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ENHANCING BORDER SECURITY AND LAW

ENFORCEMENT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

DRUG POLICY AND HUMAN RESOURCES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 10, 2002

Serial No. 107–171

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

STEPHEN HORN, California

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

BOB BARR, Georgia

DAN MILLER, Florida

DOUG OSE, California

RON LEWIS, Kentucky

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

DAVE WELDON, Florida

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida

C.L. ‘‘BUTCH’’ OTTER, Idaho

EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

——— ———

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,

DC

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

JIM TURNER, Texas

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

KEVIN BINGER, Staff Director

DANIEL R. MOLL, Deputy Staff Director

JAMES C. WILSON, Chief Counsel

ROBERT A. BRIGGS, Chief Clerk

PHIL SCHILIRO, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY AND HUMAN RESOURCES

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana, Chairman

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN L. MICA, Florida,

BOB BARR, Georgia

DAN MILLER, Florida

DOUG OSE, California

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

DAVE WELDON, Florida

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JIM TURNER, Texas

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine

JANICE D. SCHAKOWKY, Illinois

EX OFFICIO

DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

CHRISTOPHER DONESA, Staff Director

NICHOLAS COLEMAN, Counsel

CONN CARROLL, Clerk

JULIAN A. HAYWOOD, Minority Counsel

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on April 10, 2002 .............................................................................. 1

Statement of:

Johnson, Larry C., CEO and founder, Berg Associates LLC; Colleen M.

Kelley, national president, National Treasury Employees Union; T.J.

Bonner, president, National Border Patrol Council, American Federation of Government Employees; Christopher Koch, president, World

Shipping Council; John Simpson, president, American Association of

Exporters and Importers; and Steve Russell, chairman and CEO,

Celadon Trucking Services, American Trucking Associations .................. 33

Tischler, Bonni, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, U.S.

Customs Service ............................................................................................ 10

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Bonner, T.J., president, National Border Patrol Council, American Federation of Government Employees, prepared statement of ....................... 53

Johnson, Larry C., CEO and founder, Berg Associates LLC, prepared

statement of ................................................................................................... 36

Kelley, Colleen M., national president, National Treasury Employees

Union, prepared statement of ...................................................................... 42

Koch, Christopher, president, World Shipping Council, prepared statement of ........................................................................................................... 62

Russell, Steve, chairman and CEO, Celadon Trucking Services, American

Trucking Associations, prepared statement of ........................................... 85

Simpson, John, president, American Association of Exporters and Importers, prepared statement of ........................................................................... 79

Souder, Hon. Mark E., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Indiana, prepared statement of ............................................................... 4

Tischler, Bonni, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, U.S.

Customs Service, prepared statement of .................................................... 14

(1)

ENHANCING BORDER SECURITY AND LAW

ENFORCEMENT

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 10, 2002

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY AND

HUMAN RESOURCES, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room

2514, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mark E. Souder (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Souder, Cummings and Davis.

Staff present: Nicholas Coleman, counsel; Christopher Donessa,

staff director and chief counsel; Conn Carroll, clerk; Tony Haywood,

minority counsel; and Earley Green, minority assistant clerk.

Mr. SOUDER. The subcommittee will now come to order. Good

morning. Thank you all for coming. Today our subcommittee will

investigate various proposals to enhance border security and law

enforcement.

Since last summer this subcommittee has been conducting a comprehensive study of our Nation’s borders, considering ways to improve both security and the efficient flow of international commerce, travel and tourism.

As policymakers have looked at ways to improve security at the

border, a variety of significant, even sweeping changes have been

suggested. These new proposals have involved both new technologies and new strategies to be used in inspections, in new organizational structures for agencies involved in border law enforcement.

Four of these proposals merit special attention here today. First,

the ramifications of moving our emphasis away from cargo inspections at the border toward inspections at the point of origin. In theory this would speed cargo through the ports of entry and eliminate

what could be substantial delays as well as allow Customs inspectors to focus their inspection efforts on high risk cargo shipments.

As the sheer volume of cargo shipments increases, it is clear that

dramatically increasing preclearances will be required. Several

issues need to be resolved, however. First, since these inspections

must take place on foreign soil, how much control over the process

can U.S. Customs officials actually exercise?

Second, how will precleared cargo be protected from tampering

as it is transported to the United States? In addition, how will the

extra cost of inspecting, protecting and monitoring precleared cargo

be allocated? Will the Federal Government pick up the tab or will

2

the industry be forced to bear the cost and pass it on to American

consumers?

These and other questions must be answered before undertaking

such a fundamental shift in law enforcement strategy.

Second, we will examine the related issue of expediting the

movement of travelers. The Customs Service and the INS have already set up so-called Fast Pass systems for commuters on both the

Northern and Southern borders. On the Northern border, the

NEXUS system is a joint project between the United States and

Canada, under which frequent commuters can enroll in a program

that allows them to use dedicated lanes, skip the long lines faced

by other border crossers.

On the Southern border, the SENTRI system allows both the

American and Mexican citizens to use a dedicated commuter lane

after submitting to a background check and paying a user fee.

At each of our field hearings, residents of border communities

have pressed for the expansion of these programs.

Again, several issues need to be addressed before the decision to

expand significant resources on the Fastpass systems is made.

Canada and Mexico do not have equally efficient mechanisms for

background checks. Also, it is not yet clear that fastpass lanes have

had a significant beneficial impact on the amount of traffic in the

general inspection lanes. Before removing further lanes from use

by the general public, we should be certain that the Fastpass system will help the overall traffic situation.

Finally, while the SENTRI system is at least partially funded by

user fees on the Southern border, currently no user fee is collected

on the Northern border. One significant question, therefore, is

whether the fastpass systems should be paid for by all of the taxpayers or by those who use the systems.

Third. Both Customs and the INS are moving forward with the

modernization of their computer data bases and automated systems. Customs faces the daunting challenge of replacing the Automated Commercial System [ACS], which was first developed in

1984, with the Automated Commercial Environment [ACE].

ACS was designed to keep track of commercial shipments into

the United States and to help Customs target which shipments

should be inspected for contraband. The system is antiquated, however, and it frequently crashes. Planning for ACE began in 1990,

but as yet no system has been finalized. It appears it will take at

least another 5 years before it is up and running.

While there is broad agreement that ACS is inadequate and that

ACE must be deployed as soon as is feasible, Congress needs to

know now how much the new system will cost and how quickly and

widely it can be deployed.

Finally, several proposals have been made to consolidate the various agencies responsible for border management. The most sweeping proposals have been made in the Senate where one bill envisions merging Customs, INS, the Department of Transportation

and other agencies into a Department of Homeland Security.

A less ambitious proposal reportedly under consideration by the

administration would merge Customs, the Border Patrol and INS’s

enforcement divisions into a single agency under the supervision of

the Department of Justice.

3

While consolidation of border enforcement agencies should be

given appropriate consideration, much more information will be

needed before such a step can be confidently taken. Consolidating

even just the INS and Customs would require significant time and

effort and would only be justified if both agencies would benefit.

Congress needs specific information about what problems would

be solved by the agency merger, what activities would be enhanced,

and what difficulties caused by the merger would have to be overcome. These issues are all extremely important. And I look forward

to discussing them with all of our witnesses today.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Mark E. Souder follows:]

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5

6

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Mr. SOUDER. We are pleased to welcome Ms. Bonni Tischler, Assistant Commissioner of the Office of Field Operations for the U.S.

Customs Service; Mr. Larry Johnson, CEO and Founder of BERG

Associates, LLC, and a former counterterrorism expert at the CIA

and the Department of State; Ms. Colleen Kelley, National President of the National Treasury Employees Union, which represents

Customs workers; Mr. T. J. Bonner, President of the National Border Patrol Council of the American Federation of Government Employees which represents the INS employees; Mr. Christopher

Koch, President of the World Shipping Council; Mr. John Simpson,

President of the American Association of Exporters and Importers;

and Mr. Steve Russell, Chairman and CEO of Celadon Trucking

Services, representing the American Trucking Associations.

We thank everyone for taking the time this morning to join us

for this important discussion.

Now I would like to recognize Mr. Cummings for an opening

statement.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to

commend you for holding this hearing and for taking such a keen

interest in the issue of promoting security and efficiency at America’s border crossings and ports of entry.

The series of field hearings you have held, culminating in today’s

hearing, serve an important purpose. Our air, land, and seaports

of entry are literally America’s gateways to travel, tourism and

international trade and commerce.

Our desire for openness and cultural exchange and our dependence on international trade, make it imperative that these conduits

operate efficiently.

But as the persistent illegal narcotics trade and, even more dramatically, the September 11th attacks have demonstrated, our insistence upon openness can be manipulated to inflict tragic consequences upon us all. Because of the nature of the September 11th

attacks, the issue of airport security and airplane passenger safety

has drawn enormous attention from the public, the media and all

levels of government, and rightly so.

Equally important, however, is our government’s responsibility to

ensure that America’s land and seaports are able to operate both

safely and efficiently. That is the reason for today’s hearing. The

more than 40 Federal agencies that operate at our Nation’s ports

of entry have an enormous task on their collective hands. Among

those, the burden of regulating our borders and ports and providing

the first line of defense in our homeland security efforts.

This falls heaviest upon the U.S. Customs Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S.

Border Patrol. We will hear directly today only from the Customs

Service, but all of our witnesses will have something to say about

the efforts of all of these agencies and how they can work most effectively and efficiently together to advance the Nation’s interest in

securing our borders, facilitating tourism and trade, and enforcing

our laws.

Mr. Chairman, I must say that I do regret that we don’t have

the director of the Office of Homeland Security, Tom Ridge, who is

the person who brings all of this together and could probably provide us with the kind of information we need, here today with us.

9

As you all are aware, Mr. Chairman, Customs Service Chairman

Bonner recently said that if terrorists succeeded in detonating a

nuclear device in a commercial shipping container, the government

would shut our container terminals down.

Leaving aside the tragic health and environmental consequences

of such an event, I suspect that many Americans do not realize the

extent to which the American economy is supported by its seaports.

The Port of Baltimore, for example, contributes mightily to the economic strength of the Mid Atlantic region in particular. But the

goods that arrive there reach deep into the Midwest and other

areas of the country, just as the goods that leave through it travel

all over the world. Cities like Baltimore, New Orleans, New York

and Los Angeles that have major commercial ports depend on those

ports to support a wide array of related industries that employ millions of Americans both locally and far beyond their borders.

The shutting down of just one major U.S. port would have a substantial national economic impact and ripples would be felt worldwide. Similarly, the flow of commerce over land between the United

States and our two largest trading partners, Mexico and Canada,

is vital to the economic health of the entire hemisphere and beyond.

In the new normality that has been thrust upon us, Customs,

INS, Border Patrol and the Coast Guard are all being forced to

evolve quickly to meet the challenge of avoiding the kind of threat

to homeland security and the world economy that Commissioner

Bonner described.

New initiatives in the area of technology, strategy and interagency cooperation, including a possible reorganization of so-called

border agencies, are being developed, implemented or considered by

Congress and the administration.

Today’s hearing provides an important opportunity to examine

both the status and the wisdom of these various efforts, and I look

forward to hearing the valuable testimony of our witnesses.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back and I thank you.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you. Before proceeding, I would first like to

have the record show that the director of Homeland Security, Mr.

Ridge, will be giving a briefing to the members of this full committee this week, and we are looking forward to that. Mr. Zigler has

been in front of us several times. They have a number of hearings

on the Hill, will continue to work with INS.

Today we will be focusing a little more directly on the commerce

interaction which is more directly related to Customs, but we will

have a number of INS questions, and they have submitted written

testimony and will respond to our questions as those directly showing to overlap as well.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Will the chairman yield for a question?

Mr. SOUDER. I yield for a question.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Just one question. On Tom Ridge’s appearance

before that committee, that is—before our committee, is that

closed? Is that the entire committee? Is that a closed hearing? Will

the public have access?

Mr. SOUDER. Yes. My understanding is that it is—double-check

because I assumed it was closed, which it is. But it is for the full

committee.

10

Mr. CUMMINGS. Very well. Thank you.

Mr. SOUDER. But that—we formally invited, but did not pressure

Mr. Ridge to come in public because we knew the briefing was coming. But he is clearly going to need to speak to the Hill more in

response if in fact consolidation goes ahead. I think both sides

agree with that basic point.

Before proceeding, I would like to take care of a couple of procedural matters. First, I would ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days to submit written statements and questions for the hearing record and that any answers to written questions provided by the witnesses also be included in the record.

Without objection, it is so ordered.

Second, I ask unanimous consent that all exhibits, documents

and other materials referred to by the Members and the witnesses

may be included in the hearing record, and that all Members be

permitted to revise and extend their remarks. Without objection, it

is so ordered.

As is customary, we will begin with the administration witness

who today is Ms. Bonni Tischler, Assistant Commissioner for the

Office of Field Operations for the U.S. Customs Service.

I would like to note for the record that we also invited the representatives of INS and the White House, as I just said. There are

a number of other hearings. We know there are pressures on all

of the witnesses and we appreciate it very much that the Customs

has come today, because we have this focus on commerce. It is a

standard in our committee to ask all witnesses to testify under

oath. So, Ms. Tischler, if you would stand and raise your right

hand.

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. SOUDER. Let the record show that the witness responded in

the affirmative. I now ask you to give an opening statement. We

ask you to summarize it in 5 minutes. We will insert your full

statement in the record.

STATEMENT OF BONNI TISCHLER, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS, U.S. CUSTOMS

SERVICE

Ms. TISCHLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the

subcommittee, for this opportunity to testify on behalf of Commissioner Bonner and the U.S. Customs Service. Throughout our 212-

year history, the Customs Service has demonstrated its ability to

adapt to the varying challenges our Nation has faced in its greatest

times of peril.

With the tragic events of September 11th, a coordinated attack

on our homeland, the mission of the Customs Service has evolved

yet again. And simply put, our No. 1 priority is now to protect our

Nation from terrorists.

The task at hand is enormous. On a national basis the Customs

Service is responsible for processing over 470 million people, 129

million cars and over 19 million trucks, railcars and sea containers

that arrive into the United States each year. Obviously we cannot

inspect each and every shipment of goods that enters the United

States. To do so would cripple the flow of trade.

11

Customs employs a systematic process based on the principles of

risk management. This process involves data collection and analysis, combined with years of experience and old fashioned intuition

as our personnel identify trends and anomalies in data to make informed risk-based decisions on what to screen, target and, when

appropriate, examine.

Since September 11th the Customs Service has been operating at

our highest level of vigilance. Inspectors manning America’s front

line have been staffing land border ports of entry around the clock,

performing increased enforcement screenings, examinations and security operations.

Officers at our ports of entry are working 12 to 16 hours a day,

6 and 7 days a week, and they have been doing so for over 6

months. Since last September the rules have changed. Customs can

no longer be satisfied with conducting examinations solely at the

port of entry. We must begin to view the border as more than a

mere physical boundary between countries. We must also understand it in terms of the actions we undertake with our foreign partners to prescreen people and goods before they arrive in the United

States.

To better address the threat that terrorists could exploit commercial trade, Customs has developed a Container Security Initiative.

We call it CSI, which is designed to improve our border security

and efficiency by pushing our enforcement efforts beyond our borders.

CSI will allow U.S. Customs more time to anticipate, identify

and stop threats before they reach our shores and expedite the flow

of low risk commerce across our borders. The core elements of this

initiative include receiving specific advance electronic manifest information, establishing a common targeting methodology for identifying high risk containers, and prescreening these containers at

their port of departure before they are loaded aboard a vessel and

transported to the United States.

CSI is already underway. Customs has personnel detailed to seaports in Montreal, Halifax and Vancouver, Canada to target intransit sea containers destined to the United States. In order for

our efforts to push our border outward under CSI to be successful,

we must enlist the support of industry and the trade community.

To this end, Customs announced the development of the Customs

Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, CTPAT, and Operation

Shield America. Through CTPAT we are working with importers,

carriers and other industry sectors to secure the international supply chain by emphasizing a seamless security-conscious environment throughout the entire commercial process. Operation Shield

America is an industry outreach initiative dedicated to enlisting

the support of manufacturers and distributors in preventing terrorist organizations from obtaining weapons or sensitive equipment

and technologies.

Furthermore, Customs is leading Operation Green Quest, a

multiagency initiative aimed at interdicting terrorist funding by

identifying, disrupting and dismantling the financial systems they

use to fund their operations.

Through interagency efforts, working with our law enforcement

counterparts and members of industry, we are developing comVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:25 Jun 17, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\85608.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
12

prehensive strategies, procedures and plans to maximize the utilization of existing resources to improve border security, coordinate

enforcement activity and respond to terrorist acts and collaborate

on legislative initiatives.

On the international front, Customs is working with our counterparts in Canada and Mexico to improve the level and information

exchange and adopt measures to protect our mutual borders.

Over 25 initiatives aimed at improving cross-border collaboration

and security are already underway under the Smart Border Accord

recently signed with Canada. A similar agreement was recently negotiated with Mexico and we are in the initial stages of developing

eight joint action plans to address security issues along the southwest border.

Customs’ most important technology initiative to secure our future was already underway before the events of September 11th.

This initiative is the ongoing development of the automated commercial environment or ACE. ACE will provide the information

technology architecture and infrastructure that will allow Customs

to streamline our commercial data processing systems and significantly improve our ability to collect advance commercial information from a variety of automated sources in order to efficiently perform law enforcement analysis and targeting.

Technology and information-sharing are absolutely essential to

our counterterrorist mission. Customs must deploy the technology

necessary to rapidly and comprehensively inspect arriving and departing conveyances and cargo at our ports of entry in order to detect anomalies and prevent the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction, narcotics and other contraband. This must be done without impeding the flow of legitimate commercial trade. Customs is

implementing a strategy to develop, acquire and deploy non-intrusive INS technology to systematically increase the smuggler’s risk

of detection in all port environments, including all modes of transportation.

So far under this plan Customs has deployed over 80 large scale

inspection systems at our air, land and seaports of entry. These

large-scale fixed sites, relocateable and mobile X-ray and gamma

ray imaging systems are able to rapidly and efficiently screen commercial trucks, sea containers and vehicles entering the United

States.

In addition to these large-scale systems, Customs has also deployed personal radiation detectors to allow inspectors to monitor

their ports for radioactive sources. We are also working on developing new smart technologies capable of ensuring the integrity of a

shipment and those capable of detecting and identifying chemical,

biological and nuclear materials. For example, U.S. Customs and

the Department of Transportation are in the initial stages of trying

to develop a secure technology, a smart seal, capable of ensuring

the integrity of a sea container or alerting law enforcement personnel when tampering has occurred.

Additionally, we are also working on the development of wireless

technology like personal data assistants and notebook computers

which can interface with our law enforcement data bases on the

ground. This wireless technology will improve the flow and exchange of key law enforcement data to ensure our officers on the

13

front line have the most current tactical information available to

them when they are performing enforcement operations to target

and examine high risk passengers and cargo shipments.

In closing, allow me to state that we are grateful for this support

we have received from the administration and Congress to continue

the development of ACE. We also appreciate the support we recently received in the antiterrorism supplemental budget which

will provide additional inspectors, agents and K–9 enforcement officers and more high-tech, nonintrusive INS technology for deployment at our ports of entry over the next 2 years.

I firmly believe that the U.S. Customs Service has the expertise

and the experience to protect our borders. Thank you again, Mr.

Chairman, and the members of the subcommittee for this opportunity to testify. I look forward to answering any questions you

may have.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Tischler follows:]

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Mr. SOUDER. Thank you very much for both your leadership and

your willingness to testify today. The challenges that the Customs

Service is facing are overwhelming. Just the daunting challenges

that you faced in commerce and contraband and illegals before was

difficult enough and stressing our system even before we got into

the September 11th.

So far I have been on both the north and south borders. In Vermont, in addition to looking for Quebec Gold and ecstacy, they are

looking for contraband cheese coming across.

In North Dakota, I went through one of the facilities for the train

inspections that is relatively new. They have a lot of cargo, wheat,

moving across, and other things across the North Dakota border

where we have more crossings, actually, than any other place in

the United States. In Los Angeles, Long Beach, some of the new

technology that Customs has brought in there at the largest harbors in the world, it is amazing the different things you have to

look for and what the Customs agents in the field have to look for,

and they vary so dramatically, even from site to site, even in the

same State range.

We are working on this border report. I have a number of very

specific questions. We will probably do two rounds here and then

submit some others for written. One of the—maybe I will start

with the automated computer system. What is the time table

roughly for implementation, and how long before it is deployed at

the seaports and the airports as well as the border crossings?

Ms. TISCHLER. Well, our automated commercial environment is

actually just that, an environment. So it is not just a rollout to the

ports. It is going to encompass everything Customs does commercially. We were on a 5-year timeframe. Our commissioner is doing

everything possible to reduce that to 4 years. It is a function of the

funding stream. We have been very fortunate the last couple of

years, and we look forward to mutually discussing this with your

committee and others that in fact are interested in it.

What that commercial environment will do, as I stated before, is

really establish an electronic data warehouse. And so while we will

be able to efficiently process commercial entries, we will also be

able to use it, in conjunction with our targeting system, to identify

anomalies in the flow. That is what it is all about. Because whether you are smuggling narcotics or smuggling weapons of mass destruction, it is all about smuggling. And that is the daunting task

of how in the sea environment, for instance, to reduce this 5.9 million containers a year to a manageable number for us to in fact effectively look at.

Mr. SOUDER. Do you—when you say 5 to 4, was that starting

with fiscal 2001?

Ms. TISCHLER. It is starting fiscal year 2000. But the money was

delayed, so I believe they started it in 2001. I know that our first

entry configuration is due to start rolling out the end of this year

in the beginning of next fiscal year.

Mr. SOUDER. So under that plan it would probably be 2005 if we

got accelerated to 4?

Ms. TISCHLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOUDER. Do you believe that as we have looked—because we

have been at Port Huron as well as San Diego and other places.

23

But particularly where the SENTRI and the NEXUS systems are,

do you believe—and in Blaine, do you believe that they have—do

you have figures that show they—that they are succeeding in the

way that they had hoped?

Ms. TISCHLER. First, let me state that Commissioner Bonner supports the idea of having these types of fast lanes. You know, we

are walking a tightrope. I know I do not have to tell you because

you saw it on the Northern and Southern border. Not only facilitating trade, but an enormous number of people cross every day for

work and for other reasons, to contribute to the economy, for instance, in Detroit.

Personally I think they should shrink it down to one manageable

system. I think at the end of the day our partners in Canada are

very pro for that, in fact, that NEXUS and actually the SENTRI

environment continue. I think it is part of the Smart Border Accord. So for the people who are crossing now, we think it is pretty

efficient. For the numbers that might cross at some point where we

would expand the system, it is a question of logistics at that point,

is how to create the fast lanes that would allow them to come in.

Port Huron, it is a lot easier, for instance, than at the Port of

Detroit.

Mr. SOUDER. That is one of the—I have got some detailed other

areas I want to get into in the second round. But we are going to

do a little bit of some followup questions, if not today then in writing, on that very problem. Because where have you have—like at

Blaine, Washington, you can bounce certain people over to the next

port of entry because they are relatively close. On the North Dakota border, New York and Vermont even, but when you get into

the matter of the traffic coming through Detroit, it is so jammed

that unless we can figure out alternative ways to put it on the Canadian side—Buffalo is the same thing. They have environment

challenges about new bridges, and yet Detroit and Buffalo are

where the bulk of where the north border traffic is coming through.

On the south border we have a few similar problems, have got

a couple of ports of entry where there is longer distances involved.

And so we need in Congress to understand, because all of us agree

we have to keep the commerce moving and control the terrorism,

because jobs and security are our two biggest concerns as Members

of Congress. But to do that is going to require some major infrastructure questions because you cannot say we are for fastpass and

not have enough lanes. And physically we have rivers in some of

these borders and this is a very costly proposition.

Mr. Cummings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And Ms.

Tischler, thank you very much for being here.

I agree with the chairman that the Customs unquestionably has

a very difficult challenge. And consistent with that, I guess we

have a lot of people who are working overtime now?

Ms. TISCHLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. CUMMINGS. And what are we doing about bringing in new

people?

Ms. TISCHLER. Well, we have been very fortunate this year,

thanks to Congress and the administration for supporting efforts to

increase our rolls. Just in the 2000 arena, that is all I can speak

24

to, we almost have gone up about 1,000 people. And it is split between the Customs inspectors, as I pointed out before, the K–9 officers and our agents. So the total number of inspectors that we are

getting actually as a result of the 2002 initiatives and the supplemental is 919. And the total number of agents is 381. And we are

quite happy about that. We have been pretty static for the last

number of years. It was pretty hard to spread people around. In

fact in 1999, when the Rasson incident happened and we had to

send people to the border, then we realized exactly how thin we

were on the Northern border. That is why a lot of these individuals

are going to be reporting to the Northern border ports.

Mr. CUMMINGS. One of the things that was very interesting during one of our hearings that—we were talking about—the issue of

airline security came up. And it may have actually been in another

committee that I am on. And they were saying that—how as they

had to get more of these folks that ride in the airplanes, the security.

Ms. TISCHLER. Sky marshals.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Sky marshals. That—so many new terms here.

I asked them where were these people coming from, the new people. And they said most of them were coming from the Border Patrol, which is very interesting. I am just wondering where are your

people coming from? Is there any particular place that you see a

high number of them coming?

Ms. TISCHLER. We have lost a few to TSA as well in their endeavor to staff the sky marshal area. When we are recruiting, we

recruit in the widest area possible. And so, frankly, does INS. So

it sort of depends on who actually puts in. But we just had a team,

for instance, in New England looking to staff the Northern border

because we realize it is possible that if you hire somebody from the

southwest border and try to send them to Beecher Falls, they

might not stay there too long. So we try very diligently to fit the

right person with the right job.

And we are recruiting all across the United States right now. So

we do not expect really to pull from the other agencies except for

the special agent position.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Not very long ago I got a call I think from The

New York Times, and they were trying to pull together an article

about how since September 11th there had been an increase in the

amount of drugs that have been found by Customs and they wanted me to comment.

And is that accurate, first of all? Have we seen an increase in

drug discoveries?

Ms. TISCHLER. Customs has—we have just recently run a survey

on that, and it appears to us that we have been able to interdict

a lot more drugs coming across the southwest border, and even

coming across the Northern border. Although it is pretty restricted

to certain areas. So we would agree with that.

Mr. CUMMINGS. And is that because the surveillance is much

stricter?

Ms. TISCHLER. I would like to think it is a function of the number

of people up there, yeah.

25

Mr. CUMMINGS. And as far as going back for a moment to the

new peopling coming in, is the training that they receive now much

different than it was say pre-September 11th?

Ms. TISCHLER. No. Our training has really been pretty consistent

over the years. Like I said, the issue of how to address smuggling

on the border or how to address how to process commercial traffic

pretty well stays the same. What we have added is a new focus on

terrorist activities. How to spot anomalies that might lead us in

that direction. I am not being facetious, but what a weapon of mass

destruction might look like, how to work the radiation pagers, how

to deal with some of the new technology that we are going to be

using to look for chemicals that are inbound.

So, in general, training really hasn’t changed that much in specific. To deal with the area of terrorism, we pretty well are cranking up our program to include new areas that will impact on that.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Just one other question. And I would be more

than remiss if I did not ask you this. I do not think I could go back

to my district. You know, there was a time, and it is a little unrelated but related, about a year or so ago when African-Americans

were very concerned that the Customs, particularly airlines, we

would be having all kind of problems. African-American women

were disproportionately being checked at the airports. And I know

that—I guess that may have been about 2 years ago. Our colleague,

John Lewis, spoke out against it at the Congressional Black Caucus. And African-American men were being disproportionately

stopped and checked and searched, in many instances stripsearched. And I was just wondering has a—I know that back then

some new policies were put in place.

And I was just wondering how those policies were working out?

I know this is a little unrelated, but I have to ask you since I have

you here before us.

Ms. TISCHLER. Even prior to September 11th, the level of noise,

the level of complaints, letters we were getting in had completely

fallen off. So we are very pleased with the policies that we put into

place. Our training on personal search has proven to be really reliable.

Our search efficiency rate, meaning the numbers of people

searched and what we actually find on them, has actually gone up.

Because, for instance, in one of our ports, I will not tell you which,

they searched like 1,000 people and got very little return. Well,

they have searched a lot fewer people than the 1,000 people within

that same timeframe and their search efficiency rate went way up.

They have made seizures where none existed before.

So Customs has really taken a lot of time, energy, and put a lot

of money behind straightening that perceived problem out. And we

are pleased.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much.

Mr. SOUDER. Our economy in Indiana would die if we were restricted much with our Canadian trade because it has become a

huge part because of NAFTA, in addition to trade with Mexico. So

we are very concerned how to keep the commerce moving, particularly if we have additional terrorist incidents, which we know at

some point we will have in the United States, and how our country

is going to a react on the borders. Since September 11th it has gone

26

down to near manageable levels again, and we have done that with

a lot of stress. We are bringing in the systems. But we all know

that this isn’t a problem that is suddenly over, and therefore we

are likely to see the pressures.

We all know that this expedited clearance process is critical. So

I have some very specific questions related to this. One pilot program which is a joint venture between Customs and the State of

New Hampshire apparently will involve a Slovakian factory and a

U.S. importer. The goods will be inspected and sealed at the factory

in Slovakia and then brought into the United States. Who will

carry out the inspections at the point of origin? Will the U.S. Customs do that? Will they simply supervise them? If it is the latter,

will the private firms that make or carry the goods be entrusted

with the inspections or will the foreign nations’ customs inspectors

carry them out?

In other words, how is this process exactly going to work? Because this is vital in the preclearance questions and in the security

question.

Ms. TISCHLER. Correct. The Croatian pilot is Operation Safeguard. It is being sponsored by the Coast Guard. I believe they are

going to be handling the security issues overseas.

But let me say this, that the concept of what Safeguard is trying

to pilot, the issue of a company securing its supply chain from start

to when it gets to American Customs, is an apt one. That is what

that CTPAT concept and CSI, the Container Security Initiative, is

all about, In Canada, however, which is something I can speak to,

we have got inspectors at Vancouver, Montreal and Halifax. We are

cooperating with our Canadian counterparts. We do the targeting

with them. We are showing them how to do it as well.

By the way, they have got people now at Seattle and Newark

that are doing the same things for cargo going to Canada.

But once we identify an anomaly, we set the container to the

side. They are handling it. The Canadians are handling it, with us

observing. They are running these containers through NII that

they have got, and/or opening the cargo. I guess I think it is fortunate that we have come up with nothing. But we have done a number of containers. We just sent our inspectors into Halifax and

Montreal the week before last. So we know what is going to happen

there.

The idea is, I know—I do not think I am speaking out of turn

if I tell you, we have already been to one of the mega ports and

have been negotiating with this country—I really do not want to

say what it is, because I don’t want to put them on the spot. But

they seem very receptive of the idea of us sending inspectors over

there again to target.

Now in terms of who is going do the searching and what they are

going to do with the stuff if we do interdict something, from a law

enforcement perspective in the context of narcotics, will we try to

do a controlled delivery? Will they handle it there? That all remains to be seen. I think as we go to each country that has one

of those mega ports or even beyond that, it is going to be a function

of how we deal with that country and what law enforcement is

available there, what kind of NII they actually have.

27

I know we have been talking to the State Department about the

possibility of providing NII to some of these ports that don’t have

anything. It just makes sense to do that. But I do have to say that

there are some bills before Congress right now which would help

us out, absent that, and even including that. And that is a House

bill and a Senate bill that speak to reforming the way we look at

the manifests and trying to get them far in advance.

We would like to see an electronic transfer of manifest information. We would like more detailed and accurate manifest information and we would like it 24 hours before a ship, for instance,

would depart from a port overseas. I think some of the proposals

have revolved around 5 days which works pretty well for Europe

and Asia, but for this hemisphere it doesn’t work very well when

this stuff is coming in from Grand Bahama Island which is hours

away from Miami. So we are looking for a little tinkering with the

bills.

But back to overseas. So far the countries that we have talked

to have been receptive. And I think, as they say, the devil is in the

details.

Mr. SOUDER. Will your ACE computer system be able to handle

all of this data?

Ms. TISCHLER. When ACE finally gets up and running, absolutely. ACS is going to be a little stretched.

Mr. SOUDER. Would it be—a little stretched means it might not

be able to handle it?

Ms. TISCHLER. I think for the short term, within the next couple

of years, it will be able to handle it fine. It is just that it is not

as sophisticated as we would like to do data analysis and trend

analysis. And it is in that area where the information would come

in and then be used to, in fact, target cargo that will be a little on

the lacking side. That is why we are so anxious to get ACE up and

running.

Mr. SOUDER. I know the president of Mexico has taken tremendous strides in cleaning up a lot of the corruption in Mexico but

it is a prevalent problem in their police departments. And one of

the problems in the south border is we are dependent on their local

police commanders because there is no central criminal data base.

I would suggest that this probably presents problems on rail and

other things coming in, not only with Mexico but other countries.

Would you agree with that statement?

Ms. TISCHLER. I am not knowledgeable enough to actually agree

with you. But I would say that would present a problem, if true.

I know that Mexican Customs is investing pretty heavily in IT, and

they feel that they are going to be very sophisticated in order to

interface with ACE, and our Canadian partners as well.

Mr. SOUDER. In your reference to the legislation, I think it is fair

to say, that much like we did on the airline manifests and have put

pressure on the different countries to provide us with the names

of the people heading into this country, to make the fastpass systems work, whether they are NEXUS or SENTRI or whatever

types of preclearances, we are going to have to have more data.

Now I know trucking companies and others and shippers are

going to want to add things at the last minute. That is the nature

of the business. But to the degree you do that, we don’t have the

28

same sense of security. One of the things that we have raised at

some of our hearings with some Canadian trucking companies, at

one of the hearings with others, is that probably there are going

to need to be more severe penalties if you abuse the preclearance

system, because the—the integrity of that system is vital to the

movement of commerce. And it is almost like having a specially

vetted unit. When you ask for special privileges, which we need to

do, we need to have special obligations, clearances to make sure

that this doesn’t become a prime target to slip contraband and terrorists through. And we are certainly going to make sure that these

type of things are there. But we also have to make sure that you

have got the technology and the computers, because it doesn’t do

us any good to set up a system if you can’t get the data in.

One last question on that. There have been proposals to put GPS

transponders on cargo. I assume that the current system wouldn’t

handle that. Would ACE be able to have the capacity to handle

that?

Ms. TISCHLER. Yes. But I have to tell you that we were—in fact,

Mr. Koch, who is on your next panel, and I were speaking about

this very thing this morning. There are a number of vendors out

there that are talking to Customs and Transportation about what

would constitute a smart container and how you would in fact

track inventory around. Just yesterday a vendor came in to talk to

us about it and I actually gave him Mr. Koch’s name and phone

number because we would like to pilot something like that soon.

And it is just a function of what it is.

We understand that the Department of Defense might have had

a system they used, and are still using, actually, but they developed it during the Gulf War to track their ammunition and munitions around. So if that is true, then it would be something that

would be very helpful. But we could not handle this unless our

partners agreed to some type of test.

Mr. SOUDER. These are difficult questions. We rode in to the LA

Harbor with some of the sea marshals, which meant boarding a

ship at 4 something in the morning. It was moving a little faster

than I thought it was going to be when—it didn’t look like we were

moving until you get ready to step across that—being a landlubber.

But one of the things that is apparent—and this particular one,

it was a cruise ship. But in these ships that, even if you have the

integrity of the system at the point of origin, in the—and we are

checking it, at least partially as they come in, we also have to have

some assurance in the transshipment process that something isn’t

altered or added. And many of these flags that the ships are coming in under are questionable.

And that—and that, even in the cruise ship that we boarded, it

was very noticeable as we went through with the people from INS

and Customs and down into the underbelly of the ship and talked

to the people who were actually controlling it, they were up with

the harbor pilot much like the sky marshals do as they enter the

closeness of the harbor, but on top of that, the—the operating crew

not only didn’t speak English, they spoke a multitude of languages.

And that is why this other—these other questions of tracking the

cargo inside become critical.

29

And it isn’t that we have to do every piece, but we need to make

enough uncertainty and enough accountability that the American

public has confidence. Because, like I mentioned before, September

11th, none of us knew it was coming. Our level of accountability

in Congress and the government and the potential reaction if we

have further problems is going to be so out of proportion to what

the reaction was even in September 11th, that we are preparing

over a period of a number of years in our computer systems, our

infrastructure. And I hope you are looking at all of those interrelationships. Because we want to make the commerce work. And

we need to know from you where the problems are and what the

actual resource costs are that we have to look at here in Congress

when we make these abstract decisions that sound good, and then

tell you to go do it and don’t give you the money.

Ms. TISCHLER. That is correct. And, in truth, it is an unknown

universe right now. That is why it is so important to partner with

the trade. Because they have got a piece of the puzzle. Transportation—I don’t mean the department, I mean the trade portion of

transportation has in fact used some of this technology over the

years. We put a technology subcommittee together under CTPAT to

explore all of the technology that the different transportation

universes were using, sea, land, air, rail. It is amazing because

they didn’t know pretty much about what each other were using,

which meant there is a lot of duplication of effort.

And so part of CTPAT is trying to avoid the duplication and turn

everybody on to technology. That seems to be the best practice.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you. Mr. Cummings, do you have additional

questions?

Mr. CUMMINGS. Just a few other questions.

You briefly mentioned Operation Green Quest. Would you talk

about that a little further, please.

Ms. TISCHLER. Operation Green Quest is an antiterrorism

money-laundering operation that Customs, Treasury and the Justice agencies stood up in October, to really get at the soft underbelly, if you will, of terrorism.

I personally—I have been in law enforcement for almost 31 years

now, and I have watched us try to interdict narcotics and do narcotics investigations. But my background is money-laundering. And

I am a firm believer in taking the money out of the equation. And

so what Green Quest was designed to do basically was trace and

track illicit funds or licit funds that were in fact being used for terrorist purposes.

Mr. CUMMINGS. It was interesting that—the other day one of the

Cabinet members over there in Afghanistan made a—made a

speech about trying to make sure that, you know, illegal drugs

would be stopped and the growing of various crops leading to the

distribution of illegal drugs. And I was just wondering, if it is not

too confidential, are we looking at Afghanistan?

Ms. TISCHLER. We have always looked at Afghanistan because of

the heroin trade. Similar to what has happened with Columbia

with the FARC, the cocaine traffic has fueled the FARC down

there. And we know darn well that the heroin trade has been fueling bin Laden and others who would seek to destroy our way of life.

30

So we have been actually dealing with it from a narcotics illicit

proceeds perspective for some time now.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Uh-huh. And are we—does this—has Customs at

all worked with the government of Afghanistan, giving advice or

anything of that nature, to your knowledge?

Ms. TISCHLER. Up to now? No.

Mr. CUMMINGS. You mentioned that the Customs, Department of

Transportation working group presented a report to the Office of

Homeland Security making recommendations to improve container

security. Is that report available publicly?

Ms. TISCHLER. I don’t know if it has actually gone to the coordination committee PCC or not. I know that it was due to go. Then

they were going to review it and open it up for review.

Mr. CUMMINGS. And so the next step is opening it up for review?

It has several recommendations?

Ms. TISCHLER. It has a number of recommendations. I think

there are 25 recommendations.

Mr. CUMMINGS. And I take it that the Office of Homeland Security would have a lot to do with making sure that those recommendations, the ones that they felt appropriate, went into effect.

Is that accurate?

Ms. TISCHLER. I think that they are submitting it to them for

their thoughts. Some of the recommendations will require funding.

I am sure that we will have to take it to Congress to discuss these

recommendations.

Homeland security, I think, will spearpoint these recommendations once they finish looking at the report and digesting the elements.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to

Congressman Davis, if you had any questions.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Davis will get 5 minutes plus any additional.

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to

thank the gentleman for yielding. I also want to thank you and

commend you, both you and Representative Cummings, for the diligence with which you have pursued this whole issue and the diligence that you are taking to look at the whole question of drug

trafficking, the whole business of crime, criminality and even looking at the whole question of prevention and how we can really get

a handle on drug policy that is effective for our country.

I also want to thank you for your testimony. I have enjoyed listening to your responses. The questions that sort of come to mind

in terms of border effectiveness obviously require a great deal of cooperation between countries. What are our experiences right now

in terms of the level of cooperation that we are receiving from other

countries with whom we have to interact at the borders?

Ms. TISCHLER. Well, I would like to talk about Canada. We have

always cooperated with Canadian Customs and vice versa. And we

deal with the RCMP, frankly, on a recurring basis. The Smart Border Accord that our two countries have struck, I think, will go a

long way to increasing that cooperation.

We have the same focus, how to keep terrorists out of the United

States and possibly out of Canada and still have that trade go

through which is so critical to the border areas.

31

So I’ve got nothing but pluses for the Canadians. And we have

recently started the same type of proposed accord with Mexico. I

think President Fox has gone a long way to straightening things

out in Mexico. And we’ve always dealt the same thing with Mexican customs on a very positive level. They’ve recently within the

last couple of years, they have a whole new cast of managers that

are managing Mexican customs. We have been dealing with them

in enforcement and working groups that have to do with the trade.

Things have been coming along quite well as far as we are concerned.

As far as our counterparts overseas, we deal extremely well with

the British, the French, the Germans. In Asia, our cooperative efforts extend to Thailand and Singapore. And we just opened an office actually in India.

I really truly believe in a global trade environment, Customs has

got to be able to maintain positive relationships with not only our

counterparts but their government as well. And so far over the

years, it’s worked out quite well. There is a World Customs Organization, actually, where all the countries come together with Customs and we deal quite a bit with them as well as with the Interpol

to really establish and keep up these cooperative efforts.

Mr. DAVIS. As we increase reliance upon technology, and as there

are continuing advances in technological development, are we still

getting the human person power, I mean, the reliance obviously

upon the expertise of agents, of humans who work in the process?

Are we getting what we need in terms of interest and in terms of

people being interested in entering the service?

Ms. TISCHLER. We think so. Customs relies on a tiered-up process, anyway. We have lines of defense. For instance, in narcotics

we have inspectors, we have our dog handlers with our canines, of

course, and the NII, the technology all working in concert with

each other. And so now that we are expanding, we are fortunate

enough to get a number of personnel resources committed off the

2002 supplemental and the initiatives, and we are recruiting for an

individual that has—of course, not too hard with these kids these

days because they are much better at computers than I ever was,

that’s for sure—but we are looking for people with specific interests. Language capabilities, multicultural issues come into play

here. So we are trying to draw from a very broad segment of the

population in order to do the best customer service in law enforcement that we can.

Mr. DAVIS. Representative Meeks and I spent a great deal of

time working with Commissioner Kelly during the past administration and we saw some of the new processes and procedures that

were being put into place designed to cut down on the number of

complaints relative to the issue of profiling and the concerns that

Representative Cummings expressed a little bit about. Are we finding that the new technology, the screening devices, for example,

that were put in, have they reduced significantly, to your knowledge, the number of complaints about strip-searching and profiling

and that kind of issue?

Ms. TISCHLER. I had been explaining previously the level of our

complaints as well is way down. Way down. I couldn’t point specifically to technology. I would like to think it was our training and

32

our—and in the bicultural areas that we have been doing and our

personal search training and the levels of review that have to be

undertaken before somebody can, in fact, search someone bodily.

That is actually contributing to that. Our body scan machines have

been useful, but they are on a voluntary basis and most people who

are faced with a search actually decline them. They would rather

be hand-searched.

Mr. DAVIS. And so you are monitoring that aspect of the new developments closely so that we know that there is, in fact, adherence

to the new policies and procedures? I mean that’s a real part, I

would assume.

Ms. TISCHLER. Yes, sir, it’s part of our internal control system.

Mr. DAVIS. Well, let me commend you in terms of—I mean, I

think there have indeed been improvements in that arena. Obviously, we are never out of the water. We’ve never done as well as

we can do. I think we are always becoming. But I certainly have

not received the number of complaints that I was getting, you

know, coming out of the area where I live and spent a great deal

of my time in Chicago, where there is a tremendous amount of traffic. And so I certainly want to commend you and commend the

agency for progress in that arena.

I have no other questions, Mr. Chairman. And thank you very

much.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you, Mr. Davis. And thank you, Ms. Tischler,

for your testimony today. We’ll have some additional written questions, but it was very helpful as we look at some of these complex

matters. And please accept on behalf of the Customs department

our sincere thanks for all the hard work in the field from the many

agents who have worked overtime and who have been so steadfast.

In Port Angeles, we went over and met with Diana Dean, and

you made a reference earlier to the individual experience and skill

of the customs officer on the ground. So much of this is instinct,

and that with people who see something a little different on the

bottom of one truck and lead to a huge bust.

Even with all the technology, it’s also the agents in the field. And

we need to make sure they have the best technology, but we also

need the experience in the training. Thank you very much for being

here today.

Ms. TISCHLER. Thank you, sir.

Mr. SOUDER. If the second panel could now come forward. Mr.

Larry Johnson, Ms. Colleen Kelley, Mr. T.J. Bonner, Mr. Christopher Koch, Mr. John Simpson, and Mr. Steve Russell.

We will wait until you all get seated and then we will ask you

to stand up.

If you could each stand and raise your right hand. It is our customary procedure as an oversight committee to swear in each witness.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SOUDER. Let the record show that all the witnesses responded in the affirmative. You have now joined in this distinguished room—this is the committee that has done everything from

the travel office to the China investigations to Waco and oversight

investigations since—for a number of years since we have taken

over. And it’s our customary procedure to do that.

33

Your testimony today, even though it’s for many of you a long

way to travel for 5 minutes, and with the questions, this is building

a systematic hearing record on border security in particular and

the interrelationship of Congress, INS and security that isn’t

matched anywhere else in the system. Because we have been doing

field hearings in the North, field hearings in the South. I have had

all the commissioners in from the different agencies and we want

to make sure here in Washington that we hear from the business

side as well. These are huge questions, as we look at the multiple

missions of these agencies. And if we throw them together, how is

that going to impact our trade and our security efforts?

So I thank each of you for taking this time today and being part

of our efforts to sort this through. We will begin with Mr. Johnson,

a very frequent witness over the years to this committee, as we

have dealt with—this subcommittee in particular as we have dealt

with counterterrorism questions long before the whole world was

focused on counterterrorism. We appreciate your tremendous insights.

STATEMENTS OF LARRY C. JOHNSON, CEO AND FOUNDER,

BERG ASSOCIATES LLC; COLLEEN M. KELLEY, NATIONAL

PRESIDENT, NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION; T.J.

BONNER, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL BORDER PATROL COUNCIL, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES; CHRISTOPHER KOCH, PRESIDENT, WORLD SHIPPING

COUNCIL; JOHN SIMPSON, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF EXPORTERS AND IMPORTERS; AND STEVE RUSSELL, CHAIRMAN AND CEO, CELADON TRUCKING SERVICES,

AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Congressman Souder. It’s a privilege

to be with you again today. I ask that my full statement be made

a part of the record. Over the last 3 years, in my company and current business, we spent a lot of time in Latin America, and specifically in the Colon Free Zone of Panama, doing undercover operations and tracking product counterfeiting. In the course of doing

that, we have gotten some insights that address this whole issue

of both border security, port security and some gaps that need to

be closed, and in my statement I outline what I think are five

broad areas that need to be addressed.

One of those in particular is the need for clearinghouse with the

whole security technology R&D. Right now the U.S. Government is

spending a lot of money in a lot of different arenas in a lot of different agencies trying to develop technology. But at the end of the

day there is no one place that is helping sort out and establish priorities.

So, for example, a lot of what is now the TSA center up in New

Jersey, there is efforts to develop explosive detection systems, separate efforts to develop cargo systems. This much I know: The U.S.

Government and the people of the United States have an enormous

talent and scientific ability, and when you put that together with

the talents that are resident in the national laboratories, it is beyond me why we have not been able to harness all of that into a

concentrated, if you will, Manhattan effort to develop effective security technology. Because there is a legitimate question here

34

about you don’t want to stop commerce by unnecessary inspections,

but there are ways to develop that technology. The key for it is

money has to be appropriated. We saw this with the explosive detection systems. It was recommended back in 1990 after Pan Am

103 to do it, but Congress and the administrations, both Republican and Democrat, never appropriated the money to put those

machines and get them out and create a market for it until after

September 11th. And we cannot wait until we have a disaster in

a port to do that.

A second issue—and I endorse the concept of putting INS and

Customs and Coast Guard together in some fashion. And I think

if I had to weigh in on one side, I think it would be better to bring

INS and Coast Guard under Customs as opposed to subjecting others to the Department of Justice.

But right now when you have three different chiefs directing

things, that means nobody is in charge and at the end of the day

there is a great need for coordination in this front.

And I outline in my testimony the problem of stovepiping of information. Not just keeping information within the Federal agencies, where DEA doesn’t talk to Customs and doesn’t talk to FBI,

and there is not a flow of information across that direction, but you

also see in my testimony an e-mail I received from a law enforcement officer in the United States who worked out in the West

Coast near a U.S. military base, and he recounts his frustrations

of making repeated efforts first to alert the FBI to what he thought

was a Middle Eastern cell operating near this military base that

handles nuclear weapons. And the FBI said—and this was 3 years

ago—we’re not doing profiling and we’re not going to focus on it.

He has subsequently gone back to them because he has identified

some activities that relate to Hispanics and the FBI said, no, no,

we are focused only on the Middle Eastern side.

What you have here is a law enforcement officer who is extremely frustrated with what he sees as the inability of Federal officials to receive the information that State and local cops have, as

well as for the State and local cops to get that information where

they can be a part of the national security effort.

The last point I’ll make—and I intended to bring a Power Point

presentation for you today, and I admit that I did not know how

to properly use zip files so I sent the wrong one—but it illustrates

the problem of visas and making sure that we go after these overseas in the right way.

Now the picture I was going to show you was one of Walid Zayed

Massis. Mr. Zayed, I ran across in the course of doing an investigation in product counterfeiting. What made him even more interesting after we got him on this charge was he was the first individual

convicted in Panama for money-laundering. But in 1989 he published a book that its English translation is ‘‘Palestine: The Burning Silence.’’ He also happens to be the intelligence chief for the

PLO in Central and South America and is on the record calling for

the extinction of Israel. He is involved and has links to groups and

individuals that are involved in terrorism.

This individual also happens to have a company that is incorporated in the United States. Now when you look at U.S. visa law,

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victed of drug trafficking, and because the only other category for

excluding him on is this vague thing called moral turpitude, we

have made efforts in the course of our business to get people like

Mr. Zayed blocked from getting visas to come to the United States.

In another instance, we ran across an individual who was not engaged in terrorism, but was using his trips to the United States

every year to go to U.S. companies’ marketplace, identify the new

products, take pictures, go back home, place an order in China, and

then the Chinese would manufacture these counterfeit items that

he would then bring in. He had been convicted in Venezuela. It has

gone all the way to the Supreme Court. The conviction has been

upheld. But despite that conviction, when we went to the U.S. Embassy and said block this individual from coming into the United

States and using the United States as a tool for attacking U.S.

companies, the U.S. Embassy said under visa law we cannot stop

him. Product counterfeiting is not moral turpitude.

Now those kinds of gaps I find completely senseless. I mean, this

is a place where we need to have common sense come into the picture. We don’t want to block people who have a legitimate desire

to come to the United States. But the individuals who are engaged

with the criminal activity, the drug trafficking, the money-laundering, and potentially terrorism, it is a small group of people. But in

my experience, they have been very effective exploiting the loopholes that exist in both U.S. ports of entry and in U.S. law.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson follows:]

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Mr. SOUDER. Well, thank you for that fairly discouraging testimony.

Mr. JOHNSON. Sorry about that.

Mr. SOUDER. And if you would like to submit the other power

points for the record.

Mr. JOHNSON. I will get that to you and will figure out how to

use it properly.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Kelley,

you are next.

Ms. KELLEY. Thank you, Chairman Souder, Ranking Member

Cummings. I appreciate the subcommittee holding this hearing

today and having the opportunity to testify on the enhancement of

border and port-of-entry security. As the president of NTEU, I have

the honor of leading a union which represents over 12,000 Customs

employees across the country. Customs inspectors and canine enforcement officers make up our Nation’s first line of defense in the

wars on terrorism, on drugs, and on illegal contraband.

The U.S. Customs Service continues to be the Nation’s premier

border agency by interdicting more drugs than any other agency.

Customs is also a revenue collection agency, collecting an estimated

$25 billion in revenue each year on over 25 million entries involving $1.3 trillion in international trade every year.

One of the most discussed ideas being debated on the topic of

border and port-of-entry security is the idea of border agency consolidation. And the most talked about border agency consolidation

proposal, although we have not yet seen one from the administration, would combine the Customs Service, INS and the Border Patrol into one agency under the jurisdiction of the Department of

Justice.

I find this proposal to be extremely troubling. Unfortunately, this

type of a border agency consolidation plan would not improve but,

in fact, exacerbate current border problems. The management of

the Justice Department and its recent highly visible errors indicate

that the lack of a sound organizational structure with regard to the

border security agencies currently under its jurisdiction needs to be

looked at very carefully.

Consolidating these three organizations would take attention

away from critical homeland security priorities. Each one of these

agencies’ missions is very unique and it should remain within their

current agency structure. Ignoring each agency’s field of expertise

will lead to losing the expertise that agency currently possesses.

Customs personnel expertise include using advanced manifest information on goods to improve targeting systems to detect questionable shipments as well as deploying state-of-the-art inspection technology and advanced computer systems at land borders, at airports

and at seaports.

Another popular argument in favor of consolidation involves the

perceived lack of intelligence-sharing between border security agencies. Since September 11th, Customs and INS receive FBI intelligence briefings. These briefings should have been happening on a

regular basis even before September 11th. But these briefings demonstrate that consolidation isn’t necessary to improve intelligencesharing. There are other ways to do it and there needs to be other

ways to do it.

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In Customs’ case, no one doubts that the level of conveyances of

cargo and of passengers has increased dramatically, but unfortunately, its resources have not kept pace. In fact, Customs’ internal

review of staffing done over a year ago, which they call the resource allocation model or RAM, shows that Customs needs over

14,000 additional positions just to fill its basic mission, and that

was before September 11th.

For instance, with increased funding, modern technologies such

as the VACIS, which is the vehicle and cargo inspection systems,

could be acquired. However, adequate and consistent funding to

purchase, to operate, and to maintain these technologies has not

been forthcoming. The President’s fiscal year 2003 budget requests

a token increase from last year’s appropriations and is simply inadequate to meet the needs of the Customs personnel.

The recent deployment of over 700 unarmed National Guard

troops to our borders clearly shows the need for more Customs personnel. These troops need to be removed from the borders and

quickly replaced with highly trained Customs personnel.

Last year, Congress acknowledged the shortage of staffing and resources by appropriating $245 million for Customs staffing and

for technology, and these were included in the Department of Defense appropriations.

We urge the Congress to again increase the funds available for

additional inspectors and equipment in areas around the country

that are experiencing these severe shortages. The 12 and 16-hour

shifts and working 6 and 7 days in a row, which Ms. Tischler testified to, cannot continue without putting the safety, the health and

the effectiveness of the Customs inspectors who are doing this work

at risk.

In addition to appropriations, Customs also receives funds from

the COBRA user fee account. This funds all inspectional personnel

overtime as well as approximately 1,100 Customs positions across

the country. This account is currently at a point where there is a

significant shortfall expected in fiscal year 2002. To help remedy

this problem, the President’s fiscal year 2003 budget proposes to

temporarily increase two COBRA fees to raise an additional $250

million for personnel overtime and resource needs. Unfortunately,

Congress has been extremely reluctant in the past to raise these

fees, so it seems unlikely that this additional money will ever materialize. The COBRA fund is currently set to expire on September

30, 2003, unless it is reauthorized by Congress before then. COBRA

must be reauthorized or Congress must appropriate additional

funds to make up for the loss of these user fees in order for Customs to continue to be able to effectively deliver its mission.

I thank you again for the opportunity to testify today and look

forward to any questions you might have.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Kelley follows:]

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Mr. SOUDER. Thank you very much. As I said earlier, I hope both

you and Mr. Bonner will communicate to your members the appreciation on behalf of Members of Congress, and also the American

people, for all the overtime hours, for the hard work that you have

been giving on the border at this critical time of our Nation’s need.

You had been doing it before September 11th, but everybody is

aware of it now and the overtime pressure is very much appreciated. And we have met lots of your members and agents at the

different borders. I asked them to testify at different field hearings,

and it has been a great learning experience for us, too, to see it

firsthand what you do and the challenges.

Ms. KELLEY. Thank you very much.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Bonner.

Mr. BONNER. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee,

on behalf of the National Border Patrol Council, which represents

over 9,000 nonsupervisory Border Patrol employees, thank you for

this opportunity to present our views on steps that can be taken

to improve security and efficiency at our Nation’s borders and ports

of entry.

The recent events involving the INS has given new life to many

proposals for organizational change, some beneficial and some detrimental. Some of these would effectively eliminate the INS, while

others would absorb all or part of it into larger consolidated agencies. There are other proposals that would improve border security

technologies. One of these would enhance the ability of the INS to

retain its single greatest asset, experienced personnel, by authorizing an increase in the pay level of border agents and immigration

inspectors.

This brings me to the most important point I wish to make this

morning. The biggest problems facing the INS will not be solved by

moving boxes around on an organizational chart or enhancing technology. In our view, the solution lies in two primary areas: one,

holding senior managers directly accountable for their actions and/

or inaction; and two, addressing the staggering attrition rate within the INS.

Accountability of high level managers must be established quickly in order to restore public confidence and employee morale. Recent calls for authority to terminate the employment of rank-andfile employees without regard to due process are misinformed. Federal managers have always had the ability to terminate the employment of any employee for misconduct or poor performance and

routinely exercise this power.

Depriving employees of due process protections would do nothing

to enhance accountability, but would certainly exacerbate an attrition rate that is already unacceptably high. According to statistics

compiled by INS, the attrition rate for Border Patrol agents is currently about 15 percent and will probably rise to 20 percent by the

end of the fiscal year.

Among immigration inspectors, the current attrition rate is 10

percent and may rise to 15 percent before the fiscal year is over.

In our view, a key element of improving security at our Nation’s

borders is addressing the three main causes of attrition: low pay,

limited lateral and promotional transfer opportunities, and lack of

job satisfaction.

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The National Border Patrol Council has long supported the goal

of separating immigration enforcement and immigration service

functions. While there will always be a need for coordination between these two functions, it seems clear that greater mission clarity for each is likely to improve the effectiveness of both.

The various consolidation proposals, on the other hand, do not

have our support. While on the surface it might appear that such

measures would enhance coordination and efficiency, a closer examination shows that they would have the opposite effect by creating unwieldy bureaucracies. There are over 45 Federal agencies

that have some homeland security responsibility as well as thousands of State and local agencies.

In retrospect, it is obvious that none of the consolidation proposals being discussed would have prevented the terrorist attacks of

September 11th. The most important step that can be taken to

safeguard against future attacks is the creation of a computer data

base of all suspected terrorists that can be easily accessed by all

law enforcement personnel in the country. It is much more likely

that a terrorist will be encountered by a law enforcement officer in

the months or years that he or she is living in our country than

in the moments that he or she crosses our borders. Without the

tools to recognize such terrorists, however, it is doubtful that they

will be detained when they are encountered.

As this subcommittee and Congress seek ways to enhance border

security and find solutions for the frustrating problems at the INS,

we urge you not to lose sight of the thousands of agents, inspectors

and other employees who dedicate themselves to the difficult, dangerous and often thankless task of enforcing the law along our Nation’s borders. As limited Federal dollars are being committed to

border security initiatives, some of those funds must be directed toward keeping these experienced employees on the job.

I again thank you for the opportunity to address this subcommittee and look forward to answering any questions that you might

have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bonner follows:]

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Mr. SOUDER. Thank you very much for your testimony. Mr. Koch.

Mr. KOCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The World Shipping Council represents the international liner shipping industry, and what

the members of this industry do is they carry about two-thirds of

the value of all of America’s oceanborne commerce. To give you a

perspective, in 2001 that was 4.8 million containers of export cargo

going through our ports, 7.8 million containers of import cargo coming through our ports. Another way to think it, $1.1 billion worth

of goods moving in and out of U.S. ports every single day, which

goes back to the point both of you gentlemen made about the importance of trade and what is at issue here.

On September 11th we were all faced with the vulnerabilities of

a free society and what America is looking at here. In the aviation

context we saw what happened when four planes were hijacked,

the people who were killed. From just a transportation perspective,

the aviation industry was up and running—starting to be up and

running 3 days after September 11th.

When you look at the ocean shipping industry, the container industry in this situation, if there were four containers which had an

incident on a single day, the government’s response now is not sufficiently well organized to get trade up and running in 3 days. The

response, as Commissioner Bonner and the Commandant of the

Coast Guard has said, would be we will close our ports. In essence,

our response is we are going to blockade ourselves.

It is incumbent upon the government to develop the organizational structure and the measures necessary to put in place to

make sure that we don’t do that, because all that does is make our

industry a bigger target for terrorists because of the economic damage that would result from such an event.

So our position is that this issue is not just about transportation.

This issue is about trade. It’s about the economy, the economic

health of our country, jobs. And not just in our country, but with

all of our trading partners as well.

After September 11th, as was stated earlier, when the Canadian

border was shut down for a couple of days, or at least slowed down

for a couple of days, the auto plants in Detroit almost were forced

to close. It is not just auto plants in Detroit that depend on Canadian commerce, it is all of American commerce that is hooked into

this intermodal international transportation network. There are

many aspects of protecting this infrastructure from terrorism.

There is dealing with the ships, there is dealing with the ports and

the marine terminals, there is credentialing people, there is the information process about what information does the government

want, when does it need it? And there is also the container itself.

Let me talk for a second about the government. I think there is

pretty good understanding being developed for what the vision

ought to be for international containerized shipments, and the vision is that we ought to have a secure supply chain, we ought to

have an information process where the government has enough information about a container that if it has reason to want to inspect

it, it can do so at the port of loading before it is put on a ship and

sent to the United States. Inspecting containers in the U.S. port of

discharge is the wrong time to do it, and it is the wrong place to

do it.

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So as we go through this, what do we need to do? We need to

define and develop the rules and regulations that will create a secure supply chain. And at customs the CTPAT initiative that

Bonnie Tischler talked about is an example of doing. We need to

test technology development standards and implement them. We

need to credential people. We need to develop an information system that allows the government to determine what containers need

this inspection before loading and have those capabilities both here

and abroad.

Now I recognize this is a difficult issue and our government is

struggling with it. Some of the struggle is just because the issue

is a hard one to deal with. But part of the struggle is also because

our government is not sufficiently well organized to deal with the

issue itself. I would say it has done a fine job on dealing with the

issue of ships. The Coast Guard has shown leadership, both of addressing port security and vessel security in U.S. ports and at the

International Maritime Organization, because responsibility is

clear, they are focused on it and they are doing it.

We’re doing a better job at port security, but that isn’t moving

quite as well along. But to undertake the steps necessary to secure

the international container cargo security issue is where we are

really, I think, in need of better focus. We have the Customs Service who regulates trade. They have come up with a CSI initiative

and the CTPAT initiative. We have the Coast Guard who deals

with ships, but also trying to deal with ports and other issues at

the IMO, and now within DOT we are standing up the Transportation Security Administration where this mission has not been

terribly well defined.

The U.S. Government needs focus and organizational clarity.

Furthermore, we cannot persuade foreign governments to join us in

doing this unless we have decided clearly within our own government what we’re willing to accomplish and can speak with one coherent voice. Admiral Loy, Commandant of the Coast Guard, said

2 weeks ago when he spoke before the Port Association, we’re talking about what we ought to do rather than getting on with the job

of getting it done. We believe the Admiral is correct.

Some of the questions that I would submit kind of reflect this:

Who is responsible for the information systems that will support

enhanced security analysis? Customs, which the Senate bill addresses? Is it DOT, which the House bill addresses? What are the

government’s informational requirements and who is going to decide what those requirements are? Who is responsible for setting

cargo security rules? Who is responsible for determining how we

manage cargo security and trade if there is an incident? How are

we going to manage and make sure we don’t have the blockade scenario that I mentioned at the beginning of my comments?

Finally, to conclude—as our testimony does, which I ask to be

put a part of the record—that four principles be kept in mind as

we do all this.

First, we need to act and get legislation to facilitate this process.

We need a unified strategy. One person speaking on the issue. We

need clearly mandatory rules so that everybody in the supply

chains know what they have to do and are held to it. We need a

security regime that allows for a free and efficient flow of trade.

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And finally we must reflect on the fact that if we’re going to effectively extend our borders beyond U.S. jurisdiction, we need international cooperation. We need to coordinate with our trading partners, and so we will need a coherent international effort as well.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Koch follows:]

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Mr. SOUDER. Thank you very much. Mr. Simpson.

Mr. SIMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I actually think I could

have gotten a better seat to a Redskins game.

Mr. SOUDER. If you wanted to see them play.

Mr. SIMPSON. I’m going to echo some of what my colleagues have

said. Importers and exporters are well aware, and have for years

been concerned about cargo and port security, primarily because of

the potential for merchandise pilferage and also to support our government’s effort to keep illegal drugs out of cargo containers.

Since September 11th, we’ve been acutely aware of the potential

for legitimate trade to be used to conceal entry into the United

States of dangerous persons or weapons of mass destruction. However, we think it’s important to emphasize the contribution that

our international trade makes to our national security.

The United States is the strongest Nation on earth, not because

we are the most populous Nation, not because we’re the best endowed with natural resources or, as we like to think, because God

likes us best, but because we’re the richest Nation on earth. That

is what gives us the power to project our policies militarily and diplomatically around the world. Anyone who talks about shutting

down our trade with other countries in the interest of national security simply just doesn’t understand the basis for our national security, which is our wealth. And our international trade makes a

significant contribution to the economy of the United States.

So the critical thing is to balance security at the borders with

maintenance of a robust international trade with other countries.

We think there are a couple of keys to doing that. One is information. It’s critical that our government get information and get it

in an electronic format. Whenever a piece of information required

by the government has to be delivered on paper, there’s a significant risk that the piece of paper in a cargo container will not be

at the same place at the same time and that creates the likelihood

that a container of potentially hazardous materials will come to

rest at a place where it wasn’t expected to be and it isn’t prepared

to handle it.

There is also the fact that holographic certifications or signatures

are simply not as easy to authenticate as electronic signatures, so

from a security standpoint alone, having information in an electronic format is critical.

A second thing, and this was referred to by Mr. Koch, is that

there are 40 agencies of the Federal Government that regulate

trade at the border. A simple shipment of fresh strawberries from

Mexico into the United States involves information collection by

seven different agencies.

Our government needs to have one agency acting as an agent on

behalf of all other parts of the Federal Government as the information collector. We recommend that be the Customs Service, but we

are agnostic on that. The critical thing is that there be one window

through which information can be transmitted, and there has to be

the potential for that information to be shared and compared

among all of the agencies that collect it.

A third critical thing about the information is that we need to

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tion. Carriers will never be able to authenticate the description of

what’s in a sealed cargo container. They can only do that if they

had the opportunity to open it and examine the contents, and that’s

simply not feasible. So it is critical that our government look to the

best source of information and not simply impose a reporting burden on the party that is nearest at hand, whether that be the importer or carrier.

A fourth point we would like to make about information is that

the security response to terrorism, the commercial response, if you

will, like the military response, has to be multilateral. We can’t

begin the security process at our borders. There are a couple of

things that we think could be done to improve our security by

pushing the perimeter out beyond our border.

For example, we would recommend that the trading governments

of the world develop unique consignment reference identifiers for

cargo so that a shipment of goods can be tracked all the way

through from the exporter to the destination in the United States

with a single identifying code.

A second thing we would recommend, and here I’m going to differ

from everyone else who has spoken before, is that our government

look a little bit differently at how we provide for security for trade

coming across the border with Canada. In the interests of emphasizing a point, Mr. Chairman, I’m going to exaggerate it. I think

any dollar the U.S. Government spends on personnel or security

equipment on our border with Canada is a dollar that is misspent.

As an amateur historian, I will tell you that one of the things I

have learned is that successful generals often win their battles by

selecting intelligently the place where the battle is fought. A 4,000-

mile-long land border with Canada is not the place to draw a security perimeter.

So I think it is time we sit down with the government of Canada

and look at the functions we perform on our border. That border

has not for years performed a significant revenue function. It’s not

a good place to enforce our health and safety regulations. Hundreds

of thousands of Canadians and Americans across the border every

day. They drink the water, they eat the food, they breathe the air,

they ride on public transportation, they drive on highways 5 feet

away from 18-wheelers with no thought that they have entered a

more risky environment. And yet we spend over $200 million a

year here in the United States to enforce our health and safety regulations at the border.

So I think one of the things we need to do is to consider working

with the government of Canada to create what I would call a zone

of confidence in which we’re satisfied that not only the health and

safety standards on both sides of the border are comparable, and

this is a fact that Canadian and American citizens de facto already

recognize, but also that the immigration and policing functions on

both sides of the border are effective and able to keep terrorists out

of both the United States and Canada. Because I can tell you this:

any dangerous person who can find a way into Canada will be able

to cross our border. There is simply no way we can prevent that

from happening.

So the critical thing is to spend the scarce resources we have in

those choke points that are the entry points into North America.

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The airport in Toronto, the airport at Montreal. The airports in

New York and Atlanta. If we can put our resources into those

choke points and pull them off the land border that we can’t defend

anyway, we believe we can do a much more effective job of not only

facilitating trade but guaranteeing the security of all North Americans. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Simpson follows:]

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Mr. SOUDER. Thank you very much. And our last witness will be

brought home by a fellow Hoosier. Batting cleanup is Mr. Steve

Russell, representing the trucking industry.

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Representative

Cummings. My name is Steve Russell. I’m the founder and chairman and CEO of the Celadon Group, a trucking company based in

Indianapolis. Celadon was established in 1985, and is the largest

transporter of truckload freight between the United States, Canada

and Mexico. We own and operate over 2,700 tractors and 8,000

trailers and employ about 2900 people.

Today I also appear before you as a member of the American

Trucking Association or ATA. I appreciate the opportunity to speak

to the subcommittee today and I want to commend you for holding

these hearings at a very timely point and looking at ways of possibly further ensuring the security of operations and the efficiency

of our country’s land border ports of entry.

Since our inception, Celadon has handled more 1.3 million truckload crossings between the United States, Canada and Mexico,

with crossing roughly 2,400 trailers per week at the Southern border and 800 per week on the Northern border. Trucking plays a

critical role in trade between these countries by moving 71 percent

of the value of freight between Canada and the United States and

81 percent between Mexico and the United States.

ATA and the trucking industry have been busy working with a

number of government agencies, such as Customs, INS, and DOT

to improve the security of motor carrier operations across our land

borders. A more detailed description of these efforts is included in

my written remarks that I have provided to the subcommittee.

Such joint industry-government efforts will continue to work well

to eradicate the potential use of legitimate commercial conveyances

for moving illegal cargo and aliens across our Northern and Southern borders.

My comments will focus on two issues before the committee. One,

the potential reorganization and consolidation of U.S. Government

agencies operating at U.S. ports of entry and, two, the importance

of working closely with Canada and Mexico to further improve the

efficiency of operations and security of our borders.

ATA supports any viable realignment that can improve the operation of the U.S. border agencies to increase security and efficiency

at our ports of entry. ATA’s concerns are not related to the structure of organizations, however, but more in the processing of information systems that exist between the agencies. Therefore, any restructuring effort should focus on fixing the systems for processing

and sharing information among the agencies.

However, members of the trade community are concerned that

recent energies and efforts focused on improving Customs clearance

and other clearance for cargo and people entering in and exiting

the United States could be derailed. Perhaps more important, Commissioners Bonner and Ziglar from Customs and INS have asked

for nongovernmental interests to provide feedback and input into

the development of improved systems and technologies. ATA is actively participating in these efforts.

I would now like to talk about NAFTA and our relations with our

NAFTA partners. Both Canada and Mexico, our largest and second

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largest trading partners respectively, play a critical role in our economic well-being. Bilateral trade with Mexico has tripled while

U.S.-Canada trade has more than doubled since NAFTA began.

The recently announced border security plans established with

Canada and Mexico have launched a new basis for improving the

operation and security of our mutual borders.

These plans compel our respective governments to improve harmonization of border operations, improve our exchange of information, and coordinate infrastructure development. ATA supports the

establishment of a Northern American perimeter zone for security

between Canada and the United States and believes that Mexico

should be part of such deliberations as well. Such an approach

would allow for protection of the external borders of North America, therefore alleviating security pressures constraining our land

border operations.

Any efforts to enhance security of the movement of cargo across

our common borders should not only focus on the trucking industry, but also include the movement of freight by rail and railcars

or intermodal by rail.

On behalf of the ATA and its members, I urge the subcommittee,

in conjunction with other House committees with oversight of border agencies, to look at the needs of our ports of entry. We must

establish appropriate levels of resources, physical infrastructure,

investments and technology to improve security and efficiency. Before a decision is reached to reorganize and realign border agencies

into a single department, let’s make sure that we have exhausted

all other remedies.

Trade with Canada and Mexico is essential to our economic wellbeing. Therefore, it is critical that the movement of cargo across

borders be done in an efficient, secure manner that relies on improved communications and coordination among our border agencies.

Mr. Chairman, ATA looks forward to continuing our cooperation

with those authorities charged with securing our Nation against future terrorist threats. ATA understands the role trucking must

play to ensure our national security in this newly changed landscape. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Russell follows:]

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Mr. SOUDER. Thank you very much. One of the frustrations that

you have when you plunge in an area, it reminds me of when I was

in high school, my dad found this plaque that he thought was hilarious and he brought it home from vacation to the band director.

And we all had to sit every time we had band and look at this

plaque, and he thought it was hilarious. None of us got it. It said,

‘‘Why can’t all life’s problems come when we are young and know

all the answers?’’ .

The older you get, the more you realize the truth of that statement. And the more you plunge into this, the more difficult it is.

And let me—we will go at least two rounds here because I have

quite a few questions and will submit.

But let me first start with Ms. Kelley and Mr. Bonner. We are

looking in our report that I chaired with Parliamentarian Susan

Wayland of Windsor the U.S.-Canada parliamentary subgroup on

transborder issues. And Windsor-Detroit presents a huge problem

area of how to locate enough facilities to keep the traffic moving.

And one of the discussions, also there are concerns on the Canadian side about moving over the bridge, if there are safety concerns. And so they’ve been, as well as other locations, pushing for

facilities on the Canadian side.

What is the position on either of your unions of having any of

your personnel based in—across the border and what concerns do

you have about that?

Ms. KELLEY. NTEU currently represents some Customs employees who do in fact work in the preclearance areas in Canada, and

so they are there, and there are processes for how it’s determined

which employees will go there, for how long, and other safety concerns. There is an issue over there concerning their inability to

carry weapons, which in the United States, of course, Customs inspectors are armed.

But on the bigger issue of whether that should be expanded to

more ports, I really cannot give a NTEU position at this time primarily because we have had, other than your statement, no briefings from Customs on anything that has even been considered in

this area. It is something that I would like to seriously consider

and needs to be addressed one way or the other as we hear about

all the problems that the Customs as well as trade and the government are facing. But without a lot more information, at this point

I would have to delay my response, but I would look forward to the

opportunity for the briefing and for more information actually

about your meetings because I just don’t have that information.

Mr. SOUDER. Particularly as we look at even more complex questions of if we would move to focus at the origin of seaport traffic,

as opposed to looking at it here, these become big questions on the

involvement of U.S. personnel and what restrictions we have and

the safety and the clearances. Even at the Ottawa airport, which

has been traditional, there are concerns about safety, about the

ability of both, as I understand, both INS and Customs, even if you

spot somebody who is a potential terrorist, and they get any idea

that we are spotting them, they can move and it may take multiple

levels of the Canadian Government, which is the most cooperative

of governments and the most similar to our system, to respond, and

we quite frankly usually lose them.

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RCMP has been cooperative. Other agencies have been less so,

I think it would be fair to say. Mr. Bonner.

Mr. BONNER. As Ms. Kelley says, the biggest concern we have is

the inability of our officers to be armed in Canada, and that terrorists and other criminals are going to be armed. So in order to defend ourselves and to defend the public around us, I think that is

critical. So there has to be some way to overcome that if we are

going to have our officers operating in foreign countries.

Mr. SOUDER. Would pursuit be a question as well?

Mr. BONNER. Depending on how it’s structured. I mean, if they’re

going deeper into the foreign country, then obviously it is their

problem and not a problem of ours. If we have the ability to shut

down the lanes at the ports of entry, I don’t think it would be a

problem coming into the United States.

Mr. SOUDER. Because we have had this hot pursuit question at

Port Angeles where we caught the millennium bomber. They went

beyond their bounds and took it into their own hands or we would

have lost the millennium bomber as well. These are tough questions at the borders that your agents are dealing with: Doing what

they sense is the right thing to do versus doing what they are told

they are supposed to do.

One other question I wanted to ask both of you on upgrading the

data base and automated systems: Do you believe that there is sufficient progress being made and could you give us any insights into

the ACE system?

Ms. KELLEY. The problem with the ACE system, all along in the

very beginning the funding was not provided to get it off to a jump

start. The information that I have to date on the ACE system is,

as Bonnie Tischler testified, it is still progressing. It is still a funding issue, but it is one that I believe will address most, if not all,

of the issues that we consistently hear identified that need to be

addressed in the trade area.

I think everyone wishes it could happen in 6 months, not in 4

or 5 years. That has been the interest from the very beginning because of the stretch and the stress that is being put on the ACS

system, as well as the employees that are trying to operate in that

environment. It would be a big help to them being able to more effectively doing their jobs. If there was a way to speed up the funding, assuming that this data base work and all the technology work

could be done, and I think it could be done faster than 4 years if

the funding were provided, that would be, I think, a help not just

to Customs, but to everyone who is depending on it.

Mr. SOUDER. Do you have any comments on that, Mr. Bonner?

Mr. BONNER. No, I believe that——

Mr. SOUDER. We will give you some written questions on the INS

clearance processes on the visas and see if you have any—or either

of you can in the additional days here for testimony get any input

from field agents that they may have about some concerns about

where we have look at how to make the systems better. We are not

looking how to set us back but how to make them more effective.

Mr. Cummings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you all for your testimony. It has been

very interesting. Mr. Bonner, what is the rationale for limiting the

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lateral transfer opportunities for personnel along the southwest

border?

Mr. BONNER. Cost savings. If they hire new people and put them

in the desirable locations, they don’t have to pay the transfer costs

of experienced personnel. But in the end, you end up paying more

because your experienced personnel leave because they can’t get

out of their initial duty assignment.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Chairman Souder has mentioned offering incentives for language proficiency, as in Spanish, for example. Do you

have a view on this?

Mr. BONNER. Actually, that has been authorized since the passage of the Federal Law Enforcement Pay Reform Act of 1990 or

1991. But it’s never been paid. It’s discretionary with the agency.

They have the ability to pay a 5 percent foreign language bonus,

but have chosen never to pay a penny to their employees.

Mr. SOUDER. We also heard at the Quebec border that a number

of—I can’t remember if it was INS or Customs person actually

grew up in a French-speaking household and couldn’t meet the

standards even though his first language was French, because it’s

State Department criteria for very formal French. And that one of

the things when we are looking at languages is because we focus

so much on Spanish, even in the Quebec border, you would think

we would have somebody who could be certified to speak French.

So one of the things, in addition to hearing here that they aren’t

giving the bonuses, is is the standard expectation so high the agencies don’t go after it, in addition to they don’t believe they are going

to get the money? This has become huge in the question of Arabic,

Farsi, other languages where we basically get on a phone and you

try to find the service that can interpret what that package says

in a car or a truck, which probably is not written in English.

Ms. KELLEY. If I could add in the Customs Service, NTEU has

been successful in negotiating with Customs over establishing some

criteria for payments of the foreign language awards for recognition

of that. And you are right, it is under the State Department criteria, but we have been successful in setting up joint criteria, and

there are persons in the Customs Service receiving these awards,

perhaps not to the extent we would like to see it paid, but Customs

is making those payments to employees today.

Mr. CUMMINGS. There was another part to my question I did not

finish, so we have been answering a partial question. I was just

wondering, with that incentive in mind, do you all see that as a

way of retaining people and attracting folk? I know the problems

that you just stated.

Ms. KELLEY. In my experience, it is not anything that necessarily

serves as a huge retention factor. It’s not a high percentage of salary or anything that really, you know, would be a retention incentive, for example. And for the most part, we see them existing on

the southwest border mostly in the language of Spanish. I really

haven’t seen statistics for the different languages, and in light of

this conversation, I am going to get more information about what

languages employees do have and where they are receiving this. I

will also check on their belief concerning its retention value. I

think it probably needs to be a higher percentage available to them

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and more actual funds available in order for that to really be a factor. But I’ll check on that and get back to you, Mr. Cummings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. I appreciate that. I was getting ready to ask Mr.

Bonner did he know what percentage of the immigration inspectors

on the southwest border speak Spanish. Do you have any idea?

Mr. BONNER. All Border Patrol agents are required to be somewhat fluent in Spanish. They undergo a number of weeks of foreign

language training and are tested twice during their probationary

period, and if they are not proficient enough, their employment is

terminated. Similarly, immigration inspectors all receive foreign

language training. So the percentage along the Southern border is

99 percent who speak Spanish very well. And obviously on the

Northern border, you have folks who are fluent in French.

I would say that it would be a help if we could get this mandatory to have this 5 percent bonus in retaining people. But bear in

mind that the differential between the base pay of these employees,

both the Border Patrol agents, immigration inspectors, and Customs inspectors is far behind that of most other Federal law enforcement agents.

The journeyman level is GS–9 compared to GS–12 for most other

agencies. When you factor in the differences between both base pay

and the overtime pay, which for the higher-graded agents is obviously paid at a higher level, you are looking in the neighborhood

of about $25,000 per year.

So it is no surprise that a lot of those agents are looking for better-paying jobs. The fact that so many Border Patrol agents are

going over to the Air Marshal Program now is only indicative of

this dissatisfaction with the job which has been simmering under

the surface for all of these years. They have just been waiting for

someone else to open up jobs. Now that they have, fully half of the

Border Patrol agents have applied for those jobs and——

Mr. CUMMINGS. Half?

Mr. BONNER. Fully half. The INS estimates that the attrition

rate will hit 20 percent by the end of the year. We believe that it

will be closer to 25 percent. That is one out of every four agents

will have left, primarily for the Air Marshal Service.

Mr. CUMMINGS. So what are you doing to replace them? I mean,

do you have an aggressive program?

Mr. BONNER. Yes. It has an aggressive hiring program, but their

biggest problem is hanging on to the people that they have. And

unless that is addressed, we can hire from now until the end of the

beginning of the next millennium, and we are still going to be having this problem.

Mr. CUMMINGS. What does a GS–9 make?

Mr. BONNER. A GS–9 makes in the neighborhood of mid-30’s.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Uh-huh. Just one other question.

Do you know, Mr. Bonner, whether within the INS leadership

there is any kind of support for a single terrorist data base?

Mr. BONNER. I am unaware. I don’t know.

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right. Does anybody else?

All right, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Simpson, as to your Canada proposal, do you

have a similar feeling about Mexico?

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Mr. SIMPSON. I think, Mr. Chairman, the logical extension of my

argument is that at some point we would have to consider the

same sort of arrangement with Mexico, because that border is

equally difficult to patrol. And I think the Government of Mexico,

frankly, being aware that the idea of a zone of confidence between

the United States and Canada has been considered, is interested

in not being left out.

What I have learned is that they realize that the potential for

the United States and Canada to enter into that sort of an arrangement is more advanced. Mexico understands that arrangement will

come first between the United States and Canada. They just want

to be on the same track, even if they are farther behind on the

track. They would like to be sure that they are on the same track.

Mr. SOUDER. I think it is—a couple of things are relatively safe

to say, because one is—is that most of us are aware that there are

differences in the north and south border, but politically to separate the two is almost impossible. It has been a stumbling block for

years, long before September 11th. And with the shifting population mixes in the United States, it is even more politically difficult, without enunciating further; that regardless whether it is

based on merit or perceived discrimination, that—a second thing is

that we are trying to move with the Canadians toward more commonality, but to some degree this threatens Canadian self-identity

as much as it does American self-identity. In other words, they are

proud of their visa differences and their immigration differences.

They have made some movement, but when we were up in Ottawa and met with the Attorney General and the parliamentarians,

they have made some movement, but they aren’t really interested

in, quote, becoming like the United States and our more restrictive

immigration policies, which is a huge stumbling block.

Furthermore, in spite of efforts, and we have made some

progress, they have substantially different opinions on narcotics,

particularly on BC Bud, which is going on the streets of Fort

Wayne and New York for more than cocaine right now because of

its potency. And fortunately they haven’t taken the more radical

steps they were looking at in some of these areas.

Almost all of our Ecstacy is coming from Holland via Canada,

and while we are trying to move as far in that direction as possible,

and we need to work with them because I understand the difficulty

at the border, not to mention localized issues, like I said, like

cheese, the problems in the Vancouver Harbor reception and point

of origin of what they are willing to do as what we might be able

to do, Long Beach, Los Angeles or Seattle, with point of origin, are

very difficult questions.

We are similar, and the goal in NAFTA is to push us more toward similarities and see the advantage of that cooperation, but

there are some substantial difficulties. But organizations like yours

pushing us in that direction hopefully will help do that.

Mr. SIMPSON. If I may, Mr. Chairman, I believe that the things

that we need to do to create the zone of confidence between the

United States and Canada can be accomplished without either nation sacrificing its political sovereignty. I think it is a really wonderful state of affairs that the United States and Canada have the

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luxury of disagreeing over soft wood lumber and cheese. That is,

to me, a delightful situation.

I think the problems that lie between us and the sort of common

security arrangement that we need to create are entirely manageable both politically and diplomatically and administratively, and

there is no reason not to move forward quickly.

Mr. SOUDER. I wanted to also followup with Mr. Russell, because

have you had experiences at both borders. Do you see—what kind

of differences do you see that impact your firm differently on the

north and south borders?

Mr. RUSSELL. We have seen a change over the past 17 years. In

the past 2 years, the Mexican border has advanced in terms of infrastructure on the Mexican side rapidly. It is—there are differences in several core areas. Today a U.S. driver can cross into

Canada, and a Canadian driver can cross into the United States.

But along the lines of the point you were just making, Mr. Chairman, there are differences. If a U.S. driver has been indicted on a

nonpayment of alimony, as an example, in his county in Oklahoma,

he is not allowed into Canada, whereas the U.S. laws and the—the

immigration permission for Canadians crossing into the United

States is different, and those differences basically have affected the

way the borders have operated from a trucking standpoint in a relatively meaningful way.

The flow of freight between the two borders on the Canadian side

after September 11th was quite difficult, for perhaps the next

month or two, with the extensive delays, 20 hours, 15 hours, long

lines of traffic. But due to the efforts of Customs and Immigration

over the past several months, that has improved to almost the way

it was before September 11th.

The Mexican border, again tremendous efforts by the Customs

people, increasing the amount of intensity of reviews, and yet essentially very minor delays compared to prior to September 11th.

So the borders are different in many regards, but I think the philosophy that Mr. Simpson was talking about of creating a North

American perimeter zone in certain areas makes a tremendous

amount of sense.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Johnson, could you talk a little bit about the

challenges we face on the southern border, because in the north I

would assume that shipping is a little more seasonal; not completely, but a little more seasonal. The water sides of Mexico are

complex. That is where a lot of our narcotics are coming in. The

immigration question is a lot, because Mexico also can’t control its

south border. You referred to Panama and things moving through

there.

Could you talk about your confidence in some of the security systems and how this would work——

Mr. JOHNSON. Sure.

Mr. SOUDER [continuing]. Both from the commerce standpoint

and a potential terrorist?

Mr. JOHNSON. I think if we use the term ‘‘security system,’’ we

are being very generous in describing it as such, because it is not

much of a system nor very secure. And I don’t think there is a

quick fix. I mean, it is human nature. We would like to get the

quick fix. If we sit back and look at this objectively, the Al Qaeda

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members who tried to come into the United States came in two

ways. They came in through the visa waiver program in Europe,

and they went into Canada and then came in through Canada. We

don’t have any evidence of them coming across the Southern border.

I think, as I have talked to different people both in the

counterterrorism community from State, from Customs, from FBI,

and from some other agencies, I keep hearing the same thing,

which is nobody has really sat down and agreed upon, within the

U.S. Government, what secure border means, and so therefore we

are pursuing a goal without even having it defined.

And I think there are legitimate concerns about how can you ensure that the commerce can move, because if—if anybody has sat

and watched a container being loaded—I have been in Colon, Panama, and watched these things being stacked. I guess the only

thing perhaps more exciting than that is sitting at an airport

watching an X-ray machine. They are both very boring activities.

It is repetition. And I think within this we can get to a point where

we can put in place some screening systems. I mean, the cargo systems are being developed, but to get those developed technologically where they will process cargo containers at a very efficient

rate is going to require an investment of resources that the private

sector is not going to match. That is where government is going to

have to step in and help move that along.

I don’t think we are going to ever stop the illegal immigration

of people coming across the border, because particularly in the

Texas-New Mexico area and Arizona, it is too wide open. There are

ways that people can get in there. But the threat that is posed

from people trying to take advantage of the commercial transactions to me is one where we can use a combination of human behavior and incentives governing human behavior, making sure that

people have an incentive to do a good job and equipping them with

the technology to do it.

That said, getting that done, I think we are looking at a fairly

5 or 6-year effort at a minimum. That is assuming we commit the

resources and we have a vision of what we are doing. What I am

telling you now, based upon the facts here in government are telling me, there is no vision, and there is no consensus, and until you

get those two issues addressed, I don’t think you can deal with the

others.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

Mr. Cummings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes. I just have just a few more questions.

Ms. Kelley, you talked about the briefings and joint operations

like intelligence collection and analysis teams. You talked about

how they had improved interagency cooperation. Do you think more

of these briefings would cure some of the problems that proponents

of consolidating agencies are attempting to achieve?

Ms. KELLEY. I think they would definitely help. I think they are

not the only answer. The issue of a data base, a shared data base,

that all law enforcement agencies have access to is one that I think

needs to be followed through on, and it is one that I hear repeatedly is kind of the missing link for the front-line employees out in

the field who are actually working the borders and the seaports

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and the airports, that is what they need is a single source of information for easy checking and access. That doesn’t exist.

The briefings that I spoke about occur at the much higher levels

here in Washington, DC, between the agencies. And I know that

before September 11th, Customs, for example, was not included in

those briefings, and they are today, and that has made a big difference in the communication that we see obviously on this important issue.

Mr. CUMMINGS. So you don’t see reorganization as being necessary at all?

Ms. KELLEY. I don’t. I think it always makes sense to look at how

agencies are operating, if they are operating efficiently, but I think

to reorganize or to consolidate and thinking that is the be-all and

the end-all is the wrong answer. I think with everything that the

agencies have that they are faced with today, having to focus their

energy instead on a reorganization about who is in charge and

about losing expertise—I continue to be very worried that each of

the agencies have their very clear areas of expertise which I believe

are undisputed, and to merge those and have them be diluted, I

think, would be a disservice to the taxpayers and actually go

against the goals that those who talk about consolidation are trying

to achieve. It is not about consolidating, it is about providing the

resources to the agencies to do the areas of expertise that they

were formed and chartered to do many years ago.

Mr. CUMMINGS. These VACIS machines that are sitting and with

nobody trained to use them, are there a lot of instances of that

kind of thing where we have—first of all, is that pretty widespread,

that particular machine?

Ms. KELLY . Yes. There are too many instances where the equipment is available—either is available and there is not enough staffing to run it, because you have to be trained to use it. Is a very

intense process, so you need staffing. And so that is one issue is

the staffing. And the second is equipment that is there, but needs

maintenance. It needs to be repaired in some way. And the resources aren’t there to do that, so it doesn’t happen, it doesn’t get

used.

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right. We have got a vote. But I want to

thank all of you for your testimony, and we will be following up

with some written questions.

Mr. SOUDER. Thanks. I also want to thank you. I have a couple

of additional questions I want to try to squeeze in here. Mr. Koch,

first I want to thank not only you, but the others for giving us very

specific things to chew on that we can try to get in the system here.

That in the point of origin, because that was an interesting concept, I assume that you also—there would be spot checks in transport, and you are saying the primary should be at port of origin.

To what extent do you think that would be done by American

agents, by—combination with private companies, and the companies—and representatives of the other nations at the point of origin?

Mr. KOCH. I would agree with Bonni Tischler’s comment this

morning. I think it is going to depend on the government and the

port here that the U.S. Government is talking to. It could very easily be an analogy to the Canadian situation where we trust CanaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:25 Jun 17, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00105 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\85608.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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dian Customs, but would have some U.S. Customs people there to

oversee the job, to look at the advanced data and say, hey, this one

I want to look at; that one is fine, let it go.

I think we have to accept the fact that if we are going to put people in foreign ports, that they are going to expect reciprocity, and

so we are going to have to be prepared to offer to foreign governments whatever we expect of them, because some foreign governments view American exports with some concern, too. Timothy

McVeigh showed you can put something in a truck or a container

and cause a lot of damage with it, and we cannot be insensitive to

the fact that trade is bilateral, and what is going to be good for us

has got to be good going in both directions.

There may be some countries where there is not effective cooperation, and then the government will have to figure out, how do

you respond to that? But I think it is going to be a series of layers.

It is going to be things like the TPAT program, where you find

shippers who are willing to secure their supply chain from the time

the container is stuffed through the transit to the port with the

ocean carrier all of the way through. And for those people who

don’t participate in those kinds of programs, there has got to be

consequences to greater risk of being inspected or delayed or whatever. It is going to be various layers that are going to be the answer to this. There won’t be one single solution.

Mr. SOUDER. I think the record should show, too, what we have

heard at a couple of the border crossings is that they actually have,

in some cases, more narcotics going across our direction to Canada

than vice versa, as well as money laundering. Often the BC Bud

comes down, and the cocaine goes back. It isn’t just a problem of

coming at the United States, it is what we are putting out. And I

think that was well said. Too often we don’t acknowledge that. Everybody else is bad, and we are not. We have some problems in

controlling things here, too.

I want to briefly—you each made, I believe, some comments on

the mergers. And, I have one other question first. I believe, Mr.

Johnson, you made a reference to the Coast Guard. What do you

think is the single most important issue regarding maritime security that you believe our government isn’t giving attention to so

that as we look at new legislation——

Mr. JOHNSON. With the Coast Guard you do not have enough

people to do the full inspection of the ships coming into the ports.

That is simply stated. And the reason I favor looking at some sort

of merger and putting these different agencies together is to harness the resources, to eliminate the redundancy, and to maximize

the efficiency of all of the personnel.

Mr. SOUDER. You had a rather interesting alternative, because,

that—that what is unbelievably confusing here is Coast Guard is

under Transportation. Customs is under Treasury. We heard about

the strawberries, which would be Ag, among others, seven agencies, that—and, of course, INS is Justice.

Part of the reason we have this committee with such broad oversight, probably the only oversight committee we have pieced it together. We have all drugs and narcotics because it got frustrating

because it was in 22 different places. But we also have Commerce

in with Justice, in with HHS and Education and HUD to try to

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look at different prongs of health and narcotics policy, but also because when we dealt with Justice issues and border issues, we can

have Commerce underneath it. And this is just a microcosm of the

mess—this is an oversight committee as well as some authorizing

on narcotics. But you propose putting it all under Commerce where

none of it currently is.

Mr. JOHNSON. I suggested putting it under Treasury, but the specifics, I think, can be battled over. But I think at the end of the

day, look at it from a military standpoint. Within the military ultimately when you fight a war, there is a Commander in Chief.

There are other agencies or units that support. And what you have

right now with the U.S. Government in terms of protecting our borders is there is nobody in charge. There is no one person who is

the CINC with support in command.

Mr. SOUDER. Would you agree that at a minimum that—your

point in technology is something that just seems stupid, quite

frankly, is that we are having multiple agencies develop different

means to do the same thing; that at the very least the technology

ought to be consolidated.

Mr. JOHNSON. Absolutely. I mean, immediately.

Mr. SOUDER. And data collection?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

Mr. SOUDER. And if the other parts aren’t consolidated, would

you put those under Homeland Security, or would you put them

under Justice?

Mr. JOHNSON. I think the Homeland Security Agency is a good

concept, but Tom Ridge, unless he has money, he is ineffective. We

watched with the drug czar for years, well-meaning people who get

into that job, but they have no effective control over DOD, over Department of Justice, etc. So at the end of the day, the money—you

know, the money in this town makes the world go around. If you

get to write the checks, you get to direct the way the resources go.

So at the end of the day, I think there has to be somebody who

is ultimately accountable to the Congress from a budget standpoint, because they can also enforce their will with the money.

Mr. SOUDER. The functional practicality at the borders, what we

have seen is that INS and Customs agents are sharing duties; in

fact, sometimes flipping who does what at different points of the

day.

But the reason this is going to be so hard—and one of the things

I want to make sure in this committee is that in—it has actually

turned out as we look at terrorism, we are also following the narcotics question, but that the Coast Guard also has a search and

safety component that historically has been the biggest. It has a

fisheries component. The business community is going to be very

reluctant to have the border become predominantly oriented toward

security as opposed to trade. Those who are concerned about immigration as opposed to just terrorists are going to have huge concerns, and that is another block. Politically I don’t really see how—

not to mention just normal institutional committee jurisdiction

problems these things often have. We have massive reports, but in

practicality I just don’t see, unless we are under multiple repeated

attacks, that can happen that way.

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And to the degree that we can get this scoped in and say, look,

we have to do the technology, we have to do this—this security

background check stuff where agencies—information floating

around everywhere and not consolidated, or the types of terrible

things that you mentioned, not to mention others that have been

in the news media about we have the information, and it doesn’t

get into the system. That—we need to do those.

Do any of you have any additional comments you want to make

before we close this down, and then we will also ask additional

written questions. Any additional information that you or members

of your association want to submit, because we are trying to build

the case here, and we know the administration is debating on some

of these things at this time. It is a good time to weigh in.

Mr. KOCH. Fully recognizing, Mr. Chairman, the difficulty of getting Congress to approve a legislative reorganization task, I still

think there is plenty of issues that where there is organizational

confusion in our government, where you don’t need an act of Congress to get it fixed. The Office of Homeland Security was created

to be a White House staff office. It could have the power of the

White House to say, you have got this, you have got this, and you

got this. And we are glad Governor Ridge is coming before you, because, I mean, presumably that office has the authority to make

some of the—develop some of the answers to some of the questions

you have heard today, which is what is the relationship between

TSA and the Customs Service and the Coast Guard? Who owns

container security? Who has got the job of negotiating with the foreign governments? Who owns the issue?

And while certainly legislation is one way to do it, it is not the

only way to bring some clarity and resolution to the ambiguity that

is holding things up.

Mr. SOUDER. I will say one of the things that I have learned in—

when we dealt with narcotics overseas, that automatically takes

you into trade and immigration. So we wound up consolidating

things, because whenever we go over, we don’t talk about all three

things. We raise one; they raise another. We go back and forth. The

other governments are also aligned and even often in more bureaucratic systems and overlap and trying to match up, so we have an

international problem.

But I agree that—first off, we all agree we can do a whole lot

better. The question is that hopefully under this administration we

can see some of that.

Does anybody else have any additional comments?

Once again, thank you all for coming, and we will be in touch

over the next few days.

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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