INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL 

STRATEGIC STUDIES 

CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S 

"VELVET DIVORCE," 

VISEGRAD COHESION, AND 

EUROPEAN FAULT LINES 

JEFFREY SIMON 

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY 

McNair Paper 23 
A popular Government, 

without popular information or the means of 

acquiring it, 

is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or 

perhaps both. 

Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; 

And a people who mean to be their own 

Governors, 

must arm themselves with the power which 

knowledge gives. 

JAMES MADISON to W. T. BARRY 

August 4, 1822 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S "VELVET 

DIVORCE," VISEGRAD 

COHESION, AND EUROPEAN 

FAULT LINES 

JEFFREY SIMON 

McNair Paper 23 

October 1993 

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES 

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY 

Washington, D.C. 

For sale by the U~. Government Printing Office 

Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328 
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY 

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[] Editing and text design: Kathleen A. Lynch 

Jeffrey Simon is a Senior Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies, 

National Defense University. Previously, he was Chief, National Military Strategy 

Branch and Soviet Threat Analyst at the Strategic Studies Institute, US. Army War 

College. He has taught at Georgetown University and has held research positions at 

System Planning Corporation., the RAND Corporation, and the American Enterprise 

Institute. 

From time to time, INSS publishes short papers to provoke thought and inform 

discussion on issues of U.S. national security in the post--Cold War era. These 

monographs present current topics related to national security strategy and 

policy, defense resource management, international affairs, civil-military relations, military technology, and joint, combined, and coalition operations. 

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations, expressed or implied, are those 

of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Defense 

University, the Department of Defense, or any other US. Government agency. 

Readers are invited to submit (nonreturnable) manuscripts for consideration for 

publication. Please submit them in WordPeffect (3o 3.5 inch diskettes with one printout. 

Portions of this publication may be quoted or reprinted without further 

permission, with credit to the Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington, D.C. A courtesy copy of reviews and tearsheets would be appreciated. 

ISSN 1071-7552 
Contents 

Geopolitical Transformation 

For the Czech Republic 

For Slovakia 

Diverging Security Concerns 

Visegrad Cooperation 

Eastern Implications 

2 

3 

4 

6 

7 

9 

Western Responses to Disintegrating Visegrad 

Cooperation 11 

The Visegmd Group 1 2 

The European EC/WEU 1 4 

The Trans-AtlantJc NATO/NACC 1 6 

The Pan-European CSCE 1 9 

What Is to Be Done? 21 
Czechoslovakia's 

"Velvet Divorce," Visegrad Cohesion, and 

European Fault Lines 

JEFFREY SIMON 

The separation of the Czech and Slovak Federated Republic 

(CSFR) into the Czech Republic and Slovakia on 1 January 

1993 did not just draw a new state boundary at the 

Moravian-Slovak border. The psychological and regional 

security implications of the split are much greater: it has 

caused realignment in Central Europe. New borders have 

caused the Czech Republic to turn westward, weakening the 

Visegrad Group and creating the potential for isolating 

Slovakia with reverberations extending to Ukraine. 

Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary created the 

Visegrad triangle on 15 February 1991 to demonstrate the 

ability of the three to overcome historical differences and 

to coordinate their eventual "return to Europe. ''~ This was 

to be achieved by joining Western institutions such as the 

European Community (EC) and the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO). 2 

During most of 1990, 74 percent of the CSFR's 2,141- 

mile border was with then Warsaw Pact allies Poland (813 

miles) and East Germany (285 miles) in the north, Hungary 

(420 miles) in the south, and the Soviet Union (61 miles) 
2 CZECHOSLOVKIA'S "VELVET DIVORCE" 

in the east. Between East and West it shared borders with 

the core of both alliances' Central Regions; the Soviet 

Union and the Federal Republic of Germany (221 miles)) 

CSFR Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier argued that Czechoslovakia's role was to cooperate within the triangle and to 

act as a "bridge" between West and East. This policy 

remained in force through the fall of 1991. 

Geopolitical Transformation 

The geopolitical situation was radically altered by the 

unification of Germany on 3 October 1990, the final 

withdrawal of the Soviet Central Group of Forces from 

Czechoslovakia in June 1991, the termination of the 

Warsaw Pact on 1 July 1991, and the disintegration of the 

former Soviet Union at the end of 1991. Germany's 

unification had significant ramifications for the CSFR. The 

German Democratic Republic disappeared, expanding the 

CSFR's border with NATO Germany to 506 miles; and, as 

a result of the Four-plus-Two Agreement, the CSFR could 

now anticipate the withdrawal of the Western Group of 

Soviet Forces from Germany by 1994. The final withdrawal 

of the Soviet military from Czechoslovakia and formal 

termination of the Warsaw Pact on 1 July 1991 gave the 

CSFR a new sense of independence. The disintegration of 

the Soviet Union led to the emergence of successor 

states---Russia (Kaliningrad), Lithuania, Belarus, and 

Ukraine--on the borders of the Visegrad triangle; Czechoslovakia now had only Ukraine as a neighbor from the 

former Soviet Union. The confidence of Czechoslovakia 

and its Visegrad triangle counterparts was bolstered, and 

they began to push harder in their shift westward. 

The June 1992 CSFR elections paradoxically created the 
JEFFREY SIMON 3 

preconditions for the "velvet divorce. ''4 The key dimension 

of the dispute was not nationalistic, but economic. It related 

to economic equality and inequality in both republics 

where, coincidentally, the same opinion dominated; that 

federation was unprofitable. 5 After deciding that a national 

plebiscite was unnecessary, the new Czech republic and 

Slovak republic governments decided to draw a new state 

border between the CSFR's Moravian and Slovakian republics. On 1 January 1993 two new states--the Czech Republic and Slovakia were created; and the Visegrad Triangle 

became the Visegrad Group. 

FOR THE CZECH REPUBUC. The regional and political 

implications of the split have been dramatic for the Czech 

Republic. From Prague's perspective, the Czech Republic's 

ties to the West have been significantly enhanced. Now 62 

percent of its 1,300-mile border is with German-speaking 

Europe; it shares 806 miles with (unified) Germany and 

Austria. 6 Its borders with Visegrad allies have been reduced 

greatly, to 34 percent; its border with Poland has been 

halved to 440 miles, and its border with Hungary no longer 

exists. On its eastern frontier, Slovakia now provides the 

Czech Republic with a 200-mile buffer with Ukraine. 

The Czech Republic's external regional environment 

provides the necessary stability for the economic, political, 

and social changes on its agenda. In addition, the Czech 

Republic does not have to face the internal problem of large 

ethnic minorities; Slovaks constitute its largest minority, 

numbering only 100,000 (about 1 percent) of its 10.3 

million population at the time of independence. 

Freed of the economic millstone of Slovakia, the Czech 

Republic's economy is now more advanced than its 

Visegrad neighbors. Although the Czech Republic's trade 

declined by 8.8 billion koruny (Kcs) with Slovakia in the 
4 CZECHOSLOVKIA'S"VELVET DIVORCE" 

first five months of 1993, Czech exports to other markets 

rose by Kcs 11.5 billion. Two of the Czech Republic's 

biggest companies have signed agreements with top German 

groups. With an expected turnover of $200 million in 1995, 

AEG-Westinghouse has joined with CKD of Prague (AEGCKD Transport Systems) to build trams for Western and 

Eastern markets. Skoda Pilsen has teamed with Siemens to 

build steam turbines and has recently formed a consortium 

to resume arms production for the domestic market and 

export. 7 

In the first quarter of 1993, the Czech Republic attracted 

about $300 million in foreign investment, raising its total 

since 1990 to $1.86 billion, s In the largest investment in the 

region, Volkswagen A.G. acquired the Skoda automobile 

plant in 1991. By the end of the decade, the German auto 

maker plans to invest nearly $5 billion and double annual 

production to 450,000 automobiles. 9 

As a result, Prague feels geographically and psychologically more distant from its Visegrad allies and the East and 

economically, socially, and politically closer to the West. 

FOR SLOVAKIA. The implications of the split have been 

equally dramatic for Slovakia. Ninety percent of Slovakia's 

1,000-mile boundary is still with Visegrad members to the 

north, south, and west; with Poland (375 miles), Hungary 

(420 miles), and the Czech Republic (100 miles). To the 

east Slovakia still borders Ukraine (61 miles); and its only 

window to the West, a mere 60 miles (6 percent), is neutral 

Austria. 

Before the divorce, Slovak nationalists argued that most 

of their products were sold to the Czech Republic and that 

with independence Slovakia would be able to sell more of 

its products abroad. In addition, they argued that since only 

10 percent of foreign investment in Czechoslovakia went to 
JEFFREY SIMON 5 

Slovakia, that with independence this influx would increase. 

But with independence neither came to pass. During the 

first five months of 1993 two-way trade between the two 

republics had declined by 40 percent and the slowdown in 

Western Europe has made Slovakia's expansion into 

Western markets more difficult. This is the case particularly 

for Slovakia because it lacks the flexibility to seek new 

markets for its more limited range of products 1° and its only 

direct overland contact with Western markets is across its 

short border with Austria. Since 1990 the total foreign 

investment in Slovakia has been only $231 million, and 

since independence Slovakia has received little new foreign 

investment, u 

Slovakia retains most of the former CSFR's military 

industrial base and large reservoirs of unemployment. 

Bratislava no longer receives economic subsidies from 

Prague. Ever since independence, Slovakia's economy has 

declined, unemployment has increased, ~2 and political 

support for Vladimir Meciar and his government has 

continued to erode. 

But if, as is likely, Slovakia, which faces many of the 

same economic problems as Ukraine, fails to attract new 

Western investments and markets and continues to decline 

economically, it will be frustrated by the unfulfillment of its 

post-independence expectations. If Slovak leaders resort to 

Slovak nationalist rhetorical exhortation, ethnic tensions are 

likely to result among Slovakia's heterogeneous Magyar, 

Gypsy, 13 and numerous other national minorities, 14 which 

constitute between 18 percent and 25 percent of Slovakia's 

5.27 million population. 

As a result of the split, Bratislava feels more isolated 

from the West and more dependent on its Visegrad allies. 

Slovakia's geography, economy, and ethnic heterogeneity 
6 CZECHOSLOVKIA'S "VELVET DIVORCE" 

resemble Europe's eastern and southern security environment more closely than those of the West. 

Diverging Security Concerns 

In the aftermath of the divorce, the Czech Republic and 

Slovakia have reached different conclusions regarding 

regional security. Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus has concluded that the Czech Republic's new-found relative economic 

advantage gives Prague the means to join Western institutions---European Community-Western European Union 

(WEU) and NATO---more rapidly. Hence, he sees continued multilateral Visegrad cooperation with Poland and 

Hungary as a drag on that process; a perspective that 

applies even more to less developed Slovakia. 

In addition, the willingness of the Czech Republic (and 

Poland) to act as a sieve for Germany, f'dtering out wouldbe emigrants from the Balkans and the former Soviet Union 

before they reach Germany's own borders, has turned the 

Czech-Slovak border into a new West-East dividing line. 15 

A reinforced border has significant psychological significance; it marks the limit of the Czech Republic's exposure 

to the East while making Slovakia a mere appendix of 

Western Europe. Slovakia's eastern border is joined to 

economically distressed Ukraine and linked via the Danube 

to the unstable Balkans. In sum, the reinforced CzechSlovak border has the potential to reduce Slovakia to a 

second division of former Communist Eastern Europe. 

In marked contrast to Dienstbier's notion of the CSFR 

cooperating with Visegrad neighbors and building bridges 

between West and East, the new Czech Republic strategy 

is to seek the most rapid integration possible with the West, 

to downplay multilateral Visegrad cooperation with Poland 
JEFFREY SIMON 7 

and Hungary, and to turn its back to Slovakia. 

Slovakia, on the other hand, has two competing security 

visions. A "western" vision, represented by recently sacked 

Foreign Minister Milan Knazko, wants Slovakia to continue 

in the Visegrad Group because it sees that group as the 

main instrument to anchor Slovakia to the West by joining 

NATO and, at the same time, to counteract the eastern tug 

of Ukraine, which is also seeking ties to the West. A 

competing "eastern" security vision sees Slovakia as a 

"bridge" between West and East, calls for a "balanced 

policy" stressing the significance of contacts with Ukraine, 

rejects the idea of Slovakia's joining NATO, and recommends "neutrality." This vision would result in placing 

Slovakia's security hostage to Ukrainian developments. 

VISEGRAD COOPERATION. The ability of the Slovak government to accommodate the specific interests of its ethnic 

minorities to Slovak national interests, and to incorporate 

them into Slovak state interests, will be one of the Slovak 

government's major challenges. This is particularly the case 

for its 600,000 to 700,000 Magyar minority, 11 percent to 

13 percent of Slovakia's population. Such tensions are 

likely to exacerbate Slovakia's relations with Hungary and 

further undermine Visegrad cooperation. 

Slovakia's relations with Hungary contain several 

sensitive issues. These include: first, Slovak worries over 

possible Hungarian efforts to seek revisions in the borders 

created by the 1920 Treaty of Trianon which reduced 

Hungary to its present size. For a thousand years, Slovaks 

lived in what was Upper Hungary within the larger Hungarian kingdom and were later incorporated into the AustroHungarian Empire. A revision of Trianon threatens 

Slovakia's new-found "national" statehood. 

Second, the dispute over the Gabcikovo Dam on the 
8 CZECHOSLOVKIA'S "VELVET DIVORCE" 

Danube River border complements ethnic suspicions. 

Although the Gabcikovo Dam issue is at the International 

Court of Justice in The Hague, it will take years for a ruling. In the meantime, Hungary claims that altering the flow 

of the Danube will change the frontier to Slovakia's 

advantage. Slovakia has alleged that Budapest has encouraged ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia to protest and hamper 

development of the dam. 16 

Third, the status of Slovak minorities in Hungary and 

more numerous Magyar minorities in Slovakia poses a 

special problem. On one hand, Meciar, a fervent nationalist, 

has accused Hungarians of subversion for seeking autonomy 

for the three regions in southern Slovakia where Hungarians 

are in majority. On the other hand, the new Slovak Constitution, stresses "national rights" rather than citizen rights. 

Despite its proclaimed adherence to democracy, the Constitution comes closer to raw majoritarianism, giving little 

attention to national minorities. Its references to the Slovak 

"Nation" rather than Slovak citizens feeds the anxiety of 

Slovakia's Hungarian minority. Fourth, Slovaks appear concerned about what they see as a "feverish military build-up" 

in Hungary. Recently this issue was aggravated by 

Hungary's decision to acquire $800 million-worth of MiG29s from RussiaY In turn, Slovakia has decided to buy 

some more MiG-29s from Russia. 

This problem is exacerbated in part because the Czech 

Republic inherited better military facilities than Slovakia. 

This occurred because during the Warsaw Pact era the 

Czech Republic bordered the Federal Republic of Germany, 

and most CSFR and Central Group of Forces were deployed 

west along the German border. Slovakia, well behind the 

German border, inherited poor military facilities and air 

fields. In addition, Slovakia has had to start from scratch; 
JEFFREY SIMON 9 

it must build a defense ministry in Bratislava and Military 

Command in Trencin, as well as develop a new military 

organization. Slovakia is also behind the Czech Republic in 

that it also lacks an air defense system. 

Although both countries started with Russian military 

equipment, each country has made initial decisions that may 

further differentiate them in the furore. The Czech Republic 

has decided not to use its Russian hard currency credit to 

buy Russian military equipment; instead, it will seek 

subsidized pricing of oil and natural gas. In marked contrast, Slovakia, has decided to use some of its hard currency 

credit to buy Russian military equipment (specifically MiG29s). 

Even if Slovakia does not experience economic downturn as expected, Visegrad multilateral cooperation is 

complicated because of Prague's bolt Westward and mutual 

suspicions between Bratislava and Budapest. For Slovakia 

(and the Central European region) this could precipitate an 

"identity-crisis" in both national and international terms. 

Slovakia's potential lack of economic viability at a time 

when it is attempting to build a market economy will 

undermine its political stability while it is trying to create 

new political institutions. All this is occurring while 

Slovakia is attempting to forge a new national political 

identity, which can irritate ethnic relations within the new 

state. If Slovakia's perceived regional role does not come 

to fruition because the Visegrad Group ceases to play a 

unifying and stabilizing role, Slovakia may feel abandoned 

and cast adrift. 

EASTERN IMPUCATIOI~. To the extent the Visegrad Group 

loses effectiveness, Slovakia will lose its "perceived" role 

as providing Ukraine with a point of entry to the West. This 

may be more important for Slovakia than Ukraine, which 
10 CZECHOSLOVKIA'S "VELVET DIVORCE" 

also has Poland and Hungary as links to the West. Without 

Visegrad, Slovakia's security also will become increasingly 

hostage to relationships outside its control, specifically 

Ukrainian-Russian and internal Ukrainian relations. Correspondingly, Slovakia will lose the psychological and 

physical security accrued from Visegrad's multilateral forms 

of cooperation and its ties to the West. 

Not only would the disintegration of the Visegrad Group 

"close" off a multilateral anchor providing potential entry 

for Slovakia and Ukraine to the West, it would also cast 

them adrift and make them increasingly hostage to Russia. 

Movement in this direction has been inadvertently exacerbated by past U.S. efforts to support the USSR's center 

(Mikhail Gorbachev) and by continuing U.S. efforts to 

pursue a Russo-centric policy (Boris Yeltsin)~S; and by the 

efforts of some Western countries (notably France) to close 

off entry of Visegrad members into Western institutions. 

Indirectly, the effect of these policies has been to alienate Kiev's Western-oriented elite, undermine their domestic 

legitimacy, and aggravate Russian-Ukrainian relations. 

Ukraine's Western orientation is evident in the fact that it 

has either established or is planning cooperative defense 

agreements with Visegrad members; and that some Kiev 

officials have expressed a desire to participate in NATO as 

it provides a "strategic counterweight to Russia in Europe. ''~9 Second, the degree to which the Ukrainian elite and 

populace begin to perceive Ukraine's entry to the West 

being denied, the Western-oriented elite will be undermined 

and alternate security perspectives will emerge, 2° and the 

internal West-East Ukrainian fault line may deepen as did 

the Czech-Slovak fault line. 

Since Nikita Khrushchev only "granted" the Crimean 

peninsula to Ukraine as a gesture of good will in 1954 and 
JEFFREY SIMON 11 

as between 80 percent and 85 percent of the population in 

Ukraine's east is ethnic Russian, it is not inconceivable that 

this group, sensing weakness of Western Ukrainian leadership, would push for Crimean independence. With support 

from the Russian Federation pursuing a "near abroad" 

policy, 2~ Ukraine's 11 million ethnic Russians might push 

for incorporation of eastern Ukraine into Russia. zz Should 

such a scenario come to pass, the independence not 0nly of 

"west" Ukraine but also of "isolated" Slovakia would be 

endangered. 

Thus, Czechoslovakia's "velvet divorce" was effected 

with unusual civility. Its implications can be expected to 

reverberate far beyond the redrawing of the Czech and 

Slovak border, however, creating a series of new alignments 

and concerns in Central Europe and possibly beyond. 

Western Responses to Disintegrating Visegrad 

Cooperation 

If nation-states like the Czech Republic and Slovakia--as 

well as Poland, Hungary, the Baltic states, Ukraine, and 

Russia--are going to moderate their antagonisms, old and 

new, they will have to develop the institutional means to do 

so. These new nation-states present the West with a major 

challenge: to develop multilateral decision-making processes 

that can encompass and moderate diverse interests--and 

make them adhere to internationally acceptable standards. 

The challenge for the West is to help promote stability 

within the Visegrad states as well as nurture democratic 

institutions. This problem is complicated not only because 

of the difficulties within the Visegrad Group, as discussed 

above, but also because of the European nations' difficulties 

defining their own post-1989 security institutions. For 
12 CZECHOSLOVKIA'S "VELVET DIVORCE" 

example, already struggling with this challenge are such 

multilateral institutions as the regional Visegrad Group, 

European EC-WEU, trans-Atlantic NATO-North Atlantic 

Cooperation Council (NACC), and pan-European Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). 

THE VISEGI~D GROUP. One of the West's goals should be 

to prevent the Czech-Slovak border from becoming a new 

European East-West dividing line; a situation that has 

become more likely with the need to control emigration 

from the east. The fate of that border--with all its psychological, economic, political, and security consequences-will be closely connected with developments in Ukraine 

and Russia. Visegrad cooperation is an important tool to 

prevent Europe's division along the Czech and Slovak 

border. 

A second goal should be to prevent divergent security 

perceptions from arising within the group. This is particularly important for two reasons. First, a common Western 

security focus tends to orient the group to Western institutions and, second, thereby legitimizes Visegrad leaders and 

reinforces them with compatible economic and political 

values. 

A final go',d should be to encourage Visegrad regional 

cooperation and transparency to prevent ethnic tensions and 

conflicts and regional arms races. This potential already 

exists in embryo between Slovakia and Hungary. The aim 

would be a regional system of collective security, working 

closely with the main Western collective security structures--notably EC-WEU, NATO-NACC, and CSCE. 

Slovakia has potential for becoming a major actor in 

developing different forms of regional cooperation in 

Central Eastern Europe. Slovakia's central location--it is 

the only Visegrad group member that borders all the other 
JEFFREY SIMON 13 

members--makes its role or responsibilities crucial for the 

development of the Visegrad Group. If the West will not or 

cannot provide real security guarantees to the Visegrad 

Group or to Slovakia within the group because of its 

relative "backwardness," it should at least work to support 

regional military and security cooperation among these 

countries as a group and gradually help them to develop 

closer links with NATO and WEU. 

If admission of Visegrad countries to Western security 

structures such as WEU or NATO ultimately is given 

serious consideration, the timing of the four countries' 

admission should not be significantly differentiated. Sequential admission of all or some of the four over a long period 

of time would likely undermine Visegrad Group cooperation. An elongated, differentiated admission policy would 

heighten existing differences among the group and could 

"alienate" precisely those members whose behavior the 

West may most want to influence or moderate. Within the 

group it would most likely result in the isolation of 

Slovakia. If the Czech Republic were permitted to enter 

Western security structures before Slovakia, the resulting 

East-West line would further distance and isolate Ukraine, 

making it hostage to events in Russia. 

Multilateral Visegrad cooperation is more advantageous 

than bilateral cooperation among Visegrad members 

because of the "peer pressure" effect in moderating potential 

cleavages. Visegrad economic and political cooperation 

tends to stabilize the region by moderating potential ethnic 

tensions and cross-border suspicions. Multilateral Visegrad 

cooperation also provides the group with "equal" access to 

West Europe (EC-WEU and NATO) and contributes to the 

group's "equal" importance to Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, and 

Lithuania for access to the West. 
14 CZECHOSLOVKIA'S "VELVET DIVORCE" 

In sum, the goal of U.S. bilateral and multilateral ECWEU, NATO-NACC, and CSCE institutional policy should 

be to encourage multilateral Visegrad cooperation and to 

guard against the pursuit of policies that differentiate and 

inadvertently divide group members by turning them into 

competitors. To achieve this end, a key challenge will be to 

employ Western multilateral institutions so that they interact 

positively and are, indeed, inter-locking. In the past they 

have failed by leading to the perception that they are "interblocking." 

THE EUROPEAN EC-WEU. The European Community is a 

clear model of European integration. Since the Visegrad 

Group's 6 October 1991 declaration of its desire to join the 

EC, 23 the four have signed agreements of association, u 

Hence, the EC plays an essential economic and political 

role in assisting in stabilizing the Visegrad region. 

On the security side, the December 1991 Maastricht 

summit has clarified the role of the Western European 

Union as a bridge between the European Community and 

NATO. The Community confirmed the WEU's dual 

commitment to embody the European defense identity and 

to serve as the European pillar of the NATO Alliance. It 

agreed to broaden the nine-member WEU to include the 

other EC member states and the other European allies as 

members. 

In addition, in June 1992, the WEU Council of Ministers met in Bonn and decided to make the WEU more 

operational by planning humanitarian, peacekeeping, and 

peace-making tasks (Petersberg Declaration). They also 

decided to create a Forum of Consultation to "enhance" 

WEU's relations with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 

Romania, Bulgaria, and the three Baltic States. A second 

WEU ministerial level meeting convened in Rome in May 
JEFFREY SIMON 15 

1993 to discuss developing relations with the European 

Community and the situation in former Yugoslavia. 

Unlike NATO's North Atlantic Cooperation Council, 

WEU relations are differentiated with countries that are 

developing association links with the European Community. 

While the WEU Forum of Consultation may play an important role in facilitating the Visegrad Group's adherence to 

European institutions, it has the potentially deleterious 

effect of isolating the former Soviet Union (except the 

Baltic states) from Europe and could develop a significant 

European fault line. One means to circumvent these 

problems is to acknowledge the significance of the EC 

economic role by giving the WEU observer status in 

NATO-NACC. Thereby, the NACC could be used as an 

effective device to link NATO to the European Community, 

and the Community to its former adversariesY 

In this regard, one of the European Community's major 

roles toward the East is not necessarily to provide membership, but instead to make an economic commitment that 

these countries will gain access to its expanding markets by 

a set date. 26 Lack of access has been a constant stumbling 

block and irritant for the Visegrad Group. Tensions and 

disagreements have arisen over agricultural and steel imports as well as banking, insurance, and real estate markets. 

Expanded EC markets would enhance not only foreign 

investment and economic development in the East, but also 

Western-oriented political leaders and political stability. 

In sum, to overcome "divisive" WEU security functions, 

it could be given observer status on the NACC. The 

European Community could play its greatest role economically by opening its markets to Visegrad. By doing so, it 

would serve as an example to countries farther to the south 

and east--Bulgaria, Romania, the Baits, Ukraine, and Rus- 
16 CZECHOSLOVKIA'S "VELVET DIVORCE" 

sia that regional cooperation can pay off. 

THE TR/hNS-ATLNqTIC NATO-NACC. As the Visegrad countries 

have made NATO membership a priority, z7 NATO appears 

to enjoy great prestige and influence with these countries. 

NATO's great advantage is that it commits the United 

States and Canada to maintaining stability in Europe. At the 

same time it is the only organization that possesses the 

necessary military bases, communications, equipment, and 

armed forces. A major change occurred in November 1991, 

when the Rome summit adopted a New Strategic Concept 

which moved NATO's emphasis away from massive mobilization toward enhanced crisis-management capabilities. 

NATO is also attempting to facilitate the emergence of 

a European pillar. To do this, marginalization of Alliance 

members that are not part of the European Community or 

WEU must be prevented. Hence, regular contacts between 

NATO and WEU are being established and deepened. A 

significant move in this direction occurred on 8 June 1993 

when a joint session of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) 

and WEU Council reviewed embargo operations in the 

Adriatic since July 1992. The Councils approved a combined NATO-WEU concept of operations, which included 

a single command and control arrangement for combined 

NATO-WEU operations under the authority of both 

organizations' councils. Operational control of the combined 

NATO-WEU Task Force was delegated through NATO's 

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) to the 

Commander Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe 

(COMNAVSOUTH). 

Aside from these adaptations, NATO has begun to reach 

out to the East. The process began with the July 1990 

London Declaration which extended its "hand of friendship" 

and invited former Warsaw Pact members "to establish 
JEFFREY SIMON 17 

regular diplomatic liaison with NATO." The June 1991 

Copenhagen North Atlantic Council furthered this process 

by agreeing to use NATO to intensify military contacts with 

the East. The 20 December 1991 establishment of the North 

Atlantic Cooperation Council provided an important instrument to address European security. A Work Plan was 

approved at a 10 March 1992 extraordinary NACC meeting, 

which convened to admit the former Soviet republics 

(except Georgia); and on 1 April 1992 NATO-NACC 

defense ministers (minus France) created a Group on 

Defense Matters (GDM) to act as a clearing house for 

proposals for defense cooperation. 

Following the June 1992 NAC Foreign Ministers 

session, which agreed "to support on a case-by-case basis 

in accordance with their own procedures, peacekeeping 

activities under the responsibility of CSCE, ''2s NATO 

moved "out of area" and with the WEU dispatched naval 

units to the Adriatic to enforce the UN embargo. The 

NACC also agreed to contribute its forces to peacekeeping 

operations in partnership with NATO. Of the Visegrad 

Group, Polish and Czechoslovak units joined the forces of 

other nations as observers under the UN flag in Croatia. 

Hungary, fearing reverberations for its large Magyar 

minority in Serbia's Vojvodina, initially was more cautious, 

but in October 1992 decided to allow NATO AWACS 

aircraft monitoring Bosnia to overfly Hungarian territory, z9 

The December 1992 NAC Ministerial noted the 

Alliance's readiness "to support peacekeeping operations 

under the authority of the UN Security Council. ''3° In a 

parallel effort, the December 1992 NACC meeting produced 

agreement that NATO and cooperation partners would share 

experience with one another and with other CSCE states in 

planning and preparing peacekeeping missions and would 
18 CZECHOSLOVKIA'S "VELVET DIVORCE" 

consider possible joint peacekeeping training and exercises. 

The same NACC also approved a 1993 Work Plan that 

included specific provisions on peacekeeping and subsequently created a NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in 

Peacekeeping to discuss general political and conceptual 

principles and practical measures for cooperation. 

Closer cooperation and confidence among NACC 

partners was made evident in late February 1993 when the 

Military Committee met for the first time in cooperation 

session and Hungary authorized overflight of its territory to 

U.S. Hercules aircraft dropping relief supplies over 

Bosnia. 3~ When NACC defense ministers met at the end of 

March 1993, they recognized the increased importance "of 

the ability to act in a cooperative framework" in peacekeeping tasks and "ensure[d] that a high priority be given 

this work. ''3z 

On 12 April 1993, under authority of UN Resolution 

816, NATO started the operation of its no-fly zone enforcement over Bosnia-Herzegovina. In late April, the Military 

Committee again met in cooperation with Chiefs of Defense 

Staff to discuss the possibility of NATO intervention in 

Bosnia should a peaceful solution fail. For Hungary, the 

possibility of intervention renewed feelings of being threatened and again raised the question of NATO security 

guarantees in case of Serbian reprisals. Although NATO 

denied the Hungarian request, Foreign Minister Jeszenszky 

confirmed that NATO's AWACS contributed to Hungary's 

security. 33 

The June 1993 Athens NACC adopted the Ad Hoc 

Group's detailed Report on Cooperation in Peacekeeping 34 

and agreed to accelerate the Ad Hoc Group's practical 

cooperation to implement the program, including the 

sharing of experience in peacekeeping planning, training 
JEFFREY SIMON 19 

and exercises, and logistics. 35 As a result of the Athens 

NACC session, Prague hosted a high-level NACC seminar 

on peacekeeping from 30 June to 2 July to discuss conceptual and doctrinal issues of peacekeeping. In addition to 

cooperation partners, European neutrals--Austria, Finland, 

and Sweden--also participated. 36 

In summary, the situation in former Yugoslavia has 

renewed insecurities and instabilities in Central Europe and 

has required NATO to evolve in ways unforeseen a few 

years ago. In contrast to simple expansion of membership, 

NATO's broadening has been occurring in new ways. For 

example, the NATO-NACC has been described as providing 

a pool of resources as a sort of "Security International 

Monetary Fund. ''37 NATO-NACC could develop in the 

security field something similar to the reserve fund maintained by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for its 

members. In the same vein, General James McCarthy, 

former Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command has suggested that NACC could establish sets of 

NACC-funded and maintained peacekeeping equipment, 

along the lines of prepositioned equipment sets 

(POMCUS). 3s 

Peacekeeping planning, exercises, and operations are 

also a basis for military cooperation that, while not providing Article 5 security guarantees, could enhance regional 

stability and security. In addition, while NACC does not 

provide the desired security guarantees, it could act as a 

transitional framework for eventual Alliance membership. 39 

THE PAN-EUROPEAN CSCE. The CSCE has an important role 

to play in moderating ethnic conflict and in setting codes of 

conduct. Since the 1975 Helsinki Summit, CSCE was 

mostly process. The 19-20 November 1990 Paris Summit 

began CSCE's institutionalization. It created the CSCE 
20 CZECHOSLOVKIA'S"VELVET DIVORCE" 

Secretariat (Prague), Office for Free Elections (Warsaw) 

subsequently renamed Office for Democratic Institutions 

and Human Rights (ODIHR), and Conflict Prevention 

Center (Vienna). In addition, the Paris Summit established 

a three-tiered system of consultation; CSCE heads of state 

meeting every two years, foreign affairs ministers every 

year, and a Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) several 

times a year. 

The 10 July 1992 Helsinki Summit document, The 

Challenges of Change was part of an effort to develop 

CSCE structures to manage crises and create instruments of 

conflict prevention and crisis management. 4° The summit 

leaders acknowledged a role for the CSCE in peacekeeping 

and adopted a set of principles governing CSCE operations, 

including the potential use of the resources of the European 

Community, WEU, and NATO. 

CSCE institutionalization was further fostered in 

December 1992 when its Council, meeting in Stockholm, 

established a High Commissioner for National Minorities to 

provide "early warning [and] early action ''41 on ethnic 

minority tensions that could develop into conflict within the 

CSCE area. The Council also established the Vienna Group 

of senior diplomats (who meet weekly), decided to make 

CSCE a U.N. Chapter VIII regional arrangement, and 

agreed to create a Secretary General. 

In effect, the 1992 decisions led CSCE away from the 

1975 Helsinki Final Act's principles guiding relations 

between states to enter the area of conflict "within" participating states. 42 Now CSCE peacekeeping could focus on 

intra-state conflict where at least one party to a conflict was 

not a political entity recognized by the CSCE as a participating state. All of these decisions have made the CSCE the 

main forum for pan-European consultation and crisis mana- 
JEFFREY SIMON 21 

gement. The importance of CSCE has increased as the standard bearer of democratic legitimacy and for resolving 

ethnic issues within and between multinational states and 

neighbors; such as in the former Yugoslavia, or Slovakia 

and Romania with neighboring Hungary, or in the former 

Soviet Union. 

These developments are particularly significant in light 

of the NATO-NACC decisions and activities during 1992 

to carry out functions under either CSCE or U.N. mandate; 

and during 1993 to develop a multinational peacekeeping 

capability that would include not just cooperation partners, 

but also neutrals such as Austria, Finland, and Sweden. In 

this sense, the NATO-NACC pan-European pretensions are 

its strength----compared to the narrower WEU Consultative 

Forum. NATO could be further strengthened if it gained 

permanent observer status in the CSO of the CSCE and 

representation on the CSO Working Group in Vienna where 

preparations are made. 43 

What Is to Be Done? 

The West faces multiple challenges. First, we must prevent 

nascent fault lines from developing into fissures as they 

have in the former Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Second, 

we are faced with the task of legitimizing democratic 

leaders in the new states in Europe, and by doing so, 

helping to legitimize their political, economic, and social 

programs. 

Although the division of the CSFR into two separate 

states has proceeded with unusual civility thus far, the 

future regional security implications may be quite significant, and not necessarily all positive. For Europe, the 

division exaggerates the economic, political, psychological, 
22 CZECHOSLOVKIA'S "VELVET DIVORCE" 

and social inequalities between the Czech Republic and 

Slovakia. By doing so, the division has tended to encourage 

competition and undermine cooperation within the Visegrad 

Group. 44 

If Slovakia is not allowed to participate fully in the 

Visegrad Group and provide a political, economic, and 

social bridge to Ukraine, 45 thereby facilitating the evolution 

of a united Europe, then the velvet divorce risks dividing 

Slovakia and Ukraine from the West. Such an East-West 

division must be discouraged, and Western institutions---notably EC and NATO--should engage in a coordinated policy to facilitate Visegrad Group cooperation and 

their "return to Europe." 

The CSCE, as a U.N. Chapter VIII regional arrangement, has become the pan-European political forum that 

legitimizes sanctions, military actions, or both. For 

Visegrad, in particular, CSCE has been a useful instrument 

for focusing attention on ethnic issues and thereby moderating regional tensions. 4~ CSCE's institutionalization and 

more recent evolution of ties with NATO-NACC have 

enhanced its significance, particularly for Visegrad. 

The NATO-NACC remains a particularly good forum 

for military-political entry for Visegrad because of its: (1) 

trans-Atlantic ties, which provide psychological security to 

the East; (2) broader eastern cooperation partnership, which 

has the effect of uniting, rather than dividing Europe; and 

(3) recent tendencies to become more pan-European, by 

participating with neutrals such as Austria, Finland, and 

Sweden. In addition, NATO-NACC has expanded its ties to 

the WEU operationally, has actively moved into peacekeeping planning, and remains the Visegrad Group's security 

institution of choice. 

The European Community furnishes Visegrad with its 
JEFFREY SIMON 23 

economic-political entry point to Europe. By providing investment sources, expanded and predictable markets, and a 

projected date of entry, the Community can greatly enhance 

the Visegrad Groups's economic and political stability. The 

risk of having the WEU play a role of dividing Europe can 

be obviated by shifting focus to the NACC, which is gaining pan-European tendencies. Shifting the burden might be 

made politically palatable and achievable by giving the 

WEU observer status in the NACC. 

The United States, with a major interest in European 

security and a role in Visegrad stability, must take into 

account all the issues mentioned above. First, it is the U.S. 

military presence and commitment to remain engaged that 

provides psychological security to the Visegrad Group. The 

U.S. presence helps make NATO-NACC the Visegrad 

Group's security institution of choice. 

Second, the United States should make every effort to 

ensure that European institutions are complementary (interlocking) rather than competitive (inter-blocking). In this 

regard one of the most urgent tasks is to ensure that the 

relationship between the United States and European 

Community and between NATO and the WEU develops 

smoothly and cooperatively. 

While this has already begun to proceed with NATO's 

command of the Eurocorps in certain contingencies and 

with operational control of peacekeeping operations, further 

efforts can and should be made with the WEU's Consultative Forum and NACC--perhaps along the line of giving 

the WEU observer status on the NACC. This would help to 

reduce confusion and apparent competition between WEU 

and NATO toward the East. In the same vein, the regularized consultations between the United States and the 

European Commission should be widened to permit the 
24 CZECHOSLOVKIAS "VELVET DIVORCE" 

United States to participate in the discussions of the 

European Council. 

Third, the United States should make every effort to 

foster the continuation of Visegrad Group cooperation, 

instead of responding to individual member needs that 

might further differences and foster competition. To this 

end, the United States should make every effort to deal with 

the Visegrad Group as a group, as it did with the 1992 Air 

Space Management Conference in Stuttgart and has done 

with professional military education programs. It should 

continue a non-differentiated policy toward the Visegrad 

Group in Alliance policy. In other words, the United States 

should discourage the Czech Republic's efforts to "bolt" 

from the group and to acquire early admission or other differentiated status. 

The United States and NATO-NACC can play a major 

role in assisting the Czech Republic and Slovakia's civilmilitary development. First, both need assistance in developing and deepening civilian control of the military. Since 

1 January 1993, both states have returned to the 1989 timeframe in regard to legislative-executive (defense ministry) 

relations. Since neither state parliament emerged from the 

previous federal parliament, their defense and security 

committees are entirely new. The earlier republican parliaments had no similar counterparts. In addition, all the key 

civilians in the Czech defense ministry are new, with little 

or no military experience; and the Slovaks must not only 

create a new defense ministry in Bratislava, but also a 

Military Command Headquarters in Trencin. 47 Both states 

need assistance in civilian-military relations, and Slovakia 

needs assistance in constitutional development, notably on 

the question of citizen rights in a multi-ethnic state. 
JEFFREY SIMON 25 

Second, both states have participated in the U.N. 

Protective Force (UNPROFOR) actions and have consciously developed force structures to deal with peacekeeping 

activities. The United States can assist in their development 

either bilaterally or through NACC and thereby facilitate 

further participation by the Czechs and Slovaks in European 

structures. The Czech Republic's interest was evidenced by 

the July 1993 Prague-sponsored NACC conference on 

peacekeeping doctrine and planning. The United States will 

sponsor a follow-up NACC conference on peacekeeping 

operations in November 1993. 

The United States might use international military 

educational-training and military-to-military contacts to 

assist the Czechs and Slovaks in developing a compatible 

peacekeeping capability. In fact, the United States might do 

this at an all-Visegrad level on the 1992 air space-management model. This could be done within NATO-NACC 

by first evolving joint peacekeeping military exercises and 

procedures. Then perhaps a NATO-NACC Security "IMF 

pool" of resources could be developed or POMCUS sets of 

peacekeeping equipment to enhance compatibility and 

cooperation between NATO members and cooperation 

partners. 

Clearly, the Czech Republic and Slovakia need great 

assistance. The United States, in particular, should use its 

resources and influence to encourage Visegrad's cooperative 

efforts and to facilitate the group's adherence (as a group) 

to Western institutions. By creating a sea of stability and 

cooperation in Europe's center, a "bridge" (not barrier) will 

be built to Europe's south and east--to Bulgaria, Romania, 

the Baltic states, Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia. Only 

by pursuing and coordinating a policy with the Western 
26 CZECHOSLOVKIA'S "VELVET DIVORCE" 

Allies that encourages and rewards cooperation over 

competition can the United States ensure its Cooperation 

Partners' safe "return to Europe." This course would 

discourage European fault lines from evolving into new 

fissures. 
JEFFREY SIMON 27 

NOTES 

1. On 25-26 January 1990 Czechoslovakia's President Vaclav Havel 

visited Hungary and Poland and called on all three countries to 

coordinate their "return to Europe." In October 1990 deputy defense 

ministers and deputy foreign ministers met to coordinate policy. On 15 

February 1991 presidents Vaclav Havei and Lech Walesa and Prirne 

Minister Jozsef Antall met in Visegrad, Hungary to determine forms of 

"triangle" cooperation. 

2. For a summary, see Joshua Spero, "The Budapest-Prague-Warsaw 

Triangle: Central European Security After the Visegrad Summit," 

European Security, vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring 1992), pp. 58-83. 

3. The CSFR also bordered neutral Austria (341 miles). 

4. In Slovakia the 1992 elections gave a parliamentary majority to 

parties that spearheaded the dismantling of the common state whose 

continued existence was supported by a majority of Slovaks. Martin 

Butora and Zora Butorova, "Slovakia After the Split," Journal of 

Democracy, vol. 4, no. 2 (April 1993), pp. 78-80. 

5. In the Czech Republic, 55 percent of those polled believed they 

subsidized Slovakia. In Slovakia, 73 percent believed that the Czech 

Republic gained advantage from union. See Ivan Gabal, "Czechoslovak 

Public Opinion Perspectives," paper prepared for Eighth Annual Strategic Studies Conference "The Atlantic Community After Communism," 

Knokke-Heist, Belgium, 23-25 September 1992. 

6. The Czechs had been under German influence since the Battle of 

White Mountain in 1620 until the Czechoslovak state was created by the 

Treaty of Versailles in 1919. 

7. Anthony Robinson, "Breaking Up Was the Easy Part," Financial 

Times, 6 August 1993, p. I1. 
28 CZECHOSLOVKIA'S "VELVET DIVORCE" 

8. Peter Maass, "After the Civil Divorce," Washington Post, 10 August 

1993, p. A12. 

9. Between April and December 1991, Volkswagen lost $31 million on 

sales of $544 million. In 1992 it turned a profit on sales of $1.1 billion. 

Richard W. Stevenson, "In a Czech Plant, VW Shows How to Succeed 

in the East," New York Times, 22 June 1993, pp. A1,D6. 

10. European Community restrictions on steel imports have hit one of 

Slovakia's most efficient enterprises, the East Slovakian Steel Works 

(VSZ) at Kosice, which accounts for almost 20 percent of Slovakia's 

exports. Anthony Robinson, "Slovak PM Personifies Republic's Image 

Problems," Financial Times, 12 August 1993, p. 11. 

11. Two-thirds of the $231 million was invested in Bratislava, probably 

because of its proximity to Vienna. Slovakia's three major sources of 

capital were Austria (27.3 percent of all investment), Germany (24.2 

percen0 and the United States (19.9 percen0, which provided the largest 

single investment (K-Mart). In contrast to the Czech Republic (which 

opposes tax breaks for foreigners), on 5 April 1993 Slovakia announced 

a tax break for foreigners. See Sharon Fisher, "Economic Developments 

in the Newly Independent Slovakia," RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 2, 

no. 30 (23 July 1993), p. 45. 

12. After shrinking by 2.5 percent in 1990, 15.8 percent in 1991, and 

6 percent in 1992, the Slovak economy was showing signs of recovery 

at the time of the split. Separation brought further difficulties for the 

Slovak economy, which is expected to decline by between 2 percent and 

15 percent in 1993. In contrast the Czech Republic is expected to 

exhibit small growth. Between 31 December 1992 and 31 March 1993 

Slovak unemployment increased from 10.4 percent to 12.01 percent. See 

Sharon Fisher, ibid., pp. 42-43. 

13. Estimates vary greatly on Slovakia's Romany population. Of 

Slovakia's 5,268,935 March 1991 Census population, estimates vary 

between 250,000 to 500,000 Gypsies; between 4.7 percent to 9.5 percent 

of the population. Vasil Hudak, "East-Central Europe and the Czech and 

Slovak Republics in a New Security Environment," European Security, 

vol. 1, no. 4 (Winter 1992), p. 141. 
JEFFREY SIMON 29 

14. A total of about 100,000 other national minorities---Czechs, 

Ukrainians, Ruthenians, Poles, and others---live in Slovakia. 

15. It also has the effect of establishing a similar dividing line at 

Poland's eastern border with Ukraine, Belarus, Kaliningrad (Russia), 

and Lithuania. 

16. James Wyllie, "The Hungarian Question--Mutual Concerns and 

Suspicions," Jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 5, no. 6 (June 1993), p. 

259. 

17. Hungary acquired 28 MiG-29s. See Alfred A. Reisch, "Hungary, 

Russian MiG-29s, and the Regional Balance of Power," RFE/RL Weekly 

Report, 7 July 1993, pp. 2-3. 

18. William Bodie makes the point that the West should rid itself of the 

illusion that the CIS will ever serve as the functional equivalent of the 

USSR; that the other republics view it as an entity whose usefulness has 

passed. William C. Bodie, "Anarchy and Cold War in Moscow's 'Near 

Abroad'," Strategic Review, vol. 21, no. 1 (Winter 1993), p. 50. 

19. Aleksandr Goncharenko, Oleg Bodrug, and Eduard Lisitsyn, "Possible Ways of Safeguarding Ukraine's National Security," Narodnaya 

Armiya, pt. 1 (29 July 1992), p. 2. FBIS-USR-92-118 (16 September 

1992), p. 53. 

20. In Spring 1993 a Ukrainian initiative proposed the creation of a 

security zone that would include the Visegrad Group, three Baltic states, 

Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova, but excluded Russia. Poland, Hungary, 

and the Czech Republic distanced themselves from the Ukrainian 

initiative. See Alfred A. Reisch, "Central and Eastern Europe's Quest 

for NATO Membership," RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 2, no. 28 (9 

July 1993), p. 47. 

21. Citing Yevgeny Ambartsumov's idea of a so-called "Monroe 

Doctrine" in the "Near Abroad" and from Russia's May 1992 Draft 

Military Doctrine that "A violation of the fights of Russian citizens 

•.. in the former USSR republics can be a serious source of conflicts," 
30 CZECHOSLOVKIA'S "VELVET DIVORCE" 

Stephen Blank argues this tactic could be used in the Ukraine. Stephen 

J. Blank, Russia, Ukraine, and European Security (Carlisle Barracks, 

Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 20 May 1993), pp. 10--12. 

22. During 1992 the Crimea was in turmoil due to the Russian 

Parliament's calls either for Crimean independence or for turning it 

back to Russia. 

23. At the second Visegrad summit in Krakow, Poland, Havel, Walesa, 

and Antall signed the "Krakow Declaration" on 6 October. It stressed 

association with the European Community as a priority objective and 

called for "the speediest conclusion of discussions about associate status 

in the EC." For text, see European Security, vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring 1992), 

pp. 104-08. 

24. Agreements were signed on 16 December 1991. Warsaw TVP. 

FBIS-EEU-91-242 (17 December 1991), p. 2. After the velvet divorce, 

the Czechs and Slovaks renegotiated the agreements on 15 June 1993. 

25. See Simon Serfaty, "The Challenge of Continuity: Hyperboles, 

Hysteria, and History," in Jeffrey Simon (ed.), NATO: The Challenge 

of Change (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 

1993), p. 36. He also makes the persuasive argument that the United 

States is a de facto nonmember of the European Community because its 

assets and influence are greater than most EC members. He noted the 

1991 steps to regularize consultation between the United States and the 

European Commission and argues that perhaps later in the decade this 

could be widened to permit U.S. participation in the discussions of the 

European Council similar to the status given to the President of the EC 

Commission in the G-7 meetings. Ibid. 

26. See Simon Serfaty, Ibid., pp. 33-34. 

27. At the third Visegrad summit held in Prague on 6 May 1992, the 

communique stressed that NATO and a sustained U.S. presence were 

of utmost importance for European security; and emphasized their desire 

to become full members of NATO. See Communique, Budapest MTI 

6 May 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-089 (7 May 1992), p. 3. 
JEFFREY SIMON 31 

28. "Final Communique issued by the North Atlantic Council in 

Ministerial Session," NATO Press Communique M-NAC-1 (92) 51, 4 

June 1992, p. 4. 

29. See Reisch, "Central and Eastern Europe's Quest for NATO 

membership," p. 47. 

30. "Final Communique issued by the North Atlantic Council in 

Ministerial Session," NATO Press Communique M-NAC-2(92)106, 17 

December 1992, p. 2. 

31. At the same time Hungary appointed a colonel as permanent 

military representative, with the rank of ambassador, to NATO 

headquarters. Reuters (Brussels), 9 March 1993. 

32. "Statement issued by the Meeting of Defense Ministers," NATO 

Press Communique M-DMCP-l(93)28, 29 March 1993, p. 3. 

33. Reuters (Brussels), 14 and 17 May 1993. 

34. "Report to Ministers by the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation 

in Peacekeeping," NATO Press Release M-NACC-l(93)40, 11 June 

1993, pp. 8-11. 

35. "Statement Issued by the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 

Ministerial Session," NATO Press Communique M-NACC-l(93)39, 11 

June 1993, p. 1. 

36. "NACC High Level Seminar on Peacekeeping," NATO Press 

Release (93)45, 25 June 1993. 

37. Michael Ruhle, "NATO's Evolving Role in the New Europe," 

European Security, vol. 1, no. 3 (Autumn 1992), p. 270. 

38. James P. McCarthy, "Strengthening Security in Central and Eastern 

Europe: New Opportunities for NATO," Strategic Review, vol. 21, no. 

1 (Winter 1993), p. 58. 
32 CZECHOSLOVKIA'S "VELVET DIVORCE" 

39. For a discussion of this, see Jeffrey Simon, "Does Eastern Europe 

Belong In NATO?," Orbis, vol. 37, no. 1 (Winter 1993), pp. 21-35. 

40. See John Borawski and Macha Khmelevskaja, "The CSCE Helsinki 

Summit: New Directions for Euro-Atlantic Security," European 

Security, vol. 1, no. 3 (Autumn 1992), pp. 252-61. 

41. CSCE Helsinki Documents 1992, p, 9. 

42. See Lynn M. Hansen, "The CSCE and United Nations," in Simon, 

NATO: The Challenge of Change, pp. 111-13; 117-18. 

43. See Jamie P. Shea, "NATO: Meeting the Challenge of Change," in 

Simon, NATO: The Challenge of Change, pp. 246--47. 

44. Since January 1993 Czech Defense Minister Antonin Baudys has 

missed at least one Visegrad meeting and on 28 March 1993 on the eve 

of the NACC, said that each of the Visegrad countries should act on 

its own in striving for possible association with NATO. RFE/RL Daily 

Report, no. 61 (30 March 1993), p. 3. 

45. In February 1993 when Polish Defense Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz met with Ukrainian counterpart Konstantin Morozov in Kiev, he 

stressed that while Poland was seeking to join the European Community 

and NATO, it would not turn its back on Ukraine. 

46. Poland has turned to CSCE in regard to the plight of ethnic Poles 

in Lithuania. Hungary has used CSCE to focus attention on the situation 

of ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia. 

47. Although the Slovaks must create a new ministry, Slovak defense 

minister Imrieh Andrejcak was a former CSFR vice minister and 

minister of defense. 
McNalr Papers 

The McNair Papers are published at Fort Lesley J. McNair, 

home of the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the 

National Defense University. An Army post since 1794, the fort 

was given its present name in 1948 in honor of Lieutenant 

General Lesley James McNair. General McNair, known as 

"Educator of the Army" and trainer of some three million troops, 

was about to take command of Allied ground forces in Europe 

under Eisenhower, when he was killed in combat in Normandy, 

25 July 1944. 

1. Joseph P. Lorenz, Egypt and the New Arab Coalition, February 

1989. 

2. John E. Endicott, Grand Strategy and the Pacific Region, May 

1989. 

3. Eugene V. Rostow, President, Prime Minister, or Constitutional 

Monarch?, October 1989. 

4. Howard G. DeWolf, SDI and Arms Control, November 1989. 

5. Martin C. Libicki, WhatMakes Industries Strategic, November 1989. 

6. Melvin A. Goodman, Gorbachev and Soviet Policy in the Third 

World, February 1990. 

7. John Van Oudenaren, "The Tradition of Change in Soviet Foreign 

Policy," and Francis Conte, "Two Schools of Soviet Diplomacy," in 

Understanding Soviet Foreign Policy, April 1990. 

8. Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, A Strategic View of 

lnsurgencies: Insights from El Salvador, May 1990. 

9. Steven R. Linke, Managing Crises in Defense Industry: The 

PEPCON and Avtex Cases, June 1990. 

10. Christine M. Helms, Arabism and Islam: Stateless Nations and 

Nationless States, September 1990. 

11. Ralph A. Cossa, lran: Soviet Interests, US Concerns, July 1990. 

12. Ewan Jamieson, Friend or Ally? A Question for New Zealand, May 

1991. 

13. Richard J. Dunn III, From Gettysburg to the Gulf and Beyond: 
Coping with Revolutionary Technological Change in Land Warfare, 

14. Ted Greenwood, U.S. and NATO Force Structure and Military 

Operations in the Mediterranean, June 1993. 

15. Oscar W. Clyatt, Jr., Bulgaria' s Quest for Security After the Cold 

War, February 1993. 

16. William C. Bodie, Moscow's "Near Abroad": Security Policy in 

Post-Soviet Europe, June 1993. 

17. William H. Lewis (ed.), Military Implications of United Nations 

P eacekeeping Operations, June 1993. 

18. Sterling D. Sessions and Carl R. Jones, Interoperability: A Desert 

Storm Case Study, July 1993. 

19. Eugene V. Rostow, Should Article 43 of the United Nations 

Charter Be Raised From the Dead? July 1993 

20. William T. Johnsen and Thomas Dureil-Young; Jeffrey Simon; 

Daniel N. Nelson; William C. Bodie, and James McCarthy, European 

Security Toward the Year 2000, August 1993. 

21. Edwin R. Carlisle, ed., Developing Battlefield Technologies in the 

1990s, August 1993. 

22. Patrick Clawson, How Has Saddam Hussein Survived? Economic 

Sanctions, 1990-93, August 1993. 

23. Jeffrey Simon, Czechoslovakia's "Velvet Divorce," Visegrad 

Cohesion, and European Fault Lines," October 1993. 
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