[Federal Register Volume 69, Number 219 (Monday, November 15, 2004)]
[Notices]
[Pages 65619-65627]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 04-25396]



[[Page 65619]]

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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Transportation Security Administration

[Docket No. TSA-2004-19160]


Notice of Final Order for Secure Flight Test Phase; Response to 
Public Comments on Proposed Order and Secure Flight Test Records

AGENCY: Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS).

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: This notice responds to public comments received in response 
to three documents that the Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA) published in the Federal Register on September 24, 2004, related 
to testing of a new domestic passenger prescreening program known as 
Secure Flight. Secure Flight is an aviation passenger prescreening 
program that, once operational, would identify passengers known or 
reasonably suspected to be engaged in terrorist activity in order to 
allow action to be taken to prevent them from boarding a domestic 
flight or to ensure that appropriate additional security screening 
procedures are applied. Under the program, TSA would compare passenger 
reservation information for domestic flights, primarily in the form of 
passenger name records (PNRs), to information maintained by the Federal 
Government about individuals known or reasonably suspected to be 
engaged in terrorist activity.
    In preparation for testing the feasibility of the Secure Flight 
program, on September 24, 2004, TSA issued a Federal Register notice 
establishing a system of records under the Privacy Act for purposes of 
the Secure Flight program during the test phase. TSA also published a 
notice in the Federal Register that the agency had submitted to the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) a request for approval to collect 
PNRs from aircraft operators to test the Secure Flight program. That 
notice included the text of a proposed order to certain aircraft 
operators directing them to provide a limited set of historical PNRs to 
TSA. OMB subsequently has approved the information collection through 
March 31, 2005, and assigned OMB control number 1652-0025. In addition, 
TSA published a Privacy Impact Assessment for the testing phase of the 
Secure Flight program.
    This Federal Register notice that TSA publishes today addresses 
public comments received in response to the Federal Register notices 
published on September 24, 2004, and describes changes made to TSA's 
proposed order, which TSA now is issuing in final form.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lisa Dean, Privacy Officer, 
Transportation Security Administration, 601 South 12th Street, 
Arlington, VA 22202-4220; telephone (571) 227-3947; facsimile (571) 
227-2594; e-mail <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#64080d17054a0001050a24000c174a030b12"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="96faffe5f7b8f2f3f7f8d6f2fee5b8f1f9e0">[email protected]</span></a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    On September 24, 2004, TSA published in the Federal Register three 
notices related to TSA's plan to issue a final order to aircraft 
operators in order to obtain PNRs for testing of a new domestic 
passenger prescreening program known as Secure Flight (69 FR 57342, 
57345, and 57352). This Federal Register notice that TSA is publishing 
today responds to public comments received in response to the notices 
published on September 24, 2004, and provides public notice of the 
final order that TSA is issuing for purposes of testing the Secure 
Flight program.

Secure Flight Program

    The Secure Flight program is an effort to move the existing 
passenger prescreening process into the Federal Government in order to 
make the process more effective, consistent, and efficient for the 
traveling public. By administering this screening process within the 
Federal Government, the Secure Flight program will allow for better 
protection of government watchlist information that currently is 
provided to aircraft operators.
    Secure Flight will involve the comparison of information in PNRs 
from domestic flights to names in the Terrorist Screening Database 
(TSDB) maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), including 
the expanded TSA No-Fly and Selectee Lists, in order to identify 
individuals known or reasonably suspected to be engaged in terrorist 
activity. TSA anticipates that it will also apply, within the Secure 
Flight system, a streamlined version of the existing passenger 
prescreening process, known as the Computer Assisted Passenger 
Prescreening System (CAPPS), which evaluates information in PNRs that 
passengers otherwise provide to aircraft operators in the normal course 
of business.
    Simple comparisons of PNR information against records maintained in 
the TSDB will not permit TSA to identify information provided by 
passengers that is incorrect or inaccurate, potentially rendering the 
comparisons less effective. Therefore, on a very limited basis, in 
addition to testing TSA's ability to compare passenger information with 
data maintained by TSC, TSA will separately test the use of commercial 
data to determine if use of such data is effective in identifying 
passenger information that is incorrect or inaccurate and reducing the 
number of false positive matches of passenger information against TSDB 
records. This test will involve commercial data aggregators whose 
procedures will be governed by strict privacy and data security 
protections. TSA will not receive the commercially available data that 
would be used by commercial data aggregators. TSA will use this test of 
commercial data to determine whether such use: (1) Could identify when 
passengers' information is inaccurate or incorrect and/or assist with 
the resolution of false positive matches; (2) would result in 
inappropriate differences in treatment of any protected category of 
persons; and (3) could be governed by data security safeguards and 
privacy protections that are sufficiently robust to ensure that 
commercial entities or other unauthorized entities do not gain access 
to passengers' personal information and to ensure that the government 
does not gain inappropriate access to commercial information about 
individuals. TSA will defer any decision of whether commercial data 
will be used in its prescreening programs, such as Secure Flight, until 
a thorough assessment of test results is completed. If TSA decides to 
use commercial data for Secure Flight, it will not do so until the 
agency publishes a new System of Records Notice announcing how 
commercial data will be used and individuals' privacy will be 
protected.
    TSA's efforts to develop and test the Secure Flight program are 
fully consistent with the recommendation in the final report of the 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 
Commission), which states at page 392:

    ``[I]mproved use of ``no-fly'' and ``automatic selectee'' lists 
should not be delayed while the argument about a successor to CAPPS 
continues. This screening function should be performed by TSA and it 
should utilize the larger set of watch lists maintained by the 
Federal Government. Air carriers should be required to supply the 
information needed to test and implement this new system.''

    The expansion of these watchlists to include information not 
previously included for security reasons will be possible as 
integration and consolidation of the information related to individuals 
known or suspected to be engaged in terrorist activity maintained

[[Page 65620]]

by TSC is completed and the U.S. Government assumes the responsibility 
for administering the watchlist comparisons. Secure Flight will 
automate the vast majority of watchlist comparisons, will allow TSA to 
apply more consistent procedures where automated resolution of 
potential matches is not possible, and will allow for more consistent 
response procedures at airports for those passengers identified as 
potential matches.
    Secure Flight represents a significant step in securing domestic 
air travel and safeguarding terrorism-related national security 
information, namely, the watchlists. It will dramatically improve 
consistency and effectiveness of comparisons of passenger information 
with data now maintained by TSC and will reduce the long-term costs to 
air carriers and passengers associated with maintaining the present 
system, which is operated individually by each aircraft operator that 
flies in the United States.

Prior Federal Register Notices

    In order to test the feasibility of the Secure Flight program, TSA 
must obtain a sample of passenger information for domestic flights. In 
preparation for obtaining this information for testing purposes, on 
September 24, 2004, TSA published three public notices in the Federal 
Register. First, TSA published a system of records notice in accordance 
with the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a), including a list of the 
proposed routine uses of information in the system of records. (69 FR 
57345). The system of records notice establishes a new system entitled 
``Secure Flight Test Records'' (hereafter referred to as DHS/TSA 017), 
which will govern the collection, maintenance, use, and disclosure of 
PNRs and other information obtained by TSA for purposes of testing the 
Secure Flight program. TSA requested public comment on the routine uses 
for DHS/TSA 017 during a 30-day comment period ending on October 25, 
2004.
    Second, TSA published in the Federal Register a notice that TSA had 
submitted to the Office of Management and Budget in accordance with the 
Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501, et seq.) a 
request for emergency processing of OMB's review and approval for TSA 
to collect PNRs from aircraft operators to test the Secure Flight 
program (PRA notice). (69 FR 57342). That notice included the text of a 
proposed order to certain aircraft operators directing them to provide 
a limited set of historical PNRs to TSA that cover commercial scheduled 
domestic flights. Specifically, the proposed order covered PNRs with 
domestic flight segments flown during the month of June 2004 and 
excluded those PNRs with flight segments that occurred after June 30, 
2004. The purpose of this limitation was to ensure that during the test 
phase, TSA does not obtain any information about future travel plans of 
passengers on domestic flights. The order also proposed to exclude PNR 
flight segments to or from the U.S. Although not required to do so, TSA 
requested public comment on the proposed order during a 30-day comment 
period ending on October 25, 2004. OMB subsequently has approved the 
information collection through March 31, 2005, and assigned OMB control 
number 1652-0025.
    Third, TSA published in the Federal Register a Privacy Impact 
Assessment for the test phase of the Secure Flight program, which TSA 
prepared in accordance with the E-Government Act of 2002. (69 FR 
57352).
    TSA received approximately 500 public comments on the Privacy Act 
system of records notice for DHS/TSA 017. Identical versions of most of 
those comments also were sent to OMB in response to TSA's PRA notice. 
TSA has reviewed and considered the issues raised by the public 
comments submitted to TSA and OMB. This notice addresses those issues 
and describes changes made to TSA's proposed order to aircraft 
operators, which, after carefully considering the comments, TSA now is 
issuing in final form.

Public Comments

    Public comments on the Secure Flight system of records notice and 
PRA notice generally focused on one or more of the following categories 
of issues: (1) The program's effect on individual privacy and civil 
liberties; (2) the routine uses established for the Secure Flight Test 
Records System (DHS/TSA 017); (3) passenger consent to the use of 
historical PNRs; (4) the absence of a redress process; (5) concerns 
with the use of commercial data; (6) the efficacy of the Secure Flight 
program; (7) TSA's compliance with the Privacy Act, the PRA, and other 
laws; and (8) possible conflicts of laws involving European Union (EU) 
data privacy requirements.

Effect on Individual Privacy and Civil Liberties

    A large majority of the commenters viewed the use of PNRs to 
prescreen passengers against government watchlists as an invasion of 
privacy and an infringement on their civil liberties, including 
individuals' right to travel and exercise other Constitutional rights 
that might be related to travel, such as the freedom of assembly. The 
National Business Travel Association (NBTA), stated that TSA should 
balance the need to establish better security measures with policies 
and procedures that protect civil liberties and privacy. The NBTA also 
stated that TSA should not impose unnecessary costs on business 
travelers.
    TSA is aware of, and sensitive to, the need to preserve Americans' 
freedoms while pursing better security. In implementing a new security 
measure that affects these interests, it is necessary to move 
deliberately and cautiously. It is for this very reason that TSA is 
testing the Secure Flight program before moving forward with an 
operational system.
    The prescreening of passengers against Government watchlists is a 
security measure that has been in place for several years, performed by 
aircraft operators, using watchlists provided by the Federal 
Government. Because the airlines have varying systems by which they 
implement passenger prescreening, the effectiveness, efficiency, and 
consistency in response for airline passengers of the current system is 
limited. The Secure Flight program is an effort to move this 
prescreening process into the Federal Government in order to make the 
process more effective, consistent, and efficient for the traveling 
public. This effort is consistent with a specific aviation security 
recommendation of the 9/11 Commission.
    The Secure Flight program will not impose an unconstitutional 
burden on an individual's right to travel or exercise other 
Constitutional rights. The Secure Flight program is a limited, 
reasonable security screening measure designed to further the Federal 
Government's compelling interest in protecting aviation security. 
Except in cases where a passenger may authorize TSA to retain 
information about him or her for purposes of redress, TSA has no long-
term need to retain the information and is seeking approval from the 
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) to destroy 
passenger information shortly after completion of the passenger's 
itinerary. Similarly, for purposes of the test phase of the program, 
TSA is seeking NARA approval to destroy PNRs used for the test after 
the test has been completed and the results have been evaluated. TSA's 
purpose in obtaining PNRs is to test the program, not to maintain 
information on individuals' travel.
    TSA agrees with NBTA's comments regarding the need to have policies 
and procedures that protect passengers' civil liberties and privacy 
interests and to ensure the Secure Flight program is

[[Page 65621]]

effective. TSA is in the process of developing redress procedures that 
will accomplish these goals, as discussed further below.
    The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) objected to TSA's 
statement in the System of Records notice that the records created and 
maintained in the course of the Secure Flight test phase should be 
exempt from a number of the provisions of the Privacy Act, such as the 
provision allowing individuals to obtain access to certain records 
containing information about them.
    The Privacy Act specifically permits agencies to exempt from 
certain of its provisions investigatory materials compiled for law 
enforcement purposes, because allowing individuals access to law 
enforcement files could impair investigations, particularly those 
involving complex or continuing patterns of behavior. The intent of the 
exemption is to prevent access to law enforcement records if that 
access would alert subjects that their activities are being scrutinized 
and allow them to take countermeasures to escape detection and 
prosecution.
    In the Secure Flight system of records notice section entitled 
``Exemptions Claimed for the System'', TSA stated that for portions of 
the system it would invoke exemptions to the Privacy Act's requirements 
such as those that: (1) Permit individuals to obtain access to, and 
amend, information pertaining to them; and (2) require that information 
collected by the agency be relevant and necessary to the agency's 
statutory purpose. (69 FR 57348). TSA is in the process of preparing a 
notice of proposed rulemaking to implement these exemptions, which will 
include a detailed explanation of the basis for invoking the exemptions 
and will offer the public an opportunity to comment further.
    At this point, it is unclear whether TSA will need to invoke these 
exemptions for the Secure Flight program in its operational stage. In 
order, however, to preserve its ability to protect classified and law 
enforcement investigatory information from public disclosure, TSA 
identified these exemptions in the system of records notice as 
exemptions it may invoke, if necessary. EPIC noted in its comment that 
certain information in the system of records, such as PNRs, may not be 
subject to the exemptions and therefore should be releasable to the 
affected individual under the Privacy Act. TSA agrees with this view. 
As stated in the system of records notice, TSA will give individuals 
access to records in the system pertaining to them to the greatest 
extent feasible, consistent with law enforcement and national security 
concerns. It should become clearer during the test phase whether the 
records in the system may be structured in such a way as to exclude any 
information that must be withheld from the public for the reasons 
discussed above.
    With regard to the requirement that information collected by the 
agency be ``relevant and necessary,'' one of the objectives of the test 
phase is to confirm what information in a PNR is relevant and necessary 
to conduct an effective comparison of PNRs to information in the TSDB. 
The results of the test phase should enable TSA to determine more 
precisely what passenger information is relevant and necessary to the 
operation of the Secure Flight program and to limit its collection 
accordingly during the operational stage.
    A number of commenters expressed concern that the Secure Flight 
program could easily be expanded in the future beyond the scope 
outlined for the test phase. A number of other commenters anticipated 
that TSA would use passenger data to monitor where individuals travel 
and with whom they travel or whether they engage in other activities 
that could come within the First Amendment protection of freedom of 
assembly. These commenters have misconstrued the purpose of Secure 
Flight and the requirements that TSA has proposed for this test.
    TSA will neither use passenger information to monitor individuals' 
movements within the country nor share such information with other 
agencies or third parties. In fact, for the operational phase of Secure 
Flight, TSA intends to seek approval from NARA to destroy passenger 
information shortly after completion of the passenger's itinerary. This 
will preclude TSA from keeping any record of passenger movements around 
the country. TSA will not monitor the individuals with whom a 
particular passenger travels.
    If testing of the program indicates that it is a feasible and 
effective security measure, TSA will initiate a public rulemaking 
process in which it will provide an appropriate proposal for the 
workings of the system, as well as the redress process. This process, 
in conjunction with future publication of a Privacy Act system of 
records notice for the operational stage of the program will limit 
TSA's activities under Secure Flight to those outlined in the notice 
and serve as the basis for the operation of the program. To the extent 
that there are any substantial changes to collection of use of 
information under the program, these will be subject to additional 
notice and opportunity for public comment. This transparency will serve 
to prevent so-called ``mission creep.''
    One commenter asked whether Secure Flight would use race, color, 
gender, age, religion, national origin, political views, origin of a 
passenger's name, disability, or other personal characteristics as the 
basis for screening decisions. One commenter suggested that TSA would 
use gun ownership as a basis for screening decisions. Several 
commenters stated that TSA should use ethnicity or national origin as a 
screening factor.
    With regard to the use of race, gender, national origin, or other 
factors listed above, Secure Flight will comply with the Constitution 
and other applicable law. TSA has adopted and complies with the 
``Guidance Regarding Use of Race by Federal Law Enforcement Agencies'' 
issued by the United States Department of Justice in June 2003.

Routine Uses

    TSA received several comments on TSA's possible disclosure of 
personal data obtained for testing the Secure Flight program. Under the 
Privacy Act, TSA is required to list routine uses of the information it 
will maintain in the system of records created for testing the Secure 
Flight program. A routine use is a disclosure of a record outside the 
Department of Homeland Security for a purpose that is compatible with 
the purpose for which the information was collected. In its system of 
records notice for DHS/TSA 017, TSA listed the following routine uses 
for Secure Flight Test Records:
    (1) To the Federal Bureau of Investigation where TSA becomes aware 
of information that may be related to an individual identified in the 
Terrorist Screening Database as known or reasonably suspected to be or 
having been engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid 
of, or related to terrorism;
    (2) To contractors, grantees, experts, consultants, or other like 
persons when necessary to perform a function or service related to the 
Secure Flight program or the system of records for which they have been 
engaged. Such recipients are required to comply with the Privacy Act, 5 
U.S.C. 552a, as amended;
    (3) To the Department of Justice (DOJ) or other Federal agency in 
the review, settlement, defense, and prosecution of claims, complaints, 
and lawsuits involving matters over which TSA exercises jurisdiction or 
when conducting litigation or in proceedings before any court, 
adjudicative or

[[Page 65622]]

administrative body, when: (a) TSA; or (b) any employee of TSA in his/
her official capacity; or (c) any employee of TSA in his/her individual 
capacity, where DOJ or TSA has agreed to represent the employee; or (d) 
the United States or any agency thereof, is a party to the litigation 
or has an interest in such litigation, and TSA determines that the 
records are both relevant and necessary to the litigation and the use 
of such records is compatible with the purpose for which TSA collected 
the records;
    (4) To the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) or 
other Federal agencies pursuant to records management inspections being 
conducted under the authority of 44 U.S.C. 2904 and 2906;
    (5) To a Congressional office from the record of an individual in 
response to an inquiry from that congressional office made at the 
request of the individual; and
    (6) To an agency, organization, or individual for the purposes of 
performing authorized audit or oversight operations.
    Some commenters objected to the disclosure of information to other 
agencies whose missions are unrelated to counterterrorism or security 
and to foreign governments. TSA has established a very limited set of 
routine uses for the Secure Flight Test Records. Consistent with the 
commenters' view, TSA will disclose information to the FBI in 
connection with its counterterrorism function where TSA becomes aware 
of information that may be related to an individual identified in the 
TSDB as known or reasonably suspected to be or having been engaged in 
conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to 
terrorism. The other routine uses applicable to DHS/TSA 017 are 
necessary for the operation of the agency or the operation and 
oversight of the Secure Flight program. TSA will not provide any of the 
information related to the Secure Flight program to foreign 
governments.
    One commenter expressed concern with TSA's plan to allow government 
contractors access to personal data and suggested that TSA ensure that 
strong contractual requirements are in place to deter weak data 
handling practices. TSA will put such contractual requirements in 
place.
    One commenter stated that TSA should ensure that if Secure Flight 
is used to screen actual passengers, any underlying information about 
the passenger used to make screening decisions should not be provided 
to the airlines or screeners. TSA agrees with this comment. One of the 
main purposes of Secure Flight is to bring within the Federal 
Government the watchlist comparison results that currently are in the 
hands of airlines.

Passenger Consent

    Many commenters objected to the government's collection of PNRs for 
testing purposes because they had not given consent to the collection. 
As discussed previously, aircraft operators currently use the 
information in PNRs to conduct passenger prescreening, including 
watchlists checks and the application of CAPPS. The existence of these 
prescreening measures has been public knowledge for many years. 
Therefore, when passengers provide information to aircraft operators in 
order to purchase air transportation, they have notice that their 
information will be used for prescreening purposes. In fact, the PNRs 
TSA will receive for testing Secure Flight already were already used 
for airline-implemented prescreening in June 2004. Therefore, TSA's 
collection of the PNRs is consistent with the purposes for which the 
information in those PNRs originally was collected, and passengers who 
traveled by air in June 2004 had notice of those purposes.

Redress Process

    Commenters noted that TSA has not yet established detailed redress 
procedures to handle cases where passengers believe they have been 
unfairly or inaccurately singled out for additional scrutiny as a 
result of the comparison of their PNRs to information in the TSDB. NBTA 
stated that TSA should develop a redress process to address 
inaccuracies in the databases TSA uses to prescreen passengers, 
including special procedures for corporate travelers to allow them to 
continue to fly while any security issue is resolved.
    TSA is in the process of developing a robust redress program and 
has begun hiring and is well into the process of developing redress 
procedures that will be refined during the Secure Flight test in 
November. For present purposes, however, TSA is only testing the Secure 
Flight concept. Because the data to be used concerns domestic flights 
that have already been completed during the month of June 2004 `` 
meaning that passengers were already screened `` and because the test 
results will not be used in an operational setting to conduct passenger 
screening, no passengers will need to avail themselves of the redress 
process during testing. With respect to special procedures for business 
travelers, TSA does not, at this point, believe that the Secure Flight 
program will cause delays that would warrant special treatment for any 
class of passengers. Information obtained through program testing, 
however, may be relevant to this issue, and TSA will consider it in 
developing the operational aspects of the Secure Flight program.

Use of Commercial Data

    A number of commenters had questions and concerns regarding TSA's 
plan to test the use of commercial data to identify passenger 
information that is incorrect or inaccurate. Commenters expressed 
concern that TSA's access to commercial information would open the door 
to abuse of individuals' privacy rights and possible theft of their 
personal information.
    As discussed in detail in the Privacy Impact Assessment for the 
Secure Flight Test Phase (69 FR 57352), TSA's testing of commercial 
data will be governed by stringent data security and privacy 
protections, including: contractual prohibitions on commercial 
entities' maintenance or use of PNR information for any purposes other 
than testing under TSA parameters; strict firewalls between the 
government and commercial data providers; real-time auditing procedures 
to determine when data has been accessed and by whom; and strict rules 
prohibiting the access or use of commercially held personal data by 
TSA. TSA will not have access to or store the commercially available 
data that would be used by commercial data aggregators.
    One commenter questioned TSA's need for passengers' credit card 
information as part of Secure Flight and whether TSA would be using 
commercial data to check credit histories and other personal 
information unrelated to Secure Flight. Commenters also had questions 
about the types of commercial information that could lead TSA to apply 
enhanced screening or deny an individual access to an aircraft. One 
commenter suggested that TSA use only those sources of commercial data 
that are easily corrected by consumers so that if there are errors in 
commercially available data that lead to incorrect screening decisions 
by TSA, those errors can be resolved in a timely manner.
    These are all are key issues that TSA will be attempting to resolve 
during the testing phase. Once TSA has information about the 
feasibility and efficacy of using commercial data, such as credit card 
numbers, to gauge the accuracy of passenger information and reduce 
false positive matches to information in the TSDB, the agency will be 
in a position to provide specific answers to the types of questions 
raised

[[Page 65623]]

by the commenters. TSA will not have access to individuals' credit 
histories, medical records, or other personal records.
    A number of commenters expressed concern over access by data 
aggregators to passenger information during the testing. TSA will 
require the data aggregators with whom it works to abide by the 
requirements of the Privacy Act as well as to execute legally 
enforceable nondisclosure agreements prohibiting their use of 
information for any purpose other than for the testing of the 
effectiveness of the use of commercial data for Secure Flight. As a 
security mechanism, TSA has installed an auditing system as part of the 
platform on which the Secure Flight program will operate. The auditing 
mechanism will immediately detect any unauthorized access to the 
passenger data. Within TSA, individuals who are not conducting the test 
of the Secure Flight program will not have access to any passenger 
information. The real-time auditing mechanisms in place should prevent 
unauthorized access by individuals who are not part of the team 
conducting the test. TSA personnel with access to information for the 
testing phase will undergo specialized privacy training and will be 
required to hold appropriate security clearances and, therefore, will 
understand the sensitivity of the information to which they have 
access.
    Under section 552(d) of the Department of Homeland Security 
Appropriations Act, 2005 (Pub. L. 108-334), TSA may not test the use of 
commercial data until the agency has developed measures to determine 
the impact of the use of commercial data on aviation security and the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) has reported on TSA's evaluation 
measures. TSA currently is working with GAO to provide the information 
GAO needs to evaluate TSA's measures.

Efficacy of the Program

    Commenters questioned the potential effectiveness of the Secure 
Flight program because, they claim, the information in the TSDB 
regarding individuals known or suspected of being engaged in terrorist 
activity is inaccurate. A number of commenters stated that TSA should 
instead focus its resources and effort on improved physical security 
measures such as improved checkpoint screening, increased numbers of 
Federal Air Marshals and Federal Flight Deck Officers, and improved 
screening of baggage and cargo. NBTA stated that TSA should stress test 
the Secure Flight system and develop operational safeguards and 
oversight policies for the program.
    TSA agrees with those commenters who have stated that TSA should 
ensure that the Secure Flight program is effective before going forward 
with implementation and should have a quick and effective redress 
process to address situations in which passengers are mistakenly 
subjected to enhanced scrutiny or believe that they have wrongly been 
included on a watchlist.
    With respect to the suggested choice between developing Secure 
Flight or directing TSA's resources towards other security measures, 
TSA approaches security as a layered process. TSA is committed to 
taking actions that will improve each layer of security and believes 
that such actions are not mutually exclusive.
    The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) commented that the 
continued expansion of government watchlists creates a risk of false 
positive matches of passengers on watchlists. Therefore, the ACLU 
stated, effective management of the watchlists will become even more 
important. Again, TSA agrees that the Secure Flight program must be 
shown to be effective in achieving its stated goals before it is 
implemented. In order to determine whether the program can be 
effective, however, TSA must test the system and is doing so while 
respecting the privacy and civil liberties of individuals.
    A number of commenters stated that Secure Flight would not be 
effective in identifying terrorists who may travel by air but are not 
currently known to the Federal Government and therefore are not 
included in the TSDB. Commenters also stated that even if an individual 
is included in the TSDB, Secure Flight will not detect that individual 
if he or she assumes the identity of a person not included in the TSDB, 
such as through identity theft.
    TSA agrees that checking passenger names against information in the 
TSDB will not identify unknown terrorists or those using a stolen 
identity. Commercial data may be useful in identifying instances where 
a passenger may have presented inaccurate or incorrect information.
    As discussed previously, however, Secure Flight will involve the 
use of a streamlined version of the existing CAPPS system that aircraft 
operators currently are using to prescreen passengers. That system 
evaluates information in PNRs that passengers otherwise provide to 
aircraft operators in the normal course of business. This element of 
Secure Flight will address the threat posed by an individual who may 
pose a threat but is not included in the TSDB or has assumed the 
identity of a person not included in the TSDB.
    A number of commenters stated that TSA should make public the 
results of the Secure Flight test phase. TSA will make the results 
available to the extent consistent with national security and homeland 
security.

Compliance With the Privacy Act, PRA, and Other Laws

    The EPIC stated that OMB should not approve the information 
collection until TSA provides more detailed information to the public 
about the Secure Flight program.
    The Secure Flight program is at a very early stage of development. 
The purpose of the test phase is to determine the technical feasibility 
of a consolidated system by which TSA may compare information in PNRs 
to information in the TSDB. At this point, therefore, TSA has provided 
as much detail as it can about the planned workings of the Secure 
Flight program. Once the test is completed and the results are 
analyzed, if the test phase indicates that the program is technically 
feasible, TSA will then be able to engage in a public rulemaking 
process that will involve a more detailed proposal for the Secure 
Flight program. This subsequent rulemaking will provide members of the 
public further opportunity to comment on operational and policy issues 
raised by the program.
    One commenter questioned whether TSA had a basis for receiving 
emergency processing from OMB of the information collection contained 
in the proposed order. TSA's request for emergency processing was based 
on the need to move forward with a new passenger prescreening system as 
quickly as possible, consistent with the 9/11 Commission's recently 
issued recommendation that TSA take over from aircraft operators the 
function of passenger prescreening using government watchlists.
    The commenter also articulated a number of aspects of the Secure 
Flight program that he argued are contrary to the requirements of the 
Privacy Act or other laws. First, he argued that PNRs constitute 
information regarding an individual's exercise of the First Amendment 
right of assembly because travel is a form of assembly.
    The Privacy Act imposes certain limits on an agency's authority to 
collect records describing an individual's exercise of First Amendment 
Rights. See 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(7). TSA does not agree that PNRs contain 
information related to the exercise of First Amendment rights, 
including the right of assembly.

[[Page 65624]]

    Second, the commenter argued that TSA's proposed order to aircraft 
operators to submit PNRs is inconsistent with the requirement that an 
agency collect information to the maximum extent practical directly 
from an individual when the information may result in an adverse 
determination about an individual's rights, benefits, or privileges. 
See 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(2). The commenter stated that TSA has failed to 
show that it would be impractical for TSA staff to collect information 
about passengers from them directly at the airport prior to boarding.
    Collecting information from passengers at the airport for purposes 
of the Secure Flight test would impose a tremendous burden on the 
flying public in the form of additional time required for security 
screening. It also would not allow TSA to obtain and test the 
information in a PNR format, which is the form in which TSA would 
receive the information during the operational phase of the program.
    Third, the commenter, as well as others, stated that the proposed 
order is inconsistent with the Privacy Act because passengers whose 
information will be submitted to TSA under the order did not receive 
notice in accordance with section 552a(e)(3) of the Privacy Act, which 
requires a Federal agency to ``inform each individual whom it asks to 
supply information'' of: (1) The authority under which the request is 
made; (2) whether the disclosure of the information is mandatory or 
voluntary; (3) the principal purpose for which the information is 
intended to be used and the routine uses which may be made of the 
information; and (4) the effects on the individual if any, of not 
providing all or part of the information.
    The notice requirement under 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(3) does not apply to 
the collection of the PNRs described in the proposed order. OMB has 
interpreted the notice requirement in section 552a(e)(3) to be 
inapplicable to situations in which an agency collects information 
about an individual from a third party.
    Fourth, the commenter argues that the system of records notice for 
Secure Flight fails to meet the requirement in 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)(B) 
that it describe the categories of individuals on whom records are 
maintained in the system. The commenter notes that PNRs may contain the 
names of travel agents or other individuals who make, pay for, or 
process a passenger's travel but who are not passengers. The commenter 
also noted that the proposed order covered PNRs with itineraries that 
were entirely cancelled, thereby capturing individuals who had not 
flown.
    It is our understanding that the inclusion in PNRs of names other 
than those of passengers is rare. In any case, for purposes of testing 
the Secure Flight concept, TSA will not retrieve information from PNRs 
using the names of travel agents or other non-passengers who may be 
included in a PNR, because the purpose of Secure Flight is to screen 
passengers. The purpose of listing ``Categories of individuals 
covered'' in the system of records notice is to provide notice to those 
individuals whose records are subject to the Privacy Act because the 
records are retrieved by their name or personal identifier. The purpose 
is not to provide notice to every individual whose name may be 
incidentally mentioned in a record retrieved by the name of another 
individual. In addition, TSA has revised the final order to exclude 
from its scope any PNRs with itineraries that have been cancelled in 
whole, thereby avoiding collection of PNRs for individuals who have not 
actually completed any part of the itinerary in the PNR. For these 
reasons, the provision in the system of records notice meets the 
requirements of the Privacy Act.
    Fifth, the commenter argues that TSA has failed to meet certain 
requirements applicable to the promulgation of regulations under the 
Airline Deregulation Act, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, 
and the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, and the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act. Other commenters noted that TSA has not published a 
cost-benefit analysis for the Secure Flight program.
    As discussed previously, TSA is obtaining historical PNRs for the 
test phase of Secure Flight through the issuance of an order, not 
through rulemaking. Therefore, the foregoing statutes, as well as other 
statutes and Executive Orders that apply to agency rulemaking, do not 
apply in this instance. If testing of the program indicates that it is 
a feasible and effective security measure, TSA will initiate a public 
rulemaking process in which it will again fully comply with all 
applicable statutory requirements.
    Sixth, the commenter argued that TSA has no authority to establish 
a system of records for Secure Flight or order aircraft operators to 
provide PNRs to TSA.
    TSA has ample authority to conduct the Secure Flight test. Under 
the Aviation and Transportation Security Act and authority delegated to 
the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security (Transportation Security 
Administration) by the Secretary of Homeland Security, TSA is 
responsible for, among other things, the screening of passengers and 
property transported in air transportation and intrastate air 
transportation. Also under its delegated authority, TSA has broad 
authority under 49 U.S.C. 40113(a) to issue orders necessary to carry 
out its statutory duties, which expressly include providing for 
security screening, under 49 U.S.C. 44901(a). TSA also is authorized to 
undertake research and development activities necessary to enhance 
transportation security under 49 U.S.C. 114(f)(8) and create a 
successor system to the existing CAPPS under 49 U.S.C. 44903(j)(2). 
Under these authorities, TSA may order aircraft operators to provide 
PNRs to TSA to test the Secure Flight program. Implementation of the 
Secure Flight test also is in furtherance of Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive-6/HSPD-6 of September 23, 2003 (``Integration 
and Use of Screening Information to Protect Against Terrorism''), 
which, among other things, directs Federal agencies to conduct 
screening at all appropriate opportunities using consolidated terrorist 
information and intelligence about individuals known or appropriately 
suspected to be or have been engaged in conduct constituting, in 
preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism.

Potential Conflict With EU Laws

    United Airlines and other commenters expressed concern that 
complying with the proposed order would expose U.S. airlines to 
liability for violating privacy laws of the Member States of the EU. 
United suggested that the U.S. government work closely with foreign 
governments to address any conflicts of laws that may arise. While TSA 
has clear statutory authority to require the submission of reservation 
information for use in prescreening passengers on domestic flight 
segments, TSA understands the sensitivity of aircraft operators to the 
possibility of conflicting legal obligations under U.S. law and the 
laws of EU Member States. Therefore, in the interest of implementing 
this test expeditiously, TSA has determined that for purposes of this 
test phase, aircraft operators may opt to exclude from PNRs submitted 
to TSA any PNR that includes a flight segment between the United States 
and the EU.
    TSA and Department officials briefed European Commission (EC) 
representatives on October 25 to provide further details on Secure 
Flight testing, including the parameters of data to be

[[Page 65625]]

submitted for the test. TSA informed the EC that carriers may elect not 
to submit to TSA for use in testing any PNRs with a flight segment 
between the EU and the United States. The Department and EC 
representatives will continue regular discussions to keep the EU fully 
apprised of TSA's progress regarding Secure Flight, and to receive EU 
feedback on Secure Flight issues. TSA, in conjunction with DHS, will 
continue to consult with the EU prior to and during Secure Flight 
implementation.

Other Issues

    United Airlines stated in its comment the concern that the Secure 
Flight program might result in unnecessary costs to airlines if they 
are required to establish new systems to transmit passenger information 
to TSA, rather than relying on existing systems, such as those that 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection has in place for receiving advance 
passenger information for international flights. In planning and 
developing the operational stage of the Secure Flight program, TSA will 
work to use existing communications links between the airlines and the 
Federal Government in order to avoid imposing duplicative requirements 
on the airlines to the greatest extent possible.

Final Order

    The final order is largely unchanged from the proposed order, with 
the exception of the following provisions.
    First, in order to simplify and clarify compliance with the order, 
TSA changed the scope of PNRs that aircraft operators are required to 
provide and the description of the category of aircraft operators 
covered by the order. The proposed order would have required the 
submission of any PNRs with a flight segment completed during June 
2004, so long as all the flight segments in the PNR had been completed 
by the end of June 2004. Thus, the proposed order covered PNRs with 
flight segments completed many months before June 2004. The final order 
applies only to those PNRs with all flight segments (flights between 
two locations) completed in June 2004.
    The proposed order applied to PNRs for any passenger on ``a 
scheduled flight within the United States, in operations subject to a 
full security program under 49 CFR 1544.101(a).'' This language was 
intended to cover any scheduled passenger or public charter operation 
conducted under a full security program. Because the proposed order did 
not specifically mention public charter operations and used the term 
``scheduled flight,'' there was some confusion as to whether TSA 
intended to cover any public charter operations. The final order 
clarifies this point by stating the following: ``This order applies to 
aircraft operators that conduct scheduled passenger or public charter 
operations subject to a full security program under 49 CFR 
1544.101(a).''
    The proposed order directed aircraft operators to exclude from the 
PNRs submitted to TSA any flight segment to or from the United States. 
TSA now understands, however, that deleting information related to 
flight segments from PNRs is difficult and could inhibit aircraft 
operators from complying with the order in a timely manner. After 
reviewing this issue and considering the issues discussed above related 
to possible conflicts of law with EU Member States, TSA revised the 
order to allow aircraft operators to exclude entirely from its 
submission PNRs that include flight segments between the United States 
and the EU.
    TSA has modified the proposed order in response to questions about 
how the order applied to aircraft operators that use passenger 
manifests rather than PNRs. The final order provides that if an 
aircraft operator does not use PNRs, the order applies to the 
reservation data in whatever form the aircraft operators receive or 
maintain for operation of a flight, such as a passenger manifest. The 
final order also clarifies that with respect to codesharing operations, 
if an aircraft operator does not maintain PNRs or other passenger 
reservation information for the flights that it operates, the aircraft 
operator may comply with the order by stipulating in writing to TSA 
that the entity maintaining such PNRs or other passenger reservation 
information has agreed to provide the information to TSA on behalf of 
the aircraft operator. For example, a regional aircraft operator that 
relies on other aircraft operators to maintain PNRs for the regional 
operator's flights must stipulate that the other aircraft operators 
will submit PNRs to TSA on the regional aircraft operator's behalf.
    TSA also received questions about how to address situations where 
PNR history, which was excluded from the scope of the proposed order, 
includes completed flight segments, which were included in the scope of 
the proposed order. The final order clarifies that if the PNR history 
includes information on flight segments already flown, they must be 
included in the PNR submitted to TSA. In such cases, the aircraft 
operator may move information on flights flown out of the PNR history 
or include the entire PNR history in the information submitted to TSA, 
and TSA will extract the flown flight segments. The final order also 
clarifies that PNRs must include all data that would have been 
available to the aircraft operator prior to the completion of the 
itinerary (active fields), including any ``remarks'' sections, the 
reservation creation date, and CAPPS scores and codes.
    Finally, the final order provides additional information about how 
the PNRs are to be submitted, including a requirement that they be 
password protected.
    Based on the foregoing, TSA will issue the following final order to 
aircraft operators. The text of the final order is set forth below.

    Issued in Arlington, Virginia, on November 10, 2004.
Lisa S. Dean,
Privacy Officer.
OMB Control Number 1652-0025
Expiration Date: March 31, 2005

Transportation Security Administration Order

    Pursuant to the authority vested in me as Assistant Secretary of 
Homeland Security (Transportation Security Administration) (TSA) by 
delegation from the Secretary of Homeland Security, 49 U.S.C. 
40113(a), and other authorities described below, I hereby direct 
each aircraft operator listed in Attachment A to this order to 
provide passenger name records (PNRs) to TSA in accordance with the 
terms of this order.

Background and Authority

    1. The Secretary of Homeland Security has delegated to the 
Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security (TSA), subject to the 
Secretary's guidance and control, the authority vested in the 
Secretary by section 403(2) of the Homeland Security Act respecting 
TSA, including that related to civil aviation security under the 
Aviation and Transportation Security Act.
    2. Under 49 U.S.C. 114(e)(1) and 44901(a), TSA is responsible 
for, among other things, providing for the screening of passengers 
traveling in air transportation and intrastate air transportation.
    3. One component of passenger screening is the Computer-Assisted 
Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS), an automated screening system 
developed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in 
cooperation with U.S. aircraft operators. U.S. aircraft operators 
implemented CAPPS in 1997.
    4. CAPPS evaluates information in PNRs that passengers otherwise 
provide to aircraft operators in the normal course of business to 
determine whether a passenger will be selected for a higher level of 
security screening prior to boarding. A PNR is a record that 
contains detailed information about an individual's travel on a 
particular flight, including information provided by the individual 
when making the flight reservation. While the Federal Government 
established the CAPPS selection criteria, CAPPS is operated entirely 
by U.S. aircraft operators.

[[Page 65626]]

    5. Passenger prescreening also involves the comparison of 
identifying information of airline passengers against lists of 
individuals known to pose or suspected of posing a threat to civil 
aviation or national security. Aircraft operators currently carry 
out this function, using lists provided by TSA. Because the lists 
are provided in an unclassified form, the amount of information they 
include is limited. For this reason, TSA will take over from 
aircraft operators the function of screening passengers against such 
lists and use a larger set of data maintained by the Federal 
Government for this purpose. This is consistent with the 
recommendation by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon 
the United States (9/11 Commission) related to the use of expanded 
``No-Fly'' and ``Automatic Selectee'' lists, and the 9/11 Commission 
recommendation that aircraft operators be required to supply the 
information needed to test and implement such a system.
    6. In accordance with the authority in 49 U.S.C. 44903(j)(2), 
TSA is in the process of developing a successor system to CAPPS that 
will be operated entirely by TSA and will incorporate the screening 
of passengers against data maintained by the Terrorist Screening 
Center (TSC) about individuals known or reasonably suspected to be 
or have been engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in 
aid of, or related to terrorism.
    7. In order to test such a system, TSA must have access to 
information contained in the PNRs for domestic passenger flights. 
TSA also must have access to passenger information from aircraft 
operators that maintain the information in forms other than PNRs, 
such as passenger manifests.
    8. TSA has broad authority under 49 U.S.C. 40113(a) to issue 
orders necessary to carry out its functions, including its 
responsibility to provide for the security screening of passengers 
under 49 U.S.C. 44901(a). TSA also has authority to identify and 
undertake research and development activities necessary to enhance 
transportation security under 49 U.S.C. 114(f)(8).

Findings

    9. The security prescreening of passengers, as mandated by 
Congress, is vital to aviation security and national security.
    10. After a lengthy review of the initial plans for a successor 
system to CAPPS, and consistent with the recommendation of the 9/11 
Commission, the Department of Homeland Security is moving forward 
with a next generation system of domestic passenger prescreening 
that meets the following goals: (1) Identifying, in advance of 
flight, passengers known or suspected to be engaged in terrorist 
activity; (2) moving of passengers through airport screening more 
quickly and reducing the number of individuals unnecessarily 
selected for secondary screening; and (3) fully protecting 
passengers' privacy and civil liberties.
    11. In the revised program, known as Secure Flight, TSA will 
compare information in airline PNRs or other passenger manifest 
formats for domestic flights to information in the Terrorist 
Screening Database (TSDB) maintained by TSC, including expanded TSA 
No-Fly and Selectee lists, in order to identify individuals known or 
reasonably suspected to be or having been engaged in conduct 
constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to 
terrorism. The Secure Flight program also will test operation of a 
streamlined version of the existing CAPPS evaluation criteria. TSA 
will use the PNRs obtained under this order to test these aspects of 
the program.
    12. TSA also will test whether comparing passenger information 
to other commercially available data can enhance TSA's ability to 
identify passenger information that is inaccurate or incorrect.
    13. In order to develop and test such a system, TSA must obtain 
passenger information in PNRs, or other passenger manifest formats 
where PNRs are not used, from aircraft operators.
    14. On September 24, 2004, TSA published in the Federal Register 
a proposed order requiring aircraft operators to provide PNRs for 
testing the Secure Flight program. After considering the public 
comments received and making modifications to the proposed order, 
where appropriate, TSA is issuing this final order to aircraft 
operators for purposes of obtaining PNRs to test the Secure Flight 
program.

Action Ordered

    15. Scope:
    a. Aircraft Operators:
    This order applies to aircraft operators that conduct scheduled 
passenger or public charter operations subject to a full security 
program under 49 CFR 1544.101(a).
    b. Information:
    This order applies to PNRs containing itineraries for domestic 
flights operated under a full security program and for which all 
flight segments in the itinerary were flown between June 1, 2004 and 
June 30, 2004, (after 2400 hours 31 May 2004 and before 0001 hours 1 
July 2004). This includes PNRs for non-revenue and space available 
passengers.
    For purposes of this order, ``PNR'' means the electronic record 
maintained by the aircraft operator detailing information about an 
individual's travel on a particular flight and any other information 
contained in that record.
    For purposes of this order, ``domestic flight'' means a flight 
between two locations in the United States (to include the U.S. 
Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, Guam, Saipan, and American Samoa).
    This order does not apply to PNRs reflecting itineraries that 
were cancelled in whole.
    An aircraft operator may elect to exclude from the scope of the 
order any PNRs which include any flight segments between the EU and 
the United States.
    If an aircraft operator does not use PNRs, the order applies to 
the reservation data in whatever form aircraft operators receive or 
maintain for operation of a flight, such as a passenger manifest.
    c. Information in PNRs:
    PNRs must include all data that would have been available to the 
aircraft operator in a displayed PNR prior to the completion of the 
itinerary (active fields), including any ``remarks'' sections, the 
reservation creation date, and CAPPS scores and codes.
    PNRs may not include information related to changes in a PNR 
prior to completion of the flight itinerary (PNR history). If, 
however, the PNR history includes information on flight segments 
already flown, they must be included in the PNR. In such cases, the 
aircraft operator may move information on flights flown out of the 
PNR history or include the entire PNR history in the information 
submitted to TSA, and TSA will extract the flown flights segments 
(itinerary).
    PNRs may be submitted in archive format.
    16. Submission of PNRs:
    The aircraft operator must submit to TSA all PNRs described in 
paragraph 15 so that the data is received by TSA no later than 5 
p.m. EST on November 23, 2004.
    Mail all information through overnight carrier to: Lisa Dean, 
Privacy Officer, Transportation Security Administration, 601 S. 12th 
Street, TSA-9, Room E7-305N, Arlington, VA 22202, Phone: (571) 227-
3947.
    17. Codesharing Operations:
    If an aircraft operator does not maintain PNRs or other 
passenger reservation information for the flights that it operates, 
the aircraft operator may comply with this order by stipulating in 
writing to TSA that the entity maintaining such PNRs or other 
passenger reservation information has agreed to provide the 
information to TSA on behalf of the aircraft operator. For example, 
a regional aircraft operator that relies on other aircraft operators 
to maintain PNRs for the regional operator's flights must stipulate 
the other aircraft operators will submit PNRs to TSA on the regional 
aircraft operator's behalf.
    Letters of stipulation, described above, must be signed and on 
company letterhead. They may be delivered in one of the following 
three ways:
    U.S. Mail: TSA/ONRA, Attention: Airline Team, P.O. Box 597, 
Annapolis Junction, MD 20701.
    FAX: (240) 568-3528.
    E-mail (scanned copies): <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#30635553454255765c59575844707478631e575f46"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="57043234222532113b3e303f2317131f0479303821">[email protected]</span></a>.
    18. The aircraft operator must provide to TSA information about 
the aircraft operator's PNR data schema and layout, such as a PNR 
format book and a data dictionary that includes all acronyms and 
codes not standard to the International Air Transport Association.
    19. For purposes of the test, the aircraft operator must provide 
the PNRs to TSA on optical media in an unpacked or uncompressed 
form, in a structured data format or XML, if available. Information 
must be password-protected. The aircraft operator must supply TSA 
with the password via e-mail at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#d685b3b5a3a4b390babfb1bea296929e85f8b1b9a0"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="5c0f393f292e391a30353b34281c18140f723b332a">[email protected]</span></a>.

Attachment A--Aircraft Operators

1. Air Midwest Inc.
2. Air Wisconsin Airline Corp
3. AirTran Airways Inc.
4. Alaska Airlines Inc.
5. Allegiant Air
6. Aloha Airlines Inc.
7. America West Airlines Inc.
8. American Airlines Inc.
9. American Eagle
10. American Trans Air Inc.

[[Page 65627]]

11. Atlantic Southeast Airlines (ASA)
12. Big Sky Airlines
13. Boston and Maine Airways
14. Cape Air (Hyannis Air Service)
15. Caribbean Air
16. Casino Airlines
17. Casino Express TEM Enterprises
18. Champion Air (Grand Holdings)
19. Chautauqua Airlines
20. Chicago Express Airlines
21. Colgan Air
22. Comair, Inc.
23. Commutair (Champlain Ent.)
24. Continental Airlines Inc.
25. Continental Micronesia Inc.
26. Corporate Airlines
27. Delta Air Lines Inc.
28. Executive Airlines/American Eagle
29. Expressjet Airlines (Cont. Express)
30. Falcon Air Express
31. Freedom Air
32. Freedom Airlines
33. Frontier Airlines
34. Great Lakes Aviation Ltd.
35. Gulfstream International Airlines
36. Hawaii Island Air (Island Air)
37. Hawaiian Airlines
38. Horizon Air
39. Independence Air (Atlantic Coast Airline)
40. Jetblue Airways Corp.
41. Kenmore (start-up)
42. Mesa Airlines
43. Mesaba Aviation Inc.
44. Miami Air International
45. Midwest Airlines Inc.
46. North American Airlines
47. Northwest Airlines Inc.
48. Omni
49. Pace/Hooters
50. Pacific Island Aviation Inc.
51. Pacific Wings
52. Pan American Airways Corp.
53. Piedmont Airlines
54. Pinnacle Airlines (d/b/a Northwest Airlink)
55. Planet Air
56. Primaris Airlines, Inc. (Primaris)
57. PSA Airlines
58. Ryan International Airlines
59. Shuttle America
60. Sky King
61. Sky West Airlines
62. Skyway Airlines/Midwest Connect
63. Southeast Airlines
64. Southwest Airlines (U.S.A.)
65. Spirit Airlines
66. Sun Country Airlines Inc.
67. Trans States Airlines
68. Transmeridian Airlines
69. United Airlines Inc.
70. US Airways Inc.
71. USA3000
72. World Airways

[FR Doc. 04-25396 Filed 11-12-04; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-62-P


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