UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

JEAN CAMPBELL, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BP AMOCO POLYMERS, INCORPORATED,

Defendant-Appellee,  No. 02-1814

and

BP AMOCO CORPORATION, an Indiana

Corporation; BP AMOCO CHEMICAL

COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation,

Defendants. 

JEAN CAMPBELL, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BP AMOCO POLYMERS, INCORPORATED,

Defendant-Appellee,  No. 02-1924

and

BP AMOCO CORPORATION, an Indiana

Corporation; BP AMOCO CHEMICAL

COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation,

Defendants. 
JEAN CAMPBELL, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 03-1409

BP AMOCO POLYMERS, INCORPORATED,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Rock Hill.

Terry L. Wooten, District Judge.

(CA-00-810)

Submitted: August 5, 2003

Decided: September 11, 2003

Before WIDENER, MICHAEL, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

No. 02-1814 and No. 02-1924 affirmed and No. 03-1409 dismissed

by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

C. William Michaels, Baltimore, Maryland; Stephine M. Wells,

WELLS & HOPKINS, Chula Vista, California, for Appellant. Lisa D.

Freeman, BP AMERICA, INC., Warrenville, Illinois; Ingrid B.

Erwin, NEXSEN, PRUET, JACOBS & POLLARD, Greenville,

South Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 

2 CAMPBELL v. BP AMOCO POLYMERS, INC.
OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Jean Campbell filed suit against BP Amoco Polymers, Inc., BP

Amoco Corp., and BP Amoco Chemical Co., alleging that her April

1999 termination was based on gender discrimination and retaliation

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 1994 & Supp. 2002), and

South Carolina public policy. (J.A. 32-39). Following a jury trial, the

district court entered judgment in favor of BP Amoco Polymers.

Campbell filed a timely notice of appeal. The district court subsequently denied Campbell’s post-trial motions. Campbell filed a second notice of appeal. The two appeals were consolidated in Nos. 02-

1814 and 02-1924. 

BP Amoco Polymers has filed a cross-appeal of the district court’s

order granting a stay in the execution of the judgment pending appeal

and denying BP Amoco Polymers’ petition for attorney’s fees, with

leave to refile when Campbell’s appeal is no longer pending in this

Court. BP Amoco Polymers’ cross-appeal, No. 03-1409, has been

consolidated with Campbell’s appeals. 

BP Amoco Corp. and BP Amoco Chemical Co. filed motions to

dismiss in which they alleged BP Amoco Polymers was Campbell’s

sole employer and they were entitled to dismissal as party defendants.

In a report and recommendation, the magistrate judge construed the

motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment because it considered matters outside the pleadings and determined BP Amoco

Polymers was Campbell’s sole employer. The magistrate judge recommended dismissing BP Amoco Corp. and BP Amoco Chemical

Co. as party defendants without prejudice so that Campbell could file

a motion to reinstate either or both corporations as party defendants

should the evidence adduced through discovery so warrant. The district court adopted the report and recommendation. 

BP Amoco Polymers filed a motion for summary judgment alleging Campbell’s claims were barred because she executed a Special

Resignation Agreement that contained a release of all claims arising

out of her employment with BP Amoco Polymers. In a report and recCAMPBELL v. BP AMOCO POLYMERS, INC. 3
ommendation, the magistrate judge recommended denying BP Amoco

Polymers’ motion for summary judgment. BP Amoco Polymers filed

objections to the report and recommendation. Campbell did not file

objections. The district court adopted the report and recommendation

and denied BP Amoco Polymers’ motion for summary judgment. 

Before trial, Campbell filed several motions in limine, including a

motion seeking to exclude evidence regarding the executed Special

Resignation Agreement. The district court held an evidentiary hearing

and denied Campbell’s motion. The case proceeded with an eight-day

jury trial. The district court denied Campbell’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)

motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence. The jury determined the parties entered into a Special Resignation Agreement dated May 3, 1999 that barred Campbell from

recovery. The district court denied Campbell’s post-trial motions for

judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, for a new trial.

On appeal, Campbell argues: (1) the district court erred in failing

to rule as a matter of law when it considered the summary judgment

motion that the Special Resignation Agreement was not effective; (2)

the district court abused its discretion by not granting Campbell’s

motion in limine to exclude the Special Resignation Agreement; (3)

the district court abused its discretion when it failed to grant Campbell’s Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close

of all the evidence; (4) the district court erred when it failed to grant

Campbell’s Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law following the verdict; (5) the district court abused its discretion in failing

to grant Campbell’s Rule 59 motion for a new trial because the verdict was against the weight of the evidence before the jury; and (6)

the district court erred when it granted BP Amoco Corp. and BP

Amoco Chemical Company’s motions to dismiss. In its cross-appeal,

BP Amoco Polymers argues: (1) the district court erred in failing to

consider the merits of its petition for attorney’s fees, costs and

expenses; (2) the district court erred in failing to award costs; and (3)

the district court erred in failing to award attorney’s fees, costs and

expenses because the parties had a binding agreement. 

First, Campbell asserts the district court erred in failing to rule as

a matter of law that the Special Resignation Agreement was ineffective when it considered the summary judgment motions. To the extent

4 CAMPBELL v. BP AMOCO POLYMERS, INC.
Campbell contends the court should have granted summary judgment

in her favor on this issue, we need not review the court’s pre-trial

determination, as Campbell received a full trial, offering her various

avenues through which to challenge the court’s ruling, several of

which Campbell exercised. See Chesapeake Paper Prods. Co. v. S&W

Engineering, 51 F.3d 1229, 1237 (4th Cir. 1995). We address those

challenges, under the appropriate standards, below. 

Second, Campbell asserts the district court erred when it denied her

motion in limine seeking to exclude the Special Resignation Agreement. We review a district court’s ruling on such a motion in limine

for abuse of discretion. Malone v. Microdyne Corp., 26 F.3d 471, 480

(4th Cir. 1994). We have reviewed the record and find no abuse of

discretion. 

Third, Campbell argues the district court erred in denying her

motion for judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)

at the close of all the evidence. Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate if "there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find" in favor of a party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). We

review the district court’s denial of a motion for judgment as a matter

of law de novo. Private Mortgage Inv. Servs., Inc. v. Hotel & Club

Assocs., Inc., 296 F.3d 308, 311-12 (4th Cir. 2002). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. We

have reviewed the record and find no error. 

Fourth, Campbell argues the district court erred in denying her

post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law. Following trial,

Campbell filed a motion titled "Motion for Judgment Not Withstanding the Verdict or Alternatively for New Trial." The district court

construed the motion for judgment not withstanding the verdict as a

renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ.

P. 50(b) and denied the motion. 

We review the district court’s denial of a Rule 50(b) motion de

novo. South Atl. Ltd. P’ship of Tenn., L.P. v. Riese, 284 F.3d 518, 532

(4th Cir. 2002). "A district court should grant a Rule 50(b) motion

only if the court ‘determines, without weighing the evidence or considering the credibility of the witnesses, that substantial evidence does

not support the jury’s findings.’" Id. (quoting Konkel v. Bob Evans

CAMPBELL v. BP AMOCO POLYMERS, INC. 5
Farms Inc., 165 F.3d 275, 279 (4th Cir. 1999)). We view the evidence

in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Id. We have

reviewed the record and find no reversible error. 

Fifth, Campbell asserts the district court erred when it denied her

motion for a new trial. We review the district court’s denial of a

motion for a new trial under Fed. R. Civ. 59(a) for abuse of discretion. Cline v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 294, 301 (4th Cir.

1998). A new trial will only be granted in three circumstances: (1) if

the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence; (2) is based

upon false evidence; or (3) will result in a miscarriage of justice. Id.

We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. 

Finally, Campbell asserts the district court erred when it dismissed

BP Amoco Corp. and BP Amoco Chemical Co. as defendants. Campbell asserts the names of the companies were used interchangeably at

trial and that persons from these corporate entities were involved in

the decision to terminate her. We have reviewed the district court’s

order accepting the report and recommendation of the magistrate

judge and find no error in the dismissal of BP Amoco Corp. and BP

Amoco Chemical Co. as party defendants. Accordingly, we affirm the

district court orders at issue in Campbell’s appeals in Nos. 02-1814

and 02-1924 in all respects. 

In BP Amoco Polymers’ cross appeal, it seeks to appeal the district

court’s order granting a stay of execution of the judgment and denying its motion for attorney’s fees and expenses, with leave to refile,

pending this appeal. We may exercise jurisdiction only over final

orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2000); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v.

Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The district court

denied BP Amoco Polymers’ petition for attorney’s fees with leave

to refile when Campbell’s appeal is no longer pending in this Court.

Because the district court has not entered a final order ruling on BP

Amoco Polymers’ motion, the cross-appeal is interlocutory and not

subject to appellate review. We therefore dismiss BP Amoco Polymers’ appeal in No. 03-1409. We grant Campbell’s counsel’s motion

to withdraw. We grant the motion to submit on briefs and dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are ade6 CAMPBELL v. BP AMOCO POLYMERS, INC.
quately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process. 

Nos. 02-1814 & 02-1924 - AFFIRMED

No. 03-1409 - DISMISSED

CAMPBELL v. BP AMOCO POLYMERS, INC. 7