United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 17-1014 

LEONAL ANTHONY GARCIA-GARCIA; KARELIS ECHEVARRÍA-CRUZ; CONJUGAL 

PARTNERSHIP GARCIA-ECHEVARRÍA, 

Plaintiffs, Appellants, 

v. 

COSTCO WHOLESALE CORPORATION, 

Defendant, Appellee. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 

[Hon. Silvia L. Carreño-Coll, U.S. Magistrate Judge] 

Before 

Lynch, Thompson, and Kayatta, 

 Circuit Judges. 

Jose G. Fagot Diaz and Manuel E. Lopez-Fernandez on brief for 

appellants. 

Vincente J. Antonetti, Javier G. Vázquez-Segarra, and Goldman 

Antonetti & Córdova, LLC, on brief for appellee. 

December 22, 2017 
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THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. After approximately eleven 

years of working his way up the Costco1 employment ladder, 

appellant Leonal Anthony Garcia-Garcia2 (Garcia) was fired 

following an investigation which revealed an inventory discrepancy 

in the Meat Department that he managed. Garcia sued Costco in 

federal court invoking diversity jurisdiction and alleging an 

array of Puerto-Rico-based claims stemming from his discharge.3 

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Costco on 

all counts and Garcia appealed to this Court. We briefly summarize 

Garcia's employment history before we delve into the inventory 

snafu which ultimately led to his dismissal. In doing so, we view 

the evidence in the light most favorable to Garcia and draw all 

reasonable inferences in his favor. See Del Valle-Santana v. 

Servicios Legales De Puerto Rico, Inc., 804 F.3d 127, 128 (1st 

Cir. 2015). 

BACKGROUND 

In 2002, Garcia began working at Costco store #365 

located in Caguas, Puerto Rico, as a meat wrapper in the store's 

 1 Cover bears defendant's full corporate name. 

2 Garcia's wife, Karelis Echevarría-Cruz, and their conjugal 

partnership are also named plaintiffs and their claims are 

derivative. See Medina-Rivera v. MVM, Inc., 713 F.3d 132, 134 

(1st Cir. 2013). 

3 The claims against co-defendant National Union Fire 

Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Costco's liability insurer, were 

dismissed per joint motion. 
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Meat Department. Throughout his tenure at Costco, Garcia 

continuously received positive performance evaluations and 

promotions. In 2006, he was elevated to meat cutter, and then in 

2011, to meat manager. As part of his responsibilities as manager, 

Garcia was tasked with conducting inventory of all goods within 

the Meat Department. Although meat inventory was not Garcia's 

sole responsibility, it was nevertheless his "primary" one. 

Fast forward to October 28, 2013. Steve Stoddard, a 

Regional Meat Manager at Costco, noticed, while reviewing the 

Costco meat inventory, that "the ending inventory of $297,000 

represented a meat inventory much higher than the actual inventory 

[Costco] store #365 [could] physically accommodate in the store at 

any given time."4 Thereafter, David Soto, then Costco-store-#365's 

manager, along with his assistant manager, Rocío Mendez, and Garcia 

were tasked with conducting a full accounting of the Meat 

Department's stock. What they found was an ending inventory of 

$315,000. Given this high ending tally, a manual count of the 

meat cases was performed, which resulted in a discrepancy of 

$114,000 in missing product. 

Following up, on November 4, 2013, Nayreth Ríos, 

Internal Auditor at Costco store #365, along with Rocío Mendez and 

Garcia, performed a second manual inventory count, which resulted 

 4 All dollar amounts included in this decision are approximate 

figures rounded to the nearest thousand. 
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in an ending value of $178,000. When handed the result, Stoddard 

compared the audited manual inventory count with the ending 

inventory of the previous period and concluded that "the inventory 

discrepancy was due to a hidden shrink5 of approximately $146,000." 

A broader review of the inventory entries revealed that, on the 

27th, 28th and 29th of October 2013, manual entries of 

approximately $114,000 in product were made into the system (known 

as AS400). At that time, "it was determined that . . . Costco's 

inventory of the Meat Department for store #365 had been erratic 

for over nine . . . monthly periods." 

Thomas Farano, a Loss Prevention/Regional Manager at 

Costco, conducted interviews to get to the bottom of the product 

discrepancy. While speaking with Garcia, Farano, along with Jose 

Mendez, Costco's Loss Prevention Manager, and Frank Chiriboga, 

Costco's Regional Meat Manager, accused Garcia of stealing and 

altering the inventory numbers "to cover up the theft."6 According 

to Farano, 

[Garcia] denied any knowledge or involvement in entering 

the additional inventory into the AS400. [Garcia] 

indicated that other people had his pass word [sic] and 

he did not make any fraudulent entries to increase his 

inventory levels. He also could not offer any 

 5 Shrinkage is the reduction in or loss of inventory due to 

factors such as theft, vendor fraud, breakage, or waste. See 

Shrinkage, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014); Rando v. 

Leonard, 826 F.3d 553, 554 (1st Cir. 2016). 

6 Nayreth Rios, Inventory Auditor, was also separately 

interviewed. 
- 5 - 

explanations to what could have happened which would 

have impacted the inventory numbers. 

Jeremy Dempsey, Vice President of Operations at Costco, 

also interviewed Garcia and accused him of "manipulating inventory 

and stealing products." When grilled, Garcia once again was 

"unable to explain why his inventories were high and erratic over 

the past nine . . . periods." Garcia reiterated that he had not 

stolen any merchandise and that, in fact, he believed all the 

merchandise had been accounted for. On three occasions, Garcia 

also grieved to Dempsey, Soto, and Farano about the accusations 

being made against him and complained about (what he characterized 

as) Costco's "gender-based disparate treatment," which he said was 

causing him emotional distress and anxiety. According to Garcia, 

Costco had treated similarly situated female employees, including 

Beatriz Gomez, Rocío Mendez, and Johanne Oquendo, differently than 

him; when they engaged in similar alleged conduct (i.e., stealing 

or allowing theft under their watch), they were not disciplined 

and were actually later promoted. 

Seven days later, on November 29, 2013, Costco gave 

Garcia the boot. According to Garcia, Soto delivered the discharge 

news, and while doing so, apologized to Garcia and admitted Costco 

had no evidence that "pointed to Garcia as having committed any 

wrongdoing." Approximately two months later, Garcia sent a letter 

to Joe Portera, Costco's Executive Vice President, asking Costco 
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to reconsider its decision to terminate his employment. In the 

letter, Garcia pointed out that other younger employees, "both 

male and female," who had been involved in "similar situations" 

had been allowed to continue working at Costco. He professed, 

once again, that he did not steal from Costco and urged Portera to 

reconsider his termination. Garcia's request was denied and his 

employment was never reinstated. 

The following year, Garcia, represented by counsel, sued 

Costco in federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 alleging 

multiple violations of Puerto Rico law: (1) gender-based disparate 

treatment and retaliation, Law 100, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29 § 146; 

(2) sex discrimination and retaliation, Law 69, P.R. Laws Ann. 

tit. 29 § 1321; (3) libel and defamation, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 32 

§§ 3141-3149; (4) violation of Sections 1, 8, and 16 of Article II 

of the Puerto Rico Constitution; (5) wrongful discharge, Law 80, 

P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29 § 185b; and (6) violation of Puerto Rico's 

Civil Code, Art. 1802. His complaint sought compensatory damages 

and reinstatement. Costco filed an answer to the suit denying all 

wrongdoings alleged in the complaint and retorting that Garcia was 

dismissed "with just cause . . . after the investigation regarding 

the inventory discrepancy showed that he was responsible for the 

grossly negligent mishandling of company records and serious 

misconduct and incompetence in the performance of his job."
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Following discovery, Costco filed a motion for summary 

judgment maintaining that the "present case poses no genuine issues 

of material fact and as a matter of law the instant [c]omplaint 

should be dismissed." In support of its motion, Costco filed three 

affidavits from Costco agents Stoddard, Farano, and Dempsey. 

Garcia objected to the motion on several grounds, including that 

Costco had failed to meet its burden of establishing that his 

termination was based on good cause.7 Garcia also objected to the 

admission of the three affidavits asserting they were not notarized 

and, according to Garcia, "all fail to represent[,] . . . assert[,] 

and/or mention in the specific document that each declarant has 

personal knowledge of the facts they pretend to assert." 

Additionally, Garcia claimed, without any discussion, that "the 

documents attached as exhibits to the [affidavits] are not 

authentic" and should not be admitted. The judge disagreed and 

admitted the affidavits8 after concluding that Stoddard "declared 

 7 He also argued that: (1) a jury could infer he had shown 

pretext (relating to his gender discrimination claim); (2) he 

demonstrated a strong causal connection between his protected 

conduct and his termination (relating to his retaliation claim);

(3) Costco lost its conditional privilege to communicate matters 

regarding the workplace (relating to his defamation claim); and 

(4) his constitutional claim should still stand even if his 

defamation claim failed. 

8 It is unclear whether the judge ruled on the admission of 

the Farano and Dempsey affidavits. Because there is nothing to 

suggest these affidavits were excluded and Garcia treats them as 

having been admitted, we will do the same for purposes of this 

appeal. 
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events based on his personal knowledge." She also declined to 

entertain Garcia's "boiler-plate objection" that the exhibits had 

not been properly authenticated. As to the merits of Garcia's 

wrongful discharge claim, the district court found the following 

facts to be undisputed and thus dispositive: (1) Garcia was in 

charge of keeping inventory of the Meat Department; (2) Costco 

conducted an extensive investigation into the inventory 

discrepancy; and (3) Garcia was unable to account for such a 

discrepancy. The district court also found no merit to Garcia's 

remaining claims and granted summary judgment on all counts.9 

Garcia appealed to this Court. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

"We review the entry of summary judgment de novo." 

Echevarría v. AstraZeneca Pharm. LP, 856 F.3d 119, 126 (1st Cir. 

2017). A grant of summary judgment is appropriate when "there is 

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Ameen v. Amphenol 

Printed Circuits, Inc., 777 F.3d 63, 68 (1st Cir. 2015). "A 

genuine issue of fact exists where 'the evidence is such that a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" 

Taylor v. Am. Chemistry Council, 576 F.3d 16, 24 (1st Cir. 2009) 

(quoting Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 43 (1st Cir. 

 9 We will discuss the lower court decision in greater detail 

as it becomes pertinent to our analysis. 
- 9 - 

2009)). The court must examine "the record in the light most 

favorable to the nonmovant" and must make "all reasonable 

inferences in that party's favor." Ameen, 777 F.3d at 68 (quoting 

Barclays Bank PLC v. Poynter, 710 F.3d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 2013)). 

"While we resolve all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, we 'must ignore conclusory allegations, improbable 

inferences, and unsupported speculation.'" Taylor, 576 F.3d at 24 

(quoting Am. Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Local Union No. 7, Int'l Ass'n 

of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental & Reinforcing Iron Workers, 536 

F.3d 68, 75 (1st Cir. 2008)). 

Moreover, when the district court's ruling is dependent 

in part on preliminary evidentiary rulings, we "review the district 

court's evidentiary rulings made as part of its decision on summary 

judgment for abuse of discretion." Hoffman v. Applicators Sales 

and Serv., Inc., 439 F.3d 9, 13 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Alternative 

Sys. Concepts, Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc., 374 F.3d 23, 31 (1st Cir. 

2004)). 

DISCUSSION 

On appeal, Garcia raises with us the same arguments he 

made below regarding the admission of the affidavits and the 

exhibits attached thereto--that neither should have been 

considered because they were not in compliance with Rule 56(c)(4) 

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Additionally, Garcia 

continues to challenge the judge's summary-judgment ruling on the 
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merits of each of his six claims against Costco. We begin with a 

discussion of the affidavits before examining whether each count 

of Garcia's complaint warranted summary disposition.10 

A. Admission of Affidavits 

 Rule 56(c)(4) provides that "[a]n affidavit or 

declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on 

personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in 

evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to 

testify on the matters stated." "[T]he requisite personal 

knowledge must concern facts as opposed to conclusions, 

assumptions, or surmise." Perez v. Volvo Car Corp., 247 F.3d 303, 

316 (1st Cir. 2001). 

 Before this Court, Garcia once again maintains that 

Costco's supporting affidavits were not in compliance with Rule 56 

for two reasons: (1) because the affiants did not declare that 

they have personal knowledge regarding the matters stated therein; 

and (2) because the inventory exhibits attached to the affidavits 

were not authenticated by the affiants. We are not persuaded the 

judge abused her discretion. 

 10 We pause to note that although every heading (including the 

table of contents) of Costco's brief states that the district court 

erred in entering summary judgment, the body of the brief prays we 

affirm that entry. 
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1. Affidavits 

Garcia maintains the judge erred by not striking the 

affidavits of Stoddard, Farano, and Dempsey from the record. 

According to Garcia: the three affidavits "reveal[] that the 

affiants did not declare that they have personal knowledge of the 

purported facts set forth in each of their declarations" and, 

"[f]or such reason and because the affiants did not declare how 

they would be competent to testify on those matters raised in the 

[affidavits] at trial, the [district court] erred in not striking 

these from the record as they are inadmissible in evidence."11

(Emphasis in the original). Notably, although Garcia summarily 

and generally asserts that the affiants lacked personal knowledge 

about the matters being sworn to, the argument he actually develops 

on appeal is much more narrow and technical--he argues that the 

affiants' mere failure to specifically declare within the 

affidavits themselves that they did have personal knowledge 

suffices to make the affidavits inadmissible. 

 11 In his brief, Garcia quotes cases explaining the previous 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), which required the records 

submitted with affidavits to be certified (although he makes no 

argument relating to certification). This rule was amended in 

2010; while no change was made to the summary-judgment standard 

itself, or to the burdens imposed on movants and opponents, 

"authentication" is no longer required under the rule. Rule 56. 

Summary Judgment, 10A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. CIV Rule 56 (4th 

ed.) 
- 12 - 

First we note that Rule 56 contains no requirement that 

the affiant specifically articulate that he or she has personal 

knowledge. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Therefore, Garcia's focus 

on this narrow argument, which is unsupported by the plain language 

of the applicable rule, is quite odd. Further, a reading of the 

affidavits demonstrates that all three affiants did have personal 

knowledge about the facts they were swearing to, despite not 

explicitly stating so. See Barthelemy v. Air Lines Pilots Ass'n, 

897 F.2d 999, 1018 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal citation omitted) 

("That Rule 56[]'s requirements of personal knowledge and 

competence to testify have been met may be inferred from the 

affidavits themselves."). For instance, Stoddard specifically 

states in his affidavit that he was the Costco agent who noticed 

the high inventory number of approximately $297,000 for store #365 

and later "determined that the inventory discrepancy was due to a 

hidden shrink of approximately $146,000[.]" Similarly, Farano 

attested that he had been instructed to investigate the inventory 

discrepancy, and as part of doing so, interviewed Garcia, along 

with Mendez and Chiriboga. Farano also attached two emails as 

exhibits to his affidavit whereby he provides a synopsis of the 

interviews he conducted as part of the investigation. Finally, 

Dempsey notes that Stoddard informed him of the high-ending 

inventory, and that on November 13, 2013, he too "interviewed 

Garcia regarding the inventory discrepancy." It is readily 
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apparent, and easily inferred, that these statements were made 

with personal knowledge. 

But, to the extent the affiants make broader statements 

about the inventory investigation without making their knowledge 

readily clear, those statements are either undisputed or are not 

specifically challenged by Garcia. Again, we note he does not 

contest the accuracy or veracity of any specific statement within 

the affidavits. 

Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the lower 

court's decision to admit the affidavits. See Vélez v. Thermo 

King de Puerto Rico, Inc., 585 F.3d 441, 445 n.1 (1st Cir. 2009) 

(no abuse of discretion in admitting employer affidavit to show 

what motivated employee's firing because "the relevant question in 

th[at] case [was] not whether [the employer] was correct that [the 

employee] had violated rules, but whether that perceived violation 

was the reason it fired him"). 

2. Exhibits 

As to the exhibits attached to the affidavits, Garcia 

maintains that they were not authenticated by the affiants or 

certified under oath and therefore, should have been excluded. We 

disagree. As noted, the district court never reached the merits 

of this contention because Garcia's argument was merely 

boilerplate--it characterized the exhibits as lacking 

authentication without noting any specifics. While Garcia 
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attempts to resurrect this argument on appeal by adding in a bit 

more bite (he gets more specific and argues the exhibits are 

"illegible and unsigned"), his attempt is futile. See McCoy v. 

Massachusetts Inst. of Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 22 (1st Cir. 1991) ("It 

is hornbook law that theories not raised squarely in the district 

court cannot be surfaced for the first time on appeal.") 

Importantly, Garcia does not challenge the district court's 

finding that his argument regarding the exhibits was mere 

boilerplate. Accordingly, "[w]e reject, as procedurally 

defaulted," Garcia's arguments relating to the authenticity of the 

exhibits. See id. 

Seeing no abuse of discretion, we proceed first to 

address Garcia's wrongful discharge challenge and then take up his 

gender-based discrimination and defamation claims. 

B. Wrongful Discharge (Law 80) 

Garcia's wrongful discharge claim is based on a Puerto 

Rico statute, colloquially known as "Law 80," which provides a 

remedy to employees who are discharged "without just cause." P.R. 

Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 185a; see also Echevarría, 856 F.3d at 140. 

Law 80 provides that "[a] discharge made by the mere whim of the 

employer or without cause relative to the proper and normal 

operation of the establishment shall not be considered as a 

discharge for good cause." Id. § 185b(f). On the other hand, the 
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statute specifies that the following constitute examples of goodcause discharge: 

 "the worker indulges in a pattern of improper or disorderly 

conduct[;]" Id. § 185b(a). 

 the employee's failure to perform his or her work "in an 

efficient manner, or . . . doing it belatedly and 

negligently or in violation of" quality standards; Id. § 

185b(b). 

 "repeated violations of the reasonable rules and 

regulations established" by the employer, if a written copy 

has been duly furnished to the employee. Id. § 185b(c).12

The following burden-shifting framework is applicable to 

Law 80 claims: "(1) the employee must [first] show that he or she 

has been discharged and allege that the dismissal was not 

justified; (2) the burden then shifts to the employer to show, by 

a preponderance of the evidence, that the dismissal was justified; 

and (3) if the employer shoulders that burden, the employee must 

rebut the showing of good cause." Echevarría, 856 F.3d at 140. 

In the present case, our de novo review demonstrates 

that Garcia easily overcomes the first hurdle--it is undisputed 

 12 The statute also specifies three other good-cause grounds 

for termination "that relate to company restructuring or 

downsizing." Carrasquillo-Ortiz v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 812 F.3d 

195, 196 (1st Cir. 2016); see also P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 

185b(d)-(f). 
- 16 - 

that he was discharged from his employment with Costco and he 

alleges in his complaint that such discharge was not justified. 

The burden now shifts to Costco to show by a 

preponderance of the evidence that Garcia's discharge was based on 

good cause. See id. To meet the good-cause prong, Costco "need 

only demonstrate that it had a reasonable basis to believe that 

[Garcia] has engaged in one of those actions that the law 

identified as establishing such cause." Id. (quoting Pérez v. 

Horizon Lines, Inc., 804 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2015)). In fact, 

even a "perceived violation [would] suffice[] to establish that 

[the employer] did not terminate [the employee] on a whim, but 

rather for a sensible business-related reason." Hoyos v. Telecorp 

Commc'ns, Inc., 488 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2007) (emphasis added). 

The termination need only be "non-arbitrary" and bear "some 

relationship to the business' operation." Pérez, 804 F.3d at 9. 

Costco cites Garcia's inability to account for the 

$146,000 in missing meat product as the cause of his termination. 

As noted, Garcia, as meat manager, had inventory oversight of the 

Meat Department. He himself admitted at his deposition that 

ensuring that the reported inventory figures comported with the 

physical inventory in the Meat Department was his "primary 

responsibility"; despite this, under his supervision, the meat 

inventory was inflated for a total of nine monthly periods. When 

Costco agents inquired about the discrepancy, Garcia was unable to 
- 17 - 

explain or justify the numbers. At best, the record shows that 

Garcia wasn't satisfactorily performing his primary job 

responsibility. Given this backdrop, we believe the evidence 

presented by Costco would compel a reasonable jury to conclude 

that Costco has met its good-cause burden and that its decision to 

dismiss Garcia was not made on a whim.13 See Hoyos, 488 F.3d at 

10. Therefore, Costco has shouldered its burden of proving by a 

preponderance of the evidence that Garcia's employment was 

terminated for good cause. See Pérez, 804 F.3d at 10 ("Although 

[employee] has shown that he was discharged, a reasonable jury 

could only conclude that [employer] ha[d] met its burden of showing 

just cause.") 

"Because [Costco] established cause for [Garcia's] 

termination, to withstand summary judgment [Garcia] bore the 

burden to rebut that showing." Id. To satisfy his burden, Garcia 

was required to do more than "cast[] doubt" on Costco's proffered 

reason for his discharge; instead, Garcia had to "adduce probative 

evidence that [Costco] did not genuinely believe in or did not in 

fact terminate [Garcia] for the reason given." Id. at 11 (citing 

Dea v. Look, 810 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1987)). 

 13 The district court ended its analysis here, but Law 80 

framework requires us to consider whether Garcia has presented any 

evidence to rebut Costco's good-cause showing. See Echevarría, 

856 F.3d at 140. 
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The following three themes can be distilled from 

Garcia's brief (with a lot of effort on our part) as addressing 

why he believes he has rebutted Costco's good-cause showing: (1) 

he had an excellent employment record at Costco; (2) no inventory 

discrepancy actually existed; and (3) even if one did exist, Costco 

failed to prove he was the one responsible.14 We address and reject 

each of these arguments in turn. 

1. Employment History 

Garcia maintains that as to his "purported job 

incompetence and just cause for dismissal," he presented evidence 

that he had a great employment history with Costco, highlighting 

that "during the same year of his termination, (2013) he was 

favorably evaluated and received a salary increase." He also cites 

to his history of frequent promotions, high ratings on quality 

inspections, and high monthly average sales to rebut Costco's goodcause showing.

While evidence of overall positive employment reviews 

may be used to establish pretext when an employee is later 

 14 Garcia's brief does not clearly present these arguments 

within prong 3 of the Law 80 burden-shifting framework (where he 

is tasked with rebutting Costco's proffered reason for discharging 

him). Instead, he conflates prongs 2 and 3--sometimes arguing 

Costco has not met its burden (implying prong 2), while at other 

times arguing that the proffered reason given by Costco for his 

dismissal was pretextual (implying prong 3). Because Garcia's 

arguments all appear to challenge Costco's proffered reason, we 

think they best address the third prong. We note that his 

arguments fail irrespective of what prong we tie them to. 
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terminated for poor performance, see Acevedo-Parrilla v. Novartis 

Ex-Lax, Inc., 696 F.3d 128, 140-43 (1st Cir. 2012), Costco has 

never suggested that it was anything but pleased with Garcia's 

work performance before his elevation to Meat Department manager. 

Indeed, in 2010 Costco had named Garcia employee of the month. 

However, Costco need not establish a continuous pattern of poor 

behavior to satisfy the good-cause prong; instead, one instance 

can suffice. See Hoyos, 488 F.3d at 6 ("Although Law 80 generally 

refers to multiple episodes of misconduct as constituting good 

cause, 'Law 80 does not invariably require repeated violations, 

particularly where an initial offense is so serious, or so reflects 

upon the employee's character, that the employer reasonably should 

not be expected to await further occurrences.'") (quoting Gonzalez 

v. El Dia, Inc., 304 F.3d 63, 75 (1st Cir. 2002)). Undeniably, 

Costco's proffered reason--a costly and unexplained $146,000 

inventory discrepancy within the department Garcia managed--is so 

severe that Costco could not have been "expected to await further 

occurrences." See id. Therefore, Garcia's first attempt to rebut 

Costco's good-cause showing fails.15

 15 To the extent Garcia argues there are "genuine issues over 

material facts" regarding his stellar employment record, these 

facts are by no means material to this case. Whether Garcia had 

a great (or a terrible) employment history with Costco prior to 

the inventory discrepancy does not really matter because Costco 

relies on the inventory discrepancy (and nothing else) to satisfy 

its good-cause prong. 
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2. Existence of Inventory Discrepancy 

Next, Garcia argues that there was no actual inventory 

discrepancy as all the products that Costco agents claimed were 

missing were, in fact, "physically there and part of the 

inventory." According to Garcia, when he specifically asked to 

see the list of "missing items," Costco was unable to provide him 

with one.16 Garcia maintains that the apparent inventory 

discrepancy could easily be explained: Costco agents compared a 

partial inventory (of just beef and pork resulting in a low 

$160,000 figure)17 with the inventory reported for the entire meat 

department. In other words, there appeared to be a discrepancy 

because they did not compare the same products. 

Garcia's attempt to undermine Costco's evidence of 

hidden shrinkage fails. Stoddard's affidavit, including the 

inventories and emails attached thereto, show that the "partial 

inventory" of pork and beef Garcia refers to was in fact compared 

to a manual inventory conducted for the same meat items. Here's 

what the record shows: Stoddard was surprised by the reported 

inventory of $297,000 and requested that Soto perform another 

 16 Garcia does not point to anything in the record indicating 

he requested this information during discovery. 

17 Although Garcia notes a $160,000 amount for the pork and 

beef inventory, the record suggests this figure was actually 

$118,000. Regardless, the exact amount is not material to the 

issues on appeal. 
- 21 - 

inventory; after the results were still high ($315,000), Stoddard 

requested a manual recount of the entire Meat Department ($178,000) 

and, specifically, the results for "pork and meat."18 Stoddard 

then compared the results of the manual recount sent by Soto to 

reported inventories for seven specific "pork and meat" items. 

The $114,000 discrepancy found was the result of a comparison 

between what was reported and what was physically present for these 

seven meat items.19 Thus, Garcia's argument that the apparent 

discrepancy is based on an inherently flawed analysis is not 

supported by the record. 

3. Other Employees 

 Lastly, Garcia faults Costco for failing to meet 

"its burden of demonstrating without any doubt" that he is the 

person who actually engaged in the alleged theft and/or inventory 

manipulation. Other employees, including managers and auditors, 

had his password, says Garcia, and could have accessed and entered 

false inventory figures into AS400. Once again, we are not 

persuaded. 

 18 Because "meat" would include the entire department, it is 

likely that he meant "pork and beef." 

19 The hidden shrink later rose to $146,000 when the entire 

physical meat inventory of $178,000 was compared to the reported 

ending inventory for the previous period of $297,000. A worksheet 

attached to Stoddard's affidavit includes the calculations made to 

reach the amount of $146,000 in hidden shrink. 
- 22 - 

For starters, Garcia clearly has the standard wrong; 

Costco need not "demonstrate[] without any doubt" that Garcia 

manipulated the numbers. Instead, it must show by a preponderance 

of the evidence that it had good cause to terminate Garcia. See 

P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 185b. As noted, even a "perceived 

violation" is sufficient to rebut an allegation that the decision 

to dismiss an employee was made on a whim. See Hoyos, 488 F.3d at 

10. Here, Garcia as manager was primarily responsible for the 

meat tabulation; whether or not he was the one guilty of any theft 

or of manipulating the inventory numbers is immaterial. Being 

terminated from his post for failing to adequately perform his 

primary responsibility of ensuring that the accounting was 

accurate bore a direct "relationship to the business' operation." 

See Pérez, 804 F.3d at 9. Therefore, Garcia has failed (once 

again) to rebut Costco's good-cause showing. 

Accordingly, because a reasonable jury would be 

compelled to find that Costco has met its burden of proving just 

cause and that Garcia has failed to rebut such showing, the 

district court correctly granted summary judgment on the Law 80 

claim.20 Id. at 8. 

 20 Garcia also argues that Costco's alleged violation of its 

own internal accounting procedures by not having a member of the 

warehouse management staff sign the inventory (and then later using 

that inventory to establish that Garcia's discharge was justified) 

demonstrates that the reasons given for his termination were 

pretextual. We fail to see any plausible link between an inventory 
- 23 - 

C. Gender Discrimination (Law 100 and Law 69) 

In addition to his wrongful discharge claim, Garcia 

alleges that he was discriminated against in violation of Law 100, 

P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29 § 146, and Law 69, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29 

§ 1321. These statutes prohibit gender and sex-based 

discrimination in the workforce. See id. "Indeed, Law 69 is 

merely an amplification of the principles contained in Law 100." 

Rodriguez-Torres v. Caribbean Forms Manufacturers, Inc., 399 F.3d 

52, 61 (1st Cir. 2005). Law 100's burden-shifting framework 

provides that: (1) the employee must first show that his or her 

discharge was not for just cause21--if successful, the employee 

enjoys a presumption that he or she has been the victim of 

discrimination; (2) the burden of production and persuasion then 

shifts to the employer to rebut this presumption. Ramos v. Davis 

 

that was not signed, and Garcia's argument that somehow this 

demonstrates pretext. Garcia's argument, as this Court understands 

it, completely lacks merit and is rejected. 

Moreover, Garcia indicates that several other male Costco 

employees had stolen merchandise at Costco but were nevertheless 

allowed to continue their employment. Because Garcia does not 

develop any specific argument as to how this fact rebuts Costco's 

good-cause showing, it is deemed waived. See Mills v. U.S. Bank, 

NA, 753 F.3d 47, 54 (1st Cir. 2014) (treating as waived "embryonic 

arguments"). 

21 "'[T]he Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 

determined that, because Law 100 did not define the term 'just 

cause,' the term's definition would be drawn from an analogous 

statute--' Law 80." Alvarez-Fonseca v. Pepsi Cola of Puerto Rico 

Bottling Co., 152 F.3d 17, 28 (1st Cir. 1998). 
- 24 - 

& Geck, Inc., 167 F.3d 727, 734 (1st Cir. 1999). Here, because 

Costco made the showing that it had just cause to dismiss Garcia 

in the Law 80 context, it follows that "the Law 100 presumption 

[of discrimination] disappears." Alvarez-Fonseca v. Pepsi Cola of 

Puerto Rico Bottling Co., 152 F.3d 17, 28 (1st Cir. 1998) (citing 

P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 148). Therefore, Garcia bears "the 

burden of proof on the ultimate issue of discrimination," meaning 

that he "must prove that, even if the dismissal was justified, 

[Costco] nevertheless violated Law 100 because the dismissal was 

motivated by discriminatory animus instead of or in addition to 

the legitimate reasons for dismissal." Id. In other words, that 

the reasons proffered were pretextual.22 See Pérez, 804 F.3d at 8 

n.4 ("[The Law 100] framework follows the Law 80 burden shifting 

framework" and because "no reasonable jury could conclude that 

[the employer] lacked cause to terminate [the employee,] . . . to 

succeed on his Law 100 claim [the employee] must show that [the 

 22 The district court, after noting that Law 100's presumption 

of discrimination "was not triggered" because Costco had met its 

burden of showing that the dismissal was justified, concluded that 

"the burden shifting analysis ends here." The judge nevertheless 

provided an analysis "assuming that the presumption of 

discrimination was triggered," and found that Garcia would in any 

event lose. (Emphasis added). We pause to note that even where 

the presumption is not triggered, as was the case here, the 

analysis does not end there. Instead, as noted, the result is 

that the employee bears "the burden of proof on the ultimate issue 

of discrimination." See Alvarez-Fonseca, 152 F.3d at 28.
- 25 - 

employer's] proffered reason was pretext specifically designed to 

mask gender discrimination."). 

One method of showing that an employer's stated reasons 

are pretextual "is to produce evidence that the plaintiff was 

treated differently than other similarly situated employees." 

Kosereis v. Rhode Island, 331 F.3d 207, 214 (1st Cir. 2003) 

(citations omitted). While the "examples of disparate treatment 

'need not be perfect replicas, . . . they must closely resemble 

one another in respect to relevant facts and circumstances.'" Id. 

(quoting Conward v. Cambridge Sch. Comm., 171 F.3d 12, 20 (1st 

Cir. 1999)). In other words, when comparing the plaintiff's 

experience to that of other employees, "apples should be compared 

to apples." Woodward v. Emulex Corp., 714 F.3d 632, 639 (1st Cir. 

2013) (quoting Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth Coll., 889 F.2d 13, 

19 (1st Cir. 1989)). 

After reviewing the record, we conclude that Garcia's 

gender discrimination claims under "Law 100 fail because he has 

not 'proffered sufficient admissible evidence, if believed, to 

prove by a preponderance of the evidence . . . that the employer's 

justification . . . was merely a pretext for impermissible [gender] 

discrimination.'" See Velázquez-Fernández v. NCE Foods, Inc., 476 

F.3d 6, 11 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Woodman v. Haemonetics Corp., 

51 F.3d 1087, 1092 (1st. Cir. 1995) (ellipses in original)). In 

support of his pretext argument, he claims "similarly situated 
- 26 - 

female employees" were treated differently and cites several 

examples of employee wrongdoings that went unpunished.23 

First, Garcia notes that three female employees, 

including Beatriz Gomez, Rocío Mendez, and Johanne Oquendo, were 

allowed to continue their employment at Costco after they admitted 

to authorizing a $95,000 purchase which was later discovered to be 

fraudulent. Garcia suggests that the monetary amount involved in 

this incident alone should have been enough to terminate these 

employees. Even assuming that the employees implicated in the 

incident were "similarly situated" because of the monetary value 

of the fraud, a crucial fact, which Garcia acknowledged at 

deposition but omitted from his brief, is that this incident also 

involved two male employees who like their female colleagues were 

not terminated. See Mariani-Colón v. Dep't of Homeland Sec. ex 

rel. Chertoff, 511 F.3d 216, 222 (1st Cir. 2007). 

To have a plausible differential treatment claim, Garcia 

was required to first show that employees of the opposite sex were 

similarly situated and that he "was treated differently and then 

that gender was the reason for that difference." Rivas Rosado v. 

Radio Shack, Inc., 312 F.3d 532, 534 (1st Cir. 2002) (citations 

omitted). Given that male employees were also involved, this fraud 

 

23 The examples he cites throughout his brief, however, also involve 

male employees, are overly broad, do not involve employees 

"similarly situated," or encompass some combination of these fatal 

flaws. 
- 27 - 

incident does little to support Garcia's allegation that he was 

treated differently than female employees, let alone "that gender 

was the reason for that difference." Id. Even when viewed in the 

light most favorable to him, an example involving unpunished male 

and female employees does not support a finding that he was 

discriminated against based on his gender. 

Second, Garcia maintains that Johanne Oquendo and Rocío 

Mendez were involved in some sort of "issue with the use and 

payment of the chemicals," but were allowed to continue working at 

Costco.24 Garcia also cites to an incident where Rocío Mendez 

failed to follow managerial procedure after she observed another 

employee improperly use Garcia's password to access AS400. We can 

easily dispose of both examples as Garcia fails to explain exactly 

how these women were "similarly situated" to him--he provides no 

detail and no support other than his subjective belief that he was 

being discriminated against by Costco. See Mariani-Colón, 511 

F.3d at 222 (summary judgment affirmed in favor of employer in 

employee's Title VII discrimination claim because employee's 

"statements merely reflect [his] 'subjective speculation and 

suspicion' that he was treated unfairly") (quoting Quinones v. 

Buick, 436 F.3d 284, 290 (1st Cir. 2006)). His general statements 

 

24 The district court did not consider this allegation as it held 

it was not sufficiently supported by the record. 
- 28 - 

that are not properly supported by the record fail to carry the 

day. 

Prior to the inventory discrepancies and Garcia's 

termination, Garcia had been repeatedly promoted by Costco and 

"[t]here were no statements or behaviors by [Costco agents] 

involved in terminating [Garcia] from which an inference of 

discrimination could be drawn." See Rivas Rosado, 312 F.3d at 

534. The evidence presented at summary judgment would not permit 

a reasonable jury to find that Garcia had carried his burden of 

proof on the ultimate issue of discrimination. After taking a 

fresh look ourselves, we conclude that the district court did not 

err in dismissing with prejudice Garcia's gender discrimination 

claim. 

D. Retaliation (Law 69) 

Moving along, Garcia alleges that his discharge was an 

act of retaliation after he complained to Costco agents that he 

was being treated differently than his female co-workers--recall 

he told Dempsey, Soto, and Farano during the inventory 

investigation that Beatriz Gomez, Rocío Mendez, and Johanne 

Oquendo were not disciplined after engaging in similar alleged 

misconduct. Law 69, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29 § 1340, contains a 

retaliation provision that mirrors one of its federal law 

counterparts under Title VII. The statute provides, in relevant 

part, that: "[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer 
- 29 - 

. . . to dismiss or discriminate against any employee or 

participant who files a complaint or charge, or is opposed to 

discriminatory practices. . . ." P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29 § 1340. 

To prove a claim of retaliation, Garcia must first establish a 

prima facie case, including that (1) he engaged in protected 

conduct; (2) he experienced an adverse employment action; and (3) 

there was a causal connection between the protected conduct and 

the adverse employment action. Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of 

Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 25 (1st Cir. 2004). "[I]nformal protests of 

discriminatory employment practices, including making complaints 

to management, writing critical letters to customers, protesting 

against discrimination by industry or by society in general, and 

expressing support of co-workers who have filed formal changes," 

are instances of protected conduct. Planadeball v. Wyndham 

Vacation Resorts, Inc., 793 F.3d 169, 175 (1st Cir. 2015). 

Garcia maintains that "the facts demonstrate that prior 

to his unlawful termination, [he] grieved of gender based disparate 

treatment" by Costco and that the temporal proximity--being fired 

just seven days after he last grieved--may alone create the causal 

connection "between the firing and the activity because it is 

strongly suggestive of retaliation." See Collazo v. Bristol-Myers 

Squibb Mfg., Inc., 617 F.3d 39, 49 (1st Cir. 2010) ("[O]ur law is 

that temporal proximity alone can suffice to meet the relatively 

light burden of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation.") 
- 30 - 

(quoting DeCaire v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2008)). 

Here, though, any probative force of the chronology is belied by 

the fact that the allegation of discrimination itself only came in 

response to Costco's accusation of a defalcation that was itself 

the cause for the discharge that ensued. See Germanowski v. 

Harris, 854 F.3d 68, 74-75 (1st Cir. 2017). For purposes of this 

appeal, we will nevertheless assume without deciding that Garcia 

has produced adequate evidence to establish a prima facie case. 

See Straughn v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 250 F.3d 23, 33 (1st Cir. 

2001); see also Kouvchinov v. Parametric Tech. Corp., 537 F.3d 62, 

67 (1st Cir. 2008) ("For simplicity's sake, we assume without 

deciding that the plaintiff established a prima facie case 

. . . ."). 

Taking it from there, the burden then shifts to Costco 

to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its action. 

See Collazo, 617 F.3d at 46 (citation omitted). Given Costco's 

reason for discharging Garcia--the inventory discrepancy--as 

discussed in detail above, Costco has met this burden. Having 

been successful, "the burden shifts back to [the plaintiff] to 

show that the proffered legitimate reason is in fact a pretext and 

that the job action was the result of the defendant's retaliatory 

animus." Id. (quoting Roman v. Potter, 604 F.3d 34, 39 (1st Cir. 

2010)). 
- 31 - 

Garcia has presented no evidence by which a reasonable 

jury could conclude that Costco's proffered reason for terminating 

him was mere pretext and that his termination "was the result of 

the defendant's retaliatory animus." Id. (quoting Roman, 604 F.3d 

at 39) (summary judgment for the employer inappropriate in 

retaliation claim where employee had "submitted evidence from 

which a reasonable jury could conclude that the purported company 

reorganization was not the real reason for his termination"). The 

only record evidence Garcia points to in support of his retaliation 

claim is his own deposition statement wherein he states his belief 

that he was "dismissed unjustifiably" and that Costco "took 

reprisals" against him because he noted "that they had done nothing 

against [other employees]." Garcia failed to present any evidence 

to support these "conclusory allegations." See Vives v. Fajardo, 

472 F.3d 19, 21 (1st Cir. 2007) ("Even in retaliation cases, where 

elusive concepts such as motive or intent are at issue, summary 

judgment is appropriate if the non-moving party rests merely upon 

conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported 

speculation.") (internal quotation marks omitted). Having failed 

to present "significant probative evidence tending to support 

[his] [retaliation] claim[,]" we are satisfied that summary 

judgment in favor of Costco on Garcia's retaliation claim was 

appropriate. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 

249 (1986). 
- 32 - 

E. Defamation 

Garcia's final arguments address his defamation claims. 

He contends the judge erred in dismissing his claims and in 

concluding that Costco's communications to others were covered by 

the qualified privilege of intra-business communications. In 

Puerto Rico, "[t]he protection against defamatory or libelous 

expressions has three sources." Giménez Álvarez v. Silen 

Maldonado, 131 P.R. 91, 97 (1992). First, the Constitution of the 

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Art. II, § 8; second, the Libel and 

Slander Act, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 32 §§ 3141-3149; and third, Civil 

Code § 1802, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31 § 5141. Id. at 97-98 (citations 

omitted). 

A defamation claim based on all three sources of Puerto 

Rico law "requires that the plaintiff prove: (1) that the 

information is false, (2) that plaintiff suffered real damages, 

and (3) in the case of a private figure plaintiff, that the 

publication was negligent.” Ayala-Gerena v. Bristol Myers-Squibb 

Co., 95 F.3d 86, 98 (1st Cir. 1996) (quoting Mojica Escober v. 

Roca, 926 F. Supp. 30, 33 (D.P.R. 1996)); see P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 

32 §§ 3142-43. "[P]ublication" is an essential element of the 

claim and can be met "when the defamatory statement is communicated 

to a third person, that is, someone other than the person defamed." 

Porto y Siurano v. Bentley P.R., Inc., 132 P.R. 331, 347-48 (1992). 
- 33 - 

In Porto y Siurano, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico discussed the 

publication element in the corporate context. Id. at 348. 

As at issue here, communications within an organization 

"among 'managers or supervisors of a discharged employee, 

regarding the reasons for'" an employee's discharge are covered by 

a conditional privilege. Soto-Lebrón v. Fed. Express Corp., 538 

F.3d 45, 63 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Porto y Siurano, 132 P.R. at 

353-54). Because the privilege is conditional, it is lost if the 

employer abuses it by giving the statement "excessive publicity" 

or by publishing it for "improper reasons." Id. The privilege 

also vanishes if the publication is made to one whom there is no 

reason to believe will protect the author's interest or the 

community's. Porto y Siurano, 132 P.R. at 354. 

 Garcia argues that the district court twice erred, first 

by ruling that Costco's publications were subject to privilege;

according to Garcia, Costco "abused its conditional . . . privilege 

by publicizing defamatory statements to other [Costco] employees 

who had no right to know about Garcia's termination of employment." 

Second, Garcia argues that he "proffered evidence to prove malice," 

as the statements "were made with knowledge of falsity and reckless 

disregard as to their truth." 

We agree with the district court's conclusion that 

Garcia's allegations in support of his defamation claims "are the 

textbook definition of 'conclusory.'" As the district court noted, 
- 34 - 

all that Garcia put forth fell into three groups: "(1) 

conversations that he sustained with his superiors as part of the 

investigation into the inventory discrepancies;" "(2) alleged 

information relayed . . . by . . . other Costco employees" 

(including Garcia's father-in-law who worked at Costco); and "(3) 

two emails sent by Jerry Dempsey to Yoram Robanenko and David Soto" 

accusing Garcia of altering company documents. 

As it relates to group one conversations--Garcia's 

superiors accusing him "of negligence, lying, stealing 

merchandise[,] and of manipulating inventory and its data[,]"--

clearly these communications are intra-business communications 

covered by the qualified privilege. See Porto, 132 P.R. at 354-

55. Garcia has failed to present any evidence to support his 

allegation that the privilege was lost due to "excessive 

publication" or that any publication was made for "improper 

reasons." See Soto-Lebrón, 538 F.3d at 63. As the nonmoving party 

at the summary judgment stage, Garcia was tasked with providing 

more than mere allegations; he was required to "set forth specific 

facts showing that there [were] genuine issue[s] for trial." 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56). Garcia 

has failed to meet his burden.25 Furthermore, even if the 

 25 In granting summary judgment the district court expressed 

that "other than his own averments, [Garcia] has not shown that 

the statements in question[] damaged his reputation or honor." We 

pause to note, however, that to the extent the statements are that 
- 35 - 

conditional privilege had been lost, Garcia cannot meet the 

publication element required because these accusations were 

communicated to him, not to third parties. See Porto y Siurano, 

132 P.R. at 347. 

Moreover, as it relates to the remaining groups two and 

three statements--those purportedly made by Costco managers to 

employees, which eventually made their way to Garcia--we agree 

with the district court that they "are based on nothing more than 

hearsay and gossip, and, as such, do not provide a solid basis for 

a defamation claim." Garcia presented no supporting affidavits or 

deposition transcripts from the individuals who allegedly learned 

these defamatory statements from Costco managers. The deposition 

transcript of Israel Echevarría-Nieves (Garcia's father-in-law), 

which accompanied Garcia's objection to Costco's motion for 

summary judgment, does not provide any support for Garcia's 

allegations. Echevarría-Nieves (like we mentioned earlier), an 

 

Garcia is a thief, he would not be required to establish harm. 

See González Pérez v. Gómez Aguila, 312 F. Supp. 2d 161, 174 

(D.P.R. 2004) (citing Pérez–Rosado v. El Vocero de Puerto Rico, 

149 P.R. 427 (1999)) ("[T]he Puerto Rico Supreme Court has held 

that publications in which the commission of a crime is imputed 

are considered libelous per se."). 
- 36 - 

employee at a separate Costco store, noted that his manager, Rafael 

Reyes, asked him what he thought had occurred at store #365 but 

that he didn't have an answer for him. According to EchevarríaNieves, his manager said that prices were inflated and that numbers 

did not match, and that Garcia "had no reasoning or answer to 

that;" "that it appeared that it was either they had stolen the 

merchandise or they had inflated the inventories." When 

specifically asked whether Reyes had told him that Garcia had 

stolen the merchandise, Echevarría-Nieves responded: "No. 

[Reyes] just said that he didn't understand how something like 

that could've happened." Not only is this statement hearsay, even 

if it were admitted and accepted, it readably does not support 

Garcia's claims. See United States v. $8,440,190.00 in U.S. 

Currency, 719 F.3d 49, 61 (1st Cir. 2013) ("[I]t 'is black-letter 

law that hearsay evidence cannot be considered on summary judgment 

for the truth of the matter asserted[.]'") (quoting Kenney v. 

Floyd, 700 F.3d 604, 609 (1st Cir. 2012)). 

Accordingly, even viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to Garcia, he has completely failed to present any 

triable issue relating to his defamation claims to survive summary 

judgment. Accordingly, we affirm the entry of summary judgment in 

favor of Costco.26 

 26 Garcia also claims that the district court erred by not 

separately addressing his constitutional causes of action. While 
- 37 - 

 AFFIRMED. 

 

Garcia attempts to characterize his constitutional claim as an 

independent claim, what he alleges--that his "dignity was 

transgressed and utterly violated resulting from Costco's 

continuous badgering and hostile working environment in calling 

him a thief and a liar"--sounds like defamation. "[M]erely 

relabeling [his] arguments does nothing to advance them." Coors 

Brewing Co. v. Méndez-Torres, 678 F.3d 15, 27 (1st Cir. 2012); 

see Brown v. Hearst Corp., 54 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 1995) 

(restatement of a defamation claim as a "false light" privacy claim 

merited no independent discussion). Moreover, Garcia does not 

specify in his constitutional argument exactly who made the 

statements and to whom the statements were made. On top of that, 

in his filing to the district court, and again in his brief to us, 

Garcia quotes a Puerto Rico Supreme Court case, Garcia Benavente 

v. Aljoma Lumber, 2004 T.S.P.R. 125 (2004), in support of his 

argument that his constitutional claim should stand even though 

his defamation claim failed, but Garcia "has not provided a 

translation as required by this court's rules." Hoyos, 488 F.3d 

1, 6 (citing 1st Cir. Loc. R. 30[e]). As such, "the case may not 

be used to support his position." Id. (citing López-González v. 

Mun. of Comerío, 404 F.3d 548, 552-53 n.4 (1st Cir. 2005)). For 

all these reasons, we affirm summary judgment in favor of Costco 

on Garcia's constitutional claims. We also reject Garcia's 

argument that Costco has waived any defense regarding his 

constitutional claim.