UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

__________________ _______________ LIMING WU, Pl aintiff - Appellant,

v. DEB HAALAND, Secretary of the United States Department of Interior; * UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, Bureau of Land Management; NEW MEXICO STATE OFFICE, DOI BLM; ADEN SEIDLITZ; BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
De fendants - Appellees. No. 20-2067 (D.C. Nos. 1:14 -CV-00150-RB-KRS, 1:17-CV-00113-MV-LF, 1:18-CV-00813-KBM-SCY) (D. N.M.)

__________________ _______________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT **

__________________ _______________ Before TYMKOVICH , Chief Judge, HOLMES , and BACHARACH , Circuit Judges.

* During the pendency of this appeal, Ms . Deb Haaland became Secretary of the United St ates Department of the Interior. She is thus substituted for Mr. David Bernhardt as the defendant-appellee. See Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).

** We conclude that oral argument would not material ly help us to decide the appeal, so we have decided the appeal based on the record and the parties’ briefs. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)( C); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). Our order and judgment does not constitute bi nding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But the order and judgmen t may be cited for its persuasi ve value if otherwise appropriate. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### July 8, 2021 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court2 __________________ _______________ This appeal stems from the district court’s denial of pro se plaintiff Ms. Liming Wu’s motion to reconsider orders based on newly discovered evidence. In that motion, Ms. Wu sought to set aside a settlement agreement. The district court denied the motion, characterizing it as a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b ). We affirm, concluding that the district court di d not abuse its discretion.
1. Background Ms. Wu worked as a geologist for the United States Department of the Interior (DOI), Bur eau of Land Management. Ms. Wu sued the DOI’s Secretary, claiming disc rimination (based on her race, national origin, and age), retaliation, and neg ligence. She entered a se ttlement agreement with the DOI, which requ ired dismissal of her claims and retirement from the DOI. In exchange, the DOI would pay $200,000 a nd provide a neutral letter of recommendation. The agreemen t allowed Ms. Wu to revoke the agreement through wr itten notice. To ex ercise this option, Ms. Wu had to deliver the notice of revo cation in time for it to be received within seven days at a given address. R., Vol. 1 at 118. Ms. Wu tried to revok e the agreement by sending notice through FedEx’s standard overnight service. But the notice was no t delivered until the eighth day. (A nother federal agen cy received the no tice on the sixth3 day, but that wasn’t the agency identified in the agreement to receive the notice.) Ms. Wu returned to work, but she fa inted after her first day back and suffered a traumatic brain injury. The DOI moved to enforce the agreement, and Ms. Wu consented. Th e district court thus granted the motion, Ms. Wu accepted $200,000, and the parties st ipulated to dismissal of the action with prejudice. Roughly three years late r, Ms. Wu moved to se t aside the stipulated order of dismissal, the agreement, a nd the order enforcing the agreement. The district court treated the motions as Rule 60(b) moti ons and denied relief. Ms. Wu also filed two more suits in 2017 and 2018, asserting claims involving her employment w ith the DOI. The district court dismissed part of the 2017 suit and allo wed Ms. Wu to file a fi fth amended complaint on the surviving claims . The court dismissed the 2018 action as duplicative of the first. Instead of filing a fifth amended complain t in the 2017 action, Ms. Wu appealed, seeking review of va rious orders from the three actions. We dismissed that appeal in part fo r lack of jurisdic tion and otherwise affirmed. See Wu v. Bernhardt , 820 F. App’x 669, 671 (10th Cir. 2020). While that appeal was pending, Ms. Wu moved for relief under Rule 60(b). (We refer to this as “the third Rule 60(b) motion.”) In the4 motion, Ms. Wu did not say which order she wanted reconsidered. The court assumed that Ms. Wu wanted reco nsideration of an order issued in February 2019, which had denied the first two Rule 60(b) motions. In denying the third Ru le 60(b) motion, the court addressed Ms. Wu’s argument that two pieces of new evidence showed coercion into withdrawing her objection to the DOI’ s motion to enforc e the agreement. One piece of evidence was a generic medication instruction in an after-visit note from a March 2019 doctor’s visit. The note showed a recommendation that if Ms. Wu were to obtain sedative medications, she should not make any impo rtant decisions or sign any legal documents. The court determined that the note had not related to Ms. Wu’s mental state in August 2015 (when she consented to enforcem ent of the settlement agreement). The second piece of evidence was a text message that Ms. Wu’s employer had sent shortly after the fall: Please call me in the morning to tell me the . . . prognosis and what your plan for the week is. If you will not be attending work, I will need a doctor note no la ter than Thursd ay by noon. I hope this is not serious an d you feel better soon. R., Vol. 1 at 719. Ms. Wu characterized the text as coercion to acquiesce in the DOI’s motion to enforce. The district court rejected this characterization. Ms. Wu also complained of the employer’s filing of a redacted motion to enforce the agreement. Ms. Wu charact erized the red action as an5 effort to cover up earlie r efforts to coerce her in to acquiescing in the motion to enforce the agreement. The district court disagreed for two reasons. First, the red action did not delete docu ments from the court’s electronic filing system, so the court could still access the unredacted version. Second, the redactions simp ly avoided public di sclosure of two categories of information: (1) the na me, address, and ac count information for payment of th e $200,000 and (2) the tax id entification number for Ms. Wu’s attorney. The court found no intent by the DOI to ha rm Ms. Wu and declined to reconsider the Febr uary 2019 order. Ms. Wu also alleged violation of the Older Workers Benefits Protection Act, which provides that a waiver of righ ts under the Age Discrimination in Employm ent Act must be knowin g and voluntary. The court first examined two of the requirements for an individu al’s waiver of an age-discrimination clai m: (1) the individual must be “given a period of at least 21 days within which to consider the agreement,” 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(F)(i); and (2) the agreement must “provide[] that for a period of at least 7 days follow ing the execution of such agreement, the individual may revoke the agreement,” id. § 626(f)(1)(G). The co urt concluded that these requirements do no t apply to the settlement of a court action. Though the court concluded that th e DOI had satisfied the statute, Ms. Wu argued that the agreement wa s voidable because the DOI had not sent a neutral letter of recommendation. The court disagreed, explaining6 that Rule 60(b) pr ovided the only available re medy and the DOI’s failure to send the letter had not justified relief. R., Vol. 1 at 768. The court added that Ms. Wu had failed to address

 “why the DOI’s provision of th e letter in response to [an earlier] motion [was] insufficient to accomp lish justice” or

 “why she did not simply ask the DOI to provi de the letter earlier.” Id. at 768-69 (citation & intern al quotation marks omitted).
2. Appellate Jurisdiction We first address the existence and scope of our juri sdiction. In the notice of appeal, Ms. Wu re ferred only to the district court’s denial of the third Rule 60(b) motion. Because this is the only order identifi ed in the notice of appeal, our jurisdiction do es not extend be yond this order. See Williams v. Akers , 837 F.3d 1075, 1078 (10th Ci r. 2016) (stati ng that the requirement for designation of the orde r being appealed is jurisdictional). Even if the notice of appeal had encompassed the preceding orders, however, “the timely filing of a notice of appeal in a ci vil case [would be] a jurisdictional requirement.” Bowles v. Russell , 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007). The only order timely appealed was the denial of the third Rule 60(b) motion. The deadline for the no tice of appeal was th e 60th day following entry of the underlying order. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B)(i). The district court clerk file-stamped the denial of the third Rule 60(b) motion on7 March 16, 2020. But this order was no t entered on the civil docket until March 17. See R., Vol. 1 at 13 (text for docket entry 132). So the 60-day period began to run on March 17 a nd ended on Saturday, May 16. Because the last day of the peri od was a Saturday, Ms. Wu ’s notice of appeal was due the following Mond ay, which was May 18. See Fed. R. App. P. 26(a)(1)(C). Because Ms. Wu file d her notice of appe al on May 18, the notice was timely as to th e March 16 order. But the notice of appeal would have been late as to the earlier orde rs. So irrespective of the limited scope of the notice of appeal, ou r jurisdiction would be confined to review of the March 16 order. 1 Ms. Wu cannot skirt these jurisdicti onal limitations by virtue of the district court’s treatment of the th ird Rule 60(b) mo tion as requesting reconsideration of its February 2019 or der denying her firs t two Rule 60(b) motions. “An appeal from a denial of a Rule 60(b) motion addresses only the district court’s order denying the motion, and no t the underlying

1 In her reply brief, Ms. Wu quotes Davis v. Passman , 442 U.S. 228 (1979), for the propositi on that the district c ourt had subject-matter jurisdiction over the prece ding rulings. The district court did have subjectmatter jurisdiction, but subject-matter jurisdicti on differs from an appellate court’s jurisdiction. See Arthur Anderson LLP v. Carlisle , 556 U.S. 624, 628 n.3 (2009) (“[T]here are good reason s for treating subjectmatter jurisdiction differ ently . . . from the appe llate jurisdiction here conferred.”).8 decision itself.” Servants of the Paraclete v. Does , 204 F.3d 1005, 1009 (10th Cir. 2000). 2
3. Standard of Review We review the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion fo r “an abuse of discretion, keeping in mind that Rule 60(b) relief is extraordinary and may only be granted in ex ceptional circumstances.” Lebahn v. Owens , 813 F.3d 1300, 1306 (10th Cir. 2016 ) (internal quotation ma rks omitted). An abuse of discretion occurs when a district court’s ruling “is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or manifestly un reasonable[,] or when we are convince d that the district court made a clear error of judgment or ex ceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances.” Dodge v. Cotter Corp. , 328 F.3d 1212, 1223 (10th Cir. 2003) (inter nal quotation marks omitted).
4. Revocation of the Settlement Agreement Invoking the Older Workers Benefits Protecti on Act, Ms. Wu denies that she had enough time to consider or revok e the settlement of her agediscrimination claim. We disagree. Under that Act, waiv er through settlement of a court action is “knowing and voluntary” only upon sa tisfaction of “subparagraphs (A)

2 In her reply brief, Ms. Wu re urges her constitutional claims and criticizes a prior opinion that found improper claim splitting. Wu v. Bernhardt , 820 F. App’x 669, 676–77 (10t h Cir. 2020) (unpublished). But the third Rule 60(b) moti on did not address any constitutional claims or claim-splitting.9 through (E) of paragraph (1).” 29 U.S. C. § 626(f)(2). Bu t there’s nothing to require satisfaction of subparagraphs (F) and (G ), which set forth the time periods to consider a settlement and revoke it. Under § 626(f)(2), a claimant can settle a court action i nvolving an age-di scrimination claim without waiting a speci fied number of days. See Walters v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc ., 703 F.3d 1167, 1173 (10th Cir. 2013). So the district court correctly concluded that the statutory timing provisions (21 days to consider a waiver and 7 days to revoke the waiver) do not apply. Ms. Wu argues that th e district court’s decision conflicts with Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc. , 522 U.S. 422 (1998 ). We disagree. Oubre concerned an employee’s release of claims “as part of a termination agreement,” id. at 423, not a settlement of a court action. 3 In her reply brief, Ms. Wu conten ds that the agreement violated § 626(f)(1)(C), which prov ides that “the individu al does not waive rights or claims that may aris e after the date the waiv er is executed.” “We generally do not consider arguments raised for th e first time in a reply

3 Though the statutory provision fo r revocation does not apply, the settlement agreement specified that Ms . Wu had seven da ys to revoke the settlement agreement. The third Rule 60(b) moti on does not address satisfaction of the settlement agreem ent’s provision fo r revocation. The agreement is specific abou t revocation by stating that the Director of the Office of Civil Rights ha d to receive the notice of revocation w ithin seven days at Mailstop 4310, 1849 C Street, N.W., Washington , D.C. 20240. R., Vol. 1 at 118.10 brief.” Sierra Club v. Okla . Gas & Elec. Co. , 816 F.3d 666, 676 n.9 (10th Cir. 2016). But this contention would fail even if we were to consider it. The agreement states that it re solved all claims “arising out of or relating to Plaintiff’s employment with the Agency, up to and including the date [she] signs this Settlement agreement.” R., Vol. 1 at 117 . This provision necessarily excluded any waiver of righ ts or claims that may have arisen after the date of the waiver. So th e district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the ag reement satisfies § 626(f)(1)(C).
5. Alleged Failure to Provide a Neutral Letter of Recommendation In a prior appeal, we rejected Ms. Wu’s argum ent that the alleged failure to provide a neutral letter of recommendation would justify avoidance of the stipulat ed dismissal. We explai ned that “[a]bsent any basis for setting aside the stipulated dismissal, the district court properly declined to set asid e the [agreement].” Wu v. Bernhardt , 820 F. App’x 669, 675 (10th Cir. 2020). Th at ruling constitutes the law of the case. See Dobbs v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield , 600 F.3d 1275, 1279-80 (10th Cir. 2010) (explaini ng that an appellate deci sion on a ru le of law governs the same issue in later stages of the same case). So we will not second-guess our prior op inion on this issue.11 6. New Evidence In moving for reconsideration, Ms . Wu submitted a doctor’s note from 2019, recommending cau tion if she’d received sedation. But Ms. Wu had agreed to the settle ment 3-1/2 years earlier. Given the timing, the district court discounted the doctor’s note because Ms. Wu had never presented any evidence that she was under th e influence of a sedative when she agreed to the settlement. Ms. Wu does not present any reason to question this conclusion.
7. Deletion of the Original Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement Ms. Wu also argues that a defense attorney tinkered with the docket system, deleting a motion to enforce the settleme nt agreement. The district court explained that the clerk’s office (not defe nse counsel) sealed the motion because the document contained private financial information as to Ms. Wu and her counsel. So the court found that no thing had been deleted. Ms. Wu again does not pr esent any reason to que stion this finding.12 8. Conclusion We affirm the denial of the third Rule 60(b) motion. 4
Entered for the Court

Robert E. Bacharach Circuit Judge

4 We also deny the gov ernment’s motion to dismi ss this appeal as moot because the government withdrew the motion.