STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A13-2401

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

vs.

Abdirizak Mohamed Abdi,

Appellant.

Filed October 27, 2014

Affirmed

Connolly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court

File No. 27-CR-11-28068

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Mark V. Griffin, Assistant County 

Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Danail M. Mizinov, Assistant 

Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and 

Johnson, Judge. 

S Y L L A B U S

Because Minn. Stat. § 609.1055 (2012) gives the district court discretion to make a 

dispositional departure from the sentencing guidelines by placing an offender with a 

serious and persistent mental illness on probation with the condition that the offender 

successfully complete an appropriate supervised alternative-living program having a 
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mental-health treatment component, an appellate court reviews the decision to make or 

not make such a departure for an abuse of discretion. 

O P I N I O N

CONNOLLY, Judge

Appellant entered an Alford plea to a charge of assault in the first degree; the plea 

agreement provided that the state would seek a prison sentence and that appellant would 

argue for a dispositional departure on the ground of mental illness.1 The district court 

rejected appellant’s argument and imposed the presumptive prison sentence. Appellant 

challenges the sentence.

FACTS

In September 2011, appellant Abdirizak Mohamed Abdi repeatedly stabbed his 

wife in the home they shared with their two small children. His wife ran to the 

neighbors, told them about the stabbing, and called 911; she also reported the matter to 

the police.

Appellant was charged with attempted murder in the second degree. The district 

court ordered that he be evaluated for competency to proceed to trial under Minn. R. 

Crim. P. 20.01. Appellant was initially found incompetent to stand trial, but, after 

undergoing treatment, was found competent.

He entered an Alford plea to an amended charge of assault in the first degree. The 

plea agreement provided that the state would seek a prison sentence of 86-103 months 

 

1 A defendant entering an Alford plea maintains innocence but concedes that there is 

sufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict. State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 761 

(Minn. 1977); accord North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160 (1970).
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and that appellant would seek a dispositional departure on the ground of mental illness. 

Following a hearing, at which appellant presented five witnesses, the district court denied 

his request for a dispositional departure and imposed an 86-month prison sentence. 

ISSUES

1. Does the district court have discretion to make a dispositional departure 

from the sentencing guidelines by placing an offender with a serious and persistent 

mental illness on probation conditioned on the offender’s successful completion of a 

supervised alternative-living program having a mental-health treatment component?

2. Did the district court abuse its discretion in imposing a prison sentence on 

appellant?

ANALYSIS

1. Standard of Review

In construing statutes, “‘[m]ay’ is permissive.” Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 15 

(2012). When an offender has “a serious and persistent mental illness . . . the court, 

when consistent with public safety, may instead [of imposing a prison term] place the 

offender on probation . . . and require as a condition of the probation that the offender 

successfully complete an appropriate supervised alternative living program having a 

mental-health treatment component.” Minn. Stat. § 609.1055 (2012) (emphasis added). 

Thus, placing a mentally ill offender on probation conditioned on completion of a 

supervised alternative-living program is discretionary with the district court. We 
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therefore review a district court’s decision to make a dispositional departure on the 

ground of mental illness under Minn. Stat. § 609.1055 for an abuse of discretion.2 

2. Appellant’s Sentence

Basing its decision on two conclusions, the district court decided not to make a 

dispositional departure from the sentencing guidelines by putting appellant on probation 

with the condition that he complete an appropriate supervised alternative-living program.

Appellant asked to be sent to a program at a residence for people of Somali descent that 

he designated as a place where he could “successfully complete an appropriate supervised 

alternative living program having a mental health treatment component” within the 

meaning of Minn. Stat. § 609.1055. The district court concluded that the program at the 

residence did not qualify as a “supervised alternative living program” and that sending 

appellant there would not be consistent with public safety. The state notes in its brief that 

the district court’s written decision was “thorough, reasoned, analytical, rational, and 

based on the evidence in the record.” We agree. 

A. Suitability of the residence

The president and CEO of the residence program had not met appellant and knew 

nothing about him, but testified extensively about the program at the residence. 

 

2 As the district court noted, several unpublished decisions of this court have determined 

that this is the appropriate standard of review. See, e.g., State v. Shingobe, No. A10-

0900, (Minn. App. Feb. 1, 2011) (affirming denial of dispositional departure for mentally 

ill defendant based on reasons of public safety); State v. Sturm, No. A06-1299, (Minn. 

App. Sept. 4, 2007) (same); State v. Molacek, No. A05-0499, (Minn. App. Oct. 4, 2005) 

(affirming dispositional departure for mentally ill defendant because Minn. Stat. 

§ 245.462, subd. 20(c) (2004), includes “bipolar disorder” as a mental illness). 
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Specifically, he testified that: (1) the program has never had a resident who was sent there 

on probation by the criminal justice system; (2) about 50% of the residents have bipolar 

disorder; (3) the residents are on medication; (4) residents who are not compliant with 

their medication regimen are discharged; (5) residents stay an average of one year and 

eight months; (6) whether a resident is ready to leave is determined by the staff and the 

residents’ psychiatrists; and (7) nothing can be done to require residents who have chosen 

to leave the program to return to it.

Based on this testimony and on the testimony of appellant’s psychiatrists that 

appellant would require close monitoring and close supervision to manage his mood 

disorder through medication and other means, the district court determined that, 

“[because] identifying and quickly responding to such symptoms [as appellant’s] may be 

crucial to preventing the occurrence of another violent incident, . . . [the program at the 

residence] would not be able to provide the close supervision or emergency response time 

necessary for [appellant].” There was no abuse of discretion in this determination.

B. Consistent with Public Safety

Appellant testified at the Alford plea hearing that: (1) while he remembers nothing 

about the incident, he understood that his wife had run to the neighbors and told them that 

he had stabbed her with a knife; (2) she reported this to the police; (3) she would testify if 

appellant were tried on a charge of attempted murder; (4) she still suffered injury or 

substantial bodily harm from the knife wounds; (5) her testimony would give the jury 

reason to convict appellant of first-degree assault; and (6) there was enough evidence 

from the neighbors, from his wife, from the 911 calls, from the police report, and from 
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the medical examiners to convict him. Appellant answered “Yes” when the district court 

asked him if, while maintaining his innocence, he agreed there was enough evidence to 

convict him. 

The program’s president and CEO testified that the residence is not locked during 

the day; residents may come and go as they please; residents are encouraged to have day 

jobs; no security guards or police officers are on the staff; the 24-hour supervision 

provided by the program means that a staff person is always in the residence; some 

residents go AWOL; no doctors are on the staff; no staff members are trained in spotting 

bipolar symptoms; and, when staff members notice residents’ behavior changes, they call 

a doctor or a supervisor to report the changes. 

Based on this evidence, the district court concluded that:

[Appellant] is a serious risk to public safety. He 

brutally attacked his wife with a knife, repeatedly stabbing 

her, chasing her through the home they shared with their two 

small children, and inevitably leaving her for dead on the 

dining room floor. This is an act of violence that cannot be 

minimized or explained away by the diagnosis of a mental 

illness. If [appellant] is capable of this type of violent crime 

there is no indication of what might happen if or when he is 

released into the community, which is theoretically what [he] 

asks this court to do. . . . [The program] has never had a 

resident placed there as a substitute to prison [and] has no 

means of notifying the neighborhood of the dangerous nature 

of a potential resident, leaving the public unreasonably 

unaware.

The determination that making a dispositional departure by sending appellant to the 

program at the residence rather than imposing a prison sentence would not be consistent 
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with public safety was not an abuse of discretion. Indeed, the statute specifically 

provides that this factor is to be considered.

Finally, appellant argues that the district court did not consider a downward 

durational departure once it had rejected his request to be sent to the program at the 

residence. Apart from the fact that such a departure was not contemplated by the express

terms of the plea agreement, the district court did carefully consider such a request. In its 

decision the district court stated:

Per the [s]entencing [g]uidelines, this court has the discretion 

to impose a durational departure in circumstances where the court 

finds that “the offender, because of physical or mental impairment, 

lacked substantial capacity for judgment when the offense was 

committed.” [Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.D.2.a.(3) (2010).] This 

mitigating factor may be used as grounds for a departure. Based on 

the severity of the offense, along with the ongoing effect on the 

victim, and the need for a consistent treatment plan, this court does 

not find it appropriate to apply the “mental illness” factor as one 

mitigating [appellant’s] culpability, and in turn sufficient to warrant 

a durational departure in this sentence.

We see no abuse of discretion in the decision not to grant a downward durational 

departure.

D E C I S I O N

The standard of review for a district court’s decision to make a dispositional 

departure from the sentencing guidelines by placing an offender with a serious and 

persistent mental illness on probation with the condition that the offender successfully 

complete a supervised alternative-living program having a mental-health treatment 

component is abuse of discretion. We see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s 
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decision not to place appellant on probation but to impose the presumptive prison 

sentence, and affirm it.

Affirmed.