WHY THEY FIGHT:

COMBAT MOTIVATION IN THE IRAQ WAR

Leonard Wong

Thomas A. Kolditz

Raymond A. Millen

Terrence M. Potter

July 2003
ii

*****

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not 

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, 

the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for 

public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

This study was greatly supported by members of the 800th Military Police 

Brigade -- specifically BG Paul Hill, COL Al Ecke, and LTC James O’Hare. Staff 

Judge Advocates COL Ralph Sabbatino and COL Karl Goetzke also provided 

critical guidance. Finally, COL Jim Embrey planned and coordinated the visits to 

units for this study. 

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded 

to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes 

Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244, or directly to Leonard.Wong@carlisle.army.mil 

Copies of this report may be obtained from the Publications Office by calling 

(717) 245-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or by e-mail at Rita.Rummel@carlisle.army.mil

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ISBN 1-58487-133-4
iii

FOREWORD

With the recent lightning swift combat successes of Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM, there may be a tendency to view with awe the 

lethality of U.S. technology and training. Indeed, the U.S. military 

is unmatched in the raw combat power it is capable of unleashing in 

a conflict. This monograph, however, argues that the true strength 

of America’s military might lies not in its hardware or high-tech 

equipment, but in its soldiers. 

Dr. Leonard Wong and his colleagues traveled to Iraq to see 

what motivated soldiers to continue in battle, to face extreme 

danger, and to risk their lives in accomplishing the mission. As 

a means of comparison, they began by interviewing Iraqi Regular 

Army prisoners of war to examine their combat motivation and unit 

dynamics. The researchers then interviewed U.S. combat troops 

fresh from the fields of battle to examine their views. 

What they found was that today’s U.S. soldiers, much like 

soldiers of the past, fight for each other. Unit cohesion is alive and 

well in today’s Army. Yet, Dr. Wong and his fellow researchers 

also found that soldiers cited ideological reasons such as liberation, 

freedom, and democracy as important factors in combat motivation. 

Today’s soldiers trust each other, they trust their leaders, they trust 

the Army, and they also understand the moral dimensions of war. 

This year marks the 30th anniversary of the all-volunteer Army. 

This monograph is a celebration of the success of that radical idea 

and the transformation of the U.S. Army from a demoralized draft 

army, to a struggling all-volunteer force, to a truly professional Army. 

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this study of the 

American soldier to the national defense community as policymakers 

continue to chart the course of the Army’s transformation.

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 

v

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE AUTHORS

DR. LEONARD WONG is an Associate Research Professor of 

Military Strategy (Human and Organizational Dimensions) in the 

Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College. His army 

career included assignments teaching leadership at West Point, 

serving as an analyst in the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army 

and in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, and 

serving as the Director of the Office of Economic and Manpower 

Analysis. His current research includes leadership, professionalism, 

and innovation in the military. Dr. Wong is a Professional Engineer 

and holds a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy, and an M.S.B.A. 

and Ph.D. from Texas Tech University. 

COLONEL THOMAS A. KOLDITZ is Professor and Head of the 

Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership at the U.S. 

Military Academy. Colonel Kolditz’s most recent troop assignment 

was from 1997 to 1999 as commander of 2nd Battalion, 17th Field 

Artillery in the Second Infantry Division, Republic of Korea. His 

research activities and teaching assignments span applied social 

psychology, personality, and leader development. Colonel Kolditz 

holds a B.A. from Vanderbilt University, as well as M.A. and Ph.D. 

degrees in Social Psychology from the University of Missouri, a 

Master of Military Arts and Science from the School of Advanced 

Military Studies, and a Masters in Strategic Studies from the U.S. 

Army War College. 

LIEUTENANT COLONEL RAYMOND A. MILLEN is assigned as 

the Director of European Security Studies at the Strategic Studies 

Institute. He is a Foreign Area Officer for Western Europe. Lieutenant 

Colonel Millen graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1982, 

was commissioned as an infantry officer, and has held a variety of 

command and staff assignments in Germany and Continental United 

States. He has also served as the U.S. Army Infantry School Liaison 

Officer to the German Infantry School at Hammelburg, Germany; 

Battalion Executive Officer, 3-502d Infantry, Fort Campbell, 

Kentucky; and Chief of Intelligence Section and Balkans Team 
vi

Chief, Survey Section, SHAPE, Belgium. Lieutenant Colonel Millen 

has published articles in a number of scholarly and professional 

journals to include Infantry Magazine and the Swiss Military Journal. 

His book, Command Legacy, was published by Brasseys in April 

2002. Lieutenant Colonel Millen is a graduate of the U.S. Army’s 

Command and General Staff College, and holds an M.A. degree in 

National Security Studies from Georgetown University.

COLONEL TERRENCE M. POTTER is an Associate and Academy 

Professor at the U.S. Military Academy, Department of Foreign 

Languages. Colonel Potter has served in the Army for over 29 years, 

and has taught languages and linguistics for the past 7 years. His 

research interests include applied sociolinguistics, onomastics, 

language and culture, and the teaching and learning of Arabic. 

Colonel Potter holds a B.A. from The Citadel, an M.A. from 

Middlebury College, and a Ph.D. from Georgetown University.
vii

SUMMARY

Since World War II, studies have argued and conventional 

wisdom has claimed that soldiers fight for each other. Cohesion, 

or the bonds between soldiers, traditionally has been posited as the 

primary motivation for soldiers in combat. Recent studies, however, 

have questioned the effects of cohesion on unit performance. This 

monograph reviews the combat motivation literature and then 

analyzes findings from interviews conducted during the recent Iraq 

War.

By examining the perspectives of Iraqi Regular Army prisoners 

of war, U.S. troops, and embedded media, the monograph argues 

that unit cohesion is indeed a primary combat motivation. The 

report also notes that, contrary to previous studies of U.S. soldiers, 

notions of freedom, democracy, and liberty were also voiced by 

soldiers as key factors in combat motivation. 

The monograph concludes that soldiers continue to fight for each 

other, but today’s soldiers are also sophisticated enough to grasp 

the moral concepts of war. The report suggests that this is a result 

of the transformation of the Army from a fledgling all-volunteer 

experiment to a truly professional force.
1

WHY THEY FIGHT:

COMBAT MOTIVATION IN THE IRAQ WAR

Four brave men who do not know each other will not dare to 

attack a lion. Four less brave, but knowing each other well, sure 

of their reliability and consequently of mutual aid, will attack 

resolutely.1

Ardant du Picq, 1870

Introduction.

This monograph seeks to answer the question: Why do soldiers 

fight? It begins with a historical overview of the combat motivation 

literature and examines studies from World War II, Korea, and 

Vietnam. It then shifts to the recent Iraq War and analyzes the 

results of interviews with Iraqi Regular Army prisoners of war, 

U.S. combat troops, and embedded media. The varied perspectives 

combine to show the critical importance of unit cohesion in combat 

motivation but also highlight how today’s soldiers are different from 

U.S. soldiers of the past. 

Why Do Soldiers Fight?

The motivations of America’s conscripted soldiers was a growing 

concern during the early stages of World War II, as the Army ranks 

swelled with freshly drafted soldiers. As Kansas newspaper editor 

William Allen White noted, soldiers of a draft army “haven’t the 

slightest enthusiasm for this war or this cause. They aren’t grouchy, 

they are not mutinous, they just don’t give a tinker’s dam.”2 After 

noting the ineffectiveness of prepared lectures read to bored troops, 

Chief of Staff of the Army General George C. Marshall brought in 

movie producer Frank Capra and told him to make a movie that 

would “explain to our boys in the Army why we are fighting, and 

the principles for which we are fighting.”3 Critics claimed that there 

were more important things to do, but Marshall insisted on men 

motivated and knowledgeable about the democratic cause. The 

seven-part Why We Fight film series resulted and was widely used 

during World War II.4 The riveting film series emphasized that the 
2

war was not “just a war against Axis villainy, but for liberty, equality, 

and security.”5 

After World War II, a series of studies emerged that examined 

the motivation of soldiers during combat--to determine why a 

“tired, cold, muddy rifleman goes forward with the bitter dryness 

of fear in his mouth into the mortar bursts and machine-gun fire of a 

determined enemy.”6 Was it for ideological reasons as suggested by 

the Why We Fight series? 

In his widely acclaimed work, The American Soldier, Samuel 

Stouffer documented the attitudes of World War II combat 

infantrymen. When soldiers were asked what kept them going 

during the war, the most common response was getting the war over 

so that they could go home. The second most common response 

and the primary combat motivation, however, referred to the strong 

group ties that developed during combat.7 When asked about 

sources of support during combat, responses concerning loyalty to 

one’s buddies and the notion “that you couldn’t let the other men 

down” were second only to the number of combat soldiers who 

said they were helped by prayer.8 Despite the Why We Fight films, 

Stouffer’s study argued that ideology, patriotism, or fighting for the 

cause were not major factors in combat motivation for World War 

II soldiers. Cohesion, or the emotional bonds between soldiers, 

appeared to be the primary factor in combat motivation.

Historian S. L. A. Marshall reinforced the importance of the bonds 

between soldiers in his examination of World War II infantrymen in 

Men Against Fire. He noted, “I hold it to be one of the simplest truths 

of war that the thing which enables an infantry soldier to keep going 

with his weapons is the near presence or the presumed presence of 

a comrade. . . . He is sustained by his fellows primarily and by his 

weapons secondarily.”9 As for fighting for a cause, Marshall wrote, 

“Men do not fight for a cause but because they do not want to let 

their comrades down.”10

In another landmark study on combat motivation, Shils and 

Janowitz interviewed Wehrmacht prisoners in an attempt to 

determine why some continued to fight so determinedly despite 

the overwhelmingly obvious evidence that Germany would lose the 

war. Testing the belief that good soldiers were those who clearly 
3

understood the political and moral implications of what was at 

stake, they concluded that the behavior and attitudes of infantrymen 

who fought to the end derived, instead, from the interpersonal 

relationships within the primary group (although they did note an 

allegiance to Hitler as a secondary motivation.) From their research, 

they concluded that:

When the individual’s immediate group, and its supporting formations, 

met his basic organic needs, offered him affection and esteem from 

both officers and comrades, supplied him with a sense of power and 

adequately regulated his relations with authority, the element of 

self-concern in battle, which would lead to disruption of the effective 

functioning of his primary group, was minimized.11

The emphasis on unit cohesion as the primary source of combat 

motivation continued into the Korean War. Sociologist Roger Little 

observed a rifle company in combat for several months and found 

that the bonded relationships between men in combat--what he 

called “buddy relations”--were critical to basic survival.12 To Little, 

buddy relations could refer to a specific soldier or the entire unit. 

During the Vietnam War, noted military sociologist Charles 

Moskos interviewed soldiers and concluded that combat primary 

group ties serve an important role in unit effectiveness. Interestingly, 

Moskos argued that the close bonds with other soldiers may be 

a result of self-interested concern for personal safety rather than 

an altruistic concern for fellow soldiers.13 Regardless, Moskos 

reinforced the critical role of cohesion in combat performance. 

Despite the wide acceptance of the importance of interpersonal 

relationships between soldiers in combat,14 things began to change 

in the later stages of the Vietnam War. In their controversial book, 

Crisis in Command, Gabriel and Savage claimed that the individual 

replacement system in Vietnam and the lack of professionalism in 

the officer corps led to the dissolution of primary group cohesion 

in the Army. While their conclusions about the causes of the 

decline of cohesion can be questioned, they did bring attention to 

a potentially deleterious effect of cohesion--fragging. They pointed 

out that cohesion between soldiers without the proper norms can 

work against organizational goals as in the case of nearly 800 cases 
4

of fragging in Vietnam.15 

More recently, cohesion in the military has been addressed by 

several critical studies that go beyond highlighting the potentially 

detrimental effects of cohesion and instead challenge the correlation 

of unit cohesion with performance. Interestingly, the subject of 

many of these studies is not cohesion, but the current Department 

of Defense (DoD) policy on homosexual conduct. The current policy 

assumes that, “The presence in the armed forces of persons who 

demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts 

would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, 

good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of 

military capability [emphasis added].”16 Arguing that unit cohesion 

is not critical to military capability supports efforts to change the 

DoD policy. To this end, researchers such as Elizabeth Kier examined 

the cohesion literature and concluded that “fifty years of research in 

several disciplines has failed to uncover persuasive evidence . . . that 

there is a causal relationship leading from primary group cohesion 

to military effectiveness.”17 

In a 1993 RAND report, Robert MacCoun argued that actually 

two types of cohesion exist. According to MacCoun, social cohesion 

refers to the quality of the bonds of friendship and emotional 

closeness among unit members--the type of cohesion referred to by 

the post-World War II studies. Task cohesion, on the other hand, 

refers to the commitment among unit members to accomplish a task 

that requires the collective efforts of the unit. MacCoun argued that 

task cohesion is correlated with unit performance, not social cohesion. 

Social cohesion, according to MacCoun, has little relationship to 

performance, and can even interfere with unit performance (e.g., 

rate busting, groupthink, or fragging).18 MacCoun’s arguments 

are echoed by Segal and Kestnbaum who stated that, “There is no 

clear causal link that can be demonstrated using rigorous methods 

between social cohesion and high levels of military performance.”19 

Despite an emerging debate about cohesion occurring in the 

academic realm, it is tempting to believe that it has little relevance in 

the Army policy arena. Three factors suggest otherwise. First, the 

homosexual conduct policy assumes that unit cohesion is essential 

to military capability. Determining the role of cohesion in combat 
5

motivation helps inform that policy debate. 

Second, the Army is pushing ahead with the Unit Manning 

Initiative that rests on the premise that “full-spectrum forces must 

be highly cohesive teams whose shared experiences and intensive 

training enable them to perform better in combat.”20 As the 172nd 

Infantry Brigade transforms to a Stryker Brigade Combat Team and 

implements a unit manning personnel system, its soldiers will arrive 

and train together through a standard 36-month tour. If cohesion is 

truly unimportant to unit performance as recent critics suggest, then 

the Army is putting an abundance of resources into a radical change 

that may produce a modicum of results. 

Finally, discussions at the DoD level have been exploring the 

difference between task and social cohesion and which has the 

biggest impact on the military. One view maintains that the Services 

already do a good job of getting people who “don’t like one another” 

to work well together, so social cohesion may be unnecessary. Given 

that the academic debate concerning cohesion has moved into the 

policy arena, an exploration of cohesion--specifically social cohesion

--and the broader topic of combat motivation, is warranted. 

Methodology.

This monograph analyzes motivation and cohesion in combat. 

The backdrop for analysis was Operation IRAQI FREEDOM with 

major combat operations occurring roughly from March 20, 2003, 

to May 1, 2003. To examine the concepts of combat motivation 

and cohesion, views were solicited from three distinct samples that 

experienced combat during IRAQI FREEDOM. 

The first sample consisted of Iraqi Regular Army soldiers. The 

combat motivation of Iraqi soldiers was analyzed through interviews 

with enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) held at Camp Bucca at Umm 

Qasr, Iraq.21 Nearly all of the EPWs questioned were lower enlisted 

Iraqi soldiers; two officers, a lieutenant colonel and a lieutenant, 

were also interviewed. Only two soldiers, both sergeants, claimed 

membership in a Republican Guard or Special Republican Guard 

unit. In this sample, then, views probably represent rank-and-file 

soldiers, rather than elite units or senior leaders. The researchers 
6

conducted,recorded, translated, and transcribed over 30 interviews, 

using a structured interview format. 22 

To gain the U.S. perspective, researchers met with troops assigned 

to the maneuver units of the three U.S. divisions conducting the 

majority of combat operations--the 3rd Infantry Division, the 101st 

Airborne Division (Air Assault), and the 1st Marine Division.23

Researchers conducted interviews at unit locations in the vicinity of 

Baghdad and Al Hillah prior to the official cessation of major combat 

operations. They conducted, recorded, and transcribed over 40 

interviews.24 The same structured interview format was used with 

both Iraqi EPWs and U.S. troops--thus providing a good comparison 

and contrast of issues across both armies. 

Embedded media represent the third sample used to analyze 

cohesion and motivation in combat. They furnished a unique 

perspective on cohesion and combat motivation for two reasons. 

First, they were able to comment on small unit dynamics without 

being a part of the small unit. Second, prior to the war, much 

discussion concerned the embedded media needing to avoid 

developing emotional relationships with unit soldiers in order to 

remain objective journalists. The personal reflections of the media’s 

experience help to explore the role of cohesion in combat. Over a 

dozen members of the media embedded in U.S. Army ground units 

were interviewed in person or telephonically, or responded to an 

email questionnaire. 

Motivated by Fear.

During World War II, Stouffer asked combat veterans the 

question, “Generally, in your combat experience, what was most 

important to you in making you want to keep going and do as well 

as you could?” The same question concerning combat motivation 

was asked of the Iraqi EPWs. Iraqi EPWs were expected to respond 

that they were motivated to fight for each other (as earlier research 

had shown with the Wehrmacht or North Vietnam’s Viet Cong) or 

were simply defending their homeland.25 

Instead, the near universal response was that the Iraqi Regular 

Army soldiers were motivated by coercion. Even with the powerful 
7

coalition forces to their front, they were fearful of the dreaded Baath 

Party to their rear. Their behavior was driven by fear of retribution 

and punishment by Baath Party or Fedayeen Saddam if they were 

found avoiding combat. Iraqi soldiers related stories of being jailed 

or beaten by Baath Party representatives if they were suspected of 

leaving their units. Several showed scars from previous desertion 

attempts. One soldier related how he still felt guilty that his mother 

was jailed in response to his AWOL26 status several years before. 

When Iraqi soldiers described the desertion of their comrades, 

they noted the universal practice of deserting with small arms, 

rather than burying their weapons in the sand as U.S. psychological 

leaflets had urged. Deserters remained armed to protect themselves 

against the Fedayeen Saddam death squads they expected to find in 

Iraqi rear areas. The decision to desert with arms is one not taken 

lightly because it increased the likelihood of being killed by U.S. 

or British forces, particularly reconnaissance units common to the 

most forward elements. Armed desertion, then, represented clear 

evidence of the fear experienced by those who wished neither to 

fight nor surrender.

Surprisingly, fear of retribution was usually not attached to 

officers serving in Iraqi units. Most of the enlisted soldiers described 

their officers as distant, but normally not as a threat. Iraqi officer 

training was described by a captured graduate of the Baghdad 

Military Academy as “on the Sandhurst model,” suggesting a British 

influence and a subsequent separation between the ranks of officers 

and enlisted. Officers were often politically appointed and not 

regarded as tactically competent by their men. Such circumstances 

led to little mutual respect between officers and the enlisted soldiers, 

but the strained relationship was far from intimidating. Several 

prisoners reported that if their officers had tried to force them to fight, 

they would have simply killed them and surrendered anyway. No 

prisoner ever described an attempt by officers to compel resistance 

against coalition forces.

Surrender decisions, in the sample interviewed, were usually 

made at very low levels, often among small groups of soldiers, and 

were not attributed to the capitulation of a higher headquarters. 

Artillery shelling or air attack sometimes catalyzed surrender--
8

though none of the soldiers interviewed had to withstand lengthy 

bombardment. Officers permitted surrender, sometimes by their 

own desertion, sometimes by benign neglect. One officer stated, 

when questioned about why he had not forced his men to fight, “As 

a man before Allah, that would have been the wrong thing to do.” 

Although he understood that his mission was to defend along the 

edge of an oil field, he had no map, no plan, and no communication 

with his higher headquarters. The ability of the Iraqi small unit 

leadership to invoke loyalty and influence up and down the 

command chain was almost completely lacking and unquestionably 

contributed to the disintegration of Iraqi Regular Army units in the 

face of advancing coalition forces.

As far as cohesion serving as a factor in combat motivation, 

questioning revealed that if Iraqi Regular Army soldiers had 

emotional ties to other soldiers, they were almost always with 

soldiers from their tribe or region. Squads and platoons had little 

or no cohesion. Iraq’s approximately 150 major tribes are comprised 

of more than 2,000 smaller clans with a wide range of religions 

and ethnic groups. Soldiers spoke of units fragmented by tribal 

or regional differences. In addition, units were at such reduced 

strength that manning issues may have exacerbated the effects of 

fragmentation. No Iraqi soldier reported a unit strength greater 

than 40 percent. One of the two officers in the sample, a platoon 

leader, found his unit composed of only nine men of more than 48 

authorized.

Many soldiers reported the practice of constantly asking (and 

bribing) their officers for permission to go home to their families for 

ten days out of every month. As Shils and Janowitz in the World 

War II study of German prisoners found, surrender decisions 

are greatly facilitated when primary groups are disrupted. The 

surrendering Iraqi soldiers showed little or no concern about letting 

their comrades down since their allegiances to their fellow soldiers in 

the unit were already strained or never fully cultivated. One BMP27

driver related how, despite the fact that one of his friends was both 

his vehicle commander and his immediate supervisor, his surrender 

decision was easily made at home where he was physically and 

emotionally separated from his unit. 
9

Interviews uncovered no evidence of higher order concepts 

such as commitment to national service or the Arabic obligation 

to withstand (Sumoud) among the Iraqi soldiers interviewed. The 

soldiers never invoked Iraqi nationalism or the need to repel 

Americans as an invading army in response to questions about 

why they were in the Army, or what would cause them to try their 

hardest in battle.28

 The Iraqi Regular Army appeared to be a poorly trained, poorly 

led, disparate group of conscripts who were more concerned with 

self-preservation and family ties than defending their country. It 

provided a good case study of what happens to a unit when social 

cohesion and leadership are absent. 

Motivated for Others.

When U.S. troops were interviewed shortly after their experience 

in combat (for most, it was 3 weeks of continuous enemy contact), 

one of the first questions the researchers posed addressed their 

reasons for entering the military in the first place. The responses 

were what most recruiters already know--to get money for college, 

to gain experience before looking for a job, to follow in the footsteps 

of a family member who had been in the military, or just to find 

some adventure before settling down. Although one or two 

mentioned that they were motivated to enlist because of September 

11, 2001, most did not cite patriotism or ideology as their enlistment 

rationale. 

As the interview progressed, soldiers were asked the same 

question posed to World War II combat soldiers by Stouffer and 

also to the Iraqi EPWs in this monograph--“Generally, in your 

combat experience, what was most important to you in making you 

want to keep going and do as well as you could?” For World War 

II soldiers, besides ending the task to go home, the most common 

response was solidarity with one’s comrades. For Iraqi Regular 

Army soldiers, it was coercion. For U.S. soldiers in the Iraq War, 

similar responses were given about going home, but importantly the 

most frequent response given for combat motivation was “fighting 

for my buddies.” Soldiers answered with comments such as, “In 
10

combat, just the fact that if I give up, I am not helping my buddies. 

That is number one.” or “Me and my loader were talking about it, 

and in combat the only thing that we really worry about is you and 

your crew.” The soldiers were talking about social cohesion--the 

emotional bonds between soldiers. 

Social cohesion appears to serve two roles in combat motivation. 

First, because of the close ties to other soldiers, it places a burden of 

responsibility on each soldier to achieve group success and protect 

the unit from harm. Soldiers feel that although their individual 

contribution to the group may be small, it is still a critical part of 

unit success and therefore important. As one soldier put it, “I am 

the lowest ranking private on the Bradley [fighting vehicle] so I am 

trying to kind of prove something in a way that I could do things. I 

did not want to let anyone down.” 

This desire to contribute to the unit mission comes not from a 

commitment to the mission, but a social compact with the members 

of the primary group. One Bradley Commander (BC) spoke of the 

infantrymen in the back of his vehicle and the responsibility he felt 

for them:

You have two guys in the back who are not seeing what is going on, and 

they are putting all their trust into the gunner and the BC. Whatever 

objects or obstacles, or tanks or vehicles are in front of you, you are 

taking them out, because they don’t know what is going on. They are 

just like in a dark room. They can’t do nothing. Having that trust. . . . I 

guess that is one thing that kept me going. 

One soldier simply stated, “I know that as far as myself, sir, I 

take my squad mates’ lives more important than my own.” Another 

soldier related the intense burden he felt for his fellow soldiers, 

“That person means more to you than anybody. You will die if he 

dies. That is why I think that we protect each other in any situation. 

I know that if he dies and it was my fault, it would be worse than 

death to me.”

The second role of cohesion is to provide the confidence and 

assurance that someone soldiers could trust was “watching their 

back.” This is not simply trusting in the competence, training, 

or commitment to the mission of another soldier, but trusting in 
11

someone they regarded as closer than a friend who was motivated 

to look out for their welfare. In the words of one infantryman, “You 

have got to trust them more than your mother, your father, or 

girlfriend, or your wife, or anybody. It becomes almost like your 

guardian angel.” 

The presence of comrades imparts a reassuring belief that all will 

be well. As one soldier stated, “It is just like a big family. Nothing 

can come to you without going through them first. It is kind of 

comforting.” One soldier noted, “If he holds my back, then I will 

hold his, and nothing is going to go wrong.” Another added, “If 

you are going to war, you want to be able to trust the person who 

is beside you. If you are his friend, you know he is not going to let 

you down. . . . He is going to do his best to make sure that you don’t 

die.”

Once soldiers are convinced that their own personal safety will 

be assured by others, they feel empowered to do their job without 

worry. One soldier attempted to describe how the close relationship 

he had with another soldier provided the psychological cushion to 

drive his vehicle without concern:

I knew Taylor would personally look out for me. . . . It was stupid little 

things like, ‘Dude, you look like you need a hug.’ He would come over 

and give me a big old bear hug. He knew that I looked out for him 

and vice versa. . . . Knowing that there is somebody watching when I 

didn’t have the opportunity to watch myself when I am driving--Taylor 

watched everywhere. When I am driving down the road, I have to 

watch in front of me knowing where I am driving and knowing that I 

am not going to drive over anything. I don’t know what is behind me. 

I don’t know what is to my side. I trusted Taylor was going to keep an 

eye on everything. He always did. Obviously, he did. We are still here. 

Thank God. 

It should be noted that soldiers understood that totally entrusting 

their personal safety to others could be viewed as irrational. One 

young soldier commented on his parents’ reaction--“My whole 

family thinks that I am a nut. They think, ‘How can you put your 

life in someone’s hands like that? . . . You are still going to be shot.’” 

Despite the occasional skepticism of outsiders, soldiers greatly 

valued being free of the distracting concerns of personal safety. 
12

Of course, anyone who has been around soldiers for any period of 

time recognizes that there is always a level of bickering and quarreling 

occurring between soldiers--especially in austere conditions. Social 

cohesion in combat, however, manages to overcome petty disputes. 

A soldier put it this way:

I think that when we are here and we are living and seeing each other 

every single day going on 6 months, there is a lot of [stuff] that you just 

get irritated with and don’t want to be around one another. But in the 

same sense, I think that everybody learned that no matter how [ticked] 

off we were at one another and how bad we were fighting, when the 

artillery started raining down and [stuff] started hitting the fan--it was 

like the [stuff] never happened. Everybody just did what we had to 

do. It was just looking out for one another. We weren’t fighting for 

anybody else but ourselves. We weren’t fighting for some higher-up 

who is somebody; we were just fighting for each other. 

The bonds of trust between soldiers take weeks and months to 

develop. Soldiers related how shared experiences prior to combat 

helped develop those bonds. One soldier related how the weeks 

of training prior to deployment helped build relationships between 

soldiers:

Going out and constantly training together, NTC rotations. . . . We are 

together every day for the majority of the day, 5 days a week. You are 

going to start knowing what ticks people off, what makes them happy, 

what you need to do to work with them. Eventually a bond is going to 

form.

Once deployed, soldiers spent more time together training. As 

one soldier noted, “We have worked a lot together. We did a lot of 

field training together, so it is like we are brothers. Suffered through 

it all together.”

But cohesion is not just developed in training. In the long, often 

mundane, periods of time spent neither in training or actual combat, 

the bonds between soldiers are often nurtured. One infantryman 

spoke of cultivating relationships while pulling security:

I knew we were going to end up spending some time together, but I 

never knew that we would be sleeping nose to nose, waking each other 

up to stand guard over the hole. . . You are waking somebody up to help 
13

keep you awake and they will get up and talk to you for however long 

it takes.

Interestingly, much of the cohesion in units is developed simply 

because there is nothing else to do except talk. As one soldier 

observed, “In a fighting hole with somebody for so many hours, 

you get to know them real good because there is nothing else to talk 

about. You become real good friends.” Another pointed out:

You are sitting in the dirt, scanning back and forth, [and] the only person 

you got to talk to for me is him, which is on my left right here, about 18 

inches away, sitting shoulder to shoulder. After about a month or so 

in the dirt like that together, you start talking about family. You start 

talking about everything . . . family, friends, what is going on, and your 

life in general pretty much, what is not right at home. Everything.

While some soldiers referred to the relationships between soldiers 

as “friendships,” most tried to convey the depth of the relationships 

by using the analogy of the family. One soldier insightfully noted:

You are away from your family and everybody--I don’t care who you are, 

even if you are in the States and you are not in the military--you are going 

to look for something to attach yourself to. In the military, especially 

when you come out to the field, you have no family. Everyone here 

becomes your family. With my wife, for the first couple years of being 

with her, I had to learn to live with her--her routine in the morning and 

how my routine fits in with that, who uses the bathroom first and what 

have you. It is the same thing with a bunch of Joe’s walking around. You 

learn everybody’s personality--who is grumpy in the morning, who is 

grumpy at night, and who is grumpy when they miss chow and let them 

up in front of you. It is pretty much the same deal.

Another soldier echoed the family analogy by stating:

We eat, drink, [go to the bathroom]--everything--together. I think that 

it should be like that . . . I really consider these guys my own family, 

because we fight together, we have fun together. . . . We are to the point 

where we even call the squad leader “Dad.”

Despite the academic debate concerning social cohesion and its 

effects on performance, social cohesion remains a key component of 

combat motivation in U.S. soldiers. Social cohesion is what motivates 
14

soldiers not only to perform their job, but also to accept responsibility 

for the interests of other soldiers. At the same time, social cohesion 

relieves each soldier of the constant concern for personal safety as 

other members of the unit take on that responsibility. 

Reporting the War.

To provide another perspective on cohesion in combat units, the 

researchers solicited views from members of the embedded media, 

who presented a unique point of view for two reasons. First, they 

could describe small unit dynamics in combat from an observer 

viewpoint. Because they were essentially outsiders, they did not 

have to be committed to the unit’s mission or contribute to the unit 

effort. Second, and more importantly, embedded media could relate 

their own experiences with relationships in their embedded units. 

It was expected that most of the embedded media would avoid 

becoming too emotionally connected with soldiers to maintain 

their objective, neutral journalist role. Staying aloof would avoid 

predictions that the media embeds would “end up ‘in bed’ with their 

military protectors.”29 As CBS anchor Dan Rather warned early in 

the war, “There’s a pretty fine line between being embedded and 

being entombed.”30

 Embedded media were asked if their intentions were to establish 

close bonds with the soldiers and then to describe the eventual 

outcome as far as establishing emotional bonds. Surprisingly, the 

overwhelming majority of the media interviewed did not attempt 

to prevent any bonds from forming. One journalist commented, “I 

knew they would form, I just didn’t know how strong they would 

be.”31 For the media, cohesion provided the assurance that their 

personal safety would not be imperiled. One media person noted, 

“We were going to war. It was potentially dangerous. I needed to 

get to know people to figure out who to trust if things got ugly.” 

Another stated, “My intention all along was to form as close a bond 

as possible, since my main objective was to come home safe, second 

to telling the story.” 

Nearly all of the embedded media stated that close emotional 

bonds did form, although the bonds were not instantaneous. Similar 

to the experience of soldiers, time spent together provided an 
15

opportunity for relationships to develop. As one embed stated, “It’s 

impossible to spend that much time living and working with people 

round-the-clock and not develop both a rapport and an affection.” 

In the words of another journalist:

I felt at first the soldiers were very suspicious and leery of me. But as 

the days went by and I faced the threats they faced and I went through 

the hardships without complaint, and I helped wherever I could, and I 

tried to do good deeds for them whenever possible, they came around 

and actually ended up feeling quite a bit of affection for me. I certainly 

did for them.

Another reporter related how he became close to his 

“minder”:

At the battery level, I rode with this young lieutenant who was “in 

charge” of media relations through the initial race across Iraq in the 

opening few days of the war. We faced snipers and an enemy artillery 

attack together and I think that helped form a bond. When we finally 

made camp out in the desert and stayed there for a week or so, he and I 

often chatted for hours on end (there not being much else to do most of 

the time). 

To many of the embeds, the relationships that formed were 

surprising and profound. One reporter stated, “I don’t really have 

many close male friends back here at home. So I didn’t expect 

much in the way of close emotional relationships. I was pleasantly 

surprised that I made some very close friendships with some of these 

guys.” Another journalist reflected upon the experience and stated:

I am still in contact with the wives, who pass on messages from their 

husbands. We also learned after we returned home that the two cots 

[I and my photographer] used . . . were still in place and no one else 

was allowed to sleep there, either out of respect for us or because they 

think we might be back. Either way, I thought it was a nice tribute and 

demonstrates in some small degree the respect they have for us and the 

friendships we developed while telling the story of Charlie Co.’s war.

Interestingly, once a level of personal trust was established via 

the emotional bonds with the soldiers, the embedded media felt as 

if they could accomplish their job better. With their personal safety 
16

assured through the trust gained by closer personal relationships, 

the media could fully concentrate on reporting the war. One 

embedded journalist contrasted his experience in the Gulf War with 

the Iraq War. In the Gulf War, he felt like an outsider and “a spy.” 

In the Iraq War, he was able to deliver a better product--reporting 

the war uninterrupted by a lack of trust. He commented, “War is 

a barrier by itself, so you don’t need another barrier with a lack of 

trust.” Another reporter noted, “I became so familiar with them that 

I became part of the team. I was serving my nation as well, in a 

different way, just like the soldiers.”

As far as becoming too close to the unit and losing objectivity, the 

embedded media saw that the trust that comes with cohesion works 

both ways. They could trust the soldiers, but the soldiers could also 

trust the media to report fairly. After a serious incident occurred in 

one unit, a reporter commented how the relationship he had formed 

with the brigade commander allowed him to report on the incident:

What was really helpful was that by then, he and I had already got to 

know each other. I liked him and trusted him. When he said he was 

concerned about releasing certain information, he would give me a 

reason, and the reason made sense. That is not generally the case even in 

civilian life when dealing with officials in a crisis. 

Another reporter, after experiencing the combat intensity of 

purposefully driving into ambush after ambush on a “Thunder 

Run” into Baghdad, described how the bonds he had formed helped 

him overcome his reluctance to go again:

The company first sergeant, in whose APC I rode, asked me if I wanted 

to stay behind that day because he knew it was going to be bad. But I felt 

that if I opted out of that, it would be abandoning those guys. I felt I had 

to be there to tell their story of the day they went into Baghdad to stay. 

So, despite a great deal of concern, I went with them.

The perspectives of the embedded media are important 

because they were a group that could choose their approach to 

establishing relationships. While the bonds the embeds described 

were often qualitatively different from the intense, almost familial 
17

relationships described by soldiers, the presence of soldiers with 

whom relationships had been established gave the embedded media 

a reassurance of their personal safety and an empowerment to do 

their job. 

Motivated by the Cause.

The conventional wisdom established by post-World War II 

studies done on the American soldier is that soldiers fight for each 

other. This generalization was and continues to be reinforced in 

American society through media ranging from Mauldin’s Willie and 

Joe cartoons to movies such as Blackhawk Down or Band of Brothers. 

Indeed, the findings of this study add yet another example of how 

cohesion serves as an important component of combat motivation 

for U.S. soldiers. 

Cohesion is not, of course, the only source of combat motivation. 

The notion of fighting for one’s comrades has usually been contrasted 

with the possibility that soldiers may be motivated in combat by 

idealistic principles--fighting for the cause. Past researchers almost 

always concluded that ideological notions are not prime sources 

of combat motivation for American soldiers. For example, Civil 

War researcher Bell Wiley studied both the Confederate and Union 

armies. Concerning the Confederate soldiers, he wrote that “it is 

doubtful whether many of them either understood or cared about 

the Constitutional issues at stake.”32 Concerning the Union soldiers, 

he wrote, “One searches most letters and diaries in vain for soldiers’ 

comment on why they were in the war or for what they were fighting. 

. . . American soldiers of the 1860s appear to have been about as little 

concerned with ideological issues as were those of the 1940s.”33

 The soldiers in the 1940s were the subjects of Stouffer’s The 

American Soldier studies. In that work, he noted that, “Officers and 

enlisted men alike attached little importance to idealistic motives--

patriotism and concern about war aims.”34 He added that except for 

expressions of flagrant disloyalty, the strongest taboo in World War 

II combat soldiers was “any talk of a flag-waving variety.”35 

Surprisingly, in the present study, many soldiers did respond that 

they were motivated by idealistic notions. Liberating the people and 
18

bringing freedom to Iraq were common themes in describing their 

combat motivation. In the words of one soldier, “Liberating those 

people. Liberating Iraq. Seeing them free. They were repressed for, 

I don’t know how many years, 30 something years. Just knowing 

that they are free now. Knowing that is awesome to me.” Another 

soldier noted:

There were good times when we see the people. . . . How we liberated 

them. That lifted up our morale. Seeing the little children. Smiling 

faces. Seeing a woman and man who were just smiling and cheering 

‘Good! Good! Good! Freedom Good!’ . . . That lifted us up and kept us 

going. We knew we were doing a positive thing.

One embedded media person wrote, “By far the most powerful 

motivation for many soldiers here is the belief that they will improve 

life for the Iraqi people.”36 Another embed commented that soldiers 

did fight out of a sense of camaraderie and a duty concept, but an 

“icing of patriotism guides their decision to go down this path.” 

Three points are important here. First, this combat motivation 

centered on bringing freedom and democracy to Iraq. It was not 

nationalism or even a national security issue, but a more fundamental 

outcome addressing the people of Iraq. Although much of the official 

rationale for the war was much more complex, e.g., “Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM is the multinational coalition effort to liberate the 

Iraqi people, eliminate Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and end 

the regime of Saddam Hussein,”37 soldiers focused only on the more 

fundamental liberation aspects of the war aims. 

Second is the timing of this response. Many soldiers described 

how this motivation was revealed to them as combat progressed. 

The images of Iraqi citizens, especially the children, helped the 

realization of liberation as a motivation to emerge as the war 

developed. As one soldier related:

After everything settled down we actually got to see some of the 

people we liberated and we got to talk to them. I think that was the 

most rewarding part of it. Getting to do presence patrol and seeing all 

the little kids coming out and waving, everybody honking their horns, 

everybody being happy because we came over here and we kicked some 

ass.
19

Another infantryman noted:

We were down for a while because we were in cities--all we did was get 

shot at and we didn’t see no civilians until like now . . . I didn’t see it at 

first, and then I saw the people coming back who are happy, it was like, 

‘Thank You!’ That really was the turning point. Now I know what I am 

doing.

It appears that today’s soldiers are motivated in actual combat 

by fighting for their buddies, but once the war outcomes become 

apparent, the motivation shifts to more ideological themes. 

Additionally, these soldiers were interviewed just a few days after 

major combat operations, but before units transitioned to the peace 

enforcement role. Possibly, as soldiers experience a protracted 

deployment supporting the Coalition Provisional Authority, this 

motivation may shift again. 

Third, while it is no longer taboo to talk about idealistic notions

--especially after September 11th, soldiers still find it difficult to 

express this moral dimension of their combat motivation. It was not 

uncommon for soldiers to tell of the difficulty of describing morally 

charged values. Comments such as, “You just have to be there and 

see it for yourself” or “You can’t really explain it” were frequent. As 

one tongue-tied infantryman put it:

It may be a cornball answer, but believe me, I’m not into all that, but just 

actually seeing some of them waving and shooting thumbs up. They are 

like, ‘We love you America!’ . . . I am not like a very emotional person, 

but the kids come up to you, they give you a hug. One lady came up to 

one of our soldiers and tried to give him the baby so that the baby could 

give him a kiss. It was like, ‘Whoa!!’ It was a heartfelt moment there for 

me.

Despite the results of previous studies and the subsequent 

conventional wisdom that American soldiers are not motivated by 

ideological sentiments, many soldiers in this study reported being 

motivated by notions of freedom, liberation, and democracy. Why 

would today’s U.S. soldiers be more apt to speak of being motivated 

by idealistic aims? Two possible reasons emerge. 
20

First, U.S. soldiers throughout history may have had ideological 

motives, but did not realize it. In his study of American enlisted 

men, Moskos argued that while cohesion is often the primary 

combat motivation, supplementary factors (other than training 

and equipment) must exist to explain why cohesion alone does 

not determine battle performance. He posited that cohesion will 

“maintain the soldier in his combat role only when he has an 

underlying commitment to the worth of the larger social system for 

which he is fighting.”38 He called this commitment a latent ideology

that supports the role of cohesion as a combat motivation. According 

to Moskos, soldiers may not acknowledge or even know about this 

latent ideology, but it nevertheless exists. Thus, while today’s 

soldiers still feel awkward speaking of idealistic motivations, they 

may be relatively less inhibited about articulating idealistic notions 

compared to soldiers of the past. 

Civil War historian James McPherson proposed another possibility 

concerning why soldiers sometimes fight for ideology. McPherson 

argued that ideology did serve as a combat motivation during the 

Civil War. He proposed that three situational characteristics were 

present during the Civil War that helped ideology emerge as a 

combat motivation for both sides of that war. First, he noted that 

the Confederate and Union armies were the most literate armies in 

history to that time. Over 80 percent of the Confederate soldiers and 

over 90 percent of the Union soldiers were literate. Second, most of the 

soldiers were volunteers as opposed to draftees or conscripts. They 

were not forced to take up arms. Finally, McPherson noted that Civil 

War soldiers came from the world’s most politicized and democratic 

society.39 Soldiers voted, read newspapers, and participated in 

discussions concerning national issues. The interaction of these three 

factors provided the conditions where soldiers were able, inclined, 

and encouraged to debate ideological notions. Soldiers who are 

educated, comfortable discussing ideological topics, and volunteers 

are more apt to fight for the cause. As a result, McPherson argued 

that Confederate soldiers fought “for liberty and independence 

from what they regarded as a tyrannical government” while Union 

soldiers fought “to preserve the nation created by the founders from 

dismemberment and destruction.”40 
21

Interestingly, the same three conditions exist today. Soldiers are 

well-educated. The average education of a new soldier in 2002 was 

12.1 years of education. That implies that the average new soldier 

is more than a high school graduate; he or she has some college 

experience. Soldiers are also older and more mature than we think. 

In 2002, the average new soldier was 21.1 years old. 

Soldiers are also amazingly in touch with the pressing issues 

of the day. Via the Internet, Fox News, and CNN, they know the 

world situation, who the key players are, and the essence of the 

policy debates. When The New York Times quoted an infantryman 

of the 3rd Infantry Division as saying, “You call Donald Rumsfeld 

and tell him our sorry asses are ready to go home,”41 it was not only 

surprising to hear such a direct message being conveyed up the 

chain of command, but it was also eye-opening that a Private First 

Class (PFC) would even know who the Secretary of Defense was. 

One embedded journalist commented on the underestimated 

sophistication of today’s soldiers and said, “Soldiers I encountered 

were trained, ethical, thoughtful, and intelligent. It was not unusual 

to talk to a Private or PFC and be absolutely astounded at how 

well he could talk about why they were there [fighting in Iraq].” 

Additionally, soldiers are attuned to ideology, values, and abstract 

principles. Since the day they took their enlistment oaths, they have 

been bombarded with idealistic notions. New soldiers are socialized 

to be comfortable talking about value-laden ideas ranging from the 

seven Army values to the Soldier’s Creed.42 

Finally, today’s soldiers are volunteers. They were not coerced 

into service, and they did not approach the military as the employer 

of last resort. They come from a generation that trusts the military 

institution. In 1975, a Harris Poll reported that only 20 percent of 

people ages 18 to 29 said they had a great deal of confidence in 

those who ran the military.43 Compare that with a recent poll by 

the Harvard Institute of Politics that found that 70 percent of college 

undergraduates trust the military to do the right thing either all or 

most of the time.44 Soldiers understand that they are professionals 

in a values-based institution. They trust each other, their leaders, the 

Army, and they understand the moral aspects of war. 

The U.S. Army has matured from a conscript army, through a 
22

fledgling all-volunteer army, to what is now a truly professional 

army. Professional soldiers still fight for each other, but professional 

soldiers also accept the responsibility that the Army has entrusted 

to them. Evidence of this transition is found even in the families 

of today’s soldiers. When reporters interviewed wives about their 

husbands’ delayed redeployment from Iraq, one sergeant’s wife 

commented, “As military spouses, we know our husbands have 

responsibilities. They are professionals doing their jobs.” Another 

spouse added, “I wonder how [complaining] must sound to someone 

who’s lost someone.” 45 Still another spouse noted, “I could have 

married anyone else who would have been at work 9 to 5. The job 

(my husband) does is an amazingly honorable one.”46

Conclusion.

Shortly after the latest Iraq War, Colonel Abdul-Zahra of the 

former Iraqi Army commented that, “The U.S. Army is certainly the 

best in the world. But it’s not because of the fighting men, but because 

of their equipment.”47 Colonel Abdul-Zahra missed the point. The 

Iraq War showed that while the U.S. Army certainly has the best 

equipment and training, a human dimension is often overlooked. 

As military historian Victor Davis Hanson observed shortly after the 

end of major combat operations in Iraq:

The lethality of the military is not just organizational or a dividend of 

high-technology. Moral and group cohesion explain more still. The 

general critique of the 1990s was that we had raised a generation with 

peroxide hair and tongue rings, general illiterates who lounged at malls, 

occasionally muttering ‘like’ and ‘you know’ in Sean Penn or Valley Girl 

cadences. But somehow the military has married the familiarity and 

dynamism of crass popular culture to 19th-century notions of heroism, 

self-sacrifice, patriotism, and audacity.48

The soldiers interviewed for this study presented an impression 

that was often crude, vulgar, and cynical, yet that impression was 

leavened with a surprisingly natural acceptance of the institution’s 

values. The U.S. Army is the best in the world because, in addition to 

possessing the best equipment, its soldiers also have an unmatched 

level of trust. They trust each other because of the close interpersonal 
23

bonds between soldiers. They trust their leaders because their leaders 

have competently trained their units. And they trust the Army 

because, since the end of the draft, the Army has had to attract its 

members rather than conscripting them. Unable any longer to obtain 

labor by force, the all-volunteer Army was “compelled to transform 

itself into an institution that people would respect and trust. Bonds 

forged by trust replaced bonds forged by fear of punishment.”49

Because our soldiers trust the Army as an institution, they now look 

to the Army to provide the moral direction for war. As this study 

has shown, soldiers still fight for each other. In a professional army, 

however, soldiers are also sophisticated enough to grasp the moral 

reasons for fighting. 

Implications.

Two implications result from this study. First, cohesion, or the 

strong emotional bonds between soldiers, continues to be a critical 

factor in combat motivation. One of the main purposes of the Unit 

Manning System is to increase unit cohesion. While critics may 

attack the implications of the Unit Manning System because of the 

effects on leader development, total force turbulence, or increased 

personnel management complexities, denouncing cohesion as either 

irrelevant or detrimental is nonsensical. Likewise, attempting to 

dissect cohesion into social or task cohesion and then comparing 

correlations with performance is best left to the antiseptic 

experiments of academia. For those interested in overturning the 

DoD homosexual conduct policy, it may be prudent to choose a 

strategy other than questioning the linkage between cohesion and 

combat performance.

The Iraq War confirms what every combat soldier already 

knows--cohesion places a shared responsibility for the success of 

the unit on each individual while giving each soldier the confidence 

that someone else is watching over them. Spending large amounts 

of time together, usually in austere conditions, develops this trusting 

relationship. The Iraqi and American armies provide an interesting 

contrast in cohesion. In the former, the absence of cohesion made 

the surrender decision easy. In the latter, the presence of cohesion 
24

was a primary source of combat motivation. 

The second implication concerns the transformation of the force 

to a professional army. The move from a struggling all-volunteer 

army to a truly professional force has not been easy. Early problems 

in the “hollow” Army included declining enlistment propensity, 

low quality recruits, high attrition, and plummeting morale.50 Seven 

years into the experiment, Richard Nixon, who introduced the allvolunteer Army, wrote, “The volunteer army has failed to provide 

enough personnel of the caliber we need for our highly sophisticated 

armaments.”51 The Army rebounded in the 1980s with “Be All You 

Can Be” and a recruiting overhaul, but the 1990s dismantled much 

of what had been accomplished through a demoralizing downsizing. 

The survivors picked up the pieces, however, and overcame another 

recruiting crisis in the late 1990s. Today, the “Army of One” is the 

culmination of 30 years of movement toward a professional Army. 

It is a high-tech, highly trained, and highly professional force. 

The bonds of trust among soldiers, their leaders, and the Army as 

an institution, however, are not invulnerable. Horror film director 

John Carpenter was once asked what he thought scared people the 

most. His answer: “Uncertainty.”52 Uncertainty can unravel the 

trust that provides the underpinnings for the professional Army 

through two means.

First, uncertainty can be introduced by subjecting the Army to a 

major downsizing. The research is clear that downsizing severely 

damages the psychological contract between an organization and its 

downsizing survivors.53 Those left behind grapple with uncertainty 

in the form of wondering about the magnitude and duration of 

the downsizing, the management of the downsizing, determining 

who will pick up the remaining workload after the reductions, and 

wondering if their turn is next. In the rush for lessons learned after 

the Iraq War, there has been enough talk of trading force for speed 

that the specter of an Army downsizing in the future is real. 

Second, uncertainty can be imposed on the Army through openended deployments. Soldiers will salute and deploy to distant parts 

of the world when ordered, but when their redeployment date 

is uncertain, trust with the institution is strained. Much like the 

society they represent, today’s soldiers view wars in terms of weeks, 
25

not months, e.g., a CBS poll early in the war showed 62 percent of 

Americans believing that the war would be “quick and successful.”54

While today’s wars may be prosecuted quickly, the ensuing 

peace operations continue indefinitely. As a result, the Army is 

increasingly stretched over 120 countries, and the ability to redeploy 

soldiers home after an operation has diminished significantly. After 

observing the current situation, Michael O’Hanlon noted, “It would 

be the supreme irony, and a national tragedy, if after winning two 

wars in 2 years, the U.S. Army were broken and defeated while 

trying to keep the peace.”55

This study set out to examine why soldiers fight. The findings 

showed that U.S. soldiers continue to fight because of the bonds 

of trust between soldiers. They also fight, however, because of the 

bonds of trust established with the Army as an institution. Our 

soldiers are professionals and are the culmination of 30 years of an 

all-volunteer force. While that may be cause for commemoration, it 

is also cause for consideration as policymakers chart the course for 

the future. 

ENDNOTES

1. Ardant du Picq, Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern, Harrisburg, PA: Military 

Service Publishing, 1947, p. 110. 

2. Why We Fight, http://history.acusd.edu/gen/filmnotes/whywefight.html.

3. Frank Capra, The Name Above the Title: An Autobiography, New York: De 

Capo Press, 1997, p. 327. (Original emphasis.)

4. Thomas Doherty, Projections of War: Hollywood, American Culture, and World 

War II, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, p. 70. 

5. Ibid., p. 73. (Original emphasis.)

6. Samuel A. Stouffer, et al., The American Soldier: Combat and Its Aftermath, 

Volume II, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1949, p. 107.

7. Ibid., p. 110.

8. Ibid., p. 136.
26

9. S. L. A. Marshall, Men Against Fire, New York: William Morrow and 

Company, 1947, pp. 42-43.

10. Ibid., p. 161.

11. Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, “Cohesion and Disintegration in the 

Wehrmacht in World War II,” Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 12, Summer 1948, p. 

281. 

12. Roger W. Little, “Buddy Relations and Combat Performance,” in Morris 

Janowitz, ed., The New Military: Changing Patterns of Organization, New York: 

Russell Sage Foundation, 1964, p. 221.

13. Charles C. Moskos, Jr., The American Enlisted Man: The Rank and File in 

Today’s Military, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970, p. 146.

14. Other works supporting the role of cohesion in combat include Nora 

Kinzer Stewart, Mates and Muchachos: Unit Cohesion in the Falklands/Malvinas 

War, New York: Brassey’s, 1991; William D. Henderson, Why the Vietcong Fought: 

A Study of Motivation and Control in a Modern Army in Combat, Westport, CT: 

Greenwood Press, 1979; and Reuven Gal, A Portrait of an Israeli Soldier, Westport, 

CT: Greenwood Press, 1986.

15. Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, Crisis in Command: Mismanagement 

in the Army, New York: Hill and Wang, 1978, p. 43. The fragging data is from 

1969-72. 

16. U.S. Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part II, Chapter 37, Section 654, (a) (15). 

17. Elizabeth Kier, “Homosexuals in the U.S. Military: Open Integration and 

Combat Effectiveness,” International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2, Fall 1998, p. 18. 

18. Robert J. MacCoun, “What is Known About Unit Cohesion and Military 

Performance,” in RAND, Sexual Orientation and U.S. Military Personnel Policy: 

Options and Assessment, Santa Monica, CA: National Defense Research Institute, 

MR-323-OSD, 1993, p. 298.

19. David R. Segal and Meyer Kestnbaum, “Professional Closure in the 

Military Labor Market: A Critique of Pure Cohesion,” in Don M. Snider and Gayle 

L. Watkins, eds., The Future of the Army Profession, New York: McGraw-Hill Primus, 

2002, p. 453. See also Stephen B. Knouse, Keeping “On Task”: An Exploration of 

Task Cohesion in Diverse Military Teams, Patrick Air Force Base, FL: Defense Equal 

Opportunity Management Institute, 1998.

20. Unit Manning Task Force, https://www.unitmanning.army.mil/Overview_
27

items/mission_statement.htm.

21. The Iraqi soldiers required special consideration due to their status as 

captured combatants. Both the Geneva Convention and specific guidance from 

Department of Defense (Department of Defense Directive 3216.2, Protection of 

Human Subjects and Adherence to Ethical Standards in DoD-Supported Research, 

Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 25, 2002) protect enemy 

prisoners from exposure to the idly curious and from use as human subjects 

in behavioral research. Questions were therefore restricted to issues involving 

individual and unit military effectiveness and followed the advice and consent of 

staff judge advocates in Iraq, Kuwait, and CONUS. Although camp rules dictated 

that prisoners remain under military guard at all times, the interview setting was 

made as comfortable as possible. A U.S. military intelligence officer oversaw the 

collection of information from EPWs. 

22. Colonel Terrence Potter is an Arabic professor at the U.S. Military Academy 

and conducted all the interviews. 

23. While 16 U.S. Marines were interviewed, the majority of the U.S. sample 

consisted of U.S. Army soldiers. No noticeable differences in demographics or 

attitudes were noted between the Marine and Army infantrymen interviewed. 

24. Subsequent quotations from soldiers are taken directly from the transcribed 

interviews. 

25. Perhaps the Iraqis would have been expected to fight because that is what 

soldiers do when their country is attacked. Sumoud (as in the al-Sumoud missile) 

means “withstanding” or “steadfastness” in Arabic, and soldiers might have been 

expected to respond that they fought just to resist the invaders. 

26. Absent Without Leave.

27. Soviet armored personnel carrier.

28. Such questions are sensitive in a prison setting and responses may have 

been influenced by social desirability concerns. It should be noted that during 

the interviews, significant numbers of prisoners were being released from the 

camp--as many as 350 per day during the final 2 days of interviews. Under such 

circumstances, prisoners may be less likely to express defiant or nationalistic 

attitudes to military interviewers. On the other hand, knowing that freedom was 

imminent may have allowed them to speak more freely. 

29. Howard Kurtz, “After Invading Kuwait, Reporters Need Boot Camp,” The 

Washington Post, March 10, 2003, p. C1. 
28

30. Justin Ewers, “Is the New News Good News?,” U.S. News & World Report, 

Vol. 134, No. 11, April 7, 2003, p. 48. 

31. All embedded media interviewed for this monograph were assigned to U.S. 

Army ground units. One could expect different responses from Air Force or Navy 

embedded media as well as from journalists embedded to higher headquarters. 

Unless otherwise noted, quotations from embedded media are taken from phone, 

email, or personal interviews. 

32. Bell Irwin Wiley, The Life of Johnny Reb: The Common Soldier of the Confederacy, 

Indianapolis: Wiley, 1943, p. 309.

33. Bell Irwin Wiley, The Life of Billy Yank: The Common Soldier of the Union, 

Indianapolis: Wiley, 1952, pp. 39-40. 

34. Stouffer, p. 111.

35. Ibid., p. 150.

36. Ann Scott Tyson, “Oceans Away, US Troops Crave Approval at Home,” 

The Christian Science Monitor, April 8, 2003, p. 1.

37. Photo caption insert on all Operation IRAQI FREEDOM imagery, Joint 

Combat Camera Center, a division of the American Forces Information Service 

(AFIS), a field activity of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs).

38. Moskos, p. 147. 

39. James M. McPherson, What They Fought For: 1861-1865, Baton Rouge, 

LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1994, p. 4. See also Earl J. Hess, The Union 

Soldier in Battle: Enduring the Ordeal of Combat, Lawrence, KS: University Press of 

Kansas, 1997, pp. 97-102, for a discussion of the role of “The Cause” in the combat 

motivation of Union soldiers. 

40. McPherson, p. 7. 

41. Steven Lee Myers, “Anxious and Weary of War, G.I.’s Face a New Iraq 

Mission,” The New York Times, June 15, 2003, p. 1.

42. The seven Army values are Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless-service, Honor, 

Integrity, and Personal Courage. These values are on posters, wallet cards, and 

even tags to accompany each soldier’s identification tags (dog tags). The Soldier’s 

Creed is issued to soldiers with their Soldier’s Manual on the first day of basic 

training. It contains statements such as, “I am doing my share to keep alive the 

principles of freedom for which my country stands.”
29

43. Harris Poll, Harris Confidence Index, January 22, 2003. 

44. Institute of Politics, Harvard University, A National Survey of College 

Undergraduates, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2002, p. 2.

45. Jack Kelley, Gary Strauss, and Martin Kasindorf, “Troops, Families Await 

War’s Real End,” USA Today, June 12, 2003, p. 1. 

46. Gregg Zoroya, “Spouses, Kids Endure Own Agonies of War,” USA Today, 

July 11, 2003, p. 9.

47. Charles J. Hanley, “Iraqis Find Price of Battle Too High,” Associated Press, 

June 1, 2003. 

48. Victor Davis Hanson, “Anatomy of the Three-Week War,” National Review 

Online, April 17, 2003, http://www.nationalreview.com/hanson/hanson041703.asp. 

49. Richard A. Posner, “An Army of the Willing,” New Republic, May 19, 2003, 

p. 27.

50. See Mark J. Eitelberg, “The All-Volunteer Force After Twenty Years,” in 

J. Eric Fredland, et al., eds., Professional on the Front Line: Two Decades of the AllVolunteer Force, Washington: Brassey’s, 1996, pp. 66-98.

51. Richard M. Nixon, The Real War, New York: Warner Books, 1980, p. 201.

52. Mark Seal, “What Scares the Scary People?” American Way, October 15, 

1993, p. 71. 

53. For an analysis of the effects of the Army downsizing on those left behind, 

see Leonard Wong and Jeffrey McNally, “Downsizing the Army: Some Policy 

Implications Affecting the Survivors,” Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 20, Winter 

1994, pp. 199-216.

54. CBS News Poll, Americans See Longer War, March 25, 2003.

55. Michael O’Hanlon, “Breaking The Army,” The Washington Post, July 3, 

2003, p. 23. 

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven Metz

Authors

Dr. Leonard Wong

Colonel Thomas A. Kolditz

Lieutenant Colonel Raymond A. Millen

 Colonel Terrence M. Potter

Director of Publications

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Ms. Gretchen S. Smith