Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

Chief Justice:	 Justices: 

Clifford W. Taylor	 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver Opinion Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman 

FILED DECEMBER 19, 2008 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v No. 135666 

ERIC TAYLOR, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v No. 135683 

ROBERT LEE KING, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v No. 135692 

MARLON SCARBER, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 

PER CURIAM. 

In this case, two juries convicted three defendants of multiple crimes 

related to the kidnapping and murder of Fate Washington. Defendant Robert L. 

King argues that the inculpatory statements of codefendant Marlon Scarber, 

admitted through the testimony of an acquaintance, violated the rules of evidence 

and King’s right of confrontation under People v Poole, 444 Mich 151; 506 NW2d 

505 (1993). In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we hold that, insofar as Poole held 

that the admissibility of a codefendant’s nontestimonial hearsay statement is 

governed by both MRE 804(b)(3) and the Confrontation Clause of the United 

States Constitution, it is no longer good law. We nevertheless affirm the decision 

of the Court of Appeals because we conclude that the Court sufficiently addressed 

the issue of the statements’ admissibility under MRE 804(b)(3). We deny 

defendants’ applications for leave to appeal in all other respects. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

The Court of Appeals summarized the facts of this case as follows: 

The victim, Fate Washington, was sitting in the driver’s-side 

seat of his Ford Expedition on the street outside his house. He had 

just finished speaking with a neighbor when defendant Scarber and 

an unidentified man, both clad in black, approached the vehicle and 

forced Washington, at gunpoint, further into the vehicle. Both the 

neighbor and Washington’s adult son, who was near a window 

inside the house, witnessed the scene. Washington scuffled with the 

men long enough that the neighbor was able to run home, retrieve a 

handgun, and open fire on the vehicle from his front porch. The 

eyewitnesses verified that Scarber climbed into the driver’s seat 

while a second vehicle[,] driven by defendant King, rolled up and 

2
 
opened fire on the neighbor with an automatic rifle. Other witnesses 

confirmed that the tandem of vehicles sped off through the streets 

after the shots were fired. Soon afterward, defendant King forced 

Washington to make a series of calls demanding ransom in return for 

his life. 

A former friend of Scarber’s and associate of [Taylor and 

King], Troy Ervin, provided a detailed account of events after 

Washington was taken captive. The group took Washington to a 

house owned by Ervin’s sister, and defendant King persuaded Ervin 

to trade cars with him for a while. When Ervin visited the house, he 

was initially denied access into the home. Scarber later called him 

and told him that he and the other defendants had kidnapped 

Washington and held him at the house. Scarber explained that 

Taylor had helped and that King had shot at the man’s defenders. 

Scarber also admitted that he almost blew himself up burning the 

man’s vehicle. This information was confirmed at trial by a witness 

who heard a large explosion that night and saw a vehicle, later 

identified as Washington’s Expedition, on fire outside her home. 

Ervin visited the house again and found Washington lying on the 

floor of a back room wearing nothing but a sheet. Taylor guarded 

the man with an automatic rifle like the one described by witnesses 

to Washington’s capture, and King was armed with a handgun like 

the one Scarber had used. While Ervin was there, he heard Taylor 

deny Washington’s request to use the phone again to make more 

ransom calls. 

Ervin left, but returned again later after Scarber called and 

told him that King had shot Washington in the legs and he had bled 

to death. Ervin was agitated at finding that Washington was killed in 

his sister’s house, because it associated him with the murder. He 

saw the dead body in the back room, and then he went to the 

hardware store for King and purchased tools for burying the body. 

After he dropped off the tools, he was again called and informed that 

the group had buried the body in the back yard of the property. 

Ervin was again agitated at the use of his sister’s property, but 

Taylor assured him that the burial site was inconspicuously 

concealed by the doghouse and the body was secure under a layer of 

concrete. Searchers later found the body buried as Ervin described 

it. The body was found with two gunshot wounds, one through each 

leg. 

3
 
 

Upon hearing that Ervin, who was not charged with a crime, 

had made a statement to police about Washington’s murder, 

defendant Scarber also decided to make a statement. Except for 

Scarber’s self-serving insistence that he participated in the crimes 

under duress and tried to care for Washington by bandaging his first 

gunshot wound and bringing him water, Scarber’s statement to 

police was remarkably consistent with Ervin’s. Scarber’s statement 

confirmed the details of a successful ransom recovery that involved 

a peculiar delivery method, a particular mailbox, and a relatively 

small amount of money and drugs. Scarber’s statement described 

defendant King as Washington’s killer, and explained that, before he 

shot Washington a second time, King expressed a frustrated lack of 

concern with Washington’s life and an unabashed willingness to kill 

him. Because the prosecutor wanted to place defendant Scarber’s 

statement into evidence, Scarber received a separate jury for the 

purpose, isolating defendant King’s and defendant Taylor’s jury 

from Scarber’s blame-shifting account of Washington’s captivity. 

[People v Taylor, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of 

Appeals, issued November 29, 2007 (Docket Nos. 273443, 273543, 

and 273955), at 2-3.] 

A jury convicted King and Taylor of second-degree murder,1

 MCL 

750.317; first-degree felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b); kidnapping, MCL 

750.349; and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 

750.227b. It also convicted King of armed robbery, MCL 750.529, but acquitted 

Taylor of armed robbery. The trial court sentenced King to life imprisonment for 

the first-degree felony murder conviction, 25 to 80 years for the second-degree 

murder, armed robbery, and kidnapping convictions, and two years for the felonyfirearm conviction. It sentenced Taylor to life imprisonment for the first-degree 

1

 Both were charged with first-degree premeditated murder, but the jury 

convicted them of the lesser offense of second-degree murder. 

4
 
 

murder conviction, 25 to 80 years for the kidnapping conviction, and two years for 

the felony-firearm conviction.2 

A separate jury convicted defendant Scarber of first-degree premeditated 

murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a); felony murder; armed robbery; kidnapping; felonyfirearm; and felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f. The trial court 

sentenced him to life imprisonment for the premeditated murder conviction, 38 to 

80 years for the armed robbery and kidnapping convictions, and two years for the 

felony-firearm conviction.3 

After consolidating defendants’ appeals, the Court of Appeals affirmed 

Scarber’s convictions and sentences, but set aside King’s second-degree murder 

and kidnapping convictions and Taylor’s kidnapping conviction on double 

jeopardy grounds.4

 All three defendants sought leave to appeal in this Court. 

2

 The trial court vacated Taylor’s second-degree murder conviction on 

double jeopardy grounds. 

3

 The trial court vacated Scarber’s felony-murder conviction on double 

jeopardy grounds and dismissed his felon in possession conviction without 

explanation. 

4

 The Court reasoned that King could not be convicted of both first-degree 

and second-degree murder of the same person. With respect to King’s kidnapping 

conviction, the Court ruled that either the kidnapping conviction or the armed 

robbery conviction was the predicate felony for the felony-murder conviction, so 

setting aside the kidnapping conviction meant that King would only receive one 

punishment for the kidnapping conviction (his sentence for felony murder), and 

then could be separately punished for armed robbery. The Court set aside Taylor’s 

kidnapping conviction using the same reasoning (the only difference is that Taylor 

was acquitted of armed robbery). Taylor, supra at 3-5. We note that because the 

Court of Appeals issued its opinion in this case before we issued our opinion in 

People v Ream, 481 Mich 223, 225; 750 NW2d 536 (2008) (holding that 

5
 
 

II. ANALYSIS 

Defendant King challenges the trial court’s admission, through Ervin’s 

testimony,5

 of defendant Scarber’s statements to Ervin that (1) Scarber, King, and 

Taylor had kidnapped Washington and were holding him at the house owned by 

Ervin’s sister and that (2) King had shot Washington once in each leg, causing him 

to bleed to death. King argues before this Court, as he did before the Court of 

Appeals, that Scarber’s statements to Ervin were inadmissible hearsay and that the 

trial court erred in failing to consider their reliability before holding that the 

statements would not violate the Confrontation Clause. The Court of Appeals held 

that the rules of evidence did not preclude admission of the statements because 

they fell within the hearsay exception for statements against the declarant’s penal 

interest, MRE 804(b)(3). Taylor, supra at 5. It also held that the trial court’s 

failure to analyze the reliability of the statements was harmless because the 

statements bore sufficient indicia of reliability under the factors articulated in 

Poole, supra at 165, and they therefore did not violate King’s right of 

confrontation. Taylor, supra at 5-6. 

We hold that the portion of Poole pertaining to the requirements of the 

Confrontation Clause is no longer good law because it was premised on Ohio v 

“convicting and sentencing a defendant for both felony murder and the predicate 

felony does not necessarily violate the ‘multiple punishments’ strand of the 

Double Jeopardy Clause”), the Court did not have the benefit of our holding in 

Ream when it decided this case. 

5

 As a codefendant, Scarber was not available to testify at trial. 

6
 
Roberts, 448 US 56; 100 S Ct 2531; 65 L Ed 2d 597 (1980), which has been 

overruled by Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36; 124 S Ct 1354; 158 L Ed 2d 

177 (2004), and Davis v Washington, 547 US 813; 126 S Ct 2266; 165 L Ed 2d 

224 (2006). Because the hearsay statements in this case were nontestimonial, they 

do not implicate the Confrontation Clause, Davis, supra at 821, and their 

admissibility is governed solely by MRE 804(b)(3). We nevertheless affirm the 

decision of the Court of Appeals on the basis of the Court’s determination that the 

statements were admissible under MRE 804(b)(3). 

The Confrontation Clause provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the 

accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” 

US Const, Am VI. This Court’s Confrontation Clause analysis in Poole was 

predicated on the Confrontation Clause analysis articulated by the United States 

Supreme Court in Roberts. In Roberts, the Court considered the relationship 

between the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule. It held that the 

Confrontation Clause limits the scope of admissible hearsay in two ways: first, it 

generally requires the prosecution to either produce the declarant or demonstrate 

that he is unavailable; second, it requires that the statement bear certain “indicia of 

reliability.” Id. at 65-66. The Court further held that “[r]eliability can be inferred 

without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay 

exception.” Id. at 66. Otherwise, the evidence is inadmissible “absent a showing 

of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Id. 

7
 
In Poole, this Court considered the admissibility of a declarant’s voluntary, 

out-of-court statement made to someone other than a police officer, implicating 

the declarant and the defendant in criminal activity. Id. at 153-154. It held that in 

order for such a statement to be admissible as substantive evidence against the 

defendants at trial, it must be admissible under both MRE 804(b)(3) and the 

Confrontation Clause. Id. at 157. After concluding that the statement was 

admissible under MRE 804(b)(3), the Court considered whether admission of the 

statement at issue violated the defendants’ right of confrontation. Id. at 162. 

Following a discussion of Roberts and Idaho v Wright, 497 US 805, 819, 822-823; 

110 S Ct 3139; 111 L Ed 2d 638 (1990) (applying Roberts), this Court set forth 

guidelines for analyzing the reliability of a declarant’s out-of-court statement: 

In evaluating whether a statement against penal interest that 

inculpates a person in addition to the declarant bears sufficient 

indicia of reliability to allow it to be admitted as substantive 

evidence against the other person, courts must evaluate the 

circumstances surrounding the making of the statement as well as its 

content. 

The presence of the following factors would favor admission 

of such a statement: whether the statement was (1) voluntarily given, 

(2) made contemporaneously with the events referenced, (3) made to 

family, friends, colleagues, or confederates—that is, to someone to 

whom the declarant would likely speak the truth, and (4) uttered 

spontaneously at the initiation of the declarant and without 

prompting or inquiry by the listener. 

On the other hand, the presence of the following factors 

would favor a finding of inadmissibility: whether the statement (1) 

was made to law enforcement officers or at the prompting or inquiry 

of the listener, (2) minimizes the role or responsibility of the 

declarant or shifts blame to the accomplice, (3) was made to avenge 

8
 
the declarant or to curry favor, and (4) whether the declarant had a 

motive to lie or distort the truth. [Poole, supra at 165.] 

Applying these factors, the Poole Court concluded that the witness did not 

prompt the declarant to make the statement or inquire about events referenced in 

the statement. The statement did not minimize the declarant’s role in the 

attempted robbery or his responsibility for the murder, and was not made in order 

to shift blame to the defendants, avenge the declarant, or curry favor. Nor was 

there any indication that the declarant had a motive to lie. On that basis, the Court 

concluded that the statement and the circumstances under which it was made bore 

sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy the requirements of the Confrontation 

Clause. Id. at 165-166. 

The United States Supreme Court subsequently decided Crawford and 

Davis, which in combination overruled Roberts in its entirety. In Crawford, the 

Court overruled the Roberts “indicia of reliability” analysis where testimonial 

statements are concerned. It held that, “[w]here testimonial evidence is at issue,” 

“the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability 

and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Crawford, supra at 68. The Court 

declined to “spell out a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial,’” but stated that 

“[w]hatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a 

preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police 

interrogations.” Id. 

9
 
In Davis, the United States Supreme Court revisited the question of the 

application and requirements of the Confrontation Clause. It held that the clause 

only restricts the admissibility of testimonial statements because “[o]nly 

statements of this sort cause the declarant to be a ‘witness’ within the meaning of 

the Confrontation Clause.” Id. at 821. While nontestimonial statements are 

subject to traditional rules limiting the admissibility of hearsay, they do not 

implicate the Confrontation Clause. Id. The Court considered the circumstances 

under which statements made during a police investigation were testimonial. It 

concluded that such “[s]tatements are nontestimonial when made in the course of 

police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary 

purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing 

emergency.” Id. at 822. “They are testimonial when the circumstances 

objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary 

purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant 

to later criminal prosecution.” Id. 

The overruling of Roberts by the United States Supreme Court in Crawford 

and Davis undermines the analytical underpinnings of this Court’s decision in 

Poole, which was entirely predicated on Roberts. Thus, the holding in Poole that 

a codefendant’s nontestimonial statement is governed by both MRE 804(b)(3) and 

the Confrontation Clause is no longer good law. Scarber’s statements to Ervin 

were nontestimonial because they were made informally to an acquaintance, not 

during a police interrogation or other formal proceeding, see Crawford, supra at 

10
 
 

68, or under circumstances indicating that their “primary purpose” was to 

“establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution,” 

Davis, supra at 822. Accordingly, the admissibility of the statements in this case 

is governed solely by MRE 804(b)(3). This Court’s MRE 804(b)(3) analysis in 

Poole remains valid, however, and provides the applicable standard for 

determining the admissibility of a codefendant’s statement under the hearsay 

exception for statements against a declarant’s penal interest. MRE 804(b)(3) 

provides: 

(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by 

the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: 

* * * 

(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the 

time of its making so far contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or 

proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil 

or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant 

against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant’s position 

would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. A 

statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and 

offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless 

corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of 

the statement. 

In Poole, this Court held: 

[W]here, as here, the declarant’s inculpation of an accomplice 

is made in the context of a narrative of events, at the declarant’s 

initiative without any prompting or inquiry, that as a whole is clearly 

against the declarant’s penal interest and as such is reliable, the 

whole statement—including portions that inculpate another—is 

11
 
 

admissible as substantive evidence at trial pursuant to MRE 

804(b)(3). [Poole, supra at 161.][6] 

In this case, Scarber made his first statement, implicating himself, King, 

and Taylor in the kidnapping, during a telephone conversation with Ervin on the 

day of the kidnapping. During another call to Ervin the following day, apparently 

shortly after Washington died, Scarber made the second statement implicating 

King alone in the shooting of Washington. Scarber did not make any selfinculpatory statements during this call. The Court of Appeals concluded that both 

statements fell within the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest, 

stating that “because the statements at issue were provided in a narrative, both 

those portions that inculpated Scarber alone and those that inculpated his 

6 Poole, supra at 161-162, explicitly relied on the commentary to FRE 

804(b)(3), on which MRE 804(b)(3) is modeled. In Williamson v United 

States, 512 US 594, 600-601; 114 S Ct 2431; 129 L Ed 2d 476 (1994), the 

United States Supreme Court held that the federal rule “does not allow 

admission of non-self-inculpatory statements, even if they are made within 

a broader narrative that is generally self-inculpatory.” We note this 

development in federal law, but believe that the portion of Poole pertaining 

to MRE 804(b)(3) was correctly decided. See People v VanderVliet, 444 

Mich 52, 60 n 7; 508 NW2d 114 (1993), amended on other grounds 445 

Mich 1205 (1994) (noting that this Court finds commentary and caselaw on 

the federal rules of evidence helpful and, in some cases, persuasive). See 

also People v Beasley, 239 Mich App 548, 556; 609 NW2d 581 (2000). In 

Poole, we also suggested that “carry over” portions of a declarant’s 

statement—those that inculpate the defendant but are not directly against 

the declarant’s interest—might be admissible under a “catch-all” hearsay 

exception, which Michigan did not have at the time. Poole, supra at 159 n 

11. Although the Michigan Rules of Evidence now contain such an 

exception, MRE 803(4), we do not address whether the statements at issue 

12
 
 

codefendants were admissible.” Taylor, supra at 5. Moreover, in discussing the 

admissibility of the second statement under the Confrontation Clause, the Court 

acknowledged that “it is arguable that defendant Scarber’s desire to disassociate 

himself from the murder provided him with a motive to lie about the identity of 

the individual (perhaps Scarber himself) who actually shot Washington.” Id. at 6. 

The Court concluded, however, that the second statement was part of “a pattern of 

impugning communications” volunteered spontaneously and without reservation 

to a friend, not delivered to police, and “without any apparent secondary 

motivation other than the desire to maintain the benefits of the relationship’s 

confidence and trust—and according to the record, to brag.” Id. Accordingly, the 

Court concluded that “Scarber’s statements to Ervin constituted a ‘narrative of 

events,’ so the statements were admissible at trial in their entirety.” Id. Given 

these determinations, we are satisfied that the Court of Appeals sufficiently 

considered the issue of the statements’ admissibility under MRE 804(b)(3) and 

Poole, supra at 161, and affirm on that basis. 

here are admissible under that exception because we conclude that they are 

admissible under MRE 804(b)(3). 

13
 
In all other respects, defendants’ applications for leave to appeal are denied, 

because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by 

this Court. 

Clifford W. Taylor 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman 

14
 
v 

v 

v 

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 

SUPREME COURT 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

No. 135666 

ERIC TAYLOR, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

No. 135683 

ROBERT LEE KING, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

No. 135692 

MARLON SCARBER, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

CAVANAGH, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 

I concur that People v Poole, 444 Mich 151; 506 NW2d 505 (1993), is no 

longer controlling law to the extent it relied on Ohio v Roberts, 448 US 56; 100 S 
Ct 2531; 65 L Ed 2d 597 (1980), to hold that the admissibility of a codefendant’s 

nontestimonial hearsay statement is governed by the Confrontation Clause of the 

Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. I dissent, however, because I 

would grant leave to appeal to consider the viability of Poole’s interpretation of 

MRE 804(b)(3) in light of Williamson v United States, 512 US 594, 600-601; 114 

S Ct 2431; 129 L Ed 2d 476 (1994). 

Under MRE 804(b)(3), a nontestimonial hearsay statement is not excluded 

if the declarant is not available as a witness and the statement “so far tended to 

subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability . . . that a reasonable person in the 

declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be 

true.” Poole interpreted MRE 804(b)(3) to allow a declarant’s statements to be 

admitted as a whole against a codefendant, even where some of the statements 

inculpate the codefendant without inculpating the declarant, if made “in the 

context of a narrative of events” that as a whole was against the declarant’s penal 

interest. Poole, supra at 161. The Poole Court stated that it was “guided by the 

comment of the Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Evidence 

concerning FRE 804(b)(3), on which the Michigan rule is modeled.” Id. 

As the majority opinion acknowledged in this case, one year after Poole 

was decided, the United States Supreme Court repudiated the interpretation of the 

federal commentary advanced in Poole. See Williamson, supra at 600-601. 

Specifically, Williamson held that “the most faithful reading of Rule 804(b)(3) is 

that it does not allow admission of non-self-inculpatory statements, even if they 

2
 
 

 

are made within a broader narrative that is generally self-inculpatory. . . . [T]his is 

especially true when the statement implicates someone else.” Williamson, supra 

at 600-601. Williamson further stated that the Court did not need to look to the 

federal commentary to interpret FRE 804(b)(3) because “the policy expressed in 

[the rule]’s text points clearly enough in one direction that it outweighs whatever 

force the Notes may have.” Id. at 602. Nevertheless, the Court considered the 

portion of the federal commentary on which Poole relied, and found it “not 

particularly clear” and inconsistent with other portions of the commentary, which 

the Court found to support a contrary interpretation. Id. 

This Court should grant leave to appeal to reconsider the validity of Poole 

in light of Williamson. The majority opinion dismisses Williamson in a footnote 

by tersely stating that “[w]e note this development in federal law, but believe that 

the portion of Poole pertaining to MRE 804(b)(3) was correctly decided.” Ante at 

12 n 6. While the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of FRE 804(b)(3) 

does not necessarily control how this Court interprets MRE 804(b)(3), I cannot 

agree that Poole is so clearly and completely unaffected by Williamson that it is 

appropriate for this Court to dismiss the issue in a footnote. 

The United States Supreme Court’s express rejection of the interpretation 

of the federal commentary on which Poole relies is significant. The majority 

misses the point when it notes that this Court is not bound by the FRE by stating 

that “this Court finds commentary and caselaw on the [FRE] helpful and, in some 

cases, persuasive.” Ante at 12 n 6, citing People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 60 n 

3
 
 

7; 508 NW2d 114 (1993). When this Court bases its interpretation of an MRE on 

the federal commentary to the equivalent FRE, and the United States Supreme 

Court then soundly rejects that understanding of the FRE, it merits greater 

attention from this Court than dismissal in a footnote. It is true that we are not 

bound by the FRE because we find commentary and caselaw for the FRE “only” 

helpful and sometimes persuasive. But, because we do find commentary and 

caselaw for the FRE helpful and sometimes persuasive, it is worth evaluating in a 

meaningful, substantive manner whether Poole’s interpretation of MRE 804(b)(3) 

was correct irrespective of Williamson’s rejection of Poole’s reasoning.1 This 

jurisprudentially significant issue merits, at a minimum, granting leave to appeal. 

Further, as stated in my dissent in Poole, I continue to think that it is more 

consistent with the text of MRE 804(b)(3) to exclude the portions of a declarant’s 

statements that implicate a codefendant but are not against the declarant’s penal 

interest. See Poole, supra at 166-169 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). The exception to 

the general rule against hearsay in MRE 804(b)(3) allows admission of statements 

against interest only insofar as a “reasonable person in the declarant’s position 

would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true.” As stated in 

Williamson, supra at 599-600: 

Rule 804(b)(3) is founded on the commonsense notion that 

reasonable people, even reasonable people who are not especially 

1

 In lieu of conducting a meaningful, substantive evaluation of the validity 

of Poole after Williamson, the majority opinion “notes” Williamson and affirms 

Poole without analysis and seemingly without genuine consideration. 

4
 
 

 

honest, tend not to make self-inculpatory statements unless they 

believe them to be true. . . . The fact that a person is making a 

broadly self-inculpatory confession does not make more credible the 

confession’s non-self-inculpatory parts. One of the most effective 

ways to lie is to mix falsehood with truth, especially truth that seems 

particularly persuasive because of its self-inculpatory nature. 

Poole’s interpretation of MRE 804(b)(3) is an imprecise proxy for when a 

“reasonable person in the declarant’s position would not have made the statement 

unless believing it to be true.” MRE 804(b)(3). Poole incorrectly assumed that 

any statement made in the context of a narrative of events that as a whole is 

against the declarant’s penal interest is one that a reasonable person in the 

declarant’s position would not have made unless it were true. Williamson’s 

interpretation more accurately reflects the rule’s text and the reality that the 

underlying justification for inferring that self-inculpatory statements are true does 

not necessarily extend to contemporaneous non-self-inculpatory statements. This 

is especially true when, as in this case, the non-self-inculpatory statements 

exculpate the declarant and inculpate a codefendant.2 

This Court should grant leave to appeal to reconsider Poole in light of 

Williamson because Williamson rejected the interpretation of the federal 

2

 To the extent that Scarber’s statements in the first phone call implicated 

both himself and his codefendants, a court could infer that a reasonable person 

would not have made the statements unless they were true. In contrast, Scarber’s 

statements in the second telephone call implicated only King. It would be in 

Scarber’s interest to exculpate himself from the shooting by inculpating only King 

in the second call; therefore, a “reasonable person” might have made those 

statements even if they were not true. This demonstrates why Williamson’s 

5
 
 

commentary on which Poole was based. Further, the facts of this case illustrate 

the flaws in Poole’s interpretation of MRE 804(b)(3) as compared to Williamson’s 

interpretation. 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

Marilyn Kelly 

application of MRE 804(b)(3) reaches a result more precisely connected to the 

rule’s text than Poole’s interpretation does. 

6