. .

I 

## TXXEA~TORNEYGENERAL OF TEXAS I **AUlSlWJ.** 

### TExAa m3vll
April 4, 1974

The Honorable Henry Wade Opinion No. H- 270 District Attorney Dallas County Government Center Re: Whether the respondent in Dailaa. Texas 75202 a cause filed under the Uniform Reciprocal SupportAct Dear Mr. Wade: is entitled to ajury trial You have aeked our opinion onthe question ofwhether a respondent in a cause filed under the Uniform Reciproca! Enforcement ofSupport Act is entitled to ajury trial. The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement ofSupportAct hae been enacted 81 Chapter 21ofthe Texas Family Code. It derive8 from Art. 232&3b-4,V. T. C.S., enacted by the 59th Ltgirlature in 1965, andfrom e8rlier similar legislation. We considered a similar question in opinion No. H-218 butconfined our reply to contempt proceeding6 brought under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement ofSupport Act where an obligation to support had already been validly fixed by another court and in which enforcement by contempt of court war the only iaBue. Opinion No. H-218 was written in rerrponeeto an inquiry by the Honorable Tom Hanna, Criminal District Attorney of Jefferson County, Texas, andhe, like you, haa requested thatwe broaden the opinion and state “whether a respondent in a Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of SupportAct to netthe amount of child support is entitled to cjury trial.” This opinion is intended aa an anrwer to Mr. Hahna’ inquiry 81 well as toyours. Ae indicated in Mr. Henna’6 supplemental inquiry a court in a Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act proceeding hre authop. 1264The Honor8ble Henry Wade, page 2 (H-270)

rity to set theamount of child support. Other issues which might come before the court in such a proceeding 8re theneed for child support, the duty to contribute, which would involve prrenthood, 8nd other rel8ted issues.We believe thrt such proceedings rre controlled by $11.13 of the Tex8a F8mily Code which provide6 8s follows:

“(a) In8 suit 8ffecting theparent-child ret.- tionrhip, except 8 suit inwhich adoption ia nought, 8ny p8rty nuy demand 8**jury** trial.

“(b) The verdict of thejury ie binding on the court except with respect to theiaeueo of nunaging conaerv.torclhip, poesersion, 8nd support of and 8cceae to8 child, onwhich theverdict ir rdviaory only. provided, however, the court may not enter 8 decree that contravene8 theverdict of the**jury** on the ir#uer ofmanaging coneervatorrhip, porresaion of, or 8cceaB to 8 child. ” We believe that the 8dvinory jury specified in 011.13(b) i6 8vailrble in Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act proceeding8 and thus, in answer to Mr. Hanna’r supplemental inquiry, such rn 8dvirory jury would be available where the court is setting the amount of child support in such 8 proceeding. The right to 8 **jury** concerning other issuea would be governed by the terms of § 11.13. Accordingly, while 8jury ie notavrilrble to 8 respondent in 8 contempt proceeding filed under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement ofSupportAct to enforce 8 previous valid order of child support [see Attorney Gener81 Opinion H-218 (1974)], theprovisions of 011.13 of the F8mily Code, making 8jury avril8ble in suit6 affecting the p8rent-child relrtionahip, are appliuble to other leg81 irauea which might arise in Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act proceeding8 in rccordrnce withthe term8 of s8id 011.13.

p. 1265. .

The Honorrble Henry Wade, page 3 (H-270)

SUMMARY A jury ir available toa reopondent in noncontempt Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act proceeding0 if one of the ieauer rpecified in 811.13 of the Family Code ir before the court. Very truly yourr,

P A?& JOHN L. HILL Attorney General of Texrr

DAVID M. KENDALL, Chairman Opinion Committee

p. 1266