12-2727-cv

Davis v. Mount Saint Mary College

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER 

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1,

2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.

WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON

ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals

2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United

3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,

on the 21st 4 day of March, two thousand thirteen.

5

6 PRESENT: JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,

7 ROBERT D. SACK,

8 RICHARD C. WESLEY,

9

10 Circuit Judges.

11

12 

13

14 DUANE DAVIS, 

15

16 Plaintiff-Appellant,

17

18 -v.- 12-2727-cv

19

20 MOUNT SAINT MARY COLLEGE,

21

22 Defendant-Appellee.

23 

24

25 FOR APPELLANT: MICHAEL H. SUSSMAN, Sussman & Watkins,

26 Goshen, NY.

27

28 FOR APPELLEE: JAMES P. DROHAN (Laura Wong-Pan, on the

29 brief), Thomas, Drohan, Waxman, Petigrow

30 & Mayle, LLP, Hopewell Junction, NY. 

31

32 Appeal from the United States District Court for the

33 Southern District of New York (Seibel, J.).
1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED

2 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be

3 AFFIRMED. 

4 Plaintiff-Appellant Duane Davis("Davis")appeals from

5 the June 28, 2012 decision and order of the United States

6 District Court for the Southern District of New York

7 (Seibel, J.) granting summary judgment in favor of

8 Defendant-Appellee Mount Saint Mary College (the “College”).

9 Davis was the College’s part-time, men’s basketball

10 coach for fourteen consecutive seasons pursuant to a series

11 of one-year contracts, until he resigned after learning

12 that, after three consecutive losing seasons, the College

13 would not be renewing his contract for the 2009-2010 season. 

14 After Davis resigned at age 69, the College created a new

15 position for a full-time, men’s basketball coach, formed a

16 search committee to interview applicants, and, after

17 interviewing six individuals, hired Ryan Kadlubowski at age

18 26. Subsequently, Davis sued the College claiming that the

19 decision not to renew his contract was an adverse employment

20 action motivated solely by his age in violation of the Age

21 Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621

22 et seq. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

2
1 underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues

2 presented for review. 

3 ADEA claims are analyzed under McDonnell Douglas’s

4 three-step burden-shifting framework. See Gorzynski v.

5 JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 106 (2d Cir. 2010). 

6 Davis only claims that the district court erred at step

7 three in light of three facts: (1) he was more experienced

8 than Kadlubowski, (2) the Athletic Director made a stray

9 comment that Kadlubowski was an “impressive young man,” and

10 (3) the College renewed contracts for younger coaches of

11 different sports that had similar or worse records than he

12 did. Considering the totality of the circumstances as we

13 must, these facts do not reasonably suggest that age was the

14 ‘but for’ cause of the College’s decision. Gorzynski, 596

15 F.3d at 106. For substantially the same reasons as the

16 district court articulated in a comprehensive 28-page

17 opinion, we affirm. 

18 We have considered all of Davis’ arguments on appeal

19 and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing

20 reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby

21 AFFIRMED.

22 FOR THE COURT:

23 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

24

25

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