Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-DN-256 | July 28, 2020 Page 1 of 15

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Jessie D. Cobb-Dennard

Sallee Law, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Zachary J. Stock

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Marriage of:

Ruth Morales,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

Rolando Morales,

Appellee-Respondent.

July 28, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

20A-DN-256

Appeal from the 

Marion Superior Court 

The Honorable

Marc T. Rothenberg, Judge

The Honorable

Kimberly Dean Mattingly, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

49D07-1808-DN-33242

Kirsch, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-DN-256 | July 28, 2020 Page 2 of 15

[1] Ruth Morales (“Wife”) appeals the trial court’s order dissolving her marriage to 

Rolando Morales (“Husband”) and dividing the parties’ marital property. Wife 

raises the following restated issues for our review:

I. Whether the trial court violated her right to procedural due 

process when it determined that she had expended her 

allotted time and prematurely terminated her case-in-chief

and denied her right to cross examine Husband; and

II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in its division 

of the marital property.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Husband and Wife were married on September 14, 2013. Wife filed a petition 

for the dissolution of the marriage on August 22, 2018. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 

9. During the marriage, Husband worked consistently and earned income. Tr. 

Vol. II at 15-17. While the parties were married, Wife was not always 

employed, but she had worked for many years before the marriage and had 

accumulated retirement savings in the approximate amount of $69,000.00. Id. 

at 19-20, 30-31, 43. Wife also brought proceeds of a prior home sale into the 

marriage that the parties used for the down payment for their marital home in 

the amount of $30,000.00. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 36; Tr. Vol. II at 31. 

[4] During the marriage, Husband and Wife acquired various assets, including the 

marital home, vehicles, bank accounts, and miscellaneous personal property;
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they also incurred liabilities, including a mortgage and credit card debt. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 9-15; Tr. Vol. II at 2, 8-9, 11-14. The marital home was 

the most significant asset of the marriage with an appraised value of 

$217,000.00. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 9; Tr. Vol. II at 8-9, 32-33; Resp’t’s Ex. A. 

The largest liability of the marriage was the mortgage, which was 

approximately $130,000.00. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 9; Tr. Vol. II at 8, 33. 

[5] On September 27, 2018, an Agreed Provisional Entry was issued, under which 

Wife maintained possession of the marital home while the dissolution was 

pending, and Husband paid “all expenses” related to the home, which included

the mortgage, utilities, insurance, taxes, and necessary maintenance, upkeep 

and repairs. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 21. While the dissolution was pending, 

Husband made payments totaling approximately $17,000.00 for mortgage, 

insurance, tax, and utility payments. Id. at 10; Tr. Vol. II at 34-35. In the 

Agreed Provisional Entry, Husband was required to pay $200.00 per month in 

maintenance to Wife. Husband made approximately $12,000.00 in 

maintenance payments while the dissolution was pending. Appellant’s App. Vol. 

2 at 11, 23; Tr. Vol. II at 46-47. 

[6] On September 12, 2019, the trial court set the parties’ dissolution for a final 

hearing on November 1, 2019 from 9:00 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. Appellant’s App. Vol. 

2 at 58. On November 1, 2019, the final hearing was held and began at 

approximately 9:00 a.m. Id. at 7; Tr. Vol. II at 2. The record stopped at 9:09 

a.m. and did not resume until 10:25 am., resulting in an approximate seventy-
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six minutes missing from the transcript. Tr. Vol. II at 5. At 10:25 a.m., the trial 

court stated: 

We are back on the record after some technical difficulties in 

Case Number 49DO71808DN33242. The things I said when I 

thought the record was running are that: I was able to verify that 

Wife has filed an updated financial declaration. [Wife’s counsel]

is more appropriately dressed so we’ll proceed. [Husband’s 

counsel] indicated he was not able to update Husband’s financial 

declaration but insists that nothing has in fact changed since his 

[financial declaration] was filed in February. Counsel, there is an 

issue that the record apparently shut down maybe twenty 

minutes before we actually adjourned. Are you uncomfortable 

with that? Do you want to repeat some of Wife’s testimony? I 

have detailed notes. I could state for the record what my notes

have. 

Id. Both parties agreed to rely upon the trial court’s notes and to proceed. Id. 

[7] From the trial court’s comments, it is clear that Wife had presented some of her 

case-in-chief and had begun testifying before the record had stopped. After the 

record resumed, Wife continued to testify under direct examination. Id. at 5-6; 

Pet’r’s Exs. 1, 2. After a few minutes of testimony and sometime before 11:00 

a.m., the trial court cautioned Wife’s counsel, “The time we lost is assessed to 

you. We still need to hear from [H]usband by the time we adjourn at 11:30. 

So, you need to pickup [sic] your pace.” Tr. Vol. II at 24. A few moments later, 

the trial court again cautioned Wife’s counsel, “[Y]our direct will end at 11:00 

straight up.” Id. at 26. After several more minutes of additional direct 

examination, the trial court interrupted Wife’s counsel and stated, “That 
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concludes direct. [Husband’s counsel] you may cross.” Id. at 28. Wife’s 

counsel did not make any objection at this time. Id. 

[8] Husband’s attorney then cross-examined Wife and began his case-in-chief by 

questioning Husband. Id. at 28-32. When Husband’s counsel finished his 

direct examination of Husband, he concluded his questioning, and the 

following exchange occurred between the trial court and Wife’s counsel: 

THE COURT: You may step down Sir, thank you. 

[COUNSEL]: Your Honor may I cross?

THE COURT: No. 

[COUNSEL]: Why not? 

THE COURT: You used thirty minutes this morning on direct of

your client. Not thirty minutes, we spend probably eight or ten 

working together on stipulations and the lack of [financial 

declarations]. We came back just after ten, you went until 11 

with direct of your client. We were set for two and a half hours 

and you used ninety minutes of that on direct of your client. You 

can’t use more than half the time and then expect to be able to 

use [Husband’s counsel’s] time. We’re now past our allotted 

time.... 

[COUNSEL]: I’m entitled to cross-examine the witness, Your 

Honor. 

THE COURT: No Ma’am, you’re not. 
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[COUNSEL]: I’m not?

THE COURT: Your time is over. You would have been had 

you saved some of your time. You used more than your half of 

trial time on direct of your client. That was your and your 

client’s choice; strategy, I don’t know, but no. I’m not going to 

stay through a lunch meeting because you didn’t use your trial 

time wisely. That’s not permitted. . . .

Id. at 51-52. The trial court then requested proposed decrees be submitted, and 

the hearing concluded. Id. at 52-53. 

[9] On January 28, 2020, the trial court issued its decree dissolving the marriage 

between Husband and Wife and dividing the marital property. Appellant’s App. 

Vol. 2 at 9-15. The trial court determined that Husband should keep one 

vehicle, two bank accounts, and various personal property consisting of 

furniture and tools. Id. at 11, 14-15. The trial court awarded Wife one of the 

vehicles and personal property consisting of furniture with a value of

approximately $8,000.00. Id. at 12, 14. Husband was awarded the marital 

home and the associated mortgage. Id. at 11, 14. The trial court ordered 

Husband to refinance the mortgage on the home and provide Wife with her 

share of the equity in an equalization payment of $40,951.89. Id. at 11. The 

trial court assigned the debt acquired before the petition for dissolution was 

filed, which appears to have been either $17,000.00 or $20,000.00, to be split 

equally between the parties. Id. at 12, 14. The trial court found that, if Wife 

has not paid her share of the debt at the time that Husband closed the refinance 

on the marital home, Husband was to deduct the unpaid amount Wife owed on 
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the debts as a credit toward her share of the home’s equity. Id. at 12. The debts 

incurred by each party after the petition for dissolution was filed were to be kept 

by the party who incurred the debt. Id. The trial court’s distribution of the 

marital estate resulted in an equal division of the marital property. Id. at 9-15. 

Wife now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Management of the Proceedings

[10] Wife argues that the trial court violated her due process rights during the final 

hearing. “Provided that a trial court fulfills its duty to conduct trials 

expeditiously and consistent with the orderly administration of justice, a trial 

court has discretion to conduct the proceedings before it in any manner that it 

sees fit.” J.M. v. N.M., 844 N.E.2d 590, 601 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Hoang 

v. Jamestown Homes, Inc., 768 N.E.2d 1029, 1035 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. 

denied), trans. denied. We review the decisions that a trial court makes regarding 

the conduct of the proceedings for an abuse of that discretion. Id. 

[11] Wife argues that the manner in which the trial court conducted the final hearing 

violated her right to procedural due process. Specifically, she contends that she

was deprived of her right to a full and fair hearing because the trial court 

prematurely terminated her case-in-chief and denied her request for further 

proceedings. Wife also asserts that the trial court denied her procedural due 

process right to cross examine an adverse witness, Husband. 
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[12] The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits any 

state from depriving a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of 

law. Melton v. Ind. Athletic Trainers Bd., 53 N.E.3d 1210, 1215 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2016). The Indiana Constitution states that “[a]ll courts shall be open; and 

every person, for injury done to him in his person, property, or reputation, shall 

have remedy by due course of law. Justice shall be administered freely, and

without purchase; completely, and without denial; speedily, and without 

delay.” Ind. Const. art. I, § 12. Indiana courts have consistently construed 

Article I, Section 12, also known as the due course of law provision, as 

analogous to the federal due process clause. Melton, 53 N.E.3d at 1215. The 

right to cross-examine witnesses under oath is a fundamental right which 

cannot be denied unless waived. Theobald v. Theobald, 804 N.E.2d 284, 286 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2004). “[T]he right to effectively cross-examine witnesses can be 

waived.” Archem, Inc. v. Simo, 549 N.E.2d 1054, 1060 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) 

(finding right to cross-examination waived by mere failure to object when trial 

court did not provide opportunity to cross-examine the witness), trans. denied.

[13] In the present case, Wife was aware that the final hearing was scheduled for 

two and one-half hours. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 58. Once the record resumed 

after the approximate seventy-six minutes time span that it had stopped, direct 

examination of Wife resumed, and sometime before 11:00 a.m., the trial court 

cautioned Wife’s counsel, “[t]he time we lost is assessed to you. We still need 

to hear from [H]usband by the time we adjourn at 11:30. So, you need to 

pickup [sic] your pace.” Tr. Vol. II at 24. A few moments later, the trial court 
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again cautioned Wife’s counsel that her direct examination would end at 11:00 

a.m., “straight up.” Id. at 26. Wife did not object to either of the trial court’s 

admonishments. Id. at 24, 26. After several more minutes of additional direct 

testimony, the trial court interrupted Wife’s counsel and informed her that 

direct testimony was concluded. Id. at 28. Wife’s counsel again did not make 

any objection. Id. With presumably only thirty minutes left in the hearing, 

Husband’s attorney then cross-examined Wife and presented his direct 

examination of Husband. Id. at 28-32. When Husband’s counsel finished his 

direct examination of Husband, the trial court excused Husband, and Wife’s 

counsel asked if she could cross-examine Husband. Id. at 51. When the trial 

court told her that she could not, the following exchange occurred: 

[COUNSEL]: Why not?

THE COURT: You used thirty minutes this morning on direct of 

your client. Not thirty minutes, we spend probably eight or ten 

working together on stipulations and the lack of [financial 

declarations]. We came back just after ten, you went until 11 

with direct of your client. We were set for two and a half hours 

and you used ninety minutes of that on direct of your client. You 

can’t use more than half the time and then expect to be able to 

use [Husband’s counsel’s] time. We’re now past our allotted 

time.... 

[COUNSEL]: I’m entitled to cross-examine the witness, Your 

Honor. 

THE COURT: No Ma’am, you’re not. 
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[COUNSEL]: I’m not?

THE COURT: Your time is over. You would have been had 

you saved some of your time. You used more than your half of 

trial time on direct of your client. That was your and your 

client’s choice; strategy, I don’t know, but no. I’m not going to 

stay through a lunch meeting because you didn’t use your trial 

time wisely. That’s not permitted. . . .

Id. at 51-52. 

Wife made no formal objection to the procedure employed by the trial court. 

Beyond stating her belief that she was entitled to cross-examine Husband, 

Wife’s counsel did not object to either the trial court cutting short Wife’s direct 

examination or to not allowing cross-examination of Husband. Grounds for 

objection must be specific and any grounds not raised in the trial court are not 

available on appeal. Franciose v. Jones, 907 N.E.2d 139, 147 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009 

(citing Grace v. State, 731 N.E.2d 442, 444 (Ind. 2000)), trans. denied. Because 

Wife failed to make a specific objection to the trial court’s actions in limiting 

her direct examination and not providing an opportunity to cross-examination, 

she waived any error. See Archem, 549 N.E.2d at 1060 (finding right to crossexamination waived by mere failure to object when trial court did not provide 

opportunity to cross-examine the witness). 

II. Division of Marital Property

[14] The division of marital property is within the sound discretion of the trial court, 

and we will reverse only for an abuse of discretion. In re Marek, 47 N.E.3d 
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1283, 1287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. “We will reverse a trial court’s 

division of marital property only if there is no rational basis for the award; that 

is, if the result is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and 

circumstances, including the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.” Id. 

When we review a claim that the trial court improperly divided marital 

property, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the trial court’s 

disposition of the property without reweighing evidence or assessing witness 

credibility. Id. at 1288-89. “Although the facts and reasonable inferences might 

allow for a conclusion different from that reached by the trial court, we will not 

substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.” Id. at 1289. Such a case

turns on “whether the trial court’s division of the marital property was just and 

reasonable.” Morgal-Henrich v. Henrich, 970 N.E.2d 207, 210-11 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2012). 

[15] Wife argues that the trial court abused its discretion in its division of the marital 

property. She specifically asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when 

it awarded Husband the marital residence and seems to contend that, because 

she contributed to the down payment for the home and substantially 

contributed to its acquisition, she should have received it in the property 

division, which would have resulted in an unequal division. Wife also claims 

that the trial court’s division of property was an abuse of discretion because the 

trial court failed to account for all assets and debts of the marriage and assigned 

values to other assets and debts that were not supported by the evidence. Wife 

further argues that despite the equalization payment, the trial court actually 
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awarded an unequal portion of the marital property to Husband because the 

equalization payment was subject to credits for certain payments made by 

Husband while the dissolution was pending.

[16] It is well-settled that in a dissolution action, all marital property, whether 

owned by either spouse before the marriage, acquired by either spouse after the 

marriage and before final separation of the parties, or acquired by their joint 

efforts, goes into the marital pot for division. Ind. Code § 31-15-7-4(a); 

Falatovics v. Falatovics, 15 N.E.3d 108, 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). For purposes 

of dissolution, property means “all the assets of either party or both parties[.]” 

Ind. Code § 31-9-2-98(b). This “one pot” theory ensures that all assets are 

subject to the trial court’s power to divide and award. Carr v. Carr, 49 N.E.3d 

1086, 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. Indiana Code section 31-15-7-4

provides the trial court shall divide the property of the parties in a just and 

reasonable manner, whether that property was owned by either spouse before 

the marriage, acquired by either spouse in his or her own right after the 

marriage and before the final separation, or acquired by their joint efforts. An 

equal division is presumed to be a just and reasonable division. Ind. Code § 31-

15-7-5. A challenger must overcome a strong presumption that the court 

considered and complied with the applicable statute, and that presumption is 

one of the strongest presumptions applicable to our consideration on appeal. 

J.M., 844 N.E.2d at 602. 

[17] Here, in dividing the marital property, the trial court determined that Husband 

should keep one vehicle, two bank accounts, and various personal property 
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consisting of furniture and tools, totaling approximately $23,000.00. Appellant’s 

App. Vol. 2 at 11, 14-15. The trial court awarded Wife one of the vehicles and 

furniture which totaled approximately $8,000.00. Id. at 12, 14. Husband was 

also awarded the marital home and the associated mortgage. Id. at 11, 14. The 

trial court ordered Husband to refinance the mortgage on the home and provide 

Wife with her share of the equity in an equalization payment of $40,951.89. Id. 

at 11. The trial court assigned the debt acquired before the petition for 

dissolution was filed, which appears to have been either $17,000.00 or 

$20,000.00, to be split equally between the parties. Id. at 12, 14. However, the 

trial court found that if Wife has not paid her share of the debt at the time that 

Husband refinanced the mortgage on the marital home, then Husband was to 

deduct the unpaid amount Wife owed on the debts as a credit toward her share 

of the home’s equity. Id. at 12. The debts incurred by each party after the 

petition for dissolution was filed were to be kept by the party who incurred the 

debt. Id. The trial court’s distribution of the marital estate resulted in an equal 

division of the marital property. Id. at 9-15. 

[18] To the extent that Wife is arguing that the trial court erred when it did not 

award her the marital home, we disagree. The evidence showed that Wife 

contributed $30,000.00 to the down payment for the home. It also showed that 

Husband was employed consistently throughout the marriage, that Wife was 

not and that, at least throughout the time the dissolution was pending, Husband 

paid for the mortgage, taxes, insurance, and utilities on the home, which totaled 

at least $13,500.00. Tr. Vol. II at 15-17, 20, 31, 33-34. The trial court did not 
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abuse its discretion in awarding the home to Husband because the evidence 

showed that both Husband and Wife contributed to the acquisition of the 

marital home.1

[19] Wife also takes issue with the way that several items were valued and assigned 

by the trial court in the division of marital property. Our Supreme Court has 

held that a trial court’s disposition of marital property is to be considered “‘as a 

whole, not item by item.’” Morgal-Henrich, 970 N.E.2d at 212 (quoting Fobar v. 

Vonderahe, 771 N.E.2d 57, 59 (Ind. 2002)). 

In crafting a just and reasonable property distribution, a trial 

court is required to balance a number of different considerations 

in arriving at an ultimate disposition. The court may allocate 

some items of property or debt to one spouse because of its 

disposition of other items. Similarly, the factors identified by the 

statute as permitting an unequal division in favor of one party or 

the other may cut in different directions. As a result, if the 

appellate court views any one of these in isolation and apart from 

the total mix, it may upset the balance ultimately struck by the 

trial court. 

Fobar, 771 N.E.2d at 59-60. 

1 To the extent that Wife is contending that the trial court disproportionately awarded the marital property to 

Husband by giving him credit for the expenses he paid toward the marital residence and toward maintenance 

while the dissolution was pending, we do not find this to be true. While the trial court did state in the decree 

that Husband shall receive a credit for those expenses, it did not subtract those sums from the equalization 

payment that Husband is ordered to pay Wife. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 11. Instead, the only sums to be 

subtracted from the equalization payment were any unpaid portion of Wife’s share of the credit card and 

small bank loan, which were ordered to be divided equally between Husband and Wife. Id. at 11-12. 
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In crafting its division of the marital property, the trial court’s distribution of the 

marital estate resulted in an equal division of the marital property. There is a 

statutory presumption that “an equal division of the marital property between 

the parties is just and reasonable.” Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5. Wife has not shown

how the division of marital property should have differed and, if so, whether it 

should still result in an equal division of the marital property. Assuming that 

there should still be an equal division since Wife has not raised any of the 

statutory reasons why her claimed errors would result in an unequal division, 

we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its determinations. 

Wife’s challenges, including the miscalculation of a tax refund, loan balance, 

and asset valuations, are too small to have changed the overall result of the trial 

court’s division of the marital property.2 Wife has not shown that the trial 

court’s division of the marital property was not just and reasonable, and the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion.3 

[20] Affirmed.

Najam, J., and Brown, J., concur.

2 As to the debts, including the Sam’s Club credit card that Wife contends were not included in the decree, 

the evidence showed that the Sam’s Club credit card had a zero balance at the time the dissolution petition 

was filed, and therefore, the outstanding balance at the time of the final hearing was incurred while the 

petition was pending, and the trial court ordered the parties to be responsible for the debt they incurred since 

the petition for dissolution was filed. Tr. Vol. II at 24, 43; Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 12. 

3 We do note that, in her dissolution petition, Wife requested that she be restored to her former name, “Ruth 

Misiuta,” but it appears that the trial court did not address this issue in the dissolution decree. Appellant’s 

App. Vol. 2 at 9-12, 17-19. To the extent that the trial court has not yet done so, we instruct the trial court to 

restore Wife to her former name.