FOREWORD 

by 

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell 

Over the past two decades, the Western Hemisphere has seen dramatic advances in the 

institutionalization of democracy and the spread of free market economies. Today, the nations of 

the Americas are working in close partnership to build a hemisphere based on political and 

economic freedom where dictators, traffickers and terrorists cannot thrive. 

As fate would have it, I was in Lima, Peru joining our hemispheric neighbors in the adoption of the 

Inter-American Democratic Charter when the terrorists struck the United States on September 11, 

2001. By adopting the Democratic Charter, the countries of our hemisphere made a powerful 

statement in support of freedom, humanity and peace. 

Conspicuous for its absence on that historic occasion was Cuba. Cuba alone among the 

hemispheric nations did not adopt the Democratic Charter. That is not surprising, for Cuba alone 

among the nations of Americas is a dictatorship. For over four decades, the regime of Fidel 

Castro has imposed upon the Cuban people a communist system of government that 

systematically violates their most fundamental human rights. Just last year, the Castro regime 

consigned 75 human rights activists, independent librarians and journalists and democracy 

advocates to an average of nearly 20 years of imprisonment. These prisoners of conscience are 

serving out their harsh sentences under inhumane and highly unsanitary conditions, where 

medical services are wholly inadequate. 

The Democratic Charter clearly states: “The peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy 

and their governments have an obligation to promote and defend it.” In fulfillment of that solemn 

obligation, the United States remains strongly committed to supporting the efforts of the Cuban 

people to secure the blessings of democracy for themselves and their children. 

President Bush formed the U.S. Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba to explore ways we 

can help hasten and ease Cuba’s democratic transition. As this report shows, the United States 

seeks to cooperate with neighbors in the hemisphere and nations across the globe to help 

Cubans prepare for democratic change. We want to help Cubans build an independent civil 

society. We want to do all we possibly can to free the flow of ideas and information to, from and 

across the island. We are adjusting U.S. economic pressure to counter the ever evolving ways 

the Castro regime attempts to replenish the coffers that fund the subjugation of the Cuban 

people. And the United States will stand with those in Cuba who courageously speak in defense 

of human rights and work for political and economic reform. 

Our goal is a true democratic transition. We want to help the Cuban people put Castro and 

Castroism behind them forever. Any post-Castro succession that perpetuates the regime’s hold 

on power would be completely contrary to the hemisphere’s commitment to freedom. There can 

be no reconciliation between the United States and Cuba until far-reaching steps are taken to 

ensure political and economic liberty on the island. Indeed, under the Cuban Liberty and 

Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, the United States is prohibited by law from providing 

assistance to a post-Castro transition government unless that government legalizes all political 

activity, releases all political prisoners, publicly commits to organizing free and fair elections 

within 18 months, and bars Fidel and Raul Castro from any role in a future government. 

In Cuba’s transition to democracy, we envision and welcome an active role for the Cuban 

American community. The United States has been enriched by the Cuban American 

community’s culture, entrepreneurial spirit and patriotism. The success of Cuban Americans 

demonstrates the great capacity of the Cuban people to prosper in freedom and serves as a 

source of hope and inspiration to their brothers and sisters on the island. Cuban Americans will 

be able to provide valuable insights, as well as business acumen and capital, as the citizens of 
2

Cuba work to repair the devastation done to the Cuban society and economy by more than forty 

years of communism. 

We also can draw on the lessons we have learned from our experiences assisting the peoples of 

East and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union with their transitions from communism to 

democracy and free markets. And, as was the case with the East Bloc nations, we see an 

important part for the multilateral financial institutions to play in Cuba’s transition. 

We hope that this Report will help the United States, our neighbors in the Americas and free 

nations across the globe better support the efforts of the Cuban people to secure their right to 

democracy and realize their dreams for a better future. 

 
COMMISSION FOR ASSISTANCE 

TO A FREE CUBA 

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 

MAY 2004 

Colin L. Powell 

Secretary of State 

Chairman 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii 

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 

CHAPTER 1: HASTENING CUBA’S TRANSITION 

I. Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 

II. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 

III. Empower Cuban Civil Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 

A. Current U.S. Assistance Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 

B. Improve U.S. Outreach to Cuban Civil Society . . . . . . . . . 17 

IV. Break the Information Blockade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 

V. Deny Revenues to the Castro Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 

A. Undermine Regime-sustaining Tourism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 

B. Limit the Regime’s Manipulation of 

Humanitarian U.S. Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 

C. Deny Other Sources of Revenue to the Regime . . . . . . . . . 42 

VI. Illuminate the Reality of Castro’s Cuba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 

VII. Encourage International Diplomatic Efforts to Support 

Cuban Civil Society and to Challenge the Castro Regime . . . . . . 45 

VIII. Undermine the Regime’s Succession Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 

i
CHAPTER 2: MEETING BASIC HUMAN NEEDS IN THE AREAS

OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, HOUSING, AND 

HUMAN SERVICES 

I. Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 

II. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 

III. Immediate Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 

A. The Current Situation in Cuba Prior to Transition . . . . . . . 67 

B. Developing a Transition Assistance Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 

C. Humanitarian Assessment and Program Design . . . . . . . . . 74 

D. Challenges in Providing Humanitarian Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 

E. Implementing Short-Term Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 

F. Food Aid for Cuba in the Short-term . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 

G. Action Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 

IV. Medium- and Long-Term Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 

A. Health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 

B. Education and Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 

C. Food and Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 

D. Housing and Urban Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 

E. Other Human Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 

V. Consulting and Coordinating with the International Community . 150 

CHAPTER 3: ESTABLISHING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, 

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, RULE OF LAW,

AND NATIONAL JUSTICE AND 

RECONCILIATION 

I. Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 

II. U.S. Assistance to a Transition Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 

III. Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 

ii
A. Political Prisoners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162 

B. Prison Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 

C. Other Human Rights Abuses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164 

D. Cuban Human Rights Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164 

E. International Support for Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 

F. Guaranteeing Free Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 

G. Ensuring Equal Opportunity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168 

IV. National Justice and Reconciliation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171 

A. Truth Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171 

B. Preserving the Old Regime’s Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 

C. Renunciation of Official Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174 

D. International Fugitives from Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 

V. Establishing Democratic Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 

A. Strengthening Legislative Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 

B. Independent Political Parties and Interest Groups . . . . . . . . 177 

C. Free and Fair Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 

D. International Support for Elections. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181 

E. Inter-American Democratic Charter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182 

F. Public Sector Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184 

G. Fighting Corruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185 

H. Independent Trade Unions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186 

I. Support for Decentralization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189 

VI. Rule of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189 

A. Constitutional Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190 

B. The Armed Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192 

C. Independent Judiciary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193 

iii
D. Reconstituting Police Forces and Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . 196 

CHAPTER 4: ESTABLISHING THE CORE INSTITUTIONS OF A 

FREE ECONOMY 

I. Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201 

II. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205 

III. Immediate Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210 

A. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210 

B. Stabilize the Economy, Decontrol Pricing, and 

Begin to Denationalize State-Owned/Controlled Entitie . . 211 

C. Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214 

D. Rejoin International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and Other 

International/Regional Institutions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218 

E. Encourage Foreign Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219 

F. Reschedule the External Debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222 

G. Trade Financing/Credits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223 

IV. Medium- and Long-Term Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224 

A. Settle Outstanding Expropriated Property Claims . . . . . . . . 224 

B. Rekindle Entrepreneurship and Private Enterprise . . . . . . . 229 

C. Establish an Independent Banking System and an 

Independent Central Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234 

D. Build an Effective Finance/Economy Ministry . . . . . . . . . . 236 

E. Create an Independent Tax Collection Agency . . . . . . . . . . 236 

F. Streamline Existing Government Economic Ministries . . . 237 

G. Promote Ownership of Private Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238 

iv
H. Establish Free And Efficient Labor Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . 244 

I. Promote Healthy Labor Management Relations with 

Newly Independent Unions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246 

V. Engaging and Empowering the Cuban People . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248 

VI. Consulting and Coordinating with the International Community . 250 

CHAPTER 5: MODERNIZING INFRASTRUCTURE 

I. Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255 

II. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256 

III. Immediate Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259 

A. Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259 

1. Aviation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259 

2. Maritime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264 

3. Railroads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267 

4. Highways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268 

B. Energy Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268 

C. Water Resources Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270 

IV. Medium- and Long-Term Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272 

A. Regional Planning Councils . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273 

B. Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273 

1. Aviation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273 

2. Maritime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288 

3. Railroads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297 

4. Public Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301 

5. Highways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304 

6. Traffic and Vehicle Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314 

v
C. Energy Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315 

D. Telecommunication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334 

E. Water Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346 

F. Cultural and Historical Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354 

V. Engaging and Empowering the Cuban People . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355 

VI. Consulting and Coordination with the International Community . 357 

CHAPTER 6: ADDRESSING ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION 

I. Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361 

II. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362 

III. Immediate Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364 

A. Drinking Water and Wastewater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364 

IV. Medium- and Long-Term Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365 

A. Environmental Quality and Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365 

1. Environmental Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365 

2. Water Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371 

3. Land Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381 

4. Air Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389 

5. Other Environmental Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 394 

B. Natural, Cultural, and Historical Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . 402 

1. Parks and Protected Areas, Forests, and 

Marine Protected Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 403 

2. Wildlife and Fisheries Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . 416 

V. Engaging & Empowering the Cuban People . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 420 

VI. Consulting & Coordination with the International Community . . 422

vi
COMMISSION FOR ASSISTANCE 

TO A FREE CUBA 

CHAIRMAN 

Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State 

CORE GROUP MEMBERS 

John W. Snow, Secretary of the Treasury 

Donald L. Evans, Secretary of Commerce 

Alphonso Jackson, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development 

Tom Ridge, Secretary of Homeland Security 

Condoleezza Rice, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs 

Andrew S. Natsios, Administrator, United States Agency for International 

Development 

COMMISSION COORDINATOR 

Roger F. Noriega, Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs, 

Department of State 

WORKING GROUP ON HASTENING CUBA’S TRANSITION 

Chairman

Daniel W. Fisk, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere 

Affairs, Department of State 

Participants 

Department of Commerce 

Department of Defense 

Department of Homeland Security 

Department of State 

vii
Department of the Treasury 

Foreign Claims Settlement Commission 

National Security Council 

U.S. Agency for International Development 

WORKING GROUP ON MEETING BASIC HUMAN NEEDS IN THE 

AREAS OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, HOUSING, AND HUMAN 

SERVICES

Chairman 

Joseph Esposito, Deputy Under Secretary for International Affairs, 

Department of Education 

Participants 

Department of Agriculture 

Department of Education 

Department of Health and Human Services 

Department of Housing and Urban Development 

Department of Labor 

Department of State 

National Security Council 

Office of National Drug Control Policy 

Peace Corps 

Social Security Administration 

U.S. Agency for International Development 

WORKING GROUP ON ESTABLISHING DEMOCRATIC 

INSTITUTIONS, RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, RULE OF LAW, 

AND NATIONAL JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION 

Chairman

Adolfo Franco, Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the 

Caribbean, U.S. Agency for International Development 

Participants 

Department of Commerce 

Department of Defense 

Department of Education 

viii
Department of Homeland Security 

Department of Justice 

Department of Labor 

Department of State 

Department of the Treasury 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

Foreign Claims Settlement Commission 

National Security Council 

U.S. Agency for International Development

WORKING GROUP ON ESTABLISHING THE CORE 

INSTITUTIONS OF A FREE ECONOMY 

Chairman

Walter Bastian, Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Western Hemisphere, 

Department of Commerce 

Participants 

Department of Agriculture 

Department of Commerce 

Department of Housing and Urban Development 

Department of Justice 

Department of Labor 

Department of State 

Department of the Treasury 

Export-Import Bank of the United States 

Foreign Claims Settlement Commission 

National Security Council 

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative 

Overseas Private Investment Corporation 

Small Business Administration 

U.S. Agency for International Development

ix 
WORKING GROUP ON MODERNIZING INFRASTRUCTURE AND 

ADDRESSING ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION 

Chairman 

Michael Reynolds, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Aviation and 

International Affairs, Department of Transportation 

Participants 

Department of Agriculture 

Department of Commerce 

Department of Energy 

Department of Homeland Security 

Department of Housing and Urban Development 

Department of the Interior 

Department of State 

Department of Transportation 

Army Corps of Engineers 

Environmental Protection Agency 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

National Security Council 

U.S. Agency for International Development 

U.S. Coast Guard 

SPECIAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: 

Executive Coordinator 

Mirta Alvarez, Deputy Director, Office of Cuban Affairs, Bureau of Western 

Hemisphere Affairs, Department of State 

Special Assistant to the Commission 

Benjamin Hardman, Office of Cuban Affairs, Bureau of Western 

Hemisphere Affairs, Department of State 

Editor 

Jose R. Cardenas, Senior Advisor, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, 

Department of State 

x 
PREFACE 

On October 10, 2003, President George W. Bush announced the 

creation of a Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba that would “draw 

upon experts within our government to plan for Cuba’s transition from

Stalinist rule to a free and open society [and] to identify ways to hasten the 

arrival of that day.” 

This Commission was thus established to focus U.S. Government 

agencies on hastening the arrival of a transition in Cuba, and planning to 

respond to this opportunity. To that end, the Commission was responsible

for (1) identifying additional measures by which the United States can help 

the Cuban people bring about an expeditious end of the Castro dictatorship; 

and (2) identifying U.S. Government programs that could assist the Cuban 

people during a transition. 

In furtherance of the President’s mandate, the Commission developed 

and reviewed a comprehensive range of actions and programs that could be 

provided to hasten a transition as well as assist Cuba once a transition is 

underway. However, the Commission did not attempt to address current 

legal, regulatory, or budgetary barriers to assistance; consequently, the 

report may include recommendations to assist a free Cuba that may be 

prohibited or limited by current U.S. law or which will need to be funded in 

the future. In order to provide the full extent of the assistance outlined in 

this report, these legal prohibitions and budgetary limitations will need to be 

addressed. In particular, in order for assistance to be provided, the 

prerequisites for assistance to a transition government and a democratically 

elected government contained in the Cuban Liberty and Democratic 

Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act will need to be satisfied. The 

recommendations in this report regarding future assistance to Cuba can be 

implemented only if those requirements and standards are met. 

Finally, the proposed programs and initiatives to assist a transition 

government in Cuba are prospective. They are meant to help prepare the 

U.S. Government to respond to a transition in Cuba. They are not intended 

to be a prescription for how a free Cuba organizes itself or what policies it 

decides ultimately to pursue; those decisions remain with the Cuban people 

as expressed by a free and sovereign Cuban government.

xi 

PREFACE 

On October 10, 2003, President George W. Bush announced the 

creation of a Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba that would “draw 

upon experts within our government to plan for Cuba’s transition from

Stalinist rule to a free and open society [and] to identify ways to hasten the 

arrival of that day.” 

This Commission was thus established to focus U.S. Government 

agencies on hastening the arrival of a transition in Cuba, and planning to 

respond to this opportunity. To that end, the Commission was responsible

for (1) identifying additional measures by which the United States can help 

the Cuban people bring about an expeditious end of the Castro dictatorship; 

and (2) identifying U.S. Government programs that could assist the Cuban 

people during a transition. 

In furtherance of the President’s mandate, the Commission developed 

and reviewed a comprehensive range of actions and programs that could be 

provided to hasten a transition as well as assist Cuba once a transition is 

underway. However, the Commission did not attempt to address current 

legal, regulatory, or budgetary barriers to assistance; consequently, the 

report may include recommendations to assist a free Cuba that may be 

prohibited or limited by current U.S. law or which will need to be funded in 

the future. In order to provide the full extent of the assistance outlined in 

this report, these legal prohibitions and budgetary limitations will need to be 

addressed. In particular, in order for assistance to be provided, the 

prerequisites for assistance to a transition government and a democratically 

elected government contained in the Cuban Liberty and Democratic 

Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act will need to be satisfied. The 

recommendations in this report regarding future assistance to Cuba can be 

implemented only if those requirements and standards are met. 

Finally, the proposed programs and initiatives to assist a transition 

government in Cuba are prospective. They are meant to help prepare the 

U.S. Government to respond to a transition in Cuba. They are not intended 

to be a prescription for how a free Cuba organizes itself or what policies it 

decides ultimately to pursue; those decisions remain with the Cuban people 

as expressed by a free and sovereign Cuban government.

xiii 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

CHAPTER 1: HASTENING CUBA’S TRANSITION

As an essential part of America’s commitment to stand with the 

Cuban people against the tyranny of Fidel Castro’s regime, President George 

W. Bush mandated that the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba 

identify additional means by which the United States can help the Cuban 

people bring about an expeditious end to the Castro dictatorship. 

In the past, the United States has tended to initiate policies towards 

Cuba that were implemented in isolation from each other. For instance, 

economic sanctions were initially imposed with little, if any, support to 

Cuban civil society, and were not coupled with initiatives to break the 

regime’s information blockade or proactively engage the international 

community. In addition, well-meaning humanitarian policies were 

authorized without thorough consideration of the relationship they would 

have to the fundamental policy objective of assisting the Cuban people 

regain their freedom and their right to determine their way of life and their 

future. 

The Commission sought a more proactive, integrated, and disciplined 

approach to undermine the survival strategies of the Castro regime and 

contribute to conditions that will help the Cuban people hasten the 

dictatorship’s end. The recommendations focus on actions available to the 

United States Government, allowing us to establish a strong foundation on 

which to build supportive international efforts. This comprehensive 

framework is composed of six inter-related tasks considered central to 

hastening change: 

Empower Cuban Civil Society: The Castro dictatorship has been able to

maintain its repressive grip on the Cuban people by intimidating civil society 

and preventing the emergence of a credible alternative to its failed policies. 

As a result of Castro’s 45-year strategy of co-opting or crushing independent 

actors, Cuban civil society is weak and divided, its development impeded by 

pervasive and continuous repression. Through absolute control of the Cuban 

economy and the manipulation of U.S. migration policy, the Castro regime 

 xiii
has made it all but impossible for human rights activists and reformers to 

operate and has forced many into exile. 

Now, the tide of public opinion has turned and Castro’s loyalists must 

constantly work to restrain the Cuban people from organizing and 

expressing demands for change and freedom. Cubans are increasingly 

losing their fear and vocalizing their desire to be architects of their own 

destinies. By continuing to isolate the Castro regime while supporting the 

democratic opposition and empowering an emerging civil society, the 

United States can help the Cuban people in their efforts to effect positive 

political and social change in their country. Cuban civil society is not 

lacking spirit, desire, or determination; it is hampered by a lack of materials 

and support needed to bring about these changes. 

Break the Cuban Dictatorship’s Information Blockade: The Castro 

regime controls all formal means of mass media and communication on the 

island. The Cuban Communist Party exerts strict editorial control over 

newspapers, television, and radio through the regime’s pervasive apparatus 

of repression, preventing the Cuban people from obtaining accurate 

information on such issues as the regime’s systematic violations of human 

rights and fundamental freedoms, and the state of the Cuban economy. 

Consistent with its fear of an uncontrolled information flow to the Cuban 

people, the regime has set up technological, administrative, and intelligence 

structures to impede the ability of pro-democracy groups and the larger civil 

society, both on and off the island, to effectively communicate their message 

to the Cuban people. In concert with efforts to strengthen Cuban civil 

society, and building on the excellent work already underway by U.S. 

Government broadcasting entities, the means exist to increase the 

availability to the Cuban people of reliable information on events in Cuba 

and around the world and to assist in the effort to present a democratic 

alternative to the failed policies of the Castro regime. 

Deny Resources to the Cuban Dictatorship: The policies of the Castro 

regime have debilitated the Cuban economy and impoverished the Cuban 

people. Rather than address the deprivation confronting Cubans, the regime 

cynically ignores its obligations and seeks to exploit external engagement 

with the island and humanitarian assistance to the Cuban people in order to 

maintain its grip on power. The economic lifelines of the Castro regime are 

tourism; access to subsidized Venezuelan oil; commodities; and revenues 

and other support generated by those with family on the island, with the vast 

xiv 
majority of such support coming from the United States. Over the past 

decade, the regime has built an apparatus designed to exploit humanitarian 

aspects of U.S. policy, specifically to siphon off hundreds of millions of 

dollars for itself. Remittances, gift parcels and travel-related revenues from 

those in exile with family on the island, especially those Cubans who have 

come to the United States since the early 1990s, are avenues through which 

the regime has franchised out the subsistence of a significant portion of the 

Cuban population. The dollars made available to the regime through these 

means permit it to divert resources to the maintenance and strengthening of 

its repressive apparatus and away from meeting the basic needs of the Cuban 

people. Dollars and donated goods, although provided with good intentions 

by U.S. persons, are effectively helping keep the regime afloat. U.S. 

initiatives should maintain avenues by which Americans can engage the 

Cuban people, and by which those with family on the island can reasonably 

assist immediate relatives, while minimizing the regime’s manipulation and 

exploitation of the plight of the Cuban people. 

Illuminate the Reality of Castro’s Cuba: The current survival of the 

regime is, in part, dependent upon its projection of a benign international 

image. Cuba presents itself internationally as a prime tourist destination, as 

a center for bio-technological innovation, and as a successful socialist state 

that has improved the standard of living of its people and that is a model for 

education, health care, and race relations for the world. This image belies 

the true state of Cuba’s political, economic, and social conditions, its status 

as a state sponsor of terrorism, and the increasingly erratic behavior of its 

leadership. 

Encourage International Diplomatic Efforts to Support Cuban Civil 

Society and Challenge the Castro Regime: There is a growing 

international consensus on the nature of the Castro regime and the need for 

fundamental political and economic change on the island. This consensus 

coalesced, in large part, after the regime’s brutal March-April 2003 

crackdown on peaceful pro-democracy advocates, an act properly 

characterized as the most severe repression of peaceful political activists in 

the history of Cuba, and certainly the most significant act of political 

repression in Latin America in a decade. Infuriated by, and fearful of, the 

valiant effort by these same activists to continue to reach out to the Cuban 

people and the international community, the regime reacted; Castro’s 

political attacks against the European Union (EU) and other nations also 

reveal his regime’s continuing trepidation in the face of peaceful Cubans 

 xv
calling for their fundamental rights. Many of those who once stood by 

Castro have now begun to speak out publicly against the regime’s abuses. 

However, while this same international consensus has limits, encouraging 

multilateral diplomatic efforts to challenge the regime in international 

organizations and to strengthen policies of proactive support for prodemocracy groups in Cuba should form a cornerstone of our policy to hasten 

an end to the Castro regime. The International Labor Organization and the 

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, amongst other international 

organizations, are natural fora for highlighting the conditions under which 

Cubans live and struggle to survive. 

Undermine the Regime’s “Succession Strategy”: The Castro dictatorship 

is pursuing every means at its disposal to survive and perpetuate itself 

through a “succession strategy” from Fidel Castro to Raul Castro and 

beyond; its goal is that the unelected and undemocratic communist elite now 

in power remain so indefinitely. The United States rejects the continuation 

of a communist dictatorship in Cuba, and this Commission recommends 

measures to focus pressure and attention on the ruling elite so that 

succession by this elite or any one of its individuals is seen as what it would 

be: an impediment to a democratic and free Cuba. 

SELECTED RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 Provide an additional $29 million (to augment the current Cuba program 

budget of $7 million) to the State Department, USAID, and other 

appropriate U.S. Government agencies to: 

 Work with willing third-country allies to support creation of an 

international fund for the protection and development of civil society 

in Cuba, to engage, train, and provide resources for volunteers of 

different nationalities to travel to Cuba to provide assistance to 

independent libraries, professional organizations, charity 

organizations, journalists, educators, nurses, and medical doctors 

working independently of the regime; 

 Fund programs to provide educational opportunities to family 

members of the political opposition and, working with the 

Organization of American States (OAS), to establish a university 

scholarship program for the children of Cuban dissidents to study at 

Latin American universities; and 

xvi 
 Fund programs to support democracy-building efforts by youth, 

women, and Afro-Cubans to train, develop, and organize these 

disaffected and marginalized segments of Cuban society to take 

greater action in support of democracy and human rights in Cuba. 

 Direct the immediate deployment of the C-130 COMMANDO SOLO 

airborne platform and make available funds to acquire and refit a 

dedicated airborne platform for the transmission of Radio and Television 

Martí into Cuba, consistent with U. S. international telecommunications 

obligations; 

 Support efforts by NGOs in selected third countries to highlight human 

rights abuses in Cuba, as part of a broader effort to discourage tourist 

travel and reinforce international attention on the plight of the Cuban 

people, including political prisoners and civil society; 

 Eliminate abuses of educational travel by limiting it to undergraduate or 

graduate degree granting institutions and for full-semester study 

programs, or shorter duration only when the program directly supports 

U.S. policy goals; 

 Direct U.S. law enforcement authorities to conduct “sting” operations 

against “mule” networks and others who illegally carry money and offer 

rewards to those who report on illegal remittances that lead to 

enforcement actions;

 Reduce the regime’s manipulation of family visits to generate hard 

currency — while preserving efforts to promote legitimate family ties and 

humanitarian relief for the Cuban people by: 

 Limiting family visits to Cuba to one (1) trip every three years under a 

specific license; individuals would be eligible to apply for a specific 

license three years after their last visit to Cuba; new arrivals from 

Cuba would be eligible to apply for a specific license three years after 

leaving Cuba; 

 Limiting the definition of “family” for the purposes of family visits to 

immediate family (including grandparents, grandchildren, parents, 

siblings, spouses, and children); and 

 xvii
 Reducing the current authorized per diem amount (the authorized 

amount allowed for food and lodging expenses for travel in Cuba) 

from $164 per day to $50 per day (i.e., approximately eight times 

what a Cuban national would expect to earn during a 14-day visit) for 

all family visits to Cuba, based on the presumption that travelers will 

stay with family in Cuba. 

 The process for implementation of Title III of the Cuban Liberty and 

Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act should ensure that the full range 

of policy options are made available to the President, and that a detailed, 

rigorous, and complete country-by-country analysis of policies and 

actions with respect to Cuba is provided to the President for use in 

assessing whether the suspension is necessary to the national interests of 

the United States and will expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba; 

 To deter foreign investment in Cuba in confiscated properties, claims to 

which are owned by U.S. nationals, aggressively pursue Title IV visa 

sanctions against those foreign nationals trafficking in (e.g., using or 

benefiting from) such property, including devoting additional personnel 

and resources to application and enforcement; 

 Neutralize Cuban government front companies by establishing a Cuban 

Asset Targeting Group, comprised of appropriate law enforcement 

authorities, to investigate and identify new ways in which hard currency 

is moved in and out of Cuba; 

 Provide an additional $5 million for U.S. Embassy public diplomacy 

initiatives to: 

 Disseminate information abroad about U.S. foreign policy, 

specifically regarding human rights and other developments in Cuba, 

including Castro’s record of harboring terrorists, committing 

espionage against the United States and other countries, fomenting 

subversion of democratically elected governments in Latin America, 

and the U.S. Government’s belief that Cuba has at least a limited 

developmental offensive biological weapons research and 

development effort; and

xviii 
 Fund and promote international or third-country national conferences 

to disseminate information abroad about U.S. policies on transition 

planning efforts related to Cuba.

 Increase direct efforts with willing third-country governments to 

implement a robust, proactive policy to (1) support Cuban civil society, 

including the opposition, and (2) develop policy frameworks for 

assistance to a post-dictatorship Cuba; 

 Work with NGOs and other interested parties to assure that a Cuban 

independent labor representative or labor representative in exile is able 

to speak at ILO conferences; 

 Encourage efforts by NGOs to draw attention to exploitative labor 

conditions in Cuba and assist Cuban workers in obtaining redress for 

that wrong; 

 Fund NGO projects designed to help Cuban citizens obtain effective 

access to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and provide

in-country training, through appropriate NGOs, to Cuban human rights 

activists in collecting and preparing information in order to file claims 

with the IACHR;

 Target regime officials for visa denial if they (1) are or were involved in 

torture or other serious human rights abuses or (2) provided assistance 

to fugitives from U.S. justice; and 

 Establish a Transition Coordinator at the State Department to facilitate

expanded implementation of pro-democracy, civil-society building, and 

public diplomacy projects for Cuba and to continue regular planning for 

future transition assistance contingencies.

CHAPTER 2: MEETING BASIC HUMAN NEEDS IN 

HEALTH, EDUCATION, HOUSING, AND HUMAN 

SERVICES

Cuba’s transition from the Castro regime to a democratic society with 

a free economy will be a challenging process. The task of meeting the basic 

human needs of the Cuban population involves the removal of the 

 xix
manifestations of Castro’s communism; the introduction of the values and 

practices of democracy and free enterprise; and the building of institutions 

and services that will improve the health, nutrition, education, housing, and 

social services available to the Cuban people. 

The fundamental goal of any assistance to a free Cuba must be to 

empower the Cuban people by improving their economic and social wellbeing, ensuring that adequate health and social services are maintained, 

reconstructing a democratic civic culture through education and institutionbuilding, dealing with the human cost of the totalitarian police state, and 

supporting the Cuban people as they cope with these issues and work to 

transform themselves. 

The international community, especially organizations in the Western 

Hemisphere, can play a leading role in assisting the Cuban transition 

process. The U.S. Government can work through the Organization of 

American States and regional agencies, and with the United Nations and its 

agencies, and other organizations and individual countries. 

Improving Cubans’ condition will require dramatic reforms to ensure 

that democratic values and a civic culture return, that important democratic 

institutions — including private and faith-based organizations — are able to 

flourish, and that helping agents such as schools, clinics, and community 

centers can respond to real needs and be accountable to the citizenry. 

Some of the effort to meet basic human needs will involve immediate, 

short-term assistance to ensure that critical health, nutrition, and social 

services issues are addressed; that schools are kept open and provided with 

new instructional materials and staff; that any housing emergencies are 

addressed; that comprehensive needs assessments and data collection are 

begun; and that food and medical aid is distributed as needed. 

As a new Cuban government initiates the process of establishing the 

rule of law, safeguarding human rights, and creating a new climate of 

opportunity, a variety of programs and services are identified that U.S. 

public and private sources could provide to the Cuban people over the 

medium- and long-tem. It is expected that such assistance would come not 

only from U.S. Government agencies and contractors, but also from

philanthropic foundations, non-profit expert organizations, and businesses 

xx 
investing in Cuba’s future. Cuban-American and other U.S. citizens and 

organizations would be involved in these efforts. 

Both short- and long-term issues will involve the work of many 

players and will need to be coordinated. The Cuban people are educated to a 

good basic standard and, despite the repression of the Castro regime, they 

have shown themselves to be remarkably resilient, savvy, and 

entrepreneurial. They will need the resources (including short- and longterm loans), technical assistance, and general support to enable them to 

improve health standards, manage the change to a market economy, and 

maintain and improve their infrastructure and basic services. 

SELECTED RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 The U.S. Government, if requested by the transition government, should 

be prepared: 

 To conduct a hands-on needs assessment to provide objective data 

and observations on the state of health care, nutrition, education, 

housing, and social services; 

 For the immediate immunization of all children under five who have 

not been already immunized under the existing health system for the 

major childhood diseases; 

 To distribute food aid as needed and as feasible, and consider a food 

aid monetization program for merchants to maintain the price of food 

at a reasonable level; 

 To work with Cuban churches and their external supporting church 

institutions to use local religious networks and structures to assist 

with humanitarian relief; 

 Prepare to keep all schools open during an emergency phase of the 

transition in order to keep children and teenagers off the streets and 

learning during this unstable period; 

 To institute large-scale public works projects using local Cuban labor 

to provide immediate jobs and help with aid efforts; and 

 xxi
 To provide support to Cuban small farmers to supplement food aid 

and to encourage self-reliance. Use the humanitarian aid program to 

encourage the democratic transition by empowering Cuban churches, 

free libraries, civic centers, the media, and small businesses to assist 

in the effort. 

CHAPTER 3: ESTABLISHING DEMOCRATIC 

INSTITUTIONS, RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, RULE 

OF LAW, AND NATIONAL JUSTICE AND 

RECONCILIATION

The United States is committed to assist a post-Castro transition 

government in the promotion and consolidation of representative democratic 

processes and institutions that will respect the human rights and personal 

freedoms of all Cuban citizens. 

Only when the Castro regime’s authoritarian institutions and practices 

are abandoned, its instruments of repression dismantled, and a popularly 

based democratic process initiated, will Cubans be able to begin governing 

themselves through the exercise of their own free will. Such a liberation 

from Fidel Castro’s brutal communist dictatorship will inspire a new 

political order based on national reconciliation, the rule of law, personal 

choice, and equal justice and opportunity for all. 

Leaders of a transition government will likely move urgently to 

address a number of immediate priorities. Political prisoners will be freed 

because they have been unjustly incarcerated for exercising their 

fundamental freedoms. The large segment of the population that has been 

subjugated and silenced by government intimidation and violence will fear 

no more. The many forms of violence that have characterized the Castro 

regime’s behavior at home and abroad will be abandoned. The Cuban 

people will have reason once again to be proud as they take collective 

responsibility for restoring their country to a respected, peaceful, and 

constructive role in the international community. 

Other immediate priorities a transition government will face include: 

professionalizing military and civilian police and security services; 

considering whether to end obligatory military service; voiding 

xxii 
constitutional provisions that are inimical to democracy; revising criminal 

codes and sentencing guidelines; deciding what laws and regulations should 

be rescinded; cleansing the judiciary of corrupt and political judges; 

initiating a national debate about the provisions of a new constitution and 

procedures for drafting and ratifying it; opening prisons for the first time to 

outside inspection; guaranteeing human rights and freedom of speech; and 

ending all forms of discrimination. 

Among the most daunting challenges a transition government 

immediately will face are those that will pit popular demands for 

prosecutions of former Castro regime officials against the imperative of 

establishing a government firmly founded on the rule of law and due 

process. On balance, the prospects for a rapid and peaceful transition to 

democracy could depend more on this key variable than any other. 

Middle- and longer-term priorities will include building all of the 

institutions, processes, relationships, and values that will nourish democratic 

governance. The U.S. Government should be prepared to work with the 

Cuban people and their chosen representatives, should they ask, to lend 

assistance in drafting laws and regulations, preparing a new constitution, and 

establishing a system of checks and balances and the spectrum of national

and local level democratic institutions (executive, legislative, and judicial) 

responsive to the public will. 

U.S. public and private assistance could also help in the critical 

longer-term task of promoting a culture of lawfulness in which citizens 

believe in their new system, accept its legal and constitutional principles and 

understand their obligations in that context, and involve themselves in an 

emerging civil society. In building professional, apolitical law enforcement 

institutions, international assistance could be beneficial. 

As the transition to a multi-party democracy progresses — with the 

help and encouragement of the United States — Cubans will be able for the 

first time in decades to enjoy the freedoms that prevail in the rest of the 

Western Hemisphere. The experiences of some of those neighbors — and of 

former communist countries — that have progressed from dictatorship to 

democracy could influence the choices Cubans make in constructing their 

own free society. A free and democratic Cuba will be welcomed back as a 

full participant in the inter-American system. 

 xxiii
The assistance and encouragement of democracies in the region, and 

elsewhere, could prove to be crucial in helping to assure that the transition to 

constitutional democracy is rapid and peaceful. Assuming a free Cuban 

government agreed, the U.S. Government would also be prepared to assist as 

Cubans form diverse and representative political parties, interest groups, 

labor unions, and other free political institutions, as well as civic, 

professional, and commercial associations. A national legislature, such

other regional and local governments as the Cuban people desire, courts and 

other legal and judicial infrastructure, as well as new and accountable 

executive branch agencies could receive U.S. assistance, if desired. 

Eliminating and preventing official corruption will be a continuing priority. 

A peaceful transition to democracy will require the presence of 

effective, professional Cuban security institutions that are committed fully to 

supporting the democratic transition. As an immediate priority, and 

assuming the new Cuban government desires it, the United States would be 

prepared to assist a free Cuba develop a truly professional civilian police 

force. 

SELECTED RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 Introduce exchange programs to inform Cuban leaders and 

administrators about democratic policy and decision-making and 

transparent governance; 

 The U.S. Government should be prepared to provide technical assistance 

and capacity building to strengthen legislative institutions, processes, 

and procedures; 

 The U.S. Government should be prepared to provide technical assistance 

on decentralization through the development of provincial and municipal 

governments;

 If requested by a transition government, the U.S. Government should 

provide technical assistance to promote and develop democratic political 

party structures and processes and introduce concepts and mechanisms 

for citizen oversight of parties as well as of local government; 

 Offer expertise and assistance, if requested by a transition government, 

to help develop and strengthen a democratic electoral system including 

xxiv 
on the drafting and reform of election laws and training election officials 

in voter registration, maintenance of voting lists and balloting 

procedures, and proactive measures against fraud and abuse; and 

 Work with the OAS to support electoral observation missions to help 

Cuban transition government authorities bring accountability to their 

electoral process. 

CHAPTER 4: ESTABLISHING THE CORE

INSTITUTIONS OF A FREE ECONOMY

The Cuban economic system is broken; it will not be easily fixed. It 

will take time to build national institutions, as well as develop in individuals 

the attitudes, expertise, and skills capable of managing Cuba’s 

reconstruction. Lessons learned from other transition countries demonstrate 

that it is extremely important to identify and prioritize needs, and to manage 

expectations correctly. 

After decades of repression and material deprivation, Cubans will also 

be able to assert their new political freedoms to establish an entirely new 

economic order. Liberated from the rigidities and corruption of Castro’s 

communist system, they will be free to create a private sector capable of 

providing jobs and opportunity, generating wealth, and spurring diversified 

growth. Long denied rights available to peoples in nearly every other 

country of the world, Cubans can be expected to place a high immediate 

priority on restoring rights to private ownership and the formation of 

competitive free enterprise. 

The reconstruction effort in a free Cuba will be costly. In this regard, 

the burden of reconstruction need not fall completely on the shoulders of the 

United States and must be done in close consultation with the Cuban people. 

There is a significant role to be played by the international donor 

community, the international financial institutions (IFIs), including the InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB), and the United Nations development 

agencies, all of which can provide programs and assistance to a free Cuba. 

We should seek engagement by the international community and the IFIs to 

better ensure a smooth transition when the time comes. 

 xxv
Economic change in Cuba will not occur in a vacuum. Two 

generations have grown up under Castro’s repressive system. There are 

Cubans (i.e., the communist elite) who will have vested interests in 

maintaining the status quo. They will present a difficult but not 

unprecedented problem. 

It is crucial that the Cuban people be full partners in the reform 

process, that whatever proposals we make to a free Cuban people are 

realistic, and that any promises made are promises kept.

SELECTED RECOMMENDATIONS:

 The U.S. Government, applying its experiences with other non-market 

economy transitions, should be prepared to encourage a free Cuba to 

decontrol prices, including energy prices, in the near term; 

 The U.S. Government should provide examples to a free Cuba from 

Eastern Europe concerning its experiences in transitioning from a 

centralized economy, including experiences with the restructuring of 

enterprises controlled by militaries; 

 The U.S. Government and the IFIs should be prepared to offer assistance 

to a free Cuba to help it design an effective privatization program as well 

as prepare enterprises for privatization, including industries and 

enterprises operated or managed by the Cuban Armed Forces;

 The U.S. Government should be in a position to work with a free Cuba to 

establish a U.S.-Cuba Joint Committee on Trade and Investment (JCTI). 

The JCTI would focus on post-embargo relations affecting trade and 

investment. It would also serve as a precursor and first step toward the 

possible negotiation of a U.S.-Cuba Free Trade Agreement; 

 The U.S. Government should encourage a free Cuba to rejoin the 

International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and OAS, and join the 

IDB as quickly as possible; 

 The U.S. Government and the IFIs should be prepared to assist a free 

Cuba in developing a new investment regime that fosters foreign 

investment and investor confidence, consistent with appropriate free 

market mechanisms; and 

xxvi 
 The U.S. Government should encourage a free Cuba to settle outstanding 

claims issues as expeditiously as possible, bearing in mind that a long, 

complicated process is not in Cuba’s best economic interest. 

CHAPTER 5: MODERNIZING INFRASTRUCTURE

As a result of years of inadequate investment and neglect of repairs 

and maintenance, Cuba’s infrastructure has significantly deteriorated. 

Examples of the abysmal state of Cuba’s infrastructure are not difficult to 

identify. The only investment realized in Cuba’s transportation 

infrastructure over the last two decades has been to support the narrow 

interests of the tourism industry at the expense of the general population. 

Ports, roads, and bridges suffer from a lack of investment, as do many of the 

supporting components of a healthy transportation and distribution system. 

To assist a transition government in Cuba and meet humanitarian as 

well as reconstruction challenges significant infrastructure investments will 

be needed in transportation systems, energy, telecommunications, water 

resources, and sanitation. Since infrastructure, by definition, implies 

facilities and equipment that are unlikely to be built or acquired in a 90-day 

timeframe, this Commission identified short-term actions, such as 

operational changes and signing of new cooperative agreements, that can 

facilitate the most rapid assistance to the Cuban people in a time of 

transition. It also identified the areas which would need, in the proper 

context, on-site technical evaluation to establish needs and priorities for 

longer-term infrastructure reconstruction. 

In the short-term, the U.S. Government can assist a free Cuba and its 

citizens by facilitating the acquisition of new and/or used equipment, 

opening avenues of cooperation between public/private U.S. transport 

entities and their Cuban counterparts, conducting technical needs 

assessments, and providing technical assistance to develop an infrastructure 

development plan that will identify emergency requirements as well as 

medium- and long-term needs. 

To address long-term infrastructure needs, elements of the U.S. 

Government can support a free Cuba in seeking donor assistance from the 

international community and organizations such as the World Bank and the 

Inter-American Development Bank to help finance feasibility studies, 

 xxvii
improve the operation and financial viability of public utilities, upgrade and 

replace plants and equipment, undertake the privatization of utilities, 

encourage competition in services, and develop regulatory mechanisms for 

natural monopolies. 

SELECTED RECOMMENDATIONS: 

Transportation: 

 Highways: Subject to the desires of a free Cuban government, the U.S. 

Government could provide advisors to a Transportation Ministry to 

assist Cuban officials with design, construction, and maintenance issues 

associated with primary and secondary roads and bridges. 

 Aviation: The U.S. Government should be prepared to provide technical 

assistance to conduct airport assessments in Cuba to facilitate granting 

them permission to serve as the last point of departure for the United 

States. 

 Maritime: The U.S. Government should be prepared to assist a free 

Cuba in identifying priority needs for port equipment and investments in 

port and intermodal infrastructure. 

 Railways: In a transition context, the U.S. Government should be 

prepared to assist a free Cuba to ascertain the status of railroad bridges, 

culverts, track, and other critical rail-related infrastructure assets, 

including rolling stock. 

Energy: 

 Work with officials of a free Cuban government to perform a 

comprehensive assessment of energy sector needs, priorities, and 

acquisition planning. 

Potable Water: 

 If requested by a transition government, assess existing plants to ensure 

that the population is receiving water that is clean and safe and offer 

technical assistance to develop a coordinated program of capital 

rehabilitation of the distribution system and distribution to end users of 

xxviii 
home water disinfection chemicals (i.e., sodium hypo chlorite as used in 

many developing nations). 

CHAPTER 6: IDENTIFYING & ADDRESSING

ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION

Cuba has many natural assets and challenges. The natural 

environment has suffered degradation as a result of the neglectful policies of 

Cuba’s Soviet-style economic system. Cuba faces degraded soil, old and 

decaying water and sanitation infrastructure, wildlife habitat destruction, and 

salt water intrusion into its fresh water supplies. Thanks to the regime’s 

insistence on crushing organizations it cannot control, Cuba also lacks an 

independent non-governmental organization (NGO) sector capable of 

providing accountability and advocating on behalf of the environment and 

natural resources and to serve as a mechanism to raise public awareness and 

bring new ideas and issues to the attention of policy makers for action. 

Among Cuba’s assets are a rich biodiversity, mineral reserves, relatively low 

levels of industrialization, elements of an environmental framework law, an 

educated population, and highly trained experts and scientists. These assets 

could serve as a foundation for sustainable development in a free Cuba. 

The poor environmental protection policies that have been in effect 

are evident in the quality of land, water, air, and natural habitats that exist on 

the island today.

Land and Soils: The Cuban government has permitted deforestation and 

over-cultivation of the land, compaction of soils due to the use of heavy

farm machinery, and strip mining. These practices have resulted in salinity 

in soils and heavy erosion of the land. 

Water: Agricultural runoff from heavily treated fields has contributed to 

the degradation of surface water streams, in addition to the untreated 

wastewater from cities, sugar mills and other food-processing plants, and 

nickel mining operations. Irrigation practices have resulted in low 

groundwater levels, causing significant salt-water intrusion into fresh water 

and salinity in coastal soils. Low river flows due to dam construction have 

in turn caused lower re-charge of aquifers and further salinity in the streams. 

 xxix
Habitat/Biodiversity: Wildlife habitat has been affected by water quality in 

freshwater streams, which is in turn affected by runoff from agricultural 

practices, erosion due to deforestation, and sedimentation of freshwater 

streams. The introduction of non-native species has also had a significant 

impact on the overall viability of the ecological system. The relatively 

recent phenomenon of major hotel and tourism infrastructure construction 

projects, particularly in highly fragile ecosystems like the Sabana-Camaguey 

Peninsula, has already had deleterious effects, which will worsen if 

uncontrolled development continues. 

Air: Air emissions from industry and transportation cause significant health 

problems. Stationary sources of emissions (electric power plants, petroleum 

refineries, cement plants, nickel plants, and other old industries) emit large 

amounts of sulfur dioxide and particulate matter. While it is true that Cuba's

poverty means that it has a comparatively low density of vehicles per capita, 

Cuban vehicles are old and lack basic pollution controls and maintenance. 

U.S. cooperation and technical assistance can help a free Cuba address 

the immediate and long-term needs it will face in a post-Castro era. As an 

immediate step, the U.S. Government can help a transition government 

conduct a rapid assessment of immediate equipment needs to ensure that 

drinking water systems are operational and chemicals needed to treat the 

water are made available. For medium- and long-term actions, a wide range 

of cooperation and assistance possibilities exist. However, it is important to 

select a few key areas where there can be a short-term success as well as 

work on medium- and long-term capacity building efforts. Generating and 

providing quality environmental information to the public will be a 

cornerstone for engaging a free Cuban people in environmental and natural 

resources management. 

SELECTED RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 The U.S. Government should be prepared to offer to a free Cuba 

strengthen its legal framework and improve its development and 

implementation of its environmental laws; 

 The U.S. Government should be prepared to assist a free Cuba in 

developing and conducting assessments of the impacts of point and nonpoint sources of pollution; 

xxx 
 U.S. Government agencies could provide a free Cuba with significant 

capacity building expertise, including the development of monitoring 

programs, review and assessment of water quality data (drinking water, 

effluent discharge, ambient water quality), long-term development of 

laws and regulations, development of pre-treatment programs (control of 

industrial discharges into public waste water systems), etc.; 

 The U.S. Government can assist transition government coral reef 

managers with a number of tools, including mapping of benthic habitats

of coral reef ecosystems and assessing the associated reef fish and their 

essential fish habitat; 

 In the area of solid wastes, if requested by a transition government, U.S. 

Government experts could provide technical assistance in the areas of 

contaminant-specific Environmental Technologies, treatment & control 

of solid wastes, medical waste tracking, municipal solid waste source 

reduction, soil washing (chemical and metals removal), management of 

watersheds and freshwater ecology, and erosion control and water 

management associated with solid waste landfill situations;

 The U.S. Government could provide assistance, if requested, in 

addressing all facets of soil erosion, sedimentation, soil compaction, and 

related conservation practices; and

 The U.S. Government should be prepared to look for public-private 

partnerships and partnerships with cities — with the objective of 

identifying U.S. expertise that could help a free Cuba reduce pollution, 

such as landfill methane recovery or industrial energy efficiency, and 

develop policies for “responsible investment.”

 xxxi
Introduction 

The transition to freedom will present many challenges to the 

Cuban people and to America, and we will be prepared. 

America is not alone in calling for freedom inside of Cuba. 

Countries around the globe and the United Nations Human 

Rights Commission increasingly recognize the oppressive 

nature of the Castro regime, and have denounced its recent 

crackdowns. We will continue to build a strong international 

coalition to advance the cause of freedom inside of Cuba. 

President George W. Bush 

October 10, 2003

For more than four decades, Fidel Castro’s destructive policies at 

home and abroad have caused great hardship for the Cuban people. He has 

systematically undermined the democratic principles and fierce national 

pride of Cuba, destroyed its economy, subverted his neighbors, and launched 

bloody military expeditions around the world. 

Under Castro, Cuba’s economic and social prospects remain bleak. 

Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of massive 

subsidies, the Cuban economy contracted by nearly 40 percent, compared to 

its level in 1989, and it has not recuperated all of that loss. Absent 

fundamental reforms, there is little prospect of rebuilding the country’s 

capital base. 

The diversion of scarce resources to sustain the regime’s control has 

had a dramatic impact on the Cuban people’s welfare. Health and nutrition 

have deteriorated significantly. Chronically low levels of investment have 

produced a severe housing shortage and a serious deterioration of Cuba’s 

infrastructure. Ever increasing numbers of Cubans are involved in the black 

market and other illicit activities to survive in a dysfunctional economy. 

Cubans continue to be denied fundamental freedoms. They cannot 

form independent, alternative political parties outside of the communist 

party, elect representatives of their own choosing, form free associations, or 

1
freely express themselves. They are denied recourse to an independent 

judiciary that could protect their rights. Absolute political control remains 

the paramount objective of the regime. 

Cuba, tragically, remains the outcast in the Western Hemisphere’s 

democratic community of nations. Yet it has been the historical role of the 

United States to support the Cuban people’s aspirations to hasten the day 

when they can restore their country to a respected, peaceful, and constructive 

role in the international community. 

Chapter 1 of this report thus identifies additional means by which the 

United States can help the Cuban people bring about an end to the Castro 

dictatorship, taking into account the various methods the regime has 

instituted in recent years to sustain itself in power. The strategy is multidimensional: adopting measures to empower Cuban civil society; breaking 

the regime’s information blockade of the Cuban people; reducing financial 

flows to the regime; undermining the regime’s “succession strategy” (i.e., 

from Fidel to Raul Castro) by increasing pressures on the ruling elite and its 

principal instruments of coercion/control; aggressively increasing public 

diplomacy efforts abroad to counter Cuban propaganda; and encouraging 

multilateral efforts to challenge the Cuban regime. 

There is no way to predict exactly what form a transition in Cuba will 

take, but what is certain is that soon the Cuban people will be freed from 

Fidel Castro’s repressive rule. Clearly, the agents of change are the Cuban 

people, who are struggling to define Cuba’s future. Based on the experience 

of recent history, one can predict that when given the opportunity, the Cuban 

people will choose democracy and a market-based economy. 

What follows in Chapters 2 through 6 is a survey of the areas in which 

the U.S. Government can assist a free Cuba in all facets of its reconstruction 

and renewal. This document proposes a wide range of actions that the U.S. 

Government might propose to a Cuban transition government. They are not 

intended to be a prescription for Cuba’s future. 

The Cuban people will determine the transition and their specific 

assistance needs. It is likely that a Cuban government embarked upon a 

democratic transition will have aspirations and needs similar to those of 

other transition countries from former communist rule. As such, a free Cuba 

can be expected to seek assistance: 

2 
• To meet critical humanitarian and other important needs early in the 

transition essential to relieving social hardship and initiating the 

reactivation of the economy; 

• To help build essential democratic institutions, both in the government 

and civil society; 

• To help establish the policy, institutional, and legal reforms necessary 

to stimulate the domestic private sector; meet the long-term social 

needs of the population; attract foreign investment; meet conditions 

for lending from international financial institutions; and otherwise lay 

the basis for economic recovery; and 

• To address the degradation of its infrastructure and environment, 

which, as in other countries freed from communism, have seen serious 

deterioration in the areas of water and sanitation, power, 

telecommunications.

The fundamental goal of any U.S. assistance to a free Cuba must be to 

empower and respect the sovereign rights of the Cuban people. 

Empowering them will mean improving their economic and social wellbeing, helping them reconstruct a democratic civic culture through education 

and institution-building, and supporting them as they transform themselves 

and Cuban society. 

This report also seeks to dispel misperceptions regarding the future 

challenges and opportunities that Cuba will face once the transition process 

begins. The Castro regime attempts to manipulate information on conditions 

internally and developments abroad to engender popular fears regarding the 

future prospects of a Cuba without Castro. The choice for the Cuban people 

is not between the present and the past, as the regime would have the people 

believe; it is between the present repression and economic malaise and a 

future of freedom and opportunity for all Cubans. 

Cuba has excellent prospects for achieving a democratic society and 

sustained economic growth following a transition. It has a number of 

advantages that many of the former communist countries lacked. It is a 

relatively well-integrated society with a single language and a relatively 

3
educated, flexible, and mobile workforce that can be readily absorbed into 

new economic activities. The Cuban people’s strong entrepreneurial spirit is 

also well established. Cuba also will be able to draw upon the support of a 

large overseas Cuban community with extensive business and technical 

expertise, market connections, investment capital, and a commitment to help 

their families and fellow Cubans on the island. Finally, a Cuba in transition 

can count on strong support from the United States. 

Well-conceived and implemented political and economic transition 

programs that lead to democracy and a market-based economy are mutually 

supportive. A democratic government, a free press, an active civil society, 

and the rule of law will help ensure that a new Cuba is worthy of all her 

citizens. 

Cuba has the human and natural resources to become a free and 

prosperous nation. When it undertakes a transition to democracy, Cubans 

from all walks of life, from San Antonio to Maisi, can count on the United 

States and the international community to help them forge a peaceful future, 

free from repression and economic misery. Cuba will then take its rightful 

place in the democratic community of nations, befitting its long history of 

struggle for freedom. 

4 
CHAPTER 1 

Hastening Cuba’s Transition

5

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

As an essential part of America’s commitment to stand with the 

Cuban people against the tyranny of Fidel Castro’s regime, President George 

W. Bush mandated that the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba 

identify additional means by which the United States can help the Cuban 

people bring about an expeditious end to the Castro dictatorship. 

In the past, the United States has tended to initiate policies towards 

Cuba that were implemented in isolation from each other. For instance, 

economic sanctions were initially imposed with little, if any, support to 

Cuban civil society, and were not coupled with initiatives to break the 

regime’s information blockade or proactively engage the international 

community. In addition, well-meaning humanitarian policies were 

authorized without thorough consideration of the relationship they would 

have to the fundamental policy objective of assisting the Cuban people 

regain their freedom and their right to determine their way of life and their 

future. 

The Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba sought a more 

proactive, integrated, and disciplined approach to undermine the survival 

strategies of the Castro regime and contribute to conditions that will help the 

Cuban people hasten the dictatorship’s end. The recommendations focus on 

actions available to the United States Government, allowing us to establish a 

strong foundation on which to build supportive international efforts. This 

comprehensive framework is composed of six inter-related tasks considered 

central to hastening change: 

EMPOWER CUBAN CIVIL SOCIETY 

Recognizing the work that is already underway by U.S. agencies and 

NGOs, we propose additional ways to empower Cuban civil society and 

strengthen the democratic opposition through material assistance and 

training. Our recommendations include facilitating the provision of support 

to the families of political prisoners by independent actors, including NGOs; 

increasing U.S. Government funds to support pro-democracy activities and 

bolster the work of independent civil society activists; and, streamlining 

licensing requirements to get more, and more useful, equipment and material 

7
support to the island. We also recommend expanding international and other 

sources of support for civil society in Cuba through greater use of willing 

third-country organizations and greater outreach to religious and faith-based 

groups. 

BREAK THE INFORMATION BLOCKADE 

The Castro regime controls all formal means of mass media and 

communication on the island. The Cuban Communist Party (CCP) exerts 

strict editorial control over newspapers, television, and radio through the 

regime’s pervasive apparatus of repression, preventing the Cuban people 

from obtaining accurate information on such issues as the regime’s 

systematic violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the 

state of the Cuban economy. Consistent with its fear of uncontrolled 

information flow to the Cuban people, the regime has set up technological, 

administrative, and intelligence structures to impede the ability of prodemocracy groups and civil society, both on and off the island, to effectively 

communicate their message to the Cuban people. In concert with efforts to 

strengthen Cuban civil society, and building on the excellent work already 

underway by U.S. Government broadcasting entities, the Commission 

recommends a near-term program to deploy COMMANDO SOLO as an 

airborne platform for radio and television transmissions on a regular basis; 

an increase in the use of third-country private radio stations for broadcasting 

programs into Cuba; and expanded distribution of videotapes and other 

media materials on the island. Over the long-term, the Commission 

recommends making available funds to acquire and refit an aircraft for 

dedicated airborne radio and television transmissions into Cuba, in a manner 

consistent with the United States’ international telecommunications 

obligations. 

DENY RESOURCES TO THE CUBAN DICTATORSHIP

The policies of the Castro regime have debilitated the Cuban economy 

and impoverished the Cuban people. Rather than address the deprivation 

confronting Cubans, the regime cynically ignores its obligations and seeks to 

exploit external engagement with the island and humanitarian assistance to 

the Cuban people in order to maintain its grip on power. The economic 

lifelines of the Castro regime are tourism; access to subsidized Venezuelan 

oil; commodities; and revenues and other support generated by those with 

8
family on the island, with the vast majority of such support coming from the 

United States. Over the past decade, the regime has built an apparatus 

designed to exploit humanitarian aspects of U.S. policy, specifically to 

siphon off hundreds of millions of dollars for itself. Remittances, gift 

parcels and travel-related revenues from those in exile who have family on 

the island, especially those Cubans who have come to the United States 

since the early 1990s, are avenues through which the regime has franchised 

out the subsistence of a significant portion of the Cuban population. The 

dollars made available to the regime through these means permit it to divert 

resources to the maintenance and strengthening of its repressive apparatus 

and away from meeting the basic needs of the Cuban people. Dollars and 

donated goods, although provided with good intentions by U.S. persons, are 

effectively helping keep the regime afloat. 

Our recommended strategy is to maintain avenues by which 

Americans can engage the Cuban people, and by which those with family on 

the island can reasonably assist immediate relatives, while minimizing the 

regime’s manipulation of the plight of the Cuban people. In order to reduce 

the flow of U.S. dollars to the regime, the Commission’s principal 

recommendations include: promulgation of new regulations denying the 

transfer of funds to certain Cuban government officials and members of the 

Cuban Communist Party; reasonable restrictions on the contents and 

shipment of gift parcels to minimize unintended benefits to the regime; and 

new limits on travel that ensure that it is for valid and necessary family or 

educational purposes, and that prevent importation of regime-subsidizing 

products. We also recommend supporting an international campaign to 

highlight the repressive and criminal nature of the Cuban regime to diminish 

the island’s attraction as a tourist destination. 

ILLUMINATE THE REALITY OF CASTRO’S CUBA 

The current survival of the regime is, in part, dependent upon its 

projection of a benign international image. Cuba presents itself 

internationally as a prime tourist destination, as a center for biotechnological innovation, and as a successful socialist state that has 

improved the standard of living of its people and that is a model for 

education, health care, and race relations for the world. This image belies 

the true state of Cuba’s political, economic, and social conditions, its status 

as a state sponsor of terrorism, and the increasingly erratic behavior of its 

9
leadership. We propose increased efforts to illuminate the reality of Castro’s 

Cuba, with the objectives of encouraging international solidarity with the 

Cuban people and promoting democracy on the island, including through the 

funding of NGOs to facilitate the distribution of information on the 

condition of the Cuban people, the reality of the circumstances under which 

they struggle to survive, and the nature of the Castro regime, including its 

threat potential. 

 

ENCOURAGE INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO 

SUPPORT CUBAN CIVIL SOCIETY AND CHALLENGE THE 

CASTRO REGIME

There is a growing international consensus on the nature of the Castro 

regime and the need for fundamental political and economic change on the 

island. This consensus coalesced, in large part, after the regime’s brutal 

March-April 2003 crackdown on peaceful pro-democracy activists, an act 

properly characterized as the most severe repression of peaceful political 

activists in the history of Cuba, and certainly the most significant act of 

political repression in Latin America in a decade. Infuriated by, and fearful 

of, the valiant effort by these same activists to continue to reach out to the 

Cuban people and the international community, the regime reacted; Castro’s 

political attacks against the European Union (EU) and other nations also 

reveal his regime’s continuing trepidation in the face of peaceful Cubans 

calling for their fundamental rights. Many of those who once stood by 

Castro have now begun to speak out publicly against the regime’s abuses. 

However, this same international consensus has limits. 

Encouraging multilateral diplomatic efforts to challenge the regime in 

international organizations and to strengthen policies of proactive support 

for pro-democracy groups in Cuba forms a cornerstone of our policy to 

hasten an end to the Castro regime. Specifically, we recommend 

intensifying support for the monitoring of human rights by and engagement 

with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. We also propose 

expanding coordination with willing friends and allies to encourage both 

greater assistance to independent Cuban civil society groups and, building 

on the work done by this Commission, to also encourage more robust and 

more international initiatives to plan for Cuba’s transition. Finally, in order 

to target the regime’s gross violation of labor rights and norms, and to 

encourage the establishment of minimal standards for engagement by 

10
existing foreign investors, we recommend supporting re-energized 

International Labor Organization efforts and increased coordination and 

cooperation with labor groups in other countries regarding Cuba. 

UNDERMINE THE REGIME’S “SUCCESSION STRATEGY” 

The Castro dictatorship is pursuing every means at its disposal to 

survive and perpetuate itself through a “succession strategy” from Fidel 

Castro to Raul Castro and beyond; its goal is that the unelected and 

undemocratic communist elite now in power remain so indefinitely. The 

United States rejects the continuation of a communist dictatorship in Cuba, 

and this Commission recommends measures to focus pressure and attention 

on the ruling elite so that succession by this elite or any one of its 

individuals is seen as what it would be: an impediment to a democratic and 

free Cuba. The Commission recommends: targeting regime officials for 

U.S. visa denials by establishing a database consisting of the names of those 

Cubans involved in torture and other serious human rights abuses against the 

Cuban people and others, including the torture by Castro regime officials of 

American POWs in South East Asia; and creating a second database of those 

Cuban regime officials who have provided assistance to fugitives from U.S. 

justice. These visa denial watchlists will be provided to other nations, 

particularly those in the EU and Latin America, to ensure that Cuban regime 

human rights abusers cannot find refuge in these regions. The Commission 

also recommends establishing a Transition Coordinator at the State 

Department to facilitate expanded implementation of civil society building 

and public diplomacy efforts and to continue regular transition planning and 

coordination with other U.S. Government agencies. 

11
II. INTRODUCTION 

[T]he Cuban people have a constant friend in the United States 

of America. No tyrant can stand forever against the power of 

liberty, because the hope of freedom is found in every heart. So 

today we are confident that no matter what the dictator intends 

or plans, Cuba será pronto libre [Cuba will soon be free]. 

President George W. Bush 

October 10, 2003 

Fidel Castro continues to maintain one of the world’s most repressive 

regimes. As a result of Castro’s 45-year strategy of co-opting or crushing 

independent actors, Cuban civil society is weak and divided, its development 

impeded by the comprehensive and continuous repression of the Castro 

regime. Yet despite decades of suppression, degradation, and deprivation, 

the aspiration for change is gathering momentum and growing in visibility 

on the island. Brave Cubans continue to defy the regime and insist that it 

recognize their fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the Universal 

Declaration on Human Rights, which Cuba signed, but to which Cuba now 

outlaws any reference. The March-April 2003 crackdown on peaceful 

opposition activists was only the most recent and brutal high-profile effort 

by the regime to eliminate democratic civil society. While these actions set 

back the consolidation of that movement, they did not end the Cuban 

people’s quest for freedom. 

The Castro regime continues to be a threat not only to its own people, 

but also to regional stability, the consolidation of democracy and market 

economies in the Western Hemisphere, and the people of the United States. 

The Castro regime harbors dozens of fugitives from U.S. justice, including 

those convicted of killing law enforcement officials. It aggressively 

conducts espionage against the United States, including having operated a 

spy network, one of whose members was convicted of conspiring to kill U.S. 

citizens. The Castro regime also has engaged in other hostile acts against its 

neighbors and other democracies in the Hemisphere. On several occasions, 

Castro has threatened and orchestrated mass sea-borne migrations to Florida 

of tens of thousands of Cubans in an effort to intimidate and harm the United 

States. 

12
This dictatorship has every intention of continuing its stranglehold on 

power in Cuba and is pursuing every means at its disposal to survive and 

perpetuate itself, regardless of the cost to the Cuban people. In furtherance 

of this goal, the regime ruthlessly implements a strategy to maintain the core 

elements of the existing political and repressive structure to ensure that 

leadership passes from Fidel Castro to his selected successor, Raul Castro. 

Under this “succession strategy,” the core governmental and Communist 

Party elite would survive the departure of Fidel Castro and would seek to 

effect a new relationship with the United States without undergoing 

fundamental political and economic reform. An element that is critical to 

the success of the regime’s strategy is its repressive security apparatus, 

which instills fear in the Cuban people and uses their impoverishment as a 

means of control. 

This strategy cannot succeed without the continued flow of resources 

to the regime from outside Cuba. To this end, the Castro regime has built an 

economic structure on the island designed specifically to exploit all outside 

engagement with Cuba. One of the regime’s central goals is to obtain 

additional sources of income from the United States, especially through 

tourism receipts. Overall, these efforts annually subsidize the regime in the 

amount of more than $3 billion in gross revenues. 

Specifically, the tourism sector has been developed to generate hard 

currency as well as to contribute to an image of “normalcy” on the island 

and to promote international acceptance of the regime. The Castro regime 

also cynically exploits U.S. humanitarian and immigration policies, 

primarily remittances and “family visits,” to generate millions in hard 

currency flows from its victims: those seeking freedom and the Cuban 

diaspora. Further, Cuba maintains a beneficial arrangement with the 

sympathetic government of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, whereby Castro 

receives up to 82,000 barrels of oil per day on preferential terms; this 

arrangement nets more than $800 million in annual savings to Cuba 

(mirrored by an identical amount of lost revenues to Venezuela). Cuba 

continues to exploit joint economic ventures with third-country investors, 

who enter these arrangements despite the absence of the rule of law or 

neutral dispute resolution mechanisms and despite Cuba’s lack of respect for 

basic labor rights. Under these ventures, international employers pay hard 

13
currency to the Castro regime for each Cuban worker, who is in turn paid in 

worthless Cuban pesos. 

Another facet of the regime’s survival strategy is to control 

information entering, circulating within, and coming from the island. The 

regime seeks to minimize the information available to the Cuban people, as 

well as to manipulate what the outside world knows about the Castro 

dictatorship and the plight of the average Cuban citizen. Cuba presents itself 

internationally as a prime tourist destination, as a center for biotechnological innovation, as a successful socialist state that has improved the 

standard of living of its people, and as a model for the world in terms of 

health, education, and race relations. This image belies the true state of 

Cuba’s political, economic and social conditions and the increasingly erratic 

behavior of its leadership. 

Despite the aggressive internal and international propaganda effort by 

the regime, there is a growing international consensus on the need for 

change in Cuba. This consensus has been strengthened by the regime’s 

March-April 2003 suppression of peaceful pro-democracy activists, the 

summary executions of three Afro-Cubans attempting to flee the island, and 

the courageous effort by many peaceful activists to continue to reach out to 

the Cuban people and the international community. This flagrant repression, 

along with the continued work of pro-democracy groups in Cuba, has caused 

the international community to again take stock of the Castro regime and 

condemn its methods. This re-evaluation provides an opportune moment to 

strengthen an evolving international consensus for democratic change in 

Cuba. 

America’s commitment to support the Cuban people against Castro’s 

tyranny is part of our larger commitment to the expansion of freedom. In 

furtherance of this commitment, President George W. Bush mandated that 

the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba identify additional means by 

which the United States can help the Cuban people bring about an 

expeditious end to the Castro dictatorship. 

In the past, the United States has tended to adopt policies toward Cuba 

that were implemented in isolation from each other. For instance, economic 

sanctions were imposed with little, if any, support to Cuban civil society, 

and were not coupled with initiatives to break the regime’s information 

14
blockade or proactively engage the international community. In addition, 

well-meaning humanitarian policies were authorized without thorough 

consideration of the relationship they would have with the fundamental 

policy objective of assisting the Cuban people regain their freedom and their 

right to determine their way of life and their future. 

The Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba sought a more 

proactive, integrated, and disciplined approach to undermine the survival 

strategies of the Castro regime and contribute to conditions that will help the 

Cuban people hasten the dictatorship’s end. The recommendations also 

focus on actions available to the United States Government, allowing us to 

establish a strong foundation on which to build supportive international 

efforts. This comprehensive framework is composed of six inter-related 

tasks considered central to hastening change: 

 To empower Cuban civil society; 

 To break the Cuban dictatorship’s information blockade; 

 To deny resources to the Cuban dictatorship; 

 To illuminate the reality of Castro’s Cuba; 

 To encourage international efforts to support Cuban civil society and 

challenge the Castro regime; and 

 To undermine the regime’s “succession strategy.” 

III. EMPOWER CUBAN CIVIL SOCIETY 

The Castro dictatorship has been able to maintain its repressive grip 

on the Cuban people by intimidating civil society and preventing the 

emergence of a credible alternative to its failed policies. As a result of 

Castro’s 45-year strategy of co-opting or crushing independent actors, 

Cuban civil society is weak and divided, its development impeded by 

pervasive and continuous repression. Through absolute control of the Cuban 

economy and the manipulation of U.S. migration policy, the Castro regime

has made it all but impossible for human rights activists and reformers to 

operate and has forced many into exile. Until recently, the dictatorship has 

been able to keep civil society infiltrated and stunted. Through the use of 

these totalitarian measures, the regime has been able to mobilize large 

segments of the Cuban public to “support” it in times of difficulty and to 

assist it in silencing voices of dissent. As a result, Cubans have had little 

15
opportunity to glimpse an alternative to the Castro regime and its failed 

policies. 

Now, the tide of public opinion has turned and Castro’s loyalists must 

constantly work to restrain the Cuban people from organizing and 

expressing demands for change and freedom. Cubans are increasingly 

losing their fear and vocalizing their desire to be architects of their own 

destinies. Examples of this include the efforts of such brave dissidents as 

Raul Rivero, Dr. Oscar Elias Biscet, Martha Beatriz Roque, and Oswaldo 

Paya. These people demonstrate the same determination to challenge the 

system that was evident in the Polish “Solidarity” movement two decades 

ago. The same resilience and determination of Czech leader Vaclav Havel’s 

Charter 77 and of the “Solidarity” movement is also embodied today in the 

activists of the Cuban independent library movement, and the scores of 

independent journalists who risk everything so that the world no longer can 

claim ignorance about the repressive practices of a ruthless dictatorship. 

Charter 77, the Polish student and union movements, and the 

forthright role of the Polish Catholic Church created authentically 

independent civil societies, building islands of independent thought, 

movement, interaction, and self-reliance among the repressed peoples of 

Eastern Europe. The development of a self-contained civil society within 

the gates of repression helped create a parallel culture that offered the people 

of the former Soviet Bloc alternatives to the corruption, exploitation, fear, 

and powerlessness that characterize life under communism. It offered them

hope. 

In Cuba, we are now witnessing a similar phenomenon. By 

continuing to isolate the Castro regime while supporting the democratic 

opposition, and empowering an emerging civil society, the U.S. can help the 

Cuban people in their efforts to effect positive political and social change in 

their country. Cuban civil society is not lacking spirit, desire, or 

determination; it is hampered by a lack of materials and support needed to 

bring about these changes. 

A. Current U.S. Assistance Program 

Section 109 of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act 

(LIBERTAD) of 1996 (P.L. 104-114) authorizes the President to furnish 

16
assistance and provide other support for individuals and independent NGOs 

“to support democracy-building efforts for Cuba.” This provision authorizes 

assistance for, among other things, published and informational matter such 

as books, videos, and cassettes on democracy, human rights, and market 

economies; humanitarian assistance to victims of political repression, as well 

as their families; support for democratic and human rights groups; and, 

support for visits and permanent deployment of independent international 

human rights monitors in Cuba. 

This assistance program, currently administered by the U.S. Agency 

for International Development (USAID), concentrates on information 

dissemination efforts that will foster democratic change through the 

development of civil society. The USAID Cuba Program aims at increasing 

the flow of accurate information on democracy, human rights, and free 

enterprise to, from, and within Cuba. The program provides support to U.S. 

NGOs and individuals engaged in this effort. U.S. partners encourage the 

development of independent civil society and provide humanitarian 

assistance to political prisoners, their families, and other victims of 

repression. 

U.S. programs are also intended to help build solidarity with Cuba’s 

human rights activists, give voice to Cuba’s independent journalists, help 

develop independent Cuban NGOs, defend the rights of Cuban workers, 

provide direct outreach to the Cuban people, and support planning for 

assistance to a future transition government in Cuba. Partnership with U.S. 

NGOs and their Cuban counterparts is central to program design and 

implementation. 

 

The United States Interests Section (USINT) in Havana is also a vital 

asset in the effort to aid the Cuban people in their struggle for freedom and 

democracy. USINT stands as a symbol of freedom and opportunity in the 

center of Havana and is a focal point for Cubans seeking more information 

about events both in Cuba and around the world. 

B. Improve U.S. Outreach to Cuban Civil Society 

Youth, women, and Afro-Cubans: Youth, women, and AfroCubans constitute key segments necessary for the continued growth of the 

Cuban civil society movement. These groups acutely lack access to 

17
independent and non-regime sources of information that address their 

specific needs and aspirations for freedom and democracy. At the same 

time, the regime portrays these segments of Cuban society as pillars of social 

support and stability for Castro’s regime. 

Outreach to Cuban youth represents one of the most significant 

opportunities to hasten the end of the regime. More than half of Cuba’s 

population is under age 35. This generation has the weakest attachment to 

the Castro revolution; even by Cuban government admission, apathy and 

disaffection are endemic in this segment of the population. However, U.S. 

and international pro-democracy programs aimed at Cuban youth, 

motivating them and mobilizing them are nearly non-existent. Yet, youth 

have been critical catalysts for regime change in other countries, helping to 

unify opposition forces, particularly in the former Yugoslavia, Slovakia, and 

recently in Georgia. 

Women have also fared poorly in Castro’s Cuba. Over the past 

decade, many have been treated as commodities to be exploited for the 

regime’s benefit. With Fidel Castro’s active encouragement, Cuban women 

have been advertised as inducements to foreign male tourists. Castro denies 

the fact that his policies have forced women into prostitution, claiming that 

Cuban women choose prostitution “because they like sex” and boasts that 

Cuban prostitutes are “highly educated hookers” who are “quite healthy.” It 

is then not surprising that women, such as imprisoned Martha Beatriz Roque 

of the Assembly to Promote Civil Society, are at the forefront of the 

independent civil society movement. The mothers and wives of the 75 

activists imprisoned after the March-April 2003 crackdown are a powerful 

and visible domestic and international symbol of the current struggle for 

freedom and democracy in Cuba. At the same time, the broader 

development of women’s civil society groups that directly address the 

concerns of women in Cuba today remains limited. Few international or 

third-country women’s NGOs have developed links with Cuban women’s 

groups or implemented programs to encourage their development. In other 

societies struggling to rid themselves of dictatorships, these women’s groups 

helped form the backbone of powerful civic movements. 

Afro-Cubans and mixed-ethnicity Cubans comprise 62 percent of the 

population. Yet despite the regime’s incessant rhetoric of social inclusion, 

Afro-Cubans are underrepresented in leadership positions and continue to be 

18
socially marginalized. The regime gives lip service to inclusion of AfroCubans and mixed-ethnicity Cubans in government. For example, persons 

of color currently occupy only 33 percent of the seats (203 out of 609) in the 

rubber-stamp National Assembly of People’s Power, only nine out 31 

positions on the all-powerful Council of State, and just 4 of the 14 provincial 

Communist Party leadership positions. Afro-Cubans tend to have the least 

access to external or non-regime sources of information. They have little or 

no access to outside sources of humanitarian support, and they are the least 

likely to migrate from Cuba, largely as a result of their poor economic and 

social condition. 

As with youth, more programs need to be oriented towards the AfroCuban population. NGOs have proposed promoting the development of 

civil society within the Afro-Cuban community through targeted 

broadcasting and by encouraging more African ex-government and NGO 

leaders to travel to the island for training and outreach and to form national 

working groups on Cuba in their own countries. Former government leaders 

from Africa have offered to take the lead in these efforts. Small grants of 

U.S. funds could provide the critical spark to activate more of the AfroCuban community and generate greater involvement by African-Americans 

and African nations in promoting change in Cuba. The African-American 

experience in peaceful civil society formation to achieve political change 

could be instructive in the Cuban environment. 

Political Prisoners and Their Families: In March and April 2003, 

75 human rights and opposition activists were arrested and sentenced to 

prison sentences as long as 28 years for acts such as possessing and publicly 

displaying human rights literature, receiving money and medicine from 

abroad for families of political prisoners, communicating with international 

media organizations, and organizing meetings and demonstrations to call for 

political reforms. Members of the security forces and prison officials 

routinely beat and abuse detainees and prisoners, including human rights 

activists. According to human rights monitoring groups inside the country, 

there are between 300 and 400 political prisoners in Cuba. 

 

The detainees and their families face enormous challenges, including 

meeting their basic economic and social needs. The regime has used the 

pretext of the arrests to confiscate property, evict families from their homes, 

19
and dismiss members from employment. These courageous people need 

additional support. 

 

Independent Civil Society Groups: Despite years of repression, 

there is a growing independent civil society movement on the island. 

Cubans have organized, or attempted to organize, and identify themselves as 

“independent journalists,” “independent librarians,” “independent writers,” 

“independent economists,” etc. The key is their willingness to depart from

the existing Stalinist structure. These groups are hampered, however, by a 

lack of basic materials and access to the equipment necessary to conduct 

their work. Independent libraries operate out of people’s homes and the 

majority lack even the most rudimentary equipment. The tools of 

independent journalists often only consist of a simple notepad and pencil as 

the Castro regime denies them access to basic equipment such as cameras, 

copiers, and computers. Even possession of a typewriter, regardless of 

vintage, can be used by the regime as a pretext for detention and worse. 

One example is that of Raul Rivero, an accomplished poet and 

journalist who founded the unofficial press agency Cuba Press. Using a 

manual typewriter to produce his reports, he often wrote on political and 

economic conditions in Cuba. For this, he was accused under Article 91 of 

the Penal Code of carrying out unspecified “subversive activities, aimed at 

affecting the territorial independence and integrity of Cuba.” The regime

also accused him of disseminating “false news to satisfy the interests of his 

sponsors of the North American government” and of associating with 

Reporters Without Borders and Agence France Presse. The regime cited his 

typewriter as evidence of his guilt. He was sentenced to 20 years in prison. 

Despite this type of intimidation and the scarcity of basic materials, civil 

society activists continually seek the means by which they can exercise their 

skills and their rights. Hence, increasing the amount of basic equipment 

available to them is vital. 

A number of regulations govern the export from the United States of 

equipment, including computers, to Cuba, a state sponsor of terrorism. 

These export rules are intended to restrict the Cuban government’s access to 

sensitive technology and to prevent the Cuban government from transferring 

this technology to other hostile states. 

20
At the same time, it is essential that Cuban civil society gain greater 

access to computers and other basic modern equipment, such as faxes and 

copiers, in order to help expand distribution of information and facilitate 

pro-democracy activities. Greater access to these types of equipment will 

assist Cuba’s civil society in its efforts to disseminate information to the 

Cuban people and counter regime efforts to harass, intimidate, and stifle 

opposition and dissent through exclusive control over all forms of 

communication. 

Religious Organizations and Faith-Based Initiatives: Religious 

organizations, including both Catholic and certain authentically independent 

Protestant denominations, represent the fastest growing and potentially 

strongest alternatives to the Cuban state in providing basic services and 

information to the Cuban people. 

About four to five million Cubans identify themselves as Roman 

Catholic, and Cuban Catholic priests estimate that as many as 10 percent of 

Catholics attend mass weekly. Cuba has close to 1,000 priests and nuns, less 

than half the total prior to 1960, when Cuba had half of today’s population. 

The regime has failed to live up to its commitment to loosen restrictions on 

the Church in the wake of the 1998 visit by Pope John Paul II; overall 

numbers of Catholic Church officials are only slightly higher than before the 

Papal visit. Many Catholic Church leaders are engaged in a daily struggle 

with the regime to provide help, both spiritual and material, to the Cuban 

people. The regime continues to deny the Catholic Church access to the 

Internet, does not allow the Church to purchase vehicles or to run 

educational institutions, and engages in other measures to impede its work 

and growth. Nonetheless, many Catholic churches and Catholic charities 

regularly distribute medicine and other material help to both Church 

members and non-members, even though state health officials threaten them

with “severe sanctions” for doing so. 

 Estimates of the number of Protestants in Cuba range from 600,000 to 

two million. These estimates may be low, however, given the recent 

explosive growth in evangelical Christian worship in “house churches” not 

registered by the “Office of Religious Affairs” of the Ministry of Interior 

(MININT), which is responsible for a number of organs of political control. 

Less than 30 percent of Cuban Protestants are members of those 

establishment denominations that make up the Cuban Council of Churches, a 

21
body tightly controlled by government authorities. Several heads of 

denominations within the Council were, or are now, “deputies” in the 

National Assembly, Cuba’s powerless legislature. The Council, which 

works closely with MININT’s Office of Religious Affairs, gives 

authorization to publish and distribute religious literature and to broadcast 

religious radio programs. It also approves overseas travel by pastors, and 

accepts large-scale humanitarian donations, but only after the political 

overseers in MININT have signaled their acceptance. The largest religious 

denominations generally reject cooperation with the Council, and have been 

able to grow and develop limited humanitarian and social services. In 

addition, several U.S. NGOs are working to develop conferences of 

ministries, churches, and lay persons with a common interest in providing 

humanitarian aid in Cuba as a vehicle to strengthen civil society. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

A Robust U.S. Assistance Program to Empower Cuban Civil Society: 

 Recognizing the U.S. assistance program already in place, the 

Commission recommends that the U.S. Government make available an 

additional $29 million (to augment the current Cuba program budget of 

$7 million) to the State Department, USAID, and other appropriate U.S. 

Government agencies for the following measures to aid the training, 

development, and empowerment of a Cuban democratic opposition and 

civil society: 

 Provide additional grants to willing NGOs for activities supporting 

democratic and human rights groups on the island to fund an 

increased flow of information on transitions to a political system 

based on democracy, human rights, and a market economy to the 

island, including radio and TV broadcasts, in support of and to 

augment Radio/TV Martí’s efforts;

 Support NGOs involved in medical assistance in buying and 

distributing medicines on the island, which can be distributed to 

unemployed physicians and medical personnel. Over-the-counter 

medicines, vitamins, and similar products can also be distributed to 

dissidents and human rights organizations to assist in outreach efforts 

within their communities; 

22
 Work with willing third-country allies to support creation of an 

international fund for the protection and development of civil society 

in Cuba. This fund should engage, train, and provide resources for 

volunteers of different nationalities to travel to Cuba for several 

weeks to provide logistical and technical assistance to independent 

libraries, professional organizations, charity organizations, 

journalists, educators, nurses, and medical doctors working 

independently of the regime; 

 Fund programs to provide educational opportunities to family 

members of political opponents and, working with the OAS, to 

establish a university scholarship program for the children of Cuban 

dissidents to study at Latin American universities; 

 Fund programs to support democracy-building efforts by women, 

such as programs to train, develop, and organize women’s groups in 

Cuba, and bring third-country NGOs with expertise on this issue into 

Cuba. Core areas for activity could include areas of concern to 

women in Cuba — including education, security of the family, health, 

and sex tourism — that are neglected by the Castro regime; 

 Fund programs to develop democracy-building and civil-society 

groups within the Afro-Cuban community. Programs could involve 

NGO leaders from the African-American community and African 

countries traveling to Cuba for training and outreach and forming 

national working groups on Cuba in their own countries. Also fund 

targeted broadcast programs targeted to the needs of the Afro-Cuban 

community; 

 Fund programs to reach out to disaffected Cuban youth to enable 

them to take greater political/civil society action in support of 

democracy and human rights in Cuba. The program could draw on 

youth organizations in Central and Eastern Europe, especially in 

Poland, the Czech Republic, Albania, Serbia, and others, to travel to 

Cuba to organize and conduct training, develop informational 

materials, and conduct other outreach. Many of these groups have 

been successfully involved in similar efforts in other countries and 

have expressed a commitment to doing the same in Cuba; and 

23
 Fund NGO training programs that promote peaceful methods to build 

democracy and civil society and advocate greater respect for human 

rights and fundamental freedoms. While some limited training is 

already underway, increased funding would enable greater use of 

techniques and experiences of other countries through expanded 

training and travel, targeted especially at Cuban youth, and through 

the greater use of broadcasting. 

Additional Measures to Support Cuban Civil Society: 

 Streamline current licensing requirements for providing computers and 

other basic equipment to Cuban civil society groups with the following 

goals: 

 Increase the capacity of computers and similar equipment that can be 

donated to Cuban civil society groups to the maximum level allowed 

by U.S. law; 

 Expedite the approval process for licenses sought by NGOs receiving 

U.S. Government funding to send computers and similar basic 

equipment to Cuban civil society groups; and 

 Increase coordination with willing third-country donor countries and 

NGOs to maximize the provision of basic equipment to independent 

Cuban civil society groups. 

 Encourage a wider array of religious organizations to provide 

humanitarian assistance and training to Cuban churches through 

streamlining licensing procedures and expanding outreach to those 

organizations.

24
m

RECOMMENDED FUNDING

 

A. Building Democracy by Empowering Cuban Civil Society: 

$7 million Ongoing USAID Section 109 Cuba program

$5 million Human Rights and Democracy: Grants for activities supporting 

democratic and human rights groups on the island and to fund an 

increased flow of information to the island on transitions to a political 

system based on democracy, human rights, and a market economy. 

$5 million Women: Programs to support democracy-building efforts by women, 

such as programs to train, develop, and organize women’s groups in 

Cuba. 

$4 million Afro-Cubans: Programs to develop democracy-building and civil-society

$4 million 

groups within the Afro-Cuban community. 

Youth: Programs to reach out to disaffected Cuban youth to enable them

to take greater political/civil society action in support of democracy and 

$3 million 

human rights in Cuba. 

Civil Society Development: NGO training programs to promote pea

methods to build democracy and civil society and adv

ceful

ocate greater

$3 million 

respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. 

Material Assistance: Provision of computers, short-wave radios, satellite

dishes, decoders, faxes and copying machines by U.S. and third-country

$2 illion

NGOs to Cuban civil society groups and journalists.

Independent Libraries: Programs to re-stock, strengthen and expand the 

Cuban independent library network and to promote their solidarity with

$3 million 

national library associations in Europe and Latin America. 

Independent Labor: Programs to promote membership and organiza

development in Cuba and to facilitate i

tional

nternational contacts by the

independent labor movement in Cuba. 

$36 million Subtotal 

B. Illuminating the Reality of Castro’s Cuba:

Public Diplomacy: Illuminate the reality of Castro’s Cuba, through 

public diplomacy initiatives worldwide, including conferences, small 

grants, media and public outreach. 

$41 million Total Recommended Funding 

$5 million 

25
IV. BREAK THE INFORMATION BLOCKADE 

The Castro regime controls all formal means of mass media and 

communication on the island. Strict editorial control over newspapers, 

television, and radio by the regime’s repressive apparatus prevents the 

Cuban people from obtaining accurate information on such issues as the 

Cuban economy and wide-scale and systematic violations of human rights 

and abridgement of fundamental freedoms. It also limits the ability of prodemocracy groups and civil society to effectively communicate their 

message to the Cuban people. 

According to a December 2003 poll of Cuban public opinion, more 

than 75 percent of the Cuban public watch state-run television or listen to 

state radio on a weekly basis.1

 The regime uses these media programs to 

advance its propaganda war against Cuban civil society and other forces for 

change. The Cuban public, however, is increasingly seeking external and 

non-state sources of information. According to the same poll, increasing 

numbers of Cubans are turning to international television and radio 

broadcasting for news and information. Foreign TV broadcasters such as 

CNN, TV Espanola, and TV Martí, as well as radio programs such as Radio 

Martí, BBC, and Voice of America (VOA) enjoyed high levels of 

recognition. 

 

Access to the equipment necessary to receive foreign media, however, 

remains a critical obstacle to empowering civil society. The Castro regime 

blocks many external radio signals and limits the ability of Cubans to obtain 

the necessary equipment to receive international broadcasts. According to 

the poll, only 15 percent of Cubans had access to satellite channels. Forty 

percent claimed to have a VCR at home. While Cubans recognized and had 

highly favorable views of foreign radio stations, a far lower percentage had 

regular access to such stations. 

 

Radio and Television Martí have consistently sought imaginative and 

effective solutions to increase the audience on the island. The primary, 

almost exclusive, means of transmitting radio and television signals to Cuba 

has been by the use of an aerostat. An important step in expanding the 

1

 “Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB) Review: Media Audience Telephone Survey, Nov.-Dec. 2003,” 

presented by Casals & Associates, to the Office of Cuba Broadcasting, by Sergio Diaz-Briquets, February

24, 2004. 

26
transmission of accurate and timely information to the Cuban people is 

through the maintenance and continued deployment of the existing aerostat 

capability and adding a second transmission capability. 

Immediately and for the short-term, existing C-130 COMMANDO 

SOLO aircraft have the ability to augment regular Radio and TV Martí 

broadcasts, as demonstrated in May 2003. These aircraft and their 

experienced crews fly in weather conditions that could ground the aerostat 

transmission platform now regularly used for broadcasts into Cuba. 

Lofting both the C-130 COMMANDO SOLO airborne platform and 

the existing aerostat platform simultaneously, while operating on two 

separate frequencies, would advance the objective of reaching a larger 

Cuban audience. Over the longer-term, an airborne platform dedicated to 

full-time broadcast transmissions into Cuba, in combination with the aerostat 

platform, would expand the listening and viewing audience. 

Similar patterns of obstruction, control, and lack of equipment apply 

to the Internet and computers. While 95.7 percent of Cubans polled had 

heard of the Internet, only 4.5 percent had used the Internet in the past year. 

The Cuban regime controls all access to the Internet, and all electronic mail 

messages are subject to strict government review and censorship. There are 

estimated to be only 270,000 computers in Cuba, with a paltry 58,000 

connected to the national Internet network, which blocks access to most sites 

on the worldwide web. Thus, access to computers and peripheral equipment 

remains limited, and the Internet can be accessed only through governmentapproved institutions. Dial-up access to government-approved servers is 

prohibitively expensive for most citizens, and hence very few have access. 

The regime also blocks instant messaging programs and has increased 

efforts to identify unauthorized Internet and e-mail users. In 2002, the 

government opened a national intranet gateway to some journalists, artists, 

and municipal-level youth community centers, but continued to restrict the 

types and numbers of international sites that could be accessed. Catholic 

Church representatives have been denied access to the Internet, or even the 

establishment of an intranet among dioceses. 

This blockade on information must be broken in order to increase the 

availability to the Cuban people of reliable information on events in Cuba 

27
and around the world and to assist in the effort to present a democratic 

alternative to the failed policies of the Castro regime. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 Direct the immediate deployment of the C-130 COMMANDO SOLO 

airborne platform, coordinated with the Office of Cuba Broadcasting 

(OCB), for weekly airborne radio and television transmissions into Cuba, 

consistent with the United States international telecommunication 

obligations. 

 Make available funds to acquire and refit a dedicated airborne platform 

for full-time transmission of Radio and TV Martí into Cuba, consistent 

with the United States international telecommunications obligations. 

 Direct OCB to provide audiotapes, videotapes, CDs and DVDs of its 

programs to NGOs for distribution in Cuba. 

 Provide funds to NGOs to purchase broadcast time on TV and radio 

stations in the Caribbean basin that can be received in Cuba for 

programs on democracy, human rights, and market economies. 

 Increase the provision of short-wave radios, satellite dishes, decoders, 

and other similar types of equipment to the Cuban people. 

V. DENY REVENUES TO THE CUBAN DICTATORSHIP 

A. Undermine Regime-sustaining Tourism 

“Flooding the island with tourists” is part of the Castro regime’s 

strategy for survival. Since 1992, it has been aggressively developing and 

marketing a tourism infrastructure, including a cynically-orchestrated 

campaign to make Cuba attractive to U.S. travelers. 

The estimated annual total number of international travelers is in the 

1.8 to 2 million range. Of this global figure, some 160,000 to 200,000 legal 

and illegal travelers have come from the United States on an annual basis 

over the past decade. Since the October 10, 2003 implementation of 

increased U.S. enforcement efforts, there has been a decrease in the number 

of U.S. travelers, reducing the total to about 160,000. The regime has a 

28
target of hosting 7.5 million international tourists by 2010 and 10 million by 

2025. Currently, tourism is Cuba’s largest single source of revenue, 

generating some $1.8-$2.2 billion in annual gross revenues. Of this amount, 

it is estimated that the regime nets 20 percent, although its take may be 

greater given the Cuban regime’s routine failure to pay creditors or honor 

contracts with foreign investors. While Cuba based its initial calculations on 

luring U.S. tourists because of history and geography, the largest number 

visiting the island are from Western Europe (primarily Spain, Italy, and 

Germany) and Canada. 

Today, Cuba has approximately 40,000 hotel rooms, and also permits 

the option for foreign nationals to rent private residences. The regime’s 

eventual goal is to have upwards of 200,000 hotel rooms, and then limit, if 

not end, the ability of average Cubans to rent out rooms. The regime is 

moving now to implement this aspect of its strategy by increasing the tax on 

private room renters, as well as by sharply increasing harassment of those 

entrepreneurs. It seeks an eventual earning potential of $20,000-40,000 per 

hotel room per year. 

Tourism & Travel-related exports: Central to the marketing of 

Cuba as a tourist destination, including to U.S. nationals traveling for 

licensed activities, is its “sand, sun, rum, and cigars” image. Closely related 

to tourism is the marketing and export of alcohol and tobacco products, a 

significant revenue-generating activity. Under current U.S. Department of 

Treasury regulations, licensed U.S. travelers to Cuba can import up to $100 

worth of Cuban goods as accompanied baggage. In practice, these goods are 

almost exclusively Cuban rum and tobacco. In 2003, such imports by 

licensed travelers could have generated as much as $20 million in revenues 

to the regime through sales. (Actual revenues may have been even greater 

because of illegal imports by licensed and unlicensed travelers.) 

Revenue gained from the sale of Cuban state-controlled commodities 

and products strengthens the regime. In addition, a number of state 

companies where these products are manufactured are subject to 

expropriation claims by U.S. nationals or have lawsuits pending in the 

United States to resolve ownership rights to product trademarks. Allowing 

the continued import of such goods increases the Castro government’s hard 

currency reserves, undermines efforts to promote a transition to a market 

29
economy, and legitimizes Cuban government use and marketing of 

confiscated trade names. 

Educational Travel: Under current regulations, accredited academic 

institutions receive specific licenses, usually valid for up to two years, to 

permit students to travel to Cuba for certain educational activities. These 

include undergraduate or graduate students participating in a program as part 

of a course at a licensed institution; students conducting research towards a 

degree; students participating in a formal course of study at a Cuban 

academic institution; and other teaching-related activities. In practice, while 

there are well-meaning participants who use this license category as 

intended, other travelers and academic institutions regularly abuse this 

license category and engage in a form of disguised tourism. 

Many institutions use Cuba “study-tour programs” to generate 

revenues for other programs and most accept students not enrolled in their 

institution. A large number of programs are for a short duration, allow for 

limited interaction with the Cuban people, and include lengthy unscheduled 

time periods to permit largely tourist activities to be accomplished. Such 

travel does not promote a genuinely free exchange of ideas between Cubans 

and American students. Evidence indicates that the majority of visits by 

U.S. students are organized by or coordinated through Cuban state travel and 

tour entities, are highly controlled by Cuban state security officials, and 

allow for only limited interaction with the average Cuban citizen. Moreover, 

the regime has often used the visits by U.S. education groups to cultivate the 

appearance of international legitimacy and openness to the exchange of 

ideas. Requiring that educational licenses be granted only to programs 

engaged in full-semester study in Cuba would support U.S. goals of 

promoting the exchange of U.S. values and norms in Cuba, would foster 

genuine academic study in Cuba, and would be less prone to abuse than the 

current regulations. Academic programs of a shorter duration would be 

permitted only when the program directly promotes U.S. foreign policy 

goals. 

 “Fully-Hosted Travel”: “Fully-hosted travelers” — those whose 

travel-related expenses are paid for by the regime or other non-U.S. entity — 

currently may travel to Cuba without violating the Cuban Assets Control 

Regulations. Although the regulations currently state that any person subject 

to U.S. jurisdiction who travels to Cuba without an Treasury Department 

30
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) general or specific license is 

presumed to have engaged in prohibited travel-related transactions, the 

regulations allow a traveler to overcome this presumption by providing a 

signed explanatory statement, accompanied by relevant supporting 

documentation, showing that — however unlikely this might be, and 

however contrary this would be to the regime’s intent of squeezing available 

dollars from U.S. and other foreign visitors — the traveler undertook no 

financial transactions. 

A number of U.S. travelers, with the assistance of the Cuban regime, 

have abused the concept of fully-hosted travel to hide tourism to the island. 

This abuse is especially relevant in the case of Cuban marinas, which are 

owned and operated by the regime, and used by U.S. pleasure boaters. 

These marinas and related Cuban government agencies routinely issue letters 

attesting that the traveler was fully-hosted, when in fact the traveler paid for 

his/her own travel expenses and paid an additional fee to the Cuban regime

to obtain the letter. Thus, the regime facilitates tourism by assisting U.S. 

travelers to evade U.S. travel restrictions which enhances the regime’s 

currency reserves and undermines our overall policy goals of minimizing 

direct subsidies to the regime. Pleasure boaters on “fully-hosted” travel 

continue to need to seek a license from the U.S. Department of Commerce 

for the vessel. 

 

Travel By Private Plane: Currently, U.S. regulations allow for 

licensed travelers to obtain a license, known as a temporary sojourn permit, 

from the U.S. Department of Commerce to travel by private plane to Cuba. 

While some private plane travel to Cuba is necessary, such as for the 

delivery of licensed humanitarian goods, this travel increases the regime’s 

revenues through landing rights, airport/entry-exit fees, and services, and it 

limits the U.S. Government’s ability to strictly enforce travel and trade 

prohibitions. Moreover, such travel by private plane, while ostensibly for 

humanitarian or religious purposes, often includes a tourism element and 

creates the appearance of business-as-normal relations with the Cuban 

government. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

31
 Continue to strengthen enforcement of travel restrictions to ensure that 

permitted travel is not abused and used as cover for tourism, illegal 

business travel, or to evade restrictions on carrying cash into Cuba. This 

can be accomplished by increasing inspections of travelers and 

shipments to and from Cuba and continuing training of inspectors at all 

points of entry and pre-clearance facilities on the identification of 

unlicensed travelers. 

 Support efforts by NGOs in selected third countries to highlight human 

rights abuses in Cuba, as part of a broader effort to discourage tourist 

travel. This could be modeled after past initiatives, especially those by 

European NGOs, to boycott tourism to countries where there were broad 

human rights concerns. Such a campaign, focused on international 

audiences, would reinforce international attention on the plight of the 

Cuban people, including political prisoners and civil society. 

 Eliminate the regulatory provision allowing for the import of $100 worth 

of Cuban goods produced by Cuban state entities, including cigars and 

rum, as accompanied baggage. In order to enforce this measure, 

Treasury would need to continue to provide training to law enforcement 

authorities at U.S. ports and pre-clearance facilities to identify and fine 

violators of the import ban. 

 Eliminate abuses of educational travel by limiting educational travel to 

only undergraduate or graduate degree granting institutions and only for 

full-semester study programs, or for shorter duration only when the 

program directly supports U.S. policy goals; requiring that the travelers 

be enrolled in a full-time course of study at the licensed institution; and 

requiring that educational institutional licenses be renewed annually, 

rather than bi-annually, to allow for improved enforcement of OFAC 

regulations. 

 Eliminate the general license provision for amateur or semi-professional 

athletic teams to travel to Cuba to engage in competitions and require 

that all such travel be specifically licensed. 

 Eliminate the specific license provision for travel related to clinics and 

workshops in Cuba, leaving general and specific license categories for 

professional research and attendance at professional meetings 

unchanged. 

32
 Eliminate the concept of fully-hosted travel and require that all Cuba 

travel-related transactions be licensed under general or specific license, 

regardless of whether or not the U.S. traveler or another person subject 

to U.S. jurisdiction is directly involved in and/or pays for the 

transactions. 

 Effective March 1, 2004, the President expanded the Cuba national 

emergency to provide the Coast Guard authority to require pleasure 

boaters to demonstrate that they have the appropriate Treasury and 

Commerce licenses before granting them a permit to leave U.S. 

territorial waters for Cuba. In order to improve unity of effort, 

responsiveness, and overall effectiveness, federal, state, and local law 

enforcement agencies should increase active participation in intelligence 

sharing and establish agreed-upon protocols for locating and 

prosecuting pleasure boaters who travel to Cuba illegally. We 

recommend an increase in both maritime surface patrols and air sorties 

in the region by law enforcement agencies. 

 Revise the U.S. Government licensing policy to limit the issuance of 

temporary sojourn permits for private travel, except for the explicit 

delivery of humanitarian goods or services or when it is in the U.S. 

foreign policy interest. To mitigate against undue burdens on legitimate 

religious and humanitarian groups, we recommend increased efforts to 

reduce the costs charged by licensed scheduled charter flights. 

B. Limit the Regime’s Manipulation of Humanitarian U.S. Policies 

To alleviate the hardships of a portion of the Cuban population, the 

United States has implemented various measures by which those with family 

members in Cuba can send cash remittances to them; travel to Cuba carrying 

gifts; and ship “gift parcels.” 

Castro has exploited these policies by effectively shifting burdens that 

ought to be assumed by the Cuban state and by profiting enormously from

these transactions. Not only has he benefited from the pacifying effects of 

these humanitarian outreaches within the population — relying on the exile 

community to provide the Cuban people what he refuses to — but he 

attaches high fees to the various transactions involved. Whether sending 

remittances or care packages or traveling to the island, the costs to the exile 

33
community far exceed market rates and translate into a significant cash 

windfall to the regime. 

The Commission found that more than $1 billion annually in funds 

and goods are sent to Cuba from those living outside the island. This 

revenue stream has been institutionalized over the last 10 years, including by 

the manipulation of migration flows through the U.S.-Cuba Migration 

accords. Between 1994 and the first quarter of 2004, the United States 

issued more than 260,000 immigration travel documents to Cuban nationals, 

a total roughly equal to 2.7 percent of the island’s entire population. It is 

estimated that of all Cuban nationals who have emigrated to or entered the 

United States since 1994, more than 50 percent were from the Havana area. 

In effect, U.S. compliance with the Migration Accords has had the effect of 

facilitating the relocation of a significant Cuban population to the United 

States; it is this population that is the most active in traveling and sending 

remittances and gift parcels to the island. And it is this source of resources, 

on a net basis, which is by far the largest hard currency source for the Castro 

regime after tourism. The following data further illuminate this situation: 

Remittances: Under current U.S. regulations, U.S. persons aged 18 

or older may send to the household of any individual in Cuba cash 

remittances of up to $300 per household in any three-month period, provided 

that no member of the household is a senior-level Cuban government or 

senior-level Cuban Communist Party official. Remittance transactions alone 

account for an estimated $400 to $800 million in annual hard currency flows 

to the island, with some estimates placing the total as high as $1 billion. The 

regime quickly captures a portion of the total value of remittances through 

transfer fees negotiated with legal U.S. remittance companies and through 

their “cut” from the unlicensed remittance carriers (“mules”) bringing 

currency onto the island. There is no way to know how much is extorted 

from “mules,” but information collected by legal U.S. remittance companies 

indicates that courier fees paid to “mules” by U.S. remitters exceed service 

fees charged by legal U.S. remittance companies, which are approximately 

19 percent of the value of the remittance. 

The regime recoups more of the remitted foreign exchange when the 

recipients make purchases at state-controlled Tiendas para la Recuperación 

de Divisas (TRDs) -- literally, Stores to Recover Hard Currency. Also 

known as “dollar stores,” a large number of which also host offices of legal 

34
U.S. remittance companies, these enterprises are a central part of the 

regime’s apparatus to capture hard currency sent to the island. As of 2003, 

1,000 dollar stores had been established, of which 300 were in Havana 

alone. Given the regime’s near-monopoly on legal sales of products in 

dollars, the prices in dollar stores average 240 percent of the value of the 

product. 2 Between these mark-ups and the limited black market 

opportunities for Cubans to trade in dollars among themselves, the regime

eventually captures a large percentage of the remaining amount of remitted 

dollars, estimated at 75-80 percent. 

Gift Parcels: Gift parcels (“paquetes”) with a dollar limit of $200 per 

parcel per month (excluding food, which is exempt from the value 

calculation) may be legally exported to Cuba and do not require a license. 

Eligible parcels may only contain items from 14 categories: food, clothing, 

vitamins, seeds, medicines, medical supplies and devices, hospital supplies 

and equipments, equipment for the handicapped, clothing, personal hygiene 

items, veterinary medicines and supplies, fishing equipment and supplies, 

soap-making equipment, and receive-only radio equipment and batteries for 

such equipment.

While the gift parcels provide a critical humanitarian benefit to the 

Cuban people, the Cuban regime directly benefits in two ways. First, such 

parcels decrease the pressure on the government to provide the basic needs 

of its people, enabling it to dedicate more resources to strengthening its 

repressive apparatus, while taking the political credit for the resultant 

improvement at the margin in the well-being of the Cuban people. Second, 

through delivery charges, the regime is able to generate additional hard 

foreign currency. 

During the 2002-2003 period, the number of individual gift parcels 

authorized for shipment was 1.215 million, or about 50,650 per month. In 

2003, the total value of licenses approved for Cuban gift parcels was $243 

million. In 2002, the total value of approved gift parcel licenses was $257 

million; in 2001, it was $302.9 million. There is no reliable figure for value 

or amount of goods shipped to Cuba outside these means. These are goods 

 2

 “Realities of Food Security in Cuba,” Presentation prepared by Dr. James E. Ross, Courtesy Professor, 

University of Florida, for seminar on Humanitarian Aid for a Democratic Transition in Cuba, sponsored by

the University of Miami’s Cuba Transition Project, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, 

Washington, D.C., January 16, 2004. 

35
that the regime does not have to purchase to meet the needs of the Cuban 

population.

Because the Cuban government does not permit direct mail or private 

shipping service to individuals, those wanting to mail packages to Cuba 

must use the services of consolidators, who ultimately rely on and pay fees 

to the Cuban state agency CubaPacks for delivery within Cuba. (The United 

States has repeatedly offered to resume normal postal service to Cuba, but 

the Castro regime has refused.) On average, U.S.-based consolidators 

charge $10 per pound for delivery of food and medicine parcels and $15 per 

pound for other eligible items (mainly clothing items), exclusive of the value 

of the commodities being shipped. CubaPacks, which receives the gift 

parcels when they arrive in Cuba and delivers them to the recipients, charges 

processing and delivery fees of $5 per pound for food and medicine parcels 

and $12 per pound for clothes. These Cuban government fees are built into 

the consolidators’ fees. Based on an average weight of 3.5 pounds per 

parcel, this amounts to $53.2 million in gross value over the 24-month that 

the export license is valid. Of this amount, the Castro regime receives $36.2 

million in revenues over the same 24-month period, or $1.5 million per 

month, in delivery charges. 

Family Visits: Under existing U.S. regulations, U.S. nationals and 

permanent resident aliens are authorized to travel to Cuba once a year to 

visit relatives in Cuba, without a specific license. Any number of additional 

trips within the one-year period may be specifically licensed by the Treasury 

Department and such licenses are routinely issued. This category of travel 

was intended to support families, provide humanitarian relief to the Cuban 

people, and promote the sharing of U.S. democratic values. 

Again, the regime has managed to exploit a well-intentioned program

to generate hard currency for itself. A good portion of this travel involves 

carrying extra cash into the country, including under the rubric of allowable 

per diem amounts, which are $164 per day for any visiting U.S. national or 

permanent resident alien. As with other travel, Cuba makes money from the 

charter flights, which it controls; from its dollar stores, where the incoming 

dollars are generally spent; as well as in a variety of other ways, as outlined 

in the next section. In 2003, while the total number of U.S. travelers to the 

island dropped to an estimated 160,000, travelers claiming to visit family 

comprise as many as 125,000 of this number, which represents no decrease 

36
in this category of travel. And of these 125,000 individuals, at least 31,097 

traveled more than once (based on the number of specific licenses for 

additional family visits issued by the Treasury Department). It is estimated 

that the regime was able to generate $96.3 million in hard currency through 

these family visits from the United States to the island in 2003. 

This amount does not include regime earnings through customs duties 

and a percentage of excess baggage fees levied on the extra baggage that 

most travelers on family visits bring to Cuba. Cuba allows travelers to the 

island to bring in goods valued at no more than $250 free of customs duties. 

In practice, most travelers on family visits bring in merchandise of much 

greater value and are therefore required to pay the Cuban regime $200 per 

traveler in additional customs duties, on top of the excess baggage fees of $2 

per pound above the 44 pound maximum charged by the charter flight 

companies, fees of which the regime earns a percentage. It is estimated that 

the regime earns up to $20 million per year through fees and duties charged 

on excess baggage. 

When considering possible changes to the “family visits” program, 

which was implemented in its present form in 1995 and revised in 1999 and 

2003, it is important to note that those Cubans who have arrived in the 

United States within the last ten years under the Migration Accords are the 

most likely to travel back to Cuba on a regular basis, including through 

multiple annual trips.3

 

While the present regulations were presented as an effort to facilitate 

brief and intermittent family visits, the policy, in effect, has facilitated the 

ability of some Cubans in the United States to “commute” between the 

United States and Cuba. Should a migrant from Cuba wish to reunite his or 

her family, there are existing safe and legal methods to bring immediate 

relatives to the United States for reunification. It is then up to the Castro 

regime to allow those with immigrant visas to leave Cuba. 

 

 3

 Under current U.S. law, persons who are natives or citizens of Cuba may apply for Lawful Permanent

Resident (LPR) or "green card," status one year after being admitted to or paroled into the United States. 

As LPRs, they may travel to Cuba, but, as is true for all LPRs and U.S. citizens, they are subject to the 

Department of Treasury's Cuban Asset Control Regulations and must comply with these requirements 

before a Treasury license will be issued. All Cuban LPRs who meet the regulatory requirements may 

travel to Cuba, regardless of how they initially entered the United States, including if they were originally 

admitted as refugees. 

37
Migration as a Revenue Generator: Remittances, gift parcels, and 

family visits are generated as a result of the migration of Cubans principally 

to the United States, facilitated by the fact that the United States is 

effectively obligated under the Migration Accords to issue at least 20,000 

migration documents annually. It was the Castro regime that insisted on the 

20,000 visas threshold, not Cuban dissidents or the exile community. While 

the humanitarian interest of discouraging potential rafters from taking to the 

seas remains paramount, the regime has effectively been provided an 

institutionalized safety valve for Cuban discontent with an accompanying 

revenue generator — it is the Cubans who recently migrated who have 

become one of the largest sources of funds and goods to the island. 

The present system for Cuban emigration provides the Castro regime

an additional mechanism to earn hard currency. U.S. law requires a medical 

examination before permanent entry into the United States; however, U.S. 

law does not require a foreign government or entity to conduct these 

examinations. In the case of Cuba, such examinations are conducted by a 

Cuban government doctor and have failed to identify serious pre-existing 

medical conditions of some Cubans seeking entry into the United States. 

However, these examinations have proven to be a reliable source of hard 

currency for the regime and represent another part of the regime’s 

manipulation of the migration process to approve those individuals it wants 

to send to the United States, regardless of their true medical condition. 

Medical examinations in Cuba for migration purposes cost between $350-

400 per person; for the same purpose, the same examination is routinely 

performed in other Latin American countries for generally less than $70. 

The regime earns approximately $8 million per year from these medical 

examinations. 

Another migration-related source of revenue for the regime is the fees 

for Cuban passports, which the regime requires for all Cubans seeking to 

emigrate. The regime mandates a Cuban passport in order for a Cuban to 

obtain a regime-issued exit permit. Fees for passports are $55. Fees for exit 

permits are $150. 

All activities related to the regime’s regulation of the exit process can 

only be paid for in U.S. dollars by the Cuban wishing to exit Cuba in a safe, 

orderly, and legal manner. In total, these costs amount to over $12,664,000 

38
per year in additional hard currency for the regime through Cubans 

migrating to the United States. 

Under the current system, visas may be processed at the U.S. Interests 

Section in Havana, but the determination of who actually gets to leave the 

country is ultimately determined by the Castro regime, through the issuing 

of the exit visa, known as the “white card.” There are literally hundreds of 

cases of individuals who cannot leave the country even though they possess 

valid U.S. migration documents. There also are cases in which the regime 

simply extorts payments for exit visas, especially from professionals and 

those with family members living in the United States. Fees between 

$15,000 and $30,000 are sometimes required to gain the release of 

professionals. There is no effective means to tabulate the amount earned by 

the regime through this means of extortion. The regime garners further 

revenue through the cost of airfare charged to regime-approved charter 

services. These charters are the primary means of travel for migrants (and 

other travelers to Cuba). Each traveler must pay a $25 departure tax and 

approximately $300 for airfare. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

Recognizing the humanitarian need in Cuba as a basis for U.S. 

policies on remittances, gift parcels, and family travel, the Commission 

recommends a tightening of current policies to decrease the flow of 

resources to the regime. 

Remittances: 

 Prohibit remittances to certain Cuban officials and members of the 

Cuban Communist Party and its affiliated institutions. 

 Permit individuals to send remittances only to immediate family 

(grandparents, grandchildren, parents, siblings, spouses, and children) 

in Cuba. 

 Revoke the existing general license provision in the Cuban Assets 

Control Regulations for banks to send individual remittances to Cuba. 

Such transactions would require each bank to be specifically licensed as 

39
a remittance-forwarding service provider. This will facilitate the 

oversight and effective enforcement of remittance regulations. 

 Offer rewards to those who report on illegal remittances that lead to 

enforcement actions. An undetermined amount of remittances are sent 

illegally to Cuba, via third country companies and through “mules” who 

carry the money to Cuba either directly or through third-countries. 

Rewards will encourage efforts to identify and eliminate illegal 

remittance networks. 

 Direct U.S. law enforcement authorities to conduct “sting” operations 

against “mule” networks and others who illegally carry money to Cuba 

as a means to disrupt and discourage the sending of illegal remittances. 

Gift Parcels: 

 Recognizing that gift parcels meet a fundamental humanitarian need in 

Cuba and that the shipment of these benefit the regime less directly than 

cash remittances, the Commission recommends: 

 Prohibit gift parcels to certain Cuban officials and members of the 

Cuban Communist Party and its affiliated institutions. 

 Limit gift parcels to medicines, medical supplies and devices, receiveonly radios, and batteries, not to exceed $200 total value, and food 

(unlimited in dollar amount); and 

 Limit gift parcels to one per month per household, except for gift 

parcels exclusively containing food, rather than the current policy of 

allowing one gift parcel per month per individual recipient. This 

change will have no impact on NGOs that provide humanitarian 

support or assistance to pro-democracy or civil society groups.

Family Visits: 

 To reduce the regime’s manipulation of family visits to generate hard 

currency — while preserving efforts to promote legitimate family ties and 

humanitarian relief for the Cuban people — the Commission 

recommends: 

40
 Limit family visits to Cuba to one (1) trip every three years under a 

specific license; individuals would be eligible to apply for a specific 

license three years after their last visit to Cuba; new arrivals from 

Cuba would be eligible to apply for a specific license three years after 

leaving Cuba; 

 Limit the definition of “family” for the purposes of family visits to 

immediate family (including grandparents, grandchildren, parents, 

siblings, spouses, and children); 

 Limit the length of stay in Cuba for family visitation to 14 days. (This 

limit would be consistent with limits currently being implemented for 

humanitarian and other groups visiting the island); 

 Reduce the current authorized per diem amount (the authorized 

amount allowed for food and lodging expenses for travel in Cuba) 

from $164 per day to $50 per day (i.e. approximately eight times what 

a Cuban national would expect to earn during a 14-day visit) for all 

family visits to Cuba, based on the presumption that travelers will stay 

with family in Cuba. This new limit will reduce the amount of hard 

currency that travelers can carry on their person and therefore 

undermine the efforts of those who seek to carry illegal remittances; 

and 

 Limit the volume of baggage carried by those traveling to Cuba to no 

more than 44 pounds per traveler, without the possibility of 

purchasing excess baggage capacity. Travelers and groups holding 

specific licenses to deliver humanitarian goods or to deliver 

assistance to civil society groups and official U.S. Government 

travelers would continue to be exempt from this requirement. 

Denying Migration Revenues to the Regime: 

 Recognizing our humanitarian interest in continuing to discourage 

potential rafters from risking their lives at sea, while seeking to minimize 

the Castro regime’s ability to earn hard currency by exploiting our visa 

determination process, the Commission recommends: 

41
 Reduce Castro’s profiteering from legal migration to the United 

States, including through charging exorbitant fees for passports, exit 

permits, medical examinations, and charter flights, by requesting an 

international monitoring and coordination entity to conduct a 

thorough review of regime practices with a view to reasonableness 

and consistency with other nation’s practices, and to suggest changes 

as appropriate. 

C. Deny Other Sources of Revenue to the Regime 

Foreign Investment in Cuba: Starting in the early 1990s as part of 

its effort to replace lost Soviet subsidies, the Castro regime has pursued an 

aggressive effort to attract third-country investors for joint ventures. A 

number of these ventures involve properties expropriated by the regime

without adequate and effective compensation. The Castro regime continues 

to promote foreign investment opportunities in Cuba, including in 

confiscated properties, claims to which are owned by U.S. nationals. An 

unfavorable investment climate, a hostile Cuban bureaucracy, and unwieldy 

and frequently changing laws have limited the levels and types of foreign 

investment in recent years. In 2003, for example, the number of foreign 

joint ventures in Cuba dropped by 15 percent, the most notable decline in 

recent years and a sign of the Castro regime’s failed economic and 

investment policies. However, it continues to actively seek foreign 

investment, especially from Europe, Canada, and Latin America, in its drive 

to reap more hard currency. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity 

(LIBERTAD) Act provides measures to discourage foreign investments in 

Cuba that involve confiscated property, claims to which are owned by U.S. 

nationals. 

Implementation of these laws must address the legitimate desire of 

U.S. citizens to seek redress for the confiscation of their property, an 

objective consistent with efforts to implement a comprehensive strategy to 

deny hard currency to the Castro regime. For those U.S. nationals who hold 

an ownership claim to property wrongfully confiscated by the Castro 

government, Title III of the LIBERTAD Act provides that U.S. national the 

right to bring an action in U.S. federal court against foreign nationals 

benefiting from that property. Furthermore, Title IV of the LIBERTAD Act 

provides authority to impose visa sanctions against foreign nationals who 

benefit from properties wrongfully confiscated when a claim to the property 

42
is owned by a U.S. national. The U.S. Government should seek to deter 

investment in Cuba by devoting additional personnel and resources to Title 

IV implementation and enforcement. 

 

Cuban Government Front Companies: The Cuban government is 

believed to operate a number of front companies in the United States, Latin 

America, and Europe that are used to circumvent travel and trade restrictions 

and to generate additional hard currency. These front companies are 

believed to be involved in efforts to encourage illegal tourism and the 

sending of illegal remittances and gift parcels to Cuba, as well as helping the 

regime acquire high-end computer equipment and other sensitive 

technologies. These front companies provide another source of currency and 

technological information for the regime and function as a base for 

economic espionage. 

Venezuelan Oil: Cuba maintains an extremely favorable oil 

arrangement with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, whereby up to 

82,000 barrels of oil per day is received on preferential terms, a portion of 

which is then sold on the spot market. This arrangement nets more than 

$800 million in annual savings to Cuba, mirrored by an identical amount of 

lost revenues to Venezuela. In exchange, according to his own accounts, 

Castro has provided Chavez with an army of up to 12,000 Cubans, including 

doctors, medical personnel, and other technicians to bolster Chavez’s 

popularity with the poorer segments of Venezuelan society, as well as more 

senior political and military advisors to help Chavez strengthen his 

authoritarian grip on the nation. Reports from Venezuela also indicate that 

Cuban doctors are engaging in overt political activities to boost Chavez’s 

popularity. Cheap Venezuelan oil is vital to keeping the Cuban economy 

functioning, generates additional hard currency, and enables Cuba to 

postpone much needed economic reforms. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 The process for implementation of Title III of the Cuban Liberty and 

Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act should ensure that the full range 

of policy options are made available to the President, and that a detailed, 

rigorous and complete country-by-country analysis of policies and 

actions with respect to Cuba is provided to the President for use in 

assessing whether the statutory requirements for a suspension of this 

43
authority are satisfied, i.e., whether suspension is necessary to the 

national interests of the United States and whether suspension will 

expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba. 

 To deter foreign investment in Cuba in confiscated properties, claims to 

which are owned by U.S. nationals, aggressively pursue Title IV visa 

sanctions against those foreign nationals trafficking in (e.g., using or 

benefiting from) such property, including devoting additional personnel 

and resources to application and enforcement. 

 Neutralize Cuban government front companies by establishing a Cuban 

Asset Targeting Group, comprised of appropriate law enforcement 

authorities, to investigate and identify new ways in which hard currency 

is moved in and out of Cuba, including Internet banking, pre-paid cards, 

hawala-type systems, Internet gambling companies, and other such 

mechanisms. The group would also work to identify and close Cuban 

government front companies. 

VI. ILLUMINATE THE REALITY OF CASTRO’S CUBA 

 

The current survival of the regime is in part dependent upon its 

carefully crafted international image. Cuba presents itself internationally as 

a prime tourist destination, as a center for bio-technological innovation, and 

as a successful socialist state that has improved the standard of living of its 

people. This image belies the true state of Cuba’s economic and social 

conditions and the increasingly erratic behavior of its leadership. 

U.S. Embassy Public Diplomacy Efforts: Public Diplomacy 

sections at U.S. embassies around the world, especially in Latin America and 

Europe, maintain extensive contacts with national NGOs and other civil 

society groups. Through small-grants programs, International Visitor 

Programs (IVPs), media resource centers, and other public diplomacy 

initiatives, Public Diplomacy sections have significant capabilities to 

communicate U.S. policies abroad and to generate host-country national 

interest on a given issue. With additional funding and other resources, these 

Public Diplomacy sections could be used to raise awareness of the human 

rights situation in Cuba, promote the discussion of transition planning for 

Cuba, and assist in the development of national working groups on the Cuba 

issue. 

44
RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 Recognizing the importance of an enhanced public diplomacy effort, the 

Commission recommends that the U.S. Government make available an 

additional $5 million for the following purposes: 

 Fund U.S. Embassy public diplomacy sections worldwide to 

disseminate information abroad about U.S. foreign policy, specifically 

regarding human rights and other developments in Cuba, including 

Castro’s record of harboring terrorists, committing espionage against 

the other countries, fomenting subversion of democratically-elected 

governments in Latin America, and the U.S. Government’s belief that 

Cuba has at least a limited, developmental offensive biological 

weapons research and development effort;

 Provide small grants and other assistance to local national groups 

interested in promoting greater information about U.S. policies 

toward Cuba and greater national involvement in support of 

democracy and the development of civil society in Cuba; and

 Fund and promote international or third-country national conferences 

to disseminate information abroad about U.S. policies on transition 

planning efforts related to Cuba.

VII. ENCOURAGE INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS 

TO SUPPORT CUBAN CIVIL SOCIETY AND TO CHALLENGE 

THE CASTRO REGIME

There is a growing international consensus on the nature of the Castro 

regime and the need for change. This consensus was brought about, in part, 

by the March-April 2003 crackdown on peaceful pro-democracy activists, 

the valiant effort by these same activists to continue to reach out to the 

Cuban people and the international community, and Castro’s political 

attacks against the European Union and other nations. Many of those who 

once stood by Castro have now begun to speak out publicly against the 

regime’s abuses. This same international consensus has limits. All too 

frequently, moral outrage and international condemnation have not 

translated into real actions that directly assist the Cuban people in their quest 

for freedom and basic human rights. On the positive side, the European 

45
Union and its member states have denounced the Cuban regime, curtailed 

assistance and, in some cases, stepped up contacts with Cuban dissidents. 

However, much more needs to be done. 

Encouraging international solidarity, challenging the regime in 

international organizations where appropriate, and strengthening 

international proactive support for pro-democracy groups in Cuba form a 

cornerstone of our policy to hasten an end to the Cuban regime and the 

transition to a free Cuba. 

International Solidarity: Since the March-April 2003 crackdown, 

some third-country governments and NGOs have been searching for viable 

options to support civil society groups and political prisoners in Cuba. 

International outrage has opened the doors to new and creative strategies to 

support the opposition in Cuba, as the possibilities resulting from the 

downgraded public image of the regime increasingly mount. High-profile 

public initiatives, such as solidarity campaigns involving prominent public 

figures, solidarity concerts and artistic expositions, TV public interest 

commercials, etc., are valid options, as sectors of the international 

community are now much more willing to participate in public criticism of 

the regime and accept the necessity of halting rights violations in Cuba and 

supporting independent pro-democracy efforts. 

This strategy is designed to generate greater active support for Cuban 

civil society from new sources and ultimately to develop a larger network of 

like-minded organizations sharing a body of knowledge and experience 

about democracy efforts in Cuba. This strategy will not only serve to 

globalize assistance efforts, but will also bring new perspectives, ideas, and 

methodologies to the table. 

Examples of the types of projects that willing third-countries and 

NGOs could engage in include: technical training and material assistance to 

the Independent Libraries Project; outreach initiatives on labor rights in 

Cuba; technical training for independent unions provided by willing thirdcountry trade unionists; publicly available Internet access facilities in 

diplomatic missions in Cuba, which also could be used to distribute other 

informational materials related to democracy, the rule of law, and human 

rights; direct relationships between willing third-country governments and 

46
independent civil society and opposition groups; and solidarity visits to the 

families of political prisoners by prominent foreign figures. 

International Working Group on Democracy in Cuba: A working 

group on democracy in Cuba composed of willing third-country leaders (expresidents and prime/cabinet ministers) could extend formal recognition to 

the civic movement on the island and contribute to the international isolation 

of the Castro regime. The working group could also be instrumental in 

forming national working groups on Cuba that would raise the profile of 

human rights abuses and mobilize third-country governments to do more to 

promote change on the island. 

Labor Rights and International Labor Organizations: Currently, 

Cuban workers do not have the right to organize freely into independent 

unions. Cuban citizens who attempt to organize independent unions have 

been persecuted, and in some cases, imprisoned. In other cases, their 

families have also been subject to employment discrimination by the 

government, which maintains “employee files” that contain information on 

political activities. Because workers have no access to independent unions 

and the official union confederation merely reflects government views, 

collective bargaining rights are also denied to employees. Furthermore, 

Cuban workers do not have a legal right to strike. 

 

The International Labor Organization (ILO) has been especially 

critical of the lack of freedom of association in Cuba, in particular with 

regard to the institutionalized trade union monopoly enjoyed by the official 

union confederation under Cuba’s Labor Code. In 2003, the ILO’s 

supervisory bodies also examined cases related to threats, detentions, and 

pressure against workers who attempted to form unions outside the 

established structure. In June 2003, the ILO Conference Committee on the 

Application of Standards called on the Cuban government to accept an ILO 

“direct contacts mission” with a view to ensuring the application of freedom

of association in law and practice. The Cuban government rejected this 

suggestion, and instead argued that Cuban labor movement “unity” was the 

will of the workers themselves and that alleged attempts to establish new 

unions were in fact subversive activities funded by the United States. The 

ILO should be supported in its efforts to improve the labor situation on the 

island. 

47
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: The InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) monitors human rights 

abuses in the Western Hemisphere. Any person, group, or NGO may 

present a petition to the IACHR alleging violations of the rights protected in 

the American Convention on Human Rights. The IACHR may process 

petitions alleging human rights violations by state agents and petitions 

alleging that a state failed to act to prevent a violation of human rights or 

failed to carry out proper follow-up after a violation, including the 

investigation and sanction of those responsible as well as the payment of 

compensation to the victim. 

The IACHR continues to exercise jurisdiction regarding Cuba, 

processes complaints, and has twice requested on-site visits to Cuba. The 

Commission also continues to prepare reports on the situation of human 

rights in that country, which have been transmitted to the Cuban government 

and submitted to the member states of the OAS. However, more can be 

done to support efforts by Cubans to more effectively utilize the IACHR to 

highlight the regime's continued human rights violations and focus the 

activity of the international community, especially in Latin America, on 

these violations. 

48
RECOMMENDATIONS: 

International Solidarity Campaign: 

 Recognizing the need to solidify international consensus and promote 

greater direct involvement by third-countries in Cuba, we recommend the 

implementation of the following diplomatic campaign: 

 Increase direct efforts with willing third-country governments to 

develop a robust, proactive policy to (1) support Cuban civil society, 

including the opposition, and (2) develop policy frameworks for 

assistance to a post-dictatorship Cuba; 

 Encourage greater involvement in Cuba by willing third-country 

NGOs to promote the development of Cuban civil society;

 Encourage willing third-country governments to establish direct 

relationships with legitimate independent civil society groups; 

 Encourage willing third-country governments to create public access 

Internet facilities in their missions in Cuba; 

 Assist the development of an International Working Group on 

Democracy in Cuba through diplomatic support and making U.S. 

government financial assistance available to willing third-country 

NGOs as appropriate;

 Encourage like-minded governments and third-country NGOs to 

develop coordinated international political and legislative actions to 

condemn the Castro regime and to pressure for change through the 

creation of Cuba working groups and interest groups and through 

actions by national legislatures to take up the issue of Cuba, call for 

hearings, and issue statements; and

 Participate in and support efforts by willing third-country NGOs to 

host roundtables of experts to discuss transition planning and 

compare transition experiences. 

49
Labor Rights and the ILO: 

 To increase international attention to labor rights violations and to 

bolster support for the advancement of labor rights in Cuba, the 

following steps to re-energize labor rights efforts should be taken. In 

addition, increased attention to labor rights and corporate social 

responsibility in Cuba will have the added impact of raising the risks 

associated with investment on the island under the current regime and 

could facilitate efforts to discourage further investments. 

 Provide informational material on Cuba’s labor rights violations at 

regional labor meetings and at the ILO conference as appropriate. 

Distribute the Department of State pamphlet “The Dream Deferred: 

Fear and Freedom in Fidel’s Cuba” at similar meetings. 

 Assist NGOs and other interested parties in organizing conferences 

abroad on corporate social responsibility, to include NGOs, 

businesses, and unions. Participants would be encouraged to protect 

worker rights in existing foreign investment ventures and to speak out 

strongly against Cuban government labor rights violations at ILO 

conferences and other international meetings on labor issues. 

 Work with NGOs and other interested parties to assure that a Cuban 

independent labor representative or labor representative in exile is 

able to speak at ILO conferences. 

 Reach out to willing third-country labor unions and urge them to 

raise Cuban labor rights violations at regional labor meetings. 

 Encourage efforts by NGOs to draw attention to exploitative labor 

conditions in Cuba and assist Cuban workers in obtaining redress for 

that wrong. 

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: 

 Fund NGO projects designed to help Cuban citizens obtain effective 

access to the IACHR and provide in-country training, through 

appropriate NGOs, to Cuban human rights activists in collecting and 

preparing information in order to file claims with the IACHR.

VIII. UNDERMINE THE REGIME’S SUCCESSION STRATEGY 

50
Approaching his 78th birthday, Fidel Castro has conspicuously 

deteriorated physically and probably mentally as well. His decline over the 

last few years has been apparent on several occasions at public events in 

Cuba and abroad. The quality of Castro’s decision-making has declined 

along with his physical condition. He has savagely denounced foreign 

leaders who have been the targets of bizarre and belligerent outbursts. 

Foreign visitors have been shocked by his decline, although little of this has 

attracted international media attention. 

On the island, however, Cuban officials are aware of his impairments. 

Senior leaders have been called upon to cover for him and explain away his 

misstatements. Nothing remotely like this public checking of his absolute 

power has ever happened before. 

The senior Cuban leadership is now faced with the reality that Fidel 

Castro’s physical end is at hand and is making preparations to manage a 

“succession” of the regime that will keep the senior leadership in power. 

The regime’s survival strategy is to maintain the core elements of the 

existing political structure in passing eventual leadership of the country from

Fidel to Raul Castro and others currently in the senior leadership. 

 

U.S. policy must be targeted at undermining this succession strategy 

by stripping away layers of support within the regime, creating uncertainty 

regarding the political and legal future of those in leadership positions, and 

encouraging more of those within the ruling elite to shift their allegiance to 

those pro-democracy forces working for a transition to a free and democratic 

Cuba. To these ends, attention and pressure must be focused on the ruling 

elite so that succession by this elite or any individual is seen as what it 

would be: an impediment to a democratic and free Cuba. Targeting current 

regime officials for U.S. visa denials is one instrument available to the 

United States to hold them accountable for human rights abuses against the 

Cuban people and others, including the torture by Castro regime officials of 

American POWs in South East Asia, or for providing assistance to fugitives 

in Cuba from U.S. justice. Current U.S. law prohibits assistance to a 

transition government that includes Raul Castro.4

 

4

 See Sec. 205(a)(7) of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act.

51
 Transition Coordination: Another signal of the unwillingness of 

the United States to accept the Castro regime’s “succession strategy” would 

be the establishment of a focal point within the U.S. Government to 

coordinate U.S. programs to assist a democratic transition. Presently, there 

are offices to address the current bilateral relationship, migration, and other 

elements of U.S. policy towards Cuba, but no entity or official with a 

specific mandate to help prepare the U.S. Government for a transition. 

 

The work of this Commission is the first comprehensive effort to 

address how the U.S. Government can support a democratic transition. 

Appointing a Transition Coordinator would signal to the regime and to the 

international community the interest of the United States in proactively 

preparing for a post-Castro Cuba. It would also provide a means through 

which the strategies and programs set forth by this Commission can be 

reviewed, updated, and revised as events on the island unfold. By 

establishing a dedicated Transition Coordinator, the U.S. Government can be 

prepared to respond strategically and effectively to a transition in Cuba. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 Target regime officials for visa denial if they (1) are or were involved in 

torture or other serious human rights abuses or (2) provided assistance 

to fugitives from U.S. justice. Implementation measures would include: 

 A database of Cubans credibly alleged to have participated in torture 

or other serious human rights abuses; and 

 A second database of persons who provide assistance to fugitives from 

U.S. justice. 

 Establish a Transition Coordinator at the State Department to facilitate 

expanded implementation of pro-democracy, civil-society building, and 

public diplomacy projects for Cuba and to continue regular planning for 

future transition assistance contingencies.5

5

 The Transition Coordinator could serve as the Coordinating Official contemplated by Sec. 203 of the 

Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act. 

52
CHAPTER 2 

Meeting Basic Human Needs in the Areas of 

Health, Education, Housing, and Human Services 

53

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

A. Overview

Cuba’s transition from the Castro regime to a democratic society with a free 

economy will be a challenging process. Meeting the basic human needs of the Cuban 

population involves the removal of the manifestations of Castro’s communism; the 

introduction of the values and practices of democracy and free enterprise; and the 

building of institutions and services that will improve the health, nutrition, 

education, housing, and social services available to the Cuban people. 

The fundamental goal of any assistance to a free Cuba must be to empower 

the Cuban people to enable them to create an authentic democracy and free market 

economy. Empowering the Cuban people will mean improving their economic and 

social well-being, ensuring that adequate health and social services are provided, 

reconstructing a democratic civic culture through education and institutionbuilding, dealing with the human cost of the totalitarian police state, and 

supporting the Cuban people as they cope with these issues and work to transform 

themselves. 

Improving their condition will require dramatic reforms to ensure that 

democratic values and a civic culture return, that important democratic institutions 

— including private and faith-based organizations — are able to flourish, and that 

helping agents such as schools, clinics, and community centers respond to real 

needs and are accountable to the citizenry. 

Some of the effort to meet basic human needs will involve immediate, shortterm assistance to ensure that critical health, nutrition, and social services are 

addressed; that schools are kept open and provided with needed instructional 

materials; that housing emergencies are attended to; that comprehensive needs 

assessments and data collection are begun; and that food aid is distributed as 

needed. 

Over the medium- and long-term, a variety of programs and services are 

identified that U.S. public and private sources can provide to the Cuban people, as 

a new Cuban government initiates the process of fundamental reform, establishing 

a rule of law, safeguarding human rights, and creating a new climate of 

opportunity. It is expected that such assistance will be available not only from

U.S. Government agencies and contractors, but also from other international 

donors, international organizations and institutions, philanthropic foundations, 

55
non-profit expert organizations, and businesses interested in investing in Cuba’s 

future. Cuban-American and other U.S. citizens and organizations would be 

involved in these efforts. 

Both short- and long-term issues will involve the work of many players and 

will need to be coordinated. The Cuban people are educated and, despite the 

repression of the Castro regime, have shown themselves to be remarkably resilient, 

savvy, and entrepreneurial. They will need the resources (including short- and 

long-term loans), technical assistance, and general support to enable them to 

improve health standards, manage the change to a market economy, and maintain 

and improve their infrastructure and services.

B. Seven Foundations for Action in Cuba’s Transformation 

There are seven overarching principles that are so fundamental to a 

successful transition that they cut across all other actions and issues. They are: 

1. All that is done must have the goal of empowering the Cuban people. Cuba 

must be free and sovereign, and the pride its people have in their culture, history 

and hopes for the future must be affirmed. Assistance proposed herein is 

illustrative. It will be up to the Cuban people through an open, democratic process 

to decide what assistance Cuba may seek from international sources. 

2. The international community, especially organizations in the Western 

Hemisphere, can play a leading role in assisting the transition process. The U.S. 

Government can work through the Organization of American States and regional 

agencies, and with the United Nations and its agencies, and other organizations and 

individual countries. 

3. Churches and other religious bodies have an important role in building a free 

Cuba. 

4. The Cuban diaspora will want to take a role in helping the homeland. It might 

be useful to establish an umbrella organization to help coordinate diaspora 

assistance, such as a “Foundation for Assistance to a Free Cuba.” 

5. U.S. and other assistance to Cuba should be coordinated to ensure it is managed 

effectively and provides help where it is needed most. The U.S. Government 

might consider creating a planning and coordination team before Castro’s regime 

56
falls, and, as appropriate, involve public and private sector donors including 

foundations, non-profit organizations, and corporations. 

6. The United States and others should be prepared to help Cuba depoliticize its 

institutions and promote justice and reconciliation. The U.S. Government can 

assist Cuban efforts to eliminate profoundly politicized Castro-era textbooks, other 

instructional materials and media resources, as well as support the Free Libraries of 

Cuba network to enhance the physical presence of diverse materials and circulation 

of free ideas. Cubans may want to establish a justice and reconciliation process to 

address Castro’s crimes, identify regime victims, and assist the social healing 

process; they may request outside help. 

7. The United States and the international community should enable the Cuban 

people to develop a democratic and civic culture, a free economy, and the values 

and habits essential to both. The U.S. Government could create the “Cuba Civil 

Society Education Project” to help provide the resources, training, and materials 

for education in democracy, civic values, and entrepreneurship at all levels. Radio 

and Television Martí can continue to provide transition information, support and 

information to civil society, and training opportunities for free Cuba’s journalists. 

II. INTRODUCTION1

The Cuban people will soon undergo a change from the personal rule of 

Fidel Castro and his communist regime, which have run Cuba since 1959. What 

follows in this chapter is a survey of areas in which the U.S. Government and 

private organizations could offer assistance to a free Cuba in the areas of health, 

education, housing, nutrition, and human services. This document proposes a wide 

range of possible actions, which a Cuban transition government might request or 

which the U.S. Government might propose, and a Cuban transition government 

may accept. They are not intended to be prescriptive; the fundamental goal of any 

assistance to a free Cuba must be to empower the people to enable them to create 

an authentic democracy and free market economy. 

Empowering the Cuban people will mean improving their economic and 

social well-being, ensuring that adequate health and social services are provided, 

 

1

 The following federal agencies contributed to this section of the Report: Department of Education (Chair of

Working Group and lead agency); Agency for International Development; Department of State, Bureau of

Educational and Cultural Affairs and Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs; Peace Corps; Department of 

Agriculture; Department of Health and Human Services; Social Security Administration; Department of Housing 

and Urban Development; Department of Labor; and the Executive Office of the President, Office of National Drug

Control Policy. 

57
reconstructing a democratic civic culture through education and institutionbuilding, dealing with the human cost of the totalitarian police state, and 

supporting the Cuban people as they cope with these issues and work to transform 

their country. 

 

Empowering the Cuban people and improving their condition will require 

dramatic reforms to ensure that democratic values and civic culture return, that 

important democratic institutions — including private and faith-based 

organizations — are able to flourish, and that helping agents such as schools, 

clinics and community centers respond to real needs and are accountable to the 

citizenry. 

According to a report issued by the Cuba Transition Project (CTP) in June 

2003, “living conditions have deteriorated as evinced by an acute housing shortage

estimated at 1.66 million dwellings. At least 13 percent of the population is 

clinically undernourished as the state food rationing system now provides for only 

a week to ten days of basic alimentary needs [per month]. Unemployment has 

reached 12 percent, based on official data, and as many as 30 percent of workers 

are displaced or underemployed” while “university enrollment has fallen 46 

percent as would-be college students opt for more lucrative jobs in the tourism

industry.”2

 

Further, a paper by Jerry Haar published by CTP in October 2003 indicated 

that, “while working conditions and labor rights in the Americas offer a mixed 

picture, in no country in the hemisphere are they worse than in Cuba.”3

Some of the effort to meet basic human needs will involve immediate, shortterm assistance to ensure that critical health, nutrition, and social services issues 

are addressed; that schools are kept open and provided with depoliticized texts, 

other instructional materials; that any housing emergencies are attended to; and 

that comprehensive needs assessments and data collection are begun. Short-term

assistance should be planned in advance and be available as appropriate while a 

new Cuban government forms itself and sets its plans and priorities for the 

important work ahead. 

 

Different components of the Inter-American system, such as the 

Organization of American States, the Inter-American Development Bank, the 

2

 Staff Report, Cuba Transition Project, June 2003 3

 Jerry Haar, “Working Conditions and Labor Rights in Cuba,” Cuba Transition Project, October 2003 

58
Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture, the Pan American Health 

Organization, and the Pan American Development Foundation could coordinate 

the delivery of assistance offered by other nations of the hemisphere using the 

same mechanisms and procedures available to all member states. In addition, 

private organizations (e.g., foundations, expert associations, and faith-based 

organizations) and businesses could supply much needed assistance, experience, 

and knowledge. It will be important to coordinate these elements to determine 

which actions to take and to implement them as quickly and smoothly as possible. 

A rapid assessment of immediate needs should focus on the critical initial 

six months. Longer-term assistance will be necessary for an undetermined period 

of time as the new Cuban government initiates the process of reforming what 

exists, establishing a rule of law, safeguarding human rights, renovating and 

reconstructing infrastructure and services, building new institutions, and creating a 

new climate of opportunity. 

Both short- and long-term issues will involve the work of many players and 

will need to be coordinated. The Cuban people are educated and, despite the 

Castro regime, have shown themselves to be remarkably resilient, savvy, and 

entrepreneurial. They will need resources (including short- and long-term loans), 

technical assistance, and general support to enable them to improve health 

standards, manage the change to a market economy, and maintain and improve 

their infrastructure and services. 

A. Foundations for Action in Relation to Cuba’s Transition

A well-educated and healthy population, a safe environment, and adequate 

human services are critical to the success of most, if not all, of the 

recommendations in the other sections of this report. At the same time, meeting 

human needs in the special Cuban context depends upon a transition process that 

ideally embraces several fundamental principles. 

1. Assistance to a Cuban Transition Must Be a Multilateral Effort 

Many different international organizations and donors are interested in 

Cuba and will want, and need, to be involved in the transition. It will be important 

to: 

 Mobilize and rely on regional assistance through the Organization of American 

States, Pan American Development Foundation, and other bodies. 

59
 Invite and work with international organizations, including specialized agencies 

such as UNESCO, as appropriate. 

 Encourage the participation of nongovernmental donors such as religious 

groups, relief organizations, philanthropic foundations, and corporations. 

2. Churches and Other Religious Bodies Can Play an Important Role in 

Building a Free Cuba 

Religious organizations can play an indispensable role in the transition to a 

free Cuba. This is not simply because religion and religious institutions have been

suppressed under the communists or because external religious bodies have roots 

in Cuba and seek to help. Rather, the special importance of religious institutions in 

the transition is due to the fact that they are one of the few intact nongovernmental 

organizations on the island that have the trust of the people and the means to 

organize through an existing social network of communications and distribution 

channels at all levels of society. 

In the words of Teo A. Babun, Jr., executive director of the aid association 

Evangelical Christian Humanitarian Outreach (ECHO)-Cuba: “Faith-based 

nongovernmental organizations currently conduct neighborhood humanitarian 

services, providing transportation, obtaining medical supplies, and providing 

meals. Church-affiliated social services are permitted to receive educational, 

financial, and material support from sister organizations in the United States [and 

elsewhere]. In return, the Cuban government demands that church-affiliated 

NGOs on the island serve people without regard to their religious beliefs.”4

 

Religious charities have established a climate of popular trust, a reputation 

for service to all as opposed to the narrow sectarianism of the past, and effective 

grassroots networks. Given the manifest difficulties, some of these organizations 

are truly remarkable:

 The Roman Catholic aid service Cáritas de Cuba is reported to have a staff of 

30 and some 8,000 local volunteers, located in every Cuban diocese. It 

conducts a full range of social projects, the most important of which are elder 

care, care for persons with disabilities and families with disabled children, day 

 

4

 Teo A. Babun, Jr., “Faith-Based NGOs: Their Role in Distributing Humanitarian Aid and Delivering Social 

Services in the Special Period,” White Paper Report Association of Cuban Economists, August 7, 2001, p. 4. 

60
care, support for single mothers, outreach to alcoholics, tutoring for adolescents 

with learning disabilities, aid for small farmers, and classes in subjects like 

sewing and computer use. 

 ECHO-Cuba distributes medicines, medical supplies, food, clothing, and 

provides educational services through a network of over 100 locations (often 

house churches) throughout Cuba. Evangelical denominations are the fastest 

growing Protestant churches in Cuba. 

 Indigenous mainline Cuban Protestant churches are also growing and are 

supported by sister churches in the United States, Mexico, and other countries. 

They are very active in providing social and medical services. The Protestant 

interfaith seminary at Matanzas, despite interference from the Castro regime, 

has managed to educate over 30 percent of the ordained Cuban pastors working 

in Cuba. 

The renewal of Cubans’ interest in religion has been considerable in recent 

years. A modest thaw in religious persecution occurred after the Pope’s visit to 

Cuba in 1998. Religious bodies are now permitted to operate churches, provide 

social services and even limited educational services (but not open evangelism), 

and distribute some literature. The Bible is the number one selling book in Cuba, 

even at officially sponsored book fairs. 

Despite a recent relative decline in numbers, Catholics are still by far the 

largest group of Christians in Cuba and the Church today is probably far stronger 

and more authentically Cuban than in the past. There are rapidly growing 

evangelical and mainline Protestant Christian communities, and a small but active 

Jewish community. They are centered in the cities of Havana and Santiago de 

Cuba, and supported by B’nai B’rith and various U.S. congregations. In addition, 

there are a significant numbers of followers of Afro-Caribbean religions such as 

Santeria. Religion in Cuba appears to have been strengthened, not weakened, by 

the people’s ordeal under Castro. 

61
Reasonably accurate data as of 2000 for the number and distribution of 

religious Cubans are as follows5

: 

Population of Cuba (2000) 11,199,176 100 % 

 

Protestant Churches: 

Adventist 26,000 0.2 % 

Baptist 68,100 0.6 % 

Disciples/Christian 30,000 0.3 % 

Holiness/Church of God 10,200 0.1 % 

Methodist 45,000 0.4 % 

Pentecostal 198,538 1.8 % 

Reformed/Presbyterian 17,443 0.2 % 

Independent, House Churches 5,400 0.1 % 

Isolated Radio Believers 39,200 0.3 % 

Other Protestant 1,550 0.9 % 

Protestant Subtotal 541,431 4.8 % 

 

Roman Catholic Church 5,178,652 46.2 % 

Orthodox Christians 1,300 under 0.1 % 

Other Christians 180,100 1.6 % 

 

Jews 823 under 0 .1 % 

Afro-Caribbean Religions 1,923,683 17.2 % 

Other Religions 61,664 0.6 % 

Total Religious Population 7,887,653 70.4 % 

Non-religious Population 3,313,025 29.6 % 

 

5

 Source: Detail for Country: Cuba, World Christian Database, Center for the Study of Global Christianity, GordonConwell Theological Seminary, 2003, http://www.worldchristiandatabase.org/wcd/default.asp. Data derived from

the 2001 editions of the “World Christian Encyclopedia and World Christian Trends.” 

62
3. Strengthening Social Service Delivery Capability of Independent Churches 

and Synagogues in Cuba 

Organized assistance bodies such as Cáritas de Cuba, ECHO-Cuba, B’nai 

B’rith, and the relief organizations of the major Protestant churches with Cuban 

connections (Baptist, Methodist, Episcopal, Lutheran, Pentecostal, Presbyterian) 

should be included in any planning for short-term and medium- to long-term 

transition assistance. 

i. Use the networks of churches within Cuba and invite sister organizations 

outside Cuba to assist them. 

a. Religion and short-term assistance 

 The churches can play a role in the initial planning and coordination of 

donor services for short-term humanitarian assistance. Ideally, they would have a 

“seat at the table” in whatever intergovernmental and interorganizational 

committees are constituted to oversee provision of immediate transition assistance. 

Cuban church leaders, as well as members of sister faith communities outside 

Cuba, can play an important role in the diplomatic and organizational work 

accompanying the political transformation. 

 Within most communities, churches and faith-based organizations are a 

major part of the support system. The Cuban people during a transition likely will 

want to maintain and strengthen those systems. Faith-based organizations can 

provide emotional support, a sense of trust, and continuity. They can also be used 

to educate and to communicate information to individuals and communities on the 

subject areas covered in this chapter. 

b. Religion and medium- and long-term assistance 

Religious organizations and leadership, from the local community up to the 

national and international levels, can also play significant roles in medium- and 

long-term reconstruction work in Cuba. Religious congregations, charities, orders, 

and other bodies will be needed to help provide social services, education, 

community organization, health care, and to address infrastructure issues such as 

housing and communications. Houses of worship can play a major role in helping 

Cuban society make independent ethical and moral judgments, and in providing 

the values needed to function in a free society. 

63
ii. Differentiate the leadership of the Cuban Council of Churches, a Castroinfiltrated body, from the sincere grassroots churches that have been forced to 

join it. 

In 1941, the Cuban Protestant Christian churches formed an ecumenical 

council to work together on joint initiatives, such as providing aid to the poor and 

supporting the interfaith seminary at Matanzas. The Council remained 

independent until it was taken over by the Castro regime in the early 1960s and 

used as a means to control the Protestant churches then operating on the island. 

Since then, it is fully identified with the regime and is controlled by Castro 

supporters, including Christian Marxists and liberationists, several head of the 

Council are or were members of Castro's rubber-stamp communist national 

assembly. The Council is now the only legal religious body other than the Roman 

Catholic Archdiocese of Cuba. 

 

At the same time, it should be noted that most of the grassroots clergy and 

laity of the denominations that belong to the Cuban Council of Churches (CCC)6

are sincere Christians who have been caught in an impossible situation. (No 

member church has been able to leave the CCC since several Baptist groups did so 

in the early 1960s.) Like the Roman Catholics and others who have had to deal 

with the regime, the overwhelming majority of these mainline and evangelical 

Christians are not sympathizers with Castro and the communists, and therefore 

should not be denied assistance or a role in Cuban religious affairs due to “guilt by 

association.” 

The U.S. government should not deal directly with the CCC during the 

transition, but should work with the individual member churches and other 

religious groups that have a stake in Cuba. It is important not to appear to take 

sides in internal Cuban religious affairs or endorse one faith group or set of groups 

over another. It should be U.S. policy to support the involvement of all genuinely 

non-political religious groups in both the transition and the development of a free 

Cuba, regardless of their beliefs or forced associations with the former regime. 

6

 The CCC includes both evangelical and mainline churches, including Methodists, Presbyterian and Reformed

Christians, Anglicans, Friends (Quakers), Lutherans, Mennonites, Nazarenes, the Cuban Salvation Army, and some

Baptist and Pentecostal denominations. 

64
4. The Cuban diaspora will want to take a role in helping the homeland

 Well over 1,500,000 Cubans have left the island for opportunities and 

freedom elsewhere since the communist revolution of 1958.7

 This exceeds ten 

percent of Cuba’s current population of slightly over 11 million. Today, over 1.2 

million persons of Cuban ancestry live in the United States alone, over 813,000 of 

whom are estimated to be Cuban-born.8

 Many other Cubans and persons of Cuban 

ancestry live in Spain, Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, and other 

countries. 

 

i. Urge the Creation of a “Foundation for Assistance to a Free Cuba” to help 

diaspora Cubans channel assistance and coordinate relief operations 

One important way diaspora Cubans might contribute to a Cuban transition 

is to set up a foundation through which assistance to Cuba can be channeled. Such 

a foundation could coordinate donations and other assistance, and would be a more 

efficient and powerful voice in the transition process than a variety of 

uncoordinated individual activities. 

5. U.S. and other assistance to Cuba should be coordinated to ensure it is 

managed effectively and provides help where it is needed most 

A defined core team of key U.S. Government agencies, NGOs, international 

organizations, and vendor representatives should be identified, which can work 

with Cuban transition authorities to facilitate assistance, manage priorities, and 

help prevent inefficient or poorly unorganized situations. This assistance should 

be delivered under the umbrella of the inter-American system to provide other 

hemispheric nations a framework within which they can make their own 

contributions. 

i. Create and put in place a short-term assistance planning and coordination 

team before a transition begins 

A team of U.S. Government agencies, in contact with international 

organizations, private sector organizations (secular relief and assistance 

organizations, corporations), and religious bodies, should be formed to organize 

 

7

 “Emigration,” Cuba On-Line Database, Institute for Cuban & Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami,

2001, http://cuba.iccas.miami.edu/Docs/c01305.pdf. 8

 U.S. Bureau of the Census, “2000 Census and Current Population Survey Tables,” Census Factfinder, February

2004, http://www.factfinder.census.gov/. 

65
and coordinate the initial phase of transition assistance. This should be done, if 

possible, prior to any actual change of regime and be ready to move quickly into 

operational mode. 

 

The mission of a short-term coordination team should be to plan for various 

humanitarian relief contingencies, depending on the situations that develop when 

the Castro regime ends. All of the priorities discussed in the section on short-term

humanitarian assistance would fall within the jurisdiction of this team. 

It is vital that relief efforts be coordinated and managed in conjunction with 

emergent Cuban authorities and those engaged in diplomatic and security 

measures. Without coordination across all sectors, short-term assistance activities 

could degenerate into a situation dangerous for assistance workers, unreliable for 

transshipment of supplies, and overwhelming for the Cuban people and authorities. 

ii. Create medium- and long-term coordination groups for public and private 

sector donors that can continue to work with a new Cuban government 

The cooperation and coordination established during the initial short-term 

assistance phase should be continued into the subsequent phases of the transition, 

when planning and cooperation on projects will still be desirable. 

Donors, vendors, charities and agencies should be encouraged to work with 

the new Cuban government and non-governmental organizations in Cuba to select 

priority projects, develop action plans, and carry out joint endeavors. There will be 

a tremendous amount of work to do. Without continuing coordination there could 

be problems involving movement of persons, shipments, communications and 

payment, as well as unnecessary duplication and overlap. Helping ensure the 

safety and security of key infrastructure, including public buildings, transportation, 

and communications networks will also be important. 

iii. The special case of drug use prevention and control 

Castro’s Cuba is a proven trafficking point for drugs and has its own drug 

problems. Drug use and addiction are public health concerns, best dealt with by 

public health approaches — prevention, early intervention, and treatment — 

provided the procedures are based on solid findings of scientific research. 

Outreach, identification, referral, and treatment programs will need to be 

developed in sufficient number and type until they are available and accessible in 

every part of Cuba. Once Cuba has established the conditions that will allow it to 

66
rejoin the inter-American system, particularly the OAS, standards and 

commitments set by the Inter-American Drug Abuse Commission in the Anti-Drug 

Strategy of the Americas and the Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism will facilitate 

meeting the objectives outlined. 

Resources devoted to education about drug abuse prevention and stopping 

drug problems could be balanced with near equal emphasis on public health, public 

safety, and market disruption. Cuban and international resources could be devoted 

to prevention efforts and to instituting adequate interdiction and control efforts. 

6. As Cuba seeks to depoliticize its institutions and promote justice and 

reconciliation, the United States and others should stand ready to assist. 

The Cuban transition is likely to resemble other post-communist transitions 

in that there will be a need to help Cuban society begin the long process of 

recovering from the effects of ideology, terror, corruption, and warped institutional 

and social attitudes and habits. 

7. The Cuban people should be enabled to develop a democratic civic culture, 

a free economy, and the values and habits essential to both. 

Cuban society under Castro operates on the principle of “resolver,” or 

getting by via deals and other informal arrangements to resolve issues. This 

principle works in the peculiar climate of a communist regime with a pervasive 

bureaucracy, insufficient and corruptly distributed resources, and a thriving black 

market. It is not a good foundation for building a free society with an objective 

rule of law, honest institutions, and formal market institutions. Even though many 

Cubans understand the concepts of freedom and seek self-reliance, experience with 

other post-communist transitions indicates that it will take a concerted effort to 

change old habits and develop a genuine culture of democratic free enterprise. 

III. IMMEDIATE ACTIONS

A. The Current Situation in Cuba Prior to Transition 

A thorough, accurate, and comprehensive assessment of Cuba’s 

humanitarian needs must await the end of the Castro dictatorship. The Castro 

government rigidly controls calculation of mortality and morbidity rates, estimates 

of household income, food availability, nutrition, and other key indicators of 

67
humanitarian needs, in order to score political points and win debates in 

international fora. These data are fundamentally unreliable. 

1. The Health Care System 

Partial reporting from independent sources inside and outside Cuba indicates 

the health sector is near collapse and the nutritional needs of the Cuban people are 

increasingly unmet. This is the result of a long process of decline that began to 

accelerate fifteen years ago. 

The demise of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s led to the sudden 

withdrawal of billions of dollars in annual Soviet subsidies to Cuba. By 1989, 

Cuba’s entire economy was in crisis. Cuban GDP fell by some 40 percent between 

1989 and 1993. The emergence of an epidemic of optic neuropathy in 1991 (a 

disease caused by nutrient deficiency) characterized that decline. By 1992, the 

Cuban curative health system was in shambles due to serious shortages of 

equipment, medicine, and supplies. 

The health sector, more than any other, depends on hard currency imports. 

In 1989, Cuba imported an estimated $227 million in health-related goods. Part of 

this value was in-kind or the result of bartering arrangements provided by the 

former Soviet Union. These non-monetary arrangements disappeared after 1989 

with the loss of socialist trade relations. By 1993, Cuba’s health-related hard 

currency imports amounted to only an estimated $67 million. 

Access to basic medicines declined precipitously from 1989 to 1993 and 

supplies became irregular, depending on unstable access to foreign exchange, 

rapidly changing sources of purchase, and changing patterns of donation. The 

Cuban ration system substituted herbal medicines. Cuban hospitals increasingly 

turned to acupuncture as a substitute for anesthesia.

Cuban GDP grew by only 10 percent from 1993 to 1996, and sporadically 

thereafter, accompanied by a serious decline in the purchasing power of the Cuban 

peso that gutted salaries and health ministry budgets. The process of stagnation 

and deterioration continues to the present. 

Today, the Cuban government still prohibits physicians from engaging in 

private practice, and pays them only about US$20-$30 per month, far less than a 

what a maid or bellboy earns from tips in a Cuban government-run tourist hotel. 

68
As a result, many Cuban doctors and nurses have given up their professions to 

work in tourism or the informal economy. 

2. Nutrition and Sanitation 

The failure of the Castro regime’s Marxist economic policies together with 

external factors such as the declining price of sugar have made it impossible for the 

Cuban government to maintain an effective food-rationing system, either through 

food imports or through domestic production. 

During the first thirty years after the Cuban revolution, the Cuban 

government imported about half of all protein and calories intended for human 

consumption. After the withdrawal of Soviet subsidies, importation of foodstuffs 

declined by about 50 percent from 1989 to 1993, and per capita protein and calorie 

availability from all sources declined by 25 percent and 18 percent from 1989 to 

1992, respectively. Currently, only about 1200 calories per person per day are 

available from low-cost rationed distribution. 

Cuban government statistics show that the burden of calorie, protein and 

micronutrient deficits falls predominantly on adult men, whose caloric intake fell 

from 3100 in 1989 to 1863 in 1994. However, infants, children, pregnant women, 

and the elderly also suffer acute deprivation. 

The proportion of newborns weighing less than 2500 grams rose 23 percent, 

from 7.3 percent of all births in 1989 to 9.0 percent in 1993. Guaranteed daily 

milk rations reached only children up to the age of 7 after 1992. Anemia affected 

about half of all children and adolescents and half of pregnant women aged 15 to 

45 during the 1990s. 

Cuban government data on pregnant women show that, from 1988 to 1993, 

the percentage of women with inadequate weight at pregnancy rose 18 percent, 

from 7.9 percent to 9.3 percent. Women with weight gains of less than 8 kilogram 

during pregnancy rose from 5.3 percent to 5.8 percent. 

Cuba’s economic decline in the 1990s also resulted in a reduction of the 

materials needed to ensure clean water. From 1990 to 1994, Cuban government 

statistics show the proportion of the population with domestic water connections 

declined from 83 percent to 81 percent in urban areas and from 30 percent to 24 

percent in rural areas. 

69
During the same period, the portion of the population without access to 

potable water increased from 10 percent to 12 percent. The country’s ability to 

produce or import chlorine declined, reducing the population covered by 

chlorinated water systems from 98 percent in 1988 to 26 percent in 1994. In 1994, 

only 13 percent of the country’s 161 municipal water systems were chlorinated. 

Mortality from diarrheal diseases rose from 2.7 per 100,000 in 1989 to 6.8 per 

100,000 in 1993. 

Poor nutrition and deteriorating housing and sanitary conditions were 

associated with a rising incidence of tuberculosis, from 5.5 per 100,000 in 1990 to

15.3 per 100,000 in 1994. Medication shortages were associated with a 48 percent 

increase in tuberculosis deaths from 1992 to 1993. From 1989 to 1993, these 

conditions were also associated with a 67 percent increase in deaths due to 

infections and parasitic diseases and a 77 percent increase in deaths due to 

influenza and pneumonia. 

3. Education 

The Cuban school and higher education curricula are completely politicized. 

Mathematics, for example is taught by solving problems related to such things as 

how many guns are needed to defeat counterrevolutionaries. Professionals such as 

lawyers are trained to function as servants of the regime rather than as ethically 

independent practitioners. Educators as well as students are required to be state 

informants. Individuals are not allowed to finish school or enter postsecondary 

training or education programs unless they are deemed politically acceptable, have 

demonstrated loyalty to the Castro regime, and have actively participated in 

required organizations and labor activities. 

The state of the educational physical plant is deteriorating due to the 

collapsing economy, the age of the facilities, and the poor management of 

available resources. Many facilities dating from before 1958 are in poor shape, 

especially those in rural areas, particularly in the east of the island. Formerly 

private and church schools seized by the regime have deteriorated out of neglect. 

School and university textbooks and library materials are written and 

produced by the regime, and the content is suspect in all but the most advanced 

technical and scientific fields. Access to imported materials is severely restricted, 

and many books and journals are outdated by the time anyone is allowed to use 

them. 

70
The educational system has also suffered the loss of hundreds of qualified 

teachers because of poor pay (the equivalent of less than $10 a month). Many 

teachers have left the system to work in tourism. Elementary and early childhood 

education has been especially hard hit due to both teacher attrition and the 

relatively low priority placed on these areas by the state. The staffing situation is 

now such that the regime has instituted programs of training “courageous ones,” 

secondary teachers who will teach every subject except English and physical 

education, and crash courses to train secondary students to teach in primary 

schools. 

School completion is also affected by economic problems. Students 

increasingly see the earning potential of the black market and even menial jobs in 

the dollar-based tourist industry as incentives to drop out of school. Only about 

five percent of Cuban school graduates now go on to higher education. Vocational 

education and training suffers from lack of resources, modern programs, incentives 

to stay in school, and the traditional low prestige of studying occupational subjects 

as opposed to academic subjects. 

 

4. Current International Assistance to the Castro Regime 

According to information provided by the U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID), total foreign aid from official sources to all sectors of the 

Cuban government in 2003 was estimated at $106.6 million. This includes $33.6 

million in multilateral aid through the United Nations, $6.37 million from the 

European Union, $5.8 million from the OPEC fund, and the remaining amount (in 

millions of dollars) from bilateral donors including Spain (Central Government and 

Basque Regional Government), Japan, Canada, China, France, Kuwait, Sweden, 

Germany, Norway, Switzerland, and Brazil. In addition, Venezuela provides Cuba 

up to 82,000 barrels of petroleum per day under concessionary financing. 

In July 2003, Fidel Castro announced Cuba would no longer accept “scraps 

of aid” from the European Union (EU). The following month, Cuban authorities 

informed the EU delegation in Havana of its plan to cancel 22 cooperative projects 

managed by the EU and other European countries. This came after the EU 

censured the sentencing of 75 Cuban dissidents to an average of 28 years in prison 

after mock trials, and the execution of three Afro-Cubans who hijacked a ferry in 

an attempt to flee the island. 

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5. Traditional Coping Mechanisms of the Cuban People 

Cubans have long used five coping mechanisms to survive: 

 Remittances from relatives living abroad; 

 Return to rural areas to grow food; 

 Humanitarian aid; 

 Tourism; and 

 The informal sector. 

The weakness of these coping mechanisms is that a great portion of the 

population does not have access to them; this gap combined with high 

unemployment has meant that a sizeable portion of the population has suffered 

great deprivation. It is likely that much of this distressed population is in urban 

areas where there is little tourism. Evidence for this distress may be found in the 

decline of caloric intake to the lowest per capita level in Latin America as of 1995. 

According to the UN Statistical Yearbook (2000), Cubans now have less access to 

cereals, tubers and meats than they had in the late 1940’s. 

Officially reported ration levels are likely not distributed evenly among all 

classes of the population given the tendency of Marxist societies to distribute food 

and medicine based on bureaucratic rank — the more important you are to the 

survival of the state apparatus the higher your ration. 

Thus, it is likely that the official food distribution system is no longer a main 

source of food for the Cuban poor who increasingly survive through the informal 

sector, or that there is widespread acute malnutrition, or both. A well designed 

humanitarian aid program should be targeted on this distressed population of urban 

poor for whom these coping mechanisms are not available, who are suffering 

disproportionate deprivation from the economic collapse, and whose precarious 

livelihoods may be endangered by disruptions during the transition. 

6. The Link Between Coping Mechanisms and Relief Operations 

At the heart of all humanitarian relief strategies lie two priorities: saving 

lives and reducing human suffering. While relief commodities can supplement a 

humanitarian relief effort, it is the immediate rehabilitation programs that yield the 

greatest and most productive results in making people self-sufficient. 

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The two essential missions — saving lives and reducing suffering —need to 

form the basis of the work done by and through UN agencies, the Red Cross, nongovernmental organizations, and donor aid agencies such as USAID. An implied 

part of these two imperatives is the notion that humanitarian assistance should 

stabilize people’s condition, at a minimum, so their situation does not worsen 

through unintended consequences or inadvertently flawed programming. The 

more chaotic conditions become, the more likely it will be that the rule of 

unintended consequences will apply and that humanitarian relief programming will 

get drawn into the chaos or even exacerbate it if not properly designed. 

B. Developing a Transition Assistance Plan9

How the transition in Cuba proceeds will profoundly affect the nature of the 

humanitarian response. Humanitarian relief managers, as a professional principle, 

plan for the worst and hope for the best. 

1. Humanitarian Aid Objectives 

 

The adoption of the following objectives depends on the political situation, 

the nature and assistance requests of the transition government, and the diplomatic 

objectives of donor governments. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 A set of basic objectives should be considered in the case of short-term 

assistance to a free Cuba, and should include: 

 Supporting the democratic transition by having relief organizations work 

closely with ministries in the transition government, so that the public 

credits the new government with the improvement in living conditions rather 

than international groups; 

 Encouraging building civil society and democratic pluralism by having 

relief organizations work with emerging local institutions such as churches 

to administer the relief effort. This joint work should be designed to build

local capacity and institutional strength in running programs; 

9

 Based on the article “Humanitarian Assistance during a Democratic Transition in Cuba,” Studies in Comparative 

International Development, volume 34, number 4 (Winter) 2000, written by Andrew S. Natsios. 

73
 Preparing for long-term development by creatively designing short-term 

relief programs to serve both purposes simultaneously. This is called the 

relief-to-development continuum where the humanitarian aid programs are 

designed to encourage long-term development. For example, seed programs 

to increase food production over the short-term on an emergency basis 

could be used to introduce new seed varieties (after they have been locally 

tested for appropriateness), improved cropping techniques could increase 

yields, and better storage of the harvest and marketing of produce could 

increase general availability of food; and 

 If the transition government is contending for permanent status in an 

election campaign against other legitimate democratic parties, then the 

humanitarian relief program should attempt to remain neutral in the 

campaign by distancing itself from any political party including the 

incumbent government.

C. Humanitarian Assessment and Program Design 

1. Conduct a Needs Assessment at the Outset of Transition 

We will not know for certain what the needs are in Cuba until a 

humanitarian assessment can be done by an objective outside agency, given that 

reports from the current Cuban government are politicized. If requested, this 

assessment can be done by the United States Government through the Office of 

Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) within USAID using a standard format 

widely accepted among humanitarian agencies. UN agencies or the Red Cross 

movement could also do such an assessment. 

RECOMMENDATION: 

 Given the importance of being as prepared as possible to respond rapidly to 

changes on the island, the OFDA should conduct a needs assessment, based on 

the information currently available, to: 

 determine the food supply situation; 

 assess the nutritional status of children; 

 examine and report on housing and other shelter; 

74
 examine and report on transportation and communications; 

 assess agricultural production; 

 assess water quality and supply; 

 evaluate sanitation conditions and identify hazardous environmental sites;

 evaluate the true state of local medical care and facilities; 

 make a preliminary report on school conditions and resources; 

 assess the microeconomic situation in Cuba; and 

 recommend programmatic measures to address the findings. 

Accepting media accounts or reports from non-technical people on these 

conditions is usually a short route to serious trouble: the wrong medicines, the 

wrong tonnage and kind of food, and the wrong economic remedies are frequently 

ordered by people who accept uncritically what they see or hear. This assessment 

of the microeconomic situation will be of central importance, particularly in the 

case of Cuba because its economy has been so distorted by Marxist ideology for so 

long. The microeconomic study will explain the cause of malnutrition or 

starvation, the relationship of family income to food prices, how expensive food is 

in local markets, whether famine conditions are developing, the robustness of 

markets in various regions of the country, any impediments to the development of 

more efficient markets, and whether localized political tensions or conflicts are 

rooted in economics. 

D. Challenges in Providing Humanitarian Aid 

The challenges to the proper design and successful implementation of the 

program will be substantial. Some of the issues are predictable. 

1. International humanitarian agencies have developed a set of standards for 

working in complex emergencies called the “Code of Conduct,” which has 

sought to correct problems uncovered in previous relief efforts. 

It is essential that all aid groups be familiar with the “Code of Conduct” and 

the established international standards that have been developed for working in 

75
complex emergencies. One way to facilitate this process could be through the 

establishment of a “Foundation for Assistance to a Free Cuba,” referred to earlier 

in this Chapter. 

2. The old order will not relinquish power willingly and will try to subvert or 

corrupt the transition process to enrich itself and maintain its influence. 

In other post-communist countries, the party cadres have used their inside 

understanding of bureaucratic offices, their old boy network of connections within 

the party, their superior education, and any money they had amassed under the old 

regime to put themselves in a commanding position to disrupt the transition or for 

personal gain. They will likely see the resources represented in the aid effort as a 

source of wealth from which they may further enrich themselves. 

Following the collapse of other communist regimes, members of internal 

security apparatus privatized themselves and formed organized criminal syndicates 

to feed off legitimate new businesses and the humanitarian aid agencies. They did 

this through protection rackets, threats of violence against aid agencies, raking off 

rent and equipment, and other schemes. It is possible that a similar phenomenon 

could appear in Cuba, as the old order seeks to protect its privileges, unless an 

organized effort is made to protect the aid agencies doing the humanitarian 

response. 

3. A very large number of aid agencies will likely want to participate in the 

humanitarian aid response in Cuba because of its visibility within the United 

States and the public demand for action. 

These efforts must be coordinated. Directing and managing the response of 

humanitarian agencies to the Cuban transition will not be easy: reducing 

overlapping aid agencies’ sectoral and geographic jurisdiction, managing the 

inevitable competition for aid resources and media coverage, and coordinating 

programmatic conflict among agencies will be a major undertaking. A large 

number of diverse, eager assistance donors is yet another reason to establish a 

coordinating committee. 

4. The participation of people at the neighborhood level in making decisions 

about the aid effort in their communities is desirable and will provide a 

critical opportunity to build civil society, help develop local institutions, and 

nurture the democratic values needed to build self-government. 

76
Because Cuba has not functioned under a stable democratic system within 

the living memory of most people in the country, we cannot expect democratic 

values and decision-making processes to be readily understood. The 

transformation of values will be rocky but important to encourage. 

E. Implementing Short-Term Assistance 

The architecture of the international humanitarian response system that has 

developed in the post-cold war period to respond to emergencies similar to the one 

expected in Cuba is highly diffuse, decentralized, extraordinarily complex, and full 

of internal tension. 

1. Key Non-governmental Organizations 

The architecture of the system includes NGOs, which are the front line 

distributors of aid and managers of local aid programs. While there are perhaps 

400 NGOs registered with USAID, only 150 of them are members of the NGO 

trade association called InterAction, and of these, only 40 to 50 do humanitarian 

relief programming (the rest are focused entirely on long-term development). Of 

these 40 to 50 NGOs, only 20 to 25 run large enough programs, possess the 

technical proficiency and resources, and have sufficient staff to have a serious 

impact in Cuba. 

The qualified NGOs have developed, through past experience as well as 

their own internal strategic planning, certain sectoral expertise in areas such as 

public health, medicine, agriculture, and food aid. Many of these 20 to 25 NGOs 

have been informally meeting within the InterAction umbrella for the past three 

years to coordinate their ongoing work in Cuba. Those NGOs with a presence in 

Cuba now have a comparative advantage over those who enter the country for the 

first time during a democratic transition. They know the local elite, for better or 

worse, the operation of the local markets, agricultural conditions, medical 

facilities, and have a staff of some kind in place. Groups that are not established 

parts of the humanitarian assistance architecture may want to consider coming 

together to create an umbrella foundation that could work with other donors and to 

funnel assistance. 

One major benefit of NGOs, beyond their experience in emergency response 

and technical field expertise, is their grassroots network within American society 

that can mobilize public support among their contributors for an aid effort in an 

emergency. NGOs have been increasing their presence on the ground in Cuba 

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gradually, as the economic deterioration has grown more severe. Because they are 

constrained by the Cuban government from developing indigenous, grassroots 

organizational structures, NGOs do not have the same ground presence they might 

have in other countries. 

2. International Organizations 

Four UN agencies have the operational and legal mandates under the UN 

Charter to do humanitarian relief work: the World Food Program (providing food 

aid and food for work projects), UNICEF (addressing the long-term needs of 

developing countries), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (providing 

international protection for refugees), and the UN Development Program

(providing long-term development). One UN secretariat level agency, the Office 

of the Coordinator of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA), has the mandate to 

coordinate the emergency response for UN agencies and NGOs. The new High 

Commissioner for Human Rights has been given the mandate to monitor and 

protect against human rights abuses. 

3. Key U.S. Federal Agencies

 

The bulk of recent funding for assistance that moves through the 

international relief aid system has come from two sources: the U.S. Government, 

through USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and Food for Peace; and 

the European Union’s European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO). When 

there are refugee emergencies, the State Department’s Bureau of Population, 

Refugees, and Migration is crucial to the response. 

F. Food Aid for Cuba in the Short Term 

There are a number of different food security scenarios that could confront a 

transition government in Cuba. For instance, the domestic Cuban food supply, 

transportation, infrastructure, and the storage base could be disrupted by turmoil 

that could follow a vacuum of authority. The U.S. Government and private 

organizations have determined that there may very well exist a severe case of 

malnutrition and lack of available supply and money to feed the Cuban people, or 

sectors of the Cuban people, to avoid massive sickness and disease. 

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RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 The U.S. Department of Agriculture has food aid authorities that could be used 

to address any of the potential food security scenarios listed above and others: 

 Food for Progress is a grant program that can provide any U.S. food 

commodity to governments, private voluntary organizations, or the World 

Food Program. While the program is not large, if Cuban food needs are 

determined to be a priority, an estimated 100,000 tons of food could be 

quickly purchased and shipped to Cuba. Likely commodities would be rice, 

beans, vegetable oil, and wheat or flour if needed; 

 Section 416(b) is a USAID grant program that could provide nonfat dry milk 

that could be distributed directly to people or used in processing. If 

distributed for direct feeding, it would be best to do so through institutions 

— schools, hospitals, orphanages — and probably through a private 

voluntary organization or the World Food Program; and 

 These programs could be implemented to provide an immediate response to 

a dire food aid situation as well as serve as a first step for additional U.S. 

Government and international food aid responses. 

G. Action Plan 

We have learned enough from other humanitarian emergencies to begin 

planning for a transition in Cuba. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 Prior to the transition, establish a coordinating committee for government and 

international intervention and assistance and a parallel committee for NGO 

assistance. Planning and coordination will be critical for an efficient and rapid 

response. These mechanisms will help ensure that the diversity of donors can 

be managed and that Cuban conditions and problems can be addressed as they 

appear. 

 Encourage existing Cuban-American charities, which will likely wish to 

participate in a humanitarian response, to become members of InterAction, the 

NGO trade association, to become registered with USAID, and to learn USAID 

79
grant-making processes and InterAction governance and programming 

standards.

 Encourage charities, particularly those without field experience, to create a 

joint assistance foundation, the “Foundation for Assistance to a Free Cuba,” to 

provide resources through established channels and begin collaborative 

programming efforts with established NGOs in Central American or Caribbean 

countries, including the coordinating committee. 

 Prepare to conduct a hands-on needs assessment as soon as possible, to 

provide objective data and professional observations. Terms and conditions 

could be developed now for four tracking systems, two in food and two in public 

health. These should include nutritional surveys of children under five, 

morbidity and mortality tracking, food market surveys of prices, and household 

surveys of family food stocks. Data from these surveys are crucial in predicting 

crises before they occur, determining whether aid programs are reaching the 

needy population, and where aid should be targeted. Procedures for assessing 

infrastructure, housing, education, agriculture (from field to market), food 

distribution systems, plant and animal health, and the microeconomy should 

also be planned. 

 A plan should be developed for the immediate immunization for the major 

childhood diseases of all children under five who have not been already 

immunized under the existing health system. Should the food security system in 

Cuba deteriorate and malnutrition rates rise, children under five will be at 

particular risk. 

 The reported high level of immunization coverage in Cuba should be 

surveyed, as the quality control in the production of these immunizations 

may be weak. This will reduce the mortality rates among children under five 

who are always the most vulnerable in any food emergency. 

 The well-established primary and secondary school system could be used to 

provide the nutritional supplements to children to maintain an adequate diet 

until the new government can create its own public health system. 

 Work with Cuban churches and their external supporting church institutions to 

use local religious networks and structures to assist with humanitarian relief. If 

the transition of previous communist societies is any indication of what will 

happen in Cuba, the churches will grow rapidly. 

80
 The church’s established grassroots organizations and volunteer networks 

could be used together with NGO counterparts as mechanisms for the 

provision of humanitarian assistance if careful accountability systems are 

set up to ensure proper targeting of need and control over relief 

commodities. 

 While official U.S. Government funding cannot be used to build or support 

churches, these grassroots institutions can be a stabilizing force during the 

stresses of a transition and an important force in longer-term development 

of civil society to guard against the return of totalitarianism. 

 Prepare to respond positively to a request from a transition government to 

assist with public security and law enforcement during the initial stages of 

transition, to protect both humanitarian assistance providers and the Cuban 

population. 

 Be prepared, if asked by the transition government, to commission appropriate 

NGOs to manage large-scale public works projects using local Cuban day 

labor to provide immediate jobs to ensure minimal income for families that are 

most at risk during the economic transition and to help with the relief and 

reconstruction efforts. Such public works projects could be centered, for 

example, on the rehabilitation of the road system 

 Prepare to respond positively to a request from transition authorities to help 

keep schools open, even if teachers are paid with food aid or volunteers have to 

be temporarily imported, in order to keep children and teenagers off the streets 

during this potentially unstable period. School attendance can keep teenagers 

from becoming involved in street crimes, and restore a degree of normalcy to 

home life. While support for schools is not typically seen as a humanitarian 

relief program, schools can have an ameliorative affect on the social order 

during a time of high stress.

 Prepare to provide short-term food aid via existing U.S. emergency programs, 

augmented by cooperation with international organizations, private donors, 

and other countries 

 Be prepared to propose a food aid monetization program to merchants, to 

maintain the price of food at a reasonable level. 

81
 U.S. agencies should seek to form a coordination unit with NGOs, the Red 

Cross movement, and UN agencies operating in Cuba to deal with the 

transition government as a single humanitarian voice. Studies of coordination 

mechanisms in other emergencies have found that the most effective system is 

for the indigenous government to demand a single point of contact. 

 Recommend that the transition government request that such a coordination 

mechanism set up and that all humanitarian agencies join this unit and work 

through it with the transition government agencies. 

 Use the humanitarian aid program to encourage the democratic transition. 

Experts on democratization argue that the democratic process is best taught 

through local government. 

 USAID could encourage NGOs that specialize in democratization 

programming to develop a joint program with humanitarian relief NGOs to 

set up local mechanisms for the public at the town and neighborhood level to 

participate in making important decisions in the relief program. 

IV. MEDIUM- AND LONG-TERM ACTIONS 

 A. Health 

The Cuban health system of socialized medicine was designed for the 

population to receive free preventive, curative, and rehabilitation care, including 

primary care, routine medical attention, dentistry, and hospital care requiring 

advanced medical technology. Cuba’s state-operated medical system started to 

decline when Soviet subsidies ended in 1989. Cuba is now faced with shortages of 

equipment, medical supplies and medication. Although the problem is not as 

severe as in other Caribbean nations, Cuba has an unquantified HIV/AIDS 

problem, fueled by the regime’s tacit acceptance of prostitution. 

The physical, mental, and emotional health of the Cuban people is directly 

linked to their level of empowerment. Healthy individuals are better able to make 

informed decisions about their own well-being and that of their community. This 

ability to be involved in the decision-making process leads, in and of itself, to a 

sense of empowerment. 

The Cuban people will likely expect a new government to place an emphasis 

on public health. With the proper equipment and supplies, Cuban physicians and 

82
other health care professionals will be able to practice medicine to an even higher 

standard. This will lead to a healthier population that will want to be involved in 

all areas affecting their lives. 

1. Public Health Infrastructure: Ensuring Adequate Systems and Resources 

It will be important, if asked by the transition government, to provide 

adequate epidemiological data and other health unit assistance. Cuban health care 

units integrate the monitoring, epidemiological surveys, and evaluation of the 

health care system. Such units also conduct rapid assessments and epidemiological 

investigations. Good epidemiological data will be necessary to determine where 

needs exist for short-term interventions and long-term plans in the health sector. 

UN agencies, along with the World Health Organization/PAHO, already have a 

presence in Cuba. Several NGOs in New York and Florida may also be able to 

provide technical assistance to Cuba. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 U.S. Government agencies, along with other partners, could work with Cuban 

epidemiologists by providing technical assistance, training, and equipment 

needed to update the national surveillance system. 

 Exchange opportunities, including organized visits to the U.S. Centers for 

Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the National Institutes of Health 

(NIH), could be arranged for Cuban epidemiologists in order to receive 

training and instruction in the latest means of collecting and evaluating data.

 The calibration and measurement traceability for existing medical equipment 

and laboratory equipment could be provided organized as well.

2. State of Health Care Delivery: Ensuring Adequate Systems and Resources 

i. Acute Care 

Cuba has by all accounts enough hospitals and hospital beds; however, the 

physical structure of these buildings is often in disrepair and unsafe. There is some 

question as to whether Cuba, in fact, has a surplus of secondary and tertiary health 

care facilities. Cuba also produces a surplus of medical professionals. There is no 

private health care, either in terms of insurance or providers. Sanitation is a 

concern in health care facilities and hospitals. Medical and surgical supplies, 

83
furniture, equipment, and medications (inpatient and outpatient prescribed and 

over-the-counter) are in short supply. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 U.S. Government agencies and international partners could evaluate hospitals. 

Although supposedly more than enough hospitals exist, there may be a need for 

improved safety of the physical structures and improved sanitation. 

 A “twinning program” could be established between Cuban and U.S. hospitals 

and/or Cuban provincial and U.S. county health departments to help improve 

Cuban practices and offer professional assistance. 

 Cuban pharmacists, who may have been underutilized in the past, may be using 

a wide variety of medications. They may need additional and up-to-date 

training, which could be provided via U.S. and other pharmaceutical agencies 

and exchange programs. 

 Many Caribbean nations and universities have outstanding medical facilities 

and programs, and may be able to assist in continuing medical education for 

Cuban healthcare professionals. 

ii. Primary Care 

 Family doctors in Cuba, who number some 28,500, provide the vast majority

of primary care coverage. There is a surplus of physicians, to the point that the 

Castro regime exports doctors as part of subsidized programs in the developing 

world. Cuba’s primary care and preventive medicine systems are faced with 

shortages of medicines and supplies even though Cuba has an established 

pharmaceutical industry. Primary care is also hampered by a poor transportation 

infrastructure, especially outside major urban centers. There are several avenues 

for assistance to Cuban health authorities in improving primary care services. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 U.S. Government agencies and international partners could evaluate the 

strengths and weaknesses of the Cuban healthcare system, and help determine 

the need for restructuring and/or modernization. 

84
 Encourage institutions in the U.S. and other countries to offer scholarships and 

fellowships to improve professional training. 

 Encourage NGOs, Caribbean universities, and private institutions to work with 

Cuban healthcare providers to address needs identified by Cuban authorities. 

iii. Elder Primary Care Services 

 Older people present a potentially vulnerable population in Cuba. Fourteen 

percent of Cuba’s population is 60 and over. According to a just released joint 

MERCK/PAHO report, in the next 20 years Cuba will have more people over 60 

than under 15. By 2025, over ten percent will be over 80. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 It might be useful to evaluate the quality of eldercare in Cuba. At present, there 

are 190 homes for the elderly on the island. Usually the residents of Cuban 

nursing homes have no extended family. With an aging population, 

surveillance studies could help prepare for immediate and future needs. 

 It would be useful to evaluate older people’s specific health needs for shortand long-term planning. The present and future older population will require 

medical services tailored to their needs. According to HelpAge International, 

most NGOs emphasize primary healthcare programs that neglect older people. 

Emergency food and nutrition programs are seldom adjusted to their needs and 

there is a tendency to overlook supplementary food programs for them. 

Reduced mobility, combined with distances to centralized health systemsand 

water-points, can create significant barriers to older people’s access to health 

services. 

 Initial efforts might include surveying the acute and chronic health care needs 

of older people both in the cities and rural areas. PAHO has done some initial 

work in its SABE study and could continue to be involved. At risk older persons 

need to be identified. 

 Systems could be put in place to ensure that older Cubans receive adequate 

medical treatment, especially for chronic conditions such as diabetes, 

hypertension, and the need for assistive devises. HHS has the expertise to offer 

technical assistance in establishing elder care programs. Care of the elderly 

involves communities, families, and NGO’s. 

85
 The nutritional situation of the Cuban elderly, reported as severe, could pose a 

challenge during any transition. In the initial stages, nutritional screening and 

comprehensive health assessments could be made to prevent malnutrition and 

severe medical crises. 

 Nutritional support programs should be mobilized from the world 

community including U.S. Government agencies, other governments and 

governmental agencies, faith-based organizations, humanitarian 

organizations, and UN organizations. 

3. HIV/AIDS Prevention and Care 

Cuba currently reports a low prevalence of HIV infection but is at high risk 

for a rapid spread of the epidemic. Men who have sex with other men represent 85 

percent of infected men. They and people practicing commercial sex are the most 

vulnerable groups for HIV infection. There has now been an increase in the 

transmission of HIV in the heterosexual population. It is estimated for every case 

diagnosed there is one case that is not diagnosed. Although the rates are low, it is 

important that during the transition the prevention message and treatment continue. 

i. Changing the Sanitarium Policy 

 From the onset of the HIV/AIDS pandemic until 1993, the Castro regime 

forcibly isolated HIV/AIDS patients in state sanitariums. Since 1993, the regime

has not required that HIV positive people live in sanitariums indefinitely. Newly 

diagnosed patients are required to spend eight weeks in a sanitarium completing 

courses on how to live with the virus, how to avoid transmitting it to others, the 

importance of follow-up treatment, and how to handle discrimination. Forty-eight 

percent of HIV positive Cubans live in these sanitariums. Many of these patients 

are rejected by their families and are the target of widespread discrimination, and 

thus choose to remain in the facilities. 

 ii. International Collaboration 

 It will be important to coordinate with the Global Fund for AIDS, TB, and 

Malaria (GFATM), which has given funding to Cuba for the prevention of HIV 

and treatment and care of people living with HIV. 

iii. Combating Prostitution and Irresponsible Sexual Activity 

86
Prostitution and child prostitution and exploitation are already a significant 

problem in Cuba due to increased tourism. Youth often become sexually active 

due to the absence of support systems and increased unemployment that may occur 

with changes in established systems. During the transition, the message of 

prevention can disseminated through many means, including schools, churches, 

printed material, television and radio, and peer education. Along with the 

prevention message, child prostitutes may need additional intervention with 

psychological issues. The GFATM has also given funding to Cuba for this 

prevention activity. Several Caribbean countries have very good programs and 

could share their experiences. 

iv. Workplace HIV/AIDS Prevention 

 Although the reported incidence of HIV/AIDS in Cuba is relatively low, the 

growing rate of infection in the heterosexual population and the lack of awareness 

by many people who carry the virus create conditions in which the disease could 

rapidly spread. Any spread of HIV/AIDS could have a devastating impact in the 

workplace and the economy by causing declines in output and productivity; losses 

of income and available labor; and higher health and labor costs related to sick 

leave, absenteeism, medical insurance, replacement and training, death-related 

costs, and shortage of skilled labor. The stigma attached to HIV/AIDS can also be 

particularly onerous in the workplace, making those who carry the virus subject to 

severe employment discrimination. On the prevention side, the potential impact of 

HIV/AIDS in the workplace makes it a powerful forum for raising awareness and 

attacking the spread of the disease. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 Encourage evaluation of sanitariums for quality of care and treatment. If 

patients are truly voluntary residents, suggest discussions with Cuban 

healthcare providers as to whether these institutions should continue. 

 During the government transition, there may be a need for temporary facilities 

in communities and prisons where patients receiving antiretrovirals can 

continue receiving their medications. Non-compliance with medications can 

interfere with the efficacy of the treatment and increase the risk of resistant 

strains of HIV. USAID and HHS could coordinate this activity with Cuban 

physicians. 

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 U.S. Government agencies should coordinate their efforts with the GFATM. 

 It will be important to continue HIV prevention messages. HHS, USAID, and 

the Peace Corps could give technical assistance in this regard and in 

establishing prevention programs. 

 In cooperation with transition authorities, Cuban employers, the International 

Labor Organization (ILO), the Academy for Educational Development, free 

Cuban trade unions, and Cuban health and education authorities, the U.S. 

Department of Labor could help to design and implement a workplace program 

to help prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS, enhance workplace protections, and 

reduce the disease’s adverse consequences for social, labor, and economic 

development. Such a program could strengthen Cuba’s capacity deal with 

HIV/AIDS through some or all of the following activities: 

 Assisting the review and revision of existing policy and legislation related to 

HIV/AIDS; 

 Collecting and analyzing data and best practices on HIV prevention and 

care; 

 Developing comprehensive workplace-based prevention and education 

programs; 

 Promoting and facilitating employer and employee interest in such 

programs; 

 Developing and disseminating informational and instructional materials; 

 Training outreach workers, instructors, and volunteers; and 

 Fostering linkages with relevant HIV/AIDS programs in other countries. 

4. Care for Prisoners 

 According to estimates, the Castro regime holds more than 100,000 

prisoners, or 900 inmates for every 100,000 people, in some 200 labor camps and 

prisons. At least 300 members of the total prison population are documented 

political detainees. It is possible that the total number of prisoners detained on 

various questionable charges is actually higher. The high number of prisoners, one 

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of the world’s highest rates of incarceration, is reflective of both the communist 

dictatorship’s control practices and the high real crime rate that is the result of the 

post-Soviet economic decline and the regime-induced breakdown of family 

structures. By all accounts, prison and camp conditions are extremely poor and 

inmates are frequently denied proper medical care, external contact, and other 

services. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 Offer to assist health and security authorities to survey the prison population, 

assessing living conditions and immediate health needs as well as their legal 

status. 

 Be prepared to assist in providing treatment for inmates whose detention is in 

violation of human rights laws, who may need treatment for medical conditions 

as well as counseling and assistance to help them reunite with their families 

and regain their occupational status and civil rights. 

 Be prepared to assist in providing all inmates proper health services, 

counseling, educational opportunities, and legal services so that they can 

eventually re-enter society as free and potentially productive citizens.

5. Improving Biomedical and Behavioral Sciences Research 

Cuba shares common health problems with the U.S. and other regional 

partners. Similar interests exist across a broad spectrum of priority health

concerns, including HIV/AIDS, dengue, and other infectious diseases; 

cardiovascular disease; hypertension; diabetes; nutritional disorders; cancer; and 

chronic pulmonary diseases, including asthma. 

 

Four initiatives could be undertaken by HHS/NIH, in the short-, medium-, or 

long-term to help build new or strengthen capacities to help address priority health 

concerns: 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 Development of research collaborations and consultations focused on health 

problems that represent a high burden in Cuba and throughout the region could 

lead to projects of benefit to the Cuban people and the global community. 

Workshops, conferences, and scientific meetings, small or large scale, and 

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could include PAHO, U.S. universities, the private sector, HHS/CDC, and other 

relevant U.S. Government agencies, and NGOs. 

 HHS could open more broadly its current training programs at HHS/NIH 

laboratory facilities in Bethesda, Maryland, to Cuban scientists and 

researchers, as well as its research training programs administered through 

U.S. universities. These programs cover a broad array of research interests, 

including HIV/AIDS, emerging infectious diseases, environmental health, and 

population and health. In addition, expanded efforts to support a return home 

after U.S.-based training could be considered. 

 Through a new travel award program, HHS could invite and support travel of 

Cuban scientists to international consultations on health research issues, or to 

attend state-of-the-art clinical and scientific conferences held in the U.S. These 

could include professional society meetings such as the annual meetings of the 

Infectious Diseases Society, the American Society for Tropical Medicine, 

American Pediatric Society, and Society for Neuroscience, American 

Association of Immunologists, and others. Individual research projects would 

be facilitated through personal contacts. 

 HHS/NIH could support grant-writing workshops as a means of building Cuban 

expertise. 

6. Mental Health Services 

 During the transition, the mental and emotional health of the Cuban people 

will be subjected to increased stress. Significant events and changes, whether 

positive or negative, can disrupt daily lives. Emotional stress is most often seen 

fairly early. It is important that healthcare professionals — including physicians, 

mental healthcare workers, and other counselors such as qualified clergy — be 

prepared to deal with this possibility. 

i. Community-based Intervention 

Initially, the community and community leaders, faith-based organizations, 

schools, and other civic institutions might benefit from some basic training in 

community-based interventions to restore a sense of wellness and hope to the 

general public. Humanitarian organizations and organizations that are trained in 

these situations can provide crisis intervention as needed. 

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ii. Mental Health Education 

Similarly, mental health professionals may benefit from continuing medical 

education in the use of the new medications for various psychiatric diagnoses. 

This can be accomplished through exchange programs with partner countries. 

iii. Evaluation of Patients in Mental Institutions 

Evaluation of patients in Cuban mental institutions could be done fairly 

quickly. There are suggestions that the regime has used psychiatric and mental 

health facilities as instruments of repression and intimidation. The incarcerated 

population may also need a rapid mental health assessment since many may be 

political prisoners. 

iv. Evaluation of the Elderly 

Older people are often overlooked in times of emergency. The feelings of 

loss, trauma, confusion, and fear familiar to all people in emergencies can be more 

damaging for older people. They may need special support to recover emotionally 

and find new roles. Elderly people’s chronic health, mobility, and mental-health 

problems are not a priority for aid agencies in most emergencies. 

Relief efforts could include sensitizing and training community mental 

health professionals to the special needs of older Cubans who may have an 

especially difficult time dealing with changes and losses. Older Cubans could be 

provided with crisis intervention, counseling, and information. Outreach efforts to 

older Cubans could be made, as they may not reach out for services. These efforts 

could involve organizations such as the American Red Cross, HelpAge 

International, and Little Havana Activities & Nutrition Center of Dade County, 

Inc. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 U.S. agencies could develop a toolkit for community workers on health 

promotion that stresses prevention, self-efficacy, and rebuilding trust in each 

other and the government. 

 HHS and USAID could work with Cuban mental health professionals to 

determine how to best rapidly evaluate and decide if urgent intervention is 

needed for a patient. 

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 U.S. agencies could assist in evaluating patients in Cuban mental institutions. 

 U.S. programs such as HelpAge International could provide elder health care 

advice and assistance. 

 HHS’s Administration on Aging and Substance Abuse and Mental Health 

Services Administration (SAMHSA) could facilitate outreach efforts to older 

Cubans. 

7. Drug Use and Alcohol Abuse Prevention and Treatment 

 Cuba is a proven trafficking point for drugs and possesses its own drug 

problems. With the possible stresses on individuals during the transition there may 

be an increase in drug use, including alcohol. There are several U.S. and 

international sources of assistance that could help address these challenges. A 

great deal of data and written material in many languages can be translated into 

Spanish. For example, existing health professions training in Spanish developed 

by SAMHSA could be provided in the early stages of transition, on issues such as 

screening mechanisms within primary care settings for identifying addictive 

disorders, co-occurring mental health problems, and traumatic stress. Moreover, in 

Puerto Rico, the Addiction Technology Transfer Center is an immediate resource 

that can be tapped as a vehicle to establish host country links and to coordinate 

addiction training and treatment programs with other NGOs and international relief 

agencies. There may need to be Cuba-specific research and data on drug use and 

effective treatment methods. Drug use and addiction are public health problems, 

which are best dealt with by public health approaches — prevention, early 

intervention, and treatment. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 Be prepared to conduct an evaluation, if necessary, to determine if current 

regime claims that intravenous drug use is not a problem in Cuba, and to 

identify the “drug of choice” of the Cuban population. Data may be needed to 

formulate the best prevention message. 

 In the initial stages of Cuban freedom, Spanish-language educational materials 

on prevention from the United States could be reprinted and shared with Cuba. 

Prevention messages to children should include the dangers of tobacco and 

alcohol. 

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 As U.S. companies begin operations in Cuba they should be encouraged to 

adopt drug-testing policies, especially those companies with sensitive positions 

such as transportation providers. SAMHSA could serve as a resource on drug 

testing in the government workforce. 

 Make provisions for continuing medical education through U.S. institutions and 

the universities in the Caribbean. Primary care health professionals could be 

trained and prepared to identify and intervene in cases of suspected or reported 

drug abuse. 

 

 The U.S. Department of Education’s Institute of Education Sciences and Office 

of Safe and Drug-Free Schools can contribute to research, dissemination, and 

educational efforts in Cuba. 

 HHS’s National Institute on Drug Abuse could help establish a research 

infrastructure. Surveys and data reporting may have to take place in person, 

as the infrastructure in Cuba will not immediately support polling by mail or 

telephone. Sources of information include the general public, schools, criminal 

law enforcement, employers, and medical professionals. 

B. Education and Culture 

1. Overview

The current state of the Cuban education system may be summarized by a 

statement from Cuban scholar Graciella Cruz-Taura in a report to the University of 

Miami’s Cuban Transition Project: 

Most assessments of the state of Cuban education continue to 

conclude that Cuba is an indebted, poor country with a highly 

educated population that is particularly well trained in the exact and 

military sciences. One decade after the collapse of the Soviet world, 

the Cuban educational system is besieged by diminishing resources, 

ideological ambiguity, and labor demands unable to accommodate the 

scientifically trained graduates the Revolution had showcased as one 

of its major accomplishments and as the cornerstone of its legitimacy. 

It was a system designed to service Marxist-Leninist ideology and the 

one-party state. If Cuba is going to make a peaceful transition into an 

age of globalization and post-communism, this philosophy of 

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education must be reversed to one that will legitimately and 

effectively service the individual.10

Implementing the change proposed by Cruz-Taura and other experts likely 

will require actions focused on renewing a participatory civic culture that supports 

free enterprise, the rule of law, and personal accountability; promotes alternative 

solutions to problems, including those solutions provided by public, private, and 

faith-based entities; encourages high standards for students and educators; and 

introduces new governance models that encourage parental and community 

involvement and devolve significant responsibilities to local and institutional 

leadership. The aims of education and training at all levels could be to reinforce 

democracy and produce the knowledge and skills needed to allow Cubans to be 

successful in the global economy. 

This section is divided into three parts: recommendations that apply to the 

whole Cuban education system; recommendations specific to particular levels and 

types of education; and recommendations for the related areas of cultural 

preservation and exchange. 

2. Assistance for System-wide Reform of Cuban Education 

i. Reintroducing Democratic Values Through Education 

 

A Cuban transitional government, together with assisting governments, 

international organizations, and private donors, may want to complete a 

comprehensive review and needs assessment regarding system reform, priorities 

for action, and available resources. We have identified certain issues as basic to 

long-term reform and critical at all levels of the education system. 

a. Civil Rights and Equal Access to Educational Opportunity 

A democratic Cuba likely will operate a free public education system that is 

open to all parents who choose to enroll their children in it, and will permit and 

recognize private and church-related schools and allow parents the option of using 

them. Access to postsecondary education, both vocational and academic, likely 

will be encouraged for all qualified graduates of secondary schools, and the higher 

education system should be open to public, private, and church-related institutions. 

Assistance to parents and adults in financing education likely will be made 

10 Graciella Cruz-Taura, “Rehabilitating Cuban Education,” 2002

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available as resources permit and should be available to all who qualify for it. 

Cuba has a sad history of separating disabled citizens and denying them access to 

mainstream opportunities, as well as socioeconomic, racial-ethnic, and political 

discrimination. The new system likely will cease discriminatory practices that 

exist and avoid introducing new ones such as discrimination for reasons of political 

revenge or elitism. The United States could offer several forms of assistance, if 

asked, to help the transition government establish such a system. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 The U.S. Government could assist transition authorities assess areas of 

vulnerability in providing equal access to educational opportunity for all 

population groups regardless of racial/ethnic background, religious preference, 

gender, disability, legitimate political affiliation, or family history. 

 The U.S. Government could provide technical assistance to Cuban policy 

makers in the development of laws and regulations that protect the educational 

rights of all individuals and groups. Experts from the U.S. could advise on this 

issue, as could agencies such as the U.S. Departments of Justice and Education. 

 The U.S. Government could assist in putting in place a framework to ensure 

access to and training for the teaching profession without discrimination with 

regard to political, religious, or philosophical beliefs, race, ethnicity, family or 

social background, gender, or disability. 

 The U.S. Government could assist in training Cuban print and broadcast 

journalists through educational programs at U.S. colleges and universities, 

professional exchange programs with U.S. media outlets, and professional 

mentoring relationships between Cuban and U.S. media professionals 

b. Education for a Culture of Democracy 

A priority of the new Cuban education system may well be building a 

culture of shared democratic ideals and citizenship skills. This likely will require 

the removal and replacement of biased, ideological, and outdated instructional 

materials; the retraining of educators; a comprehensive civic education program 

involving schools, communities, churches, and the media; and curricula designed 

to address specific post-communist transition issues such as respect for law and 

trusting others, responsibility and accountability, participatory democracy, and 

entrepreneurship. 

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Once initial replacement of heavily politicized materials is complete, a 

transition government may want to introduce curriculum content in civic and 

democracy education and in character education programs that inculcate values at 

all levels by working with public education authorities and appropriate civil society 

groups, including those providing or sponsoring private education. Training and 

retraining educators likely will be an essential component, as will be the 

introduction of material on the new Cuban legal and political systems. Models for 

this civic curriculum could involve resources such as the Department of 

Education’s Civitas Latin America program. In order to minimize resistance to the 

change, efforts should be made to identify educational texts and materials from

other Spanish-speaking countries that could be used by Cuba. 

Cubans at all education levels can benefit from education in the principles 

and values of free enterprise economics and the appropriate knowledge and skills 

for employment and advancement. This probably requires the modification of the 

curriculum at all levels, retraining of educators, and encouraging the nascent 

business community to engage in economics and business education in partnership 

with public and private educational providers. 

Cubans will want to feel that the new system works for them, and they likely 

would benefit from informal advice, counseling, and networking in addition to 

more formal services. A useful part of the overall civic and economic education 

process can be to establish mentoring networks, via churches, business and 

professional associations, fraternal associations, and clubs to enable Cubans to 

build the contacts and obtain the advice that will be important as they navigate the 

new civil society, consider career options, seek to start businesses, or look for jobs 

or specific assistance. Organizations outside Cuba that have island connections, 

such as church groups, Freemasons, Rotary and other business clubs, and other 

private groups can be beneficial as mentoring partners to Cuban citizens of all 

ages, professions, and circumstances. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 The U.S. Government should be prepared, if asked by the transition 

government, to assist in the following manner: 

 Introduce modern civic education curriculum concepts and practices 

(instruction) at all levels; 

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 Introduce modern instruction in economics and business; 

 Expand and emphasize exchange opportunities, making them available to 

Cuban educators, students, community leaders, civic groups, and business 

entrepreneurs, including arrangements providing opportunities for two-way 

exchange of people and information (the U.S. Fulbright Exchange program 

and related programs can be of great assistance in this process); and 

 Institute mentoring programs and partnerships. 

ii. Reforming Educational Governance 

Cuba has always had a national education system overseen by an education 

ministry. The new Cuban government will determine what kind of governance 

structure is best for Cuba’s future. Regardless, the extreme centralized control, 

security institutions, and opposition to private education that characterized the 

Castro regime will no doubt be modified or eliminated. Suggestions for how the 

U.S. Government could assist a transition change a free Cuban educational 

governance organization include the following. 

a. Encourage Educational Diversity 

Modern systems of education are increasingly diverse. Strong public 

education sectors are supplemented by private sectors that supply both general and 

specialized services to populations that choose them. Alternative approaches to 

education, such as distance learning, are becoming increasingly common and 

important as tools for both traditional and nontraditional providers. And the 

national system will be more responsive to Cubans and cost-effective if a 

mechanism is provided that permits public input as well as a measure of selfgovernance. The post-transition Cuban education system will be stronger and 

better able to serve all of the needs of the Cuban people and economy if it 

recognizes and encourages educational diversity. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 The Offices of Non-Public Schools and Faith-Based Initiatives, U.S. 

Department of Education, could serve as facilitating agencies in ensuring that 

the system recognizes private as well as public educational providers, and 

could: 

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 Facilitate the development of private, including faith-based, education and 

training solutions where these can fill demand niches, improve quality, and 

provide services more efficiently than public institutions; 

 Ascertain which of the religious groups that had schools in Cuba have plans 

to reopen their schools, such as the famous Colégio Belen Jesuit 

Preparatory School in Havana; 

 Assist in consideration of changing laws and regulations to permit private 

providers to operate and offer a full range of services, from short courses to 

degree programs; 

 Encourage Cuba’s new education authorities to consider some degree of 

decentralization and self-governance, by considering national policies, laws, 

and regulations that permit local communities and parent organizations a 

voice in the operation of public schools; 

 Likewise, they could be encouraged to allow public schools and 

postsecondary institutions a measure of self-governance, including the 

capacity to raise funds and accept gifts; 

 Private schools, postsecondary institutions, and other providers could be 

allowed complete self-governing rights so long as adequate educational 

standards are maintained (the Inter-American System could coordinate 

governance reform assistance provided by Hemispheric partners consisting 

of law and education experts such as the Inter-American Justice Studies 

Center or other similar institutions); and 

 The U.S. Department of Education could contribute research and assistance, 

in cooperation with USAID, in promoting new and non-traditional solutions. 

Cuban authorities could be encouraged to consider new solutions to the 

organization and delivery of education, such as the development of private 

and charter schools, distance education, and possibly the development of 

institutions similar to community colleges to help prepare youth and adults 

for careers or job changes. 

b. Education Statistics and Management Tools 

As with other aspects of a transition, Cuba’s education system can benefit 

from the establishment of a modern information system. This step will be 

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important in order to be able to make and implement good policy decisions and 

monitor progress over time. A transition government likely will want to ensure 

that data collection is regular and that all institutions, public and private, are held 

accountable for performance. This effort could make use of the Summit of the 

Americas Regional Indicators project and enlist the help of other countries. The 

National Center for Education Statistics can contribute expertise. 

c. Parent, Employer, and Community Involvement 

No matter how a free Cuba decides to organize the governance of education, 

it will be useful to be able to provide ways for the government and the schools to 

receive assistance from interested donors and to help build democracy through 

organic connections to the communities in which schools are located and which 

they serve. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 The U.S. Government should be prepared to assist the transition government in 

doing the following: 

 Give parents and communities a supportive role in local education. By 

working with Cuban leaders and educators, and with advising governments 

and private organizations, to encourage the involvement of parents, the 

private sector, and community leaders in education through volunteering,

participating in school governance, fundraising, equipment donations, and 

other forms of partnering. Peace Corps Volunteers could provide assistance 

to communities in this process. 

 Help to build viable stakeholder relations, by offering technical assistance 

and facilitation for the establishment of parent and community groups, 

including faith-based groups, and encouraging the establishment of business 

partnerships with schools and post-secondary institutions. 

 Help develop Cuba-specific parent toolkits and other aids to assist in 

developing research-based, user-friendly publications and other resources 

in Spanish and other languages for community, faith-based, and parent 

organizations, and design toolkits for parent and community group use. 

Possible topics include how to be involved in your child’s education, 

tutoring and homework, keeping children safe and drug-free, and character 

education. The U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Intergovernmental 

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and Interagency Affairs, Institute of Education Sciences, and Office of Safe 

and Drug-Free Schools could provide assistance. 

d. National Commission on Progress through Education 

To promote national dialogue on school reform, the United States could 

assist a transition government in establishing a National Commission on Progress 

through Education, in association with Cuba’s existing network of libraries. Each 

library could be designated as the organizing entity for a local “Progress through 

Education” dialogue. Community members in attendance could voice concerns 

and share ideas directly with officials from the new Ministry of Education. The 

dialogue could focus on particular themes, such as curriculum and teacher 

education. In addition to serving as a community needs assessment, such a process 

could help to establish ownership and empowerment in education reform and send 

the message that the government is dedicated to creating a system of education that 

is responsive to the needs of the people. 

RECOMMENDATION: 

 Assist a transition government establish a National Commission on Progress 

through Education, in association with Cuba’s existing network of libraries. 

e. Community Education Boards 

Working with a new Cuban Ministry of Education, community education 

boards could encourage local community participation in local school affairs by 

establishing an outreach program focused on community ownership and 

investment in schools. Building from the success of similar initiatives in the 

region, officials from the Inter-American system and the United States could work 

with the Cuban Ministry of Education, the Independent Libraries network, and 

other national stakeholders to establish local school community education boards. 

The specific functions of these boards would evolve as necessary, yet the two 

primary goals might be to (1) encourage support and accountability for education 

in the community by promoting the importance of quality education to a private 

sector, NGOs, and private agencies, and by demonstrating ways in which these 

entities can become involved in local schools; and (2) formally represent the needs 

of the community (teachers, students, and administrators alike) to the national 

government, and the private and non-profit sectors on an on-going basis. 

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RECOMMENDATION: 

 Be prepared to work with the new Cuban Ministry of Education, the 

Independent Libraries network, and other national stakeholders to establish 

local school community education boards. 

f. Leadership Development 

After a transition, a free Cuba will develop a new generation of educational 

and civic leaders even as it reorients current students, educators, and community 

leaders. These twin needs provide an opportunity to develop a cadre of potential 

leaders, experts, and researchers, who can assume positions of influence in 

academic, government, and nongovernmental sectors. 

RECOMMENDATION: 

 Through the Department of State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs 

(ECA) Partnerships for Learning program, a variety of educational, youth, 

cultural, and professional exchange programs can be employed to promote civil 

society, development of nongovernmental organizations, and good governance 

practices and linking of Cuban schools, students, and teachers with their U.S. 

counterparts. 

 The U.S. Government should be prepared early in a transition to implement 

exchanges for the purposes of professional development. 

iii. High Standards for All 

A free Cuba will likely seek to create an education system that is modern, 

flexible, and open. There are mechanisms for maintaining high standards that may 

have particular relevance for the transition process in Cuba and for the specific 

needs of the Cuban education system as it reforms itself. 

a. Curricular Standards and Assessments 

A new Cuba’s educational leaders will likely revise the school curriculum to 

rid it of communist ideology and to update those portions that could not keep pace 

with international intellectual developments while the Castro regime controlled 

what people learned and how. Vocational and higher education institutions may 

also need to revise their curricula as appropriate. If requested, U.S. educators 

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could assist in the creation of a system of standards, curricula, and assessments in 

core academic content areas and elective areas in the Cuban school curriculum. 

1. Duration of Schooling 

Cuba is a country that has operated a school cycle consisting of 9 years of 

compulsory education. Incentives to drop out and seek employment in the black 

market or tourism sectors, and perceived disincentives to finish school (through the 

12th year) and seek postsecondary education, have produced a significant 

population of undereducated persons. 

2. Academic Standards for All Students 

A system of standards and assessment may be needed to ensure that all 

Cuban children (including those with disabilities) have access to a quality 

education and that their performance is assessed on their achievement of set 

standards. Individual student achievement data could inform education policy 

decision regarding curriculum, academic focus, and professional development. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 The U.S. Department of Education should be prepared to participate, perhaps 

in cooperation with the OAS and the private sector, in the creation of a system 

of standards, curricula, and assessments in core academic content areas and 

elective areas in the Cuban school curriculum. 

 Encourage Cuban authorities to adopt policies after the transition that 

recognize the need for employable adults to have completed school and that 

provides incentives for youth to stay in school for twelve years and graduate.

 Be prepared to assist Cuban authorities in devising a system of standards and 

assessment to ensure that all Cuban children have access to a quality education 

and that their performance is assessed based on their achievement of set 

standards.

b. The Teaching Profession 

Education is one of the professions that a transition Cuban government may 

need to evaluate and reform. Cuba may suffer a temporary teacher shortage due to 

a combination of the reform process and the loss of many teachers who had left the 

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profession during the Castro years, often for work in tourism and other jobs. 

Several opportunities may exist to offer assistance to Cuba in restoring and 

maintaining the high professional standards that its education system needs. 

1. Encourage Cubans to Enter, or Re-enter, the Education Profession 

Aid donors could assist the transition government in providing positive 

incentives for former educators to re-enter teaching and for new higher education 

graduates to be attracted to the profession. 

2. Establish effective Teacher Preparation Practices Through Partnerships 

The United States could facilitate partnerships between Cuban educators and 

institutions, and those in the United States and other assisting nations, to develop 

professional teacher standards that are aligned to academic standards, and to 

redesign teacher preparation programs (including curriculum) as well as programs 

preparing administrators and other professionals. The U.S. Department of 

Education could assist with teacher standards development. 

3. Help Design and Implement Effective Professional Development Programs 

U.S. and other experts could participate in technical assistance missions and 

teacher and faculty exchanges to implement models for professional development 

to increase the knowledge base (general knowledge content as well as democratic 

and civic education content and values) of current pre-K-12 teachers and 

paraprofessionals, vocational instructors, and postsecondary faculty. The Fulbright 

Teacher Exchange Program could assist this process, and the effort could involve 

U.S. community colleges, four-year colleges, and universities.

4. Develop a Corps of Potential Leaders Who Would Assume Positions of 

Influence in Academic, Public, and Private Education

 

The Department of State, through the Bureau of Educational and Cultural 

Affairs Fulbright and Humphrey exchange programs, could implement programs to 

achieve this objective. 

5. Establish a “Teach for Cuba’s Future” Program 

One of the critical steps to reform education in Cuba and support the 

development of a democratic culture may be a fundamental shift in instruction 

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from a system based on rote learning and ideology to one that teaches independent 

thinking and problem solving. Such a shift may require not only entirely new 

teaching materials, but also teachers who are prepared to teach these skills. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 USAID should be prepared to collaborate with IARB, private sector donors, 

and businesses in providing low-cost or free educations for prospective 

teachers and salary and living cost incentives for returning teachers. 

 The U.S. Government should be prepared to facilitate partnerships between 

Cuban educators and institutions, and those in the United States and other 

assisting nations, to develop professional teacher standards that are aligned to 

academic standards, and to redesign teacher preparation programs as well as 

programs preparing administrators and other professionals. The U.S. 

Department of Education could assist with teacher standards development. 

 The U.S. Government should be prepared to participate in technical assistance 

missions and teacher and faculty exchanges. The Fulbright Teacher Exchange 

Program could assist this process. 

 The Department of State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs 

Fulbright and Humphrey exchange programs should be prepared to implement 

programs to develop a corps of potential leaders who would assume positions 

of influence in academic, public, and private education. 

 The U.S. government, perhaps in cooperation with the OAS, IDB, and countries 

in the region, could provide funding, technical assistance, and materials in 

Spanish to a new Cuban Ministry of Education to support a “Teach for Cuba’s 

Future” program, which would be open both to existing teachers and those who 

seek to enter the classroom for the first time. It could consist of the following 

components: 

 Vacation Institutes of three weeks’ duration, to teach teachers how to 

present lessons that encourage children to think and to work in groups to 

solve problems, also fostering a spirit of trust and mutual support. 

 Resource Centers to provide ongoing assistance to teachers who have 

attended the Vacation Institutes and to provide sample lesson plans and 

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other resources that support the new national curriculum and the 

development of thinking skills. 

 Networks of Teachers and possibly a “buddy” system will be set up during the 

Institutes, to provide ongoing support to teachers from among their peers as 

they try out their new skills in the classroom. 

c. Accreditation and Quality Assurance 

It will be important for Cuban educational authorities to develop and 

implement a non-political process for the recognition and regular quality assurance 

inspection of all schools, post-secondary institutions, and other education providers 

operating in the country. There are several successful models for such a process, 

but there is no doubt that a high-quality modern education system needs a quality 

assurance process to achieve and maintain credibility as well as to protect its 

standards and its people. 

RECOMMENDATION: 

 U.S. Government and other experts, including accrediting associations and 

quality assurance authorities, should be prepared to cooperate with Cuban 

educators to develop a workable national system of ensuring the quality of 

Cuban public and private education providers and programs of study at all 

levels. 

iv. Educational Technology 

 Information technology has the potential to help a free Cuba make a 

technological leap in education reform and also overcome poor physical 

communications facilities, especially in rural areas and eastern Cuba. 

The use of computer-assisted learning techniques and other information 

technology resources is now common in education systems, and Cuba is no 

exception. While the Castro regime claims that over 80 percent of Cuban schools 

are wired for computers and possess Internet access, the truth will have to await an 

inventory during a transition. What is known is that the Castro regime restricts 

Internet access to selected sites and operates a very powerful national firewall that 

blocks most signals. It also censors other electronic media and polices their use. 

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In addition, school buildings in Cuba are known to vary widely in condition and 

upkeep, and technology is not always current. 

Despite these barriers, many Cubans have learned to operate modern 

information technology and bypass Castro’s censors. In addition, churches have 

assisted in providing community-based instruction in computer use and access to 

modern equipment and software. 

a. Share Best Practices and Resources 

 The United States and other assistance providers can assist the Cuban 

authorities in developing and implementing good instructional uses of information 

technology as well as with equipment upgrades and training. Some specific 

suggestions include: 

1. Encourage the Use of Educational Technology Where Possible 

Share expertise on the training of teachers to use technology in the 

classroom by facilitating technical assistance efforts between Cuban teacher 

training programs and U.S. school districts, universities and colleges, and other 

expert groups in examining best practices and integrating educational technology 

into subject content areas. 

2. Assist Cubans in Developing Accessible and High-Quality Educational 

Technology 

Organize technical assistance for national planning and policy development 

in the use of educational technology that ensures accessibility and connectivity for 

all potential users. Develop public-private partnerships and networks of experts to 

serve as valuable resources for Cuban leadership involved in future strategic 

planning and policy development efforts. 

3. Join and Make use of the Education Portal of the Americas 

This international Internet service is managed by the OAS to facilitate online 

training offered by over 250 partner institutions of higher learning from throughout 

the Hemisphere and Spain. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

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 The Department of Education’s Office of Educational Technology could share 

its database of successful projects on the use of educational technology and 

coordinate the provision of outside expertise. 

 The Office of Educational Technology can also provide assistance and 

resources in the area of technology planning. 

 The U.S. Government should encourage a free Cuba to join the OAS Education 

Portals of the Americas electronic network and make use of its resources. 

b. Classroom-to-Classroom Linkages 

 For Cuban schools that are wired, a program could be implemented to 

promote classroom-to-classroom connections between Cuban schools and teachers 

and their U.S. counterparts — including those schools with large numbers of 

Cuban-Americans — using models such as those established by the Friendship 

Through Education initiative and the World Wise Schools program of the Peace 

Corps. Such linkages could also be expanded to other countries, providing an 

array of new, mutually beneficial linkages with Cuban schools. 

c. Distance Education 

 Distance education can provide many advantages to a free Cuba if it is 

developed intelligently and if high standards are imposed as for other types of 

education. Properly done, distance education is an excellent resource for reaching 

into all locations and for empowering people who may not otherwise have access 

to educational opportunities. 

1. Establish Good Policies and Standards for Distance Education

Cuban authorities, in concert with outside experts, could undertake the 

development of a national distance learning policy, including standards for 

accredited providers, and tools such as a resource database 

2. Create Cuban Versions of Neighborhood Technology Centers 

Cuba could establish its own versions of neighborhood Technology Centers 

via collaborations involving Cuban leaders and educators, agencies from countries 

with significant distance learning experience and appropriate private organizations. 

These centers could be located in rural and urban areas, providing the entire 

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community with access to technology, computers, and the Internet. Partner with 

OAS, IICA, and other institutions that are working to establish centers throughout 

the nations of this Hemisphere. 

RECOMMENDATION: 

 The Office of Educational Technology, Office of Post Secondary Education, and 

regional and state policy groups in the United States could assist in the effort to 

establish good policies and standards for distance education. 

v. Improve Cuba’s Educational Infrastructure 

There is little doubt, based on the observation of visitors over the past 

decade, that Cuba’s educational infrastructure is in poor shape. Even “model” 

schools and other facilities (laboratories, libraries, computing centers) in or near 

Havana that the Castro regime allows visitors to see show signs of decay and age 

(often superficially covered by a fresh coat of paint or stucco) and lack the 

amenities and necessities considered normal elsewhere. Reports of church leaders 

and others from remote and underserved areas like eastern Cuba indicate much 

worse conditions. Private educational facilities are at present nonexistent. Former 

private establishments seized after 1959 have either been converted for other uses 

and are no longer suitable for educational use, or have been abandoned and 

allowed to go to ruin for 45 years. Tackling this decay and neglect will take 

money, time, and expertise, but it may need to be done if Cuba’s people are to reap 

the benefits of a modern and free education system. 

a. Develop an Infrastructure Plan Based on a Facilities Inventory 

An educational facilities inventory might be one of the first tasks of 

educational authorities during the transition after Castro. Based on this, plus an 

assessment of priorities and resources, Cuba could develop an infrastructure 

improvement plan. This may well involve the sale or discard of some properties as 

well as coordination with private and religious educational foundations. The 

renovation and reconstruction of Cuban schools, community learning centers, and 

vocational and higher education facilities could be a priority in infrastructural 

assistance planning. Cuban authorities could work with international financial 

organizations to introduce low-cost capital financing and other mechanisms to 

improve the infrastructure. 

b. Accessibility and Universal Design 

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 The principle of empowering all Cubans likely will require attention to 

making as much of Cuba’s educational infrastructure as possible accessible to all, 

including persons with disabilities. Public and private education authorities should 

ensure that renovated and new education and training facilities are accessible to 

persons with disabilities and are wired to accommodate modern educational 

technology. Assistance agencies, organizations, and businesses should work with 

Cuban authorities to develop cost-effective design and construction solutions. 

RECOMMENDATION: 

 The U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Special Education and 

Rehabilitative Services can assist Cuban authorities make as much of Cuba’s 

educational infrastructure as possible accessible to all. 

c. Libraries and Information Resources 

 The renovation and modernization of Cuba’s libraries, museums, and other 

information resources will be a major undertaking that might best operate in 

coordination with reforming and modernizing the education system. Public 

libraries, school libraries, and university libraries, will need adequate current 

materials to replace outmoded and deteriorated holdings. There could also be 

assistance in providing needed technical services and in upgrading facilities in 

conjunction with other educational infrastructure improvements. Cuban libraries 

and information centers can benefit from modern information technology, and their 

staffs can be trained or retrained to provide modern information services for a free 

society. Foreign assistance providers and Cuban experts could cooperate in 

revitalizing Cuban libraries. Organizations such as the Institute of Museum and 

Library Services, the American Library Association, and other interested private 

sector organizations should be encouraged to support this endeavor. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 The State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs should 

offer to cooperate in the effort to bring to Cuban libraries and information 

centers new, up to date information. 

 To promote literacy and reading among Cubans, the Department of Education 

could provide assistance to Cuban libraries to conduct book fairs.

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d. Adopt-a-School Programs 

 Business investors in Cuba may be in a position, and inclined, to assist local 

schools, vocational education centers, and higher education institutions that supply 

them with their workforce and support the whole community. This is an 

opportunity that could extend the resources available to Cuban education 

reformers, and if possible it should be encouraged. 

RECOMMENDATION: 

 The U.S. Department of Education could join U.S. private organizations and 

state agencies, partnership organizations such as Sister Cities International, 

and other countries with successful business-school partnerships to assist in 

this process. 

3. Assistance at Specific Levels and for Specific Types of Education 

i. Early Childhood Education 

a. Modernize and Professionalize Early Education 

Both teachers in the primary grades and child day care providers are 

frequently poorly qualified in Castro’s Cuba because labor shortages have led to 

allowing secondary (high school) students to provide these services on so-called 

“emergency” appointments. In addition to encouraging qualified persons to enter 

the field of early childhood education, transition authorities could review existing 

policies on early childhood education and related day care and improve or establish 

standards for professional certification, for accreditation of providers, and 

curricular and program guidelines that synchronize with the initial school grades. 

b. Make Early Education Accessible Through Choice of Providers

The aforementioned labor shortages plus the fact that many current teachers 

are may need to be retrained may make it difficult for Cuban authorities to supply 

adequate early childhood services from the existing public education workforce. 

Therefore, assistance donors, including private and faith-based organizations, 

could work with Cuban authorities to provide a variety of early childhood options 

for families with different needs. The goal should be to ensure equal access to 

early childhood programs for all families, including those with children with 

disabilities. 

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ii. Second- (English-) Language Learning 

a. Help Strengthen Second (English) Language Education for All 

The Castro regime enforced Russian as the main foreign language to be 

learned by Cubans prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since 1990, there has 

been some move toward English, but this has been slowed by the large-scale 

departure of qualified English language teachers for jobs in the tourism industry. 

Assistance donors can help improve this situation — which will be very important 

for competitiveness and to attract foreign investment — by cooperating with 

Cuban educators and employers in the establishment of effective second-language 

programs in English in the schools at the primary and secondary levels, in 

postsecondary institutions, and in courses for adults who need improved language 

skills. Teacher exchanges in this area could be particularly valuable. Establish 

school-to-school programs rapidly. 

RECOMMENDATION: 

 The Department of Education’s Office of English Language Acquisition could 

assist with this objective in conjunction with the Peace Corps, USAID, and the 

Department of State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. 

iii. Safe and Drug-Free Schools 

a. Ensure Safe and Drug-Free Learning Environments 

There is no clear evidence that serious crime or drug abuse problems exist in 

Cuban schools, but these problems do exist in Cuban society and could infect the 

schools during a transition if adequate preventive steps are not taken. If asked, 

U.S. authorities, churches, and other donors should work with Cuban transition 

authorities and those providing other assistance to ensure that drug abuse 

prevention and anti-crime measures are implemented as needed in Cuba’s schools. 

This effort could involve coordination across the areas of infrastructural 

renovation, civic and character education programs, parent and community 

involvement, and professional development to create learning environments free of 

crime, health hazards, and climates of mistrust and intimidation. 

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RECOMMENDATION: 

 The Departments of Justice, Education (Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools), 

and Housing and Urban Development, plus the Office of National Drug Control 

Policy, could provide assistance and expertise, and work with private donors to 

help Cuban transition authorities develop and implement drug abuse prevention 

and anti-crime initiatives for Cuba’s schools. 

b. Develop Cuban Drug Use Prevention, Health, and Nutrition Education 

Programs 

Technical assistance should be offered to a transition government to assist 

Cuban educators to develop and implement national curricula, programs, and 

services to inform students, parents, and adults of the dangers of drug use, to 

identify patterns of abuse, and to refer cases as appropriate to health and law 

enforcement authorities. Assistance in the development of curricula can be 

supplied by experienced private organizations, including religious bodies. 

RECOMMENDATION: 

 The Department of Education and Office of National Drug Control Policy 

should provide joint assistance in developing action and management 

strategies. 

c. Encourage Cooperation Between Educators and Health and Law

Enforcement Professionals 

A Cuban transition government will develop its own policies and procedures 

for coordinating the development and implementation of appropriate health 

education and drug use prevention programs, referral protocols, training materials, 

and instructor training across its education, health, and law enforcement 

authorities. 

RECOMMENDATION: 

 If asked, the Office of National Drug Control Policy, perhaps together with 

partner agencies in OAS countries and their local jurisdictions, could help 

provide law enforcement coordination. 

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iv. Career and Technical Education 

a. Help Improve Preparation for the Transition from School to 

Postsecondary Education and Work

The transition to a free economy, the curtailing of the black market 

economy, and the demobilization of the state security apparatus likely will result in 

career transition challenges as well as the need for information and programs to 

prepare Cubans for a host of new employment opportunities. Cuban educational 

authorities may benefit from assistance in improving and modernizing educational 

and career counseling and assessment services. These services could be provided 

for students at the secondary and postsecondary levels as well as for adult learners. 

RECOMMENDATION: 

 The U.S. Departments of Labor and Education could provide assistance in 

conjunction with state employment agency networks, and the State 

Department’s Faculty Development and Fulbright Senior Specialist Programs 

can assist in building essential infrastructure. 

b. Implement High-Quality Career Education Programs and Standards 

The transition government may want to increase the quality and relevance of 

vocational and technical training for secondary students and adults. In keeping 

with the requirements of the knowledge revolution and the global economy, there 

could be a focus on higher-order competencies, problem-solving abilities, and 

communication and critical thinking skills rather than a focus on manual abilities 

alone. This will involve facilitating the provision of technical assistance, 

equipment and instructional materials, instructor training, facilitating exchanges, 

and designing curricula. It is unlikely that the state can do all of this itself, so 

training collaborations should be encouraged with and among businesses, 

governments, associations, and faith-based groups. 

RECOMMENDATION: 

 Coordination and assistance to increase the quality and relevance of vocational 

and technical training could be provided by the Department of Education’s 

Office of Vocational and Adult Education.

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c. Implement Entrepreneurship and Business Education 

General education in the values and principles of democracy and market 

economies could be provided through innovations in Cuban civic education 

programs, but more specific technical education may also be needed. Both Cuban 

and international employers likely will need persons qualified in all levels and 

types of business and industry operations, and preparation for starting small 

businesses as well as enrichment training and assistance for established 

entrepreneurs may be desirable. Cuban entrepreneurship education at the technical

and vocational level could seek to prepare workers as well as to improve economic 

literacy skills and promote the start-up of small businesses. 

d. Focus Training on Tourism and Other Employment Markets 

The Castro regime is belatedly attempting to develop a competitive tourism

industry, has a modest reputation in pharmaceuticals, an emerging need for 

geriatric services, and can develop other sectors and niches where training 

programs can be focused as foreign investment revives and Cuban entrepreneurs 

are free to operate normally. Post secondary training programs could be focused 

on locally important industries and job markets, and collaborations with business 

can strengthen this effort as well as help finance it. 

e. Consider Innovative Career and Technical Education Solutions 

A variety of programs for career and technical education should be 

considered, including solutions new to Cuba but common elsewhere. These could 

include: 

1. Bridge programs 

Bridge programs in career education that span the last years of high school 

and the first years of post secondary education would be useful to introduce the 

community college model. These programs permit interested and qualified 

graduates to continue their educations at higher levels with recognition for prior 

credit, and provide alternative education programs to address the need to qualify 

Cubans who possess skills and experience acquired outside the formal economy. 

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Distance education approaches could be considered whenever appropriate, since 

this would permit instruction to be supplied from outside as well as inside Cuba. 

v. Higher Education and Research 

a. Consider the Community College Model as Appropriate 

Cuba, like other countries, has many post-secondary needs and opportunities 

that could benefit from being organized and structured to better serve students and 

employers needing short programs that also provide access to higher level 

programs. The U.S. community college is one model solution, and partnerships 

and exchanges should be encouraged that can expose Cuban higher education to 

this type of institution and its potential. 

RECOMMENDATION: 

 The Department of Education’s Office of Vocational and Adult Education, and 

the American Association of Community Colleges, can help Cuba establish 

links and partnerships with U.S. community colleges to facilitate the 

development of this model. 

b. Encourage Private and Non-Traditional Higher Education 

Post-Castro Cuba likely will want a higher education sector that consists of 

strong public institutions and strong private institutions, and that includes 

institutions that provide instruction and services via traditional programs as well as 

via distance education. Religiously affiliated institutions could be allowed to 

operate without hindrance. 

c. Help to Improve Higher Education Teaching and Research 

The United States, as well as international research organizations, can 

facilitate partnerships and collaborations between Cuban faculty, institutions, and 

their counterparts abroad to develop and improve content and standards in 

instructional and research programs in academic and professional subjects at the 

postsecondary level. 

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RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 The Department of Education’s Fund for the Improvement of Post Secondary 

Education (FIPSE) could assist in this effort through a program cooperating 

with the new Cuba. 

 The Department of State’s Faculty Development and Fulbright Senior 

Specialist Programs can assist in building essential infrastructure. 

d. Ensure High Standards Through Proper Accreditation 

The best way to prevent problems like those that developed in other postcommunist transition states — such as educational frauds and marginal quality 

providers whose credits and degrees are not recognized elsewhere — may be to 

establish a strong system of accreditation and quality assurance plus a transparent 

process for recognizing foreign academic credits, degrees, and professional 

qualifications. (The latter will be brought to Cuba by Cubans returning from

overseas educational programs as well as by foreigners working and living in 

Cuba.) Licensing and chartering laws that tie approval to operate to becoming 

accredited by recognized bodies could reinforce a strong accrediting system. 

e. Build a Strong Academic Research Sector 

It will be important to strengthen and modernize Cuban university and 

research strengths in established fields such as the health professions and 

pharmaceuticals, and to encourage concentration in additional fields that support 

the emerging free economy and the needs of investors. Cuban experts could 

emphasize internationalization through partnerships with foreign institutions, 

collaborations with industry, international exchanges, and outreach. Partnerships 

can be formed with U.S. universities that have already established such programs. 

RECOMMENDATION: 

 Cooperative assistance in this area can be provided by the Department of 

Education’s FIPSE, its Office of Post Secondary Education graduate and 

research programs, and the private sector.

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vi. Adult Education and Lifelong Learning 

a. Life Skills Education 

Foreign donors and Cuban authorities could work together to develop and 

implement special functional skills programs targeted to post-communist Cuba that 

emphasize needs such as consumer skills, job-related skills, economic literacy and 

financial skills, and assist with civic education for out-of-school adults. 

Organizations and countries with experience in post-communist transitions, 

including USAID and other U.S. organizations can be instrumental in helping 

produce and disseminate practical and high-quality functional literacy resources for 

the Cuban transition. 

b. Basic Literacy Skills 

There are inevitably going to be some adults who did not attain proficiency 

in basic literacy and numerical skills when they were enrolled in school. Technical 

assistance from both adult basic education and community college developmental 

programs to Cuban adult literacy programs could help in developing effective 

instructional services to build adult basic literacy among adults needing such 

services. Findings from experimental and field-based research in the United States, 

which address basic adult reading and teaching English as a Second Language, can 

also be shared with Cuban program administrators and teachers.

4. Cultural Ties and Cultural Preservation 

i. Reinvigorate Intellectual and Cultural Ties 

a. Establish a Vigorous Cultural Exchange Program 

Cuban culture is famous for its contributions to fine arts, music, folklore, 

decorative arts, architecture, and sports. These strengths and sources of national 

pride could be maintained and strengthened during and after transition through a 

broad range of professional and cultural exchanges and other means. Specific 

exchange areas that could be implemented immediately include: music groups and 

individual performers; artists, visual and performing; sports, both professional and 

amateur; and cooperation in major sporting events such as the Special Olympics. 

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RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 The Department of State’s ECA cultural exchange programs, such as 

scholarships for dance or two-way exchanges within the Jazz Ambassador 

Program, as well as foundations and U.S. cultural organizations could help 

support Cuban fine arts, music, folklore, decorative arts, architecture, and 

sports. 

 A similar scholarship and exchange program could be developed for scholarathletes and professionals in the field of sports, as well as joint ventures in the 

sponsorship of athletic events such as Special Olympics, interscholastic, 

intercollegiate, and touring competitions. 

ii. Urban and Cultural Preservation 

a. Assistance to Cuban Museums, Urban Planners, and Heritage Groups 

The transition government likely will preserve Cuba’s material cultural 

heritage to be able to present it to future generations. As with libraries, U.S., 

UNESCO, and other nations’ experts and foundations can assist Cuba to 

depoliticize and modernize its museums and galleries, inventory historical sites and 

develop preservation plans, balance conservation and development, train 

professionals, and seek financing and resources. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 The Department of State could propose a cultural preservation project under 

the “Ambassador’s Fund for Cultural Preservation.” The project could be 

directed at object(s) in need of conservation; a site/neighborhood in need of 

preservation; or forms of traditional expression (dance, music, language). 

 There are also opportunities under the Department of State’s International 

Visitor Program sponsored by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs; 

e.g., a museum project to bring Cuban museum professionals to meet with their 

counterparts in the U.S. to engage in dialogue about professional and 

exhibition exchanges. 

 Under the Department of States’ Citizen Exchanges Program, there is the 

International Partnerships Among Museums which seeks to bring together 

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foreign museums with American museums for the purpose of exchanging 

professional staff who work toward a mutually agreed upon project. 

 The areas of greatest preservation need are in the historic neighborhoods that 

are in grave danger of being lost and the protection of designated cultural 

heritage sites. Department of State-sponsored exchanges or “comparative” 

professional experience in urban planning, preservation, and development 

could offer Cuban professionals expertise in these areas to maintain both 

historic neighborhoods and the character of downtown Havana, which has been 

largely preserved, as well as focusing on Santiago de Cuba and other sites that 

have suffered neglect. 

C. Food and Agriculture 

Cuba currently has a command-driven food, agriculture, and forestry sector. 

Nutritional issues exist because availability of food has long been a critical issue. 

However, Cuba has the potential to greatly expand agricultural production if it 

were to make a transition into a market economy. Such a transition should be one 

overriding goal during a transition, while ensuring that basic food and nutritional 

needs are met and that natural resources are not degraded. Additionally, it may be 

important for Cuba to focus on food safety and animal and plant health issues to 

ensure consumer safety and a vibrant agricultural sector, as well as to enhance its 

export capacity to increase income. 

 

Technical assistance should be a key component in assisting Cuba’s 

transition to a market economy. For example, the use of technology could 

modernize Cuba’s food safety system. The country’s agricultural production 

system and processing facilities need updating to give Cuba the chance to achieve 

global and hemispheric standards. Cuba’s food security can be strengthened by 

providing a free Cuba access to the U.S. land-grant system of colleges and 

universities. Such partnerships could help Cuba move from a command-driven 

system to one that is more in tune with market economies. Additional on-theground assessment may be needed, including a thorough examination of: the 

animal and plant disease situation; existing Cuban statistical capabilities; and the 

current status of the Cuban agricultural sector, its markets, and its 

educational/training system. 

A vital factor in addressing Cuba’s food security would be the ability to 

collect relevant and accurate data and to disseminate it in a timely fashion. 

Provided that there is technical assistance, Cuba would be able to develop a 

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dependable system of agricultural statistics, market information, and market 

analysis geared specifically to a market-driven economy. Components of such a 

program might include the following: 

 Assessments of the quality of information available for market analysis and the 

capacity of relevant institutions; 

 Guidance in assembling and evaluating data on key commodity markets; 

 Training and assistance in conducting short-term market analysis and mediumterm forecasts for key commodities; 

 Assistance to establish systems that effectively disseminate information and 

analysis (including publications, e-publications, and websites); 

 Collaborative analysis of trade or policy issues of mutual interest; and 

 Provision of personal computers and Internet access facilities to Cuban 

individuals and organizations involved in the food and agriculture production 

and marketing process. 

Direct nutritional technical assistance support could help the transition 

government set up logistics and stock control systems for the centralized food 

banks, helping ensure the delivery of healthful meals. Technical assistance should 

support commodity assistance programs that supplement the diets of program

participants with nutritious foods. 

Public awareness initiatives should include help to establish educational 

programs regarding the link between nutritional meals and health. Assistance 

could be provided to assist social marketing to better inform the Cuban public of 

nutritional feeding and education programs and to encourage broad public 

participation. 

International organizations could also offer assistance. The Inter-American 

Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA), an agricultural development 

organization, currently led by ministers of agriculture from every country in the 

hemisphere except for Cuba, has international programs and partnerships in place, 

all of which can be used to coordinate international assistance for Cuba. Working 

with other international organizations, for instance, the United Nations Food and 

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Agriculture Organization (FAO) could help to make the transition process easier to 

manage. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 If requested by a transition government, the U.S. Government should be 

prepared to provide technical assistance and capacity building to:

 Establish in Havana an Office of Agricultural Affairs (OAA) and an Animal 

and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of the U.S. Department of 

Agriculture (USDA), which would enable the U.S. Government to assist with 

development activities and to foster increased trade opportunities for both 

countries; 

 Allow Cuban importers to use credit guarantee programs that enhance 

Cuba’s ability to import agricultural products to help meet its food needs; 

 Provide technical assistance that would help Cuba come fully into World 

Trade Organization (WTO) compliance, including trade-related food safety, 

and plant and animal health; 

 In the short-term, provide technical assistance on post-harvest handling, the 

transport of tropical fruits and vegetables, and the development of an 

exporter/importer transportation education program; 

 In the intermediate-term, provide assistance to enhance the collection and 

reporting system of domestic and international shipment costs, to develop 

commodity and agricultural product grades and standards, and to generate 

commodity/agricultural product market price news; 

 Offer, through the USDA’s Cochran Fellowship Program, short-term 

agricultural marketing and agribusiness-related training with the help of 

U.S. universities, agricultural trade organizations, market development 

associations, government agencies, and the private sector; 

 

 Encourage partnerships between experts from land-grant institutions and 

Cuban counterparts to ensure that extension systems are responsive to 

farmers’ needs, that research is guided by near- and long-term needs, and 

that teaching adequately prepares the next generation of Cuban 

agriculturalists; 

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 Assist, through such programs as the International Institute for Tropical 

Forestry and the White Water 2 Blue Water initiative, in developing 

sustainable agricultural and forestry practices to limit environmental 

degradation and assess Cuba’s watershed management; and 

 Assist in defining specific objectives and indicators for the progress and 

success of nutrition and food security programs, including: 

 The design and implementation of a household food consumption survey; 

 Providing information on programs that provide low-cost or free meals 

for children; 

 Technical support for commodity delivery, food storage, and food 

tracking systems; and 

 Information and technical assistance for supplemental foods, health care 

referrals, and nutrition education for pregnant, breastfeeding, and nonbreastfeeding postpartum women, and to infants and children found to be 

at nutritional risk. 

 Provide technical assistance to cooperative and marketing organizations. 

Such assistance might include: 

 Assessing Cuba’s cooperative and farmer organization sector capacity 

for establishing commercial relations with U.S. firms and markets; 

 Assessing the capacity of Cuban government and educational institutions 

to provide training in commercial agriculture and agribusiness 

management for farmer-based organizations; 

 Assessing agricultural and rural credit and lending institutions in Cuba; 

 Providing initial training workshops in principles of U.S. cooperative 

and commercial marketing organizations; and 

 Developing, with appropriate Cuban institutions, a plan for building 

training program curricula in the areas of cooperative organization, 

agribusiness management, and agricultural and rural finance. 

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 Providing initial training workshops in principles of U.S. cooperative and 

commercial marketing organizations. 

 Developing, with appropriate Cuban institutions, a plan for building 

training program curricula in the areas of cooperative organization, 

agribusiness management, and agricultural and rural finance. 

D. Housing and Urban Policy 

1. Introduction 

 Deferred maintenance, lack of resources, and lack of private property rights 

have created difficult, overcrowded and deteriorated housing conditions for many 

Cubans. Surveys have revealed that housing considered in “good shape” range 

from 56 percent in Havana (pop. 2,550,000) to 44 and 38 percent in provinces such 

as Las Tunas and Granma in the central and eastern portions of the island. Reports 

of derrumbes (houses that collapse) have become more frequent in Old Havana. 

Almost all visitors to the island comment on the beautiful yet deteriorated 

structures as well as the lack of paint on buildings throughout Cuban towns and 

cities. 

Once, the Castro regime attempted to remove slums and improve rural 

housing conditions, but many of the challenges have been difficult to overcome 

due to lack of resources, shoddy workmanship, and failed government policies. 

Many rural Cubans left traditional bohios, the traditional palm-thatched one room

dwelling for barracones, or tin roofed concrete dwellings. Meanwhile, large 

population increases, coupled with an inability to construct an adequate number of 

units, have led Cubans to live in overcrowded housing in most cities. Large efforts 

to build modernist Soviet-style public housing have only concentrated the poor in 

the outskirts of cities. So although housing conditions improved for some, today 

the difficulties outweigh the successes of Cuba’s housing policy. 

Low incomes in Cuban pesos paired with a black-market economy that 

functions on the U.S. dollar have made daily life difficult for Cubans when most 

goods are either rationed or available at high prices for dollars. Therefore, Cubans 

currently are unable to improve their living conditions. Because many Cubans live 

in deplorable or difficult living conditions, improving living conditions likely will 

be an immediate priority for many Cubans. Cuban Americans might bring new 

appliances and building materials to family members and Cubans will attempt to 

patch roofs, paint, and repair homes that are structurally unsafe and unsound. 

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International and U.S. non-profit organizations will attempt to meet immediate 

humanitarian needs that may include housing repair and housing rehabilitation. 

The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) could aid a 

new transition government in Cuba through the following actions: (1) recommend 

steps to assist Cubans immediately; (2) provide technical assistance in relevant 

program areas; (3) help coordinate organizations, trade associations, and 

companies in the design, planning, and construction fields; and (4) recommend 

approaches and policies in the planning, housing, and community development that 

work toward the establishment of democratic institutions that engage and empower 

the Cuban people. 

2. Immediate Steps 

As Cubans begin to change their lives and their country, many will try to 

meet the immediate material needs of their families. The suggestions below will 

go a long way in providing families a way to assess the work that is needed on 

their homes as well as means to obtain the funds necessary for the repairs. This 

immediate assistance will also provide hope for the future. Within the first 60 to 

90 days after a transition, the Department of Housing and Urban Development 

could coordinate the following:

i. A Commission on Housing and Urban Policies 

 

Under HUD’s aegis, the Department can bring together national and 

international organizations in the planning and design fields, such as the American 

Planning Association, the American Institute of Architects, and the National Trust 

for Historic Preservation, among others, to coordinate assistance in the housing, 

community development, planning, and design fields. Additional members could 

include universities, representatives from construction and trade groups,

foundations, and international financial institutions interested in housing issues in 

Cuba, as well as Cuban American experts in the planning and design fields. The 

latter are familiar with Cuba’s history, traditions, and idiosyncrasies and could be 

helpful in working with Cubans on the island. 

ii. Temporary Roofing Materials 

Many Cuban homes suffer from leaky roofs that have not been repaired in 

many years. Cuba’s rainy weather, particularly in the summer, is blamed for many

of the building collapses. Since water damage is the number one cause of building 

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deterioration and degradation, providing temporary plastic or PVC material to 

cover roofs will help stabilize buildings, give some measure of protection, and 

allow time to develop more permanent solutions. Priority could be given to 

buildings most in danger of collapse or damage, paying special attention to 

buildings with historic or cultural significance. Manufacturers of these materials 

and retail corporations in the building trades might donate or provide deep 

discounts for the necessary materials. 

iii. Paint 

Visitors to the island often comment on the deteriorated appearance of 

Cuban buildings. Cuba is well known for its architectural heritage, but many of 

buildings look worn and faded. A coordinated effort by foundations and home 

supply corporations could coordinate volunteers to assist in painting buildings. 

Exterior painting might require more professional volunteers in the construction 

trades, but there is no doubt that an immediate improvement in the exterior 

appearance of buildings would provide a sense of hope and progress to the Cuban 

people. 

iv. Microloans for Rehabilitation 

Small loans to help repair dangerous building code violations, update 

kitchens and bathrooms, and complete other necessary repairs can be an important 

part in making immediate improvements and help spur the construction sector of 

the economy. HUD could help coordinate assistance provided by the federal 

government, foundations, and the private sector. A foundation might be created to 

fund this specific purpose. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 Within the first 60 to 90 days after a transition, HUD should be prepared, if 

asked, to coordinate: 

 Establishment of a Commission to advise on Housing and Urban Policies; 

and 

 Assistance provided by the U.S. Government, foundations, and the private 

sector, including such things as temporary roofing materials, paint and 

microloans for housing rehabilitation. 

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3. Housing Priorities During the First Year 

Within the first year of a transition government, HUD can provide or 

coordinate assistance in a wide variety of areas including: housing policy, housing 

finance, building design, construction, and planning issues. HUD also can 

establish relationships with its counterpart agencies, such as a new Cuban 

Ministries of Housing and Construction. At the request of its agency counterparts 

in Cuba, HUD would be willing to provide the following assistance: 

i. Assessment of Housing Ministry Strengths and Weaknesses 

Cuba currently has a Ministry of Housing and a Ministry of Construction 

that built much of the public or “social” housing. An assessment of its strengths 

and weaknesses could help determine how HUD can best communicate and assist 

the new ministries. 

ii. Survey of Housing Conditions 

Many Cubans live in dangerous and overcrowded housing conditions. 

Families live in one room apartments and lofts. Forty-five years of deferred 

maintenance and lack of access to materials and funding have created dangerous 

electrical, gas, and structural issues. Resolving many of these issues may be of the 

highest priority. In addition, accurate information on Cuba’s housing conditions is 

limited. A survey of housing conditions is essential in order to gain an accurate 

picture of short-term and long-term housing needs. HUD, along with partner 

universities, would be willing and able to assist Cuba in developing and 

implementing a survey that will provide a baseline for future needs and goals. 

iii. Temporary Housing 

The current regime prevents and controls all external migration from Cuba 

and all internal migration within the island. The immediate collapse of such 

controls could cause a rapid population increase in large cities, especially Havana, 

where change and growth will be most rapid. There may be an immediate need for 

modular homes that are easy to transport and assemble. There are several 

companies that build good high quality modular or manufactured housing. 

Modular or manufactured housing can alleviate some of the overcrowding that 

already exists as well as the overcrowding that might result from internal 

migration. 

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iv. Historic Preservation Efforts 

Cuba has a wealth of architecture built throughout its five hundred year 

history. Many of these resources are in a deplorable state. Although health and 

safety issues come first, many of Cuba’s buildings should be protected for future 

generations as evidence of Cuba’s cultural accomplishments and heritage. Cuba 

already recognizes that historic preservation is an important part of its economic 

development and tourism strategy, and cultural and natural resources also could be 

a key part in its redevelopment. Several organizations such as the National Trust 

for Historic Preservation, U.S. International Council on Monuments and Sites 

(ICOMOS), Cuban National Heritage, and several schools of architecture are 

familiar with preservation issues in Cuba. Preservation requires specialized 

knowledge in construction, design, and resource management. A working group 

could coordinate technical assistance provided to Cuban design professionals. 

v. A Cuban National Trust and Revolving Loan Fund 

With the overwhelming amount of historic resources in Cuba, the private 

sector can play an important role in saving, rehabilitating, and reusing historic 

buildings. Many countries around the world have created national trusts that buy 

historic properties and open them for the public. Most notable are the U.S. 

National Trust for Historic Preservation and the British National Trust, credited 

with saving many of Britain’s historic country houses and landscapes. In this way, 

private money could help save important historical sites for future generations by 

supplementing government’s limited scope. At the same time, the Trust could 

foster active participation among Cuban citizens and Cuban Americans interested 

in protecting their common heritage. The idea of a Cuban National Trust could be 

taken a step further by the addition of a revolving loan fund. The Trust could be 

used to buy historic properties and sell them to potential buyers who are willing to 

rehabilitate the property and find compatible uses for the buildings. 

vi. Professional Exchanges 

HUD’s Office of International Affairs could serve as a clearinghouse for 

requests for U.S. technical assistance and organize exchanges of professionals in 

the planning, design, and community development fields. International Affairs 

could sponsor U.S. professionals interested in working in Cuba and place Cuban 

professionals or emerging leaders in U.S. local, state, or Federal agencies, as well 

as in non-profit or private sector offices. 

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vii. Training 

A new government, democracy, and a free market will bring forth many 

development opportunities. New investments will also bring about new 

construction and redevelopment. Reducing overcrowded conditions will also 

require the construction of new homes. HUD is willing to assemble a group of 

experts in the fields of architecture and construction familiar with Cuban housing 

typologies that will help the private sector develop model homes palatable to the 

potential Cuban consumer. HUD might sponsor a design competition to develop 

model housing that is reflective of Cuban design traditions yet includes the latest in 

energy saving technology and construction techniques. 

viii. University Partnerships 

HUD currently funds two programs that encourage universities to work with 

their communities and develop future community development and planning 

professionals. The University Partnership program seeks to tap the intellectual 

resources of colleges and universities to develop creative and innovative solutions 

to housing and urban development issues. The Community Work-Study program 

seeks to attract minority and economically disadvantaged students into graduate 

programs in community planning and development. The program provides tuition 

assistance and stipends to students who combine an academic program with 

practical field experience. A variation on both themes could potentially partner 

Cuban and American universities by helping Cubans establish program strategies 

in the field and allowing Cuban students to work directly in neighborhoods. 

Furthermore, American students interested in the planning, community 

development, and design fields could be placed in a community work-study 

program that would allow them to work in local planning agencies, the housing 

and construction ministries, or new NGO’s dedicated to housing and community 

development. Interested Cuban students might also be placed in a similar workstudy program that would allow them to gain experience and coursework in the 

United States. 

ix. A Geographic Information System 

A geographic information system (GIS) involves the geo-coding of data for 

computer mapping of land use and infrastructure to guide urban policy decisions. 

HUD currently has working relationships with the U.S. Geological Survey and the 

University Consortium for Geographic Information Science (UCGIS) for work 

with communities along the U.S.-Mexico Border and for GIS training between 

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U.S. universities and research institutions throughout the world. A GIS is one of 

the most effective tools in the phasing and planning of infrastructure. With the 

overwhelming amount of deferred infrastructure needs, GIS could be an important 

tool in helping to prioritize needs and identify redevelopment areas. 

x. Areas for Redevelopment 

Certain areas surrounding ports, airports, and downtown areas will be ripe 

for development. Special attention could be placed in identifying these areas so 

that they may be planned in as orderly a manner as possible. Infrastructure needs 

cannot be upgraded all at once so selecting areas wisely throughout the island can 

help spur investment in certain neighborhoods, creating the construction of new 

housing. These ‘islands of redevelopment’ could also help lessen internal 

migration pressures. Good planning has been at the heart of redevelopment efforts 

in many East European cities of the former Communist Bloc. Of particular note 

are Berlin, Prague, Budapest, and Warsaw. 

xi. A Model Permitting System 

HUD could assist a post-Castro Cuba in the development of an efficient and 

speedy permitting system that can keep track of redevelopment and new 

construction that will likely take place at a rapid pace. Permitting is necessary to 

ensure safe building construction methods, good design, and appropriate 

development. However, a slow and bureaucratic system could discourage 

investment and development. An efficient system that uses the latest technology 

and good management could serve as a model for other cities throughout the 

island. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 Within the first year of a transition government, HUD should be prepared to 

establish relationships with its counterpart agencies, such as a new Cuban 

Ministries of Housing and Construction, and at the request of its agency 

counterparts in Cuba, HUD could provide the following assistance: 

 Assess the strengths and weaknesses of new Ministries of Housing and 

Construction; 

 Conduct a survey of housing conditions along with partner universities that 

will provide a baseline for future needs and goals; 

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 Form a working group on preservation issues to coordinate technical 

assistance provided to Cuban design professionals; 

 Support creation of a Cuban National Trust and a revolving loan fund;

 Serve as a clearinghouse for requests for U.S. technical assistance and 

organize exchanges of professionals in the planning, design, and community 

development fields, and sponsor U.S. professionals interested in working in 

Cuba or place Cuban professionals or emerging leaders in local, state, or 

Federal agencies as well as in non-profit or private sector offices; 

 Assemble a group of experts in architecture and construction familiar with 

Cuban housing typologies to help the private sector develop model homes 

palatable to the potential Cuban consumer; 

 Consider sponsoring a design competition to develop model housing that is 

reflective of Cuban design traditions yet includes the latest in energy saving 

technology and construction techniques; 

 Develop university partnerships; 

 Assist a free Cuba to establish a Geographic Information System; 

 Assist in the determination of areas for redevelopment; and 

 Assist a free Cuba in the development of a system that can keep track of 

redevelopment and new construction. 

4. Longer-Term Planning, Community Development, and Housing Issues 

After the first or second year, urban policy likely will be focused on long 

range planning, community development, and housing issues. Assistance will be 

focused on transforming Cuba’s centralized planning structure into one that 

provides for citizen participation yet allows professionals to make wise 

recommendations using up-to-date and accurate information. Involvement at the 

local and neighborhood level is at the foundation of civic life and democracy 

building. It is at the local level that citizens learn to work together and make 

community choices. Oftentimes, new leaders emerge from local politics and civic 

involvement. Cuba also has a dearth of NGOs focused on housing and community 

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development. In the U.S., these organizations help organize neighborhood 

resources, attract new investment, and build housing in neighborhoods that might 

otherwise be overlooked. Community development NGOs play an important role 

in the development of new civic institutions. Finally, the U.S. has resources and 

experiences that it can share with its Cuban counterparts on a variety of housing 

issues that are particularly focused on those citizens most in need. 

i. Planning Assistance 

Cuba has a long tradition of urban planning that dates from four hundred 

years of Spanish influence. Later, French and American notions of planning and 

urban design greatly influenced the landscape. This was later replaced by Sovietstyle autocratic central planning. Cuba’s new planning system likely will respect 

Cuba’s long tradition in urban design and planning that includes civic participation 

— an important foundation for participation in a democratic society. 

a. Local planning 

The U.S. can assist local planning to reorganize, allowing for methods and 

work styles that will help guide the orderly and more efficient construction and 

redevelopment of cities and neighborhoods. Teaching methods that include 

participation by local citizens in the decision-making process will also be a key 

part in the exchange of U.S. and Cuban planning professionals. Organizations 

such as the American Planning Association and the International City Management 

Association can assist in training Cuban professionals. 

b. Development management tools 

HUD can assist a free Cuba by bringing together planning professionals and 

training Cuban professionals on the various development management tools that 

help guide development in a market-driven economy. Tools such as impact fees 

can help raise necessary funds for infrastructure in need of repair such as water and 

sewage systems and community facilities such as schools and libraries that are 

necessary components of a vibrant neighborhood. Other tools include buying 

development rights in neighborhoods where dense development might not be 

desirable, or performance standards that develop a point system for development 

proposals. The American Planning Association and departments of planning at 

leading U.S. universities are natural partners in this effort. 

c. Specialized working groups 

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U.S. planners along with international counterparts could also help Cubans 

develop strategies for special planning issues in Havana and other provincial 

capitals. Havana has special urban design and redevelopment issues that will be 

the focus of initial investment and redevelopment. In addition, many of Cuba’s 

provincial capitals and smaller cities such as Trinidad are UNESCO World 

Heritage Sites and are worthy of special care and attention. Other larger cities such 

as Santiago and Cienfuegos also offer a rich array of architecture that deserves 

protection. At a transition government’s request, HUD can help assemble U.S. and 

international experts to tackle a particular issue. 

ii. Community Development 

 

Certain areas in Havana and in some major cities presumably will be the 

focus of redevelopment due to their geographic location and their tourism (Cayo 

Coco) or economic (Havana’s port area) potential. However, Cubans in other 

areas also may want to begin repairing their homes and open new businesses that 

will create vibrant neighborhoods. Community development non-profits and faithbased organizations can play an important part in helping Cubans improve housing 

conditions and create new housing opportunities. 

a. Community Development Corporations 

HUD, along with its partners in the community development field, can help 

Cubans create new community development corporations and non-governmental 

organizations focused on building new housing. These non-profit corporations 

could include small investors, international foundations, and churches as partners. 

Cuba currently has very limited non-governmental organizations that are mostly 

affiliated with churches, international organizations, and dissident groups. Growth 

of these organizations could be a key component in improving housing conditions 

and creating new investment opportunities throughout the island. National groups 

such as the Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC), the Enterprise 

Foundations, and the Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation have a large 

network and extensive training from which new Cuban organizations could benefit.

b. Faith-based Organizations 

Cuba’s Catholic Church and to a lesser extent Protestant churches sponsor 

some of the few nongovernmental organizations on the island. Faith-based 

organizations can be an important part of the island’s redevelopment efforts, 

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particularly in the health sector. HUD can present models of how faith-based 

organizations in the U.S. are involved in housing and community development. 

HUD’s Office of Faith-based Initiatives can help link faith-based organizations in 

the United States with their new counterparts in Cuba. 

c. Self-Help Organizations 

Although Cuba has a failed experience with so-called microbrigades, more 

organized efforts by successful organizations such as Habitat for Humanity can 

help meet an immediate need for housing, while organizations such as Youthbuild 

can help train young people in highly-prized construction skills. Spain’s Escuelas

Talleres focuses on specialized training techniques useful in rehabilitating historic 

buildings. These self-help organizations can help interested Cubans acquire new 

skills in the construction industry. 

iii. Housing Reform 

HUD can help its likely counterpart agencies, the new Ministries of Housing 

and Construction, to consider new housing policies necessary in a market-oriented 

and democratic society. Some families may still need assistance in the forms of 

loans or grants, at least to get them started. Below are some housing policies and 

issues to consider. 

a. Historic Preservation 

Urban areas were long neglected, but since the late 1980s, historic 

preservation and restoration has been a limited tool for economic development of 

the tourist industry. Cuba has one of the largest collections of Spanish colonial 

architecture in the world, as well as notable buildings from the 18th and 19th 

century. Its own unique style of modernist architecture was recently recognized as 

worthy of protection. Historic preservation can be a key tool in developing Cuba’s 

tourism economy and an important factor in developing national pride. Cubans 

could consider new tools that would help protect their unique architecture but that 

would still accommodate appropriate development. Some ideas to consider 

include establishing areas of protection that require more stringent development 

review. Another idea to consider is Spain’s One Percent Fund. One percent of all 

public works projects goes to cultural and historic preservation projects. These 

projects are usually historic sites worthy of public protection as cultural facilities, 

such as museums, or which may have a portion open to the public. HUD can help 

gather experts that can provide technical assistance in the preservation field. 

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b. Fair Housing Laws 

Currently, Cuba claims that there is no housing discrimination, but Cubans 

are discriminated against in their choice of housing for political reasons. Internal 

migration controls prevent Cubans from making housing choices on their own, and 

racial discrimination also exists on the island. HUD can provide direct assistance 

in establishing laws that protect Cuba’s citizens from housing discrimination. 

c. Private-Sector Housing Markets 

A transition government can adopt homeownership strategies used by other 

Spanish-speaking countries, like Chile and Spain, which possess a proven track 

record of extremely high homeownership. For example, Chile has a 

homeownership rate of 75 percent. Long-term loans and a secondary market have 

made homeownership an attainable goal for many Chileans. Spain’s housing 

policies have also created a high homeownership rate (85 percent) by giving direct 

subsidies on mortgage interest rates and releasing jumbo issues of mortgagebacked bonds. More specific recommendations are given in Chapter 4. 

d. Social Housing Policy 

Cuba currently has a large number of social (public) housing units built 

mostly in the 1960s and 1970s in the Soviet style. Much of this housing has 

become overcrowded and is in disrepair. It tends to be depressing and dreary, but 

inhabitants have few alternatives. If asked, HUD would be willing to directly 

assist the transition government in surveying public housing conditions and make 

recommendations for immediate improvement. Since the 1990s, the U.S. has 

focused its efforts on improving public housing by creating new opportunities for 

the private sector and creating public-private partnerships. Many of these lessons 

might be useful to the new Ministry of Housing responsible for Cuba’s social 

housing complexes. 

e. Subsidy Assistance 

The Cuban transition government may wish to provide some direct 

investment in housing, including new construction, rehabilitation, and financial 

assistance to renters and homeowners. In particular, creating a long-term 

sustainable rehabilitation program can be very important in helping to improve the 

living conditions of Cubans. If so, there is a wide range of options. Examples of 

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program models in the United States include public housing, housing vouchers, tax 

credits, down payment assistance, high-risk mortgage insurance, and interest 

subsidies. The specific type of assistance would vary greatly in terms of the level 

of need, the nature of the assistance, and how the assistance is administered. To 

the greatest extent possible, we recommend that funds be leveraged with private 

sector funding. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 HUD should be prepared to do the following at the request of the transition 

government: 

 Assist local planners establish a local planning system for cities; 

 Bring together planning professionals and train Cuban professionals on 

development management tools that help guide development in a marketdriven economy; 

 Help assemble U.S. and international experts to tackle specific planning 

issues; 

 Along with partners in the community development field, help Cubans create 

new community development corporations and non-governmental 

organizations focused on building new housing; 

 Present models of how faith-based organizations in the U.S. are involved in 

housing and community development. HUD’s Office of Faith-based 

Initiatives can help link faith-based organizations in the United States with 

their new counterparts in Cuba; 

 Help its new counterpart agencies consider new housing policies necessary 

in a market-oriented and democratic society; 

 Help gather experts that can provide technical assistance in preservation; 

 Provide direct assistance in establishing laws that protect Cuba’s citizens 

from housing discrimination; 

 Directly assist the transition government survey public housing conditions 

and make recommendations for immediate improvement; and 

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 Recommend new subsidy assistance models. 

5. Special Transition Issues in Housing 

i. Transition and Socialized Housing 

Although it is important to encourage the development of a free-market 

economy, some families likely will need assistance to afford decent housing. 

Government subsidies of housing can be an essential element of social policy. 

There are a variety of subsidies and delivery systems for providing such assistance. 

A first step is to assess the need for assistance. Initially, assistance would 

probably take the form of direct governmental intervention to ameliorate hazardous 

conditions. This suggests programs directly administered by the central 

government to rehabilitate existing housing, to provide emergency assistance to the 

homeless, or to construct housing to eliminate severe over-crowding. An early 

step also would be to facilitate the investment of international agencies in Cuban 

housing. 

As institutions for delivering housing assistance are developed, housing 

assistance programs may need to resolve a series of issues. One of these is the 

level of need to be addressed. Simply, what portion of the population should 

receive assistance, how poor should recipients of assistance be, and how much 

assistance should they receive? 

ii. Geographic and Community Issues 

Another set of issues concerns geographic targeting. Housing is not only 

shelter, but also part of community development. Focusing subsidies on certain 

priority cities, or in certain rural areas, can have a very different impact than 

providing assistance to individuals regardless of where they live. For example, 

Cuban rural areas and the eastern part of the main island are very poorly served 

from a housing standpoint in comparison to greater Havana and the northwest. 

Targeted allocation of housing resources, including external assistance, may be 

needed in certain cases. Similarly, some communities are likely to have been 

deprived of resources in comparison to others, or have enjoyed advantages due to 

connections to the political and black market centers of power and influence. 

There will also be geographic issues of topography, microclimates, locally 

available materials and skills, and infrastructure. 

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iii. What Form Should Housing Assistance Take? 

Another set of issues concerns the nature of assistance. For example, in the 

United States there is experience building and operating public housing, 

subsidizing privately-owned rental housing (e.g., Section 8 New Construction, 

Low Income Housing Tax Credits), subsidizing rents (Housing Choice Vouchers), 

subsidizing purchasing power (e.g., down payment assistance, interest subsidies), 

subsidizing rehabilitation (e.g., CDBG, HOME), and subsidizing infrastructure to 

support housing (e.g., CDBG). 

Another issue to be resolved is who receives the assistance. One model is to 

provide funding to local governments or non-profit organizations to carry out 

activities on behalf of needy families. Another model would provide funding to 

private landlords to build and maintain housing. Still another model would provide 

assistance directly to families that they could apply to building, maintaining, or 

renting their homes. 

Determining how assistance is distributed must also be addressed. At one 

extreme, assistance could be directed to a particular city or project based on known 

priority needs. At another, given good data on local needs and an appropriate 

administrative infrastructure, it is possible to implement a block grant system. In 

this, HOME and CDBG funds could be divided among local entities that determine 

local priorities and deliver the programs. A model between these would be some

set of categorical programs, in which local entities would write competitive 

applications for funding and the best proposals would then receive it. 

iv. Accounting for and Evaluating Assistance 

Finally, in any sort of subsidy system, an accountability system is usually 

required to ensure that available funds are used for intended purposes. Wherever 

government subsidies are involved, there is a potential for waste, fraud, and abuse. 

An auditing and monitoring system also is usually required. 

RECOMMENDATION: 

 If asked, HUD would be willing to provide training in developing a new subsidy 

system as well as training professionals responsible for managing the new 

programs. 

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E. Other Human Services 

1. Introduction 

A new Cuba may face a number of social challenges that require significant 

attention from human services agencies and organizations. During a transition, 

critical challenges could include serving a large aging population, combating 

prostitution, guaranteeing child welfare, and providing adequate services for 

victims of torture and human trafficking. Also, it will be important to develop 

alternative programs to engage youth, who are currently indoctrinated by 

government programs that promote complete allegiance to the state and minimize 

family influence. 

Incomes in Cuba are already considerably lower than those of the transition 

economies of Eastern Europe at the time of the Soviet collapse. Therefore, a free 

Cuba may share many of the same or worse demographic and social challenges 

that have confronted other former communist countries. These include a rapidly 

aging population and a highly developed welfare state that is dependent for 

revenues on a crumbling centrally planned economy, in which non-compliance and 

corruption have become endemic. 

All of these challenges likely will call for a strong effort from the social 

services arena. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the 

Social Security Administration (SSA) could become involved in advising and 

assisting a free Cuban government to address social problems in the manner 

outlined below. 

i. Surveying Social and Economic Needs 

At the outset of the post-Castro transition, Cuban authorities may want to 

conduct as comprehensive a social services survey as possible. Cuban experts 

could work with PAHO, USAID, and private organizations (e.g., HelpAge 

International, the main internationally operated NGO to support the elderly in the 

Caribbean) in assessing the social and economic needs of older Cubans and in 

developing social care systems that meet the needs of older persons. Assistance 

providers should prepare for the possibility of the collapse of existing programs — 

pensions, stipends for caregivers, health care, food, etc. 

2. Maintaining Social Security for the Retired and Disabled 

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i. Problems Facing a Transition Government 

In Cuba, social security refers to old age, survivor and disability insurance, 

cash benefits for illness, maternity, and work injury. Each employer, mainly stateowned enterprises, contributes up to 14 percent of payroll to cover all of these 

programs and the government covers any deficit. 

 

The Cuban pension system’s financial problems, created in part by the 1990s 

economic crisis, changing social attitudes, and population aging, include the 

following:11 

a. Adverse demographic factors 

The fertility rate declined from 3.7 to 1.6 between 1970 and 1998, while life 

expectancy reached developed world levels. The effect was to create rapidly aging 

population. The UN estimates that 36.4 percent of Cubans will be over age 60 in 

2050, up from 15.6 percent today and 25.9 percent expected in 2025. Cuba’s 

working age population (ages 15-59) is projected to peak in 2010, and then shrink 

by more than one third over the ensuing 40 years. By 2030, there could be only 

1.8 working age Cubans for each person of pension-age, compared to 4.2 today. 

b. Decreased coverage of the labor force 

The number of employers contributing to social security fell from 4.3 

million in 1989 to 3.1 million in 1997. At the same time, the share of the labor 

force covered by social security declined from about 90 percent in 1990 to about 

66 percent in 1997. This trend  reflecting the rapid growth of the informal 

economy  has considerably reduced the dependency ratio of workers to retirees 

(falling from 6.6 in 1970 to 2.5 in 1998) and produced a severe funding crisis. 

c. Permissive qualifying conditions and benefit formulae 

A relatively low retirement age and generous benefit formula (based on the 

highest 5 years out of the last 10, replacing between 50 and 90 percent of 

earnings), combined with a high life expectancy, has meant that the average 

pensioner receives a benefit for about 20 years. During the economic crisis, the 

average retirement age fell from age 63.5 to 60 and the number of disability 

11 Most of the information in the rest of the section on social security comes from several recent papers written by 

Carmelo Mesa-Lago, a noted economist and expert on Latin American social security systems. 

139
pensions increased, as Cuba used the pension system as an unemployment and 

welfare program for older unemployed workers. 

d. A growing deficit and actuarial imbalance 

The social insurance system is deeply in the red. In 2000, the government 

paid 34 percent of social security expenses. In 2001, the pension deficit totaled 

2.2% of GDP, while expenses were 6.5 percent of GDP — and growing rapidly. 

Cuba has no reserve fund. 

e. Deterioration of the real value of benefits 

Although nominal costs of social security rose during the 1990s, this rise 

was due mainly to inflation, which dramatically reduced the real value of unindexed benefits. By 1998, the real value of pensions had declined 41 percent 

from the 1989 level. At the same time, government expenditures for social 

assistance, such as cash benefits to the needy elderly, underwent an even steeper 

decline. While the Castro regime has been discussing reforms to the system for at 

least 10 years, nothing significant has been done. 

3. Reforming the Retirement and Pension Systems 

The Cuban economy and government budget after transition may not be able 

to sustain the level of unearned benefits and the lax requirements for eligibility that 

the communist system permitted. At the same time, it will be important to ensure 

that the retired and disabled populations receive a level of support that prevents 

health problems, acknowledges the worth of their contribution to society, and 

limits protests and unrest. 

The current Cuban retirement system is funded in part from a 14 percent 

payroll tax. It is not known how much of that goes to health or other services. 

What is known is that one-third of pension monies have to come from other 

sources (presumably the VAT), because payroll tax collections are not sufficient. 

If only half of the 14 percent goes to pensions and it covers only two-thirds of the 

pension bill, then under current compliance rates and eligibility rules Cuba needs 

approximately 11-12 percent of payroll to cover pension costs alone. 

In the initial transition period, there will probably be a large increase in noncompliance resulting from the simultaneous collapse of the centrally planned 

economy and the coercive power of the tax authorities. During this period, paying 

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the very low benefit levels under the existing system could require significant 

infusions of aid. Raising taxes to the higher levels needed to sustain current 

benefits, even under the best of circumstances, probably would undermine job 

creation in the formal economy and generate even more non-compliance. (China, 

which also has a large and fast-growing aged population, faces a similar problem.) 

The challenge likely will be to create a broad based revenue source designed 

to minimize the current problem of widespread non-compliance. Cuba has a good 

chance of being the world’s oldest society by mid-century, and any solution must 

take this fact into account. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 In light of the coming collapse of Cuba’s centrally planned economy, the U.S. 

Government should be prepared to encourage a free Cuba to initiate a 

sustainable, pre-funded social security system, as has been done in other 

transition economies. 

 The U.S. Government should be prepared to encourage the transition 

government to consider funding the transition as much as possible through the 

sale of state-owned assets. The World Bank has been leading the way in 

promoting funded approaches in Latin America and Eastern Europe. 

 Other reforms the U.S. Government should consider encouraging a free Cuba 

to take include: 

 Increasing the minimum pension and adjusting pensions to the consumer 

price index; 

 Moving to eliminate the black market economy, license businesses, and 

institute laws requiring employer contributions with small business 

exemptions; 

 Applying some of the proceeds from the sale of state assets to a pension fund 

for the Cuban people; 

 Working with lending organizations to obtain loans to help Cuba build the 

beginnings of a real reserve fund; 

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 Working with charities and churches to find in-kind solutions to providing 

pensioners with access to basic medical care and human services on the 

community level; and 

 Creating a Cuban Elder Corps to help develop income-generating projects 

for older Cubans who may be without resources, thus also employing them, 

if in good health, to assist in reconstructing the nation. 

 The Peace Corps could help provide micro-enterprise training, and HHS’s 

Administration on Aging (AoA) and its aging network could serve as a resource 

in developing intergenerational programs — providing support to youth and 

assistance to the elderly. 

f. A national insurance market 

The post-transition Cuban government may want to adopt some or all of the 

above proposals. The United States has an interest in preventing both a 

humanitarian crisis within Cuba and a situation that could prompt thousands of 

Cubans to try to migrate to where benefits are more reliably financed and 

generous. We and a free Cuban government also may share an interest in finding 

pension solutions that do not further bankrupt the Cuban economy or drive away 

the business investments and start-ups on which a new Cuba will depend. 

4. Social Assistance 

i. Services for the Elderly 

The Cuban government also provides social assistance benefits to those in 

need, including disabled, single mothers, relatives dependent on a deceased 

insured, pensioners with low benefits, and workers reaching retirement age but not 

entitled to a pension, cash benefits, and benefits-in-kind such as food, shelter, and 

medications. Some of the social assistance programs include free medical care, 

low-cost meals at soup kitchens, subsidized housing, day care centers, and public 

and private nursing homes for some elderly. However, these programs do not 

cover all of those who are in need. The social protection network has also 

deteriorated in recent years. Rations that in the past covered one month now barely 

cover 10 days. Many elderly Cubans may become even more vulnerable during 

and after a transition period. 

Development of community and home-based services will be important. It 

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may be important to assess the short- and long-term needs of older Cubans and to 

create home and community-based services that meet their needs, and those of 

their caregivers. These programs may include supportive, nutritional, preventive 

health, caregiver, and protection of the elderly services. The Administration on 

Aging, together with other HHS agencies and faith- and community-based 

organizations could support these efforts by providing or arranging for training, 

technical assistance, and sharing of materials developed in Spanish. 

a. Public information campaign 

During a transition, some older Cuban-Americans may desire to return to 

Cuba. There could be establishment of educational efforts to inform older 

returning Cubans about the availability or lack of food, housing, health and 

medical services, lifestyle changes, and availability of social security and other 

benefits when they return to Cuba. 

RECOMMENDATION: 

 At the request of a transition government, HHS could develop and distribute 

educational materials, conduct local workshops, and prepare mental health 

services to help Cuban Americans with the anxiety and decision making process 

about returning. 

b. Church and community assistance 

The existing pattern of home-based elder care and care for those with 

disabilities will benefit from an increased presence and greater freedom for 

churches and private charities, as well as renewed support for families and 

community organizations. This assistance will not be able to shoulder the entire 

burden, but it can do more if it is allowed to do so. Florida International 

University, under a USAID grant, has worked with Cubans (including visiting 

religious leaders) to develop program guides for working with older Cubans. 

c. Prevent abuse and neglect of the elderly 

Older people may be particularly at risk of abuse and neglect by family 

members and others during a transition period. 

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RECOMMENDATION: 

 The Administration on Aging, working with other HHS agencies and NGOs 

could, if asked by a transition government, help to prepare and distribute 

information concerning elder abuse and neglect as well as available resources. 

AoA could also identify potential foster homes or “shared housing” 

arrangements to provide immediate shelter to the most vulnerable elderly. 

d. Discounted medical services 

A Cuban transition government might consider, in cooperation with private 

pharmaceutical companies, insurance companies, and aid donors, instituting access 

to basic medical services and medicines on a discounted basis, as is now being 

done in Africa and other poverty-stricken countries. This solution could also 

extend to special populations such as those living with HIV/AIDS and other 

chronic conditions. 

e. Train and support more social and community workers 

A free Cuba may need to retrain its existing social workers and community 

organizers, as well as prepare new professionals who can help individuals, 

families, and groups locate assistance and opportunities in a post-Castro system. 

Exchange programs and service providers can assist Cuba in doing this.

ii. Services for Youth 

Cuba is known to have serious problems with runaway and homeless youth, 

school dropouts, juvenile delinquency, and child prostitution. Concerted efforts by 

Cuban transition authorities and public and private assistance donors may be 

needed to counter these problems. 

a. Youth Development Programs 

It could be important to introduce positive youth development programs as 

part of civic engagement efforts, and to provide street outreach, education, and 

mental health services through shelters for runaways and homeless youth. 

HHS/SAMHSA could support these efforts, while the Administration for Children 

and Families (ACF) could use its Family Youth Services Bureau’s (FYSB) 

clearinghouse and training and technical assistance providers to provide street 

outreach materials in both English and Spanish. FYSB could form a team of 

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Government and private/nonprofit youth service agencies to go to Cuba. The latter 

could include partnerships with faith-based and community-based organizations 

b. Youth Rescue Programs 

The new Cuban authorities, churches, and other private organizations, 

including concerned employers, may want to develop special outreach programs to 

deal with youth crises such as drug abuse, criminal activity (including gangs), 

prostitution, and diseases such as HIV/AIDS. U.S. federal agencies such as HHS, 

churches, and specialized youth crisis intervention organizations could assist their 

Cuban counterparts in developing and implementing special programs to deal with 

abused, troubled, and diseased youth. Cooperation with youth development 

program providers and law enforcement could be useful in this effort. 

c. Youth Mentoring 

American and Cuban adults can also assist Cuban youth through the 

establishment of mentoring programs sponsored by mentoring associations, 

counseling services, and churches. Mentoring services can address specific 

problems faced by Cuban youth as well as general counseling and companionship. 

Adult mentors could be provided from either Cuba or other countries such as the 

United States, and can help Cuban youth get the extra emotional and educational 

support they need to start a new, healthy and productive life. A special mentoring 

program could be established for children and youth with disabilities to assist and 

encourage this heretofore isolated segment of Cuban society to find necessary care 

and appropriate work, and to make sure they have respect and access to needed 

services. 

iii. Child Welfare

Child welfare services involve a combination of services to families and 

single parents who have infants and young children, as well as a program of care 

and adoption services for infants and children without living parents or who have 

been abandoned. Assistance to parents is likely to be provided via other social, 

educational, and health services in the public and private sectors, as well as 

through the churches. Abandoned or orphaned children require special services 

not commonly available under the Castro regime. 

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a. Establish Child-Centered Adoption Services. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 If asked by transition authorities, the U.S. Government in cooperation with 

private donors such as churches could initiate a technical assistance program 

to offer a child-centered adoption process: 

 HHS could work with USAID to assess the Cuban adoption system and 

provide necessary assistance to create a child-centered approach. Child 

tracking systems developed by the World Bank could be implemented and 

training of Cuban nationals could be developed in partnership with 

HHS/ACF and USAID, as well as international agencies like UNICEF 

and/or the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO); and 

 ACF could use the methodology of Child and Family Services reviews to 

conduct an analysis of the overall services providing a benchmark for 

improving those services. 

HHS’s Head Start Bureau currently works with seven Hispanic Serving 

Institutions (colleges and universities) that are redefining their approach to 

working with early education staff in new and innovative ways toward attaining an 

academic degree. Head Start could work to expand the use of the Head Start 

Bureau’s Web-based Learning Center, which is under development, and help 

implement web-based learning opportunities. The Learning Center is immediately 

accessible for online technical assistance, resource materials, specialized cottages 

for a variety of concerns, chat rooms where experts monitor and respond in a 

problem-solving mode, national consultant pool rosters of expert consultants, and 

Spanish-speaking consultants, staff, and materials. Head Start could share lessons 

learned from initiatives for teaching early literacy, such as Good Start/Grow Smart. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 The Administration for Children, Youth, and Families at HHS could offer to 

assist the transition government in the creation of a clearinghouse and provide 

Spanish- language information and training materials on a wide range of child 

welfare programs and the creation of performance standards. Training and 

technical assistance can include early childhood education, fatherhood and 

family development, homelessness, and developing and enriching the Early 

Childhood Curriculum and syllabus at colleges and universities in Cuba. 

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5. Special Social Assistance to Castro Regime Victims 

i. Victim Identification and Outreach System

It could be helpful to create an outreach program to vulnerable populations 

for the purpose of identifying victims and preventing people from becoming 

victims. HHS’s Administration for Children and Families (ACF) could use lessons 

learned from the Trafficking in Persons model that includes public awareness 

strategies, rapid education of intermediaries, and a referral system to handle 

informational inquiries and crisis and law enforcement calls. Examples of 

intermediaries include faith-based and community-based institutions, social service 

providers, NGOs, health and welfare services, the travel industry, and educational 

institutions. 

RECOMMENDATION: 

 U.S. federal and local experts, as well as private sector providers, could help a 

transition government establish an integrated call center for telephone crisis 

counseling to address counseling tasks for victims of trafficking, as well as 

other social ills such as rape, domestic abuse, at-risk/runaway youth, and 

homelessness. 

ii. Victims of Torture 

It likely will be important to help provide emergency treatment and care to 

meet victims’ immediate needs. Assistance could include helping conduct an 

assessment of the prevalence of torture victims and the current capacity for 

providing immediate, short-term and long-term services for victims. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 ACF, through its Office of Refugee Resettlement, could work with USAID and a 

number of NGOs to develop this assessment if a transition government so 

requests. 

 ACF also could undertake assist transition authorities with publicity campaign 

to gain domestic assistance and support. 

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 The U.S. Government could, if asked, help in the creation of national legislation 

and legal authorities to continue to help victims of torture and provide longterm services. 

6. Child Victims of Commercial Sexual Exploitation 

Prostitution is illegal in Cuba. Nevertheless, the Department of State reports 

that prostitution of girls and boys is a serious problem, particularly in areas of the 

country that attract foreign tourists. Police in Cuba have led a general crackdown 

on prostitution in recent years, but these efforts have not eliminated child 

prostitution. A transition government will need to find effective ways to address 

what is formally called the commercial sexual exploitation of children (CSEC), 

particularly if the government adopts policies that promote more tourism. 

Simultaneously, the government likely will need to provide counseling and support 

services to children who have been victimized by CSEC. 

The causes and effects of the commercial sexual exploitation of children and 

adolescents, including child prostitution and trafficking, are complex and

multifaceted. Relevant factors include poverty, child abuse and/or abandonment, 

social attitudes that undervalue children, and weak application of existing laws. 

Victims of CSEC often suffer irreparable damage to their physical and mental health. 

Common problems that they experience are early pregnancy, the spread of sexually

transmitted diseases, such as AIDS, and dropping out of school. A CSEC program 

would need to address all of these aspects to effectively combat this complex and

tragic problem. 

 

i. Remedial Steps 

The U.S. Government, particularly the Department of Labor, has significant 

experience in developing and implementing programs to combat child trafficking 

and prostitution. In the Americas alone, the Department of Labor has funded and 

overseen cooperative CSEC programs in Central America, the Dominican 

Republic, Mexico, Brazil, and Paraguay. These programs have provided funding 

and technical assistance to aid in reforming laws covering CSEC, raising 

awareness about the problem, and providing vital services to its victims. 

RECOMMENDATION: 

 If asked, the Department of Labor could assist a transition government in 

designing and managing a program to combat the commercial sexual 

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exploitation of children and adolescents. Partners could include international 

organizations that the Department of Labor has worked with and through on 

past CSEC projects, including the International Labor Organization’s 

International Program on the Elimination of Child Labor, UNICEF, and 

relevant NGOs. Local Cuban authorities and leaders, including the education 

community, would also be important partners in any CSEC assistance. 

 Drawing from experience, a Cuban CSEC project could include the following 

objectives:

 Identify gaps in the existing legal systems and formulate recommendations 

for improved legislation for the protection of sexually exploited children and 

adolescents; 

 Make available credible information and intelligence related to CSEC, 

including possible child trafficking networks, for use in the planning, design, 

and implementation of public interventions; 

 Develop an information system to identify exploiters, and train government 

personnel in the application of the system; 

 Build the capacity of relevant public, private, and religious institutions to 

fight CSEC in terms of their ability to formulate and implement plans and 

programs; 

 Organize workshops and meetings, and develop coordinated partnership

among nongovernmental organizations, law enforcement authorities, trade 

unions, employers’ organizations, community leaders, and the media to 

mobilize against CSEC; 

 Implement outreach campaigns — including school-based programs — and 

establish youth clubs to raise awareness of the problem nationally, and 

particularly in target areas and populations; 

 Organize and provide legal, health, psycho-social, and educational services 

to children and their families to remove children from CSEC and prevent 

children at risk from involvement in CSEC; 

 Train professional staff in psycho-social trauma treatment methods and case 

management with a focus on child participation, and help develop national 

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standards and guidelines for care facilities and the training of caregivers; 

and 

 Help to develop income generation programs for families in high-risk areas 

to help reduce vulnerability to involvement in CSEC. 

7. The Challenge from a Social Security Perspective 

In the past, the U.S. Social Security Administration has sent specialists to 

other countries to evaluate their system and propose change. It could provide 

similar technical assistance to a free Cuba. Other international organizations active 

in pension reform include the International Labor Organization, the Inter-American 

Development Bank, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. 

Technical assistance alone, however, may not be sufficient to deal with the 

financial and social challenges facing a rapidly aging Cuba. Even under the most 

optimistic of scenarios, Cuba faces severe pension and health care crises with the 

potential to delay economic recovery in a post-Castro transition. Under a worstcase scenario, these crises could lead to unacceptable social outcomes requiring a 

dramatic humanitarian response from U.S. policymakers and the Cuban émigré 

community. 

RECOMMENDATION:

 The U.S. Social Security Administration should offer to send specialists to 

evaluate and propose changes to the transition government.

V. CONSULTING AND COORDINATING WITH THE INTERNATIONAL 

COMMUNITY 

Many different international organizations and donors are interested in Cuba 

and will desire to be involved in the transition. Assistance to a Cuban transition 

must be a multilateral effort and U.S. efforts will generally prove more successful 

if taken in consultation and cooperation with these groups. Coordinating plans will 

need to take this into account and be ready to accommodate diverse assistance 

providers according to interests, capabilities, and the needs of the Cuban people. 

The U.S. Government should begin to plan how to coordinate with these 

organizations to show Cubans that legitimate assistance providers have their 

interests at heart and should not be feared or suspect. 

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Within the Inter-American system, the Organization of American States, the 

Inter-American Development Bank, the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation 

on Agriculture, PAHO, and the Pan-American Development Foundation could all 

have roles to play and expertise and assistance to offer. 

Several UN agencies already operate in Cuba, including the United Nations 

Development Program (UNDP), UNICEF, PAHO, UNESCO, and the World Food 

Program. A free Cuban government may want to invite them to remain in Cuba 

during a transition and to provide services during the short- and longer-term 

phases. It may be appropriate for other UN agencies to be involved, as 

circumstances require. 

In addition, NGOs can play an important role, including universities 

humanitarian organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross 

(ICRC), and fraternal organizations such as the Masonic Order. 

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CHAPTER 3 

Establishing Democratic Institutions, Respect 

For Human Rights, Rule Of Law, and 

National Justice And Reconciliation

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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

The United States is committed to assist a post-Castro transition 

government in the promotion and consolidation of representative democratic 

processes and institutions that will respect the human rights and personal 

freedoms of all Cuban citizens. 

Only when the Castro regime’s authoritarian institutions and practices 

are abandoned, its instruments of repression dismantled, and a popularly 

based democratic process initiated, will Cubans be able to begin governing 

themselves through the exercise of their own free will. Such a liberation 

from Fidel Castro’s brutal communist dictatorship will inspire a new 

political order based on national reconciliation, the rule of law, personal 

choice, and equal justice and opportunity for all. 

Leaders of a transition government will surely move urgently to 

address a number of immediate priorities. Political prisoners will be freed 

because they have been cruelly incarcerated only for exercising their rights 

of free speech. The large segment of the population that has been 

subjugated and silenced by government intimidation and violence will fear 

no more. The many forms of violence that have characterized the Castro 

regime’s behavior at home and abroad will be abandoned. The Cuban 

people will have reason once again to be proud as they take collective 

responsibility for restoring their country to a respected, peaceful, and 

constructive role in the international community. 

Other immediate priorities a transition government will face include: 

professionalizing military and civilian police and security services; 

considering whether to end obligatory military service; voiding a number of 

constitutional provisions that are inimical to democracy; revising criminal 

codes and sentencing guidelines; deciding what laws and regulations should 

be rescinded; rebuilding an honest and impartial judiciary; initiating a 

national debate about the provisions of a new constitution and procedures for 

drafting and ratifying it; opening prisons to outside inspection; guaranteeing 

human rights and freedom of speech; and ending all forms of discrimination. 

Among the most daunting and immediate challenges a transition 

government will face are those that will pit popular demands for 

prosecutions of former Castro regime officials against the imperative of 

establishing a government firmly founded on the rule of law and due 

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process. On balance, the prospects for a rapid and peaceful transition to 

democracy could depend more on this key variable than any other. 

There may be calls for truth commissions, which have been used in 

several countries when new democratically elected governments decided it 

was best to provide a forum to review allegations of criminal behavior by 

officials of the former dictatorships. In some of these cases, the 

commissions did not have much authority to impose punishment, but 

nonetheless provided a cathartic and peaceful outlet for victims of 

oppression. 

Middle- and longer-term priorities will include building all of the 

institutions, processes, relationships, and values that will nourish democratic 

governance. The U. S. Government will be prepared to work with the 

Cuban people and their chosen representatives, should they ask, to lend 

assistance in drafting laws and regulations, preparing a new constitution, and 

establishing a system of checks and balances and the spectrum of national

and local level democratic institutions (executive, legislative, and judicial) 

responsive to the public will. 

U.S. public and private assistance could also help in the critical 

longer-term task of promoting the culture of the rule of law in which citizens 

believe in their new system, accept its legal and constitutional principles and 

understand their obligations in that context, and involve themselves in an 

emerging civil society. In building professional, apolitical law enforcement 

institutions, international assistance could be beneficial. 

As the transition to a multi-party democracy progresses, Cubans will 

be able for the first time in decades to enjoy the freedoms that prevail in all 

of the other countries of the Western Hemisphere. The experiences of some 

of those neighbors — and of the former communist countries — that have 

progressed from dictatorship to democracy could influence the choices 

Cubans will make in constructing their own free society. A liberated Cuba 

should be welcomed back as a full participant in the inter-American system. 

The assistance and encouragement of democracies in the region and 

elsewhere could prove to be crucial in helping to assure that the transition to 

constitutional democracy is rapid and peaceful. At the request of a free 

Cuban government, the U.S. Government would also be prepared to assist as 

Cubans form diverse and representative political parties, interest groups, 

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labor unions, and other free political institutions, as well as civic, 

professional, and commercial associations. A national legislature, and 

regional and local governments as the Cuban people desire; independent 

courts, and other legal and judicial infrastructure; as well as new and 

accountable executive branch agencies can expect American counsel and 

assistance. Eliminating and preventing official corruption will be a 

continuing priority. 

Achieving these goals will not be easy. Already acute economic 

problems — rationing, shortages of virtually all consumer goods, 

unemployment, and poverty — could grow considerably worse by the time 

of the transition. Furthermore, popular expectations for political and 

economic change will intensify as the old regime disappears. If severe 

economic hardships are not quickly redressed, a transition government might 

have to deal with increasingly urgent demands from a newly empowered 

populace. 

A peaceful transition to democracy will therefore require the presence 

of effective, professional Cuban security institutions that are committed fully 

to supporting the democratic transition. As an immediate priority, and 

assuming the new Cuban government desires it, the United States would be 

prepared to assist a free Cuba develop a truly professional civilian police 

force. Military modernization will also be important. Reliable military 

forces could help transition authorities prevent massive sea borne migration 

and deliver humanitarian assistance. 

II. U.S. ASSISTANCE TO A TRANSITION GOVERNMENT 

After enduring more than four decades of often brutal dictatorship, the 

Cuban people overwhelmingly aspire to a future of freedom and 

representative democracy, of human rights and due process, and of justice 

and national reconciliation. In desiring to empower themselves under the 

rule of law, they will no doubt emulate the peoples of other once subjugated 

nations who have transformed their societies into free and open ones. 

The United States is committed to assisting a post-Castro transition 

government in the promotion and consolidation of representative democratic 

processes and institutions that will respect the human rights and personal 

freedoms of all Cuban citizens. Similarly, it will be prepared to work with 

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independent civil and political groups on the island to help foster the 

legitimacy and effective functioning of a transition government. 

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), in close 

collaboration with the Department of State and the U.S. Interests Section in 

Havana, has for some time endeavored to empower the Cuban people by 

promoting the flow of accurate information on democracy, human rights, 

and free enterprise to, from, and within Cuba. Grant funding is provided to a 

wide range of U.S. universities and NGOs enabling them to: 

 Build solidarity with Cuba’s human rights activists by providing them

information and (non-financial) material support; 

 Give voice to Cuba’s independent journalists by publishing their reports 

worldwide over the Internet and by disseminating them inside Cuba in 

hard-copy newsletters; 

 Help develop independent Cuban libraries and other non-governmental 

organizations (NGOs) by providing them books, training materials, and 

(non-financial) material assistance; 

 Defend the rights of Cuban workers by providing information and (nonfinancial) material support to Cuba’s struggling independent labor union 

movement; 

 Engage in direct outreach to the Cuban people by providing them

information in hard copy and by electronic means; and 

 Plan for a transition by engaging the Cuban people in a dialogue 

concerning all of the issues a transition government will face. 

During the transition, the USAID Cuba program could be expanded to 

provide training, technical assistance, and other support for Cuba’s emerging 

civil society and to support the informational needs for all the Cuban people. 

This could include providing computers, Internet access, books, and other 

informational materials to Cuba’s schools and public libraries, as well as 

ensuring that most Cuban households have working radios capable of 

receiving national and international broadcasts. The United States could 

help transition authorities subsidize the sale of television sets capable of 

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receiving TV Martí, as well as other international media and Cuban 

transmissions. 

In such a new setting, the Cuban people should have access to 

information, training, and assistance from the United States and other 

countries that had not theretofore been available to them. Once a 

democratically elected government is in office, and possibly before, the 

United States will be prepared to offer financing, technical assistance, 

training, and other support to help in the establishment of the full range of 

institutions a true democracy requires. Notably, these include an 

independent judiciary, an elected national legislature, whatever regional and 

local governments the Cuban electorate deems appropriate, a competent and 

accountable executive branch of government, and law enforcement and 

security services that respect human rights and operate under the rule of law. 

In coordination with willing bilateral and multi-lateral donors, and 

with U.S. and foreign private sector involvement, the U.S. Government 

could provide funding, technical assistance, training, and exchange programs 

to help satisfy many of the immediate and longer-term needs of the Cuban 

people as they consolidate democratic rule. 

In the short term, following the demise of the Castro dictatorship, the 

challenges a transition government is likely to face in fulfilling the 

democratic and free market aspirations of the Cuban people will be 

daunting. Most of the resources, institutions, and capabilities for 

establishing democratic rule will be lacking because they have been banned 

during the last 45 years. 

For these reasons, and because the development of a democratic and 

prosperous Cuba is a critical goal for the United States, the American people 

and their government stand ready to work with the international community 

to assist a post-Castro transition government. 

Empowering the Cuban people is central to that effort. Their 

liberation from the repression and brutality of Fidel Castro’s dictatorship 

will come as their human rights and due process are respected, the free flow 

of information is made possible, transparent multi-party elections held, and a 

new constitution freely debated and adopted. 

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The U.S. Government is committed to supporting the Cuban people 

throughout this process, and as they develop the many groups and 

institutions of a new and independent civil society. Independent NGOs, selfhelp groups, trade unions, political parties, as well as commercial, 

professional, and other civic associations could be candidates for public and 

private U.S. assistance. A free press and privately owned and directed 

media, mainstays in all democracies, will provide independent sources of 

information, opinion, and analysis. 

Churches and other religious organizations can play an important role 

in the transition. Their ability to provide independent social services and 

human rights monitoring could be important as independent civil society 

expands and becomes more involved in Cuba’s political life. 

 

Coordinated international assistance, including from the Organization 

of American States (OAS), international financial institutions (IFIs), and the 

United Nations (UN) can help stabilize a transition government and promote 

the peaceful establishment of an elected, constitutionally legitimized 

successor. In this regard, the U. S. Government should be prepared to work 

with other donors to help establish an effective Cuban government donor 

coordination unit. 

 

The coordination of private sector assistance — whether from the 

United States or elsewhere — will provide an additional challenge for 

transition leaders. They may therefore decide to employ an NGO umbrella 

organization to help coordinate the flow. The U.S. Government, if asked, 

should be prepared to assist a Cuban transition government with the 

development of donor coordination mechanisms. 

 

A transition government and its democratically elected successor will 

succeed to the extent that they operate in an accountable and wholly 

transparent manner, fully disclosing their day-to-day operations and 

providing the Cuban people with a constant flow of accurate information on 

all aspects of reform and reconstruction. The U.S. Government should be 

prepared to offer to assist the creation of a professional public information 

office within a transition government. 

As important as government actions will be during the transition, 

Cuba’s new private sector will provide the capital, entrepreneurial skills, and 

creativity needed to accelerate democratic and free market change. 

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Protection of private individual and corporate property rights, including the 

rights of intellectual property, will provide the basis for private sector 

development and Cuba’s return to the rule of law. The U.S. Government

can offer technical assistance and training to help Cuban leaders eliminate 

the maze of legal and cultural impediments to private sector development 

imposed by the Castro regime. (See Chapter 4 for further discussion.) 

Educational, cultural, youth, and professional exchange programs will 

be important vehicles for promoting the development of civil society, NGOs, 

and good governance practices, and can link Cuban schools, teachers, and 

professionals with their U.S. counterparts. Exchange programs are by nature 

structured to “share” experiences and expertise. They will offer 

opportunities for initial overtures and continuing engagement with the 

people of Cuba. 

Since 1997, U.S. universities and NGOs, some with USAID grant 

funding and others through private initiative, have promoted such change. 

Training, technical assistance, and informational materials have been 

provided to a wide range of independent Cuban organizations. Human 

rights activists, journalists, librarians, doctors, churches, and other groups 

independent of the Castro regime have begun to build a nascent civil society 

on the island. With further assistance in the future, they will help to play a 

key role in charting Cuba’s democratic future. 

III. HUMAN RIGHTS 

Some of the most urgent priorities for a transition government will be 

in the areas of human rights and equal opportunity. Only when the Castro 

regime’s authoritarian institutions and practices are abandoned, its 

instruments of repression dismantled, and a popularly based democratic 

process initiated will Cubans be able to begin governing themselves through 

the exercise of their own free will. 

Unthinking fealty to a single, inflexible, and dogmatic leader and his 

obsequious political apparatus will no longer be the essential requirement of 

Cuban citizenship. Liberation from Fidel Castro’s brutal dictatorship will 

likely inspire a new political and social order based on national 

reconciliation and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 

These include freedoms of speech, assembly, and association, the right to

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privacy, assurances of the sanctity of private property, and equal opportunity 

and justice for all. 

Human rights violations in Castro’s Cuba have been so pervasive and 

protracted, and so frequently the object of international censure, that 

redressing them will surely be among the highest and most urgent priorities 

of a transition government. 

A. Political Prisoners 

Prisoners of conscience and other political prisoners will undoubtedly 

be freed as one of the highest immediate priorities of a transition 

government. According to the estimates of international human rights 

monitoring organizations, there are more than 300 political prisoners now in 

Cuban jails. All were incarcerated after summary trials closed to 

independent observers and without recourse to any real defense or appeals. 

Nearly all, moreover, did nothing more than to express peacefully their 

personal opinions in provoking the wrath of Castro’s regime. 

The most recent group of 75 prisoners of conscience — human rights 

and pro-democracy activists rounded up in the spring of 2003 and summarily 

sentenced to long prison terms — did not advocate or resort to violence 

against the regime, conspire, demonstrate, or call for its overthrow. Some 

were leaders of the Varela Project, an effort originally conducted entirely 

within current Cuban law to promote democratic change. Others are 

founders of the independent library movement, independent journalists, and 

aspiring independent labor organizers. They are serving prison terms 

ranging up to 28 years, most under harsh conditions. 

Eyewitness accounts document the degrading and inhumane 

conditions these and the other political prisoners endure: lack of basic 

sanitation, rodent and insect infestation, beatings, infrequent access to light 

and exercise, lack of potable water, denial of medical care, extreme 

temperatures, and often solitary confinement. A number of the incarcerated 

suffer from serious medical conditions and are serving out their sentences at 

locations far from their families. 

Once they are freed, these stalwart victims of the dictatorship might 

benefit from direct and indirect U.S. assistance intended to help reintegrate 

them into society and, in the cases of the infirm, to recover from untreated 

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medical problems. A large number of former political prisoners also could 

benefit from such help. Condemned by the regime to live on the margins of 

society, typically under constant surveillance and intimidation, most are 

denied employment, benefits, and decent living standards. Generally, 

former political prisoners must subsist on the generosity of family and 

foreign benefactors. 

The U.S. Government is committed to expanding current programs 

that indirectly provide humanitarian assistance to political prisoners, former 

political prisoners, and their families. Additional future assistance could 

include vocational and technical training, technical assistance, income 

support, and counseling to help them develop new skills and to compensate 

for the injustices they and their families have suffered. The U.S. Department 

of Labor (DOL) has experience implementing job-training and employment 

programs in neighboring countries, and has worked to address the needs of 

dislocated and traumatized groups in other transitions. DOL could play a 

role in helping former political prisoners adjust to new lives in a free society. 

B. Prison Conditions 

Conditions in Cuban prisons have only been subject to outside 

accounting through the testimonies of those who survived their sentences 

and managed to leave the island. No thorough, competent, and independent 

monitoring of Cuban prisons has been allowed. The Castro government has 

refused to allow the personal representative of the High Commissioner on 

Human Rights to visit the country, in direct defiance of several resolutions 

passed by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR). 

That said, convincing, first-hand testimony over these many years indicates 

that conditions are deplorable, sentencing often arbitrary, and criminal 

prosecution frequently influenced by political factors. Human Rights Watch 

has reported, for example, that political prisoners have been forced to work 

in exploitative conditions producing items such as mattresses, clothing, and 

furniture, which are later sold by the regime. 

A transition government could promote transparency and legitimacy 

in Cuba’s opaque penal system by assigning a high immediate priority to 

opening all prisons to international inspection. The United States would be 

willing to work with the UN, the OAS, and other nations or organizations to 

help finance and facilitate such an effort. 

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C. Other Human Rights Abuses 

Many other types of human rights abuses and discrimination have 

characterized the Castro’s regime’s treatment of its own people. Child 

prostitution is still fairly common, particularly in high-tourist areas. 

Similarly, the regime’s treatment of the seriously mentally ill may be 

another area of egregious human rights violations. The Castro regime 

demonstrated its savage disregard of proper standards for the treatment of 

the mentally ill when, during the Mariel boatlift of émigrés to the United 

States in 1980, thousands of patients were evacuated from mental 

institutions and packed onto boats going to Miami. 

Separated from families and treatment, for the most part involuntarily 

forced into exile, and sent without medical or treatment records, these most 

vulnerable of Cuba’s citizens were simply declared surplus by the regime. It 

is inconceivable too that the decision to do so could have been made by 

anyone other than Fidel Castro himself. On balance, there are perhaps no 

more deplorable examples in the modern experience of civilized nations than 

Castro’s brutal treatment of so many of Cuba’s seriously mentally ill in 

1980. 

Given the abominable human rights record of the Castro regime, 

leaders of a transition government will surely place a high and immediate 

priority on redressing these abuses in a variety of ways. For example, they 

will probably want to enact strong anti-discrimination and other laws 

guaranteeing individual rights, create well-staffed mechanisms to enforce 

them, and be amenable to public and private international assistance. 

D. A Cuban Human Rights Commission 

As in other countries that have made successful transitions from 

dictatorial rule, Cubans may want to establish a local Human Rights 

Commission. With U.S. Government and other international support, such a 

body could begin functioning early in the transition at the national, regional, 

and perhaps local levels to enforce anti-discrimination principles, help 

inspire legislation, provide guidance to businesses, unions, and employees 

concerning their rights and responsibilities, and generally to promote the fair 

and equitable treatment of all citizens. To maximize their impact, these 

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efforts could also focus on education and outreach strategies to prevent 

discrimination from occurring in the first place. 

In cooperation with a transition government, as well as international 

entities and private monitoring organizations, the U.S. Government could 

provide grant funding to NGOs to place human rights monitors at locations 

across the island with responsibility to review the treatment of any citizens 

who credibly allege official mistreatment. This would provide an initial 

level of protection to emerging Cuban democratic and human rights 

organizations and provide international observers information about 

evolving human rights matters. 

E. International Support for Human Rights 

International human rights organizations can assist Cuba’s transition 

to democracy. In particular, the Inter-American Commission on Human 

Rights (IACHR), an organ of the OAS, could provide many kinds of support 

based on its experiences in other countries in the Western hemisphere. 

The IACHR has the principal function of promoting the observance 

and the defense of human rights. In carrying out its mandate, it receives, 

analyzes, and investigates individual petitions that allege human rights 

violations, observes the human rights situation in member countries, and 

publishes reports. It organizes visits to countries to analyze human rights 

situations and investigates credible allegations of abuse. 

In 1948, the Cuban government participated in an inter-American 

conference that established the inter-American human rights system with the 

signing of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. 

Adopted before the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it was the 

first international human rights instrument of its kind. In 1959, Cuba also 

approved the creation of the IACHR. 

In January 1962, the OAS voted to suspend the Castro government 

from participation in the inter-American system, although Cuba technically 

remains an inactive member. In the course of its Fourth Session in April 

1962, the IACHR decided to continue its activities and communications with 

respect to the human rights situation in Cuba. The decision was based in 

large part on a determination that it was the government and not the State of 

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Cuba that was excluded from the OAS and, therefore, violations against 

Cuban citizens could be investigated. 

The IACHR has given special attention to the human rights situation 

in Cuba by producing seven special reports on human rights conditions. The 

reports have taken into account individual complaints formulated against the 

current regime as well as the testimony of numerous witnesses. 

During a transition in Cuba, the U.S. Government would be prepared 

to work with Cuban authorities to help sort, prioritize, and provide 

information to the IACHR, relating to the human rights situation. A 

transition government would be encouraged to invite the IACHR to visit 

Cuba in order to establish a credible baseline on the human rights situation 

in the immediate aftermath of the Castro regime. The IACHR could publish 

a special report on the situation, as it has done in other countries. 

The IACHR also has the ability to publish studies on related subjects, 

such as measures to be taken to ensure greater independence of the judiciary, 

the human rights situation of minors and women, and the human rights of 

specific segments of a population that may suffer discrimination. The U.S. 

Government would support and encourage the IACHR to study existing 

institutions in Cuba that may survive the demise of the Castro regime. The 

purpose would be to evaluate whether their structures, as opposed to the way 

they function, are lacking human rights safeguards. 

Any person, group, or non-governmental organization may present a 

petition to the IACHR alleging violations of the rights protected in the 

American Convention and/or the American Declaration. In this respect, the 

IACHR has been playing an important role gathering information and 

identifying human rights violations since the current regime came into 

power. However, the work of the IAHCR in a post-Castro Cuba would be 

essential to efforts to foster rule of law, justice, and the resulting national 

reconciliation. 

While there are various officially “illegal” NGOs in Cuba that 

promote the protection of human rights, in a transition scenario these groups 

could become more broad-based opposition parties or civic associations. 

There will be a shortage of broad-based organized human rights institutions. 

In this environment, the independence of the IACHR, and its legal 

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foundation and jurisdiction, provide it with the necessary legitimacy to 

become an important instrument for the protection of human rights. 

F. Guaranteeing Free Speech 

From its first years in power, the Castro regime has exercised a 

monopoly over all Cuban media and forms of expression. Except for the 

United States-sponsored Radio and TV Martí, other foreign broadcasts that 

reach Cuban listeners, and small circulation Catholic Church publications, 

Cubans have almost no choice but to read and listen to regime propaganda 

via the official media. 

The government controls newsprint, paper, and other communications 

materials as well as all broadcast capabilities on the island, and has limited 

the availability of the Internet to well-controlled tourist resorts, joint venture 

locations, and government offices. Few Cubans, and scarcely any who are 

unauthorized by the regime, have unfettered access to cyberspace and the 

boundless independent information available there. 

Independent journalists on the island have almost no ability 

themselves to publish or circulate their writings within Cuba. Generally, 

their writings are telephoned or otherwise dispatched abroad where they are 

disseminated to foreign audiences followed by some distribution on the 

island. Unlike in the former Soviet Union and other communist countries, 

moreover, little independent underground literature circulates clandestinely. 

Security forces and their networks of informers have managed to prevent the 

circulation of any significant independent media. Similarly, the independent 

libraries have also been violently repressed by the regime. Books have been 

seized and burned. 

As an urgent priority once a transition government is established, and 

with the consent of the Cuban government, the U.S. Government would be 

prepared to provide advice and assistance to Cubans who crave the 

establishment of independent and uncensored media of all types. Technical 

assistance could be provided to help draft laws and executive orders that 

restore and protect this fundamental right. Training of Cubans on the island 

and at American media facilities in cooperation with the private sector 

would help in the development of independent and professional media 

capabilities. 

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The restoration of freedom of the press, the end of the regime’s 

jamming of international broadcasts, and the willingness of a transition 

government to operate in an open, transparent manner will facilitate civic 

education and public outreach. In addition, the U.S. Government can offer 

assistance to increase the flow of accurate information on democracy, human 

rights, free enterprise, and international developments to all interested 

Cubans. 

Once Cuban government jamming is terminated, Radio and TV Martí 

and other international media could reach interested audiences throughout 

Cuba. USAID could continue to provide or subsidize the provision of 

portable radios, rechargeable batteries, and re-chargers to the Cuban 

population. Portable computers, software, and other technical assistance 

from public and private sources abroad would also contribute powerfully to 

the rapid development of new communications media. 

Despite the opposition of the current regime, USAID grantees now 

sending thousands of newsletters each month by e-mail to Cuban households 

across the island. The number receiving such materials could be greatly 

expanded. In addition, USAID and the U.S. Interests Section in Havana 

provide thousands of books, videos, and other informational materials to 

Cuba’s independent libraries, and other independent organizations. This 

effort should increase during the transition, and Cuban government libraries 

should receive substantial USAID and other assistance for administration as 

well as in the form of reading and audiovisual materials. 

The U.S. Government can work with international organizations and 

others to help a Cuban transition government employ mass media 

campaigns, including televised town hall meetings; develop national and 

regional training-of-trainers workshops; and introduce model programs

concerning democracy, human rights, and free enterprise. 

G. Ensuring Equal Opportunity 

In contrast to the regime’s persistent propaganda over the years, racial 

and other forms of discrimination have been serious problems in Castro’s 

Cuba. Furthermore, racially identifiable disparities in income, influence, 

access, and social position have been getting worse since the holding of 

dollars was legalized in 1993. On a number of occasions over the years, the 

Castro regime brutally persecuted male homosexuals, and it is unlikely that 

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all such official abuses have terminated. Afro-Cubans suffer discrimination 

most conspicuously in the tourism industry, where lighter-skinned Cubans 

are favored in government hiring. Since the beginning of Castro’s rule, they 

have also been under-represented in senior government and Communist 

Party posts. 

Other forms of discrimination occur to varying degrees on the basis of 

gender, religion, ethnicity, and disability, in addition, of course, to political 

beliefs and economic preference. Nonetheless, the Castro regime insists on 

the myth that it has created a society based on equal opportunity. 

This history of secrecy about discrimination issues could hinder the 

transition to an economy based on principles of equal opportunity and justice 

because problems that are not recognized cannot easily be solved. To 

address this, a transition government could begin the process of developing a 

culture and practice of equal employment opportunity by initiating an open, 

truthful dialogue on racial and gender bias issues in Cuba. Such an initiative 

would help to identify existing barriers to equal opportunity in the labor 

market and facilitate public discourse on how a free market economy in a 

democratic society can best address those barriers. 

 

The U.S. Government would be prepared, if asked, to provide support 

and guidance in whatever decisions a transition government may make to 

address racial and other social inequality on the island. Specifically, USAID 

could help develop equal opportunity principles, human rights offices, and 

enforcement and compliance mechanisms to address racial prejudices and 

exclusionary practices. In addition, the U.S. Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) would be prepared to work with future 

Cuban leaders by sharing whatever in its extensive experience might be 

relevant to Cuba’s unique situation. 

A transition government might choose, for example, to articulate a set 

of basic principles that will guide its efforts in all areas, including 

employment, education, housing, and government services. Establishing a 

framework to ensure civil rights and equal opportunity for all Cubans will be 

an important component of a successful transition to a free market economy. 

The effort could begin with an open examination and discussion of racism 

and other forms of discrimination and inequality. 

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Assuming both governments agree, the U.S. EEOC would be able to 

assist Cuba develop equal opportunity protections and create effective 

compliance mechanisms by providing Spanish-language publications setting 

forth the principles of equal opportunity and the argument for a pluralistic, 

merit-based system. It could also train Cuban leaders — in government, 

schools, and business — to help establish a commitment to the principles of 

equal opportunity. 

In addition, the EEOC could offer exchanges so that Cuban 

government officials could observe and learn how it and other civil rights 

agencies work in the United States to prevent discrimination and enforce 

anti-discrimination statutes. It could also provide assistance for the 

development of strategies to address the issue of protecting the rights of 

disabled individuals and for preventing discrimination in education, public 

accommodations, transportation, and employment. 

As a transition government moves toward a free market economy, it 

will face the challenge of articulating and enforcing principles of equal 

opportunity in the marketplace. It may also need to conduct a public 

dialogue to allay any concerns that the transition to a free market society will 

lead to increased discrimination in the workplace. Cubans can engage in

open dialogue to convey the message that the most successful and profitable 

companies in a free market society are those that utilize inclusive hiring and 

promotion policies to draw talent and ideas from all segments of the 

population. Such a dialogue can help demonstrate that diversity and equal 

opportunity are fundamental business concepts in free market economies. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 If requested by a transition government, the U.S. Government should be 

prepared to provide technical assistance and capacity building for:

 A volunteer legal liaison program to make available legal expertise 

and technical assistance for Cuba as it modifies and restructures its 

laws and legal systems; 

 Partnerships with U.S. Government agencies, private sector firms, 

and individuals to share best practices for ensuring diversity, equal 

opportunity, and competitiveness; 

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 Training programs for government leaders, educators, and the 

emerging private sector to ensure that equal opportunity and diversity 

become integral business concepts that are recognized as tools to 

provide a competitive advantage in the increasingly global economy; 

 Compliance and law enforcement mechanisms within government 

institutions that will expedite implementation of equal opportunity 

principles; and 

 Training programs for people with disabilities. 

IV. NATIONAL JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION 

Among the most daunting challenges a transition government will 

immediately face are those that will pit popular demands for prosecutions of 

former Castro regime officials against the imperative of establishing a 

government firmly founded on the rule of law and due process. On balance, 

the prospects for a rapid and peaceful transition to democracy could depend 

more on this key variable than any other. 

Some of those seeking justice — or vengeance — will want the new 

authorities to prosecute their alleged tormentors and to enact laws that will 

permit legal action for a wide range of offenses dating back perhaps through 

the entire 45 years of Castro’s rule. There may be pressure to create one or 

more “truth commissions” to investigate and illuminate excesses of the 

former regime and to identify worst offenders who ought to be punished. 

A. Truth Commission 

Establishing an equitable process for undertaking such reviews with 

appropriate checks and balances including the right to counsel, adequate 

rules for the use of evidence, consideration of statutes of limitations, and 

provisions for appeals will be exceedingly difficult, especially in the short 

term. The challenge for the transition authorities will be greatly 

compounded by the need to reconstruct Cuba’s legal and judicial systems 

and by the potential enormity and complexity of the charges that could be 

brought. 

Officials of Castro’s government and its security services, perhaps 

many members of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, regime 

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militants who inflicted violence on peaceful dissidents, and other pro-regime 

zealots will be the objects of citizens seeking justice for crimes allegedly 

committed against them. The list of accused could be long, even if a 

transition government decided to allow criminal trials only in the most 

extreme cases and to apply a statute of limitations to some crimes. And 

prominent senior officials of the Communist Party, the government, the 

mass organizations, and especially the police and security services may very 

well be accused of egregious violations. 

But however difficult and potentially destabilizing investigations of 

past abuses could be for a transition government, the failure of new leaders 

to move quickly to establish a set of at least provisional standards for dealing 

with such matters could also undermine popular support for democratic 

change. In the worst of cases, lacking any access to official recourse, some 

individuals pressing allegations of victimization might be tempted to take 

matters into their own hands, and thus undermine law and order and perhaps 

the transition itself. Post-Castro Cuban leaders may, therefore, be hard 

pressed in the short-term to chart a peaceful and humanitarian course 

between these opposing pressures. 

The decisions new leaders make will likely enjoy legitimacy only to 

the extent that they faithfully reflect Cuba’s unique needs, culture, history, 

and the morals and values of society. It will be of critical importance, 

therefore, that transition leaders effectively communicate decisions in these 

matters to the populace and endeavor to gain substantial popular feedback 

and support for the stands they take. The experiences of a number of Latin 

American and former communist countries that in recent years have dealt 

with similar issues will be instructive. Generally, leaders of new 

democracies emerging from the ashes of dictatorships have been reluctant to 

prosecute officials of the old regimes, except in truly extreme instances. 

Truth commissions have been used in several countries when new 

democratically elected governments decided it was best to provide a forum 

to review allegations of criminal behavior by officials of the former 

dictatorships. In some of these cases, the commissions did not have much 

authority to impose punishment, but nonetheless provided a cathartic and 

peaceful outlet for victims of oppression. 

 In Argentina, a truth commission confirmed the “disappearances” of 

nearly 9,000 people as well as the existence of 340 secret detention and 

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torture centers. Civil courts identified and prosecuted some former 

military junta members and other officials responsible for the most 

flagrant abuses. 

 In Chile, a truth commission investigated and assigned blame for 3,000 

cases of political violence that had resulted in deaths or disappearances. 

The Supreme Court terminated prosecution of former dictator Augusto 

Pinochet on the grounds that he suffered from “moderate dementia.” But 

criminal investigations of other military officers and secret police are still 

underway many years after the transition to democracy. 

 In Uruguay, several truth commissions began to investigate human rights 

abuses committed during a previous military regime, but the Congress 

decreed an unconditional amnesty. 

 A South African “truth and reconciliation” commission investigated only 

cases of extreme violence and amnestied all those accused of crimes as 

long as they accepted blame and were willing to reveal what they knew 

about the abuses they were charged with. 

 In El Salvador, a United Nations commission registered more than 

22,000 grievances, most having to do with extrajudicial deaths, 

disappearances, and torture. It assigned responsibility to individual 

military officers and commanders of the guerrilla forces. The 

government then declared a general amnesty. 

 In Guatemala, two truth commissions identified many of those 

responsible for violations of human rights. The government and the 

former guerrilla opposition agreed to an amnesty that did not apply to 

those guilty of genocide, disappearances, torture, and other crimes for 

which there is no statute of limitation. To date, there have been no 

successful prosecutions. 

B. Preserving the Old Regime’s Records 

A possibly essential tool a transition government and the Cuban 

people could rely on as they consider the merits and demerits of these issues 

will be the records and archives of the old regime. In particular, the files of 

the Ministry of Interior’s police, intelligence, and other security services, 

especially the General Directorate for State Security (DGSE), as well as 

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certain army (Revolutionary Armed Forces, or FAR) counterintelligence 

units — if they are not in fact destroyed by the time of a transition — could 

be invaluable. 

Procedures enacted to examine such once secret records have varied 

in former communist countries. In Romania, the secret police records of the 

communist regime will remain sealed for 40 years. In Germany, however, 

where legislation was passed creating a new government agency with 

responsibility for storing and managing the records of the former East 

Germany’s secret police, the Stasi, citizens can apply to review files. The 

constitutional court ruled that citizens had the right to know who had been 

collecting information about them and for what purposes. To protect 

personal rights and to reconcile them with the public interest, parliament 

passed a law in 1991 allowing individuals access to Stasi records. 

Government agencies are able to refer to the records to check the 

backgrounds of employees, and in some cases former Stasi officers have 

been denied their pension rights. But the information has not always been 

reliable and in some cases false. 

C. Renunciation of Official Violence 

As a high immediate priority, leaders of a transition government will 

surely abandon all of the forms of violence that the Castro regime has 

practiced and condoned since its inception in 1959. The large segment of

the population that has been subjugated and silenced will fear no more. 

Officially orchestrated “acts of repudiation” and the intimidation and 

brutality commonly directed against human rights activists, dissidents, and 

regime critics should end as the dictatorship does. 

The many forms of violence — explicit and implicit — in the Castro 

regime’s incessant demands that the populace militantly join in its 

“revolutionary” causes at home and abroad will be discarded. And finally, 

Fidel Castro’s lifelong commitment to the use of lethal violence to advance 

his domestic political and international interests is certain to be abandoned 

by the leaders of a transition government. 

The arbitrary use of the death penalty — for example, as it was 

applied summarily in 2003 against three young Afro-Cuban men who had 

hijacked a vessel while committing no lethal offense — will end with 

Castro’s regime. Transition authorities will no doubt terminate the 

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imposition of the death penalty for political purposes, which has been 

characteristic of the so-called “revolutionary” justice since Castro came to

power. Instead, in a democratic environment sentences, even for the most 

heinous crimes, will result from transparent legal and judicial processes and 

be subject to institutionalized appeals procedures, the rule of law, and 

humanitarian considerations. 

The lengthy sentences and harsh conditions both common and

political prisoners have endured under the Castro regime’s criminal codes 

are certain to be thoroughly revised by a popularly based transition 

government. Draconian laws — such as the one against “dangerousness” —

used for political intimidation of dissidents will likely be deleted from the 

books. Other punitive laws branding those who criticize Castro or his 

regime as “counterrevolutionaries,” and making them subject to criminal 

prosecution will also give way. Legal restrictions on foreign travel no doubt 

will be lifted. And many other laws intended only to preserve the hegemony 

of Fidel Castro and his political apparatus will expire. 

D. International Fugitives from Justice 

Perpetrators of violence, whether officials and supporters of the old 

regime or foreign nationals who have been given sanctuary in Cuba should 

be subject to democratic due process. Lacking an effective extradition 

relationship with the Castro regime, and given the regime’s willingness to 

shelter violent criminals if a “political” justification for their crimes can be

alleged, dozens of fugitives from U.S. justice, including at least four 

convicted of killing American law enforcement officials, are currently in 

Cuba with the full support of the regime, and therefore beyond the reach of 

U.S. legal authorities. The U.S. Government will seek the assistance of a 

transition government in pursuing these cases and will want to ensure that 

our nations have a functioning and effective extradition relationship to 

prevent U.S. criminals from sheltering in Cuba. 

V. DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 

After four and a half decades of Fidel Castro’s personal dictatorship, 

and starved by that dictatorship of true information about the world and 

competing political systems, the truth is that, at least initially, Cubans may 

not be ideally positioned to govern themselves in a representative process 

with efficiency, transparency, professionalism, concern for basic human 

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rights, and under the rule of law. Both democratic leadership and citizenship 

require free association, discussion, debate, and an environment free from 

intimidation or repression. That being said, the fundamental intelligence and 

fairness of the Cuban people would be their most important asset as they 

move quickly to establish an effective and representative democracy. 

The U. S. Government would be prepared to work with the Cuban 

people and their chosen representatives, should they so choose, to provide 

assistance as Cubans draft a new constitution and create a system of checks 

and balances, as well as the spectrum of provincial and municipal level 

democratic institutions (executive, legislative, and judicial) responsive to the 

public will. U.S. public and private assistance could also help in the critical 

longer-term task of promoting a rule of law culture in which citizens believe 

in their new system, accept its legal and constitutional principles and 

obligations, and involve themselves in an emerging civil society. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 If requested by a transition government, the U.S. Government should be 

prepared to provide technical assistance and capacity building to: 

 Reform executive branch management, budgeting, payment, financial 

controls, auditing, and accountability systems; 

 Develop mechanisms and principles for fighting and prosecuting 

corruption; 

 Strengthen legislative institutions, processes, and procedures; 

 Encourage decentralized power sharing through the development of 

provincial and municipal governments; 

 Introduce exchange programs to inform Cuban leaders and 

administrators about democratic policy and decision-making and 

transparent governance; 

 Revise labor laws and reform the structure and functioning of the 

Labor Ministry to help establish a free labor market; and 

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 Inform Cuban citizens about their new constitution and the role, 

function, and powers of democratic forms of government. 

A. Strengthening Legislative Institutions 

Since it was created, the puppet National Assembly of People’s Power 

has been subordinated to the will of Fidel Castro and the communist party. 

The 609 members of the unicameral assembly, carefully selected by Castro 

and his so-called “mass organizations,” and who do not even face an 

opponent in what are termed “elections,” meet for only six weeks a year, and 

have functioned entirely as a rubber stamp for the regime. A case in point is 

the failure to discuss the Varela project petition organized under its existing 

rules. 

Once Cuba holds free and fair elections for a new legislature, a 

constituent assembly, or establishes legitimate legislative representation, the 

United States could encourage and support assistance through the OAS to 

overcome the historic lack of confidence in the legislative branch of 

government, help establish its authorities within a system of checks and 

balances, and modernize the way it functions. 

To this end, the OAS could provide support for the generation, 

exchange, and dissemination of new skills and information on the role, 

problems, and practices of legislatures and their modernization. 

B. Independent Political Parties and Interest Groups 

Virtually since its inception, the Castro government has banned 

independent political parties while persecuting and incarcerating those who 

attempted to develop them. The regime has consistently been successful in 

suppressing nearly all forms of independent civil society typically by 

employing brutal and repressive means. It has only been in recent years, 

with the emergence of a nascent independent civil society centered on free 

library, labor, and journalism groups, as well as the Varela Project, that the 

Cuban people have found emerging democratic alternatives. 

 

The USAID Cuba Program, in cooperation with the U.S. Interests 

Section in Havana and U.S. NGOs, has provided Cuban citizens with more 

than two million books, newsletters, videos, and other informational 

materials elaborating on political freedom, democracy, and human rights. 

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With the cooperation of a transition government, USAID grantees could 

greatly expand those efforts, reaching a much larger percentage of the Cuban 

populace while directly assisting those eager to form and develop 

independent political parties and interest groups. USAID grantees could 

work in coordination with the U.S. Department of Education (Civitas 

Program), the U.S. Department of State (Bureau of Educational and Cultural 

Affairs), European and Latin American political party institutes, the 

International Republican Institute (IRI), the National Democratic Institute 

(NDI), the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), and other 

entities. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 If requested by a transition government, the U.S. Government should be 

prepared to provide technical assistance and capacity building to:

 Conduct programs at the national and provincial levels and hold town 

hall and local meetings for citizen involvement in the formation of 

political parties; 

 Promote democratization of political party structures and processes 

and introduce concepts and mechanisms for citizen oversight of 

parties as well as of local government; 

 Disseminate concepts and best practices through television and radio 

broadcasts, videotaped training materials, and town hall meetings; 

 Hold a national conference to develop specific recommendations for 

democratic reforms, including political party formation; 

 Inform the Cuban people about the roles, functions, and 

responsibilities of political parties in a democracy; 

 Support media public awareness campaigns; 

 Provide training for civil servants, journalists, educators, and others, 

and in-school programs for high school and university students; 

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 Work with the OAS to support electoral observation missions to help 

Cuban transition government authorities bring accountability to their 

electoral process. 

USAID, in coordination with the Department of State’s Public 

Diplomacy experts, could work with UN specialized agencies and others to 

help introduce model programs providing civic education and information 

about democracy, human rights, and free enterprise. A transition 

government and its supporters would be able to employ independent Cuban 

mass media in this educational effort, including televised town hall meetings 

across the island. Radio and TV Martí and other international radio and 

television broadcasters would be able to help carry out a wide range of 

informational and educational programs. USAID and others could help 

develop national and regional training-of-trainers workshops for Cubans 

through personalized information sharing.

C. Free and Fair Elections 

Assuming the transitional government and Cuban people agree, the 

U.S. Government could offer assistance to a transition government for the 

planning of free and fair multi-party elections. Assistance would draw on 

the recommendations of the Transitional Election Planning Manual for 

Cuba developed under USAID funding in 1998 to the International 

Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), a U.S. non-governmental, nonprofit, and non-partisan organization. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 If requested by a transition government, the U.S. Government should be 

prepared to provide technical assistance and capacity building to:

 Ensure elections are democratic and competitive; 

 Observe international laws governing state practice, and paying 

special attention to voting and election rights and procedures, the 

rights and responsibilities of candidates, parties and their campaign 

organizations, as well as the rights and responsibilities of citizens; 

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 Establish procedures for voter registration that are effective, 

impartial, and non-discriminatory, and ensure that voting is equally 

accessible for all those qualified; 

 Ensure that the right to be a candidate is open to all adult citizens, as 

should be the right to form or join a political group in order to 

compete in an election; 

 Guarantee freedom of speech and information and the right to 

disseminate, seek and receive information needed for making 

informed choices; 

 Guarantee the right to freedom of movement throughout the campaign 

period and to campaign on an equal basis with other political parties; 

 Ensure the right of equal access to the mass media and access for all 

parties and candidates; 

 Provide adequate security and protection for candidates, ensuring 

they have equal protection of the law and access to remedies for 

violations of political or electoral rights; 

 Establish clear criteria on voter and candidate age, citizenship and 

residence requirements; allow the greatest possible freedom to 

political parties, consistent with minimum standards of public safety 

and welfare; and create the conditions whereby all candidates for 

public office enjoy a level electoral playing field; 

 Create an unbiased and impartial mechanism for the management of 

elections and maintain its autonomy; 

 Train election officials in voter registration, maintenance of voting 

lists and balloting procedures, personnel training, and proactive 

measures against fraud and abuse; 

 Encourage candidates and parties to abide by a code of conduct to 

govern their actions, and those of the media, during the election 

campaign; 

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 Protect the freedoms of movement, assembly, association, and 

expression, especially during political rallies and meetings; and 

 Permit all candidates and parties to communicate their views to the 

electorate without interference. 

Because of important deficiencies in the current communistdominated voter registration process, Cuban transition authorities may find it 

necessary to compile an entirely new voter list, based on either a house-tohouse enumeration or through voluntary self-enrollment as is done in the 

United States and other countries. If requested, USAID could provide 

technical and financial support for either approach. 

USAID could also help train Cuban electoral commission personnel in 

democratic procedures related to the supervision of balloting, vote 

tabulation, handling documents, and verification and announcement of 

results on election day. Additional assistance could be provided to ensure a 

comprehensive, national voter information program including times, dates, 

and places of voter registration; posting of voter registration lists; locating 

voting precincts; and voting procedures. 

D. International Support for Elections 

The OAS could also help provide legitimacy to the electoral process. 

Once Cuba’s suspension from OAS activities is lifted, the United States, in 

cooperation with and at the request of a transition government, would be 

prepared to support the assistance of the OAS Unit for Promotion of 

Democracy (UPD) to encourage the rule of law in Cuba. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 If requested by a transition government, the U.S. Government should be 

prepared to provide technical assistance and capacity building to:

 Offer advice and assistance to help develop and strengthen a 

democratic electoral system including drafting and other reforms to 

election law; 

 Provide help in redrafting, reforming, or amending, as appropriate, 

Cuba’s electoral code and related legislation; 

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 Sponsor studies, seminars, and research on the strengthening of 

electoral laws and provide options for transforming the current 

electoral law and process; and 

 Offer technical assistance and training to modernize and automate 

electoral process and systems. This would involve reviewing and

modernizing civil registries, and promoting voter participation and 

civic electoral education. 

Electoral observation missions have been an OAS tool for the 

promotion and strengthening of democracy in the hemisphere. The 

observation process often begins at the voter registration stage and continues 

through actual voting until the verification stage. The main objective is to 

observe and report on the electoral process. The basic reference point for 

these missions is the constitution and the laws of the member state in which 

the election is taking place. The missions work closely with the entity 

charged with running elections in each country and sign an agreement for 

each observation. 

E. Inter-American Democratic Charter 

The Inter-American Democratic Charter, adopted by all 34 active 

OAS member states in 2001, provides the ideal hemispheric tool and 

standard to encourage the development of a democratic system in Cuba. It 

provides clear benchmarks agreed to by all the countries of the Western 

Hemisphere by which the progress of democracy in Cuba and the strength of 

democratic institutions could be assessed. The Charter also provides a 

roadmap for reinstating the government of Cuba as a full and active 

participant in the OAS and the inter-American system. 

At the same time, one of the most important elements of the InterAmerican Democratic Charter has been the recognition that representative 

democracy requires constant efforts to promote the basic principles, values, 

and practices of a democratic political culture among the citizens, as well as 

continuous work to provide advanced training for its leaders. Assuming the 

transition government requested such aid, the United States would support a 

Unit for the Promotion of Democracy mission to Cuba that would target 

such assistance. 

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By adopting the Charter, a transition government would be accepting 

the principle that representative democracy is indispensable for Cuba’s 

stability, peace, and development. In order to adopt the Charter, Cuban 

leaders would have to agree to a number of important provisions reflected in 

the Charter related to representative democracy, transparency in government 

functions, freedom of speech and the press, the institutionalization of 

civilian authority, building democratic institutions, providing opportunities 

for citizen participation, protecting human rights and democracy, conducting 

free and fair elections, and promoting the rule of law. 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 In order to promote good governance and the rule of law, the U.S. 

Government would work within the OAS to encourage a hemispheric 

effort to explain to Cuba the importance of signing, ratifying, and 

otherwise acceding to, the following inter-American instruments, 

processes, and commitments: 

 The Charter of the OAS and its Protocols; 

 The Inter-American Democratic Charter; 

 The commitments established in the Summit of the Americas 

processes; 

 Inter-American Convention Against Corruption and the Document of

Buenos Aires, establishing the Follow-up Mechanism; 

 Inter-American Convention against Terrorism; 

 The Anti-Drug Strategy of the Americas; 

 Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and 

Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and other Related 

Materials; 

 Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal 

Matters; and 

 Agreement establishing the Inter-American Development Bank.

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F. Public Sector Reform 

An early and critical priority for a transition government will be to 

begin the process of reconstituting public sector institutions. The Cuban 

people and their new leaders will need to decide what qualifications — and 

disqualifying considerations — should apply to hiring and retaining public

sector employees. The experiences of other post-communist and postdictatorial countries in recent years will provide valuable models and 

lessons. Assuming the Cuban government agrees, the United States would 

be prepared to offer assistance in fostering the professional development and 

training of those personnel who will fill the ranks of a new Cuban 

government. 

Through exchange and training programs financed by the U.S. 

Government, international organizations, educational institutions, and 

academies of public administration, the Cuban people could develop a new 

cadre of leadership and administrative talent equipped with modern skills of 

public management. Some examples of exchange and training programs are: 

 Mass media public awareness campaigns; 

 Training programs for civil servants, journalists, and educators; and 

 In-school programs for high school and university students.

The transition government may wish to consider creating a 

government-donor Task Force for Comprehensive Public Sector 

Modernization, which could set parameters and objectives that could guide 

that process. Such a process could begin by developing a new merit-based 

civil service, which would foster leaders who adhere to high standards of 

integrity and transparency.

The long-term credibility of a transition and successor governments 

will rest to a considerable extent on the quality and integrity of its elected

and appointed officials at all levels, as well as its permanent staff. A 

professional and well-trained civil service, founded on merit principles, will 

therefore be an essential component of Cuba’s transformation to a 

democratic culture. By fostering the development of a capable, efficient, 

and impartial civil service, the Cuban people will come to trust and respect 

their government, lay the foundation for economic growth, and win Cuba the 

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respect of the international community as the new government negotiates a 

spectrum of agreements with other countries and re-enters international 

organizations. 

G. Fighting Corruption 

A transition government will face the challenge of addressing the 

destructive results of the Cuban communist system, in which corruption is 

endemic and in many respects considered normal. Both petty acts of 

administrative corruption, widespread theft of state-controlled goods by 

individuals, and state-sponsored forms of corruption have thrived under 

Castro’s rule. Without a proactive strategy for transparency and 

accountability in government, the levels of corruption and official 

malfeasance of all sorts could increase as the transition gets underway. 

The current civil service is bloated, notorious for its inefficiency, 

poorly attuned to modern managerial concepts, enmeshed in a tradition of 

secrecy and lack of transparency, and oblivious to the notion of customer 

service. Civil servants are poorly paid and its upper echelons are explicitly 

politicized. 

Should the transition government request it, the U.S. Government 

would be able to offer assistance to transition authorities to establish a civil 

service personnel system that will build public confidence in the integrity, 

honesty, and efficiency of government officials. Principles of merit-based 

employment and standards of ethical conduct for public officials can be 

emphasized in training and information packets. 

A professional Cuban civil service would operate under transparent 

and fair rules. Individuals would be selected for jobs based on merit and 

qualifications alone, rather than for political reasons, favoritism, or 

nepotism. Measures for ensuring transparency in government processes and 

finances, public access to government information, and impartiality in 

government decision-making could also be shared with officials and civil 

servants of a transition government. 

To embody the value that government employment is a public trust, a 

transition government could adopt and enforce rules prohibiting the use of 

public office for private gain and barring preferential treatment, bribery, 

special privilege, or retribution in the provision of government services. In 

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this effort, it can draw upon the many tools, resources, and incentives 

offered by the U.S. Government through its initiatives to combat corruption 

globally. 

Cuba’s new leaders could demonstrate their commitment to take 

action to end corruption by cooperating in international monitoring and 

enforcement endeavors and by becoming a signatory to intergovernmental 

conventions such as the OAS Inter-American Convention Against 

Corruption and the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 

Officials in International Business Transactions. Through various 

mechanisms, including the follow-up mechanism to the Inter-American 

Convention against Corruption, the OAS could provide assistance to a new 

Cuban government in this respect. 

Corruption facilitates other crimes. Until government officials at all 

levels respect the rule of law and abide by legally accepted policies and 

procedures, any attempt to effectively combat other crime will be seriously 

hindered. The U.S. Department of Justice as well as other USG agencies 

could assign advisors to work with a willing transition government in 

training public officials to prevent, detect, investigate, and prosecute 

corruption. 

H. Independent Trade Unions 

Currently, Cuban workers do not have the right to organize 

independent unions. This is true in the domestic economy as well as in areas 

open to international investment, where the government controls hiring and 

firing. Workers have no access to independent unions and are denied the 

rights to strike or to bargain collectively. Those who attempt to organize 

have been persecuted and, in some cases, imprisoned. In other cases, their 

families also have been subject to employment discrimination by the 

government, which maintains “employee files” that contain information on 

political activities. 

The International Labor Organization (ILO) has been especially 

critical of the lack of freedom of association in Cuba, in particular with 

regard to the trade union monopoly institutionalized for the official union 

confederation in the Labor Code. 

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During 2003, the ILO also examined cases related to threats, 

detentions, and pressure against workers who attempted to form independent 

unions. That June, the ILO requested that the Cuban government accept an 

ILO “direct contacts mission” with a view to ensuring the application of 

freedom of association in law and practice. The Castro government rejected 

this, however, and instead argued that Cuban labor movement “unity” 

reflected the will of the workers themselves and that attempts to establish 

new unions were in fact subversive activities funded by the United States. 

To fully recognize basic rights in the workplace, a transition 

government should enact democratic labor legislation. It would also be 

essential to strengthen national labor law administration and compliance. 

The Department of Labor (DOL) could provide appropriate technical 

assistance and training. It would also be essential to strengthen national 

labor law administration and compliance. 

USAID and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) are 

already providing support to Cuba’s incipient independent trade union 

movement through grants to U.S. NGOs. Such support should be increased 

when a transition government is in place in order to ensure that 

internationally recognized labor rights are fully respected. These rights, 

embodied in the ILO’s 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 

Rights at Work, include freedom of association and collective bargaining; 

elimination of forced and compulsory labor; abolition of child labor; and the 

barring of employment discrimination. 

These principles are essential for the promotion of an open economy, 

higher living standards, and a favorable climate for trade and investment. 

Although the Castro regime has committed itself to upholding these 

standards by accepting the 1998 ILO Declaration in theory, and ratifying 

core ILO Conventions on fundamental labor rights, many of these rights are 

systematically denied in practice. 

One key to such an effort will be a complete reform of the Labor 

Ministry’s inspection functions and investments in efforts to raise awareness 

among employers, workers, and government representatives about labor 

rights. To serve as a vehicle for workplace democracy and to open a 

national dialogue on labor rights, these efforts should be undertaken in a 

transparent process involving employers, workers, and government 

representatives. 

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DOL has experience in other countries implementing programs to 

improve labor law, strengthen labor inspection, eliminate forced labor, and 

reduce commercial sexual exploitation. It has worked primarily through the 

ILO in these efforts, but it has also involved other international and national 

organizations with expertise. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 If requested by a transition government, the U.S. Government should be 

prepared to provide technical assistance and capacity building to:

 Reform labor laws to facilitate private sector development by 

establishing a sound, equitable, and predictable framework for 

collective and individual labor relations, promoting democratic 

participation, cultivating transparent and accountable laws, and 

making legislation more accessible; 

 Provide technical advice in the reform effort, with special emphasis 

placed on democratic and participatory approaches in all stages of 

the discussions with employer and worker organizations and other 

concerned parties. Promote sustainability by building the capacity to 

effectively amend, implement, and enforce labor laws; 

 Develop public awareness of labor issues, in part by training Cuban 

partners to conduct seminars on labor laws, core labor principles and 

available services. After four and a half decades of Cuban 

government repression of any signs of independent labor activity, 

substantial effort will probably be needed to provide Cuban workers 

and employers the knowledge and tools to secure full respect for their 

rights; and 

 Improve the effectiveness of government labor inspection functions by 

creating a corps of inspectors trained in modern inspection 

techniques and to assist in developing a system for monitoring 

violations. This would include steps to: 

 Develop policies, training, and procedures for carrying out 

labor inspections to enforce national laws; 

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 Foster strong institutional linkages among government 

officials, employers, and workers; 

 Implement a program to target inspections to the most 

problematic employers and sectors; 

 Audit labor inspectorates and develop national plans for labor 

law compliance; 

 Train staff in the technical knowledge of modern inspection 

systems; and 

 Create a computerized database for labor inspection reports. 

I. Support for Decentralization 

In the framework of the inter-American system, decentralization is an 

instrument for fostering citizen participation and for enhancing democracy at 

a local level. Diffusion of the powers that have been highly centralized in 

Havana during Castro’s dictatorship would respect the country’s earlier 

history of encouraging effective provincial government. Decentralization 

would have the added benefit of increasing accountability since it would 

allow monitoring at the local level. The U.S. Government would support a 

request by Cuba to the OAS’s UPD to develop a program for 

decentralization in Cuba. 

Finally, the protection of private property is fundamental to Cuba’s 

future development. The United States could provide valuable assistance to 

a transition government that sees the wisdom of protecting property rights, 

as well as any continuing threats to those rights. 

The U.S. Department of Commerce could work directly with Cuba’s 

private sector to develop sound business practices, combat corruption, and 

improve transparency. It has worked with the private sectors in a number of 

other countries to improve business practices. 

VI. THE RULE OF LAW 

As the transition to democracy proceeds, new legislation and 

constitutional mandates affecting judicial and legal affairs will no doubt be 

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approved. With both public and private assistance from the United States 

and other democratic countries, Cubans will be able to access the intellectual 

resources to draft and approve a new constitution, reconstitute criminal and 

civil procedures and codes, modernize the legal profession, develop new law 

school curricula and standards as well as bar associations, institute public

prosecutor and defender capabilities, de-politicize the police and military 

forces and train them in human rights, and establish a new corrections 

system that will all fully respect the rights of citizens and operate under the 

rule of law. 

A. Constitutional Reform 

The Cuban people will decide how to secure their new democracy 

with a popularly ratified constitution that liberates and empowers them as 

collectively sovereign. If asked, the U.S. Government would be prepared to 

offer technical assistance either to amend the current communist constitution 

through interim legislation and executive orders or to suspend it entirely. In 

either event, Cubans will want to immediately enjoy the freedoms of 

unencumbered speech and expression, assembly and association, including 

the right to form political parties. U.S. assistance could include technical 

materials and studies to assist in the drafting and popular vetting of a 

constitution, as well as help in conducting a referendum. 

The current communist constitution formalizes an authoritarian, one 

party political system that has stifled fundamental political and economic 

freedoms. The immediate, minimal priorities of transition government 

authorities with respect to the constitution will probably therefore be to 

dismantle all of the authoritarian powers it propounds and to delete its 

ideological vehemence. Some of its provisions that are most inimical to 

democratic governance follow: 

 The primacy it grants to the Cuban Communist Party, and the special 

status its related Communist Youth Union enjoys, has sanctified a singleparty, ideologically driven system. 

 The privileged status it bestows on Castro’s mass organizations 

contributes substantially to the pressures citizens feel to affiliate with 

these regime-sponsored entities. 

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 Language that extols military virtue, struggle, and missions (and requires 

compulsory military service) places the armed forces on an elevated 

plane in comparison to civilian society. 

 The general mobilization of society for defense contributes to Cuba’s 

militarization and the militancy the regime frequently demands of the 

populace. 

 The principle of state socialist property within a “command” economy, 

the supremacy of state directives even over peasant private property, and 

limits on private property and inheritance rights are enunciated. 

 The state is constitutionally granted monopoly control over education, 

culture, sports, health care, and most other services. 

Proceeding during the transition period toward democratic governance 

and the rule of law would be impossible under such constraints. Even if 

transition government leaders were to decide temporarily to work with some 

parts of the current communist constitution while amending and deleting 

others, they will want to immediately countermand its authoritarian and 

ideological content. The U.S. Government would be prepared to offer 

technical assistance to facilitate the changes Cubans decide to make. 

Ultimately, the full consolidation of democracy will require a wholly 

new constitution. Thus, an early priority for a transition government — in 

intensive and broad consultation with Cuban citizens — no doubt will be to 

begin deliberating specific ways to amend it. A constitutional convention of 

popularly elected delegates specifically empowered to debate and draft a 

new charter will be one option. 

There are many model constitutions now undergirding newly 

consolidating democracies in other countries. Constitutional drafting and 

ratifying processes in the experiences of other newly democratized nations 

could also be of use to the Cuban people. And once a draft has been 

completed, the final step, as in most countries that in recent years have made 

the transition from dictatorship to democracy, would be to submit it for 

public approval in a referendum. 

USAID is currently providing constitutional and rule of law experts to 

work with the constitutional and juridical commissions of the government of 

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Afghanistan. Lessons learned there and in Iraq, the former Soviet Union, 

and other countries would inform whatever U.S. assistance to the Cuban 

constitutional reform process is requested. 

The U.S. Government, as well as other governments and private 

sources, would also make available to the Cuban people whatever 

documents and studies they may want as they consider incorporating a Bill

of Rights in their constitution. The United Nations Declaration of Human 

Rights, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, those 

outlined in the Inter-American Democratic Charter of the OAS, as well as 

those developed in other countries that in recent years have adopted 

democratic charters, could be useful. 

B. The Armed Forces 

Although Cuba’s military services, serving under the Ministry of the 

Revolutionary Armed Forces, are directly treated in only two of the 

constitution’s numerous articles, the general militarization of society, 

including compulsory military service, appears in a number of other places 

in the document. In effect, the constitution decrees the subordination of 

every Cuban’s existence to the country’s defense, postulating the need for 

eternal vigilance against external threats. 

Given the inordinately large size of the armed forces today (even after 

substantial downsizing in recent years), their shrunken defense and 

international missions, domestic deployment for agricultural and other 

production purposes, and the involvement of many officers in managing the 

economy, the military’s role — if any — in a democratic Cuba will likely be 

a key issue. Furthermore, the respect the armed forces historically enjoyed 

with the populace may have eroded in recent years as a substantial number 

of active and retired officers have become engaged in entrepreneurial 

activities, especially in the tourism sector, and perceptions that some have

become corrupt have increased. 

At a minimum, therefore, transition government authorities, in 

consultation with the populace, may conclude early in the transition that an 

all volunteer force would be preferable to the existing conscript force. The 

transition government will need to determine early in the transition process 

the appropriate short-term and long-term missions for the armed forces. In 

the short term, such missions could include domestic security and disaster 

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assistance. Over the longer term, the armed forces could become involved 

in peacekeeping operations. Regular military units that in recent years have 

been assigned largely if not exclusively to agricultural work will probably be 

decommissioned and their work privatized. A transition government may 

also conclude that loyal and dependable military units will be needed at least 

until a democratic government can be consolidated and a new constitution 

approved by the people. Reliable military forces could help transition 

authorities prevent massive seaborne migration and distribute humanitarian 

assistance. 

C. Independent Judiciary 

After enduring decades of repressive totalitarian rule in which the 

judiciary is constitutionally subservient to the communist executive, and the 

executive used that authority routinely to intervene in judicial matters, the 

establishment of a truly independent judiciary will be a critical step toward 

the establishment of a rule of law in Cuba. An independent judiciary, 

however, is more than a collection of judges who render impartial decisions 

on cases before them. An independent judiciary also is accountable to the 

public for both its decisions and its operations. It requires, among other 

things, judges who know the law, are selected through an apolitical process, 

enjoy security of tenure, share an expectation that they will be allowed to act 

independently, and are subject to appropriate disciplinary procedures. 

Judges need as well to be managers of their courtroom and of resources. 

There are different models and different views on judicial independence 

between common and civil law countries. A free Cuba will have to evaluate 

its judiciary and its many options for judicial reform. 

USAID and the Department of Justice have been working with 

judiciaries in Latin America for almost twenty years. In November 2001, 

USAID published “Guidance for Promoting Judicial Independence and 

Impartiality,” based on its worldwide experience in this area. Its programs

focus on judicial ethics, selection, training, and administration (including the 

separation of administrative from judicial functions and creation of court 

management offices). USAID and the Department of Justice’s contacts 

throughout the hemisphere include supreme court justices and appellate and 

lower court judges, court administrators and civil society organizations that 

have spearheaded important judicial reforms in their own countries. U.S. 

judges and other experts have participated in many of these programs. This 

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experience and these resources could all be made available to interested 

Cuban authorities in the context of a transition. 

While a free Cuban judiciary will have to face the legacy of 45 years 

of politicization and the judiciary’s role in acts of repression, at the same 

time, Cuba at transition will want to address many of the same judicial 

reform issues now under discussion in the rest of Latin America. Much of 

the work that has been done by U.S. agencies over the last two decades to 

strengthen the administration of justice in other countries in the region has 

focused on the criminal justice system — and more specifically, the need for 

new procedural codes and new relationships among police, prosecutors, 

judges and defense counsel to implement them. Given the notorious failings 

and politicization of the criminal justice system in Castro’s Cuba, 

particularly where cases against the political opposition or those seeking the 

exercise of their fundamental freedoms are concerned, it would seem natural 

that transition authorities would want to focus attention on issues related to 

criminal procedure. 

Should that occur, the United States should be prepared to assist in 

any way possible in the development of information and options for their 

consideration. Because of the many actors involved in developing, 

presenting and rendering judgments in criminal cases, assistance in this area 

would preferably be provided within an inter-institutional context that 

included all interested parties. The starting point for analysis would be 

unique within the Latin American context. USAID and the Department of 

Justice both have considerable experience working this issue in other 

countries and could be asked to support such an effort. There are also 

experts from other Latin American countries, as well as Europe, who could 

readily be tapped to provide their experience moving to a different system of 

criminal justice, should a free Cuba so desire. 

At a broader level, judicial reform should be recognized as a political 

process that, to be fully successful, must involve the society at large. In 

other countries in the region, including the United States, civil society 

groups — such as bar associations, law schools and civil rights watchdog 

organizations — play a critical role in assessing judicial performance and 

demanding reform when needed. Civil society is in effect the ultimate 

constituency for judicial reform; another important challenge faced by a free 

Cuba is the systematic crushing of independent civil society by the current 

totalitarian government. When the opportunity arises in a free Cuba to make 

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changes in the institutional structure of government, attention should be 

given early on to identifying the most knowledgeable and committed actors 

outside government — be they organizations or individuals — who will 

begin to articulate the changes needed in the justice system. These sources 

may provide new names for government positions, but perhaps more 

importantly in the long run, they will become part of the judicial reform

process. In all countries, judicial reform is an ongoing evolutionary process 

that needs civil society participation. USAID has worked in many other 

countries in the hemisphere facilitating the development of such groups. 

The United States should be prepared to support similar groups in Cuba. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 If requested by a transition government, the U.S. Government, through

DOJ, USAID and other agencies, should be prepared to provide 

technical assistance and capacity building to:

 Train new and current professional and lay judges to abide by rule of 

law procedures in criminal adjudications, as well as train and employ 

courthouse staff — including marshals, reporters, legal clerks, 

notaries, and other administrative personnel; 

 Provide full-time advice and technical assistance through resident 

legal advisors (RLAs) to help establish fair and effective legal and 

judicial practices and institutions; 

 Train judges and prosecutors in methods of effective trial advocacy 

through programs designed to assist prosecutors in instituting 

effective trial advocacy, including techniques for the analysis and use 

of evidence, handling witnesses, police/prosecutor interaction,

presentation of evidence, charging decisions, and oral trial 

techniques. Technical assistance could also be provided to 

prosecutorial and judicial components in organizational development, 

judicial and witness security, and case management; 

 Assist in drafting a uniform criminal procedure code that respects the 

rights of criminal defendants, including the right to counsel, the 

presumption of innocence, and the right to a trial with an impartial 

and incorruptible decision maker; 

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 Assist in drafting constitutional amendments and laws that increase 

separation between the judiciary and the executive, buffering judges 

and attorneys from political influences that can distort the judicial 

process. Work to eliminate inconsistencies in criminal laws, striving 

to achieve a coherent legal framework to which judges and attorneys 

could refer when adjudicating cases; 

 Educate Cuban citizens about their new administration of justice 

system, which will be critical to the success of democracy. 

Administration of justice specialists would be able to teach citizens 

the difficulties inherent in their jobs and the assistance they require 

from the general public; and 

 Develop effective community policing and community prosecution 

programs. Citizens would learn how public officials (and defense 

attorneys) should be doing their jobs, which would increase the 

transparency of government prosecutions and make citizens more 

likely to join together and fight against corruption within the 

administration of justice system. 

D. Reconstituting Police Forces and Functions 

The reorientation of the security services from internal control to 

democratic policing and service to the community will be an important part 

of the transition. The United States has assisted other countries in Latin 

America to establish civilian police forces in the wake of democratic 

openings. However, the changes in structure, attitude and capability that 

will be needed in Cuba will undoubtedly have unique characteristics. 

Cuban security forces are profoundly politicized and serve as agents 

of repression. They have been privileged members of Cuban society under 

Castro and are undoubtedly resented and feared by others in the community. 

An initial question will be whether those currently in the police service can 

so transform their relations with the public to be accepted as legitimate 

leaders and officers of a new law enforcement organization. Certainly, as a 

point of policy and at a minimum, the United States would recommend the 

dissolution of the apparatus of political repression, including the General 

Directorate for State Security. 

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One of the most important tasks that should be assumed by the 

transitional Minister of the Interior and the Director General of police would 

be the development of a mission statement and strategic plan for the new 

police force. A problem-solving, community-oriented approach to policing 

could be an appropriate organizational philosophy. A civilian, as opposed to 

a military, structure should be developed for the police, along with policies 

and procedures that reflect generally accepted international norms of 

policing, professional conduct and human rights. Effective management and 

administrative systems, including personnel, budget, and information, should 

be put in place, as well as an office of professional responsibility, internal 

affairs unit, and/or an inspector general to handle allegations of misconduct 

in a transparent and credible way. A review of all training curricula would 

be needed, as well as new core curricula, to implement the new vision for 

the police force. There is abundant material from other countries in Latin 

America and other regions of the world that have made the transition to

democratic policing that could provide useful models for Cuban authorities 

as they address these many issues. 

The Departments of State and Justice have considerable experience 

working with police forces in transitional situations, often in coordination 

with other donors and international organizations. In general, such 

assistance programs have begun with in-depth needs assessments of both the 

police organization and existing training programs. An initial vetting of 

existing command and officer levels is recommended, to eliminate 

individuals who have engaged in criminal activities or human rights abuses. 

Those who are accepted into the new force have generally been required to 

complete “transition courses” that are designed to introduce or emphasize 

basic concepts of democratic policing. This initial training has been of a 

limited duration (customarily three to four weeks), so that a large number of 

officers could be cycled through the course without wholesale disruption to 

actual police services. 

The U.S. Government should be prepared to assist a free Cuba

develop a democratic police force. Assistance could cover all or some of the 

areas identified, as well as specialized training or technical assistance in 

areas of interest for international law enforcement cooperation, such as 

counter-narcotics, terrorism, or pursuit of international organized crime. 

The Department of State would have responsibility for overall organization 

and policy direction of any such effort and would call upon the expertise of 

the Departments of Justice, Treasury, and Homeland Security, as well as 

197
state and local law enforcement agencies, as appropriate. Any assistance to 

the police would be closely coordinated with assistance to other institutions 

in the criminal justice system, as well as interested civil society 

organizations. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 If requested by a transition government, the U.S. Government should be 

prepared to provide technical assistance and capacity building to:

 Coordinate internships for Cuban police with internal affairs units in 

major U.S. police department where they could observe how 

investigations are conducted, the way the internal affairs units are 

managed, and how they handle public complaints; 

 Provide integrated criminal investigation training to Cuban police, 

prosecutors, and judges. This training would initially focus on basic 

criminal investigation training and management development; 

 Provide other programs to bolster the institutional strength of Cuban 

police forces, including instructor development and training, academy 

development assistance, strategic planning assistance, and forensic 

development assistance; 

 Assist in vetting personnel in order to ensure a police force that is 

committed to respecting democratic due process and the human rights 

of all individuals; and 

 Implement a basic- recruit training program that would provide basic 

police skills to the members of police forces. The curricula would 

place a major emphasis on human dignity and respect for human 

rights. 

198
CHAPTER 4 

 

Establishing the Core Institutions of 

a Free Economy 

199

201

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

The Cuban economic system is broken; it will not be easily fixed. It will 

take time to build national institutions, as well as develop in individuals the 

attitudes, expertise, and skills capable of managing Cuba’s reconstruction. Lessons 

learned from other transition countries demonstrate that it is extremely important to 

identify and prioritize needs, and to manage expectations correctly. 

The reconstruction effort in a free Cuba will also be costly. In this regard, 

the burden of reconstruction need not fall completely on the shoulders of the 

United States and must be done in close consultation with the Cuban people. 

There is a significant role to be played by the international donor community, the 

international financial institutions (IFIs) including the Inter-American 

Development Bank (IDB), and the United Nation’s development agencies, all of 

which can provide programs and assistance to a free Cuba. We should seek 

engagement by the international community and the IFIs to better ensure a smooth 

transition when the time comes. 

 Economic change in Cuba will not occur in a vacuum. Two generations 

have grown up under Castro’s repressive system. There are Cubans (e.g., the 

communist elite) who will have vested interests in maintaining the status quo. 

They will present a difficult but not unprecedented problem, one that experience 

shows will not be easily solved. As we have learned elsewhere, a disenfranchised 

political elite and military can be dangerous. 

It is crucial that the Cuban people are full partners in the reform process, that 

whatever proposals we make to a free Cuban people are realistic, and that any 

promises made are promises kept. 

IMMEDIATE ACTIONS

Stabilizing and liberalizing the economy are fundamental preconditions for 

economic growth and for the creation of a viable free market economy. A free 

Cuba should design a macroeconomic stabilization and growth program to ensure 

price stability and to anchor the expectations of its population. A stable 

macroeconomic environment is a necessary precondition to support high levels of 

investment and productivity growth. The core components of a stabilization policy 

include sound fiscal and monetary policies that limit deficits to sustainable levels 
202

and limit the monetary financing of these deficits. Closely linked to the monetary 

policy is a decision over the exchange rate regime, which will be the decision of 

the new Cuban transition government. 

The United States, the international community, and the IFIs (including the 

IDB) can offer assistance and resources to a free Cuba to design an effective 

economic strategy that includes sound macroeconomic policies, price 

liberalization, deregulation, investment climate and legal reforms, and 

privatization. We should draw on experiences in working with other non-market 

economy transitions to encourage Cuba to decontrol prices in the near term. 

The U.S. Government should work with the IFIs, NGOs, and other interested 

parties to make the preparations to assist a free Cuba to gain access to short term 

financing for trade and reauthorizing the trade credit insurance program for Cuba. 

The U.S. Government should work with a free Cuba so that it can qualify for, at 

the earliest appropriate time, preferential benefits under the Caribbean Basin 

Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) and the U.S. Generalized System of 

Preferences (GSP). The U.S. Government should also establish a Joint Committee 

on Trade and Investment (JCTI) which could serve as a first step toward possible 

negotiation of a Free Trade Agreement with a free Cuba, and should be prepared to 

move quickly to establish an embassy in Havana with strong commercial and 

agricultural components, in order to provide information to and establish contacts 

for U.S. companies interested in exporting to or investing in Cuba. Moreover, the 

U.S. Government should be prepared to encourage its regional allies to include a 

free Cuba in regional free trade arrangements and work with Cuba in the World 

Trade Organization to further reduce barriers. 

A free Cuba will urgently need to engage the IFIs, including the InterAmerican Development Bank. We should encourage the IFIs to engage fully with 

a free Cuba, including technical assistance and financing as soon as possible. 

Finally, the U.S. Government should be prepared to work through existing 

international institutions and with a free Cuba’s other bilateral partners to address 

financing needs, including debt relief from its creditors and donor aid. 

 If requested by a transition Cuban government, the U.S. Government, in 

coordination with the IFIs, should be prepared to assist in developing a new 

investment regime that fosters foreign investment and eliminates restrictions to 
203

trade and investment. The U.S. Government should also consider negotiating a 

Bilateral Investment Treaty at the earliest possible time in the transition. 

The U.S. Government, in order to prepare for a transition and to be ready to 

implement programs quickly, should consider establishing a Standing Committee 

for Economic Reconstruction (SCER) to review specifically and regularly 

reconstruction plans and to ensure that appropriate U.S. Government agencies are 

prepared to implement programs immediately. Strong consideration also should be 

given to establishing a standing private sector advisory committee. As an initial 

step, this standing committee could review and comment upon this report, ensuring 

that it becomes a longer term planning document. The committee could then meet 

on a regular basis to complement the SCER in planning for prompt assistance to a 

free Cuba. 

MEDIUM- AND LONG-TERM ACTIONS 

Settling the issue of expropriated properties will be critical to a transition 

Cuban Government. Proper resolution of this issue will be seen by many as a 

signal that Cuba is once again open for normal business. Potential investors will 

be reluctant to get involved in Cuba as long as questions of ownership, property 

rights, and restitution remain unsettled. The longer this issue remains open, the 

longer it will take for Cuba’s financial and economic recovery. This will be 

especially true in cases of the ownership and clear title of commercial property. 

As progress is made in this area, so will progress be made in getting businesses 

established, jobs created, and the economy growing. 

The U.S. Government should encourage a free Cuba to indicate at an early 

stage in the transition, and in the strongest possible terms, that it intends to settle 

the expropriation issue as quickly as it can and in an open and fair manner. The 

U.S. Government should also encourage Cuba to settle outstanding claims issues as 

expeditiously as possible, using an open, transparent process. 

 The U.S. Government should work with the Cuban-American community 

and a free Cuba to facilitate the low-cost, speedy transfer of remittances and 

promote their use to finance self-employment and small business start-ups in Cuba. 

The U.S. Government should encourage the Cuban-American community and the 

larger U.S. investment community to create a “Friends of Cuba” organization that 

could provide private-sector support to Cuba during transition and assist in 
204

promoting microfinancing and a more open flow of goods and services on the 

island. 

 

 The U.S. Government should be prepared to offer assistance to a transition 

government in developing an independent central bank and, along with the IFIs, 

offer to provide technical assistance to develop its banking system, including its 

regulatory framework. 

 The U.S. Government, in conjunction with the IFIs, also should offer to 

provide technical assistance on budgeting, expenditure management, debt 

management, and procurement rules, as well as technical assistance to help set up a 

new revenue collection agency and to ensure its enforcement capabilities. 

 The U.S. Government should offer to assist in developing a more rational 

design for Cuba’s numerous economic ministries and encourage the World Bank to 

assist with reforming the public sector through its Governance Reform Program. 

The U.S. Government, working with other Latin American allies, should be 

prepared to provide assistance to Cuba in the area of e-government. 

The U.S. Government, if requested, should offer a free Cuba assistance in 

re-creating the right to own, rent, and sell private property, with particular 

emphasis on homeownership. The U.S. Government, based on its experience, 

should offer to provide advice in establishing a credit-enhancing agency along the 

lines the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) initially followed and assist Cuba 

in developing primary and secondary mortgage markets. It should also assist in the 

implementation of a framework for the protection of intellectual property, 

encouraging investment and jobs. 

The U.S. Government should offer to help establish mechanisms to place 

workers in new jobs. Technical advice should be offered to help change the laws 

and role of the Labor Ministry to allow a free labor market to function. Changing 

attitudes about the government’s role in providing employment will be essential to 

a free Cuba’s economic prosperity. 

 

The U.S. Government should offer technical advice to a transition 

government in supporting projects that create healthy labor-management relations 

and assist Cuba by providing a coordinated process to revise labor laws to be 
205

consistent with International Labor Organization (ILO) standards and promote 

strengthened labor-management relations.

The U.S. Government should be prepared to provide training to Cuban 

entrepreneurs, focusing on harvesting the benefits of a market economy. The U.S. 

Government should encourage a free Cuba to permit employees of denationalized 

firms and agricultural cooperatives to purchase shares in these formerly stateowned enterprises. The U.S. Government should extend its trade capacity building 

efforts to Cuba, including those geared toward rural development and export 

diversification, and work with a Cuban transition government to remove all 

obstacles to self-employment and other forms of entrepreneurship in a free Cuba. 

The U.S. Government should greatly expand programs that assist in training midlevel managers in U.S. business practices. 

II. INTRODUCTION 

Political change in Cuba will be accompanied by change in the economic 

framework of the country. Lessons learned in the transition of the centrally 

planned economic systems of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union teach us 

that this can be an arduous process where it is extremely important to manage 

expectations correctly. Critics claim that proponents of free markets and economic 

liberalization have oversold the benefits to countries that adopt them and to their 

citizens. Promised results have not kept pace with popular expectations and, as a 

result, dissatisfaction has spawned a counter reaction, and led to the rise of 

governments that are not ideologically committed to democratic and free market 

values (e.g., the Chavez government in Venezuela). Replacing Cuba’s statecontrolled economic model with a free market system will create hopes that 

economic growth and job creation will occur in a fairly short period of time. The 

expected inflow of U.S. business people, talking of investment and trade, will 

reinforce those hopes. 

Past experiences show that growth may be slow and uneven in coming. 

Cuba’s infrastructure, both institutional and physical, is either nonexistent or 

inadequate. Creating institutions to support the new economy, creating a new legal 

structure, including new economic and commercial legislation and regulations, and 

refurbishing/replacing an existing physical infrastructure is time consuming and, in 

the latter instance, expensive. 

 
206

 Historically, even in countries where reasonable physical and bureaucratic 

infrastructures were in place, the transition to a free market model was slow, 

painful, and politically sensitive. The former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 

demonstrate the enormous challenges facing transition governments. Where the 

necessary political will and economic infrastructure were lacking, efforts to 

promote democracy and free markets have failed. 

 Economic change in Cuba will not occur in a vacuum. Besides the lack of 

necessary infrastructure, there are numerous other important factors to consider. 

Among these is the fact that, for more than four decades, the people of Cuba have 

been subject to a repressive regime that rarely rewarded private initiative. Two 

generations of Cubans have grown up under this centralized economic system. 

And there are Cubans (e.g., the communist elite) who will have vested interests in 

maintaining the economic status quo; they will present a unique problem. 

It is therefore crucial that the Cuban people are the centerpiece of any reform 

process, that whatever proposals made to the Cuban people are realistic, and that 

any promises made are promises kept. There are a number of activities and 

programs that need to be put in place immediately during a transition. It is 

essential that actions to establish the social safety net be prioritized and 

implemented to mitigate changes that may cause hardship to the Cuban people. 

There are a number of issues affecting the establishment of a free economy, 

among them: 

A. Centralized Economic Control 

The Cuban state owns, operates, and regulates virtually all means of 

production, employment, and pricing in Cuba today. State-owned and operated 

enterprises and joint ventures with foreign partners are virtually the only sources of 

lawful employment. The state screens candidates for jobs in joint-venture firms; 

Cuban workers receive only 5 percent of the salary paid by foreign investors to the 

Cuban state. The military controls a lion’s share of Cuba’s present economy, 

including control over several key ministries. 

Since 1993, when the Cuban economic crisis hit bottom as a result of the 

withdrawal of subsidies from the Soviet Union, Cuba has somewhat stabilized its 

economic freefall. In part, it has done this by aggressively pursuing joint ventures 
207

with foreign investors and exploiting humanitarian policies designed to alleviate 

the suffering of the Cuban people (see Chapter 1). However, gross domestic 

product (GDP) in 2003 was still below 1989 levels. 

Cuba’s precarious economic position is complicated by the high cost of 

foreign financing. Castro’s government defaulted on most of its international debt 

in 1986 and does not have access to credit from international financial institutions 

like the World Bank. As a result, Havana must rely heavily on short-term loans to 

finance imports, chiefly food and fuel. Because of its poor credit rating, a $12.2 

billion hard currency debt, and the risks associated with lending to Cuba, interest 

rates have reportedly been as high as 22 percent. In 2002, citing chronic 

delinquencies and mounting short-term debts, Moody’s lowered Cuba’s credit 

rating to Caa1 — “speculative grade, very poor.” Furthermore, Dunn and 

Bradstreet rate Cuba as one of the riskiest economies in the world.1

Limited economic reforms in the early-to-mid 1990s were introduced out of 

necessity by the Castro regime to encourage more efficient enterprises and to 

permit limited self-employment. But beginning in 1995, state enterprises, as well 

as the self-employed, were subjected to increased control and curtailment of 

economic activities. This trend towards re-centralization of economic activity 

continues today. No independent labor unions exist, collective bargaining is not 

allowed, and strikes are outlawed. Cuban state salaries, which are paid in Cuban 

pesos, are insufficient to meet the minimum basic needs of the population given 

the “dollarized” dual economy. Prices are regulated by the state with no regard to 

market conditions. 

 The Wall Street Journal/Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom 

2004 ranks Cuba among the world’s most economically repressed societies, putting 

it in the same category as North Korea, Iran, and Libya. 

B. Outstanding Expropriated Property Claims

 

The expropriation of U.S. assets was one of the major initial causes of the 

deterioration of relations between Castro’s Cuba and the United States and of the 

imposition of the U.S. trade embargo. The U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement 

1

 “Debt Default Hurts Cuba’s Credit Rating,” The Miami Herald (April 8, 2002), p. 19G, as cited on cubanet.org.
208

Commission (FCSC) has certified 5,911 claims (totaling about $1.8 billion) by 

U.S. nationals against the Castro regime for the taking of their property since 

January 1, 1959. Of this amount, more than 85 percent, or $1.58 billion, involves 

898 corporate claimants and the rest corresponds to individual claimants. One 

hundred thirty-one (131) of the 5,911 claimants — 92 corporations and 39 

individuals — have certified claims of $1 million or more. Forty-three corporate 

claimants and five individuals have certified claims in excess of $5 million. The 

FCSC determined that simple interest at 6 percent should be included as part of the 

certified claims. Using this figure results in a value in excess of $7 billion, as of 

April 2004. 

Expropriation claims by nationals of other countries were much smaller than 

those of the United States. For the most part, they have been settled through 

bilateral agreements between Cuba and the respective country, although often at a 

fraction of the assessed value and at a very slow payout rate by the Castro regime. 

For example, Spanish claims were valued at $350 million, but settled for $40 

million. Even with the sizeable reduction, Cuba took six years to pay the agreed 

value. In addition, Cuba also expropriated property from a large part of the Cuban 

population, including some who have become U.S. citizens. This, too, will be a 

key issue that Cuba must grapple with when settling outstanding property claims. 

C. Lack of Private Property Rights, Including Real and Intellectual 

Property Rights 

Cuban citizens cannot legally buy or sell real property (unless specifically 

authorized by permit — e.g., purchasing an automobile). They may trade homes or 

apartments, provided, however, that no money changes hands. Typically, housing 

swaps involve under-the-table money exchanges, with Cubans who are caught 

suffering severe penalties. The fact that Cubans may trade, but may not buy or sell 

dwellings, creates a special difficulty for families that change size or for Cubans 

who move from one place to another. 

Prolonged austerity and the state controlled economy’s inefficiency in 

providing adequate goods and services have created conditions for an active 

informal, black market economy. As the variety and amount of goods available in 

state-run peso stores has declined, Cubans have turned increasingly to the black 

market to obtain needed food, clothing, and household items. Pilfering of items 

from the workplace to sell on the black market or illegally offering services on the 
209

sidelines of official employment is common. Cuban companies regularly figure 15 

percent in losses into their production plans to cover this illegal activity. A report 

by an independent economist and opposition leader speculates that 40 percent of 

the Cuban economy operates in the informal sector. 

Article 15 of Cuba’s communist constitution broadly defines “socialist state 

patrimony” to include all lands not owned by small agricultural producers or 

cooperatives formed by small agricultural producers. This “patrimony” includes 

properties expropriated from foreign nationals as well as properties left by Cubans 

forced to flee the island. The constitution also specifically prohibits mortgages on 

small landholdings. All major real estate transactions are negotiated through a 

central market, although a black market among Cubans exists parallel to the 

official central market. Article 23, however, allows foreign investors to acquire 

and hold rights, pursuant to Article 15, to assets forming part of the “socialist state 

patrimony,” but only upon prior and specific approval of the Council of Ministers 

or its executive committee. 

Cuban citizens cannot enter into contractual obligations with one another or 

with foreigners. Only the Cuban state, or a Cuban state entity, can legally contract 

with third-country nationals. For example, contracts for the purchase of U.S. 

agricultural products, sales of which are permitted by U.S. law, are negotiated with 

the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Trade’s Empresa Comercializadora de Alimentos

(Alimport), not with private Cubans or foreign investors in Cuba. 

In terms of intellectual property, although Cuba theoretically issues patents 

to individual inventors, the patent holder has a binding “social obligation” to 

license/transfer the patent to the state in order to “benefit” society. 

D. Constraints Upon Entrepreneurship 

The state is the largest employer in Cuba. According to Cuban government 

statistics, about 75 percent of the labor force is employed by the state. The actual 

figure may be more than 90 percent, with some 150,000 small farmers and another 

108,000 “cuentapropistas,” or holders of licenses for self-employment, out of a 

total workforce of about 4.4 million people. 

Today the state rarely grants new licenses for lawful self-employment. 

Moreover, existing self-employed workers are subjected to constant harassment 
210

and Cuba has revoked many existing licenses or failed to renew them. In the 

agricultural sector, so-called “violators” may be subjected to detention, heavy fines 

of up to 1,500 Cuban pesos, and/or the confiscation of their goods. Only the selfemployed pay personal income taxes. The Oficina Nacional de Atencion 

Tributaria (ONAT), Cuba’s internal revenue agency, is in charge of 

repressing/curtailing lawful self-employment and does so through onerous tax 

practices. 

Finally, the self-employed are specifically prohibited from forming 

“cooperatives, associations or any type of collective production organization.” As 

a result of stricter controls and harassment, the overall self-employed sector has 

declined from 208,500 in 1995 to about 100,000 in 2003.2

 

 

III. IMMEDIATE ACTIONS 

A. Introduction

 

Based on an analysis of transitions from non-market to market economies in 

Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the World Bank drew some lessons 

and recommendations from the most successful reform policies.3

 Key among these 

was the need to privatize while encouraging competitive new enterprises and 

discouraging the continuation of former state enterprises. The World Bank 

identified a number of reforms that successful transition economies had 

undertaken, including: 

 macroeconomic stabilization; 

 price and trade liberalization; 

 the imposition of hard budget constraints on banks and enterprises; 

 an enabling environment for private sector development; 

 a reform of the tax system and restructuring of public expenditure; 

 legal and judicial reform; and 

 reform of public sector institutions. 

2

 U.S. Department of State, Background Note: Cuba, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (November 2003).

3

 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, Transition: The First Ten Years, 

Analysis and Lessons for Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (Washington, D.C., 2002).
211

 In addition, the World Bank noted that success in a transition means the 

ability to generate economic growth. This in turn was dependent upon a number of 

factors that, in their totality, were conducive to encouraging the growth of new 

enterprises while, at the same time, assisting in the process of privatizing state 

enterprises. These included: 

 developing a favorable climate for domestic and foreign investors; 

 securing property and contract rights; 

 providing basic infrastructure; 

 reducing excessive marginal tax rates; 

 simplifying licensing and regulatory procedures; and 

 developing a competitive and efficient banking system. 

This chapter deals with several of these factors. 

B. Stabilize the Economy, Decontrol Prices, and Begin to Denationalize 

State-Owned Entities

Stabilizing and liberalizing the economy are fundamental preconditions for 

economic growth and for the creation of a viable free market economy. A free 

Cuba should design a macroeconomic stabilization program to ensure price 

stability and to anchor the expectations of its population. A stable macroeconomic 

environment is a necessary precondition to support high levels of investment and 

productivity growth. The core components of a stabilization policy include sound 

fiscal and monetary policies that limit deficits to sustainable levels and limit the 

monetary financing of these deficits. Closely linked to the monetary policy is a 

decision over the exchange rate regime, which will be the decision of the Cuban 

transition government. 

Prices in today’s Cuba remain substantially state-controlled, distorting 

economic decision-making and leading to a misallocation of resources. 

Decontrolling pricing is essential to enabling the free market to allocate resources 

and production decisions and thereby stimulate growth. 

 

 In order to implement these policies, a free Cuba will need an effective 

Finance Ministry and Central Bank, as well as effective tax collection. External 

technical assistance will likely be available, both through the U.S. Government and 

IFIs, to support the design of these policies and their implementation. 
212

Privatization of state-controlled enterprises can help consolidate private 

property rights, stimulate the economy, and provide the basis for the enterprises to 

run efficiently. Careful thought and consideration should go into how state-owned 

enterprises will be privatized, whether it will be through a voucher system, public 

bidding process, management-employee buyout, or targeting of strategic investors. 

Each method has both positive and negative benefits and it is feasible to use a 

combination of these methods in the privatization process. For example, small 

enterprises could be sold quickly through a public bidding process to new owners. 

This has the benefit of unleashing an entrepreneurial spirit and encouraging a 

sector that will provide most of the growth and job creation during the early years 

of transition. Agricultural cooperatives could be sold to their members, which is a 

form of a management-employee buyout. Other agricultural enterprises could 

target sales to strategic outside investors who have the experience, resources, and 

know-how to restructure the enterprise and make it economically viable. Whatever 

method(s) a free Cuban government chooses, the rules for privatization must be 

clearly established and the process should be transparent. 

 

Any efforts to privatize state-owned or -controlled entities will have to come 

to terms with the undue influence of the military in Cuba’s economic life. The 

Cuban military (FAR) controls a large percentage of Cuba’s present-day economy. 

More than 230 factories and firms are included in the Union of Military 

Enterprises. In addition, current or former FAR senior officers control several key 

ministries, among them are Sugar, Transport and Ports, and Information 

Technology and Communications. Tourism, civil aviation, and the marketing of 

cigars and other tobacco products are controlled by the military. Likewise, active 

and retired officers also manage banks, the state electronics monopoly, and other 

key economic sectors. According to one study, these enterprises account for 89 

percent of exports, 59 percent of tourism revenue, 24 percent of productive service 

income, 60 percent of hard currency wholesale transactions, 66 percent of hard 

currency retail sales, and employ at least 20 percent of state workers.4

 Beginning in the mid-1980s, the FAR introduced a new management 

system, the Sistema de Perfeccionamiento Empresarial, into many of its military 

enterprises. The goals of this new system ranged from promoting greater self4

 Domingo Amuchastegui, “FAR: Mastering Reforms,” in Cuba in Transition, Volume 10, Association for the 

Study of the Cuban Economy (August 2000). 
213

sufficiency to increasing efficiency and productivity in FAR enterprises. In 

October 1997, Perfeccionamiento Empresarial was adopted as the Cuban 

Communist Party’s official policy to guide restructuring of the Cuban state 

economic system.5

 Perfeccionamiento Empresarial trains executives, managers, 

and advisers at European, Japanese, and Western Hemisphere universities and 

business schools, but it is a long, drawn-out process involving many layers of 

bureaucratic review and control. As a result, to date, only a handful of enterprises 

have completed the entire process. 

According to one analyst, these enterprises appear to function as protected 

monopolies entrusted to regime favorites, picked more for their loyalty than their 

competence. Some evidence suggests that the regime may also tolerate some level 

of corruption in their operation to allow trusted officials to increase their own 

standard of living.6

 Finally, there exists no clear evidence that military managers 

have succeeded in meeting the Perfeccionamiento Empresarial goal of introducing 

greater efficiency and productivity into their operations. The sugar industry in 

particular has consistently experienced historically poor harvests since its take-over 

by the military. Nevertheless, the Perfeccionamiento Empresarial process has 

developed an educated professional core with some understanding of market 

principles. It has also introduced the prospects, at least in theory, of market 

economics into Cuba’s closed economic system. However, the military’s 

extensive involvement in the Cuban economy also may have created a vested 

constituency dedicated to maintaining the current closed economic structure. 

 

Many of Cuba’s medium and large enterprises will need to be restructured, 

with corporate governance methods put in place to enhance their value prior to any 

privatization. When assessing the value of Cuba’s state-owned/controlled 

enterprises, the value should take into account the viability of the enterprise and 

not the circumstances of the current state of the Cuban economy. The United 

States and the IFIs can offer assistance to a free Cuba to help it design an effective 

privatization program as well as prepare specific enterprises for privatization. 

5

 Ibid. 

6

 Brian Latell, The Cuban Military and Transition Dynamics, Cuba Transition Project, Institute for Cuban and 

Cuban-American Studies (University of Miami, 2003).
214

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 The U.S. Government should encourage the IFIs to engage with the Cuban 

transition government to design and implement an effective economic strategy 

that includes sound macroeconomic policies, price liberalization, deregulation, 

investment climate and legal reforms, and privatization. 

 The U.S. Government and the IFIs should offer assistance to a free Cuba to 

help it design an effective privatization program as well as prepare enterprises 

for privatization, including industries and enterprises operated or managed by 

the Cuban Armed Forces. 

 The U.S. Government should provide examples to a free Cuba from Eastern 

Europe concerning that region’s experiences in transitioning from a centralized 

economy, including experiences with the restructuring of enterprises controlled 

by militaries. 

C. Trade 

A renewed trade relationship with the United States and Latin American 

partners will be critical to developing and sustaining a free Cuban economy. In 

1958, despite its small economy, Cuba was a relatively important U.S. trade 

partner, ranking as the 7th largest U.S. export market and the 7th leading source of 

U.S. imports. Even under the most optimistic assumptions, this position is not 

likely to be replicated anytime soon. Cuba today is a relatively minor actor in the 

multilateral trade arena, with 2002 exports of about $1.6 billion (mostly in sugar 

and nickel). 

The composition of Cuban exports has changed substantially in recent years. 

Sugar, once the mainstay of the Cuban economy, has declined in both absolute and 

relative terms. Tourism has emerged as the number one hard-currency earner for 

the Castro regime, having surpassed sugar exports as a revenue source in 1994. 

The U.S. International Trade Commission, in a study examining the effects of the 

U.S. embargo on both Cuba and the United States, identified several sectors where 

the United States might be able to realize small, but important near-term gains in 
215

trade and investment with Cuba if trade relations were normalized (and allimportant financing was made available).7

 These sectors included: 

 maritime transportation; 

 tourism; and 

 exports of wheat, rice, and fats and oils. 

 Similarly, the Commission noted several sectors for which normalization of 

trade relations would have a potential impact on U.S. industry. Some positive 

aspects include access to less expensive nickel and cobalt. At the same time, U.S. 

industries could lose market share in citrus, sugar, and perhaps cigars. 

Clearly, one of the first steps to be taken as part of the re-establishment of a 

full official U.S. presence in a free Cuba should include a permanent U.S. 

Government Foreign Commercial Service. This entity would play the vital role of 

serving as an information clearinghouse for U.S. business executives; as a point of 

contact for requests for meetings with the proper Cuban transition government 

agencies; and in identifying joint venture, investment, and trade partners. 

 

Because the demands for information and for business services are expected 

to be large once a transition is underway, and because it will involve the 

participation of many U.S. Government agencies, a new embassy should include 

representation from other agencies. For example, the United States should explore 

having representatives from the Small Business Administration (SBA), the 

Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), and Export-Import Bank (EXIM 

Bank) co-located to create a type of one-stop shop for business executives. 

Because Florida will probably be a principal jumping off place for Cuba, a mirror 

operation could be established in Miami to provide similar information before 

executives depart for Cuba. 

 The U.S. Government should be prepared to include members of the Foreign 

Agricultural Service in a new U.S. embassy in a free Cuba. Having such a 

presence will enable the U.S. Government to coordinate development activities in 

the agricultural area and foster increased trade opportunities for both countries. 

 

7

 United States International Trade Commission. The Economic Impact of U.S. Sanctions with Respect to Cuba, 

Investigation 332-413 (Publication 3398; February 2001).
216

 It is important to work with both a free Cuban government and a Cuban 

private sector to assist them in developing new markets for their products and new 

products that are up to acceptable standards. To that end, the National Institute of 

Standards and Technology should be prepared to provide technical assistance in 

the standard’s area and the Patent and Trademark Office should be prepared to 

position itself to provide technical assistance in the area of intellectual property 

rights protection. 

 The U.S. Government and its regional partners should also consider working 

with other hemispheric economies to reintegrate a free Cuba rapidly into the 

regional trading system that has developed over the past two decades. As a first 

step, the U.S. Administration in office at the start of transition should request the 

U.S. International Trade Commission to undertake a Probable Economic Effects 

study focusing on the likely impact on U.S. industry and agriculture of integrating 

Cuba into the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA). The report 

could be used as guidance toward eventually reviewing eligibility for preferential 

treatment to Cuban products under CBERA and under the U.S. Generalized 

System of Preferences (GSP). The U.S. Government should also consider steps 

Cuba will need to take in order to meet U.S.-Cuba Free Trade Agreement standards 

and work with Cuba to identify appropriate assistance, including from multilateral 

and other bilateral sources. The goal would be to set Cuba on the path to eventual 

negotiation of a U.S.-Cuba Free Trade Agreement. A free Cuba should also be 

encouraged to solidify its regional trade ties with its Latin American and Caribbean 

neighbors and to tap regional neighbors’ trade expertise. 

Trade capacity building has emerged as a key component in support of U.S. 

efforts to liberalize trade in the world and, in particular, the Western Hemisphere. 

The President’s 2001 International Trade Agenda emphasized the need to “help 

developing countries and emerging markets begin the process of integrating 

themselves into the world trading system.” Since that time, trade capacity building 

activities, implemented by a broad range of U.S. Government agencies, have 

assisted developing and transition countries to participate in and benefit from 

expanding global trade. In FY02, U.S. trade capacity building assistance to the 

Americas totaled more than $90 million, up from $61 million in 2001. Trade 

capacity building efforts range from providing technical assistance directly to 

governments aimed at increasing understanding of World Trade Organization 

(WTO) commitments, to facilitating trade by lowering the costs of doing business. 

These elements are important elements of the Free Trade Area of the Americas 
217

(FTAA) negotiations, as well as within the ongoing or planned free trade 

agreement negotiations with Central America, the Dominican Republic, Panama, 

and the Andean Community. 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 The U.S. Government should be in a position to work with a free Cuba to 

establish a U.S.-Cuba Joint Committee on Trade and Investment (JCTI). The 

JCTI would focus on post-embargo relations affecting trade and investment. It 

would also serve as a precursor and first step toward the possible negotiation 

of a U.S.-Cuba Free Trade Agreement. 

 The U.S. Government should be prepared to establish a Foreign Commercial 

Service presence as part of our Embassy in a free Cuba in order to provide 

information to and establish contacts for U.S. companies interested in exporting 

to or investing in Cuba. 

 The U.S. Government should be prepared to move rapidly to establish a U.S. 

Department of Agriculture (USDA) presence as part of our embassy in a free 

Cuba. Specifically, USDA’s Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) should be 

prepared to establish an Office of Agricultural Affairs (OAA) in a re-opened 

U.S. embassy. USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) 

should be in a position to establish an office alongside the OAA to lend its 

support to USDA animal and plant health activities, all of which will be 

essential in the early stages of a new government. 

 The U.S. Government should encourage its regional allies to consider including 

a free Cuba in its free trade arrangements. 

 The U.S. Government should offer to provide technical assistance to a free 

Cuba by the National Institute of Standards and Technology in the area of 

standards and encourage the Patent and Trademark Office to provide technical 

assistance in the area of intellectual property rights protection. The U.S. 

Government should also encourage a free Cuba to seek complimentary 

assistance from multilateral institutions. 

 The U.S. Government should encourage a free Cuba to involve its newly 

emerging private sector in an advisory role on future trade matters. By doing 
218

so, Cuba would help to establish an environment conducive to private sectorled growth, as it would ensure that the needs of business are properly 

addressed and taken into account by government regulators. 

 The U.S. Government should be prepared to extend its trade capacity building 

activities, including customs cooperation, to a free Cuba, with a principal focus 

on the island’s transition to a free market system and on encouraging efficient 

and secure trade between the United States and Cuba. 

 The U.S. Government should offer to help a free Cuba upgrade and expand its 

use of free trade zones as a means to attract investment and expand trade. Free 

trade zones are used throughout Latin America and Asia, where they have 

proven to be attractive to investors because they rationalize resources and 

improve productive efficiency. 

 The U.S. Government should be prepared to establish an aviation relationship 

with Cuba (as discussed in Chapter 5, section IV) based on Open Skies 

principles. This would provide valuable benefits to U.S. and Cuban shippers, 

travelers, and air carriers. 

D. Rejoin International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and Other 

International/Regional Institutions 

Cuba is not a member of the institutions of the international financial 

community. To join these organizations requires a majority vote by the Board of 

Governors (or equivalent) of each institution. Membership is strictly sequential: 

first, Cuba would need to achieve membership in the IMF, then the World Bank, 

and finally its regional IFI, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). IMF 

and World Bank membership is a prerequisite for debt reduction in the Paris Club. 

 As a member, a free Cuba would be required to subscribe to its quota share 

in a combination of local and convertible currencies. That membership 

subscription would provide the basis for future lending. Lending from the IMF 

could take place through different facilities, depending on the circumstances on the 

ground in Cuba. The IMF could undertake some activities to support Cuba before 

it was admitted to the Fund, including providing technical assistance and some 

informal activities. The IMF’s relationship with West Bank/Gaza Strip is one 

example of its technical assistance activities. 
219

 Cuba will also need assistance from the Organization of American States 

(OAS) in adhering to the principles and aspirations regarding democracy and 

human rights expressed in the Inter-American Democratic Charter approved on 

September 11, 2001. Although Cuba is a member state of the OAS, the Castro 

government is suspended from active participation in the organization. The Cuban 

government will therefore need to reestablish its qualifications for a return to 

active participation in the OAS. Further, the suspension of the government of 

Cuba must be withdrawn before it can join the IDB.

Lending from the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank is 

generally carried out in the context of a three-year country assessment strategy 

(CAS). A CAS can take up to several months, although that period could 

undoubtedly be expedited if Cuba were determined to have substantial needs for 

immediate assistance. A critical factor in determining the interest rate associated 

with any such lending would be Cuba’s per capita income levels. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 The U.S. Government should encourage a free Cuba to rejoin the IMF, World 

Bank, and OAS, and join the IDB as quickly as possible. 

 The U.S. Government should encourage the IFIs to engage with the new Cuban 

government to design and implement an effective economic strategy that 

includes a range of macroeconomic and microeconomic reforms to provide the 

basis for sustained growth. 

 The U.S. Government should encourage the IFIs to provide a free Cuba with 

technical assistance in a variety of areas, including privatization, where the 

World Bank in particular has extensive expertise based on its study of 

transitions in a number of former non-market economies. 

E. Encourage Foreign Investment 

To keep itself afloat, the Castro regime actively courts foreign investments, 

which take the form of joint ventures (with the Cuban government often holding 

half or more of the equity) or management contracts with third-country businesses. 
220

 A new legal framework laid out in 1995 (Law No. 77) introduced a number 

of modest changes to Cuba’s foreign investment regime, but significant restrictions 

are still in place.8

 For example, approval for all foreign investment is still required 

on a case-by-case basis. Firms may only contract with a designated state labor 

supply agency for workers, and the state is responsible for disciplining workers and 

resolving labor-management disputes. Although the law also allowed for majority 

foreign ownership in joint ventures with the Castro government, in practice, 

majority ownership by the foreign partner is practically nonexistent. 

 

The number of joint ventures formed each year has been steadily declining 

since 1997, and foreign direct investment flows decreased from $448 million in 

2000 to $39 million in 2001, with little prospect for near-term improvement. Of 

the 540 joint ventures formed since the Cuban government issued the first 

legislation on foreign investment in 1982, 397 remained at the end of 2002. 

According to Granma online, 342 still operated at the end of 2003. Many of these 

investments are management contracts, or special arrangements regarding supplies, 

or the provision of services normally not considered equity investment in Western 

economies. European companies have grown increasingly frustrated with what 

they perceive as arbitrary investment rules, excessive paperwork requirements, and 

uncertain payment schedules. In 2002, a group of European Union embassies in 

Havana presented a list of complaints to the Castro government of the difficulties 

faced by European businessmen operating in Cuba. Presented as a constructive 

exercise by the Europeans, the initiative angered the Castro government. 

 

 A number of issues that are a consequence of Cuba’s current foreign 

investment regime will need to be examined. For example, the sale or transfer of 

investors’ capital to third parties is subject to Cuban government approval. This 

failure to provide a viable “exit strategy,” unless changed, will undoubtedly have a 

chilling effect on future foreign investment. Law 77 also failed to settle the issue 

of investor certainty. Article 3.3 of the Foreign Investment Law continues to leave 

open the possibility of Cuban termination of investment agreements seemingly at 

will and without due process or adequate compensation. Moreover, the inability to 

8

 Robert David Cruz, Foreign Direct Investment in Post-Castro Cuba: Problems, Opportunities and 

Recommendations, Cuba Transition Project, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies (University of Miami, 

2003).
221

hire workers directly is another feature of the current investment regime that will 

need to be altered. 

Ensuring protection for intellectual property and pursuing vigorous 

enforcement of IPR laws and regulations will be one key to attracting additional 

foreign investment. In May 2000, Cuba’s IPR law was modified by Decree-Law 

203 for Trademarks and Other Distinct Signs. This was designed to bring Cuba 

into conformity with the WTO TRIPs agreement.9

 Cuba is a member of most multilateral international treaties in effect relating 

to IPR law, including the Paris Convention, the World Intellectual Property 

Organization, and the Bern Convention. Since Castro came to power, both the 

U.S. and Cuba, as parties to the 1929 General Inter-American Convention for 

Trademarks and Commercial Protection, have reciprocally recognized trademark 

rights. 

 

In terms of patents, Cuba, which developed its pharmaceutical industry by 

more than occasionally violating international patents, is today a staunch defender 

of its own IPR with some 500 patents registered around the world. As a 

consequence, Cuba has developed joint ventures in biotechnology and 

pharmaceuticals in a number of worldwide markets, particularly in developing 

markets. For example, a recent joint venture in Malaysia will eventually produce 

biotechnology products for Southeast Asian markets. 

 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 The U.S. Government and the international financial institutions should be 

prepared to assist a free Cuba in developing a new investment regime that 

fosters foreign investment and investor confidence, consistent with appropriate 

free market mechanisms. 

 If progress can be made on a process for settling outstanding claims and the 

establishment of a sound policy and legal framework for foreign investment, the 

U.S. Government should consider complementing this by negotiating a Bilateral 

Investment Treaty with a free Cuba at the earliest possible time. 

9

 Jesus (Jay) Sanchelima, “Selected Aspects of Cuba’s Intellectual Property Laws,” in Cuba in Transition, Volume 

10, Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy (August 2000).
222

 The U.S. Government should encourage a Cuban transition government to 

provide assurances that it will continue to uphold its obligations under 

international intellectual property agreements. Doing so early in the process 

would be an incentive to foreign investment and thereby facilitate Cuba’s move 

to a free-market economy. 

F. Reschedule External Debt 

Cuba’s precarious economic position is complicated by the high price it 

must presently pay for foreign financing. The Cuban government defaulted on 

most of its international debt to Western countries in 1986 and does not have 

access to credit from international credit institutions. This means Havana must 

rely heavily on short-term loans to finance imports, chiefly food and fuel. Because 

of its poor credit rating, a $12.2 billion hard currency debt, and the risks associated 

with Cuban investment, interest rates have reportedly been as high as 22 percent. 

In 1995, Cuba restarted informal contacts with the Paris Club of Creditor 

Nations for possible rescheduling agreements of its external debt. Cuba has 

bilaterally negotiated a number of rescheduling agreements with some of its 

official and commercial creditors, including a 1998 rescheduling with Japanese 

creditors for $769 million. However, it defaulted on this agreement in October 

2002. At the same time, Cuba suspended all payments on the $380 million owed 

to Bancomext, the Mexican government’s export financing bank. In May 2003, 

the Spanish government acknowledged in response to a Spanish parliament inquiry 

that Cuba is Spain’s top foreign debtor government, presently in default on an 

estimated $816 million. Cuba’s outstanding debt to the U.S. Government is 

approximately $36.2 million, not including late interest. The entire amount is in 

arrears. The Paris Club works on the consensus of its 19 member creditor 

countries and requires the debtor to have an IMF arrangement with strong policy 

reform conditionality in order to be eligible for debt treatment. 

A free Cuba will need to normalize relations with its external creditors. This 

would involve a number of actions by Cuba and the international community, 

including an effort to reschedule Cuba’s debt, including arrears, and establish 

conditions whereby Cuba might resume making debt service payments in 

accordance with its financial capacity. Multilateral debt rescheduling would 

require an IMF program, according to longstanding Paris Club practice. This, 
223

along with economic reforms, would likely accelerate the flow of new money into 

Cuba. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 The U.S. Government should encourage both the World Bank and IMF to 

provide loans to a free Cuba, if needed. 

 The U.S. Government, working with its allies, should offer to assist a free Cuba 

in securing debt relief from its major creditors. It should also offer to help 

Cuba in securing donor aid from other sources (e.g., the EU).

G. Trade Financing/Credits

 The rapid rise of small- and medium-sized private-sector enterprises will be 

a key determinant in the success or failure of a transition government’s economic 

reconstruction and development programs. Cuba’s export sector will play a critical 

role in sustaining economic growth and ensuring job creation. A number of 

institutions and sources may be looked to, including the Cuban-American 

community, to provide financing for Cuban exporters. Some of these are discussed 

in greater detail below. 

In addition, consideration should be given to reviving a program used during 

the late 1980s and early 1990s in Central America by the U.S. Agency for 

International development (USAID) and the EXIM Bank to provide badly needed 

trade financing. Specifically, the U.S. Government should consider reinstating for 

Cuba the “trade credit insurance program” under which USAID, in FY1985, was 

authorized to issue guarantees to the EXIM Bank of up to $300 million for export 

credit insurance authorized by the EXIM Bank to support U.S. exports to the 

private sector in Central America on repayment terms of up to one year. The 

program ended on September 30, 1991. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 The U.S. Government should work with the multilateral development banks, 

NGOs and other interested parties in assisting a free Cuba to gain access to 

short term financing for trade. 
224

 The U.S. Government should consider reauthorizing the trade credit insurance 

program for a free Cuba.

IV. MEDIUM- AND LONG-TERM ACTIONS 

A. Settle Outstanding Expropriated Property Claims 

1. Background 

 Settling the issue of expropriated properties will be critical to a transition 

Cuban Government. It will be seen by many as a signal that Cuba will be open for 

normal business once again. Potential investors will be reluctant to get involved in 

Cuba as long as questions of ownership, property rights, and restitution remain 

unsettled. The longer this issue remains open, the longer it will take for Cuba’s 

financial and economic recovery. This will be especially true in cases of the 

ownership and clear title of commercial property. As progress is made in this 

area, so will progress be made in getting businesses established, jobs created, and 

the economy growing. 

It will not be easy. The challenge is complicated by a variety of factors. 

There are multiple claimants (companies and individuals, U.S. and non-U.S. 

nationals), different types of properties (commercial, agricultural, and residential) 

and existing foreign companies operating through joint ventures in expropriated 

facilities. In many cases, records may have been lost, altered, or otherwise prove 

difficult to confirm ownership or clear title. Also, a Cuban transition government 

will have finite resources to devote to compensation payments. 

Eastern European and former Soviet states provide a number of recent 

examples dealing with expropriation. Eastern European countries followed one of 

two models — restitution or compensation — during this difficult process. 

Restitution involved the return of the expropriated property to the original owner. 

In the case of residential property, it often required that the original owner take 

physical control (i.e., live in) the returned property. In cases where restitution was 

not possible, the original owners were compensated either in whole or in kind (in 

cash, bonds, or vouchers), or in part. Compensation, on the other hand, provided 

payment to the former owner for the expropriated property. In some instances, a 

mixture of the two approaches was used. 

 
225

2. Commercial Property

It will be important to establish a process to settle commercial property 

claims without disrupting jobs and distribution systems. At the outset of a 

transition, it is likely that all state enterprises and joint ventures will continue 

operating as though everything were normal, until clear ownership and titles are 

established, so that payrolls continue to be met and goods and services continue to 

be provided. This process will be complicated by the fact that some expropriated 

properties are presently hosting joint ventures with third parties. The fate of joint 

venture contracts between the Castro regime and third-country businesses should 

be addressed by a new Cuban government. As the legal owner of each property is 

determined, a transition government will need to maintain an environment for a 

smooth titling of those properties. 

3. Residential Property

The situation involving residential property will be extremely complex. 

Castro has been telling Cubans for years that the end of communism will result in a 

mass of exiled Cubans returning to Cuba to claim their homes. The specter of 

mass evictions that this raises is compounded by estimates that Cuba already 

suffers from a tremendous housing shortage (around 1.6 million units), and that 

much of the existing housing is substandard, particularly as one moves further out 

from Havana.10 The issue of residential housing raises the potential for major 

political dissatisfaction by a large segment of Cubans at the start of a transitional 

government. Moreover, housing will be one of the major avenues for average 

Cubans to begin realizing their dreams via homeownership and, in particular, the 

equity benefits of owning a major piece of collateral. Clear title to property is a 

major step toward promoting individual entrepreneurship, bringing people into the 

formal economy, and providing them with a stake in the island’s future. 

 

Whichever path is eventually chosen — restitution, compensation, or some 

mix of the two — the experiences from Eastern Europe demonstrate the 

advantages of proceeding quickly and of placing an emphasis on using the process, 

in conjunction with privatization, to develop small- and medium-sized enterprises. 

10 Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Growing Economic and Social Disparities in Cuba: Impact and Recommendations for 

Change, Cuba Transition Project, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies (University of Miami, 2003).
226

A strong, economically viable middle class will be essential to forming a stable 

government and economy. 

4. Intellectual Property 

Under current U.S. law and regulations, the Cuban government and its 

entities have generally been permitted, under license, to register trademarks and 

logos with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Cuba has registered 

trademarks in the United States for a number of goods. A number of trademarks 

are in dispute currently over ownership. This is an area that will need to be 

addressed promptly during a transition in Cuba.

5. One Approach for Dealing with Expropriated Real Property 

 The U.S. Government, if requested by a transition Cuban government, could 

help establish a structure for addressing property expropriations. Creation of a 

Commission on the Restitution of Property Rights (CRPR), Property Claims 

Courts, and a Supreme Commission on the Restitution of Property Rights under the 

supervision of a new Cuban Supreme Court, could form the framework for such 

property resolution process. This structure could establish entities, such as the 

CRPR and Property Claims Courts, at the local/provincial level, which might 

expedite the process, as it would allow local transition officials, who are more 

familiar with issues in the province, to have a greater voice in the property issues, 

which in turn could contribute to future provincial viability. The process could be 

governed by the following guidelines: 

 All title to real property should temporarily remain with a free Cuban 

government, or whoever has current title, until this process determines who has 

clear title. 

 Any damage to the property before a final ruling should be dealt with as an 

offense against a free Cuban government. 

 Those eligible to file a claim should include all Cuban nationals who lost title or 

possession of real property without due compensation, and U.S. nationals 

whose claims were certified by the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement 

Commission (FCSC) and nationals of other foreign countries who have 
227

legitimate rights and interests in real property. No distinction should be made 

as to whether Cuban nationals left or stayed in Cuba during the Castro regime. 

 

 A CRPR should be required to reach a settlement agreement between the 

parties as quickly as possible, perhaps within a year from the initial filing. 

Potential claimants should be required to file initial claims for ownership within a 

specific time frame (e.g., six months). Once all parties have submitted their 

claims, the CRPR might be given another specified period (e.g., three to six 

months) to consider the matter. If, after this time period, the initial claim is 

uncontested, the claimant should be adjudged to have the right to compensation or 

restitution, as reasonably appropriate, with respect to the property in question. 

Title to the claim would either pass to the claimant or remain with the state, as the 

case may be, but in any event it would be clear, and immune to challenge. 

A CRPR should have the power to determine (a) who has title; (b) whether 

the property should be returned to the title holder, remain with the state for reasons 

of public interest or necessity, or be awarded to the current occupant; (c) what 

conditions might be appropriate as to the use and/or conveyance of the property if 

it is to be returned to its former owner, and what obligations the new owner may 

assume; (d) what compensation should be given to the former owner if the property 

is not returned; and (e) what compensation is to be given to other parties with an 

interest in the property (e.g., foreign investors) and on what conditions. 

With regard to commercial property claims, a CRPR goal should be to 

establish the legal owner and return possession as soon as possible. A free Cuban 

government may wish to consider allowing the CRPR to offer compensation 

(whether in the for of cash, bonds, or vouchers) to bona fide purchasers of full or 

partial rights and interests in property. 

 

 With regard to claims involving residential property, in cases where the 

CRPR finds in favor of the former owner, temporary tenant restrictions should be 

permitted to avoid undue hardship on current occupants. If the CRPR finds that 

the property is occupied as a home, then the claimant should be unable to evict the 

tenants and take possession of the property for a specified period of time. 

Additionally, the owner will be restricted as to how much rent to charge the tenants 

or in the amount of any increases in their rents. These restrictions may be waived 

by mutual consent of the owner, the tenants, and the CRPR. This waiver or release 
228

of the tenant’s restrictions may be secured by contract with consideration to the 

tenants from the decreed clear title owner with permission of the CRPR. 

If a settlement agreement cannot be reached, then the case should be referred 

to the Property Claims Court for adjudication. The Property Claims Courts would 

serve as the initial appeals court in cases involving property claims that were not 

resolvable at the Commission level. The Supreme Commission in Havana would 

serve as the arbiter of last resort, and have the discretion to consider appeals and 

review rulings of a Property Claims Court. It could have the authority to reverse 

Property Claims Court decisions, or remand them for further consideration. 

Finally, the Supreme Commission could decree a final clear title to the owner. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 The U.S. Government should encourage a free Cuba to indicate at an early 

stage in the transition, and in the strongest possible terms, Cuba’s intent to 

settle the expropriation issue as quickly as it can and in an open and fair 

manner. 

 The U.S. Government should encourage a free Cuba to settle outstanding 

claims issues as expeditiously as possible, bearing in mind that a long, 

complicated process is not in Cuba’s best economic interest. 

 The U.S. Government should be prepared to work with a free Cuba to establish 

a mechanism that is open and transparent to resolve property claims. A 

mechanism that is perceived as fair and free from political influence will be 

critical to ensuring that the process works quickly and creates a minimum of 

residual hard feelings. 

 In the area of trademarks and patents, the U.S. Government should be prepared 

to assist a free Cuba to develop a modern trademark and patent registration 

mechanism and appropriate legal protections. The U.S. Government also 

should work with a Cuban transition government to address trademarks and 

patents in dispute.
229

B. Rekindle Entrepreneurship and Private Enterprise

1. The Role of Remittances

 

A post-Castro transition in Cuba will not enjoy the luxury of time to address 

the immediate challenge of an unemployed/underemployed population, estimated 

at 12 percent of the island’s current four million active workforce. 

 Judging by the failure of the current Cuban regime to generate new jobs (as 

evinced by the displacement of over 100,000 agricultural and blue-collar sugar 

industry workers who continue to receive salaries while attending vocational or 

university courses), political and social stability in a transitional post-Castro Cuba 

will depend to a great extent on the ability of a fledgling private sector to provide 

meaningful livelihoods for the Cuban people. 

While Cuba has an educated and technically skilled work force, the island 

will nonetheless begin a transition in a state of impoverishment. Foreign direct 

investment (FDI) by multinational companies will likely be directed toward larger 

state-owned enterprises undergoing privatization while IFI loans will be necessary 

to rebuild the island’s public infrastructure. In other words, conventional sources 

of capital and schemes of foreign aid will not resolve the critical underemployment 

that afflicts the Cuban economy today and that will only be aggravated by the 

collapse of the Castro regime’s statist policies. 

As with other aspects of a transition, the Cuban-American community could 

play a pivotal role in job creation on the island. At present, remittances from 

Cuban-Americans are estimated by the Inter-American Development Bank at over 

US$1 billion a year and constitute the second largest source of foreign exchange 

for the Castro regime, second only to tourism. It is estimated that the CubanAmerican community may have assets worth as much as $40-$50 billion. Even if 

a relatively modest share of the combined assets of Cuban-American firms were 

invested in a post-transition Cuba, they would dwarf the estimated $2 billion in 

foreign investment received by Cuba since the early 1990s.11

11 Sergio Diaz-Briquets and Jorge Perez-Lopez, The Role of the Cuban-American Community in the Cuban 

Transition, Cuba Transition Project, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies (University of Miami, 2003).
230

As noted in Chapter 1, remittances today serve two purposes: a means of 

meeting the basic consumer needs for Cubans fortunate enough to have relatives 

and loved ones abroad and a significant source of revenue for the repressive 

regime. In a transitional economy, remittances could serve as the start-up capital 

for reviving self-employment and small enterprises on the island. 

2. Microfinancing

 Given the urgency — economically as well as psychologically — of 

addressing the immediate needs of the population, creating and implementing a 

microfinancing program should be paramount. In this process, the CubanAmerican community in general, and the Cuban-American business establishment 

in particular, could be called upon to capitalize microdevelopment funds for startup enterprises on the island. For example, the early success of paladares (homebased restaurants) and casas particulares (home-based boarding establishments) in 

the mid-1990s reveal what enterprising Cubans can accomplish when given an 

incentive, even under an intolerant and repressive regime. It should be recalled 

that a number of paladares and casas particulares were initially financed by 

remittances from those in the U.S. with enterprising relatives on the island. Access 

to such start-up capital would be greatly expanded with the presence of 

microfinancing institutions, especially for those Cubans who do not have relatives 

abroad. 

Microfinancing institutions are not humanitarian or charitable organizations, 

and the availability of their funds should be seen as an investment in specific 

ventures. This will hopefully encourage venture capitalists and financial 

institutions to view microfinancing as a low-risk option to invest in Cuba.12 

 

Microfinancing is also the most effective form of public-private partnerships 

to foster the growth of small- and medium-sized enterprises. A concrete example 

that could certainly be emulated and replicated in Cuba is the work of the 

Enterprise and Growth Foundation (Fundación Empresa y Crecimento or FEC) in 

Mexico. Funded by multinational Spanish companies operating in Latin America, 

including Telefonica and Santander Bank, this foundation seeks to address the 

12 The New York Times, “Banking for the World’s Poor,” (November 19, 2003). Case-in-point: During the Asian 

financial crisis, a leading bank in Indonesia lost only 2 percent in defaults from among its microenterprise portfolio, 

but almost 100 percent in its corporate portfolio. 
231

need for financing of small- and medium-sized business ventures in Mexico. 

Within six months of beginning its work, the FEC was evaluating more than 100 

projects. The investment fund, currently valued at US$17 million, is 

professionally managed by Mexican nationals rather than by the foreign investors. 

According to FEC, three ventures have been approved for a total disbursement of 

US$6 million and have generated some 500 jobs in Mexico over the six-month 

period. Due to the success of the microfinancing program, the Mexican 

government’s Nacional Financiera (NAFINSA) development bank and the IDB 

have joined in supporting the program. 

 

While no one scheme will be a panacea for Cuba, certainly such publicprivate partnerships offer a feasible approach for reviving private enterprise in a 

cash-strapped Cuban economy and rapidly creating employment opportunities.13 

3. Partnerships 

 In addition to its role in providing potential financial resources to Cuba, the 

Cuban-American community might provide other forms of badly needed 

assistance. For example, business networks between the Cuban-American 

community and their Cuban counterparts could do much to help foster trade. 

Informal contacts between interested business associations could be used to 

overcome informal barriers that inhibit trade, such as weak enforcement of 

international contracts and inadequate information about trading opportunities. 

 In addition, the Cuban-American business community could effectively 

energize the small business sector in Cuba. The management, production, and 

technical know-how of the Cuban-American community could inject life into an 

emerging Cuban small business sector in a relatively short time. Moreover, 

Cuban-American firms could also play the role as “first movers”: investors who 

could enter the Cuban market early in the transition and by their presence and 

example change market expectations and advance the flow of foreign direct 

investment from more conventional sources. 

13 Marcelo Risi, “Capital para los pequenos,” BBC Mundo (September 2003).
232

4. Small and Micro Enterprises 

In the United States, small business accounts for 50 percent of jobs, 40 

percent of GDP, 30 percent of exports, and one-half of technological innovations. 

These businesses provide the basis of a middle-class life for millions of people. 

The emergence of small- and medium-sized private-sector enterprises in a free 

Cuba will determine success or failure of reconstruction and development 

programs. A Cuban transition government should consider what policies it can 

implement to generate small and microenterprise (SME) development. 

 

Microenterprise versus Small Business. In developing countries, 

microenterprise is part of a strategy of poverty alleviation, typically based on the 

village lending approach pioneered by Grameen Bank. Not necessarily an end in 

itself, microenterprise development can increase awareness of the negative 

circumstances of a country’s business environment that force would-be business 

owners into the inefficient informal sector. Once this is recognized as a problem, 

steps can then be taken to formalize the informal sector as a country considers how 

to move from microenterprise to small business. Creating a supportive 

environment for small business involves improving the legal, regulatory, and 

judicial environment (commercial law, contract law, etc.), financial sector 

improvement, commercial banking reform, small business managerial training, and 

so on. 

Applicable SME Model for Cuba. Two small and microenterprise 

development models might be applicable to a free Cuba. The first is Latin 

America; the second are transition countries moving from socialism to a marketbased economy, as is the case in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics. 

In Latin America, in 2003, the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) started a 

network of SME agencies in the Western Hemisphere called the SME Congress of 

the Americas to serve as a forum for sharing ideas on the SME experience among 

Latin American nations. In a post-Castro environment, Cuban engagement with 

this group would be useful. 

In the case of the former socialist countries of the Soviet Bloc, there are 

several country experiences to consider. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic 

made relatively rapid transitions, creating an enabling environment for SMEs and 

ultimately economic integration with the EU. These former socialist countries 

share their experiences at the SME Working Party of the OECD, to which SBA has 
233

been a contributor. Compared to Cuba, however, these are relatively affluent 

countries; so the SME experience of the poorer transition countries may offer 

better examples for Cuba early in a transition. 

Applicability of SBA and possible technical assistance to Cuba. SBA is an 

SME agency wholly oriented toward the United States. Its experience reflects a 

sophisticated economic environment and first-world SME issues. Nonetheless, the 

SBA has worked successfully in developing countries. In the past two years, SBA 

completed more than $4 million of USAID-funded SME projects in countries such 

as Nigeria and Egypt. A free Cuba should be considered for the establishment of 

Business Information Centers (BICs), which are on-the-ground, community-based 

locations for office support, fax, copying, PC, Internet, business training and 

applications software, workshops, and advice on dealing with entry-level business 

problems. SBA recently helped set up BICs in Nigeria. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 The U.S. Government should work with the Cuban-American community and a 

free Cuba to facilitate the low-cost, speedy transfer of remittances and promote 

their use to finance self-employment and small business start-ups in Cuba.

 The U.S. Government should encourage the Cuban-American community and 

the larger U.S. investment community to create a “Friends of Cuba” 

organization that could provide private-sector support to Cuba during 

transition and assist in promoting microfinancing and a more open flow of 

goods and services on the island. This organization should focus on bringing 

entrepreneurs from the United States and Cuba together to promote business 

relations and establish initial business contacts. 

 Assistance should be offered to promote microfinancing in Cuba. With 

assistance from USAID — perhaps a program similar to the partnership with 

VISA for Central American microfinancing projects — and other aid bodies, 

joint public-private ventures could pool financial resources and invest in sound 

business plans by new Cuban entrepreneurs. 

 The U.S. Government should work with the IFIs to encourage the creation of 

microfinance enterprises in a free Cuba, similar to those that have been 

successfully deployed in other developing countries. 
234

 The U.S. Government should offer to Cuban entrepreneurs demonstration tours 

of U.S. small businesses to promote best practices and encourage small 

business development. The U.S. Government also should be prepared to 

establish small business mentoring programs to encourage exchanges of 

successful small businesspersons with their Cuban counterparts. 

 The U.S. Government should encourage Cuban transition officials to examine 

the experience of the U.S. Small Business Administration to determine if a 

comparable entity would be helpful. 

 In addition, the U.S. Government could offer microenterprise assistance, 

including exposure to the many community-based lenders that make use of SBA 

start-up funding. 

 The U.S. should be in a position to offer to establish Business Information 

Centers in a free Cuba. 

 The United States should encourage a free Cuba to participate in the SME 

Congress of the Americas so that it can learn from the experiences of other 

Latin American countries in promoting SMEs.

C. Establish an Independent Banking System and an Independent Central 

Bank 

 

 The key objectives for a Central Bank include maintaining price stability 

through monetary policy, promoting safety and soundness in the banking sector 

through effective banking supervision, and fostering and maintaining a stable and 

competitive market-based financial system. A Central Bank needs to be 

empowered to license and supervise commercial banks as well as other financial 

intermediaries, such as money transmission companies and foreign exchange 

bureaus, and operate as a lender of last resort for the existing commercial banks. 

Depending on a free Cuba’s choice of exchange rate regimes, the role for the 

Central Bank may be more or less limited. 

The first task will be to create the legal basis for the Central Bank’s 

independence and operations. However, it will take time to institutionalize this 

independence in practice. 
235

 

 The private banking system has a traditional role of allocating resources 

efficiently and stimulating economic growth by intermediating between borrowers 

and investors. In a properly functioning market economy, a sound banking system 

fulfills basic functions such as executing payments, implementing monetary policy, 

mobilizing savings, and intermediating between borrowers and investors. 

Part of the foundation for a well functioning banking system is a legal 

infrastructure to promote a modern competitive banking system, and a supervisor 

that has the institutional capacity to rigorously monitor the condition of its banks 

and to resolve problems within an adequate legal and regulatory framework. A 

properly functioning supervisory system builds: depositor confidence; deeper 

levels of financial intermediation (thus economic growth); and faster resolution of 

problems, and at an earlier stage, so that there is little cost to the taxpayer. 

 Reform will necessarily involve decisions on how to build a private banking 

system either through entry of new private banks, entry of foreign banks, or 

privatization of existing state banks. State banks in transition economies have 

traditionally presented problems, because of large numbers of non-performing 

loans, links to state enterprises, opaque governance structures, and the dominance 

of the deposit base. Reform will need to address each of these problems, including 

auditing the state banking sector, severing links to non-performing borrowers, and 

preparing the banking system for privatization. It will also need to ensure that the 

public banks do not inhibit the growth of a private banking system by using its 

stronger deposit base and likely perception of government backing to offer lower 

interest rates. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 The U.S. Government and the IFIs should be in position to offer assistance to a 

free Cuba in developing an independent central bank based on its experience 

with other developing countries in Latin America. 

 The U.S. Government and the IFIs should offer to provide a free Cuba with 

technical assistance to develop its banking system, including its regulatory 

framework and the capacity to supervise the banks. 
236

 The U.S. Government should offer to do training in best practices for bank 

supervisors in a free Cuba.

D. Build an Effective Finance/Economy Ministry 

 An effective finance ministry will be needed to conduct fiscal policy, 

oversee the budget process, manage the debt, and coordinate overall economic 

policy. In a transition, Cuba’s national budget will likely be radically overhauled 

to meet the needs of a new market economy. This includes rationalizing 

expenditures away from subsidizing state enterprises and determining the 

economic needs and viability of Cuba’s numerous social programs. Effective debt 

management will be critical to ensuring that Cuba can meet its financing needs and 

manage the profile of its debt. Its first task will likely be to normalize external 

debt. It will also need to manage the balance between domestic and external debt. 

Such a ministry would also need to ensure that proper expenditure controls are in 

place and procurement rules are followed. 

RECOMMENDATION: 

 The U.S. Government, in conjunction with the IFIs, should offer technical 

assistance to a Cuban transition government on budgeting, expenditure 

management, debt management, and procurement rules. 

 

E. Create an Independent Tax Collection Agency 

During a transition period and the change in the locus of economic activity 

from the state sector to the private sector, building an effective market-oriented tax 

system and agency to collect taxes will be necessary to ensure adequate revenue 

collection and preserve the transition government’s ability to set tax policy. 

Maintaining revenues also will support stabilization during a transition period and 

ease the need for the new government to obtain financing. It will be critical that 

the Cuban transition government stress the political neutrality and independence of 

any taxing authority. As noted earlier, ONAT, Cuba’s existing internal revenue 

agency has been an instrument of state control for those involved in selfemployment activities. Tax avoidance, a problem experienced in many Latin 

American countries, is likely to be a problem in Cuba also, unless Cubans are 

convinced that a new authority will be truly apolitical. 
237

RECOMMENDATION: 

 The United States and the IFIs should be prepared to offer technical assistance 

to a free Cuba to help set up the new collection agency. 

F. Streamline Existing Government Economic Ministries 

Communist Cuba has never been short of bureaucracy. The Council of 

Ministers, through its nine-member executive committee, handles the 

administration of the economy, which is largely state-controlled except for a tiny 

and shriveling self-employed sector. Fidel Castro is President of the Council of 

State and Council of Ministers and his brother Raul serves as First Vice President 

of both bodies as well as Minister of Defense. Immediately below the Council of 

Ministers there are 30 Central State Administration bodies comprising 27 

Ministries and three Institutions. 

The transformation of Cuba’s present centralized economic policies into 

those of a competitive market democracy will require major structural changes and 

technical assistance. One of the early priorities will be the need to reform, reorient, 

and consolidate existing ministries that deal with non-market economic issues into 

a structure designed to encourage market development, promote private sector 

economic growth, and expand trade. 

 E-government can be a key factor in streamlining and restructuring the 

various ministries. Visitors to Cuba will undoubtedly find a citizenry starved for 

information. Clearly, inefficient government and corruption will be some of the 

challenges faced by a Cuban transition government in the short term. Cuban 

entrepreneurs will have little idea how to manage an economy and conduct 

business in the Information Technology (IT) age. A modern, robust, and 

liberalized telecommunications infrastructure and access to computers are 

fundamental to the success of any E-initiatives. 

Proper use of the Internet and a simple e-government system can simplify 

procedures for foreign investors and provide for the speedy delivery of important 

commercial information. Government procurements can be posted on the web, 

taxes can be collected, utility bills can be paid, and government services 

information can be maintained and updated, all online. This is a particularly 

valuable medium as it helps promote the concept of open government. In view of 
238

the closed nature of the Castro regime, this would be an indication that times are 

genuinely different. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 The U.S. Government, if requested, should assist a free Cuba in developing a 

more rational design for its numerous economic ministries. 

 The U.S. Government should be prepared to provide assistance to a free Cuba 

in the area of e-government. In addition, assistance in this area should be 

sought from countries that have extensive experience in this sector. 

 The U.S. Government should encourage the World Bank to assist a free Cuba in 

reforming its public sector through its Governance Reform Program. 

 U.S. Government institutions such as OPIC and EXIM should be prepared to 

assist U.S. telecommunications and information technology companies in 

establishing investments in the sector. 

 The U.S. Government should be in a position to assist a Cuban transition 

government in consolidating and/or improving mechanisms among the various 

ministries. For example, in the United States, the Trade Promotion 

Coordinating Committee, chaired by the Secretary of Commerce, is used to 

coordinate promotion activities among the numerous federal entities involved in 

trade. Mechanisms such as this could be a model for a free Cuba. 

 The U.S. Government should offer technical assistance for evaluating and 

eliminating unnecessary regulations that hinder the efforts of private 

enterprise, thus simplifying procedures. It should also offer assistance in 

improving the public sector’s management and technological skills. 

G. Promote Ownership of Private Property

1. Establish Private Property Rights

The restoration of private property rights will be one of the biggest 

challenges of the transition period. In particular, as noted above, the challenge of 

expropriated property, especially residential property, is a Gordian Knot. Many 
239

Cubans left the island under difficult conditions, leaving behind their families, their 

possessions, and their way of life. Many believed they would return soon, 

beginning a wait that is now in its forty-fifth year. In the meantime, the Castro 

regime’s Urban Reform Law gave renters property, at least in name, while the 

subdivision of many homes created overcrowded and substandard living 

conditions. In addition, a lack of supply and years of deferred maintenance have 

taken their toll on Cuba’s housing stock. The regime has stoked fears that Cubans 

will immediately lose their homes should Cuban exiles return. Similarly, this has 

been one of the most difficult issues in Eastern Europe. Somehow, restitution or 

compensation of property must be balanced with the need to maintain and not 

exacerbate an already severe housing crisis. Without clear protection of private 

property, real estate, and investment, sustained economic growth will be difficult 

to achieve. 

At the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Monterrey, the U.S. 

Government stressed the key link between property rights, market opportunity, and 

democratic governance. Accessible and transparent property rights systems — 

comprising laws, institutions, and information systems harmonized with informal 

practices — are a “hidden” infrastructure often taken for granted or overlooked, yet 

essential for commerce, services, and governance. As Peruvian economist 

Hernando de Soto argues, broad-based growth means making the law effective to 

mobilize the vast assets of smaller firms and of poorer households that constitute 

this informal economy. 

Through this “hidden” infrastructure, governments recognize rights and 

responsibilities in uses and transactions of property. At the same time, incentives 

and information are generated that are vital to public and private planning, revenue 

collection, and service provision, for example, housing, credit, water, energy, and 

disaster management. 

Good governance of property is important for the provision of financial 

services to micro, small and medium enterprises. Property rights matter both for 

primary access to credit (securing loans for consumption and enterprise activities) 

and for capital availability to lending institutions (securitization of loan portfolios/ 

secondary markets participation). 

With regard to primary credit supply, pledging of collateral was traditionally 

a barrier to access to institutional sources of credit for small and informal 
240

businesses. The introduction of microfinance institutions dramatically reduced this 

barrier. Microenterprise development programs have demonstrated that the 

immediate need for credit can be answered without collateral and that specialized 

microfinance institutions are effective in removing other barriers to credit access 

(e.g., by offering alternative administration mechanisms and risk management 

techniques). 

 

 Still, the limited dollar amount for microfinance loans can be a damper to 

enterprise development. Graduation to bigger, individual loans at better interest 

rates is facilitated by collateral. Also, coverage of the still-underserved target 

population can be expanded through property system reforms that make collateralbased lending viable. 

In an interview with the Center for International Private Enterprise, 

Hernando de Soto noted that: 

Clear-cut property rights are indeed essential since you can only 

pledge collateral if you own something. If you give somebody a 

valid, respected, secure property title, it’s really the first step in the 

securitization process. Let’s take the U.S. example, ...at the bottom 

of these mechanisms is the fact that somebody who owns land or other 

private property can pledge it as collateral. This engenders a great 

deal of the capital markets in the U.S. and even anchors the rest of its 

financial system. 

Today, many donors offer significant support for improving the 

documentation of property rights and streamlining administrative processes 

regarding property-based transactions. 

The bottom line is that transparent and equitable property markets are a 

keystone of vibrant market economies, strong democracies and healthy 

environments. These bring the peace and stability needed for nascent market 

economies to mature. 

2. Assistance in Creating a Real Estate Market 

Creating a viable system of institutions and markets that restores consumer 

confidence in the secure holding and exchange of real estate will be an important 
241

part in Cuba’s transition to a free market economy worthy of investment. A major 

challenge in Cuba will be re-creating a property titling system along with laws, 

standards, and regulations under which property can be bought, sold, transferred, 

or foreclosed. 

 In most market-based economies including the United States, the 

responsibility and discretion for most of the choices regarding transactions, 

operation, and maintenance of real estate are left with the private parties most 

closely associated with the decision. A vast private sector infrastructure of 

professional service providers generally emerges to meet the need, including real 

estate developers (who, with architects, general contractors, and builders, construct 

residential housing as well as commercial office and retail space), appraisers (who 

help value property), property insurers (who protect against casualty losses), real 

estate brokers (who help people buy and sell property), lenders (who, supported by 

a broad financial network, broker the financing), property managers, etc. Each 

profession normally adopts professional standards and accepted codes of conduct. 

With the ability to own and exchange real estate, it is reasonable to expect that the 

professional service sector needed to produce real estate and facilitate its exchange 

would develop in Cuba, particularly with the assistance of the professional service 

sector in the United States and non-profit organizations such as the Institute of 

Real Estate Management and the National Association of Realtors. That process 

will be accelerated with the standardization and discipline that development of a 

primary mortgage finance system will impose. 

3. Establishing a Primary Mortgage Market System

 Establishing a primary mortgage market system in Cuba will be an important 

part of bringing about broad ownership of private property and the sound basis for 

a stable and growing economy. A key prerequisite is an institutional framework of 

credit enhancements and mortgage products that permit households to leverage a 

modest level of assets to finance most of the purchase price of a home with 

borrowed funds. In the United States, the principal institutions by which 

government assists mortgage finance have evolved since 1934 to include the 

government-operated Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and Ginnie Mae and 

Federally-chartered Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, coupled with private mortgage 

insurance (PMI). Federally insured depository banks and thrifts also play a 

significant part in providing mortgage finance. However, a viable system for Cuba 

would not need to be so institutionally complex. 
242

 The aforementioned institutions provide either a credit enhancement that 

links borrowers to funds from lenders in the primary market or a credit 

enhancement that links lenders to funds from ultimate investors in the secondary 

market. FHA helps borrowers secure mortgage funds from lenders by providing 

them a credit enhancement in the form of government-backed mortgage insurance 

at an actuarially fair premium that protects the lender against default loss up to 100 

percent of the unpaid principal balance. Ginnie Mae helps lenders secure loanable 

funds from the capital market by providing them a credit enhancement in the form 

of a government guaranty of on-time payment of principle and interest to capital 

market investors should a lender fail to make the payments. Thus, FHA borrowers 

utilize FHA insurance in the primary market to secure mortgage funds from 

lenders who in turn utilize the Ginnie Mae guaranty in the secondary market to 

obtain the borrowed funds from capital market investors. Thus, a single 

governmental entity combining the functions of FHA and Ginnie Mae could 

provide the necessary primary and secondary market credit enhancements. 

However, such an entity would need to set standards governing lender approval, 

credit and collateral underwriting standards, minimal property standards, 

settlement standards/consumer protections for single-family and multifamily 

finance, respectively. 

Would-be owners in need of financing to purchase a home or multifamily 

structure must assure lenders and ultimately the credit enhancer (mortgage insurers 

or guarantors) that they not only have the capacity but also sufficient incentive to 

repay the loan according to schedule, and protect and maintain the security for the 

loan. Hence, any would-be owner seeking financing must overcome two key 

obstacles. The first is underwriting with a demonstration of responsible 

management of past credit situations and a reliable source of income that the lender 

determines sufficient, after considering other scheduled and normal expenses, to 

support the loan. 

The second hurdle is the accumulation of sufficient cash to pay the equity 

down payment and transaction costs associated with the property sale and 

mortgage financing. The equity down payment is in essence an insurance 

deductible that the borrower must forfeit before a lender or a mortgage insurer 

would bear any loss. The down payment and accumulation of cash to pay 

transaction costs not only serve as an incentive for the borrower to act in ways 

consistent with minimizing the potential for a lender’s or insurer’s loss, but it also 
243

represents a demonstration of the borrower’s capacity to budget and accumulate 

funds, a skill the owner will need to build in order to cover capital repairs and 

maintenance of the property. 

4. Establish a Secondary Mortgage Market System 

A secondary mortgage market affords two principal advantages. First, it 

lowers the cost of mortgage finance by allowing credit risk and interest rate risk to 

be separated and borne by those best able to bear it. Second, it levels the cost of 

finance by connecting local housing markets to international capital markets so that 

borrowers have access to the lowest cost funds, not just those available locally. As 

mentioned above, a credit enhancement for lenders in a secondary mortgage 

market would provide them a liquid source of funding by permitting lenders and 

investors to easily sell and buy bundles of mortgage loans without regard for the 

underlying credit risk. Establishing a secondary mortgage market would require a 

governmental entity, similar to Ginnie Mae, to underwrite a security instrument 

backed by mortgage loans and guarantied against loss from credit risk that could 

trade in international capital markets. That entity would have to set out, 

administer, and enforce the terms and conditions under which the guarantied 

security instrument could be issued. It would have to establish standards for the 

guaranty and its pricing, create a process to service and manage the instrument, 

monitor performance of issuers, provide for recovery of collateral from defaulting 

issuers, and provide training. 

5. Develop a Government Agency to Promote Housing 

 

 Cuba currently has a Ministry of Housing and a Ministry of Construction 

that built much of the country’s public or “social” housing. An assessment of their 

strengths and weaknesses will help determine how best the U.S. Government can 

communicate and assist a free Cuba to address the Cuban people’s housing needs. 

This assessment can be done in coordination with similar efforts by other nations 

such as Spain and Mexico. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 The U.S. Government, through USAID and other donor institutions, should 

offer to assist a free Cuba in re-establishing the right to own, rent, and sell 

private property. Particular emphasis should be placed on U.S. experience 
244

 

with homeownership and on promoting the benefits of property rights and 

ownership. 

 Given the nascent character of any mortgage market in a newly free Cuba, the 

U.S. Government could provide advice in establishing a credit-enhancing 

agency along the lines the FHA initially followed. A Cuban transition 

government should be offered expertise in underwriting, property valuation, 

and minimum construction standards.

 The U.S. Government should assist a free Cuba in developing primary and 

secondary mortgage markets based on its vast experience in these areas.

 The U.S. Government should be prepared to offer to assist a Cuban transition 

government to organize itself to address the housing issue and to train Cuban 

officials in a transition government, including in the promotion of affordable 

housing by private sector entities, mortgage guarantees for financial 

institutions, and fair housing protections.

H. Establish Free And Efficient Labor Markets 

 According to Human Rights Watch, the Cuban government’s virtual 

monopoly on jobs allows it to exercise tight control over the nation’s workforce.14 

To be given a job, a worker in Cuba is asked to sign a contract that includes a 

pledge of support for the Cuban Communist Party.15 Such policies and practices 

prohibit an efficient use of human resources, placing workers in jobs they may not 

have the skills for or interest in doing. As a transitional Cuban government begins 

to denationalize state-owned and controlled entities, workers will encounter a new 

world in which the state will no longer be the provider of the paycheck, allowing 

for a more productive and efficient free market economy and potentially causing 

significant worker dislocations. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 The U.S. Government has significant experience working with countries that 

have recently undergone or are undergoing transitions from controlled 

14 Human Rights Watch, Cuba’s Repressive Machinery (1999). 15 Center for a Free Cuba, The European Union and Cuba; Solidarity or Complicity (September 2000). 
245

economies to market economies. This technical assistance should be offered to 

a free Cuba to help it establish mechanisms that can ease the transition, helping 

place workers in new jobs, as well as changing old attitudes about the role of 

government in providing employment. 

 The U.S. Government should also offer technical advice to a free Cuba to the 

extent that a transition may require changing the laws and role of the Labor 

Ministry to allow the free labor market to function and to improve a free 

Cuba’s compliance with International Labor Organization (ILO) core labor 

standards. 

 The U.S. Government should also be prepared to offer its extensive experience 

helping countries develop their labor market information systems and 

infrastructure for those systems. For example, in several Caribbean countries, 

a U.S. Department of Labor project has installed computer software and 

hardware to support labor market information systems; assisted stakeholders in 

the development or enhancement of Labor Force Surveys, Occupational Wage 

Surveys, and Productivity Indicators; and provided direct assistance in 

sampling and survey design by technical experts. 

 The U.S. Government should also assist a free Cuba by providing a coordinated 

process for revising labor laws in order to promote strengthened labormanagement relations. This would facilitate private sector development by 

establishing a sound, equitable, and predictable framework for labor relations; 

promoting democratic participation of social partners in governance; 

cultivating transparent and accountable laws; and making legislation more 

enforceable. 

 The U.S. Government should also offer extensive technical advice to Cuba in 

supporting projects that promote healthy labor-management relations, a key 

element to a healthy and dynamic workforce. In Vietnam, for example, where 

the industrial relations system is inadequate to support the country’s transition 

towards a market economy, the U.S. Department of Labor has a project to 

develop workplace democracy and sound industrial relations at the national, 

provincial, and enterprise levels, including the prevention and settlement of 

disputes.
246

I. Promote Healthy Labor Management Relations with Newly 

Independent Unions 

As stated in Chapter 1, the ILO has been critical of the lack of freedom of 

association in Cuba, particularly the official union confederation’s monopoly on 

trade unions as institutionalized in the Cuban Labor Code. During 2003, the ILO’s 

supervisory bodies also examined cases related to threats, detentions, and pressure 

against workers who attempted to form unions outside the established structure. In 

June 2003, the ILO Conference Committee on the Application of Standards 

pointedly requested that the Cuban government accept an ILO “direct contacts 

mission” with a view to ensuring the application of freedom of association in law 

and practice. 

Cuba is clearly in violation of the ILO’s 1998 Declaration on Fundamental 

Principles and Rights at Work, particularly with regard to the right to freedom of 

association and collective bargaining. These basic principles are essential to 

promoting an open economy, higher living standards, and a favorable climate for 

trade and investment. Although Cuba has legally committed itself to upholding 

these standards by accepting the 1998 ILO Declaration and ratifying core ILO 

Conventions on fundamental labor rights, clearly many of these basic rights are 

systematically denied in practice. 

Keys to any effort to rebuild and fortify a free labor movement in a postCastro Cuba would be complete reform of the Labor Ministry’s inspection 

functions and investments in efforts to raise awareness among employers, workers, 

and government representatives about labor rights. To serve as a vehicle for 

workplace democracy and to open a national dialogue on labor rights, these efforts 

should be undertaken in a transparent process involving employers, workers, and 

government representatives. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 The U.S. Government can offer extensive technical advice to a free Cuba in 

supporting projects that foment healthy labor-management relations, a key 

element to a dynamic workforce. DOL has experience in other countries 

running programs to improve labor law, strengthen labor inspection, eliminate 

forced labor, and reduce commercial sexual exploitation. It has worked 
247

primarily through the ILO in these efforts, but it has also involved other 

international and national organizations with expertise. 

 The United States can also provide medium- and long-term assistance to a 

transitional government in Cuba by providing a coordinated process for 

revising labor laws so that they are consistent with ILO standards and promote 

strengthened labor-management relations. This would facilitate private sector 

development by establishing a sound, equitable, and predictable framework for 

labor relations; promoting democratic participation of social partners in 

governance; cultivating transparent and accountable laws; and making 

legislation more enforceable. 

 A robust program to address labor rights in a free Cuba would include 

involvement in the following areas: 

1. Labor Law Reform

 Reformed labor laws could facilitate private sector development by 

establishing a sound, equitable, and predictable framework for collective 

and individual labor relations, promoting democratic participation, 

cultivating transparent and accountable laws, and making legislation more 

accessible. 

The DOL could work with international experts and partners, such as 

the ILO, to provide technical advice in the reform effort. Special emphasis 

would be placed on democratic and participatory approaches in all stages 

of the discussions with employer and worker organizations and other 

concerned parties. As a result, the program would promote sustainability by 

building the capacity to effectively amend, implement, and enforce labor 

laws. 

2. Raising Awareness

After four and a half decades of Cuban government repression of any 

signs of independent labor activity, substantial effort will probably need to 

be exerted to provide Cuban workers and employers the knowledge and 

tools to secure full respect for their rights. The DOL could assist a 

transition government undertake a broad range of activities to develop 
248

public awareness of labor issues and train Cuban partners to conduct 

seminars on current labor laws and available services. 

3. Strengthened Inspection Services

 DOL could also provide assistance to help improve the effectiveness 

of government labor inspection function. The goals would be to create a 

corps of inspectors trained in modern inspection techniques and to assist in 

developing a system for monitoring violations. If the transition government 

agrees, the DOL could provide assistance to 

 develop policies, training, and procedures for carrying out labor 

inspections to enforce national laws; 

 

 foster strong institutional linkages among government officials, 

employers, and workers; 

 implement a program to target inspections to the most problematic 

employers and sectors; 

 audit labor inspectorates and develop national plans for labor law 

compliance; 

 

 train staff in the technical knowledge of modern inspection systems; and

 create a computerized database for labor inspection reports.

V. ENGAGING AND EMPOWERING THE CUBAN PEOPLE

 The U.S. Government should facilitate the flow of remittances and other 

private funding flows to Cuba during a transition to help provide the Cuban people 

with the resources they need not only to survive but also to prosper through the 

creation of small and medium enterprises. 

 The Cuban-American community is especially well placed to provide 

support for Cuban entrepreneurs during the initial transition to democracy and free 

enterprise. Cuban-American firms should use their in-depth knowledge of the U.S. 

market to accelerate the establishment of commercial and economic linkages 
249

between the U.S. and Cuba and facilitate the island’s reintegration into the world 

economy. 

The United States should provide training to new Cuban entrepreneurs 

focused on the benefits to be derived from working with a market economy, and in 

particular the importance of adopting strong rules of law to facilitate the smooth 

functioning of the market. For the past 45 years, Cuban entrepreneurs have been 

forced either to flee Cuba or to engage in informal and often “illegal” business 

activity. The Castro government taxed, harassed, and otherwise impeded selfemployment and other market-driven activities. 

 The United States should encourage Cuba to permit employees of 

denationalized firms and agricultural cooperatives to purchase shares in these 

formerly state-owned enterprises. 

The United States should extend its trade capacity efforts to a free Cuba, 

including those geared more directly toward promoting rural development and 

encouraging export diversification. 

The United States should work with a transition government to remove all 

obstacles to self-employment and other forms of entrepreneurship in a free Cuba. 

With U.S. Government funding, Cuban-American and other U.S. NGOs and 

consulting firms can provide training and technical assistance to any Cuban who 

wants to open a small business. 

 The Pan American Development Foundation and Junior Achievement 

International, through USAID funding, are already training business trainers in 

Cuba. The U.S. Government should greatly expand these and similar efforts 

during a transition. U.S. Government programs that assist in training mid-level 

managers in U.S. business practices should be expanded to include Cuban 

professionals. 
250

VI. CONSULTING AND COORDINATING WITH THE 

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 

A. The International Community 

Issues involving privatization, debt, aid, and trade, to name a few, can all 

benefit from including the international community before, during, and after the 

transition process. For example, in the area of trade, the United States could 

encourage the European Union (EU) to finalize a free Cuba’s access to the 

Cotonou Agreement, which would provide preferential access to the EU market for 

certain Cuban products. 

Other transitional economies should be approached to the extent that they 

may offer valuable lessons to Cuba based on their recent experiences. 

The burden of the reconstruction need not fall completely on the shoulders 

of the United States. Clearly much of the training and education can be provided 

by international organizations such as the World Bank, the Inter-American 

Development Bank, and the Organization of American States. Also, there is a 

huge body of knowledge and inventory of good practices that can be drawn into 

the process. 

Organizations such as Fundación Chile can be called upon to share 

experiences with the newly formed Cuban government and the developing Cuban 

private sector. Trade associations in the United States and abroad can be called 

upon to lend technical expertise regarding best practices, research and 

development, trade generation, and job creation. Specific industry associations can 

be used to provide information and matchmaking opportunities for specific 

ventures. State government development agencies can provide business contacts 

and assist in the formation of investment ventures. 

B. Some Initial Internal Steps 

In order to be prepared for a transition and to implement programs in the 

economic arena quickly, it would be prudent to establish a U.S. Government 

Standing Committee for Economic Reconstruction (SCER), to act in coordination 

with the Department of State Transition Coordinator (see recommendations in 

Chapter 1) specifically on economic issues addressed in this report. The SCER 
251

would meet as necessary to review reconstruction plans, ensure that appropriate 

agencies are prepared to implement programs immediately and to update programs 

as needs change or as a situation might dictate. This committee should be made up 

of representatives from Commerce, State, USAID, Justice, SBA, OPIC, EXIM, 

Agriculture, HUD, USTR, and Treasury. Other agencies can be included as 

required. This Committee should be chaired at the Deputy Assistant Secretary 

(DAS) level with participation at the DAS or Office Director level at participating 

agencies. The Committee should report periodically regarding its reconstruction 

plans and its readiness to implement the same. 

 

In a similar vein, strong consideration should be given to establishing a 

standing private sector advisory committee composed of Cuban experts from 

around the country to ensure that the best available advice is provided to the U.S. 

Government as it prepares for a free Cuba’s transition. As an initial step, this 

standing committee should review and comment upon this report, ensuring that it 

becomes a longer term planning document. The committee would then be 

expected to meet on a regular basis to add more detail to this initial planning.16

16 Both the SCER and a private sector advisory committee could assist a Cuba Council -- which may be designated 

under Sec. 203 of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act – to ensure coordination with the 

private sector in responding to a transition in Cuba. 
CHAPTER 5 

Modernizing Infrastructure

253

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

As a result of years of inadequate investment and neglect of repairs 

and maintenance, Cuba’s infrastructure has significantly deteriorated. 

Examples of the abysmal state of Cuba’s infrastructure are not difficult to 

identify from published reports and personal accounts. The only investment 

realized in Cuba’s transportation infrastructure over the last two decades has 

been to support the narrow interests of the tourism market, not the general 

population. Ports, roads, and bridges suffer from a lack of investment, as do 

many of the supporting components of a healthy transportation and 

distribution system. 

To assist a transition government in Cuba and meet humanitarian, as 

well as reconstruction challenges, significant infrastructure investments will 

be needed in transportation systems, energy, telecommunications, water 

resources, and sanitation. This chapter provides an overview of Cuba’s 

infrastructure using all available sources of information and reflects how the 

U.S. Government can assist a transition government in Cuba to meet 

humanitarian and reconstruction challenges. 

The chapter’s first section focuses on the first 90 days and actions that 

support humanitarian assistance. Since infrastructure, by definition, implies 

facilities and equipment that are unlikely to be built or acquired in a 90-day 

timeframe, this section of the report will identify short-term actions, such as 

operational changes and signing of new cooperative agreements, that can 

facilitate the most rapid assistance to the Cuban people in a time of 

transition. This section will also identify the areas of infrastructure in need 

of on-site technical evaluation to establish needs and priorities for longerterm infrastructure. 

In the short-term, the U.S. Government can assist a free Cuba and its 

citizens by facilitating the acquisition of new and/or used equipment, 

opening avenues of cooperation between public/private U.S. transport 

entities and their Cuban counterparts, conducting technical needs 

assessments, and providing technical assistance to formulate an 

infrastructure development plan that will identify emergency requirements 

as well as medium- and long-term needs. 

To address long-term infrastructure needs, elements of the U.S. 

Government can support a free Cuba in seeking donor assistance from the 

255
international community and organizations such as the World Bank and the 

Inter-American Development Bank to help finance feasibility studies, assess 

and prioritize needs, improve the operation and financial viability of public 

utilities, upgrade and replace plants and equipment, undertake the 

privatization of utilities, encourage competition in services, and develop 

regulatory mechanisms for natural monopolies. 

II. INTRODUCTION 

Sound physical infrastructure is required for any country to develop 

and sustain economic growth and quality of life for its citizens. It is the 

backbone of social and economic development, and for a transitioning Cuba, 

it will be critical for success. After years of inadequate investment and 

neglect of repairs and maintenance, Cuba’s infrastructure is in a state of 

serious deterioration. All basic infrastructure, including transportation, 

energy, telecommunication, and water and sanitation facilities have suffered, 

and all such systems are antiquated, unreliable, and incapable of supporting 

the increased demands associated with an open, consumer-oriented, marketbased economy. 

Infrastructure development and maintenance is capital intensive. For 

nearly 30 years, Cuba received large subsidies, principally from the former 

Soviet Union, and mostly via concessionary sugar-for-oil agreements. 

Wasting this capital on military adventurism, the Castro regime ignored the 

day-to-day infrastructure needs of the nation, which is in part responsible for 

the long-term damage to the economy. Since the Soviet Union’s collapse in 

1991 and Cuba’s loss of what had been a $6 billion a year subsidy, Cuba’s 

state-planned economy has had difficulty generating sustainable revenue. 

Capital shortages are reflected in a pattern of deferred maintenance and a 

lack of renewal of the country’s infrastructure. Even before the break-up of 

the Soviet Union, Cuba’s showed the damages of its ideologically based, 

state-planned system, with its distortions and misplaced subsidies that 

favored inefficient operation of state-run enterprises for political reasons at 

the expense of market-driven production. 

Regardless of these economic constraints, the Cuban government has 

spent disproportionately large sums of money to establish its influence in 

many third world countries through both military and foreign aid 

expenditures. Large sums were also directed to activities such as the 

development of biotechnology and bioscience centers not appropriate in 

256
magnitude and expense for such a fundamentally poor nation, and which 

have failed to be justified financially. In fact, this sector has continued to 

receive heavy investment despite cutbacks in other sectors of the economy, 

one of which has been basic infrastructure. The investment in the biotech 

sector has not resulted in significant inflows of capital, and has raised 

questions about the types of activities undertaken.1

Examples of the abysmal state of Cuba’s infrastructure are not

difficult to identify from published reports and personal accounts. The 

collapse of the sugar industry has led to a substantial reduction in rail assets, 

with more than a third of the rail network — itself antiquated and very 

poorly maintained — being mothballed. The rail signaling system dates 

from the middle of the last century, and is in need of substantial 

improvement. Ports, roads, and bridges similarly suffer from a lack of 

investment, as do many of the supporting components of a healthy 

transportation and distribution system. For example, firms now doing 

business in Cuba report a significant shortage of warehousing facilities, 

particularly refrigerated warehousing facilities, with implications both for 

the transportation system and the ability to serve the population’s basic food 

and health needs. 

In the electric energy generation sector, several factors have led to a 

serious deterioration of the Cuban system, including lack of proper 

maintenance, use of inappropriate fuel, aging equipment, unsuitable spare 

parts, lack of system equilibrium, and the effects of blackouts. Some 

sources estimate Cuba’s current real capacity at only 1,200 megawatts. In a 

free Cuba, the infrastructure will need to be modernized to generate 3,900 

megawatts as soon as possible to help support economic development. A 

robust capacity for generating electrical energy will be essential.2

 

Telecommunications is one of the most important areas of 

infrastructure investment. In the last 30 years, the world has witnessed a 

revolution in telecommunications technology in which Cuba has barely 

participated. Microwaves, fiber optics, satellites, wireless phones, digital 

switching, computer networking, Internet, electronic mail, faxes, and 

interactive television are all examples. During the course of Castro’s 

revolution, Cuba’s telecoms capacity actually decreased, going from 15 

 

1

 Cereijo, Manuel, Cuba’s Infrastructure: Present and Future, Institute for Cuban & Cuban-American

Studies, University of Miami, 2003. 2

 Ibid. 

257
telephone lines per 100 inhabitants in 1959 to 3.5 lines per 100 persons in

1999. Moreover, many of the existing lines and systems are not suitable for 

the speed, bandwidth, and applications of modern telecommunications.3

Similarly, infrastructure associated with water and sanitation has 

suffered since the 1959 revolution. Little or no maintenance has been given 

to plants, distribution, collection, and transmission systems due to lack of 

investment due to antiquation and a shortage of spare parts. Water and 

sanitation facilities in the urban areas of Cuba are an average of 70 years old. 

The universally accepted useful life of water distribution and sewer lines is 

50 years, and then only when reliable, routine maintenance is performed.4

 

These examples are typical of a wider pattern of inadequate and 

failing infrastructure due to age, lack of investment, poor maintenance, and 

failure to acquire necessary spare parts. The transport system, and virtually 

all other aspects of Cuba’s infrastructure that support its society, suffer from

the same lack of attention and consequent degradation. To assist a free Cuba 

and its citizens, all aspects of the existing infrastructure will need to be 

examined and modernized in order to support and foster broader economic 

growth, social development, and democratic institution-building. 

This chapter provides an overview of Cuba’s infrastructure using all 

available sources of information and reflects how the U.S. Government can 

assist a transition government in Cuba to meet humanitarian and 

reconstruction challenges. The chapter’s first section focuses on the first 90 

days and actions that support humanitarian assistance. Since infrastructure, 

by definition, implies facilities and equipment that are unlikely to be built or 

acquired in a 90-day timeframe, this section of the report will identify shortterm actions, such as operational changes and signing of new cooperative 

agreements, that can facilitate the most rapid assistance to the Cuban people 

in a time of transition. This section will also identify the areas of 

infrastructure in need of on-site technical evaluation to establish needs and 

priorities for longer-term infrastructure. Long-term issues are addressed in 

the chapter’s second section. Throughout the chapter, actions where the 

U.S. Government may provide assistance to a free Cuba are shown in italics. 

Recommendations represent a best estimate based on the available 

information.

 

3

 Ibid. 4

 Ibid. 

258
III. IMMEDIATE ACTIONS5

A. Transportation 

1. Aviation 

i. Air Traffic Management/Airway Facilities 

To facilitate coordination and hand-offs and improve flow 

management for a projected increase in air traffic, once a transition 

government is in place, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the 

Institute of Civil Aeronautics of Cuba (IACC) should agree to establish 

liaison positions in both the Havana Air Traffic Control Center (ACC) and 

the Miami Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) for immediate 

exchange of controllers and the development of a flow management unit. 

The FAA will need to identify a bilingual FAA liaison that is operationally 

current, that is familiar with the Cuban ATC environment (from the Miami 

ARTCC), and that has a broad background in traffic management, 

procedural development, and instruction. The liaison would also require 

extensive knowledge of International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 

standards and recommended practices. The liaison would be located at the 

Havana Center for a period of up to 12 months. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 Once a transition government is in place, seek a Technical Assistance 

Agreement for immediate exchange of controllers (Miami and Havana) 

to facilitate coordination and hand-offs and improve Flow Management 

for projected traffic increases. 

 Encourage a transition government to establish a liaison at the Miami 

ARTCC facility to facilitate coordination in the new air traffic 

environment. 

The accurate and efficient transmission and reception of critical voice 

and data communications are crucial for the safe management of air traffic, 

particularly when automated data exchange is not available. The current 

 

5 Actions that may be taken in the first 90 days of a post-transition government.

259
communications arrangement and system between Cuba and the United 

States is barely sufficient for current traffic levels and is inadequate for 

accommodating the projected growth in traffic. The FAA and the IACC 

should jointly examine point-to-point (Havana-Miami initially) options for 

expanding bilateral communications capabilities to ensure the safe 

transmission of critical information. Experts from the ICAO’s MEVA 

(Mejores al Enlace de Voz del ATS) Project Team for Latin America and the 

Caribbean should be involved in the discussions. 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 Provide assistance with restructuring radar sectors and improving 

operational procedures.

 Advise on upgrading communications systems.

ii. Safety Oversight 

The FAA has a statutory obligation to ensure the safe operation of 

foreign aircraft operating in the United States. When a foreign air carrier 

files an application for direct service to the United States, the FAA conducts 

an International Aviation Safety Assessment (IASA) to determine the 

foreign government’s level of compliance with ICAO standards. Given the 

level of U.S. Government interest and the likely interest of any airline based 

in a free Cuba to begin operations to the United States following the 

normalization of relations, the FAA should be prepared to assign a technical 

team to conduct a review of the aviation safety oversight system as soon as it 

is feasible. 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 Conduct technical review to determine compliance with ICAO standards. 

The technical evaluation would focus on the following areas: 

 Runway and taxiway conditions; 

 Lighting and marking; 

 Airport signs; 

260
 Runway safety areas; 

 Airport rescue and firefighting; 

 Emergency planning; and 

 Airport operating personnel.

 Following the onsite evaluation, the technical team would prepare a 

report documenting existing conditions and assist in creating an action 

plan for bringing airports into compliance with ICAO standards. The 

technical team would spend approximately 14 days in Cuba for the 

evaluation. The report could be completed within 60 days.

Based on the results of the technical review, the U.S. Government 

should provide the resources necessary for a team of safety experts, FAA or 

contractual as appropriate, to work with Cuban IACC officials to correct any 

deficiencies in the Cuban government’s safety oversight system. 

 Provide technical assistance as needed to bring the Civil Aeronautic 

Institute of Cuba into compliance with ICAO standards. 

iii. Airports 

In preparation for an immediate response to humanitarian assistance 

needs and the need to expedite air cargo shipments, a technical evaluation of 

all of Cuba’s airports and their compliance with ICAO standards must first 

be conducted. Once a free Cuban government exists, FAA airport experts 

would need to perform a technical evaluation of several major airports in 

Cuba to determine the current level of compliance with ICAO standards. A 

team of airport safety specialists would need to visit three of Cuba’s major 

international airports to identify immediate safety concerns and interim 

solutions, including Jose Marti International Airport at Havana; Juan 

Gualberto Gomez International Airport at Varadero; and Antonio Maceo 

Airport at Santiago. 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 Conduct technical evaluation of major airports in Cuba for compliance 

with ICAO standards. 

261










Provide technical assistance/training to achieve ICAO compliance as 

needed. 

Develop a forecast based on increased U.S. passenger traffic at three 

principal airports. 

Identify possible means to increase capacity and expand/modernize 

facilities. 

Assist in the development of new emergency/contingency plans to meet 

the projected increased demand. 

Conduct aircraft rescue and firefighting audit and training as needed. 

iv. Security Infrastructure and Oversight of Air Operations 

For security staffing at key gateways, additional staffing for security 

checkpoints could be realized by realigning resources within the airports. 

Other measures include authorizing overtime for the current staff and using 

the National Screening Force to augment screeners in order to meet surge 

requirements. As the volume stabilizes, additional screeners may be needed 

to accommodate an increase in passenger volume. Compliance with U.S. 

security requirements, as expressed in Aviation Security Plans, Security 

Directives, and Emergency Amendments, is required. 

For a foreign airport to be authorized to provide last point of departure 

service to the United States, a request must be submitted to the Department 

of Transportation (DOT). DOT confers with several U.S. Government 

entities (e.g., Transportation Security Administration [TSA], Federal 

Aviation Administration [FAA], other DOT components) in developing the 

response to this request. TSA’s evaluation involves sending a survey team 

to the airport to determine the existing security posture and to ascertain 

whether a more in-depth assessment is required prior to initiating service. 

Surveys and/or assessments include reviews of aviation security components 

such as passenger and baggage screening procedures, cargo handling, 

physical security at the airport, and established policies. Once TSA is 

confident that the security level meets ICAO Standards and Recommended 

262
Practices (SARPs), an advisory of any aviation concerns is submitted to 

DOT.6

RECOMMENDATION:

 Conduct airport assessments in Cuba prior to granting a Cuban airline 

permission to serve as the last point of departure for the United States. 

The Transportation Security Area Representative (TSAR) Program 

was initiated in 1990 as a result of the downing of Pan Am flight 103. 

Created in the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990 (49 U.S.C. 

appendix 1301 note), the position of TSAR (formerly referred to as Civil 

Aviation Security liaison Officer) was established to promote alignment and 

consistency between the security requirements of the U.S. and foreign 

governments. This position was also designed to foster reciprocal 

relationships with host countries to ensure the safety and security of the air 

transportation system. The Act established the TSAR position as the 

principal representative of TSA in all matters relating to transportation 

security in a designated area of responsibility. Once additional direct 

commercial services begin between the two countries in a transition context, 

liaison activity will be required. 

RECOMMENDATION: 

 Provide guidance on compliance with U.S. security requirements, to 

 

6 Prior to the arrival of a TSA assessment team, the Transportation Security Administration Representative 

(TSAR) would arrange appropriate meetings and briefings. U.S. Interest Section representatives, host 

government representatives, and airport officials would be pre-briefed on what the assessment team would 

observe and how the information that is gathered would be used and safeguarded. 

The assessment teams would use the minimum SARPs established by the ICAO’s Annex 17 as a reference 

of measurement. The assessment would take roughly one week, depending on the size and complexity of 

the airport. The assessment team would be expected to directly observe the measures and processes 

involved in fulfilling the SARPs. 

The results and observations of each assessment would be shared at an out-briefing with the Cuban 

government via the U.S. Interests Section. Then, using information provided by the assessment team, the 

Administrator would determine whether the assessed airport(s) implements and maintains effective security 

measures. 

If no significant problems were noted, a letter would be sent to the Cuban government, through the U.S.

Interests Section, summarizing the results of the assessment. Should the Administrator determine that 

effective security measures are not maintained at a particular airport, there would be several options

available, depending upon the gravity of the situation. 

263
include passenger and luggage screening. 

2. Maritime 

i. Port Operations 

Repair and replacement of equipment is a key maritime infrastructure 

priority in Cuba. The main facility that handles containers is at the Port of 

Havana, which presently operates at 60 percent capacity or less. 

Additionally, the city of Havana faces congestion problems associated with 

state-sponsored development of the island’s tourist industry.

7

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 If requested by a transition government, the U.S. Government should be 

prepared to analyze and advise a free Cuba on port privatization 

prospects recognizing possible complications associated with Castro-era 

expropriation policy. 

 If requested by a transition government, the U.S. Government should be 

prepared to assist a free Cuba in identifying priority needs for port 

equipment and investments in port and intermodal infrastructure. 

ii. Intra-island Barge and U.S./Cuban Ferry Operations 

An intra-island barge transport system could complement Cuba’s 

inefficient land-based transport system, especially where the road system is 

deteriorated, inadequate, and congested. Cuba’s waterways and numerous 

seaports provide a good foundation for freight movement by barges. The 

condition of any existing barges, however, is unknown. Although present 

low freight volumes do not justify barge movements, during a transition 

such capacity would be valuable to handle increasing freight volumes and 

emergency shipments. 

 

7

 The only gantry crane equipment seen in Cuba is located at the Port of Havana. The gantry cranes, many 

manufactured in Eastern Europe, can handle primarily 20-ft containers. The road system could possibly

accommodate 40-ft containers but the trucking capacity is not known. There is no railroad equipment to 

accommodate 40-ft containers. 

264
RECOMMENDATION:



 

Analyze and advise Cuban authorities on prospects for using intra-island 

barges to relieve Cuba’s inefficient land-based transport system. 

For a regular short-sea shipping and/or ferry service with the state of 

Florida to be viable, a considerable volume would be needed to allow 

profitable operations. Cooperation with other modes, shippers, and 

forwarders would require logistics coordination, service level, frequency, 

and reliability for effective door-to-door transport. 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 Facilitate expansion of existing U.S.-Cuban ferry service to transport 

passengers and cargo. 

 Facilitate short-sea shipping opportunities for U.S. commercial interests 

involving operations between the United States, Cuba, and other 

Caribbean island nations. 

iii. Navigation Facilities

Navigation has historically been a vital component of Cuba’s 

commerce and will play an even larger role in a free Cuba’s commerce. 

Though the actual condition of Cuba’s many ports is unknown, most are 

believed to be operating at some level. Immediate efforts could be directed 

to the staff at the Ministry of Transportation of a free Cuba and the Cuban 

Port Association to determine if depths at the major harbors are currently 

adequate for the ingress and egress of vessels, and the adequacy and 

accuracy of fixed navigation aids. Anecdotal evidence collected by the U.S. 

Coast Guard on authorized missions reveals that Cuban-reported depths are 

often unreliable. The immediate needs would only be focused on the major 

harbors and/or any bottlenecks in the system. Cuban capabilities will be 

assessed to determine if there are adequate in-house resources available, 

what contracting capabilities are either in place or available to support the 

Cubans, and whether or not new contracts need to be issued.8

8

 A list of the major harbors is listed below: 

Principal Harbors 

Maximum Depth (meters) 

265
RECOMMENDATION:



 

Conduct Navigation Facilities Evaluation 

 An acquisition plan identifying various contracts for services related 

to Architects/Engineers (A/E) services, surveys, geotechnical and 

geographic information systems, and other related support will facilitate the 

Harbor Province Entrance Anchorage Docks 

Bahía Honda Pinar del Río 8.8 11.8 9.1 

Cabañas Pinar del Río 6.7 6.4 6.4 

Mariel La Habana 10.0 9.1 9.1

La Habana La Habana 13.1 1 10.0 12.8

Matanzas Matanzas 185.0 27.4 10.3

Nuevitas Camaguey 11.5 9.7 10.6

Puerto Padre Las Tunas 8.2 7.9 7.9 

Gibara Holguín 14.3 7.0 3.9

Banes Holguín 9.1 9.1 7.6

Nipe Holguín 71.3 14.6 10.3

Guantánamo Guantánamo 22.5 8.3 7.3

Santiago Santiago 13.7 9.1 8.8

Cienfuegos Cienfuegos 13.1 12.8 9.1

1 Increased depth may be limited by highway tunnel

General: Initiation of efforts would be through the in-house Cuban workforce, existing construction and/or 

Architect/Engineer (A/E) contracts or the issuing of new contracts, if needed. Work would initially 

proceed with the assessment of the critical harbors and then move to the remaining principal harbors to

determine their condition and needs for emergency actions, and to establish a process for rehabilitation. 

This initial effort would include surveys of the harbors and assessment of the piers, bulkheads and other 

marine and support structures. The above list of principal harbors provides a magnitude of the scope of the 

effort required. Known depths as currently reported in available literature are noted. As coordination is 

established with the Cubans within the framework of the overall development assistance plan, an order of 

work or priorities can be developed for the assessment of the harbors. The type of effort immediately

needed includes the following: 

1) Hydrographic Surveys. Establish the requirements for performing Multibeam surveys of

harbors, to include docking areas, and supported by geo-referenced aerial photography as well

as Lidar capability. The critical harbors could be surveyed within the initial two months. 

1) Geodetic Positioning Framework. From the existing network in Cuba, confirm its location

and accuracy for needed survey work. 

1) Geotechnical Studies. Provide for capabilities for core borings and geophysical 

investigations in support of the structural assessment of facilities. 

Reconnaissance Assessment of Facilities. Through the use of A/E contracts, perform a reconnaissancelevel assessment of the critical harbors through the use of surveys, geotechnical studies and inspection of

the docks, bulkheads, wharfs and marine facilities as to their structural integrity, maintenance and renewal 

and replacement needs. Establish a priority points process to rank the deficiencies and criticality of needs. 

266
improvement of navigational facilities. Ideally, such a plan would identify 

more than one contract, which could include small firms with bilingual 

capabilities (Spanish and English), as well as emerging Cuban national firms 

from the current Ministry of Construction framework. 

RECOMMENDATION:



 

Assist in development of an acquisition plan. 

3. Railroads9

Because published/available rail-related data and assessments of 

Cuba’s rail system are either outdated and/or based on perfunctory 

observations, a critical requirement is to have a qualified U.S. team quickly 

perform an accurate system assessment to assist a free Cuba in restructuring 

and improving Cuba’s railroads. 

RECOMMENDATION:

 If requested by a free Cuba, the U.S. Government could contract with a 

U.S. company specializing in rail system assessments to ascertain status 

of railroad bridges, culverts, track, and other critical rail-related 

infrastructure assets including rolling stock.

9

 Rail transportation has played an important part in Cuba’s economy for many decades, with its railroad 

hauling primarily sugar and tobacco commodities. The overwhelming majority of the Cuban population

has ready access to rail service.

Cuba’s railroad, the Union de Ferrocarriles de Cuba (UFC), is operated as a fully integrated state 

enterprise by Cuba’s Ministry of Transport. Current staffing remains high for the size and volume 

generated by this system.

Although the rail infrastructure is in need of maintenance, upgrading and/or modernization, a more critical 

need in the near term is the replacement of locomotives and other rolling stock. 

Intermodal (rail/truck/maritime) traffic between Cuba and the U.S. will be vital to successfully transition 

the controlled economy to a free market-driven economy. Such economic transition must occur quickly 

and effectively in order to achieve efficient, on-time delivery of services to potential customers, both in the 

U.S. and Cuba. Furthermore, container traffic moved by rail to distribution centers and/or the end customer 

is vital for the UFC itself to become profitable. 

Currently, rail access to/from ports appears to be haphazard. Access to piers often is nonexistent, 

inadequate, e.g., one rail spur only, or in need of maintenance and repairs. Since intermodal traffic would 

be a major key to economic success in a free Cuba, every effort should be made early on to focus on

improving rail access to/from ports. 

267
4. Highways 

i. Provide Staff Expertise

This work could include detailed analyses of key processes to identify 

administrative and procedural problems, conflicts, and resolution of issues 

that may arise during various phases of the rebuilding effort; updating 

manuals in order to meet widely accepted international practices; developing 

integrated information systems; establishing project delivery timelines; and 

establishing a relationship between the Cuban Ministry of Transportation 

(CMOT) of a free Cuba and the U.S. DOT to facilitate the establishment of

technology transfer centers. 

RECOMMENDATION:

 If requested by a free Cuban government, the U.S. Government could 

provide advisors to the Ministry for a 2-year period, with options to 

renew. They would assist Cuban officials with design, construction, and 

maintenance issues associated with primary and secondary roads and 

bridges, as described below. 

B. ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE 

Several factors have led to a serious deterioration of the Cuban energy 

infrastructure system, including lack of proper maintenance, use of 

inappropriate fuel, aging equipment, unsuitable spare parts, lack of system 

equilibrium, and the effects of blackouts. Some sources estimate Cuba’s 

current real capacity at only 1,200 megawatts. In order to support a market 

economy, the infrastructure would need to be modernized to generate 3,900 

megawatts. Because current sources provide only a fragmentary view of the 

current state of Cuban energy generation and distribution capabilities, a 

comprehensive on-site evaluation of the existing infrastructure will be 

essential to, inter alia, assess the 1) adequacy of electric power supply to 

meet critical needs, including potential need for emergency generators; 2) 

adequacy and reliability of oil and natural gas supply sources, both domestic 

and foreign; and 3) adequacy and status of the electricity transmission and 

distribution network, crude oil and product pipelines and refinery facilities, 

and natural gas pipelines and distribution network.

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RECOMMENDATION:

 Work with officials of a free Cuban government to perform a 

comprehensive assessment of energy sector needs, priorities, and 

acquisition planning. 



Once a transition is underway and Cuba begins operating under a new, 

market-oriented philosophy, the country will require significant increases in 

energy supply for transportation, to provide tourism-related services, 

increase production of cement and other construction materials, boost 

production of numerous industrial and primary goods, and support the 

mining industry. 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Oil and Gas: In coordination with and subject to the desires of a free 

Cuban government, assess the adequacy and reliability of oil and natural

gas supply sources, both domestic and foreign. In concert with a free 

Cuban government, identify funding needs and assist in providing or 

coordinating access to financing. In the gas sector, secure supply for 

power generation use and to industries that have converted to natural 

gas use. 

 Refining: Again in coordination with Cuban authorities, assess the 

condition of the refining infrastructure and evaluate investment needs. 

Cuban officials will need to guarantee supply of adequate crude for 

processing, which would likely require financing guarantees. 

 Electricity: Working with a free Cuban government, assess the adequacy 

of the electric power supply to meet critical needs and assess the need for 

new generating facilities, transmission lines, and substations. Provide 

access to financing and continue investments to expand power generation 

capacity. The U.S. Government should encourage a free Cuba to 

incorporate modular units to increase electricity supply to major cities 

without relying on major transmission grids and maintain local 

distribution grids. Guarantee electrical supply to water utilities. 

 Nuclear: After coordination with free Cuban officials, assess radioactive 

materials in Cuba and determine which facilities require 

decontamination and decommissioning (D&D). 

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 Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency: Subject to the desires of a free 

Cuban government, encourage or assist in a complete assessment of 

potential renewable energy resources (wind, hydropower, solar, 

biomass). 

C. WATER RESOURCES INFRASTRUCTURE 

It will be productive to assess the capability and status of the Cuban 

ministry and individuals who previously had responsibility in the waterresources field. Those engineers and scientists are vital resources for 

providing historical knowledge and identifying critical needs. 

1. Safety of Dams 

U.S. sources should help Cuban technical staff to identify any critical 

dam safety issues. The inspections would assess the condition of the dams, 

identify urgent corrective measures, define needs for additional studies, 

scope and estimate cost of repairs and improvements, and evaluate the 

operations and maintenance schedule of each structure. Dam repair and 

rehabilitation is often very expensive and funding should be programmed to 

address critical issues quickly. 

2. Drinking Water Quality and Wastewater Assessment 

There may be a need for a rapid assessment of immediate equipment 

needs to ensure that drinking water systems are operational and chemicals 

needed to treat the water are available. Functioning drinking water 

treatment facilities would need to be optimized to ensure the highest quality 

of drinking water possible using existing facilities. 

RECOMMENDATION:

 If requested by a transition government, assess existing plants to ensure 

that the population is receiving water that is clean and safe. 

Quality and quantity of source water are critical considerations in 

determining where to focus triage efforts. An ample quantity of raw supply, 

regardless of any inadequacies of the treatment and distribution 

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infrastructure, can keep pressure in the distribution system to prevent 

continual recontamination of pipes. 

RECOMMENDATION:



 

Offer technical assistance to develop a coordinated program of capital 

rehabilitation of the distribution system and distribution to end users of 

home water disinfection chemicals (i.e., sodium hypo chlorite as used in 

many developing nations). 

Specifics of Cuba’s water supply system are not known, but the lack 

of safe and adequate potable water is common throughout Latin America. A 

report by CEPIS,10 “Assessment of Drinking Water and Sanitation 2000 in 

the Americas, PAHO, Sept. 2001” indicated that only 62 percent of Cubans 

have reasonable access to disinfected water. The inspection of existing 

water treatment plants should be a high priority. It is reasonable to assume 

that more capacity would be needed and/or the effluent quality would not be 

up to standards considered safe in the United States. Therefore, 

rehabilitation and expansion of treatment plants would likely be an 

immediate need. 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 Offer assistance to assess the extent of any potential contamination of 

drinking water sources and address need to eliminate the source of 

pollution or install advanced treatment to address the contaminant of 

concern.

 Develop recommendations for equipment renewal and expansion. 

 In concert with Cuban authorities, develop and put in place appropriate 

quality control and assurance for the treatment processes. 

 

10 CEPIS is the Spanish acronym for Pan American Center for Sanitary Engineering and Environmental

Sciences (CEPIS), a regional center of the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). 

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IV. MEDIUM- and LONG-TERM ACTIONS 

A. REGIONAL PLANNING COUNCILS 

Many of the infrastructure improvements described in this chapter 

transcend municipal or provincial boundaries. Improvements to water and 

sewage systems, highways, public transportation, and the electrical grid, for 

example, would demand large-scale improvements and investments simply 

to modernize infrastructure that is overburdened and that has suffered years 

of deferred maintenance. Cuba had a history of regional planning predating 

the Castro revolution, which could prove useful in a transition scenario. 

The World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank could 

potentially provide some of the funding. The necessary funding, however, 

would likely not all come at once. This would require free Cuban authorities 

to make difficult decisions, including regarding phasing. The areas that 

receive infrastructure improvements first would likely be the areas that also 

redevelop first; therefore, choosing the areas that receive infrastructure 

improvements would have a huge economic impact on the regional 

economy. Regional planning efforts in other cities such as Cienfuegos and 

Santiago could also help improve job access in those regions, which have 

suffered under the Castro government, and create a better atmosphere for 

economic development. 

In the United States, municipalities frequently create capital 

improvement plans for five or ten years in order to select and phase 

necessary infrastructure projects. In a free Cuban context, regional planning 

councils could help prioritize projects and the phasing of large, multi-year 

infrastructure improvements. Development would follow infrastructure, so 

selected projects would spur economic development in selected 

neighbourhoods. A capital improvements plan with recommendations from

engineers and planning professionals, with public input, and selected by 

elected officials, would help create an orderly yet open and democratic 

system for needed infrastructure improvements. An open process at the 

regional level would also help foster citizen participation and the 

development of local democratic institutions. 

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RECOMMENDATION:

 The Department of Housing and Urban Development and organizations 

such as the National Association of Regional Councils (NARC) can assist 

a free Cuba in the development of a regional planning approach that 

includes elected officials, planning professionals, and the public. 

Regional cooperation would help develop common strategies that also 

efficiently use available funds for issues that transcend simple political 

boundaries but are more reflective of the regional economy. 

B. TRANSPORTATION 

1. Aviation 

An efficient air transportation system is a critical element of 

infrastructure that would facilitate the development of tourism, employment, 

and overall economic development in a post-Castro Cuba. It is unrealistic to 

expect that Cuba will be able to handle the anticipated immediate and 

substantial increase in user demand that may occur when Cuba is free. In 

particular, the rapid expansion of the Cuban air transport system would lay 

the foundation for Cuba to re-establish aviation relations with the U.S. and, 

in turn, assist in the growth of an efficient, market-based international 

economy with exponential potential for increasing commercial and business 

exchanges, investment, exports, and tourism. Depending on a number of 

variables, air passenger traffic between Cuba and the United States is likely 

to grow in a transition scenario. 

i. International Air Services Agreements 

Upon initial resumption of air services with Cuba on the basis of 

comity and reciprocity, in addition to rights under the 1953 bilateral aviation 

agreement, the U.S. Government should seek negotiation of a bilateral air 

services agreement on Open Skies principles. Open Skies air transport 

agreements enhance aviation relations by allowing airlines to make 

commercial decisions with minimal government intervention. They provide 

for open routes, capacity, frequencies, designations, and pricing, as well as 

opportunities for cooperative marketing arrangements, including code 

sharing. A liberal regime would offer Cuba the best environment for 

developing its markets to attract additional air services for the benefit of 

travelers, shippers, tourism, and the broader economies of both countries. 

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It is U.S. policy to pursue liberal, market-oriented Open Skies 

agreements with virtually all nations that are willing to make the 

commitment. Since 1992, the U.S. has reached bilateral Open Skies 

agreements with more than sixty partners throughout the world. Our 

partners include countries at all levels of economic development. The 

United States should also encourage Cuba to adopt a liberal aviation 

framework with its international partners. 

RECOMMENDATION:

 The United States could assist Cuba in developing a liberal international 

aviation policy. Bilaterally, the United States should negotiate a new 

aviation agreement with Cuba on Open Skies principles. 

ii. Organizational/Governance Structure 

a. Institute of Civil Aeronautics of Cuba 

The Institute of Civil Aeronautics of Cuba (IACC) is the government 

organization responsible for regulating and maintaining civil aviation safety 

oversight for Cuba, and for providing air traffic/air navigation services. The 

IACC also has oversight responsibilities for the airport system and is 

responsible for the inspection and certification of airports. 

b. Empresa Cubana de Aeropuertos Sociedad Anónima

The Empresa Cubana de Aeropuertos Sociedad Anónima (ECASA) 

handles overall management and operation of Cuba’s airport system. In 

addition to the airports, ECASA operates four airlines, in-flight catering 

operations, ground operations, and other service companies.11 

 

Cuba is one of the original members of the International Civil 

Aviation Organization (ICAO) of the United Nations and is currently a 

member of the ICAO Council. Cuba is also a member of the Latin 

American Commission for Civil Aviation (LACAC), a regional organization 

that meets to discuss and plan required measures for cooperation and 

coordination of regional civil aviation activities.

11 U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc., “Economic Eye on Cuba,” December 20, 1998. 

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iii. Current State of Aviation Infrastructure 

a. Cuban Air Carriers 

The quality and condition of the island’s aviation infrastructure will 

dictate how readily a free Cuba could adapt to forecasted increases in air 

travel expected once U.S.-Cuban relations normalize. 

b. Cuban Air Carriers (International) 

Cubana Airlines is the government-owned air carrier, which is part of 

the IACC. An aging fleet led to a string of accidents in 1990s and to a 

dubious distinction of being identified as one of the worst airlines in the 

world in 1999. Since then, the Cuban government has purchased a new 

Airbus 320 and 330, and an IL-62 for international flights, has leased a used 

DC-10 through a French airline (AOM), and has continued to use aging 

Russian aircraft (YAK- 42 and AN-24) for domestic flights and cargo flights 

on Cabaña Cargo. According to IATA statistics, Cubana carried 598,800 

passengers internationally on 5,284 flights in 2000.12 Aircraft from 62 

foreign airlines (mainly from Europe) arrived in Cuban airports last year.13 

Aero Caribbean Airlines is a small regional commuter airline with 

routes to Santo Domingo, Managua, Nassau, Freeport, Port au Prince, 

Montego Bay, and Grand Cayman. Its fleet consists of Antonov An-26s, 

ATR 42-300s, Ilyushin Il-18Ds, and Yakovlev Yak-40s.14

c. Cuban Airport Operations 

The Cuban government has developed an extensive network of 

airfields to provide aviation services throughout the island nation. Empresa 

Cubana de Aeropuertos Sociedad Anónima (ECASA) is responsible for the 

overall management and operation of Cuba’s airport system. The IACC 

maintains oversight responsibilities for the airport system and is responsible 

for the certification process for airport operations. 

Several airports maintain runways, aprons, and parking areas that can 

accommodate large commercial transport aircraft. The airports vary in terms 

 

12 Cubana web-site www.cubana.cu/ingles 13 Center for Promotion of Investment in Cuba web-site www.cpi-minvec.cu 14 caribbbeanaviation.com/airlines; nashtravel.com/aerocaribbean.com

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of available services and general condition. Five cities — Camaguey, 

Havana, Holguín, Santiago, and Varadero — operate airports with runways 

that are more than 10,000 feet in length. The two longest runways in the 

country are found at Havana’s José Martí International Airport and 

Santiago’s Antonio Maceo International Airport. Both airports operate 

runways of approximately 13,100 feet, which can accommodate the largest 

wide body aircraft on the market today. 

Major Airports in Cuba Used for Commercial Aviation Operations 

City Airports Elevation (ft.) Longest 

Runway 

Length (ft.)

Runway 

Width (ft.)

Camaguey Ignacio Agramonte

International 

413 9,842 180

Cienfuegos Jaime González 100 7,874 135

Havana José Martí

International 

210 13,123 148

Holguín Frank País 348 10,154 164

Santiago Antonio Maceo Intl 225 13,123 148

Varadero Juan G. Gómez Intl 213 11,483 160 

Source: Defense Intelligence Agency Report – November 1998

The CIA World Factbook reports that Cuba had 161 airports in 2002. 

Approximately 70 of these airports operate with paved runways. Of this 

total, seven reportedly operate runways longer than 9,900 feet, which can 

accommodate most large commercial jet aircraft. Another 10 airfields have 

paved runways between 7,996 and 9,900 feet. Most of these airports can 

also handle large commercial jet and turboprop aircraft. 

1) Conditions of Airport Facilities 

Limited official information is available on the current condition of 

airport terminals, buildings, runways, and emergency services. Given its 

economic reliance on tourism, the Cuban government has invested in 

upgrading airport terminals in the principal tourism locations since the mid1990s.15 Most airports have adequate fuel and cargo handling equipment, as 

well as air traffic control equipment for managing movements of civil 

 

15 Among others, the airports in Havana, Santiago, Varadero and Cayo Coco have new terminals and

facilities. The Cuban government has worked primarily with European and Canadian organizations on the 

upgrades. 

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aircraft. Maintenance facilities are also available at the larger airports. In 

addition, Airport Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) equipment is available at 

larger airfields, although the condition of the equipment is not known.16 

Excessive vegetation growing near and around airport runways is a 

common problem in Cuba. In particular, tree encroachment is reported as a 

problem for the safety of aviation operations at several airfields. 

2) NAVAIDS 

The amount and sophistication of air traffic control equipment 

available to support aviation operations varies among airports. Advanced 

radars and navigation aids are available at several major airports, though 

their operational integrity is not known. Most radar systems are airport 

surveillance radar (ASR) systems, which typically have ranges of between 

50 and 60 miles. International airports typically have approach control 

supported through air/ground radio systems, instrument landing systems 

(ILS), and non-directional beacons (NDB).17

d. Air Traffic Management/Airway Facilities 

1) Current U.S.-Cuban Air Traffic Environment 

Proximity and operational necessity have fostered a working 

relationship between the United States and Cuba on air traffic procedures 

and operations. The Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) Miami Air 

Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) and the Havana Air Traffic Control 

Center (ACC) communicate daily to transfer control of aircraft across the 

common Flight Information Region (FIR) boundary, through which much of 

the traffic passes en route between the U.S./Canada and the Caribbean, 

Central and South America.18 

A significant amount of en route traffic between the U.S. and Latin 

America/Caribbean passes through the Cuban FIR, due to its size and 

location 90 miles off the coast of Florida. The volume of this traffic that 

flies over Cuba has increased in recent years by an average of more than 3 

 

16 Sources: Defense Intelligence Agency Report – November 1998; Joint Theater Transportation Study, DI2000-187-99 17Ibid. 18 The United Nations International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) determines FIR boundaries. 

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percent per year, for a total of 48 percent since 1990. In 1990, the Havana 

ACC handled approximately 300 aircraft operations per day. In 2004, the 

number has grown to approximately 560 operations per day.19 This upward 

trend is expected to continue for the foreseeable future. Air traffic into 

Cuba’s seven principal international airports20 is mostly conducted by 

chartered aircraft and European, Canadian, Mexican, and Caribbean 

commercial carriers.21 According to the “Country Infrastructure Brief” by 

Cuba Caribbean Consulting of Miami, air transportation within Cuba is 

somewhat limited due to a shortage of available aircraft.22 

The Miami ARTCC and the Havana ACC coordinate transfer of 

control for more than 500 aircraft in four of the five approved radar sectors 

on a daily basis.23 There are two direct voice circuits (“hot” phone lines that 

are voice activated) used to coordinate information on aircraft entering each 

country’s airspace. In addition, controllers use seven MEVA Network dial 

lines to place direct calls between the Centers and one Aeronautical Fixed 

Telecommunications Network (AFTN) circuit for transmitting aircraft flight 

plans (including departure times and estimated time of arrival at the FIR 

boundary) to the receiving facility. 

2) Air Traffic Control System in Cuba

The Cuban Air Traffic Control (ATC) system is relatively modern for 

a country with limited resources, a reflection of the government’s interest in 

encouraging tourism. Cuba has full radar coverage over its flight area, with 

multiple radar sites. Most of the ATC equipment is Canadian and French. 

The Air Traffic Control Center (ACC) located on the grounds of the José 

Martí International Airport in Havana handles all en route flight service for 

the island. In addition, the Havana ACC controls the approach (landing and 

take off) for all Cuban airports that conduct Instrument Landing System

(ILS) or other Instrument Flight Rule (IFR) approaches. It is a dual-use 

 

19 Statistics from FAA Miami Air Traffic Control Center and Cuban IACC website. 20 The seven principal international airports are Havana, Varadero, Camaguey, Santiago de Cuba, Holguin,

Cienfuegos, and Cayo Largo del Sur. 21 U.S. carriers that provide authorized charter service to Cuba are American Eagle, Continental 

(Gulfstream), Delta (Marazul Tours), United, Falcon Air, Golden Air, and Miami Air. Most fly to Havana, 

but service is also offered to Camaguey, Cienfuegos, Holguin, Santiago, and Varadero. 22 Country Infrastructure Brief, Report No. IF-06-98, CubaCaribbean Consulting (formerly Development

Co.), 2001 23 Along the 11 approved north bound and south bound routes 

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facility, with three en route air traffic sectors, the approach to José Martí, 

and one military operations sector.24 

The Havana Center is similar in size to a small U.S. approach facility 

such as that located in Ft. Myers, Florida, but with the additional 

responsibilities of an en route center. Any aircraft that flies through 

(overflies) Cuban airspace is assessed an overflight fee for use of the air 

navigation services. Overflight fees generate a significant amount of 

revenue for the Cuban government, given Cuba’s advantageous position as a 

direct route between the eastern U.S./Canada and Latin American/Caribbean 

air travel. The Havana ACC has a dedicated position to track and record 

overflight aircraft. 

In 2003, the IACC completed construction on a newly renovated ACC 

building on the José Marti airport surface in Havana. The new center,

designed and built by INTELCAN Technosystems, Inc. of Canada, is 

purported to have a modern automated Air Traffic Management (ATM) 

system with Voice Communications Control Switching, Radar Processing 

and display, Flight Data Processing, Air Traffic Network Message 

Switching, VHF Ground to Air radios, an intercom and recording systems, 

and a nationwide Data Telecommunications Network.25 The ACC uses offthe-shelf computers and monitors, with an advanced ATM software package 

customized to meet the operational requirements of the Havana ACC. 

INTELCAN maintains that the software has been designed to allow for a 

seamless transition to a new satellite-based Communications, Navigation, 

and Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) environment, which 

Cuba expects to move to over the next few years.26

Separation standards in Cuban airspace are greater than those applied 

in the U.S. Havana ACC maintains a minimum of 10 nautical miles between 

aircraft horizontally, rather than the five or three miles in the United States. 

 

24 For the purposes of this report we will focus on civilian operations exclusively. 25 INTELCAN Technosystems Inc. Project Experience website. The FAA has not yet seen the new facility; 

the next bilateral air traffic operations meeting is scheduled to take place in Havana in July 2004. 26 Ibid; the Miami ARTCC confirms that the Cuban controllers have not yet moved into the new facility, 

pending completion of training on the new equipment.

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3) Cuban Air Traffic Controllers 

The FAA has a working relationship with the Cuban Air Traffic 

Controllers in Havana. Although most air traffic controllers are civilians, 

the Cuban ATC system functions much like a military organization. The 

controllers wear uniforms and generally work 10-12 hour shifts. 

 

4) Safety Oversight - Organizational/Governance Structure 

Safety Oversight/Flight Standards issues will be among the most 

complex, most time consuming, and potentially most costly to resolve in an 

environment with the expected dramatic increases in air traffic. Pressure on 

the IACC to increase operations to meet expected demand (both arriving and 

departing Cuba) may be far beyond current capabilities. 

5) ICAO Audit of the Cuban IACC 

In June 2000, ICAO issued a summary report of its November 29 – 

December 6, 1999 audit of the Institute of Civil Aeronautics of Cuba (IACC) 

under the ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Program (USOAP). 

ICAO audits all member states under the USOAP. The purpose of the 

USOAP visit was to determine the IACC’s level of compliance with the 

ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) in the area of safety 

oversight.27 This was a follow up visit to the initial USOAP carried out in 

1996. The USOAP team found Cuba’s level of compliance to be 

“essentially satisfactory,”28 but noted a number of findings that did not meet 

the SARPs. Again reflecting the government’s interest in encouraging 

tourism, Cuba subsequently submitted an action plan to address the findings 

and recommendations from the interim audit report. The Safety Oversight 

Audit section of ICAO considered the plan to be adequate. Since then, 

however, there have been no follow up audits to ensure that the action plan 

has been completed and that the IACC is meeting minimum ICAO 

standards. It is important to note that findings from USOAP reports do not 

satisfy FAA requirements to verify the adequacy of safety oversight 

capabilities of foreign civil aviation authorities from countries with service 

to the United States. 

 

27 USOAP audits are based on ICAO Annexes 1, 6, and 8 of the Chicago Convention and associated 

guidance material. Cuba, as a signatory to the Chicago Convention, which established ICAO in 1944, has 

pledged to meet minimum safety standards and recommendations established by ICAO. 28 ICAO USOAP Summary Report, Audit of the Institute of Civil Aeronautics of Cuba, June 2000, p.2.

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RECOMMENDATION:

 The FAA should conduct a separate, more detailed assessment of the 

Cuban IACC. 

6) FAA International Aviation Safety Assessment (IASA) Program 

The FAA has a statutory mandate to ensure the safe operation of 

foreign aircraft operating in U.S. airspace. The FAA’s International 

Aviation Safety Assessment (IASA) program seeks to ensure safety by 

verifying that foreign civil aviation authorities are in compliance with the 

international safety oversight SARPs established by ICAO.29 The IASA 

program goes into greater detail than USOAP, and, unlike ICAO findings, 

an IASA finding of non-compliance carries consequences, which provides 

an incentive to correct deficiencies or face restricted or denied service to the 

United States. 

RECOMMENDATION:

 The FAA should conduct an IASA of the IACC. 

7) Bilateral Agreement and Economic Authority 

The U.S. Departments of State and Transportation (DOT) would seek 

to negotiate a new bilateral air services agreement with Cuba to replace the 

existing 1953 bilateral agreement. Once an acceptable agreement is in place 

between the two governments, the airlines would need to apply to DOT for 

economic authority to fly to the United States. 

RECOMMENDATION:

 The U.S. Departments of State, Transportation (DOT), and Commerce 

(DOC) would seek to negotiate a new bilateral air services agreement 

with a free Cuba on the basis of Open Skies principles, to replace the 

existing bilateral agreement dating from 1953. Pending completion of a 

bilateral air services negotiation, the two governments could allow a 

range of air services operations to resume on the basis of comity and 

 

29 The establishment of the FAA’s IASA program led to the development of the ICAO USOAP program.

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reciprocity, in addition to the rights dating from the 1953 bilateral air 

agreement. FAA and TSA regulatory requirements would also have to be 

met before service can commence, and DOT would need to grant 

economic authority to carriers. 

 

8) IASA and the TSA Security Assessment 

The application for economic authority filed with DOT will trigger an 

automatic IASA of Cuba. A team of FAA aviation safety inspectors would 

travel to Cuba to assess the government’s compliance with ICAO standards 

in Annexes 1, 6, and 8. 

Before Cuban airlines could begin service to the United States, the 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) requires a security 

assessment. TSA assesses the airport(s) that would serve as the last point of 

departure before arriving in the United States. After these assessments are 

successfully completed, the airline would need to work with the FAA to 

obtain an air carrier certificate and Operations Specifications for approved 

U.S. routes. 

iv. Identified Infrastructure Development Needs and U.S. Assistance

a. Safety Oversight - Organizational/Governance Structure 

While the ICAO USOAP report found that the IACC complies with 

most of the ICAO standards and recommended practices for safety 

oversight, concerns remain over other outstanding findings cited in the 

USOAP reports. Other safety concerns relate to the aging Cuban aircraft 

fleet, the dearth of manufacturing support for some of the Soviet models, 

and the limited resources for proper maintenance of equipment and training 

of personnel. In addition, conflict of interest issues will likely arise as a 

result of the Cuban government’s position as both the owner and regulator of 

the country’s air carriers. All of these factors contribute to the need for a 

full FAA IASA as soon as politically feasible. 

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1) Technical Review to determine compliance with ICAO standards. 

RECOMMENDATION:

 The FAA could work with the IACC to evaluate its compliance with ICAO 

SARPs in maintenance facilities and procedures, fueling facilities and 

procedures, and ground handling of aircraft in Cuba. 

2) Provide guidance on any needed changes to the eight critical 

elements of safety oversight in accordance with ICAO standards. 

RECOMMENDATION:

 The U.S. Government could assign a team of safety experts to work with 

Cuban IACC officials on the correction of any deficiencies in the eight 

ICAO Critical Elements of a Safety Oversight System, and the 

development of an action plan to achieve compliance. The FAA could 

also offer guidance on the process of certifying airlines, as well as 

approving maintenance and repair facilities. 

3) Operations/Airworthiness/Cabin Safety Inspector Training 

RECOMMENDATION:

 Based on the results of the recommended technical review, the FAA 

should be prepared to offer reimbursable, in-country inspector training 

in operations, airworthiness, and cabin safety inspection as needed. 

b. Airport Operations 

1) Technical Evaluation for compliance with ICAO standards 

See page 260, Safety Oversight

2) Technical Assistance/Training 

Capacity-Building Assessment 

Cuba may need to expand airport capacity to meet the expected

demand for aviation services. Capacity constraints at existing airports may 

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actually limit the ability of U.S. and Cuban air traffic service providers to 

take full advantage of new procedures that would be implemented to 

accommodate the increased demand for air travel. 

RECOMMENDATION:

 The FAA can arrange for capacity building assessments of the major 

international airports for increases in both passenger and cargo traffic. 

These assessments would focus on the impact of increased aviation traffic 

on the airports and develop a strategic plan through which those airports 

could accommodate increased traffic through additional runways and/or 

taxiways, etc. 

Critical Airports Assessment 

An in-depth evaluation would require approximately 12 months, given 

the large number of airports with paved runways in Cuba. This study would 

focus only on those airfields with paved runways. 

RECOMMENDATION:

 If agreed by both countries, the FAA could also arrange for an 

evaluation of the entire Cuban airport system to determine which 

airports are critical to the future of the overall system and which are 

superfluous. In addition to passenger traffic, the study would evaluate 

the requirements for accommodating expected increases in general 

aviation and cargo activity. 

Certification/Inspection Program Assistance 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 The FAA would propose a follow-up visit to evaluate Cuba’s Airport 

Certification/Inspection Program initiated in 1999 to verify its 

compliance with ICAO Safety Standards and the ICAO Manual for 

Airport Certification. FAA airport safety certification specialists would 

conduct meetings and interviews with government agencies and airport 

operators to determine legislation and programs in place to certify and 

inspect airports. The FAA inspectors would prepare a comprehensive 

report within 90 days of the visit to document existing airport 

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certification and inspection programs and any areas where 

improvements would be necessary. 

 The FAA has an Airport Certification Inspection course based on ICAO 

requirements and recommended practices that could be taught in Cuba to 

airport safety inspectors. In addition, the FAA would offer guidance to 

the senior airport officials at the IACC on the management of a 

successful airport certification program. 

3) Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) Capabilities 

RECOMMENDATION:

 The FAA has Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) experts who could 

conduct thorough analyses of the ARFF capabilities at the principal 

international airports in Cuba. Using ICAO SARPs and related 

guidance material, the FAA ARFF team would identify areas where 

improvements are needed to be ICAO compliant. 

4) Emergency/Contingency Planning Assistance 

RECOMMENDATION:

 Based on the needs identified in the FAA’s initial Technical Evaluation 

for ICAO Compliance, the FAA could offer emergency and contingency 

planning assistance to each of the principal airports with international 

operations. 

c. Air Traffic Management 

The demand for air travel to and from Cuba is expected to increase 

dramatically when the U.S. travel restrictions to a free Cuba are lifted. This 

increase in aviation activity will have an impact on air traffic services (ATS) 

in both the U.S. and a free Cuba. 

In addition to anticipated increases in passenger and major carrier 

activity, the FAA foresees a proliferation of small carriers interested in 

providing service to and from Cuba and substantial increases in general 

aviation (small/private or business planes). Significant and sustained 

increases in air cargo are expected as U.S. companies and government 

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agencies seek to assist in meeting the long-standing needs of the Cuban 

people. 

The following is a survey of the areas in which the U.S. Government 

could offer assistance to a free Cuba in the areas of Air Navigation Services 

(ANS) (including air traffic management and efficiency) and ANS 

Infrastructure (including communications, navigation, and surveillance). 

1) Improve Air Traffic Flow Management and Operational Procedures 

(e.g., coordination and transfer of control) 

RECOMMENDATION:

 The FAA should encourage a free Cuba to establish a liaison at the 

Miami ARTCC facility to facilitate coordination in the new air traffic 

environment. 

2) Automation Systems Interfaces 

RECOMMENDATION:

 The FAA and IACC should investigate a means of interfacing their flight 

data and radar data processors, allowing for automated data exchanges 

This will increase controller flexibility and system capacity to help meet 

the projected increase in traffic. 

3) Restructure Radar Sectors

RECOMMENDATION:

 If mutually agreed upon, the FAA can arrange a capacity building 

analysis of radar sectors within the Havana ACC and provide 

recommendations for improvements. 

4) Assist with the adoption and use of basic Global Positioning System 

(GPS) in Cuban airspace 

Cuba is currently working with Europe on global navigation satellite 

systems. 

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RECOMMENDATION:

 The U.S. Government should explore the capabilities that the U.S. GPS 

Augmentation System might provide to Cuba. 

5) Controller Training 

Cuban air traffic controllers can handle the current air traffic volume 

in Cuba. With a potential normalization of relations between the United 

States and a free Cuba and the anticipated increase in traffic that would 

likely follow, a free Cuba may need additional controllers and training to 

meet the increased volume. 

RECOMMENDATION:

 The U.S. Government should be prepared to offer technical assistance to 

Cuban controllers to deal with the expected increase in flights and 

training for any additional controllers needed. 

6) Liberalization of International Air Agreements with the U.S. and 

others 

It is advisable to pursue an Open Skies bilateral air transport 

agreement with a free Cuba. If necessary, such an agreement could include 

phased-in provisions. Cuban air carriers, after some 50 years of government 

control, are not likely to be operationally or financially capable of competing 

with deregulated and more efficient U.S. carriers in an immediately openmarket environment. Moreover, it is unlikely that Cuban aviation and 

tourism facilities will be able to handle an immediate and substantial 

increase in user demand. Phased-in provisions will allow time for Cuban 

infrastructure development. An Open Skies agreement would provide a 

basis for each country’s airlines to enter into cooperative marketing 

arrangements, including code-sharing operations with other airlines and with 

surface transportation providers. These agreements would be beneficial to 

U.S. and Cuban carriers. 

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RECOMMENDATION:

 The U.S. Government should pursue an Open Skies bilateral agreement 

and also support Cuba’s effort to liberalize aviation relations with third 

countries. 

2. Maritime 

Cuba’s maritime transport system of waterways, ports, and intermodal 

connections played a dominant role in Cuba’s early settlement and growth. 

As an island state, Cuba depends heavily on marine transport for trade and 

commerce, and thus, the well-being of its people. However, the Cuban 

marine transport system, like other parts of its national transport 

infrastructure, has been in a state of long-term deterioration due to a 

persistent lack of maintenance and supply of equipment. 

Cuba’s extensive coastline can help stimulate regional growth and 

economic development. To help Cuba take advantage of its geographic 

position and compete in a global trading environment, a robust marine 

transport system with efficient waterways and ports with links to rail, 

trucking, barge, and pipeline operations will be necessary. Low-cost barge 

transport growth could also complement Cuba’s overall transport system by 

alleviating land-based transport congestion and thus increasing productivity. 

Due to the importance of linkages between Cuba’s maritime assets 

and other modes of transport on the island, the need to rapidly evolve 

intermodal aspects of its transport system is critical. To achieve a seamless 

global supply chain, dependence on technology and connectivity will 

become a high priority for a free Cuba as the volume of cargo increase. 

Additionally, if Cuba is to conform to the recent “24 hour manifest rule”

mandated by U.S. Customs Service, investment in technology and training 

will also be required. 

i. Organizational/Governance Structure 

At present, the Cuban Ministry of Transportation (MITRANS) is the 

institution responsible for maritime civil transportation, including auxiliary 

and connective services. It administers, on behalf of the Cuban regime, an 

enterprise system composed of more than 250 public and private enterprises 

as well as joint ventures. 

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ii. Current State of Infrastructure 

a. Main Ports and Facilities 

The U.S. Business Council, with funding from the U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID), completed a study on “Ports of Cuba.” 

In 2001, The Cuba Caribbean Development Co. published the report “Ports 

of Cuba Report, IF-02-96,” that provides a comprehensive profile of 

strategic Cuban seaports, including accessibility, stage of development, 

transportation, and other potential trade and commerce issues. This section 

provides key characteristics of Cuba’s ports and does not revisit extensive 

and/or specific technical details that are already published. 

Cuba, with 44,206 square miles, is the largest island in the Caribbean. 

Between the eastern and western extremities of the island, there is a distance 

of approximately 750 miles. Cuba’s coastline of approximately 2,200 miles 

has an extraordinarily large number of good harbors, among which are the 

bottlenecked harbors that have narrow entrances but commodious 

anchorage. The main harbors of this type are Bahia Honda, Cabanas, 

Mariel, Havana, Nuevitas, Puerto Padre, Nipe, and Tanamo on the north 

coast, and Guantanamo, Santiago de Cuba, and Cienfuegos on the south 

coast. The principal open harbors are Matanzas and Cardenas. 

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There are a total of 70 ports in Cuba. Ten of these can be categorized 

as major, including Havana (60 percent of all cargo), Matanzas, Santiago de 

Cuba, Cienfuegos, Nuevitas, Caibarien, Guantanamo, Cardenas, and 

Mariel.30 

 

30 Havana - The container terminal of Havana Harbor (TCH S.A.) is a joint venture between Cuba and 

Spain started in 1998. It is the only one of its type in Cuba, due to its high technological specialization

through a modern information network. The investments are currently addressing berthing and storage

capacity, port handling equipment, and railway access. 

Cienfuegos is the second largest port in the Caribbean. It is the marketing and processing center of a region

producing sugarcane, tobacco, coffee, and rice; it also has rum distilleries and fish canneries. Cienfuegos

as the capital of Cuba's most industrialized province, is a major hub of industry, commerce, and trade. With

its expansive, deep bay, the city receives much of the shipping business for goods needed by other 

industrialized cities in the area. Cienfuegos has enough land for future development and could

accommodate Post-Panamax vessels. 

Matanzas is the third largest port with a large, deep harbor with deep oil terminal. Industries in the city 

include sugar refineries and textile mills. Matanzas is located on the turnpike between Havana and

Varadero Beach. Matanzas is important for transshipment services to the Caribbean of bulk and bagged

fertilizers. It is also linked to the national railway system. The port also operates the port of Cardenas that 

provides tourist ferry traffic to the province. 

Cardenas lies in the Matanzas province. It processes and exports sugar and has industries producing

tobacco, beer, and soap. A fishing fleet is based at Cardenas, which is also an important commercial center. 

Nuevitas is sheltered by a huge harbor, has two auxiliary ports, and is a major shipping point for Cuban

sugar as well as other products from the surrounding agricultural region. It also possesses diversified light

industry and serves as a road and rail terminus. Ports handle about 6 percent of total sugar exports, serving

5 sugar mills from Camaguey and Ciego de Avila provinces, and have cargo facilities for bulk grain

handling. Nearby are a thermoelectric plant, fertilizer and cement plants. It is connected to Camaguey city 

by railroad system and a 2-lane highway. 

Mariel port has the greatest possibilities for development in the Western part of Cuba and at the same time

it is very close to Havana. It is particularly interesting when evaluating new options of transshipment due 

to the fact that it is close to the main ports of North and Central America. The Port can handle general 

cargo and containers. The port equipment includes 5 shore cranes (10 to 20 tons capacity). Mariel free 

zone is considered an important logistics factor for future marketing development. 

Santiago de Cuba is located in the eastern part of Cuba. Its geographic position in relation to the maritime 

lines that go to and from the Panama Canal, the Caribbean Sea and the north part of South America, give

the port the potential to be a transshipment hub. Minerals, agricultural produce, and woods are exported. 

The city is also the terminus of a major highway and railway. One of Cuba’s most comprehensive port 

facilities with a capacity of handling over 3,000,000 tons/2,721,000 metric tons of containers, bulk grain, or 

liquid cargo. Port facilities are good and able to handle bulk grains, liquids, and containers. The two

thermoelectric plants and an oil refinery are the backbone of local and regional industry. 

Guantanamo is on the Guaso River. It is the processing center for a sugar- and coffee-producing region

and has road and rail connections with Santiago de Cuba. At Guantanamo Bay, the United States 

maintains an important naval station. The base has naval installations covering c.45 sq. mi (116 sq. km). 

Guantanamo Bay, as a Navy base, is not built for normal cargo operations, meaning the piers do not have

large cranes like a commercial port (http://www.msc.navy.mil/N00P/pressrel/press02/press02.htm). 

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b. Container Facilities 

The container terminal of Havana Harbor (TCH S.A.) is a 50-50 joint 

venture between Cuba and Spain, formed in 1998. TCH was originally 

budgeted for traffic of 180,000 TEU31/year being reached by the end of its 

15-year concession (with a 5-year option) in 2013, but throughput reached 

262,000 TEUs.32

The facility has the technical ability to handle cargo with very 

modern, complex, fully outfitted equipment. However, Cuba’s frequent 

blackouts make the entire system unreliable, as equipment and refrigeration 

units can not function without power. Also, the generators are old and break 

down regularly, and are a challenge to repair without skilled labor and easy 

access to replacement parts. In 2003, the port of Havana handled a total of 

about 300,000 TEUs a year. 

c. Shipyards 

Cuba has four shipyards located close to the City of Havana, Havana, 

Santiago de Cuba, and Cienfuegos, which are also specialized in naval 

repairing and constructing steel polyester and aluminum. There is also a 

naval engineering division that carries out related projects, repairs, 

supervision of naval construction, diagnosis, development of specialized 

plans, and maintenance systems. Shipyards in Santiago de Cuba are 

capitalized in association with Dutch companies. 

d. Cruise terminals 

Cuba’s government-operated Cubanco S.A., a joint venture between 

the Cuban Ministry of Transportation and Silares Terminals del Caribe NV, 

currently operates cruise ship terminals at the port of Havana, the port of 

Santiago de Cuba and on the Isla de la Juventud. The company constructed 

a fourth passenger-ship terminal at the Cuban port of Cienfuegos.33 

 

31 The International Standards Organisation specifies standard shipping containers as 20 feet long by 8.5

feet square. These are the standard unit for measuring container throughput-one such standard container is

1 twenty-foot equivalent unit or 1 TEU. 32 http://www.worldcargonews.com/htm/n20030201.424841.htm 33 www.cruisehavana.com/news01.html 

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e. Intermodal Connections 

Intermodal transport is critical for Cuba’s economy and expansion of 

foreign trade. Cuba, however, would need to develop sophisticated logistics 

and supply management expertise to integrate its transport system into 

customer-oriented, end-to-end services. 

1) Current State of Intermodal Transport 

Any development of intermodal transport would necessitate a level of 

normality in the transportation network before embarking into more 

sophisticated integrated networks. This process is hampered because Cuba’s 

continuing economic crisis has dramatically slowed the pace of motorization 

while the Castro regime ensured that development has been tightly 

controlled. Particularly noticeable is how the modal share of motorized 

transport fell from 93 percent to about 43 percent (from 1962 to present), 

making Havana one of the most non-motorized cities in the world (57 

percent modal share) just under Beijing, China (62 percent); Jaipur, India 

(66 percent); and Bobo Dioulasso, Burkina Faso (87 percent). 

iii. Identified Infrastructure Development Needs and U.S. Assistance

a. Organizational/Governance Structure 

Good governance provides an enabling environment for the expansion 

of trade and economic growth. Current transition strategies have 

increasingly recognized the importance of well-functioning social 

institutions as the necessary foundation of a well-functioning market 

economy. A free Cuba’s transport and logistics integration into the Western 

Hemisphere will be an important strategic objective. 

When a transition to a free Cuba takes place, additional investments 

would be needed for maritime connections, including a program to break up 

congestion around ferry ports (previously major entry points for American 

tourists) in order to accommodate the significant anticipated increase in 

economic and hence transport activity. A priority is to promote the rapid 

growth of export-oriented private business34 enterprises and facilitate the 

 

34 Cuba Transition Project – Foreign Direct Investment by Robert David Cruz 2003

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development of business management skills necessary for success in a 

globally integrated market economy. 

RECOMMENDATION:

 The U.S. Government should focus primarily on providing technical 

assistance, transferring knowledge and information, and promoting a 

multinational effort to provide the financing needed to rebuild transport 

infrastructure that promotes trade and economic development. 

b. Capital Improvement Needs - Port Assessments 

A significant effort by new leaders to improve the marine transport 

system will be required to support the rapid growth of maritime commerce 

expected following a change in government on the island. A free Cuba may 

require assistance in developing a marine transport strategy to meet the 

present and future needs of Cuba’s commercial and recreational users in the 

areas of public safety, efficient movement of cargo, and national security 

while facilitating recreation and environmental protection. 

RECOMMENDATION:

 The U.S. Department of Transportation should offer technical assistance 

in these areas. 

In the initial period of transition, it may be easier for large 

transnational firms to raise the capital necessary to build new ports or 

modernize existing ports than for a new Cuban government. Privatized ports 

may represent an option for developing much-needed infrastructure within a 

short time frame. Experience suggests that a regulatory structure that 

balances private and public interests is necessary in the case of privately 

owned and operated infrastructure. 

RECOMMENDATION:

 Encourage international financial institutions, such as the IMF, the 

World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank, as well as other 

governments and the private sector, to provide Cuba technical assistance 

to modernize its ports through capital improvement. 

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c. Human Development Needs - Maritime Training 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 If requested by a transition government, the U.S. Maritime 

Administration (MARAD) could send maritime experts from the U.S. 

Merchant Marine Academy (USMMA) to Cuba to provide training, or 

Cubans could be trained at the USMMA. 

 Under the same conditions, MARAD, working with the Department of 

State, could develop a maritime education and training program in Cuba. 

 Working with international aid organizations, the U.S. Government 

should encourage representatives of a free Cuba to attend the World 

Maritime University, located in Sweden and established by the 

International Maritime Organization (IMO). The university offers 

specialized postgraduate education in maritime transportation. 

d. Security and Safety of the Marine Transportation System 

Cuba is a party to the basic International Maritime Organization 

(IMO) conventions and protocols to improve maritime safety and protection 

of the maritime environment, including SOLAS, COLREGS, MARPOL, the 

Load Lines Convention of 1966, STCW, the Facilitation Convention of 

1965, Inmarsat Convention of 1976, and the Intervention Convention of 

1969. Notably, Cuba is not a party to the SOLAS Protocol of 1988, the 

Load Lines Protocol of 1988, the amendments to Inmarsat, the Intervention 

Protocol of 1973, the OPRC Convention of 1990, or any of the liability 

agreements. 

Cuba appears to be an active member of the Viña Del Mar 

Agreement, an agreement of nine Latin American states to address Port State 

Control (PSC) of Vessels, that implements port state control inspections in 

support of IMO treaties and protocols. However, shipmaster’s reports from 

the guide reference no PSC type inspections and examinations by Cuban 

officials to determine compliance with international safety, security, and 

environmental standards aboard visiting commercial vessels. The lack of

information regarding the quality, degree of intrusiveness, and technical 

acumen of Cuban PSC boarding teams leaves uncertainty regarding the 

capability of Cuban maritime safety officials in this area. Comments on 

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examinations reported by masters in the guide were limited to issues related 

to Customs (including sealing of valuables in a transit room and accounting 

for currency), crew identification (sometimes including full musters), 

veterinary victuals (including sealing of meats, milk, cheese, poultry, and 

fish products not sourced from U.S., Australia, Canada, and New Zealand), 

sanitary and certificate review (including collection of copies of all required 

documents and forms). Thorough inspection by Border Guards, often with 

dogs, are conducted of all man-sized spaces prior to a vessel’s departure 

after all other Cuban port authorities are ashore (searches are often 

conducted along with crew musters). 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 If requested by a transition government, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) 

could provide support to a transition government through an existing 

International Training Program. Under this program, the Coast Guard 

provides training to officers, enlisted, and civilian personnel from foreign 

military and civilian agencies when USCG operational and training 

requirements permit, in compliance with applicable laws and authorities. 

 The Coast Guard could deploy mobile education and training teams 

(MET/MTTs) to provide training in all mission areas. In addition, Cuba 

may desire, and the United States may wish to provide, Coast Guard 

resident training and support from the Caribbean Support Tender after 

the emergency phases are complete. 

e. Privatization / Commercialization Prospects 

Like ports in other Latin American nations, it is anticipated that 

Cuba’s largest and most important investments will come from the private 

sector with assistance from institutions such as Inter-American Development 

Bank (IDB) and the World Bank. Most of these investments will be made 

for privatization of state-owned assets, and will come from private 

companies with specific objectives and from capital markets. Cuba’s close 

proximity to the United States, its underdevelopment and plentiful mineral 

resources, its educated work force, its top-rated natural attractions, as well as 

other characteristics, have a positive impact on potential foreign investors. 

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RECOMMENDATION:

 The U.S. Government, through its industrial base (private port industry 

and manufacturing) and the international institutions, including the 

World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, could assist in a 

free Cuba’s privatization of its port industry. 

f. Navigation Facilities 

Intermediate and long-term efforts should focus on strategic planning 

to both rehabilitate and enhance the country’s navigation system. In concert 

with a free Cuba’s Ministry of Transportation and Port Association, 

navigation modeling should be performed to analyze current and project 

navigation needs. The modeling results will allow informed, strategic 

decisions to be made about future navigation investments. 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers could provide state-of-the-art 

computer models and training if needed. 

 If requested by a transition government, the U. S. Coast Guard could 

provide: 

 technical assistance in determining correct mix of Aids to Navigation 

(A-to-N); 

 technical assistance in revising, updating, and identifying needs in 

Marine Information area; 

 technical assistance in assisting in development or modification of Ato-N units; and 

 technical assistance in any potential improvements to their training 

infrastructure to accomplish the A-to-N mission, either through 

establishing in-house capabilities or through resident or deployable 

training teams. 

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3. Railroads 

i. Introduction 

a. Importance of Railroads to Cuban National Economic Development 

The overwhelming majority of the Cuban population has ready access 

to rail service. Rail transportation has played an important part in Cuba’s 

economy for many decades, hauling primarily sugar and tobacco 

commodities. Rail passenger transportation has been equally important, 

particularly during the last decade as gasoline and diesel fuel 

shortages/rationing have reduced automotive traffic. 

ii. Organizational/Governance Structure 

Cuba’s railroad is currently operated as a fully integrated state 

enterprise by Cuba’s Ministry of Transport. The UFC35 employs 

approximately 23,000 staff, although moderate staff reductions have been 

made in recent years. Current staffing remains high for the size and volume 

generated by this system, but is not atypical from other government-owned 

and -operated systems around the world. 

iii. Traffic Volumes/Commodity Flows 

The UFC operates approximately 3,200 miles (5,000 km) of so-called 

standard gauge track. The main artery of this standard gauge line runs along 

the spine of Cuba, which has been nominally maintained, including for 

purposes of military shipments. An additional 4,400 miles (7,000 km) of 

predominantly narrow-gauge rail trackage is operated by approximately 80 

plantation railroads that haul cargo to and from the UFC mainlines. The 

majority of commodities carried are related to the tobacco and sugar 

industries. According to various economic reports and databases, more than 

70 plantations and their related rail systems have ceased operation in recent 

years. 

 

Only 95 miles (151.7 km) of tracks in Cuba are electrified. This 

electrified section is used for commuter passenger traffic between Havana

and Matanzas. 

35 Cuba’s railroad, the Union de Ferrocarriles de Cuba (UFC)

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a. Current State of Rolling Stock, Infrastructure, and Operations 

Prior to 1959, most, if not all, of Cuba’s rolling stock was U.S. made, 

with locomotives manufactured by either General Motors or General 

Electric. U.S. locomotives continue to be prized for their robustness, 

reliability, and relative ease of maintenance and repair. However, obtaining 

spare parts has been difficult, but not impossible. 

Since 1959, the former Soviet Union, the former Czechoslovakia, 

Romania, and Canada have provided Cuba with rolling stock. These 

locomotives have proven unreliable after only minimal length of service, in 

part because of climate incompatibility. Replacement parts are scarce and 

directly affect UFC’s ability to provide nominal service. 

The freight car fleet is made up of pre-Castro era cars manufactured in 

the U.S., and cars more recently manufactured, mostly from former Soviet 

Bloc countries. To keep the fleet operational, the UFC has, since 1959, 

adapted and domestically manufactured spare parts from obsolete U.S. and 

other foreign country designs. 

 

b. Infrastructure 

As described in the October 1999 Railway Age magazine, UFC’s 

“...main lines are laid with 112-pound, Soviet-supplied bolted rail, Cubanmade pre-stressed concrete ties, and screw bolt fasteners. Track products are 

scarce, as is maintenance-of-way equipment.” In the same article, the editor 

states in his first hand account that “(i)n the early 1990s, UFC undertook 

reconstruction of its Havana-Santiago de Cuba main trunk, but this project 

didn’t get very far due to Cuba’s economic downturn. Some of the new 

construction has been cannibalized to repair other parts of the network.” 

The basic UFC main-line rail infrastructure was well designed and 

built and is capable of carrying considerably heavier loads, (e.g., military 

equipment), at greater frequency of operations if modern rolling stock were 

available. 

Branch and/or plantation lines, predominantly of the so-called narrow 

gauge kind, often are in marginal shape. The condition of a small, one 

commodity, company-owned railroad is most often directly related to how 

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well that company is doing economically. In a reconstituted free market 

economy, a number of companies may simply want to abandon some or all 

of their own rail transportation in favor of other transportation alternatives. 

Generally, rail hub infrastructure such as major railway stations, e.g. 

Havana, has been nominally maintained. Some stations have been restored 

and/or modernized. For instance, a major new railway station was built and 

brought on-line in Santiago in 1997. In 1998, rail facilities at and with 

access to the port of Matanzas, from where much of Cuba’s sugar production 

is shipped, were upgraded. These cases are the exception, however, as many 

other stations around the country are crumbling due to financial neglect. 

Reflecting Cuba’s dire housing shortage, it is reported that Cuban families 

have actually taken up residence in some stations, leading to vandalism and 

further, even faster, deterioration of facilities. 

When Soviet aid ceased in the early 1990s, several countries signed 

cooperation agreements with Cuba to assist in maintaining, and in some

cases, modernizing rail-related infrastructure. However, this assistance 

appears not to have materialized in any major way, as witnessed by recent 

multiple suspensions of passenger services due to track deficiencies. 

Rail access to/from ports appears to be haphazard. Access to piers 

often is nonexistent, inadequate (one rail spur only), or in dire need of 

maintenance and repairs. 

RECOMMENDATION:

 Since intermodal traffic would be a major key to economic success in a 

free Cuba, early U.S. Government technical assistance should focus on 

improving rail access to/from ports. 

iv. Identified Infrastructure Development Needs and U.S. Assistance

a. Capital Improvement: Infrastructure Modernization 

In 1998, the Cuba-Caribbean Development Co. estimated that 

approximately 30 percent of Cuba’s track infrastructure needed to be 

replaced on a high priority basis. Capital improvements would exceed $400 

million (1998 dollars), annualized over an 8-year period. Assuming the 

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percentage estimate is correct, we concur with the subsequent monetary 

estimate to revitalize the system. 

b. Capital Improvement: Rolling Stock Modernization 

It was also estimated that approximately $88 million over an 8-year 

period needs to be invested in rolling stock replacement on a high priority 

basis. However, if new locomotives are to be purchased, FRA36 views this 

estimate as low given the cost of $1.5-$2.5 million (in 2004) for a modern, 

fuel-efficient locomotive. If 30 percent of the fleet were to be replaced, 

estimated by Cuba-Caribbean Development Co. to total some 236 

locomotives, the cost would be roughly double that amount ($140-$177 

million). 

A more affordable scenario would be for the UFC to purchase 

primarily refurbished U.S. locomotives, which are available as U.S. railroads 

transition to more powerful, fuel efficient, and environmentally cleaner 

locomotives. Under this scenario, the locomotive replacement cost would 

total approximately $70-$90 million. 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 Facilitate sale of refurbished U.S. locomotives to a free Cuba. 

c. Technical Assistance & Training 

 

For a revitalized rail system to be economically successful and 

effective for potential customers/users, rail safety should become a key issue 

for Cuba’s rail future. Rail container and general cargo movements will 

have significant opportunities in Cuba’s future. 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 As it has done in a number of foreign countries, FRA could assist in 

establishing a Cuban rail safety program. For example, several Western 

36 The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) was created by the Department of Transportation Act of

1966 (49 U.S.C. 103, Section 3(e)(1)). The purpose of FRA is to: promulgate and enforce rail safety

regulations; administer railroad assistance programs; conduct research and development in support of

improved railroad safety and national rail transportation policy; provide for the rehabilitation of Northeast 

Corridor rail passenger service; and consolidate government support of rail transportation activities. 

300
Hemisphere countries have adopted portions of FRA’s rail safety 

program. 

 In addition, FRA has provided on-the-job training for representatives 

from numerous countries, by having foreign rail safety staff perform 

inspections alongside FRA inspectors in FRA regions similar to the 

geography and climatic conditions of the visiting inspectors’ country. 

4. Public Transportation 

i. Introduction 

Given the low level of personal auto ownership in Cuba, public 

transportation is a crucial element for providing the necessary mobility to 

drive Cuban national economic development. Ensuring that Cuba’s new 

government is able to support the development and maintenance of an 

effective public transportation system is vital for economic growth. 

Public transportation creates jobs and a good transit system can and 

does attract business. New employers will make decisions to locate or leave 

a community based on its transportation system. Transit provides 

independence and economic opportunity by connecting people to jobs. 

Public transportation will improve the quality of life of the Cuban people. 

Not only is public transportation the safest mode of travel, but it also 

reduces and manages congestion. 

ii. Organizational/Government Structure 

Presently, public transportation in Cuba is provided by state-run 

entities such as Cuban National Railways and the Havana Urban Bus 

Company. Land-use and transportation planning are important elements in 

developing public transportation services. These will be important areas to 

maintain and develop during a transition to a free Cuba. 

Havana, with a population of over 2 million, will require the most 

intensive investments in public transportation resources. Other Cuban cities 

such as Santiago de Cuba, Camagüey, Holguín, and Guantanamo all have 

populations below 500,000 people and services can be provided to these 

areas through well-planned bus operations. Rural areas also have serious 

unmet public transportation needs. 

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iii. Current State of Infrastructure/Operations 

a. Commuter Rail 

Cuban National Railways (CNR) provides commuter rail services in 

the Havana area. According to Jane’s,37 CNR provides the following 

services: The 90 km Havana (Casablanca)-Matanzas line is electrified 1.2 

kV DC. Diesel services also run from Tulipan station to San Antonio (35 

km, six stations), Central station to ExpoCuba (20 km, six stations), the Los 

Palos line (81 km, 15 stations, peak hours only), and other routes. 

b. Bus Systems 

The Havana Urban Bus Company (HUBC) provides bus services. A 

flat fare is charged and is paid directly to the driver. According to Jane’s, 

HUBC provides 100 million passenger journeys annually, with 200 routes, 

at a length of 2,410 km. The average peak-hour speed is 18 km/h. The fleet 

is composed of 3,000 vehicles, including 400 Ikarus articulated buses. 

According to Jane’s, the majority of vehicles are Girón models, built 

by the local Havana factory assembling kits supplied by Ikarus. Some

second-hand vehicles from Spain are also in service. Huge Tren Bus tractorhauled vehicles also came into service in the early 1990s, capable of 

carrying up to 350 people. These are commonly known as camels. Jane’s

reports that fuel shortages have put many routes out of action and that a lack 

of spare parts has led to a major reduction in the number of Girón buses fit 

for service. 

c. Jitneys 

Jane’s reports that a large number of jitneys or colectivo services are 

operated with 1950s American sedans. 

d. Ferries 

According to Jane’s, in the Havana area two ferry services operate 

across Havana Bay providing links within the city between the main 

 

37 Jane’s Information Group (www.janes.com). 

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quayside and Casablanca and Regla. The Casablanca service provides a link 

into the main central business district from trains terminating at Casablanca 

station. 

e. Subway 

Havana has no operational subway, although detailed plans for a 

subway were developed during the 1980s.

iv. Identified Infrastructure Development Needs and U.S. Assistance

a. Capital Improvements 

Cuba will require a large number of buses to meet its public 

transportation needs. Tied to these bus purchases are facilities for bus 

maintenance. Commuter rail operations may also require new rolling stock. 

An inventory of current rolling stock and public transportation infrastructure 

will need to be undertaken as part of a transitional government. As buses 

run on roads, the urban road infrastructure in the cities must also be at a 

level to permit the smooth flow of buses and cars. 

RECOMMENDATION:

 The U.S. Government could help identify U.S. companies that sell both 

refurbished and new transit buses. It could also identify U.S. companies 

with experience in developing and operating maintenance facilities. 

b. Institutional Development 

The institutional ability to plan, develop, operate, and maintain public 

transportation services is as important as rolling stock and infrastructure. 

Important decisions will be made by a free Cuba, including the amount it 

would be willing to subsidize public transportation services, fare structures, 

route control, the role of the private sector in provision of services, types of 

services to be provided, and land-use and transportation planning. 

RECOMMENDATION:

 The U.S. Government and international financial institutions such as the 

World Bank can support institutional development by informing a free 

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Cuba on how public transportation is structured in many developing 

countries. 

c. Capacity Building 

As public transportation is developed in a free Cuba, it will be 

important for Cubans to have the knowledge and capacity to maintain and 

improve these services. 

RECOMMENDATION:

 The U.S. Government and international financial institutions, such as the 

World Bank, could provide information on what types of knowledge are 

required within government institutions and assist in obtaining training. 

Also, U.S. private sector companies could provide expertise in planning, 

operations, and maintenance services. 

d. Privatization / Commercialization Prospects 

A number of U.S. and international firms may be interested in 

providing public transportation services and maintenance operations in a free 

Cuba. A private Cuban corporation, possibly aligned with international 

firms, may also be able to provide services. Successful examples that a free 

Cuba could emulate exist in such Latin American cities as Bogotá, 

Colombia, and Curitiba, Brazil. 

5. HIGHWAYS 

i. Introduction 

Successful rebuilding of the Cuban road infrastructure could be 

accomplished in a variety of ways. Training, capacity building, planning, 

and institution building, along with repair of the most significant bridges and 

the numerous potholes throughout the major road system, will be vital to 

improving Cuba’s road infrastructure, as will be the goal of assisting Cubans 

to develop a transportation infrastructure designed for the safe and efficient 

movement of people and goods. 

Medium-term assistance should be geared toward facilitating those 

projects designed to modernize the infrastructure, provide for institution 

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building, and establish the groundwork for long-term investment and 

growth. Finally, long-term planning should focus on those needs which are 

not immediately visible but which will arise as the island shifts into a 

consumer driven economy. These issues will necessitate focusing on 

planning, budgeting, and implementation of technological advances. 

Relationships could be established with a host of partners including 

U.S. public and private entities, as well as international organizations such 

as the World Road Association (PIARC).38 

RECOMMENDATION:

 If requested by a transition government, the U.S. Government could 

partner with international institutions such as PIARC to support efforts 

in the highway infrastructure rebuilding process and to train Cuban 

personnel. 

ii. Organizational/Governance Structure 

Currently, the Cuban Ministry of Transportation is responsible for 

directing, executing, and controlling the application of government policy in 

matters involving land, maritime, transportation or connected services, and 

civil maritime navigation. The list of responsibilities of the Ministry 

includes: 

 All planning and development involving transportation. 

 Environmental protection. 

 Issuance of licenses on the island and within its jurisdictional waters. 

 All security involving transportation matters including maritime 

navigation. 

 Planning and maintenance of the road system. 

 

38 “The road system plays a vital role in the performance of economies, in the social functioning of 

communities, and in achieving effective land use and regional development. As an international open 

forum for information exchange, PIARC is in a unique position to address the full range of road transport 

and road infrastructure issues. Participants in PIARC have found that they have much to learn from each 

other. They could develop more effective policies and technical approaches by learning from successes 

and failures elsewhere. The benefit of PIARC's activity would be reflected in more efficient road

administrations, an improved contribution of road transport to the wider economy, safer transport, and a 

more harmonious relationship among road transport, transport users, the environment, and society.” 

<www.piarc.org Accessed: January 2, 2004>

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 Regulating all matters involving transportation including design, 

signalization, and maintenance of signal systems and signage. 

iii. Traffic Volumes / Commodity Flows 

Highway cargo transportation was 14 mmt

39 in 1989 and 8 mmt in 

1994. Sixty-four percent of this cargo was transported under the auspices of 

the Ministry of Transportation; 8 percent under the Ministry of the 

Revolutionary Armed Forces; 7 percent under the Ministry of Sugar 

Industry; and 11 percent under local authorities and municipalities.40

As Cubans come to enjoy political and economic freedom, it is 

reasonable to assume that the road system would be under additional 

pressure from increased traffic volumes and an increase in the flow of 

commodities across the island. The U.S. Government may be able to assist 

in the planning for the increased flow, and it could do so hand-in-hand with 

the institution building process. 

iv. Current State of Highway Infrastructure 

As noted previously in this report, investment in infrastructure under 

the Castro dictatorship has been near zero. As a result, Cuba faces a major 

task in rebuilding and restoring almost its entire road infrastructure. 

Roadways, sidewalks, highways, traffic control systems, pavement 

markings, signage, and guardrails are in need of repair and restoration. 

Perhaps 50 percent of the structures need to be replaced. As noted in a 

recent report, the highest priority capital improvements and expansion 

projects are related to Intermodal projects and enhanced access, and would 

total approximately $1 billion.41 

a. Primary Highways 

Cuba is about the size of Pennsylvania, and it has approximately 

38,000 miles of roads crisscrossing the island. Within this number are 400 

miles of expressways.42 Of the total number of miles of roadways, only 

about 19,000 miles are paved. The Central Highway runs through the center 

 

39 mmt: million metric tons 40 Cuba Caribbean Development, LLC, “Rehabilitating and Modernizing Cuba’s Infrastructure” p. 23 41 CubaCaribbean Consulting, LLC, Rehabilitating and Modernizing Cuba’s Infrastructure, p. 25. 42 http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/cu.html#Trans accessed, February 10, 2004. 

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of the island and extends between Pinar del Rio and Santiago de Cuba. 

Nearly all of Cuba's cities, towns, airports, harbors, and agricultural areas 

are accessible by paved roads. Only a few towns in the mountainous, 

primarily coffee producing regions in Guantanamo province, remain 

accessible by unpaved roads.43

By the time of the 1959 Revolution, Cuba had one of the most 

extensive road networks in Latin America. Since then, further expansion 

was undertaken, although road maintenance decreased dramatically. In the 

1990s, Cuba had about 12,420 miles (20,000 km) of highways, including 

over 9,000 miles (14,500 km) of major highways.44 This extensive highway 

system transects the island, but as it was built for military purposes, it 

bypasses cities and towns, connecting with them through secondary roads, 

and is severely lacking in gasoline stations. 

b. Secondary Roads 

Secondary roads in Cuba make up the majority of unpaved roads on 

the island. These minor roads have traditionally comprised the most 

neglected part of the nation's road system, especially in the eastern part of 

the country. The absence of street lighting makes driving at night 

dangerous. This danger is exacerbated by the fact that some cars and most 

bicycles lack running lights or reflectors. Street signage, where it exists, is 

often confusing. Most Cuban cars are old, in poor condition, and lack turn 

signals and other standard safety equipment. Secondary rural roads are 

narrow, and some are in such bad condition as to be impassable by cars. 

c. Bridges and Overpasses 

Via Blanca Expressway connects Havana City, Matanzas, Varadero, 

and Cardenas with a total of 89 miles, 4-lane way. It has several of the most 

impressive bridges in the country (Bacunayagua, Canimar, and others).45

 

43 Cuba Caribbean Consulting, LLC, Rail & Roads Abstract, p. 2. 44 Institute for Cuban & Cuban American Studies, University of Miami, 

http://cuba.iccas.miami.edu/Docs/c01418.pdf Accessed February 12, 2004. 45 CubaCaribbean Development, LLC, “Rehabilitating and Modernizing Cuba’s Infrastructure” p. 24

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v. Assistance and Program Building Resources Available to a Free 

Cuba 

RECOMMENDATION:

 If requested by a transition government, the U.S. Government, 

specifically the FHWA, could take the lead in providing immediate 

assistance in the coordination of emergency reconstruction and repair, 

as well as the provision of needs assessment and training for medium and 

long-term projects. Coordination with international partners will 

facilitate the infrastructure rebuilding and reinvigoration effort and 

allow the United States to focus attention and resources on the areas with 

the highest critical need. Similarly, coordination among various U.S. 

Government agencies would be useful in speeding the revitalization 

process and assuring the maximization of resources. 

Specific recommendations for immediate assistance to a free Cuba 

include the following: 

a. Road Construction Assistance 

RECOMMENDATION:

 The FHWA could coordinate community based labor-intensive projects 

for the repair of existing roads and the development of new roads on the 

island. 

This approach has successfully been applied in areas where 

technology and resources are scarce, but where there is a large and willing 

labor force available. This would be particularly useful in providing 

immediate assistance in the City of Havana to repair roads that have suffered 

from maintenance neglect, and in the countryside to connect towns with new 

roads and pave the existing network of unpaved roads on the island. 

b. Provide Training 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 If requested by a transition government, the FHWA could take the lead in 

facilitating training in such areas as: 

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 Planning and Design – Facilitate training in design management to 

Cuban transportation officials.

 Construction Quality Control/Quality Assurance – Coordinate the 

provision of technical manuals for road building that are in 

accordance with international practices. 

 Safety – Coordinate training courses to inform Cuban personnel on 

state of the art technology road safety systems. Additionally, in the 

area of driver safety, “train the trainer” courses could be coordinated 

that would enable these persons to train other Cuban nationals. This 

would not only provide for immediate needs, but would also allow the 

U.S. Government to accomplish institution building on the island by 

promoting a “Road Safety Culture.” To better ascertain additional 

safety issues the U.S. Government may advise on, it would be 

important to obtain a broader assessment of the current condition of 

Cuba’s highway infrastructure.

 Project Management – As Cuba transforms once again into a market

economy, there will be a need for training personnel in management 

of project financial resources and expenditures. The U.S. 

Government could provide assistance in the development of project 

timelines and management support that takes private sector initiatives 

into consideration. The training should be designed to focus on such 

things as effective utilization of project financial management 

systems, accounting, and financial reporting. 

c. Technology Transfer 

 The Castro regime's self-imposed isolation from the democratic 

mainstream in the hemisphere means that Cuban transport authorities have 

not benefited from programs developed by the United States over the last 45 

years. Technological, process, and systems advances, training courses, and 

materials have, for the most part, not reached the Cuban transportation 

community. 

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RECOMMENDATIONS:

 If requested by a transition government, the FHWA could work side by 

side with Cuban personnel and international entities on the island. The 

promotion of T2 centers would allow for the meaningful sharing of 

hands-on experience and technological information. 

 If requested by a transition government, the FHWA could also provide 

assistance in the area of technology transfer by providing: 

 On the Job Training – Working with Cuban transportation officials 

through a “learning by doing” approach. This would serve to update 

Cuban transportation entities on the latest in U.S. technology and 

allow U.S. personnel to assess the state of the Cuban transportation 

system while learning new methods of road construction that can be 

applied in tropical climates.

 Personnel exchanges – Members of the Cuban transportation sector 

could be brought to the U.S., where they could participate in intense 

course work targeted to their specific needs. Funding would need to 

be provided as this is beyond the budgetary means of many individual 

agencies within the U.S. Government, such as FHWA.

 Support for Needs Assessment – The evaluations should focus on 

medium and long-term needs of the Cuban transportation system by 

providing technical support to entities that would be engaged in the 

actual reinvigoration of the island’s road system. Supporting a needs 

assessment would allow Cuban transportation officials and those 

entities engaged in rebuilding to identify and prioritize specific areas 

of assistance. The needs assessment could consist of both 

organizational and functional assessments. Medium- and long-term 

plans of action could be used as the basis for future planning for the 

island. The U.S. Government could work closely with Cuban 

transportation officials and others in the international donor 

community in devising this plan 

 In order to accurately assess the needs of the transportation system 

for medium and long-range planning, it would be necessary to do 

more in-depth assessments than is possible without being on the 

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island. Contractor evaluation teams could be hired to assist in the 

preparation of long- and medium-term plans for the island. 

d. Coordinate with Technology Transfer (T2) Centers in a free Cuba 

In Cuba, technology transfer centers have an extensive network for 

the acquisition and distribution of information on technology and processes 

throughout the island. This would cut the delivery time by working with 

existing entities and thus leverage resources. 

vi. Preliminary Activities To Be Considered 

Any development activity would require some initial preparation. In 

this effort, organizers could consider the following in preparation to assist 

Cuba, if resources were made available. 

 A preliminary survey of laws to review the status of current laws in the 

United States and Cuba and their impact on the type of assistance that we 

can offer. 

 Devising a hardship plan for issues that might arise as a result of staffing 

offices for infrastructure restoration efforts. 

vii. FHWA Technical Assistance Program Participation 

If the government of a free Cuba wishes, FHWA could share with 

Cuban authorities the benefits of its long history of providing technical 

assistance to countries throughout the world. The range of technology 

transfer material available to a free Cuba would span traditional highway 

transportation topics, such as transportation planning pavements, to state-ofthe-art technology for intelligent transportation systems. Technical 

assistance could also involve institutional and program delivery issues such 

as enabling legislation, organizational management, value engineering, 

innovative financing, and private/public partnerships. Bilateral 

arrangements or multilateral development and technical organizations would 

be required. These arrangements themselves could be used as vehicles for 

further strengthening the ties between the United States and a free Cuba. 

311
RECOMMENDATION:

 If requested by a transition government, FHWA could facilitate the 

exchange of information between Cuba and other nations to share 

technological and process information that may not already be available 

on the island. 

viii. Coordination of International Efforts 

RECOMMENDATION:

 The U.S. Government could take part in a coordination effort with a free 

Cuba designed to focus the power of the existing U.S. network of 

research sources in identifying areas of the Cuban infrastructure that 

require restoration and building. The network could further act as a 

vehicle for transferring technological information to the island. 

International partners could take the lead in working with the local 

citizenry in speeding up the process of innovation, restoration, and 

reinvigoration. 

ix. Institution Building in a Free Cuba 

RECOMMENDATION:

 If requested by a transition government, FHWA efforts could be directed 

to institution building.46 The FHWA could provide assistance to a free 

Cuba in the transition of the Cuban transportation organization into an 

institution that would respond to external, market-driven demands rather 

than military needs. Providing guidance to and facilitating training of 

transportation officials could assist a free Cuba with the establishment of 

a more efficient and effective transportation sector. 

 The U.S. Government could assist a free Cuba by facilitating Cuban 

involvement and participation in training and certification programs 

developed in the U.S and used by our international partners abroad. 

 

46 “Institution building is defined as a process of creating capacity within and among organizational sets to 

redefine the operating culture, formal and informal rules, convention and norms of individual and collective 

work in response to environmental challenges.” http://csf.colorado.edu/sristi/papers/fpm.html Accessed: 

January 7, 2004

312
These programs could be targeted to specific transportation 

infrastructure development needs and could be focused on those areas of 

greatest interest to Cuban transportation authorities. 

 Technical assistance could also be provided immediately by making the 

International Visitors Program available to Cuban transportation 

officials. This program is a vehicle for, inter alia, facilitation of 

technical exchanges. These programs bring transportation experts from 

around the globe to the United States for meetings with their American 

counterparts. As a result, relationships are established, information is 

exchanged, and communication between participating nations and the 

U.S. is enhanced. Technical information could also be provided via the 

Internet and CDs, as well as via hard copies. 

 Relationships between foreign nationals and the DOT could also be 

available through the Loaned Staff Programs. These programs could 

spearhead the effort to make information available to a free Cuba by 

opening the door to their working with U.S. agencies. This would go a 

long way toward making Cuban officials aware of the latest 

technological advances while promoting reestablishment of ties between 

the two nations. 

 Following a transition, another way to facilitate ongoing institution 

building efforts on the island might be to promote direct engagement with 

Cuban officials and transportation experts on the island. This could be 

accomplished through participation in Cuban organized conferences, 

joint workshops, and exhibitions dealing with road maintenance, 

multimodal transport, safety, and other similar pursuits. 

x. Privatization / Commercialization Prospects 

In terms of the transportation infrastructure, privatization would mean 

that the rebuilding effort must be done in partnership with a burgeoning 

Cuban private sector. This might encourage the evolution of transportationrelated private sector industries in Cuba. Prior experience has shown that

privatization and encouraging private enterprises can result in increased 

revenues to the government, job creation, job training, and 

institutionalization of a private transportation industry. As with other 

aspects of Cuban infrastructure, the U.S. Government should facilitate the 

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exchange of information regarding the benefits of privatization and the 

experiences of other countries in this area. 

6. Traffic and Vehicle Safety 

i. Introduction 

According to 1996 World Health Organization (WHO) / PanAmerican Health Organization (PAHO) statistics, road traffic crashes are 

fourth leading cause of death for all ages and the leading cause of death in 

the Cuban population between 1-49 years of age. The 1996 data is slightly

higher than previous years, suggesting that traffic crash-related fatalities are 

rising, based on adjusted rates. Due to the lack of better data, however, it is 

difficult to determine the exact scale and nature of road safety problems in 

Cuba, therefore any specific kind of assistance to Cuba should be preceded 

by a detailed analysis of Cuba’s traffic safety condition. 

Very little information is available on the Cuban government’s 

approach to road traffic safety. It is unknown, for example, whether Cuba’s 

approach encompasses all three components of road traffic safety considered 

by to the United States: the human/behavioral aspects, the vehicle aspects, 

and the environment or infrastructure. It is also uncertain whether or not

motor vehicles in Cuba must meet certain standards and regulations. It is 

not known if Cuba develops and enforces any of its own regulations and, if 

so, how.47

ii. Organizational/Governance Structure 

An agency within the Cuban Ministry of Transport, the Direccion de 

Seguridad e Inspeccion Automotor (DSIA), performs some similar functions 

to those of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in 

the United States. There are several other agencies within and outside the 

Ministry that also perform functions related to traffic safety. However, no 

information is available to determine how well coordinated the activities of 

these organizations are. 

 

47 In general, developing and vehicle non-manufacturing countries import cars that meet another country’s 

requirements. Most vehicles around the world are built according to the U.S. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety 

Standards (FMVSS), which are almost identical to the Canadian Motor Vehicle Standards, or to the

regulations of Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) or Japanese regulations, or, in some cases, a 

combination of several different regulatory systems. 

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iii. Identified Program Structure, Development Needs, and U.S. 

Assistance

RECOMMENDATION:

 If requested by a transition government, the National Highway Traffic 

Safety Administration could provide training and assistance to the Cuban 

transition government in the establishment of all aspects of a national 

highway traffic safety program. 

a. Partnership with International Organizations 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 The U.S. Government and industry could jointly: 

 encourage and support a free Cuba’s full and active participation in 

vehicle and traffic safety international organizations, including the 

World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations (WP.29) and 

Working Party on Road Traffic Safety (WP.1) under the United 

Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Western Hemisphere 

Transportation Initiative; and 

 facilitate Cuba’s active participation in standard-setting and other 

professional organizations, including the International Standards 

Organization and the Society of Automotive Engineers. 

C. ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE 

1. Introduction 

The Cuban energy sector and its infrastructure exhibit diverse

characteristics ranging from a power generation infrastructure that is 

decreasing in capacity and reliability to an active oil and gas sector that has 

international private sector participation. According to the U.S. Department 

of Energy’s Energy Information Administration (DOE/EIA), Cuba’s energy 

consumption in 2001 was nearly 0.4 quadrillion Btu (equivalent to 

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approximately 200,000 barrels of oil per day).48 Of that total, 92 percent 

came from petroleum, 6 percent from natural gas, and 2 percent from coal, 

geothermal, solar, wind, hydroelectric, and other sources. In 1999, sources 

report that nearly 80 percent of Cuba’s energy consumption was in the 

industrial sector, while only slightly more than 20 percent was used to meet 

commercial, transportation, and residential needs. 

Cuban oil production has more than doubled since 1991. In 2002, oil 

production averaged 49,300 barrels per day (bbl/d). The Oil and Gas 

Journal reported in December 2003 that Cuba’s estimated proven oil 

reserves total 750 million barrels. Most domestic crude oil production 

consists of heavy, sulfur-laden oil, which is either used to fuel power plants 

or converted into useable fuels by refineries located in Cuba. Refineries also 

process imported crude oil. Cuba imports nearly 82,000 bbl/d of crude oil 

and refined products from Venezuela, representing more than a third of the 

island’s oil demand. Cuba has a financial arrangement with Venezuela that 

expires in 2005 allowing for the purchase of oil under preferential 

conditions. Cuba also imports petroleum products from other countries, 

including Mexico. 

Natural gas production in Cuba has also increased significantly since 

the early 1990s, and as of January 2003, proven natural gas reserves stood at 

2.5 trillion cubic feet (tcf). The Cuban government claims increases in oil 

and natural gas production already fulfill more than 50 percent of domestic 

energy demand. 

The Castro regime has set a goal to generate all of its electricity 

demand from domestic crude oil resources, eventually making the island 

self-sufficient in resources for this sector. However, limited supply and high 

costs of electricity have resulted in low consumption per capita and frequent 

blackouts in the residential sector. Unlike most countries, industrial and 

even commercial users have a higher priority than residential users when 

supplies are scarce. The Cuban regime claims that 95 percent of the 

population has access to electricity from the grid, leaving over 500,000 

people in rural areas who must depend on other sources of power. 

Renewable energy (solar, wind, small hydro) plays a role in the Cuban 

energy sector but is still only a fraction of total energy and electricity 

production. 

 

48 Source DOE/Energy Information Administration, Total Primary Energy Consumption 2001

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2. Energy Overview 

Two-thirds of the energy used in the Cuba is imported in the form of 

oil or petroleum products. These imports are refined into petroleum

products or burned in power plants in order to generate electricity. For more 

than three decades, Cuban imports came from the Soviet Union. After the 

Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Cuba’s economy contracted, in part because 

of the country’s inability to obtain petroleum at the concessionary terms it 

had received from the Soviet Union. Total energy consumption has 

remained relatively flat after the steep decline of nearly 25 percent following 

the end of Soviet subsidies, but domestic oil and gas production has been 

increasing since 1995. Increasing Cuban oil production means fewer 

imports and thus an improved balance sheet. Flat energy consumption has 

resulted in old and inadequately maintained infrastructure for handling 

imports, including infrastructure for offloading and transferring the imported 

crude oil and products. On the other hand, new infrastructure for increased 

domestic production has been added. 

 

Cuba’s energy infrastructure includes the import terminals for fuels,49

pipelines that deliver imports to refineries and power plants, pipelines (or in 

many cases, trucks) that deliver the products to the distribution centers, 

transmission lines that deliver the high voltage power to the consuming 

cities, transformers that lower the voltage for final distribution, and facilities 

for delivery to the end users. Most of the energy is consumed in the 

principal cities and thus the energy infrastructure is designed and maintained 

to meet those needs. No excess capacity is available and with any lifting of 

severe energy consumption restrictions or attempts to increase the gross 

domestic product (GDP), energy supply and delivery will be the limiting 

factor for economic growth given that per capita demand should and will 

increase significantly.50

Total energy consumption decreased drastically after 1990 and has 

only recently leveled off, as can be seen in Figure 1 below. As mentioned 

above, most of the energy used in Cuba is in the industrial sector, while only 

slightly more than 20 percent is used to meet transportation, commercial, or 

residential needs (Figure 2 below). This contrasts greatly with other nations 

 

49 The “modern” port at Matanzas can handle tankers of up to 150,000 DWT. 50 Amy Myers Jaffe and Ronald Soligo, Energy in Cuba, Papers and Proceedings of the Twelfth Annual

Meeting of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy (ASCE)

317
where the transportation sector is a more significant consumer of energy. 

Less than 11 percent of energy consumed is in the transportation sector. 

Beginning in the early 1990s, bicycles and donkey carts often replaced buses 

and cars to meet daily transport needs, and by the end of the decade, up to 70 

percent of the freight and more than half of intercity travel were based on the 

rail system. 

0.00

0.10

0.20

0.30

0.40

0.50

0.60

1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001

Total Energy Consumption Quadrillion Btu

Figure 1. Historical data of total energy consumption in Cuba (Source DOE/EIA 2001) 

Transportation

11%

Industrial/Other

79%

Residential and 

Commercial

10%

Figure 2. Estimated total energy consumption by sector (1999) 

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The primary energy consumed per capita in Cuba (reported in 2001 by 

DOE/EIA) only began increasing recently (35 Million Btu per capita; 

population 11.2 million) and is similar to that of the Dominican Republic (32 

Million Btu per capita; population 8.53 million), which is growing at a more 

significant pace. However, it is well below the value before 1990, which 

was around 47 Million Btu per capita. Once the dictatorship in Cuba has 

ended and the core institutions of a free economy are being created, tourism 

will undoubtedly rise sharply, as will energy requirements. Thus, a 

reasonable long-term target may be to reach levels similar to those of Puerto 

Rico (108 Million Btu per capita, population 3.96 million). The speed with 

which this target is reached will be a function of the investments made in the 

energy sector in the years to come. 

The latest energy balance available from the Energy Information 

Administration (DOE/ EIA) is from 2000; however, it serves the purpose of 

confirming that most of the power generated and the energy consumed in 

Cuba has its origins in residual fuels as seen in Figure 3. 

Jet Fuel

6%

Residual

59%

Crude Oil

11%

Distillate

21%

Unspecified

1%

LPG's

1%

Gasoline

1%

Figure 3. Fuel imports (Source DOE/EIA Energy Balance 2000) 

This mix will likely evolve as domestic production of oil and gas 

increases and replaces imported residual fuels. DOE/EIA reported Cuban 

imports of nearly 130,000 barrels per day in 2000. The origin of these 

imports has evolved in time away from the former Soviet Union, to Mexico, 

and more recently Venezuela. The Caracas Accord signed in 2000 between 

Cuba and Venezuela provides Cuba with high volumes of crude and refined 

product, as well as financing terms well below market rates (2 percent 

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financing, in some cases with 15-year maturity). Additionally, the “accounts 

past due” is approaching $1 billion payable to Venezuela,51 most of which 

accrued during 2003. As mentioned above, Cuba does not import natural 

gas products (CNG, LNG, or others). Natural gas produced in Cuba tends to 

be sour and in the past 5 years, efforts to process this production have 

resulted in approximately 200 megawatts (MW) of new power generation 

capacity and approximately 200 barrels per day of natural gas liquids 

(propane, butane, and pentane) used primarily for residential distribution. 

Electricity consumption is on the rise from its 1994 minimum but still 

below its peak in 1990 as can be seen in Figure 4 below. 

0.0

2.0

4.0

6.0

8.0

10.0

12.0

14.0

16.0

1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001

Total Electricity Consumption Billion KWh

Figure 4. Total Electricity Consumption (Source DOE/EIA 2001 Assessment) 

Use of renewable energy sources is receiving a great deal of attention 

and is playing a role in the Cuban energy mix. However, renewables are 

still only a fraction of total energy and total electricity production, as can be 

seen by comparing Figure 4 (above) and Figure 5 (below), which shows that 

only 7 percent of electricity is generated from renewable fuels/sources. 

 

51 Reported in the Wall Street Journal, 2/2/2004 and El Universal, 2/07/2004. 

320
0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001

Total Renewable Power Billion KWh

Figure 5. Power generated from renewable sources (Source DOE EIA 2001 Assessment) 

3. Organizational/Governance Structure 

The Ministry of Basic Industries is the Cuban government agency 

responsible for the activities related to the power sector (generation, 

transmission, distribution, and commercialization), the oil and gas sector 

(exploration, production, refining/processing, and commercialization of 

hydrocarbons and products), and the mining sector (nickel and other 

minerals). Additionally, the ministry is also responsible for some 

downstream industries such as petrochemicals. In order to better support the 

general activities, the ministry is also responsible for 8 “support” 

companies:

52 that are in charge of performing or helping with: 

 Production 

 Research 

 Projects 

 Maintenance 

 Construction 

 Internal commercialization 

 Importation of raw materials and components 

 Exportation of finished products

 

52 See http://www.cubagov.cu/gobierno/fichas/fminbas.htm.

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The Energy Sector Authority covers all the activities related to 

hydrocarbons and electricity, and currently oversees two energy producing 

entities: Cubapetroleo (CUPET) and the Electric Union. CUPET is the 

Cuban state oil company responsible for all matters related to hydrocarbons, 

while the Electric Union is a public service enterprise that generates, 

transmits, distributes, and commercializes electric power. 

With the promulgation of the Mining Law of 1995, the National 

Office of Minerals Resources was created as the main regulatory agency. Its 

main functions are the control and supervision of the concessions in the 

hydrocarbon and mineral areas. That office is also responsible for the 

protection of hydrocarbon and mineral resources, the rational exploitation of 

such resources and environmental oversight of such activities. 

Even though environmental oversight of exploitation activities is the 

responsibility of the National Office of Mineral Resources, the Ministry of 

Science, Technology, and the Environment is the body responsible for 

directing, implementing, and monitoring state and government policy related 

to science and technology, environmental policy, and the peaceful uses of 

nuclear energy. It also is responsible for biological security and monitoring 

chemical substances controlled by the Convention on Chemical Weapons. 

4. Current State: Energy and Minerals/Mining Infrastructure 

i. Oil and Natural Gas Profile 

Cuba is a net importer of crude petroleum and refinery products, but 

in recent years has focused its efforts on increasing the production of crude 

petroleum and natural gas. With some foreign investment since 1997, 

Cuba’s production of crude petroleum has doubled. Production of natural 

gas has increased more than tenfold. 

The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) assessed the potential for 

undiscovered conventional oil and gas resources in part of the North Cuba 

Basin during the World Energy Assessment 2000 Project. It was assessed 

that a potential of about 480 million barrels of oil remain to be discovered in 

the North Cuba Fold and Thrust Belt Assessment Unit of the North Cuba 

Basin. This area represents the most appealing region of Cuba from a 

prospecting perspective. 

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RECOMMENDATION:

 U.S. Government agencies should reestablish working relationships with 

a free Cuba in an effort to assist with additional basin studies. Areas to 

focus on include: assess the North Cuba Foreland Basin Assessment Unit 

and the North Cuba Yucatan Shelf Assessment Unit (both of the North 

Cuba Basin), which was not assessed in 2000 given the lack of 

information. Given what the Cubans have published since 2000, these 

assessments are now possible. Following this, work could begin to focus 

on other Cuban basins and encouraging private sector participation. 

The increase in oil production has resulted in the increase and 

availability of natural gas for domestic use, residential, industrial, or power 

generation. This availability has made investments in storage and 

distribution of natural gas more attractive. Domestic natural gas displaces 

imports, and given that the transfer price to the consumer is only a 

subsidized production cost (as mentioned above, in some cases the transfer 

price is negligible), there is a decrease (if only fictitious) of energy costs to 

the consumer due to decreasing volumes of imports. Residential natural gas 

usage is still limited.53

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

1980

1981

1982

1983

19841985

19861987

19881989

19901991

19921993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

Crude Oil Production Thousand Barrels per Day

Total Production Cuba (Source DOE-EIA)

Total Foreign Production

Pebercan Inc

Figure 6. Historical increase in the production of Crude Oil in Cuba 

Sherrit Int.

 

53 Press Release, Radio Habana Cuba, January 14, 2004

323
However, since 1998, numerous efforts have been made to treat the 

natural gas produced. Energas54 receives natural gas, at no cost, from

CUPET, which it processes to produce power that it sells at a fixed price of 

4.5 cents per kilowatt hour (KWh) for a hefty profit. Two of the byproducts 

of the sour natural gas processing are sulfur and small volumes of 

condensates (propane and butane) and other natural gas liquids, which can 

be used for residential consumption. 

There are examples of high quality reservoirs (Pina) both onshore and 

offshore. The latter will likely be tied to recent exploration activity towards 

the northwest of the island. For these reservoirs, lighter crude is expected. 

This exploration activity will likely discover hydrocarbon reservoirs that are 

adjacent to, or shared with, U.S. or Mexican hydrocarbon reservoirs as can 

be seen in Figure 7. Most territorial waters up to the international border or 

the end of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) are likely to eventually be 

subject to exploratory efforts. If so, this could become an issue in the future, 

given the moratorium for oil and gas activities in Florida, and will 

undoubtedly be a cause for environmental oversight. 

Figure 7. Offshore blocks open for Oil and Gas Exploration and Production (Source: 

Sherritt International Annual Report 2002 and USGS) 

 

54 Energas is a 20 year partnership between Sherritt International Corporation (1/3), CUPET (1/3) and 

Unión Eléctrica (1/3) ending in 2017. 

324
ii. Minerals/Mining 

Cuba’s mining industry is dominated by the production of nickel, 

which is one of the country’s leading sources of foreign exchange. Cuba is 

also an important producer of cobalt, which is a byproduct of its nickel 

operations. Nickel is produced by three operations in eastern Cuba. One of 

these operations is a joint venture between Sherritt International Corporation 

(50 percent) and the Government of Cuba (50 percent). The other two mines 

and plants are operated by the state. Production of nickel has increased 

significantly after Sherritt’s investment in Cuba.55 Foreign investment in the 

mining sector became possible when Cuba changed its law regarding foreign 

investment in 1992. In 1993, nickel production was only about 28,800 

metric tons. In 2002, production was about 73,000 metric tons. At present, 

international companies are exploring at least two other deposits of nickel. 

The Castro regime has also worked with financial institutions like ING Bank 

to find ways to finance investment in its plants to improve productivity. 

 

In addition to nickel and cobalt, Cuba is a small producer of cement, 

chromite, copper (although mines were being closed in 2001 and 2002), 

gold, gypsum, steel, silica sand, and stone and other minerals for domestic 

consumption. In the 1990s, several mining companies were actively 

exploring in Cuba. Exploration has since decreased significantly. One of 

the reasons was the low price of gold that prevailed in recent years. 

iii. Refining 

Existing production is handled in the local refineries with much 

difficulty given that their design corresponded to imports of Soviet crude oil, 

which was generally lighter and had lower sulfur content than Cuban crude 

oil. In the late 1980s, based on the prospects of increasing Cuban 

production, the Cienfuegos refinery was planned and built but did not 

achieve full operational status given deficiencies in its design and lack of

investment. Over the years, there has been much publicized interest in the 

refinery so that it could be upgraded and brought online. Interest expressed 

by Libya, Venezuela (PDVSA), and most recently PETROBRAS and 

Repsol-YPF, has not resulted in a partnering agreement. One after the other, 

the tentative partners walked away from the refinery after completing their 

 

55 See Chapter 4 of this report for Expropriation issues. 

325
evaluations. Several reports reflect that anywhere from $100 million to 

$300 million will be required to upgrade the refinery. 

The three operational refineries account for approximately 110,000 

barrels per day of current refining capacity,56 which is well below their 

nominal capacity of over 200,000 barrels per day. Two significant refineries 

process most of the imported crude, one in Havana, and the other in Santiago 

de Cuba. Together they process nearly 55,000 barrels per day of crude. The 

third refinery, located in Ciego de Avila, produces 4000 barrels per day of 

lubricants for domestic consumption. 

Infrastructure for handling crude and gas products is very limited. 

Most existing pipelines are not very extensive, except for the pipeline 

connecting the port of Matanzas and the non-operational Cienfuegos 

refinery. Other minor pipelines have been inaugurated in recent years,57

such as the one that links the Nico Lopez refinery to the international airport 

in Havana for the delivery of aviation fuel, and another transfer pipeline, 

which delivers crude to the port of Matanzas. New ventures have been 

announced that are supposed to distribute and commercialize natural gas and 

natural gas liquids. The venture will have as partners CUPET, TOTAL, and 

Trafigura58 and will increase direct supply of methane gas to Havana and 

also distribute propane gas. 

iv. Electricity 

The power sector has shown much less activity. Very little new 

investment has been made over the past decade. Major capital expenditures 

have concentrated on the maintenance and upgrading of old turbines and 

boilers that use diesel and other heavy fuels as the source of energy. The old 

power plants mostly run on fuels refined from imported low sulfur crude, 

resulting in high power costs. Some efforts have been made to upgrade the 

facilities and increase effective power generation capacity and/or 

efficiency.59 These efforts are in some instances tied to initiatives to treat 

the Cuban sour natural gas and use it for power generation. As mentioned 

above, two integrated ventures owned by Energas use the associated gas 

production from the Varadero and Boca de Jaruco fields. This venture is 

 

56 Cuba News, n1, p9, Monday, January 1, 2001 57 Oil infrastructure improves. Granma (CUBA), Friday, October 12, 2001 58 Trafigura is a British company. http://www.trafigura.com/trafigura/trafigura.html. 59 Work outsourced to foreign companies such as Spain-based Iberdrola S.A. 

326
based on the treatment of the sour gas that was previously flared and is used 

in co-generation facilities to produce steam and up to 200 MW of power. 

The limited supply and the high costs of electricity have resulted in 

low consumption per capita and have supported energy efficiency strategies, 

some of which can be as simple as rationing power supply. On the other 

hand, locally produced fuels need to be diluted (with cleaner fuels) and 

would still have a difficult time finding their way into the power sector 

without an overhaul of key components of the existing infrastructure. If 

environmental regulations were added to this picture, emission mitigation 

measures, such as flue gas desulphurization units, would be needed. If this 

is taken into consideration, perhaps the best possible use for Cuba’s high 

sulfur crude is exportation in order to fund the import of more adequate fuels 

for local consumption. As for power transmission, the power grid is near 

capacity and is also declining due to the lack of maintenance. Another 

problem is that most of the existing infrastructure is based on above-ground 

transmission lines strung on wooden poles, which make the Cuban system

more vulnerable to extreme weather when compared to more modern 

concrete poles.60 Only parts of old Havana have buried lines61 that were 

recently put in place. 

Most of the electric power is consumed by the industrial sector (66 

percent),62 which has the highest priority, followed by residential use (25 

percent). The commercial sector is third sector in total power consumption 

but tends to have a higher priority in receiving power when compared to 

local residential use. This prioritization and the constant energy deficit 

result in daily blackouts in the residential sector. Additionally, in situations 

of extreme deficit, industrial activity is affected. This has resulted in 

unplanned water shortages due to problems at the water treatment facilities 

and pumping stations. At times, propaganda from the Castro regime 

announces that with the increase of local oil and gas production, or with the 

oil coming from Venezuela or other news events, there would be no more 

major blackouts. These announcements63 put a lid on news items from Cuba 

on blackouts that were not weather related. Blackouts are increasingly 

frequent. 

 

60 Interamerican Development Bank, EDE Sur EDE Norte Electric Distribution Project, Dominican 

Republic 2000. 61 Development-Cuba, Interpress Service, 9/18/2000. 62 Source: Energy Statistics and Balances of Non-OECD Countries 1994-1996, OECD. 63 On October 30, 2000, the then Minister of Basic Industries declared an end to blackouts due to the 

signing of the accord with Venezuela to supply oil to the island. 

327
Industrial

62%

Commercial

8%

Transportation

4%

Residential

26%

Figure 8. Breakdown of electricity consumption in Cuba (Source Union Electrica, Cuba 

1999) 

v. Nuclear Energy 

Also in the power sector, construction on the first of many planned 

nuclear power plants was initiated in the 1980s with significant support from

the former USSR. The Juragua plant was never completed and after many 

failed attempts to finish the project the Russian government announced in 

2000 that it was officially terminating its connection with the effort, leading 

to the project's abandonment by the regime. There are no reported efforts to 

revive the possibility of nuclear generation capacity. The use of nuclear 

energy and science is limited to medical research and treatment, and the 

National Office of Mineral Resources of the Ministry of Science, 

Technology, and the Environment is responsible for the oversight of the 

handling of radioactive material. 

vi. Hydropower / Dams 

a. Introduction 

Total power production in Cuba from hydroelectric plants is estimated 

to be less than 0.5 percent. Total estimated power production in Cuba in 

2001 was about 15,301.3 GWh, with only about 75 GWh produced from 

328
hydroelectric plants. The potential for hydropower is greater than what has 

been developed to date. 

b. Organizational/Governance Structure 

The Electric Union of Cuba, which falls under the Ministry of Basic 

Industry, is responsible for the electric grid (National Electroenergy System 

or NES). The Electric Union and the National Institute of Hydraulic 

Resources (NIHR) operate Cuba’s hydroelectric stations. 

c. Facilities 

There are more than 220 dams and many other smaller structures for 

storage and diversion of surface waters. 

vii. Renewable Energy 

The lack of productive investment in base power generation should 

have provided a greater opportunity for distributed generation mostly based 

on renewable resources. However, this opportunity has not brought any 

significant results. 

One renewable energy initiative that has received significant attention 

and publicity has been Cuba’s efforts to use sugar cane byproducts as the 

source for biomass fuels. The waste product from sugar cane production, 

bagasse, is burned for fuel in other countries with sugar cane resources. 

While we believe this concept has not moved beyond the idea and study 

phase, it has recently attracted attention from Brazilian interests given their 

experience on the production of ethanol from biomass. 

 

5. Identified Energy Infrastructure Development Needs and U.S. 

Assistance

i. Energy Sector Requirements/Opportunities 

Once a free Cuba begins operating under a new, market-oriented 

philosophy, it will require significant increases in energy supply for 

transportation, to provide tourism-related services, increase production of 

cement and other construction materials, boost production of numerous 

industrial and primary goods, and to support the mining industry. 

329
ii. Oil and Natural Gas 

In the short-term, access to new capital will limit growth. In the 

medium-term, with the growth of the sector, other issues will come to bear 

such as advanced oil and gas exploration and production technology (3-D 

seismic, offshore rigs) and, more importantly, spill response equipment and 

teams. In the longer-term, as blocks closer to the international borders are 

exploited, the issue of shared hydrocarbon reservoirs with the United States 

and Mexico will likely arise. Experience from the North Sea and other areas 

will prove useful. Another long-term issue, enhanced and improved 

recovery of the hydrocarbon resources based on (treated) seawater and the 

use of domestic sour natural gas as a means to maintain energy (pressure) of 

the reservoirs, should be considered as an efficient and possibly cost 

effective way to improve recovery. 

RECOMMENDATION:

 If requested by a transition government, the U.S. Government should be 

prepared to assist and facilitate study opportunities for transfer or 

application of offshore technology: production, 3-D seismic, oil spill 

response, or to expand natural gas processing facilities for residential 

and power generation use. 

iii. Minerals/Mining 

In a market-based free Cuba, there is a great potential for further 

development of the nickel industry and for development of construction 

materials. The emergence of a free Cuba is very likely to increase Cuba’s 

tourism industry dramatically, which combined with a need to upgrade 

existing infrastructure, will increase the domestic demand for construction 

materials. In addition, an overseas market for construction materials from 

Cuba could develop over the next ten years if the construction quarries in 

south Florida are used as cisterns to hold water for rehabilitation of the 

Everglades ecosystem. Currently, these quarries supply construction 

aggregate to a market that extends as far north as Jacksonville, Florida. 

Cuba would have to compete against other sources of aggregate such as the 

existing quarries on the Yucatan Peninsula and operations that might 

develop in the Dominican Republic. 

330
RECOMMENDATIONS:

 In the medium-term, the USGS should be prepared to provide assistance 

and facilitation to help build or modernize critical governmental 

institutions such as geological surveys, mines ministries, and related 

organizations. This would include developing and implementing mineral

resource exploration programs that use modern methods and concepts, 

modernizing geochemical and geophysical surveys as well as geological 

maps, developing and implementing programs to monitor ecosystems in 

the face of new infrastructure development, and developing approaches 

to sustainable development of non-fuel mineral resources. 

 Other U.S. Government agencies could provide assistance with 

modernizing mining laws, modernizing mining methods, and improving 

recovery of both products and waste; increasing energy efficiency of 

mining operations, multiple-use land management practices, remediation 

of abandoned mine sites, and development of new markets for materials 

that can be mined in Cuba. 

iv. Refining 

Cuban refineries have been declining in capacity due to lack of 

maintenance. The immediate need is to guarantee supply of crude adequate 

for the programmed refinery runs and initiate a continuous effort to maintain 

and reclaim processing capacity. In the long-term, as the Cuban 

transportation sector grows to keep pace with expected economic growth, 

increased processing capacity could prove useful. 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 The U.S. Government should be prepared to assist in the 

maintenance/overhaul of refinery units in an effort to increase/reclaim 

processing capacity. 

 The U.S. Government should be prepared to assist a free Cuba increase 

its refinery capacity to meet increasing local demand by the 

transportation and other sectors. 

331
v. Electricity 

In the short-term, access to needed capital will help pave the road to 

reliable electricity supply. To bridge the gap between these new investments 

and the dire supply situation that exists today, modular units could be 

brought in to increase electricity supply to major cities without relying on 

major transmission grids. 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 Medium-term: The U.S. Government should be prepared to provide 

assistance in assessing the age and condition of the transmission and 

local distribution grids. Existing wooden poles could be upgraded to 

concrete poles. 

 Long-term: The U.S. Government should be prepared to provide 

assistance in assessing existing power plants in an effort to determine if 

they should be converted or upgraded to process/utilize more efficient 

technologies through import/export incentives. 

vi. Nuclear Energy 

There are no reported efforts to develop nuclear generation capacity. 

RECOMMENDATION:

 There are opportunities for interaction and exchange of information with 

a free Cuba on the decontamination and decommissioning of radioactive 

medical equipment, as well as monitoring procedures for radioactive 

material. 

vii. Hydropower / Dams 

All indications are that Cuba’s hydropower production potential has 

been largely untapped. In general, hydropower facilities require large initial 

investments but provide many years of reliable production with low 

maintenance. 

332
RECOMMENDATIONS:

 The U.S. Government could assist with planning, focused on maximizing 

the potential of the existing dams, and also look for hydropower 

development opportunities in undeveloped watersheds. 

 The U.S. Government could assist in the development of an effective dam 

safety inspection program; any dams not inspected in the early (critical) 

phases of work should be inspected. It is very important to develop and 

maintain baseline data for future, periodic inspections. Inspections 

should be performed by an experienced multi-disciplinary team and 

include (if possible) individuals with historical knowledge of the dam 

being inspected. 

 Based on the needs assessments developed in the inspection program, a 

priority list for repairs and improvements should be developed. 

 Rehabilitation work could be accomplished using the contracts that were 

put into place during the critical needs phase to accomplish the work in a 

timely manner. All repair work should have expert quality management 

oversight due to the special construction requirements often required on 

dams. 

 The U.S. Government, through the USACE, could provide a course in 

Spanish already developed for dam safety. This training could be 

implemented for all personnel involved in Cuba’s dam safety program. 

 The U.S. Government could assist in developing a budget and 

determining finance sources for an adequate dam safety program and 

establishing a capacity building process that includes dam operators and 

personnel involved in the management of the structures. 

viii. Renewable Energy 

In the short-term, renewable energy resources will not supply 

significant energy to the Cuban economy. 

333
RECOMMENDATION:

 The U.S. Government can facilitate the exchange of information between 

a free Cuba and other Caribbean nations to share technologies and 

progress on the implementation of renewable energy technologies 

D. TELECOMMUNICATION 

1. Introduction 

The Cuban telecommunications infrastructure lags far behind the 

world, and is in the bottom rank of performers within the Caribbean region. 

Cuba, with 650,000 telephone lines in service, has a lower fixed line 

penetration (5.8 percent) than any large Caribbean nation with the exception 

of Haiti. In terms of its telecommunications development, Cuba is closer to 

the low-income nations of the world rather than the lower-middle income 

bracket to which it belongs. Consistent with the regime's efforts to portray 

itself as a capable partner for international investors, even as it clamps down 

on information dissemination on the island, Cuba’s international telephone 

infrastructure far surpasses its domestic telephone backbone. 

Telephone service varies greatly in quality from place to place despite 

improvements in recent years. Cubans have to wait for years to receive 

telephone lines, often with no success. Those who have telephones, 

however, enjoy fairly reliable service both within cities and long distance 

between cities. According to several reports, public telephones are widely 

available, and large numbers of public telephones have been installed that 

use prepaid debit cards. As telecommunications take off throughout Latin 

America, Cuba feels pressured to develop its telecommunications sector as 

well, even though the island has limited funds and few investors to finance 

its much-needed telecom growth. The current equipment is incapable of 

providing enhanced services but may be sufficient to provide basic 

communications services during a transition period from communism to 

democracy.64 The Cuban regime claims that by 2004, 92 percent of the lines 

in Havana and 74 percent of the networks in the interior of the country will 

be digital, but there is no way to verify those numbers.65 

 

64 Cereijo, M. “Telecommunications in Cuba: Recommendations for Modernization.” Cuba Transition 

Project, Institute For Cuban & Cuban American Studies, University of Miami. January 2004, p.iii. 65 Paul Budde Communications Pty Ltd. “Telecommunications and Information Highways: Cuba.” 2004, 

p. 1. 

334
Cuba’s cellular telephone system is operated by Cubacel (owned 50 

percent by the Cuban Ministry of Communications, 12.5 percent by 

Telecomunicaciones Internacionales de Mexico [TIMSA], 37.5 percent by 

Canada’s multi-industrial conglomerate, Sherritt International Corp.) and CCom (owned 50 percent by the Cuban Ministry of Communications and 50 

percent by Brussels-based DHL Int’l). Cuba’s mobile penetration, with 

22,000 subscribers, is less than 1 percent.66

As Cuba tries to diversify its national products and services away 

from commodity based sectors toward high-tech and service oriented sectors 

such as biotechnology, medicine, and tourism, the opportunities offered by a 

modern telecommunications infrastructure are becoming more evident. 

Regime webmasters are creating World Wide Web sites (under the “.cu” 

domain, but most often hosted on Canadian or other foreign servers, to 

overcome endemic bandwidth problems on-island) to lure in tourists and 

foreign investors and to sell Cuban products internationally. Domestically, 

historic avenues are being dug up to lay high-speed digital lines and cable.67 

i. History of Cuba’s Telecommunications Sector 

After four decades of neglect of the telecommunications infrastructure 

by the regime, the infrastructure is in poor working condition and was, by 

1995, largely obsolete. Outdated coaxial cable trunk systems, using an X.25 

network, are standard in Cuba.68 High speed Internet and 

telecommunications services, both domestic and those connected to Cuban 

communities internationally, are very limited despite the 1980 Cuban 

Communist Party Congress authorizing the development of computerized 

telecommunications. It was not until 1988 that the first real domestic 

electronic network was operative in Cuba. AT&T, Sprint, and MCI began 

offering direct dialing into Cuba in 1994.69

 

66 Otero, F.J. “Mobile Opportunities in the Caribbean, 2.5 Cuba.” Baskerville Strategic Research. 

(Appendix B). 67 Barksdale L. B. “The Great Possibilities of Telecommunications in Cuba.” p. 3

http://cybercuba.com/npa1.html. 68 Press, L. "Cuban Telecommunication Infrastructure and Investment.” Larry Press. August 1996. 

http://som.csudh.edu/fac/1press/devnat/general/index.htm. 69 Barksdale, p. 3. 

335
ii. Organizational/Governance Structure: Current Policy and 

Regulatory Environment 

The Ministry of Information and Communications, established in 

January 2000, is in charge of regulating information technology, 

telecommunications, postal services, information exchange networks, value 

added services, spectrum management, and the electronic industry in Cuba. 

2. Current State of the Telecommunication Infrastructure 

i. Domestic Telecommunication Infrastructure 

Cuban telecommunication infrastructure lags behind much of the 

world and the Caribbean region. The growth of the fixed-lines is much 

slower than in other developing nations or the world. The number of 

telephone lines only roughly doubled since 1995 from 350,000 to 650,000 in 

2002.70 

Central office equipment currently dates back as far as the 1930s, and 

calls are very difficult to make. The poor infrastructure causes echo and 

disconnects and hinders both voice and fax calls. It is estimated that 40 

percent of the Cuban telephone system was installed in the 1930s and 

1940s.71 Cuban equipment comes from Alcatel and Thomson-CSF (France), 

Western Electric and GTE (U.S.), Nortel and Mitel (Canada), and Ericsson 

(Sweden), former East Germany, and Hungary. This mix of equipment of 

various standards and a lack of hard currency make interoperability and 

maintenance difficult.72 

ii. International Telecom Infrastructure 

The majority of international voice traffic is to the United States. U.S. 

companies WilTel, MCI, LDDS, Sprint, and IDS began providing services 

to Cuba in November 1994, and AT&T upgraded its existing facilities in 

Cuba at that time. Canada’s Teleglobe was already providing voice and data 

services to Cuba prior to the entry of these firms. 

 

70 Budde, p. 4. 71 Press, p. 2. 72 Press, L. “Toward a US Cuban Networking Policy.” p. 2.

http://som.csudh.edu/cis/lpress/devnat/nations/cuba/cuba4.htm

336
Today the U.S. has direct dialing to Cuba and 953 authorized voicegrade (64kbps) circuits. Of these, 504 are in use.73 According to Federal 

Communications Commission (FCC) data, in 2001, 36 million minutes were 

billed in the U.S. for voice traffic from Cuba. In 2002, 94 active fiber optic 

cable and 3,477 active satellite circuits were reported between the U.S. and 

Cuba. There is also a $41 million joint venture between Cuba (51 percent) 

and Italcable (49 percent), which provides long distance and international 

service through five portable earth stations in major tourist areas. The 

capacity of these stations is not verified, but according to the Cuban Ministry 

of Communications, there are 1,109 total circuits. However, it should be 

noted that in December 2000, the Cuban Government cut off the receipt of 

direct telephone calls from the United States after U.S. telecommunications 

companies were prohibited by the terms of their Treasury licenses from

paying a large excise tax the Cuban government had imposed on such calls. 

This remains the case today, although calls originating in the United States 

are reaching Cuba thought third countries under various transiting and 

routing agreements that are common in the global telecommunications 

market. 

The hard currency revenue from increased long-distance calls 

originating in the U.S. is providing some financing for modernization, 

although under the terms of the licenses, American technology may be used 

only for overseas calls, not for local modernization. Modernization will take 

time, however, since most of the equipment in use is obsolete. Cuba 

currently has unused capacity, which allows additional customers to 

subscribe to long-distance and international calling services. However, the 

meager incomes earned by the average Cuban citizen prohibit a significant 

increase in phone usage without a major price drop by phone carriers. 

iii. Domestic Public Communications Service74

a. Microwave Network

The Thompson (made in France) equipment has a capacity of 960 

channels (16 supergroups of 60 channels), and it links Havana with the 

other provincial capitals: Pinar del Rio, Villa Clara, Camaguey, and 

Santiago (but not Matanzas). The terminal equipment located in Villa 

 

73 Press, p. 1. 74 Cereijo, p. 3-4. 

337
Clara, Camaguey, and Santiago is LTT (France). Pinar del Rio and 

other secondary points have VKM (Germany). 

b. Coaxial Cable 

The coaxial cable system in Cuba has a capacity of 1,920 channels 

out of Havana. The facilities terminal equipment is German-made VLV 

or Telemecanica VKD. The repeaters are Soviet-made, and all conform 

to CCITT standards. The cable runs by the new “autopista” 

superhighway all the way to Cabaiguan and then follows the old 

“Carretera Central” central highway to Santiago de Cuba. Repeaters are 

located every 6.3 kilometers in huts above ground.

The terminal facility has the following drops: S1 Sancti Spiritus, S2 

Cienfuegos, S3 Villa Clara, S4 Villa Clara, S5 Camaguey, S6 Ciego de 

Avila, S7 Victoria de Las Tunas, S8 Villa Clara, S9 Camaguey, S10 

Camaguey, S11 Bayamo, S12 Santiago de Cuba, S13 Guantanamo, S14 

Holguin, S15 Santiago de Cuba, and S16 Cerro Pelado, plus 24 channels to 

Jamaica. The drop in Cerro Pelado links to a microwave system and is used 

for aerial corridor communications (AICC). The equipment located at the 

provincial capitals is terminal equipment. At other points, it links with the 

CW20. 

iv. International Long Distance Service75

a. Satellite 

Cuba has access to satellite transmission via its station “Caribe de 

Comunicaciones” which is associated with the Russian manual Intersputnik 

system with 60 channels. In 1979, Cuba installed a new Standard B Intelsat 

earth station , which is an automatic Japanese station with 24 channels. 

b. Coaxial Cable 

A submarine cable was installed in 1950 between Key West and 

Havana using an analog carrier system. It is composed of two coaxial 

cables, one for each direction of transmission, and it was originally 

designed to carry 24 voice channels. The terminal equipment for this

 

75 Cereijo, p. 5-6. 

338
system is located on the third floor of the former Cuban Telephone 

Company on Aguila and Dragones streets. This equipment was damaged 

by fire several years ago. A new cable was placed by ITT from Key West

to Caviar. From Caviar, it terminates in the International 

Communications Complex in Havana with a capacity for 138 channels. 

The terminal equipment has not been installed due to the U.S. trade 

embargo with Cuba.

c. Microwave 

An over-the-horizon troposcattering system was placed in service 

in September 1957 for the transmission of one B&W video channel and 

36 audio channels of 4 MHz. When functional, this system was 

composed of three radio spans. The first operated at 3 GHz from Havana

to Guanabo; the second operated in the UHF range between Guanabo and 

Florida City; and the third operated at 3 GHz between Florida City and 

Miami, with a repeater located in Goulds. In Havana, the system 

terminated on the first floor of the Edificio Masonico, located at Carlos III 

No. 508. The TD-2 transmitters/receivers resided at the above location 

along with the L-1 carrier equipment, both made by Western Electric. In 

Guanabo, in addition to the microwave transmitters, two government

systems operated at 10 kilowatts at frequencies of 692 MHz and 740 

MHz, along with two receivers tuned to 840 MHz and 880 MHz. Both 

were connected by waveguide to 60-foot parabolic antennae.

v. Broadcast 

a. Radio 

There are approximately 30 state-run public radio stations 

throughout the island. Private broadcasting is forbidden by law. In 

addition, there are a number of military radio stations with state-of-the-art 

equipment and broadcast towers. There are three main governmentowned, public radio stations: Radio Rebelde, Radio Reloj Nacional, and 

Radio Progreso. There are a total of 62 radio transmission towers.76

 

76 Exhibit T: Cuba’s Telecommunications Summary of Major Study Results. CubaCaribbean Consulting, 

LLC. p. 47. 

339
b. Television77

Television signals, from regime-controlled stations, are available to

approximately 70 percent of the Cuban population. Private television 

broadcasting is forbidden by law. Most of the large population centers 

receive more than one service. However, two large population centers, 

Santiago de Cuba and Camaguey, have single service. Televisions are 

available in a relatively large number of households at 15 sets per 100. 

There are a total of 35 television transmitters and 45 relay stations. 

The total KW power in the countrywide network is 197.6 KW. In 

support of the system, there are a series of microwave relay stations that 

allow for live transmission from practically anywhere in the country. 

As described above, Cuba has access to satellite transmission as 

well. Some Cubans have accessed U.S. satellite feeds with homemade 

satellite dishes. 

In January 1996, Cubavision International introduced a new cable 

channel for hotels in Havana’s tourist installations, diplomatic areas, 

foreign companies, and for foreigners residing in Hotel La Habana. 

Payment for this new service is required in U.S. dollars. 

Given the dissimilar radio allocation plans of the United States and 

Cuba and their close proximity, there is a history of interference issues

between the two countries. In a free Cuba, we will need bilateral 

spectrum agreements to ensure an orderly and compatible use of the 

spectrum in the proximity of U.S. national territory to protect radio 

industries in both countries. 

vi. Mobile Communications 

Unlike most of the world, mobile services in Cuba are still 

considered a luxury item and network coverage is limited and mainly

focused on tourists. Service is unavailable to large portions of the 

island’s population but readily available to its roaming tourists. Even

though Cuba had a 75 percent growth in its mobile subscribers since 

2001, mobile penetration only reached 0.19 percent in 2002. There are 

 

77 Ibid, p. 47-48.

340
two mobile operators in Cuba: Telefonos Celulares de Cuba (Cubacel) 

and Celulares del Caribe (C-Com).

In a free Cuba, the mobile services can be expected to significantly 

expand, which will give rise to the need for bilateral radio spectrum

agreements to ensure an orderly and compatible use of the spectrum in

the proximity of U.S. national territory. Such agreements would be 

similar to those now in force with Mexico and Canada.

vii. Internet Services 

Despite the growing awareness of the Internet among the Cuban 

populace, public Internet access is still very limited due to restrictive

policies of the regime, concerned about unlimited access by average 

citizens to unfiltered news; costs; strict and severe penalties for using 

the Internet; and inadequate infrastructure. Users must prove that they

are engaged in research or belong to accredited, state institutions. Internet 

access is limited to tourists and users authorized by the government. 

High-speed services such as DSL are non-existent in Cuba.

78

For a private citizen to have full internet access in Cuba, the 

individual must have (1) a private telephone line (which is difficult to 

obtain); (2) an Internet access device, usually a personal computer with a 

modem; and (3) dial-in capability to the Internet for a monthly fee (about 

$35 per month; average monthly wage in Cuba is $13). Full Internet access 

through the black market is one of the most rapidly growing areas of the 

underground Cuban economy. To offset this rapid growth of black-market 

accounts, or “account sharing,” that provide access to uncensored 

information, the Castro regime is operating “Cyber Cafés” where individuals 

seeking Internet access can pay $3 per half hour to surf the web or send email messages. 

a. Internet Infrastructure and Services 

The Center for Automated Information Interchange of the Cuban 

Academy of Sciences (CENIAI) has had a UUCP (Unix to Unix copy 

protocol) link to the Internet since 1992, originally through a single 

unreliable twice a day dial-up link with the Association of Progressive 

 

78 Budde, p. 4. 

341
Communication's (APC) Toronto Office, Web Networks. By 1996, there 

were four networks with international dial-up connectivity in Cuba described 

below.79 Although in 2003, there were ten companies offering Internet 

services, most of Cuba’s Internet traffic runs through two main servers:

CENIA Internet and Infocom operated by the incumbent para-statal telecom

service provider, ETECSA.80

Citmatel, a branch of the Ministry of Science, Technology, and the 

Environment, operates CENIAI. As of 1996, it offered e-mail, database 

access, mail lists, programming and consulting services, and a presence on a 

Gopher server in Uruguay. Other Cuban networks include Tinored, which 

was established by the Cuban Youth Computer Clubs, an initiative of Fidel 

Castro that operates 150 walk-in computer centers in Cuba. In 1996, about 

100 clubs had e-mail accounts and about 80 had working 2,400 bps modems. 

Tinored is also a gateway for Red David, which supports Cuba's

government-operated non-governmental organizations. CIGBnet is the 

network of the center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology. It started 

operations in 1991 and had 900 users in 1996. It provides e-mail, database 

access, a biological sequence server, mailing lists, and Gopher and Web 

servers. Finally, InfoMed is the network of the National System of Health 

Information of the Cuban Ministry of Health, which has been operating 

since 1992. It had some 500 accounts in 1996 most of which were shared. 

It provides e-mail, discussion groups, file retrieval, database search, and 

consultation services.81

In addition to government imposed access restrictions, Cuba’s 

antiquated telecommunications infrastructure further hinders Internet access. 

In many areas of Cuba, modems work reasonably well at a speed of 1,200 

baud (fast enough for e-mail and limited text transmission), but they cannot 

achieve the 14,400 to 28,800 baud modem speeds required for efficient 

access to the Internet. The current infrastructure is saturated. To relieve 

demand on Cuba’s limited international telecommunications links, many 

Cuban web sites in the “.cu” domain are hosted on web servers physically 

located in Canada. 

 

79 Ibid 80 Budde, p. 5. 81 Press, L. “Internet in Cuba.” Larry Press. 1997. 

342
b. Computers 

In a measure intended to facilitate censorship of information, it is 

forbidden by law for Cubans to buy computers, printers, or faxes. 

c. E-mail

In Cuba, use of e-mail is much more common than use of the Internet. 

According to a report of the MIC, dated January 2004, Cubans hold more 

than 480,000 e-mail accounts (compared to 60,000 in 2001). Many of those 

with access to domestic or international e-mail through government jobs and 

schools can also access a government-controlled intranet, consisting of 

several hundred officially approved web pages hosted on servers in Cuba 

with no direct connection to sites on the world wide web.82

Cuban post offices began to offer, in the summer of 2001, e-mail and 

intranet access priced in U.S. dollars.83 In 2002, Cubans could purchase an email account for $4.50 (the average wage in Cuba is around $13/month).84 

d. The Government’s Use of the Internet 

The past several years have witnessed a considerable increase in the 

number of official web sites that have appeared on the Internet. The 

increase reflects the Cuban government’s priority to use this medium to 

project a benign, positive image and to promote the use of electronic 

commerce in industries such as tourism that can generate hard currency. 

According to MIC, Cuba had approximately 1,100 “.cu” domains in 2003. 

The Internet has been facilitated by financial investments in 

telecommunications infrastructure to update the antiquated telephone 

network to a digital one. 

e. New Restrictions Amidst Ongoing Upgrades 

In a move to clamp down on unauthorized use of the Internet, in 

January 2004, the MIC introduced a law that would have prohibited Internet 

access over the low-cost government service most ordinary citizens have at 

home. The law, which has been denounced by Amnesty International and 

 

82 Ibid, p.7. 83 Ibid, p.7. 84 Budde, p.5. 

343
others, limits access to those organizations (officially recognized businesses 

and government offices) that access the web through telephone accounts 

paid for in U.S. dollars. 

The new law represented a fearful regime's effort to clamp down on a 

growing group of users, semi-tolerated until now, who access the Internet 

illegally from their home telephones, using passwords from their workplace 

or using computers and Internet accounts they have borrowed or purchased 

in Cuba’s active underground cyber-market. This move can be viewed as 

part of a broad trend against activities deemed “illegal” by Cuban 

authorities, such as unauthorized private businesses and the sale of houses. 

After the story leaked to the foreign press, and protests were organized 

internationally, the regime retracted its planned crackdown. 

The law, in fact, would have changed nothing for most ordinary 

Cubans who do not have authorized access to the worldwide web. This 

access is limited to select government institutions, scientists, academics, the 

diplomatic sector, approved businesses, and state approved organizations. 

The regime closed all unauthorized free email accounts by blocking access 

to overseas servers in 2003. Full Internet access is available at the main 

hotels, which offer this service in dollars. Service at government-owned 

Internet cafes is limited to the Cuban “intranet” of approved sites. 

3. Identified Infrastructure Development Needs and U.S. Assistance: 

Pro-Competitive Telecommunications Policy and Regulatory 

Framework 

To achieve a sustainable market-based telecommunications sector, 

Cuba will need extensive policy and regulatory training and technical 

assistance to develop a telecommunications policy and a legal and regulatory 

structure that would attract private investment and promote competition to 

expand and modernize the telecommunications infrastructure at affordable 

prices. 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 If requested by a transition government, the U.S. Government should be 

prepared to assist a free Cuba with regulatory training and technical 

assistance. The U.S. Government, through the Department of State 

(EB/CIP), Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and the 

344
National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) 

could assist Cuba by: 

 providing telecommunications-related legal expertise in drafting 

legislation; 

 providing assistance in improving the spectrum management 

framework; and 

 negotiating bilateral radio spectrum agreements with the United 

States and new international broadcast frequency arrangements.

The World Bank and other international donor agencies, and the 

private sector, in cooperation with countries in the region, can begin 

assisting the Cuban telecommunications sector as soon as conditions allow 

the placing of advisors in the Ministry and inviting Cubans for training 

outside the country. 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 If requested by a transition government, the U.S. Government should be 

prepared to assist a free Cuba by: 

 providing experts to draft laws and regulations and advise on policy 

and regulation by assembling an ad hoc team of U.S. regulatory 

experts to respond to Cuban needs; 

 participation in general training programs provided by the U.S. 

Telecommunications Training Institute (USTTI). The USTTI is a nonprofit joint venture between leading U.S. based communications and 

IT corporations and leaders of the federal government and could 

provide Cuban telecom experts tuition-free management, policy, and 

technical training;

 participation in the International Visitors Program (IVP) of the FCC, 

which enables foreign delegations to interact in informal discussions 

with FCC personnel who provide legal, technical, and economic 

perspectives on a wide range of communications issues involving 

broadcasting, cablecasting, and telecommunications. During IVP 

briefings Cuban telecom experts could learn about the FCC's 

345
organizational structure, its multiple roles as an independent 

regulatory agency, including licensing, enforcement, and rule making 

procedures, and its statutory powers, regulations, and current 

proceedings; and 

 participation in the Standards in Trade Workshops, which are a major 

activity of the Global Standards and Information Group (GSIG) of the 

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The 

workshops could provide Cuban standards officials with timely 

information on U.S. practices in standards and conformity 

assessment. Participants would be introduced to U.S. technology and 

principles in metrology, standards development and application, and 

conformity assessment systems. 

E. WATER RESOURCES 

1. Introduction 

i. Organizational/Governance Structure 

The water sector has an institutional structure that provides for the 

functioning of the sector as well as its development. It is a complex system

that has evolved since 1976. 

There are two main governmental organizations that develop and 

regulate the water sector: the National Institute of Water Resources and the 

Ministry of Public Health. The National Institute of Water Resources 

controls all the activities to develop and operate the systems. The Ministry 

of Public Health sets the regulatory requirements for potable water as well as 

the quality and treatment of wastewater. 

ii. Wastewater Systems 

Cuba has significant water supply and sanitation issues. There are 

only five municipal wastewater plants in the country and only 4 percent of 

the sewerage effluent have some degree of treatment serving 18.9 percent of 

the population. Most old cities, such as Havana, have aging, combined 

sewers (combined storm and sanitary sewer). Havana’s sewers were 

designed for a population of 600,000 - when the present population is over 2 

346
million. The wastewater flow only receives primary treatment, and excess

flow is discharge to bodies of water with minimal, if any treatment. 

iii. Urban storm drainage 

Similar to the United States, urban storm drainage in Cuba is 

primarily governed and performed at the provincial and municipal level. It’s 

reasonable to assume a very wide range of urban drainage practices, 

regulations, and effectiveness of the various systems in place. It will require 

a significant effort, in country, to assess the state of affairs in urban 

drainage.

iv. Water Supply 

Potable water supplies/quantity are summarized in the table below. 

Water Supply and Sewerage Coverage 1

Urban Rural Total 

Population 8,376,000 2,761,700 11,137,700

Water Supply

 % Served 98.3 76.5 92.9 

 % Home Connect 83.5 38.5 72.4 

 % Easy Access 14.8 37.9 20.5 

 % Disinfected 83.5 Negligible 

Sewerage

 % with Sewers 48.5 7.7 38.4 

 % with Latrines & 

Pits 

49.5 76.2 55.4

 % Treated 18.9 - - 1

 Source: CEPIS, “ Assessment of Drinking Water and Sanitation 2000 in the Americas, 

PAHO, Sep 2001. 

v. Storage 

Due to the narrow east-west extension of the island, rivers are short 

and mostly flow to the north or to the south with relatively small water 

volumes. The annual average rainfall is 1,200 mm. (48 in.) with 30 percent 

347
in winter season and 70 percent during the summer season. The heaviest 

rain falls in Sierra del Toa. The principal watersheds are: Cauto Watershed 

with 9540 sq. km.; Zaza Watershed with 2413 sq.km.; Guantánamo-Guaso 

Watershed with 2347 sq. km. and Toa Watershed with 1061 sq. km. The 

river lengths vary as follows: Cauto River with 370 km.; Sagua La Grande 

River with 163 km.; Zaza River with 155 km.; Caonao River with 133 km.; 

San Pedro River with 124 km.; Jatibonito del Sur River with 119 km.; Las 

Yeguas River with 117 km.; Cuyaguate River with 112 km.; Mayari River 

with 106 km.; Hondo River with 105 km.; Agabama River with 105 km.; 

and Toa River with 100 km. 

Most of the rivers have been dammed to catch the runoff water for 

irrigation and water supply. Cuba has more than 220 dams and minor 

storage structures for water, with a combined storage capacity of 626,445 

hm. Much of this developed water is for agricultural production. The plan 

for water resources development in the second half of the 20th Century was 

to store as much water as possible, even at the risk of drying up the streams. 

However, the damming of nearly all the major rivers has reduced the flow in 

the river channels and exacerbated the salt-water intrusion along the coastal 

areas. 

vi. Treatment 

Drinking water services in Cuba are classified in three classes: (1) 

domestic connections, where the residence is connected to the water supply 

system; (2) public service, where water truck tanks distribute the water; and 

(3) easy access service, where the water must be carried for a distance of 300 

meters. Presently, 95.5 percent of the population has access to these services 

in the rural and urban areas. The total population of Cuba has been 

estimated at 11,224,321 (July 2002 estimate) with an average annual rate of 

growth of approximately 0.35 percent. 

 

Of the supplied water for domestic use, 90 percent of the urban 

potable water is from ground water sources, with approximately 83.5 percent 

of the urban water supply systems using disinfection practices as its only 

treatment. 78 percent of these systems have intermittent service, and water 

availability is only for 12.2 hours/day.85 

85 According to the Regional Report on the Evaluation 2000 in the Region of the Americas prepared by the

Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and the Division of Health and Environment of the World 

Health Organization (WHO) dated September 2001

348
There are 52 treatment plants that provide full treatment through 

flocculation, sedimentation, filtration, and final disinfection. Problems in 

maintaining treatment are primarily due to needs for equipment spare parts 

and replacements, chemicals and fuel and electrical power limitations. 

vii. Distribution 

The major cities have distribution systems, some of which date back 

to the mid 1800s. Such is the case of the Havana system, known as the 

Albear Aqueduct. The coverage of the water supply service and the 

frequency of delivery are still considered inefficient to supply the Cuban 

population. 

The following table illustrates the type and coverage of the water 

supply systems: The urban unserved population is 145,200 (1.73 percent) 

and the rural unserved population is 650,400 (23.55 percent). The total 

unserved population is 1,017,900 (12.39 percent). About 98 percent of the 

rural water supply systems are in operation. The distribution system loses 

nearly 75 percent of the treated water due to leaking pipes. 

 

TABLE OF DRINKING WATER COVERAGE IN CUBA 

Service 

Area 

Total 

Population 

Population 

Served 

Domestic 

Connection 

Public 

Service 

Easy 

Access 

Urban 

Area

8,384.300 

(100 %) 

8,293.700 

(98.9 %) 

7,059,580 

 (84.2 %) 

394,062 

(4.7 %) 

838,430 

(10 %) 

Rural 

Area

2,755,500 

(100 %) 

2,349,200 

(85.2 %) 

1,248,242 

(45.3 %) 

294,839 

(10.7 %) 

806,119 

(29.2 %) 

Total 

Area

11,139,800 

(100 %) 

10,642,900 

(95.5 %) 

8,120,914 

(72.9 %) 

690,668 

(6.2 %) 

2,328,218 

(16.4 %) 

Source: National Institute of Water Resources, 1999 

The water supply coverage and types by Provinces is shown in the following 

table: 

TABLE SHOWING THE TYPE AND COVERAGE OF WATER 

SUPPLY SERVICE BY PROVINCES N CUBA 

349
Province Total 

Population 

Population 

Served 

Domestic 

Connection

Public 

Service 

Easy 

Access

000’s 000’s % % %

Pinar del Rio 731.29 689.2 

(94.2 %) 

71.5 5.9 16.8 

La Havana 696.19 659.9 

(94.8 %) 

92.2 2.0 0.6

Havana City 2,192.32 2,192.3 

(100 %) 

99.3 0.7 0.0

Matanzas 654.52 654.

(100 %) 

87.0 2.3 10.7

Villa Clara 833.42 769.5 

(92 %) 

68.6 2.3 21.1

Cienfuegos 392.35 392.3

(100 %) 

71.7 9.9 18.4

Sancti 

Spiritus 

458.78 422.0

(92 %) 

54.7 6.6 30.7

Ciego de 

Avila 

403.88 384.4

(95.2 %) 

73.8 13.7 7.7

Camaguey 782.23 773.9

98.9 %) 

65.5 3.3 30.1

Las Tunas 525.02 482.3 

(91.8 %) 

59.3 5.0 27.5

Holguin 1,024.91 1,001.3

(97.7 %) 

46.1 13.7 37.9

Granma 827.59 743.8

(89.9 %) 

62.7 8.2 19.0

Santiago de 

Cuba 

1,027.91 925.9

(90.1 %) 

74.2 12.1 3.8 

Guantánamo 510.76 472.5

(92.5 %) 

68.3 11.2 13.0

I. de la 

Juventud 

78.69 78.6

(100 %) 

100 0.0 0.0

TOTAL 11,139.87 10,642.9 72.9 6.2 16.4

Source: National Institute of Water Resources, 1999

350
viii. Ambient Water Quality 

 

Surface and groundwater in Cuba are severely polluted by runoff from 

heavily treated fields with fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides, as well as 

by the discharge of untreated effluents from cities and industries such as 

sugar mills, sugar by-products, food processing plants, mining operations, 

etc.86 The Castro regime’s fixation with irrigation resulted in very high rates 

of extraction of groundwater, causing groundwater levels to drop, salt-water 

intrusion, and increased salinity of the soils near the coasts. In addition, an 

extensive dam construction program reduced the river flows and limited the 

natural recharge of aquifers, increasing the salt-water encroachment, 

especially in Ciego de Avila Province. The insufficient levels of wastewater 

treatment and the lack of sewer pipelines have caused a degradation of the 

water quality. 

2. Identified Infrastructure Development Needs and U.S. Assistance

The U.S. Government has limited technical expertise for addressing 

primary infrastructure issues, as states and local agencies, with the help of 

private sector engineering consulting firms, have primary responsibility for 

these issues in the United States. The U.S. Government does have 

experience in bringing together small ad hoc teams of experts from around 

the country to act as consultants to other countries on a limited basis. This 

type of team is most likely not appropriate for a full scale assessment and 

potential rebuilding of a nation’s infrastructure. 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 U.S. Government should be prepared to provide capacity building 

expertise. Capacity building includes, but is not limited to, development 

of monitoring programs, review and assessment of water quality data 

(drinking water, effluent discharge, ambient water quality), long-term 

development of laws and regulations, and development of pre-treatment 

programs (control of industrial discharges into public waste water 

systems), etc. 

86 Díaz-Briquets, Sergio and Jorge Pérez-López, Conquering Nature: The Environmental Legacy of 

Socialism in Cuba. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000; and, López Vigil, María, "Cuba 

Campaign: Twenty Issues for a Green Agenda," Global Exchange, 5 October 2001

http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/cuba/sustainable/lopez100501.html (23 January 2003)

 

351
 The U.S. Government could help a free Cuba develop a water and 

wastewater plan similar to the one being done along the 

California/Tijuana, Mexico border. The Plan would assess current 

potable water resources and needs, future potable water needs, current 

wastewater infrastructure resources and needs, and future wastewater 

needs. 

 The U.S. Government could also provide assistance on lab improvement 

and treatment optimization. A significant consideration whether there 

exists an administrative structure and potential for binding requirements 

on the water suppliers in Cuba to value and maintain improvements over 

time in these areas. If the appropriate institutional infrastructure and 

political support are not present, long-term sustainability is unlikely. 

Hence, it is important to collaborate with and empower local officials to 

carry out meaningful improvements. 

 

Long-term infrastructure financing is critical for lasting water and 

wastewater capital improvements. The U.S. Government has vast 

experience and is investigating innovative financing schemes that could 

promote financing for long-term capital improvements. 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 If requested by a transition government, the U.S. Government should be 

prepared to assist a free Cuba to: 

 develop sectorial water demand projections by providing tools to 

engineers and planners such as IWR-Main; 

 perform supply-demand analysis of the major water supply systems; 

 evaluate minimum in-stream flows required for ecosystem 

maintenance; and 

 conduct watershed analysis and sanitary surveys for surface water 

systems. 

352
3. Flood Plain Management and Flood Control Infrastructure 

i. Organizational Governance/Structure 

The development of flood control infrastructure has been very limited 

during the second half of the 20th Century. The civil defense, which 

encompasses a set of measures and activities, is under the Armed Forces 

Ministry. This structure develops general and specific plans for the response 

to disasters. From the tabulated information below, 32 percent of Cuba’s 

population is living exposed to flooding. 

Disaster Risk for Floods, 1980-20001

Events per Year 0.71 

Killed per Year 5.00 

Killed per Million 0.47 

Average People Exposed per Year 3,482,880 

Physical Exposure percent of Population 32.53 

Relative Vulnerability, Killed per exposed 106 1.44

Density Population living exposed to flood in h/km2 116.93

1

 Source: UNDP, “Reducing Disaster Risk: A Challenge for Development”, 2003 

ii. Current flood control infrastructure

Specific information on Cuba’s existing flood control infrastructure is 

not known. The vast majority of Cuba’s large-scale water resources projects 

have been to capture rainfall runoff; available data on their dams shows that 

most do not have a significant flood control component. The data in the 

above table indicates that flooding in Cuba does not present a huge problem

in terms of loss-of-life potential. Property damage statistics for flooding are 

not known. Before any specific flood control recommendations can be made 

or before any priorities can be established, a far greater understanding of the 

current situation is required (institutional, infrastructure, and history of 

flooding). 

RECOMMENDATION:

 If requested by a transition government, the U.S. Government should be 

prepared to offer state-of-the-art hydrology and hydraulic computer 

353
models that delineate flood prone areas with far greater accuracy than 

previously possible. These tools can be employed to allow informed 

decisions to be made regarding infrastructure investments and zoning 

restrictions. USACE can provide the engineering tools and training; 

courses in Spanish are already available and have been presented in 

other Latin American countries. 

F. CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 

1. Introduction 

Cuba has one of the greatest collections of architecture in the 

Caribbean and Latin America. Four hundred years of Spanish rule and 

growth during Cuba’s Republican period created a unique architectural 

legacy. Cuba’s focus on rural development and the utter lack of investment 

in the cities had the unintended but, from an architectural history 

perspective, fortuitous result of sparing Cuba some urban renewal schemes 

that have fundamentally changed the character of many cities throughout 

Latin America and resulted in the razing of historically relevant buildings. 

In early 1990s, as it scrambled to attract tourists to the island, the 

regime realized that its architectural legacy could also serve as an engine for 

tourism and economic development, although these government-led efforts 

are limited. 

2. Identified Infrastructure Development Needs and U.S. Assistance

The successful rehabilitation and reuse of the hundreds of available 

historic buildings will require the participation of the private sector. Many 

of these buildings can be rehabilitated into homes, offices, and stores. These 

buildings require sensitive design solutions that respect the integrity of the 

original design yet incorporate modern amenities and uses. 

RECOMMENDATION: 

 If requested by a transition government, the U.S. Government should be 

prepared, through the Department of Housing and Urban Development 

(HUD), to coordinate technical assistance with international 

organizations such as International Council on Monuments and Sites 

354
(ICOMOS) and national organizations such as the National Trust for 

Historic Preservation. 

Organizations such as the Instituto Cultural Puertoriqueña could also 

be of assistance with its long and accomplished history in Old San Juan and 

other historic cities of Puerto Rico. Since they share a similar architectural 

legacy, their assistance could be greatly beneficial. 

V. ENGAGING AND EMPOWERING THE CUBAN PEOPLE 

As mentioned throughout this chapter, Cuban infrastructure 

development and modernization efforts, as assisted by the U.S. Government, 

would actively involve the Cuban people. These efforts will not only 

provide a practical means to rebuild a free Cuba’s infrastructure but could 

also provide stability during a transitional period. 

Decisions regarding the nature and scope of many programs and 

projects will require local community involvement and support. 

Infrastructure improvement activities will provide opportunities for 

businesses and workers to establish themselves and grow under a new 

political and economic system. The resulting development and 

modernization will enable commerce and an entrepreneurial spirit to flourish 

at all levels, especially for those enterprises that are directly related to the 

infrastructure. For example, in many parts of this chapter, the prospects for 

various types of privatization are discussed. There are few better ways of 

empowering and engaging individuals and groups than investing them with 

the rights and responsibilities of ownership in infrastructure and related 

activities, which are literally the foundation of any modern society and 

economy. 

Below are a few of the many ways in which U.S. Government 

assistance in the area of infrastructure modernization can engage and 

empower the Cuban people. 

A. Community Based Labor Intensive Road Construction 

RECOMMENDATION:

 If requested by a transition government, the U.S. Government should be 

prepared to assist a free Cuba by promoting and facilitating community355
based labor-intensive road construction efforts. A road construction 

expert from the United States could be teamed with community 

organizers and local officials in Cuba to organize and carry out road 

construction projects. 

This type of program could accomplish immediate infrastructure 

development by paving miles of roads with a relatively small capital 

investment. Projects of this kind provide growth while simultaneously 

creating jobs and providing training. 

B. Construction Industry 

By its very nature, physical infrastructure modernization will be 

dependent upon the Cuban construction industry. Presently, the construction 

industry is made up of various enterprises and companies, all statecontrolled, under the Ministry of Construction (MICONS), with no 

opportunity for private-sector initiative. There are mixed companies, those 

foreign Construction and Development enterprises doing work in Cuba 

associated with the regional companies under MICONS. Because Cuban 

companies and enterprises have limited capabilities with respect to 

equipment and the use of the latest construction materials and techniques, 

one urgent task is to develop those enterprises quickly to bring them to up to 

par with the higher standards of the global construction industry. 

RECOMMENDATION:

 If requested by a transition government, the U.S. Government should be 

prepared to offer training and an introduction to state-of-the art 

equipment and technical software products. 

C. Architect/Engineer (A/E) Community 

A similar effort is needed for the Architect/Engineer (A/E) 

community. They are currently grouped primarily under the Union Nacional

de Arquitectos e Ingenieros de la Construcción de Cuba (UNAICC). To 

support the initial contracting efforts with A/E and construction companies, 

and in turn the involvement of the Cuban professionals, requirements such 

as those under the Small Business Contractors should be pursued where they 

relate to native Cuban enterprises. This would support a rapid transition 

from their current system to one of competitive, free enterprise.

356
VI. CONSULTING AND COORDINATING WITH THE 

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 

The international community will play an important part in the 

modernization of Cuban infrastructure. One critical component of 

international involvement will concern the financial resources needed for the 

substantial infrastructure improvements that are needed in Cuba. In 

addition, a variety of international organizations have valuable technical 

expertise that will have an impact on the restoration of Cuban infrastructure. 

Many U.S. Government agencies have experience working with 

international entities and organizations to promote infrastructure 

modernization in developing nations, and this experience can be leveraged in 

support of a free Cuba. 

The international community can help provide a free Cuba with access 

to important financial tools. While some financing for major capital 

investments may be available from the international financial institutions 

and bilateral sources, over time, the bulk of external financing for 

improvements in Cuba's infrastructure is likely to come from private 

sources. 

357
CHAPTER 6 

Addressing 

Environmental Degradation 

 359

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Cuba has many natural assets and challenges. The natural environment has 

suffered degradation as a result of the harmful policies stemming from a Sovietstyle economic system. Cuba faces degraded soil, old and decaying water and 

sanitation infrastructure, wildlife habitat destruction, and salt water intrusion into 

its fresh water supplies. It also lacks an independent non-governmental 

organization (NGO) sector that can advocate on behalf of environment and natural 

resources and serve as a mechanism to raise public awareness and bring new ideas 

and issues to the attention of policy makers for action. 

Among Cuba’s assets are a rich biodiversity, mineral reserves, relatively low 

levels of industrialization, elements of an environmental framework law, an 

educated population, and highly trained experts and scientists. These assets could 

serve as a foundation for sustainable development in a free Cuba. Only a Cuban 

government prepared to meet the environmental challenges of accelerated growth 

will be in a position to provide long-term benefits to the Cuban people. 

The poor environmental protection policies that have been in effect are 

evident in the quality of land, water, air, and natural habitats that exist on the island 

today.

Land and Soils: Like many of its Caribbean neighbors, Cuba faces deforestation 

and over-cultivation of the land, compaction of soils due to the use of heavy farm

machinery, and strip mining. These practices have resulted in salinity in soils and 

heavy erosion of the land. 

Water: Agricultural runoff from heavily treated fields has contributed to the 

degradation of surface water streams, in addition to the untreated wastewater from 

cities, sugar mills and other food-processing plants, and nickel mining operations. 

Irrigation practices have resulted in low groundwater levels, causing significant 

salt-water intrusion in fresh water and salinity in coastal soils. Low river flows due 

to dam construction have in turn caused lower re-charge of aquifers and further 

salinity in the streams. 

Habitat/Biodiversity: Wildlife habitat has been affected by water quality in 

freshwater streams, which is in turn affected by runoff from agricultural practices, 

erosion due to deforestation, and sedimentation of freshwater streams. The 

 361
introduction of non-native species has also had a significant impact on their 

ecological health. The construction of hotels and tourism infrastructure projects 

has affected fragile ecosystems. 

Air: Air emissions from industry and transportation cause significant health 

problems. Stationary sources of emissions (electric power plants, petroleum 

refineries, cement plants, nickel plants, and other old industries) emit large 

amounts of sulfur dioxide and particulate matter. Although, compared to other 

countries, there is a low density of vehicles per capita in Cuba, the vehicles are old 

and require pollution controls and maintenance. 

U.S. cooperation and technical assistance can help a free Cuba address the 

short- and long-term needs it will face in a post-Castro era. As an immediate step, 

the U.S. Government can help a transition government conduct a rapid assessment 

of equipment needs to ensure that drinking water systems are operational and 

chemicals needed to treat the water are made available. For medium- and longterm actions, a wide range of cooperation and assistance possibilities exist, such as 

training to build Cuba’s environmental governance capabilities; cooperative 

activities related to marine science and fisheries management; developing coral 

reef management tools; identifying and developing control strategies for highpriority stationary sources of air pollution; and providing on-site technical 

assistance to Cuban park staff to develop and maintain park infrastructure and 

provide visitor services. All cooperation and assistance options seek to build on 

existing capacity. Implementation of the recommendations assumes availability of 

adequate funding. 

It is important to select a few key areas where there can be a short-term 

success as well as work on medium- and long-term capacity building efforts. 

Generating and providing quality environmental information to the public will be a 

cornerstone for engaging a free Cuban people in environmental and natural 

resources management. The international community is already engaged in 

environmental and natural resource management issues. 

II. INTRODUCTION 

Cuba has a rich storehouse of biodiversity and minerals on this island of 

barely 45,000 square miles. On a per hectare basis, compared to the U.S. plus 

Canada, it has 12 times more mammal species, 29 times as many amphibian and 

 362
reptile species, 39 times more bird species, and 27 times as many vascular plant 

species.1

 Compared to its Caribbean neighbors, it has a high number of native 

species compared to non-native species. It also contains some of the healthiest 

coral reef ecosystems and largest intact coastal habitats in the Caribbean. It has a 

large percentage of the world‘s proven nickel reserves, which it exports along with 

cobalt, and it also has iron, copper, manganese, magnesium, chromium, silver and 

gold deposits. 

However, Cuba’s tropical forests, soils, and maritime areas have suffered 

degradation as a result of the harmful policies stemming from a Soviet-style 

economic system. The Castro government has failed to protect and preserve 

Cuba’s environment. There have been mistakes and shortcomings due mainly to 

insufficient environmental awareness, knowledge and education, the lack of a 

higher management demand, limited introduction and generalization of scientific 

and technological achievements, the still insufficient incorporation of the 

environmental dimension in the policies, development plans and programs, and the 

absence of an integrative and coherent judicial system.

2

 

 

An important factor in the quality of the environment in Cuba is the poor 

economic situation that exists on the island. Those who depend on the land and its 

resources for mere survival (i.e., food, housing, heating fuel, and a source of 

income) will frequently over-exploit it. This kind of poverty, which provokes the 

destruction of the natural resources, has been witnessed in other areas of the world. 

Any program aimed at conserving Cuba’s natural resources must take into 

consideration the poverty and associated behavior of its citizens, and the need to 

provide alternative income opportunities that do not conflict with the objectives of 

conservation. 

The environmental problems will require medium- and long-term strategies and 

many years of infrastructure development and implementation of programs to reverse and 

restore the years of misuse. But Cuba has many potential advantages that could help it to 

overcome these obstacles. In addition to its natural resources, the country boasts 10 

percent of the total scientists in Latin America.3

 Many of these are knowledgeable of 

 

1

 Maldonado, Argelio, “Cuba‘s Environment: Today and Tomorrow--An Action Plan”, quoting Dr. Michael Smith

of Conservation International, p3 2

 Oliver A. Houck, Environmental Law in Cuba, 16.1 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. Fall 2000, 

 363

3

 Argelio Maldonado, conference call, February 17, 2004 
environmental matters, but lack the tools (e.g., well-equipped labs, computers, and 

communications technologies) to be most effective in their fields. In addition, Cuba has a 

functioning environmental ministry that has monitored environmental commitments, 

maintains a list of environmental impact assessments, and has sponsored legislation that 

incorporates international environmental standards and testing protocols into programs of 

waste remediation and/or recycling of wastes. 

As with other nations, economics plays a large role in the implementation of 

environmental programs. To ensure that there are resources to address all of its 

environmental problems, a free Cuba should consider having a permanent nationwide 

market-based system for financing environmental infrastructure projects. This system, 

which can be capitalized by donor grants, should be large enough to ensure the 

construction of drinking water treatment plants, wastewater treatment plants, biodiversity 

initiatives, and other environmental priorities on a sustainable basis. The Castro regime’s 

inadequate funding and lack of independent oversight have prevented Cuba from

maintaining effective enforcement of existing laws and accepted international 

environmental practices. 

 Many years of neglect by the Castro regime of Cuba’s environment present many 

challenges to be overcome in a free Cuba. The island’s rich natural resources can be an 

asset in a future economic strategy where, most likely, tourism will play a predominant 

role. In this new market economy, Cuba will also be challenged to preserve its existing 

environment. An adequate regulatory structure, together with a strong public and 

industry outreach, should be part of any effort aimed at recovering and preserving Cuba’s 

diverse habitats and unique species, while also addressing its poverty. The situation in 

Cuba presents an opportunity to do things differently. 

III. IMMEDIATE ACTIONS

A. Drinking Water and Wastewater 

Please see the IMMEDIATE ACTIONS section of Chapter 5, 

MODERNIZING INFRASTRUCTURE, for a discussion of this topic. 

 364
IV. MEDIUM- and LONG-TERM ACTIONS

A. Environmental Quality and Protection 

1. Environmental Governance 

i. Legal Structure 

a. Status 

Cuba’s first steps in the environmental arena date back to 1930, when the 

country declared its first national park, followed in later years with designations of 

refuges and natural areas.4

 In 1959, the revolutionary government passed the Law 

of Agrarian Reform; its chapter on Conservation of Forests and Soils of the Law of 

the Agrarian Reform placed these reserves under management regimes.5

 In 1976, 

Cuba established the Commission for the Protection of the Environment and the 

Conservation of Natural Resources (COMARNA), centralizing all agencies with 

environmental responsibilities. Although COMARNA was all-inclusive, it lacked 

independent authority, so its activities achieved little program results.6

 In order to 

assist COMARNA, Cuba followed other Latin American countries’ environmental 

advancements, and in 1981 it adopted Law 33. Although hailed to be a law ahead 

of its time, Law 33 produced few, if any, results, given COMARNA’s ineffective 

implementation mechanism. In 1990, the country adopted Decree-Law 118, 

establishing a new Ministry of Science, Technology, and the Environment 

(Ministerio de Ciencia, Tecnología y Medio Ambiente [CITMA]) and allocating 

environmental responsibilities among more than eight separate Ministries. 

 

CITMA came to life in 1994 with a mandate to steer and control the 

implementation of environmental policy, the rational use of natural resources, and 

sustainable development.7

 CITMA was authorized to settle environmental issues 

and disagreements among agencies or to pass them on to a higher authority, the 

Council of State, which is headed by Fidel Castro. CITMA’s internal 

responsibilities were organized into two primary branches under a Deputy Minister 

4 Oliver A. Houck, Environmental Law in Cuba, 16.1 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. Fall 2000, at 14 (2000). 5

 Id. 7 Id.

 365

7

 Houck, at 19, quoting Agreement No. 2823 of the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministries of November

28, 1994. 
for the Environment. The first branch is the Environmental Agency (Agencia de 

Medio Ambiente),8

 comprised of several scientific institutes and a center for natural 

areas and a Center for Environmental Regulation and Inspection - Centro de 

Inspección y Control Ambiental, which houses the regulatory and enforcement 

power of the Ministry. The second branch is the Environmental Policy 

Directorate, which is charged with developing initiatives. In addition, CITMA also 

has an Institute of Ecology and Systematics (Instituto de Ecología y Sistemática) as 

well as other institutes (oceanography) and centers (natural areas) that have 

additional capabilities for implementing integrated coastal management. 

In July 1997, Cuba enacted Law 81, entitled The Law of the Environment 

(Ley del Medio Ambiente).9

 Law 81 is a comprehensive framework law with “14 

titles and 163 articles that embrace air, water, waste, noise, toxic substances, 

historic preservation, biological diversity, national parks, forests, wildlife refuges, 

coastal management, education, research and technology, environmental impact 

assessment and planning, inspection, enforcement, and penalty regimes.”10 Law 81 

provided CITMA with new tools for environmental management and control: 

First, it gave status of law to the environmental impact review process; second, it 

established an environmental license required for activities under the purview of 

other agencies, including tourist development, mining, land use planning, and 

licenses for foreign investment. 

 

Law 81 required CITMA to develop a system of environmental inspections 

and enforcement, and a schedule of penalties for environmental violations.11 

CITMA is allowed to enlist the help of NGOs to assist in these inspections. If 

irregularities are discovered, CITMA has the power to issue compliance orders, set 

deadlines for achieving compliance, suspend licenses (temporarily or 

permanently), order waste removal, and refer violations for criminal prosecution.12 

Facilities are required to submit requested information and must grant access to 

project sites. 

 

9 Id. At 20. 9 Houck at 23. Decree-Law 118 replaced Law No. 33, the Law for the Protection of the Environment and Natural 

Reources (1981) Ley de Protección del Medio Ambiente y los Recursos Naturales. 10 Id. at 24. 11 Id. at 57, citing Law 81 art. 39 and Second Interim Provision. 

 366

12 Id. at 57. 
Law 81, Article 71 confers on CITMA, the Attorney General, or any other 

person or entity that has “personally suffered” damage the right to claim both 

money damages and restoration for environmental harm.13 However, Article 71 

also provides that only CITMA and the Attorney General may act in defense of the 

social interest in environmental protection.14

The Cuban Code of Civil Procedure provides for judicial review of actions 

that are final and when administrative remedies have been exhausted. And, 

although the Code exempts certain subjects from judicial review, environmental 

issues are not. 

b. Needs



 

It is unclear how effectively the existing environmental laws are being 

implemented in Cuba.

15 Given the U.S. Government’s experience in other 

countries, it is very likely that the Castro regime lacks the political will and the 

means to effectively enforce its environmental laws. Other issues that need to be 

defined in a free Cuba are the issues of the standing of private individuals in claims

of environmental harm, devolution of government authority, and adequate public 

participation in environmental decision-making. 

c. U.S. Actions 

The courses mentioned below have been offered by the U.S. Government to 

other countries in the region to enhance their capacity to develop and enforce 

effective environmental laws and requirements. 

RECOMMENDATION: 

The U.S. Government should be prepared to offer to a free Cuba a number of 

courses to help strengthen the legal framework and compliance and improve 

the development and implementation of environmental law: 

13 Id. at 77. 14 Id. at 77, citing Law 81, Art. 71. 15 Sergio Diaz-Briquets and Jorge Perez Lopez. “Socialism and Environmental Disruption: Implications for Cuba” 

p. 162 citing Stanley Kabala, “Environment and Development in a New Europe” Occasional Paper No. 3, 

Middlebury, Vermont, Genomics Institute. p. 10. 

 367








The Elements of Effective Legal Regimes for Environmental Protection 

focuses on the basic elements of effective legal frameworks and institutions 

for addressing pollution. It addresses both traditional means, such as 

regulations and permit systems, as well as newer approaches including 

pollution prevention, market-based incentives, and public-private 

partnerships. It covers a variety of themes, including sustainable 

development, human health protection, public participation, market-based 

tools, and public right-to-know, and examines the role of legislative and 

administrative institutions at the federal and sub-federal level. 

The Principles of Environmental Enforcement provides a framework for 

designing effective environmental compliance strategies and enforcement 

programs; improving the enforceability of compliance programs; promoting 

more effective cooperation and implementation among ministries, and other 

public and private sector groups; introducing a broad range of tools and 

authorities for enforcement responses; and introducing negotiation 

techniques to resolve violations. 

Conducting Environmental Compliance Inspections is designed to introduce 

inspectors to the main aspects of the environmental compliance inspection 

process, and the role of the inspector in motivating compliance in any 

international setting. Topics include planning and conducting the inspection, 

evidence collection, sampling, reporting the results, and the role of the 

inspector in the enforcement process. 

Environmental Criminal Investigations Training is designed for police 

officers and teaches how to recognize environmental crime and how to 

provide an initial response, while ensuring the personal safety of all 

involved. It also seeks to improve the relationship between the police and 

environmental compliance personnel. The course was developed, and is 

given, under the auspices of Interpol. It covers pollution crimes and illegal 

trafficking of endangered species. The course can be tailored to adapt to the 

particular demands and issues for the region in which it is taught. 

 368
ii. Environmental Impact Assessments

a. Status16

 

Following the adoption of Law 81 in Cuba, an environmental impact 

assessment/analysis (EIA, or analysis) must be obtained for the proposed project, 

in order to obtain a CITMA license to move forward with it. CITMA’s regulations 

list the classes of projects that require EIAs, as well as an analysis of all phases of 

a particular proposal to which prospective and on-going government policies and 

programs must be applied.17 Resolution 77/99 requires that alternatives to the 

proposed projects, including the location of the projects, be identified in

applications for CITMA licenses.18 

Before granting a license, CITMA must take into account the interests and 

concerns of the general public and, more specifically, those in the project area.19 

In order to comply with this requirement, license applications must document the 

public information used and consultations made with the local authorities and the 

public by the applicant. However, this is the extent of public participation. There 

are no provisions for public participation or comment on EIAs, nor is there any 

recourse for the public to appeal the absence of an analysis, a defective analysis, or 

a licensing decision. However, if a license is denied, applicants can appeal the 

decision with CITMA. 

Despite what appears on paper, the Castro regime subordinates 

environmental concerns to its economic survival strategy. Economic development 

projects, which are approved by the top echelons of the Castro regime, move 

forward based largely on political and economic calculations of what benefits the 

regime, and not necessarily on a project’s environmental impact. 

16 All information contained in this subchapter is derived from Oliver A. Houck, Environmental Law in Cuba, 16.1

J. Land Use & Envtl. L. Fall 2000, (2000). 17 Houck at 28, referring to Regulations of the Environmental Impact Evaluation Process, CITMA Resolution No.

77/99 (July 28, 1999), 48 Gaceta Oficial de la Republica de Cuba 778 (Aug. 6, 1999). 18 Because many of the mission agencies that are required to conduct EIAs for their projects do not have the

necessary expertise to conduct such analyses, Cuba relies largely on a system of consultants to comply with its EIA 

process. CITMA has a list of pre-screened and approved outside consultants for this purpose. Consultants are paid

directly by the agencies requiring the analysis, not by CITMA. 

 369

19 Id. at 37. 
b. Needs/Problems

Given that the agencies requiring EIAs are also responsible for paying the

consultants hired to conduct the analysis, agencies have leverage to employ only 

consultants who will grant favorable reviews to their projects. As a result, the 

current Cuban consultant system finds itself in a situation where one central 

consulting firm is cornering the bulk of the environmental impact assessment work 

in the country.20

The lack of public participation, therefore, needs to be addressed in Cuba’s 

EIA process.. Linked to this issue is the fact that all projects in Cuba are subject to 

a process called “micro-localization,” a zoning review and authorization system

managed by the Planning Ministry that also does not include a public participation 

component.21 Under Resolution 77/99, a “micro-localization” approval must be 

obtained before an application can be submitted for an environmental license. This 

requirement in turn “fixes the location of activities that can have considerable 

impact, such as hotels, roads, and mining operations,” making the central issue of 

environmental reviews the location of the project.22 Thus, the lack of public 

involvement and the timing for the micro-localization approval and the 

environmental review are issues that need to be addressed. 

Lastly, although Cuba’s Law of Foreign Investment requires that foreign 

investment be made in the context of sustainable development and executed with 

care for the protection of the environment and the rational use of natural 

resources23 environmental concerns often bump up against economic pressures and 

it is unclear how much power, if any, CITMA has, if any, over foreign investment 

decisions. 

c. U.S. Actions 

 

EIAs serve as a valuable management tool. The U. S. Government has 

extensive experience in this area and should be prepared to offer capacity building 

assistance to a free Cuba through its Environmental Impact Assessment for 

20 Id. at 33. 21 Id. at 29. 22 Id.

 370

23 Id. at 30, quoting Ley 77, Ley Para La Inversion Extranjera [Law 77, Foreign Investment Law], reprinted in La

Economía Cubana: Reformas Estructurales y Desempeño en Los Noventa (1997). 
Reviewers Course. This course is not only targeted at an audience with different 

skill levels, but focuses on the use of environmental impact assessment review in 

any institutional setting and set of roles. It covers the general approach, along with 

the tools and techniques, for conducting objective, unbiased reviews and for 

ensuring widespread participation in the decision-making process.

2. Water Quality 

i. Ambient Water Quality 

Surface and groundwater in Cuba are severely polluted by runoff from 

heavily treated fields with fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides, as well as by the 

discharge of untreated effluents from cities and industries such as sugar mills, 

sugar by-products, food processing plants, mining operations, etc.24 Socialist 

Cuba’s fixation with irrigation resulted in very high rates of extraction of 

groundwater causing groundwater levels to drop, salt-water intrusion, and increase 

salinity of the soils near the coasts. In addition, an extensive dam construction 

program reduced the river flows and limited the natural recharge of aquifers, 

increasing the salt-water encroachment, especially in Ciego de Avila Province. 

The insufficient levels of wastewater treatment and the lack of sewer pipelines 

have caused a degradation of the water quality. 

 

Most of the rivers have been dammed to catch the runoff waters for 

irrigation and water supply. At the present time, volume of storage water is huge 

in these numerous reservoirs, but there is no specific data available. The damming 

of nearly all the major rivers has reduced the flow in the river channels and 

exacerbated the salt-water intrusion along the coastal areas. 

24 Díaz-Briquets, Sergio and Jorge Pérez-López, Conquering Nature: The Environmental Legacy of Socialism in

Cuba. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000; and, López Vigil, María, “Cuba Campaign: Twenty Issues 

for a Green Agenda,” Global Exchange, 5 October 2001. 

http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/cuba/sustainable/lopez100501.html (23 January 2003)

 371

 
ii. Land-based sources of pollution 

a. Status 

 

Cuba discharges large amounts of wastes to the Wider Caribbean, 

particularly from along its northeastern coast. Data compiled by the U.N. 

Environment Programme (UNEP)/Caribbean Environment Programme25 show 

high waste loads from domestic (municipal) and industrial sources. For domestic 

(municipal) pollution loads, Cuba contributed approximately 12 percent of the 

Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD) (63,147 tons/year) and 12 percent of the 

total suspended solids (TSS) (54,292 tons/year) introduced into the Wider 

Caribbean Basin; of Cuba’s total loading, 85 percent of BOD and 93.5 percent of 

TSS originated from its northeastern coast. The available data indicate little or no 

treatment of municipal wastewater. Waste loads from Cuba’s industrial sources 

were relatively lower, totaling 5 percent of contributions to the Wider Caribbean 

Region. Almost two-thirds of Cuba’s industrial BOD loadings came from 

sugar/molasses and rum industries. 

 

According to available sources, Havana Bay is severely polluted. A 1997 

study conducted by the Center for Environmental Engineering and Management of 

Bays and Coasts (Centro de Ingeniería y Manejo Ambiental de Bahías y Costas)26

found that the main pollutants in Havana Bay are high levels of nutrients, solids, 

oil and grease, heavy metals, and bacteria. 

 

Oil pollution is considered the most serious marine environmental problem

despite a decrease since 1981. Reported values are higher than the CARIPOL27

standards. The average hydrocarbons in surface waters of Havana Bay decreased 

from an average of 3.35 mg/l in the 1981-85 period to 0.69 mg/l in 1996. The 

average hydrocarbons in the sediments of Havana Bay decreased from 3,948 ug/g 

in 1986 to 994 ug/g in 1996. Also highly contaminated with oil and grease is the 

Santiago del Estero Bay (0.31 mg/l in water and 864 ug/l in sediments), North 

25 UNEP Caribbean Environment Programme, Regional Overview of Land-Based Sources of Pollution in the Wider 

Caribbean Region, Technical Report No. 33, 1994, pp. 28-32. 

26 UNEP Caribbean Environment Programme, Assessment of Land-Based Sources and Activities Affecting the 

Marine, Coastal and Associated Freshwater Environment in the Wider Caribbean Region, UNEP Regional Seas 

Reports and Studies #172, 1999, pp. 57-59.

 372

27 Marine Pollution Monitoring Programme in the Caribbean (a UNEP program)
Coast of Havana City (0.23 mg/l in water and327 ug/l in sediments), Matanzas Bay 

(<0.05 mg/l in water and 175 ug/l in sediments), Nipe Bay (104 ug/l in sediments), 

and the Varadero-Cardenas Coastal Area (78 ug/l in sediments). The study found 

that the majority of the sewage was discharged into Havana Bay without any 

treatment, which accounted for the high level of ammonia nitrogen, nitrate, nitrites, 

phosphorus, and fecal coliform. The bay experienced eutrophication28 due to the 

high concentration of nutrients. The amount of suspended solids also increased 

from 160 mg/l in 1986 to about 220 mg/l in 1996. Heavy metals from domestic 

and industrial sources (with the exception of iron, lead, and zinc) also increased 

from 1994 to 1996, posing a serious risk to human health and living marine 

organisms.29

b. U.S. Actions 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 The U.S. Government can assist in developing and conducting assessments of 

the impacts of point and non-point sources of pollution. The U.S. manages a 

National Status and Trends Program, which conducts long-term contaminant 

monitoring at more than 350 estuarine and coastal sites to determine the 

impacts of contaminant exposure and changes in coastal habitats on the 

distribution and abundance of living marine resources. 

 The U.S. Government can also contribute expertise in the use of chemical, 

biomolecular, microbiological, and histological research to describe, evaluate, 

and predict the significant factors related to point and non-point sources of 

pollution. 

iii. Drinking Water and Wastewater

a. Status 

 

Please see the MEDIUM- & LONG-TERM ACTIONS section of Chapter 5, 

MODERNIZING INFRASTRUCTURE, for a discussion of this topic. 

28 A process of oxygen depletion that diminishes fish populations. 

 373

29 Id. at 57-59 
b. U.S. Actions 

The U.S. Government has limited technical expertise for addressing primary 

infrastructure issues, as states and local agencies, with the help of private sector 

engineering consulting firms, have primary responsibility in the U.S. The U.S. 

Government does have experience in bringing together small ad hoc teams of 

experts from around the country to act as consultants to other countries on a 

limited basis. This type of team is most likely not appropriate for a full scale 

assessment and potential rebuilding of a nation’s infrastructure; however, the 

following actions are recommended: 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 U.S. Government agencies can provide a free Cuba with a significant amount of 

capacity building expertise. Capacity building includes, but is not limited to, 

development of monitoring programs, review and assessment of water quality 

data (drinking water, effluent discharge, ambient water quality), long-term 

development of laws and regulations, development of pre-treatment programs 

(control of industrial discharges into public waste water systems), etc. 

 The U.S. Government could help a free Cuba develop a water and wastewater 

plan similar to the one being done along the California/Tijuana, Mexico 

border. The Plan would assess current potable water resources and needs, 

future potable water needs, current wastewater infrastructure resources and 

needs, and future wastewater needs. 

 The overall project objective would be to develop a living document that 

presents an integrated strategy for water and sanitation services (including 

infrastructure) for Cuba. This will allow the local, international, and U.S. 

agencies to collaborate in meeting the needs of public health, quality of life, 

and environmental protection for present and future generations. 

 The U.S. Government could also provide assistance on lab improvement and 

treatment optimization if requested by a transition government. A significant 

consideration here is whether there exists an administrative structure and 

potential for binding requirements on the water suppliers in Cuba to value and 

maintain improvements over time in these areas. If the appropriate 

 374
institutional infrastructure and political support are not present, long-term 

sustainability is unlikely. Hence, it is important to collaborate and empower 

local officials to carry out meaningful improvements. 

 Long-term infrastructure financing is critical for lasting water and wastewater 

capital improvements. A free Cuba faces or could face problems similar to 

those of the Pacific Islanders. The U.S. Government has vast experience and is 

investigating innovative financing schemes that could promote financing for 

long-term capital improvements. 

 

iv. Coral Reefs30

a. Status 

Cuba contains some of the healthiest coral reef ecosystems and largest intact 

coastal habitats in the Caribbean. This situation stems from a combination of 

minimal coastal development on the north and south coasts and the location of 

many of its reefs, which are generally beyond the influence of land-based sources 

of pollution. It has the largest and most diverse shelf habitats in the insular 

Caribbean. In terms of reef fish, Cuban populations have higher biomass, species 

richness, and average size than many other countries in the region, but these 

parameters were declining in the 1980s and 1990s due to over-fishing, especially 

groupers, snappers, conch, and lobster. 

b. Current and Emerging Threats 

 

Overall, some scientists have rated over 70 percent of Cuba’s reefs to be 

threatened, with nearly 40 percent at high threat. The analysis identified overfishing as the predominant threat to Cuba’s reefs, but the coral reef fishery today is 

probably in better condition than other Caribbean countries.31 The use of nonselective fishing gears, the indiscriminate use of set nets during spawning 

30 Clive Wilkinson (ed), Status of Coral Reefs of the World: 2002, Australian Institute of Marine Science, 2002;

Reefbase Country Overview (Search for Cuba): http://www.reefbase.org/resources/res_overview.asp;

and Reefs at Risk: Caribbean, 2004. in press. 

 375

31 “Status of coral reefs of the world: 2002 (Wilkinson, C., ed). Australian Institute of Marine Science, Townsville, 

Australia. p Linton, D. et al. 2002. Status of coral reefs in the northern Caribbean and Atlantic node of the 

GCRMN. In .285
aggregations, and limited enforcement in the early 1970s led to extensive overfishing of several key commercial species.32 About one-fifth of reefs are 

threatened by watershed-based sources of pollution, and relatively few reefs (less 

than 5 percent) are threatened by coastal development or marine-based sources. 

Sedimentation and coastal development threats are low, mainly due to the fact that 

many reefs are offshore and outside the influence of land-based sources of 

pollution33 and because tourism, a prevalent impact on many reefs in the 

Caribbean, is relatively undeveloped in Cuba. Remote reefs (e.g., around the 

southern archipelagos) are in very good condition, but signs of decline are evident 

near large population centers such as Havana, characterized by low coral cover, 

overgrowth by algae, and disease outbreaks.34 

An existing initiative to create a national system of Marine Protected Areas 

(MPAs) by 2008 is key to helping preserve marine biodiversity. However, 

implementation of a national MPA system should be complemented by other forms 

of ocean and coastal governance, such as sustainable fisheries and integrated 

coastal management to control threats at an ecosystem scale. 

 

From 1994-2000, tourism increased an average of 20 percent annually. 

Even with no change in U.S. travel restrictions, the Cuban Ministry of Tourism

predicts international tourism will rise about 10 percent per year. Most of this 

tourism growth will occur in the coastal areas. A normalization of investment and 

travel restrictions is likely to transform, if not overwhelm, Cuban policy processes 

currently in place to manage growth. Cuban planning officials predict that total 

tourist arrivals could increase to between 5 and 10 million if the embargo is lifted 

or significantly eased. 

32 Claro, R., K.C. Lindeman & L.R. Parenti. 2001. Ecology of Marine Fishes of Cuba. Smithsonian Institution Press, 

Washington DC USA. p. 219 33 Linton, D. et al. 2002. Status of coral reefs in the northern Caribbean and Atlantic node of the GCRMN. In

“Status of coral reefs of the world: 2002 (Wilkinson, C., ed). Australian Institute of Marine Science, Townsville, 

Australia. p.281 

 376

34 Linton, D. et al. 2002. Status of coral reefs in the northern Caribbean and Atlantic node of the GCRMN. In

“Status of coral reefs of the world: 2002 (Wilkinson, C., ed). Australian Institute of Marine Science, Townsville, 

Australia. p.281 
c. Need for Assistance 

The likely dramatic expansion of tourism and coastal development will 

intensify the need for infrastructure and services, as well as add new pressures for 

fisheries. Cuba has an institutional framework for environmental management in 

the national environmental strategy of Law No. 81, but this may need to be 

reassessed in the context of rapid coastal development. Coastal management tools 

such as land use planning, project siting, environmental impact assessments, and 

licensing may also need to be reassessed to enhance their contribution to integrated 

coastal management. The agencies involved in coastal and marine monitoring and 

management will need to be strengthened to meet the challenges ahead. 

d. U.S. Actions 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 If requested by a transition government, a variety of U.S. agencies that provide 

international development and technical assistance in integrated coastal 

management and improved sectoral management could be involved in a 

comprehensive assistance program that could cost $3-$5 million a year for five 

years. 

 The U.S. Government can assist transition government coral reef managers 

with a number of tools necessary to effectively manage coral reef ecosystems. 

These tools include mapping of benthic habitats of coral reef ecosystems and 

assessing the associated reef fish and their essential fish habitat. 

 The U.S. Government should also be prepared to provide assistance and 

guidance on sampling and analyzing associated sediments, and on conducting 

research on oxidative stress and small heat shock proteins used to predict coral 

bleaching events. Such tools are useful in determining the overall health status 

of coral reef ecosystems.

The U.S. Coral Health and Monitoring Program provides services and 

information sources for researchers and the public in order to help improve and 

sustain coral reef health. The Coral Reef Early Warning System (CREWS) 

network monitors and links long-term meteorological and oceanographic 

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conditions to the health of coral reefs. CREWS is comprised of unique moored 

sampling stations that acquire a suite of meteorological and oceanographic 

measurements and transmit the data via satellite to the Nation Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration. The data are processed with a suite of expert 

systems that determine whether data are within a reasonable range and whether 

certain environmental conditions are conducive to specific marine behavioral 

events (e.g., coral bleaching). The CREWS system has been successful in 

modeling and alerting resource managers to coral bleaching conditions in the 

Florida Keys and the Great Barrier Reef. The U.S. Government plans to expand 

this alerting capability to other coral reef areas, as well as better refine and enhance 

its alerting capabilities beyond coral bleaching.35

RECOMMENDATION:

 Once a transition in Cuba is underway, the U.S. Government should be 

prepared to help Cuba become eligible for participation in the Coral Reef 

Conservation Fund, a competitive small grants program carried out by the U.S. 

Government in association with the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation. 

The Fund provides grants for projects that build public-private partnerships to 

reduce and prevent degradation of coral reefs and associated habitats. 

Program categories include management, monitoring, research, and 

conservation. The focus areas for the fund include U.S. state and territorial 

waters, freely associated states, and Caribbean or Mesoamerican coral reef 

ecosystems. The U.S. could use this program as a mechanism to help fund 

partnership coral reef conservation projects with a free Cuba. 

 

Established in 1994, the International Coral Reef Initiative (ICRI) is a 

partnership among nations and organizations seeking to implement international 

conventions and agreements for the benefit of coral reefs and related ecosystems. 

The U.S. Coral Reef Initiative (USCRI) was launched in 1996 as a platform for 

U.S. support for domestic and international coral conservation efforts. The goal of 

the USCRI is to strengthen and fill the gaps in existing efforts to conserve and 

manage coral reefs and related ecosystems (sea grass beds and mangrove forests) 

in U.S. waters in a sustainable manner. This experience, along with participation 

35 Daniel J. Whittle, Kenyon C. Lindeman, James T.B.Tripp, “International Tourism and Protection of Cuba’s

Coastal and Marine Environments,” Tulane Law Journal, vol 16, pg 533. 

 378
by other U.S. Government agencies and departments, will be invaluable in 

assessing, monitoring, and protecting the coral reefs of a free Cuba. 

The U.S. Government is developing a framework document on coral reef 

protection. This document will consider protection of coral reefs from a watershed 

management perspective, and will offer resource managers a bottom-up concept of 

management. The intent is not to manage corals reefs in isolation, but to include 

them as part of a comprehensive integrated coastal zone management plan. This 

approach will improve protection of near-shore reefs by incorporating them into 

the planning processes of their associated watersheds. 

RECOMMENDATION:

 The U.S. Government should offer to share its coral reef framework document 

with a transition government. This guidance is predominantly based on laws 

governing water resources in the United States, but could serve as a template 

for increased protection for Cuba’s coral reef system if a transition government 

seeks assistance in this area. 

v. Integrated Coastal Resource Management 

a. Status 

Cuba, as a large island nation with 3,735 km of coastline including many

smaller islands, would benefit from the development and implementation of an 

integrated coastal management program in order to deal with future development 

and environmental degradation issues in a more comprehensive way. Given its 

coastal resource base of beaches, coral reefs, mangrove forests, and waterways, 

etc., it is likely that coastal tourism (developments and activities conducted upon 

land immediately adjacent to the shoreline, coastal wetlands, estuaries and tidal 

waters, and associated marine waters) could quickly become Cuba’s leading 

industry. Massive hotel development, attractions to accommodate the expected 

increase in tourism, and associated domestic growth will also migrate to the 

shoreline to support the industry. The scenario is not an unfamiliar one. 

Experience around the world and in the United States has shown that development 

must meet certain environmental, social, and economic standards or significant 

damage can occur to the resources that attract tourists and visitors, resulting in 

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costly fixes, if and when possible. Only a Cuban government prepared to meet the 

environmental challenges of accelerated growth will be in a position to provide 

long-term benefits to the Cuban people. 

b. U.S. Actions 

RECOMMENDATION:

 To assist a free Cuba in developing an integrated coastal resource management 

program, the U.S. government could provide technical assistance to develop 

and conduct a National Coastal Assessment Program. At its completion, this 

program will assess the ecological “health” of the marine and estuarine 

resources of Cuba, provide data to suggest cause(s) of reduced health, and 

provide an ecological baseline to develop, target, and assess the effectiveness of 

environmental management activities into the future. 

This effort could be timely with regard to both the availability of validated 

monitoring and assessment technologies and the need for scientific data to manage 

natural resources that are critically important to Cuba’s national economy. 

Coordination with, and transfer of, monitoring and assessment technologies from

the U.S. National Coastal Assessment Program, a component of the Environmental 

Monitoring and Assessment Program (EMAP), will help ensure that a National 

Coastal Assessment Program in Cuba is successful and is based on the most 

current monitoring and assessment technologies. The efficiency and effectiveness 

of this proposed program will be greatly enhanced by transfer of technology 

developed at considerable cost by the National Coastal Assessment Program. 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 

 A complete monitoring and assessment program template is available, from 

sampling designs and protocols to data management and statistical analysis; a 

report format is even available that presents complex monitoring data into a 

form that is useful to decision makers. Assistance activities could: 

 transfer monitoring and assessment technologies developed in the United 

States; 

 380
 build capacity through training and assistance from U.S. Government 

scientists so Cuba can continue coastal monitoring and assessment activities 

with little or no external assistance; and 

 plan and implement monitoring and assessment programs for additional 

natural resources in Cuba such as seagrasses, wetlands, and corals.

 With more than 30 years of experience in implementing the U.S. Coastal Zone 

Management Act, the U.S. Government, using appropriate resources to include 

expertise from U.S. Gulf States and Island Territories who have faced similar 

problems, could provide a free Cuba with significant technical assistance to be 

more prepared to meet the inevitable growth that will take place. Such 

assistance, if requested, could include: 

 an interagency needs assessment of coastal stressors and Cuban 

management capabilities, the result of which will be the development of a 

technical assistance framework; and 

 the development of an exchange program of technical assistance and 

training, based on needs identified in the technical assistance framework. 

 The U.S. Government could also provide technical legal assistance on marine 

issues, such as: marine resource conservation and management, ports and 

shipping, marine protected areas, integrated coastal zone management, 

pollution prevention and natural resource restoration, mitigation of land-based 

sources of marine pollution, and implementation of international agreements 

relating to marine activities. 

3. Land Management 

As with many areas, assessments will be an important first step as a new free 

Cuban government focuses on addressing issues related to land and other natural 

resources. Such assessments should identify and prioritize land resource needs and 

identify Cuban expertise in conservation, land management, resource management, 

and other areas. Additionally, consideration should be given to establishing an 

interdisciplinary team for problem identification/solution based on levels of 

complexity. Finally, while there is good basic soils information available, more 

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detailed information should prove useful to other agricultural and domestic uses.

i. Solid Waste Management 

a. Status 36

As in the majority of Latin American and Caribbean countries, in Cuba the 

operation and administration of solid waste management is at the municipal level 

while the norms, planning, oversight, and evaluation are centralized at the national 

level. 

In 1991, Havana produced 1,100 tons/day of municipal solid waste, the 

equivalent of 0.7 kg/day/person. This figure is below the LAC average of 0.97 

kg/day/person for cities of two million people or more. The municipal solid waste 

collection coverage rate was 80 percent. Most of this waste went to one of two 

landfills; some went to specialized plants to produce pig feed. Cuba does not 

recover methane generated at these landfills. 

At the national level, Cuba has national policies related to hospital waste 

management. The IDB reports that the 50,293 beds at medical facilities across the 

country generated 11,014.2 tons/year of hazardous medical waste. Management of 

these wastes is based on their hazard classification: clinical materials and “sharps,” 

pathogenic, or common. 

 

ii. U.S. Actions 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 In the area of solid wastes, if requested by a transition government, U.S. 

Government experts could meet with Cuban scientists and environmental 

experts to provide technical assistance in the form of literature as well as direct 

consultation assistance in diverse areas, such as: 

 

36 Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo y la Organizacion Panamericana de Salud. “Diagnóstico de la Situación de 

Manejo de Residuos Sólidos Municipales en América Latina y El Caribe.” Report No. ENV.97-107. Washington, 

DC, July 1997. 

 382
 Contaminant-specific Environmental Technologies currently employed in 

the U.S. (and other countries around the world); 

 Treatment & Control of Solid Wastes (including containment technologies 

such as land fill liners or thermal treatments); 

 Pollution and Management of Scrap Tires; 

 Medical Waste Tracking; 

 Municipal Solid Waste Source Reduction; 

 Soil Washing (chemical and metals removal); 

 Management of Watersheds and Freshwater Ecology; 

 Erosion control and water management associated with solid waste landfill 

situations; and 

 Planning, design, installation, and operation of methane gas recovery 

systems at existing solid waste landfill sites. The methane gas can be used 

as an energy conservation measure to reduce fossil fuel dependence by 

replacing petroleum imports. 

ii. Toxic and Hazardous Waste Management

a. Status 

The Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO) estimated that Cuban 

industries now annually produce just over 26 million tons of hazardous wastes or 

2.37 million tons/person: 530,000 tons of hazardous sludge; 24,960,000 tons of 

hazardous liquids; and, 570,000 tons of hazardous solids. 37

 

37 Id. pp 118-119. 

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b. U.S. Actions 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 Contingent on a formal assessment of Cuban training needs, the U.S. 

Government should be prepared to offer training in areas such as: 

 Air Monitoring for Hazardous Materials; 

 Emergency Response to Hazardous Materials Incidents; 

 Field Analytical Technologies for Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) in 

Groundwater; 

 Field Based Analytical Methods for Explosive Compounds; 

 Unexploded Ordinance (UXO) Basic Training; 

 Pesticide Produce Enforcement; and 

 Waste Treatment, Transportation, & Disposal.

 The U.S. Government can also provide on-line training to Cuban environmental 

audiences through the Internet. Currently, these hazardous waste seminars 

have been conducted in 100 cities in 45 countries around the world. Of 

particular note is a course currently offered in Spanish that provides access to 

information about technologies used in soil and groundwater clean-up. 

 The U.S. Government can provide technical and hands-on assistance through 

training and information sharing concerning the reclamation of former 

industrial areas to municipalities for public or private productive use through 

the U.S. Brownfields Program. This program assists public and private 

organizations to prevent, assess, safely clean up, and sustainably reclaim these 

sites. 

 The U.S. Government can provide direct hands-on technical assistance to a free 

Cuba in specific subject matter areas of solid or hazardous waste or 

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groundwater contamination through one-on-one consultations between Cuban 

scientists and technicians and U.S. Government experts. Subjects of these 

consultations can include:

 Detection and disposal of PCBs that can be addressed by U.S. Government 

scientists and disposal experts. 

 Mining Wastes (particularly Nickel) that can also be addressed by U.S. 

Government experts. 

 If requested, the U.S. Government can provide technical advice and hands-on 

assistance for the remediation of Cuban military bases and facilities; for 

example, oil spills and chemical wastes reclamation at current and former 

military vehicular depot sites; analyses and remediation of unexploded 

ordinances at weapons testing ranges; and pharmaceutical approaches to 

hazardous substance inventories tracking and disposal practices. 

iii. Mining Operations/Reclamation

a. Status 

While a free Cuba’s economic development will include mining, U.S. 

Government assistance programs must be cognizant that mining facilities or land 

currently being mined were expropriated from American citizens in 1959. 

Cuba has 37 percent, or 800 million tons, of the world’s proven reserves of 

nickel, plus cobalt and chromium. There are 2.2 billion tons of probable nickel 

reserves in Holguin with lesser reserves elsewhere. Nickel and cobalt account for 

about 90 percent of Cuban mineral exports. Other mining activity includes iron, 

copper, manganese, chromium, silver, and gold. Cuba has two recent mining 

ventures with Canadian mining companies: KRW is investing in gold exploration 

and Newport Exploration Ltd. has acquired a 50 percent interest in the high grade 

Mantua Copper Project located in western Cuba. 

Cuba’s oil deposits are scarce and yield high sulfur residues that corrode rigs 

and refineries. Few foreign investors have been willing to produce crude oil in 

Cuba. Nevertheless, production increased to 15 million barrels of oil and 566 

 385
million cubic meters (20 billion cubic feet) of natural gas by 1999. The oil and gas 

help meet the energy demand in Cuba’s thermal power plants as well as the energy

needed to produce cement and asphalt. 

b. U.S. Actions 

RECOMMENDATION:

 The U.S. Government could provide design and maintenance assistance of 

conservation measures necessary for reclamation of surface mining activity. It 

could also provide technical assistance in erosion control, water management 

and related engineering. 

iv. Soil Erosion, Sedimentation, and Compaction 

a. Status 

Desertification has now reached over six billion hectares worldwide, affects 

one billion people, and is on the rise. Cuba is not exempt from this problem. In an 

interview with the Cuban press, the former president of the Castro regime’s 

Environmental Agency was quoted as saying that, based on Ministry of 

Agriculture data, “approximately 76 percent of the country’s potential agricultural 

land has some level of damage: erosion, salinity, or compression.” This situation 

has led the Cuban government to list soil loss and damage as its main 

environmental problem. The type and extent of soil damage varies by province: 

desertification levels seem most pronounced in the eastern provinces, salinization 

is critical in Guantanamo, and wind and rain erosion have caused the most damage 

in the Pinar del Rio coastal plains. Mineral extraction contributes to soil loss and 

compaction, particularly in areas where soil has been removed for strip mining. 

Some 40 tons of land per hectare end up in the sea or the rivers, contaminating the 

water. 38

 

Implementation of urban gardening and organic production practices 

following the collapse of the Soviet bloc may have reduced the degree of soil 

38 “Desertification: Cuba’s Main Environmental Problem,” Granma International/On-Line Edition. Havana, Cuba, 

March 6, 2003. 

 386
erosion taking place in Cuba. Additionally, the loss of imported Soviet bloc fuel 

reduced tractor use in Cuban agriculture, thereby reducing soil compaction on 

some lands. 

b. U.S. Actions 

RECOMMENDATION:

 Based on available information, the U.S. Government could provide assistance 

in all facets of soil erosion, sedimentation, soil compaction, and related 

conservation practices. Tropical data is not readily available; therefore, good 

climate and soils information would foster the best use of other expertise. 

Examples of activities to improve soils information of benefit to a free Cuba 

include: Conduct an assessment of soil conditions, soil sampling, soil 

classification, soil interpretation, establish a soil database, determine 

sedimentation rates, address sedimentation in priority areas, determine the 

extent of soil compaction and identify conservation priorities that decrease 

compacted soil layers to provide a healthy environment for plant growth. 

v. Agricultural Practices

With a change in political systems, the aim of improving agricultural 

practices and crops systems will be to avoid soil erosion, sedimentation, and 

compaction while improving nutrient content and loss of soil to the sea, and 

avoiding adverse public health and environmental effects from use of agricultural 

chemicals. 

vi. Irrigation from Surface and Groundwater 

a. Status 

Water scarcity continues to be a major problem in Cuba. With the loss of 

subsidized fuel supplies in the early 1990s, the number of crops and the amount of 

cropland under intensive irrigation has shrunk drastically. 

b. U.S. Actions 

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RECOMMENDATION:

 With a transition government in Cuba, there may be opportunities to provide 

expertise in the form of information, design, and application based on available 

soils information. Also, assistance to transfer and adapt irrigation technology 

to tropical agriculture might be warranted. Assistance could also be provided 

to apply irrigation models to existing conditions. 

vii. Chemicals Application Practices 

a. Status 

The agricultural model followed by Cuba until the mid 1980s was very 

chemicals-intensive with a high reliance on pesticides. Environmental pollution 

from chemicals has probably fallen as applications of chemicals have dropped 

substantially over the last decade. 

b. U.S. Actions 

RECOMMENDATION:

 The U.S. Government should be prepared to provide assistance and information 

on agricultural chemical management with the goal of protecting surface and 

subsurface waters, which can be modeled and predicted with adequate soils 

information 

viii. Open Field Burning of Sugar Cane

With the Cuban sugar industry shrinking over the last decade, open field 

burning of sugar cane may not be as large a problem as it once was. 

RECOMMENDATION:

 The U.S. Government could provide information on the 

advantages/disadvantages of burning versus non-burning. 

 388
ix. Research and Technology Transfer 

Research and technology transfer activities could be useful in many ways, 

including biological control of plant disease and insect attack, tropical agriculture, 

watershed management, water management for irrigation and water quality 

improvement, and animal health. 

4. AIR QUALITY 

i. Status 39

Although Cuba’s air quality monitoring network (Sistema Nacional de 

Vigilancia Atmosférica) had serious problems during the last decade due to lack of 

equipment, Cuba reported a tendency for a general increase in the average 

concentration of oxidized gas compounds during 1986 and 1998. Most of the 

emissions identified were derived from industrial and agricultural sources. 

 

In the localities of Moa, Mariel, Nuevitas, Nicaro, Santa Cruz del Norte, and 

parts of Havana City, the ambient air quality monitoring is seriously deficient. 

During the years 1989 to 1995, the acid rain was observed to increase. Since 

1996, the acid rains have apparently decreased; however, this fact cannot be 

scientifically confirmed due to the deterioration of their monitoring system. Acid 

rain deposition maps show greater values in the coastal areas of Mariel-Varadero, 

Santa Clara, Cienfuegos, Nuevitas, and the mining zone to the north of Holguín. 

The estimated reductions of SO2 and NOx emissions needed to attain acid rain 

levels close to those of nature vary between 30 percent and 80-100 percent for 

those areas affected by the acid rain. 

In the past decade, Cuba took several actions to resolve air pollution 

problems, including: 

 Law No 81 of 1997 which has a chapter on the atmosphere and establishes 

responsibilities related to these technological processes of air pollution and 

 389

39 Centro de Información,Gestión y Educación Ambiental, “Panorama Ambiental de Cuba 2000,” 2001, pp.50-52. 
technology transfer on gases and particulate emissions which affect the ozone 

layer and cause climatic changes; 

 development of maps that forecast the estimated elevations of sea levels and 

their effects on human settlement, natural resources, and short-, medium-, and 

long-range effects; 

 promotion of renewable energy sources to replace fossil fuels, such as biomass, 

solar, wind, and hydroelectric; and 

 development of technical norms or standards related to air quality. 

 Stationary and mobile sources of pollution are highly dependent on 

petroleum as a source of energy. Cuba’s infrastructure (e.g., oil refineries, electric 

power generating stations) is old and, according to available data, generally lacks 

modern emission controls. In addition, the economy is populated with a variety of 

industrial sources dominated by sugar and other food processing plants and 

mining/smelting operations (e.g., nickel). Gasoline sold in Cuba contains lead and 

has a high sulfur content.40

 

ii. Needs 

In many cases, the assistance necessary to address air pollution issues would 

require investments of tens of millions, if not hundreds of millions of dollars, when 

one considers the cost of retrofitting oil refineries and electric power plants with 

modern pollution control equipment. A transition government will need to 

consider the relative merits and costs of restoring and retrofitting old and poorly

managed facilities. In some cases, it might make more economic sense to shut 

down an existing facility and build a new facility. 

iii. U.S. Actions

 

Because of the integrative nature of air pollution with human activity, any 

strategies developed to address air quality issues would need to be integrated with 

those of other activities, including transportation planning, infrastructure 

 390

40 Argelio Maldonado, conference call, February 17, 2004. 
upgrading/replacement, and overall economic growth projections. For example, an 

air quality management process to address “stationary sources” in a free Cuba 

would require working with the country on specifications for new vehicles, 

assuming that with the economic liberalization there would be an influx of them. 

a. Stationary Sources of Pollution 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 The first level of support the U.S. Government should be prepared to provide 

would be to assess the air quality and the capacity of the Cuban environmental 

professionals to address air quality issues. To assess air quality, the U.S. 

Government could examine the available data and information on ambient air 

and emission sources. This would include a review of: the nature of the 

existing monitoring network; the extent and quality of air quality data 

(including emission or source inventories); the extent and quality of public 

health, economic and research data; the industrial source categories; and 

pollutants of primary and secondary concern. 

 To assess local capacity, the U.S. Government could help a transition 

government examine: the viability of existing statutory or regulatory 

authorities; the experience and educational level of current staff; the existing 

staffing levels; the availability of financial resources; the roles and 

responsibilities of national program staff, local government staff and 

capabilities in academia, industry, and research institutions; and the technical 

resources at the disposal of air quality staff (e.g., hardware, software).

This initial assessment could include working with Cuba to identify some 

high priority stationary sources for purposes of developing control strategies. 

 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 Once an initial assessment is complete, the U.S. Government could help a 

transition government identify any gaps in data needed to make a preliminary 

determination regarding the quality of Cuban air. If additional data is needed, 

the U.S. Government could initiate the work necessary to fill those data gaps. 

For example, if no inventory exists of current sources, a preliminary emission 

inventory could be conducted. If the monitoring network was inadequate to 

 391
determine air quality, temporary monitoring or modeling could be conducted to 

assist a free Cuba to identify priority problems. The goal would be to develop 

an adequate data set and facilitate an understanding of key air quality 

concerns. With that information, a free Cuba could develop strategic programs 

to address priority concerns. 

 While acquiring the necessary data, the U.S. Government could identify priority 

training and capacity building activities based on the initial assessment of 

Cuban staff. The U.S. Government, in conjunction with local academic 

institutions, could develop Cuba-specific training courses on topics such as air 

quality management, monitoring, and emission inventory development. The 

ideal would be to institute a train-the-trainer system designed to provide an ongoing in-country knowledge base to support air quality management activities. 

Again, the goal is to build the capacity of the Cuban staff to implement a 

strategic air quality management program. 

 Based on the priorities identified by the transition government, the U.S. 

Government would work to provide technical assistance and build staff 

capacity to become self-sustaining. Again, depending on the areas of need, this 

phase could focus on training or on-going program development assistance. 

Also, given the experience of many developing countries, there is a good sense 

of preventative measures available to mitigate the air quality problems that 

inevitably come with rapid economic expansion. 

 The U.S. Government should be prepared to look for public-private 

partnerships and partnerships with cities — with the objective of identifying 

U.S. expertise that could help a free Cuba reduce pollution, such as landfill 

methane recovery or industrial energy efficiency, and develop policies for 

“responsible investment.” 

b. Mobile Sources of Pollution 

Since mobile and stationary sources are the primary contributors to outdoor 

air pollution, the assessment steps contained under “stationary sources” would 

incorporate a mobile source component (e.g., assessing the contribution of mobile 

sources to air pollution). 

 392
RECOMMENDATION:

 In looking at vehicle pollution, there is a vehicles component (e.g., what kind of 

pollution controls are contained on the vehicle) and a fuels component (the 

quality of the fuel used to power the vehicle). The U.S. Government could assist 

a transition government in assessing their situation and help develop mitigation 

options, recognizing economic limitations. In cases where accurate data do not 

exist (as is likely the case in Cuba), there exist simplified versions of models 

that can be used with default recommendations in place of hard data. 

The Cuban vehicle population includes a large number of old vehicles that 

do not have modern pollution control devices on them (e.g., catalytic converters). 

The vehicles are also using fuel that probably has a relatively high sulfur content 

and contains lead. 

RECOMMENDATION:

 From a public health perspective, the U.S. Government could assist a free Cuba 

in devising a strategy for a phasing out lead in gasoline. This phase-out could 

present some transition problems, since Cuba has so many older cars that were 

made prior to the phase out of lead in gasoline and the introduction of catalytic 

converters. 

c. Indoor Air

RECOMMENDATION:

 The U.S. Government has a great deal of recognized expertise in developing 

voluntary programs. A training course that has been developed for this 

purpose, Leadership and Voluntary Campaign Implementation, provides groups 

in other countries with the skills needed to establish their own voluntary 

programs. This class has been offered overseas in China, Latvia, Poland, Viet 

Nam, India, and Thailand. A second project that should be made available to 

a free Cuba is the Partnership for Clean Indoor Air that looks at the use of 

biomass fuels for indoor cooking and heating. This is an international effort 

aimed at the estimated 2 million women and children who are most at risk from 

these practices. The Central American Commission for Environment and 

 393
Development is one of the project partners. 

All major Indoor Air outreach materials are also available in Spanish so they 

could be used immediately. 

5. OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 

i. “Hotspot” Areas 

a. Status

The U.S. Government has received reports of areas where levels of industrial 

contamination may be especially high. These areas include Moa nickel plants, 

areas around power plants, and petroleum refineries. 

Cuba and the United States are signatories, but not yet parties, to the 

Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs), which enters into 

force on May 17, 2004. The Convention seeks to prohibit production, use and/or 

release of 12 POPs that can travel globally, including polychlorinated biphenyls 

(PCBs). Cuba has potentially significant PCB releases that can adversely affect the 

United States. At a United Nations Workshop on POPs in 2000, the Cuban 

environment agency estimated Cuba has 250 tons of PCBs, but they recognized 

this may be an underestimate. Workshop participants toured a transformer repair 

shop and saw actual drums of PCB-containing oil. In 2000, an Arctic Monitoring 

and Assessment Program report on “PCBs in the Russian Federation: Inventory 

and Proposals for Priority Remedial Actions” found that during the period from

1981 to 1989, Russia exported 39.5 metric tons of PCBs to certain countries, 

including Cuba. 

b. U.S. Actions 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 The U.S. Government should be prepared to provide assistance and information 

on the characterization and prioritization of contaminated sites and mediaspecific environmental technologies. The U.S. Government has a list of 

training courses that are taught to regional program managers (RPMs) and on-

 394
scene-coordinators (OSCs), as well as representatives from States and the U.S. 

military, which can be re-worked or adapted for Cuban audiences. These 

training courses range from simple ‘primer courses’ (e.g., that address 

fundamental principles of site assessments and hazardous waste investigative 

and management practices) to highly complex technical courses that are 

pollutant-specific in nature, such as those that address detection and disposal 

of PCBs. 

 If requested, the U.S. Government could also help a free Cuba establish a 

sound PCB management program by helping Cuba to identify PCB-containing 

equipment, evaluate management and destruction alternatives, and conduct a 

pilot demonstration program. The U.S. would work in collaboration with 

relevant international organizations, such as the United Nations, and partner 

with countries, such as the Russian Federation, to implement this program. 

ii. Human Health Impacts Due to Environmental Degradation 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

As a democratic Cuba expands its environmental protection program, it will be 

important to develop methods and capacity to assess risk and monitor human 

health impacts due to environmental degradation. Some specific options that the 

U.S. Government might be able to offer a free Cuba are: 

 

 assess the relationship between health outcomes in children and repeated 

pesticide exposures via multiple sources and pathways; 

 build human capacity by producing competent graduates on the concepts and 

methods of risk assessment and communication; 

 develop bi-national environmental health workshops, and a full graduate 

training program in collaboration with local universities and other institutions; 

 conduct training on epidemiology, GIS, public health, entomology, and 

toxicology; 

 develop a baseline indicator suite to serve as an assessment tool for program 

 395
effectiveness; 

 develop indicators to link environmental and human health data; 

 develop outcome measures to better assess the improvements in human health 

that may accompany improvements in environmental quality; and 

 train and use local health workers to visit local residents and provide 

assessments on focus issues, provide education and information, and evaluate 

the effectiveness of their strategies. 

iii. Laboratories 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 Laboratory capacity is critical for monitoring environmental conditions and 

program effectiveness. The U.S. Government should be prepared to assist free 

Cuban health and environment ministries in upgrading their capabilities by 

sharing information on and providing training in: 

 current approaches to laboratory quality management; 

 current analytical protocols and methods for monitoring the environment 

(air, water, waste, soil) and assessing potential impacts of contamination on 

public health (e.g. pesticide residues in food monitoring); 

 fate and transport models for assessing the impacts of pollutant sources; 

 the advantages and disadvantages of various approaches to contaminated 

site assessment and contamination remediation; 

 cataloging, assessing, and protecting water resources; 

 upgrading Cuba’s drinking water and waste water treatment infrastructure; 

 solid and hazardous waste management; 

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 specialized laboratory methods for waterborne pathogens and chemicals; 

and 

 waterborne disease surveillance and control. 

iv. Oil and Chemical Spills/Emergency Response

a. Status 

 

The wider Caribbean is a major oil producing area.

41 Most of the oil 

produced within the Wider Caribbean region is shipped within the region, and 

since the United States is the major oil consumer in the region, the result is a series 

of intricate network distribution routes, several of which affect Cuba. In addition, 

the United States imports oil from outside the region, the majority of which is 

delivered to the Gulf Coast States via passage through the Old Bahamas Channel 

and the Florida Straits. 

Cuba faces risks from oil and hazardous materials releases in the marine 

environment primarily from small to medium spills related to oil transfer and 

industrial processes and the much larger spill related threats from cargo and tanker 

vessel collisions or allisions that result in the loss of petroleum cargos and/or 

bunker fuels. 

 

The majority of smaller spills have occurred during loading and unloading 

operations at terminals. Groundings and collisions account for most of the larger 

incidents. While Cuba has avoided significant spills and has seen spill volumes 

much smaller than elsewhere in the region, it is not without some spill incidents. 

The Princess Anne Marie spilled 5,700 tons of crude at Cabo Corrientes in 1980. 

The majority of this dispersed at sea. Cienfuegos appears to have had the largest 

number of spills within this relatively clean history, with the Aida spilling 

approximately 2 tons of heavy fuel oil in 1992; a second vessel, the Mare Princess, 

spilling 30 tons of intermediate fuel oil a year later; and the Stavanger Oak spilling 

approximately 10 tons of diesel oil in the same year. The Aida and Mare Princess 

spills were cleaned up with mechanical containment and recovery techniques and 

manual shoreline cleaning using Cuban national resources. The Stavanger Oak 

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41 Mexico and Venezuela rank 4th and 8th in refining systems in the world. Regional oil platforms, primarily in the 

Gulf of Mexico number some 143 platforms including some on the Saba Bank, near St. Croix and Anguilla. 
spill dispersed naturally. However, all these spills led to large claims for fisheries 

damage. 

Castro regime budget allocation decisions have resulted in deterioration in 

spill response training and the purchase and maintenance of pre-positioned 

equipment for spill response. While the nation continues to maintain some focus 

on this capability as witnessed in its participation in international and regional 

forums on the subject, and while engineering and scientific education that is 

applicable to spill response and recovery is among the highest in the region, actual 

response infrastructure is old or lacking due to the regime’s budgetary and 

purchasing decisions. The result is an able spill response work force with detailed 

planning and with appropriate governmental structures but with under-capitalized 

equipment due to lack of a commitment by the Castro regime to dedicate/allocate 

the necessary economic resources. 

Cuba is a party to a number of regional conventions and protocols under 

which marine environmental protection issues, programs, and standards are 

addressed. For example, Cuba acceded to the Cartagena Convention, which 

focuses on the protection of the marine environment of the wider Caribbean region. 

Under this Convention the parties work to prevent, reduce, and control pollution in 

the Convention area and to ensure sound environmental management, using for 

this purpose the best practicable means at their disposal and in accordance with 

local capabilities. The parties also agree to endeavor to harmonize their response 

policies and cooperate with the competent international, regional, and subregional 

organizations for their effective implementation. Cuba is also a party to the Oil 

Spills Protocol and SPAW Protocol (Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife), two 

of the three protocols to the Cartagena Convention. As well, Cuba hosts one of 

two Regional Activity Centers for Land-based Sources of Marine Pollution created 

under the UNEP Caribbean Environment Programme, even though it has yet to 

sign or accede to the third protocol to the Cartagena Convention, the LBS Protocol. 

Specifically, the convention requires, inter alia, that parties take all 

appropriate measures to prevent, reduce, and control pollution caused by 

discharges from ships and to ensure the effective implementation of the applicable 

international rules and standards established by the competent international 

organization such as the International Maritime Organization. The United States is 

also party to this Convention, the Oil Spills and SPAW Protocols, and signatory to 

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the LBS Protocol. 

This effort extends to pollution from point and non-point sources, on 

shore, on the water, in the air, and on the seabed. For example, the parties must 

work toward measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution caused by dumping 

of wastes and other matter at sea from ships, aircraft or manmade structures at sea, 

and to ensure the effective implementation of the applicable international rules and 

standards. In addition, the parties have focused on measures to prevent, reduce, 

and control pollution caused by coastal disposal or by discharges emanating from

rivers, estuaries, coastal establishments, outfall structures, or any other sources on 

their territories. This has also included measures to prevent, reduce, and control 

pollution resulting directly or indirectly from exploration and exploitation of the 

seabed and its subsoil and discharges into the atmosphere such as air pollution 

from vessels. 

Cuba has designated special protected areas to protect and preserve rare or 

fragile ecosystems, as well as the habitat of depleted, threatened, or endangered 

species. This work has complemented their work with the International Maritime

Organization under MARPOL 73/78 to designate Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas 

where no dumping by vessels is permitted. Cuba had the Sabana-Camaguey 

Peninsula so designated by the International Maritime Organization, the second 

such area in the world after the Australian Great Barrier Reef. Under the 

Cartagena Convention, the United States has a clear opportunity to support Cuban 

national spill response efforts. This is based on the Convention requirement that 

all parties, including the United States, are required to co-operate in taking all 

necessary measures to respond to pollution emergencies in the wider Caribbean, 

whatever the cause of such emergencies, and to control, reduce, or eliminate the 

pollution threat. When a Contracting Party becomes aware of cases or is in 

imminent danger of being polluted or has been polluted, it must immediately notify 

other States likely to be affected by such pollution, as well as competent

international organizations (e.g., International Maritime Organization). 

Cooperative response support by all signatories to the Convention is expected from 

this notification. 

b. U.S. Actions 

 

Cuba has acceded to the International Convention for the Prevention of 

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Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/78) administered under the auspices of the 

International Maritime Organization. This convention has six annexes of which 

Cuba has acceded to three, related to prevention of pollution by oil, control of 

pollution by noxious liquid substances in bulk, and prevention of pollution by 

garbage from ships. Cuba has not acceded to annexes addressing harmful 

substances carried by sea in package form, pollution by sewage from ships, and air 

pollution from ships. It would be highly desirable to encourage ascension to these 

additional annexes both in terms of support to Cuban marine environmental 

protection and in terms of providing support to an international regime that the 

United States has long supported.42 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 The U.S. Government can encourage ratification and be prepared to help a free 

Cuba in the implementation of international conventions and annexes related 

to: 

 Land-based Sources of Marine Pollution. Cuba has yet to sign or accede to 

the LBS Protocol to the Cartagena Convention, which requires countries to 

adopt high standards for the control and processing of sewage, agricultural 

run-off, and industrial effluents; and 

 Prevention of Pollution from Ships. Cuba has acceded to the International 

Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/78) 

administered under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization. 

This convention has six annexes of which Cuba has acceded to three, related 

to prevention of pollution by oil, control of pollution by noxious liquid 

substances in bulk, and prevention of pollution by garbage from ships. 

Cuba has not acceded to annexes addressing harmful substances carried by 

sea in package form, pollution by sewage from ships, and air pollution from 

ships. It would be highly desirable to encourage ascension to these 

additional annexes both in terms of support to Cuban marine environmental 

protection and in terms of providing support to an international regime that 

the United States has long supported. 43 

 

42 The United States has not acceded to some of these annexes. 

 400

43 The United States has not acceded to some of these annexes. 
All analysis would indicate that the greatest immediate focus should be 

along the northern coast of Cuba and related to tanker transit traffic. Substantial 

spills in the Florida Straits would flow northward by virtue of some currents and 

winds. While this effect is general and could be modified by season, weather, and 

other factors, it raises the prospect of a threat to the United States, specifically the 

Florida Keys and southeastern Florida peninsula, as well as the Turks and Caicos 

and the Bahamas, should a spill occur in the Old Bahamas Channel. 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 Develop operational agreement for oil spill response: To address this issue it is 

imperative that three actions be taken as quickly as possible for large spills 

affecting the waters of two or more nations or spills on one nation’s waters that 

migrate by virtue of winds and currents into the waters of two or more nations. 

 

 Establish a concrete and predefined notification process with a transition 

Cuban government. Such a process should include agreement regarding 

frequencies for communication, authorities responsible for initiation and 

receipt of notification, and information to be communicated (e.g., latitude, 

longitude, product, vessel type, master, registry, etc.). 

 Reach agreement on any joint response protocols. This would address the 

appropriate use of mechanical recovery, dispersant application and in situ 

burning based on the specific spill response variables to be encountered in 

this area. 

 Reach agreement on mutually cooperative command and control processes 

in a joint spill response. Agreement should be sought, though it is rarely 

reached initially, on a common command and control regime for organizing 

mutual response forces. The United States applies the Incident Command 

System, now accepted by Mexico, the British Virgin Islands, and Panama. 

 

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44 With regard to probability, the greatest emphasis must be placed on high frequency and high volume spills such as 

would be found in tanker traffic transiting near the Cuban coast rather than transfer operations in harbors and bays. 

With regard to the consequence of releases, the greatest emphasis must be placed on damage to sensitive 

environments or ecological zones. Currently, the most sensitive ecological zone noted by international convention 

as well as national interest is the Sabana-Camaguey peninsula now designated as a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area 

by IMO and located along the Old Bahamas Channel and Florida Straits. In addition, Cuba has signed an

exploratory agreement with PETROBRAS for oil production work along the northern coast. 
However, no common international standard or convention exists for these 

systems and many nations continue to adhere to their own unique national 

structures making integration of response forces difficult and, therefore, 

pre-planning imperative. 

 Develop mutual aid agreement: On a longer term basis there is a need to 

develop mutual aid agreements on spill response. Both nations are parties to 

the Cartagena Convention and its Protocol Concerning Cooperation in

Combating Oil Spills in the Wider Caribbean Region. That Protocol at Article 

6 requires parties to render assistance, within its capabilities, in responding to 

oil spill incidents and for each party, subject to its laws and regulations, to 

facilitate the movement into, through and out of its territory of technical 

personnel, equipment, and material necessary for responding to an oil spill 

incident. 

B. Natural, Cultural, and Historical Resources 

Cuba currently: 

 has ratified 25 international environmental treaties, including: Ramsar, the 

Convention on Biological Diversity, Convention on International Trade in 

Endangered Species, World Heritage and Cartagena Convention’s Protocol on 

Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife;45

 has internationally designated sites of significance, including six Ramsar 

wetlands sites, six Biosphere Reserves, and seven World Heritage Sites; 

 is required by Article 27 of its current Constitution to protect the natural 

environment; and 

 boasts significant amount of biological diversity within its small landmass:

 Per hectare, it has 27 times more plant species than the U.S. and Canada;46

 

45 Falcoff, Mark. Cuba the Morning After, AEI Press, Washington DC 2003, p145. 

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46 Maldonado, Argelio, “Cuba‘s Environment: Today and Tomorrow--An Action Plan”, quoting Dr. Michael Smith

of Conservation International, p3. 
 One percent of the world’s plants grow only in Cuba;47 and

 Cuba’s coral reefs are among the best developed in the Caribbean Basin, 

although experts suggest that 70 percent of Cuba’s reefs are threatened, with 

nearly 40 percent at high threat. It has the largest and most diverse shelf 

habitats in the insular Caribbean (barrier and patch reefs, islands, mangrove 

forests, and extensive sea grass beds.) 

 has an ambitious insular plan for terrestrial and marine areas.48

Despite the fact that Cuba has ratified major international environmental 

treaties, established environmental institutes, and passed substantial environmental 

laws; the Cuban natural resources continue to decline, and its rich biodiversity 

continues to be endangered. The management of resources, whether natural, 

cultural, or historical, is subservient to the political interests of the Castro regime 

and a decision-making process specifically founded on sustaining itself, not 

promoting a greater respect for these resources. 

1. Parks and Protected Areas, Forests, and Marine Protected Areas 

 

i. Parks and Protected Areas 

a. Status 

 

Cuba has designated 80 protected areas of national significance and 183 of 

local significance. These lands cover about 12 percent of the island. If this much 

land was actually protected it would be a major environmental achievement, but 

according to a recent World Bank analysis its management has been sub-optimal49. 

Declaring an area “protected” does not necessarily result in protection — Cuba has 

many “paper parks,” where there is no staff, no management plan, and no 

identified park boundaries. The inadequate management of its parks and protected 

areas undercuts its international environmental reputation and poses a serious 

threat to its valuable storehouse of biodiversity. 

47World Bank, “Cuba- Strengthening the National System of Protected Areas Project Documents”, April 2002, p46 48 Cuba’s National Protected Areas System Plan, 2003—2008. 

 403

49 World Bank, p53. 
Protected areas are strongly affected by tourism, and vice versa. During the 

last decade, the Cuban government has promoted mass tourism in order to increase 

hard currency reserves. From 1994-2000, tourism increased an average of 20 

percent annually.50 In 1999, tourism generated $1.7 billion and currently 

represents 21 percent of the GNP.51 Current Cuban government policy continues 

to promote a high growth rate for tourism, often in partnership with multi-national 

hotel chains. Among the documented environmental impacts from hotels and the 

roads which service them are: lagoons cut off from the sea by roads; polluted coral 

reefs, beaches, and waters; habitat destruction; disruption of critical wildlife 

behavioral patterns; propagation of introduced species; filled wetlands, with 

negative impact on fisheries; beach, and sand dune erosion, etc.52 

The infrastructure at most parks cannot adequately support tourists. Only 

33 parks of national importance have any ability to handle visitors, but carrying 

capacity is far exceeded, given the infrastructure at hand. There are few visitor 

interpretation centers, restrooms, signs, trails, bridges, wastewater systems, or 

parking lots. Maintenance and communications equipment, if present at all, are 

woefully inadequate. Many parks are not staffed. 

 

In 2002, the World Bank initiated a $13.4 million, three-year project to 

strengthen management of the National System of Protected Areas, focusing on 

four national parks as demonstration sites.53 Much more will need to be done in 

the remaining parks to improve management and infrastructure. 

ii. Governance Structure 

 

Administration and funding of protected areas is awkwardly divided among 

several Cuban ministries. Theoretically, protected areas are managed by the 

Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment by the National Center of 

Protected Areas (CNAP), which was created in 1995 to oversee and manage a 

National System of Protected Areas. However, several agencies that had protected 

area responsibilities before 1995 continue to manage some of the protected areas, 

including the National Flora and Fauna Protection Corporation under the Ministry 

50Falcoff, p144. 51World Bank, p47 and p109. 52 Falcoff p144, World Bank, p109. 

 404

53 World Bank, p1. 
of Agriculture that manages 53 of the largest and most established protected areas. 

The Ministry of Fisheries oversees management of the marine protected areas. 

Enforcing rules and regulations is the responsibility of another government agency, 

the Forest Guard under the Ministry of Interior.54 Only 20 professionals work in 

the national headquarters of CNAP.55 According to a recent World Bank report, 

CNAP is so little known or understood among its peers that the tourism industry 

has been giving its own names to unpublicized national parks, calling the Zapata 

Swamp the “Parque Natural Montemar” thus raising the frustration level of 

tourists, tour operators, and scientists. 

There are virtually no local or nationally based independent NGOs active in 

protected area system management, although foreign NGOs have had success in 

specific parks. 

iii. Needs for Assistance 

Little attention has been paid to developing nature-based tourism in Cuba or 

to collaborative research on genetic resources. If developed carefully, they could 

provide conservation-compatible livelihoods and contribute towards financing park 

management and infrastructure development. 

Given that a newly democratic Cuba would have many demands for limited 

government funds, Cuba may want to consider doing what South Africa or some

Latin American countries are doing to fund their park systems. South Africa is 

covering 100 percent of expenses from gate fees, charging a low fee for residents 

and a high fee for foreigners. Some Latin American countries are “contractingout” the management of some parks to NGOs, who in return collect gate fees and 

charitable donations from foreign NGOs. Both of these options would be helpful if 

the IMF were to impose limits on the number of government employees. 

 

Lessons learned over the last 40 years of park protection in developing 

countries have focused on the importance of local people benefiting from the 

tourism to their nearby parks, such as becoming tour guides, sharing in admission 

or hunting fees, establishing small hotels and restaurants to service park visitors, 

54 World Bank, p48 55 World Bank, p52. 

 405
etc. 

iv. U.S. Actions 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 The U.S. Government should be prepared to offer technical assistance and 

training to a free Cuba to improve its parks and develop ecologically 

sustainable infrastructure and uses. This can be done by training the Cuban 

employees or their contractors in many of the park management principles used 

by the United States. There are over 2000 employees working with Cuba’s 

national parks, and 1000 Forest Guards working in enforcement; however, they 

are not evenly distributed, as nearly 30 percent work at only three protected 

areas

56. 

 For the medium- and long-term, if requested, the U.S. Government can provide 

three types of assistance: 1) Train Cuban park managers in best practices for 

park management in a variety of settings at U.S. parks similar to their own; 2) 

Provide a Spanish-language training manual for protected area managers, 

which can be used in connection with training courses conducted in the U.S. or 

in Cuba; and, 3) Provide on-site technical assistance to Cuban parks staff to 

develop and maintain park infrastructure and provide visitor services. Other 

assistance can include mentoring opportunities in the U.S. protected areas and 

creating Sister Parks between U.S. and Cuban parks. 

 Listed below are three existing training modules, which could be provided to a 

transition government: 

 

 Training in Planning, Design, and Maintenance of Park Infrastructure. 

Methods for acquiring long-term, stable financial support; Designing and 

constructing visitor facilities, such as entry points, kiosks, visitor centers, 

hiking trails, and campsites; Development of protected area communications 

systems; Prescribed fire and wildfire management and suppression; Linking 

biological inventories and monitoring to protected area management; Legal 

surveys to define and mark protected area boundaries; and road 

 

 406

56World Bank, p51. 
construction practices. 

 Enhancing the Visitor Experience. Public outreach and education programs 

and visitor information services (including producing protected area visitor 

brochures and environmental education publications); Monitoring protected 

area visitor satisfaction); Establishing and managing concession 

operations; Visitor public relations; Interpretive signs and exhibits; and 

Development of protected area interpretive programs and facilities, 

including campfire talks and ranger-guided nature hikes; 

 Park Management and Basic Ranger Skills. Fee collection methods and fee 

structure design; Budget planning and administration; Managing and 

supervising personnel; Preparation of park operating plans; Incident 

management; Facility maintenance inspections; Radio communications 

management; Navigation by map and compass; Safety training (visitor, 

vehicle, workplace); Search and rescue operations, Field patrol techniques; 

Record keeping and reporting; and Equipment and supplies planning and 

maintenance. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

 The most immediate need is to improve the management of Cuban national 

parks, and to build the capacity of their park employees. Once park 

management is improved, and plans developed, it would be appropriate to 

identify infrastructure and visitor services needs and associated costs. U.S. 

Government assistance would cost approximately $60,000 for two weeks of U.S. 

site visits, $50,000 per two-week training session, and $30,000 per two-week 

technical assistance visit. With appropriate levels of funding, approximately 12 

courses/technical assistance visits a year could be offered for several years. 

 407
ii. Forests 

a. U.S. Actions

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 The U.S. Government promotes sustainable forest management and biodiversity 

conservation worldwide in collaboration with partners in the field, adding 

value to their projects on the ground. In partnership with international 

institutions and non-governmental organizations, the U.S. Government could 

provide assistance to a free Cuba in a number of technical areas including: 

 Watershed/Habitat Management: Through initiatives such as the White 

Water to Blue Water Initiative, the U.S. Government could assist a transition 

government in the application of scientific and management expertise to 

promote watershed protection and ecosystem restoration. Focus areas of a 

program could include migratory species, particularly birds. Activities 

could include the restoration of degraded ecosystems and mitigation 

strategies to maintain biodiversity and other environmental benefits. 

 In addition, the U.S. Government collaborates with the University of 

Wisconsin–Stevens Point to offer an International Seminar on Watershed 

Management. The seminar engages participants on critical global and 

regional watershed management issues, emphasizing innovative approaches 

to accomplishing work across a wide range of biophysical and 

socioeconomic settings. Participants from relevant government agencies 

and/or NGOs in Cuba could benefit from the seminar and informal 

exchange of information and experiences with colleagues from around the 

world. 

 Improved Forest Management: The U.S. Government could work with a 

free Cuba to promote forest conservation through the development of 

improved forest planning and management, with an emphasis on reducedimpact harvesting and forest policy options and attention to biodiversity 

conservation and criteria and indicators for sustainable forest management. 

 Relevant to this technical area is the International Seminar on Forest and 

 408
Natural Resources Administration and Management. For the past 17 years, 

this seminar has convened land managers from all over the world to explore 

and discuss the complexities of sustainable natural resource management. 

Participants from relevant government agencies and/or NGOs in Cuba 

could benefit from the seminar and informal exchange of information and 

experiences with colleagues from around the world. 

 Use satellite imagery to assess the status of forest and other resources. 

Assess the current situation of Cuba’s land cover, soil quality, etc., and 

create a baseline for future analysis. 

 Ecotourism/Recreation: The U.S. Government hosts several million visitors 

each year on its 156 National Forests — developing unparalleled skills in 

the design and delivery of infrastructure and interpretive materials for 

visitors. The U.S. Government should be prepared to provide assistance to 

Cuba in such areas as ecotourism planning and development of interpretive 

materials. 

 Wildlife Management: Conservation of Cuba’s biological diversity is in 

part dependent on the ability to conserve in the context of managed forests 

and ecosystems. The U.S. Government can work with partners in a free 

Cuba to address the management of individual species as well as habitat 

management with long term land management plans and other tools. 





Policy: In this technical area, the U.S. Government, if requested, could 

assist a transition government in bilateral policy development on a wide 

range of issues: ecotourism planning, including recreation concession 

management; models of law governing forest management; codes of 

practice including criteria and indicators for sustainability; chain of 

custody and illegal logging. 

Wood Technology: The U.S. Government has expertise in wood processing 

technologies that minimize waste and increase economic efficiency. It can 

engage with partners in a free Cuba to develop strategies to meet wood 

product demand more efficiently with less impact on the environment.

 Road Engineering: If requested, the U.S. Government can assist a free Cuba 

 409
in design of forest roads that protect fragile environments and minimize 

costs. Skills include access planning, route location, road survey and design 

methods, erosion control, contract administration and maintenance 

strategies. 

 Fire Management and Ecology: The U.S. Government should be prepared 

to assist Cuba in prevention, planning, and suppression of wildland fire. It 

can also provide assistance to partners in a free Cuba to assess the 

influence of fire on forest ecosystems and to incorporate fire mitigation 

strategies into existing forest management systems. Specific topics for 

training and technical assistance include the role of fire in topic ecosystems, 

fire regimes and fire threat, the integrated fire management approach, and 

community-based fire management, education & fire prevention programs.

iii. Marine Protected Areas 

a. Status 

There are 21 legally declared Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) and 13 very 

important ones in the final approval process of the Inter-ministerial Council’s 

Executive Committee (ICEC) as of 2003. The 2003-2008 Plan of the National 

System of Protected Areas (NSPA) contains 108 proposed MPAs (25 percent of 

the insular platform), 49 of which are considered of national significance and 

because they occupy 10.07 percent of the platform. 

The approved MPAs and the ones in the process of being approved total 34 

areas that cover 10.73 percent of the platform. These areas also represent 64.16 

percent of the total proposed extension of the Marine Protected Area System. The 

Jardines de la Reina National Park (NP), Cienaga Wetlands (possibly the two most 

important MPA’s in Cuba), Punta Frances NP, Guanahacabibes NP, Los Caimanes 

NP, the Cayos Lanzanillo-Pajonal-Fragoso Wildlife Refuge (WR), Cayos Las 

Picuas-Cayos del Cristo WR, Rio Máximo WF, and Delta del Cauto Ecological 

Reserve are especially important because of their size and value. 

The marine areas of the above sites currently receive minimal management 

support due to a lack of resources from the Castro government, but some are 

supported by international projects. This support allows for personnel for basic 

 410
protection and public use control. However, the sites lack adequate resources for 

marine patrols, research, and monitoring. 

The great majority of the remaining proposed areas are still essentially 

“paper parks” in which there is little or no effective authority or enforcement. For 

many, including the six mostly marine areas that are far from the coast, the 

boundaries and management objectives are not well defined. 

A type of protected area special classification that can be correlated with the 

IUCN Category IV is the category of Special Regions of Sustainable Development 

(SRSD) that includes extensive areas of high economic and conservation interest. 

This type of protected area includes the two largest systems of keys in Cuba: 

Sabana-Camaguey and Canarreos Archipelagos, and Zapata Wetlands, the largest 

wetland in the Caribbean and a site approved as an SRSD by Law 197 of 23 

January 1995. 

b. Governance Structure 

The two principal current legal instruments for establishing the protected 

areas system are: Law 81 on Environment (1997), which defines the National 

Protected Area System (NPAS) as a marine-terrestrial integrated system and 

defines its basic principles and objectives; and the NPAS Decree 201 (December 

1999). Decree 201 is the principal legal instrument of the NPAS. It defines 

different categories (valid for both land and ocean), administrative mechanisms, 

mechanisms for proposals, and participative planning and approving system of 

protected areas, etc. 

A “representative gap” analysis of the MPA National System was completed 

in May 2003. This analysis was developed by the Institute of Oceanology and the 

Cuban National Center for Protected Areas, with support of the World Wildlife 

Fund-Canada and Environmental Defense (USA), and with wide participation from

scientific institutions and protected areas managers. 

The 2003-2008 National Protected Areas System (NPAS) Plan defines the 

following goals for the national MPA system: 

 Represent at least 15 percent of the Cuban platform. 

 411
 Represent at least 25 percent the total coral reef area. 

 Represent at least 25 percent of each sub-type of wetlands, for each wetland 

region. 

During the MPAs national system gap analysis, the general goals have been 

classified in the following specific goals: 

 Protect representative areas and important sites of Cuba’s coastal/marine 

landscapes and biodiversity. 

 Contribute the enhancement of sustainable fisheries. 

 Represent the most important geographic features of Cuba’s coastal and marine 

zone, including the associated historic and cultural values. 

On the administrative side, the Coordinating Council of the National System

of Protected Areas (NSPA) is in the process of beginning its work. This managing 

council directed by the National Center of Protected Areas (NCPA) includes the 

six most important decision-making institutions of the Cuban NSPA: NCPA, 

Fishing Regulations Office, State Forest Service, Ranger Corps, National 

Enterprise for Flora and Fauna Protection, and Environmental Management 

(Office). Planning and approval of the areas occur through participatory processes 

that include state (national) institutions, local government and communities, and 

relevant social groups (e.g. Fishers). This process uses different methods like 

formal and informal meetings, negotiation rounds, planning and conflict

resolutions workshops, public awareness, education, and consultancies. 

c. Needs for Assistance 

The proposed substantial expansion of the national system of MPAs will 

require substantial financial and personnel resources for an already under-funded 

and under-resourced system. Needs identified in the protected areas section above 

apply for all protected areas in the national system, terrestrial, and aquatic. 

 412
For example, there is a serious need to establish a diversified national 

financing portfolio for the national protected area system. Cuban agencies 

currently have the authority to impose user fees (adequate concession and vendor 

fees, hotel/bed taxes, entrance fees), which could be applied to conservation 

purposes. However, these specific types of user fees for environmental protection 

are not widely used in Cuba. 

The expansion of the MPA system requires that new attention be placed on 

capacity building/management effectiveness at existing sites, as well as the suite of 

scientific, assessment, and management skills necessary for designing and 

implementing new sites. Moreover, since the greatest threat to marine and coastal 

protected areas and marine biodiversity generally may well come from human 

activities outside park boundaries — i.e., fisheries and pollution — and anticipated 

dramatic tourism expansion, substantial technical assistance should be provided in 

the area of integrated coastal area management. 

d. U.S. Actions 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 The U.S. Government should be prepared to offer technical assistance and 

training to a free Cuba to improve its parks and develop coastal infrastructure 

that will not damage its environment. This can be done by training Cuban 

employees or their contractors in many of the park management principles and 

integrated coastal management utilized in the U.S. at Federal and State levels. 

 The U.S. Government should be prepared to offer a range of opportunities for 

capacity building including: 

 Study tours at U.S. marine sanctuary and estuarine reserve sites; 

 Training programs at the National MPA Center on enhancing management 

effectiveness, managing visitor impacts, and other topics; 

 Legal and policy technical assistance; and 

 Training programs on tools for integrated coastal area management (e.g., 

 413
GIS). 

iv. Invasive Species 

a. Status 

Like other islands, Cuba has major invasive species problems, which are 

resulting in negative environmental impacts. However, because of its semiisolation in recent decades from international trade, Cuba has a relatively high 

number of native species compared to non-native species when compared to most 

other islands.57 

The World Conservation Union (IUCN) has “A Draft List of Species 

Reported Alien to the Caribbean.” This draft lists 22 species of invasive species of

concern in Cuba.58 In addition, the U.S. Geological Survey was able to identify 14 

species of introduced fish that have established in Cuba. Because of the unique 

endemic fish found in Cuba (e.g., four species of blind cusk eels and livebearers in 

the family Poeciliidae) these non-native establishments are a concern to 

conservation biologists.59 

 

Specific invasive plant species of current importance in Cuba are Australian 

Pines, which are causing damage to beaches west of Havana; Leuceana 

Leucocephala from Central America; and Marabu from Africa. These plants 

spread rapidly and compete with native vegetation, displacing it, and creating large 

tracts of single species forests, which are of diminished value to native wildlife. 

Invasive animals include the Indian Mongoose, pigs, black rats, cats, and dogs, 

which are serious predators to native animals when they are near protected areas.

60

 

Due to a lack of comprehensive information on species in Cuba, both native 

and invasive, there may be other major problems that are unknown at this time. 

57 Vitousek, P.M., et.al, 1996 “Biological invasions as global environmental change”, American Scientist 84:4468-

478. Vitousek, P.M., et.al, 1997, “Introduced species: A significant component of human-caused global change”,

New Zealand Journal of Ecology 21(1), pp1-16. 58 IUCN, “Draft List of Species Reported Alien to the Caribbean”, 2004, pp2-7. 59 Jim Williams, Research Biologist, Florida Integrated Science Center for Aquatic Resource Studies, Gainesville, 

Florida, in phone conservation 2/17/04. 60 World Bank, p49. 

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b. U.S. Actions 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 The U.S. National Invasive Species Council should stand ready to coordinate 

invasive species assistance to a free Cuba. Good opportunities exist both from 

an environmental focus and from an economic focus. 

 On the environmental side, it is important that the U.S. Government is prepared 

to provide stronger support to mechanisms for identification and management 

of invasive species in Cuba. The Caribbean section of the joint Global Invasive 

Species Programme (GISP), Scientific Committee on Problems of the 

Environment (SCOPE), The World Conservation Union (IUCN) and Diveasitas 

already have developed a website and mechanism dedicated to the invasive 

species of Cuba. In addition, U.S. birding organizations are studying invasive 

species in Cuba. In a free Cuba, these types of organizations could be 

instrumental in addressing Cuba’s invasive species problems. Increasing the 

communication between government and academic scientists working on 

invasive species would also provide much needed benefits. 

 On the economic side, Cuba’s sanitary and phytosanitary infrastructure needs 

to be strengthened as international trade in agricultural goods is developed. In 

order to safeguard the biosecurity of Cuba’s natural and agricultural 

resources, invasive plant and animal pests and pathogens in Cuba must be 

surveyed, and expertise in risk analysis needs to be developed, under the 

umbrella of international trade standards in animal and plant protection. 

 If requested, The U.S. Government could assist in the identification and control 

of invasive species. Additionally, with increased movement of people and goods 

there will be concerns about invasive species from Cuba introduced into the 

United States. Much work will be necessary to survey the island for potentially 

invasive species to the United States. This base-line data will be a prerequisite 

to developing and establishing market access importation conditions for 

agricultural related commodities that may serve as vectors for spreading 

invasive species to the United States through trade.

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2. Wildlife and Fisheries Management 

 

i. Birds 

a. Current State 

 

Cuba has 350 species of birds, 39 times more than the United States and 

Canada on a per hectare basis.61 It also has the world’s smallest bird, the Bee 

Hummingbird, just bigger than a grasshopper.62 It is an important refuge for 

migrating birds in the winter, harboring the largest Caribbean populations of many 

species. Cuba is the southernmost range of many migratory birds. 

Habitat alteration has been and continues to be the fundamental threat to 

Cuba’s birds. In a few cases, over-exploitation of birds by local communities has 

exacerbated this problem. This includes activities such as massive collections of 

eggs and young waterfowl; subsistence hunting; and indiscriminate killings for 

superstitious beliefs.63 The social institution of “resolver” (stealing from the 

government), has led to selling endangered species such as colorful parrots for 

profit.

64 Without local citizens benefiting from preservation of biodiversity, the 

threat of poaching will remain a problem. Other problems include logging, 

charcoal production, and slash-and-burn agriculture, which destroy dry forest. In 

the swamp areas, the threats come from dry-season burning, draining, and 

introduced predators such as mongooses and rats. 

Cuba has established several research and scientific institutions, which have 

made contributions to the understanding of their bird life. The Ojito de Agua

reserve was designated to protect the habitat of the Ivory-billed Woodpecker, but 

no monitoring or management of the area has taken place and the bird is nearly 

extinct. Of the 20 species considered threatened in Cuba, only 10 have been 

studied in enough detail to allow for the preparation of management plans for their 

protection. Cuba cites the recovery of the Rose-throated Parrot population from

100 nesting pairs in 1979 to approximately 400 pairs in 2000 as an example of 

where adequate data and management combined to bring this successful result on 

61 Birdlife International, Birdlife’s Oneline World Bird Database, 2003 62 Raffaele, Herbert, et al, A Guide to the Birds of the West Indies, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New 

Jersey, 1998 p.25 63 Id. 

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64 Maldonado, p4. 
the Isle of Youth. Similar studies are underway for the Sandhill Crane, Cuban 

Parakeet, and the Cuban Kite, which are being used as “flagships” to promote 

conservation of the entire habitats in which they live.65

b. Needs for Assistance 

 

Given that 25 species, representing seven percent of Cuba’s rich species of 

birds, can only be found in Cuba,66 there is good reason to expect that once U.S. 

citizens can legally travel to Cuba that it will be a popular destination for American 

bird watchers. In 1995, over 54 million Americans took part in some bird 

watching — a 157 percent increase from 1983. Eighteen million of these 

birdwatchers take trips away from home to see birds. Florida estimates that in 

2000 they had almost four million participants in wildlife viewing, generating $1.8 

billion in retail sales and 52,410 jobs.67 Cuba’s protected areas and bird habitat are 

not yet ready to receive a large influx of visitors. 

c. U.S. Actions 

RECOMMENDATION:

 The highest priority for protection of domestic and migratory birds in Cuba is 

increased financial support for necessary scientific studies and for managing 

habitat. Another priority is to increase environmental education and 

community participation in conservation plans for bird preservation. 

Infrastructure improvements are needed in areas where bird watching is to be 

encouraged. This would include bird watching towers, well designed roads and 

trails, visitor information services, and concessions services such as 

environmentally sensitive hotels and restaurants, along with the other needs 

described above in the “Parks and Protected Areas” section. The U.S. 

Government can provide training and technical assistance to a free Cuba in 

these areas, if requested by a transition government. 

65 Raffaele, p25. 

66 Birdlife International 

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67 Lynch, Tim and Julie Harrington, “The Economic Impacts of the 2nd Annual Florida Panhandle Birding and

Wildflower Festival, 2003. p9. 
ii. Fisheries

a. Status 

Cuba has devoted considerable energy to education in the marine sciences. 

This investment is evident in the high quality of its marine science. 

 

Cooperative Fisheries Management in the Caribbean: Forums for voluntary 

international cooperation in the field of fisheries have existed for many years in the 

western Atlantic and Caribbean, e.g., the Western Central Atlantic Fisheries 

Commission. However, many of the coastal states in the region have experienced 

similar management problems for such species as Queen conch, spiny lobster, and 

various reef fish. Therefore, there is growing interest is developing a regional 

fishery management organization with binding authority to establish fishery 

management measures in the wider Caribbean. National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration Fisheries is actively engaged in this development, including 

through the White Water to Blue Water Initiative. Because a free Cuba would be 

an important participant in such an organization, and has significant expertise in 

this subject, we should be prepared to work with a free Cuba directly as well as 

through the Caribbean Fishery Management Council to encourage participation. 

Existing International Living Marine Resource Conservation Agreements:

The commercial fishing sector in Cuba has experienced two major upswings and 

downswings in the last 50 years. Fishing activity is currently at a relatively low 

point due to lack of capital, aging fishing vessels, and depressed economic 

conditions. However, available catch information shows appreciable harvests of 

highly migratory fish stocks managed or under the management competence of the 

International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna (ICCAT), 

including skipjack and blackfin tuna, swordfish, white and blue marlin, and 

sailfish. Cuba is not currently a member of ICCAT, but inasmuch as all of these 

species are high value and some are subject to the need for strict ICCAT 

conservation regimes, it would not be a surprise for there to be increased Cuban 

fishing pressure on these stocks once economic conditions improve. Cuba was a 

member of ICCAT from 1975-1991. It should be encouraged to rejoin ICCAT. 

 Similarly, Cuban catch statistics consistently show appreciable directed 

harvests of sea turtles from undifferentiated species, but all of which are 

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endangered. This is problematic from every conservation perspective. The InterAmerican Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles (IAC) 

was established “to promote the protection, conservation, and recovery of sea turtle 

populations and of the habitats on which they depend, based on the best available 

scientific evidence, taking into account the environmental, sociological, and 

cultural characteristics of the Parties.” A free Cuba should be encouraged to join 

the IAC. 

Endangered Species Protection: An effort by Cuba in 2000 to export $4 

million worth of “in inventory” endangered hawksbill sea turtle shells to Japan, 

and capture 500 hawksbills on an annual basis was thwarted at the 12th 

Convention of the Parties of the Convention on International Trade in Wild Flora

and Fauna (CITES), held in Nairobi, Kenya.68 Cuba argued that its hawksbill sea 

turtle population was healthy due to conservation efforts; however, others argued 

that hawksbill turtles found in Cuban waters actually migrate from 11 other 

Caribbean countries to feed in Cuba for part of the year. Transition to a free 

market approach by a free Cuba could re-invigorate efforts to profit from trade in 

endangered sea turtle parts, as well as reef fish for the aquarium trade and stony 

corals for trade in carvings, jewelry, artwork, and live specimens. 

b. Needs

 

Cuba does not appear to need U.S. expertise as much as it does the resources 

to use its expertise effectively. Outreach efforts should establish and build on 

information exchanges and the provision of materials, especially equipment. The 

U.S. Government, directly as well as through the Caribbean Fishery Management 

Council, should be prepared to explore such possibilities with a free Cuba within 

funding constraints. 

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68 Cuba is a party to CITES. 
c. U.S. Actions 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 The U.S. Government should be prepared to work with a free Cuba toward the 

objective of Cuba joining ICCAT and the IAC when doing so becomes 

appropriate. 

 The United States should encourage a free Cuba to re-examine its relationship 

and commitments under CITES, and incorporate CITES into other cooperative 

Caribbean fisheries management organizations, as described in this document. 

 The U.S. Government has the capacity to work with a free Cuba in fisheries 

management to conduct laboratory and field research on estuarine processes, 

nearshore and ocean ecosystems’ biological productivity, the dynamics of 

coastal and reef fishery resources, the linkages between biological and physical 

oceanographic processes and fish population distribution, abundance and 

dynamics, the location and extent of essential fish habitat, and the effects of 

human influences on resource productivity. Such information provides 

fisheries managers with information needed to sustain and enhance 

recreational and commercial fishing. 

 The U.S. Government should be prepared to help a free Cuba develop and 

manage its recreational fishing potential. U.S. recreational fishermen and 

groups will be interested in accessing these waters and availing themselves of 

port-based support facilities in Cuba. The U.S. Government, directly as well as 

through the Caribbean Regional Fishery Management Council, could work 

with a free Cuba to explore such possibilities when doing so becomes 

appropriate.

V. ENGAGING & EMPOWERING THE CUBAN PEOPLE 

Engagement with a free Cuba will be necessary for successful development 

and implementation of programs to protect the environment and management 

natural resources. 

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RECOMMENDATIONS:

 To assist a post-Castro Cuba with this process, the U.S. Government should be 

prepared to provide assistance to: 

 Develop policies and procedures to promote transparency and public 

participation. The public should have access to relevant information and 

the opportunity to participate in a meaningful way in the development and 

implementation of environmental law and policy. Tools that promote this 

participation include notices and opportunities to comment on proposed 

regulations and other implementation instruments, advisory boards with 

citizen representation to advise on policy, and involvement of citizens in 

monitoring of the environment and natural resources. 

 Unleash the power of information. Providing well-developed public 

outreach materials for citizens, which they can use to take action to ensure a 

healthy environment, is an important element to any U.S. Government effort. 

Voluntary actions based upon self- interest can be some of the most powerful 

motivators to achieve environmental results. Information is also vital to 

communities and organizations so that local programs and approaches are 

developed with a shared understanding. This information can include such 

things as simple brochures on indoor air quality, web-based tools for use by 

specialists, and posters on prevention of pesticide poisonings. 

 Enhance all levels of collaboration. A well-developed cooperative program 

needs to incorporate key stakeholders from the private sector, 

medical/public health community, academia, NGOs and others. The core of 

voluntary programs is cooperation and collaboration to achieve a common 

goal; the range and variety of partners varies depending upon the topic. 

For example, working with programs like Tools for Schools will require a 

different set of partners than an environmental tobacco smoke program such 

as Take the Pledge to Keep Your Home and Car Smoke Free. 

 Prioritize the problems. Targeting specific environmental quality issues to 

achieve major public health and environmental benefits is an important step. 

It can assist in development of coalitions and provide a basis for outreach 

materials. The process of prioritization may be based on highly technical 

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scientific evidence of risk (such as the radon program) or vulnerable 

populations (e.g., children who suffer from asthma). 

VI. CONSULTING & COORDINATION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL 

COMMUNITY 

Cuba has signed 25 international environmental agreements and participates 

actively in many multilateral organizations that work on environmental protection 

and natural resources management, including the U.N. Environment Program, Pan 

American Health Organization, Food and Agriculture Organization, and the Global 

Environment Facility. 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 At this time, Cuba is not a member of and does not receive loans or credits from 

the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank or the Caribbean 

Development Bank. While mobilization of private investment, including from 

local capital markets, will most likely be the long-term financing source for 

Cuba’s sustainable development, multilateral development banks can play a key 

role in helping to improve environmental governance, democratizing decisionmaking and making it more transparent, and creating a climate favorable for 

private investment. The U.S. Government could help a post-Castro Cuba 

access the public international financial community (e.g., the IDB’s 

Multilateral Investment Fund and the World Bank initiatives on infrastructure 

and municipal governance) in order to create sustainable finance systems for 

environmental protection and natural resources management. 

 The U.S. Government should be prepared to provide assistance to a post-Castro 

government to create conditions favorable to the provision or modernization of 

environmental services, democratizing environmental decisions making, and 

upgrading conventional production processes, thereby stimulating indigenous 

investment and attracting foreign investment in these areas. Sectors of interest 

in this connection would include water and wastewater infrastructure, solar 

energy and energy efficient technologies for rural and urban applications, 

waste reduction and waste management technologies, biodiversity 

conservation, and “green” tourism. In several of such sectors, upgraded 

monitoring and measurement technologies are likely to be needed as well. 

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 The international environmental NGO community will be key partners for 

assistance to a post-Castro Cuba. Currently, there is a very limited presence of 

international NGOs in Cuba and these organizations have had some smallscale success. A democratic Cuba will likely create a climate where the work 

of these organizations can flourish. 

 Environmental NGOs have tremendous technical and policy expertise on a wide 

variety of topics —- such as protected areas management, public participation, 

and debt-for-nature swaps. This expertise along with any additional financial 

resources that they can bring can be leveraged in support of U.S. assistance 

efforts. The U.S. Government should be prepared to coordinate with these 

groups and may want to consider establishing an advisory committee to 

facilitate this process. 

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