### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-10-00711- CV

Rita Murdock, Appellant

v. Trisun Healthcare , LLC d/ b/a Par k Plac e Health Ce nter, A ppellee

F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F TRAVIS CO UNTY, 261 ST JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. D-1 -GN-0 7-0 0310 8, H ONO RAB LE O RLINDA NARANJO , JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

I n this case , we must decide whether appellee Trisun Hea lthcare , L L C d/b/a Park
Place Hea lth Center (“Tr isun” ), t h e d efe ndant in the underly ing proce eding , may compel its

e mp lo y e e a p p e ll a n t Ri ta M u

r d o c k ( “ M u

r d o c k ” ) , p la in

ti f f b e lo w , in

to a r b it r a ti o n b a s e d : ( 1 ) s o le ly

on an acknow ledg ment of arbitra tion ag ree ment form signe d by M u r d o c k w it h o u t evidenc e of the

c o n te n ts o f th e a

r b it r a ti o n a g r e e me n

t; o r in th e a lt e r

n a ti v e , ( 2 ) o n a

n a r b it r a ti o n a g r e e me n t b e tw e e n
M u r d o c k a n d h e r f o r me r e mp lo y

e r P M T e x a s L e a s i n g C o m

p a n y , L L C ( “ P M L e a s in g ” )

— a n alleg ed
aff ilia t e of Trisun. The trial court found there was a binding arbitra tion ag ree ment betwee n Murdock and Trisun and that Trisun was a party to t h e arbitration ag ree ment. We reve rse, concluding that Trisun failed to meet its burden of proving a valid arbitra tion ag ree ment cover ing
the claims at issue.BACK GR OUND On April 21, 2003, PM L easing hired Murdock to wo rk as a nursing assistant at Park Place Care Center located in G eorg etown, Texas. PM L easing employ ed all nonprofe ssional staff employ ees for the fac ility , and another entity , Trisun, employ ed all profe ssional and licensed 1
staff. As a condition of her em ploy ment, Murdock signe d a binding arbitra tion ag ree ment with
PM L easing

(“PM L easing

Ag ree ment”). Prior t o an alleg ed workplac e injury occur ring on September 28, 2005, the parties
ag ree Murdock beca

me a Tri s u n em ploy ee—a lthough the exact date of her employ ment is not

reve aled by the rec ord. On Aug ust 17, 2005, approximately six wee ks prior to her injury , Murdock
att ended a meeting at which Trisun informed its employ ees that it had elec ted not to purcha se worke rs’ compensa tion insurance and was instead implementing the Trisun Hea lthcare Associate
I njury Protection Plan (“Plan” ). Murdock signe d an ac k n owledg ment form (“A cknowledg ment
For m”) acknowl ed ging she attended the meeting and rece ived personal copies of a sum mary plan descr iption book, highlights brochur e, and arbitra tion a g ree ment. Although the Acknowle dg ment
For m notes Murdock’ s acc eptanc e of the P l an ’s arbitra tion ag ree ment, the documents Murdock

ac k n o wl edg es rec eiving at the announce ment meeting —including the arbitra tion ag ree ment , summary plan descr i p tion book, and highlig hts brochur e—ar e not included in the rec ord, and the
Ac k nowledg ment For

m itself does not summarize or provide the terms of the Plan’s arbitra t i o n
ag ree ment, ref

ere nce the prior PM L easing Ag ree ment, or provide the eff ective date for the Plan.

Trisun was f

ormerly known as PM Texas Manag ement Company , L L C. 1 2On S eptember 18, 2007, Murdock broug ht suit ag ainst Trisun for her workplac e

injuries alleg ing neg lige nce and vicar ious liability for the neg lige nce of Trisun employ ees. Trisun filed a motion to compel arbitra tion with the trial court alleg ing it was en t i t l ed t o enforce the
PM L easing Ag ree m en t as a party or third-par ty benef iciary beca

use it was an aff

iliate of
PM L easing

. Trisun also noted that it had prese nted Murdock with the Plan’s arbitra tion ag ree ment
at the announce ment meeting and attache d the Ac k n o wl edgment For m to its motion to compel. Trisun, h o we v er , co ncede d that Murdock had not signe d the arbitra tion ag ree ment and provided no evidenc e of the ag ree ment’s contents.

At the hear ing on the motion to compel, neither party prese nted evidence nor
reque sted an evidentiar

y hear ing. The trial court g rante d Trisun’s motion to compel, finding that the
“ar bitration ag ree ment” between Murdock and Trisun was “a bi nding ag ree ment to arbitra t e” and that Trisun was “a party to the arbitra tion ag ree ment .” Murdock appea ls from the trial court’s judgme nt confirming the arbitra tion awa rd. On appea l, Murdock arg ues: (1) Trisun failed to prove the exis tence of a direc t arbitra tion ag ree ment betwee n Murdock and Trisun cover ing the claims at issue, and (2) Trisun cannot enfor ce the PM L easing Ag ree ment as a party or third-par ty benef iciary

. We ag ree .

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The tri a l c o u

r t’ s o r d e r g ranting Trisun’s motion to compel arbitra tion does not specify whether the trial court based its ruling on the PM L easing Ag ree ment or the P l an ’s ar b i t ration
ag ree ment ref

ere nced in the Acknow ledg ment For m. Whether a va lid and enfor cea ble arbitration
ag ree ment exis ts betwee n Murdock and Trisun is a leg al question subject to de novo revie w.
3J.M. Davidson, Inc . v. W ebster , 128 S.W .3d 223, 227 (Tex. 2003)

. “We will a ffirm the trial-cour t judgme nt if it is proper on any b as i s s u pported by evidenc e.” Ely v. Briley , 959 S.W .2d 723, 726 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.). Be cause Trisun attache d both the Acknowle dg ment For m and the PM L easing Ag ree ment to its motion to compel, we will revie w both to deter mine whether either alleg ed ar bitration ag ree ment supports the judg ment. Under the Fe dera l Arbitration Act (F AA), a party seeking to compel arbitra tion 2

must establish (1) there is a valid arbitra tion ag ree ment, and (2 ) t h e claims in dispute fall within the ag ree ment’s scope. In r e Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc. , 166 S.W .3d 732, 737 (Tex. 2005). A motion to compel arbitra tion is simil ar to a motion for partial summary judgme nt and subject to the same evidentiary standards. In re Je b b i a , 2 6 S.W .3d 753, 757 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2000, orig

. proce eding ); see also Brozo v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. , 865 S.W .2d 509, 511 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1993, no writ) (“O ur task, then, is to construe all evidenc e, rea sonable infere nces, and doubt ag ainst the judgme nt of the trial court, which had construed ever y rea sonable presumption i n fa v o r o f the arbitra tion awa rd.”)

. To compel arbitra tion, the trial court must first deter mine as a matter of law that the parties have ag ree d to arbitra te. Jebbia , 26 S.W .3d at 756–57 (citing Jack

B. Anglin Co., Inc. v. Tipps , 842 S.W .2d 266, 269 (Tex. 1992)). The burden of establishing the exis tence of an arbitra tion ag ree ment i s gen er al ly evidentiar y . See , e.g. , In re Koch Indus., Inc. , 49 S.W .3d 439, 444 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, orig

. proc eeding) (“The party seeking arbitra tion has the initial burden to prese nt evidenc e of an

Although Murdock opposes ar bitration g ener ally , she does not conte st application of the 2 Fe dera l Arbitration Act. 4arbitra tion ag ree ment.”). The party moving to compel arbitra tion “must prese nt complete summary

proof of his c ase in c hief” proving the exis tence of an arbitra tion ag ree ment cover ing the claims at issue. Jebbia , 26 S.W .3d at 757. I f the movant’s summary proof “intrinsically raises issues about the proce dural enf

o rceability of the ag ree ment, the movant’s summary proof should include any evidenc e that resolves those issues without cre ating an issue of materia l fac t.” Id .; see also W eek ley Homes, Inc. v. Jennings , 936 S.W .2d 16, 18 (T ex . App.—San Antonio 1996, writ denied)

. No presumption of arbitra

bility arises until afte r the court has found there is an enfor cea ble arbitra tion

a g r e e me n t. J

e b b ia , 2 6 S. W. 3 d a

t 7 5 7 ; J

. M

. D a v is o n , I

n c
. , 1 2 8 S. W. 3 d a

t 2 2 7

. I n s te a d , w e a

p p ly s ta te

c o n tr a c t la

w p r in c ip le s to d e te r

mi n e w h e th e r a v a li d a

r b it r a ti o n a g r e e me n t e xis ts

. J

. M

. D a v is o n , I

n c
. , 128 S.W .3d at 227.

I f the party seeking arbitra tion car ries its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the party resisting arbitra tion to prese nt evidenc e on its defe nses to the arbitra tion ag ree ment. Id. I f the
movant has proven there is an arbitra tion ag ree ment as a matter of law, a presumption arises that all disputed issues betwee n the parties must be arbitra ted. Jebbia , 26 S.W .3d at 758. But, if the party allegi n g an arbitra tion ag ree ment cannot prove as a matter of law that an arbitra tion ag ree ment exis ts, “ it must seek an evidentiar y hear ing to c ompel arbitra tion.” Id .; In re Bunzl USA, Inc. , 155
S.W .3d 202, 211 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, orig . proce eding ).

DISCUSSIO N
A. Does the Acknow ledgm ent F orm alone establish the exis te n ce of a valid arbitration agree m ent between Murdock and T risun covering the claim s at issue?
To be entitled to compel arbitra tion under the FAA , Trisun had the initial burden of establishing as a matter of law the exis tence of a valid arbitra tion ag ree ment. In re FirstMerit Bank,

5N.A. , 52 S.W .3d 749, 753 (Tex. 2001); Jebbia , 26 S.W .3d at 757. For an employ er—like Trisun—to

establish a valid arbitra tion ag ree ment, it must prove that its employ ee: (1) rece ived notice of the employ er’ s arbitra tion policy and (2) acc epted it. In re Dallas Peterbilt, Ltd. , 196 S.W .3d 161, 162 (Tex. 2006). I n order to establish notice, an employ er “must prove that he unequivocally notified
t h e employ ee of definite chang es in employ ment terms.” Hathaway v. Gene ral Mills, Inc. , 7 1 1
S.W .2d 227, 299 (Tex. 1986). An employ ee has notice of an arbitra tion ag ree m en t i f she has
k n o w le d g e o f b o th th e te r

ms o f th e p o li c y a

n d th e c e r ta in ty o f th e ir im

p o s it io n . I

d

. Wh e n d e te r

mi n in g whether an employ ee rec eived notice of an arbitra tio n agr eeme nt, we are to consider all communications betwe en the e mploy er a nd employ ee. Dallas Peterbilt , Ltd. , 196 S.W .3d at 162.
I f an employ er proves that it has unequivoca lly notified the employ ee of the terms of the arbitra tion policy , the employ ee’ s continuing employ ment will constitut e ac cepta nce of the t erms as a matter of law. In re Halliburton , 80 S.W .3d 566, 568 (Tex. 2002).

Ba sed on the rec ord befor e us, we cannot conclude that Trisun unequivoca lly proved

as a m at t er o f law that it provided Murdock with notice of the terms of the Plan’s arbitra tion
ag ree ment and the cer

tainty of their imposit ion. Be cause Trisun did not attach the Plan’s arbitra tion
ag ree ment to its motion to compel, it had the b u rd en o f o t herw ise establishing that it provided Murdock with notice of the terms of the ag ree ment. Trisun arg ues the Acknowle dg ment For m alone establishes a valid arbitra

tion ag ree ment betwee n the parties cover ing the claims at issue. Whil e we

rec og nize that an acknow ledg ment form may incorporat e t h e t erms of a ref ere nced arbitra tion
ag ree ment, the arbitra tion ag ree ment ref ere nced in the Acknowle dg ment For m is not in the rec ord, and as such, Trisun ca

nnot r ely on it to establish notice. Fur ther, the Acknowle dg ment For m doe s

6n o t r e f

e r e n c e o r a c k

n o w le d g e th e p r io r PM L e a s in g A g r e e me n t. A s s u c h , d e s p it e T r is u

n ’ s a s s e r ti o n s 3

to th e c o n tr a

r y , th e te r ms o f th e PM L e a s in g A g r e e me n t a r e n o t in c o r

p o r a te d in to th e A c k n o w le d g me n t
For m and ca nnot establish notice. 4
We further

rec og nize that a summary of an arbitra tion policy

may convey notice to an employ ee w hen the policy ’s m ater ial elements are included in the s ummary . See , e.g , W eek ley Homes, L.P. v. Rao , 336 S.W .3d 413, 418 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied) (“ No t i ce of an
ag ree ment to ar b i t ra t e can be eff ectively convey ed to an employ ee by a document that only summarizes a Dispute Resolution Probl em , i t i s not nece ssary that the employ ee rec eive the complete policy .”). But the Acknowle dg ment For m does not provide a summary of the materia l elements of the policy

. I ndeed, the Acknowle dg ment For m doe s not notify Murdock of any of the
terms of the Plan’s arbitra tion ag ree ment. Bla tantly absent from the Acknowle dg ment For m is any indication that arbitra tion is the ex clus i v e method for resolving disputes, notice as to what claims

are cover ed by the ag ree ment, or an eff ective date for the Plan. Cf. In re Dillard Dep’ t Stores, Inc. , 1 9 8 S. W. 3 d 7 7 8 , 7 8 0 ( T e x. 2 0 0 6 ) ( a c k n o w le d g me n t o f a

r b it r a ti o n a g r e e me n t f o r m p r o v id e d s u f

f ic ie n t notice when “ac knowledg ment form briefly explained D il la r d ’ s a r b itration policy , stated an eff ective

Trisun attache d to its motion to compel an aff idavit from a Trisun employ ee alleg ing Trisun 3 did not require Murdock to s i gn t h e Plan’s arbitra tion ag ree ment beca use it was “substantially simil ar” to th e PM L easing Ag ree ment. Wit hout further evidenc e specify ing which terms in the p o l i cies wer e identical or substantially simil ar, Trisun cannot rely on this g ener al statement to establish the terms of the Plan’s arbitra tion ag ree ment. T h r o u g h o u

t i t s b r i e f , T r i s u n mi s ta k e n ly c o n f

la te s th e is s u e s p r e s e n te d b y th e Pl a n ’ s a r b it r a ti o n 4 ag ree ment ref

ere nced in the Acknowle dg ment For m and the PM L easing Agr ee ment. The Acknowle dg ment For

m does not in any way ref ere nce or acknow ledg e the PM L easing Ag ree ment Murdock enter ed into with her prior employ er . The issue of whether Trisun established a direc t arbitra tion ag ree ment with Murdock based on the Plan’s arbitra tion ag ree ment is distinct and wholly separ ate f rom the issue of whe ther Tr isun can e nforc e the PM L easing Ag ree ment. 7date of Aug ust 1, 2000, and conspicuously war ned that employ ees wer e deeme d to acc ept the policy b y c o n ti n u in g th e ir employ

ment”); Halliburton , 80 S.W .3d at 568 (notice sufficie nt when it inform e d employ ee that binding arbitra tion was desig nated as the exclusive method for resolving all disputes, stated eff ective date, and informed employ ees they would acc ept arbitra tion provision by continuing work afte r specifie d date) ; see also HSS Sys., L.L.C v. Lucan , No. 03-10-00761- CV, 2011 WL 2297716, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin J une 9, 201 1 , n o pet.) (mem. op.) (conc luding employ er’ s brochur e did not convey sufficie nt notice of arbi t ra t i on when it did not “cle arly communicate the mandatory

nature of the a

rbitration policy ”). The absenc e of these materia l terms raises issues about the exis tence of a mandatory arbitra tion policy eff

ective at the t ime of Murdock’s injury cover ing t h e cl aim s at i ssue. Trisun’s
summary proof does not include any evidenc e that resolves those issues, such as evidenc e of communications occur

ring at the Plan an nounceme nt meeting notify ing Murdock of the materia l terms of t h e P lan or other proof of t he contents of t he refer ence d summary plan description book, highlig hts brochur e, or arbitra tion ag ree ment. Trisun failed to establish notice as a matter of law and did not reque st an evidentiar y hear ing. See Bunzl USA, Inc. , 155 S.W .3d at 211 (“I f [ the m ovant] found itself unable to establish, as a matter of law, that the parties intended to be bound reg ardle ss of whether the contra ct was signe d, it should have reque sted an evidentiar y hear ing.” ). As such, the

rec ord wa s insufficient to compel a rbitration base d on the Acknow ledg ment For m. Even if we wer e to conclude that Tri s u n es t ablished a valid arbitra tion ag ree ment,

we cannot conclude it established that the Plan’s arbitra tion ag ree ment cover ed the claims at issue. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc. , 166 S.W .3d at 737. The Acknowle dg ment For m doe s not sta te what

8cl ai ms are cover ed, and Trisun provided no evidenc e of what claims wer e cover ed by t h e P l an ’s

arbitra tion ag ree ment. Wit hout such proof, we conclude —based on the Acknowle dg ment For m— T r is u n f a il e d to e s ta

b li s h a s a ma

tt e r o f la w a v a li d a

r b it r a ti o n a g r e e me n t c o v e r in g th e c la im s a

t is s u e . 5

B. Can Trisun enforce the P M Leasing Agre em ent as a party or third-party benefi ciary?

A f te r c o n c lu d in g Trisun did not establish a direc t arbitra tion ag re e me n t w it h M u r d o c k under the Acknowle dg ment For m, we must now deter

mine whether Trisun—as an alleg ed aff iliate of Murdock’ s former employ er—c an enfor ce the PM L easing Ag ree ment. I t is undisputed that 6
Murdock’ s claims fall within the scope of the PM L easing Ag ree ment. At issue is whether Trisun,
a par ty not expressly

identified in the Ag ree ment, may compel ar

bitration. The initial burde n of the party moving for arbitra tion to esta blish the ex istence of

a valid ag ree ment includes “proving the entity seeking to enfor ce t h e arbitra tion ag ree ment was a Trisun additionally

asser ts that Murdock i s estopped from deny ing the Plan’s arbitra tion 5 ag ree ment beca

use she r ece ived bene fits under the Plan. Be fore the ac cepta nce of benef its can be said to trig g er estoppel, it must be shown that the benef its were ac ce p t ed wi th “knowledg e of all materia l fac ts.” Frazier v. W ynn , 472 S.W .2d 750, 753 (Tex. 1971) (“[T]here can be no ratification or estoppel from acc eptanc e of the benef its by a person who did not have knowledg e of all materia l fac ts.”). Trisun did not submit evidenc e showing Murdock rec eived benef its under the Plan or that th e b e nefits wer e acc epted with knowledg e of all materia l fac ts—including the exis tence of a binding arbitra tion ag ree ment cover ing the claims at issue. As such, w e over rule this issue. Trisun contends we lack jurisdiction to de termine this issue beca use it is rese rved for the 6 arbitra tor under the terms of the PM L easing Ag ree ment. The PM L easing Ag ree ment provides that “[a]ny matter cover ed under this Ag ree ment or conce rning t h e leg ality or interpre tation of this Ag ree ment shall be hear d and decide d under the provisions and authority of the Fe dera l Arbitration Act” ( “F AA”) . When the exis tence of an a rbitration ag ree ment is challeng ed under the FA A, it is g ener ally a matter for the court to decide and not the arbitra tor. In re W eek ley Homes, L.P. , 180 S.W .3d 127, 130 (Tex. 2005). W h ether a thi rd party to an arbitration ag ree ment, like Trisun, can compel arbitra tion questions the exis tence of a valid arbitra tion ag ree ment betwee n specific parties and is th er efor e a g atewa

y matter for the court to decide

. Id; In re Rubiola , 334 S.W .3d 220, 224 (Tex. 2011).

9party to it or had the rig ht to enfor ce the ag ree ment notwithstanding.” Mohame d v. Auto Nation USA

Corp. , 89 S.W .3d 830, 836–38 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (succ essor employ er did not mee t initi al burde n of showing arbitra tion a g ree ment it c ould e nforc e as non-sig natory ). I n deter mining who may enfor ce an arbitra tion ag ree ment, we do not resolve doubts or indulge a presumption in favor of arbitra tion “bec ause the purpose of the FAA was to make arbitration

a g r e e me n ts a s e n f

o r c e a b le a s o th e r c o n tr a c ts , n o t mo r e s o . ” Ke ll o g g B r o wn & R o o t, I

n c
. , 1 6 6 S. W. 3 d
at 738. I nstead, we apply ordinary principles of state contra ct law to deter mine who may enfor ce an arbitra tion ag ree ment under the FAA

. Id. ; In re Rubiola , 334 S.W .3d 220, 224 (Tex. 2011). Under
state contra ct law, the question of who may enfor ce an agreement “is ultimately a function of the intent of the pa

rties, as e x presse d in the terms of the ag ree ment.” Rubiola , 334 S.W .3d at 224 (quoting Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov ernme nt of Tur km. , 345 F.3d 347, 362 ( 5th Cir. 2003)).

After car eful revie w of the PM L easing Ag ree ment and application of state contra ct law principles discussed below , we conclude that—under the unambig uous lang uag e of the Ag ree ment—Trisun did not establish as a matter of law that it was enti tled to enfor ce the PM
L easing Ag ree ment. An ar bitration ag ree ment with one cor poration—unless the parties e x pressly intend otherwise—is g ener ally not enfor cea ble by any other corpora te affiliates, and the pa rties to the PM L easing Ag ree ment, Murdock and PM L easing , did not express an intent to include Trisun
as a pa rty or otherw ise confe r bene fits on Trisun. As such, Trisun did not establish it was entitled to enforc e the PM L easing Ag ree ment.

Is Trisu n a party to th e PM Le asing A greement? First, we addre ss T risun’s claim that it is entitled to compel arbitra tion as a party to the P M L ea s i n g Agre ement. Parties to a contra ct are presumed to be contra cting for themselves

10only , an d an ar b itration contra ct with one corpor ation is g ener ally not enfor cea ble by any other
corpor ate aff

iliates. See In re Merrill Lynch Trust Co. FSB , 235 S.W .3d 185, 191 (Tex. 2007) (“[A]

7

contra ct with one corpor ation—including a contra ct to arbitra te disputes—is g ener ally not a contra ct with any other corpor ate aff iliates.”); In re Kaplan Higher Educ. Corp. , 235 S.W .3d 206, 210 (Tex. 2007) (“We emphasize ag ain today that arbitra tion clause s do not automatically cover all corpor ate
ag ents or aff

iliates.”). Parties to an arbitra tion ag ree ment may , howeve r, expressly g rant corpor ate aff iliates the rig ht to enforc e their a rbitration ag ree ment as par ties. Rubiola , 334 S.W .3d at 222.
W i t h re gar d to the question of who may enfor ce the PM L easing Ag ree ment, Murdock a

nd PM L easing expressed their intent as f ollows:

This Ag ree ment to resolve cl ai m s by arbitra tion is mutually binding upon both me [Murdock] and PM Texas L easing , Co., L L C and Sulik Hea lthcare Service s I nc. (hereina fter refe rre d to as t he “Com p an y ”) and any entity owned or controlled by Pete Sulik. The following contains the terms and co n d i t ions of the binding Arbitration Ag ree ment which I ag ree to entirely

. I ag ree to arbitra te and resolve an y an d al l disputes betwee n the Company , aff iliated entities and my self. I understand that the consideration for this Ag ree ment is m y em ploy

ment, or continued employ ment, with the C ompany and the differ ent benef its that g o along with e mploy ment with the Company , including the promises and comm i t m ent made in this Ag ree ment. I understand that the purpose of this Ag ree ment is to provide both the Company and my self a way in which claims or disputes must be resolved by binding a rbitration ra ther than litig ation.

I n construing the PM L easing Ag ree ment, we must first deter mine whet h er it is possible to enfor ce the contra ct as written, without resor t to parol evidenc e. J.M. Davidson, Inc. ,

Trisun does n o t ar gu e that it is entitled to enfor ce the PM L easing Ag ree ment as a 7 succe ssor-in-intere st to PM L easing or submit evidence of a cor porate assig nment. See M ohamed v. Auto Nation USA Corp. , 89 S.W .3d 830, 836–37 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). 11128 S.W .3d at 229. “An unambig uous contra ct will be enfor ced as wr i t ten, and parol evidenc e

will not be rec eived for the purpose of cre ating an ambig uity or t o gi v e t he contra ct a meaning d if f e r e n t f r o m th a t w h ic h it s la

n g u a g e im p o r ts

. ” D a v id J

. S a c k s , P

. C. v
. H

a d e n , 2 6 6 S. W. 3 d 4 4 7 , 4 5 0 (Tex. 2008). Only wh er e a co n t rac t is ambig uous may a court consider the parties’ interpre tation and admit extraneous evide nce to de termine the true meaning of the instrument. Id. A contra ct is unambig uous if it can be g iven a definite or cer tain leg al meaning and does not become ambig uous simply beca

use the parties advanc e conflicting interpre tations. J.M. Davidson , In c. , 128 S.W .3d
at 229; Columbia Gas Transmissi on Corp. v. New Ulm Gas, Ltd. , 940 S.W .2d 587, 589 (Tex. 1996). “Ultimat ely , courts must enfor ce contra ct terms as written and may not rew rite contra cts or add to the ir lang uag e under the g uise of interpre tation

. ” W eave r v. Jam ar , 383 S.W .3d 805, 811 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dis t.] 2012, no pet.).

We conclude Trisun is not a party under the u n am b i gu o u s lang uag e of the PM
L easing Ag ree ment. The first para g raph of the P M L easing Ag ree ment define s the parties to the Ag ree ment as: (1) Murdock, (2) PM L easing , (3) Sulik Hea lthcare Service s I nc., and (4) any entity owned or controlled by Pete Sulik. As Trisun does not asser t or prese nt evidenc e that it is an entity owned or controlled by Pete Sulik, it did not establish that it was a party

. We rec og nize that parties
to an arbitra tion ag ree ment m ay ex p ressly provide that cer tain corpor ate aff

iliates are parties to

an ag ree ment. Rubiola , 334 S.W .3d at 220. For example, if an ag ree ment broadly define s the
term “par ties” to inc lude “af

filiates of any party to the ag ree ment,” then those desig nated aff iliates would be entitled to compel arbitra tion as parties. Id. at 223 (holding non-sig natory o ff i ce rs and
repr esenta tives of signa tor y mortg ag e company entitled to compel arbitra tion when arbitra tion

12ag ree ment broadly define d “par ties” to include “off

icer s and repr esenta tives of any party ”). But the
PM L easing Ag ree ment does not provide a b ro ad definition of “par ties” sufficie nt to encompa ss Trisun or other

wise desig nate Tr isun as a par ty to the Ag ree ment. Murdo c k ’ s a g r e e me n t, in th e s e c o n d p a r a g r a p h , to a r b it r a te d is putes ag ainst “af

filiated entities” does not add additional parties to the Ag ree ment. Rather, the second para g raph define s the
scope of the Ag ree ment among the identified parties, and the term “af filiated entities” mere ly ref ers to those aff

iliated entities define d in the first para g raph “as any entity owned or controlled by

Pete Sulik.” See J.M. Davidson, Inc. , 128 S.W .3d at 229 (construing contra ct in its entirety to deter mine
true intention of parties) ; W estern Reserv e Life Ins. v. Meadows , 261 S.W .2d 554, 557 (Tex. 1953) (noting terms in contra cts are g iven plain, ordinary , and g ener ally acc epted meaning unless contra ct it s e lf s h o w s p a

r ti c u la r d e f in it io n s a r e u s e d to r e p la c e th a

t me a n in g )

. I n th e s e c o n d p a

r a g r a p h , M u r d o c k
ag ree s to arbitrate only

with those parties pre viously identified in the first par ag raph.
T r is u n , h o w e v e r , a

r g u e s th e te r m “ a f f il ia te d e n ti ti e s ” in th e s e c o n d p a r a g r a p h e xp r e s s e s

an intent by the parties to g rant “any aff i l i at ed entities of PM L easing ” the rig ht to enfor ce the Ag ree ment. Trisun’s arg ument construes the term “af filiated entities” in isolation from the rest of the Agre ement. A contract m ust be construed i n its entirety to deter mine t h e t ru e intention of t he parties. J.M. Davidson, Inc. , 128 S.W .3d at 229. I n attempting to asce rt ai n t h e m eaning of the words used in a contra ct, it is not proper to rely only upon a single clause or para g raph. Id. Rather, it is the duty of the Court to construe the cont ra ct as an entire instrument and “to consider eac h part with ever

y other part so that the eff ec t and meaning of one part on any other part may be deter mined.” Steege r v. Beard Drilling, Inc. , 371 S.W .2d 684, 688 (Tex. 1963). This construction “make s clea

r the intent of the pa

rties and the e x tent to which they intended to be bound.” Id.

13When the PM L easing Ag ree ment is construed i n i t s en t irety , it is clea r Murdock
ag ree d to arbitra te with only those af fi l iates owned or controlled by Pete Sulik and not, as Trisun

a s s e r ts , a n y a n d a ll a f f il ia te s . I n th e f ir s t p a r a g r a p h , M u r d o c k a g r e e s to e n te r in

to a b in d in g a

r b it r a ti o n
ag ree ment with two named pa rties: PM L easing and S ulik Hea lthcare Service s, I nc. Wit h reg ard
to unnamed parties, Murdock ag ree s in the first p ar agra ph to enter an ag ree ment only with those unnamed parties “owne d or controlled by Pete Sulik.” Any contra ry construction requiring Murdock
to arbitra te with other unnamed parties that are not owned or controlled by P et e S u l ik—such as Trisun—rende rs the parties’ intent in the first para g raph nug atory

. See Reilly v. Rangers Mgmt., Inc. , 727 S.W .2d 527, 529 (Tex. 1987) (contrac tual lang uag e shoul d be given its plai n m ea n i ng unless it appear s that the intention of the parties would there by be defea ted); R & P Enters. v. LaGuarta,
Gavre l & Kirk, Inc. , 596 S.W .2d 517, 518–19 (Tex. 1980) (cour t should favor an interpre tation that
g ives eff ect to all provisions of the contra ct s o t h at none will be rende red meaning less and the pri m ar y p u rp o s e of the ag ree ment and intent of the parties will be eff ectua ted). Acc ording ly , the
PM L easing Ag ree ment can only be rea sonably interpre ted as g ranting only those unnamed entities owned or controlled by

Pete Sulik—not Trisun—t he rig ht to compel arbitra tion. Trisun further arg

ues t hat t he parties did not define t h e t erm “af filiated entit ies” in the Ag ree ment, and the Court should look to Ch ap t er 7 4 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code (“Cha

pter 74” ) to define the term. I f a disag ree ment about the use and mea ning of lang uag e used i n a contract arises, t he court should consider how a reasonable person would have used and understood the lang uag e, by pondering the circ umstances surrounding the contra ct’s neg otiation and by considering the purposes which the parties intended to acc omplish by enter ing into the contra ct. See Manzo v. Ford , 731 S.W .2d 673, 676 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1987, no writ).

14We cannot conclude that a rea sonable p er s o n enter ing the PM L easing Ag ree ment would have

understood the term “af

filiated entities” to be define d under Chapter 74—a statute addre ssing medical liability in tor

t—when such statutory provisions wer e not addre ssed in the Ag ree ment nor in e f f e c t a t th e ti me th e c o n tr a c t w a s e xe c u te d

. S e e T e x. Ci v . Pr a c . & Re m. Co d e A nn . § 7 4

. 0 0 1 ( a ) ( 3 ) (West 2011) (statute eff

ective Sept. 1, 2 003). As such, we decline to adopt Trisun’s proposed definition for “af

filiated entities” and cannot conclude Trisun is a party under the Ag ree ment. See also David J. S

a cks, P.C. , 266 S.W .3d at 450 (only wher e a contra ct is ambig uous may a court consider the parties’ interpre tation and admit extraneous evidenc e to deter mine the true meaning of the instrument).

Is Tris u n a th ird-party benefic iary to the PM Leasing Agr eement ?
W e fu rt h er conclude Murdock and PM L easing did not express an intent to gra n t Trisun the rig ht to enfor ce the PM L easing Ag ree ment as a third-par ty benef iciary

. A t h i rd -p arty benef iciary may enfor ce an arbitration ag ree ment to which it is not a party if the parties to the
contra ct “intended to secur e a benef it to that third party and enter ed into the contract direc tly for the third party ’s benef

it.” In re Palm Harbor Homes, Inc. , 195 S.W .3d 672, 677 (Tex. 2006). But parties are presumed to be contra cting for themselves only , and this presumption may be overc ome only if the intent to make someone a third-pa rty benef iciary is “cle arly written or evidence d in the
contra ct.” Bridas S.A.P.I.C. , 345 F.3d at 362; see also South Tex. W ater Auth. v. Lomas , 223 S.W .3d 304, 306 (Tex. 2007) (pre sumption ag ainst confe rring third-par ty status on non-contra cting parties)

. There is no evidenc e in the PM L easing Ag ree ment that the parties intended to secur e a dire ct bene fit for Trisun—an entity not mentioned or otherwise conte mplated in the Ag ree ment.
15See MCI Telecomm s. Co r p
. v. Texas Utils. Elec. Co. , 995 S.W .2d 647, 651 (Tex. 1999) (“The intention to contract or c onfer a dire ct benef

it to a third party

must be clea

rly and fully spelled out

or enfor ceme nt by the third party must be denied.” ); Petula Assocs., Ltd. v. Dolco Pack aging Corp. , 240 F.3d 499, 504 (5th Cir. 2001) (Unde r T ex as law, courts “must enfor ce the unambig uous lang uag e in a contra ct as written, and the applicable standard is the objective intent evidenc ed by the lang uag e used, rathe r than the subjective intent of the parties.” ). As such, we cannot conclude that Trisun is a third-par

ty benef iciary to the PM L easing Ag ree ment. Under the unambig uous lang uag e of the PM L eas i n g Agre ement, we conclude Trisun is not entitled to compel ar b i t ra t ion as a party or third-par ty benef iciary

. Acc ording ly , we must enforc e the c ontrac t terms as written a nd deny Trisun the rig ht to compel arbitra tion.

CONCLUSION
T ri s u n fa iled to establish the exis tence of a binding arbitra tion ag ree ment wit h
M u r d o c k c o v e r in g th e c la im s a t is s u e . F o r th e f

o r e g o in g r e a s o n s , w e r e v e r s e th e tr ia l c o u r t’ s ju d g me n t confirming the ar

bitration awa

rd and r emand f

or fur ther proc eeding s consistent with this opi nion.

__________________________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice
Be fore J ustices Pury ear , Rose, and Goodwin Dissenting O pinion by

J ustice Rose
Reverse d and Remande d Filed: May

9, 2013

16