UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

__________________ _______________ WILLIS A. CENTER, SR., Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. ROBERT O. LAMPERT, Director, Wyoming Department of Corrections, in his individual and official capacities; CARL VOIGTSBERGER, Wyoming Department of Corrections Classification and Housing Manager in his individual and official capacities; KAYLA UPDAHL, Wyoming Department of Corrections Policy and Planning Manager in her individual and offi cial capacities; EDDIE WILSON, Wyoming Department of Corrections State Penitentiary Warden in his individual and offi cial capacities; MICHAEL PACHECO, Wyoming Department of Corrections State Penitentiary Warden in his individual and offi cial capacities; JANEL THAYER, Wyoming Department of Corrections Housing Manager in her individual and official capacities; DEPUTY WARDEN HOLTZ, Wyoming Department of Corrections State Penitentiary Deputy Warden in his individual and offi cial capacities; GABBY WOODS, Wyoming Department of Corrections State Penitentiary Unit Manager in her individual and offi cial capacities; No. 17-8050 (D.C. No. 1:17- CV-00096-ABJ) (D. Wyo.) FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### February 15, 2018
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 DARCY MCFARRIN, Wyoming Department of Corrections State Penitentiary Unit Manager in her individual and offi cial capacities; VICKY SMITH, Wyoming Department of Corrections State Penitentiary Unit Manager in her individual and offi cial capacities; HEATHER SPEICER, Wyoming Department of Corrections State Penitentiary Education Department Employee in her individual and official capacities; JENNA RAMILLER, Wyoming Department of Corrections St ate Penitentiary Law Librarian in her individual and official capacities; MAJOR REMACLE, Wyoming Department of Corrections St ate Penitentiary Security Major in his individual and official capacities; LIEUTENANT KAHN, Wyoming Department of Corrections State Penitentiary Lieutenant in his individual and official capacities; CAPTAIN JACOBS, Wyoming Department of Corrections State Penitentiary Captain in his individual and official capacities; K. BARKES, J. WADE, VIAU THOMPSON, OFFICER GOODMAN, OFFICER P. BROWN, OFFICER J. BROWN, OFFICER MAYNARD, D. RAMILLER, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER SABO, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER JOHNSON, Wyoming Department of Corrections State Penitentiary Correctional Officers in their individual and official capacities; CAPTAIN HOEGLIN, CAPTAIN RAPP, Wyoming Department of Corrections State Penitentiary Captains in their3 individual and offi cial capacities; PROPERTY OFFICER ROGERS, PROPERTY OFFICER WEARRING, Wyoming Department of Corrections State Penitentiary Property Officers in their individual and official capacities; CASEWORKER HOEGLIN, Wyoming Department of Corrections State Penitentiary Caseworker in his/her individual and official capacities; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER DEDRICK, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER DANDY, Wyoming Department of Corrections State Penitentiary Correctional Officers in their individual and official capacities,
Defendants-Appellees.

__________________ _______________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

__________________ _______________ Before BRISCOE , HARTZ , and BACHARACH , Circuit Judges.

__________________ _______________ This appeal is brough t pro se by Mr. Willis Center, who sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Hi s appeal grew out of the de nial of his motions for

* Oral argument would not be helpful in this ap peal. As a result, we are deciding the app eal based on Mr. Center’s briefing. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and judgment does not constitute bind ing precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata , and collateral estoppel. But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a) and 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).4  a temporary restraining order and a preliminary in junction and

 a motion to reconsider those rulings. In his motions for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction, he sought a prohibition against

 his placement in disciplinary segregation,

 the confiscation of his legal property,

 the interference with his wr itten communications with attorneys, and

 the presence of iden tified staff members within a specified distance. In addition, Mr. Center sought the appointm ent of a court a dvocate. As an alternative to all of thes e requests, he sought an or der requiring a transfer to another facility. The district court declined to grant a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction and later declined to reconsider these rulings.
I. Temporary Restraining Order We lack jurisdiction over the deni al of a temporary restraining order and refuse to reconsider this denial. See Tooele Cty. v. United States , 820 F.3d 1183, 1186 (10th Cir. 2016). Thus, we dismiss the ap peal regarding this part of the ruling.5 II. Preliminary Injunction and Reconsideration We affirm the denials of the pre liminary injunction and the motion to reconsider this denial. A. Standard of Review For our review of the denial of a preliminary injunction or a motion to reconsider this denial, we appl y the abuse-of-discretion standard. See
Gen. Motors Co rp. v. Urban Go rilla, LLC, 500 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th Cir. 2007) (preliminary injunction); Walters v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 703 F.3d 1167, 1172 (10th Cir. 2013) (motion to reconsider). A district court does not abuse its discretion unless it “‘co mmits an error of law or makes clearly erroneous factual findings.’” Gen. Motors , 500 F.3d at 1226 (quoting Wyandotte Nation v. Sebelius , 443 F.3d 1247, 1252 (10th Cir. 2006)). A preliminary inj unction involves an extraord inary remedy, which is available only when the movant’s right to relief is clear and unequivocal. Heideman v. South Salt Lake City , 348 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th Cir. 2003).
B. Mr. Center’s Burden in District Court Our precedents require Mr. Center to satisfy four elements: “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the case; (2) irreparable injury to the movant if the prelim inary injunction is denied; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outwe ighs the injury to the other party under the preliminary injunction; and (4 ) the injunction is not adverse to6 the public interest.” Salt Lake Tribune Publ’g Co. v. AT & T Corp. , 320 F.3d 1081, 1099 (10th Cir. 2003) (int ernal quotation marks omitted). C. Requests for Prohibitive Relief In part, Mr. Center sought an or der prohibiting certain conduct. 1. Placement in Disciplinary Segregation and Confiscation of Legal Property Mr. Center requested a preliminary injunctio n against placement in disciplinary segregation and conf iscation of his legal property. 1 For these requests, however, the dist rict court enjoyed discre tion to conclude that Mr. Center had failed to satisfy an y of the elements of a preliminary injunction, and Mr. Cent er has not identified an y manner in which the court erred in this part of the ruling. See Fisher v. Okla. Dep’t of Corr. , 213 F. App’x 704, 709 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (upholding the denial of a preliminary injunction against seizure of legal materials based on the inmate plaintiffs’ failure to satis fy any of the four requirements of a preliminary injunction). Thus, we affirm the denial of relief involving placement in disciplinary segregation and confiscation of legal property.

1 Before the court ruled on the moti on to reconsider, Mr. Center filed an affidavit acknowledging his release from segregat ion and the return of all of his legal property.7 2. Communications with a Jailhouse Lawyer In addition, Mr. Center sought an order preven ting disturbance of his communications with a jailhouse lawyer. 2 For this request, Mr. Center provided only a single allegation in the complaint: “They even denied me access to a jailhouse lawyer through the mail that has helped me before with court filing s.” R. at 34. Prison officials enjoy a legitimate penological interest in restricting communications betw een inmates, even when the ostensible purpose is to obtain advice from jailhouse lawyers. See Shaw v. Murphy , 532 U.S. 223, 231 (2001); Johnson v. Avery , 393 U.S. 483, 489-90 (1969). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discreti on in concluding th at Mr. Center had failed to justify a pre liminary injunction against restrictions on communications with fe llow inmates for the pu rpose of getting legal advice. 3. Communications with an Attorney Mr. Center also referred to his di fficulty in communicating with an attorney. In the compla int, he alleged: Even then they just recently de nied me postage to communicate with Ms. Urbin who works also at the Gillette, WY Public

2 In seeking a preliminary injunction, Mr. Center did not specifically ask for this prohibition. Instead, he focused on impediments to his communication with an at torney. But his complaint does raise the issue and he incorporated the complaint in his motion. For the sake of argument, we may assume that the motion would en compass his communications with a jailhouse lawyer.8 defenders office. I sent her a letter the week they took Jayson away and it return ed 5/30/16 sayi ng postage is still due. . . . I do not have access to the postage meter th at places the stamp on envelopes and they are the on es who do this . They will not allow his mail to go out to Ms. Urbin or allow her phone number to be adde d to his account.
R. at 34-35. 3 Again, however, the district court enjoyed discretion to conclude that Mr. Center had failed to satisfy the elements of a preliminary injunction; and Mr . Center identifies no er ror in this conclusion. 4. Separation from De signated Officials Mr. Center also requ ested a preliminary injunction that would prevent certain prison officials from being within a specified distance of him. Again, however, Mr. Center has not supported the exis tence of any of the equitable elements for a preliminary injunction of this sort. As a result, we conclude that the district court had discretion to deny this part of the motion. See p. 7, below (citing Lopez v. Roark , 560 F. App’x 809, 812 (10th Cir. 2014) (unpublished)).
D. Requests for Affirmative Relief Mr. Center also s ought affirmative action in his moti on for a preliminary injunction. A preliminar y injunction requ iring affirmative action “is an extraordinary remedy and is generally disfavored.” Little v.

3 When seeking reconsid eration, Mr. Center ac knowledged that he had ultimately been allowed to add Ms . Urbin’s telephone number to his contact list. R. at 91. Mr. Center then stated that he was unable to call Ms. Urbin during regular office hours because he could not afford to purchase telephone privileges. Id.9 Jones , 607 F.3d 1245, 1251 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). For a preliminar y injunction requiring a ffirmative action, Mr. Center had a heightened bu rden on the four elements. See id . The district court did not abuse its di scretion in concluding that Mr. Center had failed to satisfy his burd en on these aspect s of the motion. 1. Appointment of a Court Advocate In part, Mr. Center requested a ppointment of a co urt advocate to oversee prison operations. The district court pointed out that Mr. Center had not cited any support for the court’s auth ority to appo int a court advocate. See Webb v. Goord , 340 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that the Prison Litigati on Reform Act “has subs tantially limited the capacity of federal courts to appoint special mast ers to oversee prison conditions”). In light of the absence of support for this re quest, we conclude that this part of the ruli ng fell within the district court’s discretion. 2. Transfer In the alternative, Mr. Center sought a transfer. He is currently housed in a state prison. Bu t in the event of a denial of his other requests, he sought transfer to a federal holding facility in light of the parole board’s alleged willingness to grant parole and allow him to go into federal custody pursuant to a detainer.10 For this request, Mr. Center did not refer to any of th e elements of a preliminary injunction or identify an y legal basis to order transfer from state custody to federal custody. Against this bac kdrop, the district court acted within its discretion to deny this part of the request. See Lopez v. Roark , 560 F. App’x 809, 812 (10th Ci r. 2014) (unpublish ed) (upholding the denial of a preliminary injunction for transfer to another prison based on the inmate plaintiff’s failure to even mention the third or fourth elements for a preliminar y injunction, much less satisfy his heightened burden on these elements).
* * * Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal with respect to the denial of a temporary restraining order. But we a ffirm on the denial of Mr. Center’s motions for a preliminary injunction and reconsideration.
III. Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis We grant Mr. Center’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis . But we remind Mr. Center of hi s obligation to continue making partial payments until the entire filing fee ha s been paid in full. Entered for the Court

Robert E. Bacharach Circuit Judge