFIELD, Oregon 

BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona 

WILLIAM B. SAXBE, Ohio 

RALPH T. SMITH, Illinois 

JAMES J.GEHRIO, &ffDtredor 

EVERARD H. SMITH, Jr., Professional staff Member 

Dr. GLEN P. WILSON, Professional Staff Member 

WILLIAM PARKER, Professional Staff Member 

SAM BOUCHARD, A88t8tant Chief Clerk 

DONALD H. BRENNAN, Research Assfitant 

CRAIO VOORHEES, ProJessionat Staff Member 

(n) 
CONTENTS 

FRIDAY, APRIL 24, 1970 

Opcning statement, Senator Clinton P. Anderson, chairman---. . ~. . - - . ~. 

Opcning statomcnt, Senator Margaret Chaw Smith. - -. . ~ ~ -. . ~. . - - -. .~ - 

Statenicnt of Ilr. Thomas 0. Paine, AdministIrator, National Aeronautic.: 

and Space Administration; accompanied by Astronaut James A. Lovcll, 

Commander of Apollo 13; Astronaut John L. Rwigert, Jr., Command 

Module Pilot of Apollo 13; l>r. Rocco A. Petronc, Apollo Program 

Director; and Glynn 8. Lunncy, Apollo 13 Mission Director- - __ -. ~. - - 

Summary of actions following accident _. . -. . -. -. - ~. - -~ .. . - -. - . ~. 

Review Board investigation of accident - - ~ -. - - -. - - -. - -. . -. - - . . - 

Impact of futurc manned flights _._. .___ .____._____._._. ~ ~_._ ._- 

Apollo 13 effect on future programs__- _____._______.____. ___ 

Statement of lh. Rocco A. Petrone, Apollo Program Director-- - - - - -. - - - 

Problems noted 54 hours into mission _.____._ ~ 

Intensive investigation__. __ ___ __ -. ~ -. . -. __ -. __ -. - .. ___ - __ - - 

Expect carly resolution of problem_-_ -. - -. - -. - -. - - - - - - - - .. - Statement of Glynn S. Lunncy, Apollo 13 Mission Director ____________- 

Lunar module as lifeboat _. -. -. - __ __ __ _~_ -.__ - __ .- -- - - ___ Summary of events______.______---------.-------------------.- 

Consumables status__________.._.------.----.--------.--------- 

Sequence for cntry________..__..---~-.~---..-~..----------.-.-- 

Statement of Astronauts James A. Lovell, Commander of Apollo 13; and 

John L. Swigert, Jr., Command Module Pilot of Apollo 13 __________

Report of low morale completely false___ - - - -. - - - - - -. 

Summarizes action after explosion - -. - - - - - - -. . . . - - - - - 

Describes feelings over situation- - -. - - - - - -. - - - - - - -. - - - - - - - - Transfer spacecraft control to lunar module__ - -. - - -. - - - - - - - - 

Comments on environmental system- - - - - - - - - - -. - - - - - - - - -. - 

Employs Apollo 8 technique- - __ - - - __ - - - - -. - - - - - - - Shows film of spacecraft interior__ -. - - - - -. - - - - -. - 

Questions by Committee members- - - - .. - - -. - - -. . - - - - - - - 

Keeping cool under adverse conditions- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Space program stimulus to education ____ ~ - - - - - - - - - Questions design changes of Apollo 13.._ - - - - -. - - - . - - - - -. - - No safety shortcuts caused by budget cuts __________.___

Meteoroid damage chances- - __ ~ ._~ 

Man will travel solar system __________. .__~ _____ ~. .____. ~______ 

Foreign cooperation during Apollo 13 mission- -. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Abort procedures 

Emergency procedures outlined _____ - . -. - - - - - -. - - - - - - - - - .. - - ~ - . - -. 

Answers “last moon mission” remarks - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

Increase in pressure------~---------------.-----.-~------------- 

No unnecessary risk ___________.__________

Technology transfer benefits- - - - - . - . - - - - - - -. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Reaction to adversity prompts confidence- - - - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - - - Educational background of witnesses ____ - - - - - - - -. -. . - - - - - - - - 

Apollo 13 Review Board- - - - - -. .___ __ -~ -. - __ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - --- ~. . - 

Status of Apollo 14 mission- ___. -.__. . _ -~ -. -. __ __ - _. . _ _ _ _ -. - - 

Early cutoff of engine__________.___.---.------------.-..--..-.- 

NASA Control Center- __ - -~ _______ ._______ ~ .__. 

Value of space investment- - ._._ ~__. ._ .________.____._.__-.-- ~_. 

Possible cause of blaze _____._._._ ~. ._____.__._ ~ .__. ._.___-._.- 

Complete qualification test- __ - __~ .___ ._.___ ~._. . .--__ .--.---. ~ 

International space cooperation- ~ -. - ~ -. -- -. - - - - ___ . - 

Difficulty with oxygen tank _______ ~_._ .___.___ ~..___._ ~ _____._ 

Significance of lunar experiment___ .___ ~___._. .~ ___-__ -------.- 

Space program applications to pollution- - - -. - - - ~ - . . . . . . - - . - - - 

-. 

- 

Appendix: Establishment of Apollo 13 Review Board ____-- ~ 

(In) 

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APOLLO 13 MISSION 

FRIDAY, APRIL 24, 1970 

UNITED STATES SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 1202, 

New Senate Office Building, the Honorable Clinton P. Anderson 

(chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Anderson, Symington, Stennis, Young, Holland, 

Smith of Maine, Curtis, Hatfield, Goltlmater, and Saxbe. 

James J. Gehrig, staff director; Evcrard H. Smith, Jr., Dr. Glen P. 

Wilson, Craig Voorhces, sntl Willinrii Pnrkor, professional staff 

members; Sam Boilchard, tkssistant chief clerk; Dorialtl H. Brcnnan, 

rescarch assistant; Mary Rita Robbins, Rhea Bruno, Patricia 

Robinson, Ruby L. Hamblen and Crirol L. Wilson, clerical assistants. 

Washington, D.C. 

OPENING STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN 

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. 

Exactly one week ago we were holding our breaths praying for the 

safe return of Jim Lovell, Fred Haise, and John Swigert. Today it is 

our honor to welcome Captain Lovell and Mr. Swigrrt to appear 

before this committee. Unfortunately, Mr. Haiso is slightly ill and 

unable to be with us today. 

I wish to convey my heartiest congratulations to the entire NASA 

organization for the successful return of tho Apollo 13 crew. Their 

performance during a period of great difficulty demonstrated the 

superb capabilities of the NASA team and of the Apollo system. 

Apollo 13 will be considered by some as a failure, because it did 

not accomplish its objective of a lunar landing and return with new 

scientific information. But in a real and larger sense, it was a human 

success-a triumph of thr hnman spirit, an exoneration of the human 

mind, a tribute to human perseverance, a victory for all mankind. 

The purposc of this meeting is to discuss with NASA officials the 

Apollo 13 mission and its problems. We are anxious to learn what 

happened, and what must be done to reestablish the Apollo launch 

schedule. Towards this end, we will begin today with testimony from 

Dr. Thomas 0. Paine, Administrator of NASA, then we will hear 

Dr. Rocco A. Petrone, Apollo Program Director, Mr. Glynn S. 

Lunney, Apollo 13 Mission Director, and Astronauts Lovell and 

Swiger t . 

At a later date, after the review board has completed its investigation and made its recommendations, the committee will meet again 

with Dr. Paine and other NASA officials to discuss the future of the 

manned lunar exploration program. 

(1) 

Senator Smith? 
2 

STATEMENT BY SENATOR SMITH 

Senator SMITH ofMaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I \voiild like 

to join in paying tribute to the astronauts of Apollo 13 for their very 

great courage and coolness in times of great stress. 

Also, Mr. Chairman, I would like to pay tribute to the entire NASA 

team for what T consider one of the greatest achievements made in the 

space program, for the way initial adversity was turned into dramatic 

success. 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Paine? 

STATEMENT OF DR. THOMAS 0. PAINE, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION ; ACCOMAPOLLO 13; ASTRONAUT JOHN L. SWIGERT, JR., COMMAND MODULE PILOT OF APOUO 13; DR. ROCCO A. PETRONE, APOLLO PROPANIED BY ASTRONAUT JAMES A. LOVELL, COMMANDER OF 

GRAM DIRECTOR; AND GLYNN S. LUNNEY, APOLLO 13 MISSION 

DIRECTOR 

Dr. PAINE. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, we appreciate this opportunity to appear before you to give you a preliminary 

report on the Apollo 13 mission, America’s fifth lunar expedition and 

third landing attempt. 

SUMMARY OF ACTIONS FOLLOWING ACCIDENT 

This morning we will summarize for you our current understanding 

The accident aboard the spacecraft Odyssey while outward 

bound for the moon 55 hours and 54 minutes after launch; 

The immediate steps taken by flight controllers at Mission 

Control in Houston and the flight crew to contain the situation; 

The ensuing 300,000-mile voyage around the moon and back to 

earth using the lunar module Aquarius as a lifeboat; 

The investigative measures which were initiated within NASA 

immediately after the successful splashdown ; and 

Our view of the impact of the Apollo 13 accident on the lT.S. 

space program. 

Dr. Rocco Petrone, Director of the Apollo Program, will give you 

his present best estimate of the principal events prior to and during 

the accident which apparently led to the rupture of oxygen bottle 

No. 2 in the service module. The actions taken on the ground to 

recover from the accident and return the crew safely back to earth 

will then be described by Mr. Glynn S. I~inney, who was flight 

director in Mission Control during much of the critical period following 

the accident. Astronaut James A. Lovell, the commander of Apollo 13, 

and Astronaut Jack Swigert, the command mothile pilot, will then 

describe to you the events that took place in the spacecraft during 

this period. 

We thought it best that Astronaut Fred Haise, the lunar module 

pilot, not accompany his crewmates here today. As we informed the 

committee yesterday, the astronauts’ physician asked that Mr. Haise 

of: 
3 

be excused from the trip to Washington to facilitate his prompt 

recovery from the minor infection he has been suffering from since 

the flight. 

REVIEW BOARD INVESTIGATION OF ACCIDENT 

Before Dr. Petrone begins, I will take a few moments to summarize 

for you the actions Dr. 110~ and I have taken to assure a prompt, 

vigorous, competent, and objective investigation of the causes of the 

Apollo 13 accident and the effectiveness of the mission recovery 

actions so that appropriate corrective actions can be taken. Copies of 

the documents involved are appended to my statement. (See p 52.) 

Immediately after the splashdown, Dr. Low and I established an 

Apollo 13 Review Board chaired by Mr. Edgar M. Cortright, director 

of NASA’s Langley Research Center. Seven members were named to 

the board-all highly qualified senior individuals from NASA, the 

Air Force, and AEC who have had no direct responsibilities for Apollo 

13. The board’s assignment is to make a full and complete investigation of the circumstances siirroundiiig the accident to the Apollo 13 

spacecraft, to establish the probable cause or causes of the accident, assess the effectiveness of the recovery actions, and recommend 

appropriate corrective or other actions. The board reports directly 

to me and Dr. Idow, and has been meeting in Houston since Tuesday 

evening, April 21, delving into every aspect of the accident and 

recovery. The charge to the board and the memorandum naming its 

members were forwarded to your committee upon issuance arid 

NASA will continue to keep the committee fully informed as the 

investigation proceeds. 

We also announced immediately after splashdown that we had 

requested NASA’s statutory Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel to 

review the Apollo 13 Review Board’s procedures and its findings when 

they become available, and to submit an independent re jort directly to 

rington, is president of Douglas-United Nuclear, Inc. The Panel 

consists of six non-NASA members and one NASA member: Mr. Bruce 

Lundin, Director of the Lewis Research Center. The Panel met in 

Washington on Tuesday, April 21, and is carrying out its assignment 

as the work of the Review Board proceeds. 

A third assignment was made to Mr. Dale Myers, NASA’s Associate 

Administrator for Manned Space Flight, in two parts: First, his organization will provide all data and technical support required by the 

Review Board from the three Manned Space Flight Centers and OMSF 

Headquarters. Secondly, the Manned Space Flight organization will 

move forward immediately with the required in-depth studies, analyses, 

and other steps to provide me and Dr. Low with the best possible plans 

and recommendations for eliminating the problem encountered in 

Apollo 13 and proceeding with Apollo 14 and future manned space flight missions. This work also got underway at Houston immediately 

after splashdown. 

Thus, findings and recornmendations from three sources will be 

available to help NASA management make timely decisions on the 

corrective and other measures that should be taken prior to Apollo 14 

and subsequent manned flights. 

me and Dr. Low. The Chairman of this Pancl, Dr. C h arles D. Har- 
4 

IMPACT ON FUTURE MANNED FLIGHTS 

Now let me say a few words on the impact, as we now see it, of the 

Apollo 13 accident on the future of US. manned space flight activities. As Dr. Petrone’s presentation will show, we expect that the large 

quantity and high quality of the telemetered data received from the 

Apollo 13 spacecraft at the time of the accident will permit a precise 

and early identification of the causes of the failiire. The oxygen 

thermos flask believed to be involved is a relatively simple component 

and corrective action should not prove to be t~, major task. If this 

turns out to be the case, we should be able to move out promptly 

with the necessary alterations and proceed with Apollo 14 and subsequent flights on approximately the same schedule we have presented 

to you before. 

I think it is important that your committee understand clearly 

our view in NASA of the Apollo 13 accident and recovery. The Apollo 

13 mission was a failure. We did not succeed in America’s third lunar 

landing attempt, and me wore, therefore, unable to explore the moon’s 

Pra Maiiro formation. This hilly region remains a high priority 

objective in our lunar program. Its exploration should add much to 

our understanding of the moon, its origins, and its relationships to 

the earth. We cannot yet say which of the reniairiing Apollo missions 

will be sent there. Although the Apollo 13 mission failed, we regard 

the recovery actions that followed the accident as a gatifying success 

which mill contribute greatly to the Nation’s space flight competence. 

The Apollo hardware, the contingency planning, the training of flight 

and ground crews, arid the backup systems for emergency use appear 

to have demonstrated their flexibility and soundness. However, as 

I have stated, our charge to the Apollo 13 Review Board includes 

not only a critical review of the cause or causes of the accident, but 

also a critical assessment of the effectiveness of the recovery measures 

taken. We intend to learn everything possible from both the ticcltlent 

and the safe recovery of Apollo 13. 

APOLLO 13 EFFECT ON FUTURE PROGRAMS 

Finally, let me state my view as to how the Apollo 13 accident should 

affect the future of the space program. I see no reason why this 

setback should be-or should be made to be-the occasion for n 

major change in the course of the Nation’s space program. We have 

clearly demonstrated the basic soundness of the Apollo system and 

of our operational procedures with the successful manned flights of 

Apollos 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12. Since the qtart of manned space flight, 

NASA’s astronauts have safely flown a total of 70 !nillion miles in 

space. From a technical standpoint, there is no qurastlon but that we 

are prepared to move forward in the 1970’s with the spt~ce program wc 

have outlined to you in our previous appearances before you. 

I am happy to be able to report that the President fully shares 

this view. During our flight to Honolulu last Saturday to meet the 

astronauts, he expressed his strong sup1)ort for n vigorous on-going 

US. space program, particularly iri manned spice flight. Worldwide 

reaction has been the same. Virtually all editorial comment from 

coast to coast has strongly supported the position that the United 

States should not respond to this accident by cutting back or lowering 

its sights in space. 
5 

Now, Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to ask 

Dr. Petrone to describe to you what we know today about the events 

leading to the accident. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Dr. Petrone? 

STATEMENT OF DR. ROCCO A. PETRONE, APOLLO PROGRAM 

DIRECTOR 

Dr. PETRONE. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the 

Apollo 13 mission, planned to perform a lunar landing at Fra Mauro, 

was launched at 1413 e.s.t. on 11 April 1970. Lift-off and initial 

powered flight were nominal. Midway into the second stage burn, an 

unexpected high level thrust oscillation of the center erigiiie caused 

that engine to cut off about 2 minutes and 12 seconds early. The 

remaining four engines burned about 34 seconds longer than planned, 

to make up part of the deficit. To make up the remainder of the 

required velocity, the launch vehicle computer extended the third 

stage orbital insertion burn approximately 9 seconds longer than 

planned. With the third stage propellant remaining, we still had a 

capability to perform the translunar injection burn with a perforniance margin twice that which we normally require. This burn was 

initiated on schedule arid end conditions were nominal for translunar 

coast. Subsequent docking and extraction of the lunar module from 

the launch vehicle third stage were performed without difficulty. 

PROBLEMS NOTED 54 HOURS INTO MISSION 

About 31 hours into tho mission, a prcmission planned trajectory 

shift was performed. This shift took the spacecraft from a trajectory 

which would fly around thc. moon and back to earth, to a trajectory 

which woiild requirc a subsc~qucnt maneuver to perform a lunar flyby 

and rrturn to earth. The purpose of‘ the transfer was to optimize the 

conditions of time, velocity, and hcight above thr lunar surface upon 

arrival at thc moon. At about 54jh hours into the mission, thc Cornmandcr and liinar modulc pilot moved into the lunar module to perform % planned trarisfcr of equipment from the command module and 

preliminary examination of thv lunar module. Shortly thereafter, 

while thc crewmen were closing out the lunar modulc, Astronaut Lovt!ll 

called niissioii control to report '(We've got a problem here.” Initial 

indications of the anomaly were a warning light indicating an undervoltngc oil onc of the command module spacecraft electrical buses and 

indiceation of loss of all pressure in one of the two liquid oxygen storage 

vessels, followed shortly thcrcaftw by tt loss of two of the threo fuel 

cells. 

Until this particular probltm occurred, the mission had been proceeding in nearly a trouble-frcc rnt1niier. Insofar as we have been able 

to dctcrminr thus far, thcrc wcw no early indications that the oxygen 

system was other than normal c3xcq)t for the quantity indicator going 

off scale high approxirnatcly 9 hours bcfore the incident. Following the 

indications that wo had a problem, tho immediate requirement was to 

stabilize 1 he situation to allow time to plari subsequent courses ?f 

:don. Mr. Glynri Liinrioy will discuss these actions in more detrtil 

latcr. 

hi a(-cordance with our generid jmtctice, t~ large niiniber of contractor systems personnel were providing direct support to the mission 

44-195 0-70----2 
6 

at all times. In order to bring all available resources to bear, we immediately requested the major spicecraft con tractors, their subcontractors arid vendors, to augment this uroiind-the-c.lock support. The 

response of our industrial tlnd university team working with the 

Governnient team during this very dern:inding time was most helpful 

and gratifying . With regard to the incident. itself and its cause, our immediate 

arialyticnl efforts during the mlssion were concentrated only on the 

analysis necessary to deterrnine effects or delayed effects on other 

systems. Our prime objective was to ensure that t~ll necessary action 

was being taken to bring the astronauts back to earth as qulckly as 

possible with the least imposed additional risk. 

INTENSIVE INVESTIGATION 

Upon completion of the successful recovery of t,he astronauts, the 

Apollo program immediately initiated an intensive investigation of 

the cause of the incident and possible remedial measures. Since last 

Friday afternoon, a team of Government, industry, and university 

personnel have assembled at the Manned Spacecraft Center and are 

reviewing and tinalyzing all data. 

Allhough it is too early at this time to provide you with conclusive 

results, the preliminary assessment of the problem and systems 

involved has caused us to focus our attention on No. 2 oxygen tank 

and its associated hardware. 

If I might have viewgraph No. 1, I will attempt to orient it here. 

This is the overall view of the command and service module. The 

area right in here-and I will have another viewgraph on that-is the 

bay of the section we are interested in. You will see fuel cells on the 

top, you see oxygen tanks in the center, and hydrogen tanks at the 

base. (See fig. 1.) 

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM 

- +Y 

ECS RADIATORS 

EPS RADIATORS 

Figure I 
7 

In the next viewgraph this model is a blown up scale of that same 

sector. Here we see two of the three fuel cells, the third one behind 

these two. We see oxygen tank No. 2 and No. 1. No. 2 is the one which 

hud our ariorrialous condition. Then here we see the hydrogen tanks. 

(See fig. 2.) 

SERVICE MODULE [SECTOR IV] 

L4 

Figure 2 
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The next viewgraph is the' cutaway of the oxygen tank itself. It is 

25 inches in diameter. It has the capacity of 330 pounds of oxygen. 

We have two of these aboard. We normally operate tit pressure of 

870 to 930 pounds per square inch. It is made of steel, vtLcuum jacketed, 

has an inner rtnd outer liner of very high quality steel. Within the tank, 

we have tin element here called a heating element itrid two fan motors. 

The purpose of the heating element is to introduce energy.to contiiine causing the oxygen to remain at the pressure we need in order 

to feed that to the fuel cells. The fan motors are t,iirned on on command 

to give $1 1)roper mix of the oxygen within the tank. This quantity 

serihor is the one I referred to, that did go off scale high :q)proxirnrttely 

9 hours prior to the incident, and there is a tenipernture sensor here. 

This is a very simplified diagram, showing the tank basicdly, the 

heating elerrieiit and the sensors, itnd I will discwss those with the 

anomtilous situation and our telemetry system. (See fig. 3.) 

OXYGEN TANK 

DIAMETER - 25 INCHES 

CAPACITY - 330 LBS 02 

NORMAL PRESSURF 

870 - 930 PSI 

Figure 3 

We have a trernendoiis amount of information on the ground that 

we did receive. A11 that can be now analyzed with very accurute time 

correlation. 'he preliminary data now shows time correlation of 

events. 1 liave extrtictetl just a fen here to shon the indication that we 

now have of where our problem occurred. 

At 55 hours and 53 niinutes ground elapsed time, or 10:06 eastern 

staiidard time, April 13, we see that the oxygen tank fans lire turned 

on. At 55:53:22, we hnve a high current spike, fuel cell No. 3. This 
9 

fuel cell is responding to a demand for current from somewhere. The 

denii~rid is improper or tin uriomuly. We see that 14 seconds later, 

there is a rise in the pressure of oxygen tank 2; some 2 seconds later, 

we see another current or rather, an electrical disturbance. This was 

an 11.3-volt drop on our alternating current bus No. 2. What is significapt about No. 2 is it is feeding the power on fan and intake No. 2. 

There we see a correlation of a voltage drop, a current spike, and a 

pressure rise. 

From there, we have another high current spike on the same fuel 

cell 3 seconds later. 

Four seconds later, we saw a temperature rise; we have been left 

with an anomaly of about 190' Fahrenheit. This continued to rise 

from there. 

At this time, 55 :54 :45, \\re have the maximum recorded pressure. 

The maximum recorded pressure was not sufficient itself to burst the 

tank. However, it is recording pressure just prior to release. 

At 55:54:53 seconds we have measurable spacecraft motion. This 

was measured by the guidance system. It is at that time we believe 

that the tank ruptured, exactly there. The tank pressure read zero 

3 seconds later. 

And at 55:55:20 plotted Astronaut Love11 reported "I believe we 

have a problem here." (See fig. 4.) 

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 

GROUND EASTERN 

ELAPSED TIME STANDARD TIME 

APRIL 13, PM 

55:53 

55:53:22 

55:53:36 

55:53:38 

55:53:41 

55:53:45 

55:54:45 

55:54:53 

55:54:56 

55:55:20 

10:06 

10:06:22 

1006:36 

10:06:38 

10:06:41 

10 06: 45 

10:07:45 

10: 07: 53 

10:07:56 

10:08: 20 

EVENT 

OXYGEN TANK FANS TURNED ON 

HIGH CURRENT SPIKE, FUEL CELL #3 

OXYGEN TANK 82 PRESSURE RISE 

11.3 VOLT TRANSIENT, AC BUS #2 

HIGH CURRENT SPIKE, FUEL CELL #3 

OXYGEN TANK #2 TEMPERATURE RISE 

OXYGEN TANK #2 MAXIMUM RECORDED 

PRESSURE 

MEASURABLE SPACECRAFT MOTION 

OXYGEN TANK #2 PRESSURE ZERO 

LOVELL "I BELIEVE WE HAVE A PROBLEM 

HERE" 

Figure 4 

The next slide, please. 

This picture which is very difficult, to make out-it has been blown 

ul)-is one of the photographs the usi,ronauts did bring buck. This 

area right up here is the area of interest. This is the same bay we were 

looking ut earlier. There are tjvo fuel cells here, the hydrogen tanks 

here. Right about in here is where oxygen tank 2 had been. We are 

going through the technique of enhancing these photographs and feel 

we can learn much from them. Our primary reliance will have to be 

on telemetry data. (See fig. 5.) 
10 

Figure 5 

All of these indicators must, of course, be ex2imiiied in greater 

detail. One conclusion that we can (Irtiw, primarily becctuse of the 

electrical anomalies and pressure anti temperature rise just prior to 

the No. 2 oxygen tank fnilure, is that this event \vas riot caused by 

a meteorite. From the preliminary examination it does iippear that 

the observed rapid rise in oxygen tank No. 2 pressure would require 

an amount of heat much greater than that produc$ed from electrical 

current flow for the tank fans, heaters, and instrumentation operation. 

This does not rule out electrical power as a source of initiation for 

some other energy source as yet unde1,ermined. Analysis and tests 

have been and are being conducted to tleterrriirie whsit such an energy 

source could be and how it could have been initiated. 

EXPECT EARLY RESOLUTION OF PRORLEM 

In parallel with the above analysis, intensive effort is underwiry to 

determine what corrective wtions might be taken to modify the 

oxygen system rind associateti hardware to eliniinate the possible 

cause or causes that led to the oxygen tank failure. Final action must 

await the completion of the failure investigation. 

I am confident that the actions currently underway will lead to an 

early resolution of the problem that caused the termination of‘ the 

Apollo 13 mission. 

I would like to conclude my remarks with a few comments on the 

performance of the Apollo hardware and the flight anti ground crew. 

The actions taken to bring Apollo 13 safely home demonstrated under 
11 

extremely adverse conditions the inherent flexibility that has been 

developed into the Apollo systems and operations. The flexibility of 

the spacecraft systems provided us with many different options from 

which we selected a series of configurations in meeting the varying 

requirements on the trip home. This long, arduous voyage continuously 

presented the challenge to balance tlie spacecraft systems required to 

perform necessary functions against the availability of consumables 

of water, electrical power, oxygen, and the lithium hydroxide to 

remove the carbon dioxide. The options available to flight and ground 

crews in every case permitted acceptable courses of action to be 

selected. During this emergency situation, the remaining systems 

performed in an outstanding manner in meeting the unusual demands 

placed upon them. At the same time, the flight and ground crews 

demonstrated exceptional competence in meeting a set of unusual 

circumstances. 

In the preparation cycle for each Apollo mission, much of the flight 

and ground crew effort is spent in reviewing and improving the plans 

and established procedures to handle contingency situations. Verification of and proficiency in handling these procedures is developed 

through simulations involving the flight crew in spacecraft simulators 

and the flight controllers at their consoles in the Mission Control 

Center. However, the depth to which this contingency effort can 

proceed must be limited to some practical bound. The point 1 must 

emphasize is that the mission planning and training develops not only 

specific contingency procedures, brit much more importantly, a team 

of people with the capability to respond to unexpected events during 

manned space missions. To show how this capahilitiy was employed, 

Mr. Glynn Lunney will summarize the actions taken by this team 

which resulted in a successful recovery of Apollo 13 1 week ago today. 

STATEMENT OF GLYNN S. LUNNEY, APOLLO 13 MISSION DIRECTOR 

Mr. IJUNNEY. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, personally, as ~t member or a represmtativr of the Mission Control 

Ceritcr team, and that is a lot of rncn arid women, 1 would like to thank 

the committee for the opportunity to report on how WI: conducted the 

Apollo 13 flight. I would like to profacc my remarks by referring to 

the status that we are in in the rourse of the Apollo program today. 

We have had a number of flights; we have had a number of flights to 

the moon. The Apollo 9 flight was the first flight where we had a man 

check out the luriar module, and that was done in oarth orbit last 

winter. We hitd a series of tests conducted to first verify that thc lunar 

module would do its job at the n10011, arid secondly, we operated in a 

number of fashions, the applicatio~is of which lent themselves to tlie 

problem that we had in Apollo 13. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lunney? 

LUNAR MODULE AS LIFEBOAT 

Secondly, when we started flying to thr moon with the lunar module on Apollo 10, wc recognized that thc lunar module ship provided 

lifeboat facility for thc astronauts in case wc got into serious problems. Wc have paid it lot of attention to that in our planning. We made 
12 

a number of preparations. Most of the preparations are prepared in a 

general sense and it is difficult to try to cover all of the cases on the 

way out and the way back. But we had put the personnel through the 

discipline in thinking that out in order to respond to that kind of 

problem were we ever to run into one. 

With those remarks, let me go through what will of necessity here 

this morning be a rather sketchy outline of what we were gojng through 

in the control center. Then I think you will hear from the pilots’ points 

of view how this worked out. 

The first slide (fig. 6) very simply describes the mission we were 

in. In earth to moon, we were on the familiar figure 8 maneuver. We 

were on this trajectory called hybrid transfer maneuver, the dotted 

line-we had left the free-return trajectory, which is the dashed linearound the moon and back to earth. Tho start of tho problem occurred 

about 180,000 miles away from the earth, at about 55 hours, 55 minutes. (See fig. 7.) 
13 

/ 

Figure 6 

I 

I 

c 

i 

0 

9 

bu 

n 

3 

c 

c 

d 

I 

a 

44-195 0-70-3 
55:55 

57: 37 

58: 10 

58:40 

61:X 

63:ZO 

14 

SUMMARY OF EVENTS (1 OF 2) 

"1 BELIEVE WE'VE HAD A PROBLEM HERE" 

VARIOUS STAGES OF ACTIVITY 

CREW ENTRY INTO LUNAR MODULE 

TRANSFER GUIDANCE ALIGNMENT TO LUNAR MODULE 

COMMAND MODULE POWER DOWN 

D EC 

D EC 

SION. EXECUTION OF MIDCOURSE FOR FREE RETURN 

SION ON PROJECTED OVERALL FLIGHT PLAN 

Figure 7 

SUMMARY OF EVENTS 

Very briefly, a summary of events from that time on. It started with 

a report of the problom from tho astronauts. What I have summarized 

for you here are a number of steps that we have consitlerect iinportmt 

ones, both in tleciding things and cxcwuting things that have had to be 

pcrforrned to successfully complctc the flight. 

After the problem, which went through a series of stages that could 

be described us an increasing awareness of the extent of the problem 

and the seriousness of it, in about an hour and a half, both the ground 

controllers and the crew had decided that it was time. to go into the 

lunar module to prepare that ship for the lifeboat technique which \vc 

had discussed over the years in preparing for these flights, as I said 

earlier 

We also did, something else shortly after the crew entry into the 

lunar module which transferred the guidance idinement from the 

commarid module into the lunar module. We actually used some of the 

precious buttery power to do thtit, but we felt that if we did, thtLt we 

had something which would then permit the pilots to do propulsion. 

We were not on a free-return path flight to the earth so we did want to 

get a platform alinement. 

At about 58:40 we powered down the corrimantl module. The oxygen 

was about gone and we turned off the power drawn from the command 

module batteries to stkve them for the return portion of the flight. 

We had a number of courses available to us. We actually had the 

lunar module powered up. We could do n miticourse relatively soon iintl 

get biwk on a free return. We did have one option hic.h did not get 

very serious consideration. It htiti to do with tloiiig t~ direct return :ibort 

to the eitrth, but that would have required :L trenieritloiir >mount of 
15 

velocity of the engine. The only engine we had that could provide that 

was the service propiilsion engine arid it would have required dropping 

the lunar module. So that option was quickly deleted from our 

discussions. 

The other option we had was to power down immediately since we 

were concerned about the amount of power and water the command 

module was using. We accepted the opportunity we had at hand and 

that was to do a midcourse maneuver relthvely soon, get back on free 

return and plan a little more leisurely how we wanted to manage the 

remaining consumables in the lunar module. We decided to execute 

that at midcourse at about 61 hours md 30 minutes and address the 

problem of what would be our plan for the rest of the way back. 

By about 2 hours from that time, we had gone through a series of 

discussions both in the Control Center and with the pilots in determining what our projected ovorall flight plan would be. 

Next slide. (See fig. 8.) Very simply, after tho start of the problem, 

wc did tho rnidcorirsr to frce-rcturn to tho earth at about 6ljh hours. 

Wo now had a trajectory established-again it was the dark oncback to the earth. We did huvr. a number of ninneuvcring opportririitics in order to improw both the time it was to take to return to 

tho cwth urid tho area in the carth to which wo would return. One 

of thosc opportunitios is labeled up there, PC+2. That ciescribes an 

opportunity 2 hours aftor periconter, at the closest approach to the 

moon, which wus one of the techniques that we would have used if wo 

had to do an abort during tho interim orbit. We had two midcourse 

corrections scheduled, midcourso 5 and midcourse 7. There is no midcoursso scheduled six, because generally it occurs between those two 

and we did not do that in our budget scheduling. 
S

\ 

m 

ti 

CE 

FOR ENTRY 

CORRIDOR 

CORRIDO

FO 

(137:40) - 
17 

CONSUMABLE STATUS 

Next slide. (See fig. 9.) This is an important set of facts but there 

is a lot more that needs to be said than those facts up there. The 

CONSUMABLE STATUS 

AVAILABLE A1 

LM ENTRY 

WATER, POUNDS 324 

POWER, AMP HOURS 2181 

OXYGEN, POUNDS 50.3 

REMAINING AT 

LM JETT 

28. 2 

410 

28.5 

C02 REMOVAL, HOURS 

LM 58 (5 UNITS) 22 

C SM 156 (13 UNITS) 108 

- 

TOTAL 130 

Figure 9 

chart describes the amount of water, power, oxygen, and carbon 

dioxide removal capability we ha.d in the lunar module at entry and 

what we had remaining when we jettisoned the lunar module. 

One point I would like to mention is when we made our rojection 

at about 7 hours after the problem occurred, we ended the light with 

a set of consumables which were within about 2 percent of what we 

predicted back at 63 hours. So the view we took of the mission at 63 

hours held very well. 

We stuck to the plan that we had. We used only the power and the 

water and the oxygen that we had forecast and we were very close 

to predictions made almost 80 hours earlier. 

The second point is that although this does show that we are 

running down to 28 pounds of water, we had not employed another 

series of procedures which could have been used to further stretch 

the consumables on board the lunar module. By that I mean we kept 

the lunar module communication system, the telemetry system, the 

environmental control system up all the way back. If the consumable 

posture we were in had worsened or if we had absorbed another 

failure in some of these areas like an oxygen tank, we would have had 
18 

to resort to scheduling communications times with the crew and gone 

on what we call a duty cycle operation, where we might turn the 

equipment on for 10 minutes or 20 minutes out of every hour. I only 

say that to give assurance that although we were probably wlthin 

12 hours to 24 hours of running out of our most critical consumable, 

which was water, had we proceeded into this other set of procedures 

entailing duty cycling the communications gear on board, we probably 

could have stretched that further. 

The third point I would make was that with the lunar module 

environmental ,control system running full time, we knew that we 

would deplete the canisters in the lunar module which are used to 

remove the carbon dioxide from the air for the astronauts to breathe. 

We knew we had to find some way to use the CSM canisters in the 

module. There were a number of ways to do that. We finally selected 

the method represented by this configuration on my right. This is a 

canister designed to withdraw carbon dioxide by drawing the oxygen 

through it. This is LL hose from the lunar module (indicating). This is 

connected to the lunar module ship and the fan; the compressor in the 

lunar module sucks the oxygen through there and cleanses it as it 

comes through. That plan having been agreed upon, we then had a number of 

options for the maneuver that we were to perform 2 hours after 

passing behind the moon. The options were about, three. One, we 

could have decided to try to come back in the absolute minimum 

time by dropping the service module, thus getting rid of about 

50,000 pounds of weight. This would htLve enabled us to get a lot 

more velocity with the LM engine md would have eriubled us to 

return to earth sooner. However, we discarded that on the basis of 

the unknown thermal environment, the command module heat 

shield and the command module control system, propellant anti jet 

control system we use for entry, would be in if we jettisoned the 

service module. Those systems are essentially at the lower end of 

the module and they are protected by the command module being 

attached. To remove it would have endangered the all-important 

heat shield for entry. 

The second option we would have had would have been to try 

to land in the Atlantic. We would have been able to land about 9 

hours earlier than we did. The problem with that was we would have 

used essentially all the propellants in the descent tank to accomplish that and it would not have allowed us to make the midcourse corrections subsequent to that posture. Second, there was the recovery 

posture we were in in the Atlantic. You know there was a fair amount 

of work going on to see what would have been arranged in the Atlantic. 

We would have certainly had a lot of aircraft and people to recover 

the module. There were a lot of ships going in the urea. However, 

that option was also discarded because we would have run the lunar 

module propellant out. We chose to go on to the Pucific at a spttshdown time of 79 hours, to almost 143 hours. 

(See fig 10). 
19 

SUMMARY OF EVENTS (CONCL'D 2 OF 2) 

70.28 DECISION, EXECUTION OF MANEUVER 2 HOURS AFTER CLOSEST APPROACH 

TO MOON (PC+2) 

94:OO 

1OO:OO 

CARBON DIOXIDE SUCCESSFULLY REMOVED WITH CSM CANISTER FIX 

SIMULATOR-VERIFIED CHECKLIST READ UP FOR MCC BURN AT 105:18 

105: 18 MIDCOURSE CORRECTION FOR ENTRY CORRIDOR 

126:15 SIMULATOR-VERIFIED CHECKLIST READ UP FOR ENTRY PHASE 

133:35 BEGIN LUNAR MODULE POWER UP FOR ENTRY PREPARATIONS 

142:54 SPASHDOWN 

Figure 10 

The carbon dioxide was removed from the canister here. We used 

111) what sounded to the outside world like more numbers. We read up a 

checklist which was verified in the simulator by other sets of astronau ts j list running around the clock to perform the Inidcourse corrections we performed with the secondary guidance system. We had to 

dine it with the unique power stbvirig technique that we had to discuss 

with Captain Lovell. It worked very well. The midcourse was burned 

at 105:18 approximately. The other checklist was read up at about 126 

hours. You now recall at this stage of the flight, we were approaching 

the entry phase where we had, one, a lunar module with us that we 

wanted to use as long as possible. Two, we had a service module 

which was essentially impowered which we had to jettison. We also at 

some point had to jettison the lunar module. Third, we had a very 

critical or short supply of power in the command module and we could 

only stand a short number of hours in the command module with the 

pilots getting the vehicle ready for entry before we actually did enter. 

We also wanted to keep the tasks and the time length for the astronauts as simple as we possibly could. Those kinds of thoughts were in 

the work that we (lid, the check lists we got for the simulator and the 

checklists we read up. The other powers were for entry and splashdown. 

SEQUENCE FOR ENTRY 

Next slide (fig. 11) gives yoti an idea of the sequence for entry. 

We have the LM power up; the midcourse correction. We jettisoned 

the service module behind us. We have the command service module 

power up. 'I'his time we transferred the equipment from the lunar 

module to the command module. Later we jettisoned the lunar module. 

The entry altitude and attitude was reached and the landing was as 

predicted at 142 54. 
ENTRY ATTITUDE CSM POWE

21 

m 

F 

w 

r 

G

G.E.T. 141:30 

I G.E.T. 142:54 ip- 

- 
21 

Next came the splashdown, which I guess for the people in our 

That concludes my remarks. 

The CHAIRMAN. Now we are going to have a chance to meet an 

old friend. Captain Lovell, I hope you and Mr. Swigert will start by 

rising and facing the people in the audience. 

STATEMENTS OF ASTRONAUTS JAMES A. LOVELL, COMMANDER OF 

APOLLO 13 ; AND POHN L. SWIGERT JR., COMMAND MODULE PILOT 

{OF APOUO 13 

Astronaut LOVELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of 

the committee. [Applause.] 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I thought today that 

Jack and I would informally tell you what went on in the spacecraft 

during the flight of Odyssey and Aquarius. Dr. Petrone and Glynn 

Lunney have covered pretty thoroughly all the varied details. But 

there were certain emotional factors and techniques which I thought 

might be interesting to you. 

Actually, the flight began several says before we lifted off. This 

flight was somewhat unusual in the fact that we had a rather minor 

crisis in the crew at the time. One of our backup crew members came 

down with the measles and in examining the primary crew, we found 

out that Lt. Comdr. Ken Mattingly was susce tible to the disease. 

It was quite a dramatic decision that we shoulcfnot fly Ken, in case 

he did come down with the disease during the flight. We then looked 

at the backup crew-and Jack was backup. In the last 2 days prior to 

the flight, Jack, Fred Haise, and myself worked close together-to 

be sure that we did work as a team. To prepare for space flights, it is 

very difficult for the backup and the prime crews to get together 

because there are so many details to take care of ourselves that cross 

training is somewhat limited. But I am happy to report that as we 

made the decision to go in April with Jack, Jack did an outstanding 

job and we are very proud of how he worked in with the prime team. 

business has to be one of the most beautiful sights in the world. 

REPORT OF LOW MORALE COMPLETELY FALSE 

There was one other aspect to our training which I would like to 

report. It had been mentioned previously that I thought the morale 

at the Cape was low and that I was worried about the booster and the 

spacecraft and the people therc. This is completely false. I think one 

of the little sidelights, one of the little jobs that we have as a crew 

besides training for ourselves is to go around and talk to the people 

there. I am happy to report that the crew people, the su port team, 

conipetely behind us and completely enthusiastic about the approaching flight. I had no qualms whatsoever on April 11 to step in that 

spacecraft and undertake the mission. 

I would like to set the scene as we saw it from the spacecraf? at 

just about 55 hours, as Dr. Petrone had mentioned. Up to that t!me, 

our flight was rather normal. We tiad proceeded along the fllght 

plan and were actually ahead of it. So we requested from ground control to enter the lunar module Aquarius 3 hours earlier. There 

everybody that was connected with the flight of Apol P o 13, were 

44-195 0-704 
2’2 

was some work that Fred Hake and I had to do and we were also 

scheduled to turn on oiir television to show the people back home 

on the grorrnd some interior photography of the vehicles. We had 

done that. We were just completing our television work. I hatl been 

o erating the camera. I was moving back tlirough the tunnel, and 

&ed was still in the lrinar module, just about ready to close the 

hatch. Jack was in the (*ommarid module on the left,-hantl seat, when 

we heard a rather large explosion. 

In the testing of a lunar module, there is a valve which we actuate 

during this procedure which also gives oiit this slime loud noise. I had 

forgotten the amount of imise from this vtilve which rather iinriervetl 

iis a bit. We thought perhaps this \\’its a repent of the same test. 

Brit it tiirnetl oiit, as I SRW Fred’s face us he looked cio\vi1 through the 

tunnel, that he had nothing to (lo with this explosion. 

About that time, I looked at Jack. Jack started to see some of the 

warning lights come on and I think that I will let Jack explain what 

he saw at that time. 

SUMMAR12 ES ACTION AFTER EXPLOSION 

Astronaut SWIGEET. Mr. Chairman and members of thc committee, 

shortly after the explosion-of course, in s~)acc, there is no air, so 

there is no sourid ; the sound itself was transmitted by thc structurc. 

Since I was attached to thc seat with a lap belt, I did! fcel a small 

shudder with the explosion. At about 2 swonds thereafter, \VC had ti 

master alarm arid a main bus-B undervoltage light which comes on 

when the main bus gocs under 263: volts. I had some immediatc concern becausc we had an iinexplained problem at thc main bus during 

testing. I transmitted that we had a problem and immediately got 

over to the right-hand seat to look at tho readings of the voltage rind 

the current. 

At this time, the main bus voltage was iiormal. The current was lo IV 

and fuel cell 3 was normal, which indicated to me that whatever it 

was, it was transitory. 

At that time, being a command module pilot, I had an awful lot of 

faith in the command motlulc tint1 I thought it WLS in the TihI. Thcy 

were sitting in there without a hatch. So 1 said, “Jim, wc ht~tl bct tcr 

get tho hatch in arid then let’s sit back id take :L look at what I\ c 

have.” 

I started preparations to install the hatch, which is in the commnnd 

module to close off the tunnel area. Fred Hake hatl come clown from 

the tunnel at this time arid looked into his seat over on the right him1 

side arid began looking at the remaining indicators. At this time, 

main bus B voltage was off scale low, so it was somewhere less, than 23 

volts. The current was zero ancl the fuel cell 3 was zero, which gave 

indication that fiiel cell 3 htitl stopped putting out and we indeed had 

no voltage and no current on main bus B. 

Shortly thereafter, as Fred started transferring wrne of the load 

from that bus onto our remaining good hiis, lie lid a main bit5 A 

rindervoltnge. This c-tiiisetl him to look ILt the fiiel rells thrtt were 

powering the main bus A, fuel cells 1 and 2. He did notice that oil fuel 

cell 1, the flow was also zero. 
23 

At this point in time, Jim looked out the side of the spacecraft arid saw material venting from the space(-raft into space and appearing 

much like a snowfall in some of our Western States during the winter. 

We c.oncludecl then that the problem indeed was in the service module 

tmd we terminated our efforts to install the htbtch and began working 

with the ground to isolate the loss of oxygen which we had determined 

from our quantity indicators WLS coming from tank No. 2, and since 

the pressure was decreasing, me also were losing oxygen from tank 

No. 1. 

I think that pretty well summarizes it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Before you stop, would you mind turning around 

[Applause.] 

Astronaut LOVELL. You might wonder just what our feelings were 

about this time. The situation went from one where we anticipated 

that our lunar landing mission itself, this landing on the moon, might 

be in jeopardy, to one of whether we mould be able to return back 

home or not. The seriousness of the situation increased greatly in the 

few minutes during our analysis of what was going on. To summarize 

our situation from the crew point of view, we were losing three fuel 

cells. These fuel cells produce the electrical power to get us back home. 

The batteries in the commarid module itself were not sufficient. We 

were at the same time losing oxygen pressur in our two oxygen tanks. 

When I looked at them, one was zero, one was going down rapidly. 

It is here that the coordination, 1 thought, between the ground 

and the crew was admirable. They analyzed the situation and we 

soon realized that onr only hope of survival was to go into Aquarius, 

power up its systems, and use the systems and the consumables on 

board the lunar module for the return home. It was here that we 

realized that it was now case of survival. 

We did this. We powered up the lunar module, and the first milestone of coming home, as Mr. Lunney has said, was to get an alinemerit that we were slowly going to lose from the command module 

arid place tliat alirienient into the liinsr module. We were on a trajectory that, had we not done anything, would have entered us into 

ti per~nanent orbit, maybe 230 miles apogee, probably 100 perigee. 

So the ground crew gave us what we rieetletl to get through and get 

a free return trajectory burn and get 11s back. 

My main concern at this point wt~5 to get this spacecraft back within 

the earth’s atmosphere. I felt that this would bo a milch better termination of this flight at letist to come back into the atmosphere than it 

would have been to not come back at all. 

to the audience and giving them a Rocky Mountain wave? 

DESCRIBES FEELINGS OVER SITUATION 

TRANSFER SPACECRAFT CONTROL TO LUNAR MODULE 

Oric of the problems n hich we had to face a6 we entered the lunar 

modulc. \\;as the fact that \vta do not normally control this complete 

stack by the systems iri the lunar module. Wc fly basically by the 

command modulo, the cone-shaped spacecraft, in the center of this 

model. Consequently, we had to transfer the control of the spacecraft 
to the lunar modulo and use these thrusters. Wo had practicccl this, 

fortunately, in our training and found out that with the termination of 

a translation controller, which is normally used to niovc thc luntir 

module in the translation, plus thr attitude controllcr, we could cmtrol 

this cntire stack. Remember now that we have a servico module that 

had almost full fuel plus the reaction control system or attitude that 

was almost in full fuel. 

Our first burn with thc hclp of tho ground was surcessful. Wc wcrc 

back on frcc return. At the same time, we were trying to tlctcrmino 

just how much in thc I\ tty of consumablcs \vo hat1 on board tho sl~icecraft. This was a problem that concerned me. I kne\v that if this engine 

worked properly, we could make it back as far as the trajectory wa~: 

concerned, because w o had clono this beforo in simnliition arid cJim 

McDivitt arid tho crew on Apollo 9 had tictually tctstcd this out. Rut I 

did riot havo at my fingrrtips at the momcrit just horn much consumables we hatl on board and whether we could lust the return voyagc. 

Again thc ground came through. They computed for us, and I must 

give Fred Hake some credit, too, because hc hatl in the back of his 

mind what the situation was arid he thought hc would kc 

honest by checking out to see what we actually had to soc whuthcr 

the ground was going to give us tho truo figure or not. When Frcd said 

that we had about an hour to spare, I felt a little bit more relieved. 

Our second milestone was just after wo passed the moon and we got 

to within 130 or 140 miles of the lunar surface. As we went through 

the back side, even with the emergency going on-and since I had 

been there before, I was anxious to get this second maneuver out of 

the way-but Jack arid Fred managed to pick up a few more photographs for scientific development and exploration. So I finally had to 

turn them away from the windows so we could get on with the burn. 

The second burn was important because it increased or decreased 

the time of transit from the moon back to the earth. Again, we used 

the descent propulsion engine. At this time, since Jack had completely 

powered down the command module, he was the third member aboard 

the LM and helped us out in our maneuvers as we lit off the engine 

and made a very successful automatic burn to decrease our time corning home. 

Jack, why don’t you comment a few minutes on just what our 

environmental system was as wo tried to power down the lunar 

module? 

COMMENTS ON ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEM 

Astronaut SWIGERT. Let me just state now, we have an activn 

vehicle up here, completely passive around here [indicating]. One of 

the things that was unusual is that when you are right side up in the 

lunar module, you arc upside down in the command module. So when 

you go from one area to another, there is a period of acclirnitizat>ion. 

The lunar niodulr with its systems powcred was warm. Wr of course 

had no power in the corriniaritl modiilc anti as tirnc wcrit on, it kept 

getting colder and colder. We tiid use the command module for slccping 

for the first 2 days. It allows you a placo to strctch out, it has sleep 

restraints that you can attach to tho spacecraft structure. uritl the 

sleeping accommodations were very comfortable until it got too cold 

for sleeping. Then we were all together in a group in the lunar module, 

as crowded as it was. 
25 

One of the critical consumablcs was the water, and we were just 

not going to use any of our TAM water because, as precious as it was, WP at lcast wanted to get back. So with the help of tho ground, we 

devised a procedure for cxtracting the water from the portable tank 

in tho command module. This wc did. 

We atc fairly well. We used juice bags for our water and I would 

go up them and would take 10 or 20 juice bags and fill them up as 

full as I could and storc thcm away until tho oxygen pressure ran 

out. About 24 hours prior to the ent,ry, we ran out of water in the 

portable tank in the command module. 

We had sufficient other food in what would be called wet packs, 

which are small packages of hot dogs and beef arid gravy and things 

like that, which also afforded somc moisture as well as food. 

We had arnplc cubes and squares of gingerbread and fruitcake, 

things like that, which wore also solid food. 

We did find that conditions did get a little bit-wt? rcferred to the 

command niodulc and its combination-wc had a two-room suite 

here. We refcrred to the command module as the bedroom for awhile 

until it got too cold. Thcn we startcd calling it the refrigerator. The 

temperature upon entry of tho command module wtis 38’ arid when 

wc laridcd was still a comfortablc 50’ if you call that comfortable. 

One of tho problcnis wc had was gcttirig the lithium hydroxide 

canister modification. We havc a picturc of that. I do not know 

whether it has been rcleased but it shows thc modification that looks 

exactly like what you scc hem. Thc ground read us up tho instructions 

and Jim and I constructed it arid it worked perfectly. It reduced the 

partial pressure of carbon dioxide from 734 millimeters down to %O of 

a millimeter in 2J4 hours. It will show you the resourcefulness of the 

ground and the vcrsatility we havc and I guess good old Yankee 

ingcnuity. 

One of the things we also had-that I do not think was mentioned-that we dkcussed as crew mcmbers using, in conjunction with the ground, was the portablo life support systems, the back 

packs that thc crcw wears on lunar surface. Those two back packs did 

havo a supply of oxygon.. They did havc lithium hyclroxidr canisters 

and they did havc electrical power and fans for circulating oxygen. 

So we did discuss the possibility of using these to supplement the 

consumablcs that we had on board. 

I think that pretty well covers it. 

EMPLOYS APOLLO 8 TECHNIQUE 

Astronaut LOVELL. As we were becoming accustomed to the 

environment, rubbing our hands together, putting on our lunar 

boots to keep our feet warm-I never thought we wquld be using them 

for that purpose--me had a third maneuver coming up. After the 

second maneuver, we found out that the angle for hitting the earth’s 

atmosphere was still not sufficient. The ground was tracking us. They 

continued to give 11s the procedures for this third maneuver. The third 

maneuver was different, however, because we were powered down, 

essentially a dead spacecraft except for communications, except for 

the life support system, particularly the air and oxygen pumps 

keeping things cool. Back in Apollo 8, when we were not too sure 

about a lunar voyage and all the ramifications that might occur, we 
26 

looked at the way-out procedures which, iii case all W:LS lost, could gel 

the crew buck. Thirlgs like you never give ul), you just keep tryirig. 

One of them \\-as if you lost the phtforni, hen- could I\ e make a 

rnaneuver to change the mgle of enlry to make the t~iigle safe. This 

maneuver consisted of maneuvering the iticecraft with :ittitnde lo 

line up with the earth’s terrninntor, n h 11 WILS ti h:uidy refererice 

system. Back in Apollo 8, ulthough 1 leariled it very astutely iind 

remembered it, 1 never thought in :dl the norld that I I\ ould ever 

1i:ive to use a technique of this nature. So when they cdled up and stkid, 

“Do you remember the technique back in Apollo 8 :md why not me 

it for this maneuver?” we did. We Inaiieuvered the pacec craft. At 1,hi.; 

time, we had a three-man team all helping to make this intineiiver, 

which was strictly n manual one u~id it changed the angle for us to 

help make the entry. 

The ground WLS hclpful in other \\‘:iys. Wc hI b:ittoricis 011 bourtl 

the spacecraft that were weak. Tlicy provitlcti iis with i~ proccdurc 

that we had never heard of before, to rrchargc~ thc btLttt*rics from thc 

LM power system. This, of coiirsc, liclpctl to powcr LI~ tlic cornniantl 

module earlier for reentry. The last 5 hours ~ve \v(w fillctl \\it11 techniques and procedures. I requested that the ground come up with procedures that we could, in our rather fatigued stat(>, (lo sufficiently arid 

accurately to makc sure that \\re did not makc any mistakes. Thcy 

were very responsive. Wc got these procd\ircs and, in the last 5 ho\irs, 

we w~nt through an aliricmcnt of the LM, tho srrvicc motlulc jettison, 

in which we were able to get sornc photographs of thc tlarnagcd area, 

arid then pow.cr up of thr corninand ~iiodiilr, Lit n hich tirnc I rcniuinccl 

in the lunar rriodule and I could wc the earth getting biggclr arid biggrr. 

If you are familiar with this littlc drvic(>, thc lunar motlulc is t~ very 

fragile m ach iric. 

Then aftcr the conini:~iid motlulc IC iis po\vclrctl up t~ntl \\ (h could 

actually got an alincment, in which Jack did gct a fiiic aliricmcnt, I 

went hack through thc tunnel, closcd off thc niodulc~. wr jettisoned 

the lunar module, and rniidc u normal reentry. 

SHOWS FILM OF SPACECltAFT INTERIOH 

I mould nt this time likc to show you soin(’ of the movies which ivc 

had taken on the interior. Remember, no\\, that most of thc film wr had 

on board wtts for our ~I~I~ILI’ cxploration \\ ork ant1 ivr tlctrrmiricd thiLf 

\vc woultl hav~ plciity of film on botird. Wc wantcd to show yori sonic 

of the living conditions abroad this particrilur spticcc.rtd‘t co1lfigiir:itioii. 

1 might add that wvo flew the spacecraft iii foiir cwnfigiir:itions, which 

I do not think has bccn done bcforc. Thc cwrnplctc stack. Whc.ii \\ (L 

got done with thc servicc’ rriodule, wc’ flew tho comrntiritl rnotlulr rind 

the lunar module togethrr. Then aftor mc got through \vitli thc lunar 

module, it was thc cornmarid motlnle. And prior to tho :tctual docking, 

we flew the command and service rnodulc, thew two togcthcr, so ~(1 

had quite a combination of cxpericnccs in flying. 

If I could have that movic now, I coiild show you sorric. of our inhouse conditions. 

(A short movie is shown.) 
27 

Astronant LOVELL. I might tidd that our launch was as normal as 

we coiiltl expect, except for the one engine malfunction which lh. 

Petrone has rnentioned. 111 tts fortunde enough to be able to participate 

in two launches with the Sutrirn V. 1 urn dways arnwetl at the accuracy 

:mI the way th:it the simiilation5 that we conditct tLre very similar to 

the :wtiial perforrnance of the vehicle itself. 

Ast,roiiiLiit SwIGExrr. This is :L shot of tlic. cornrnaiicl rnodiilc coining 

btwk into dock with thc lunar modal(. booster combination. You will 

s(v thcb shadow of tht coinmmd motliilc as it (‘onies :lcross, puts thc 

~)robc’ into thc. groove. 

Astronaut T~OVELL. This is :iftrr the. ticdrrit, in tlic lunnr niodnlc. 

\170u CUIL sw things grttiiig cliiitc. Iic~tic. ‘I’liat bag \\.US originrdly 

clcAgncd to stou watc.r from tliv lifc sripport systrm. It is now bring 

titilizrd to st or(. iirinc, bec*tusr it (1 \VCIY’ not dumping ;bny ovcrboiwd. 

Brcd is in his normal slwp position in the luiitw rnodulr. The trmpcraturc is gcttirig quitc low mtl lic h:is his hid tiickcd tiway. 

Ruck in tlic trinncl is Jack. Hv 11 :is dso slccpirig. 

Astroniiut~ SWIGERT. Hrrr nrci wrnc shots of food. Wc mcnt this tiinch 

\vith somc spoon-bowl matcrid in which iw hiid somc1 adhesive mntcrid that would stick to tlrr spoon aiid riot float >t\v:iy. ‘I’hnt had som(1 of 

the gravy iri it, I think. 

Astronant LOVELL. I tricd to point out that lithiiini hydroxidc c’xI)cricncc. Tti:it bag in buck of Jim’s clhow tlicrcb-- you will br nblc. to 

scc tho crisscross taping. During most of our flight, \ye wcrc in tin iincontrolled rotational modc to kwp tlir sunlight ovcii on the vcliiclc for 

t cmlwr>~turc~onsidrratioii. ‘I‘h(~r(~for(~, \vchad light only nt ccrtain 

tiincis atid most of our timr 1~:~s sprrit with tlir flnshligtit. 

Astronaut SWIGERT. What \\ e :ire doing right here is the entry 

procedure and Jim arid I are rolling over to get it more closely. He 

mould be working in the lunar module, myself in the command 

module and this took a lot of cooperation. We found out that the 

procedure worked very well. 

Astronaut LovELrA. I :mi rubbing my hnnds because it is cold in 

there. 

We ended up wearing both of our sets of underwear ant1 our garment 

that you see there, tirid the luri~lr boots. Unfortunately, when Jack 

(’nine aboard the commaiitl module, we (lid not provide him with a 

set of lunar boots. 

This is the cornm:intl module showing the configuration as it looked 

through most of the emergency. The hatch you see at the left, the 

docking groove in the center and now through the 1,unnel. There is 

the configuration of the lnnar module outside panel. 

I might add this gave 11s a unique study in operating vehicles of IL volume that are considerably larger than either the command 

module or the lunar module separately. We found out thtLt me hat1 

no difficulty at all in trtinsporting onrselves back arid forth through 

both vehicles. 

Our one sonrce of entertainment 11 :is our little tape recorder 

that we were able to linve some music on. It was indeed fortunate 

that our communication system 11 as as good ILS it was, because the 

primary reason why we are buck today is the way tjhe ground took 
28 

hold of unusual situations t~iitl utilized their resources antl initiated 

them in getting procedures for gettiiig us home. 

questions any of you may have. 

(Conclusion of film.) 

Dr. PAINE. Mr. Chairnitin, we \voiild be very htippy to answer any 

The CHAIHMAN. Senator Smith? 

KEEPING COOL UNUEB ADVERSE CONDITIONS 

Senator SMITH of Maine. Thank yoii, Nr. Chairmnii, for giving us 

this privilege. This is certainly one of the most Inomentoils occasioiis 

of my career. 

I have a number of cluestions but I will limit mine at this time to 

two simple ones. 

Captain Lovell, as the young people woiiltl say, yoti ant1 yc!ur :LSSOc-iates “kept your cool.” What in your bac~kgroiintl do you think contribriteti most to this ability to keep your c~)ol? 

Astronaut LOVELL. Senator Smith, I think that the ability to keel) 

working under the conditions that exist is the result, perlitips, of the 

inany years of training in the business th:Lt Bred Hake, Jack, siitl 

myself are in. We are esseii titilly 1)eople n Eio test equipment. We expect 

tit times to meet adverse c~onditions. In this biisinehs, you cwinot 

expect complete success all the time. 

Among other things, 1 think, it n:ih the coolnehs of the groiintl in 

helping iib to determine \+hat our problems were and to assure us tht 

the techniques were correct to keep II~ going tilong as we did. 

Senator SMITH ofMaine. Mr. Swigert, do you have mything to add 

to that? 

Astronaut SWIGERT. No; 1 think I agree thoroughly with Jim that 

it wits the test pilot background that we had. T am sure that all of iis 

being in that background had encountered unusud situtitiom before. 

I think this is in large mensure what ermhletl us to work so well with 

the ground. 

SPACE PROGRAM STIMTJLUS TO EDUCATION 

Senator SMITH of Maine. One thing that impressed me most ILS 

the coolness antl the courtige shown by the wives antl f:imilies. It miitle 

me feel that :it least if they c~)ultl have t~orifitlericv.? in what yori were 

doing arid that you would come back stifely :LS you did, that 1 also 

should httve confidence and not be worried. 

I presume you get a great deal of mail. Wc hcrc in Congress get a 

great deal of mail from young people of school age who \vould likc to bu 

astronauts, who would likc to get into the space program. I sometimes 

wonder how to answer those lcttcrs. Do you offer my spccifio ndvicc or 

words of caution to these yonng peoplc? 

Astronaut LOVELL. Wc do, Senator Smith, gct quit(. ti fcw lcttcrs 

from young peoplc who ould likc to krio\v tholit ont‘ spice progntm 

antl about how to critcr it. Wc usually :imncr thcni in ii nianncr that 

suggests that of all things, thoy contiiiiic thcir cducation. Wc fwl th:~f 

one of the best ways that \vc can for\vartl our 1)rogr:tni is to h:tw well 

cducatecl pcople in it. I think their resourcefulncss, their bi~ckgroiind, 

made it possiblc for this flight to bc c.oniplctcti. Wc say abovc :dl 
things, continuc your ethication. Wc bclicvc. thc spacc program, if 

nothing clse, is a stimulus to cducation and inspires young people to 

follow along. 

Senator SMITH of Mainc. hlr. Swigclrt, do you hrtvo anything to 

add? 

Astronaut SWIGERT. No, 1 think that says what I wonld say. 

Senator SMITH of Mainc. Thank you. 

QUESTIONS DESIGN CHANGES OF APOLLO 13 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Symingtorl. 

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Lovcll, I join my colleagues in tho pleasure 

of seeing you back again succcssfully from another moon trip. I congratuhtc you on your glorious achicvcmcnt. It represcnts dl thcl best 

in this country, and also congratulatc your collcagucs. 

Dr. Pninc, may I congratulatca you, too, sir, on having such a 

superb organization. When you ran into this trouble, you were able 

through probably the fincst pic(-(. of coopmition wc havc hatl in tcchnological history to bring thew gentlemen back safcly. Dr. PAINE. Thank you. 

Senator SYMINGTON. Were there any changes in design of the Apollo 

13, especially in the service module, which made it cliflerent from the 

previous Apollos and which might riot have been adequately tested? 

Dr. PETRONE. senator Syniington, there were no significant changes 

in the design in the service module, specifically in the area where we 

think we had our difficulty. 

NO SAFETY SHORTCUTS CAUSED BY BUDGET CUTS 

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you. 

Some people have alleged that the sharl) reductions in approprirbtions that NASA has taken in the la5t feu years has caused NASA 

to take shortcuts which mLLy have c~)mpromisetl safety. Dr. Paine, is 

there any truth, in your opinion, in that allegation? 

Dr. PAINE. None whatever, Senator Syniingtoii. NASA u ill not fly 

any missions unless we feel we are prepared in a11 respects to do so. 

The fact that \\ e have been able to effect substantial economies has 

had nothing to do with the fact that we hatl this difficulty. We have 

kept all of the essentials and we expect that despite the economy, we 

are fully prepared to fly these missions. 

CHANCE OF METEOROID DAMAGE 

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank yon. 

What's the theoretical estimate in percentage, if you have one, 

about the chance of having one of our space-one of our spacecraft 

being hit by t~ meteoroid on future {lights? 

Dr. PETHONE. Senator' Syrniiigton, the numbers t her(. Itre vcry 

difficult to tirrivt. at. But wc havr a sc4cs of nuinburs--it is lcss than 

onc in a million in this particular time cxposurc. Whcii you say how 

much less than one in a rnillion, with vcry simplc changes in your 

assumption makc it on0 in 10 million. Then: is a vcry high order of 

magnitude, a vcry low probability that a meteorite could do damage 

in a space flight. 
30 

MAN WILL TRAVEL SOLAR SYSTEM 

Senator SYMINGTON. Thnrik you, Dr. Potroiic. 

Dr. Pairie, do you hclic.vc in munnrd spxo flight bcyond thc 111oo1i 

and think that we should preparc for it? 

Dr. PAINE. Thcrc is 110 qucstioii in riiy milid, Scncitor Symingtoii, 

that wc are only tit the vrry first stvps of man in spacc. Tt has bccn 

possible for 11s in the first dccadr of spuc~~ to cxtcrid riiaii's rcitch all 

the way out to thc moon and for the iicxt decade in space, we will 

largely br confined to tho luiitir arca. But in the\ decadcs to come arid 

purticularly in thc centuries to come, thcro is 110 qucstion in rny mint1 

that irim will indeed travcl throughout tlic solar system. 

Senator SYMINGTON. Dr. Petroiw, do you ngrcc' with thnt? 

Dr. PETHONE. Absolutcly, sir. I think tlic ycurs tilict~d will :illow 

us to tukc tliosc stops. 'Micrc is no qiwstioii of our capbility iri thck 

decades and the centuries nbcncl. 

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Lumicy, your thoughts? 

Mr. TJUNNEY. Yes, sir. 1 belicvcl wc will do that soincdtty. 1 do iiot 

know \vhcn. 1 recall tiwhilo back wlic.ii wc wcrc first playing with 

uirplanes, thri buildiug tlicm and flying thcm. Thc~ history of the. 

busirioss of flight has come so fur in tho last 50 yrars that cvcr~ to 

att,crript to predict wherc. it is going to go in thci Iictxt 50 I think is 

taking a risk. But it is going up. 

Senator Sr MINGTON. Captain Lovcll, lion- do yoii mti your cwllcagurs 

feel about this? 

Astronttiit LOVELL. I think, sir, I ('i~ti spak for jiist :~\)oiif ovcrybocly 

in thr flight group of tlic future> of our space travcl. It is our only 

rpgrot, porhps, that \vv might bv too ol(1, thoscl of 115 aboi~rd no\\ , to go to Mars. 

Senator SYMINGTON. Tlittnk you. A11 I C'UII say is you dl in:Lk(l ni(L 

very proud this morning to bc an Anicrican. [Applurrsc.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Curtis? 

Scrriitor ('URTIS I wmt to say to you, (:apttiin Lovcll :mtl Mr. 

Swigcrt, you huvch tlo~ic mow to iticroiisr~ thc tLt tcntluiic*c~ of this 

comrnittcc than ttnything thitt 1 kilo\\- of. Arid tliitt iippli(>s to thri 

spectators and the press, too. 

I would like to tLsk you, Mr. Ywigcbrt, tm t11c.y giviiig you :L bad 

time on your tax mattw? 

Astronaut SWIGERT. No, sir. It w(~nis tht I 1i:ivc riictl sorncbotly 

who knows th~ Director, so I tliink I iiiii .;:if(). 

Scnutor CIJRTIS. In cas~ Irc carmot gcit it (Ioiick, I lr:~\rc hl)(>ii t :L c*orIl)lv 

of tl(~ut1~ oii thc. tnx-it ritirig c~ornr~rittc~c~s of 1)otIi tticb Housv turd thck 

S~ritit~ tii has thri distirigiiishcd c-hiLirrnaii, ('huiriniLii Ailticrsoii. 

Whilr 1 havr rn:~d(~ it :L riilr iiot to intc~rc(~(lc on bchiilf of iridividiid 

taxpayers on the. merits of their claims, I will violato tlittt rule. if 

nccesstbry. 

Astrontuit SWIGERT. Thank yoii, sir. 

Senator CURTIS. Dr. Painp, I warit to take cxc-cl)tion to orlc statcmerit you made in your pr(~scritr~tiori. Yoit rcfm.rctl to \\.hat litis 

happcned as a fdurr. 1 would rathcr dcscribo it ns cxpcricncing 811 

Itccidcnt and uccvpt that ILS not ti fttilurcb. Sorricwrw, irnd 1 do not rrcull 

who it was, said that civilization rnovcs forward on stepping stones 
31 

of tragedy. That 110 doubt is trne. The very sad rind unfortunate 

fire thiit we had :L few yews a~o in lvliich three bmve men, White, 

ChtLffee, arid Grissorri lost their lives, hiis c::Lrised tjhe concentration iiiitl 

thc. s~i(:(:oss iu t1t:vc:loj)itig fire-rctsistimt, fireproof Iri:itcirials hLt will 

bo of boriofit, to cvcry I~HI~, \votrim, tttitl child in Atric:ric:ii rind bcyontl. 

Dr. PAINE. Yes, \ve have rntule very subststitid pro Seiiiitor Cultus. Mr. Chairrn:Ln, I have iL question I'. Pnitie 

:m1 four for Dr. Pet,rone, but iintler the circLiunstances, I would like 

t,o submit, those to them for msweririg in the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. They will be lriitritletl to them :~nd they ciLIl reply 

to them for the record. 

(The questions submitted by Senator Curtis aiid the ails\\ 

plied for the record by Dr. Puitie id Dr. Petrorie are as folloi 

Is t,ld IIO~ truc? 

FOREIGN COOPIERA'TION DURING APOLLO 13 MISSION 

Question 1. (a) Dr. Painc, thc ~CWS n~cdin ri~portcrl that during thc: dificultics of 

Apollo 13, /hv (Jnitrd Slates rccciucrl oflc~s for n 

offwed thrir sh,ips, ~top~~~d radio lransrnissions o periods, and so forth. Again with the spirit of inlernational cooperation engenderd by 

the space program, nations moved lo cooperalc u'ilh one another cmtl peoplt around lhe 

world were drawn closcr logcthcr. t wontlcr if ?jou would coiierncnl on this for lhe 

committee and place in the record a (lctaikd statcmcnt of the cooperation oflercd the 

United States during the Apollo 13 mission. 

(b) How many people around the world followed the Odyssey oJ Apollo 132 Would 

you get the State Department lo prepare a papcr or rcporl on tht: c$cct thc Apollo IS 

rnissi0.n had on U.S. relations with other nations and slates around the woridl 

Answer: (a) As soon as the word wcnt that Apollo 13 had ciicoiintrrcd a grave cmcrgency, govcrnmcnt s in all qiiiirt of thr world hastcmed to offer thcir 

assistance. Thcrc were messages to thc P dcnt, ininistrrittl telcphonc calls in 

thc early morning hours to oiir embassies, tclcgranis to 1J.S. Navy and Air Force 

arithoritics, arid telegrams and phonv calls to t hc Administrator of NASA. 

Some coiint,rics alcrtcd their naval and air rinits imd placed thcni at ow disposal. 

Others offered the we of coinmunications :tnd other facilities. Still othcrs asked 

to be informed of whatever requirement wc might havr and promised t,o cooperatt: 

to tho fiill extent of thrir ability. All offers exprcssod doep sympathy and conccrn. As it turned out, our own resources wcrc adcqnato t,o bring the Apollo crew 

back safely. This in no way detracts from the, importanco of thcsc offers of assistance nor from oiir gratitiidc for The assistance so frccly volnntcercd, as wcll as the many expressions of mthy from oiir friends throughont thc 

world, wcrc important sourccs of ragcinent and confdcnco. Thcy denionstrat,(: t,hn extcnt to which othcr n and othcr pcoples sense that they sharc 

the advcntrires of spacc. Thcy rcflcct the spirit of cooperat,ioii that irivcsts tho 

exploration of space, tt spirit that wo belicvo ow own cmphasis on working with 

othcrs has donc much to fostcr. 

Messages offering assistancc wcrc rcccivcd from thc following coiintries: Argont>in:t, Aiistralia, Brazil, Burundi, thv 1tc:priblic of China, Colombia, Cook Islands, 

Franco, t,ho Federal Itrpiiblic of Grrrriaiiy, Grc:ccc, Iran, It't~ly, Rl:Llagas.v, thc 

Ncthcrlands, NPW Zcaland, I'iLkistan, Portiigd, Senrgal, South Africa, thc Sovict 

Union, Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkty, thr IJnitcd Arab Itcl)riblic, thc: 

[Jnitcd Kingdom, arid Urugnay. 

In addition, leaders in sonic 80 corni1,ric:s sent cordial iricasagcs of sympathy, 

support and coiigratiilations concerning the plight and rrcovcsry of the Apollo 13 

astronants. 

From thv 1kp:~rtnicmt of Stat(,: hf('mOTun(l7L~L; t,o Arnold W. 

tnnt Administr:itor, Intc~rii:~tion:tl Affnirs, N:ttionnl Arroiimitics itnd S1):icv Adniiiiistr:~tioii ; froin H (~niiin Yoll:ick, I Xrcct or. 13iirv:tir of 1ritc.r'- 

nat,ion:tl Scit,ntific arid Tcehnological Aff:iirs, 1)q):irtrnc~iit of Stat('; siil)jcxc.l, 

Effect of Apollo-13 Mission 011 Anic~ic:t's Forvigii Affairs. 

ancc from ?tiany eoun rt a in jrq 1~cncic~ du ri 
32 

111 rcsponsc: to your nie~norandiini of April 28 forwnrding Svnator Ciirtis’ 

rcqiiest, for :L Stntc 1)c~partniciit cssmcmt of thc cffwt of thc Apollo-13 mission on L7.S. rc1:itions with othcr iiations arid st:tt>cs arorind thcx world, wv :ire ploascd 

to submit the attached statt:niont which you m:ty wish to niukc avnilablc to the 

Srnatc Cornniittw on Aoron:triticnl arid Spacc Sciences. 

Fhclcsiires: Stntcmcnt on “Eff cct of 1,ho i2l)ollo- 13 Mission on Aniwica’s 

Foreign Relations.” 

MAY 20, 1970. 

EFFI’:CT OF THIS APOLLO- 13 h S 10 N ( ) N AM I.: 11 I C‘ .A’ s F() 11 1%: I G N 1’: I, .\TI0 N S 

As lxirt of his tostinioriy on April 6 of this ycar, 1)r. l’ainc: siil)niittcd to t,hr 

Smatt! Cornmittec. on A(~ronaiilica1 and S1)acc Sciences thc Shtc I)cp:~rtriic~nt 

tnl spac~b 1)rogr:ttri on Anic.ric:in foreign rclation 

vcsr:il ways in wliicli t,hc sp:tc(: 1)rogr:Lrri hns h:t 

:i1 offcct 011 oiir postriro on thv world :tnd on oiir 

foreign rclat,ions. Tho prwtigc. which thv L7tiitc.d Stutcs has gaincd in the CJ’C-: 

of the \vorld :is a rcsiilt of thc sl):tcc~ progr:ttn coni(’s r I):trtly from thcs prngr:iiri’s 

rinpreccdcntc~d succms. Othu imp cliidc its coiitribiitioris to 

sciencc and to coriirri(wx :tiid the. fr nl)cnnvss with which it h:w 

hcen conductcd. 

Even t,hough id failed to tncc~t its 1)rini:try ol)ject,ivc., thc: Al)ollo-13 mission was :In overwholmingly imp1 ivv drnior1str:ition of tcchnic:il 1)rowcss and disciplined hiirnan skill. Contin c>- proccdiircs d(xsignc,d in ndv:tncc to cope with 

such an emergency, cornhinc.d witah tlisciplincd arid I)r(:cisc. irn1)rovisation by 

hiindrcds of rnrn working iiiidcr cLxtr:rordin:iry strcss, cii1rriin:ttcd in t,hv safe 

rct,itrn of the Apollo-13 :Lst,roii:iiits. 

It, is difficiilt to cstinintc: with :my l)wcision tlir itnl);ict of tho ovents of that, 

week 011 the pc’oplrs of thcx world, I)ut thcrc. is no qiic>stion that, it W:LS coiisidcrablr. 

As soon :is thc c,~nc.rgeiicy dcvclopcd, n~css:~gc~s of coii 1 arid off(~s of help t~ognn 

to strcarri in from ric\arly vv(*ry corner of t,hc world. c1r:il of tho world’s larger 

nnvics werc: prit on alert, :is war(' thv riiorchaiil, flc of ri~:triy nations. I3~vcm 

small nations such :is Trinidad and Tol):igo offcrcd t,hc sc~rviow of their Coast 

(;(lard. AS thc timc of spl:tsh- down :ippro cd :i nunibor of ships iri thc soiithwest Pacific were diverted from their coiir so :LS to I)(: ncarcr :it hmd in C~SO 

of need. 

Another cxarnpl(: of thc willingness of thc world’s nntioiis to :issist was 1)rovidod 

rnent, of tho c:ffect of oii 

‘tyort, drnionstrat cd th 

l)ortant :ind highly tion 

we haw diploniatic posts. 

It hits born wtirnatcd that, al)l)roxiniatc~ly half a billion l)cwl)l(~ watchcd lasf 

drily’s niooii walk on lives tr.lvvision. Th(5 [J.S. Iriforrnat,iori Ag-c.ncy c~stiniatcs t.hat 

thc :iridicnco on Al)ril 17 ni:Lj- havc: h:ii (tv(\ii 1argc.r. Tho strcvts of niajor citirs 

t,hrorighoiit t,ho world w(’r(t dwcirtcd as p(wl)I~ st:tyc:d indoors to wittch arid listvn. 

When it bcwmw ckar that tliv itstroiiaiils \v(%rc safc, :I wnvcx of s1)oiitiLii(soiis rc1ic.f 

arid joy was cxxl)rcwcd, IJiinc1,iiatc.d in soml cititss I),Y tho rhgirig of chiirch Ix~lls. 

A flood of rncssagcs of congratiilation from kings, l)rirric, miiiistcrs wid ordinar!. 

citizens d(wvnded on Washingt,on arid on oiir cxibassicls arid consriltitos abroad. 

Thc prws and other nictdia o sign nations, which had hwn following thv clvcints 

with growing c~xcitc~nic~rit fo csral days, w(>rv, with it fvw c~xcc~l)tioris, warm iii 

their praiscl, not only citir I(: coiiritg(~ of thc irstroi1:iiits :tnd thc tcehriic:Ll 

:whiov(:mcrit biit gi iin(’nt :ittt:ritiori to tho fact t lint oiir 1)nIicJ- of frc.clly 

sharing thv Apollo )iis with tlicb I)c~olJlw of the* world, \vhicah hiid svrvcd iis 

so wc:ll on c~arlic~r riii , had stood thc. tcst of it l)oriod of t,rial iiiid ttiixic~ty. 

A niorc coniplctt: mciit of nwdia rvactiori t tirorighoiit thct world, 1)rcl):ircd 

by thc U.S. Inform 

Aftcbr th(5 biirst of c:nthiisi:isin fdt t)jr most of t,hc world toward orit’ miintry al 

t,hc tinio of thc ninon walk hiid srihsidcd \YO w(’rc lc:ft, with a siibst,aiitial rvsidiic. 

of admiration arid I)rcstjigv which, wliil(s itn1)nssiblv 1 o titvitsiiw in qiiaritit,at,ivo 

tcmis, continiics to tw of rcd valiic with rc)sl)c,ct to niir 1)ostiirc in thcn world :tiid ow relatioris abroad. l‘ho ni:tnncr in which niir sl):tce tcani corrdrictc:d il scllf driring 

ncy, is :ipl)onded to this rvl)ort,. 
33 

the c:rncrgcncp in t,hci A1)olloImsitivo contribution to the I 

t,h(’ siicccxsfiil rc.covcry of the 

thc:sc: iqmts of thc slxm~ progrim on Anic’ric:i’s forcigil rc~lntions. 

mission, the fact that other ii:rtions could make :I 

ciic effort, throiigh maintaining radio silence, arid 

tronauts havr all hrll)od in significantly deepening 

17.8. INFORMATION AGENCY-MAY 5, 1970 

L FOREIGN MEDIA ItEACTIONS TO APOLI,0-13 

The: Apollo-- 13 flight and the safe rctrii’ii of t>hc: astronaiits evoked a rcrnarkablc 

intc~rnational rc’sponsc. of official and 1)opiiIar coriccrn followed by rdirf and wtrm 

c,ongratiilations. Kings, l)rvsid(~nts, and prim(: ininist,c%rs dircctcd congratulatory 

i~icssages from thc:ir pcoplc to t,he Prchsident, t,hc: nation, t he: :lstronniits, ttnd th(: 

NASA suplmrt team on the groiind. 

1 c~lc~viaion and radio covc’ragc: of thr splashdow~ as 1)rok)aI)ly :it its liigllcst 

I)c’ak for :my siriglc csvcnt in history, q)l)arc:ntly siirl) ing c~v(~ii that of thc act,linl 

walk 011 the: moon by Al)ollo- 11. 

Scvcral hundrod Czech viwers called thc: Pragrics stat.iori to protest the lack of 

live coverage of the splashdown. Czech telcvision had adticread to its scheduled 

program of Ilrisak at a Leniri birthday c(1lebration, tirlt it did sho\n. the splashdown 

lator OIL tap(’. At Biijiimbura, the Prc.sidt:nl of Riiriindi nl:ide! a11 iinprecedcnt,cd 

and snrprise visit on thc Ambassador after thc flight,. Arriving in his own car withont an official driver, the: Prcsid(m1, stayrd for inorc thari an hour to cxtcnd 

his congratulations. In anothcr typical reaction, thc Trinisian Prim; Minister 

personally tclephoncd the Ambassador to cxprrss thc: joy and pride of tho Tunisians 

in this great accomplishrqent. 

Foreign media comment revcalcd that thc flight may 1i:~vc had an impact on 

tho image of the U.S. a . Specifically, media cornment on the flight streswd 

tho following positive I 

(1) ‘I’hc: flight i c~l aw:rnrriicss of Inen cvcrywherc of our corninon concerns and iini cni through thcir rniitiial hopw for tho safety of 

(2) The openness of American society allowcd the rcst of the world to 

(3) Tho safe return of Apollo-13 indicated the: high lcvol of technical 

(4) Thc courage of tliu crew nnd the siipcrb pcrform:tncc of tho groimd 

SoInc media comment was seasoned wit.h reservations coriccrning tho risks 

of rnanncd spaceflight and thc wisdom of devoting major rosoiirccs t,o the Apollo 

program when thcrc is so iniich that needs attention on earth, but thcsc negative 

aspects wcre ovcrwhelmcd ricnrly evorywhcrc by rnthiisiitstic and positivc. rcac- tions. 

Itcprcsentativc media comment on each of thcsc thonies follows: 

United Mankind . . . 

IIainburg’s indcpendcnt Die, Wcll disccrriocl “:t spirit of cosmopolitan solidariLy” 

in offers of an international rcsc~ie effort which “will leave its t,raccs in the hearts 

of mankind . . . ” 

“. . . if tho people on earth can bo brought, t,ogcthcr in solving other issties as they wcre over the Apollo-13 incident, it will not be difficult to achievc peacc: 

in the world. Apollo-13 pointed to thc: possibility of global imity for mankind.” 

(Seoul Shinmum, Scoiil) 

“Wc do not wish to give tho slightest nationalistic coloration to trn (:vent that 

iinites the ontirc civilized world in a single ft:cling of coiiccrn.” (Il 

“No matter how big man gets, hc rcmains small in this iini 

al-Hal, Beirut) 

r7 

A1)ollo- 13. 

share this experience. 

cornpetcrice in America. 

personnel illustrated the finest qiialitics of contcrnporary Arncric:i. 

cle of hiiman so1idarit.y is moving and speaks highly of the sentiin men whcn one of their kind is in dangcr in thc cause of peace 

(EL Mercurio, Chile) 

“It (the flight) resulted in a morc: united mankind . . . It favored n lirtkr 

comprchcnsion among men . . .” (Corrieie rlella Sera, Mi1:tn) 

The Openness of American SocietU . . . 

“Thc Amrricans ran a considerablc: risk by agreeing from the oiitsct to say 

evcryLhing and show cvcrything about thcir space programs, regardless of what 

this might sabsi!qucntly cost thcrn. It is only right that they now be rewarded for 

this.” (Le Monde, Paris) 
34 

“America, committed as sho is to an open system, places not only her triumphs 

but also her failiires in the harsh glare of world piiblicity and world criticism . . .” 

(Trinidad Guardian) , innocrncr dmost, in the Amcrican way of lifc sparcs 11s nonc of s. Biit it idso tlcnics 11s nonc of the glory.” (Daily Mail, Loritlori) 

“Foiir thousand ncwsnicn from all ovrr thv world wrrr :~I)lc to :Lttrnd t,li<: 

cxciting bcginriing of tho first moon mission last, Jiily. Aboilt, t, 

ncwsincn shaw the tlrairia of tjhr Apollo-13 crrw. So tho Aiiirr iis the most cxciting adventrirrs of nian-in tirncs of triiimph as well as thosc 

involving grrat fear.” (Corriere de2la Sera, Milan) 

“Perhaps Itiissian astronaiit,s havo met theso perils, too. Biit iinliko the Aniericans, they do not pu1)licizr thcir atlventiires as they hrtppcn. l’hr Americans t:tko 

thc blamc with thc praise and sharc their anxieties, as they happen, with the 

world . . .” (Guardian, Manchester and London) 

A Feat of Technology . . . 

“The siiperh qiiality of the tochnology of A1)ollo is lwyond rrproach . . . Thc 

final result was a triumph for hiininn coiirage, tcitrnaork, :nid twhnological brilliance.” (Times, London) 

“If t,hcy had takm placr iii Africa, c:arlic>r cnvcbrits woiild hnvr I)roiiil)t,rti :L 1)ostI)oncrnc:nt of the laiinch hcaiisv t,tic,y woiild Iiavr twrn t,akrii as nri ornirioiis ])ortcnt. Brit t,he 1J.S. is not snl)c:rstitioris like 11s. It is :L highly scirritific coiiritry 

which dow not, rnt,ert,aiii siich irrational roiisidrrations.” (Togo-l’rexse, Ilo~inc~) 

RT ASTE I1 Y 0 F 1 MPO N I)E It A 13 1, PX’ (I Iradl i nr, Combat, Pa.ris) 

“By coping with the rincxlxctcd, NASA has dcmonstratjrd mastcry. IWorr 

yestorday, t,hr conyiiest of s[)acch was only a rt5asonc.d biit totid gsriibl~: on thr 

qiiality of the cqiiiprncmt. From now on il. is also iin cmt,cxrl)riso which . . . can :illow tcchriical failiirc!.” (I,r AZonrle, Paris) 

1 he rctiirii was :I victory for scicncc. t)v no ni(vins lrss inil)ort:int elim Iaiiiichirrg :I sp:icc,shil) to 1,hc moon,” bc.cniisr this is t lit. first. tirnv “sri(~nrv and tliv hiirnair 

mind have bwn ])lit t,o thv t,c,st of rrcovtiring :L rriplJlrd sl)acrshil) and its astroiiiuits safrly.” (ul-Jurida, Bririit) 

“If t,ho rccovorp attcxiipt, sriccccds, it, will bc :inothcsr :ind nior(s convincing t~iid 

c2str:tordin:irj- fcat of th(, tc~rhno1ogic:iI and sci(,ntific cq)acity of thc Amrrirnn 

nation.” (ll Tempo, Itoinct) 

“Apollo-13, the abortcd, cril)i)lvd, iriisfortiiric:-dogged t.hird mission to t,hc rnooii. 

Icprcwnts a greater landmark in man’s striigglc to niastc.r his rnvironrncnt, than if 

it had rrachcd its destination.” (Hindustan Times, Ncw Iklhi) 

Admiration for the Crew and Ground Personnel . . . 

“Thc wondrrfiil Al)ollo-13 nstroiiaiit,~ 11avc~ all ttic: charactc.rist,ics of “IIorno 

Americans”. ’rhcy arc cxaniplcs of 21st ccntiiry lKl:%Il . . .” (II Tempo, Ito~iic) 

h o inan 11:~s ever boc~n nior(1 alonc th:in t,hv thrw inrn cr:irrilwd inxidc. Now wvc scc thc triic coiirago of tho riiooiirn(w. No straiigor has cvrr fvlt closcr to oiir 

hearts.” (Daily Mail, London) 

“Thc rcactioii of NASA and of thv Al)ollo crew has bccn rc~Inarkablr . . . Trolly 

arid hiitnor sl)riiikl(d thc dialogiic . , .” (Comhnl, Paris) 

“With Apollo- 11 thc: iistroii:uitr rd himself as thc liricxt 1)rodiict of Arnrricitn 

civilimtion. With Al)ollo-13 liv r( a hrinian look . . .” (Le Mode, Paris) 

“Apollo-13 mckans wc niiist a thc: nivn, thttir i)r(>imr:itioii, thvir grc:itr 

eoiirage, arid thvir :Lhility.’ 

“Far niore valiiablr, mo coiiragc and rcsilicmcc in 

not . . .” (Hintinstan Times, Now lklhi) “wc do not find words to caxprcss oiir ndniiration for t,hc qiiirt, 

coiiragc with which the thrcr astronaiit,s arc facing this twrit)Ic cri 

faultless nianner in which thqy :irv Ivorking c’nicrgeiicy ni:m:iivc:rs to s&v(: thcniselves from cst,astrol)hc~.” (Het I’olk, B(:lgirini) 

“The coiirage of t,ho :isLroii:uits exceeds all mcasiir(~.” (Diairo cle iVoficias, Itio de 

Janicro) 

“SPACIGCItAFT AC:CII>F:NT PE:RAIITTII:I) NASA TO SHOW AHSO1,IJTlI: 

,‘ 7 

I< T 

ABORT PKOCEDUBICS 

Question 2. Dr. I’ctrone, a question about the abort procedures which were used on the Apollo IS mission. Had these generally been worked out ahra,tl of time or were thry 

all improvised to meet this specijic situation? 
35 

Answcr. The abort mode iised on Apollo 13 included a descent ctnginc biirn to 

rctiirn to thc frce retiirri trajoctory with an Indian Occaii landing. This barn was accomplished soon aftor the :tnomaly. A swond abort burn was performed with 

tho descent cngirie 2 hours aftor pcriliin(: to speed tho rotrirn and land in tho 

prime recovr:ry area of the Piicific Occnn. Both of thcse nianeiivcrs wcro standard 

abort procediires which had been developed llrior t,o the mission and dociimcnted 

in the Opcrational Abort Plari. 

Ilctailcd subsystems port,ions of numerous contingency proccdiircs iiscd 

involving t,hc LM and CSRl had boen crxercised prwnission. Biit tho actual 

Apollo 13 mission sit>aation roqiiircd additional stridics to consider t,ho rcquircd 

systc:ni configrirations oncoiintered for poworing tho CSM from the JAM, iisc of 

the CM COZ rcnloval system for tho LM arid other various configurations nscd 

dnring the rcturn flight. 

I<:MEROllNCY PROClg2DURES OUTLINED 

Question 3. Dr. Petrone, it is reported that ull of the more diflicult tasks the aslronauts were called upon to carry out in or with the spacecraft were jirst tested in sinaulators on the ground before giving them to the Apollo 13 crew. Is that correct and 

could you describe this process for the comndtee? 

Answer. Tho more diffic\dt tasks pcrformcd by the astronauts were those which 

rcqiiircd changes to prcviorisly planricd and tested contingency proccdrirc:s. Whilc 

cxtensivc contingency planning had proceded thc mission, modifications wcro necessary to accommodate t,hc preciso flight conditions oncoiintcred in the oiiicrgency. From this standpoint, availability of tho proplaniied contingoticy actioiis 

to be iiscd as a baseline for fiirthcr rcfiricrncnt was of iiicalenlablc valuc. 

During thc erncrgcncy, proccdtircs and timelinw werc chocked by over a d~zcn 

astronaiits in simiilators in Houston and :tt thtr Kenncdy Spa,cc Ccntcr and by 

contractor personnel in simultttors at Gruninian and North American ltockwcll 

to prove their adequacy and tffcctiveness. Proccdures werc modified where neces- sary and rerun. Maneuver chocks included trying various configurations of con- trol, including automatic and manual, to cvaluatc the adequacy of thesc handling 

tcchniqucs considering the anomalous configiir:ttions. Extensivc iisc was rnadc of 

numeroiis computer facilities in connection with the simulators arid elsewhere. 

These computers proved invaliiablc in permitting detailed analyscs of the various 

systems configurations and effects thereof. Then thr: refined, agreed-upon 

checklists and instriictions were voiced iip to the crew and vcrifiod by the control 

center spacccraft communicator (CAPCOM), who is an :tstronaut himself. 

Also, thc astronauts who had perforrnod the simulations stood by in thc control 

ccntcr whilc the irist,rnctioris were passed up to thc crow and while tnnnciivcrs wcre being performed to lend :my additional a tanco aiid answer any qiiestions thc crew might havc. 

Additionally, cach cognizant flight controller monitored all instructions and 

the cnsuing actions to insure they werc being pcrformcd within tho constraints 

of this systcm. Any required real time alterations were recommended by thc 

flight control toam when appropriate. 

Question 4. Dr. Petrone, how many people were direellu involved in working on the 

emergencies employed on the Apollo IS flight? 

Answer. Early estimates of people involved ranged quito high because we re- ceived many offers of assistaricc and we could not bc sure how great our personilel 

rcqiiircrncnts might be. IIowcvcr, as tjhe situation becarno stabilized and as we reduced the altornativcs available, siich as recovery arcas, estimates of the nnnibcr 

of pcoplc required were significantly rcdiiccd. Ciirrcntly we believe that somc 5,000 pcople were dircctly 1,art)icipating from NASA, I>OD and our contractors. 

Question 6. Dr. I’etrone, after the problem occurred during the Apollo 15 mission 

200,000 miles from earth, did the Apollo system-that is, the people, the spacecraft, the groimd support equipment arid the procedures-operate as expected? 

Answer. Yes, the rcsponsc of thc Apollo 13 crcw, the NASA organization, tho 

contractors arid thc flight and ground cqiiipriicnt was triily outstanding arid was onc of tho rcwrrdirig featiircs of this niission. Tho dedicated efforts of a highly 

trained (:ovcrtinic,iit-indiistry team, tho flexibility which had bcc:n incorporated in 

Apollo qiiipmcnt and proccdiircs, and t hc outstanding pcrformanct: of the remaining spacecraft systems contributcd greatly to the safe rctrirti of th(1 Apollo 13 

flight crew. 
36 

ANSWERS “LAST MOON MISSION” REMARK 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Stennis? 

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I \\..ant especially to thank you 

niid the Senator from Ll/laine, Senator Smith, for arranging to have 

this hearing. It gives the American people these facts in an atmosphere 

that niakes it more understandable to them thm a more formal presentation would. 

Most of the questions I have in my mind have alrencly been covered, 

but Captain Lovell, yon \\..ere quoted in the press as rniiking tlik 

remark--1 think you have nlreutly refuted it, but since you \\rere 

qiiotetl thut way, 1 ~~oultl like your direct response to the quote that : 

I am afraid this is going to tw thc last moon inissiori for a long tirnv. 

Now, if you said that, just how do you feel about it no\{ ‘? 

Astronaut IIOVELL. Senator, that is t~ very good question. 1 iriatle 

that remark as \ce b\\ ung tiroiind the moon, :is 1 looked iLt it, :Liid 

was looking rather \vistfnlly, anti 1 said for very good retison at the 

time, we on board the spacecraft (lid not knoll exactly what went 

wrong. I knew one of the basic concepts of our atlrninistratioii is not 

to fly anything unless we are almost 100 percent sure that it is going 

to be u success. If nothing else, me bent over bac.kwartls on reliability 

arid on redundancy. Ant1 at the time, I knew that we were not going 

to attempt another moon mission or another space flight unless we 

had hardware that we were assured was going to operate. 

After returning homo, and after knowing the caiiso of our particular 

incident arid the hard work in which the people hat1 urialyzetl the 

telemetry from thc spacecraft, I am sure now that we htLve a good 

knowledge of what went wrong and hasrd on Dr. Petrone’s remarks, 

I think the correction can be implernentcd quite quickly. 1 do not 

see any real slowdown in our lunar missions. 

INCREASE IN PRESSURE 

Senator STENNIS. That is very fine, sir. Dr. Petrone, how far havo 

you gone in analyzing Just what caused the cxcess pressure which 

resulted in the explosion of tho oxygen tttnk? 

Dr. PETHONE. Senator Stennis, in going after tlic (~aiise for thc 

increase in pressure, wc arc searching for thr rriatcriuls that coiiltl 

give us this increusc it1 cncrgy. As 1 statetl, the rlet~tricnl cncrgy 

itself going into that tank imtlrr thc conditions 11 P hut1 ould not 

have been sufficient. But the cloctrical cncrgy, possibly ~ts tin initititor, as an energy sourco within a tank-evon metals huvo to be lookctl tLt. 

Alurninurn metals havc to be looked tit very c:Lrefully in these conditions. Those are soni(’ of the tests that we havr very intensively 

uridarway now itrid they arc going on daily around the clock. We havr 

riot yet identified thc energy soiirce which may havc given this iricreaso 

in pressure. 

NO UNNECESSARY RISK 

Senator STENNIS. 1 thtink you. 

This question is one \vliic*h I tliiiik I kilo\\ the uiiswer to, but is 

also one which 1 think the American people woultl be interested in 

liavirig Ast,ronuuts Love11 untl Slvigert aiis\ver: Do :my of your fellow 
37 

astronauts, as far as you know, feel that the astronauts are being 

put to unnecessary risks in these ventures? 

Stated the other way, do you think that everything is being done 

that could or should be done to carry outj these missions at the lowest 

possible risk to the men involved? 

Astronaut SWIGERT. Ithink I can answer that, Senator. I probably 

had the shortest tour on record as :I prime crewmember, in those 

2 clays. I never felt any reluctance or that I was being ptlt to al!y 

unnecessary risk a! all. T have alwiiys felt complete confidence in 

NASA, in the orgunization. I have worked with the ground controllers 

as a flight crewmember. I know intimately their methods of operation, 

arid 1 felt complete confidence in them. 

Right now, if you were to ask me if I would go back and fly the 

service module, I would answer I certainly would. 1 have complete 

confidence that in whatever fix it has come up with, that vehicle 

will be able fully to do whatever mission it is called on to do. 

Senator STENNIS. Do you wish to say something 011 that, Captain 

Lovell? 

Astronaut LOVELL. Senator Stennis, I agree with Jack completely. 

I think that we all niiist realize that in exploration, like exploration 

at any time, whether it \vas with the airplanes or ships or spacecraft, 

you are always faced with a certain amount of unknown risk. We are 

prepared to take that. 

Senator STENNIS. Well, that is very fine. 

I want you to convey to Astronaut Hake our great regret that ho 

could not be here. I do not say that solely because he is a Mississippian. 

I say it partly because I am a Mississippian. We arc proud of him, 

along with the rest of you, and if Astronaut Mattingly is here, I would 

like to give him a chance, Mr. Chairman, to stand up. 

He is not here. Well, we owc all of you IL great deal. You were all 

prepared for an extreme emergency. That is the supreme test. As 

Senator Symington said, we are proud to be Americans along with 

and you all the others who have contributed to your safe return. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hatfield? 

Senator HATFIELD. Mr. Chairmrtn, first of all, I would like to 

congratulate Captain Lovcll antl his crew on the brilliant manner in 

which they handled this fantastic emergency with the superb help of 

Goddard antl Houston. I would like also to indicate to you that I, for 

onc member of this committee, have frcquently questioned the cost 

of this project, along with all other space expenditures. I have reflected in those questions that I have posed from time i,o time much of 

the mail and the tenor of the public with whom I have had contact, 

who are always exhilarated, excited and proud of space achievements, 

but also raise, in terms of financc. and the mattcr of taxation, the commitment of this country to our space program. 

On April 6 of this year, Dr. Paine presented t~ very outstanding 

statement to this committee dealing primarily with technology transfer. Because it has been niy opinion that too often our space program 

has been justified purely for the sake of prestige arid of competition 

with the Riissiiins rather than for the benefits that do accrue on 

all mankind in helping solve some of the problems on this earth. 

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BENEFITS 
38 

Dr. Pairie indicated that -we have many transfers of benefits that 

have come from fields of meteorology, commuriications, medical 

research, arid education, and many other fields. 

My question to you, Cnptain Lovell, is, \v-oulcl you at this time be 

able to indicate to this committee tiny unique technology tr:ttisfer 

that might have come ILS a result of this particular flight, arid under 

these particul ar circum stances? 

Astronaut LOVELL. One area that I thitik \vas utilized to the greatest 

extent possible was the effect of the ability to cornrnunicnte back arid 

forth between the spacecraft and home base. My only regret is, I wish 

that my home communication system \\ :is as g00d :LS the one that we 

have in our spicecraft. 

hich ne hve utilized in Apollo 13 that 

were, of course, iiot used before. And :is Dr. Paiiie liad rnentionetl 

previously, we have encouraged the use of these materials aid teclinology outside of the space program. 

I think the one area, if I might digress just one minute, the one 

area which has not beeii mentioned nliicli I hnve foritid iii my travels 

throughout tlie United States, is educ8:rtiori. 'hi years ago,. or just 

before the Russians put up their firyt Sputnik, people goliig into 

science were hard to find. There \YW just iiot that stimulus. Now, it 

is completely reversed. If nothing else, I think that the space program 

has been ti trernentlous stimulris to the young people on pursuing a11 

education course. 

The CHAIRMAN. That is u very good answer. 

Astroritiut, SwIGEm. 1 do not think there is mything th:~t I could 

Senator HATFIELD. 'I'hank you very much. 

I \voultl like to emphasize again one or tvo brief thoughts here as to 

Dr. Paine's presentatioii. 

All of us are greatly concerned in the field of medical science, 

especially about some of the diseases we have riot yet conquered. In 

this testimony, Dr. Paine indicated that there had been some laboratory studier on the radiation effects on the cells of the iistroriaiits themselves that have opened up promising ne\v avenues for possible chernical control of cancer. 

No~v, here in just one :ictioti of the prograIr1, I tliirik Ice could cert airily justify mnch of the expenditure iind feel very pleased with the 

opportunity to make such expenditures. 

We also have in other fields which Dr. Paiiie mentioned, tuitl I think 

on this kind of focus of this day, we ought to certainly stress these 

positive points of the technology transfer-that there has been a 

microscope developed thikt can create vision for the viewer arid u knife 

that goes with this microscope \vhich Dr. Ptiiiie says ctm take one 

strand of hair arid cut it into 10,000 lengthwise stri 

certainly greitt implication for till of science, especidly inetlicul science. 

We could go on and on, but I think in ti11 of these occusions where we 

have tin opporturiity to direct public atteiitioii to the space program, 

we ought to utilize such occasion to emphtisize the benefits that tire 

accruing to all of us as ii result of spice exl)loratiori, :uid especially you, 

who move out of space to help bring this iien science iiritl this lien 

technology to all of us. 

There are many systems 

add that has riot been utltletl by other merribers of your cmnmittee. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator HOLLAND? 
39 

REACTION TO ADVERSITY PIZOMPTR CONFIDENCE 

Soiiator HOLLAND. Thaiik you, Mr. Chairman. 

Of course, we arc trerncndously proud, ]rot only of you three gcntlcrnpri, two of whom arc her(\, but of the. c1iitir.c group of spaco scientists. 

Wo arc happy to find that, you havc t~ tc:am thtit was thlc lo reactj t’o 

udvwsity just as you havc to SII tirid to bring n ccrt,ain dcgrec, IL 

very large dqqce, of success o what might have been much 

greater adversity. 

T think thiit all of us iii this country arc far from considering this 

project as a failure in tho scnso t>hat nothing was ticcomplishud. Thc 

original objoctivc, of courso, was not accornplishcd, but the showing of 

tremendous rcsourcefulricss arid tho ability to irioet a11 tinknown sitimtioii or unknown probloms is sonic~tliirig t’hat’ 1 think will create evcm 

greater confidence in your team, Dr. Pairio, arid in the whole effort. 

EDUCATIONAL IJACKGROUND 

I have c:crtain quostions hew, but, boforo 1 ask thoin, may I suggest, 

that the several cornmtmts that have bcen mtldc about the it 

for young people to continue uiid to complete their cducatioii-and 

I especially like what you said about that, Captain Lovell-might be 

embelished a little for this record, because I think it is going to be a 

best seller, by the way. It would bo well to have the record show at 

this point the complete educational background of each of the three 

astronauts that participatcd, Dr. Paine, as well us tho backgrounds of 

Dr. Petronc! arid Mr. Luniioy, as well tts, of course, tho background of 

Dr. Paine, thc: administrator of t,ho whole program. 

Tho CHAIHMAN. That is a very good idea. 

(The educational backgrounds referred to above arc as follows :) 

THOMAS 0. PAINE, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMIN- 

(Appointed Mar. 5, 1969. Sworn in Apr. 3, 1969) 

l)r.‘Thomas 0. Painc was born in Berkeley, Calif., November 9, 1921, son of 

Commodore and Mrs. George T. Painv, USN (Itct.). He attended public schools 

in various cities arid was gradiiated from Brown University in 1942 with an A.B. 

dcgrec in engineering. 

In World War I1 he served as a sumbariric officer in the Pacific and the Japanese 

occupation. Hc qiialified in submarines and as :L Navy deep-sea diver and was awardcd thc commendation mcdal and siibm:irinc cornbat insignia with stars. 

In 1946-49 l>r. Painc itttcndod Stanford Uniwrsity, receiving ail M.S. dcgrcc 

in 1947 and Ph. D. in 1949 in Physical Metallurgy. In 1946 hc married Barbara 

IIclcii Tauritori Poarsc of Pcrth, Wwtc:rn hiistralin. They havc foiir children: 

Marguerite Ada, George Thomas, Judith Janet and Frank Taiint,on. 

Ilr. Painc worked as a rcscarch associate at Stanford University from 1947 to 

1949, whoro hc. madc basic studics of high-termpcxrature alloys arid liqiiid metals in 

support of naval nuclear reactor programs. He joined the Gerieral Electric Rcsearch Laboratory in Schciioctady, Now York, in 194!) as rvsearch associate, 

whcrc ho initiated rcscarch programs on magnetic and composite materials. This 

work led to the first demonstration of the shapo ariisotrophy offect in singlcdomain magnetic particles, and to the basic patents on “Lodcx” pc?rmancnt 

magnets. In 1951 he trmsfcrrrd to tho Meter and Instriimcmt Dopartmont, 

Lynn, Itass., as manager of inateri:ds devclopment, and later as laboratory 

manager. Major projocts rangod from devc:lopmont of photocells and rion-arctracking organic insulation to solid-state nuclcar reactor control systems and 

lSTRATION 
aircraft instrnmentation. For the succcssfril fine-particlc: magnet dovclopmcnt 

program, Dr. Paine’s laboratory rcccivod the 19,N Award for Outstnilding Contribution to Industrial Science from the American Association for Adv:tncornent 

of Sciencc. 

From 1958 to 1962 Dr. Paino was research associate and nlanagcr of Engineering Applications at GE’s Itesearch and Ihvelopment Contctr in Schoncctiidy. 

This involved organizing and managing tt new laboratory oomponcnt erigaged 

in technical-economic studios and dcvelopmcn t programs in lasors, mcdical, 

electronics, electric vchicles, and many othcr fiolds. 

In 1963-68 hc was manager of TEMPO, (;E’s Ct:titc,r for Advariced St,iidiw 

in Saiita Barbara, Calif. This 400-rnanJ long-rangc plarini11g and interdisciplinary 

study group conducted intordisciplinary rttscarch for federal, state and local 

governments, foreign nations, banks, and industry. Thosc progranis ranged from 

criteria for selection of model cities to tho logistics sitpport. system for Polaris 

submarines and from computerized managcmcnf information systems to cconomic 

development in Africa. About, 15 percent of thosc: stndies were for top management 

of the parent company. 

On January 31, 1968, President Johnson appointed l>r. Paino Deputy Administrator of NASA. Upon the rctircmcnt of Rlr. James E. Webb on October 8, 

1968, Presidmt Johnson n:imcd Ih. Pain(, Act,ing Administrator of NASA. 

His nomination as Administrator was anriollriccd by Prcsidcrlt Nixon on March 6, 

1969; this was corifirmcd by the Scnatn on illarch 20, 1969. 110 was sworn in by 

Vice President Agnew on April 3, 1969. nr. Paine’s professional activities havo includcd chairrrmnship of thtr 1962 

Engineering Research F’oulldatiori-Engincc.rs Joint Council Confcrenca on Science and Technology for Less Tkvelopod Nations; socrctary and editor of the 

E.J.C. Engincering Itesearch Committeo on the Nation’s Enginoering Itevearch 

Needs 1965-1985; member, Advisory Committee and local chairman, Joint 

American Physical Society-Institute of Elcctrical and Electronic Engiriecrs 

Intcrriational Conference on Magnetism and Magnotic Matcrials; chairman, 

Special Task Force for U.S. Tkpartmcnt of ITousing and Urban Ikwlopment; 

lecturer, 1J.S. Army War College and American Managcrnent Association; 

Advisory Board, AIME Journal of Metals; member, Basic Science Committee 

of IEEE and thc Itescarch Committce, Instrument Society of America; Collier 

Trophy Award Committee. 

Dr. Paine is a rriember of the Sigma Xi; thc Arnljr and Navy Club, the Cosmos 

Club, the National Aviation Club, Washington, I1.C.; Ncw York Academy of 

Sciences; American Physical Society; Institiite of Eloctrical and Electronic Engi- neers ; American Institute of Mining, Motallurgical and Petrolearn Engineers ; 

American Society of Metals; Institute of NIutals (London) ; Sri1,rnarinc X‘ctcrans 

of World War 11; Socicty for the History of Tcchnology; illarinc Historical Association ; American Miiscnm of Electricity ; Ncwcorncm Society (London) ; Naval 

[Iistorical Foundation; Amorican Association for t,hc Advanccmcnt of Science; 

National Association for thc Advancement of Colored People; U.S. Naval lnstitutc; Navy League; Association of the U.S. Arrnp; 1nstriimc:nt Society of Ammica; 

Associate Fellow, American Institlttc of Acronatltics and Astronantics; National 

Space Clnh Board of Governors ; American Astronniitical Society Fellow. 

Dr. Paine rcccived an Honorary Doctor of Science dcgrec from Brown Univcrsity on June 2, 1969. 

ItOCCO A. PETRONB, I)IRECTOR, APOLLO P~o~lt.1~ 

Rocco A. Pctroric became Program Director for tho National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration on Sept. 1, 1969. As Dircetor of tho Apollo Program Officc: 

in Washington, D.C., Ilr. Pctronc has ovcrall rc:sponsibility for the direction and 

management of the Apollo manned spacc flight prograni which has as its mission 

thc rnarincd exploration of tho Moon. 

Prior to assnming the duties of his prescnt position, Ih. Pctronc was Ilircctor 

of Launch Operations at thc John F. Kenncdy Space Contcir, Fla. In this officc: 

he was responsible for the rrianagcmcnt and technical direction of prcflight operations and integration, test, checkout, and lannoh of all spacc vehicles, both 

manned and rmmanned, for the Kennedy Space Center. Larinch operations, tho 

largest organizational clcmcnt at KSC, was the key dircctoratc for cotnrnitting 

to launch the Apollo 11 which landed the first incan on the surface of the Moon. 

Dr. Petronc’s oxtcnsive carwr in rocket drvclopmcnt began in 1952 at thc 

Army’s Rcdstonc: Arscnal in Huntsvillc, Ala., whcrc: h participatcbd in thc dcvelopment of the Itedstonc, thc Nation’s first ballintic mi ilc. Hc was in the block- 
41 

housc at Cape Canavcral in August 1953 as a mcrribcr of the Missile Firing 

Laboratory for thc first latmch of the Iteds,tonc. From 1956 to 1960 hc was dctailcd 

to thc Army Gencral Staff, Pentagon, Washington, l).C., wherc: hc was assigned 

dirties in the field of guided missiles before bcing loancd by tho U.S. Army to 

NASA at Kennedy Space Ccntcr in July ll160. lhiring his NASA assignments, 

I)r. Pctronc has been directly involvcd in all 12 succcssful lauriches of tho Saturn 

I vchiclcs. 

As the Saturn Project Officer, rcsponsiblc to tho Kennedy Spwc Center Dircctor, 

I)r. Kurt H. Ikbiis, Dr. Pctronc assured that all aspects of the Saturn Project fiilfilled the Kennedy Space Center requirements. When in 1961 this nation 

clstablishod its goal to land mcii on thc Moon by 1970, the Apollo Manned Lunar 

Landing Program was approved, and 1)r. Pctrone was assigncd as Apollo Program 

1Managc:r. 

IIe was responsible for the planning, devclopment, and activation of all launch 

facilities rcquircd for thc Apollo Program, incliiding Launch Complex 39, where 

the Apollo/Saturn space vehicles are launched. Dr. Petrone retired from the U.S. 

Army with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in June 1966, after 20 years servicc, and 

at that time continued his carccr as Director of Launch Operations at Kennedy 

Space Center. 

Dr. Petronc graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1946, and after serv- ing overseas in Germany from 1947 to 1950, he resumed his studics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to earn his Masters degree in mechanical 

engineering in 1951. A year latcr, he was awarded a Professional degree in mechanical engineering. His performance at MIT won him membership in Sigma Xi, the 

scientific honor fraternity. 

In March 1968, the Canaveral Council of ‘L’cchnical Societies presented to Dr. 

Pctronc the Fifth Space Congrrss Award for his outstanding contributions to the 

local Missile and Space Program during 1967. He received thc NASA Exceptional 

Service Award in November 1968 for his direction of the successful checkout and 

launch of Apollo 7, the first three-man mission into space. Ilr. Petrone also received 

istinguished Servicc Mcdal, thc Agency’s highost award, in January 

dircction of the checkout and launch of Apollo 8, thc first rnanncd 

mission to the Moon. In May 1969, hc was awarded an llonorary Doctorate of 

Science degree from Rollins College, Winter Park, Fla. On Oct. 21, 1969, Dr. 

Pctrone received his second NASA Distinguished Scrvicc Medal-this onc for his 

direction of thc chcckout and launch of Apollo 11, the first manned lunar landing 

mission. 

Dr. Petrone is a stiident of the Civil War and has an cxtcnsivc library on thc 

subject. He is also interested in athletics, and playcd for thc Wwt Point football 

teams driring the era of All Americans Felix “Doc” Blanchard and Glen Davis. 

Ih. Pctronc and wife, Ruth, have thrcc daughters, Tcrtrsa, Nancy, and Kathryn, 

and one son, Michael. 

GLYNN S. LUNNEY, CHIEF, FLIGHT I~RECTOI~S OFFICI.:, NASA, MANNED SPACEMr. Lunncy was born November 27, 1936, in Old Forge, Penn. He was gradiiatcd from Scranton Prcp School in 1953. He attcndcd the University of Scranton 

and rcccivcd a Bachelor of Scicncc degrcc in Aeronautical Engineering from tlic 

University of Detroit in 1958. Mr. Lunney is a member of Pi Tau Sigma and 

Tau Beta Pi, scientific organizations. 

Mr. Lunney joined NASA’s predecessor, the National Advisory Council for 

Aeronautics (NACA), at Lewis Research Center under the college cooperstivc 

training program in August 195.5. In Scpt. 1959 he transfcrrcd to the Spacc Task 

Groiip at Langlcy Field, Va., prcdeccssor of the Manned Spacecraft Center, as an Aeronatitical Itcscarch Enginecr. In April 1962, Mr. Lunnoy transferred to 

the Manned Spacecraft Center in Hoiiston, Texas, and workcd iintil August 1964 as II(,ad, Mission Logic & Cornputor Hardwnrc Scction of thc Flight Control 

1)ivision. At the early age of 27 Mr. Lunncy was named :is one of thc four Flight 

Directors at MSC, August 1964. From August 1964 to July 1968, Mr. Lunney 

scrvod as Chief, Flight Dynamics Branch as well as a primc Flight Director during 

tho Gemini Program. In Jiily 1968 Mr. Lurmey joined thc Flight Control IXvision 

Staff Officc and was sclectcd to head the ncwly organizod Flight, Ilirectors Office 

in February 1969. 

As chief of the Flight 1)ircctors Officc, Mr. Lunncy provides thc Division Chicf 

with the necessary interfacc associated with Flight Ilirector manning and overall 

intcgrated team training of the various flight control teams. 

CRAFT CENTER, FLIGHT CONTROL 1)IVISION 
42 

As a Flight Director during the spacecraft missions, Mr. Lunney exercises 

critical functions involving control of the flight from liftoff of tho launch vehicle 

to landing of the spacecraft in the recovery area. This position required detailed 

familiarity with spacecraft systems arid with cornplcx ground information proccssing and display systems. I>uring mission opcration poriods, ho is empowered 

by the Center Director of Flight Olic~rttions to control all elwncnts of the Mission 

Control Ct:nl,cr, worldwide rc:rnotc sitcs, and manned s 

work; and thereby asslire the implcinentation of mission 

and flight crew safety. In contingency situations, Mr. 

authority and responsibility to make unreviewcd, real 

flight crcw safety and achieve mission objcctivcs. 

Mr. Lunney servcd as th(t prime Flight Ilircctor for thc first manned Apollo 

IbIission, Apollo 7, in Novcrnbcr 196%. For tho Apollo 8 mission 34r. L\lnncy 

again was a Flight I)irc:ct,or :md was in chargt: of tho critical Lunar Orbit Insortion (LOI) which placed the capsultt in Lrinar Orbit, 011 1)t:combcr 24, 1968. 

Mr. Lunncy, as the lead Flight 1)irector for t, ho May flight of Apollo 10, is directing 

the training, simulations, roquircrnents and documcntation roquircd for :I 

manned missi 

outstanding contribritioiis to onr Nation’s Spnco Program can be noted in thc: special honors hc h;ts rccc:ivod: 0utst):mding Porformanco 

Award--1967; Quttlity Step Incroasc--1967; Silstaincd Siiperior Pcrformnncc 

Award-1964; NASA Group Achicvc:lnoii t Awnrd-~~~ercury-l962; NASA 

Group Achievement Award-Gcmini-1967; Lctter of (2ommc:ndatiori from 

NASA l>irector-l964. His most outst:mding award to clnto was thr: NASA 

Exceptional Scrvico Medal l)rc:scrit,ed by NASA IIondquartcrs in November 1968 

in recognition of his outstnnding performance: and !e:idershil) of thc Al’ollo 7 

flight control team. 

Mr. Lunney is married t,o the former Mnriljm Jcan Kurtz of Clevol:md, Ohio. 

The couple and their four children; Jonifvr, born Fob. 1, 1961; C;lynn, born AIL&;. 

14, 1962; Shawn, born Aug. 4, 1963; and Brjvin, born Jim. 14, 1966; residt: in 

Fricndswood, Texas. 

JAMES ARTHUR LOVICLL, JH. (CAPTAIN, USN), NASA ASTI~ONAUT 

Birthplace and date.-Born March 25, 1928, in Cleveland, Ohio. His mother, 

Mrs. Blanche Lovell, resides at Edgewatcr Beach, Florida. 

Physical description.-Blond hair; blue eyes; height: 5 feet 11 inches; wcight: 

170 pounds. 

Education.-Graduated from Juneau High School, Milwaukee, Wisconsin; 

attended thc University of Wisconsin for 2 years, then received a Bachelor of 

Science degree from the IJnitcd St,ates Naval Academy in 1952; prcsentc:d it11 

Honorary Doctorate from Illinois Wesleyan IJniversity in 1069. 

Marital status.-Marricd t,o the former Marilyn Gerlach of Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Her parents, Mr. and Mrs. Carl Gerlach, arc residents of Miluwikee. 

Children.--Barbara L., October 13, 1963; Jarncs A,, February 15, 1055; Susan 

I<., July 14, 19-58; Jeffrey C., January 14, 1966. 

Recreational interests.-His hobbies arc: golf, swimming, handball, and tennis. 

Organizations.-Member of the Society of Kxperimental Test Pilots and the 

Explorers Club. 

Special honors.-Awarded thc NASA ljistinguished Scrvice Medal, two NASA 

Exceptional Service Medals, the Navy Astronant Wings, the Navy Distinguished 

Service Medal, and two Navy Distinguished Flying Crosses; recipient of thr 

1967 FA1 I>e Lava1 and Gold Space Medals (Athens, Greece), the American 

Academy of Achievement Goldcn Plate Award, the City of New York Gold 

Medal in 1969, tho City of Houston Medal for Valor in 1969, the National Gcographic Society’s Hubbard Medal in 1969, thc National Academy of Television 

Arts and Sciences Special Trustees Award in 1969, and thc Institute of Navigation 

Award in 1969. 

Co-rccipicmt of thc American Astronar1tical Society Flight Ac1iievc:rric~nt 

Awards in 1966 and 1968, the Harmon Int,ornational Trol)hp in 1066 and 1967, thc 

ltobcrt H. Goddard Memorial Trophy in 1969, thc 11. H. Arnold Trophy for 196<1, 

the General Thomas I>. Whitc IJSAF Space Trophy for 1968, t>hr Robert J. 

Collier Trophy for 1968, and thc 1969 f iciiry G. Bcrinett I>istinguishc~d Servicrb 

Award. 

Experience.-Lovcll, a Navy Captain, receivcd flight training following graduation from Annapolis in 1952. 
43 

IIe has had numerous naval aviator assignments including a 4-year tour as a tcst pilot at, thc Naval Air Test Center, Patrixcrit Ilivcr, Rlaryland. While there 

he swved as program nianagcr for the 8-411 woapon syxtcni evaluation. A graduate 

of the Aviation Safety School of the University of Soiithern California, he also 

scrvcd as a flight instructor and safetv engiuocr with Fightcr Squadron 101 at 

tjhc Naval Air Stjatjion, Ocmna, Virginia. 

He has logged more than 4,407 hoiirs flying tirnc:-more than 3,000 hoiirs in jet 

aircraft. 

Cuurrenl assignment.-Ca~)tairi Lovcll was sdoctcd as an :tstron:tut by NASA in 

Sopterriber 1962. He has since scrvod as backiip pilot for the Gemini 4 flight and 

hackiip command 1)ilot for the Gcmini 9 flight. 

On 1)ecenibcr 4, 1965, ho and Cormnand liilot Frank Horrnari were lauiichcd 

into s])acc on the history-making Gcrnini 7 mission. Thc fiight lasted 330 hours and 

35 minutes, during which the following spacc firsts were accomplished: loiigcst 

manned space flight; first, rendoevous of two riiannod maneiiverable spacecraft, as Gemini 7 was joined in orbit by Gcmitii 6; t,ho longest multi-manned spac 

flight. It was also on this fight that numerous technical and medical exl)crirncnt were completed successfully. 

The Gemini 12 mission, with Lovc~ll and pilot Edwin Aldrin, bogan on November 11, 1966. This 4-day, 5!)-rcxvolution flight tmught thc Gciniui Program to a successful closc~. Major accorn~~lisli~~ierits of thc 94-hour 35-minute flight included a third-rcvoliition rendezvous with thc, prcviorisly laiinched Ageria (iising for tho 

first time backup onboard cornpiitatioiis drio to radar faillire) ; a tetherod stationkeepirig cxerciso; rctrirval of a niicromcteoritc cxpcrimcrit packagc: from 

tho spacecraft rxtcrior; an ovalriat,ion of thc: iiso of body restraints spcciallp 

designed for comploting work tirsks oiitsidr of tho spacecraft; and completion of 

numerous photographic cxpcrimcmts, highlights of which arc thc first pictures 

takcn from syacc of an eclipse of the sun. Ccrnini 12 ondrd with retrofires a t t h r t)cginriing of tho 60th rovolution, followed 

by the second consecutive fully :iiitornatic controlled reentry of :I spacecraft, and a landing in thc Atlantic within 255 milrs of thc USS WASP. 

As a rosult of his participation in the Gemini 7 and 12 flights, Lovcll logged 

425 hours and 10 minutes in space. Aldrin established a new EVA record by 

completing 5?$ hours outside thv spacecraft during two standup EVA’S and on(: 

umbilical EVA. 

Lovcll served as command module pilot for tho (:pic six-day jouruey of Apollo 

8-man’s niaidcn voyage to the moon-Dcccrnher 21-27, 1968. Apollo 8 was thc 

first mannc.d spacecraft t,o tic liftrd into ncw-carth orbit I)y n 7~/2-million pound 

thriist Sat,rirn V launch vchiclc, and all (:vents in the flight l~laii occurred as 

scheduled with unl)clicvablo accriracy. A “go” for t,hc transliinar injcctioii burn wns givc.11 rnidway through tho second 

near-eart,h orbit, and the restart of tho S-IVI3 third s1,agc. to effect this manciivcr 

increased thcb spacecraft’s velocity to plact: it on an intcrcopt course with tho moon. Lovcll and fellow crew rnc:~nt~crs, Frmk Borrnari (spacecraft commander) 

and William A. Andcrs (lunar modiilc pilot,), piloted their spacecraft somv 223,000 milcs to ticcome the first humans t,o 1c:tvc: thv carth’s influence; arid ~ipo~l 

reaching thc moon on 1)ecomt)er 24, they pcrformcd the first, critical manouver 

to!;lucct Apollo 8 int,o a 60 I)y 168 nautical rnilrs lunar orbit. 

I wo rcvoliitions later, the crew executed a sccorid niaiicuver using the slmxcraft’s 20,500-pound thrust servicc tnodrilc propulsion systcni to achicvo il circular 

lunar orbit of 60 nautical miles. During their ten revolutions of tho moon, thr crew condiicted livc: television tr:insrnissions of the lunar surfacc aud performed 

such tasks as landniark arid Apollo landing site tracking, vertical stereo photography and stcwo navigation photography, and sextant naviga1,ion using lunar 

landmarks arid stars. At the end of the tc:nt,h lunar orbit, they cxeciited a transwrth injection biirn which placcd Apollo 8 on a proper trajectory for the return 

to carth. 

Thr final log of tho trip required only 58 hoiirs, as comlinrod t,o thc 60 holm iiscd 

to travel to thr moon, and Apollo 8 cam: to i~ s1iccc:ssful conclusion on DcccniIjor 27, 1968. Splashdowri occiirwd at an estiiiiijtcd 5,000 yards from thc IJSS 

Yorktown, following t>hc: successfril nngotiatiori of it critical 28-mile high reentrv 

corridor at speeds closc to 25,000 rnilcs ~wr hoiir. 

Captain Lovcll has siuc c:d as thc backul) sl)acc ft conirnandcr for the 

Apollo 11 lrinar landing ni . Ilc has coinplt.tcd thrc pace flights and holds 

the 1J.H. Astronaut record for tiiiic in space with a total of 572 hours and 10 rninutes. 
44 

Captain Lovell is currently assigned as spacecraft commander for the Apollo 

13 mission. 

Special assignment.-In addition to his regular duties as an astronaut, Captain 

Lovell continues to serve as Special Consultant to the President’s Council on Physical Fitness and Sports-an assignment he has held since June 1967. 

JOHN LEONARD SWIGERT, JR. (MR.). NASA ASTRONAUT 

Birthplace and date.-Born in Denver, Colorado, on August 30, 1931; he is the son of lh. and Mrs. J. Leonard Swigert who reside in Denver. 

Physical description.-Blond hair; blue eyes; height: 5 feet 1156 inches; weight: 

180 pounds. 

Education.-Attended Blessed Sacrament School, Itegis High School, and East 

High School in Denver, Colorado; received a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Colorado in 1953, a Master of Science 

degree in Aerospace Science from the Rcnsselacr Polytechnic Institute in 1965, 

and Master of Business Administration degree from the University of Hartford 

in 1967. 

Marital status.-Single. 

Recreational interests.-An avid sports enthusiast, he enjoys handball, bowling, 

water skiing, swimming, basketball, and golf. His hobbies include photography. 

Organizations.-Associate Fellow of the Society of Experimental Test Pilots; 

member of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, the Quiet 

Birdmen, Phi Gamma Delta, Pi Tau Sigma, and Sigma Tau. 

Special honors.-Co-recipient of the AIAA Octave Chanute Award for 1966 

for his participation in demonstrating the Rogallo Wing as a feasible land landing 

system for returning space vehicles and astronauts. 

Ezperience.-Swigert held a position as engineering test pilot for North 

American Aviation, Inc., before joining NASA. He was also an engineering test 

pilot for Pratt and Whitney from 1957 to 1964. 

He served with the Air Force from 1953 to 1956 and, upon graduation from 

the Pilot Training Program and Gunnery School at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, was assigned as a fighter pilot in Japan and Korea. After completing his tour 

of active duty in the military service, he served as a jet fighter pilot with the 

Massachusetts Air National Guard from September 1957 to March 1960 and was a member of the Connecticut Air National Guard from April 1960 to October 

1965. 

He has logged 5,870 hours flight time-4,555 hours in jet aircraft. 

Current assignment.-Mr. Swigert is one of the 19 astronauts selected by NASA 

in April 1966. 

Swigert was assigned as backup Command Module pilot on Apollo 13 but was named to the prime crew April 10, the day before the mission as a substitute 

for Astronaut Thomas K. Mattingly 11. Mattingly had been exposed to measles 

and was disqualified from the prime crew. 

FRED WALLACE HAISE, JR. (MR.),NASA ASTRONAUT 

Birthplace and date.-Born in Biloxi, Miss., on Nov. 14, 1933; his mother, 

Mrs. Fred W. Haise, Sr., resides in Biloxi. 

Physical description.-Brown hair; brown eyes; height: 5 feet 9$ inches; 

weight: 150 pounds. Education.-Graduated from Biloxi High School, Biloxi, Miss. ; attended 

Perkinston Junior College (Association of Arts) ; received a Bachelor of Science 

degree with honors in Aeronautical Engineering from the University of Oklahoma 

in 1959. 

Marztal status.-Married to the former Mary Griffin Grant of Biloxi, Miss. 

Her parents, Mr. and Mrs. William J. Grant, Jr., reside in Biloxi. 

Children.-Mary M., January 25,1956; Frederick T., May 13,1958; Stephen W., 

June 30, 1961. 

Organizations.-Member of the Society of Expcrimedtal Test Pilots, Tau Beta 

Pi, Sigma Gamma Tau, and Phi Theta Kappa. 

Special honors.-Recipient of the A. B. Boots Trophy as the outstanding 

graduate of class 64A from the Aerospace Research Pilot School in 1964; awarded 

the American Defense Ribbon and the Society of Experimental Test Pilots 

Ray E. Tenhoff Award for 1966. 
Ezpericncc.-Hake was a rcscarch pilot at the NASA Flight Research Center 

at Edwards, Calif., before coming to Houston and the Manned Spacecraft Center; 

and from Scptembcr 1959 to March 1963, hc was a rcscarch pilot at the NASA 

Lewis Itcscarch Center in Clcveland, Ohio. I)wing this time, he authored thc 

following papers which have lxen publishcd: a NASA TRD, entitled “An Evaluation of the Flying Qualities of Scvcn Gcncral-Aviation Aircraft;” NASA TRD 

3380, “Use of Aircraft for Zero Gravity Fhvironmcnt, May 1966;” SAE Business 

Aircraft Conference Paper, cntitlcd “An Evaluation of General-Aviation Aircraft 

Flying Qiialitics,” March 30-April 1, 1966; and a paper delivered at thc tenth sym1)osillrrl of thc Socicty of 1‘:xpcrimcntal Test Pilots, cntitlcd “A Quantitative,! 

Qualitative Handling Qrialitirs Evaluation of Scvcn General-Aviation Aircraft, 

1066. 

HP was the Acrospacc Rcscmch Pilots School’s outstanding graduate of Class 

64A and scrvcd with thc 1J.S. Air Forco from Octobrr 1961 to Aiigiist 1962 as a tactical fightcr pilot and as Chicf of thr 164th Standardization-Evaluation Flight 

of the 164th Tactical Fighter Squadron at Mansfield, Ohio. From March 1957 

t,o Scptcmbcr 1959, he was a fighter-interceptor pilot with thc 185th Fighter 

Interceptor Squadron in the Oklahoma Air National Guard. 

He also served as a tactics and all weather flight instructor in the U.S. Navy 

Advanced Training Command at NAAS Kingsvillc, Texas, and was assigned as a U.S. Marine Corps fighter pilot to VMF-533 and 114 at MCAS Cherry Point, 

N.C., from March 1954 to September 1956. 

His military career bcgan in October 1952 as a Naval Aviation Cadet at t,hc 

Naval Air Station in Pcnsacola, Fla. 

He has accnmulated 5,800 hours flying timc, including 3,000 hours in jets. 

Current assignment.-hZr. Haisc is onc of the 19 Astronauts selcctcd by NASA 

in,April 1966. Hc servcd as backup lunar module pilot for the Apollo 8 and 11 

missions. 

He is currcntly assigned as liinar modiilc pilot for the Apollo 13 flight. 

APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD 

SeniLtor HOLLAND. I have several questions. 

First, Dr. Paine, when do you anticipate that the work of the Apollo 

13 Review Board will be finished? 

Dr. PAINE. The first output which we expect to get from the Review Board is a statement on their part as to when they will have the 

review completed. We have given them open-erdecl charter so that 

they can take all the time required for a thorough review. They have 

not yet told 11s the date that they will be prepared to give us a final 

report. I \voiiltl guess it would be in the order of ti month, Senator 

Holland. 

Senator HOLLAND. Do 1 understnntl correctly that that report 

mill be made immediately available to this committee tirid the similar 

committee at the other end of the Capitol? 

Dr. PAINE. That is correct. Arid we will be happy to provide you 

with interim reports as the work progresses. 

STATUS OF APOLLO 14 MISSION 

Sen ritor HOLLAND. In the meantime, what is the status, Dr. Paine, or Dr. Petrone, of the Apollo 14 mission? Is the preparation for that 

mission continuing? 

Dr. PETRONE. Yes, we are continning the prepnration of flight 

hardware. The one thing we want to evduate is the site we go to. 

Apollo 14 was planned to land at a site on the moon known us Littrow. 

What we are discussing now with the scientific community is what of 

the sites, that for 13 or that for 14, we should go to. We are doing that 

and will be doing it in the coming week. But the basic hardware, the 

preparntion, the basic planning is going forward. 
Senator HOLLAND. Are you hoping to maintain your schediile 

for the launch of the Apollo 14, still? 

Dr. PETRONE. Sir, I \vould say to that, we are going to have to 

look at the corrections ve have to make. So in terms of rnaintaiiiing 

a schedule, it will be based around the fixes we determiiie necessary. 

We want to keep moving forward so we can take advantage of the 

time, but we are not adhering to a fixed schedule. It will be determined by the fixes, the corrections, the modifications we deem necessary before we will have the exact schedule. 

I do anticipate that we will move forward very quickly in this 

area. 

EARLY CUTOFF OF ENGINE 

Senator HOLLAND. One more question. Is there tiny possible 

connection between the shutoff of one of the engines, t~t the time 

of the launch und the aclditiorial burn that had to be completed 

before the spacecraft, \vas properly launched and the subsequent 

difficulty in the service module? 

Dr. PETRONE. Senator Holland, \ve feel that the early cutoff of 

that one engine in the second stage had no effect on the incident 

we are studying here of the 0, tank. We have very good telemetry 

information on the force that wos transmitted into the spacecraft, 

and also the observations of the crew on board. Essentially, there 

were no great vibrations or forces trciiismittetl up\vard into the spacecraft. But we feel fairly certain that there WL~ no connection between 

the early cut off of the eiigiiie and this incident we are seeing here. 

Senator HOLLAND. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Goldwater? 

Senator GOLDWATEH. T might say to the astronauts that they 

understand now what I mean when I say I feel likc tailend Charley. 

But it is nice sitting at this end of the table. 

To you astronauts, all of you and your wives, my congratulations on a job very well done. I agree with what the others of this committec 

have said. You have been a great inspiration to all of 11s and to all 

Americans. 

NASA CONTROL CENTER 

I do not wmt to belittle what you did in getting back, but I think 

sometimes we pay too little attention to the other onci of thc team. 

It has been my expcricncc to have been at the control center during 

the launching of 12, and Inter, during the trouble that you hat1 last 

week on 13. The thing that I was impressed with most, arid I wish 

there wcrc sonic way to show this visu:illy to the Arncricr~ti peopl~, is 

the complete cdmricss anti know-how that these backup people h~ve. 

I watched the communications trouble dcvrlop on 12, ant1 I think 

within three and a half minutes the solution had bem reached. 

When I \vas down there last meek, they had already started work, 

study, to determine just what happened to your oxygen tank. In 

fact, I am so impressed with this that I think the tec.hniqnes thak are 

used in the NASA Control Center can ivell be applied to all of the 

problems besetting us in America. I think it is time thiit we bogin 

thinking about collecting the good 1)mitis anti the good ttbility on till 

problems so that we can apply wliiLt you have leurnecl down there, 

the know-how, to the problems that we have in this country. 
47 

I would like to agree also with you, Captain hvell, on the subject 

of education. I guess I htLve spoken to over 10,000 teenagers. These 

tire not the high school or college ones, but my grandchildren’s age. 

I cannot wait to see these grow up, because they are real gung-ho on 

space tmd all the knowledge that is coming from it. 

1 VALUE OF SPAPE INVESTMENT 

I might add that the question has come up many times about the 

$28 billion that we have spent in space, tLrd some one of our colleagues 

has said all we have for it is several viiils of moon dust. I just want to 

repeat one or two things that I knou of tlitit liiLve come out of this 

that I think are worth the whole $28 billion, as I vdl say in a speech 

on Monday on the floor. 

While I do not think 1 can prove it now, give me 5 years, tilid 1 

think I can show you $28 billion-plus having come back from it. 

But the fnct that we call 110\v prevent tin airplane from catching 

fire as a result of space exploration, I think is worth every cent of the 

$28 billion. The fact that we have, through spirioff from space, the 

approaching ability to build an aircraft proximity warning device 

which will tell a pilot that there is tinother airplane approaching him, 

to me is worth all of the $28 billion-plus, because they are going to 

save lives. 

And, too, in the tlerrionstriLtioii we saw here last week-Dr. Puine, 

I think I have talked to you about itJ--should be made available to 

every \winen’s club, every Service club ant1 every school in America. 

We were shown what has been a(~cornplis1ied in the whole field of fireproofing. As soon ILS this inaterid comes on t,he markel,, I am going t,o 

buy iL lot of it arid call ul) rriy fire insurance agent and tell him I do 

not need him any more. 

POSSIBLE CAIJSE OF BLAZE 

I have just one short question to ask of Dr. Petrone. 

If you feel that it should not be ansareretl here, please say so. When 

I was there last week, I was sho\vri the fullscale drawings of the tanks 

antl the section antl the two small, electric pumps that I think rotate 

around 2,000 revolutions per minute, and the gage with the heater. 

As I remember it, I was told that even if these motors jammed or 

froze, they would pull no more current in that condition than when 

they were running; therefore, there could riot be a fire from insulation 

burning or anything like that. Ant1 1 wis told that the same would 

apply to the measuring device 

It was suggested during that discussion that mint srnull 1)icc.c. of 

alurniiirm or cvcn 1i:u.d rubber might have beon in that I forget what 

you call it; it is not liquid oxygen, it is somigaseous-- 

Dr. PETRONE. The supcrcriticnl oxygen. 

Senator GOLDWATER. That the. contact of that outside object with 

the heat might have caused thc blazc. Can you rulc that out? 

Dr. PETRONE. To answ’r the first ptirt of your question, what yo11 

were told is csscritially corrcct. Wc mntlc tests in the carlicr part of 

the mission. Just stalling that fan n-ould riot givc you sufficient cnergy 

to start IL firo. Tho proprllant gtigc system, as you have mentioned, 

\vould not have sufficient cnergy. Thcsc are all fused against certain 

demands, either fuse or circuit breakers. 

the heater. 
48 

However, the question of whothcr or not a spark could huvc~ bccn 

caused by IL piccc of thr. rnutorinl, cithw hard rubbcr or it rivet, or 

whether one of thc loads rieccwary to give cnc~gy for thc fwii cwnltl 

have dono it, these arc things that e (lo riot know yet. We MY’ sirnulatirig those itcms. Wo arc tittempting tliffcrmt failure rnotles to iinclcrstarid the failure mechanisrn. Thew tire the things \ve arc’ stmcliirig 

for now. 

But tho clcmc.nts tlionis~~lv(~~, thr tcxsting of tliclrii :rud tho \\ riy tlley 

function, \\ oultl not givc us sufficirnt energy. But, lion PVP~, sonic other 

mittcriul intcmcting into thc supwritical cwntlition\ might. Wr did 

have a rise in thcrc, that \vc know. That is thv thing that we li~iv(~ to 

search for. 

CORII’LETE QUALrPIC.4 TI ON TEST 

Senator GOLI)WATER. Ow other thing. 1 tliiiik th~ piiblic \votild 1)c 

intcrwtcd in this. Am I riglit in assunring tliltt \\ hc~n pori tliiiik yoii 

have solved thc problem, yoti will hidd a fdl-sc:\lr~ mockrip :Lri(1 s(v 

if you can make it repat? 

qualification test. Now, yo11 build this 111) in srri:dl instruments, rmtl 

you arc going to have to, in order to gc ornctliing to ignitc or hiirii, 

yoii are going to have to tipply abnorrnnl ciicrgics. €lo\wv(~, oiic~ \t(3 

havc tho ncm hartlwm~, \\ c will srtbjwt it to dl c1xtrcinc.s. ‘rhn,t is how 

wr havch qnalifird till hartlmarr. 

What wc will do with the I~PW modification, wc ill put it in tlic 

system. 

Senator GOLDWATER. Thank you. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator SMITH of Maine. Mr. Chairman, may I make a brief 

The CHAIRMAN. Surely. 

Senator SMITH of Maine. Mr. Chairman, earlier 1 mentioned that 

I gained a great den1 of assurance nrid confitlence from listening to arid 

watching the wives antl the families of the astronants of the Apollo 13 

antl other Apollo team members for that matter. I mi told Mrs. Lovell 

is in the audience, and I think we woultl ull like to have her stand so 

we can see the other half of the Lovell family. 

[Applause.] 

The CHAIRMAN. A great many of these people here have come in late, 

Captain Love11 and Mr. Swigert, and they n-oultl like to see you stunt1 

again. Would you please stand itntl fuce buck there to the nudierice? 

[Applause.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Speaking of the benefits from the space progruni, what is the effect 

of the space flights on cooperation srriong other riatioris? 

Dr. PAINE. Mr. Chairman, one of thc vrry fiiic dcvelopmc.nts 

of the Apllo 13 mission was thc tremoritlous iiiiiribor of niossiqp 

which poured into 11s from t~ll over thc worltl--Ii~rg(~ nations like thc. 

Soviet Union, small nations like Uruguay--off ering us (’om plctc. 

uccess to their ships, aircraft, any help they cwultl givc to us 011 this 

mission. As we havc reported before this corninittca, u c arc ~vorkiiig 

very hard to increase tho degree of international cooperation in spaac. 

Dr. PETRONE. Sir, thilt is 1loI’IIidly 0111’ ])1tili, to 1’1111 :L (.oIllpl(~tc 

comment? 

INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 
49 

We feel that the Apollo 13 mission anti the rcsponsa all around the 

world, the offers to help, are certainly going to facilitate arid speed 

up this iiicronsctl degree of intcmuttional cooperation in space which we would like to see corno about in thc 1970’s. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gchrig. 

DIFFICULTY WITH OXYGEN TANK 

Mr. GEHRIG. Mr. Chairman, there are II few additional questions, 

On April 19, u story in t,hc No\v York Tirrics sirid of the oxygcii 

but they can be ans\veretl for the rocord. 

t,arik that ruptured: 

The only timc in the tank’s history even the slightest doubt was raised about 

its preflight condition was dliring prccountdown preparations at Cape Kennedy, 

Florida. 

Tcchnicians reported having troublc draining thc liquid oxygen from the tank 

after EL tcst. Tho tank seemed to empty slower than iisiial. But tho next time it was checked out, the drainage problcm did not occur. 

Would you please cominont on this? 

Dr. PETRONE. NASA rmnoun(:cd in a prws rr:loase on April 17 that 

difficulty was encoiintortvl in tlctrtnking oxygen tank No 2 after tho 

coiintdomn demonstration tost at Kennedy Space Center. An analysis 

iridictitcd that tho tlcsigri of the fill arid vcnt line could permit this 

condition to occur. A modified- procotlure was then used to detank 

the oxygen. A second tanking was performed which confirmed the 

abovc analysis. Detanking was rrccomplishcd using the same modified 

procctlurc! as before. Further evaluation prior to launch indicated that 

the fill and vent line could only affect the detanking operation and 

woultl havo no effect on fill antl porformancc of this tank. 

This and my other relationships bctwccn liiunch preparations antl 

tjhc incident arc bcirig roviewcd by tho Apollo 13 Roview Board 

appointed by the Administrator and Deputy Administrator on 17 

April 1970. 

Mr. GEHIXIG. Mr. Chairman, rather than takc the time of the 

committee, Senator Young asks that the following qiiestions be 

answered for thc record : 

(The quostions submittctl by SonrLtor Young and thc mswers suppiiod for tho record are as follows:) 

SIGNIFIC.~NCI~> OF LTJN.\IL EXPERIMENT 

Question 1. Dr. Paine, at least one of the lunar experiments worked, the crash of 

the Saturn S-ZVB stage into the lunar surface about 80 miles from the seisometer 

left behind by the April 12 astronauts. Tlis produced a much larger than expected 

return. Can you tell the Committee anything about the signijkance of that experiment? 

Answer. During the Apollo 12 mission we delibcratcly impacted the Lunar 

Module (LM) ascent stage on the surface of the moon aftcr the astronauts had 

trarisfcrred hack to the command tnodulr. The resrdting vibration signal at the 

seismornctcr, which had been placed on the lunar surfacc, continued for almost an hour. Scisniologivts have not seen anything comparablc on oarth and beliove 

this phenomenon, when bcttcr understood, could provide a basis for dcfinin.g.a 

model of the interior of the nioon. This in turn could provide clues to tho origin 

of tho moon and its relation to the earth. 

To gain more information ahoiit this unusual seismic response of thc moon, thc 

Apollo 13 third stage (S-IVB), weighing about 30,700 poimds, was impacted on thc moon on April 14. Thc point of impact was about 87 miles from the scismomc1,c.r; th(. S-IVB vcxlocity was 8465 fcct, Iwr sccond; its cnergy cqiivalcnt was 11.5 

tons of TNT. These data comparo with thc Apollo 12 LM which impacted 42 
50 

miles from the seismometer with an equivalent cncrgy of approximatcly 1 ton of 

TNT. The depth of penetration of the S-IVB impact signal is :Lpproximatoly 12-25 

miles (vs approximately 10 miles for the LM impact). This rcsiilt implirs thal, tho 

outer shell of the moon to dcpths of at least 12 to 25 miles may be formed from 

tho same crgstallino rock niatcrial as found at the surfacc. The overall character 

of thc scismic signal is similar to that of tho LM impact signal, but the combination of higher energy and greater distance between point of impact and seismorrictcr gavc a scismic signal 20-30 tinirs largcr than the TAM impact andf oiir timrs 

longer in duration (approximately 4 hours vs 1 hoiir). 

Analyses of these scientifically significant and highly iiniqw signals should Irad 

iis closer to unlocking the mysteries concerning tho origin of thc moon and the 

earth-moon system. 

SPACE PROGRAM APPLICATIONS TO POLLUTION 

Question 2. Captain Love11 and Mr. Swigert, man?/ of us are quite concerned with 

the problems of pollution and environmental control right here on this planet. On 

Wednesday of this week, we saw a massive outpouring and concern during “Earth 

Day.” 

Can you give us your views on the space program as it relates to these problems? 

Answer. The space program is making direct contributions t,o onvironnicntal 

control and tho reduction of polliition, arid I believc its cfforts will bo oven nior(~ 

productive in tht: future. Thcrr arc: sevoral kinds of cnviroriniental polliitiori 

with which we arc all concerncd-air, water, and noiso polliition, ,principally. 

NASA is carrying on a dozen or so activities aimed at reducing air polliition. 

I am submitting a list of thom, attached to this responsr. They arc carried oiit 

under dircction of NASA’s Office of Advanced ILcscarch and Tcchnology. 

Thc future will witness another form of attack ‘on t,ho polliition problem. 

This is NASA’s Earth Itesources Survcy program, which has tho potential of 

identifying and monitoring siirface and atmospheric pollutants in watcr and air 

from aircraft and spacecraft I (? abl~ to rneasuro these pollutants 

and determine their cvoliitio 

The Earth Itesonrces Tcchriology Satellitc: program will pcrniit iis to hottcr 

understand the intricate processes of thc oceans, and their ability to producc 

food and to absorb pollutants. North American fresh watcr systcms will bc 

rindcrstood well enough for \is to nianagc them on a contincntal scale, ncithcr 

wasting nor hoarding this vital rcsoiircc. Agricultiiral managcmcnt will vcry 

likely bc improved. 

Noise is a particularly irritating pollutant. NASA has institritod rcscarch 

programs to 1,ry t,o determinr the rnochanisnis of noise generation from turbofan 

systems and supcrsonic engirio exhaust jets, and how to reduce this noisc. NASA 

is also developing a “quiet, cnginc” for aircraft. 

To snm up, Jack Swigort, Fred IIaisc, and I art: firmly convinced t,hat a strong 

and viablc space program will dofinitely incrcaso orir ability and oiir resolve to 

to ovcrcomc earthly problems, both old and now. The list refcrrcd to above follows: 

Investigation of tho kinetics of smokr and nitric oxide f n iintlrr contlitions typically found in aircraft gas trirbinc: combustion . 1nvc.stig:ition 

of thc dispersion of tho exharist ~)lumr in thv atniosphrrc chiiwt,t,s Iiist,itute of Tcchnology-FY 1971-$50,000). 

Invcstigation of thc chemical kinctics of thc dispcrsion process of pollutants 

with thc primary cmphasis on the oxidation of hydrocarbons hecausc this process 

plays a dominant role in photochemical air pollution (Jct Propulsion 1,aboratory-FY 1971-$~50,000). 

Investigation of the fluid dynamic mechanism of the dispcrsion and intcraction 

of pollutants from airborne and groand sources in iirban areas (New York University-FY 1971-$30,000). 

Development of a material for a thermal rractor to be attachctl to an atitomobile in place of thc exhaust manifold. This is being supportcd by th 

ment of Hcalth, Ediication and Welfare, and is utilizing NASA experti 

temperature matcrials. F Y 1970 funds ($300,000) havc bccn rcqivxtod to con- tinue this work (Tcledync, Continental Motors--FY 1969-$300,000). 

In support of the abovc thermal rcactor work, NASA is pcrforniing limitotl inhouse studies. Thc rcscarch includes a computcr study of the kinctics of combus- 
51 

tion of carbon monoxide and hydrocarbon in the thermal reactor and pulsed air 

injcction into the cxhanst ports which expedites the combustion process (Lewis 

Research Center-FY 1971-$25,000). 

Investigation of thc mechanism by which iiltraviolct radiation from the sun transforms nitrogcn oxides into smog in t,hc prcscncc of hydrocarbons in urban 

atinos1,herc.s (Amrs Itcscarch Center-FY 1071-$65,000). 

A stiidp to examine microwave spcctronicLtcr signals in parts per billion of :I 

host of contiirninants which include aiitoniot,ivo colorless g:~scs of intcrcst to 

Nat,iori:tl Air Control Polhition Administration (NACPA) such :IS oxides of sulfur 

(SO,), of nitrogcn (NO,), and fornmldehydc (HCH02). The NACPA laboratory 

personnel from It:ilcigh, N.C., and NASA have brcn nircting and exchanging 

t'ochnical information. NASA and NACPA :we planning to support work toward 

tho n1iniatiiriz:ttion of :I microwave spcctromctcr which will hnvo application to 

piik)lic air control groups, industry, and NASA (University of Wyoming--FY 

A study has been rindrrwny for the last two ycs:irs to dcvclop :L hybrid scnsor 

which consists of a niass spcctroinotcsr and schctivc. columns from n gas chroniatagraph apparatus. This will scmsc and monitor various contnniin:mts including 

those of intercst to NACPA. Dnring :I recent, review of this program, represent:itivcs from NACPA cxpressed interest in siipporting this work whcn thc fabrication 

phase is initiated (Pcrkin-Elnier Corporation, Pomona, CaliforniiL-FY 17!11- 

An investigation of methods of t,ht: rciiiovnl of oxidw of nitrogen and of sirlfiir 

dioxidc, hydrogcn chloridc, hydrogen fluoride, and chloriric in low concentrations 

from air as part of an eff art, to dcvclop :in cffectivt: atmosphcric purificat,iori sill)- 

torn. Tho rosults of this 1:tl)oratory work hi~ve dcinonstr:Lt,cd that solid-gas 

r;):tct,ion WLS found to thv most gcncdly vff cctivo nicthod of ccntainin:mt 

removal and specifically :I reaction I)ed containing both manganese dicxidc md 

lithium carbonatc: will rrmovc most of thc sdfiir oxides and ovcr 99yo of tho 

chlorinv :md hydrogen halides. This corning yrar an opciational subsystem will be 

fahricntcd. Thc: NACPA pcrsonnd arc on our inailing list for these reports and 

thev havc: bccn in contact' with both L:Ln&v Itoscarch Cent,cr arid the Texas 

1971-$40,000). 

$l50,000). 

Tcchnologicnl Collcgt on thc 1)rogrcsh of thi; work (T(xss Tcchnological Collcgc, 

Llit)I)ock, T(xxas--F Y 1971-$50,000). 

Tn thc. Aeronautical Vchiclv r)rogriini. thc cff orts r&It cd to the alleviation of 

pol1iit)ion arid smoke arc a part of :I continuing 1)rograni to irnprovc the pcrformancc 

of aircriift cngincs. (For cxamplc, ono of t,hv continuing objcctivcs of the Lcwis 

rcscarch progrnin on aircraft gas turbinc: combiistors.) This work is important 

1)ccaiisr of sevcral rc'asons inclriding: t hc rcductiori in air polllition, the reduction 

of visiid dctection of military aircraft, :md thr incrcwwd opcr:tting life of coinbitstors dltc to tho rcdiiction in heat radiation to mctal siirf:rccs due to :L rc~tiiictiori 

in srnokc. 

The prcscnt trends in adv:Inced crigincs arc toward higher flight speeds :mtl 

toward high tcinperaturc and prcssiirc ratios insidc thc combustor. Smoking 

tondcncy is inadc worsc: I)y an incrcasc: in prc~ssiirc~. A major part of the cxpcrimental work is conducted at pr o 4,50 psia) which arc typical of tho 

valucs cxpcctctl in future cngin tho rvsrrlts shoiiltl tic applicable to 

crrrrcnt cngiries which opcratc :it prcssiircts 111) to about 350 psia. 

A4 niimbcr of cxperinicntal gas t,iirbinc conibristors arc bcing tested to ovalu:it(: 

their ovcrall l)crforniaricc arid their smoking tc:ridciicy. In a11 effort to rcduco 

smoke oiitptit and heat radiation to thv comblistor srirfaces, various design 

fentiires nro being studied which inclrtdt: \wiations in air cntrp ports and variations in tho fuel injcction systoiii. Carbon contcnt in the flanicb zone is indicated 

t)y nicasiircnicnts of spectral :md total c:niittaricc. Thirty profcssionals arc asso- ciated with tho advaiicetl combustor lirograiii at Lcwis. 

The general technique bcing used by thr rnginc manufacturers to rctlricc sniokv 

is to introducc rnorc air into the prirnnry zono of tho coinbustor. Soinc rrduction 

in tho :tltitiidc blowout limits of tho cornbristor is associ:ttcd with tht: added air 

in the prirriary zono. Howcvc~, this ])(malty is not oxpoctctd t,o br :t problciri with 

comiiiercial aircraft althoiigh it may be a problem with inilitary aircraft. Adding 

air into tho primary zonc of current aircraft combustors rcsiilts in higher tcnipcratures and causcs a reduction in thv cniission rates of carbon monoxide and 

unburned hydrocarbons arid apparently causes an increase in the emission rates 

of oxides of nitrogcn. 
52 

NASA plans to continue the advanced combustor research work and to keep 

abreast of combustor work conducted by the engine manufacturers and the 

related work sripportcd by the FAA and thc Departnicnt of Ihfcnsc. The Lewis 

effort on low-cost small gas tiirbine engiiic: tcchnology is an arca for increasctl 

attention and support by NASA since replacing srnall aircraft rcciprocating 

engine with n gas tiirbinc engine will nlleviatc the aircraft pollution problem. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, all of you hcrc today. It 

has been u finc ant1 inspiring meeting. You have hclpd 11s vory much. 

The mccting is adjourned. 

(Whereupon, at 11 : 50 a.m., the committee utljourncd, to rcconveno 

subjcct to thc call of the Chair.) 
APPENDIX 

TO STATEMENT OF 

Dr. Thomas 0. Paine 

Administrator 

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 

before the 

Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences 

United States Senate 

(53) 
54 

OFFICE OF THE AOMINISTRATOR 

TO 

SUBJECT : 

REFERENCES : 

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 

WASIIINGTON. D.C. 20546 

April 17, 1970 

Mr. Edgar M. Cortright 

Establishment of Apollo 13 Review Board 

(a) NMI 8621.1 - Mission Failure Investigation 

Policy and Procedures 

NMI 11 56.14 - Aerospace Safety Advisory 

Panel 

(b) 

1. 

document the causes of all major mission failures which occur in 

the conduct of its space and aeronautical activities and to take 

appropriate corrective actions as a result of the findings and recommendations. 'I 

It is NASA policy as stated in Reference (a) ''to investigate and 

2. Because of the serious nature of the accident to the Apollo 13 

spacecraft which jeopardized human life and caused failure of the 

Apollo 13 lunar mission, we hereby establish the Apollo 13 Review 

Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board) and appoint you 

Chairman, The members of the Board will be qualified senior 

individuals from NASA and other Government agencies. After 

consultation with you, we will: 

(a) Appoint the members of the Board and make any subsequent 

changes necessary for the effective operation of the Board; and 

(b) Arrange for timely release of information on the operations, 

The Board 

findings, and recommendations of the Board to the Congress, and, 

through the NASA Office of Public Affairs, to the public. 

will report its findings and recommendations directly to us. 

3. The Board will: 

(a) Review the circumstances surrounding the accident to the 

spacecraft which occurred during the flight of Apollo 13 and the 

subsequent flight and ground actions taken to recover, in order to 

establish the probable cause or causes of the accident and assess 

the effectiveness of the recovery actions. 

. 
55 

(b) Rcvjcw all factors relating to ttic accident and recovery 

actions tltc J~oiir'd d(:l.eririincs lo 1)c significant and rclcvant, including 

t.Jtudics, findings, rccommentlations, rid other actions that havc been 

or may bc undertaken by the program offices, field centers, and 

contractors involved. 

(c) Direct such further specific investigations as may be 

necessary. 

(d) Report as soon as possible its findings relating to the cause 

or cause8 of the accident and the effectiveness of the flight and ground 

recovery actions. 

(e) Develop recommendations for corrective or other actions, 

based upon its findings and determinations or conclusions derived 

ther ef rom. 

(f) Document its findings, determinations, and recommendations 

and submit a final report. 

4. As Chairman of the Board you are delegated the following powers: 

(a) To establish such procedures for the organization and operation 

of the Board as you find most effective; such procedures shall be 

part of the Board's records. 

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel for its review and comment. 

The procedures shall be furnished the 

(b) To establish procedures to assure the execution of your 

responsibilities in your absence. 

(c) To designate such representatives, consultants, experts, 

You shall define their duties 

liaison officers, observers, or other individuals as required to 

support the activities of the Board. 

and responsibilities as part of the Board's records. 

(d) To keep us advised periodically concerning the organization, 

procedures, operations of the Board and its associated activities. - 

5. By separate action we are requesting the Aerospace Safety 

Advisory Panel established by Reference (b) to review both the 

procedures and findings of the Board and submit its indcpendent 

report to us. 
56 

6. 

for Milnncd Spncc Flight to: 

Uy sc:parntc action wc arc dirocling lhc Associate Administrator 

(a) Assurc that all clcmcnts of thct Ofl'icc of Mnnncd Spacc Flight 

coopcrnte fully with thc Board and provide records, data. and 

technical support as requested. 

(b) Undertake through the regular OMSF organization such 

reviews, studies, and supporting actions as are required to develop 

recommendations to us on corrective measures to be taken prior to 

the Apollo 14 mission with respect to hardware, operational 

procedures, and other aspects of the Apollo program. 

7. All elements of NASA will cooperate with the Board and provide 

full support within their areas of responsibility. 

Original signed by 

George M. Low 

George M. Low 

Deputy Administrator 

orlgiorl n1sp.a , T.O. Pain0 .=.A 

T. 0. Paine 

Administrator 
57 

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 

WASMINGTON. D.C. 20546 

April 20, 1970 

OfrlCC OF THE AOMINISTRATOR 

T : Dr. Charles D. Harrington 

Chairman, Aerospace Safety Ad**isory Panel 

SUBJECT Review of Procedures and Findings of Apollo 13 Revieu Board 

Attachment: (a) Memorandum dated April 17, 1970, to Mr. Edgar M. 

: 

Cortright, subject: Establishment of Apollo 13 

Review Board 

References: (a) Section 6, National Aeronautics and Space Adminiatration 

Authorization Act, 1968 

NMI 1156.14 -Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (b) 

1. In accordance with References (a) and (b), the Aerospace Ssfety 

Advisory Panel (hereafter referred to as the Panel) is requested to 

review the procedures and findings of the Apollo 13 Review Board (hereafter referred to as the Board) established by Attachment (a). 

2. The procedures established by the Board will be made available to the 

Panel for review and cDmment as provided in paragraph 4(a) of Attachment (a). 

3. As Chairman of the Panel, you are designated an Observer on the Board. 

In this capacity, you, or another member of the Panel designated by you, 

are authorized to be present at those regular meetings of the Board you 

desire to attend. You are also authorized to receive oral progress reports from the Chairman of the Board or his designee frw time to time to 

enable you to keep the Panel fully informed on the work of the Board. 

4. 

available prwptly to the Panel for it8 review. 

5. 

of the Board at such times and in such form as you consider appropriate. 

but no later than 10 day8 after the submission to us of the final report 

of the Board. 

The final report and any interim reports of the Board will be made 

The Panel is requested to report to us on the procedures and findings 

L?- 

George M. Low 

Deputy Administrator 

T. 0. Paine 

Mministr.ator_. ~ 

Enclosure 

cc: Kr. Edgar M. Cortright, Chairman, Apollo 13 Review Board 

MfMr. Dale Myers 
58 

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20546 

APR 2 0 1970 

OFFlCf OF THE ADMINISTRATOR 

TO : Mr. Dale D. Myers 

A88ociate Admini8trator for Manned sp8CO Flaht 

OUDJBOT : Apoiio 13 neviow 

Reference: (a) Hemorandum dated April 17, 1970, to Mr. Edgar M. 

Cortright, subject: 

Review Board 

Eetabliahment of Apollo 13 

(b) Memorandum dated April 20, 1970, to Dr. Char108 

D. Harrington, rubject: Review of Procodure8 

and Finding8 of Apollo 13 Review Board 

1. As indicated in paragraph 6 of Reference (a), you are directed to: 

(a) Assure that all elements of the Office of Manned Space 

Flight cooperate fully with the Board in praviding records, 

data, and technical support as requested. 

(b) Undertake through the regular OHSF organization 8uch reviews, 

studies, and supporting actions as are required to develop 

timely recommendations to ua on corrective measures to be 

taken prior to the Apollo 14 mission with reapect to hardware, operational procedures, flight crews, and other aspect8 

of the Apollo program. 

2. 

submitted to us in such form and at such time as you deam appropriata, 

but a report should be submitted no later than ten day6 attar the 

Apollo 13 Pevicrw Board submits its final report. 

3. 

space Safety Advisory Panel by References (a) and (b), re8pectively, 

in no way relieve you of your continuing full responaibility for the 

conduct of the Apollo and other OMSF program. 

The reconmendations referred to in paragraph l(b) above rhould be 

The assignments to the Apollo 13 Review Board and to the Aero6~6

Deputy Administrator Administrator 

cc: Mr. Edgar M. Cortright, Chairman, Apollo 13 Review Board 

Ur. Charles D. Harrington, Chairman, Aerorpace Safety Advirory Panel 
59 

OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR 

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20546 

April 71, 1970 

TO : Mr. Edgar M. Cortright 

SUBJECT : Membership of Apollo 13 Review Board 

Reference: Memorandum to you of April 17, subject: Eetrblishnt 

of Apollo 13 Review Board 

In accordance with paragraph 2(a) of Reference (a), the membership of 

the Apollo 13 Review Board is established as follows: 

Members: 

Mr. Edgar M. Cortright, Chairman (Director, Langley Research Center) 

Mr. Robert F. Allnutt (Assistant to the Administrator, NASA Hqs.) 

Mr. Neil Armstrong (Astronaut, Manned Spacecraft Center) 

Dr. John F. Clark (Director, Goddard Space Flight Center) 

Brig. General Walter R. Hedrick, Jr. (Director of Space, DCS/R&D, 

Hqs., USAF) 

Mr. Vincent L. Johnson (Deputy Associate Adminiatrator-Engineering, 

Office of Space Science and Applications) 

Mr. Milton Klein (Manager, AEC-NASA Space Nuclear Propulsion Office) 

Dr. Hans M. Mark (Director, Ames Research Center) 

Counsel: 

Mr. George Malley (Chief Counsel, Langley Research Center) 

OMSF Technical Support: 

Mr. Charles W. Mathcws (Deputy Associate Administrator, Office of 

Manned Space Flight) 

Observers: 

Mr. William A. Anders (Executive Secretary, National Aeronautics 

and Space Council) 
Dr. Charles D. Harrington (Chairman, NASA Aerospace Safety 

Mr. I. I. Pinkel (Director, Aerospace Safety Research and 

Advisory Panel) 

Data Institute, Lewis Research Center) 

Conaressional Liaison: 

Mr. Gerald J. Mossinghoff (Office of Legislative Affaire, NASA Hqs.) 

Public Affairs Liaison: 

Mr. Brian Duff (Public Affairs Officer, Manned Spacecraft Center) 

In accordance with applicable NASA instruction, you are authorized to 

appoint such experts and additional consultants as are required for 

the effective operations of the Board. 

ATWLV 

George M. Low 

Deputy Administrator 

T. 0. Paine 

Administrator 

0