Fran k s v . D e law ar e , 438 U.S. 154 (1978). 1 NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0085n.06 No. 08-3750
UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee ,

v. J OSEL I N CASTRO,
De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P E AL F ROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

T H E N O R T HE RN D IS T R IC T O F O H IO

BEF OR E: G UY , C LA Y, and W HIT E, C ir c uitJudg e s. WHITE , Circuit Judge. A g rand jury char g ed defenda

nt J oselin Castro (Castro) in atwocount indictment with being a fe lon in possession of a fire arm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g )(1) , and possession with intent to dist ribute 9.84 g rams of a substance c ontaining he roin, in violation of
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) (1) and (b)( 1)(C). Castro filed a motion to suppress evide nce obta ined during a traffic stop and subsequent sear ch of his residenc e, and reque sted a Franks hear ing. T he district 1
court de nied Castro’s motion to suppress. Castro pleade d g uilty as char g ed pursua nt to a conditional plea a g ree ment that prese rved his rig ht to appeal the de nial of the motion to suppress. The district
court s e n te n c e d h im ( a s a c ar e e r o f f e n d e r ) to 1 2 0 mo n th s ’ im p r is o n me n t o n e a c h c o u n t, to run

c on c ur re ntl y . O n a

pp e a l, C a str o c ha lle ng e s th e de nia l of his mot ion

to s up pr e ss. We A F F I RM.No. 08-3750

Un ite d S tat es v . Ca str o

Ne ith e r p art

y a sse rt s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s fa c tua l f ind ing s w e re c le arl y

e rr on e ou s. 2 - 2 - I Th e fa c ts are se t f

or th i n th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s or de r d e nyingCa str o’ s mo tio n to su pp re ss: 2
Acc ording to Cleveland Police De partment (“CPD”) Detec tive Maria Matos (“D etec tive Matos”), a

bout four months befor e the May 22, 2007 arr est and sea rch of Castro and his re sidence , she re ceive d an anony mous te lephone call informingher of Castro’s a ctivities. D etec tive Matos testified that the anony mous caller inf

ormed he r t hat Ca str o a

nd oth e r m e mbe rs o f his f

a mil y we re de a lin g he ro in o ut o f t he ir re sid e nc e . D e te c tiv e Matos state d that th e c a lle r p ro vid e d h e r w ithCa str o’ s a dd re ss (2180 West 83rd Street, C leveland, Ohio, here inafter the “Castro r esidenc e”) and a descr iption of the vehicles Castro often would drive. As a result of this tip, Detective M at o s testified that she beg an to conduc t informal surveillanc e of the Castro residenc e by

periodica lly

monitoring the house

. During the cour se of he r informa l surveillance, M at os observe d an unusually high a mount of traff

ic in and out of the Castro reside nce. On May 22, 2007, Detec tive Mat os testified that the CPD was targ eting Castro’s neig hborhood for enfor ceme nt be cause it wa s known to be a “ hot spot” – an are a in wh i ch a high c oncentr ation of illeg al, drug -re lated ac tivity took place. A t approximately

1:00 p

. m. Detec tive Matos, operating unde rcove r, appr oache d the Cas tr o r e s id e n c e in h e r u n ma r k e d v e h ic le

. Sh e te s ti f

ie d th a t s h e o b s e r

ved a g ray Toy ota station wag on (“Castro’ s vehicle” ) illega lly parke d (fa cing ag ainst traff ic) on the side of the stre et in front of the C astro residence . Detec tive Matos stated that she ob se rv e d Ca str o a

nd a wh ite ma le e nte r t

he il legal ly

pa rk e d v e hic le . A c c or din g to D e t e c t i v e M a t o s , t h e w h i t e m a l e s t art e d t h e c ar an d dr o v e i ti n t o C a s t r o ’ s dr i v e w ay, dr ivi ngini tia lly

on the wr on g side of the str e e t in or de r t o d o s o. Ac c or din g to Detec tive Matos, at that time she conta cted CPD Serg eant Ke vin Kelly (“Ser g eant Kelly ”), an d ad vised him of the traf fic violation. Dete ctive Matos then obse rved Castro exit the ca

r, brief ly enter the reside nce, a

nd return to the c ar. O nce Ca stro returne d to the car , the driver backe d out of the drivewa y and depar

ted the re sidence

. Detec tive Matos followed Castro’ s vehicle, br oadca sting its location so that office rs in a marke d vehicle c ould initi ate a traff ic stop.
A t th e s u p p r e s s io n h e ar in g , Se r g e a n t K e ll y te s ti f

ie d th a t D e te c ti v e Matos inf or me d h im that sh e ob se rv e d th e g ra y To y ota statio n wa g on c omm itt inga tr a ff ic violation and asked him to stop the vehicle. A ccor ding to Ser g eant Kelly , once heNo. 08-3750

Un ite d S tat es v . Ca str o

- 3 - observe d the vehicle , he and D etec tive Fa llon stopped it wi t h t h e assistanc e of the zone car [bl ack a nd white marke d CPD cruiser in the vicinity ]. Once the vehicle was stopped, Serg eant Kelly approa ched it to ask the dr iver for his lice nse. Serg eant Kelly deter mined that the driver of the vehicle did not have a valid license , and asked him to step out of t he vehicle s o he could be ar rested f or driving under a

suspended lice nse. When the driver exit ed the ve hicle, Serg eant Kelly testified that he obse rved a small piece of

folded pa per on the floor of

the ca r with what appe are d to be nar coti cs spilling out of it. Serg eant Ke lly advised De te c tiv e F a l l o n , w h o w a s o nt h e p a s s e n g e r ’ s s i d e o f t h e c ar , t h a th e f

o u n d dr ug s. Ac c or din g to Ke lly , at that time De te c tiv e F a llo n r e mov e d Ca str o f ro m th e ve hic le and, in the proce ss of removing Castro, discovere d a sec ond piece of folded pa per on the floor of

the vehicle that also appe are d to contain nar cotics

. T h is discovery prompted De tective F allon to conduct a pat dow n of Castro’s pe rson, during which he discove red a bag of heroin. As a result, Castro was plac ed under arr est, advised of his rig hts, and place d in the marke d police ca r. Serg eant Ke lly

further testified t h at , immediately afte r Castro’s a

rre st, he contac ted Detective Matos and advised her that they had found na rcotics dur ing the traff ic stop. Detec tive M at os and Serg eant Ke lly then dec ided to call Jennifer Driscoll (“Driscoll”) at the C uy ahog a C ounty Prosecutor’ s office , advise he r of the investigation and arr est of Castro, a nd seek a war rant to sea

rch Castro’ s re s idence

. Ac co rd i n g t o De t ec t i v e M at o s , Dr i s co l l i n fo rm e d t h em t h at t h ey

h aden o u gh information to obtain a sea rch war rant, and advised Detec tive Matos to meet with her to beg in prepa

rin g t h e d o cuments nec essar y for the w arr ant. Dete ctive Matos te sti fi e d th a t sh e we nt t o th e pr os e c uto r’ s o ff ic e , me t w ithDr isc oll , a

nd that D ri sc oll g ener ated a

war ra n t and an a ffidavit. De tective Matos stated that she sig ned the aff idavit in front of the judg e, and that ever y thing in the a ffidavit wa s true. Whil e Detec tive Matos was in the proce ss of secur ing a war ra n t , S er g eant Kelly and other members of

the vice squa d returne d to Castro’s reside nce to secure the pre mises. Accor ding to Ser g eant Ke lly , once the y arr ived at the residence , the CPD office rs approache d the hom e with their guns drawn a nd saw some moveme nt throug h the cur

tains. Serg eant Ke lly

testified th at h e k nocked on the rea r door of Castro’s re sidence and was g ree ted by Castro’s mother. Serg eant Kelly said that he told Castro’s mot h er t h at the police w ere at the home in conne ction with a drug investigation. Serg eant Ke lly said that Castro’s mother a llowed t hem to enter the home, but he did not reme mber the substance of any conver sation he may

have ha d while see king pe rmission to enter. Once Serg eant Ke lly was in the home, he noticedNo. 08-3750

Un ite d S tat es v . Ca str o

The district court dete rmined that this initi al war rantless sea

rch of Castro’s re sidence was 3 improper. - 4 - a sca le on the di ning room table. He then pr ocee ded to conduc t a protec tive swee p of the home, dur ing w hich he discove red a rifle in a c loset.[ ] 3
As soon as the war

rant was sig ned by

the judg e, De tective Matos contacte d Serg eant Ke lly , who was a lrea dy at the Castro re sidence , and told him that the war rant wa s signe d. Detec tive M at o s t es t i fied that she the n went to the Castro residenc e to meet with Serg eant Kelly and conduct a search of the house. The sear ch of Castro’s r esidenc e revea led wea pons, ammunition, additi onal quantities of her oin, and sc a le s. II De te c tiv e Matos ’s a ff

ida vit in s u p p o r t o f t h e s e a r c h w arr ant f

or Ca str o’ s r e sid e nc e inc or

re c tly stated that a c onfidential informa nt provided a tip re g ardingCastro; in fact, a n anony mous source
p r o v id e d th e ti p . F o ll o w in g a s u p p r e s s io n h e ar in g , th e d is tr ic t c o u rt s tr u c k th e r e fer ence to a

c on fi de nti a l in fo rm ant f

ro m th e affidavit , a

nd e xami ne d th e a ff

ida vit a s th ou g h th e tip ha d c ome from an a nony mous source. The district court’s orde r deny ing Ca stro’s motion t o s uppress states in p e rt ine nt p art :

Ca str o . . . argue s that the re fe re nc e to a c on fi de nti a l in fo rm ant i s r e c kle ssl y mislead i n g an d must be omitt ed fr om the probable cause analy sis. As ex plained below, the Court ag ree s as to the misleading nature of the re fer ence , but fin d s that c o mp l e t e l y s t r i k i n g t h e i n f o r m a t i o nr e l a t i n g t o t h e C I i s n o tt h e p r o p e r r e m e dy. At the suppression hear ing, Detec tive Matos testified that she did not know the identity o f t he per son who first, and r epeatedly , informed he r that Castro wa s se lli ngna rc oti c s o ut of his re sid e nc e . Th e a ff ida vit in s up po rt

of the se a rc h w arr ant, how e v e r , r e f

e r s to th e s o u r c e o f

D e te c ti v e M a to s ’ s in f

o r mati o na s a

“ c o n f idential inf or mant. ” Ca st ro argue s th a t th e us e of the te rm

c on fi de nti a l in fo rm ant i s misleading beca

use it convey s the impression that the info rm ant i s known to the police and, pe rhaps, that the inf ormant re g ularly

provides law e nforc ement off icer sNo. 08-3750

Un ite d S tat es v . Ca str o

- 5 - with information. I ndeed, disc ussing the differ ence betwee n an anony mous tipst er and a c onfidential informa nt, the Six th Ci rc u i t stated: “the distinction is relevant wh e ne ve r t ips are a t is su e in a wa rr ant a pp lic a tio n. I t sh ou ld b e re a dil y fa mil iar t o po lic e of fi c e rs , s o d isr e g ard ingit s ug g e sts re c kle ssn e ss. ” Un ite d St a te s v . E lki ns , 30 0 F .3 d 6 38 , 6 51 (6 th C ir . 2 00 2) . A c c or din g to t he Sixth C ir c uit , it

is a pp ro pr ia te for a Court to strike a portion of t he affidavit t hat erroneously descr ibes a tipster as a conf idential informant. I t is not necessar y , howeve r, to remove all ref ere nce to the tip fr om t he a ff ida vit . I d. I ns te a d, the a ff

ida vit may be e xami ne d a s th ou g h th e tip c a me fr om a

n a no ny mou s in fo rm ant. I d. Th e tip , th e re fo re , s til l w arr ants con s id e r ati o n

a lb e it o f a s o me w h a t d if

f e r e n t n a tu r e , in th e c o n te xt o f

th e Court’s analy sis of the totality

of the c ircumstance s. [C itations to t he re cord omitted.]

A Castro argues that the district cour t erre d by inserting the cor

rec t information into the w arr ant aff idavit rather than s imply striking the rec klessly false information. Castro asser ts that the district

c ourt e rr on e ou sly

he ld t hat United States v. Elkins , 3 00 F .3 d 6 38 (6 th C ir . 2 00 2) , bla zed a ne w p a th in F ourt h A me ndme nt j ur isp ru de nc e , al lo wi ng a dis tr ic t c ourt

to r e pa ir e x pos t f a c to a n a ff ida vit

c on ta ini ngre c kle ssl y

fa lse state me nts by

su bs ti tu tin g the c or

re c t in fo rm a tio n. He argue s th a t th is court in Elkins , d id n ot replace the rec klessly false statement that a c onfidential informa nt was the

source of information, but r ather , the court relied on the fac t that the same a ffidavit conta ined other ref ere nces to the sour ce, a

nd corr ectly

descr ibed the sourc e as a n anony mous source r ather

than a

c on fi de nti a l in fo rm ant. Ca str o a sse rt s tha t to a llo w a dist ri c t c ourt to r e pa ir a de fe c tiv e a ff

ida vit in support of a se arc h war

rant e x post facto would c reate pre cede nt directly contra ry to a core tenet of the Four th Amendment: the rule that a n otherwise insufficient aff idavit cannot be r ehabilitated by testimony conce rning information possessed by the aff iant when the aff

iant soug ht the war

rant, but not disclosed to the mag istrate.No. 08-3750

Un ite d S tat es v . Ca str o

- 6 - B Th is c ourt

re vie ws a dis tr ic t court ’s de c isi on on a mot ion to s up pr e ss u nd e r t wo sta nd a rd s: fac tual finding s are upheld unless clea rly err oneous, and le g al co n cl u sions as to the exi stence of probable cause are revie wed de novo. United St ates v. Combs , 369 F.3d 925, 937 ( 6th Cir. 2004). Gene rally , this court views the evidence in a lig ht most favorable to the g overnme nt, United States

v . H ill , 195 F.3d 258, 264 ( 6th Cir. 1999), and ac cords g reat defe renc e to an issuing m ag istrate’s finding of probable cause in a sea rch w arr ant application. United St ates v. W illiams , 544 F.3d 683, 685 (6th Cir. 2008). “The duty of a r eviewingcourt is simply to ens u re t h at t he mag istrate had a substantial basis for conc luding that pr obable c ause e x isted.” United States v. Laughton , 409 F.3d
7 4 4 , 7 4 7 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 5 ) ( qu o t i n g Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S

. 2 13, 238-239 (1983) ). Howe ver, F r a n k s v
. D e l a war e , 438 U.S. 154 (1978), “r ecog nized a defe ndant’s rig ht to challeng e the sufficie ncy

of an e x ec u t ed s ear ch wa rra nt on the basis that ‘a f alse stateme nt knowingly and intentionally , or with rec k l es s disreg ard f or the truth, wa s included by the af fiant in the wa

rra nt

a f f id a v it , an d

. . . the a ll e g e d ly

f a ls e s tate me n t i s n e c e s s ar y to th e f in d in g o f p r o b a b le c a u s e [. ]”
Un ite d S tat es v . A tk

in , 1 0 7 F. 3 d

1 2 1 3 , 1 2 1 6 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 9 7 ), qu o t i n g Franks , 438 U.S. at 155-56.

C
I n Elkins , mu lti ple pr op e rt ie s we re inv olv e d, and thu s se ve ra l se arc h wa rr ants and a ff ida vit s supporting those war

rants ar e discussed. O nly

the sea rch w arr ant af

fidavit reg arding 146 Neil StreetNo. 08-3750

Un ite d S tat es v . Ca str o

Two of the se arc h war

rant a ffidavits in Elkins stated that the police had re ceive d information 4 from a confidential informant when, in fac t, the information came from a nony mous callers. United States v. Elkins , 95 F. Supp. 2d 796, 826 (1270 Tutwiler) , and 827-28 ( 146 Neil Street) ( W.D. Tenn. 2000), rev’d in part on other grounds , 300 F.3d 638 ( 6th Cir. 2002). The district cour t concluded that these we re material misrepr esenta tions and struck fr om both warra nts the confidential infor

mant lang uag e. - 7 - is releva nt here

. See E lkins , 95 F. Supp. 2d at 828 and n.46, 829. I t stated that police ha d rec eived

4
information from a

confide ntial informant when, in fac t, the information ca me from a

n anony mous caller

. The district cour

t struck the re fer ence to “conf idential informant” f

rom the 146 Ne il St ree t aff idavit, noting

[] Elkins c ontests the statement that [Officer ] C incinelli rec eived infor mation from a c onfidential informa nt t h at Elkins was g rowingmarijuana in the adjac ent bu ild ingin t

he re ar o f 1 39 Sc ott

Str e e t, w hic h is 14 6 N e a l [ sic ] Str e e t. A s p re vio us ly he ld, thi s c ha

ra c te ri zat ion

of the ano ny

mou s c a lle r a s a

c on fi de nti a l in forma

nt i s a ma te ri a l mi sr e pr e se ntation. I f it w a s n ot k no wi ng ly fa lse , it wa s, a t th e ve ry

le a st, stated with rec kless disreg ard f or the truth. This pr o c e s s le a v e s th e c o u rt w it h th e f o ll o w in g a ll e g a ti o n s o f f

a c t in the aff idavit supporting the issuanc e of the war rant for 146 Neil S tree t: 1) an investigation was being conducte d into a complaint of an indoor marijuana g row at 139 Scott St re et an d 1 4 6 Neil Street; 2) James Elkins owned the buildings at 139 Str e e t and 14 6 Ne il Str e e t; 3) 14 6 Ne a l [ sic ] Str e e t is loc a te d b e hin d 1 39 Sc ott Str e e t; 4 ) t wo pounds of marijuana and assoc iated g rowing equipment was f ound at 139 Scott St ree t; 5) Elkins volunt arily g ave his c onsent to se arc h 146 Neil Street a nd then withdrew it; and 7) the office rs observe d a pallet of sheep ma

nure f ertilizer, which is commonly

used to g row mar ijuana, outside 146 Ne il St ree t. Given these f acts, the court concludes that the warrant for t he search of 146 Neil Street wa s supported by sufficie nt probable cause in the aff idavit. Un ite d S

tat es v . A tk

in , 107 F.3d 1213, 1 2 1 6 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 9 7 ) ( ci t i n g Illinois v. Gates , 4 6 2 U

. S

. 2 1 3 , 1 0 3 S

. C t

. 2 3 1 7 , 7 6 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983))

.No. 08-3750

Un ite d S tat es v . Ca str o

- 8 - Elkins , 95 F. Supp. 2d at 8 2 9

. On E lkins’s appea l, this C ourt conc luded that the district cour t
proper ly excluded the affidavit’s refer ence to a conf idential informant while r etaining the re mainder of the infor

mation reg ardingthe complaint. The c ourt stated: [T]he a ff ida vit inc lud e d a

state me nt t

hat po lic e ha d r e c e ive d “ inf or ma tio n fr om a

C/I [i .e., conf idential informant] that Elkins [ was] gr owing marijuana in . . . 146 Neil.” The dist rict court found that the police ha d actua lly rec eived a

n anonymous tip that mari jua na wa s be ing g ro wn in 15 5 Sc ott Str e e t and “ the bu ild ing be hin d Scott Street.” 95 F. Supp. 2d at 801 [ sic 829]. Treating the af fidavit’s spec ific re fer ence to 146 N eil Street is justifiable in lig ht of the tip’s ref ere nce to “ the building be hind” 155 Scott St ree t, the district cou rt never theless held that the r efe renc e to a

“ c on fi de nti a l in fo rm ant” in t he state me nt w a s r e c kle ssl y mis le a din g and

str uc k it , since in fa ct police had only rec eived a

tip from an anony

mous caller. 95 F . Supp. 2d at 829. We uphold this ruling

. The dist rict cour t permissibly

found that the police did no t kn owthe ide nti ty

of the inf or mant w ho c omp la ine d a

bo ut t he El kin se s’ pr op e rt y . T he ph ra se “ c on fi de nti a l in fo rm ant, ” ho we ve r, im pl ies a ti ps te r w ho se i d e n t i t y is known to the police. That is what is kept “confidential.” The district court did not err in de eming this discr epanc y materia l. T ips from known informa nts have more va lue than those from unknown ones. The distinction is rele vant whene ver tips are a t is su e in a

wa rr ant ap pli c a tio n. I t shou ld be re a dil y fa mil iar t o p oli c e of

fi c e rs , so disreg arding it sug g ests rec klessness. Fo r th ese re as on s th e c ou rt d id n ot c le ar ly err in exc luding from the affi davit the refere nce to the e xi s t en ce of a confidential inf or ma nt, whi le re tai nin g th e pa rt of the sta te me nt tha t re fe rre d to an (

an on y mo us ) c om pla int of d ru g a c tiv ity in 1 46 Ne il. Elkins , 300 F.3d at 651 (emphasis adde d; citations omit ted). Admittedly , the Elkins panel did not spe cifica lly addre ss a n argument that the entire ty of the tip inf or ma tio n mu st be re da c te d, rathe r t ha n s imp ly the inf or ma tio n th a t th e tip c a me fr om a confide ntial informant. Neve rtheless, Castro’ s argument that the Elkins c ourt did no t replace the

rec klessly false inf ormation that a confide ntial inf ormant was the source of information, but rathe r,

re lie d o n th e fa c t th a t th e same a ff idavit con tai ne d o the r r e fe re nc e s to the so ur c e , a nd c or re c tly descr ibed the sourc e as a

nony mous, is without merit. The district cour t’s opinion in Elkins quotedNo. 08-3750

Un ite d S tat es v . Ca str o

The other aff idavit in Elkins that wrong ly ref err ed to a confide ntial inf ormant, rathe r than 5 an anony mous source, doe s not contain any ref ere nce to the sour ce b ei ng anony mous, either. See Elkins , 95 F. Supp. 2d at 826 n.43. - 9 - the per tinent parts of the unreda cted affidavit, and there is no ref ere nce in that quoted portion of the

a ff ida vit to t he so ur c e be ingano ny

mou s. See E lkins , 95 F. Supp. 2d at 828 n.46.

5 Castro relatedly

argues that the district cour t in Elkins , unlike the district court in the instant

case , relied on oth e r parts of the aff idavit that were n ot re cklessly false to de termine whe ther probable cause exis ted. As is evident fr om the portion of the district cour t’s opinion in Elkins quoted

su pra , the district court (a ft er s t ri k ing the ref ere nce to the c onfidential informa nt) set forth the

re ma ini nga lle g a tio ns of

fa c t in th e aff

ida vit su pp or tin g the iss ua

nc e of the wa rr ant f or 14 6 N e il Street, among which wa s that “an inve stigation was being conducte d into a c om pla int of an indoor marijuana g row at 139 Scott S tree t and 146 Neil Stree t.” (Emphasis adde d.) See Elkins , 95 F. Supp. 2d a t 82 9. Thus , Ca str o’ s argume nt i s w ith ou t me ri t. We conclude that, having struck the f alse re fer ence to a confi d en t i al informant f rom the

a ff ida vit , th e dis tr ic t c ourt pr op e rl y re a d the re ma ind e r of the a ff ida vit a s th ou g h th e tip ha d c ome from an anony

mous source . Reading the affidavit in this m anner does not add a

fac t withheld from the issuing mag istrate; rathe r, it lea ves in the information reg arding the tip, but remove s the asser tion that th e so ur c e wa s a

c on fi de nti a l in fo rm ant.
III Castro contends that the district c ourt also er red in re viewing wh ether the reda cted se arc h

war rant affidavit established probable cause “with gre at def ere nce” rathe r than de novo , wher e it hadNo. 08-3750

Un ite d S tat es v . Ca str o

I n support of his a

rg ument, Castro relies on Elkins – a nd the fo llo wi nglangua g e the re fr om: 6
Whil e i n n o r ma l c ir c u ms tance s a wa

rra nt affidavit’s sufficienc y

is assessed with g reat defe renc e by

. . . revie wing courts, we wi l l re v iew de novo the suffic iency of the a ff ida vit he re , s inc e a t le a st o ne po rt ion of it h a s b e e n v a lid ly

re da c te d a s r e c kle ssl y and mater ially

false. [ Elkins , 300 F.3d at 651. I nterna l citations omit ted.]

- 10 - deter mined that portions of the af fidavit wer e re cklessly

false. A re view of the district court’s

6

o p i n i o nr e v e a l s t h a tth e c o u rte n g a g e d i nw h a t a p p e a r e d t o b e a l e n g t h y de novo evaluation of the inf or ma tio n in the a ff

ida vit , e xami nin g wh e the r i t e sta bli sh e d “ a su ff ic ie nt n e xus b e tw e e n [Ca str o’ s] ill e g a l a c tiv ity

and his re sid e nce to al low

a se arc h o f t

hat r e sid e nc e ,” and

the n, in s ta tin g its conclusion, invoked t h e ru l e that the cour t must afford g reat defe renc e to the issuing ma g istrate’s probable cause deter

mination. Although Ca stro contends that “ with the false inf ormation [i.e., all ref

er en ce s to the tip] sim ply e xclu de d, ra

the r t ha n c or re c te d, th e re ma ini nginf or ma tio n d oe s n ot g ive ri se to p ro ba ble

cause to searc h the re sidence ,” he doe s not arg u e t h at p ro b ab le ca use wa s lacking if the district court’s e x amination of the aff idavit a s though the tip came f rom an a nony mous source w as prope r. I nan y ev en t , ap p l y i n g de novo revie w, we c onclude that the r emainder of De tective Matos’s aff idavit provided probable cause to i ssue the sea rch w arr ant for Ca stro’s re sidence . The re maining portions of Matos’s aff

idavit stated that Matos is a law e nforc ement off icer with substantial training and experience ; that thr oug h a utilit ies chec k, Matos deter mined that Castro was a ssociated with the 2180 West 83rd street addr ess; that an anony mous informant provided Matos with a tip descr ibingNo. 08-3750

Un ite d S tat es v . Ca str o

- 11 - Ca str o a nd statin g tha

t Ca str o a nd his wi fe we re se lli nghe ro in f ro m th e Wes t 83 rd stre e t a dd re ss; that Matos, on sever al occ asions, surveilled the re sidence and obser ved hea vy traff ic in and out of the residenc e for

short periods of time, whic h in her e x perie nce a nd training sug g ested that na rcotics deliverie s wer e occurring ; that law enforce ment office rs conducted a leg al t raf fic stop on Castro’s

v eh i cl e s o o naf

t er h e l ef tt h e r es i d en ce , an d

h er o i nwa s fo u n d o n C as t ro ’s p er s o n as we l l as a l ar ge quantity of ca sh and a bag of suspected heroin in the vehicle; that Castro had a n extensive criminal history and wa s on parole ; a

nd that once heroin wa s found on Castro’s pe rson, he state d “I ’m done,
I ’m on parole [,] it makes no diffe renc e now.” The aff idavit pr ovided sufficie nt inf ormation to conclude that Castro was, in fa ct, involved in t he sa le of na rc oti c s, on

a c ur re nt b a sis , and that he c on du c te d so me of that a c tiv ity a t th e Wes t 83rd Street a ddress. WE A F F I RM the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de nia l of Ca str o’ s mo tio n to su

pp re ss.