In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 20-1690 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

ANDREW MCHANEY, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 1:18-cr-00045-2 — Elaine E. Bucklo, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED DECEMBER 11, 2020 — DECIDED JUNE 14, 2021 

____________________ 

Before ROVNER, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. 

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Andrew McHaney is not the first 

defendant to try to persuade this court that Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence as defined under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c). And despite our growing, unequivocal precedent to 

the contrary, we suspect he will not be the last, as defendants 

who are subject to the § 924(c) enhancement face significantly 

increased sentences. Unless the Supreme Court instructs otherwise, however, these attempts will be in vain. This court has 
2 No. 20-1690 

declared several times that Hobbs Act robbery meets the definition of a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and thus 

is a qualifying predicate crime under the statute. We see no 

cause to alter that precedent. 

I. 

McHaney participated in at least four armed robberies at 

cellular phone stores around Chicago. Just as he was attempting a fifth, he was arrested. The United States charged him 

with one count of Hobbs Act conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); 

Count 1); four counts of Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. 

§ 1951(a); Counts 2, 4, 6, and 9); one count of attempted Hobbs 

Act robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); Count 11); three counts of 

using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A); Counts 

5, 7, and 10); one count of using and carrying a firearm during 

and in relation to a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A); 

Count 12); and one count of possession of a firearm by a felon 

(18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); Count 13). 

McHaney moved the district court to dismiss Counts 

5,7,10, and 12, each of which allege violations of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c), arguing that Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as 

a crime of violence under section 924(c)(3)(A). The district 

court declined to dismiss the counts. Eventually McHaney entered into a plea agreement and was later sentenced to 177 

months in prison. In his plea he reserved his right to appeal 

the question presented here: whether Hobbs Act robbery is a 

crime of violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). 

II. 

Section § 924(c) of the criminal code establishes minimum 

penalties for anyone who uses or carries a firearm during a 
No. 20-1690 3

“crime of violence” or possesses a firearm in furtherance of 

such a crime. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Those penalties increase 

even more if the gun is brandished (as it was by McHaney in 

some of the robberies) and more still if discharged. Id. But 

what counts as a crime of violence? The statute defines it as 

follows: 

(3) For purposes of this subsection the term 

“crime of violence” means an offense that is a 

felony and— 

(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, 

or threatened use of physical force against 

the person or property of another, or 

(B) that by its nature, involves a substantial 

risk that physical force against the person or 

property of another may be used in the 

course of committing the offense. 

18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c)(3). 

In United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), the Supreme 

Court held that the (B) clause above, often called the “residual 

clause,” was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 2336. This holding came on the heels of two other Supreme Court cases that 

found similar language in other such “residual clauses” to be 

unconstitutionally vague. See Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 

591, 606 (2015) (finding the residual clause of Armed Career 

Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B), to be unconstitutionally 

vague); Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1223 (2018) (finding 

unconstitutionally vague the residual clause of the federal 

criminal code’s definition of “crime of violence,” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 16(b), as incorporated into the Immigration and Nationality 
4 No. 20-1690 

Act’s definition of aggravated felony).1 Consequently, in our 

de novo review in this case, we look only to see whether 

Hobbs Act robbery meets the definition of robbery spelled out 

in § 924(c)(3)(A)—often referred to as the “force clause.” See 

United States v. Vesey, 966 F.3d 694, 696 (7th Cir. 2020) (“We 

review de novo the question whether a prior conviction qualifies as a crime of violence under the Guidelines.”). 

The Hobbs Act defines robbery as taking or obtaining 

property from another “by means of actual or threatened 

force, violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his 

person or property.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). In United States v. 

Anglin we held that “committing such an act necessarily requires using or threatening force,” because putting a person 

in fear of injury to person or property as described in Hobbs 

Act robbery “necessarily involve[s] ‘the use, attempted use, 

or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.’” United States v. Anglin, 846 F.3d 954, 965 (7th Cir. 2017) 

(citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A)), cert. granted, judgment vacated 

on other grounds, 138 S. Ct. 126 (2017). 

1 In addition to these cases, McHaney might also have been encouraged 

in his efforts by rulings that have concluded that Hobbs Act robbery is not 

a crime of violence as that term is defined in the United States Sentencing 

Guidelines. See, e.g., Bridges v. United States, 991 F.3d 793, 800 (7th Cir. 

2021). But the sentencing guidelines do not provide an apt comparison. 

The Guidelines definition of robbery is more narrow than that in the 

Hobbs Act, requiring a threat of a violence against a person. A defendant 

can commit Hobbs Act robbery by threatening physical violence against 

any “person or property.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). Thus, under the categorical 

method of comparing crimes, a person could be convicted of Hobbs Act 

robbery without meeting the Sentencing Guidelines definition of robbery. 

Id. at 800–01. 
No. 20-1690 5

Since we issued the decision in Anglin, we have held time 

and again that Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under the elements clause—(§ 924(c)(3)(A))—because it 

entails the use or threat of force. See United States v. Hammond, 

996 F.3d 374, 398 (7th Cir. 2021) (“We squarely decided this 

issue in United States v. Anglin in holding that Hobbs Act robbery is a ‘crime of violence’ within the meaning of the elements clause of § 924(c)(3)(A)”); United States v. Brown, 973 

F.3d 667, 697 (7th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1253 (2021) 

(“We have squarely rejected this argument” that Hobbs Act 

robbery is not a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A)); United 

States v. Fisher, 943 F.3d 809, 815 (7th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 

140 S. Ct. 2631 (2020) (“[W]e have repeatedly held that a 

Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence within the meaning 

of § 924(c)(3)(A).”); Haynes v. United States, 873 F.3d 954, 955 

(7th Cir. 2017) (recognizing in dicta that Hobbs Act robbery is 

a crime of violence under the elements clause of 

§ 924(c)(3)(A)); United States v. Rivera, 847 F.3d 847, 849 (7th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2228 (2017) (“Because one cannot 

commit Hobbs Act robbery without using or threatening 

physical force, we held that Hobbs Act robbery qualified as a 

predicate crime for a crime-of-violence conviction.”). 

Every other court of appeals to have considered this 

agrees with this conclusion. See United States v. Walker, 990 

F.3d 316, 325 (3d Cir. 2021); United States v. Dominguez, 954 

F.3d 1251, 1261 (9th Cir. 2020); Brown v. United States, 942 F.3d 

1069, 1075 (11th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 577 U.S. 1091 (2016); 

United States v. Mathis, 932 F.3d 242, 266 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 

sub nom. Uhuru v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 639, and cert. denied 

sub nom. Stokes v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 640 (2019); United 

States v. St. Hubert, 918 F.3d 1174, 1175 (11th Cir. 2019); United 

States v. Bowens, 907 F.3d 347, 353 (5th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 
6 No. 20-1690 

139 S. Ct. 1299 (2019); United States v. Garcia-Ortiz, 904 F.3d 

102, 109 (1st Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1208 (2019); 

United States v. Hill, 890 F.3d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 

139 S. Ct. 844 (2019); United States v. Melgar-Cabrera, 892 F.3d 

1053, 1065–66 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 494 (2018); Diaz 

v. United States, 863 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 2017); United States 

v. Gooch, 850 F.3d 285, 292 (6th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 

2230. The Supreme Court has declined to accept certiorari on 

this issue in any of these cases. 

None of McHaney’s arguments persuades us that our 

precedent and those of every other circuit court to have considered the issue are incorrect. Contrary to the defendant’s arguments, we have concluded that putting any person in fear 

in the context of robbery necessarily involves “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the 

person of another.” See Anglin, 846 F.3d at 965; United States v. 

Armour, 840 F.3d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 2016), as amended (June 26, 

2017). Given our precedent, we have advised that arguments 

that Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence are, in fact, 

“frivolous.” Hammond, 996 F.3d at 39 (citing United States v. 

Fox, 783 F. App’x 630, 632 (7th Cir. 2019)). Consequently, the 

opinion of the district court is AFFIRMED.