REPORTED 

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS 

OF MARYLAND 

 

No. 2427 

September Term, 2015 

______________________________________ 

MATTHEW PETTY 

v. 

MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF 

BALTIMORE CITY, et al. 

______________________________________ 

 Arthur, 

Shaw Geter, 

Thieme, Raymond G., Jr.

 (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), 

JJ. 

______________________________________ 

Opinion by Thieme, J. 

______________________________________ 

 

 Filed: March 28, 2017 
Matthew Petty, appellant, appeals from an order issued by the Circuit Court for 

Baltimore City granting summary judgment in favor of appellees, the Mayor and City 

Council of Baltimore, several employees of the Baltimore City Fire Department, and the 

Baltimore City Professional Fire Fighters, IAFF Local 734. Appellant presents one 

argument on appeal: Did the circuit court err in entering summary judgment against him? 

For the reasons that follow, we shall affirm. 

FACTS 

On August 13, 2015, appellant filed a four-count complaint in the Circuit Court for 

Baltimore City against the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (the “City”); four 

employees of the Baltimore City Fire Department (“BCFD”), specifically, Jeffrey Segal, 

Mark Wagner, James Wallace, and Charles Dwyer; and the Baltimore City Professional 

Fire Fighters, IAFF Local 734 (the “Union”). Appellant had been an employee with the 

BCFD from September 18, 1995, until April 15, 2015, when he was discharged. During 

his employment, appellant had risen through the ranks, and at the time of his discharge he 

was an emergency vehicle driver assigned to a HAZMAT unit. It is not disputed that 

appellant was a dues paying member of the Union at all relevant times. 

The first count of appellant’s complaint was an action for intentional infliction of 

emotional distress against each of the defendants. He alleged that during his employment 

he was subject to “unjustified, illegal and malicious harassment” by Wagner, Wallace, and 

Dwyer, that caused, without elaboration, “certain disciplinary actions” and “disparate 

adverse treatment” to be made against him; “cast [asper]sions” on his character; and 
violated his rights to seek assistance from his Union. He alleged that the City, the BCFD, 

and Segal, Assistant Chief of the BCFD, acquiesced in those actions. 

The second count alleged tortious interference with contract and was against 

Wagner, Wallace, and Dwyer, who allegedly induced the BCFD to “breach its contractual 

obligations” regarding employment opportunities and promotions for appellant. Appellant 

alleged, again without elaboration, that as a result of those employees’ actions he was 

removed from his position and forced to resign. 

The third count alleged negligence by: 1) the City, the BFCD, and Segal for 

allowing the three named employees to harass appellant; and 2) the City and the BFCD for 

failing to provide appropriate medical care to appellant for the work-related injury to his 

right hand and thumb, which caused “serious permanent disability,” and in failing to 

properly process appellant’s retirement claim. 

The fourth count alleged breach of contract and alleged that the Union failed to 

represent him in his employment claims. 

Appellees responded by moving for summary judgment. In support of their motion 

appellees argued, among other things, that appellant had failed to exhaust administrative 

remedies before filing the action in circuit court; appellant’s tort claim was barred by the 

Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act (“MWCA”), see Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. §§ 

9-101, et. seq.; and appellant’s tortious interference with contract claim against the three 

named employees was not actionable because the employees were parties to the contract 

with the City. Appellees clarified that appellant was removed by administrative action for 

two reasons. First, he was deemed no longer fit for duty by the opinion of the Medical 

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Director of the Mercy Medical Center Public Safety Infirmary due to the injury to his hand. 

Second, appellant had exhausted his paid leave (from January 8, 2014 to April 15, 2015) 

for a line of duty injury and had to either return to work, be separated from City 

employment, or challenge his status by means of an internal appeal or grievance, which he 

has not done. 

The Circuit Court for Baltimore City agreed with appellees and entered summary 

judgment against appellant on grounds that he did not exhaust his administrative and 

contractual remedies. 

DISCUSSION 

Appellant argues on appeal that the circuit court’s ruling was in error, because the 

ruling was “erroneously predicated on the assumption” that his claims were “within the 

scope of available administrative and contractual remedies.” Appellees preliminarily 

respond that appellant has waived his appeal because he has cited no case law to support 

his argument. Even if appellant’s argument is preserved, appellees argue that the circuit 

court’s ruling was correct – appellant was required and failed to exhaust available remedies 

under the Baltimore City Charter, Art. VII, § 100, and Arts. 6 and 12 of the Memorandum 

of Understanding (MOU) between the City and the Union and the MWCA. 

We will quickly dismiss appellees’ waiver argument. Md. Rule 8-504, governing 

the content of appellate briefs, contains no requirement that an appellant must cite case law 

in support of his arguments. Anderson v. Litzenberg, 115 Md. App. 549, 577-78 (1997), 

the main case cited by appellees for its waiver argument, stands for the proposition that 

where a brief only recites facts and does not relate those facts to a legal theory, we shall 

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not address the potential merits of the argument presented. Here, appellant contests the 

lower court’s grant of summary judgment. Appellant cites several cases regarding the 

standard of review for summary judgment and several legal theories on which his claims 

are based. Although his arguments are not the pinnacle of clarity, they are sufficiently

presented, factually and legally, for our review. 

Md. Rule 2-501(f) provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he court shall enter judgment 

in favor of or against the moving party if the motion and response show that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” We review an order granting summary 

judgment de novo. See Todd v. Mass Transit Admin., 373 Md. 149, 154 (2003)(citations 

omitted). Accordingly, we first determine whether a dispute of material fact exists, and if 

not, only then will we proceed to determine whether the movant is entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law. O’Connor v. Baltimore County, 382 Md. 102, 110 (2004). Because there 

are no disputed material facts, the standard of review is whether the trial court was legally 

correct. 

The MOU for fiscal years 2014-2016 memorializes the understanding between the 

City and members of the Union on a range of issues, including wages, hours, discipline 

and discharge, health, and other terms and conditions of employment. MOU Art 6:A 

defines “grievance” as “a dispute concerning the application or interpretation of the terms 

of [the MOU]” or “a claimed violation, misinterpretation, or misapplication of the rules or 

regulations of the [e]mployer affecting the terms and conditions of employment[.]” Article 

6:A sets forth the grievance procedure in detail. See MOU Art. 6:A. Additionally, MOU 

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Article 12:A provides that “[a]ny employee who is discharged, reduced in pay or position, 

or suspended for more than thirty (30) days may contest the action either (i) by lodging an 

appeal with the Civil Service Commission . . . or (ii) by filing a grievance on the form that 

is referred to in Article 6[.]” None of the complained actions occurred outside the scope 

of appellant’s employment. Therefore, appellant’s termination and the conduct that 

negatively affected the terms and conditions of his employment were subject to the 

mandatory grievance procedure of the MOU. 

Appellant attempts to avoid this result with several arguments. First, he argues that 

the word “may” in Article 12:A, setting forth the two avenues for grievance, is permissive 

rather than mandatory, which appellant suggests permits an employee to take other avenues 

for a grievance. We reject this interpretation. We are persuaded that the use of the word 

“may” in Article 12:A clearly means that an employee who is discharged, or whose pay or 

position is reduced may either choose between the two exclusive actions offered – 

appealing to the Civil Service Commission or filing a grievance – or an employee may do 

nothing at all. Cf. Gazunis v. Foster, 400 Md. 541, 565 (2007)(reaching the same 

interpretation of the word “may” in a collective bargaining agreement). 

Second, appellant argues that the MOU applies only to the limited actions stated in 

Article 12:A, an employee who is discharged, reduced in pay or position, or suspended for 

more than 30 days. Appellant argues that Count 1 and 4 of his complaint do not allege 

wrongs based on discharge, reduction of pay, or suspension. Appellant also argued, during 

oral arguments, that his use of the adverbs “unjustified”, “illegal”, and “malicious” to 

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describe the actions complained of, took his claims outside the employment context. We 

disagree. 

Appellant’s claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count I), tortious 

interference with contract (Count II), and negligence (Count III) are all clearly based on 

employment actions and duties and are covered by MOU 6:A. Because all of appellant’s 

claims arise out of his employment and are based on duties established and defined in the 

MOU, he is bound by the administrative procedures set forth in the MOU.1

 Cf. Fleming v. 

United Parcel Serv., 604 A.2d 657, 671 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1992)(holding that an 

employee’s tort claim is so inextricably intertwined with the terms of the labor contract 

that the employees tortious interference claim is preempted and cannot be adjudicated 

without consideration of the labor contract). Moreover, the use of adverbs to describe a 

claim regarding one’s employment does not elevate the claim outside the employment 

context. Cf. Nash v. AT&T Nassau Metals, 381 S.E.2d 206, 209-10 (S.C. 1989)(employee 

Nash’s claim that Nassau deliberately and willfully deprived him of his benefits and 

terminated his employment was preempted because whether the actions were “illegal” 

involved a determination as to whether the parties complied with the employment contract). 

Additionally, that part of Count III which relates to appellant’s claim involving his 

work-related injury is actionable solely under the MWCA. The MWCA is a 

1

 Appellees are also correct that appellant’s tortious interference with contract claim 

cannot lie against the other City employees because they are party to the contract to which 

they allegedly interfered, and agents of the employer. See Kaser v. Fin. Protection Mktg.,

Inc., 376 Md. 621, 630 (2003) and Pope v. Board of School Comm’rs of Baltimore City, 

106 Md. App. 578, 592 (1995), cert. denied, 342 Md. 116 (1996). 

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“comprehensive scheme to . . . provide sure and certain relief for injured workmen, their 

families and dependents regardless of questions of fault.” Hastings v. Mechalske, 336 Md. 

663, 672 (1994)(quotation marks and citations omitted). The MWCA entitles covered 

employees to compensation for accidental injuries that arise out of the course of 

employment and is the “exclusive remedy” for an injured employee against his employer. 

Rodrigues-Novo v. Recchi America, Inc., 381 Md. 49, 57 (2004); Hastings, 336 Md. at 672; 

and Lab. & Empl. §§ 9-101(b), 9-501, 9-509(a). 

Lastly, we also note that appellant’s breach of contract claim against the Union 

(Count IV), and to the extent he alleges a cause of action against the Union in tort and 

contract, is not actionable. As the appellees correctly point out, appellant’s cause of action 

against the Union is based on the theory of breach of the duty of fair representation. This 

theory is “based on the member’s claim that the union had, without good cause or reason, 

refused to take to arbitration the member’s grievance against his employer.” Byrne v. Mass 

Transit Admin., 58 Md. App. 501, 508 (citation omitted), cert. denied, 300 Md. 794 (1984), 

cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1016 (1985). This is because the Union is required to: 1) serve all 

of its members without hostility or discrimination; 2) exercise its discretion with good faith 

and honesty; and 3) avoid arbitrary conduct. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177

(1967)(citation omitted). Before the Union has any duty to represent, however, the member 

must file a grievance. See MOU Art. 6:C. Because appellant never grieved and did not 

pursue his contractual remedy, he has no cause of action against the Union. 

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In sum, because appellant failed to exhaust the administrative and statutory 

remedies available, the lower court properly granted summary judgment. 

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. 

COSTS TO BE PAID BY 

APPELLANT. 

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