UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

_________________________________ 

WILLIS A. CENTER, SR., 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

ROBERT O. LAMPERT, Director, 

Wyoming Department of 

Corrections, in his individual and 

official capacities; CARL 

VOIGTSBERGER, Wyoming 

Department of Corrections 

Classification and Housing Manager 

in his individual and official 

capacities; KAYLA UPDAHL, 

Wyoming Department of Corrections 

Policy and Planning Manager in her 

individual and official capacities; 

EDDIE WILSON, Wyoming 

Department of Corrections State 

Penitentiary Warden in his 

individual and official capacities; 

MICHAEL PACHECO, Wyoming 

Department of Corrections State 

Penitentiary Warden in his 

individual and official capacities; 

JANEL THAYER, Wyoming 

Department of Corrections Housing 

Manager in her individual and 

official capacities; DEPUTY 

WARDEN HOLTZ, Wyoming 

Department of Corrections State 

Penitentiary Deputy Warden in his 

individual and official capacities; 

GABBY WOODS, Wyoming 

Department of Corrections State 

Penitentiary Unit Manager in her 

individual and official capacities; 

No. 17-8050 

(D.C. No. 1:17-CV-00096-ABJ) 

(D. Wyo.) 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

February 15, 2018

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

DARCY MCFARRIN, Wyoming 

Department of Corrections State 

Penitentiary Unit Manager in her 

individual and official capacities; 

VICKY SMITH, Wyoming 

Department of Corrections State 

Penitentiary Unit Manager in her 

individual and official capacities; 

HEATHER SPEICER, Wyoming 

Department of Corrections State 

Penitentiary Education Department 

Employee in her individual and 

official capacities; JENNA 

RAMILLER, Wyoming Department 

of Corrections State Penitentiary 

Law Librarian in her individual and 

official capacities; MAJOR 

REMACLE, Wyoming Department 

of Corrections State Penitentiary 

Security Major in his individual and 

official capacities; LIEUTENANT 

KAHN, Wyoming Department of 

Corrections State Penitentiary 

Lieutenant in his individual and 

official capacities; CAPTAIN 

JACOBS, Wyoming Department of 

Corrections State Penitentiary 

Captain in his individual and 

official capacities; K. BARKES, J. 

WADE, VIAU THOMPSON, 

OFFICER GOODMAN, OFFICER P. 

BROWN, OFFICER J. BROWN, 

OFFICER MAYNARD, D. 

RAMILLER, CORRECTIONAL 

OFFICER SABO, CORRECTIONAL 

OFFICER JOHNSON, Wyoming 

Department of Corrections State 

Penitentiary Correctional Officers in 

their individual and official 

capacities; CAPTAIN HOEGLIN, 

CAPTAIN RAPP, Wyoming 

Department of Corrections State 

Penitentiary Captains in their 
3 

individual and official capacities; 

PROPERTY OFFICER ROGERS, 

PROPERTY OFFICER WEARRING, 

Wyoming Department of Corrections 

State Penitentiary Property Officers 

in their individual and official 

capacities; CASEWORKER 

HOEGLIN, Wyoming Department of 

Corrections State Penitentiary 

Caseworker in his/her individual 

and official capacities; 

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER 

DEDRICK, CORRECTIONAL 

OFFICER DANDY, Wyoming 

Department of Corrections State 

Penitentiary Correctional Officers in 

their individual and official 

capacities, 

 Defendants-Appellees. 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

_________________________________ 

Before BRISCOE, HARTZ, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

 This appeal is brought pro se by Mr. Willis Center, who sued under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. His appeal grew out of the denial of his motions for 

 

*

 Oral argument would not be helpful in this appeal. As a result, we 

are deciding the appeal based on Mr. Center’s briefing. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). 

 

This order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except 

under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. 

But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value under 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a) and 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). 
4 

 a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction and 

 a motion to reconsider those rulings. 

In his motions for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary 

injunction, he sought a prohibition against 

 his placement in disciplinary segregation, 

 the confiscation of his legal property, 

 the interference with his written communications with 

attorneys, and 

 the presence of identified staff members within a specified 

distance. 

In addition, Mr. Center sought the appointment of a court advocate. As an 

alternative to all of these requests, he sought an order requiring a transfer 

to another facility. The district court declined to grant a temporary 

restraining order or preliminary injunction and later declined to reconsider 

these rulings. 

I. Temporary Restraining Order

 We lack jurisdiction over the denial of a temporary restraining order 

and refuse to reconsider this denial. See Tooele Cty. v. United States, 820 

F.3d 1183, 1186 (10th Cir. 2016). Thus, we dismiss the appeal regarding 

this part of the ruling. 
5 

II. Preliminary Injunction and Reconsideration 

 We affirm the denials of the preliminary injunction and the motion to 

reconsider this denial. 

A. Standard of Review 

 For our review of the denial of a preliminary injunction or a motion 

to reconsider this denial, we apply the abuse-of-discretion standard. See 

Gen. Motors Corp. v. Urban Gorilla, LLC, 500 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th Cir. 

2007) (preliminary injunction); Walters v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 703 F.3d 

1167, 1172 (10th Cir. 2013) (motion to reconsider). A district court does 

not abuse its discretion unless it “‘commits an error of law or makes 

clearly erroneous factual findings.’” Gen. Motors, 500 F.3d at 1226 

(quoting Wyandotte Nation v. Sebelius, 443 F.3d 1247, 1252 (10th Cir. 

2006)). A preliminary injunction involves an extraordinary remedy, which 

is available only when the movant’s right to relief is clear and 

unequivocal. Heideman v. South Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th 

Cir. 2003). 

B. Mr. Center’s Burden in District Court

Our precedents require Mr. Center to satisfy four elements: “(1) a 

substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the case; (2) irreparable 

injury to the movant if the preliminary injunction is denied; (3) the 

threatened injury to the movant outweighs the injury to the other party 

under the preliminary injunction; and (4) the injunction is not adverse to 
6 

the public interest.” Salt Lake Tribune Publ’g Co. v. AT & T Corp., 320 

F.3d 1081, 1099 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

C. Requests for Prohibitive Relief 

In part, Mr. Center sought an order prohibiting certain conduct. 

1. Placement in Disciplinary Segregation and Confiscation of 

Legal Property 

Mr. Center requested a preliminary injunction against placement in 

disciplinary segregation and confiscation of his legal property.1

 For these 

requests, however, the district court enjoyed discretion to conclude that 

Mr. Center had failed to satisfy any of the elements of a preliminary 

injunction, and Mr. Center has not identified any manner in which the 

court erred in this part of the ruling. See Fisher v. Okla. Dep’t of Corr., 

213 F. App’x 704, 709 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (upholding the 

denial of a preliminary injunction against seizure of legal materials based 

on the inmate plaintiffs’ failure to satisfy any of the four requirements of a 

preliminary injunction). Thus, we affirm the denial of relief involving 

placement in disciplinary segregation and confiscation of legal property. 

 

1

 Before the court ruled on the motion to reconsider, Mr. Center filed 

an affidavit acknowledging his release from segregation and the return of 

all of his legal property. 
7 

2. Communications with a Jailhouse Lawyer 

In addition, Mr. Center sought an order preventing disturbance of his 

communications with a jailhouse lawyer.2

 For this request, Mr. Center 

provided only a single allegation in the complaint: “They even denied me 

access to a jailhouse lawyer through the mail that has helped me before 

with court filings.” R. at 34. 

Prison officials enjoy a legitimate penological interest in restricting 

communications between inmates, even when the ostensible purpose is to 

obtain advice from jailhouse lawyers. See Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 

231 (2001); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 489-90 (1969). Thus, the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Mr. Center had 

failed to justify a preliminary injunction against restrictions on 

communications with fellow inmates for the purpose of getting legal 

advice. 

3. Communications with an Attorney 

Mr. Center also referred to his difficulty in communicating with an 

attorney. In the complaint, he alleged: 

Even then they just recently denied me postage to communicate 

with Ms. Urbin who works also at the Gillette, WY Public 

 

2

 In seeking a preliminary injunction, Mr. Center did not specifically 

ask for this prohibition. Instead, he focused on impediments to his 

communication with an attorney. But his complaint does raise the issue and 

he incorporated the complaint in his motion. For the sake of argument, we 

may assume that the motion would encompass his communications with a 

jailhouse lawyer. 
8 

defenders office. I sent her a letter the week they took Jayson 

away and it returned 5/30/16 saying postage is still due. . . . 

I do not have access to the postage meter that places the stamp 

on envelopes and they are the ones who do this. They will not 

allow his mail to go out to Ms. Urbin or allow her phone 

number to be added to his account. 

R. at 34-35.3

 Again, however, the district court enjoyed discretion to 

conclude that Mr. Center had failed to satisfy the elements of a preliminary 

injunction; and Mr. Center identifies no error in this conclusion. 

4. Separation from Designated Officials 

Mr. Center also requested a preliminary injunction that would 

prevent certain prison officials from being within a specified distance of 

him. Again, however, Mr. Center has not supported the existence of any of 

the equitable elements for a preliminary injunction of this sort. As a result, 

we conclude that the district court had discretion to deny this part of the 

motion. See p. 7, below (citing Lopez v. Roark, 560 F. App’x 809, 812 

(10th Cir. 2014) (unpublished)). 

D. Requests for Affirmative Relief 

 Mr. Center also sought affirmative action in his motion for a 

preliminary injunction. A preliminary injunction requiring affirmative 

action “is an extraordinary remedy and is generally disfavored.” Little v. 

 

3

 When seeking reconsideration, Mr. Center acknowledged that he had 

ultimately been allowed to add Ms. Urbin’s telephone number to his 

contact list. R. at 91. Mr. Center then stated that he was unable to call Ms. 

Urbin during regular office hours because he could not afford to purchase 

telephone privileges. Id. 
9 

Jones, 607 F.3d 1245, 1251 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). For a preliminary injunction requiring affirmative action, Mr. 

Center had a heightened burden on the four elements. See id. The district 

court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Mr. Center had failed 

to satisfy his burden on these aspects of the motion. 

1. Appointment of a Court Advocate 

 In part, Mr. Center requested appointment of a court advocate to 

oversee prison operations. The district court pointed out that Mr. Center 

had not cited any support for the court’s authority to appoint a court 

advocate. See Webb v. Goord, 340 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating 

that the Prison Litigation Reform Act “has substantially limited the 

capacity of federal courts to appoint special masters to oversee prison 

conditions”). In light of the absence of support for this request, we 

conclude that this part of the ruling fell within the district court’s 

discretion. 

2. Transfer 

 In the alternative, Mr. Center sought a transfer. He is currently 

housed in a state prison. But in the event of a denial of his other requests, 

he sought transfer to a federal holding facility in light of the parole 

board’s alleged willingness to grant parole and allow him to go into federal 

custody pursuant to a detainer. 
10 

For this request, Mr. Center did not refer to any of the elements of a 

preliminary injunction or identify any legal basis to order transfer from 

state custody to federal custody. Against this backdrop, the district court 

acted within its discretion to deny this part of the request. See Lopez v. 

Roark, 560 F. App’x 809, 812 (10th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (upholding 

the denial of a preliminary injunction for transfer to another prison based 

on the inmate plaintiff’s failure to even mention the third or fourth 

elements for a preliminary injunction, much less satisfy his heightened 

burden on these elements). 

* * * 

 Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal with respect to the denial of a 

temporary restraining order. But we affirm on the denial of Mr. Center’s 

motions for a preliminary injunction and reconsideration. 

III. Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis 

We grant Mr. Center’s motion for leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis. But we remind Mr. Center of his obligation to continue making 

partial payments until the entire filing fee has been paid in full. 

Entered for the Court 

Robert E. Bacharach 

Circuit Judge