UNITED STATES 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 

June 18, 2015 

SECRETARY COMMISSION VOTING RECORD 

DECISION ITEM: SECY-15-0045 

TITLE: ISSUANCE OF GENERIC LETTER 2015-01, "TREATMENT 

OF NATURAL PHENOMENA HAZARDS IN FUEL CYCLE 

FACILITIES" 

The Commission acted on the subject paper as recorded in the Staff Requirements 

Memorandum (SRM) of June 18, 2015. 

This Record contains a summary of voting on this matter together with the individual vote 

sheets, views and comments of the Commission. 

Enclosures: 

1. Voting Summary 

2. Commissioner Vote Sheets 

cc: Chairman Burns 

Commissioner Svinicki 

Commissioner Ostendorff 

Commissioner Baran 

OGC 

EDO 

PDR 

Secretary 

Annette 

of 

L. 

the 

Vietti-Cook 

~ Commission 
VOTING SUMMARY - SECY-15-0045 

RECORDED VOTES 

NOT 

APRVD DISAPRVD ABSTAIN PARTICIP COMMENTS DATE 

CHRM. BURNS x x x 6/1 /15 

COMR. SVINICKI x x x 5/22/15 

COMR. OSTENDORFF x x x 5/28/15 

COMR. BARAN x x 5/15/15 
TO: 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

Approved XX 

NOTATION VOTE 

RESPONSE SHEET 

Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary 

Chairman Burns 

SECY-15-0045: ISSUANCE OF GENERIC LETTER 

2015-01, "TREATMENT OF NATURAL PHENOMENA 

HAZARDS IN FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES" 

Disapproved XX Abstain --- ---

Not Participating 

COMMENTS: Below XX Attached XX None 

I approve issuance of Generic Letter 2015-01, subject to the attached edits. Although I 

would agree that there are different options available to the staff to collect information 

from fuel cycle facility licensees in order to assess their compliance with regulatory 

requirements related to the treatment of natural phenomena hazards, as indicated by 

Commissioner Svinicki in her vote, I support the staff's decision to address this issue by 

collecting information through this generic letter. However, I do not approve the 

inclusion of requested action (2) in the generic letter because, as Commissioner 

Ostendorff indicated in his vote, licensees are required to address noncompliance and 

including this second action would be inconsistent with the approach that has been 

used to address similar issues for power reactor licensees. 

I also do not approve the portions of the generic letter, as indicated in my attached 

edits, which analyze the potential for a backfit in the hypothetical situation where the 

NRC would take regulatory action requiring licensees to modify their ISA summaries, 

their ISAs, or to modify their facilities. I find the inclusion of this discussion in the 

generic letter to be premature. 

1 June 2015 

DATE 

Entered in STARS" Yes ,/ No 
I SGB edits UNITED STATES 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS 

WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 

NRC GENERIC LETTER 2015-01: 

ADDRESSEES 

TREATMENT OF NATURAL PHENOMENA HAZARDS 

IN FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES 

All holders of and applicants for a specific source material license or construction permit for 

large quantities of uranium hexafluoride under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 

(10 CFR) Part 40, "Domestic Licensing of Source Material." 

All holders of, and applicants for, a fuel cycle facility license or construction permit subject to 

10 CFR Part 70, Subpart H, "Additional Requirements for Certain Licensees Authorized to 

Possess a Critical Mass of Special Nuclear Material." 

PURPOSE 

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this letter for two purposes: 

(1) to request addressees to submit information to demonstrate compliance with regulatory 

requirements and applicable license conditions regarding the treatment of natural 

phenomena events in the facilities' integrated safety analysis (ISA) 

(2) to determine if additional NRC regulatory action is necessary to ensure that licensees 

comply with their licensing basis and existing NRC regulations 

The NRC's regulations at 10 CFR 40.31(b) and 10 CFR 70.22(d) require addressees to submit 

a written response to this generic letter (GL) and, if necessary, take appropriate action in 

accordance with 10 CFR 70.62(a)(1) to demonstrate compliance with the performance 

requirements of 10 CFR 70.61. This GL requires no other action. 

BACKGROUND 

On March 11 , 2011 , the Tohoku-Taiheiyou-Oki earthquake occurred near the east coast of 

Honshu, Japan. This magnitude 9.0 earthquake and the subsequent tsunami caused significant 

damage to at least four of the six units of the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power station. As a 

result, there was a loss of offsite and onsite electrical power systems. 

On March 23, 2011, the NRC Chairman issued Tasking Memorandum COMGBJ-11-0002, 

"NRC Actions Following the Events in Japan" (Agencywide Documents Access and 

Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML 110820875). In it, the Chairman directed the 

NRC's Executive Director for Operations to establish the NRC Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) to 

evaluate available technical and operational information from the events in Japan following the 

March 11 , 201 1, earthquake and tsunami at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power station. The 

ML 15086A515 
GL 2015-01 

Page 2 of 11 

NTTF was tasked to consider lessons learned from the event and to develop recommendations 

to improve the regulatory framework for reactors in the United States and their applicability to 

NRG-licensed facilities other than power reactors. 

On March 31 , 2011, the NRC staff issued Information Notice (IN) 2011-08, ''TohokuTaiheiyou-Oki Earthquake Effects on Japanese Nuclear Power Plants-for Fuel Cycle Facilities" 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML 110830824), to inform addressees of the potential challenges 

associated with preventing or mitigating the effects of natural phenomena events. IN 2011-08 

recommended that addressees review the information for applicability to their facilities and 

consider actions, as appropriate, to ensure that features and preparations necessary to 

withstand or respond to severe external events from natural phenomena (e.g., earthquakes, 

tsunamis, floods, tornadoes, and hurricanes) are reasonable and consistent with regulatory 

requirements. 

On July 12, 2011, in light of the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant, the 

NTTF, after conducting a systematic and methodical review of NRC processes and regulations, 

presented a set of recommendations to nuclear power reactors in the United States (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML 111861807). The NTTF recommendations are intended to clarify and 

strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural disasters and improve 

mitigation and emergency preparedness at nuclear power reactors in the United States. 

The NRC staff performed a systematic evaluation and inspection of selected fuel cycle facilities, 

in light of the lessons learned from the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant, 

to confirm that licensees were in compliance with applicable regulatory requirements and 

license conditions; and to evaluate their readiness to address natural phenomena hazards 

(NPH) events and other licensing bases events related to NPH. The staff's assessment 

considered the NTTF recommendations to determine whether additional regulatory actions by 

the NRC are warranted. This assessment included consideration of new seismic hazard 

information from the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) for the central and eastern United Statesl. 

which was the subject of an NRC generic communication to fuel facilities in IN 2010-19, 

"Updated Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Estimates in Central Eastern United States" (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML 102160735). 

Regulatory Framework for Fuel Facilities and Treatment of Natural Phenomena Hazards 

For facilities regulated under 10 CFR Part 70, Subpart H, the NRC staff reviewed information to 

verify that the licensees wer.e in compliance with applicable license conditions and the 

regulations contained in 10 CFR Part 70, Subpart H. Specifically, the NRC staff review looked 

at licensee compliance with the regulations in 10 CFR 70.62(c)(1), which requires, in part, that 

each licensee shall conduct and maintain an ISA that is of appropriate detail for the complexity 

of the process that identifies, among other things, "potential accident sequences caused by 

process deviations or other events internal to the facility and credible external events, including 

natural phenomena." The regulations in 10 CFR 70.62(c)(1) also require, in part, identification 

of the consequence and the likelihood of occurrence of each potential accident sequence, and 

the methods used to determine the consequences and likelihoods. The ISA is one of three 

elements of a safety program established and maintained by a licensee to demonstrate 

compliance with the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61. In addition, 10 CFR 70.22(i) 

provides criteria for the fuel facility emergency planning. 
GL 2015-01 

Page 3 of 11 

For new facilities or new processes at existing facilities, 10 CFR 70.64(a), "Baseline design 

criteria" requires, in part, that the design must provide for adequate protection against natural 

phenomena with consideration of the most severe documented historical events for the site. 

The NRC staff reviewed the ISA summaries that licensees submitted to the NRC with their 

license application or license amendment requests. The ISA summaries provide a synopsis of 

the results of the ISA and licensees retain tflem-the ISA and supporting documentation onsite. 

The majority of licensees of existing fuel cycle facilities completed their ISA after Subpart H of 

10 CFR Part 70 was promulgated1 in September 2000. The ISA, in general, postulated that 

structures, systems and components (SSCs) would remain intact during credible seismic events 

and, in some cases, concluded that a high radiological or chemical consequence was highly 

unlikely based on the assumption that the SSCs will adequately perform their safety functions 

during the NPH event. +Re-Beginning in December 2011. the staff conducted inspections of the 

ISAs on a sample basis in accordance with inspection program expectations to verify 

compliance with the new requirements in 1 O CFR Part 70, Subpart H. Prior to the recent these 

NRC inspections (further explanation in the next section), the NRC had not conducted 

systematic inspections of the ISAs with respect to NPH. 

For facilities regulated under 10 CFR Part 40, "Domestic Licensing of Source Material," the NRC 

staff reviewed information to verify that the licensees were in compliance with applicable license 

conditions and the regulations in 10 CFR 40.31U)(1)(ii), which requires, in part, an emergency 

plan for responding to the radiological hazards of an accidental release of source material and 

to any associated chemical hazards directly incident thereto, and to 10 CFR 40.31 U)(3)(ii), 

which requires identification of each type of accident sequence for which protective actions may 

be needed. The Honeywell Metropolis Works Facility and International Isotopes Fluorine 

Products Inc. completed ISAs, using methodologies, performance criteria, and staff guidance 

similar to 10 CFR Part 70 to evaluate relevant hazards and their associated accident 

sequences. The Honeywell and International Isotopes ISAs are captured in their licensing 

bases. 

Inspection Results 

From December 2011 through May 2012, the NRC staff conducted inspection activities in 

accordance with Temporary Instruction (Tl) 2600/015, "Evaluation of Licensee Strategies for the 

Prevention and/or Mitigation of Emergencies at Fuel Facilities" (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML 12286A284). The NRC completed the temporary instruction in three phases. In the 

initial phase, the staff reviewed licensing documents, including the integrated safety 

assessments and emergency plans. The second phase consisted of NRC inspectors evaluating 

licensee accident prevention measures and emergency actions through onsite evaluations that 

focused on credible natural phenomena events and loss of utilities that support onsite systems 

(e.g., electricity and water). The third phase involved assessing whether a licensee's strategies 

and equipment were effective to prevent and/or mitigate emergencies during selected 

beyond-licensing-basis natural phenomena events and extended loss-of-power and 

loss-of-offsite-water scenarios. In the review of licensing basis events, the NRC considered the 

following NPH: seismic, flooding , and high winds (caused by hurricanes or tornadoes). The 

1 Refer to 10 CFR 70.62(c)(3) which requires, in part, that existing licensees submit for NRC approval, by 

April 2001 , a plan that describes the ISA approach; and by October 2004, or in accordance with the 

approved plan, a completed ISA. It also requires licensees to identify performance deficiencies and to 

correct them with adequate compensatory measures. 
GL 2015-01 

Page 4 of 11 

NRC staff also evaluated onsite fires because seismic events may cause failure of plant 

equipment that leads to facility fires. The NRC staff gave particular attention to earthquakes 

and flooding because of recent events, such as the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear 

Power Plant, and because of significant advancements in the state of knowledge of these 

hazards. 

Based on NRC staff inspections of existing fuel cycle facilities using Tl 2600/015, the NRC 

determined that the evaluated facilities had established programs, procedures, and equipment 

to respond to licensing basis events involving fire, flooding, and loss of utilities. However, the 

NRC staff was not able to fully assess the capabilities of those facilities to adequately mitigate 

the consequences of credible natural phenomena events. Based on information obtained from 

the inspection activities, the NRC staff identified that licensees have not clearly documented the 

assumptions they used to develop their ISAs and other safety assessments. The NRC primarily 

attributed this to the lack of available facility design information and significant variations in the 

level of detail and rigor of implementation in the facility safety assessments with regards to the 

treatment of natural phenomena events. Therefore, the NRC inspectors were unable to verify 

that these facilities were in compliance with their licensing basis and regulatory requirements. 

The NRC staff could not confirm that the evaluated licensees had fully considered all credible 

external events (accident sequences) involving process deviations or other events internal to 

the facility (e.g., consequential explosions, spills, and fires resulting from the natural phenomena 

event). These accident sequences could potentially result in radiological/chemical 

consequences to workers, the public, or the environment. 

For example, many operating fuel cycle facilities regulated under 10 CFR Part 70 that are 

located in the central and eastern United States were built between 1950 and 1990. These 

facilities were built following building codes with limited seismic design considerations, or 

building codes that have since been updated with more stringent seismic and other natural 

phenomena requirements. In addition, at the time when many licensees completed the safety 

assessments for the facilities to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 70, Subpart H, 

seismic design provisions had undergone profound changes that were incorporated in building 

codes in areas of seismic hazard, seismic design detailing requirements, and performance of 

structures. 

Under Tl 2600/15, NRC inspectors found , in a number of facilities, insufficient supporting 

documentation to justify the assumption that the SSCs will adequately perform under a 

postulated NPH event. The lack of supporting documentation raises questions about the validity 

of the licensee's assumptions for the performance of the SSCs. The NRC inspectors opened 

unresolved items2 (URls) to further assess whether the evaluated licensees are in compliance 

with license conditions, the requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 , and the requirements of 

10 CFR 70.62(c), regarding NPH accident sequences. Nevertheless, the staff believes at this 

time, that for all the facilities inspected, due to consideration of inherent seismic capacity in 

SSCs, radiological/chemical source terms and existing safety programs in place (i.e. , items 

relied on for safety), the facilities are adequate to protect public health and safety. 

2 An unresolved item involves an issue that requires more information to determine whether a violation 

has occurred . The NRC dispositions all potential violations according to the NRC Enforcement Policy 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML 13228A 199), which includes noncited violations, violations, the use of 

enforcement discretion, etc. 
DISCUSSION 

GL 2015-01 

Page 5 of 11 

As a result of the inspections, the staff is issuing this generic communication due to the generic 

applicability of the URls across the nuclear fuel facility industry. The NRC will use the 

information requested to evaluate licensees' compliance with NRC rules and regulations or 

relevant license conditions. Current NRC regulations require the evaluation of site hazards 

including natural phenomena events. However, knowledge of seismic design has evolved over 

time as new information regarding site hazards and expected structural performance (ductility 

concepts) Rave-has become available. As a result, the licensing basis, design, and level of 

protection may differ among the existing operating fuel cycle facilities, depending on when the 

facility was constructed and what assumptions were used in the facilities' ISAs developed to 

comply with the new 10 CFR Part 70, Subpart H requirements. To date, the NRC has not 

undertaken a comprehensive evaluation of the licensing basis for existing fuel cycle facilities as 

it relates to natural phenomena events. 

In an effort to fully assess the capabilities of fuel cycle facilities to prevent or mitigate the 

consequences of natural phenomena events, the staff is requesting information from the 

addressees to support a determination with regards to the proper evaluation of NPH impacts at 

the fuel cycle facilities. If not properly evaluated, severe natural phenomena may lead to a 

progression of events, such as fires, explosions, and chemical releases, that could lead to 

accidents not previously considered in the facilities' assessment and for which prevention or 

mitigation measures may be needed. Failure to protect SSCs relied on for safety from natural 

phenomena with appropriate safety margins has the potential to result in common-cause 

failures that could lead to accidents that exceed the performance requirements of 

10 CFR 70.61. In addition, consistent with the Commission's goals as reflected in the NRC 

Strategic Plan (NUREG-1614 ), accidents that lead to inadvertent criticality or uncontrolled 

releases of licensed material to the environment are to be avoided. Therefore, the prevention 

and mitigation of such accidents, while ensuring that emergency preparedness is considered, 

are vital aspects that need further NRC review. 

As described above, the license application and ISAs should consider natural phenomena 

events (e.g., tornadoes, hurricanes, and earthquakes) and other external events with a sufficient 

level of detail to characterize and assess the impacts from natural phenomena events and other 

external events on facility safety. The assessment should identify the licensing assumptions 

and the design bases for the structures and equipment credited for prevention or mitigation of 

the consequences to the facility from natural phenomena events and other external events. The 

assessment should indicate which events are considered not credible and the basis for that 

determination. It should also indicate which types of events could occur without adversely 

impacting safety. In addition, compliance with the regulatory requirements to prevent or mitigate 

the consequences of NPH events may require that facilities be prepared, or possess equipment, 

that limits the consequences affecting public health and worker radiological and chemical safety 

in the context of multiple challenges and degraded or disabled emergency resources. The 

degradations could include long-term loss of functions, such as offsite power, onsite emergency 

power, offsite water supply, other offsite services, and transportation to access offsite 

resources. 

As the state of knowledge of NPH has evolved significantly since the licensing of many fuel 

cycle facilities, and given the demonstrated experiences from the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear 

power station accident and separately, updated seismic hazards information from the USGS for 

the central and eastern United States, it is necessary to confirm the appropriateness of the 
GL 2015-01 

Page 6 of 11 

magnitude and likelihood of hazards assumed for fuel cycle facilities and the licensees' ability to 

protect against those hazards. Fuel cycle facilities safety programs have been, and should 

continue to be, an evolving safety program supported by new scientific information, 

technologies, and methods for evaluation. As new information and analytical techniques are 

developed, safety standards need to be reviewed, evaluated, and changed, as necessary, to 

ensure that they continue to address the NRC's requirements to provide reasonable assurance 

of adequate protection of public health and safety. 

In developing this GL, the staff had multiple interactions with stakeholders to discuss the basis 

for issuance of a generic communication. On August 21 , 2012, the NRC staff held a public 

meeting with the Nuclear Energy Industry (NEI) and industry to discuss industry-proposed 

actions to address these URls. By letter dated October 12, 2012, "Treatment of NPH in the 

Integrated Safety Analysis" (ADAMS Accession No. ML 12296A036), NEI provided the 

background and industry's basis for the fuel facilities' current analyses of NPH in their ISAs. 

The NRC staff considered the information in NE l's letter during the development of this GL. 

On April 11 , 2013, the NRC staff held a Category 2 public meeting with the industry in Atlanta, 

Georgia, to discuss the status of several regulatory initiatives involving the fuel cycle industry, 

including the URls regarding the treatment of hazards from natural phenomena events. The 

meeting summary can be found under ADAMS Accession No. ML 13113A251 . On June 11, 

2013, during the NRC's Fuel Cycle Information Exchange, the staff discussed the status of the 

initiatives for the evaluation of lessons from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident at fuel cycle 

facilities. The staff presentation (ADAMS Accession No. ML 13168A057) was part of a panel 

discussion on post-Fukushima issues that included stakeholders direct interaction with staff on 

topics related to the treatment of NPH. 

This GL was published as a draft for public comment in the Federal Register on August 8, 2014 

(79 FR 46472). Additional details regarding the comments received and the NRC staff's 

responses to comments are provided later in this GL under "FEDERAL REGISTER 

NOTIFICATION." 

APPLICABLE REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS 

• 10 CFR 40.31(j)(1)(ii) 

• 10 CFR 40.31 U)(3)(ii), 'Types of accidents" 

• 10 CFR 70.22(i) 

• 10 CFR 70.22(f) 

• 10 CFR 70.61(a)-(e) 

• 10 CFR 70.62(c), "Integrated safety analysis" 

• 10 CFR 70.64(a)(2), "Natural phenomena hazards" 

• 10 CFR 70.65(b) 

The staff provides additional guidance on the regulatory acceptance criteria for the review of a 

license application and ISA in NUREG-1520, "Standard Review Plan for the Review of a 

License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility," and NUREG-1513, "Integrated Safety Analysis 

Guidance Document." 
GL 2015-01 

Page 7 of 11 

Appendix D to Chapter 3 of NUREG-1520 provides additional guidance for addressing accident 

sequences that may result from NPH in the context of a license application and ISA. 

REQUESTED ACTIONS 

The NRC requests that all addressees take the following actions: 

(1) Within 90 days of the date of this letter, all addressees are requested to: 

a. Submit the definitions of "unlikely," "highly unlikely," and "credible" in evaluating 

natural phenomena events in the ISA such as earthquakes, tornadoes, tornado 

missile impacts, floods, hurricanes, and other wind storms. 

b. Submit a description of the licensee's safety assessment for the licensing and 

design basis natural phenomena events, including the following information: 

i. likelihood and severity of the natural phenomena events, such as 

earthquakes, tornadoes, floods, hurricanes, and other wind storms 

ii. accident sequences as a result of natural phenomena event impacts to 

facility structures and internal components 

iii. assessment of the consequences for the accident sequences from item ii 

that result in intermediate and/or high consequence events 

iv. items relied on for safety to prevent or mitigate the consequences of the 

events from items ii and iii 

c. For facilities subject to 10 CFR Part 70, Subpart H requirements, submit a 

description of the results of the ISA review used to comply with 10 CFR 70.62(c), 

identifying the characteristics of the licensing and design basis natural 

phenomena events applicable to the site ... that evaluates possible changes in the 

methodology, likelihood, and severity of natural phenomena events with those 

used in the original design/evaluation of the facility. 

d. Submit for staff review a summary of the results of any facility assessments or 

walk downs, if performed, to identify and address degraded, nonconforming, or 

unanalyzed conditions that can affect the performance of the facility under 

natural phenomena and have available for NRC inspection the documentation of 

the qualifications of the team. 

Note: Licensees or facilities subject to 10 CFR 70.64(a)(2) may reference sections of their 

license application and/or ISA summaries as a response to applicable requested actions. 

(2) If an addressee identifies that a change in the facility safety assessment for NPH is 

needed, tho NRC requests that tho addressee submit a plan for NRC staff review, 

pursuant to 10 CFR 70.22(d) and 10 CFR 40.31, within 180 days of the date of this letter 

that considers the follmving, as required by 10 CFR 70.62(a)(1) or license conditions: 

a. The evaluation basis for NPH events. 
GL 2015-01 

Page 8 of 11 

b. A review of safety margins to determine inherent conservatism in the design or 

as built condition of the facility, as well as accident progression, to verify if the 

current state or design of the facility can compensate for the increased hazard. 

c. SSCs or items relied on for safety to protect workers and the public from 

intermediate and high consequence events. 

d. Description of administrative provisions, including maintenance, periodic testing 

and inspection program, and emergency procedures and preparedness, to 

prevent and mitigate the consequences of natural phenomena events. 

e. Proposed modifications to the facility SSCs and a schedule with an estimate of 

completion of the proposed modifications. 

REQUIRED RESPONSE 

In accordance with 10 CFR 40.31(b) and 10 CFR 70.22(d) the Commission may require further 

statements to determine if the agency should modify or revoke a facility license or take other 

action. Therefore, the NRC requires addressees to respond as described below. 

Within 90 days of the date of this GL, the NRC requires each addressee to submit a written 

response consistent with the requested actions and information. If an addressee cannot meet 

the requested response date, the addressee shall provide a response within 30 days of the date 

of this GL. In either case, each addressee must address iri its response any alternative course 

of action that it proposes to take, including the basis for the acceptability of the proposed 

alternative course of action and estimated completion dates. 

Addressees must submit the required written response, signed under oath or affirmation, to the 

NRC, ATTN: Document Control Desk, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 

20555-0001 , in accordance with 10 CFR 70.5, "Communications." In addition, addressees must 

submit a copy of the response to the Region II Regional Administrator. 

REASONS FOR INFORMATION REQUEST 

The NRC is requesting this information because after a review of operating fuel cycle facil ities 

documentation and inspections, the NRC staff was unable to validate that the facilities were in 

compl iance with their licensing basis for NPH. The inspections found that many operating fuel 

cycle facilities lacked facility design information, that there were significant variations in the level 

of detail and rigor in the facility ISAs, that the assumptions used in developing the safety 

analysis were not clearly described, and that some supporting analyses were limited or missing. 

BACKFIT DISCUSSION 

This GL is addressed to applicants for and holders of specific source licenses issued under 

10 CFR Part 40, and applicants for and holders of special nuclear materials licenses for fuel 

cycle facilities under 1 O CFR Part 70. 

Applicants and licensees under Part 40 are not protected by any backfitting provisions. 

Therefore, no further consideration of backfitting is needed with respect to Part 40 applicants 
and licensees. 

Applicants and licensees under Part 70 are protected by the backfitting provision in 

GL 2015-01 

Page 9 of 11 

10 CFR 70. 76, "Backfitting." However, this GL would not constitute backfitting under 10 

CFR 70. 76. First, because this GL only asks addressees to provide information regarding their 

facilities' compliance with the existing applicable regulatory requirements as discussed in this 

GL. Information collection and reporting requirements are not subject to the purview of the 

Backfit Rule. 

Second, the information requested in this GL concerns the content of ISAs and the supporting 

documentation for the ISAs with respect to NPH. NPHs were not a licensing requirement at the 

time of initial licensing, and, therefore, were not reviewed by the NRG at that time. The NRG 

required consideration of NPH as part of the September 2000 rulemaking (65 FR 56211; 

September 18, 2000) adding Subpart H which required the development of an ISA and the 

submission and NRG approval of an ISA summary. See 10 GFR 70.66. The NRG's review and 

approval of the ISA summaries did not involve a comprehensive review of the underlying ISAs, 

including the adequacy of either the ISAs' consideration of NPH or the supporting 

documentation. Nor had the NRG staff conducted any prior methodological inspections of the 

implementation of the ISA approaches with respect to NPH. Therefore, even if the NRG were to 

require the Part 70 licensees who are subject to this GL to make changes to their facility based 

upon inadequate information in the ISA itself or supporting documentation, this would not be 

considered backfitting. This is because the NRG did not provide any prior approval or position 

with respect to the ISA and supporting documentation •.vith respect to NPH (except to the extent 

that ISA information •.vas directly expressed in the ISA summary). 

Third, fEuel cycle facility licensees are required to "maintain," inter alia, ISAs and ISA 

summaries under 10 CFR 70.62. Any errors, omissions or failures to properly address 

applicable NRC requirements in ISA summaries, the underlying ISAs, and information 

necessary to support the ISA (required to be developed and maintained by various provisions in 

Part 70), must be addressed and reflected in the updated ISAs and ISA summaries required by 

1 O CFR 70.62. Therefore, such information developed to address any fuel cycle licensee's 

omissions or errors in documenting compliance with applicable NRC requirements on natural 

hazards, which is the subject of this GL, is a pre-existing regulatory obligation of the licensees. 

Any activities which a fuel cycle facility licensee must undertake to comply with 10 CFR 70.62 ffi--

do not constitute backfitting. 

Assuming as a result of information submitted by licensees in response to this GL, the NRG 

takes regulatory action (based on the existing interpretation of the regulation) requiring 

licensees to modify either their ISA summaries, underlying ISAs, or to modify their facilities to 

comply with their approved ISA summaries with respect to ~JPH, and if those modifications are 

considered to be backfitting, then the NRG believes such action would be necessary to ensure 

compliance with licensees' previously approved ISA summaries and/or the performance 

requirements of 10 GFR 70.61. As such, these NRG actions would fall under the "compliance 

exceptions" in 10 GFR 70.76(a)(4)(i) and/or (ii), which excepts the NRG from preparing a backfit 

analysis to support a backfitting action needed for compliance. 

The NRG believes that the compliance exception may be properly invoked, because the NRG's 

action (and any modification of an ISA summary, ISA or the facility itself) would not be based 

on: (i) a new or different NRG position on the criteria or acceptance standards with respect to 

consideration of NPH; or (ii) a ne•.v or different interpretation of the applicable NRG regulations 
in 10 CFR Part 70, Subpart H with respect to consideration of ~JPH. 

FEDERAL REGISTER NOTIFICATION 

GL 2015-01 

Page 10 of 11 

A notice of opportunity for public comment on this GL was published in the Federal Register on 

August 8, 2014 (79 FR 46472). Comments were received from Stephen McDuffie (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML 14281A266) and the Nuclear Energy Institute (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML 14316A411 ). The NRC staff considered all comments that were received. The NRC staff's 

evaluation of the comments is publicly available through the NRC's ADAMS Accession 

No. ML 14328A036. 

CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT 

This GL is not a rule as defined in the Congressional Review Act (5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808). 

PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT 

This GL contains information collection requirements that are subject to the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). These information collections were approved 

by the Office of Management and Budget, approval number 3150-XXXX. 

The burden to the public for these mandatory information collections is estimated to average 

56 hours per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data 

sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the 

information collection. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of 

these information collections, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to the FOIA, 

Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, DC 20555-0001 , or by e-mail to INFOCOLLECTS.RESOURCE@NRC.GOV; and 

to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-:XXXX), 

Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. 

PUBLIC PROTECTION NOTIFICATION 

The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a request for 

information or an information collection requirement unless the requesting document displays a 

currently valid OMB control number. 
CONTACT 

GL 2015-01 

Page 11 of 11 

Please direct any questions about this matter to the technical contact listed below, or to the 

appropriate Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards project manager. 

Marissa G. Bailey, Director 

Division of Fuel Cycle Safety, Safeguards, 

and Environmental Review 

Office of Nuclear Material Safety 

Technical Contact: Jonathan Marcano, NMSS 

301-287-9063 

and Safeguards 

e-mail: Jonathan.Marcano@nrc.gov 
OFFICE 

NAME 

DATE 

OFFICE 

NAME 

DATE 

CONTACT 

GL 2015-01 

Page 11 of 11 

Please direct any questions about this matter to the technical contact listed below, or to the 

appropriate Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards project manager. 

Marissa G. Bailey, Director 

Division of Fuel Cycle Safety, Safeguards, 

and Environmental Review 

Office of Nuclear Material Safety 

and Safeguards 

Technical Contact: Jonathan Marcano, NMSS 

301-287-9063 

e-mail: Jonathan.Marcano@nrc.gov 

DISTRIBUTION: 

CRoman, NMSS 

TMensah, NRR 

NStAmour,OGC 

TMarenchin, OE 

MSykes, Rll 

ADAMS Accession No.: ML 15086A515 

NMSS/FCSE/PORSB NMSS/FCSE/PORSB* 

Olopez,Rll CErlanger,NMSS 

SBurnell, OPA 

*via email 

Rll/DFFI* NSIR/DPR * 

Mlesser,Rll 

OE* OIS * 

JMarcano MKotzalas ABlamey JAnderson SGhasemian TDonnell 

12/04/2014 12/9/2014 12/17/2014 12/10/2014 12/10/2014 12/9/2014 

Tech Editor * OGG (NLO) * NRR/DPR/PGCB* NMSS/FCSE NMSS/FCSE (Signs) (Concurs) 

Elee MBailey MBailey 

12/22/2014 1/13/2015 3 /09/2015 3 I 11 /2015 3 1 /2015 

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY 
TO: 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

NOTATION VOTE 

RESPONSE SHEET 

Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary 

COMMISSIONER SVINICKI 

SECY-15-0045: ISSUANCE OF GENERIC LETTER 

2015-01, "TREATMENT OF NATURAL PHENOMENA 

HAZARDS IN FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES" 

Approved XX in part Disapproved XX in part Abstain 

Not Participating 

COMMENTS: Below Attached X None 

DATE 

oez/15 

Entered in STARS" Yes No 
Commissioner Svinicki's Comments on SECY-15-0045 

Issuance of Generic Letter 2015-01, 

"Treatment of Natural Phenomena Hazardsin Fuel Cycle Facilities" 

I disapprove issuance of the draft Generic Letter (Enclosure to SECY-15-0045). I approve, 

instead, a set of actions to be taken consistent with standing Commission direction and policy in 

this area. These actions would not absolutely preclude the issuance of a more narrowly scoped 

and properly justified generic letter in the future. A future generic letter should only be pursued 

after the staff has carried out actions to establish and define more clearly the level of detail of 

licensee documentation needed to support continued findings of reasonable assurance of 

adequate protection. Consistent with standing Commission direction (and as was not the case 

here), "[r]egarding the applicability of post-Fukushima measures to fuel cycle facilities, the staff 

should pursue the timely completion of the ongoing inspection activities [and a]ny proposed 

changes in licensing basis for any facility should be provided in a notation vote paper to the 

Commission." [See SRM SECY-12-0025] 

The generic letter as drafted embarks upon the initial stages of what is essentially a design 

basis reconstitution effort for U.S. fuel cycle facilities. Such a significant undertaking constitutes 

a matter for Commission review and approval and requires much greater substantiation and 

justification than is found here, in the Information Paper that I requested be converted into a 

voting matter. For example, the Commission's Policy Statement on the Availability and 

Adequacy of Design Bases Information at Nuclear Power Plants requires that, "in the event that 

design bases information is found technically inadequate or not accessible," any actions taken 

should consider whether remedial action is warranted "commensurate with the safety 

significance of the missing or erroneous information." This policy statement has many features 

that bear on the draft generic letter and yet the staff has provided no such evaluation of risk 

significance and, as a matter of fact, acknowledges within the draft generic letter itself that 

"[n]evertheless, that staff believes at this time, that for all the facilities inspected, due to 

consideration of inherent seismic capacity in [systems, structures, and components] SSCs, 

radiological/chemical source terms and existing safety programs in place (i.e., items relied on 

for safety), the facilities are adequate to protect public health and safety." (emphasis added) 

Moreover, issuance of the generic letter is inconsistent with standing Commission policy, which, 

as noted above, directed that the natural hazards phenomena for fuel cycle facilities arising 

post-Fukushima be addressed through the inspection program. The Commission adopted this 

approach in light of what the staff acknowledges within the draft generic letter itself; namely, "the 

licensing basis, design, and level of protection may differ among the existing operating fuel 

cycle facilities." It is not only true that they "may" differ; in point of fact, they "do" differ. The 

operative question is whether the facilities, as operated, provide for reasonable assurance of 

adequate protection. The staff appears to conclude that they do provide such assurance but 

then abandons the approach directed by the Commission (i.e., continuing to resolve the open 

unresolved items resulting from the inspection activities already carried out) and pivots towards 

this design basis reconstitution effort, without basis or explanation. 

It should be noted that Inspection Manual Chapter 2600, "Fuel Cycle Facility Operation Safety 

and Safeguards Inspection Program," addresses unresolved items as follows: 

An Unresolved Item (URI) involves an issue that requires more information to determine 

whether a violation has occurred. Because each URI is a potential safety issue, every 

effort must be made to obtain the required information. As such, the inspector should 

identify what information is required to close the URI to the licensee at the exit meeting 

1 
and a schedule for obtaining that information should be obtained. Additionally, the 

inspector should obtain the licensee's rationale for why the process is safe prior to 

leaving the site (e.g., a compensatory measure is in place, the equipment is shut down, 

etc.). 

The staff should get on with the process of resolving these URls. Three years is a relatively 

long period for these URls to have remained open, which seems contrary to the Principles of 

Good Regulation and is certainly inconsistent with orderly due process. This defect is 

compounded by the existence of the staff's conclusion that there is no potential safety issue that 

impugns the finding of reasonable assurance of adequate protection, further begging the 

questions of why the URls remain unresolved, why we are not focusing agency efforts on 

closing them through the inspection/oversight process (as the Commission directed), and why it 

is justified and more efficient to embark on this large-scale design reconstitution, instead. 

Ironically, in its notation vote paper on the topic of Cumulative Effect of Regulation (SECY-15-

0050), the staff used the development of this draft generic letter as an example of the 

application of CER in generic communications (see Enclosure 4 of that paper). The staff 

summarizes the outcome of its outreach effort by stating that the industry response did not 

identify any significant effect on a licensee's ability to carry out other significant NRC regulatory 

requirements or respond to the generic letter. In stark contrast, however, an actual reading of 

the industry response, dated November 6, 2014, reveals feedback that "requiring a licensee to 

replicate and consolidate [information] .. . and, in the absence of an identified safety issue, 

submit [information] in a different format simply [to repackage it] for a different regulatory 

purpose appears to be a poor use of limited industry and NRC resources." Further, in response 

to an NRC-posed question of whether the generic letter would adversely affect other efforts with 

greater safety benefit, the industry responded that it would and provided eight examples of how. 

It should also be noted that the draft generic letter fails to offer parallel treatment as was given 

to all power reactor licensees [see letters to All Power Reactor Licensees and Holders of 

Construction Permits in Active or Deferred Status, from E. Leeds, Director, Office of Nuclear 

Reactor Regulation, dated March 1, 2013 and February 20, 2014]. These letters stipulated the 

following regarding natural hazard reevaluations: 

and 

The staff considers the flood hazard reevaluations being performed pursuant to the 

50.54(f) letter to be beyond the current design/licensing basis of operating plants. 

Consequently, the results of the analysis performed using present-day regulatory 

guidance, methodologies, and information would not generally be expected to call into 

question the operability or functionality of SSCs. 

The staff considers the seismic hazard reevaluations being performed pursuant to the 

50.54(f) letter to be distinct form the current design or licensing basis of operating plants. 

Consequently, the results of the analysis performed using present-day regulatory 

guidance, methodologies, and information would not generally be expected to call into 

question the operability or functionality of SSCs. 

At bottom, I find much chaos and little order in this approach to resolution of a narrow set of 

already-identified, unresolved items, existing at fuel cycle facilities that NRC repeatedly 

acknowledges do not present a homogeneous or easily categorized set of hazards, and thus, 

where generic approaches to issue resolution are generally not efficient. The draft letter 

2 
mishandles backfit policy by embracing escalating safety standards while defining this approach 

as one of "compliance", thereby obviating the need for backfit analysis. It also misstates agency 

policy by claiming an agency goal that "accidents that lead to inadvertent criticality or 

uncontrolled releases of licensed material to the environment are to be avoided," when the NRC 

Strategic Plan adopts the goal of "minimizing the likelihood of accidents and reducing the 

consequences of an accident (should one occur)." 

In summary, the document is carelessly crafted, does not conform to our regulatory process, 

departs from standing Commission direction regarding resolution of these issues, and therefore 

should not be issued. Instead, consistent with existing Commission direction, the staff should 

do the following . 

(1) Resume resolution of the unresolved items and complete resolution in an expeditious 

manner. 

(2) In resolving these issues, the staff should not call into question the operability or 

functionality of systems, structures, and components, and items relied on for safety, 

absent prima facie evidence of inoperability. 

(3) Provide to the Commission a notation vote paper containing any proposed changes in 

any fuel cycle facility's licensing basis. 

22 May 2015 

3 
TO: 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

Approved X 

NOTATION VOTE 

RESPONSE SHEET 

Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary 

Commissioner Ostendorff 

SECY-15-0045: ISSUANCE OF GENERIC LETTER 

2015-01, "TREATMENT OF NATURAL PHENOMENA 

HAZARDS IN FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES" 

-- Disapproved X Abstain --- ---

Not Participating 

COMMENTS: Below Attached X None 

SIGNA tbfi 

DATE 

Entered in STARS" Yes No 
Commissioner Ostendorff's Comments on SECY-15-0045, Issuance of Generic Letter 

2015-01, "Treatment of Natural Phenomena Hazards in Fuel Cycle Facilities" 

I appreciate Commissioner Svinicki converting this information paper to a notation vote paper 

for the Commission. 

I have significant concerns with the generic letter provided to the Commission as discussed 

below. The promulgation of 10 CFR Part 70, Subpart H on September 18, 2000, took great 

strides regarding assessment of natural phenomena hazards at fuel cycle facilities by requiring 

licensees to develop integrated safety analyses (ISAs) to, among other things, assess accident 

sequences caused by credible external events, including natural phenomena. Licensees were 

required to submit ISA summaries, which the staff reviewed and approved. More recently, in 

response to the March, 11, 2011 , Tohoku-Taiheiyou-Oki earthquake, the staff inspected 

selected fuel cycle facilities under Temporary Instruction 2600/015, "Evaluations of Licensee 

Strategies for the Prevention and/or Mitigation of Emergencies at Fuel Facilities," and 

concluded that the facilities inspected provide adequate protection of public health and safety 

because of inherent seismic capacity, source term considerations, and existing safety 

programs in place. 

During some inspections, NRC inspectors found insufficient supporting documentation to 

justify the assumption that structures, systems, and components would adequately perform 

under postulated natural phenomena hazard events. In response, NRC inspectors opened 

unresolved items to further assess licensees' compliance with their licenses and applicable 

regulations. As these unresolved items had some common themes, and because industry has 

generally indicated a desire for the NRC to handle potentially generic issues through an 

appropriate generic process, the staff developed Generic Letter 2015-01, "Treatment of 

Natural Phenomenon Hazards in Fuel Cycle Facilities." The generic letter provides an 

appropriate mechanism to begin addressing these issues in a consistent and comprehensive 

manner and serves as the first step in what should be treated as a two-step process. Thus , I 

approve issuance of the generic letter to collect the information requested in item one. 

I do not approve including the second step of the process in this generic letter, however, and 

so I disapprove requesting the information contained in item two. I agree with Commissioner 

Svinicki's vote that the draft generic letter mishandles backfit policy by embracing escalating 

safety standards while defining this approach as one of "compliance," thereby obviating the 

need for backfit analysis requirements in 10 CFR 70. 76. The generic letter makes the case that 

the requirement for licensees to "maintain" their integrated safety analyses equates to a "living 

licensing basis." I strongly disagree with this interpretation. To be sure, if clear errors, 

omissions, or failures to properly assess NRC requirements exist in ISAs, ISA summaries, or 

supporting documentation, I support addressing those issues through the inspection and 

enforcement process. But, for issues where methodologies have changed or new information 

on external hazards has come to light since the time that the original ISA summaries were 

reviewed and approved, it is more appropriate to adopt an approach similar to what we have 

done for the power reactors. That is, first collect relevant information and analyses from 

licensees and then evaluate whether "modifications or additions to systems, structures or 

components of a facility or to the procedures of an organization required to operate a facility" 

are warranted by developing a "systematic and documented analysis pursuant to paragraph 

(b)" of 10 CFR 70.76. Consistent with standing Commission direction from SRM SECY-12-

0025 regarding the applicability of post-Fukushima measures to fuel cycle facilities, any 

proposed changes to the licensing basis should be provided in a notation vote paper to the 
Commission. Such a significant undertaking constitutes a matter for Commission review and 

approval and requires much greater substantiation and justification than is found here. 

I view the proposed generic letter as the tool to conduct the first step to ensure compliance 

with existing licensing bases. If item two in the letter is truly aimed at compliance, it is 

unnecessary because when a noncompliance is identified, licensees must always follow their 

corrective action programs to remedy them. There is no need to create a new process here. 

Finally, the staff should more clearly identify the level of detail needed in licensees' 

documentation to justify the assumption that structures, systems, and components would 

adequately perform under postulated natural phenomena hazard events. One way to 

accomplish this is through the interim staff guidance that is being developed as a companion to 

the generic letter. Staff should appropriately revise the interim staff guidance to reflect the 

changes to the generic letter and should provide it to the Commission for information prior to 

issuing it in conjunction with the generic letter. 

I have attached edits to the proposed generic letter to reflect my vote. 
..:...W:....:C"""°O,,__e""'d=it=s __________ UNITED STATES 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE 

OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS 

WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 

NRC GENERIC LETTER 2015-01 : TREATMENT OF NATURAL PHENOMENA HAZARDS 

IN FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES 

ADDRESSEES 

All holders of and applicants for a specific source material license or construction permit for 

large quantities of uranium hexafluoride under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 

(10 CFR) Part 40, "Domestic Licensing of Source Material." 

All holders of, and applicants for, a fuel cycle facility license or construction permit subject to 

10 CFR Part 70, Subpart H, "Additional Requirements for Certain Licensees Authorized to 

Possess a Critical Mass of Special Nuclear Material." 

PURPOSE 

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this letter for two purposes: 

(1) to request addressees to submit information to demonstrate compliance with regulatory 

requirements and applicable license conditions regarding the treatment of natural 

phenomena events in the facilities' integrated safety analysis (ISA) 

(2) to determine if additional NRC regulatory action is necessary to ensure that licensees 

comply with their licensing basis and existing NRC regulations 

The NRC's regulations at 10 CFR 40.31(b) and 10 CFR 70.22(d) require addressees to submit 

a written response to this generic letter (GL) and, if necessary, take appropriate action in 

accordance with 10 CFR 70.62(a)(1) to demonstrate compliance with the performance 

requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 . This GL requires no other action. 

BACKGROUND 

On March 11 , 2011, the Tohoku-Taiheiyou-Oki earthquake occurred near the east coast of 

Honshu, Japan. This magnitude 9.0 earthquake and the subsequent tsunami caused significant 

damage to at least four of the six units of the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power station. As a 

result, there was a loss of offsite and onsite electrical power systems. 

On March 23, 2011 , the NRC Chairman issued Tasking Memorandum COMGBJ-11-0002, "NRC 

Actions Following the Events in Japan" (Agencywide Documents Access and Management 

System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML 110820875). In it, the Chairman directed the NRC's 

Executive Director for Operations to establish the NRC Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) to 

evaluate available technical and operational information from the events in Japan following the 

March 11 , 2011, earthquake and tsunami at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power station . The 

ML 15086A515 
GL 2015-01 

Page 2 of 11 

NTTF was tasked to consider lessons learned from the event and to develop recommendations 

to improve the regulatory framework for reactors in the United States and their applicability to 

NRC-licensed facilities other than power reactors. 

On March 31 , 2011 , the NRC staff issued Information Notice (IN) 2011-08, "TohokuTaiheiyou-Oki Earthquake Effects on Japanese Nuclear Power Plants-for Fuel Cycle Facilities" 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML 110830824 ), to inform addressees of the potential challenges 

associated with preventing or mitigating the effects of natural phenomena events. IN 2011-08 

recommended that addressees review the information for applicability to their facilities and 

consider actions, as appropriate, to ensure that features and preparations necessary to 

withstand or respond to severe external events from natural phenomena (e.g., earthquakes, 

tsunamis, floods , tornadoes, and hurricanes) are reasonable and consistent with regulatory 

requirements . 

On July 12, 2011, in light of the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant, the 

NTTF, after conducting a systematic and methodical review of NRC processes and regulations, 

presented a set of recommendations to nuclear power reactors in the United States (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML 111861807). The NTTF recommendations are intended to clarify and 

strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural disasters and improve 

mitigation and emergency preparedness at nuclear power reactors in the United States . 

The NRC staff performed a systematic evaluation and inspection of selected fuel cycle facilities, 

in light of the lessons learned from the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant, 

to confirm that licensees were in compliance with applicable regulatory requirements and license 

conditions; and to evaluate their readiness to address natural phenomena hazards (NPH) 

events and other licensing bases events related to NPH. The staff's assessment considered 

the NTTF recommendations to determine whether additional regulatory actions by the 

NRC are warranted. This assessment included consideration of new seismic hazard information 

from the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) for the central and eastern United States. which 

was the subject of an NRC generic communication to fuel facilities in IN 2010-19, "Updated 

Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Estimates in Central Eastern United States" (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML 102160735). 

Regulatory Framework for Fuel Facilities and Treatment of Natural Phenomena Hazards 

For facilities regulated under 10 CFR Part 70, Subpart H, the NRC staff reviewed information to 

verify that the licensees were in compliance with applicable license conditions and the 

regulations contained in 10 CFR Part 70, Subpart H. Specifically, the NRC staff review looked 

at licensee compliance with the regulations in 10 CFR 70.62(c)(1 ), which requires , in part, that 

each licensee shall conduct and maintain an ISA that is of appropriate detail for the complexity 

of the process that identifies, among other things, "potential accident sequences caused by 

process deviations or other events internal to the facility and credible external events, including 

natural phenomena." The regulations in 10 CFR 70.62(c)(1) also require, in part, identification 

of the consequence and the likelihood of occurrence of each potential accident sequence, and 

the methods used to determine the consequences and likelihoods . The ISA is one of three 

elements of a safety program established and maintained by a licensee to demonstrate 

compliance with the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61. In addition, 1 O CFR 70.22(i) 

provides criteria for the fuel facility emergency planning. 
GL 2015-01 

Page 3 of 11 

For new facilities or new processes at existing facilities, 10 CFR 70.64(a), "Baseline design 

criteria" requires, in part, that the design must provide for adequate protection against natural 

phenomena with consideration of the most severe documented historical events for the site. 

The NRC staff reviewed the ISA summaries that licensees submitted to the NRC with their 

license application or license amendment requests . The ISA summaries provide a synopsis of 

the results of the ISA and licensees retain tl=!em-the ISA and supporting documentation onsite. 

The majority of licensees of existing fuel cycle facilities completed their ISA after Subpart H of 

1 O CFR Part 70 was promulgated1 in September 2000. The ISA, in general, postulated that 

structures, systems and components (SSCs) would remain intact during credible seismic 

events and, in some cases, concluded that a high radiological or chemical consequence was 

highly unlikely based on the assumption that the SSCs will adequately perform their safety 

functions during the NPH event. Beginning in December 2011, t+he staff conducted 

inspections of the ISAs on a sample basis in accordance with inspection program expectations 

to verify compliance with the new requirements in 10 CFR Part 70, Subpart H. Prior 

to the recentthese NRC inspections (further explanation in the next section), the NRC had not 

conducted systematic inspections of the ISAs with respect to NPH. 

For facilities regulated under 10 CFR Part 40, "Domestic Licensing of Source Material," the NRC 

staff reviewed information to verify that the licensees were in compliance with applicable license 

conditions and the regulations in 10 CFR 40.31(j)(1 )(ii), which requires, in part, an emergency 

plan for responding to the radiological hazards of an accidental release of source material and to 

any associated chemical hazards directly incident thereto, and to 10 CFR 40.31(j)(3)(ii), which 

requires identification of each type of accident sequence for which protective actions may be 

needed. The Honeywell Metropolis Works Facility and International Isotopes Fluorine Products 

Inc. completed ISAs, using methodologies, performance criteria, and staff guidance similar 

to 10 CFR Part 70 to evaluate relevant hazards and their associated accident sequences. 

The Honeywell and International Isotopes ISAs are captured in their licensing bases. 

Inspection Results 

From December 2011 through May 2012, the NRC staff conducted inspection activities in 

accordance with Temporary Instruction (Tl) 2600/015, "Evaluation of Licensee Strategies for 

the Prevention and/or Mitigation of Emergencies at Fuel Facilities" (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML 12286A284). The NRC completed the temporary instruction in three phases. In the initial 

phase, the staff reviewed licensing documents that licensees had submitted to the NRC, 

including the integrated safety assessments and emergency plans. The second phase consisted 

of NRC inspectors evaluating licensee accident prevention measures and emergency actions 

through onsite evaluations that focused on credible natural phenomena events and loss of 

utilities that support onsite systems (e.g., electricity and water). The third phase involved 

assessing whether a licensee's strategies and equipment were effective to prevent and/or 

mitigate emergencies during selected beyond-licensing-basis natural phenomena events and 

extended loss-of-power and loss-of-offsite-water scenarios. In the review of licensing basis 

events, the NRC considered the following NPH: seismic, flooding, and high winds (caused by 

hurricanes or tornadoes). The NRC staff also evaluated onsite fires because seismic events may 

cause failure of plant equipment that leads to facility fires. The NRC staff gave particular attention 

to earthquakes and flooding because of recent events, such as the accident at the Fukushima 

Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant, and because of significant advancements in the state of knowledge 

of these hazards. 

1 Refer to 10 CFR 70.62(cX3) which requires, in part, that existing licensees submit for NRC approval, by 

April 2001 , a plan that describes the ISA approach; and by October 2004, or in accordance with the 

approved plan, a completed ISA. It also requires licensees to identify performance deficiencies and to 

correct them with adequate compensatory measures. 
GL 2015-01 

Page 2 of 11 

Based on NRC staff inspections of existing fuel cycle facilities using Tl 2600/015, the NRC 

determined that the evaluated facilities had established programs, procedures, and equipment to 

respond to licensing basis events involving fire, flooding, and loss of utilities . However, the NRC 

staff was not able to fully assess the capabilities of those facilities to adequately mitigate the 

consequences of credible natural phenomena events, specifically, earthquakes and high wind . 

Based on information obtained from the inspection activities, the NRC staff identified that 

licensees have not clearly documented the assumptions they used to develop their ISAs and 

other safety assessments. The NRC primarily attributed this to the lack of available facility 

design information and significant variations in the level of detail and rigor of implementation in 

the facility safety assessments with regards to the treatment of natural phenomena events. 

Therefore, the NRC inspectors were unable to verify that these facilities were in compliance with 

their licensing basis and regulatory requirements . The NRC staff could not confirm that the 

evaluated licensees had fully considered all credible external events (accident sequences) 

involving process deviations or other events internal to the facility (e.g. , consequential 

explosions, spills, and fires resulting from the natural phenomena event). These accident 

sequences could potentially result in radiological/chemical consequences to workers, the public, 

or the environment. 

For example, many operating fuel cycle facilities regulated under 1 O CFR Part 70 that are 

located in the central and eastern United States were built between 1950 and 1990. These 

facilities were built following building codes with limited seismic design considerations, or 

building codes that have since been updated with more stringent seismic and other natural 

phenomena requirements. In addition, at the time when many licensees completed the safety 

assessments for the facilities to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 70, Subpart H, 

seismic design provisions had undergone profound changes that were incorporated in building 

codes in areas of seismic hazard, seismic design detailing requirements , and performance of 

structures. 

Under Tl 2600/15, NRC inspectors found, in a number of facilities, insufficient supporting 

documentation to justify the assumption that the SSCs will adequately perform under a 

postulated NPH event. The lack of supporting documentation raises questions about the validity 

of the licensee's assumptions for the performance of the SSCs. The NRC inspectors opened 

unresolved items2 (URls) to further assess whether the evaluated licensees are in compliance 

with license conditions, the requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 , and the requirements of 

10 CFR 70.62(c), regarding NPH accident sequences . Nevertheless, the staff believes at this 

time, that for all the facilities inspected, due to consideration of inherent seismic capacity in 

SSCs, radiological/chemical source terms and existing safety programs in place (i.e., items 

relied on for safety), the facilities are adequate to protect public health and safety. 

2 An unresolved item involves an issue that requires more infonnation to detennine whether a violation 

has occurred. The NRC dispositions all potential violations according to the NRC Enforcement Policy 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML 13228A 199), which includes non cited violations, violations, the use of 

enforcement discretion, etc. 
DISCUSSION 

GL 2015-01 

Page 5 of 11 

As a result of the inspections, the staff is issuing this generic communication due to the generic 

applicability of the URls across the nuclear fuel facility industry. The NRC will use the 

information requested to evaluate licensees' compliance with NRC rules and regulations or 

relevant license conditions . Current NRC regulations require the evaluation of site hazards 

including natural phenomena events. However, knowledge of seismic design has evolved over 

time as new information regarding site hazards and expected structural performance (ductility 

concepts) ha~ve become available. As a result, the licensing basis, design, and level of 

protection may differ among the existing operating fuel cycle facilities , depending on when the 

facility was constructed and what assumptions were used in the facilities' ISAs developed to 

comply with the new 10 CFR Part 70, Subpart H requirements. To date, the NRC has not 

undertaken a comprehensive evaluation of the licensing basis for existing fuel cycle facilities as 

it relates to natural phenomena events. 

In an effort to fully assess the capabilities of fuel cycle facilities to prevent or mitigate the 

consequences of natural phenomena events, the staff is requesting information from the 

addressees to support a determination with regards to the proper evaluation of NPH impacts at 

the fuel cycle facilities. If not properly evaluated, severe natural phenomena may lead to a 

progression of events, such as fires , explosions, and chemical releases, that could lead to 

accidents not previously considered in the facilities' assessment and for which prevention or 

mitigation measures may be needed. Failure to protect SSCs relied on for safety from natural 

phenomena with appropriate safety margins has the potential to result in common-cause 

failures that could lead to accidents that exceed the performance requirements of 

10 CFR 70.61. In addition, consistent with the Commission's goals as reflected in the NRC 

Strategic Plan (NUREG-1614), accidents that lead to inadvertent criticality or uncontrolled 

releases of licensed material to the environment are to be avoided. Therefore, the prevention 

and mitigation of such accidents, while ensuring that emergency preparedness is considered, 

are vital aspects that need further NRC review. 

As described above, tfl&license application~ and ISAs should consider natural phenomena 

events (e.g., tornadoes, hurricanes, and earthquakes) and other external events with a sufficient 

level of detail to characterize and assess the impacts from natural phenomena events and other 

external events on facility safety. The assessment should identify the licensing assumptions and 

the design bases for the structures and equipment credited for prevention or mitigation of the 

consequences to the facility from natural phenomena events and other external events . The 

assessment should indicate which events are considered not credible and the basis for that 

determination. It should also indicate which types of events could occur without adversely 

impacting safety. In addition, compliance with the regulatory requirements to prevent or mitigate 

the consequences of NPH events may require that facilities be prepared, or possess equipment, 

that limits the consequences affecting public health and worker radiological and chemical safety 

in the context of multiple challenges and degraded or disabled emergency resources. The 

degradations could include long-term loss of functions , such as offsite power, onsite emergency 

power, offsite water supply, other offsite services, and transportation to access offsite resources. 

~.s the state of knowledge of NPM has evolved signif.icantly since the licensing of many fuel 

cycle facilities, and given the demonstrated experiences from the rukushima Dai ichi nuclear 

power station accident and separately, updated seismic hazards information from the USGS for 

the central and eastern United States, it is necessary to confirm tho appropriateness of tho 
GL 2015-01 

Page 2 of 11 

magnitude and likelihood of ha;z;ards assumed for fuel cycle facilities and the licensees' ability to 

protect against those ha;z;ards. P"uel cycle facilities safety programs ha>,'e been, and should 

continue te be, an evolving safety program supported by new scientific infermatien, 

technologies, and methods for e•1aluation. As new information and analytical techniques are 

developed, safety standards need to be reviewed, e•1aluated, and changed, as necessary, to 

ensure that they continue to address the NRC's requirements to provide reasonable assurance 

of adequate protection of public health and safety.I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 

In developing this GL, the staff had multiple interactions with stakeholders to discuss the basis 

for issuance of a generic communication. On August 21, 2012, the NRC staff held a public 

meeting with the Nuclear Energy Industry (NEI) and industry to discuss industry-proposed 

actions to address these URls. By letter dated October 12, 2012, "Treatment of NPH in the 

Integrated Safety Analysis" (ADAMS Accession No. ML 12296A036), NEI provided the 

background and industry's basis for the fuel facilities' current analyses of NPH in their ISAs. 

The NRC staff considered the information in NE l's letter during the development of this GL. 

On April 11 , 2013, the NRC staff held a Category 2 public meeting with the industry in Atlanta, 

Georgia, to discuss the status of several regulatory initiatives involving the fuel cycle industry, 

including the URls regarding the treatment of hazards from natural phenomena events. The 

meeting summary can be found under ADAMS Accession No. ML 13113A251 . On June 11 , 

2013, during the NRC's Fuel Cycle Information Exchange, the staff discussed the status of the 

initiatives for the evaluation of lessons from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident at fuel cycle 

facilities . The staff presentation (ADAMS Accession No. ML 13168A057) was part of a panel 

discussion on post-Fukushima issues that included stakeholders direct interaction with staff on 

topics related to the treatment of NPH. 

APPLICABLE REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS 

10 CFR 40.31U)(1 )(ii) 

• 10 CFR 40.31(j)(3)(ii), "Types of accidents" 

• 10 CFR 70.22(i) 

• 10 CFR 70.22(f) 

• 10 CFR 70.61(a)-(e) 

• 10 CFR 70.62(c), "Integrated safety analysis" 

• 10 CFR 70.64(a)(2), "Natural phenomena hazards" 

10 CFR 70.65(b) 

The staff provides additional guidance on the regulatory acceptance criteria for the review of a 

license application and ISA in NUREG-1520, "Standard Review Plan for the Review of a 

License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility," and NUREG-1513, "Integrated Safety Analysis 

Guidance Document." · 

Appendix D to Chapter 3 of NUREG-1520 provides additional guidance for addressing accident 

sequences that may result from NPH in the context of a license application and ISA. 

- Comment [BEl]: This seems to imply a living 

licensing basis. Commissioner Ostendorff does not 

support such an interpretation. 
REQUESTED ACTIONS 

The NRC requests that all addressees take the following actions: 

(1) Within 90 days of the date of this letter, all addressees are requested to: 

GL 2015-01 

Page 7 of 11 

a. Submit the definitions of "unlikely," "highly unlikely," and "credible" in evaluating 

natural phenomena events in the ISA such as earthquakes, tornadoes, tornado 

missile impacts, floods , hurricanes, and other wind storms. 

b. Submit a description of the licensee's safety assessment for the licensing and 

design basis natural phenomena events, including the following information: 

i. likelihood and severity of the natural phenomena events, such as 

earthquakes, tornadoes, floods , hurricanes, and other wind storms 

ii. accident sequences as a result of natural phenomena event impacts to 

facility structures and internal components 

iii. assessment of the consequences for the accident sequences from item ii 

that result in intermediate and/or high consequence events 

iv. items relied on for safety to prevent or mitigate the consequences of the 

events from items ii and iii 

c. For facilities subject to 10 CFR Part 70, Subpart H requirements, submit a 

description of the results of the ISA review used to comply with 10 CFR 70.62( c), 

identifying the characteristics of the licensing and design basis natural 

phenomena events applicable to the site that evaluate!:!& possible changes in the 

methodology, likelihood, and severity of natural phenomena events with those 

used in the original designJ evaluation, and licensing of the facility. 

d. Submit for staff review a summary of the results of any facility assessments or 

walk downs, if performed, to identify and address degraded, nonconforming, or 

unanalyzed conditions that can affect the performance of the facility under 

natural phenomena and have available for NRC inspection the documentation of 

the qualifications of the team. 

Note: Licensees or facilities subject to 10 CFR 70.64(a)(2) may reference sections of their 

license application and/or ISA summaries as a response to applicable requested actions. 

(2) If an addressee identifies that a change in the facility safety assessment f.or NPH is 

needed, the t>IRC requests that the addressee submit a plan f.or NRG staff revioo·, 

pursuant to 10 CFR 70.22(d) and 10 CFR 40.31 , within 1 BO days of the dato of this lotter 

that considers the following, as required by 10 CFR 70.62(a)(1) or license conditions: 

a. Tho evaluation basis for t>IPH events. 
GL 2015-01 

Page 8 of 11 

b. l\ re1;iew et safety margins to determine inherent conservatism in the design or 

as b1:1ilt condition of the facility, as well as accident progression, to verify if the 

c1:1rrent state or design of the facility can compensate for the increased hazard. 

c. SSCs or items relied on for safety to protect workers and the p1:1blic from 

intermediate and high conseq1:1ence events. 

d. Description of administrative provisions, incl1:1ding maintenance, periodic testing 

and inspection program, and emergency proced1:1res and preparedness, to 

prevent and mitigate the conseq1:1ences of nat1:1ral phenomena events. 

e. Proposed modifications to the facility SSCs and a sched1:1le with an estimate of 

completion of the proposed modifications . 

REQUIRED RESPONSE 

In accordance with 10 CFR 40.31(b) and 10 CFR 70.22(d) the Commission may require further 

statements to determine if the agency should modify or revoke a facility license or take other 

action. Therefore, the NRC requires addressees to respond as described below. 

Within 90 days of the date of this GL, the NRC requires each addressee to submit a written 

response consistent with the requested actions and information. If an addressee cannot meet 

the requested response date, the addressee shall provide a response within 30 days of the date 

of this GL. In either case, each addressee must address in its response any alternative course 

of action that it proposes to take, including the basis for the acceptability of the proposed 

alternative course of action and estimated completion dates . 

Addressees must submit the required written response, signed under oath or affirmation, to the 

NRC, ATTN : Document Control Desk, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 

20555-0001, in accordance with 10 CFR 70.5, "Communications ." In addition, addressees must 

submit a copy of the response to the Region II Regional Administrator. 

REASONS FOR INFORMATION REQUEST 

The NRC is requesting this information because after a review of operating fuel cycle facilities 

documentation and inspections, the NRC staff was unable to validate that the facilities were in 

compliance with their licensing basis for NPH. The inspections found that many operating fuel 

cycle facilities lacked facility design information, that there were significant variations in the level 

of detail and rigor in the facility ISAs, that the assumptions used in developing the safety 

analysis were not clearly described, and that some supporting analyses were limited or missing. 

BACKFIT DISCUSSION 

This GL is addressed to applicants for and holders of specific source licenses issued under 

10 CFR Part 40, and applicants for and holders of special nuclear materials licenses for fuel 

cycle facilities under 10 CFR Part 70. 

Applicants and licensees under Part 40 are not protected by any backfitting provisions. 

Therefore, no further consideration of backfitting is needed with respect to Part 40 applicants 

and licensees. 
Applicants and licensees under Part 70 are protected by the backfitting provision in 

GL 2015-01 

Page 9 of 11 

1 O CFR 70. 76, "Backfitting." However, this GL would not constitute backfitting under 10 

CFR 70.76. ~Ihis GL only asks addressees to provide information regarding their 

facilities' compliance with the existing applicable regulatory requirements as discussed in this 

GL. Information collection and reporting requirements are not subject to the purview of the 

Backfit Rule. 

Second, the infermation requested in this GL concerns the content ef ISAs and the supporting 

decumentatien for the ISAs with respect to NPH. NPHs were not a licensing requirement at the 

time ef initial licensing, and, therefore, were net re•1iewed by the ~H~G at that time. The ~IRG 

required consideration of NPH as part of the September 2000 rulemaking (65 FR 56211 ; 

September 18, 2000) adding Subpart H which required the development ef an ISA and the 

submissien and NRG approval of an ISA summary. See 10 GFR 70.66. The NRG's review and 

approval of the ISA summaries did not involve a comprehensive review of the underlying ISAs, 

including the adequacy of either the ISAs' consideration of ~IPH or the supporting 

decumentation. Ner had the NRG staff conducted any prior methodological inspections of the 

implementation ef the ISA approaches with respect to ~IPH. Therefere, even if the NRG were to 

require the Part 70 licensees who are subject to this GL to make changes to their facility based 

upon inadequate informatien in the ISA itself er supperting decumentatien, this would not be 

censidered backfilling. This is because the ~IRG did net pro•1ide any prior approval or position 

with respect to the ISA and supporting documentation with respect to NPH (except to the extent 

that ISA information was directly expressed in the ISA summary). 

Third, fuel cycle facility licensees are required to "maintain," iRter a#a, ISAs and ISA summaries 

under 10 GFR 70.62. Any errors, omissions or failures to properly address applicable NRG 

requirements in ISA summaries, tho underlying IS.A.s, and information necessary to support the 

IS.A. (required to be developed and maintained by various provisions in Part 70), must be 

addressed and reflected in the updated IS,A,s and ISA summaries required by 10 GFR 70.62. 

Therefere, such information developed to address any fuel cycle licensee's omissions or errors 

in documenting compliance with applicable ~IRG requirements on natural hazards, which is the 

subject ef this GL, is a pre existing regulatory obligation of the licensees . Any activities which a 

fuel cycle facility licensee must undertake to comply with 10 GFR 70.62 is not backfilling. 

Assuming as a result of information submitted by licensees in response to this GL, the NRC 

takes regulatory action (based on the existing interpretation of the regulation) requiring licensees 

to modify either their ISA summaries, ...QI:._ underlying ISAs, or to modify their facilities to comply 

with their approved ISA summaries with respect to NPH, and if those modifications are 

considered to bo backfitting, then the NRC believes such action would be necessary to ensure 

compliance with licensees' previously-_approved ISA summaries and/or the performance 

requirements of 10 CFR 70.61. , these NRG actions would fall under the "compliance 

exceptions" in 10 GFR 70.76(a)(4)(i) and/or (ii), which excepts the ~IRG from preparing a backfit 

analysis to support a backfitting action needed for compliance. 

The NRG believes that the compliance exception may bo properly invoked, because the ~IRG s 

action (and any modification of an IS/\ summary, IS/\ or the facility itself) would not be based 

on: (i) a new or different NRG position on the criteria or acceptance standards with respect to 

consideration of NPH; or (ii) a new or different interpretation of the applicable NRG regulations 

in 10 GFR Part 70, Subpart H with respect to consideration of ~IPH . 
FEDERAL REGISTER NOTIFICATION 

GL 2015-01 

Page 10 of 11 

A notice of opportunity for public comment on this GL was published in the Federal Register on 

August 8, 2014 (79 FR 46472). Comments were received from Stephen McDuffie (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML 14281 A266) and the Nuclear Energy Institute (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML 14316A411 ). The NRC staff considered all comments that were received. The NRC staff's 

evaluation of the comments is publicly available through the NRC's ADAMS Accession 

No. ML 14328A036. 

CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT 

This GL is not a rule as defined in the Congressional Review Act (5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808). 

PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT 

This GL contains information collection requirements that are subject to the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). These information collections were approved 

by the Office of Management and Budget, approval number 3150-XXXX. 

The burden to the public for these mandatory information collections is estimated to average 

56 hours per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data 

sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the 

information collection. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of 

these information collections, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to the FOIA, 

Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, DC 20555-0001 , or by e-mail to INFOCOLLECTS.RESOURCE@NRC.GOV; and 

to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-XXXX), 

Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. 

PUBLIC PROTECTION NOTIFICATION 

The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a request for 

information or an information collection requirement unless the requesting document displays a 

currently valid OMB control number. 
CONTACT 

GL 2015-01 

Page 11 of 11 

Please direct any questions about this matter to the technical contact listed below, or to the 

appropriate Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards project manager. 

Technical Contact: Jonathan Marcano, NMSS 

301 -287-9063 

Marissa G. Bailey, Director 

Division of Fuel Cycle Safety, Safeguards, 

and Environmental Review 

Office of Nuclear Material Safety 

and Safeguards 

e-mail: Jonathan.Marcano@nrc.gov 
OFFICE 

NAME 

DATE 

OFFICE 

NAME 

DATE 

GL 2015-01 

Page 11 of 11 

CONTACT 

Please direct any questions about this matter to the technical contact listed below, or to the 

appropriate Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards project manager. 

Marissa G. Bailey, Director 

Division of Fuel Cycle Safety, Safeguards, 

and Environmental Review 

Office of Nuclear Material Safety 

and Safeguards 

Technical Contact: Jonathan Marcano, NMSS 

301-287-9063 

DISTRIBUTION: 

CRoman, NMSS 

TMensah, NRR 

NStAmour,OGC 

e-mail: Jonathan.Marcano@nrc.gov 

TMarenchin, OE 

MSykes, Rll 

OLopez,Rll CErlanger,NMSS 

SBumell , OPA 

ADAMS Accession No .. · ML 15086A515 •via email 

NMSS/FCSE/PORSB NMSS/FCSE/PORSB• Rll/DFFI• NSIR/DPR • 

JMarcano MKotzalas ABlamey JAnderson 

12/04/2014 12/9/2014 12/17/2014 12/10/2014 

Mlesser,Rll 

OE• 

SGhasemian 

12/10/2014 

OIS • 

TDonnell 

12/9/2014 

Tech Editor • OGC (NLO)• NRR/DPR/PGCB• NMSS/FCSE NMSS/FCSE (Signs) I Concurs) 

Elee MBailey MBailey 

12/22/2014 1/13/2015 3 /09/2015 3/ 11 /201 5 3/ /2015 

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY 
TO: 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

Approved XX 

NOTATION VOTE 

RESPONSE SHEET 

Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary 

Commissioner Baran 

SECY-15-0045: ISSUANCE OF GENERIC LETTER 

2015-01, "TREATMENT OF NATURAL PHENOMENA 

HAZARDS IN FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES" 

Disapproved Abstain --- ---

Not Participating 

COMMENTS: Below Attached XX None 

DATE 

Entered in STARS" Yes XX No 
Commissioner Saran's Comments on SECY-15-0045, "Issuance of Generic Letter 

2015-01, 'Treatment of Natural Phenomena Hazards in Fuel Cycle Facilities"' 

As part of the agency's response to the March 2011 nuclear accident in Japan, the NRC 

staff focused on ensuring that U.S. fuel cycle facilities could withstand or respond to severe 

external events from natural phenomena, such as earthquakes and floods. The staff began by 

issuing Information Notice 2011-08, which recommended that fuel cycle facilities consider 

mitigating actions related to natural phenomena. In 2011 and 2012, NRC also conducted 

inspections at selected fuel cycle facilities but was not able to fully assess the capabilities of 

those facilities to adequately mitigate the consequences of credible natural phenomena events. 

According to the staff, "[t]he inspections found that many operating fuel cycle facilities lacked 

facility design information, that there were significant variations in the level of detail and rigor in 

the facility [Integrated Safety Analyses], that the assumptions used in developing the safety 

analysis were not clearly described, and that some supporting analyses were limited or 

missing." As a result, the NRC inspectors were unable to verify that these facilities were in 

compliance with their licensing bases and existing regulatory requirements regarding 

preparedness for natural phenomena hazards. The staff concluded that these issues were 

generic across the fuel cycle facility fleet. 

In order to fully assess the capabilities of fuel cycle facilities to prevent or mitigate the 

consequences of natural phenomena events, the NRC staff developed Generic Letter 2015-01. 

This generic letter will request that licensees submit information to demonstrate compliance with 

existing regulatory requirements and applicable license conditions regarding the treatment of 

natural phenomena events in the facilities' integrated safety assessments. The staff will then 

determine if additional regulatory action is necessary to ensure that licensees are in compliance 

with their existing licensing bases and NRC regulations. 

This generic letter has been developed with extensive input from within the agency and 

from external stakeholders. The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards has no objection 

to the issuance of the generic letter, and the Committee to Review Generic Requirements has 

endorsed the generic letter. In my view, issuing this letter is the logical next step in the staff's 

efforts to apply the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident to fuel cycle facilities. 

Therefore, I approve the staff's issuance of Generic Letter 2015-01 .