____________

POLICY ISSUE

(Information) 

March 30, 2015 SECY-15-0049

FOR: The Commissioners 

FROM: James T. Wiggins, Director 

Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response 

SUBJECT: STATUS OF FUKUSHIMA INCIDENT RESPONSE CORRECTIVE 

ACTIONS 

PURPOSE: 

This memorandum provides the Commission with information on the staff’s progress toward 

addressing items identified in the after action report (AAR) covering the experience of the 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) internal incident response (IR) program during 

the response to the Fukushima Dai-ichi incident in Japan. This paper does not address any 

new commitments or resource implications. 

BACKGROUND: 

In preparing the AAR dated December 2011, “NRC Japan Incident Response After Action 

Report” (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession 

No ML112580203), the NRC staff collected and compiled over 1,100 comments and 

observations from the staff who were involved in the agency’s response to the Fukushima 

incident caused by the March 11, 2011, Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami. The 

central positive finding of the AAR was that, overall, the NRC’s IR program functioned 

successfully in a dynamic and challenging environment, and, more specifically, that the NRC 

successfully provided vital services to American citizens, the U.S. Embassy in Japan, and the 

Government of Japan. Following issuance of the AAR, staff conducted several internal 

meetings to assess the AAR observations and to define required actions under the NRC’s IR 

corrective action process. 

CONTACT: Jeff Kowalczik, NSIR/DPR 

 301-287-3755 

 
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DISCUSSION:

From late 2011 through 2013, NRC IR staff’s primary focus was the design, construction, and 

commissioning of the new Headquarters Operations Center (HOC). The staff addressed 

immediate AAR areas of concern, incorporated many features into plans for the new HOC, and 

prioritized the rest. Issues identified in the AAR spanned six broad categories: 

(1) NRC Mission 

(2) Response Structure 

(3) Procedural Issues 

(4) Planning 

(5) Communications 

(6) Technological Systems 

The NRC converted these observations into actions to be resolved through the IR corrective 

action process. Progress on the six overarching categories identified in the AAR is outlined 

below; the enclosure provides a detailed list of improvement actions with a status for each. 

(1) The NRC Mission 

The National Response Framework (NRF) is an interagency guide for how the Nation responds 

to all types of disasters and emergencies. The NRF describes the principles, roles, 

responsibilities, and coordinating structures for delivering the core capabilities required to 

respond to an incident, and further describes how response efforts integrate with supporting 

Federal agencies’ mission areas. The NRF is focused on domestic events; however, the 

Fukushima experience demonstrated the need for greater clarity and advance planning for 

nondomestic events having either: (1) impacts on U.S. citizens and interests at home or 

abroad, or (2) high public interest within the United States. 

The NRC’s IR program is designed to be compatible with the NRF. As a result, the NRC did not 

have established guidance or processes to facilitate an active role in responding to an 

international event. Since the issuance of the AAR, the NRC has participated in a U.S. 

interagency working group to establish response protocols and responsibilities for Federal 

agencies to use during response to an international event. If an international event were to 

occur and invoke use of these protocols, the NRC and other Federal agencies would follow 

these protocols to coordinate effectively and provide technical assistance to the U.S. Embassy 

and country in which the incident occurred, as well as provide appropriate and timely 

information to stakeholders. 

(2) Response Structure 

The Fukushima experience highlighted the fact that the amount of required information sharing 

and coordination among Federal agencies was far greater than what the NRC program was 

designed to manage. To enable more effective and efficient coordination, the staff established 

a new NRC headquarters response team—the Federal Coordination Team (FCT). This team 

integrates and coordinates the NRC response activities with Federal response activities during 

an event that requires NRC action. The FCT responders will deploy to other Federal agencies 

to provide technical assistance and liaison functions; these NRC responders have all been 
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trained and qualified, and the FCT has been incorporated into all response operations and 

recent exercises. 

The Fukushima experience also illustrated a need for greater clarity in some aspects of the 

agency’s command and control structure during response. For example, procedures used 

during the Fukushima response did not provide clear command and control authorities when the 

Executive Team director was staffed by someone other than the NRC Chairman. The NRC staff 

has developed draft changes to the response organization that would improve the existing 

structure by making it more flexible, enabling agency senior leadership to more effectively 

manage the response during periods of significant demand. Proposed changes clarify the roles 

and responsibilities of response leadership to assist senior agency leadership in exercising their 

authorities while ensuring that operational aspects of the response are addressed at the lowest 

appropriate level. The proposed changes accomplish this by restructuring the NRC Executive 

Team to better support the fact that the Chairman (or designee) is always the agency principal, 

whether physically present in the HOC or not. This restructuring creates a clearer “chain of 

command” for response decision making, eliminates unnecessary and confusing “turnovers” of 

response authorities, and permits senior agency leadership to execute their authorities while not 

being physically tethered to the HOC. Proposed changes also better align the management of 

NRC response with National Incident Management System/Incident Command System 

(NIMS/ICS) principles, which are the common standards toward which all local, State, and 

Federal response organizations are working. The staff has conducted tabletop exercises and 

will be planning broader exercises to further develop these concepts. The staff believes these 

changes will increase the NRC’s consistency with accepted operational principles employed at 

many other Federal agencies’ operations centers, ensure senior leadership is able to 

appropriately focus on important response decisions, and better reflect expected real-world 

demands on agency senior leadership during a protracted response to a nuclear event. 

(3) Procedural Issues 

The NRC’s response to the Fukushima incident provided an opportunity to identify 

improvements in response processes and procedures. The NRC staff performed a 

program-wide review of response documentation and drafted response procedures that provide 

a better framework for response, as well as expanded existing processes for protracted 

response and multi-event integration. This improved response documentation concisely lays 

out a more flexible response framework, including guidance for agency participation in Federal 

disaster recovery efforts and more efficient methodology for managing recordkeeping with 

respect to potential Freedom of Information Act requests. 

(4) Planning 

During the Fukushima response, the NRC identified several issues concerning responder 

planning, including duty roster scheduling, availability of necessary expertise, and conflicts with 

regular work duties. The staff has improved logistics and guidance regarding shift staffing, and 

has increased the size of the responder pool for available expertise. This effort included 

improvements to responder shift turnover supported by WebEOC improvements and training of 

responders. The staff is also actively working to clarify expectations provided to response team 

members and their management, including impacts on work schedules during periods of 
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activation, and processes to add and shed activities to ensure that priority response activities 

remain supported. 

(5) Communications 

The international nature of the Fukushima response provided several opportunities for 

improvement regarding communications with Federal, State, regional, and public stakeholders. 

The agency made procedural improvements to enhance communications between NRC 

headquarters and regional offices, through better use of the regional State liaison officers 

(RSLOs). RSLOs are a key part of the NRC’s communications with State governments, 

including communication of event information to States neighboring the State in which the 

incident occurred. Indeed, before Fukushima, State communications generally focused solely 

on the State(s) in which the incident occurred. The staff incorporated additional methods, such 

as daily calls, to ensure information is presented to other interested stakeholders (e.g., RSLOs, 

State emergency managers, and program staff in Agreement States). 

The staff is developing a new public information call center for incidents, designed to improve 

communications with stakeholders during significant incidents and enhance the NRC’s 

capability to monitor publicly available information, including social media. This call center will 

be designed to process a high volume of calls to address questions or issues from various 

counterparts and stakeholders, such as State agencies and private citizens. 

In an effort to build more robust communication with the whole community of responders, the 

Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordination Committee’s response subcommittee is 

leading efforts to revise the Nuclear Radiological Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery 

Federal Interagency Operational Plans. The core planning team—consisting of the NRC, the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and the 

U.S. Department of Energy—will complete this revision using input and guidance from State, 

local, nongovernmental organizations, and other relevant parties, including the Conference of 

Radiation Control Program Directors. 

(6) Technology 

Much of the response technology functioned as intended during the Fukushima response; 

however, using these tools in real-world response versus exercises offered a unique 

perspective for feedback. The staff leveraged many new technology features in the buildout of 

the new NRC HOC, most notably improved accessibility to agency systems such as ADAMS 

and email, as well as many improvements to the WebEOC® response tool. Additionally, the 

Radiological Assessment System for Consequence Analysis (RASCAL) dose assessment code 

was updated to reflect enhancements identified during the Fukushima response. Specific 

information on updates to RASCAL can be found in the memorandum SECY-14-0027, “Review 

of Analysis Codes Used during the Fukushima Incident” (ADAMS Accession No 

ML14016A478), dated February 28, 2014. 

CONCLUSION: 

The staff remains confident in the agency’s response readiness and the overall health of the 

response program. The NRC has completed significant improvements since 2011 that will 
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further enhance the agency’s already strong response capability and effectiveness during both 

domestic and international nuclear incidents. In the spirit of continuous improvement, staff 

attention to the remaining AAR items is warranted and ongoing. 

COORDINATION: 

The Office of the General Counsel reviewed this paper and has no legal objection. The Office 

of the Chief Financial Officer reviewed this paper for resource implications and has no objection. 

 /RA/ 

 James T. Wiggins, Director 

 Office of Nuclear Security 

 and Incident Response 

Enclosure: 

Status of Fukushima Incident Response 

 Corrective Actions 
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further enhance the agency’s already strong response capability and effectiveness during both 

domestic and international nuclear incidents. In the spirit of continuous improvement, staff 

attention to the remaining AAR items is warranted and ongoing. 

COORDINATION: 

The Office of the General Counsel reviewed this paper and has no legal objection. The Office 

of the Chief Financial Officer reviewed this paper for resource implications and has no objection. 

 /RA/ 

 James T. Wiggins, Director 

 Office of Nuclear Security 

 and Incident Response 

Enclosure: 

Status of Fukushima Incident Response 

 Corrective Actions 

ADAMS ACCESSION No.: ML14329B297 * via email 

OFFICE: NSIR/DPR/C

B NSIR/DPR/CB NSIR/DPR/C

B NSIR/DPR: D NMSS NRR/DIRS NRR/JLD 

NAME: JKowalczik JGrant JGrant RLewis* KJones* SMorris* MFranovich* 

DATE: 01/06/15 01/12/15 01/14/15 01/29/15 02/09/15 02/10/15 02/11/15 

OFFICE: RI RII RIII RIV Tech Editor OGC NSIR: D 

NAME: JNoggle* LWert* BDickson* JKozal* CHsu* HBenowitz* JWiggins 

Date 02/10/15 02/11/15 02/10/15 02/25/15 02/09/15 02/24/15 03/30/15 

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