NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPI RES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT AS LILY LLC, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D14-863 ) HAROLD L. MORGAN and PHYLLIS ) MORGAN; WACHOVIA BANK; ) NATIONAL ASSOCIATION; BAYWAY ) ISLES HOMEOWNERS CLUB, INC.; ) MICHAEL W. WELLS and KATHERINE ) A. WELLS; CAPITAL ONE BANK (USA); ) NATIONAL ASSOCIATION f/k/a ) CAPITAL ONE BANK; NORTHSTAR ) BANK, ) Appellees. ) ) Opinion filed May 8, 2015.

A ppeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas County; Pamela A.M. Campbell, Judge.

Stanford R. Solomon and J. Andrew Baldwin of The Solomon Law Group, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant. Russell L. Cheatham, III, of Russell L. Cheatham, III, P.A., St. Petersburg, for A ppellees Harold Morgan and Phyllis Morgan. No appearance by remaining A ppellees.

CRENSHAW, Judge.- 2 - In this foreclosure case, the circuit court entered a final jud gment of

dismissal in favor of the homeo wners, Harold and Phyllis Morgan . But because the bank, AS Lily LLC, was a proper party and had standing, we reve rse. As relevant here, the Morgans executed an adjustable rate note and mortgage in favor of Option One Mortgage in 2006. Attached to the note was an allonge with a blank endorsement. After the Morgans' subsequen t default, the note was assigned to Liquidation Properties, Inc. (LPI). LPI initiated this foreclosure proceeding in 2008 and filed a copy of the mortgage and included a lost no te count. Then, in 2012, the circuit court granted AS Lily's motion to amend the complai nt 1 and AS Lily filed the Verified First Amended Complaint at issue here. With its compl aint, it attached the adjustable rate note, the mortgage, and the allonge with the bl ank endorsement. After a bench trial, the court granted a final judgment in favor of the Morgans, and AS Lily timely appealed. The court granted judgment in favor of the Morgans largely base d on its conclusion that AS Lily was not a proper party and that it lack ed standing. A plaintiff who is not the original lender may establish standing to foreclose a mortgage loan by submitting a note with a blank or special endorsement, an assignment of the note, or an affidavit otherwise proving the plaintiff's status as the holder of the note. . . . [S]tanding must be established a s of the time of filing the foreclosure complaint. Focht v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 124 So. 3d 308, 310 (Fla. 2d D CA 2013) (citing McLean v. JP Morgan Chase Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 79 So. 3d 170, 173 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)).

1 The motion is not in our record, but the order on the motion is

.- 3 - AS Lily was not the original lender in this case. But by the t ime the verified first amended complaint to foreclose the mortgage was filed, AS Lily was the holder of the note and mortgage. AS Lily established standing by "submitting a note with a blank . . . endorsement." See id. Regardless of the no te's prior history, the operative complaint was in AS Lily's name and AS Lily held the note with the blank endorsement. That is sufficient for standing. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Morcom, 125 So. 3d 320, 322 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (citing Mortg. Elec. Re gistration Sys., Inc. v. Azize, 965 So. 2d 151, 153 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)), review denied, 139 So. 3d 299 (Fla. 2014)). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment. Though ultimately ruling against AS Lily on standing, the court allowed AS Lily to try to establish the default. The court sustained an o bjection to testimony from AS Lily's witness, a representative of Gregory Lending, that th e servicer's testimony was hearsay that was not admissible as a business record. See §§ 9 0.802, .803(6), Fla. Stat. (2011). 2 In reaching its decision the court erred in following Glarum v. LaSalle Bank National Ass'n, 83 So. 3d 780, 782 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). W hile we take no issue with Glarum, the facts of this case better track those in WAMCO XXVIII, Ltd. v. Integrated Electronic Environments, Inc., 903 So. 2d 230, 233 ( Fla. 2d DCA 2005). In this case, the witness was testifying to information she person ally knew and relayed

what she herself did in establis hing the values in this case. In Glarum, the witness could only provide inadmissible hearsay because he was testifyi ng to material he

2 We note that as far as authentication is concerned, the note an d allonge here are self-authenticating, and the servicer's representative 's inability to authenticate them is immaterial in this case. See § 90.902(8); Bryson v. Br anch Banking & Trust Co., 75 So. 3d 783, 786 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).- 4 - obtained from another servicer and he was unfamiliar with how a ny of the data entries were made, either at the servicer for whom he worked or the ser vicer on whose data he relied. 83 So. 3d at 782. In WAMCO, the witness testified to procedures the servicer for whom he worked used and testified about his personal experi ence in servicing the

loans at issue. 903 So. 2d at 233. Because in this case the b ank's witness testified to procedures the servicer for whom she worked used in some detail and also testified about her personal experience with these loans in particular, t he evidence sought to be adduced could be admitted as a business record. See id. (citin g § 90.803(6)). Thus, the court erred in concluding that the witness's testimony was inadmissible hearsay, and

it should have admitted the evidence. Because the court erred in concluding that AS Lily was not a pr oper party, lacked standing, and that its witness's testimony was inadmissi ble, we reverse and

remand for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded.

ALTENBERND and LaROSE, JJ., Concur.