Michael W. Foley

Southern Mexico: Counterinsurgency

and Electoral Politics

B r i e f l y . . .

• C u r re nt re b e l l io ns in southern Mex ico re p re s e nt clear challenges to the power of the

r u l i ng Ins t i t u t io nal Revolutio nary Party (PRI), which has do m i nated Mex ican politic s

s i nce 1929 and spring from citizen outra ge at the abuse of power by the PRI,

p a r t icularly at the local level.

• T he curre nt go v e r n me nt’s strategy has combined conc i l iatory ge s t u res with military

c o u nt e r i ns u rge ncy opera t io ns and dialogue in attempts to buy support through ge ne rous public works pro j e c t s, with largely negative re s u l t s.

• E f forts at a ne go t iated settleme nt have fo u nde red in the climate of insecurity establ i s hed by go v e r n me nt polic y, re p re s e nted by such inc ide nts as:

– t he ma s s a c re of 45 members of the pacifist group Las Abejas (of mostly wome n

a nd children) in Acteal in December 1997 by members of a paramilitary gro u p

supported by state polic e ;

– c o nt i nued hara s s me nt directed at civilia ns, whom the army was supposed to

p rotect in a proposed disarma me nt campaign that has yie l ded no re s u l t s ;

– fa i l u re to prosecute the fo r mer go v e r nors of Chiapas and Guerre ro, accused by

t he of f ic ial Na t io nal Hu man Rig hts Commission of complicity in ma s s a c re s ;

– a sustained campaign of ex p u l s io ns of fo re ign priests and other fo re ig ners active

as hu man rig hts observers; and

– t he public attack by Pre s ide nt Ernesto Zedillo on Bishop Samuel Ruíz, me d ia t o r

in talks with the Za p a t i s t a s.

• Both do me s t ic and fo re ign policy int e rests of the United States will be adversely

affected by a de e p e n i ng of the conflict. Key conc e r ns inc l ude potent ial inc re a s e d

re f u gee flows into the United States and cont i nued econo m ic instability in Mex ic o .

Mo re o v e r, the U.S. runs the risk, through cont i nued and unmo n i t o red military

a s s i s t a nce (ostensibly dr u g - i nt e rd ic t ion related), of becoming ent a ngled with an

unpopular re g i me at the mo me nt of its collapse.

UN I T E D STAT E S IN S T I T U T E O F PE AC E w w w. u s i p . o rg

SPECIAL REPORT

1200 17th Street NW, Suite 200 • Washington, DC 20036-3011 • VOX 2 0 2 . 4 5 7 .1700 • FA X 2 0 2 . 4 2 9 . 6 0 6 3

AB O U T T H E RE P O R T

In July 1998, a mo nth after the re newal of

v io l e nce in the southern pro v i nces of Mex ico, Prof .

M ichael Foley, 1997-1998 senior fellow, pro v ide d

c o ng re s s io nal testimo ny about the gro w i ng ins u rge ncy mo v e me nt in the count r y s ide and its impact

on de mo c ra t ic re form and politics in ge ne ral in

Mex ico. This report is an updated and mo re

detailed tre a t me nt of the testimo ny

( ht t p : / / w w w. u s i p . o rg / o c / c o ng re s s / m fo l e y - t e s t i mony. html), which was based on re s e a rc h

c a r r ied out du r i ng the last several years in pre p ara t ion for a book that tracks and analyzes the rise

of Mex ican guerrilla ins u rge nc ies du r i ng the 1990s.

Michael Fo l ey is an associate professor of politic

a nd a member of the Life Cycle Institute at

C a t ho l ic Un i v e r s i t y, fo c u s i ng on civil society and

de mo c ra t i z a t ion, gra s s roots org a n i z a t ion, and rura l

de v e l o p me nt. He is also a prof e s s o r ial lecturer at

t he School of Ad v a nced Int e r na t io nal Stud ies at

Jo h ns Ho p k i ns Un i v e r s i t y. Foley is the author of

s e v e ral journal artic l e s, inc l ud i ng “Laying the

G ro u ndwork: AID and the Struggle for Civil Socie t y

in El Salvador” in the Jo u r nal of Int e ra me r ic a n

S t ud ies and World Affa i r s.

The views ex p ressed in this report do not

necessarily reflect those of the United States

Institute of Pe a c e, which does not advo c a t e

specific policies.

CO N T E N T S

2 I nt ro duc t io n

3 T he Gro w i ng Crisis in Rural Mex ic o

4 T he U.S. Role

5 T he Po l i t ical Cont ext for the Ins u rge nc ie s

6 T he Rebellion in Chia p a s

8 E l e c t o ral Conflict in Chia p a s

9 T he Conflict in Guerre ro and Oaxa c a

11 T he Deepening Conflict in Southern Mex ic o

12 C o nc l u s io n

January 27, 19 9 9
I n t r o d u c t i o n

T he cont i nu i ng crisis in Mex ico’s southe r n most state of Chia p a s, whe re a guerrilla

mo v e me nt eme rged in Ja nuary 1994, and in other areas whe re other guerrilla org a n i z at io ns are active, calls into question the count e r i ns u rge ncy strategy adopted by the

Mex ican go v e r n me nt since at least 1996, when ne go t ia t io ns with the Zapatista Na t io nal Libera t ion Army (EZLN), or the Za p a t i s t a s, as the Chiapas guerrillas are called, bro ke

down. But an ade q uate unde r s t a nd i ng of the conflicts in rural Mex ico and the i r

me a n i ng for de mo c racy and econo m ic stability in Mex ico must start, not with the ins u rge nc ies the ms e l v e s, but with the political cont ext, inc l ud i ng both sig n i f ic a nt mo v e me nt

t o w a rd de mo c racy and cont i nu i ng re s i s t a nce on the part of eleme nts of the ruling Ins t it u t io nal Revolutio nary Party (PRI).

While the PRI, fo u nded in 1929, has long do m i nated Mex ican politic s, its most secure

c o nt rol has been exe rcised in the mo re backward parts of the country’s most populous

re g io ns, principally the rural southern states; and political elites in these re g io ns are

f ie rcely de f e nd i ng their tra d i t io nal cont rol of local politic s. In 1988, the PRI re c e i v e d

over 90 perc e nt of the vote in the heavily ind ige nous Los Altos re g ion of Chia p a s, whe re

t o day the opposition Party of the Demo c ra t ic Revolution (PRD) has claimed sig n i f ic a nt

v ic t o r ies in ma ny distric t s. The PRI’s success grew out of the tig ht cont rol local elites

exe rcised over the electoral process much mo re than out of any loyalty ind ige nous peoples mig ht have felt toward the ruling party, as the ra p id change in electoral results after

t he Zapatista revolt of Ja nua r y, 1994, de mo ns t ra t e s. Elsewhe re, particularly in the citie s

a nd the no r t hern states, the PRI’s tra d i t io nal cont rol ra p idly ero ded in the face of the

e c o no m ic crisis of the 1980s and the tentative political opening initiated in 1978.

F o l l o w i ng the July 1997 electio ns, the opposition ruled a third of Mex ico’s populatio n

in cities and re g io ns that accounted for over half the na t ion’s GNP. The PRI had lost cont rol of the Chamber of Deputies for the first time in its history, and no longer had the

votes in the Senate necessary to pass cons t i t u t io nal ame ndme nt s. In this cont ext, the

“old PRI” of the rural fie fdo ms of the south appears mo re than ever essent ial to the

party’s survival.

G u e r re ro state, whe re the second major guerrilla challenge to the go v e r n me nt first

e me rged in 1996 (the Popular Revolutio nary Army, or EPR), has a long history of ins u rge nc ies that have grown out of electoral disputes, some t i mes between a de mo c ra t ic

o p p o s i t ion and the ruling party, some t i mes between re formist and mo re autho r i t a r ia n

e l e me nts within the PRI. All evide nce suggests that openness to the EPR ins u rge nts on

t he part of local people in that state and parts of ne ig h b o r i ng Oaxaca stem from the bitter electoral disputes of the past few years, disputes in which the local PRI ma c h i ne has

l a rgely come out the winne r. In Chia p a s, by cont rast, electoral disputes were long avoided or suppre s s e d. With the Zapatista revolt, ho w e v e r, they eme rged quickly into vie w,

with bitter struggles within commu n i t ies over electoral outcome s. Starting in 1995,

c o m mu n i t ies sympathe t ic to the Zapatistas began setting up “a u t o no mous” mu n ic i p a l

go v e r n me nts in protest of an electoral process they saw as hopelessly corrupt. The

s u p p re s s ion of some of these commu n i t ies by state police and fede ral troops was the

o c c a s ion for the re c e nt vio l e nce in the state.

Ne go t ia t io ns with the Zapatistas began in earnest in February 1994. They bro ke of f

w hen the rebels’ supporters refused to accept a packa ge of public works promises that

failed to address funda me ntal conc e r ns about de mo c ra t ic electio ns and land. Rene w e d

after a brief go v e r n me nt of f e nsive in February 1995, ne go t ia t io ns were cons t a nt l y

ma r red by complaints of military hara s s me nt of commu n i t ies sympathe t ic to the Za pa t i s t a s. Since the go v e r n me nt’s re j e c t ion of proposed legislation on the only accord

re a c hed (that of ind ige nous rig hts), military pre s e nce in no r t hern and eastern Chia p a s

has grown, as have the activities of para m i l i t a r ie s, at least some of which have been

UN I T E D STAT E S IN S T I T U T EO F PE AC E

T he United States Institute of Peace is an

i nde p e nde nt, nonpartisan fede ral ins t i t u t io n

c reated by Cong ress to pro mote re s e a rc h ,

e duc a t ion, and tra i n i ng on the peaceful

re s o l u t ion of int e r na t io nal conflic t s.

E s t a b l i s hed in 1984, the Institute meets its

c o ng re s s io nal ma ndate through an array of

p ro g ra ms, inc l ud i ng re s e a rch gra nt s,

f e l l o w s h i p s, prof e s s io nal tra i n i ng pro g ra ms,

c o n f e re nces and worksho p s, library servic e s,

p u b l ic a t io ns, and other educ a t io nal activitie s.

T he Institute's Board of Directors is appoint e d

by the Pre s ide nt of the United States and

c o n f i r med by the Sena t e.

BOA R DO F DI R E C TO R S

Chester A. Cro c ke r ( C h a i r man), Research Prof e s s o r

of Diploma c y, School of Fore ign Servic e,

G e o rgetown University • Max M. Ka m p e l m a n, Esq.

( V ice Chairman), Frie d, Frank, Ha r r i s, Shriver and

Jacobson, Wa s h i ngton, D.C. • Dennis L. Bark,

S e n ior Fellow, Hoover Ins t i t u t ion on Wa r,

R e v o l u t ion and Pe a c e, Stanfo rd University •

T h e o d o re M. Hesbu rg h, Pre s ide nt Eme r i t u s,

University of No t re Dame • Seymour Martin

L i p s e t, Hazel Professor of Public Po l ic y, George Ma s o n

University • W. Scott Thompson, Prof e s s o r

of Int e r na t io nal Po l i t ic s, Fletcher School of Law

a nd Diploma c y, Tufts University • Allen We i n s t e i n,

P re s ide nt, Center for Demo c ra c y, Wa s h i ngton, D.C. •

Harriet Zimmerman, Vice Pre s ide nt, Ame r ican Is ra e l

P u b l ic Affairs Committee, Wa s h i ngton, D.C.

MEMBERS EX OFFICIO: Ralph Earle II, Deputy

D i re c t o r, U.S. Arms Cont rol and Disarma me nt

Age ncy • Phyllis Oakley, As s i s t a nt Secretary of

State for Int e l l ige nce and Research • Daniel H.

S i m p s o n, Vice Pre s ide nt, Na t io nal Defens e

University • Walter B. Slocombe, Under Secre t a r y

of Defense for Po l icy • Richard H. Solomon,

P re s ide nt, U.S. Institute of Peace (no n v o t i ng) 

2
e q u i p p e d, tra i ned and ma t e r ially supported by the state go v e r n me nt (and perhaps by

t he Mex ican military). An estimated 20,000 re f u gees have been ge ne rated by the s e

a c t i v i t ies and by conflicts within commu n i t ies between Zapatista supporters and go ve r n me nt loyalists.

Despite assura nces that his go v e r n me nt seeks a political settleme nt to the conflic t ,

P re s ide nt Ernesto Zedillo has attempted to apply inc re a s i ng pre s s u re not only on the

Zapatistas the ms e l v e s, but on the civilian opposition in Chia p a s. Following the Ac t e a l

ma s s a c re in December 1997 by members of a paramilitary group supported by state

p o l ic e, the Pre s ide nt orde red the Mex ican Army into the area ostensibly to disarm all

p a ramilitary gro u p s. Ne v e r t he l e s s, not one such group has been disarme d, and the

military occupation has resulted in cont i nu i ng complaints of hara s s me nt directed at precisely those civilia ns the army was supposed to protect. Ne i t her the fo r mer go v e r nor of

C h ia p a s, accused by the of f ic ial Na t io nal Hu man Rig hts Commission of complicity in the

ma s s a c re at Acteal, nor the fo r mer go v e r nor of Guerre ro, likewise accused of complic i t y

in a ma s s a c re of peasants in that state in June 1995, has been pro s e c u t e d. At the same

t i me, the go v e r n me nt has carried on a campaign of ex p u l s io ns of fo re ign priests and

o t her fo re ig ners active as hu man rig hts observers, and the pre s ide nt himself has

p u b l icly attacked Bishop Samuel Ruíz, me d iator in talks with the Za p a t i s t a s. T he go ve r n me nt’s int ra ns ige nce and attacks on several “a u t o no mous mu n ic i p a l i t ies” set up by

Zapatista sympathizers in the Spring of 1998 prompted Ruiz’ re s ig na t ion from that post

this past June.

A de e p e n i ng of the conflict has the potent ial to pro v o ke inc reased re f u gee flows int o

t he United States; further econo m ic instability in Mex ico, with spillover effects in the

United States; and inc reased abuses of hu man rig hts and de mo c ra t ic fre e do ms. In add it ion, the United States runs the risk, through cont i nued military assistanc e, of becomi ng ent a ngled with an unpopular re g i me at the mo me nt of its collapse. Although the

Mex ican go v e r n me nt is ex t ra o rd i narily sensitive with re g a rd to what it sees as fo re ig n

i nt e r v e nt ion in its affa i r s, particularly when actio ns of the United States are in questio n ,

U.S. concern can pro v ide inc e ntives to the Mex ican go v e r n me nt to de mo ns t rate the sort

of go o dwill, without which, pro g ress toward a peaceful settleme nt will be impossible.

S t ro nger cong re s s io nal oversig ht, mo re o v e r, can ens u re that U.S. military aid to Mex ic o

does not jeopardize the U.S. re l a t io nship with a future go v e r n me nt that may be built

p recisely on the re p ud ia t ion of the polic ies of the curre nt Mex ican adm i n i s t ra t io n .

The Growing Crisis in Rural Mexico

Over three mo nt hs in the spring of 1998, the Mex ican go v e r n me nt bro a c hed a ne w,

mo re vio l e nt solution to the stalemate in Chia p a s, whe re go v e r n me nt fo rces and the

rebel Zapatistas eng a ged briefly in early 1994, only to stand off in long, dra w n - o u t

ne go t ia t io ns which bro ke down late in 1996. In mid-April 1998, joint military-polic e

o p e ra t io ns bro ke up the “a u t o no mous mu n ic i p io s ”1 fo r med by Mayan Ind ia ns sympat he t ic to the Zapatistas in Taniperla and Diez de Abril; on May 1, the community of

A m p a ro Ag ua Tinta was likewise invade d. As in the other two cases, the re were mu l t i p l e

a r rests and reported pilfering of comme rc ial enterprises and ho mes by troops and polic e.

On June 3, autho r i t ies ent e red the mu n ic i p io of Nicolas Ruíz in ano t her joint opera t io n

a nd arrested 164 re s ide nt s, inc l ud i ng the legally elected town council. The ma y o r, elected under the opposition PRD, had been expelled from the community by popular vote

after he and a small group of followers switched to the ruling PRI. Fina l l y, seven da y s

later autho r i t ies eng a ged in gun battles with Zapatista “militias” for the first time whe n

a no t her opera t ion invaded the mu n ic i p io of El Bosque. Eleven people were killed, inc l udi ng two police of f ic e r s. To w nspeople claimed that several of the dead had been take n

away alive by go v e r n me nt fo rc e s. Their bodies were so mutilated on their return to the

c o m munity that positive ide nt i f ic a t ion was impossible in some cases.2

Despite assurances that his

g overnment seeks a political

settlement to the conflict,

P resident Ernesto Zedillo has

attempted to apply incre a s i n g

p re s s u re not only on the

Za p a t i s tas themselve s,

but on the civilian

opposition in Chiapas.

3
T he new turn in go v e r n me nt strategy prompted the re s ig na t ion of Bishop Samuel Ruíz

as me d iator in the stalled talks between the go v e r n me nt and the Zapatista guerrillas.3

T he attacks on the autono mous mu n ic i p ios followed stepped-up police and military pre se nce after the Acteal ma s s a c re, in the mu n ic i p io of Che nalhó, by para m i l i t a r ies linked to

t he local PRI and tra i ned and armed by the state polic e.4 T hough the go v e r n me nt’s own

Na t io nal Hu man Rig hts Commission re c o m me nded pro s e c u t ion of the state go v e r no r,

w ho was fo rced to step down, no further action has been taken against him.5 Mo re

s ig n i f ic a nt l y, despite go v e r n me nt assura nces that inc reased military pre s e nce was

i nt e nded to disarm the twelve para m i l i t a r ies associated with the ruling party in the

i nd ige nous zones of Chia p a s, to date not one such body has been disarmed; and one of

t he largest of the para m i l i t a r ie s, Paz y Justic ia, cont i nues to enjoy sig n i f ic a nt patro na ge from Chiapas state of f ic ia l s.6

T he new strategy bro u g ht protests from the Mex ican Cong ress and civil society; and,

for the first time, it prompted open ex p re s s io ns of concern from int e r na t io nal leade r s,

i nc l ud i ng Secretary of State Ma de l e i ne Albrig ht, UN Secretary Gene ral Kofi Annan, and

UN Commissio ner for Hu man Rig hts Mary Robinson. Despite the int ra ns ige nt re s p o nse of

t he go v e r nor of Chia p a s, who de c l a red his state’s “sovere ign rig ht” to rectify the irre gular situa t ion in the ind ige nous areas of the state, no new inc ide nts have taken place.

Ne v e r t he l e s s, the high state of tens ion me a nt that even when the Zapatistas de c l a re d

that they would not int e r f e re with mu n icipal and state electio ns sche duled for October

2, 1998, several commu n i t ies abstained from voting on the gro u nds that the re were

i ns u f f ic ie nt cond i t io ns for a free and fair election. In areas most heavily allied with the

Zapatistas — and whe re the Mex ican military and paramilitary org a n i z a t io ns have the

s t ro ngest pre s e nce — the abstent ion rate re a c hed as high as 76 perc e nt .

7

T he events in Chiapas were not isolated. Also in June, in the ind ige nous commu n i t y

of El Charco in the state of Guerre ro, fede ral troops attacked and captured a group of

p e a s a nts and their guerrilla tra i ners associated with the EPR guerrilla mo v e me nt, re p o r tedly assassina t i ng some of the captives and torturing othe r s.8 T he EPR first appeared in

J u ne 1996, and has carried out a series of attacks on police and military personnel in

G u e r re ro, Oaxaca and other states, as well as in Mex ico City. The EPR is cons ide red fa r

mo re da nge rous than the Za p a t i s t a s, and its pre s e nce has prompted military buildu p s

a nd patrols in some of the poorest states and re motest re g io ns of ind ige nous Mex ic o ,

f rom the Gulf Coast in no r t hern Ve racruz to Puerto Vallarta on the Pa c i f ic and south to

t he Gua t e malan borde r. The events of June, and the long and tense stalemate leading

up to them fo l l o w i ng the bre a kdown in ne go t ia t io ns with the Zapatistas in 1996, ma r k

t he de s c e nt of Mex ico into what thre a t e ns to become a long and brutal season of lowi nt e nsity warfa re de s ig ned to sho re up the waning power of the ruling PRI at a time

w hen that party is struggling for electoral survival thro u g hout the count r y. 

The U.S. Role

S i nce the eme rge nce of the Zapatista re b e l l ion in 1994, the United States has

stepped up military aid and tra i n i ng for Mex ico’s small armed fo rces under the rubric of

a s s i s t a nce for that country’s na rc o t ics int e rd ic t ion effort. After the appeara nce of the

EPR guerrillas, then Ambassador Ja mes Jo nes of f e red Mex ican autho r i t ies “whatever the y

need” to combat the new fo rc e, which he labeled “terrorist,” though the State Departme nt has not de c ided whe t her to of f ic ially apply such a label.9 T he United States has

c a refully avoided ant a go n i z i ng the Mex ican go v e r n me nt over the gro w i ng list of hu ma n

r ig hts abuses attributed to the military and civilian security fo rces and the para m i l i t a r y

g roups associated with both. In early 1995, mo re o v e r, after a dra ma t ic collapse of the

peso on the scale of the As ian crisis of 1998, the Clinton adm i n i s t ra t ion pushed thro u g h

a $20 billion bailout (with the Int e r na t io nal Mo netary Fund and others pro m i s i ng an

The new turn in gove r n m e n t

s t rategy prompted the

resignation of Bishop Samuel

Ruíz as mediator in the sta l l e d

talks between the gove r n m e n t

and the Za p a t i s ta guerrillas

[and] brought protests fro m

the Mexican Congress and

civil society.

4
a dd i t io nal $19.5 billion), de s ig ned to protect overexposed U.S. bankers and fina nc ie r s

in Mex ico and help re s t o re confide nce in the Mex ican econo my.

In a cont ext of vio l e nt conflict in the Mex ican count r y s ide, these cons ide ra b l e

de mo ns t ra t io ns of commitme nt to the curre nt re g i me carry with them very real da nge r s

to U.S. do me s t ic and fo re ign policy int e re s t s. Inde e d, the crisis in Chiapas and othe r

s o u t hern states poses a number of challenges for U.S. fo re ign policy: the risk of

i nc reased mig ra nt flows as the conflict cont i nues at the pre s e nt level or de e p e ns; the

da m p e n i ng effects of rural upheaval and the perceived political fa i l u re of the re g i me to

reach a settleme nt on investor confide nce and on cont i nu i ng econo m ic instability in

Mex ico, with spillover effects in the United States; cont i nued abuses of hu man rig ht s

a nd de mo c ra t ic fre e do ms, at varia nce with tra d i t io nal U.S. concern for these values; and

t he da nger that, through military assistance and diploma t ic support, the United States

will become ent a ngled with the re p ressive tactics of an inc re a s i ngly unpopular re g i me.

T he United States should be particularly conc e r ned about stepped-up U.S. military

i n v o l v e me nt with the Mex ican armed fo rces in the wake of evide nce that ma ny such military pro g ra ms escape cong re s s io nal scrutiny and, just for that reason, lack safegua rd s

e ns u r i ng their effective complia nce with U.S. fo re ign policy aims. As a re c e nt series of

a r t icles in the Wa s h i ngton Post sho w e d, fo re ign militaries are able to use military assist a nce and tra i n i ng in ways not fo reseen under the terms of U.S. military assistance law.

U.S. military tra i ne r s, mo re o v e r, readily admit that tra i n i ng for na rc o t ics int e rd ic t ion, the

c h ief rubric under which military assistance has been ex t e nded to Mex ico since 1994,

could easily be applied to count e r i ns u rge ncy opera t io ns; and some U.S. police and military tra i n i ng is ex p l icitly de s ig ned to handle “urban unrest,” that is, political dissent .

10 

In a re c e nt re v iew of U.S. military assistance pro g ra ms, the Wa s h i ngton, D.C.-based

Latin Ame r ican Wo r k i ng Group (LAWG) fo u nd that in 1997 Mex ico ra n ked first or second

a mo ng Latin Ame r ican count r ies in the amo u nt of military tra i n i ng received by Mex ic a n

of f icers under each of the various U.S. pro g ra ms, inc l ud i ng Int e r na t io nal Military Educ at ion Tra i n i ng (192 stude nts), the School of the Ame r icas (305 stude nt s, 34 perc e nt of

t he total), and the Int e r - A me r ican Air Forces Ac a de my (260 stude nt s, 29 perc e nt of the

total). Sales, leases and gra nts of military equipme nt came to approx i mately $144.7 mill ion in 1997.1 1 L AWG was unable to track U.S. Special Forces de p l o y me nts in Mex ico or

t ra i n i ng exe rcises by U.S. personnel in that country because re l e v a nt do c u me nts were

ne i t her available to Cong re s s io nal committees nor fo r t h c o m i ng from Army sources whe n

re q u e s t e d.

Both U.S. of f ic ials and the Mex ican go v e r n me nt insist that the re is no ge nu i ne tra c ki ng of the uses to which such tra i n i ng and equipme nt is put,1 2 l e nd i ng cre de nce to the

b e l ief, shared amo ng ma ny Mex ic a ns, that the United States is directly supporting the

go v e r n me nt’s count e r i ns u rge ncy stra t e g y.1 3 Even the appeara nce of do i ng so, ho w e v e r,

risks putting the U.S. go v e r n me nt in the position of being seen to support an inc re a si ngly unpopular re g i me in its de s p e rate struggle to hold onto power. The re c e nt

re c o g n i t ion that dr u g - i nt e rd ic t ion work with the Mex ican military has been a fa i l u re, and

Mex ico’s anno u nc e me nt that it plans to scale back the tra i n i ng of its personnel in the

United States should be the occasion for a tho rough re v iew of the re l a t io nship in the

l ig ht of the da ngers outlined he re.1 4

The Political Context for the Insurgencies

T he risks inhe re nt in re c e nt policy become appare nt once we put aside the no t io n

that the ins u rge nc ies in Chiapas and elsewhe re in Mex ico are me rely local phe no me na

a nd set them in their bro a der political cont ext. In the most ge ne ral terms, that cont ex t

has to do with the eclipse of the PRI as the arbiter of political power in Mex ico and the

re p l a c e me nt — ra p id in the urban areas and ma ny no r t hern states, halting elsewhe re —

The crisis in Chiapas and

other southern states poses a

number of challenges for U.S.

fo reign policy.... risk[s] putting

the U.S. government in the

position of being seen

to support an incre a s i n g l y

unpopular regime in its

d e s p e rate struggle to

hold onto powe r.

5
of autho r i t a r ian rule with a plura l i s t ic political system and inc re a s i ngly de mo c ra t ic

p o l i t ical pra c t ic e s. Lying behind the re b e l l io ns in Chiapas and other southern states,

mo re o v e r, is a potent combina t ion of explosive electoral issues, gro w i ng misery, and

l o ng - s t a nd i ng re s e nt me nts at the ind ig n i t ies to which the ind ige nous population has

t ra d i t io nally been subject.

T he past twelve years have seen a steady ero s ion of the PRI’s power thro u g hout the

c o u nt r y, with the July 1997 electio ns ma r k i ng a historic turning point. In 1976, the PRI

c l a i med 80 perc e nt of the vote for legislators; by 1985, the PRI’s vote had fallen to 65

p e rc e nt, but the party still claimed 289 of the 300 directly elected seats in the Chamber of Deputie s,1 5 mo re than enough to do m i nate the 500 member Chamber, and 60 of

t he 64 sena t o r ial seats. Then came the cataclysm of 1988, when left opposition leade r

C ua h a u t é moc Cárde nas probably bested the PRI’s cand idate for the pre s ide nc y, Carlos

S a l i nas de Gortari. After an infa mous “bre a kdown” of the computers calculating the vote,

S a l i nas came out on top, but with just 50 perc e nt of the vote and 234 sing l e - me m b e r

seats held by the PRI, or less than the majority ne e ded to govern sing l e - h a nde d l y.

Despite a handy victory for PRI cand idate Ernesto Zedillo Po nce de León in the Au g u s t

1994 electio ns, the party’s fo r t u nes had cont i nued to de c l i ne as the effects of electora l

re form, re newed econo m ic crisis, and the cont i nu i ng turmoil in the count r y s ide de l i ve red mo re and mo re voters to the opposition. In the July 1997 electio ns, the PRI lost

its majority in the Chamber of Deputies and its ability to pass cons t i t u t io nal ame ndme nts in the Sena t e. It also lost the mayorship of Mex ico City to Cua h a u t é moc Cárdena s, in the first election for that post. In all, electio ns in 1996 and 1997 cost the PRI

seven of 31 go v e r no r s h i p s, a third of the mayor’s of f ic e s, and almost half of state legislative positio ns.

T hese vic t o r ies for the opposition, chiefly the center-left PRD created by Cua h a u t émoc Cárde nas after his near upset of Salinas de Gortari in 1988 and the cent e r - r ig ht

Na t io nal Ac t ion Party (PAN), were quite uneven. They were conc e nt rated in urban Mexico, with opposition fig u res cont ro l l i ng most of the largest cities of Mex ico and the mo s t

a d v a nced states. While the 1997 electio ns were widely re g a rded as “free and fair” and

l a rgely unma r red by vio l e nc e, the pic t u re isra t her differe nt in the heavily populated rura l

re g io ns that ma ke up some of the last stro ng holds of the tra d i t io nal PRI, whe re local

bosses have often enjoyed virtually undisputed econo m ic and political power. The Fede ral Electoral Institute fo u nd a much hig her perc e nt a ge of electoral irre g u l a r i t ies in the

s o u t hern part of the country (16.5 perc e nt of election sites surveyed) than in the no r t h ,

Mex ico City, and the surro u nd i ng State of Mex ico (9 perc e nt). Electoral irre g u l a r i t ie s

ra ng i ng from the burning of ballot boxes to ins p e c t ion of voters’ cho ices by party of f ic ials to fa i l u re to check for double voting were much mo re common in rural areas (14.9

p e rc e nt) than urban areas (8.5 perc e nt ) .

1 6 In Chia p a s, particularly in the ind ige no u s

a re a s, the re were locales in which ballot boxes could not be installed because of viol e nce or local opposition; and in a few cases the boxes were burne d. High rates of

a b s t e nt ion me a nt that PRI sympathizers in some ind ige nous mu n ic i p ios go v e r ned with

as little as 10 perc e nt of the vote. Above all, the electio ns in the southern states did

not put an end to the vio l e nc e, which saw mu t ual re c r i m i na t io ns between Zapatista and

PRI supporters in Chiapas over killings and vio l e nt clashe s, the cont i nued de v e l o p me nt

a nd de p l o y me nt of para m i l i t a r ie s, new attacks by the EPR in Guerre ro, and inc re a s i ng

levels of military occupation from Ve racruz to Guerre ro, Oaxaca, and Chia p a s.

The Rebellion in Chiapas

T he EZLN, or Za p a t i s t a s, as the rebels of Mex ico’s southe r n most state call the ms e l v e s,

is a mainly ind ige nous fo rce from the fro nt ier re g ion surro u nd i ng the Lacandon ra i n fo rest. Initially led and tra i ned by a small handful of ra d icals from no r t hern Mex ico (of

6

Lying behind the rebellions in

Chiapas and other southern

s tates ... is a potent

combination of ex p l o s i ve

e l e c to ral issues, growing misery,

and long-standing re s e n t m e n t s.

While the 1997 elections

we re widely re g a rded as

“ f ree and fair” ... the picture

is rather different in

the heavily populated rura l

regions that make up some of

the last strongholds of

the traditional PRI.
w hom the charisma t ic “Subcoma nda nte Ma rcos” appears to be the last re ma i n i ng me m b e r ) ,

t he EZLN has come to de p e nd on an ind ige nous leadership, support from hu ndreds of ind igenous commu n i t ies in the re g ion and adjacent areas of Chiapas state, and wide s p read public

s y m p a t hy thro u g hout Mex ic o .

Early New Year’s mo r n i ng, 1994, several hu ndred re b e l s, armed with everything from AK47s to wooden mock rifles, seized the principal city of the eastern hig h l a nd s, San Cristóbal de

las Casas, and four other mu n icipal seats. Stunne d, the Mex ican go v e r n me nt was slow to re a c t ,

but within two days unleashed a count e rof f e ns i v e. Following brief fig ht i ng, the bombing of

s o me of the commu n i t ies from which the Zapatistas had come, and gro w i ng na t io nal and

i nt e r na t io nal concern about reported hu man rig hts abuses, the go v e r n me nt of Carlos Salina s

de Gortari called for a cease-fire and proposed the beginning of talks, led by a hig h - p rof i l e

member of Salinas’ party, Ma nuel Cama c ho Solís. 

T he tentative agre e me nt worked out by Cama c ho Solís and the Za p a t i s t a s, in a

dra ma t ic series of talks, was rejected in a plebiscite carried out by the rebels in the commun i t ies that supported them; but the peace re ma i ned unbro ken until February 1995, when the

Mex ican Army, at the comma nd of newly elected Pre s ide nt Ernesto Zedillo, moved to re t a ke

a reas under Zapatista cont rol. One soldier was killed in what the army described as a fire f ig ht ,

but otherwise the Zapatistas ma i nt a i ned their cease-fire. The of f e nsive was called off unde r

i nt e nse do me s t ic pre s s u re, inc l ud i ng pre s s u re from a newly assertive Cong re s s, once the military had comma nd of the commu n i t ies in questio n .

T hough the Zapatistas were now fo rced to re main in hid i ng in the further re a c hes of the

L a c a ndon re g ion, the talks, which re s u med in Ma rch 1995, enjoyed the double patro na ge of

a Na t io nal Commission for Int e r me d ia t ion (CONAI), led by Bishop Samuel Ruíz, a long - t i me

i nd ige nous rig hts activist, and the multiparty Cong re s s io nal Commission for Pa c i f ic a t ion and

R e c o nc i l ia t ion (COCOPA). The first served to facilitate the talks, ma i ntain an open channel of

c o ntact with the Za p a t i s t a s, and gua ra ntee the re b e l

ne go t iators’ security du r i ng the talks. The second “a c c o m p a n ied” the peace process and

7

Chiapas State:

indigenous are a s, zones of conflict

ESRI World Map, author’s database
p rov ided a direct channel to Cong ress to develop legislation in accord with whatever

a g re e me nts were re a c he d. Ag re e me nt, ho w e v e r, was slow in coming, in part because the

Zapatistas complained of cont i nu i ng military hara s s me nt of the commu n i t ies that constituted their base, and in part because of go v e r n me nt efforts to confine the issues in

dispute to local ones — against the Zapatista ins i s t e nce that was no less at stake than

de mo c racy in Mex ico. Pro g ress was finally ma de on the first item of the agre e d - u p o n

a ge nda — ind ige nous rig hts and culture; and an accord was sig ned in February 1996.

T he re a f t e r, ne go t ia t ion was fitful and finally bro ke down when the Zedillo adm i n i s t rat ion rejected COCOPA’s proposal for legislation to enact the February accord, complaini ng that pro v i s io ns for ind ige nous “a u t o no my” imperiled the unity of the Mex ican state.

B e s ides the Lacandon re g ion, Zapatista support is fo u nd principally in the Los Altos

a nd no r t hern areas of Chia p a s, tra d i t io nal ind ige nous stro ng ho l d s, whe re me s t i z o

ra nc hers and comme rc ial elites have held most of the econo m ic and political power, in

a l l ia nce with the PRI. Up until the re b e l l ion, the district re t u r ned virtually unc h a l l e nge d

votes for PRI cand ida t e s. In the imme d iate aftermath of the Zapatista re b e l l ion, in an

ex p re s s ion of pent-up frustra t ion at de c a des of single-party rule in Chia p a s, disside nt s

seized town halls in 19 mu n ic i p ios in protest at electoral fra ud, the imposition of cand idates for of f ice by party of f ic ia l s,1 7 a nd corruption. The re were also de mo ns t ra t io ns

a g a i nst local autho r i t ies in eig ht other mu n ic i p io s. Such actio ns stre t c hed from the ric h

coastal re g ion known as the Soconusco to the no r t hern mu n ic i p ios near Palenque and

i nc l uded long-passive hig h l a nds mu n ic i p ios in Los Altos and tra d i t io nally conflic t i v e

j u r i s d ic t io ns such as Ve nu s t ia no Carranza in the cent ral Chia p a s. State and fede ra l

a u t ho r i t ies moved quickly to placate local commu n i t ies and promised new infusio ns of

t he public works pro g ram known as Pro nasol. But the August 1994 ge ne ral electio ns

de mo ns t rated the sea change in popular sent i me nt. Whe re the opposition garne red less

than 7 perc e nt of the Chiapas vote in 1988, in 1994 Chiapas re g i s t e red just 50 perc e nt

for the PRI, 35 perc e nt for the PRD, and 15 perc e nt for other partie s.

Ag ra r ian conflict also escalated, when peasants invaded hu ndreds of ra nc hes claimi ng that lando w ners cont rolled mo re than the legal limit or had seized or occupie d

c o m mu nal lands illegally. The go v e r n me nt’s clumsy effort to create a “loyal” coalition of

p e a s a nt org a n i z a t io ns backfired when militants sympathe t ic to the Zapatista cause took

over the new org a n i z a t ion, and tho u s a nds of mostly ind ige nous peasants supported

t hem in ring i ng de nu nc ia t io ns of political corruption, econo m ic favoritism, and the go ve r n me nt’s efforts to put an end to land re form. Initially conc i l ia t o r y, the state go v e r nme nt came under inc re a s i ng pre s s u re from its tra d i t io nal supporters, the ra nc hers and

l a rge lando w ne r s, who began quietly fo r m i ng or re i n fo rc i ng the armed bands known as

“white gua rds” to de f e nd their ho l d i ng s. Ma ny of these appare ntly mutated into the

p a ra m i l i t a r ies that began opera t i ng in the area with the acquie s c e nc e, and at times open

support, of the state go v e r n me nt and, it appears, the Mex ican military.1 8 After the Febr uary 1995 seizure of Zapatista territory by the Army, the state go v e r n me nt began a

s e r ies of vio l e nt attacks on peasant occupiers of private land; but the wave of land invas io ns cont i nued to crest, with the numbers re a c h i ng 800 in mid-1996, accord i ng to one

report by Hu man Rig hts Wa t c h .

1 9

Electoral Conflict in Chiapas

T he state and na t io nal electio ns of August 1994 also bro u g ht conflict, as surprising

numbers of ind ige nous peasants became partisans of the opposition PRD. The pre s ide nt ial campaign pitted Cárde nas against Salinas’ hand - p ic ked successor Ernesto Zedillo and

t he cand idate of the cent e r - r ig ht PAN, Die go Fernández de Cevallos; in add i t ion, the

g u b e r na t o r ial campaign in Chiapas saw Ama do Av e ndaño, a muc k ra k i ng ne w s p a p e r

editor from San Cristóbal, go up against the PRI cand ida t e. Nearly killed in a still-unexZa p a t i s ta support is

found principally in the

Los Altos and northern are a s

of Chiapas, tra d i t i o n a l

indigenous stro n g h o l d s,

w h e re mestizo ra n c h e r s

and commercial elites

h a ve held most of the

economic and political powe r,

in alliance with the PRI.

8
p l a i ned automobile accide nt late in the campaign, Av e ndaño ne v e r t heless completed the

c a m p a ign with high ho p e s, as the mu n icipal disputes me nt io ned above evide nced a hig h

de g ree of unrest with the PRI. The of f ic ial results de c l a red Av e ndaño and the PRD the

w i n ner in 40 of the 111 mu n ic i p ios of the state, but gave the election to the PRI.

In protest at what they saw as electoral fra ud, Av e ndaño and his followers ina u g urated a parallel go v e r norship (re p e a t i ng an old tra d i t ion in Chia p a s, whe re such tactic s

w e re common befo re the cons o l ida t ion of PRI rule in the 1930s) and launc hed a serie s

of protests that cont i nued into 1996. The pre s s u re was such at the na t io nal level that

P re s ide nt Zedillo was fo rced to ask for the re s ig na t ion of the of f ic ially accredited go v e rnor and replace him with an interim go v e r no r, still from the PRI. A na t io nal political pact

h a m me red out in early 1995 amo ng the PRI, the PAN, and the PRD appare ntly would

have given the go v e r norships of Chiapas and Tabasco, whe re ano t her heated dispute was

in pro g re s s, to the PRD; but the pre s ide nt re ne ged on the agre e me nt under fie rce pre ss u re from local PRI org a n i z a t io ns.

T he result was a new series of protests and the de c i s ion, ma de at the last minute by

t he Za p a t i s t a s, to call for abstent ion in the October 1995 mu n icipal electio ns. The outc o me was de v a s t a t i ng for the PRD, which protested Zapatista int e r v e nt ion loud l y.

A b s t e nt ion rates as high as 80 perc e nt were reported in some areas sympathe t ic to the

Zapatistas and were over 50 perc e nt thro u g hout the state. The PRD unleashed pro t e s t s

at PRI vic t o r ies in 25 mu n ic i p io s. In ma ny are a s, particularly in Los Altos and the no r t h ,

i nd ige nous commu n i t ie s, inc re a s i ngly willing to ide ntify the mselves as supporters of the

Zapatistas (though well outside the orig i nal zone of Zapatista influence), began to

establish “a u t o no mous mu n ic i p io s,” partly in protest at what they saw as the lack of

c o nd i t io ns for a free and fair vote, and partly to carry out what they saw as the essenc e

of the February 1996 agre e me nt on ind ige nous rig hts — self-go v e r n me nt in accord with

local customs.

T hese actio ns exacerbated tens io ns within commu n i t ies and amo ng commu n i t ies of

t he same mu n ic i p io over political power, land and other re s o u rc e s, and persona l i t ie s, as

s o me sided with the PRI, others with the “a u t o no mous mu n ic i p io.” Relig ious differe nc e s

c o ntributed to the new clashe s. In the case of the mu n ic i p io San Juan Chamula, “tra d it io nals” led by local political bosses allied with the PRI had carried out a campaign of

ex p u l s ion against disside nt s, ma ny of them Pro t e s t a nt s, some of them re fo r m i ng

C a t ho l ic s, since the 1970s. Ultima t e l y, they drove out the Catho l ic priest and bro ke tie s

with the dio c e s e. In the wake of the Zapatista uprising, the ex p u l s io ns inc re a s e d, but so

d id the militancy of the expelled commu n i t y, which began to arm itself against the

t ra d i t io nal autho r i t ie s.2 0 In other cases, Pro t e s t a nts alig ned the mselves with the PRI

a g a i nst the Catho l ic ma j o r i t y, which was ide nt i f ied with the Diocese of San Cristóbal and

t hu s, in the minds of ma ny, with the Za p a t i s t a s. It was a largely Pro t e s t a nt para m i l i t a r y

g roup, for ins t a nc e, led by the PRI mayor of the mu n ic i p io of Che nalhó, that carried out

t he Acteal ma s s a c re. 

The Conflict in Guerrero and Oaxaca

E l e c t o ral conflict int e r m i xed with local struggles over re s o u rces likewise chara c t e r i z e

t he areas in which the EPR has been most pro m i ne nt, notably the states of Guerre ro and

O a xaca. In Guerre ro electoral struggles had been behind the ins u r re c t io ns led by Gena ro

Vásquez and Luc io Cabañas in the late 1960s and early 1970s.2 1 T he uneasy peace that

followed the de s t r uc t ion of Cabañas’ mo v e me nt was bro ken when two successive go v e rnors took a hard line toward a gro w i ng opposition mo v e me nt that event ually became

t he PRD. Contested electio ns, vio l e nt confro nt a t io ns between partisans of the PRD and

t he PRI, and military occupation and action to ens u re the seating of PRI mayors have

A national political pact

h a m m e red out in early 1995

among the PRI, the PAN, and

the PRD apparently would have

g i ven the governorships of

Chiapas and Tabasco ... to the

PRD; but the president re n e g e d

on the agreement under fierc e

p re s s u re from local PRI

o rg a n i z a t i o n s.

9
ma r ked the state since 1988, while much of the rest of Mex ico moved toward a mu l t iparty de mo c ra c y.

T he most dra ma t ic de mo ns t ra t ion of how far the political climate in Guerre ro had

de t e r io rated came in June 1995, when members of a militant peasant org a n i z a t ion on

t heir way to a de mo ns t ra t ion in At o y a c, close to Acapulco, were waylaid by a group of

State Po l ic e, who opened fire, killing seventeen and wound i ng twent y - t h re e. A subseq u e nt investig a t ion, directed by the go v e r n me ntal Na t io nal Hu man Rig hts Commissio n

a nd substant iated by the Mex ican Supre me Court, fo u nd that the police had fired without pro v o c a t ion, as part of a planned attack directed by their superiors and ultima t e l y

by the n - go v e r nor Rubén Fig u e roa Alcocer, who subsequently tried to cover up of f ic ia l

c o m p l ic i t y. Although the police and their imme d iate superiors were tried and Fig u e ro a

was re moved from of f ic e, ne i t her the go v e r nor nor his closest collaborators were puni s he d, and the interim go v e r nor who replaced him was, by all account s, cut from the

s a me cloth.2 2 It should have come as little surprise when, at the June 1996 cere mo ny

c o m me mo ra t i ng the de a t hs of the seventeen campesino s, a new guerrilla group, calling

itself the Popular Revolutio nary Army (EPR), ma de its first appeara nce with a fo r ma l

a n no u nc e me nt and a flourish of arms.

T he EPR is a broad coalition of old and new re v o l u t io nary groups thro u g hout Mex ic o ,

but its actio ns have been conc e nt rated in Guerre ro, ne ig h b o r i ng Oaxaca (in areas also

c h a racterized by bitter electoral conflict), and, to a much lesser ex t e nt, a handful of

o t her states of Mex ico’s south and southeast characterized by high levels of poverty,

r u ral social conflict, and political do m i na t ion by the PRI. By all account s, it is much better armed and fina nced than the Zapatistas; and its politic s, to the ex t e nt any t h i ng is

k nown about them, are much mo re in the mold of leftist ins u rge nc ies of the past. In

s o me are a s, it appears to lean on olde r, clande s t i ne org a n i z a t io ns with a re p u t a t ion fo r

s e c t a r ianism and brutality toward both their ene m ies and their rivals. Ne v e r t he l e s s, it

could not have eme rged as a fo rce without broad popular discont e nt in the re g io ns in

w h ich it has been most active, a discont e nt fueled by both econo m ic crisis and political exc l u s io n .

2 3

To da t e, the EPR has carried out at least 44 attacks in seven states and Mex ico City,

with an of f ic ial tally of 57 soldiers and police killed and twice that number wounde d.

I n fo r mal reports suggest that go v e r n me nt casua l t ies have been much hig her in some

i ns t a nc e s. Governme nt fo rces claim to have killed two dozen guerrillas, and as ma ny as

10

Contested elections,

violent confro n ta t i o n s

b e t ween partisans of the PRD

and the PRI, and milita r y

occupation and action to ensure

the seating of PRI mayors have

marked the [Guerre ro] sta t e

since 1988, while much of the

rest of Mexico moved towa rd a

multiparty democra cy.

EPR attacks and propaganda acts

1 9 9 6 – 1 9 9 8
200 persons are in jail accused of being members of one or ano t her of the guerrilla org an i z a t io ns that ma ke up the EPR. Charges of hu man rig hts abuses have followed army and

p o l ice opera t io ns in affected states as do g gedly as they have do ne so in Chia p a s, and

in Guerre ro in partic u l a r, just as in Chia p a s, the army and/or state of f ic ials appear to

have enc o u ra ged the cre a t ion of paramilitary groups amo ng PRI militants to carry out a

c a m p a ign of hara s s me nt and mu rder against disside nt civilia ns tho u g ht to be associa ted in some way with the EPR. In Ja nuary 1998, re f u gees from mo u ntain commu n i t ie s

near Atoyac complained of military hara s s me nt, the cont i nued activities of PRI-backe d

p a ra m i l i t a r ie s, and the lack of security to permit a return to their commu n i t ie s.2 4 I n

m id - J u ne, 4000 Mixteco Ind ia ns de mo ns t rated against military occupation of southe r n

G u e r re ro and in protest of a ma s s a c re of guerrillas and peasants at El Charc o ,

2 5 by go ve r n me nt troops on what military sources claimed was dr u g - i nt e rd ic t ion patro l .

In cont rast to Chia p a s, int e r na t io nal attent ion has scarcely re g i s t e red the conflict in

G u e r re ro, Oaxaca, and other states affected by the EPR ins u rge nc y. Yet the level of mili t a r i z a t ion on the coast and in the mo u nt a i ns of Guerre ro, in some parts of Oaxaca, in

t he Huastecas re g ion of Hida l go and Ve racruz states, and elsewhe re appears to be ne a rly as high as in Chiapas; and the re c o rd of hu man rig hts abuses is every bit as serio u s.

Troops patrol the roads and dirt tracks of these areas aro u nd the clock, at times sacking

p e a s a nt ho mes in search of weapons or arre s t i ng suspects on the basis of info r ma nt s ’

re p o r t s, ge ne rally with little hope of pro of in court. Illegal arre s t s, torture, and hara s sme nt of non-PRI commu n i t ies and ord i nary citizens appear to have become re g u l a r

f e a t u res of life in areas of the country de e med possible stro ng holds of the EPR, at time s

with the excuse that troops are involved in na rc o t ics int e rd ic t ion activitie s.2 6

The Deepening Conflict in Southern Mexico

T he June actio ns in Chiapas were the culmina t ion of mo re than a year of gro w i ng

t e ns io ns in which do z e ns of people had been killed by members of paramilitary org a n iz a t io ns and, mo re ra re l y, their oppone nts in territory ra ng i ng far beyond the locus of the

o r ig i nal re b e l l io n .

2 7 In the wake of the stepped-up of f ic ial campaign against the ind igenous supporters of the Za p a t i s t a s, the Bishop of San Cristóbal, Samuel Ruíz, re s ig ned his

p o s i t ion as head of CONAI in early June, and CONAI dissolved itself. Bishop Ruíz and the

o rg a n i z a t ion had come under inc re a s i ng attack from go v e r n me nt of f ic ia l s, inc l ud i ng

P re s ide nt Ernesto Zedillo himself, for their critic i s ms of the go v e r n me nt’s position on

i m p l e me nt a t ion of the initial accord s.

At the same time, on June 9, go v e r n me nt troops claimed to have stumbled upon a

me e t i ng of a small band of guerrillas and peasants in the course of na rc o t ics int e rd ict ion patro l s, in the village of El Charco in the state of Guerre ro, not far from Ac a p u l c o .

T he guerrillas, who had arra nged a tra i n i ng for members of a local “militia,” were

a s s o c iated with a splinter group that had re c e ntly bro ken with the EPR. Ac c o rd i ng to

a c c o u nts from village r s, the troops arrived in the early mo r n i ng ho u r s, while guerrilla

t ra i ners and peasant tra i nees from other villages were sleeping in the school; go v e r nme nt fo rces barra ged the building with gunfire and, when the occupants surre nde re d,

t hey dra g ged several to the town’s basketball court whe re they were summarily exe c u te d.2 8 It appears clear that the troops were tipped off and knew with whom they were

de a l i ng and that drug int e rd ic t ion had little to do with their pre s e nce in the re g io n .

T he events of June appeared to confirm a long-term tre nd away from ne go t ia t e d

s e t t l e me nts of the conflicts burning in much of peasant Mex ico and towards a count e r i ns u rge ncy solution. After the Acteal ma s s a c re in December, the inde p e nde nt weekly

P roceso published excerpts from a 1994 white paper by a fo r mer comma nder of the

military in Chiapas advocating a strategy that inc l uded the tra i n i ng and arming of paramilitary gro u p s, surveillance and hara s s me nt of civilian commu n i t ies and org a n i z a t io ns

C h a rges of human rights abuses

h a ve fo l l owed army and police

o p e rations in affected states as

doggedly as they have done so

in Chiapas.

11
s y m p a t he t ic to the Zapatistas; “c i v ic action” campaig ns on the part of the military; and

t he fina nc ial and political support of local of f ic ials loyal to the go v e r n me nt. Though both

t he go v e r n me nt and the military have de n ied this link, the white paper describes with

c o ns ide rable accuracy the actual policy being pursued in rural Mex ico toda y.2 9

E f forts by COCOPA, the multipartisan cong re s s io nal committee charged with overseei ng the peace pro c e s s, to pro mote a political settleme nt have yie l ded little in conc re t e

a c t ion, though the fede ral go v e r n me nt has pro c l a i med its willing ness to suspend the

d i s ma nt l i ng of autono mous mu n ic i p io s. In answer to pleas from several sides to ne got ia t e, the Zapatistas bro ke their long silence in August 1998 to proclaim that the re was

no reason to ne go t iate so long as the go v e r n me nt refused to ho nor the 1996 accord on

i nd ige nous rig ht s. A Zapatista acceptanc e, in September, of a call from a wide spectrum

of Mex ican int e l l e c t ua l s, peasant leaders and political fig u res for a dialogue “with civil

s o c iety” resulted in a notable convocation in San Cristóbal in No v e m b e r, 1998, but no

mo v e me nt on the go v e r n me nt’s part and no return to ne go t ia t io ns. And while ne i t he r

t he Zapatistas nor the EPR show sig ns of disappearing, the other key actor in this dra ma ,

t he go v e r n me nt of Ernesto Zedillo, seems unable to launch a credible peace initia t i v e ;

i nde e d, it seems int e nt on cont i nu i ng the low-level war of attrition that has chara c t e rized most of the past four years in the ind ige nous zones of Mex ic o .

C o n c l u s i o n

Despite sig n i f ic a nt steps toward a competitive, de mo c ra t ic system, Mex ico faces an

o ngo i ng political crisis in the southern count r y s ide, ho me to most of the country’s 17

m i l l ion peasant fa r me r s, ma ny of them members of one or ano t her of the na t ion’s 40

i nd ige nous gro u p s. The crisis reflects the cont i nu i ng, de e p e n i ng misery in rural are a s, as

a combina t ion of tra de libera l i z a t ion and the persistent lack of credit and go v e r n me nt

support, which toge t her have devastated agric u l t u re. But the crisis is at base politic a l

— a clash between ent re nc hed elites whose power is slipping away as de mo c ra t ic

p rocesses spre a d, and citizens eager for change and outra ged at the corruptio n ,

ma n i p u l a t ion and vio l e nce with which elites have sought to retain cont rol. Fede ral int e rv e nt ion mig ht have da m p e ned the conflict from the beginning. Ins t e a d, two suc c e s s i v e

p re s ide nts have chosen to back the old PRI, re p l a c i ng one corrupt and int ra ns ige nt

go v e r nor with ano t her in mo me nts of crisis and de p l o y i ng the military in ever inc re a si ng numbers in a vain attempt to subdue dissent. As a result, the conflict has spre a d

a nd int e ns i f ied over the past four years, pro m p t i ng still mo re re p ressive me a s u res by

state and fede ral autho r i t ie s.

To da t e, the crisis has pro duced tho u s a nds of int e r nal re f u gees in the affected states

(20,000 in Chiapas alone by one widely accepted estimate); undoubtedly tho u s a nd s

mo re have sought re f u ge and mo re secure lives in other states and even in the Un i t e d

S t a t e s. Some credit the Zapatistas’ occupation of 32 mu n ic i p io s, in December 1994, with

b e i ng the spark that prompted the dra ma t ic collapse of the peso that mo nth. Whatever

t he truth of that cont e nt ion, it is clear that cont i nued vio l e nce in the count r y s ide has

a da m p e n i ng effect on the econo my, inc l ud i ng on fo re ign investme nt. A worsening crisis in the count r y s ide would threaten Mex ico’s alre a dy shaky econo m ic re c o v e r y. It is also

clear that the go v e r n me nt’s strategy in Chiapas and elsewhe re has da ma ged Mex ico’s re pu t a t ion int e r na t io na l l y.3 0 T he conflict has also contributed to the gro w i ng power of the

Mex ican military, which, despite criticism even from the go v e r n me nt’s own Na t io na l

Hu man Rig hts Commission, enjoys virtual impunity in carrying out its missio ns in Chiap a s, Guerre ro, Oaxaca, and elsewhe re. In add i t ion to an influx of new equipme nt fro m

t he United States, inc l ud i ng Blackhawk he l ic o p t e r s, the military has ex p a nded the nu mber of special airborne fo rces from two units in 1994 to 100 toda y.3 1 Ac c o rd i ng to the

While neither the Za p a t i s ta s

nor the EPR show signs of

disappearing, the other key

a c tor in this drama, the

g overnment of Ernesto Ze d i l l o ,

seems unable to launch a

c redible peace initiative.

12
World Bank, Mex ican ex p e nd i t u re on the military inc reased from a mo dest 0.7 perc e nt

of GDP in 1985 to 1.0 perc e nt in 1995.3 2

T he United States has a played a du b ious role in this pro c e s s. In unde r s t a nda b l e

e a ge r ness to ma i ntain cord ial re l a t io ns with an important tra d i ng partne r, the Un i t e d

States has re f ra i ned from criticism of the go v e r n me nt’s conduct and quietly moved to

ex t e nd military assistance to Mex ico, which tra d i t io nally has been wary of accepting U.S.

a id. Military assistance and tra i n i ng have been justified as part of the count e r - na rc o t ic s

e f fort. Ne v e r t he l e s s, the re are no ade q uate me a ns to ens u re that such assistance is no t

used in the count e r i ns u rge ncy strategy that the inc u m b e nt re g i me has ado p t e d. And

t he re is cons ide rable evide nce that the United States has pro v ided Mex ican military of f ic ials with advice and info r ma t ion specifically orie nted to the confro nt a t ion in Chia p a s.3 3

Whatever the truth about the re l a t ion between U.S. military and int e l l ige nce operat io ns and the Mex ican Army’s count e r i ns u rge ncy campaig ns, the very appeara nce of U.S.

i n v o l v e me nt is da ma g i ng to U.S. int e re s t s. The ins u rge nc ies in southern Mex ico re p res e nt no possible threat to United States na t io nal security. Inde e d, at their pre s e nt

levels they are not a sig n i f ic a nt threat to the Mex ican state. What is thre a t e n i ng, fo r

both the de v e l o p me nt of Mex ican de mo c racy and the vitality of its econo my, and fro m

t he point of view of tra d i t io nal U.S. fo re ign policy conc e r ns, is the persistence of political vio l e nce in the count r y s ide. And the Mex ican go v e r n me nt’s curre nt strategy has do ne

vastly much mo re to exacerbate and spread the conflict than to calm it. 

P re s s i ng conc e r ns for the United States, mo re o v e r, have scarcely been addressed by

U.S. polic y ma ke r s. The threat of greater re f u gee flows into the United States is very re a l .

T he da nger that escalating conflict in the count r y s ide could unde r m i ne the de mo c ra t ic

p rocess on the na t io nal level, even cont r i b u t i ng to the possibility of a military coup,

s hould also be of concern, especially as cont i nu i ng hu man rig hts abuses lead to

g ro w i ng calls amo ng civilia ns for the pro s e c u t ion of military of f ic e r s. Po l i t ical turmo i l

t h re a t e ns Mex ico’s ability to ma na ge its econo m ic crisis, just as the corruption of the

t ra d i t io nal system has ma r red efforts to “mo dernize” the econo my.

S uch da ngers call for the prude nt eng a ge me nt of the United States with the situat ion in southern Mex ico. Mex ic a ns are rig htly touc hy about U.S. int e r v e nt ion in Mex ic a n

a f fa i r s. Secretary of State Ma de l e i ne Albrig ht’s disclosure that the U.S. was “pre s s i ng ”

t he Mex ican go v e r n me nt to find a peaceful solution to the conflict in Chiapas in June

1998 set off a storm of protest within Mex ico. Mex ico vio l e ntly rejected the call of the

UN Commission on Hu man Rig hts for an end to impunity in its tre a t me nt of ind ige no u s

p e o p l e s. And the country has expelled do z e ns of fo re ig ners over the last year who have

c o me to Chiapas as int e r na t io nal hu man rig hts observers or to “a c c o m p a ny” the Za patista commu n i t ie s.

Ne v e r t he l e s s, int e r na t io nal pre s s u re, both overt and quiet, has had important effects

in Mex ico, as the Mex ican go v e r n me nt’s cease-fire in Ja nuary 1994 attests. Mex ican of f ic ials may protest, but they are mo re apt to try to satisfy the int e r na t io nal commu n i t y

than to defy it. The United States, accord i ng l y, should not hesitate to apply pre s s u re, as

d i p l o ma t ically as possible, for a change of polic y. Mo re o v e r, the United States should see

to it that U.S. military tra i n i ng and assistance are not directed to bolstering the count e r i ns u rge ncy strategy curre ntly under way in southern Mex ico. That may mean cutting

back on assistance mo re ge ne ra l l y. It would certainly mean end i ng whatever cooperat ion exists in int e l l ige nce gathe r i ng and in tra i n i ng directly focused on the conflicts in

C h ia p a s, Guerre ro, and other parts of Mex ico. Above all, it would mean effective overs ig ht of military re l a t io ns to ens u re that the United States is not seen as bolstering the

c u r re nt go v e r n me nt in a de f e nse of an unpopular and uns uccessful stra t e g y, through its

e ng a ge me nt with the Mex ican military.

13

International pre s s u re, both

overt and quiet, has had

i m p o r tant effects in Mex i c o ,

as the Mexican gove r n m e n t ’ s

c e a s e - f i re in January 1994

a t t e s t s.... The United Sta t e s,

a c c o rd i n g l y, should not

h e s i tate to apply pre s s u re,

as diplomatically as possible,

for a change of policy.
E n d n o t e s

1 The m u n i c i p i o, or mu n ic i p a l i t y, is roughly the county level of go v e r n me nt in Mex ico and most of Latin Ame r ica and is the lowest politic o - a dm i n i s t rative unit.

2 Julia Preston, “Mex ico Squeezes Rebels, Pro v o k i ng New Grief,” The New York Times,

I nt e r na t io nal, June 28, 1998.

3 Julia Preston, “He l met Instead of a Miter for the Bishop of Chia p a s,” The New Yo r k

T i m e s, I nt e r na t io nal, June 16, 1998.

4 See Julia Preston, “Mex ican Gunmen Slay 45 in Southern Ind ian Village,” The New

York Times, December 24, 1997; Cent ro de Dere c hos Hu ma nos “Fray Bartolomé de las

C a s a s,” The Road to the Massacre, San Cristóbal de las Casas, Mex ico: 1998; Ange l e s

Mariscal, “Privan impunidad y manipulación a seis meses de la matanza de Acteal,” L a

J o r n a d a, June 22, 1998, p. 1. A re c e nt go v e r n me nt “white paper” describes the killing

as largely the result of a family dispute and downplays the involveme nt of state of f ic ia l s.

G o b ie r no de México, Pro c a duría Gene ral de la Républica, “El Libro Blanco Sobre Ac t e a l , ”

No v e m b e r, 1998. Available at ht t p : / / w w w. go b e r na c io n . go b. m x / g E s p / c h ia p a s / a rc h iv o / d ic ie m b re/ libro Ac t e a l . ht m l .

5 Julia Preston, “Mex ican Governor Resig ns in Aftermath of Ind ia ns’ Ma s s a c re,” T h e

New York Times, Ja nuary 8, 1998; Julia Preston, “Mex ico Accuses Po l ic e man of He l p i ng

Arm Mass Killers,” The New York Times, Ja nuary 13, 1998. In December, 1998, ten othe r

h igh of f ic ials implicated in the crime and coverup were fo r mally banned from ho l d i ng

p o l i t ical of f ice for ten years. Jesus Ramirez, “Mex ican Offic ials Sanc t io ned For 1997 Ma ss a c re,” Reuters, December 15, 1998. . 

6 The location and activities of the paramilitary groups have been do c u me nted by

t he Mex ican hu man rig hts org a n i z a t ion, Cent ro de Dere c hos Hu ma nos “Miguel Ag u s t í n

P ro Juárez,” in Chiapas: La guerra en curso, Mex ico City: 1998.

7 In the m u n i c i p i o of Ocosingo, which inc l udes important Zapatista stro ng ho l d s, fede ral troops were pro m i ne ntly on display in at least three commu n i t ie s, in vio l a t ion of

Mex ican electoral law, and members of para m i l i t a r ies reportedly oversaw the voting in

s e v e ral commu n i t ie s. Juan Balboa, “En zona zapatista, abstención y operativos del tricolor para captar votos,” La Jornada, October 5, 1998, p. 1.

8 Alvaro Delgado and Gloria Letic ia Díaz, “Te s t i mo n ios de ind í ge nas confirman: Va rios milic ia nos y dos civiles fueron ejecutados en El Charco,” P r o c e s o, No. 1128, June 14,

1 9 9 8 .

9 Robert Collie r, “U.S. Offer Raises Sticky Questio ns,” San Francisco Chronicle, December 10, 1996, p. A12. Collier reports that Mex ican of f ic ials were embarrassed by the publ ic of f e r, but did not rule out coopera t ion. Inde e d, it is widely believed that the Un i t e d

States has shared satellite and electro n ic int e rcept data on Chiapas since the Za p a t i s t a

re b e l l ion began.

10 Dana Priest, “Free of Oversig ht, U.S. Military Tra i ns Fore ign Tro o p s,” Wa s h i n g t o n

Po s t, July 12, 1998, p. A1; Douglas Farah, “A Tutor to Every Army in Latin Ame r ic a , ”

Washington Po s t, July 13, 1998, p. A1; Lynne Duke, “A f r ic a ns Use Tra i n i ng in Unex p e c ted Wa y s,” Washington Po s t, July 14, 1998, p. A1. See also Tim We i ne r, “U.S. Tra i n i ng of

I ndo ne s ia Troops Goes On Despite Ban,” The New York Times, Ma rch 17, 1998, p. A3, and

Tim We i ne r, “Ja karta Disside nt Questio ns U.S. Military Aid,” The New York Times, Ma rc h

25, 1998.

11 Adam Isacson and Joy Olson, “Just the Facts: A Civilian’s Guide to U.S. Defens e

a nd Security As s i s t a nce to Latin Ame r ica and the Caribbean,” Wa s h i ngton, D.C.: Latin

A me r ica Wo r k i ng Group, 1998, pp. 198—90. An updated version is available on-line at

ht t p : / / w w w. c i p o n l i ne. o rg / fa c t s /

12 Tim Golden, “U.S. Helps Mex ico’s Army Ta ke a Big Anti-Drug Role,” The New Yo r k

T i m e s, December 27, 1997, p. A1.

14
13 See Gabriel Ma rcella and Donald E. Schulz, “Mex ico: Will a Larger Military Role

Harm Demo c racy?” Los Angeles Times, Ja nuary 19, 1997.

14 Tim Golden, “U.S.-aided Effort by Mex ican Army on Drugs Fizzles,” The New Yo r k

T i m e s, December 23, 1998, p. 1.

15 The re ma i n i ng 200 seats are awarded by a pro p o r t io nal re p re s e nt a t ion fo r mula and

w e re reserved for minority partie s.

16 Mireya Cuéllar, “En sur y sure s t e, la me nor calidad electoral: IFE,” La Jornada, July

19, 1997, p. 1.

17 In ma ny ind ige nous commu n i t ies in Mex ico, custom prescribes that of f ic ials be

selected by the community by cons e ns u s. To do otherwise would impair the “unity” of

t he village. Commu n i t ies have been willing to back the PRI in the na me of unity, so

l o ng as the PRI, in effect, ra t i f ies the community’s cho ic e s. In pra c t ic e, the party (or

local power bro kers ins ide and outside the ind ige nous commu n i t ies) often chose cand idates for their own re a s o ns and insisted that the community accept their cho ic e.

18 Excerpts from a military “white paper” pre p a red in October 1994 were publishe d

by the Mex ican weekly P r o c e s o, sugge s t i ng that the re c r u i t me nt and tra i n i ng of param i l i t a r ie s, as well as community action pro g ra ms of various sorts, should be an int e g ra l

part of a count e r i ns u rge ncy strategy in Chia p a s. See Carlos Marín, “Plan del Ejército en

C h ia p a s, de s de 1994: crear bandas para m i l i t a re s, desplazar a la población, destruir las

bases de apoyo del EZLN,” P r o c e s o, Ja nuary 4, 1998.

19 Hu man Rig hts Wa t c h / A me r ic a s, Implausible Deniability: State Responsibility fo r

Rural Violence in Mex i c o ( New York: Hu man Rig hts Watch, 1997), p. 33.

20 In a surprising turnabout, Chamu l a ns refused to allow electoral booths to be set

up in the m u n i c i p i o for the October 1998 electio ns in protest of the arrest of five of the i r

l e a ders on a variety of charge s, inc l ud i ng ho m ic ide.

21 Arma ndo Bartra, “Guerre ro Bro nco: Campesino s, cuida da nos y guerrilleros en la

Costa Gra nde,” Mex ico City: Edic io nes s i n f i l t r o, 1996.

22 Tr i u n fo Elizalde, “Sigue sie ndo parc ial el cumplimie nto de la re c o me ndación, afirma,” La Jornada, June 28, 1998, p. 1.

23 The active partic i p a t ion of local ind ige nous campesinos in the EPR in Guerre ro

a nd, accord i ng to go v e r n me nt accusatio ns, the ent i re town council and much of the populace of the m u n i c i p i o of Los Lox ic h a s, Oaxaca, attests to the support the mo v e me nt

enjoys amo ng ord i nary citizens.

24 Maribel Gutiérrez, “Rehúsan de s p l a z a dos re t o r nar a El Cucyachi, en Guerre ro; ex i s t e

r ie s go de vio l e nc ia en la zona serra na,” La Jornada ( Mex ico City), Ja nuary 9, 1998, p. 1.

25 Alonso Urrutia, “En Ayutla, 4 mil mixtecos ex igen justic ia,” La Jornada, June 16,

1998, p. 1.

26 A coalition of Mex ican hu man rig hts groups has unde r t a ken to do c u me nt some of

t hese abuses. See “Red de Org a n i s mos Civiles de Dere c hos Hu ma nos” Todos los derechos

para todos; Violencia e impunidad en Guerrero. Informe de la misión de observadores de

derechos humanos en Guerrero, del 20 al 23 de junio, 1997.

27 See Cent ro de Dere c hos Hu ma nos Fray Bartolomé de las Casas, Camino a la Masacre

(San Cristóbal de las Casas, Mex ico: Ja nua r y, 1998).URL: ht t p : / / w w w. l a ne t a . a p c. o rg / c d h bc a s a s / c he na l ho / i n fo r me / i nd ic e. htm. This is a de t a i l e d, balanced account of the vio l e nc e

on both sides in the m u n i c i p i o of Che nalhó in the year pre c e d i ng the ma s s a c re at Ac t e a l .

28 Delgado and Díaz, “Te s t i mo n io s. ”

29 Carlos Marín, “Plan del Ejército,” P r o c e s o, Ja nuary 4, 1998. See also Cent ro de

D e re c hos Hu ma nos Fray Bartolomé de las Casas, “A p l icación del Ma nual de Guerra Irre gular del Ejército Na c io nal Mex ic a no en la Zo na Norte de Chia p a s,” chap. 8 of “Ni Paz, Ni

J u s t ic ia” (San Cristóbal de las Casas, Mex ico: October, 1998). URL: ht t p : / / w w w. l a net a . a p c. o rg / c d h b c a s a s / c he na l ho / n i p a z j u s / 8 . ht m

15
30 In August 1988, a subcommission of the United Na t io ns Commission on Hu ma n

R ig hts called on the Mex ican go v e r n me nt to “give high priority to the fig ht agains t

impunity for the authors of grave vio l a t io ns of hu man rig ht s,” particularly ind ige no u s

p e o p l e, re f e r r i ng to the situa t io ns in Chia p a s, Guerre ro, Oaxaca, and elsewhe re. In Octob e r, the Int e r - A me r ican Court of Hu man Rig hts took up three Mex ican cases, inc l ud i ng

that of the alleged mu rde r, by members of the Army, of civilia ns in the Zapatista community of Mo re l ia, du r i ng the Ja nua r y, 1994, of f e ns i v e. Both me a s u res were hotly contested by the Mex ican go v e r n me nt. See Ky ra Núñez, “Insta el org a n i s mo a re i n ic iar el

p roceso de diálogo en Chia p a s,” La Jornada, August 21, 1998, p. 1; 

31 Jesús Ara nda, “En cua t ro años aume nt a ron de dos a 100 las unida des de élite de l

E j é rcito,” La Jornada, September 9, 1998, p. 1.

32 World Bank, World Development Report 1998/99: Knowledge for Development,

Wa s h i ngton, DC: World Bank, 1998. The report also notes the “sig n i f ic a nt” inc rease in

poverty in Mex ico since 1994, with 45 perc e nt of the population surviving on inc o me s

of less than two dollars a da y.

33 Relevant newspaper accounts are cited in Brian Wilson, The Slippery Slope: U.S.

Military Moves into Mex i c o, re v. ed., April 1998. URL: ht t p : / / w w w. g l o b a l exc h a nge. o rg / c a mp a ig ns / mex ic o / s l o p e /

16

GENERAL RESOURCES

Background Notes: Mexico (May 1996)

http://www.state.gov/www/regions/ara/bgnpage.html

Latin American Network Information Center (LANIC): Mexico

http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/mexico/

Federal Electoral Institute • http://www.ife.org.mx/

Partido Acción Nacional The web site of the National Action Party (PAN)

http://www.pan.org.mx/

Partido de la Revolución Democrática Homepage of the Party of the

Democratic Revolution (PRD) • http://www.cen-prd.org.mx/

Partido del Trabajo • http://www.pt.org.mx/

Partido Revolucionario Institucional • http://www.pri.org.mx/home2.html

Partido Verde Ecologista de Mexico • http://www.pvem.org.mx/

GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND POLICIES

Chiapas • http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/pages/chiapas/chiapas.html

Chiapas - Gobierno del Estado • http://www.chiapas.gob.mx/index.html

Mexico-U.S. Relations

http://www.sre.gob.mx/comunicados/informes/1998/america_del_norte.htm

Procuraduría General de la República

http://www.pgr.gob.mx/frames/framei.htm

Secretaría de Gobernación (Mexico) • http://www.gobernacion.gob.mx/

U.S. Security Assistance to the Western Hemisphere

http://www.ciponline.org/facts/

U.S. State Department - Bureau of Inter-American Affairs

http://www.state.gov/www/regions/ara/mexico_index.html

DISSIDENT POLITICAL AND GUERRILLA GROUPS

Ejército Popular Revolucionario (EPR) • http://www.pengo.it/PDPR-EPR/

¡YA BASTA! (FZLN) • http://www.ezln.org/

Zapatistas in Cyberspace, a Guide to Analysis and Information

http://www.eco.utexas.edu/faculty/Cleaver/zapsincyber.html

HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELATED CIVIL ORGANIZATIONS

Centro de Derechos Humanos Fray Bartolomé de las Casas

http://www.laneta.apc.org/cdhbcasas/index.htm

Centro de Derechos Humanos Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez

http://mixcoac.uia.mx/PRODH/default.htm

Comisión Mexicana de Defensa y Promoción de los Derechos Humanos

http://www.laneta.apc.org/cmdpdh/

Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos

http://www.cndh.org.mx/

Congreso Nacional Indígena 

http://www.laneta.apc.org/cni/

EnlaceCivil • http://www.enlacecivil.org.mx/

Frente Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (FZLN)

http://spin.com.mx/~floresu/FZLN/

La Liga Mexicana por la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos

http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/mexico/limeddh/

Mexican Academy of Human Rights • http://www.unam.mx/amdh/

Red Nacional de Organismos Civiles de Derechos Humanos

http://www.laneta.apc.org/vitoria/

Servicio Paz y Justicia • http://www.NONVIOLENCE.ORG/serpaj/mexico/

MAPS AND GUIDES

CIA World Factbook: Mexico • http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/mx.html

PCL Map Collection: Mexico http://www.lib.utexas.edu/Libs/PCL/Map_collection/americas/Mexico_pol97.jpg

PEACE AGREEMENTS

Chiapas (Mexico): Digital Peace Agreements Liberation Front (EZLN) from

February 1996. Part of the United States Institute of Peace Library's Digital

Peace Agreements Collection • http://www.usip.org/pa/index/pa_chiapas.html

Other Resources

Below are links by topical catego r ies to re s o u rces about the conflict in Chiapas from sources mainly active in Mex ic o .