NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANTONIO BORJAS-TRANQUILINO, AKA Antonio Borja,

Petitioner,

v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. No. 19-70628 Agency No. A206-406-333

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Im m igration Appeals Subm itted May 12, 2022 * * Pasadena, California Before: IKUTA and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and DANIELS, * * * District Judge. Antonio Borjas-Tranquilino seeks review of a decision of the Board of 

# FILED

MAY 16 2022
M OLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

* * The panel unanim ously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argum e nt. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

* * * The Honorable George B. Daniels, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.Im m igration Appeals (“BIA”) dism issing his appeal of the Im m igration Judge’s

(“IJ”) denial of his applications for cancellation of rem oval, asylum , withholding of rem oval, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s denial of Borjas-Tranquilino’s request for cancellation of rem oval. The IJ and the BIA based this decision on the conclusion that rem oval would not cause “exceptional and extrem ely unusual” hardship, and we lack jurisdiction to review this determ ination. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), 1229b(b)(1)(D); Chuyon Yon Hong v. Mukasey , 518 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that an IJ’s “exceptional and extrem ely unusual hardship ... finding ‘is a subjective, discretionary judgm ent that has been carved out of our appellate jurisdiction.’” (citation om itted)). Further, Borjas-Tranquilino failed to raise a “constitutional claim ” or “question of law” to the BIA and IJ’s findings to support his request for cancellation of rem oval. Petitioner fails to raise

a m ixed question sufficient to establish jurisdiction under Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr , 140 S. Ct. 1062 (2020). See Mendez-Castro v. Mukasey , 552 F.3d 975, 980- 81 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that the court lacks jurisdiction to review the application of the “exceptional and extrem ely unusual hardship” standard to undisputed facts because that rem ains a discretionary determ ination). Therefore,

2without a “constitutional claim ” or “question of law,” this Court does not have

jurisdiction to review that decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). Substantial evidence supports the IJ and BIA determ ination that BorjasTranquilino failed to establish past persecution to support his asylum and withholding of rem oval requests because he did not allege that h e suffered harm rising to the level of persecution. See Sharma v. Garland , 9 F.4th 1052, 1063 (9th Cir. 2021). Moreover, Borjas-Tranquilino failed to evidence how his assault as ateenager or the threats he received after returning to Mexico establish a wellfounded fear of future persecution or a clear probability of future persecution. Therefore, we uphold the IJ and BIA denial of Borjas-Tranquilino’s asylum and withholding of rem oval requests. Finally, substantial evidence supports the BIA and IJ decision to deny Borjas-Tranquilino’s CAT request because he failed to dem onstrate that if he returned to Mexico, he would m ore likely than not be tortured by or with the acquiescence of the Mexican governm ent. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1); Zheng v. Ashcroft , 332 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2003). 1 PETITION DENIED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART

.

1 Because the BIA did not discuss the IJ’s determ ination that BorjasTranquilino’s testim ony was not credible, we do not address his argum ents on this issue. 3