UNITED STATES 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

Region III 

2443 Warrenville Road, Suite 210

Lisle IL 60532-4352

August 9, 2013 

EA-13-125 

Mr. Larry Meyer 

Site Vice President 

NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC 

6610 Nuclear Road 

Two Rivers, WI 54241 

SUBJECT: FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION OF A WHITE FINDING WITH 

ASSESSMENT FOLLOWUP AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION; NRC 

INSPECTION REPORT NO. 05000266/2013012 AND 05000301/2013012; 

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 

Dear Mr. Meyer: 

This letter provides you the final significance determination of the preliminary Yellow finding 

discussed in our previous communication dated June 18, 2013, which included U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC) Inspection Report No. 05000266/2013011 and 

05000301/2013011. The finding involved your failure to implement external flooding wave 

run-up protection design features as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). 

Specifically, Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP) Procedure PC 80 Part 7, as implemented, 

would not protect safety-related equipment in the turbine building or pumphouse because the 

procedure: (1) did not appropriately prescribe the installation of barriers such that gaps 

between the barriers were eliminated to prevent water intrusion, (2) did not protect equipment 

by requiring barriers to be placed in front of the doors, from 1996 to 2008, as described in the 

FSAR, and (3) did not require the barriers to protect the plant to an elevation of at least 9 feet as 

described in the FSAR. The finding was previously classified as an apparent violation with 

significance to be determined in NRC Inspection Report No. 05000266/2013002 and 

05000301/2013002 issued on May 13, 2013. 

At your request, a Regulatory Conference was held on July 22, 2013, to discuss your views on 

this issue. A copy of the handout you provided at the conference was previously placed in the 

NRC’s Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) at Accession No. 

ML13200A396. During the conference, your staff described your assessment of the 

significance of the finding, and the corrective actions taken to resolve it, including the root cause 

evaluation of the finding. You attributed the root cause of the finding to a 1996 change in 

strategy for flood protection and a failure to require the change to be validated by procedure. A 

partial list of attendees at the conference is included in Enclosure 1. 

During the conference, you stated that you agreed that there was a performance deficiency, but 

that you disagreed with the significance of the finding. Specifically, you stated that you 

performed a new engineering analysis using a state-of the-art computer model, which took into 

account the site specific bathymetric and topographic information. Based on your wave run-up 

analysis, you determined that it was extremely unlikely for water to accumulate in the turbine 

building. As a result, your probabilistic risk assessment determined that the risk was of very low 

safety significance because of the limited equipment that would be impacted by the flood. 
L. Meyer -2- 

The NRC carefully reviewed the information provided during the conference, along with the 

supporting technical information submitted between June 28 and July 29, 2013, (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML13179A333, ML13193A032, ML13197A118, and ML13211A056). 

The NRC determined that the most significant input from your evaluation were the insights from 

your revised wave run-up evaluation using the DELFT3D computer model. During the NRC’s 

post-regulatory conference review, conducted in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 

(IMC) 0609.01, “Significance and Enforcement Review Panel Process,” the NRC concluded that 

while the revised wave run-up analysis used in your assessment of the performance deficiency 

provided insights, the final results of your evaluation could not be easily translated into a 

quantitative probabilistic framework that would provide a final answer with appropriate 

consideration of the potential uncertainties involved. The results of your wave run-up evaluation 

were significantly different from the wave run-up evaluation described in the FSAR and from the 

probabilistic wave run-up model used in the Individual Plant Examination of External Events 

(IPEEE) and in the preliminary Significance Determination Process (SDP) evaluation. While 

arguments about conservatism were used, the NRC could not determine the uncertainty 

associated with important inputs and did not have any sensitivity analysis showing how the 

results could potentially vary given different assumptions. Additionally, the NRC determined 

that the level of effort and resources to perform such an independent analysis at the NRC was 

well beyond the scope of what is appropriate and necessary for the SDP, the purpose of which 

is to determine what additional inspection is necessary as a result of an identified performance 

deficiency. The NRC determined that the review of a complex new deterministic wave run-up 

model would be more appropriately conducted during a NRC license amendment process or as 

part of NRC’s Fukushima Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1, which requires a plant 

specific hazard re-evaluation for external flooding. 

While the NRC determined that it was not appropriate to directly use the results of your 

deterministic wave run-up model in our SDP evaluation, we concluded that your analysis 

provided an insight that an alternate wave run-up model could produce results that include wave 

run-up effects less than previously calculated and as described in the FSAR and IPEEE. The 

NRC viewed your results as an alternate model to the FSAR and IPEEE wave-run up model, 

rather than as a replacement that completely supersedes past analyses. Given the significantly 

different results regarding wave-run up between the new information presented and the FSAR 

wave-run up evaluation, the NRC decided to transition the evaluation of this finding to the 

process described in IMC 0609, Appendix M, “Significance Determination Using Qualitative 

Criteria.” The NRC accounted for the wave run-up analysis in a semi-quantitative analysis using 

the previously developed quantitative framework used in the preliminary finding determination, 

including important attributes of the inspection finding. 

Enclosure 2 provides our summarized assessment of the major points that you raised during the 

regulatory conference, along with our final significance determination. It also summarizes the 

important qualitative considerations that we developed as part of the Appendix M process. 

Therefore, after considering the information developed during the inspection and the additional 

information provided in your submittals dated June 28, July 10, 15, and 29, 2013, the NRC has 

concluded that the finding is appropriately characterized as White, a finding of low to moderate 

risk significance. 

Although the NRC has concluded that the DELFT3D computer model provided reasonable 

insights for the purposes of the SDP, the NRC has not accepted this model for use in the 

licensing basis. The NRC would like to specifically remind NextEra of the provisions of 
L. Meyer -3- 

10 CFR 50.59 (c)(2)(viii), which requires, in part, that a licensee obtain a license amendment 

prior to implementing a proposed change to the facility, as described in the FSAR, if the change 

results in a departure from a method of evaluation described in the FSAR used in establishing 

the design bases or in the safety analyses. 

You have 30 calendar days from the date of this letter to appeal the staff’s determination of 

significance for the identified White finding. Such appeals will be considered to have merit only 

if they meet the criteria given in Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 2, “Process for 

Appealing NRC Characterization of Inspection Findings (SDP Appeal Process).” An appeal 

must be sent in writing to the Regional Administrator, Region III, 2443 Warrenville Road, Lisle, 

IL 60532-4352. 

The NRC has also determined that the failure of NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC, to 

implement a procedure addressing external flooding wave run-up protection design features 

is a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and 

Drawings,” as cited in the Notice of Violation (Notice) provided in Enclosure 3. The 

circumstances surrounding the violation were described in detail in NRC Inspection Report 

No. 05000266/2013002 and 05000301/2013002. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement 

Policy, the Notice is considered escalated enforcement action because it is associated with a 

White finding. 

The NRC has concluded that information regarding the reasons for the violation, the corrective 

actions taken and planned to be taken to correct the violation and prevent recurrence, and the 

date when full compliance was achieved, is already adequately addressed on the docket in 

NRC Inspection Report No. 05000266/2013002 and 05000301/2013002 and in your submittals 

dated July 10, 15, and 29, 2013. Therefore, you are not required to respond to this letter unless 

the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective actions or your position. In 

that case, or if you choose to provide additional information, you should follow the instructions 

specified in the enclosed Notice. 

As a result of our review of PBNP’s performance, including this White finding, we have 

assessed Unit 1 to be in the Degraded Cornerstone column (Column III) due to having two 

White findings in the Mitigating Systems cornerstone of the NRC’s Action Matrix, as of the first 

quarter of 2013. We have assessed Unit 2 to be in the Regulatory Response column of the 

NRC’s Action Matrix, effective the first quarter of 2013. Therefore, we plan to conduct a 

supplemental inspection using Inspection Procedure 95002, “Supplemental Inspection for One 

Degraded Cornerstone or Any Three White Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area,” when your 

staff has notified us of your readiness for this inspection. This inspection procedure is 

conducted to provide assurance that the root cause and contributing causes of risk significant 

performance issues are understood, the extent of condition and the extent of cause are 

identified, and the corrective actions are sufficient to prevent recurrence. In addition, this 

procedure is conducted to provide an independent determination of whether safety culture 

components caused or significantly contributed to the risk-significant performance issues. 

For administrative purposes, this letter is issued as NRC Inspection Report 

No. 05000266/2013012 and 05000301/2013012. Additionally, apparent violations 

(AV) 05000266/2013002-10 and 05000301/2013002-10 are now closed, and violations 

(VIO) 05000266/2013002-10 and 05000301/2013002-10 are opened in their place. 

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's “Rules of Practice,” a copy of this letter, its 

enclosures, and your response, if you choose to provide one, will be made available 
L. Meyer -4- 

electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC’s 

Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC 

Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response 

should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be 

made available to the Public without redaction. The NRC also includes significant enforcement 

actions on its Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/enforcement/actions. 

Sincerely, 

/RA by G. Shear for/ 

Cynthia D. Pederson 

Regional Administrator 

Docket Nos. 50-266, 50-301 

License Nos. DPR-24, DPR-27 

Enclosures: 

1. Regulatory Conference List of Attendees 

2. Analysis of Licensee Information 

3. Notice of Violation 

cc w/encls: Distribution via ListServ 
REGULATORY CONFERENCE 

LIST OF ATTENDEES 

Enclosure 1 

NextEra Energy 

Larry Meyer, Site Vice President 

Richard Wright, Plant General Manager 

Rudolfo Gil, Corporate Engineering Manager 

Steven Bowe, Operations Shift Manager (AOM) 

Anil Julka, Fleet Reliability and Risk Manager 

Steven Catron, Fleet Licensing Manager 

Ronald Seizert, Site Licensing Supervisor 

James Petro, Managing Attorney - Nuclear 

Sandra Dinzeo, Enercon Engineering Lead 

Jemie Dababneh, Rizzo Associates Technical Director 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Anne Boland, Acting Regional Administrator, Region III 

Kenneth O’Brien, Deputy Division Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP) 

Jamnes Cameron, Chief, Branch 6, DRP 

Patricia Pelke, Acting Chief, Branch 6, DRP 

Steven Orth, Enforcement Officer 

Diana Bettencourt, Acting Senior Resident Inspector, Point Beach site, DRP 

Laura Kozak, Senior Risk Analyst, DRP 

Jeffrey Mitman Senior Reliability and Risk Analyst, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) 

David Passehl, Senior Risk Analyst, DRP 

Mark Rubic, Acting Regional Counsel 

Jakob Steffes, Reactor Engineer, DRP 

Prema Chandrathil, Public Affairs Officer 

Patricia Lougheed, Senior Enforcement Coordinator 

Lauren Casey, Enforcement Coordinator, Office of Enforcement (via phone) 

Fernando Ferrante, Reliability and Risk Analyst, NRR (via phone) 

Kenneth See, Senior Hydrologist, NRR (via phone) 

Stephen Vaughn, Reactor Operations Engineer (via phone) 

Sunil Weerakkody, Chief, PRA Operational Support Branch, NRR (via phone) 

John Rutkowski, Project Engineer, Branch 6, DRP (via phone) 

Meghan Thorpe-Kavanaugh, Resident Inspector, Point Beach site, DRP (via phone) 

Public 

Brandon Irwin, Erin Engineering 

Glen Kaegi, Exelon 

Kenneth Nicely, Exelon 

Robert Busch, Wisconsin Emergency Management (via phone) 

Carrie Fosaaen, Xcel Energy (via phone) 

Kim Harshaw, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman (via phone) 

Jeffery Kitsembel, Public Service Commission of Wisconsin (via phone) 

Jeffrey Oskamp, Rizzo Associates (via phone) 

Kenny Horne (via phone) 

Peter Kissinger (via phone) 

Kim Knipple (via phone) 

Richard Loeffler (via phone) 

Mitch Mathews (via phone) 
ANALYSIS OF LICENSEE RISK INFORMATION 

Enclosure 2 

Updated Wave Run-Up Analysis and Safety Significance Determination Analysis 

In order to evaluate the impact of an alternate wave-run up model, the NRC performed a set of 

sensitivity evaluations using the NRC Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) Model that 

varied either the amount of water impounded between the turbine building and the circulating 

water pump house or the flood frequency. For the set of calculations that varied the amount of 

water impounded, the analysts used the same flood frequency that was used in the preliminary 

SDP assessment. The evaluation assessed the impact given the flood effects described in your 

July 15, 2013, letter from Attachment 2, Table 1, Bins 1 and 2. The analysts also developed a 

modified Bin 2 to account for the uncertainty in the flood effects. The modified Bin 2 notably 

included the 4.16kV vital switchgear train A. In some cases, separate calculations were 

performed for Unit 2 by modifying the SPAR Unit 1 model, which yielded higher risk estimates 

because of the impact of the flood on the power supply for the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater 

pump, 2P-53. The resulting ∆CDF calculations ranged from Green, a finding of very low safety 

significance to Yellow, a finding of substantial safety significance. 

A second set of sensitivity calculation were performed that lowered the flood frequency by one 

order of magnitude, from 7.3E-4/yr to 7.3E-5/yr. For this set of calculations, the flood effects 

were as defined by Bin 3 of your Attachment 2, table 1. Again, a modified Bin 3 was developed 

to account for uncertainty in the flood effects. The modified Bin 3 notably included DC 

distribution panels D01 and D02. Again, separate calculations were performed for Unit 2 

because of the impact on the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. The resulting ∆CDF 

calculations for this set of sensitivity evaluations also ranged from Green, a finding of very low 

safety significance to Yellow, a finding of substantial safety significance. 

In using the Appendix M process, the quantitative range of ∆CDF results and risk insights were 

used in conjunction with our evaluation of the qualitative attributes of findings’ significance. The 

most influential qualitative attributes that contributed to the NRC’s risk-informed decision-making 

included the defense-in-depth and the likelihood that the licensee’s recovery actions would 

successfully mitigate the performance deficiency were affected. Specifically, the licensee did 

not have any specific procedural requirements to increase protective efforts as lake levels 

increased, did not have any specific training provided to operators on how to respond to such an 

event, and did not have any recovery actions specified for equipment operation in a flooded 

state. 

Service Water Pump Operation Following Loss of DC Control Power 

Your July 15, 2013, letter also contained Attachment 3 which provided an explanation of the 

Point Beach Nuclear Plant design of the Service Water system showing that a running service 

water pump would continue to operate following a loss of DC control power. The NRC reviewed 

the information and procedure AOP 0.0, “Vital DC System Malfunction.” The NRC determined 

that the Point Beach SPAR model did not require any permanent changes because it accurately 

modeled service water system AC and DC power supply dependencies. In the SPAR model, 

the service water pumps and other equipment are typically modeled as requiring DC power for 

the full 24-hour mission time used in PRA. As the station batteries do not last for 24 hours, 

battery chargers are required for the system/train to fulfill its PRA function. The SPAR model 

also contains operator actions to switch to alternate control power supplies and models 

cross-tying AC buses in certain circumstances. In the case of a loss of offsite power, failure of 
Analysis of Licensee Risk Information - 2 - 

“A” train buses, and the failure of the D-07, D-08, and D-08 battery chargers, only one service 

water pump is completely unaffected. Given that the SPAR model success criteria require at 

least two-service water pumps, the service water function is failed in this scenario unless 

operator action, which is already modeled, is taken to cross-tie 480 V buses. 

A temporary model change was made to add a second operator action for manually operating 

the service water system under these conditions. The change did not have a significant impact 

on the results. 

Analysis of the Rate of Rise of Lake Michigan 

You provided an estimate of the time for Lake Michigan to rise from the point the jersey barriers 

are required to be installed until lake level would be high enough to cause potential flood 

problems if wind-driven waves occurred. The NRC had determined during the preliminary SDP 

assessment that time would be available to correct problems with jersey barrier installation 

before the flood, but found that licensee procedures and emergency plans did not provide any 

specific additional actions to implement given rising lake levels. This information did not result 

in any changes to the quantitative risk evaluation. 

Appendix M Analysis 

Regarding qualitative insights into the risk, the NRC staff determined this finding reduced the 

defense in depth of the site’s flooding protective strategy which in turn decreased the safety 

margin for protection against external flooding events. During the licensee’s walkthrough of the 

procedure, it was discovered that the barriers could not be installed as described. The 

deficiencies with the procedure included: (1) the surface where the barriers would be installed 

did not have a flat surface, which created a 4-inch gap through which water could get past the 

barrier; (2) the rebar present in the jersey barriers created gaps that prevented the barriers to be 

installed flush against each other which allowed for water intrusion; (3) the bottom of the jersey 

barriers were cut for transportation causing gaps where water could intrude; and (4) the length 

of the barriers was insufficient (an extra 8.42-feet was needed on each side) to provide the 

protection specified in the FSAR. The inspector’s review of the flood mitigation strategy 

revealed that that the licensee did not consider the amount of time needed to erect the barriers, 

did not recognize the need to perform additional evaluations for crediting the use of sandbags 

and jersey barriers and did not assign prompt corrective actions to fix the deficient barriers until 

prompted by the inspectors. 

The licensee expressed in the Regulatory Conference that they would take actions to walkdown 

the flood barriers and verify no flooding conditions exist. They would also shutdown both units 

at the license basis lake level (581.9-feet). However, the NRC noted that the licensee did not 

have any specific procedural requirements at the time the performance deficiency was identified 

to increase protective efforts as lake levels continued to rise or to shut down the plant. 

Additionally, the NRC noted that no training had been given to the operators on how to respond 

to such an event. Finally, the guidance referenced by the licensee was not in place until after 

the performance deficiency was identified. The above described consequences of the 

performance deficiency remove a significant barrier (sandbags, jersey barriers or equivalent) 

that were intended to protect risk significant equipment from the flood waters. Thus not having 
Analysis of Licensee Risk Information - 3 - 

these barriers reduced the amount of equipment available to protect the core during these flood 

conditions, and therefore, reduced the defense in depth. 

The NRC staff also determined that the finding reduced the likelihood that the licensee’s 

recovery actions would successfully mitigate the performance deficiency. The licensee 

performed an analysis of lake level rise using National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

(NOAA) data from 1918 through 2013. The results of their analysis shows that the largest 

single month lake level rise during that time was 0.85-feet and given the present lake level the 

licensee concluded that it would take eight weeks to reach the level at which Point Beach 

procedures require wave run-up barrier construction initiation. In the licensee’s estimation, this 

eight weeks would provide more than enough time to identify and correct the gaps in the jersey 

barriers and prevent the lake water from impacting plant equipment. Additionally, the licensee 

expressed in the Regulatory Conference that they would also shut down both units at the 

license basis lake level (581.9-feet). 

However, the NRC staff concluded that while some time would be available to correct the 

problems with jersey barrier installation before the flood, the licensee did not have any specific 

procedural actions to increase protective efforts as lake levels continued to rise or to shut down 

the plant. Additionally, no training had been given to the operators on how to respond to such 

an event. The guidance referenced by the licensee was not in place until after the performance 

deficiency was identified. In addition, recovery actions after equipment is affected by water 

entering the respective buildings is highly questionable as water in the buildings may cause a 

loss of general area lighting and may increase working area hazards significantly. 

Additionally, the NRC staff took into consideration the degree of degradation of failed or 

unavailable components. Specifically, the NRC noted that the licensee’s analysis has flood 

water impounding at levels that could rise up to approximately 8 inches in the turbine building. 

The analysis assumes that even though water may intrude cabinets, but because cables and 

equipment are not submerged, their failure rates remains at their nominal level. However, the 

NRC staff considered that flooding of the turbine building will have some effect on cables and 

equipment. 
NOTICE OF VIOLATION 

Enclosure 3 

NextEra Energy, Point Beach, LLC Docket Nos. 50-266, 50-301 

Point Beach Nuclear Plant License Nos. DPR-24, DPR-27 

 EA-13-125 

During an NRC inspection conducted from January 1 to March 31, 2013, a violation of NRC 

requirements was identified. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the violation is 

listed below: 

Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” 

requires, in part, that activities affecting quality be prescribed by procedures of a type 

appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these 

procedures. 

Point Beach Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Section 2.5, from June 1996 to 

August 2008, stated, in part, that, if the storm sewer system is not adequate to drain the 

amount of water which would top the bank and should the seepage through the doors be 

great enough to result in a risk to the continued operation of essential equipment, the 

equipment in the turbine building and pumphouse will be protected by using sandbags, 

concrete jersey barriers, or equivalent barrier placed in front of the doors to an elevation 

of at least +9.0 feet. 

Point Beach FSAR, Section 2.5, from August 2008 to June 2013 stated, in part, if the 

storm sewer system is not adequate to drain the amount of water which would top the 

bank and should the seepage through the doors be great enough to result in a risk to the 

continued operation of essential equipment, the equipment in the turbine building and 

pumphouse will be protected by using sandbags, concrete jersey barriers, or equivalent 

barrier placed on the north and south sides of the circulating water pumphouse just east 

of the walkway to an elevation of at least +9.0 feet. 

Licensee procedure PC 80 Part 7, “Lake Water Determination,” Revision 0, dated 

January 19, 1996, Step 3.2 states, in part, “IF Lake level is greater than or equal to 

580.7 ft., THEN inform Maintenance planner to have concrete Jersey Barriers installed in 

accordance with FIGURE A within next three weeks.” (Similar statements were 

contained in Step 3.2 of Revision 1, dated August 5, 2002, in Step 5.2 of Revision 2, 

dated February 16, 2006, and Revision 3, dated January 23, 2012. Figure A showed 

placement of the barriers in lines on the north and south sides of the pumphouse.) 

Contrary to the above, from January 19, 1996, to March 13, 2013, the licensee failed to 

have a procedure appropriate to the circumstances to address flooding as described in 

the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR.) Specifically, procedure PC 80 Part 7, as 

implemented, would not protect safety-related equipment in the turbine building or 

pumphouse because the procedure: (1) did not appropriately prescribe the installation 

of barriers such that gaps between the barriers were eliminated to prevent water 

intrusion, (2) did not protect equipment by requiring barriers to be placed in front of the 

doors, from1996 to 2008, as described in the FSAR, and (3) did not require the barriers 

to protect the plant to an elevation of at least 9 feet as described in the FSAR. 

This violation is associated with a White SDP finding. 
Notice of Violation -2- 

The NRC has concluded that information regarding the reason for the violation, the corrective 

actions taken and planned to correct the violation and prevent recurrence, and the date when 

full compliance was achieved is already adequately addressed on the docket in NRC 

Inspection Report No. 05000266/2013002 and 05000301/2013002 and in your submittals dated 

July 10, 15, and 29, 2013. However, you are required to submit a written statement or 

explanation pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Section 2.201 if the 

description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective actions or your position. In that 

case, or if you choose to respond, clearly mark your response as a “Reply to a Notice of 

Violation, EA-13-125” and send it to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: 

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001 with a copy to the Regional 

Administrator, Region III, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspectors at the Point Beach facility, 

within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). 

If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response, with 

the basis for your denial, to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. 

If you choose to respond, your response will be made available electronically for public 

inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC’s Agencywide Documents 

Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at 

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. Therefore, to the extent possible, the response 

should not include any personal privacy, or proprietary information so that it can be made 

available to the Public without redaction. 

In accordance with 10 CFR 19.11, you may be required to post this Notice within two working 

days of receipt. 

Dated this 9th day of August, 2013 
L. Myers -4- 

should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be 

made available to the Public without redaction. The NRC also includes significant enforcement 

actions on its Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/enforcement/actions. 

Sincerely, 

/RA by G. Shear for/ 

Cynthia D. Pederson 

Regional Administrator 

Docket No. 50-266, 50-301 

License No. DPR-24, DPR-27 

Enclosures: 

1. Regulatory Conference List of Attendees 

2. Analysis of Licensee Risk Information 

3. Notice of Violation 

cc w/encls: Distribution via ListServ 

 

FILE NAME: G:\ORAIII\EICS\ENFORCEMENT\Cases\Enforcement Cases 2013\EA-13-125 Point Beach 

Flooding\EA-13-125 Point Beach draft final significance letter.docx 

OFFICE RIII RIII RIII RIII D:OE RIII RIII 

NAME Lougheed Kozak Pelke O’Brien Zimmerman1

CLauren for 

Orth Pederson 

GShear for

DATE 08/07/13 08/06/13 08/06/13 08/07/13 08/06/13 08/07/13 08/07/13 

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

 

1 OE concurrence received via email from C. Lauren on August 6th, 2013. 
Letter to Mark Schimmel from Cynthia D. Pederson dated August 9, 2013 

SUBJECT: FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION OF A WHITE FINDING WITH 

ASSESSMENT FOLLOWUP AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION; NRC 

INSPECTION REPORT NO. 05000266/2013012; 05000301/2013012; 

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT 

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