Enclosure 

Responses to Requests for Information 

Senator James Inhofe et al. 

Letter Dated March 4, 2015

Request 1.

Has the Commission met to discuss how to best execute the orderly transition of its 

post-Fukushima effort back into the statutorily mandated organization? If so, please tell 

us about those plans and schedules.

ANSWER. 

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has strived to maintain an effective and 

efficient organizational structure for the implementation of lessons learned from the Fukushima 

Dai-ichi accident. Because of the complex nature of these activities, the agency established a 

special organization, the Japan Lessons Learned Directorate (now Division) (JLD), to manage 

and coordinate the activities with oversight provided by the JLD Steering Committee, which is 

comprised of agency senior managers who collectively possess responsibility for 

implementation of lessons learned. 

The Commission recognizes the importance of ultimately transitioning these activities back to 

the NRC’s normal organizational structure at the appropriate time. In fact, the NRC staff has 

already done so for the majority of lessons learned activities, as discussed in SECY-13-0095, 

“Fourth 6-Month Status Update on Response to Lessons Learned from Japan’s March 11, 2011, 

Great Tohoku Earthquake and Subsequent Tsunami.” As described in that paper, only four 

issues remain under the direct oversight of the JLD Steering Committee: 

• Periodic re-confirmation of external hazards. 

• Reliable hardened vents for containment designs other than boiling water reactors with 

Mark I and II containments. 

• Hydrogen control and mitigation, and 

• Applicability of lessons learned to other NRC-regulated facilities. 

Because of the complexity of the four issues described above, the Steering Committee 

determined that continued direct oversight of those activities was warranted. The remaining 

activities were evaluated by the Steering Committee against the criteria described in SECY-13-

0095 and moved into the NRC’s normal processes and organization. Although these activities 

are no longer under the direct oversight of the Steering Committee, the Committee continues to 

stay apprised of the transitioned activities to ensure adequate focus is maintained on 

implementation and provide executive leadership, if needed. 

The NRC staff intends to maintain the JLD in place for some period of time as part of the NRC’s 

organizational structure. The JLD serves as a central liaison to achieve technical and 

programmatic consistency, especially as it relates to activities that might involve multiple NRC 

organizations. This role will minimize any potential duplication of effort or inconsistent 

application of NRC processes. The NRC’s Executive Director for Operations is committed to 

reevaluating Fukushima-related staffing and organizational needs at the end of fiscal year 2016 

and reporting back to the Commission. 
- 2 - 

Request 2.

What agency mechanism is now in place to periodically ensure that the post-Fukushima 

recommendations are receiving the benefit of a comprehensive structured review, 

including risk prioritization, to ensure the mistakes of the post-TMI era are not repeated?

ANSWER. 

The JLD Steering Committee has been the primary source of direct staff oversight to ensure the 

NRC’s post-Fukushima activities are conducted effectively and efficiently. The Steering 

Committee, which, as discussed above, consists of senior NRC executives under the leadership 

of the NRC’s Deputy Executive Director for Reactor and Preparedness Programs, has led the 

staff in ensuring issues are appropriately defined, plans are established, and guidance on the 

implementation of NRC actions in response to the accident is provided. In addition, the creation 

of a centralized organizational structure for day-to-day implementation of lessons learned 

initiatives, the JLD, has been instrumental in ensuring consistent and durable implementation of 

post-Fukushima lessons learned initiatives. 

In carrying out these initiatives, the Steering Committee and the JLD have been mindful of 

lessons from previous initiatives, including those associated with the Three Mile Island accident. 

As discussed in SECY-11-0137, “Prioritization of Recommended Actions to be Taken in 

Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned,” from the initial stages of its response to the 

accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi, the NRC has recognized the importance of discipline and rigor 

in our response to the accident. For example, shortly after its establishment, the JLD Steering 

Committee formed the following guiding principles, which continue to provide the foundation for 

the NRC’s post-Fukushima activities: 

• Do not distract from safety 

• Be disciplined in the screening of additional issues 

• Do not displace work of greater safety significance 

• Do it right the first time 

• Establish a sound basis for decisions. 

External stakeholder engagement has also been important to ensure effectiveness and 

efficiency in this area. The JLD Steering Committee holds periodic public meetings with the 

industry’s Fukushima steering committee, and the NRC staff holds routine meetings with the 

industry, public, and other parties on a variety of topics related to lessons learned from the 

accident. These discussions are an opportunity to talk about any challenges to implementation, 

including the cumulative effect of the efforts, and solicit information from both the industry and 

members of the public on ways of improving the effectiveness and efficiency of our activities in 

this area. 

Finally, the Commission itself has provided routine oversight and direction to the NRC staff as 

the agency implements lessons learned initiatives through, for example, routine meetings with 

the staff and external stakeholders and the issuance of formal requirements to staff in cases 

when policy issues arise. 

The consistent application of the guiding principles, interaction with external stakeholders, and 

leadership and oversight of the JLD Steering Committee and Commission have ensured, and 

will continue to ensure, that lessons learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident result in 
- 3 - 

appropriate, durable safety improvements to U.S. nuclear plants and that lessons learned from 

previous such initiatives are heeded. 

Request 3.

Without such mechanisms to ensure proposed requirements receive a structured review 

and risk prioritization, would you agree that the imposition of agency requirements 

becomes more a matter of ad hoc, subjective decisions, and less a product of a 

consistent, rigorous and risk informed consideration?

ANSWER. 

The NRC agrees that the establishment of structured and disciplined reviews of new regulatory 

initiatives is important (both for Fukushima-related activities and others), and that the use of risk 

insights can inform the prioritization of such initiatives. As discussed above, the NRC 

recognized the importance of such concepts early into our review of lessons learned from the 

Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. For example, in SECY-11-0137, the NRC staff discussed the 

need to carefully review and prioritize activities in light of other important ongoing work: 

The overriding challenge the staff will face when implementing actions to 

address the NTTF [Fukushima Near-Term Task Force] recommendations 

will be redefining agency priorities while ensuring that this process does 

not displace ongoing work that has greater safety benefit, work that is 

necessary for continued safe operation, or other existing high priority 

work. The staff has identified some examples of work, including National 

Fire Protection Association 805 reviews; resolution of Generic Safety 

Issue 191, “Assessment of Debris Accumulation on PWR [pressurized 

water reactor] Sump Performance;” implementation of the recently 

updated emergency preparedness rule; materials, fuel facility, and reactor 

oversight program activities; and near-term combined license reviews, 

which the staff does not intend to delay to work on the NTTF 

recommendations. This will be a continuous process as new operating 

reactor issues emerge which, because of their potential impact on safety, 

may take priority over action on some lower priority NTTF 

recommendations. The staff will make use of available risk information 

and experience when performing these periodic re-evaluations. 

The staff further emphasized this commitment in a letter to reactor licensees dated June 13, 

2013 (available in the NRC’s Agencywide Documents Access and Managements System 

(ADAMS) at Accession No. ML13151A377). The NRC informed licensees that the postFukushima work was impacting the review of lower priority licensing actions and encouraged 

licensees to communicate any safety impacts of their licensing actions to the NRC in order to 

assist in our properly prioritizing the work. As stated in the letter, 

The NRC will continue to assess and redefine priorities, consistent with 

the agency's mission to protect public health, safety, and the 

environment. Resource allocations and schedule expectations will be 

made to ensure timely licensing reviews, based on the level of safety 

significance and operational needs associated with the action. 
- 4 - 

The establishment of the organizational structure, guiding principles, and other measures 

discussed in the NRC’s responses to Questions 1 and 2 ensure that the NRC’s post-Fukushima 

safety enhancements are evaluated and implemented in a rigorous and consistent manner. 

From a broader perspective, the agency has been focusing on consideration of the cumulative 

effects of regulation for a number of years. The goal of this effort is to examine ways in which 

the agency may be able to enhance the efficiency with which it implements regulatory actions, 

while mitigating the cumulative impact of regulatory activities on licensees. A related activity, 

referred to as the Risk Prioritization Initiative, has been established with a goal of enabling the 

NRC staff and licensees to focus resources on issues that are most significant to public safety 

using risk insights. The NRC staff submitted a paper to the Commission at the end of March 

that summarizes the efforts to date on this initiative and makes recommendations for options 

going forward. 

The NRC also benefits from the insights of various external stakeholders, such as the nuclear 

industry, members of the public, and non-governmental organizations, along with internal NRC 

advisory groups, such as the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards and the Committee to 

Review Generic Requirements, to ensure our activities are appropriately focused and risk 

informed. 

Request 4.

How many of the remaining post-Fukushima issues would likely be justified under 

rigorous, quantitative technical and cost benefit analyses in accordance with the NRC’s 

Backfit Rule?

ANSWER. 

Because the NRC has not completed the analyses that are required under Section 50.109, 

“Backfitting,” of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) for each of the remaining 

Fukushima lessons-learned activities, it is difficult to speculate which of those activities would 

qualify as cost-justified backfits. The NRC intends to use existing processes, such as the 

development of formal backfit analyses, as applicable, and interactions with the NRC’s Advisory 

Committee on Reactor Safeguards and Committee to Review Generic Requirements, to ensure 

that a strong basis is developed for any additional requirements imposed on our licensees. 

Request 5.

Please provide a list of additional regulatory requirements imposed over the last five 

years that have been outside the scope of the Backfit Rule.

ANSWER. 

The NRC understands, “outside the scope of the Backfit Rule,” as focused on issuance of NRC 

regulations and orders applicable to nuclear power reactors for which either: (i) a backfit 

analysis was not prepared, or (ii) a detailed discussion of the comparable “backfitting” 

protections applicable to new power reactors under 10 CFR Part 52 (referred to as “issue 

finality” under Part 52) was not prepared. 
- 5 - 

Over the last five years, the NRC has issued 34 final regulations and 4 orders applicable to 

nuclear power reactors for which a backfit analysis was not prepared. See Table 1 (Attachment 

1). The reasons why backfit analyses were not prepared for these final regulations are 

summarized in Table 1. For purposes of comparison, the NRC notes that, in the last five years, 

the NRC has issued two final regulations and one order applicable to nuclear power plants for 

which a backfit analysis was prepared. See Table 2 (Attachment 2). 

Request 6.

Please describe the training and mentoring programs in the agency that emphasize 

commitment to the Principles of Good Regulation, and empower managers to be guided 

by them.

ANSWER. 

The NRC constantly emphasizes the importance of adhering to our Principles of Good 

Regulation by integrating the Principles into several formal technical training courses, such as 

“Field Techniques and Regulatory Processes” and “Conducting Inspections,” which are required 

for many technical qualification programs. In addition, the agency’s leadership and professional 

development programs support the development of skills in the areas that help us achieve the 

spirit of the Principles, e.g., interpersonal and communication skills. Our mentoring and 

knowledge management programs facilitate the sharing of information and best practices 

among staff in order to promote open collaboration and effective and efficient implementation of 

our daily tasks. 

The agency’s values also play an important role in emphasizing our commitment to the 

Principles of Good Regulation. Recently, the agency embarked on an initiative titled “Behavior 

Matters,” which focuses on identifying and demonstrating behaviors that demonstrate we are 

living the NRC values. By ensuring there is alignment between the agency’s Values and 

Principles of Good Regulation, we believe we are developing an organizational culture that 

expects and empowers staff and managers to be guided by them. Through our training, 

mentoring, knowledge management, and organizational development activities, we strive to 

ensure the Principles of Good Regulation are embedded into our regulatory activities.