### FI LED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT J une 16 , 2 004 THO MAS K. KAH N CL ERK

Honora ble J . Owen F orre ster, United States District Judge f or the Nor

thern District of * Geor g ia, sitting by

desig nation [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 03- 1133 8

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N os. 00-0000 7-CV -W CO- 2 and 96-00 020 CR-1-2 RANDY LAMAR BLACK, Petitioner-Appellee, ve rs us UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, Re spon de nt- Appe llant.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the N orthe rnD istri ct

of G eo rg ia

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (J un e 16, 200 4) Before BA RKE TT and KRA VI TC H, Circuit Judges, and FO RRE ST ER , D istrict * Judg e.2

Randy Lam ar B lack, currently

serving four life sentences for drug-related of fe nse s, f ile d th e ins tant 2 8 U . S. C. § 22 55 p et iti on t o va cate his li fe se nte nc e fo r co nspi ra cy

to poss es s m ar ij uanaand m etha m phe tam ine ba se d onac la im of in effe ct iv e as si st an ce o f co un se l. T he c onsp ir ac y

in thi s c as e inv olv ed

tw o dr ugs, m ar ij uanaand m et ha m ph et am in e, whi ch carr ie d d iff eren t s ta tu to ry

m ax im um sen te nc es . A convictio n for conspiracy to distrib ute m arij uana carr ied with it a statutory m axim um sentence of ten y ears f

or a person in Black’ s posi tion . See 21 U. S. C. § 841 (b)(1)( D) . A c onvi ction for a conspiracy invol ving m etham

phetam ine, how ev er , w as sub

j ec t t o astatut or

y m ax im um se nte nc e of

li fe im pr iso nm en t. 21 U . S. C. § 84 1( b) (1 )( A )( vii i) . A t the he ar t of Bl ac k’ s c la im

is his c ont en tio n th at

he w as w ro ngl y

se nte nc ed

to lif e im pr iso nm en t un de r his c onsp ir ac y c onvi ct ion because the general ver dict did n ot sho w that the j ury found him

guiltyof a conspiracy

that had the objective of distributing the drug with the higher sentence. A ft er Bl ac k’ s tr ia l, the j ur

y r et ur ne d age ne ra l ve rd ic t of

gui lty a s to co nspi ra cy

to poss es s w ithint en t t o di str ibu te m ar ij uanaand m etha m phe tam ine in vio la tio n of

21 U . S. C. § 84 1( a) (1 ) an d 21 U . S. C. § 84 6; f our c ount s of kno w ing ly an d in te nti ona lly

pos se ssi ng w ithint en t t o di str ibu te m etha m phe tam ine in vio la tio n of

21 U . S. C. § 84 1( a) (1 ); and know ing ly thr eate nin g to c au se bod ilyAt se nte nc ingand

on dir e c t a pp e a l, B la c k c onte nd e d th at th e c ourt e rr e d in attr ibutin gto 1 him 100 gr ams of methamphe tamine. The Pre sentenc e Investig ation Report ca lculated that 70.2 gra m s we re i n v o l v edi nBl ac k ’s ac tu al co n d u ctun d er th e p o s s es s i o nco un t s . T h e t ri al j u d ge found other e vidence attributing a g reater qua

ntity of the drugto be re liable and se ntence d Bla ck for possession of more than 100 g rams of me thamphetamine. At no point duringthe sentenc ing hear ing or

on appea l did counsel object to the attribution of any methamphetamine to B lack f or the purposes of

calc ulating his sente nce unde r the fir st count of conspira cy . Bla ck’s c ontention reg ardingattribution of drugquantities for the posse ssion sentence s was re solved on direc t a pp e a l. 3 inj ur y to, and d am ag e to the tangi ble pr ope rty of , aw itn es s inr et al ia tio n f or co m m un ic at in g i nf

or m at io n t o l aw en fo rcem en t i n v io la ti on of 1 8 U.S.C. § 1513 (b )( 2) . B la ck

w as se nte nc ed

to fo ur li fe se nte nc es , 360 m onths’ i m p ri s o n m en t , a n d1 2 0 m o n t h s ’ impr i s o n m en t , a l l t o ru n co n cu rr en t l y. Bl ac k ’s tr ia l c ouns el ne ith er

r eque ste d aspe ci al ve rd ic t a t tri al nor obj ec te d to the im posi tio n of

Bl ac k’ s c onsp ir ac y

se nte nc e ba se d up on a

c al cu la tio n of

the quanti tie s of

m etha m phe tam ine a s w el l a s m ar ij uanaa ttr ibu te d to him . B la ck , represe nted by

the sam e counsel, appealed to this court, contending th at the trial co urt e rr ed

in its c al cu la tio n of

the dr ug quanti tie s a ttr ibu ta

ble to Bl ac k un de r his poss ession cou nts, am ong o ther issues. N one of the issues raised on d irect 1 ap pe al , how ev er , r el at ed

to the use of

age ne ra l ve rd ic t f

orm , nor did appe llate co unse l dr awto the c ourt’ s a tte nti on the c as es of E dw ar ds v . U nit ed

S ta te s, 523 U. S. 511 (199 8), and United States v. R iley , 142 F. 3d 12 54 (11th Cir. 1998 ), w hic h w er e de ci de d w hil e the appe al w as pe ndi ng.A proc edura l defa ult created by

a fa ilure to appe al ca

n also be ove rcome if a de fenda nt 2 can showa funda

mental miscarr iag e of justice, suc h as ac tual innocenc e. Mills, 36 F.3d at 1055 (citingMurra

y v. Carrie r, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)) . Bla ck, howe ver, ha s made no such s h o wi n g. 4 Ge nerally , if

a challenge to a c onvi ction or sentence is not m ade on direct ap pe al , it w ill be pr oc ed

ur al ly barr ed in a 28 U . S. C. § 22 55 c ha lle nge . Mi lls v. U n i t e dS t a t e s , 3 6 F . 3 d1 0 5 2 , 1 0 5 5 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1 9 9 4 ) . Ad e f e n d a n tmay o v e r c o me this procedural default by showing bo th cause for his default as w ell as de m onstratin g a ct

ua l pr ej udi ce suf

fe re d a s ar es ult

of the a lle ge d e rr or . I d. I n th e 2 ins tant m atte r, Bl ac k e sse nti al ly c ont en ds tha t hi s c ouns el w as ine ff ec tiv e in failing to po int ou t two ca ses, E dwar ds and Riley , decided after the appeal w as filed, but before the appeal w as decided that would lim it the m axim um sentence on the c onsp ir ac y

c ount to te n y ears . I n or de r to p re va il on this c la im , Bl ac k m ust showthat c ouns el ’ s pe rf

orm an ce w as so d ef

ic ie nt tha t i t f

el l be lowan ob

j ec tiv e standard of r ea sona ble ne ss a s w el l a s de m onstrate that bu t f or the de fi ci en t pe rf orm an ce , the out co m e of

the appe al w oul d have be endif fe re nt. C ha te loi n v. Si ngl et ar y , 89 F . 3d 7 49, 752 ( 11th C ir . 199 6) ( ci tin g S tr ic kland v . W as hin gto n, 466 U.S . 668, 687 (1984); Matire v. W ainwright, 811 F. 2d 14 30, 1435 (11t h Cir. 19 87 )).5

Inthi s c oll at er al a tta ck , the dis tr ic t c ourt he ld tha t tri al c ouns el ’ s f ai lur e to as k f or aspe ci al ve rd ic t onthe dua l- obj ec t c onsp ir ac y c ount , or obj ec t t o th e inclusio n of m etham

phetam ine quantit ies for ca lculation o f his conspiracy sentence, did no t render his assistance to Black ineff ective. Further, the district co urt f ound that B la ck

did not suf fe r fr om ine ff ec tiv e as sis tanc e of

appe llate co un se l wh en co un se l d idno t b rin g t o t he att en ti on of t he co ur t o f ap pe al two cas es de ci de d wh il e Bl ack ’s di rect ap pe al was s ti ll pe nd in g. Aft er re vi ew, we a f f i rm. In order to evaluate whether appellate counsel’ s perform ance w as o b je ct i v el y re as o n ab l e , i ti s i m p o rt an tt o u n d er s t an dth e c o n t ex ti n wh i ch Bl ac k ’s co u n s el wo u l dh av e r ec ei v ed an du n d er s t o o d Ed wa rd s an dRi l ey. F o r B l ac k ’s co unse l, U nit ed

S ta te s v. D en nis , 786 F . 2d 1 029 (1 1thCi r. 198 6) , w as the lawof the circuit both at the tim e of trial and as of the date the direct appeal w as filed. In D en nis , f our de fe ndants w er e fo und gui lty of ac onsp ir ac y

“ to k now ing ly , w ill fu lly an d in te nti ona lly

dis tr ibu te and p oss es s w ithint en t t o di str ibu te quanti tie s of co ntr oll ed

sub stanc es , inc lud ing he ro in, c oc ai ne , m ar ij uana , and t al w in, ” in violatio n of 21 U. S. C. § 846 . Id. at 1032 . Ea ch defendant wa s also convi cted of at le as t on e subs tanti ve dr

ug o ff en se . I d. T w o de fe ndants ha d a ske d a t tri al that the j ur y r et ur n aspe ci al ve rd ic t sp ec if

y ing the obj ec t dr

ugs in the c onsp ir ac y , but thi s6

re que st w as de nie d by

the dis tr ic t c ourt j udge . I d. a t 10 37- 38. U nde r the ap pli ca ble law , the m ax im

um c onsp ir ac y

se nte nc e fo r m ar ij uanaw as f ive y ears , while up to fifteen y ears im prisonm ent could be im

posed for a conspiracy inv olv ing he ro in o r co ca ine . I d. a t 10 38. D ef en dants r ec ei ve d se nte nc es r an gin g be twee n fo uran d t en y ears on th e co ns pi racy cou nt . Id. O n a ppe al , the D en nis de fe ndants c ont en de d th at the tr ia l c ourt e rr ed

in sentencing th ese defe ndants as to the conspiracy count in th e absence of a special ve rd ic t i ndi catin g w hic h dr ugs w er e fo und by

the j ur y to ha ve be enthe obj ec t of the conspiracy . Id. at 1033 . While we agreed that a tr ial j udge sho uld require a j ur y to ind ic at e w hic h of

the c harg ed

dr ugs w er e obj ec ts o f the c onsp ir ac y , w e he ld that a f ai lur e to d o so w as not

ne ce ssari ly

r ev er sib le e rr or . I d. a t 10 38- 39. Appellants m ay

not prevail on th eir cla im sim ply by showing that the y w er e co nvi ct ed

und er c onsp ir ac y

ins tr uc tio ns whic h, on the ir face , m ight p erm it the jury to return a guilty

verdict if the conspiracy fo und did not inv olv e [the hig he r- pe na liz ed dr ug] . I t m ust a lso ap pe ar that the e vid en ce w oul d su ppor t su chac onstru ct ionof

the ve rd ic t a ct

ua lly obt ai ne d. Id . a t 10 39. T he c ourt f

ound that the e vid en ce sho w ed be y ond a re as ona

ble doubt that the consp iracy

invol ved cocaine and heroin and therefore a ffirm ed. Id . at 1040 , 105 0. A cc or din gly , und er the lawof

the c ir cu it at

the ti m e of

tr ia l, and a s of the f ili ng o f Bl ac k’ s di re ct

a ppe al , Bl ac k’ s c ouns el w oul d have und er sto od tha t the7

la ck of aspe ci al ve rd ic t w as not of it se lf suf fi ci en t t o c re at e a suc ce ssf ul a ppe llate argum ent. I nstead, Blac k’ s counsel would h ave known that he would be required unde r D en nis to shownot onl y that the j ur

y ins tr uc tio ns c oul d be r ea d to a llo w j urors to convi ct Black of a m arij uana-only

conspiracy , but also that the evidence w o u l ds up p o rtac o n s t r

u c t i o n th a tth e ju ry i n t e n d e dt o c o n v i c tB l a c ko f o n l y a m ar ij uanac onsp ir ac y , to the e xc lus ionof ac onstru ct ionthat w oul d sh owj ur or int en t t o c onvi ct

Bl ac k of am ar ij uanaand m etha m phe tam ine c onsp ir ac y . T he gove rn m en t’ s e vid en ce he re be gin s w itham ar ij uanatr an sa ct ionw ithBl ac k, but thereaf ter all of the e vidence dealt with m etham phetam ine and, there fore, counsel had no serious argum ent to advance under Dennis. It w as with such an unde rs tandi ng o f the lawof the c ir cu it that B la ck ’ s c ouns el w oul d have r ea d and i n t e r p r e t e dEd w a r d s an dR i l e y. Both Edwards and Riley

consider the sentencing o f a def endant convi cted by general ver dict of a dual-obje ct drug conspi racy when the sentence im

posed do es no t ex ceed th e p en al ty for t he dru g wi th th e lo wes t m ax im um sen te nc e. E dw ar ds, 523 U . S. a t 51 5; R ile y , 142 F . 3d at 12 56. I n E dw ar ds v . U nit ed S ta te s, the pe tit ion er s w er e co nvi ct ed by ge ne ra l ve rd ic t of

c onsp ir ac y

to poss es s c oc ai ne and cocaine base, or cra ck. 523 U.S . 511, 513 (1998). A s a general ver dict form w as use d, the pe tit ion er s c ont en de d th at the dis tr ic t c ourt j udge e rr ed in8

co nsi de ri ng the quanti ty

of both dr ugs, and n ot m er el y

c oc ai ne , w he n im

posi ng a se nte nc e unde r the S en te nc ing G uid el ine s. I d. T he Co urt he ld tha t “ in the ci rc um stanc es of

thi s c as e the j udge w as auth or iz ed to de te rm ine f

or se nte nc ing purpos es whether

cra ck, a s well a s cocaine, wa s invo lved in th e offe nse-relate d activities.” I d. T he sentence im posed di d not exceed the m axim um sentence for a cocaine-only

conspiracy

and the Suprem e Court held that it did n ot m atter whether the j udge a ssu m ed

the j ur y c onvi ct ed

the pe tit ion er s of

ac onsp ir ac y

inv olv ing onlycocaine or both cocaine and cra ck, bec ause the Sentencing Guidelines in st ru cta jud ge to co ns id er al l “ rel ev an t co nd uc t.” Id . at 5 14 , U.S.S.G. § 1B 1.3 . Af ter the Suprem e Court handed down its decision in Edw ards, this court ha d oc ca sio n to c onsi de r a sim ilar iss ue in U nit ed S ta te s v. Ri le y , 142 F . 3d 1 254 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1 9 9 8 ) . I n R i l e y, a s i n Ed w a r d s , th e p e t i t i o n e r s h a db e e n c o n v i c t e db y a ge ne ra l ve rd ic t f

or ac onsp ir ac y

to poss es s w ithint en t t o di str ibu te tw o dr ugs, cocaine powder and cocaine base. Id. at 1255. T he Riley petition ers, too, w ere sentenced under the Guidelines on th e basis of both form s of cocaine and appealed the dis tr ic t c ourt j udge ’ s de ci sio n to c onsi de r the quanti tie s of both c oc ai ne and crac k invo lved in th e conspiracy . Id. at 1256 . Citing Edwar ds, the Riley panel he ld tha t “ a se nte nc ing j udge is not li m ite d to c onsi de ri ng the of fe nse of convictio n. Rather, the j udge m ay sentence for both of

fe nse c ondu ct and

any9

oth er ‘ re le vant c ondu ct . ’ ” I d. a t 12 56 ( int er na l c itatio ns o m itt ed ) (e m pha sis in or ig in al ). In Sm ith v. Singletary , w e held that counsel’s ignorance of a we ll-defined le ga l pr inc ipl e co uld

be ine xc usa

ble and d em onstrate ine ff ec tiv e pe rf

orm an ce by co unse l. 170 F . 3d 1 051, 105 4 ( 11th C ir . 199 9) . I f the le ga l pr inc ipl e at iss ue is unsettled, however, counsel will not have rendered deficient perf orm ance f

or an er ro r in j udgm en t. I d. ; P itt s v. Co ok, 923 F . 2d 1 568, 157 3 ( 11 Ci r. 199 1) ( fa ili ng th t o ra i s e a Ba t s o n cl ai m

b ef o re Ba t s o n h ad b ee n d ec i d ed d i dn o tre n d erco u n s el ’s p er fo rman ce d ef

i ci en t ). Th u s , i f a re as o n ab l e a t t o rn ey i n ap p el l at e c o u n s el ’s posi tio n c oul d have c onc lud ed that a giv enportio n of

an op ini on w as dic tum discuss ing an un settled questi on of law and no t bind ing auth ority for his case, that attor ne y ’ s pe rf

orm an ce w ill not

be de em ed

de fi ci en t f

or not r ai sin g th at

iss ue to th e co ur t. See Sm it h v . Sin gl et ary, 17 0 F .3dat 1 05 4. D ic tum is a term that has been variouslydefined as a statem ent that neither constitu tes the holdi ng of a case, no r ari se s fr om

a pa rt o f th e o pi ni on th atis ne ces sa ry to th e h ol di ng of t he cas e. Se m ino le T ri be of

F la . v. F lor ida , 517 U . S. 44, 66- 67 ( 1996 ); se e al so U . S. v. H unt er , 172 F . 3d 1 307, 131 0 ( 11th C ir . 199 9) ( Carn es , J. , c onc ur ri ng) ( dis cu ssi ng the dif fe re nc e be tw ee n bi ndi ng p re ce de nt and d ic taand s ta tin g th at , “ [t ] he hold ings o f a prior decision can reach only as far as the fac ts and circum stances10

pr es en te d to the Co urt i n th e ca se w hic h pr oduc ed the de ci sio n. ”) . Whil e the

“ re le vant c ondu ct ” pr inc ipl e is a c le ar hol din g of

both E dw ar ds and R ile y , both ca se s a lso c onsi de r the hy pothe tic al se nte nc ing of

ade fe ndant c onvi ct ed

by ge ne ra l ve rd ic t of

adua l- obj ec t dr

ug c onsp ir ac y

w he n th e obj ec ts o f the conspiracy

car ry differ ing m axim

um statutory sentences. Edw ards, 523 U.S . at 51 5; Ril ey , 14 2 F .3dat 1 25 6. A cc or din gly , w e m ust de te rm ine if

ar ea sona

ble attorney in the posi tion o f Blac k’ s appellate counsel in 19 98, w hile direct appeal wa s still pen ding , c ouldhave concluded that th e hy poth etical scenar io consid ered i n th e tw o c a s e s wa s s i mp l y dic ta and d id n ot p ro vid e bin din g auth or ity f or Black’ s case. InE dw ar ds, a ft er

the c ourt he ld tha t a

se nte nc ing j udge m ay

c onsi de r al l re le vant c ondu ct

in im posi ng a se nte nc e unde r the G uid el ine s, the Co urt w en t on to d isc uss af

ac tua l si tuatio n w hic h di d no t a ct ua lly e xis t i n E dw ar ds: O f co ur se , pe tit ion er s’ statut or y and c onst itu tio na l c la im s w oul d m ake a diff

erence if it w ere poss ible to argue, say , that the sentences im posed exceeded the m axim um that the statutes perm it for a co ca ine -o nly

c onsp ir ac y . T ha t i s be ca use am ax im

um se nte nc e se t by statute trum

ps a higher sentence set forth in the Guidelines. B ut, as the G ove rnm en t po int s ou t, the se nte nc es im pose d he re w er e w ith in the statut or

y li m its appl ic ab le to a co ca ine -o nly c onsp ir ac y , giv enthe quantit ies of that drug attributed to each petitioner.11

523 U.S . at 515 (internal citations om itted). B lack points to this h y poth etical dis cu ssi on and arg ue s th at ar ea sona

ble a tto rn ey

w oul d have arg ue d to the c ourt of appeals, based upon this passage, that Bla ck’ s sentence wa s in error a s it exceeded the statut or

y m ax im um f or am ar ij uanac onsp ir ac y . N ota bly , how ev er , the langua ge m ost

use fu l t o B la ck , thi s di sc uss ionof m ax im um se nte nc es f

or adua lobj ec t c onsp ir ac y , aro se in the c ont ex t of ahy pothe tic al c ir cum stanc e an d no t ou t of the a ct ua l f ac ts o f the c as e be fo re the Co urt. F urthe r, af ai r re ad ing of

E dw ar ds ind ic at es that the Co urt’ s di sc uss ionw as not ne ce ssary

to de ci de the iss ue presented, a s the court had already decided that a sentencing judge wa s authorized to d et er m ine w ha t c ontro lle d su

bst an ce s w er e at

iss ue , and the quanti tie s of tho se subs tances, under the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 513-14. T he subsequ ent Riley opi nio n m en tio ne d th is s am e langua ge in E dw ar ds, not ing that the E dw ar ds r ule did no t apply

if the am ount of one controlled sub stance w ouldlead to a lowe r statut or y m ax im um se nte nc e than w oul d oc cur ba se d up on the a m ount of the se co nd c ontro lle d su

bst an ce . 142 F . 3d at 12 56. H er e ag ai n, tho ugh, the langua ge in Riley that supp orts Black’ s posi tion d id not apply to the facts in Riley

and was not ne ce ssary

to re sol ve the a ct

ua l qu es tio n be fo re the c ourt: se nte nc ing und er the Gui de li ne s fo r two dru gs carry in g t he same sta tu to ry m ax im um sen te nc e. Id .12

Ac cordingly , the f

acts and circum stances of E dwar ds and Riley are distin ct fro m a si tu at io n i n wh ic h d iff

eren t m ax im

um sen te nc es were i n fa ctim pl ic at ed . Mor eo ve r, the dis cu ssi on o f pr ope r se nte nc ing f or m ult ipl e- obj ec t dr

ug conspiracies invo lving subst ances w ith different statutory m axim um sentences wa s not ne ce ssary

to the r es olu tio n of

e ith er E dw ar ds and R ile y ; r em ovi ng the r el ev an t passages from

the opini ons do es not change their central holding that j udges are free to consid er not only

offense c ondu ct but also all relevant conduct when se nte nc ing c ri m ina ls unde r the G uid el ine s. E dw ar ds, 523 U . S. a t 51 4; R ile y , 142 F. 3d at 12 56. F urthe r, our opi nio n inRi le y

did not m en tio n U nit ed

S ta te s v. D en nis , sti ll the lawof

thi s c ir cu it in 1 998. C er ta inl y , the pane l i n R ile y

w oul d no t b e ab l e t o o v e rtu rn th e o p i n i o n o f an o t h e r p a n e l o f th i s c o u rt ; o n l y t h e S up r e me Co urt or thi s c ourt si tti ng en ban c c oul d a cc om pli sh s uc h ata sk. S ee G la zn er v. G la zn er , 347 F . 3d 1 212, 121 4 ( 11th C ir . 200 3) ; se e al so S ax tonv. A CF I ndus tr ie s, In c. , 254 F . 3d 9 59, 960 n. 1 ( 11th C ir . 200 1) . A s di sc uss ed above , how ev er , af

ai r re ad ing of

E dw ar ds c oul d le ad

an a tto rn ey

to be lie ve that the r el ev an t l an gua ge re qui ri ng a

spe ci al ve rd ic t w as dic tum , and the tot al sil en ce in Ri le y r eg ar din g Den ni s ce rta in ly w ou ldno t p ro vi de an y ad di ti on al gu id an ce t o B la ck ’s cou ns el . T hus, ar ea sona

ble a tto rn ey

c oul d have c onc lud ed

that D en nis w as sti ll the lawof the c ir cu it. F or

a ll the se r ea sons , Bl ac k’ s a ppe llate c ouns el , r ea din g th es e ca se s inA ca ref ul rea ding of

this footnote, however , could lend its support to a diffe rent 3 c on c lus ion . It is qu ite po ssi ble that th e “ ho ldi ng ” in E dw ard s to wh ic h th e Ap pr e nd i f oo tno te ref ers is not a holdingthat sentenc es ca nnot exceed the statutory

maxi mum sentence for the low e r- se nte nc e d d

ru g , b ut r athe r a

ho ldi ngthat a

maximumse nte nc e se t by a statut e wi ll trump any c ontr ary pr ov isi on s p ro vid e d in

the Se nte nc ingGu ide lin e s. Whe the r t he Ed wa rd s st ate me nts beca me a holdingby

virtue of Appr endi is irrele vant, howeve r, to the matter at hand. As an initial matter, the question befor e us is not whether or not Edwar ds was bindinglaw, but whethe r a fa ilure to ref

er to Edwa

rds in 1998 would rende r counse l’s perf ormanc e to fa ll below standards of objec tive rea sonablene ss. Furthe r, the holdingin Allen eff ectively made the dic tum, or holding, of

Edwar ds the law of this circ uit. United States v. Allen, 302 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2002). 13 1998 , w oul d have ve ry

goo d r ea son to b el ie ve that E dw ar ds and R ile y w er e not bin din g onthe sub

j ec t m atte r of

Bl ac k’ s a

ppe al but r athe r co nsi ste d in dic ta . Su bse que ntl y , of

c our se , the S upr em e Co urt a ppe ar s to have state d th at the E dw ar ds d isc uss ionof

dif fe ri ng s ta tut or

y m ax im um se nte nc es w as in fa ct

a hol din g of

the c as e in a

f ootnot e to Appr en di v . N ewJe rs ey . 530 U . S. 466 , 497 n.21 (2000). T he pr inc ipa l di sse nt, in ad dit ion , tr eats u s to ale ngthy dis qui sit ion on the be ne fi ts o f de te rm inate se nte nc ing sc he m es , and the e ff ec t of tod ay ’ s de ci sio n onthe f

ed er al S en te nc ing G uid el ine s. T he G uid el ine s are , of

c our se , not

be fo re the Co urt. W e the re fo re e xpr es s no view on the sub

j ect bey ond what this Cou rt has alre ady held. S ee, e. g ., E d wa rd s v . Un i t ed St at es (n o t i n g th at “ [o ]f c o u rs e, p et i t i o n er ’s statutory and constitu tional clam s would m ake a diff erence if it w ere poss ibl e to arg ue , say , that the se nte nc es im pose d e xc ee de d th e m axim um that the statutes perm it for a c ocaine-only conspiracy . That is because a m axim

um sentence set by

statute trum

ps a higher se nte nc e se t f

orth i n th e G uid el ine s. ”) ( som e int er na l c itatio ns om itted). 3In f a c t, a fo otn ote in A lle n d e sc ri be s th e fa c tua l is su e in t hat c a se , s imi lar t o th e fa c ts 4 befor e us in the pre sent ca se, to be a n issue of first impression. 302 F .3d at 1274 n.42. It is not at all clea r, then, that this circ uit reg arde d Edwar ds and Riley to be binding pr ece dent when A llen was de cided in 2002. 14 Furthe r, Appr en di n owr equir es that, “ [o ] the r than th e fa ct of apr ior c onvi ct ion , any fac t that increases the penalty for a crim e bey ond th e prescr ibed statuto ry m axim um m ust be sub m itted to a jury , and provedbey ond a reasonable doub t.” Id . a t 49 0. Mo re ove r, a s th is c ourt m ad e cl ear in A lle n, the hy pothe tic al pos iti on la id o ut i n E dw ar ds and R ile y w as in fa ct

the lawof

the c ir cu it. U nit ed

S ta te s v. A lle n, 302 F . 3d 1 260, 127 4- 75 ( 11th C ir . 200 2) . T he se c lari fi catio ns and 4 hold ings, however, we re not handed down unt il several y ears a fter dire ct appeal w as c onc lud ed

in 1998 . T he c en tr al inquir y , the n, m ust be w he the r it is objec tively

rea sonable to require Black’ s counsel to have predicted in 1998 that th e la ng ua ge in he ren t i n Ed ward s an d R il ey lat er wo ul d b e co ns tru edas a ho ld in g. G ive n th e str ong ind ic at ion s f ro m the f ac e of the opi nio ns tha t the langua ge co nc er nin g di ff er ing statut or

y m ax im um se nte nc es w as dic ta , w e find that appellate counsel’ s perform ance w as not deficient for fa iling to predict what w as not y et a ce rtain holdin g. A ccordingly , w e find that Black did not su ffer from such de fi ci en t pe rf

orm an ce on the part

of his appe llate c ouns el a s to f al l be lowthe standard s of

obj ec tiv e re as ona

ble ne ss. A s B la ck

c an not sho wthat hi s a

ppe llate15

counsel’s per form ance w as deficient, he cannot show that he rece ived such ine ff ec tiv e as sis tanc e of

c ouns el a s to ove rc om e his pr oc ed ur al de fa ult f or not rai si ng th is is su e in it ia ll y on ap pe al . E ve n if w e as sum e, how ev er , that B la ck ’ s a ppe llate c ouns el w as ine ff ec tiv e for not arguing th at E dwar ds and Riley required a r eduction in sentence, Black has not sho w n th at

he w as pr ej udi ce d by

thi s f ai lur e. B la ck

w as c onvi ct ed

of f our su bs ta nt iv e co un ts of p os se ss io n wi th in te nt to di st rib ut e m et ha m ph et am in e. Furthe r, e ac h of

the se dis tr ibu tio n c ount s w as a lle ge d to be an ov er t a ct of the co nspi ra cy . T hus, w hil e Bl ac k w as c onvi ct ed of c onsp ir ing to dis tr ibu te dr ugs by general verdict, the great w eight of the evidence shows that the consp iracy inv olv ed m etha m phe tam ine . B la ck ’ s j ur

y w as a dvi se d th at

it ne ed ed to fi nd b oth m etham phetam ine and m arij uana to convict hi m of the conspiracy

charge and was giv enac opy

of the ind ic tm en t w hic h e xpl ic itl y m an da te d th e pr es en ce of both controlled su bstances. More over, under the lawof the circ uit at the tim e of trial an d a ppe al , in or de r to s howthe f ai lur e to u se aspe ci al ve rd ic t w as r ev er sib le error , a defendant had to sho w not only that he wa s convicted of a dual-object co nspi ra cy

by ge ne ra l ve rd ic t, but

a lso that the e vid en ce w oul d on ly sup port a co nvi ct ionund er

the c ontro lle d su

bst an ce w iththe low er

statut or y m ax im umAs no te d a bo ve , B la c k a lso a lle g e s th at tr ia l c ouns e l w a s in e ff e c tiv e at tr ia l f

or fa ili ngto 5 reque st a specia l verdict for m. Howeve r, there is no question that neither Edwa rds nor Riley

was available at the time of trial. F urther, the law of the circ uit at the time of trial was United States v. Dennis, 786 F .2d 1029, 1039 (11th Cir. 1986), which did instruct judg es to employ specia l ve rd ic t f or ms b ut e xplic itl y

no te d th at th e fa ilure to d o s o w ou ld o nly be c on sid e re d p re

jud ic ia l if there was insuffic ient evidenc e to convict the de fenda nt of the under lying substantive c rime. Her e, B lack wa s convicted of possession with intent to di stribute methamphetamine, the underlying substantive c rime, so the fa ilure to reque st a specia l verdict for m would not have constituted reve rsible er

ror. Additionally , the jury instructions and indictment provided su ff ic ie nt i ns tr

uc tio n to the jur

y that th e y we re re qu ir e d to fi nd

a c on sp ir a c y

ba se d u po n b oth dr ug s. 16 se nt en ce. Uni te d S ta te s v . Denn is , 78 6 F .2d10 29 , 10 39 (11 th Cir . 19 86 ). As 5 ev ide nc ed

by the c onvi ct ion s f

or pos se ssi on w ithint en t t o di str ibu te m etha m phe tam ine , Bl ac k w oul d no t be able to showthat the e vid en ce w oul d no t supp ort a conviction for consp iracy to distrib ute m etham

phetam ine. C f. id. at 1040 . A cc or din gly , Bl ac k di d no t su ff er pr ej udi ce f

ro m his a tto rn ey ’ s f

ai lur e to ad dr es s E dw ar ds and R ile y on a ppe al . Fo r al l the r ea sons se t f

orth a bove , the j udgm en t of

the dis tr ic t c ourt i s AFFIR MED.