UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

REGION III 

2443 WARRENVILLE RD. SUITE 210 

LISLE, ILLINOIS 60532-4352

February 23, 2015 

EA-14-168 

Mr. Anthony Vitale 

Vice President, Operations 

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. 

Palisades Nuclear Plant 

27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway 

Covert, MI 49043-9530 

SUBJECT: FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION OF A WHITE FINDING WITH 

ASSESSMENT FOLLOWUP AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION; NRC INSPECTION 

REPORT NO. 05000255/2015007; PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT 

Dear Mr. Vitale: 

This letter provides you the final significance determination of the preliminary White finding 

discussed in our previous communication dated December 2, 2014, which included 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Inspection Report No. 05000255/2014010. This 

report is available in the NRC’s Agencywide Documents Access and Management 

System (ADAMS) at accession number ML14336A624. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC 

Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. The finding involved the failure of your 

staff to properly monitor external doses during the control rod drive (CRD) housing replacement 

activities in February and March 2014. This resulted in inaccurate calculation and assignment 

of dose for numerous workers. 

At your request, a regulatory conference was held on January 13, 2015, to discuss your views 

on this issue. This meeting was open to the public. A copy of the Entergy presentation was 

placed into ADAMS at accession number ML15012A368. During the meeting, you described 

your assessment of the significance of the finding and the corrective actions taken to resolve it, 

including the root cause evaluation of the finding. You attributed the root cause of the failure to 

inadequacies in an Entergy procedure and determined that deficiencies in planning and field 

oversight by the radiation protection staff contributed. A summary of the conference, including a 

list of attendees and a list of questions, was provided to you under separate enclosure. This 

document can be found in ADAMS at accession number ML15042A458. 

During the meeting, you stated that you agreed with the performance deficiency and the 

violation, but that you disagreed with the significance of the finding. Specifically, your staff 

stated that the ability to assess dose was not compromised and that a realistic dose 

assessment, as presented during the conference, calculated only a minimal increase in the 

assigned doses as compared with the initial calculation. 

The NRC reviewed the additional dose reassessment information presented during the 

conference and concluded that the information did not change the NRC’s position. The NRC 

was unable to credit the assumptions and results used in the alternative dose assessment as 

described in Enclosure 1. Specifically, the NRC concluded that your monitoring resulted in a 

situation where workers were allowed to leave the site and to engage in other radiological work 
A. Vitale -2- 

at other facilities without having full and complete knowledge of their actual dose. Until 

identified by the NRC inspector, this deficiency compromised your ability (and the ability of other 

subsequent licensed employers) to ensure that additional allowed worker exposures would not 

result in annual doses that exceeded Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 20 

limits. 

Therefore, after considering the information developed during the inspection and provided at the 

regulatory conference, the NRC has concluded that the finding is appropriately characterized as 

White, a finding of low to moderate risk significance. 

You have 30 calendar days from the date of this letter to appeal the staff’s determination of 

significance for the identified White finding. Such appeals will be considered to have merit only 

if they meet the criteria given in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 2, “Process 

for Appealing NRC Characterization of Inspection Findings (Significance Determination Process 

Appeal Process).” An appeal must be sent in writing to the Regional Administrator, Region III, 

2443 Warrenville Road, Lisle, IL 60532-4352. 

The NRC has also determined that the failure of Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., involved two 

violations as cited in the Notice of Violation (Notice) found in Enclosure 2. The circumstances 

surrounding the violations were described in detail in NRC Inspection Report 

No. 05000255/2014010 and during the regulatory conference. In accordance with the NRC 

Enforcement Policy, the Notice is considered escalated enforcement action because it is 

associated with a White finding. 

You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the 

enclosed Notice when preparing your response. If you have additional information that you 

believe the NRC should consider, you may provide it in your response to the Notice. The NRC 

review of your response to the Notice will also determine whether further enforcement action is 

necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. 

As a result of our review of Palisades’ performance, including this White finding, we have 

assessed the plant to be in the Regulatory Response column of the NRC’s Action Matrix, 

effective the fourth quarter of 2014. Therefore, we plan to conduct a supplemental inspection 

using Inspection Procedure 95001, “Inspection for One or Two White Inputs in a Strategic 

Performance Area,” when your staff has notified us of your readiness for this inspection. This 

inspection procedure is conducted to provide assurance that the root cause and contributing 

causes of risk significant performance issues are understood, the extent of condition and the 

extent of cause are identified, and the corrective actions are sufficient to prevent recurrence. 

For administrative purposes, this letter is issued as NRC Inspection Report 05000255/2015007. 

Additionally, apparent violation (AV) 05000255/2014010-01 is now closed and violation 

(VIO) 05000255/2014010-01 is opened in its place. 

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's “Rules of Practice,” a copy of this letter, its 

enclosures, and your response, if you choose to provide one, will be made available 

electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from ADAMS. 

 
A. Vitale -3- 

To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, 

or safeguards information, so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction. 

The NRC also includes significant enforcement actions on its Web site at 

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/enforcement/actions. 

Sincerely, 

/RA/ 

Cynthia D. Pederson 

Regional Administrator 

Docket No. 50-255 

License No. DPR-20 

Enclosures: 

1. Final Significance Determination 

2. Notice of Violation 

cc w/encls: Distribution via ListServ®
FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION 

Enclosure 1 

During the regulatory conference, you provided your perspective that the first dose assessment 

was overly conservative in assessing the amount of dose that should be assigned to the 

workers involved in the activity of concern. You provided information for what you considered to 

be a more realistic assessment, which considered: (1) whether a sufficient dose gradient 

existed to warrant relocation of dosimetry; (2) development of a model to evaluate the dose at 

the abdomen if a sufficient gradient existed; and (3) the impact of using the tungsten vest. 

Based on these factors, you recalculated the effective dose equivalent dose for external 

radiation (EDEX) in accordance with a method described in Regulatory Guide 8.40, “Methods 

for Measuring Effective Dose Equivalent from External Exposure,” (RG 8.40) Section C.1, using 

compartment weighting factors. 

Entergy Position: Your staff started with an assumption that if the ratio between an individual’s 

unmonitored abdomen dose and monitored chest dose was less than 1.5 then there was not a 

sufficient dose gradient to require relocation of the chest dosimeter. Your staff stated that this 

criteria was derived from guidance in NRC Inspection Procedure 71124.01, “Radiological 

Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls,” paragraph 03.05.c. 

NRC Evaluation: The NRC staff evaluated this acceptance criteria assumption and noted that 

NRC regulation 10 CFR 20.1201(c) requires, for calculating the EDEX, that the assigned deep 

dose equivalent must be measured by dosimeters located at the part of the body receiving the 

highest exposure. 

NRC Regulatory Guide 8.40 provides NRC guidance for use of multiple dosimeters, and 

specifies that the dosimeter for each compartment must be located at the part of the 

compartment receiving the highest exposure, in order to ensure compliance with 

10 CFR 20.1201(c). Based on the dosimetry data and radiological surveys that you provided, 

the NRC determined that, for the combined thorax abdomen compartment, the dosimeter was 

not placed at the part of the compartment receiving the highest exposure. The NRC does not 

have a basis for accepting an initial assumption to place the dosimetry at a location other than 

the part of the compartment receiving the highest exposure as this would be non-conservative 

and lead to underestimating the actual dose received by a worker. The NRC reviewed 

Inspection Procedure 71124.01 and determined that the guidance to an inspector provided a 

risk informed criteria for when additional questions should be asked of a licensee to ensure that 

there was no missed dose. This guidance was targeted at work activities where licensees were 

using a single dosimeter in a non-uniform exposure situation. The guidance does not imply that 

observed discrepancies are acceptable. Therefore, an inspector can question placement of 

dosimetry whenever it appears that the part of the body receiving the highest exposure is not 

being monitored. Consequently, the acceptance criteria that your staff developed did not 

ensure that it met NRC requirements. In summary, the NRC concluded that this step did not 

assess whether a dose gradient existed, but whether the observed dose gradient warranted 

moving the dosimeter to the highest exposed portion of the compartment. The NRC does not 

agree that the use of the 1.5 gradient in this manner is an acceptable practice. 

Entergy Position: Your staff developed a model to determine whether there was a dose 

gradient. Based upon aggregate data from all the workers, your staff assumed that the data 

best fit a straight line from the unshielded thighs to the unshielded arms, with the highest dose 

being from below. Your staff then assigned locations for the abdomen and chest measurements 

falling between the arm and thigh measurements. Specifically, your staff looked at the axial 
Final Significance Determination -2- 

separation between the dosimeters placed on the arms, the chest, and the thighs of a standing 

individual and then, based on the principle of similar triangles, determined that if the difference 

between the average dose of the unshielded thighs and average dose of the unshielded arms 

divided by the chest was greater than 1.25, the linear gradient met the criteria to warrant a 

separate abdomen dose assessment. If it was less than 1.25, then your staff concluded that no 

relocation was necessary and the chest dosimeter represented the abdomen and chest (thorax) 

dose. 

NRC Evaluation: The NRC evaluated the model to determine its overall acceptability in 

providing a means to calculate the exposure to the unmonitored abdominal compartment. The 

NRC determined the model was non-conservative based on the following concerns: First, the 

screening assumed that the differences in the doses measured by the unshielded dosimeters 

resulted from a linear dose gradient that decreased with distance from an under foot source 

geometry (i.e., the reactor head). This assumption ignored the possibility that the observed 

dose gradient could be affected by self-shielding from the worker’s body, the contribution of 

radiation sources other than the reactor head, and the non-uniform distribution of the radiation 

source across the reactor head surface which would not necessarily decrease as a linear 

function with distance from the reactor head. 

Secondly, the model misrepresented the abdominal compartment in that it did not include the 

gonads as an appropriate location to calculate the dose to the highest exposed part of the 

abdomen. The model incorrectly depicted the gonads as being in the thigh compartment rather 

than the abdominal compartment, as defined in the approved EDEX method. Finally, the model 

used a premise that the workers were standing. This position placed axial separation between 

the non-measured abdominal dose and the measured thigh dose. Based on interviews with 

your staff, and information from the root cause evaluation (CR-PLP-2014-04683), the NRC 

determined that nearly 90 percent of the workers routinely worked in a seated or crouched 

position, as shown in the pictures attached to the Inspection Report. In this position, with the 

source of radiation from below the workers, the gonads would be unshielded by the vest and 

much closer to the source than assumed by your staff’s model. It also would eliminate any axial 

separation between the thighs and the unmeasured abdominal compartment; in fact, the NRC 

has concluded that portions of the abdomen (gonads) could be below the top of the thighs in the 

seated/crouched position. Furthermore, with the workers in a seated or crouched position, there 

would be a reduction in axial separation between the unshielded arms and unshielded thighs. 

Consequently, the NRC concluded that the underlying assumptions for the model were incorrect 

and significantly underestimated the dose to important tissues in the abdomen, specifically the 

gonads. 

In summary, the model used did not represent the exposure geometry of most workers. The 

model assumes a standing individual, which non-conservatively moves all of the whole-body 

compartments away from the predominate underfoot radiation source to interpolate a dose to 

the abdomen compartment. 

 

Entergy Position: Your staff discussed the correction of the chest dose measurement to 

account for unshielded areas when the tungsten vests were worn. Your staff provided two 

assumptions. First, the vests covered approximately 83 percent of the chest area. The second 

assumption was that the tungsten vest reduced or shielded the exposure by 17 percent. Based 

on these assumptions, your staff calculated a correction factor for use of the vests. This 

correction factor was then multiplied by a value representing how frequently the vests were 
Final Significance Determination -3- 

worn, resulting in a final corrected chest dose. This corrected chest dose was then applied to 

the thorax and abdomen compartments to calculate the workers’ EDEX. In response to a 

question during the regulatory conference, your staff indicated that reducing the effective 

shielding factor would provide “about the same results” as what was reported in the 

presentation. 

NRC Evaluation: In regard to correction of the chest measurements, the NRC determined the 

shield effectiveness was over estimated in that it did not account for the back panel being 

optional, the worker size which affected the size of the side gaps, directional (lateral) radiation 

exposures that occurred when the worker laid on their sides to inspect the work, and, more 

importantly, the shield not protecting the gonads when individuals were sitting or standing. 

Based on the evidence that you provided, for the majority of the workers, the shielded portion 

was less than 83 percent. Pictures, provided previously and used during the regulatory 

conference also showed cases where the worker was directly exposing either the unshielded 

sides or the gonads to the radiation source while the chest dosimetry was shielded by the vest. 

Each of these factors could significantly affect the amount by which the shielded chest 

dosimeter represented the unshielded portion of the torso, such that the calculated correction 

factor appeared unwarrantedly low. Consequently, the NRC determined that the chest 

measurement correction was non-conservative and underestimated the actual dose received by 

the thorax and abdomen portions of the worker’s body. 

Therefore, after full evaluation of the information provided during the regulatory conference, the 

NRC concluded that the dose reassessment was not technically justified and did not represent 

the actual dose received by the workers. The dose reassessment provided at the regulatory 

conference would result in your recording and reporting multiple worker doses that were 

significantly lower than the actual doses received. The information provided does not change 

the condition identified by the NRC where this deficiency compromised your ability (and the 

ability of other subsequent licensed employers) to insure that additional allowed worker 

exposures would not result in annual doses that exceeded 10 CFR Part 20 limits. 

The NRC reviewed the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process 

flowcharts provided in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix C. The flowchart 

evaluates first whether there are planning issues, then if an actual exposure occurred or there 

was a substantial potential for an overexposure to occur. If none of these three factors apply, 

the flowchart then asks whether the ability to assess dose was compromised. The NRC 

concluded that the ability to assess dose was compromised, as initially assessed. Therefore, 

the NRC assigned a safety significance of low to moderate, or White. 
NOTICE OF VIOLATION 

Enclosure 2 

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. Docket No. 50-255 

Palisades Nuclear Plant License No. DPR-20 

 EA-14-168 

During a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection conducted from August 11 to 

October 30, 2014, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the NRC 

Enforcement Policy, the violations are listed below: 

A. Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 20.1201(c) requires, in 

part, that, when the external exposure is determined by measurement with an external 

personal monitoring device, the deep-dose equivalent (DDE) must be used in place of 

the effective dose equivalent (EDEX), unless the EDEX is determined by a dosimetry 

method approved by the NRC. The assigned DDE must be for the part of the body 

receiving the highest exposure. 

Contrary to the above, between February 6 and March 8, 2014, during control rod drive 

housing replacement work activities at the Palisades Nuclear Plant, the licensee did not 

use the DDE and the EDEX was not determined by a dosimetry method approved by the 

NRC. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that radiation worker dosimeters 

(calibrated to the DDE) were located at the highest exposed portion of the respective 

compartment, a condition of the NRC-approved method for determining EDEX. 

B. Technical Specification 5.4.1.a. states, in part, that “written procedures shall be 

established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures 

recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978.” 

NRC Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 7 addresses “Procedures for Control 

of Radioactivity (For Limiting Materials Released to Environment and Limiting Personnel 

Exposure),” Section 7.e, addresses “Radiation Protection Procedures,” and 

Subsection 7.e.(7) discusses procedures for personnel monitoring. 

Radiation protection procedure EN-RP-204, “Special Monitoring Requirements,” 

Revision 6, provides instructions and requirements for the relocation of whole body 

dosimeters and the use and issuance of dosimeters for EDEX monitoring. 

Contrary to the above, between February 6 and March 8, 2014, the licensee failed to 

establish a procedure for personnel monitoring covering all practical worker positions 

and shielding geometries prior to implementation during control rod drive housing 

replacement work activities at the Palisades Nuclear Plant. Specifically, EN-RP-204 did 

not require locating the dosimeter at the highest exposed portion of the respective body, 

as required by 10 CFR 20.1201(c), nor did it account for the shielding effects caused by 

use of tungsten vests. 

These violations are associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding. 

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, you are hereby required to submit a written 

statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document 

Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, 
Notice of Violation -2- 

Region III, 2443 Warrenville Road, Lisle, IL 60532 and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at 

the Palisades Nuclear Plant, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of 

Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a “Reply to a Notice of Violation, 

EA-14-168” and should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if 

contested, the basis for disputing the violation or severity level, (2) the corrective steps that 

have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken, and (4) the 

date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previous 

docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response. 

If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a 

Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, 

suspended, or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where 

good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time. 

If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response, with 

the basis for your denial, to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. 

Because your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC 

Public Document Room or from the NRC’s Agencywide Documents Access and Management 

System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/adams.html, to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or 

safeguards information so that it can be made available to the public without redaction. If 

personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, 

then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that 

should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you 

request withholding of such material, you must specifically identify the portions of your response 

that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., 

explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal 

privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.390(b) to support a request for 

withholding confidential commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is 

necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described 

in 10 CFR 73.21. 

In accordance with 10 CFR 19.11, you may be required to post this Notice within two working 

days of receipt. 

Dated this 23rd day of February, 2015. 
A. Vitale -3- 

To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, 

or safeguards information, so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction. 

The NRC also includes significant enforcement actions on its Web site at 

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/enforcement/actions. 

Sincerely, 

/RA/ 

Cynthia D. Pederson 

Regional Administrator 

Docket No. 50-255 

License No. DPR-20 

Enclosures: 

1. Final Significance Determination 

2. Notice of Violation 

cc w/encls: Distribution via ListServ®

ADAMS Accession Number: ML15056A072 

OFFICE RIII RIII RIII RIII D:OE RIII RIII 

NAME Lougheed Dickson Ellegood O’Brien Holahan1

Figueroa 

Duncan Pederson 

DATE 02/09/15 02/10/15 02/12/15 02/12/15 02/20/15 02/23/15 02/23/15 

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY 

 

1

 OE concurrence provided via email from G. Figueroa on February 20, 2015 
Letter to Anthony Vitale from Cynthia D. Pederson dated February 23, 2015 

SUBJECT: FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION OF A WHITE FINDING WITH 

ASSESSMENT FOLLOWUP AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION; NRC INSPECTION 

REPORT NO. 05000255/2015007; PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT 

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