UNITED STATES AIR FORCE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

UNITED STATES

v.

Airman First Class DANIEL J. RODGERS

United States Air Force

ACM S38832

8 November 2016

Sentence adjudged 1 April 2015 by SPCM convened at Kadena Air Base, 

Okinawa, Japan. Military Judge: Brendon K. Tukey (sitting alone).

Approved Sentence: Bad-conduct discharge, confinement for 3 months, 

forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction to E-1.

Appellate Counsel for Appellant: Lieutenant Colonel Patrick E. Neighbors, 

Major Lauren A. Shure, and Captain Annie W. Morgan. 

Appellate Counsel for the United States: Gerald R. Bruce, Esquire.

Before

DREW, J. BROWN, and MINK

Appellate Military Judges

OPINION OF THE COURT

This opinion is issued as an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as 

precedent under AFCCA Rule of Practice and Procedure 18.4.

MINK, Judge:

Appellant was convicted, pursuant to his plea, by a military judge sitting as a general 

court-martial of attempting to commit lewd acts upon a child under the age of 16, on divers 

occasions, in violation of Article 80, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 880. Appellant was sentenced to 

a bad-conduct discharge, confinement for three months, forfeiture of all pay and 

allowances, and reduction to E-1. The convening authority approved the sentence as 

adjudged. 
2 ACM 38832

Pursuant to United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982), Appellant raises 

the sole issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. We disagree and affirm.

Background

One charge with two specifications, in violation of Article 80, UCMJ, were 

preferred against Appellant. Specification 1 of the charge alleged that Appellant attempted 

to commit sexual acts upon a child under the age of 16 and Specification 2 alleged that 

Appellant attempted to commit lewd acts upon a child under the age of 16, on divers 

occasions. After the charge and its specifications were referred to a general court-martial,

Appellant entered into a pretrial agreement with the convening authority whereby the 

convening authority agreed to amend Specification 2 by striking the word “anus” from the 

specification and to withdraw and dismiss with prejudice Specification 1 upon the 

acceptance of Appellant’s guilty plea to the amended Specification 2. Appellant also 

agreed to enter a reasonable stipulation of fact, waive all waivable motions, and waive the 

right to trial by court members and request trial by military judge alone. There was no

limitation on the sentence that the convening authority could approve in the pretrial 

agreement. Both Appellant and the convening authority complied with all of the terms of 

the pretrial agreement. 

Additional facts necessary to resolve the assignment of error are included below.

Effectiveness of Counsel

Appellant submitted an affidavit in which he contends that one of his trial defense 

counsel, Captain (Capt) CG, provided him ineffective assistance by advising him that the 

charge in his case would be a misdemeanor and claimed that, but for this advice, he would 

not have agreed to plead guilty in accordance with the pretrial agreement. In reviewing 

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we look “at the questions of deficient 

performance and prejudice de novo.” United States v. Datavs, 71 M.J. 420, 424 (C.A.A.F. 

2012) (quoting United States v. Gutierrez, 66 M.J. 329, 330–31 (C.A.A.F. 2008)).

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, “an appellant must demonstrate both 

(1) that his counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) that this deficiency resulted in 

prejudice.” United States v. Green, 68 M.J. 360, 361 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (citing Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). Under the first prong, the appellant has the burden 

to show that his “counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness—that counsel was not functioning as counsel within the meaning of the 

Sixth Amendment.” United States v. Edmond, 63 M.J. 343, 351 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (quoting 

United States v. Davis, 60 M.J. 469, 473 (C.A.A.F. 2005)). The question is, therefore, “did 

the level of advocacy ‘fall[] measurably below the performance . . . [ordinarily expected] 

of fallible lawyers?’” United States v. Haney, 64 M.J. 101, 106 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (quoting 

United States v. Polk, 32 M.J. 150, 153 (C.M.A. 1991)) (alterations in original). Under the 
3 ACM 38832

second prong, the deficient performance must prejudice the accused through errors “so 

serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” United 

States v. Tippit, 65 M.J. 69, 76 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). 

Counsel is presumed competent until proven otherwise. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

Additionally, in the guilty plea context, “[t]o satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the 

defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he 

would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” United States v. 

Bradley, 71 M.J. 13, 16 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). 

“‘A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.’ That requires a ‘substantial,’ not just ‘conceivable,’ likelihood of a different 

result.” Id. at 16–17 (quoting Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 189 (2011)). Further, 

Appellant must satisfy an objective inquiry: he must show had he been advised properly, 

that it would have been rational for him to reject the benefits of the pretrial agreement and 

to plead not guilty. Id. at 17.

In his affidavit, Capt CG denied ever characterizing the misconduct with which 

Appellant was charged as a misdemeanor. He noted that while the maximum possible 

confinement in Appellant’s case decreased from 45 years to 15 years as a result of the 

pretrial agreement wherein the convening authority agreed to withdraw and dismiss the 

first Specification, Capt CG asserted that he would never characterize an offense with a 

possible period of confinement of 15 years as a “misdemeanor.” Capt CG also averred he 

advised Appellant “orally and in writing, on multiple occasions, about the severity of the 

offenses with which he was charged and to which he pled guilty,” including advising 

Appellant of the possibility he would be required to register as a sex offender. Capt CG’s 

written advice regarding this requirement, which Appellant also acknowledged in writing, 

was attached to Capt CG’s affidavit. Appellant’s other trial defense counsel, Maj LS, also 

averred that he never heard Capt CG characterize Appellant’s misconduct as a 

misdemeanor, nor did he do so himself.

“[T]he defense bears the burden of establishing the truth of the factual allegations 

that would provide the basis for finding deficient performance.” Tippit, 65 M.J. at 76 

(citing Polk, 32 M.J. at 153). When there is a factual dispute, appellate courts determine 

whether further factfinding is required. United States v. Ginn, 47 M.J. 236, 242–43 

(C.A.A.F. 1997). 

Based upon our review of Appellant’s claim, trial defense counsel’s affidavits, and 

the matters contained in the record, we can resolve this issue without ordering additional 

factfinding by applying the principles set forth in Ginn, 47 M.J. at 248. Under the first 

principle in Ginn, no factfinding hearing is required if “the facts alleged in the affidavit 

allege an error that would not result in relief even if any factual dispute were resolved in 

appellant’s favor.” Id. Under the fourth principle in Ginn, no factfinding hearing is 
4 ACM 38832

required “if the affidavit is factually adequate on its face but the appellate filings and the 

record as a whole ‘compellingly demonstrate’ the improbability of those facts.” Id.

At trial, the military judge discussed the maximum punishment authorized based 

solely on Appellant’s plea of guilty with Appellant and his trial defense counsel. Appellant 

acknowledged that the maximum authorized punishment was a reduction in grade to E-1, 

total forfeitures of all pay and allowances, 15 years confinement, and a dishonorable 

discharge. As noted above, the pretrial agreement did not limit the sentence that could be 

approved by the convening authority. Prior to accepting Appellant’s guilty plea, the 

military judge also asked Appellant if his defense counsel had advised him of sex offender 

reporting and registration requirements that could result from his guilty plea and Appellant 

acknowledged that his defense counsel had done so. During the sentencing portion of the 

trial, Appellant provided the military judge with an unsworn statement in which Appellant 

acknowledged that he was going to be a federal convict, have to register as a sex offender, 

and that even if he received no punishment from the court-martial, he would “forever 

struggle more than most to find a place to live, a job, and any college that would accept 

[him].” 

We find it unnecessary to resolve the factual discrepancy between Appellant’s 

assertion that his trial defense counsel characterized the charge as a misdemeanor and the 

denial by his trial defense counsel that he did so. Even were we to assume that Capt CG

erroneously characterized the charged misconduct as a misdemeanor, Appellant would not 

be entitled to any relief since he has failed to demonstrate any prejudice as a result. It is 

clear from the appellate filings and the record as a whole that Appellant understood the 

seriousness and the consequences of the charge to which he pleaded guilty. Applying an 

objective standard, we conclude that it would not have been rational for Appellant to reject 

the pretrial agreement, which reduced his potential possible confinement by 30 years, and 

plead not guilty solely on the basis the misapplication of the term “misdemeanor” to the 

charge in his case. Appellant was fully advised and aware of the consequences of his guilty 

plea. 

In addition, the appellate filings and the record as a whole “compellingly 

demonstrate” the improbability of Appellant’s assertions. This was a sex offense that could 

have resulted in sex-offender registration and up to 15 years in confinement. The term 

“misdemeanor” is generally understood to mean a crime less serious than a felony; 

however, offenses under the UCMJ are not categorized as either misdemeanors or felonies. 

There is absolutely nothing that would suggest that this federal offense was the equivalent 

of a misdemeanor, or that anyone who was aware of what constituted that term would 

suggest that it was similar to the conviction here. 

We find that Appellant has failed to establish that he was denied effective assistance 

of counsel. United States v. Paxton, 64 M.J. 484, 490 (C.A.A.F. 2007). 
5 ACM 38832

Promulgating Order Error

We note that Specification 2 of the Charge on the initial court-martial promulgating 

order (CMO) incorrectly states that Appellant was found guilty of Specification 2, 

including the word “anus.” While the Appellant pleaded guilty to Specification 2, he 

pleaded not guilty to the word “anus.” Prior to finding Appellant guilty of Specification 2, 

the military judge directed the trial counsel to amend Specification 2 by lining through the 

word “anus” on the original charge sheet in compliance with the terms of the pretrial 

agreement. The original charge sheet was apparently never modified and the word “anus” 

was included in Specification 2 on the CMO. We direct completion of a corrected CMO 

to remedy this error. 

Conclusion

The findings and sentence are correct in law and fact, and no error materially 

prejudicial to the substantial rights of Appellant occurred. Articles 59(a) and 66(c), UCMJ, 

10 U.S.C. §§ 859(a), 866(c). Accordingly, the findings and sentence are AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT

KURT J. BRUBAKER

 Clerk of the Court