In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: September 21, 2021

S20G1518. ROBERTS v. UNISON BEHAVIORAL HEALTH.

 NAHMIAS, Chief Justice.

After Sally Madison Roberts was involved in a car accident 

with a vehicle owned by Unison Behavioral Health, a Georgia 

community service board, she filed suit against Unison. As required 

by the Georgia Tort Claims Act (“GTCA”), OCGA § 50-21-20 et seq., 

Roberts provided an ante litem notice listing, among other things, 

the nature of her loss. See OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5) (D). Unison 

moved to dismiss Roberts’s complaint for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction, however, arguing that the description of her loss was 

insufficient. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, but after 

Unison was granted an interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals 

reversed. See Unison Behavioral Health v. Roberts, Case No. 

A20A0595 (decided July 1, 2020) (unpublished). We granted 
2

Roberts’s petition for certiorari to decide whether the Court of 

Appeals erred in determining that Roberts’s ante litem notice failed 

to meet the requirements of OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5) (D). Because 

we conclude that Roberts’s notice was sufficient, we reverse the 

Court of Appeals’ decision.

1. The pertinent facts are undisputed. On April 17, 2017, 

Roberts was in a car accident with a vehicle owned by Unison and 

driven by a Unison employee. Roberts’s mother1 began discussing a 

possible settlement with a liability adjuster at the Georgia 

Department of Administrative Services (“DOAS”) soon after 

Roberts’s accident, but no settlement was reached. On February 28, 

2018, Roberts’s attorney sent an ante litem notice of Roberts’s claim 

by email and certified mail to the DOAS, the Georgia Department of 

Behavioral Health and Developmental Disabilities, and Unison. 

Under the heading “Nature of loss suffered,” the notice gave the 

following description:

Sally Madison Roberts: Bodily injury; past, present and 

future mental and physical pain and suffering; infliction 

 1 In her reply brief, Roberts asserts that she was a minor at this time.
3

of emotional distress; past, present and future medical 

expenses; past, present and future lost earnings; 

diminished earning capacity.

The notice also said, among other things, that the loss was caused 

by Unison’s employee operating a van “in a wanton and negligent 

manner and collid[ing] with the rear end of Ms. Roberts’[s] vehicle 

at a high rate of speed” and that the “amount of loss claimed” was 

$1,000,000.

On November 8, 2018, Roberts filed a complaint in the Bacon 

County Superior Court alleging that Unison’s negligence caused her 

car accident and injuries.2 Unison, represented by the Attorney 

General, filed a special appearance answer and a motion to dismiss, 

asserting that the ante litem notice did not comply with OCGA § 50-

21-26 (a) (5) (D) and thus the lawsuit was barred by sovereign 

immunity.3

On June 21, 2019, the trial court denied Unison’s motion to 

 2 Roberts also included Unison’s driver-employee as a defendant, but she 

later voluntarily dismissed the driver-employee without prejudice. 

3 Unison also raised several other defenses to Roberts’s complaint, but 

Roberts filed an amended complaint on February 5, 2019, which the trial court 

held resolved those other issues. Unison did not appeal that holding. 
4

dismiss, ruling that Roberts’s notice satisfied the requirement of 

OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5) (D). But the trial court granted Unison a 

certificate of immediate review, the Court of Appeals granted 

Unison’s application for an interlocutory appeal, and Unison then 

filed a timely appeal.

On July 1, 2020, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s 

order, holding that Roberts’s notice was not sufficient because the 

“description of the nature of her loss does not fulfill the requirement 

that she state the required information ‘to the extent of [her] 

knowledge and belief and as may be practicable under the 

circumstances.’” Roberts, slip op. at 5 (quoting OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) 

(5)). Quoting Bailey v. Georgia World Congress Center, 351 Ga. App. 

629, 631 (832 SE2d 446) (2019), a case in which the Court of Appeals 

held that a similar notice of loss was insufficient under § 50-21-26 

(a) (5) (D), the court said:

“While [Roberts’s] ante litem notice specifies an amount 

of damages and indicates that she suffered various 

general types of damage and injury, it does not describe 

the nature of those injuries or provide any details 

regarding the type of injury or injuries she allegedly 
5

sustained.”

Roberts, slip op. at 5. This Court then granted Roberts’s petition for 

certiorari.

2. The GTCA provides a limited waiver of the State’s sovereign 

immunity, and that waiver is effective only if all of the requirements 

in the act are met. See OCGA § 50-21-23 (b) (“The state waives its 

sovereign immunity only to the extent and in the manner provided 

in this article and only with respect to actions brought in the courts 

of the State of Georgia.”). OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) requires a tort 

claimant who plans to file a lawsuit against the State to provide an 

ante litem notice within a certain time frame, in a certain manner, 

and including certain information. See OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (1), (2), 

(5). If the required notice of a claim is not given, the courts do not 

have jurisdiction over the claim. See id. (a) (3) (“No action against 

the state under this article shall be commenced and the courts shall 

have no jurisdiction thereof unless and until a written notice of claim

has been timely presented to the state as provided in this 

subsection[.]”).
6

A purpose of these notice requirements is “to ensure that the 

state receives adequate notice of the claim to facilitate settlement 

before the filing of a lawsuit.” Williams v. Ga. Dept. of Human 

Resources, 272 Ga. 624, 625 (532 SE2d 401) (2000) (“Williams”).4

Strict compliance with the GTCA’s ante litem notice requirements 

is required; substantial compliance is insufficient. See Bd. of Regents 

of Univ. System of Ga. v. Myers, 295 Ga. 843, 845 (764 SE2d 543) 

(2014). However, “strict compliance [does not] ‘take precedence over 

the plain language or meaning of the statute.’” Id. at 846 (citation 

omitted).

The particular ante litem notice requirement at issue in this 

case is found in OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5), which says:

A notice of claim under this Code section shall state, to 

the extent of the claimant’s knowledge and belief and as 

 4 We note that this Court said in Williams (and has repeated in other 

cases) that this is “the” purpose of the ante litem notice, but the only authority 

cited for that statement was a law review article that in turn cited nothing in 

support of that proposition. See Williams, 272 Ga. at 625 & n.8 (citing David 

J. Maleski, The 1992 Georgia Tort Claims Act, 9 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 431, 437 

(1993)). We do not doubt that a purpose of any ante litem notice is to give notice

before litigation (that is, “ante litem”) so that litigation potentially can be 

avoided. But the statement that this is the exclusive purpose of OCGA § 50-21-

26, based solely on a law review article’s ipse dixit, is dubious, as nothing in 

the statutory text supports such a restrictive conclusion.
7

may be practicable under the circumstances, the 

following:

(A) The name of the state government entity, the acts or 

omissions of which are asserted as the basis of the claim;

(B) The time of the transaction or occurrence out of which 

the loss arose;

(C) The place of the transaction or occurrence;

(D) The nature of the loss suffered;

(E) The amount of the loss claimed; and

(F) The acts or omissions which caused the loss.

Because we presume that the General Assembly “‘meant what it 

said and said what it meant,’” Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 

(751 SE2d 337) (2013) (citation omitted), we will analyze the 

language that the legislature used in this provision.

(a) The “to the extent of the claimant’s knowledge and belief and 

as may be practicable under the circumstances” qualifier.

OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5) requires a claimant to state the 

information required by subsections (A) through (F) “to the extent of 

the claimant’s knowledge and belief and as may be practicable under 

the circumstances.” Unison argues that this language required

Roberts to provide more details about her injuries because she knew

more details. Unison asserts that Myers supports this position. It 

does not.
8

In Myers, this Court held that the requirement of OCGA § 50-

21-26 (a) (5) (E) that the ante litem notice state “[t]he amount of the 

loss claimed” was not satisfied by a notice that “did not state any 

amount of loss whatsoever,” when the plaintiff had “actually 

incurred medical expenses at the time she gave notice.” Myers, 295 

Ga. at 846. We explained that although “the statute does not require 

that a claimant give notice of the ‘entire loss,’ the ‘complete loss,’ or 

the ‘total loss,’” “the extent of [the claimant’s] knowledge and belief 

at the time of notice included, at a minimum, the medical expenses 

she had incurred thus far.” Id.

Although Myers held that OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5) required the 

plaintiff to provide more information than she had provided in her 

notice because she knew more information, the key to that holding 

was that the information the plaintiff withheld – the amount she 

was claiming for her loss at the time of the notice – was responsive 

to the requirement set forth plainly in § 50-21-26 (a) (5) (E). See

Myers, 295 Ga. at 846 (“[T]he plain language requires notice of the 

amount of the loss claimed at that time, within the belief and 
9

knowledge of the claimant, as may be practicable under the 

circumstances.”). In other words, the plaintiff gave no information 

at all in her ante litem notice about “the amount of the loss” that she 

claimed, even though she knew an amount at that time based on her 

medical expenses up to that point. Myers did not hold that the 

plaintiff was required to provide any details about the amount 

claimed (for example, the name and itemized cost of each medical 

treatment she had received) – although she likely knew such details

– because that additional information is not required by the plain 

language of subsection (a) (5) (E). Thus, Myers does not support 

Unison’s argument that Roberts should have provided more 

information about her alleged loss in her ante litem notice simply 

because she knew more information at that time. OCGA § 50-21-26 

(a) (5) (D) says that a claimant must state the “nature of the loss 

suffered,” not everything she knows about her injuries.

Unison’s argument on this point also does not offer any real

guidance on how much detail Roberts was allegedly supposed to 

provide. Even Unison does not appear to assert that Roberts was 
10

required to share every detail she knew about her injuries, but it has 

not explained what level of detail is required (or practicable). Rather 

than developing such a test, we will rely on the plain language of 

subsection (a) (5) (D) to determine what information is needed to 

satisfy that element of the ante litem notice.

(b) “The nature of the loss suffered.”

OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5) (D) requires a claimant to state only

“the nature of the loss suffered.” The GTCA does not define “nature,”

so we look to the ordinary meaning of that word in context. See Duke 

v. State, 311 Ga. 135, 140 (856 SE2d 250) (2021) (“When interpreting 

a statute, we must give the text its plain and ordinary meaning, view 

it in the context in which it appears, and read it in its most natural 

and reasonable way, while also giving meaning to all words in the 

statute.” (citations omitted)). In ordinary English, “nature” in this 

context means the “kind” or “type” of a thing, or its “essential 

characteristics.” See, e.g., Webster’s II New Riverside University 

Dictionary (1994) (defining “nature” in this context as “Kind; type” 

or “Essential characteristics and qualities”); The American Heritage 
11

Dictionary (1991) (defining “nature” in this context as “Kind; type” 

and “The essential characteristics and qualities of a person or a 

thing.”). 

The next question, then, is what is a kind, type, or essential 

characteristic of a “loss” in the specific context of the GTCA. The 

GTCA defines “loss” for purposes of the act as: 

personal injury; disease; death; damage to tangible 

property, including lost wages and economic loss to the 

person who suffered the injury, disease, or death; pain 

and suffering; mental anguish; and any other element of 

actual damages recoverable in actions for negligence.

OCGA § 50-21-22 (3).5 Helpfully, this definition explains what loss

means in the GTCA context by providing examples of various kinds

of loss recoverable in negligence actions. These examples 

demonstrate what types of loss are pertinent in this context, and 

using these examples or similar descriptions of loss in an ante litem 

 5 We note that the Court of Appeals in this case appeared to conflate 

“loss” and “injury” in its holding that the statute requires the claimant to 

describe “the nature of [her] injuries” and provide “details regarding the type 

of injury.” Roberts, slip op. at 5. Unison similarly conflates those terms in its 

briefing here. As is clear from the definition of “loss,” however, an injury – such 

as personal injury – may be a kind of loss, but “loss” and “injury” are not

entirely interchangeable.
12

notice should therefore be sufficient to state “the nature of the loss 

suffered” in compliance with OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5) (D). For 

example, if a claimant contracted tetanus due to alleged negligence

by the State, “disease” would likely be her principal type of loss; the 

essential characteristic of that loss is that it is a disease and not, for 

example, that it is tetanus or that it is infectious or that it is 

“characterized by tonic spasm of voluntary muscles.” Medical 

definition of tetanus, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (last updated 

Aug. 24, 2021), https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/tetanus#medicalDictionary.6

In its brief here, Unison argues that Roberts’s ante litem notice 

was insufficient because “it merely parrots portions of the GTCA’s 

definition of ‘loss’ in a perfunctory manner.” As mentioned above, 

Roberts’s notice described the nature of her loss as:

 6 We note, however, that if a claimant lists tetanus (which is a disease)

in her ante litem notice as the nature of her loss, she has sufficiently stated 

that disease as a loss, although her specifically naming the disease was not 

required and other types of loss that may have resulted from the tetanus, such 

as medical bills or lost wages, would not be indicated. Indeed, nothing we say 

today precludes a claimant from providing more details about her claim in her 

ante litem notice than are statutorily required.
13

Bodily injury; past, present and future mental and 

physical pain and suffering; infliction of emotional 

distress; past, present and future medical expenses; past, 

present and future lost earnings; diminished earning 

capacity.

A comparison of that description with the statutory definition of loss

shows that Roberts did not merely copy the loss definition. Instead, 

she selected from the definition the types of loss that apply to her

claim.7 This is an appropriate way of fulfilling the notice 

requirement in OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5) (D).8

 7 In her brief, Roberts highlights that her ante litem notices said “bodily 

injury” rather than “personal injury” and asserts that “bodily injury” is a 

clearer description than “personal injury” because “personal injury” could 

apply to many categories of loss. However, in the context of this tort claims act, 

“personal injury” – which is listed separately from other kinds of injuries to a 

person, such as death or mental anguish – would plainly include “bodily 

injury.” See Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining “personal injury” 

when used “[i]n a negligence action” as “any harm caused to a person, such as 

a broken bone, a cut, or a bruise; bodily injury. — Also termed bodily injury”). 

In any event, bodily injury appropriately described a kind of loss suffered by 

Roberts, and we need not decide today the exact parameters of “personal 

injury” as used in the context of the GTCA. 8 We emphasize, however, that as Roberts did here, the claimant must

list the types of loss that she actually alleges she suffered. A true parroting of 

the entire definition of loss under the GTCA – without any tailoring to the 

specific loss the claimant suffered in her particular case – may not be deemed 

to comply with OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5) (D) if it includes types of loss not

allegedly suffered by the claimant. Moreover, the loss definition gives examples 

of kinds of loss, not an exhaustive list. See OCGA § 50-21-22 (3) (concluding 

with “any other element of actual damages recoverable in actions for 
14

(c) The other parts of OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5).

In considering the meaning of a statutory provision, we should

not read it in isolation from the other statutory provisions of which 

it is a part. See Hartley v. Agnes Scott College, 295 Ga. 458, 462 (759 

SE2d 857) (2014). As quoted above, OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5) as a 

whole requires a claimant to provide information on six subjects

related to her claim; “[t]he nature of the loss suffered” is only one of 

these. See OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5) (A)-(F). The combination of

required information can provide a clearer picture of the loss alleged 

by the claimant than the information required by one subsection 

alone. And we can consider this more complete picture of the loss in 

determining whether the ante litem notice gave the State “adequate 

notice of the claim to facilitate settlement before the filing of a 

lawsuit.” Williams, 272 Ga. at 625.

In this case, for example, as required by subsections (E) and 

(F), Roberts’s ante litem notice stated the “amount of the loss 

 

negligence”). Nothing precludes a claimant from including in the description of 

her loss types of loss not expressly listed in the definition.
15

claimed” and the “acts or omissions which caused the loss.” So in 

addition to knowing the types of loss that Roberts suffered, Unison 

knew that Roberts was injured in a high-speed car accident and was 

seeking $1,000,000 for her loss, indicating that the overall loss

claimed was quite serious. Unison argues that it needed more details

about Roberts’s injuries to facilitate settlement, but Unison has

never explained what additional details were needed or how such 

details would have been significant. For example, it is not clear why 

Unison could better consider settlement if, in addition to all of the 

information provided in the ante litem notice, it knew whether

Roberts injured her lower left leg rather than her upper right arm 

or had soft tissue injuries rather than broken bones.9

Indeed, an ante litem notice that follows the statute and 

focuses on the types of loss alleged, rather than providing lots of

details about specific injuries, may be a more effective way to alert 

the State to the claim it may face in a lawsuit and thereby facilitate 

 9 In fact, the record indicates that before Roberts sent her ante litem 

notice, the DOAS liability adjuster had made at least three offers of settlement 

to Roberts (none of which were accepted).
16

settlement. For example, if a claimant’s notice said that she suffered 

a transverse fracture of the tibia and fibula (a broken lower leg), she 

has provided notice of a personal injury. But she has not indicated 

whether the broken leg caused any other kinds of loss, such as

medical bills, lost wages, and pain and suffering. Although Unison

may view this hypothetical notice as more detailed, it may well 

provide less useful information. The notice provided by Roberts, on 

the other hand, expressly explained the kinds of damages that she

may seek at trial, including damages based on bodily injury, pain 

and suffering, medical bills, and lost wages. In sum, her ante litem 

notice adequately described the “nature of the loss” for her claim as 

required by OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5) (D).

4. The Court of Appeals’ opinion in this case principally relied 

on two of that court’s prior decisions, Bailey and Williams v. Wilcox 

State Prison, 341 Ga. App. 290 (799 SE2d 811) (2017) (“Wilcox State 

Prison”). In each of these cases, the Court of Appeals held that the

ante litem notice at issue was insufficient to describe the claimant’s

loss. Unison principally relies on these two cases as well. As 
17

discussed below, however, the notice in Wilcox State Prison was 

quite different from Roberts’s notice, and Bailey failed to consider

the plain meaning of the statute and is inconsistent with other case 

law, including Williams – this Court’s only prior decision 

considering the sufficiency of a “nature of the loss” description under 

OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5) (D). To explain these points, we will review 

Williams and the cases that followed it before turning to Wilcox 

State Prison, Bailey, and Bush v. Eichholz, 352 Ga. App. 465 (833 

SE2d 280) (2019), an opinion that deemed sufficient an ante litem

notice very similar to the one given in Bailey.

(a) Williams and its progeny.

Williams and the cases that followed it addressed a plaintiff’s 

alleged failure to mention one type of loss in the ante litem notice. 

In Williams, the notice said that the claimant, Sheila Williams, had 

suffered 

“pain, disfigurement, and greatly reduced life expectancy, 

with a concomitant loss of both the intangible and 

tangible benefits of life itself, resulting from the denial to 

her of the benefits of early detection and treatment of 

breast cancer, including what would have been an 
18

increased likelihood of total recovery, a likelihood of 

longer term survival, and a likelihood of reduced 

treatment, and suffering.”

272 Ga. at 627 (Benham, C.J., dissenting) (quoting the notice). The 

notice also said that her husband had suffered loss of consortium. 

See id. at 624 (majority opinion). Soon after that notice, Mrs. 

Williams died, and Mr. Williams then filed a wrongful death claim 

but did not provide an updated notice. See id. This Court held that 

the notice was not sufficient for the wrongful death claim because it 

“did not adequately describe the nature of [Mr. Williams’s] loss after 

[Mrs. Williams’s] death.” Id. at 626. 

Thus, the defect in the ante litem notice was not a lack of detail

about the various types of loss alleged but a complete failure to 

include death as a type of loss suffered. In fact, the Court noted that 

Mr. Williams’s loss of consortium claim remained pending in the 

trial court and Mrs. Williams’s estate’s claim for her pain and 

suffering had apparently been filed as a separate action. See id. at 

624. In this way, with its focus on the types of loss listed in the ante 

litem notice, our holding in Williams supports our conclusion today
19

about the meaning of “the nature of the loss.”

The Court of Appeals followed Williams in three cases that 

dealt with the question of whether a type of loss had been included 

in the ante litem notice. In Georgia Ports Authority v. Harris, 243 

Ga. App. 508 (533 SE2d 404) (2000), the claimant gave ante litem 

notice of “‘injuries [that] occurred as a result of [a] section of pipe 

falling, causing extensive damage to [Harris’s] knee, ankle[,] and 

shoulder.’” See id. at 510 (quoting the notice). The Court of Appeals 

affirmed the jury’s judgment in favor of Harris as to his claim for 

“personal injuries,” rejecting the argument that the notice was not 

properly delivered under the GTCA and a number of arguments of 

error at trial. See id. at 509-514.10 The Court of Appeals also 

affirmed the trial court’s decision not to enter judgment in favor of 

Harris’s wife for her loss of consortium claim. See id. at 515-516. 

Citing Williams, the Court of Appeals held that Harris’s description 

of the nature of the loss claimed did not give notice of his wife’s

 10 This Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ holding that the delivery of 

the ante litem notice complied with the GTCA in Georgia Ports Authority v. 

Harris, 274 Ga. 146, 149-150 (549 SE2d 95) (2001).
20

separate loss of consortium claim. See Harris, 243 Ga. at 515.

In Georgia Department of Transportation v. Baldwin, 292 Ga. 

App. 816 (665 SE2d 898) (2008), the ante litem notice described the 

nature of the loss as 

the wrongful death of Baldwin’s wife; the full value of her 

life; the fright, shock, and mental suffering of the wife; 

physical pain and suffering of the wife; loss of consortium, 

society, advice, example, and counsel of the wife; value of 

the wife’s services; punitive damages; attorney fees, costs, 

and expense; and “any other damages as may be lawfully 

authorized which arise out of the above-described 

transaction or occurrence.”

Id. at 824 (quoting the notice). The Court of Appeals affirmed the 

judgment in favor of Baldwin for the wrongful death claim based on 

his wife’s death as well as claims of loss of consortium and pain and

suffering, rejecting several evidentiary objections. See id. at 816-

824. However, the court held that Baldwin’s claim for wrongful 

death of his unborn child was properly dismissed because “[t]he 

notice did not mention the wife’s pregnancy or the loss of their 

unborn child.” Id. at 824. So like in Williams, the plaintiff’s problem 

in Harris and Baldwin was failure to include a type of loss in the 
21

notice.

In Delson v. Department of Transportation, 245 Ga. App. 100 

(537 SE2d 381) (2000), by contrast, the Court of Appeals held that 

claims for wrongful death filed by the surviving children of the two 

decedents had been sufficiently described when the ante litem notice

filed on behalf of the estate said: “‘Claims which may be alleged 

include wrongful death, negligence, loss of consortium, as well as 

others which may become apparent through the discovery process.’” 

Id. at 101 (quoting the notice). The court distinguished Williams, 

“because in Williams, no notice of a wrongful death claim was 

provided to the State,” whereas “[i]n this case, the State received 

notice that a wrongful death claim would be asserted.” Delson, 245 

Ga. App. at 102.11 Notably, the approved description simply

 11 The dissent argued that the ante litem notice was insufficient based 

on Williams because the notice did not alert the State that the children of the 

decedents, rather than the decedents’ estates, would be filing a lawsuit. See 

245 Ga. App. at 103 (Blackburn, J., dissenting). The dissent also noted, 

however, that the “estates cannot assert a wrongful death claim; only the 

surviving children can assert that claim,” id. at 104, and as the majority 

pointed out, wrongful death was included in the ante litem notices, id. at 102

(majority opinion). In any event, that part of the opinion is not relevant to this 

case, because Unison does not assert that Roberts is a surprise claimant.
22

provided the type of loss – wrongful death. It did not provide specific

details about the parents’ deaths, such as the medical cause of death 

or any contributing factors. Thus, this decision, like the others 

discussed above, supports our holding that OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5) 

(D) requires a claimant to list only the types of her loss. None of 

these cases lends support to Unison’s argument that the “nature of 

the loss” must include detailed descriptions of the claimant’s

injuries.

(b) Bailey and the recent Court of Appeals opinions.

In deciding this case, the Court of Appeals did not mention

Williams or its progeny. Instead, it looked to Wilcox State Prison and

Bailey, in which the Court of Appeals held that the ante litem

notices failed to provide the nature of any loss – while ignoring Bush, 

a case that addressed the same issue but reached the opposite result. 

We will discuss these cases next.

(i) Wilcox State Prison.

The plaintiff’s ante litem notice in Wilcox State Prison said that 

she “‘sustained serious injuries;’” as a result of a slip-and-fall and 
23

that she had requested her medical records and expected her 

damages to exceed $25,000. 341 Ga. App. at 294 (quoting the notice). 

The Court of Appeals held that this description was insufficient 

because it “provided no information regarding the injuries for which 

[the plaintiff] received or planned to receive medical treatment.” Id.

(ii) Bailey.

The plaintiff’s ante litem notice in Bailey said that because of 

a “‘failure to warn of dangers relating to the premises and to 

maintain premises in a safe condition,’” she suffered the following 

loss:

“personal injuries, present and pass [sic] medical 

damages, present and future loss, [sic] wages, Intentional 

Infliction of Emotion Distress, lost [sic] of consortium and 

other damages in excess of $6 million dollars.”

351 Ga. App. at 631 (quoting the notice). The Court of Appeals held

that this description of “various general types of damage and injury 

. . . does not describe the nature of those injuries or provide any 

details regarding the type of injury or injuries she allegedly 

sustained.” Id. The court reasoned that “[s]imilar to [Wilcox State 
24

Prison], Bailey’s ante litem notice stated that she expected her 

damages to exceed $6,000,000, but provided no information about 

the specific injuries causing this alleged amount of damage.” Id. at 

632.12

(iii) Bush.

Three days after Bailey, a different Court of Appeals panel 

 12 In support of its holding, Bailey also cited Camp v. Coweta County, 271 

Ga. App. 349, 354 (609 SE2d 695) (2005). In that case, after affirming the 

dismissal of the complaint on two other grounds (one of which this Court 

reversed in Camp v. Coweta County, 280 Ga. 199 (625 SE2d 759) (2006)), the 

Court of Appeals concluded its opinion with the summary statement: “Further, 

the notice does not provide the specific place or time of the incident or the 

nature of Camp’s injuries.” 271 Ga. App. at 355. But Camp’s ante litem notice 

said that he “‘was severely injured when he fell from a scaffold on or about 

August 27, 2002, at the Coweta County Fairgrounds’” and that his “‘legs were 

shattered when he landed in the rocks beneath the scaffold. It is unclear at 

this point whether Mr. Camp will ever regain the full use of his legs.’” Id. at 

354-355 (quoting the notice). Thus, at least as to the first two points – that the 

notice did not provide the specific time or place of the incident – the Court of 

Appeals was obviously wrong. And assuming the court was referring to the 

requirement that a claimant list “the nature of the loss” when it said that Camp 

did not provide “the nature of Camp’s injuries,” we doubt that the opinion was

entirely correct on this point either. Although Camp did not provide as clear a 

list of the types of loss he suffered as Roberts has provided in this case, his 

notice did make clear that he at least suffered a personal injury. It seems that 

this should be sufficient notice for at least that claim, although the opinion 

does not indicate what claims Camp sought to bring in his lawsuit against 

Coweta County. In any event, because his notice was not nearly as clear as 

Roberts’s notice, we need not decide whether Camp’s summary alternate 

holding on this point – in an opinion that was wrong on at least three other 

points – was correct.
25

decided Bush, in which the plaintiff filed a legal malpractice claim

alleging that he lost his ability to file a tort claim against the Georgia 

Ports Authority for his injuries from a crane accident because his 

counsel’s ante litem notice was insufficient. See Bush, 352 Ga. App. 

at 465-468. The plaintiff’s ante litem notice in Bush described his 

loss as:

“pain and suffering, past, present and future, both mental 

and physical, all medical expenses incurred for hospitals, 

physicians, therapy, medication and related expenses, 

past, present and future, lost wages, lost future earning 

capacity, a diminishment in capacity to labor, a loss of 

enjoyment of life, loss of consortium, loss of services and 

the scarring, disfigurement, disabilities, impairment and 

permanent injuries resulting from this incident.”

Id. at 469 (quoting the notice). The Court of Appeals held that it was 

“clear” that this notice “described the nature of Bush’s losses.” Id. In 

support of its conclusion, the court cited Williams, noting that in 

Williams when the “ante litem notice described the nature of a 

husband’s and wife’s losses as pain, disfigurement, a reduced life 

expectancy, and a loss of consortium,” this Court said “the couple 

‘gave written notice of their claims under OCGA § 50-21-26 of the 
26

Georgia Tort Claims Act.’” Bush, 352 Ga. App. at 469 (citing 

Williams, 272 Ga. at 624-626). The Court of Appeals then 

distinguished Wilcox State Prison on the ground that “serious 

injuries” is a “general phrase” that “could ostensibly apply to any of 

the losses listed in OCGA § 50-21-22 (3).” Bush, 352 Ga. App. at 469-

470. The court did not mention Bailey.

(iv) Reconciling Wilcox State Prison, Bailey, and Bush.

The holding in Wilcox State Prison is consistent with the 

holding in Bush and with our holding today, because the claimant 

in Wilcox State Prison did not identify any type of loss in her ante 

litem notice. Although she identified the amount of her loss (at least

$25,000) and what sort of incident caused the loss (a slip-and-fall), 

her description of the nature of her loss (“serious injuries”) gave no 

indication of what kind of loss she had suffered. From the allegation

that the loss was caused by a slip-and-fall and that she was getting 

some kind of medical treatment, the State perhaps could have 

surmised that her loss may have included personal injury, but that 

is not certain. Instead, her “serious injuries” that required medical 
27

treatment could have been mental anguish or some kind of disease 

triggered by the fall. Moreover, she did not state if her “serious 

injuries” included economic damages, such as property damaged in 

the fall or lost wages. Because all of this was left to speculation by 

the terse description of the claimant’s loss, the Court of Appeals’ 

conclusion that the notice was insufficient appears sound – but it 

does not support a holding that Roberts’s notice, which did clearly 

indicate the several types of loss she allegedly suffered, was 

insufficient. 

Bailey, on the other hand, would support the Court of Appeals’

holding that Roberts’s notice was insufficient. But Bailey was 

wrongly decided. The Bailey court concluded that the plaintiff’s

notice there was “[s]imilar to [Wilcox State Prison]” because it 

“provided no information about the [claimant’s] specific injuries.”

351 Ga. App. at 632. The notice provided by Bailey, however, was 

much more thorough. Rather than simply saying that her “injuries”

were “serious,” Bailey stated that her loss included personal 

injuries, medical damages, lost wages, emotional distress, and loss 
28

of consortium. By holding that this notice – which the court 

described as listing “general types of damage and injury,” Bailey, 351 

Ga. App. at 631 (emphasis added) – was insufficient, Bailey went 

much further than Wilcox State Prison, without justifying the 

expansion. The court did not explain what language in OCGA § 50-

21-26 (a) (5) (D) required “details” as to “the type of injury” (and as 

explained in Division 2 above, there is no such language), nor did 

the court give any guidance as to what sort of details would be

required. See Bailey, 351 Ga. App. at 631.

By contrast, the Bush court, when faced with an ante litem

notice very similar to the one in Bailey, looked to our decision in

Williams and, consistent with that opinion and the text of the 

statute, concluded that the notice was sufficient. This was the 

correct conclusion. Accordingly, we overrule Bailey.13

 13 Additionally, to the extent the statement in Wilcox State Prison that 

the claimant’s notice was insufficient because she “provided no information 

regarding the injuries for which she received or planned to receive medical 

treatment,” 341 Ga. App. at 294, may be read to indicate that a claimant must 

give specific details about all bodily injuries sustained, that language is 

disapproved.
29

5. For the reasons discussed above, we hold that Roberts’s ante 

litem notice, which listed the types of loss that she allegedly 

suffered, was sufficient under OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5) (D). We

therefore reverse the Court of Appeals opinion holding otherwise. 

Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur, except McMillian, 

J., who concurs specially.
30

 MCMILLIAN, Justice, concurring specially.

I write separately to clarify that I do not agree with the 

majority’s characterization of Unison’s argument as set out in the 

last paragraph of Division 2 (a), and in particular the sentence that 

reads: “Even Unison does not appear to assert that Roberts was 

required to share every detail she knew about her injuries, but it has 

not explained what level of detail is required (or practicable).”14 I see 

nothing problematic in an advocate’s assertion of an argument that 

is in their client’s best interest. However, because that sentence is 

not necessary to the majority’s analysis, I can concur fully in the 

remainder of the opinion. 

 14 The emphasis appears in the original.