STRATEGY FOR SAFELY RETURNING SPACE 

SHUTTLE TO FLIGHT STATUS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMNITTEE ON 

SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON 

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MAY 15, 1986 

[No. 1281 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Science and Technology 

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

63-144 0 WASHINGTON : 1986 

For aale by the Superintendent of Documenta, Congressional Wee office 

U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402 
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 

DON FUQUA, Florida, Chairman 

ROBERT A. ROE, New Jersey 

GEORGE E. BROWN, JR., California 

JAMES H. SCHEUER, New York 

MARILYN LLOYD, Tenneesee Wisconsin 

TIMOTHY E. WIRTH, Colorado 

DOUG WALGREN, Pennsylvania 

DAN GLICKMAN, Kansas 

ROBERT A. YOUNG, Missouri 

HAROLD L. VOLKMER, Missouri 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

STAN LUNDINE, New York 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

DAVE McCURDY, Oklahoma 

NORMAN Y. MINETA, California 

MICHAEL A. ANDREWS, Texas 

BUDDY MAcKAY," Florida 

TIM VALENTINE, North Carolina 

HARRY M. REID, Nevada 

ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

TERRY BRUCE, Illinois 

RICHARD H. STALLINGS, Idaho 

BART GORDON, Tennessee 

JAMES A. TRAFICANT, JR., Ohio 

MANUEL LUJAN, JR.,' New Mexico 

ROBERT S. WALKER, Pennsylvania 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

CLAUDINE SCHNEIDER, Rhode Island 

SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York 

TOM LEWIS, Florida 

DON RI'ITER, Pennsylvania 

SID W. MORRISON, Washington 

RON PACKARD, California 

JAN MEYERS, Kansas 

ROBERT C. SMITH, New Hampshire 

PAUL B. HENRY, Michigan 

HARRIS W. FAWELL, Illinois 

WILLIAM W. COBEY, JR., North Carolina 

JOE BARTON, Texas 

D. FRENCH SLAUGHTER, JR., Virginia 

DAVID S. MONSON, Utah 

HAROLD P. HANSON, Executive Director 

ROBERT C. KETCHAM, General Counsel 

REGINA A. DAVIS, Chief Clerk 

JOYCE GROSS FREIWALD, Republican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS 

BILL NELSON, Florida, Chairman 

GEORGE E. BROWN, JR., California 

MICHAEL A. ANDREWS, Texas 

ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey 

BART GORDON, Tennessee 

JAMES H. SCHEUER, New York 

HAROLD L. VOLKMER, Missouri 

NORMAN Y. MINETA, California 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

ROBERT S. WALKER,' Pennsylvania 

JAN MEYERS, Kansas 

ROBERT C. SMITH, New Hampshire 

JOE BARTON, Texas 

D. FRENCH SLAUGHTER, JR., Virginia 

DAVID S. MONSON, Utah 

DR. RADP~RD BYERLY, Staff Director 

DR. HARRY S. DAWSON, Technical Consultant 

'Ranking Republican Member. 

"Serving on Committee on the Budget for 99th Congress. 

(11) 
CONTENTS 

WITNESSES 

Page 

May 15, 1986: 

Richard Truly, Associate Administrator, Office of Space Flight, NASA, 

Washington, Dc, Jesse Moore, Director, Johnson Space Center, NASA, 

Houston, TX Arnold Aldrich, Manager, National Space Transportation 

Systems, Johnson Space Center, NASA, Houston, TX; Robert L. Cnp 

pen, Deputy Director, Flight Crew Operations, Johnson Space Center, 

NASA, Houston, TX; John W. Young, Chief, Astronaut Office, Johnson 

Space Center, NASA, Houston, TX; and Paul Weitz, Deputy Chief, 

John Brizendine, Chairman, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel; Norman 

R. Parmet, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel; Herbert Grier, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel; Seymour C. Himmel, Aerospace Safety Advisory 

(111) 

Astronaut Office, Johnson Space Center, NASA, Houston, TX .................. 

Panel; and Norris J. Brone, Safety Advisory Panel ...................................... 

4 

94 
STRATEGY FOR SAFELY RETURNING SPACE 

SHUTTLE TO FLIGHT STATUS 

THURSDAY, MAY 15, 1986 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS, 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 o’clock, in room 

2318, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bill Nelson (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. NELSON. Good morning. The subcommittee will come to 

order. 

In the months since the Challenger accident, this subcommittee 

has held hearings on the budgetary and programmatic impacts of 

this tragedy. We’ve explored the actions of the administration and 

the Congress, which actions we’ll have to pursue in order to maintain assured access to space. 

Now we think that we have reached a point in time that we have 

to start exploring what must be done in order to safely return the 

shuttle to flight status. 

As in our past hearings, these hearings today will not investigate the Challenger accident. We made a decision in this committee, 

along with our colleagues in the Senate and the House in all the 

committees that have jurisdiction over space, that we were going to 

let the Rogers Commission do its work unimpeded, recognizing that 

that was in the best interest of the country, that we identify what 

the problem is so we could get upon the task of correcting the prob 

lem, and thus we will not be entering into the arena with regard to 

the Challenger accident here, even though these hearings are on 

the subject of flight safety. Now these hearings are necessary so that we continue to have an 

effective line of communication between NASA and the Congress 

rather than having the information flow back and forth purely on 

the basis of press reports. We continue to believe that it’s in the 

best interests of the country that these proceedings be conducted in 

a manner that is totally open to the public. We think that that’s 

the best way in which we can air this subject that obviously SO 

many people have so much interest in. 

Now we understand, having talked to a number of you privately, that NASA’s current recovery planning is based on success-oriented schedules, so that if roblems are encountered, delays naturally 

approach the current national emergency in space launch capacity. 

(1) 

Washington, Dc. 

are going to be the resu P t. We believe that this is the proper way to 
2 

On the other hand, we want to make sure that, regardless of a 

set schedule, that safety and reliability are not sacrificed even 

though we all know how absolutely necessary it is for us to get 

back into the space launch business as soon as possible for many, 

many reasons, not the least of which is national security. 

We want to make sure that there is sufficient time, that there is 

the sufficient funding that is properly allocated to fully resolve any 

and all safety or reliability issues as we move toward that date 

that we all look forward to, which is when we can soar into the 

heavens again. 

So the focus of today’s hearing is going to be on the strategy for 

safely returning the space shuttle to flight status. 

Now today we’re going to have testimony from Dick Truly, who 

is the Associate Administrator for Space Flight; from Jesse Moore, 

Director of Johnson Space Center; from Arnie Aldrich, the Manager of the National Space Transportation Systems at JSC; from 

John Young, who is Chief of the Astronaut Office; from P.J. Weitz, 

who is his Deputy; and from Bob Crippen, who is Deputy Director. 

We’re going to also hear from members of the Aerospace Safety 

Advisory Panel. It’s an organization of outside experts that has responsibility for advising the NASA administrator on the safety 

aspect of all of the manned flight programs, and people that will be 

on that panel are John Brizendine, who is the Chairman; Mr. 

Parmet; Mr. Grier; Mr. Himmel; and Dr. Krone. 

So I want to thank you all for being with us today, and I’d like to 

ask my ranking Member, Mr. Walker, for his comments. 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to join you in welcoming our witnesses before the committee today. We have many friends here, and together I hope we can 

make some important progress toward improvement of flight safety 

in the future of the program. This hearing will be our first major 

step in reviewing NASA’s progress toward our mutual goal of safe 

manned flight. 

I’ve read your memo, Admiral Truly, and your testimony. I applaud your calm and reasoned approach to the problems that we 

face. In fact, I think it will be crucial that there be a strong and 

steady hand at the helm, and I assure you that you will have my 

full support as we proceed along, trying to get us back flying. It’s important that we remember that flight safety is more than 

a motto, it must be a way of life within NASA. Quite frankly, I’ve 

been deeply concerned about the pattern of safety and quality control problems that have become public in recent months. 

We are not going to examine the Challenger accident here today. 

We agree that the proper forum for that discussion will come after 

the Rogers Commission reports. The intent of this hearing is to resolve future concerns, not the past. But, as is inscribed on the National Archives, those who do not learn from the past are doomed 

to repeat it. 

There is a pattern of problems, if ignored, that we will pay for in 

the future. We must make certain that safety practices are not violated at any point in the future. We cannot continue to have the 

kinds of concerns within the agency and publicly about whether or 

not safety is given the top priority in the NASA Program. 
launch system, it was a risk we were forced to accept. Today we 

are obviously returning to a mixed fleet. Since we are going to be 

forced to accept a delay in both the Galileo and Ulysses missions, it 

seems to me that it is sound public policy to carefully reexamine 

that risk. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to examine with our witnesses the 

possibility of incorporating representatives of the Astronaut Office 

into the Mission Management Team with formal responsibility for 

flight safety. 

Mr. Chairman, this committee remains committed to a manned 

space program. For more than a quarter of a century, more Americans have carried the fire of manned space exploration of this universe. The finest memorial we can fashion to the crew of the Challenger is a vibrant and revitalized manned program that will quickly return us to flight status with the risks minimized. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Walker. 

OK, we’ll proceed, and, Admiral Truly, we’ll start with you. Then 

we’ll go to Mr. Aldrich, and it’s my understanding Mr. Moore-do 

you need-- 

Mr. ANDREWS. I just wanted to make a few comments. 

Mr. NELSON. Yes, sir, Mr. Andrews. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank you and applaud you for calling this hearing this 

morning to have an opportunity to review plans to renew the shuttle operations. We prepare for this action safely and prudently, and 

I think these hearings are going to be a very important part of 

that. 

These have been very difficult days for all of us who appreciate 

the importance of the national space effort. From the professional 

engineer at the Johnson Space Center to the pad technician at the 

Cape, to every member of the House and Senate committees, there 

is certainly a fervent and enthusiastic desire to set the space transportation system right and move it forward again. I think Admiral Truly’s strategy, as outlined in his May 24 

memo, is a good one and a good starting point. This subcommittee 

needs to study each of his proposals carefully. 

This framework, I think, that you’ve set for us, Admiral Truly, 

has real merit, and I look forward to it. I think it’s going to put us 

on a path toward safety and put us on a path toward returning to 

space at the earliest possible time. 

And I do want to say that I’m delighted to see John Young here. 

He and I were judges at a chili cook-off Saturday, and we tasted 30 
MOORE, DIRECTOR, JOHNSON SPACE CENTER, NASA, HOUSTON, 

PORTATION SYSTEMS, JOHNSON SPACE CENTER, NASA, HOUSTON, TX; ROBERT L. CRIPPEN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, FLIGHT 

TX; ARNOLD ALDRICH, MANAGER, NATIONAL SPACE TRANSCREW OPERATIONS, JOHNSON SPACE CENTER, NASA, HOUSTON, TX; JOHN W. YOUNG, CHIEF, ASTRONAUT OFFICE, JOHNSON SPACE CENTER, NASA, HOUSTON, TX; AND PAUL WEITZ, 

DEPUTY CHIEF, ASTRONAUT OFFICE, JOHNSON SPACE CENTER, 

NASA, HOUSTON, TX 

Admiral TRULY. Mr. Chairman, I’m pleased to be here and with 

this group today to address the issue-the main issue of this hearing, which is flight safety. 

Since the Challenger accident on January 28 and about a month 

later when I took the present position at NASA Headquarters as 

Associate Administrator for Space Flight, I think no other single 

issue has been more on my mind than to try to create an environment in which we can return to flight and we can return in a 

manner that makes us all confident and comfortable with the 

space shuttle system, which is one that I think this Nation should 

be extremely proud of, and I have spent every moment since then 

in one way or another toward that goal. 

As you know, one of my jobs is as the chairman of the NASA 

task force to do the accident investigation, and I want to report to 

you as a status that the investigation, in my view, has gone extremely well. I think if Chairman Rogers were here, he would tell 

you that our task force has supported him from the very start. I 

believe that, as I have testified earlier, that they will probably conclude that there was a chain of events, as there are in most accidents, that caused this one. 

Technically, we have narrowed the causes in the field joint of the 

solid rocket motor to a small and finite list, and our direction to 

the redesign team is to make sure that their fix, when it is determined-and it has certainly not been decided yet-would solve 

every one of the potential causes that the commission has uncovered. 

The other job that I’ve had is to try to create a way for us to 

return to flight, and, as you have mentioned, about a month and a 

half ago I did publish what, in my mind, was a strategy which 

would give direction to the system as to what to do, leaving to 

Arnie Aldrich at level 2 in Houston to determine most of the howto-do-it, and he’ll be prepared to tell you about that today. 

But throughout the fabric of this strategy is flight safety. We 

have set a success schedule to get back to flight that will have a 
Arnie in his summary. 

We’re going to reassess the entire program management structure and organization, including from the design requirements, 

right up through the launch commit criteria and the commit to 

flight. 

We have a solid rocket motor joint redesign team that is in place 

and working. We’re going back through all the design requirements for the shuttle, not just for the solid rocket motor but for the 

whole system. We are reviewing the critical items list that we’ve 

heard so much about and the paperwork that supports that. We essentially are recertifying every critical item in the system. 

We are reviewing the paperwork that the Kennedy Space Center 

uses to process vehicles as they prepare for flight. We are doing a 

reassessment of the regime in which the Challenger was lost, and 

that is the launch and abort phase of the flight, to look at our mission rules that come in many varieties. 

The second major area that we did was, we outlined some guidelines for the first flight which are conservative and safe, I believe, 

but still will allow us to launch a major and important payload, 

and some guidelines to allow the system, not me personally but the. 

mission planning system, to plan a year of-the first year of sak 

flight. 

And, finally, we have initiated an effort that is in work and, 

frankly, will take a bit longer to come to a final conclusion, but the 

objective of which is to set a safe and sustainable flight rate for the 

shuttle in the future so that we can plan a flight rate that we all 

believe in and believe that we can make. 

We have a mountain of work to do. The work has already started. In almost every area that has come to light and is being discussed I think this strategy embodies ways that each of the concerns can be met, and we’re extremely pleased to be here today 

and tell you where we stand. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Richard Truly follows:] 
and Applications 

Committee on Science and Technology 

House of Representatives 

Statement by: 

Richard ti. Truly 

AssoL'dte Administrator 

'or Space FNight 

99th Congress 
Associate Administrator 

Office of Space Flight 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

before the 

Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications 

Committee on Science and Technology 

United States House of Representatives 

Mr. Chairman and Distinguished Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am happy to accept your invitation to testify before this 

Subcommittee about the Office of Space Flight plans for recovery 

and the steps we are taking to ensure a safe and successful return 

to space for the Space Shuttle. 

The Space Shuttle is the most complicated and technically 

sophisticated vehicle in the world. To build it required 

engineering knowledge at the forefront of technology and 

engineering breakthrouyhs. It has capabilities that are totally 

unmatched anywhere in the world. While it is probably the most 

reliable space transportation vehicle in the world, one-hundred 

percent reliability for such a vehicle was and is an 

impossibility; however, we must and will do all we can to maximize 

safety and reduce the risks. 

Safety is obviously not just a function of hardware; it is a 

function of care, of emphasis, of environment, of training, and of 

communications. The NASA team of civil servants and contractors 
g

associated onboard hardware, the need for a complete review of all 

procedures and hardware systems affecting flight safety, 

implementation of necessary system modifications, and a flight 

hiatus of at least a year. 

Our primary emphasis continues on the right Solid Rocket Booster 

(SRB) aft field joint. Major tests are in process at MortonThiokol and at the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) to better 

understand the joint characteristics in various conditions. We 

are also destacking the SRE at KSC to analyze the effects of 

stacking on stack joints. Salvage operations have recovered 

several pieces of the suspect joint, including a portion of the 

aft segment which contains the failed joint. These pieces are 

being prepared for failure analysis. 

A dedicated Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) joint design group has been 

established at Marshall Space Flight Center, with selective 

participation from other NASA centers and external organizations, 

to recommend a program plan for the SRM joint redesign. 

will include the type and content of post-flight inspections for 

the redesigned joints. Other flight components will be developed 

in detail, with criteria developed for commitment to the next 

launch as well as reusability of the specific flight hardware 

components. 

Two of the most important factors in training our astronauts are 

the Shuttle training aircraft and the flight simulators. The 

astronauts, in their testimony before the Presidential Commission, 

noted every astronaut who flew the Shuttle has complimented our 

Shuttle Training Airplanes (STA's), which are modified Gulfstream 

II's, because the STA's were real preparation for the rigors of 

flight. Similarly, they valued the time spent on the Shuttle 

Simulators (SMS) and expressed their support for continuing with 

our efforts to obtain a fourth STA and support upgrading the 

Shuttle Simulators so that sufficient time was available to train 

the large complement of astronaut pilots. 

As we know, simulations and design are not sufficient to test the 

full capability and demands placed on the marvelous sytem we 

have. Some of the conclusions about the flight environment and 

knowledge of limitations of the Orbiter can be obtained only from 

actual flight and landings. Because of the knowledge obtained 

from flights, a redesign of the nosewheel steering mechanism was 

This plan 

-2- 
actobased ote Cossos dgs ad deteatos, ad 

to submit its final report within 120 days. 

The STS 51-L Task Force at Kennedy Space Center, which is 

analyzing the accident, is managed on a day-to-day basis by my 

Vice Chairman, Dr. J. R. Thompson. This task force includes six 

teams including a development and production team, a prelaunch 

activity team, a mission planning and operations team, an accident 

analysis team, a salvage support team, and a photo and TV team. 

There is also a strong NASA/Commission interface in Washington, 

D.C., which includes a Headquarters action center. This center 

formalizes all Commission requests for data, analyses, and 

reports; and maintains status of task force activities. 

Currently, for example, they are tracking over 300 Commission 

action items. In our review to date, the task force has focused 

on the physical evidence from salvage operations; on launch 

related data analysis including weather effects, photographic 

evidence, integrated loads analysis, and the mission events 

timeline; on the manufacturing and assembly processing of 

hardware; on the launch pad, and on the cargo. The task force 

teams and subteams reported to the Commission on April 18; the 

Commission's report to the President is due the first week in 

June. 

We are following a comprehensive strategy that, when completed, 

will allow resumption of the flight schedule. NASA Headquarters 

particularly, the Office of Space Flight, the OSF centers, the 

National Space Transportation System (NSTS) program organization 

and its various contractors have been given guidance to proceed 

with the realistic, practical actions necessary to return to the 

NSTS flight schedule with emphasis on flight safety. This 

guidance is intended to stabilize planning activities for the 

first year of flight while putting in motion the activities 

required to establish a realistic and an achievable launch rate 

that will safely sustain the Orbiter fleet. This strategy states 

that we intend, in general, to fly the first year of operations 

within our flight experience. If, for example, we have flown the 

engines at 104 percent, we will exceed the 104 percent criteria 

only after very thorough safety reviews. 

The NSTS program management philosophy, structure, reporting 

channels and decision-making process will be thoroughly reviewed 

and those changes implemented which are required to ' assure 

confidence and safety in the overall program, including the commit 
implemented. Those items which are not revalidated by this review 

must be redesigned, certified, and qualified for flight. Category 

2 and 3 CIL's will be reviewed for reacceptance and to verify 

their proper categorization. 

The Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specifications 

Document (OMRSD) will be reviewed to insure that the requirements 

defined in it are complete, and that the required testing is 

consistent with the results of the Critical Items List (CIL) 

review. Inspection/retest requirements will be modified as necessary to assure flight safety. 

The launch and launch abort rules, and philosophy will be assessed 

to assure that the launch and flight rules. range safety 

systems/operational procedures, landing aids, runway configuration 

and length, performance, abort weights, runway surface, and other 

landing related capabilities provide an acceptable margin of 

safety to the vehicle and crew. Additionally, the weather 

forecasting capability will be reviewed and improved where 

possible to allow for the most accurate reporting. 

The planning for the flight schedule for the first year of 

operation will reflect a launch rate consistent with this 

conservative approach. The specific number of flights to be 

planned for the first year will consider KSC and VAFB work flow, 

software development, controller/crew training, etc. Changes to 

flight plans, ascent trajectories, manifest, etc., will be 

minimized in the interest of program stability. 

The most important step in resuming this Nations' leadership in 

space is to identify the problems which led to the Challenger 

accident, to design and implement fixes for these problems, to 

assure flight safety when we return to Shuttle flight activity, 

and to expand upon the base of experience we have developed. 

Our Nations' future in space is dependent on the individuals who 

must carry this strategy out safely and successfully. The Space 

Shuttle program will only succeed in the future if the talented 

and dedicated men and women who fly the Shuttle have confidence in 

the system we design. 

Mr. Chairman, this is the end of my prepared testimony. I 

appreciate this opportunity to appear before you taday and would 

be pleased to answer any questions you may have. 

-4- 
David W. Garrett 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

(Phone: 202/453-8400) 

Feb. 20, 1986 

10:00 a.m. EST 

RELEASE NO: 86-15 

TRULY APPOINTED SPACE FLIGHT ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR 

Rear Admiral Richard H. Tr~ly, USN, Commander of the Naval 

Space Command, has been appointed Associate Administrator for 

Space Flight, NASA Headquarters, effective immediately. 

Truly will head NASA's Space Shuttle program and will assume 

direction of the agency's Design and Data Analysis Task Force 

which is reviewing the Shuttle Challenger accident of Jan. 

28, 1986. In both roles, he succeeds Jesse W. Moore. 

Moore will assume the post of Johnson Space Center Director, 

an appointment that was announced on Jan. 23. 

Truly was designated a naval aviator in 1960. His initial 

tour of duty was in Fighter Squadron 33, where he flew F-8 

Crusaders and made sore than 306 carrier landings. From 1963 to 

1965, he was first a student and later an instructor at the U.S. 

Air Force Aerospace Research Pilot School, Edwards Air Force 

Base, Cdlif. In 1965, he was among the initial military 

astronaiits selected to the USAF Manned Orbiting Laboratory 

program. He became a NASA astronaut in 1969 and spent 14 years 

with NASA. 

Tr.,ly was pilot for one of the two-man crews that flew the 

Shuttle Enterprise approach and landing test flights in 1977. He was the) assigned as backup pilot for STS-1, the first orbital 

flight .est of the Space Shuttle. His first space fliqht was STS-2 ('lov. 12-14, 1981) as pilot of the Shuttle Columhia. He was comii,ander of STS-8 (Aug. 30-Sept. 5, 1983), the Shuttle 

Challenjer, the first night launch and landing in the Shuttle 

program. 

TrAly became the first commander of the Naval Space Command 

upon it,; commissioning on Oct. 1, 1983. The Command is 

respons-ble for management and operational control of all Navy 

satellites in use and provides direct space system Support to the 

fleet w?rldwide. 
He also is the recipient of the Robert H. Goddard Memorial 

Trophy, the Thomas D. White Space Trophy and the Robert J. 

Collier Trophy. 

Truly has received numerous Defense, Navy and NASA awards. 

Truly is married to the former Colleen Harmer of 

Milledgeville, Ga. They have three children. 

- end - 

This release and other NASA information is available 

e1eCtrOniCally through ITT DIALCOEI. FOK access to NASA NEWS, 

through this system, contact Jim Hawley, ITT DIALCOM Inc. at 

202/488-0550. 
support of the program during this period. This morning I

d like to 

highlight that statement in submitting it by covering those items 

directly related to the safety reviews that we’re conducting and ancillary activities. 

In response to Admiral Truly’s direction on safely returning the 

space shuttle to flight status, I have initiated programwide activities to fully implement Admiral Truly’s actions. Specific lead assignments and status are summarized as follows: 

First, as Admiral Truly pointed out, a solid rocket motcr redesign team, headed by Mr. John Thomas of the Marshall Space 

Flight Center, has been put in place in residence at Marshall, consists of approximately 75 people from both within and without 

NASA. Their preliminary work to date has concentrated on the 

analysis of a wide range of potential design fixes. 

Preliminary analyses so far support a potential delivery of redesigned and retested SRM flight segments to KSC in the MarchApril 1987 time frame, and this is the basis for the July 1987 first 

flight projection which we’re working toward. 

Second, a space shuttle design requirements team is headed by 

Mr. Jesse Goree of the NSTS Systems Integration Office at JSC. It 

has been assigned to re-review all of the NSTS design requirements 

and the associated technical verification of those requirements. 

This team will focus on each space shuttle project element and on 

the total space shuttle system design requirements themselves. 

This activity will culminate in a space shuttle Delta Design Certification Review of the total program approximately 3 months prior 

to the next space shuttle launch. 

Third, as Admiral Truly pointed out, we have instigated a cornplete re-review of all space shuttle program failure modes and effects analyses and associated critical items lists. Mr. Bill McCarty, 

the NSTS manager for safety, reliability, and quality assurance, at 

the Johnson Space Center in my office, has been assigned to lead 

this activity, and each space shuttle project element and their associated prime contractors are conducting separate comprehensive reviews which will culminate in a programwide review with myself 

later in this year. 

Technical specialists from outside the Space Shuttle Program 

have been assigned as formal members of each of these reviews, 

and as they progress, all prior criticality 1 and 1R items have been 

voided and the teams are required to reassess and formally resubmit for approval any waivers in these categories which are recommended for continued program applicability. This activity will culminate in a comprehensive final review at NASA Headquarters 

with Admiral Truly. 
g 

p

procedures at KSC is underway under the leadership of Mr. Robert 

Sieck, the Director of Shuttle Management and Operations at KSC. 

The activity includes a full technical re-review of all shuttle processing procedures, paperwork, and requirements. 

In addition, this review is responsible for developing closed-loop 

controls between the FMEA critical items, the operations and 

checkout requirements, and these checkout procedures. This activity is also expected to extend through this year and be finished in 

the early 1987 timeframe. 

A launch/abort reassessment team has been established under 

Mr. Jay Greene of the Flight Director’s Office at the Johnson 

Space Center. This team is re-reviewing space shuttle launch 

commit criteria, flight rules, operational crew procedures, space 

shuttle ascent design, landing site selection and characteristics for 

abort and normal end-of-mission landings, and the design and requirements for the space shuttle range safety system and its associated procedures. 

Teams have been established also to coordinate programwide assessments, analysis, and planning to define the schedule and characteristics for the space shuttle first flight and to develop projected 

first year and sustainable long-term flight rates. 

The first year flight definition team is headed by Mr. Edwin Hoskins, head of the Flight Integration Office at JSC. The flight rate 

team is headed by Mr. Alfred Bishop, Deputy Manager of Mission 

integration at JSC. 

As a result of this work, the program has recommended a first 

flight date of July 15, 1987, as Admiral Truly has pointed out, and 

recommended a cargo of a tracking and data relay satellite for that 

first flight. Also, several manifest options for the entire first year 

have been developed and proposed to Admiral Truly as have first 

year and sustainable long-term flight rate assessments. 

In addition to the reviews outlined above in direct response to 

Admiral Truly’s strategy and action for returning the space shuttle 

to flight status, there are a number of other critical program activities which I would like to briefly describe. 

Shortly after the Challenger accident, I felt it was necessary to 

constitute a series of formal reviews to reassess known areas of 

technical risk across the Space Shuttle Program elements. In this 

regard, in March I initiated a series of senior management special 

program control review board meetings to consider space shuttle 

system areas where safety margins are a concern. This board is 

chaired by myself; membership includes the project managers of all 

NSTS program elements and their contractor counterparts, the 
sively pursued as potential downstream enhancements to space 

shuttle safety, performance, and operations. 

Board meetings to consider safety concerns involving the Kennedy Space Center launch facilities and the Vandenberg launch facilities will be conducted in the near future. Solid rocket booster 

safety concerns are currently being addressed separately in the 

solid rocket motor redesign team at the Marshall Center that I 

mentioned previously. 

In association with other analyses of the STS 51-L accident, a 

special review of space shuttle crew egress and escape provisions 

has been initiated under Mr. Allen Louviere of the JSC Research 

and Engineering Directorate. The scope of this analysis will cover 

the total mission and flight profile, which includes onpad, launch, 

ascent flight to orbit, and descent from orbit to landing phases. To 

analyze each aspect of the mission, design teams for ground egress, 

bailout, ejection, water landing, and powered flight separation have 

been established, and a systems engineering team is in place to 

maintain steady continuity and integrate the results of the proposed system concept studies. 

The initial team activities are in progress with a preliminary 

report scheduled to me by June 15, 1986. From these data and preliminary assessments, it is expected that the most feasible concept 

to be studied further will be selected. This study will consider 

modifications to the existing STS system and also concepts which 

might be included in future space shuttle vehicles. 

At the time of the STS 51-L accident, the STS Centaur hardware 

was well into its test program, and resulting design issues were to 

be reviewed at a second Delta certification review scheduled for the 

February 1986 timeframe. 

Subsequent to the accident, JSC and the Lewis Research Center 

have initiated a comprehensive re-review of the Centaur vehicle 

and associated missions, and have defined a series of modifications 

which should be made to enhance both Centaur and orbiter safety 

on these missions. 

In addition, a series of studies and reviews were implemented to 

ensure that currently defined systems, processes, procedures are 

adequate to control the hazards associated with Centaur shuttle operations. These studies and reviews are scheduled to be completed 

in September 1986. However, currently a complete reassessment of 

the residual risk of shuttle Centaur operations is underway, and results will be presented to Admiral Truly on this subject in the near 

future. 

Planning is also continuing for the Vandenberg launch site activity required to conduct special tests of the shuttle vehicle and 
g pqy 

Columbia will be conducted utilizing currently available filament 

wound case solid rocket booster hardware which will have to be 

substituted downstream for their first flight with redesigned filament wound case solid rocket boosters. 

Finally, in consideration of the number, complexity, and interrelationship between the many activities leading to the next flight, I 

have initiated a series of formal program management reviews for 

the National Space Transportation System. These reviews are 

structured to be regular face-to-face discussions involving the key 

managers of all space shuttle program activities and will be 

chaired by myself. 

Specific subjects to be discussed at each meeting will focus on the 

progress, schedules, and actions associated with these major program reviews that I’ve described, and each meeting will be tailored 

directly to the current program work for the time period involved. 

The first of these meetings was held at Marshall on May 5 and 6, 

and it proved to be a very effective session for the total program 

elements. Follow-on reviews will be held approximately every 6 

weeks, and I’m planning to have the next meeting in the week of 

June 16 at the Kennedy Space Center. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes a summary of my testimony, and I 

appreciate this opportunity to appear today and will be pleased to 

answer other questions related to this activity. 

[The prepared statement of Arnold Aldrich follows:] 
and Applications 

Committee on Science and Technology 

House of Representatives 

99th Congress 
National Space Transportation System 

Nationa: Aeronautics and Spacp Pdministration 

Johnson Space Ceriter 

before the 

Subcommittee on Space Science ard Applicctions 

Committee on Science and Technology 

1Jriited St?trs House of ReprPsPntatives 

ur. Chairman and Distipguished hlembers of the Subcommittee: 

Thank :/ou for vour invitation to testify befcrr? this Subcomaittee reqarding 

Natiunal Spzce Transportation Systerr r;ctivities keyed ?o the safe resumption 

cf Space Shuttle operations. 

!r response to Adr,iral Truly's directior! on safely returning the Space 

Shuttle to fliyht status 1 have initidted ,program-wide activities t@ fUl':/ 

in:plyier,t Admirdl Truly's actions. Speciflrally, Space Shuttle m?ragers At 

tnt ,Jt~t~r~sov Space Ceriter, the Marshall Space Flight Center, ?rd the Kennedy 

:pace Center have been assigned responsibility for each specific action. 

These activities are well underway including the development of comprehensive implementation plars and schedules. EdLI! dctlvity iricludes appropriatp participatluii fronr Spdce Shuttle project elements, from JSC, MSFC, 

ard YSC engineering orqanizations, frorr the JSC fl lght crew (astronaut) 

operations orgzpizarior, and from the Vandenberg launch nnd lzndilig operations organizatiofi. Specific lpad assigniiients arid current stdtus are surnmari7ed as fnllows: 

1. The Solid Rocket F'otor (SRM) Pedeslan 'fearr is headed by Wr. 2nhn 

Thomas cf the Marshall Space Fligh!. Center.. He ha5 Pstahlished a tesm 

ir residence at MSFC that ciirsists uf approriti:dtely 75 peop1P frcm both 

UASP and ifidustry. Thpir pre1;rniqary work to date has concentrat-ed On 
verification. The team will focus on each Shuttle project element and 

on total Space Shuttle system design requirements. This activity will 

culmlnate in a Space Shuttle Delta Design Certification Review (ADCR) 

approximately 3 months prior to the next Space Shut.tle launch. 

3. P complete re-review cf all Space Shuttle program failure modes and 

effects analyses (FMEA's) and associated crttlcal item lists (ClL's) was initiated shortly after the 5TS 51-L accident. Mr. Rill McCarty, 

NSTS Manager for Safety, Reliability, snd Quality Assurance at the 

Johnson Space Center, has heen assigned to lead this activity. Exh 

Space Shuttle project element and their prime contractors are conducting separate comprehensive revfews which will culminate ir- a 

program-wide review with thr NSTS Manager late thls year. Technical 

specialists from cutside the Space Shuttle prograni have beep essigned as formal members of each of these review teams. As these reviews 

ComnePce. all prior criticality 1 and 1R critical item waivers hdve 

been voided and the teams are requir2d to reassess and formally 

resubmit for approval waivers in these categories recommended for 

cortinued program applicobility. This activity will culminate in a 

comprehensive final review with Admiral Truly. 

4. A program-wide re-review of all Space Shuttle test and checkout 

operations and Maintenance Requirwwnts and Specifications (OMRSD) is 

being conducted under' the leadershlp of Mr. Willidm Fibcher of the N5TS 

Systems Integration Office at JSC. PdrtiLular enlphasis will be placed 

on identifying and scrutiniziny test requirwients ttiilt leal with criticality 1, lR, and 2 hardware. This aLt.ivity is scheduled tc be completed ldtr in 1966 and is closely cc;upled with the FMEA/CIL an6 

Operaticns and Maintenance Instruction (OMI) rrviews. 

5. A comprehensive review of Space Shuttle Operations and HPintevance 

!nstruc+.ioris (OMI's) is underway under the leadership of Ilr. Rober? 

Fieck, Directrr of Shuttle Vanagement and Operations at KSC. The 

activity includes a full technical re-revipw of dll rhuttle processin! 

papsr atid requirernerts. In addition, It is responsib;e for developing 

closed-loop controls betweerl FMEA/ClL, OMPSD, and OM1 checkout requirements and procedures. This activity is expected to extend intb the 

early 1987 time frame. 

6. A LaunchiAbort Reascessment Team has been Pstablished undcr Mr. 2~v 

Greene, Flight Cirector at JSC. This teav is re-reviewinq Space 

Shuttle Launch Conmiit Critcrid, Fliyht Rule$, operationa: crpw <light 

proc~dures. Spare Shuttle ascert desiqn, landing Site ~rlrrtli~~ and 

ct,aracteristics for aborts ?nd noniin,:l rt:d-of-mission lnndiny, ar,d the 

desigr and requirerents for the Sydce Shuttlf: Range Safetv 5vstw and 

associated procedures. Ground rules and ionstrdirts ass?c'?teJ with 

first flight are receiving high priority. Longer ranye iteirs sucI' ds 
istics for the Space Shuttle flrst flight and to develop projected 

first year drid sustainable long-term Shuttle flight. rates. The first 

flight definition team 1s headed by Mr. Edwin Hoskins, Head of the 

Flight Integration OPflce at JSC, and thp flight rate team is headed by 

Mr. Alfred Rishop, Deputy Manager of the Mission Integration Office a? 

JSC. The highest prfority dctivity iri thi$ dred has beon the c'c-velopment of ground rules and constraints for first flight and dcterir.lndl,icr 

of the first cargo. As a result. of this work the prograir has recommended a first flight date of July 15, 1987, with a Tracking and Datii 

Relay Satellite (TDRS) as the fir:t cargo. Also, several manlfest 

options for the first yedr of flight have been developed arld proposed 

to the Associate Administrator for- Space fliyht. First yecr and 

sustainable fl fght rate assessments are discussed in a subsesuent 

paragraph. 

The ahove efforts will require a signiflcant amount cf vanpower bcth 

withir. NASA and at their cot:tractors. An interactive schediilc. wfiich 

shows specific milestones and the detailed interrelaticnshiu cc Lhrse 

activities is being developed. It is anticipated ttidt this wcrk will 

generally extend over the next 12 months and will culminate in spec!*,\ 

reviews to Adviral Truly at 4ASA Headquarters. 

In addition to the reviews outlined 8bove in dlrect respcrse to Adviral 

Truly's str?teyy arid actions for re?urr~iny tlie Space Shut+l? tc' 

status there are n number of additional prograrr activities underw;rj r:hlch I 

wculd like tc brieflv describe. 

Shortly after the Challenger accident ! felt that it was rfcessary 'n 

rcrstitute a srvirs of formal reviews tc; reassess awas of kr.owr technical 

risk across the Space Shuttle program elemerts. In this regard, I ir,itiatPd 

a series of senior rnarbogement special Pi-ogrnrr Rrcuirpmants Control 5car.d 

(PRCB) meetir.as in March to consider Shuttle $y$terii areas where safstv 

marqfrs are of concern. This bnerd is ihairrd by the NST5 Nariayer did 

membership iiicludes the project iiidriayers for a11 FISTS proyrav ~l~m~nts and 

their ccntrdctor cnuntrrpartS, the .lohnscr, Spoce Center's Cirpctrrs nf Space 

Operations ar,d Research and Engineering, and the {lead of the Astronaut 

QffiLr. fo datr. 96 diffPrer:t potential safety corcsrns invclbina Orbiter, 

exterridl taiik, drid Spdce Shuttle main engine hardware and software have beer 

considered. Of these, 44 are of a level ot significancv that improved 

herdware, software, processicg, and/or operatioras nay be required before 

resunring flight activities. Forward action patbs ?re uriderwo, 01' each 6' 

these itms and appropriate actions hdVF. beer1 djiigliad. T~LJIII~CCIT 1liipr'bvrments deemed not CritiLdl to f ir5t fliqtit ?re dlsV beir.i! dgywssiv~;y 

pursued as potential downstream enhancements to Shuttle sacety prrfor'nwrre 

and okerations. Board rreetings to consider, safe?) concerns iriclvinc 

Kenned:, Space Center launch facilities wlll be conducted in the ricar future. 

Solid rocket booster safety concerrs are belnq separately eddrrssec b) t+f? 

Solid Rocket Motor Rrdesigri teaw at, the Marshdll Space fliqht Cer,trr. 
g

g, , jy, g, pg

separation have been established. A system engineering team is in place to 

rnnintnin study continuity and integrate the rarults of tho proposed syrterrs 

concepts studies. In conjunction with the system engineering team an 

envelope definition team will construct and provide the approprldte trajectories to be used across the total review. These trajectories will be 

cverlaid with the physiological envelope limits and combined trajectory end 

physiologfcal envelopes will be evaluated dyalnst the capabilities of the 

various survival system concepts. tfiitial tear activities are ir proqress, 

with a preliminary report scheduled for June 15, 1986. From these data Frd 

preliminary analysis, it is expected that the most feasible concept: to be 

studied further will he selected. This study will ccnsider modificatiors tb 

the existing STS and concepts wtiich may be included in future Space Shuttl? 

vehicles. 

In conjunctior with all program elements, the NSTS Office has beer. rleveloping a prcposed plan for NSTS dctivites 1eadil;g to the first Shuttle fligbt 

and d series of options for the manifest for the first few flights downstrean. This plan includes provisions for major program objectives such as 

bririyiriy the Vandrnberg Launch Site (V1.S) facilities ?rd the Shuttle/ 

Centaur upper stage into flight status, iiiLludiny any dssociated modifications to the Orbiter flwt. Rotti t.he VLS and Cent.dbr activites are 

addressed in separate parts of this statement. 

The basis for the plbr, is a schcdli'e for the redesigr anr. tes? 06 the sclid 

rocket boaster which could permit flight hcrdware deliverv iv suppctrt of d 

July 1987 initial launch. The cargo planned for this flight is a Tracking 

and Data Relay Satellite as a top agency priority. 

Thc primary ohjectivt tif the initial nian1fe:t for 5ub:equent f:lgrts 'lac 

beer tu select dfi rdrly flight proyrairl ttid+ i\ consprvdtive ana rf;latlve?y 

insensitive to schedule delays which inight c,ccur in ritk,er the SRP rpiieslqfi, 

the Vzcdenbera ldunch si tr activation. ii :tit, Crntdur ~rtodi~ic~ttlo~~ programs 

such that all STS planning dnd training can be stabilized ip this critlca? 

period. Thus, shoule 8 slip in any of these ?ct'vltles cccu', the progrJr 

could retain tbe same bzsic flight content and sequrnce witb only a reiativel:! simple adjustment of launch dates. 

A key element of the options cctxidercd is that becausc cc launch perfomnnce requirements many of the early hiqh pricrity cargoes requ're either the 

Discovery or Atldirtih Crbiter vehicles. Di:covPrv is the cnly Grbi+er fully 

instrumented and configured *or the firs:. Vdnd.-JI-lbt,r.g launch. lherefore. the 

tiiilifip of anv Vandpnberg activity can bP influenced by the priori:y c'f blgh 

perforniiince requirenirnLs at KSC arid vice vtr.5.j. The babic options which 

result from these considcrntions relilt$ to .whether +O retali' d planetary 

flight on Centaur in December 19G7, or to defer. it iv fdvcr of nther hich 

priority TDPS, Space Telescope. or DOD missiorl$. This decision will be 

influenced by overall decislons and implementation schedules crl the Centaur 

prp,iect, The decisicp is also dependent upcr cpnfidence in the 'Vandeflberc 
design certification review scheduled fclr the February 1986 time frame. 

Subsequent to the accident, JSC and the Lewis Resedrch Center initiated a 

comprehensive review of the Centaur vehicle and associated rissions and 

defined a series of niodiflcations which should be irtade to enhance Centaur 

safety. In addition, a series of Studies and reviews were implemented tG 

ensure that currently defined systems, processes, and procedures are adequate tn control the hazards associated with Centaur operations. These 

studies atid reviews are scheduled to be completed in September- 1986. 

Deslgn modifications associated with Centaur oxygen and hydrogen dump valves 

have the qreatest schedule risk of those chariyes specified to date. Cther 

activities which could lead to additional Centaur schedule risks, shoulc! r.ew 

concerns be uncovered, are a comprehensive review of the Centaur propellant 

tenk pressure control system design and a review of system designs aid 

procedures associated with safe control of the abort situation when the 

Shuttle must return with the tanked Centaur in the nrbiter cargo bay. 

When currently deflned modifications to Centaur and to the Orbiter are 

successfully completed, ard when any further issues resultiny froir these 

continuing reviews are properly dispositloned, all krown steps necessary to 

cause the Shuttle/Centaur to be as safe as possible wlll have been taken. 

ilowcver, the basic design of the Centaur. i,e., pressure-stabilized llquld 

oxygeri ard liquid hydrogen tanks with a comvon bulkhead will not perwit 

total eliminatiop c.f 311 risk. 

A wrssessment of the residual risk of Shuttle/Certaur operations and 

asscccated acceptability is currently underwsy aod result5 will be preserted 

to the Pssociate Admlnistrntor in the neor future. Pr~vious assessments oc 

:tiis risk have led to the coiiclusior that, given successful conpletion Gf 

program activities, the residual risk will be sufficient!! control!ad to 

certify The Centaur for flight. A significert cnnsideratirn iri thc- Cui‘ienr 

reaSSesSment. will be the abfllty to maintain quality, reliability, and 

expertise ir the Centaur program and ts assure tbst the resioua\ risks car 

be adequately controlled over a long period of operation. 

Planninq 15 continuing for the Vardcnberg LdUCCh Site (VLS! actlvites 

required tc conduct special tests c,f the Shutt?e vehicle ant qround 

facilities late this year. These tests includr vehicle cnd launch munt 

structural CherdLteribtiCs definitirn, Shuttle to facility interface vet-ification, snd a demonstration of liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen tanking. 

?he test plans are being structured tG provide early verification of 

Vat-denberg activation and, therefore, provide mximum time for any related 

problem resoluticjn so as to -minimize subsequent requirements for the first 

Vandenbcrg launch flow. To complete these early tests, the program plnrls to 

ship Columbia to VanCPnberg in September 19116. .Subbequent facility test5 

with Columbia will be conducted utilizing current.ly available fi1dll’Fnt woufI:J cose solid rocket boo:+er hardware which will Fevr to bp substituted frsr a 

modified design prior to first flight. 
gp

pyg 

options for facility design changes to control this pctential hazard and 

analyses and test plans to select and fmplement a solution are in progress. 

This activity together with the efforts required to redeslqn and certify the 

fllament wound case solid rocket booster represent the inejor schedule issues 

related to the first Vgndenberg flight. 

Kith respect to the Space Shuttle Orbiters, a plan was put in place in 

mid-March to begin a concerted Orbiter IriudiYication effort to incorporate 

all outstanding vehicle modification kits at KSC which had rwt previcusly 

been scheduled for work. These kits represent approved modifications which 

had been designated "targets-of-opportunity" until a specific mission or 

itianifest dictated their incorporation and rion-mandatory wurk that had beer 

deferred from prior launch preparation flows. The major categories of 

modification work are: wing structure beef-up to improve launch probabilitv; thermal protection system upgrades to facflitate more efficient 

turnaround; fluid, mechanical, and structural modificatioits to accommodate 

the Centaur payload; and other unique Instrumntation, communications, and 

payload accommodation changes. Colunibia (OV-lo?) has 11C modifications 

scheduled. Discovery (OV-103) and Atlantis (SV-104) have 48 and 31 modificatluns respectively, which represent a lesser ouantity primarily because 

these Crbiters were built later thar Colun!bia rnd incorporated srm features 

which Colurnbis requires as liar? of their initiul build. The wcrk is progressing as planned ard will suppt2r.t d inid-1387 resumptior of flichts. 

Alsc, planning is underway to support any additionzl modifications dictate? 

by the on-gcirq Space Shuttle and Cen+nur safe5 reviews. 

The NSTS Offire ha5 provided the results ~f art analysis rf NSTS sac0 clioh: 

rate capability to the Associate Administretor Tor Space Flight. Paced upor 

6 ravlpw of the flight rate capacity of all NSTS elervnts, it was concluded 

that the limitiry factor iri determining flight ritv 1s the amount @f tlirc 

required Tor turnarcund and processing of vehicles and cargo a: KSC. Tbe 

recent best avwage turnaround achlevec! by :he ST: u4. CSC (i.e., :he last 

six flight5 prier to STS 51-L), suggest thst the ornqram could acPirve on 

operaticnal flight rate fJf 12-15 flights per jedi' with three Orbitei-s. This 

rdfiqe is dependent upon subsequent program decisiors regilrdinc increased 

pos tf 1 i ght i nspecti or per1 ods and mani f es t drc i s i ons . Yan i f es t dec i s i ur's, 

including the selection cf specific Largoes drid the number c' i'andenber~ 

launches. are very significant fdCtUrS iri determirjng actual f:ioht rate 

accomplishment. The specific selection of cargoes hds a fli5ht rate effect 

because sore cargoes such rs Centaur, Spacelab, dl'd certaii POP payloails 

require mure inteyrdtiurl dnd test time 3nd, ther-efore, occupy the vehicles 

dnd fzcilitips $or period., Icngev that: :he norm. Thi? riet rcsul'. L,~ this 

effect is the suppression of the idedl fliqht rilte cap;ibilitv which kould br 

achievaulr for a manlfest ccr,slstir$ primarily uc rui~~iiiercial satel1;tcr a-d 

smalle- science pavloads. Fnr Vandenbey Air Force Qdbc (VAFBI fllqtts, the 

-:(tended ljunch pad operattons flrd the fact ihdt :he Or-bite, is ciirren'l>/ 

planned tu be processed KSC, causes an Orbiter to be unava4:ablP fiJr 
operational flight rate once the Space Shuttle resumes flight operations. 

Factors whlch influence this bulldup, in addition to the previously mentloned manifest decisions, are the tncreascd turnaround time necessary fer 

early-on detailed postflight inspection of SRE hardware and a conservative 

approach to returning to Orbiter checkout and processing times which are ' believed to be eventually achievable. Based upon these factors, the NSTS 

Office has recommended a fliyht rate buildup of 6-7 flights in the first 

year, 9-11 flights in the second year, and 12-15 flights in the thtrd year. 

In each case a range has been specified to accnmodate subsequent manifest 

dcclsions. A flnal conclusion of the study was that a fourth Orbiter would 

he rsquired to sustain a realistic flight. rate above the 12-15 fllghts per 

year range. 

Fifld1ly, in consideration of the number, complexity, and interrelationships 

between the many actlvltles leading to the next flight, 1 have initiated a 

series of formal Program Management Revfews for the National Space Trarsportation System program. These reviews are structured to be regular 

face-to-face discussions Involving the managers of all major Space Shuttle 

progrorr activities, and will be Ctldired by the NSTS Manager. Specif'c 

subjects to be discussed at each meetin? will focus on progress, schedules, 

and actions assnclated with each of the major program revlew activities and 

Nil: he tailnred directly t@ current program activity for the tine period 

involved. The first of these meetings was reld at MSFC on nay 5-6, 1W6, 

and it proved to be a very effwtive sesslon. Follow-or reviews will be 

held approximately every G weeks with the nert meeting tentdtively set for 

the week of June 16 at KSC. 

Yr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared tr.stimmy. 1 appreciate this 

opportunity to appear before you tuday and would be pleased to answer an) 

questions you may have. 
NAME: Arnold D. Aldrioh 

TITLEI Mrna&er, National Spaoe Tranaportation Syetem 

BIRTHILACC AND DAT8: Lexington, Massaohuoetta; July 7, 1936. 

EDUCATION: Bachelor of acience degree in electrloal onglnaering, 

RCSIDLNCC: leobrook, Texao. 

MARITAL STATUS: Married to the former Eleanor Jean HArrla of 

Northeastorn Unlverslty, 1959. 

Boothbay Harbor. Maine. 

CHILDREN: Susan Olirabeth, Augurt 20, 1962; Ruarell Marria, 

Maroh 10, 1965. 

SIECIAL HORORS AND AWARDS: Presidential Rank of Moritorious 

Exrcutlve, 1982; NASA Dlrtlngulrhed Servioe Medal, 1981; 

and JSC Special Aohievement Award, 1977; Arthur 3. Floming 

Award, 1976; NASA Outstanding Leaderrhip Medal, 1975; JSC 

Certifiaate of Commendatlon, 1974; NASA Exceptional Servion Medal, 1971; and MSC Certificate of Commendation, 1969 

and 1970. - --.- 

PROFESSIONAL AND HONORARY SOCIETIES: Fellow, Amarican 

Astranrutloal Society, 1982; aarociate follow, Amorican 

Inatitute of Aoronautics and Astroneuticr; Eta Kappa Nu, 

National 8lectrioal Enginorring Honor Society; and JSC 

National bfanAgOnent Association. 

EXPERIENCE: 

1985-Preaent NASA Johnaon 3pace Center, Houaton, Toxa.. 

Manager, National Space Transportation System (NSTS). 

Lead Centor Manager for the Space Transportation System 

(STS) program nativities at the Johnson Space Center, the 

Marahall Space Plight Center, and the Kennedy Space Center 

for NSTS and overall rystems management, integration, and 

operation of the Space Shuttla system. Provided Level I1 

aana&eaent of the program; directlng'and controlling 

ooheduling and planning for NSTS design, development, 

teat, production, and operations; integrating a.11 element3 

of the program into a single operational syrtem; enrurlng 

effeotlvc'ooat control of the totel proRrrm: estahlishin~ 

And oontrolling aystem and progrmm requirenants and 

-norm- 
CIPERIBNCE (continued) 

configuration; and dlreotinu overall manaaemont of the JSC 

Space Shuttle Orbiter and asrociatbd Oovernment-furniehed 

equipment projects. 

1983-1985 Manager, Space S h u t t l e P r o j e c t s Offloo. Reaponelble 

for proaran management of a11 hardware and software for 

the Orbiter spaceoraft elomant of the ISTS. Technfoal and 

contract management activities for Orbiter systems development: Orbiter production and aodificatlons; Orbiter 

Kround support equipment; Orbiter ivlonlcs software development. and reconfiguration control; Orbiter flight oreu equipment; and engineering and logistics support for 

Orbiter operations. Overall flight readiness of the 

Orbiter spacecraft and relatbd equipment to the Manager of NSTS for all STS miasions. 

1982-1983 Managor, Orbiter Project. Dfrected the deaign, dovolopment, production, and test of the Space Shuttle Orbiter. 

Maintained technical and financial cognlrance of the 

Orbiter development and processin8 to maour. its succeasful support to SIS. Asourad the Spaab Shuttlb Proeram 

Manseer of the overall fliRht readiness of the Orbiter. 

hensivc mane(lenent with the ProRram Manager. Establiahed 

and controlled Spaoo Shuttle detalled requirements enfl 

o on flgura t ion ; implcnen ta ti on of appropr la te f ac lli t ies 

for launch, flieht, and landing support; flight planninF, 

and operations; detalled Prolrala planning and scheduling 

for the Space Shuttle system and ensuring effective cost 

control aoross the total Program. The ProKram ManaRer 

provided technical and proRrammatlc support to the 

Assoolate Administrator for STS. 

1980-1982 Deputy Manager, Spaoe Shuttle Progtsal--Bharod ooopre1976-1980 Manager, Orbiter Avionics Systems Offioe, Orbiter 

Project Office. 

opment of the Space Shuttle Orbittr avionics eyst,em for 

the Orbital Flight Test program and for the Approach and 

Landing fort program. Chairman of the Orbiter Avionics 

Softvare Control Board which basellnod and controlled 811 

Spaoe Shuttle Orbiter flieht sortusre requirements. 

Program Orrice. Directed the performance of independent 

assessments of Space Shuttle ProF,ram taehnical and 

proaranmatic areas of particular crltlcality vith special 

emphasis on tllqht vehicle systems engineering. 

Overall projeot management of the devel1975-1976 Mana(er, Program Assessment Offlce, Space Shuttle 

-more- 
1973-1975 Deputy Manager, Apollo Spaoeoreft Program Offico. 

Shared ulth the Progrem Manager planning and direating all 

Ispeots Of the Command and Servioe Module (CS1.0 pro(lram8 

for the Skylab Program and the Apollo-Soyuz Teat Project 

(AStP). Participated directly in the negotlatlonr vith 

representatives of the USSR with reapaot to inteerated 

ayDtem8 drrign arDessmente, hardware development, and 

CliRht oporetions planning in oarrying out the ASTP. In 

eddltion to his duties ae Dsputy Manager, he uas assl~ned 

as Manager, Skylab Program. Responsible for equipment 

disposition, Oonfiguratlon control of residual hrrdware, 

oontract closeout, and ooordinatlon of various actlvities 

relate8 to exploitation of the Skylab experience and 

acientlric data. 

1972-1973 Deputy Manager. Skylab ProRram. Shared wlth the Prolraa Manager overall planning, technical direction, and 

coordinatlon of all aspect. or the Skylab Procrmm at JSC. 

Flleht oper,tions activities in support of the CSM spacearaft during manned and unmanned Apollo flights. In 1972, 

assumed systena analysio and fll&ht operations planning 

and preparation rasponeibilities for bh. *..e&oas apeaocraft ~lenents or the Skylab Program. In preparing for 

Skylsb, he directed actlvities which led ta the evolution 

of fliRht systems managoment and data hand1in.g approaches 

uhich were keyed to the lOng-dUPatiOtl Earth orbital nature 

of the Skylab missions. 

1966-1972 Chlef, CSH Systems Branoh. FliRht Control Division. 

1961-1966 NASA Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston, Texas. Head, 

Oemlni Systems Section, Fllght Control Divirion. All 

flight control activlties relating to performance, rialfunction analysis, and ground control of the Gemini apacecraft rystens. Operated key console positions In the 

nirsion Control Center. 

1959-1961 NASA Space Task Oroup (forerunner of NASA Mannod 

Spacecraft Center), Langley Field, Virginia. Purine the 

lnltial phases of Project Mercury, contributed signiflcantly to initlal manned rpacecraft , f l i & h t o p e r a t i o n e 

philosophies, technique*, and pPoCGdUrBl planninlt. 

JANUARY 1986 

. -ond- 
the Data and Design Task Force, and Captain Crippen is a key 

member of that task force. He wouldn’t tell me what his real job is, 

but he said he was chief gopher. 

Astronauts are working right now in specific reviews in the 

space shuttle critical items lists and the failure modes and effects 

analysis at all the space shuttle centers, at Johnson, at Marshall, 

and at Kennedy. We expect that the review of these lists and these 

failure effects analyses will find items that need additional consideration with respect to safety design and/or test and checkout. 

We believe we’ll need additional effort downstream in the space 

shuttle turnaround to assure that the life cycle reliability of critical elements and subsystems in the Space Shuttle Program are 

maintained over the life of the program. 

In addition, other astronauts in our operating development working group are working full-time on the present activity to participate in the launch and the launch abort reassessment panels. 

They’re participating in the first space shuttle flight design and 

the first year of shuttle activity tasks. 

Every space shuttle system and every operating mode has an astronaut assigned to cover it now that we’re not flying. They participate in meetings at every NASA center on the orbiter and the Program Requirements System Design Review Control Boards, and, as 

you heard Arnie say, the Space Operations Directorate just brought 

a number of safety design changes to that Board that he chairs. 

We believe the majority of those changes will fall into the fixbefore-flight category or fix-in-the-near-term Category-which we 

assign to the completion of the carbon brakes, which is scheduled 

for mid-1988. I don’t know where the money comes from to fix 

those things, but I feel so strongly and so do the members of the 

Astronaut Office that they ought to be fixed. If extra money is required, it ought to come from the other space programs. Because, 

let’s face it, if we don’t have a space shuttle, we don’t need to talk 

about the space station much. And, if we’re going to have safe 

shuttle operations, we’re going to need to make some of these 

changes. 

Our own activity in the Astronaut Office has been restructured, 

including our safety programs. Now that we’re in the standdown, 

we plan to pursue a more conservative design, planning, procedure, 

and operation to reduce flight risks. That’s the ideas that we 

intend to advance. 

To support those safety proposals, we have assigned a senior astronaut to handle our safety in the Astronaut Office, Henry Hartsfield. At the present time, he is assisted by many other astronauts 
has to go to a change control board. 

It’s not clear from where we sit in these boards, and panels, and 

meetings that go on all over NASA that that line of communications is as good as it ought to be in order to make sure that we 

don’t have another accident. We trust that senior management is 

attuned to these concerns, and we know that they believe, ar, we 

do, that this is all going to be corrected before we fly again. 

In the interim, since we are participating in meetings, and 

panels, and review boards all over the centers, when we find a 

safety problem, we kick it upstairs. 

We have crews also assigned to working in integration simulations with the mission control center still doing things on new procedures and working with such new missions as the Centaur payload and the Vandenberg high inclination western test range 

flights, which Captain Crippen is going to be in charge of that mission. 

In summary, we have astronauts supporting to the best of our 

ability those actions that we perceive in the best interests of our 

Nation to return the space shuttle to safe operating status. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statements of Robert Crippen, Paul Weitz, and 

John Young follow:] 

63-144 0 - 86 - 2 
and Applications 

Committee on Science and Technology 

House of Representatives 

Statement by 

Robert L Crippen 

r,dJ Weitr 

John W Young 

99th Congress 
before the 

Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications 

Comnittee on Science and Technology 

United States House of Representatives 

Mr. Chairman and Distinguished Members of the Subcomnlttee: 

We want to tell you about Astronaut Office partlcipation to aid in the 

recovery from the 51-L Challenger accident. 

We have astronauts assigned to CoveI’ every actlvity associated with the 

Challenger accident. Astronauts are included in the Presidential Commission 

Investigation of the accident, at NASA Headquarters in the Accident Actlon 

Center and on every panel of the Data and Design Task Force. 

Astronauts are working right now in the the specific revfews of the Space 

Shuttle critical ttems lists ulth safety. reliability and quality assurance 

people. 

need additional consideration with respect to design change and/or test and 

checkout. We believe that we need additional effort in Space Shuttle 

turnaround to insure the life cycle reliability of critical elements and 

subsystems in the Space Shuttle Program. 

Astronauts are also participating in the solid rocket motor redesign both on 

the working teams and the oversight team. 

In addition. astronauts are working full time un the present activity of the 

launch/launch abort reassessment panels, first Space Shuttle flight design, 

and first year of Shuttle activity tasks. 

All Space Shuttle systems and operational modes have astronauts covering 

them. These astronauts participate in meetings of the Orbiter and Program 

Requirements System Design Review Change Control Boards. For example, the 

S p a c e O p e r a t i o n s Directorate brought forward to these boards a number of 

safety-critical design changes which are being disposltloned by appropriate 

change boards. The majority of these changes will undoubtedly fall into the 

fix-by-first-flight or the fix-in-the-near-term ( mid-1988) categories. We 

sincerely believe that it will be in the best overall interests of the Nation -~ if we are golng to have Safe Shuttle operations -- to make these safetycri t fcal changes. 

In the Astronaut Office. our own safety program ha: been restructured. 

During our standdown from Space Shuttle flights, our safety policy Is to reduce Spare Shuttle flight risk wherever practlcal. If more conservative 

design, planning, procedures, or operations can reduce flight risk, then 

We expect that the review of these lists will discover ltems that 
management levels tn order to Insure their early correction, but we trust 

that senlor management is attuned to these problems and recognlLe that they 

must be solved before we fly again. 

agency-wide safety group, we have been taking action to investigate and 

notify people about potential safety problems when we discover them on our 

own. 

We also have crews assigned to missions working in Integration slmulations 

with rnlsslon operations people on new procedures and proposed missions for 

the future such as the Centaur payload and the Vandenberg hlgh inclination 

Western Test Range fllghts. 

In sumnary, astronauts have been supporting to the best of our ability those 

actions that we perceive to be In the best interests of our Nation to return 

the Space Shuttle to safe operating status. 

In the interim. while we have no strong 

-2 
NAME: Robert L. Crippn (Caprain, CSNI 

NASA A8tronaut 

BIRTHPLACE AND DATE: Born in Beaumont. Tcnn8,onScptcmber 11,1937 

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION: Brown hair, brown eyea. height. 5 feet 10 inches. weight 1130 pounds 

EDUCATION; CraduaLed froill Xow Caney High School in Caney. Texsn. received a bnchrlor ofscience degree 

in Aerospace Engineering from the Cniverslty ofTexas in 1960 

MARITALSTATUS Single 

CHILDAEN: Ellen Marie, June 14, 1962. Susan Lynn. December 24, 1964. Linda Ruth. May 10,1987 

ORGAYIZATIONS: Member, &let) of Erper~nieritul Test Pilots. asnoctate fellow. American lnstituce of 

Aeronautics and Astronautics. and fellow. American Astronautical Society. 

SPECIAL HONORS: Awarded the SASA Distingushed Service Medal 119811. the NASA Exceptional Service 

Medal a n d t h e JSC Group Achierement Award (19721. the Department of Defense Distinguished Service 

Award (19811. Also received the Amerrcsn Astronautical Society Flight Achievement Award (1981). the 

National Coographic Society's Cardiner Creesc Hubbard Medal (19811. the Avlatlon Hall of Fame 

19.31 Al J Engel Award, the American Legion's Distinguished Service Medal (19811, thaSETP 

Ivan C Kincheloe Award (1981). the Federal Aviation Adminiitration's Award for Diatinguished Service 

(19821, the Goddard hlemorial Trophy 11982). the Harmon Trophy (19821, and four NASA Space Flight 

Medoh 

EXPERIENCE Crippen received his commission through the Navy's Aviation OfTicer Program at Pensacola. 

Florida, which he entered aher graduation from the University ofTexas He continued his flight training 

at Whiting Field. Florida. and went from there U, Chase Field in Beevllle. Texas, where he received his 

wings 

Frum June 19EZ 10 So\cmber 1964. he was assigned to Fleet Squadron VA 72 --completing2+ yearsaf 

duty as an attack p:lot aboard t h e a i r c r a n carrier USS ISDEPESDESCE He later attended the USAF 

Aerorpace Research Pilot School at Edwards Air Force Base, Callfornia. and upon graduatlon. remalncd 

there 

Program Crippen wns among the second group oraerospace rcsearch pilots tc be assrgned lo the MOL 

program 

He has loggcd morr thdn 6,000 hour fl! 

an instructor until his selection in October 1966 to the USAF Manned Orbiting Labratory 

time, which includes more than 5,500 hours injet aircraft 

N A S A E X P E R I E N C E : Crippen brcunie a \ASA astronaut 111 Seplrniber 1969 lie rasacrewmember on 

the hlghly successful 5k)ldb Medical Experinienls Altitude Test ISMEATI . a 56 day simulation ofthe 

Sk,lab mission. enirblkng crcx men 10 collsxt rncdtcnl e~prrimenis baseline data and cvaluato rquipment. 

operations. and proccdurcs 

Crippn w~sLI nwrnber ofthe u$lronaui 3upp)rt crew for Ihr Sk,lab 2, 3, and 4 missions, and he ser,ed in 

thls same capacitj for the Apollo Sobuz Test Project IASTF'L mlsblon, which wm completed successfully in 

July 1976 
tho nrrt true manned spaceship It wan also the first manned vehicle to be flown into orbit without benefit 

of pnvlow unmanned "orblul" trsting, the first to launch with wing# using solid rocket boosters. It was 

also the flrrt winged reentry vehicle to return to a conventional runway landing, weighing more than 

99 LON am it wan braked to a @top on the dry lakcbed at Edwards Air Force Base. California. 

Crippcn waa next spacecraft Commander of STS-'I. the secund flight for the Orbiter Challenger, 

June 18~24.1983 This was the flrot mission with a 5.per~n crew which included Rick Hauck (pilot). 

and mission specialirtr, John Fabian. Sally Ride. and Norman Thsgard During the mission, the crew 

deployed satellites for Canada (ANIK C-2) and Indonesia (PALAPA tJ.11; operared the Canadian-built 

Remolc Manipulator Sysum (RMS) to perform the first deployment and retrieval axercise with the 

Shuttle Pallet Sotellite (SPAS-01 I; conducted the first formation flying ofthe orbiter with a free-flying 

sstcllite (SPW-01); carried and operated the first U S German cooperative materials science paylosd 

(OSTA.2). and operated the Continuous Flow Electrophoresis System (CFES) and the MOnodiEperSe 

Latex Reactor (MLRI experiments, in addition to activatinp seven Getaway Special9 Mi8rion duration 

WIU 147 hours before landing at Edwards Air Force Base, California 

On his third flight, Crippen was spacecraft commander ofSTS 41-C. April 8.13,1984. His crew included 

Dick Scobce (pilotl. and mission specialists, Terry Hurt. Pinky Nelson, and Ox van Honen During this 

74sy mission the crew suwmfully deployed the Long Duration Exposurt Facility (LDEF); retrieved the 

dling Solar Maximum Satellite. repsired it on-board the orbiting Challcngrr, and replaced 11 In orbit 

using thr robot arm called the Remote Manipulator System (RMS). flight tvated the Manned Maneuvering Units (MMC'rI in twoextravehicular activities (EVAsl. as well a* opersting the Cinema 360 and 

IMAX Camera Systems, and a Bee Hive Honeycomb Structures student experiment. Mission duration 

wa. 168-hours bofore landing at Edwards Air Force Base, California 

As spacecrall commander orSTS 4l-G, October 6-13, 1984. Cripprn'x crew, the largest M fly lo date. 

included Jon McBride (pilot), three miasion specialists. Kathy Sullivan, ally Ride and Dave Leestma. as 

well as two payload specialists, Marc Carneau and Paul Sully-Power Their 8-dny mission deployed the 

Earth Radiation Budget Satellite. conducted scientific observations ofthe earth with the OSTA-5 pallet 

and Large Format Camera, as well as demonstrating potential satellite refuelling with an EVA and 

associated hydrarine transfer Mission durarlon was 197 hours and concluded wtth a landing at Kennedy 

Spnco Center. Flarrda 

CURRENT ASSIGNMENT CaptPin Crippen is currently assigned a6 spacecrah commander of STS 62-A. which is scheduled for launch in mid 1986 This will be the first Space Shuttle launched from Vendenberg Air 

Force Base. California 

JASL'ARY 1988 
NAME: John W. Young IMr ) 

NASA Astronaut 

BIRTHPLACE AND DATE: Born in San Francirco,CsliTbrnia,on September 24, 1930 

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION: Brown heir. green eyes. height 5leet 9inches. weight 165 pounds 

EDCCATION: Graduated from Orlando High School, Orlando, Florldr. received a bachelor of science degree in 

Aeronautical Engineering with high061 honors from the Georgia Institute of Technology in 1952 

MARITAL STATUS: Married to the former Sus) Feldman ofSt Louis, Missouri 

CHILDREN; Daughter, Sand?, April 30,1951 Son, John, January 17,1959 

RECREATIONAL INTERESTS: Running 

ORGANIZATIONS: Fellow ofthe American Astronautical Society(AAS1. the Societj ofExperimental Test Pilots 

(SETP). and the American Institute of AerOnclutics and Astronautics (AIAA! 

SPECIAL HONORS: Awarded the Cunyressional Space Medal of Honor l1981!, the Department of Defense 

Distinguished Service Medal 1981 I, 3 SASA Distinguished Sergicc Medals. 2 NASA Exceptiona! .Se:\ice 

Medals. Saw) Astronaut Wings (19651.2 >a\.? Distinguished Service Sledals, 3 NQV) Distinguibhed 

Flying Crosses the Georgia Tech Distinguished Young Alumni Award 11965!. Diitinguirhed Service 

Alumni Award (19721,2 SETP I\an C Kincheloe Auards t19:2 and 1981). 3 AAS Flight Achie\,ement 

Awards (1972.1981 and 1983,. 3 AlAA Haley Space Flight Awards (19i3,1982and 1984). thc AS4lE 

Spirit ofS1 Louis >ledel il9821, the Bracklej Pllots and Air Ssbigators Trophy irorn the L'ni~ed Klngdom. 

the Goddard. Collier and Harmon Trophier from thp Lnitcd States. the Sational Geographic Socier) 

Hubbard Mede! 119821. more than 45 other major awards and 0 honorary doctorate degree: 

EXPERIENCE: Lpon gredudtiun from GeorgiaTech. Youngentered thr Cnited StntPs Sad! After scrtlngon the 

west coast desiro>er, USS LAWS lDD.55@1, for 1 year. he was sent lo flight training In propr,je:s. and 

helicopters He uas then assigned IC Fighter Squadron 103 for 4 years, flying Cougars end Crusaders 

After test pilot training at the C S Kerb Test Pilot Schvcl in 1959, he was assigned to the S&I4 Air Te.1 

Center for 3 yeara His test projects included evaluations ofthe Crusader and Phantom fighter weapon5 

myitems In 1962, he set n,orld time to.climb records to 3,000 and 25,000-meterallitudcs in the Phantom 

Prior to reporting to SASA he uas maintenance offtcrrofPhantom Fighter Squadron 143 Young retired 

from the Sary aza Captain in Septemher 1976 a~tercompl~llngalmosl 25)earaofarli%e militar! Ferbice 

He hea logged more than 10.200 huur. Ilb trig time, including 835 hours in six ~pacefligllls 

NASA EXPERIENCE: In September 1962 Young uassrlPcleda4 an BS:TO~BUI Hr IS the firbt person ton? tn 

space Six trrnee The flight ma; uiih Cui Crissnrn in Cemim 3. the first manned Gemini mic5!u 

March 23 1965 Thikuars rompleitend tri rrid test oftheCeminr spwecrafl On G~mill 10, Jult : 

1966 Young. a8 comrr.andri and 51th~ Coilins, es pilot cornp:rted a dual rcndezxouc uirh lwo separa 

Agrna target behicles Mlkr Collins MISO did an prira\ehicular transfer to retripbe B micrometeurili 

dvlrrtor rrom the second Agrr,a On hi% third night Ma> 16-26 196Y. Young rommand module p 

Apo!,o 10 Tom Stafford dr.d Lcne Cernan -ere alri on thli miision uhlch orbited rhr \loo:, and coin 

' ! 4 1. r I. 
.yatemr performance during Irunch. on orbit. and entry Tc8U included rvrlurtion of thr orbit 

rrrchanlul syotdms much as the payload bay doors. attitude and mrneuverlng rocket thrusurr. guidance 

and nbvlgation ayskrm. and Orbiterlcrew compatibility Columbia i~ the first manned spaceship lo be 

flown Into orbit wlthout benefit of previous unmanned orbrtal tarring Columbia 1s alm the first wingpd 

mentry vmhicle lo roturn from apncr tom runway landing It WoiEhed almost 100 Lon3 as Young braked ~t 

tom #top on he dry lakebed it Edwards Air Force Brie, Cdifornin 

Young‘s sixth flight wu aa mp.cecrahcommander ofSIS9. the first Spacelab miscion. S‘ovrmber 28- 

December 8, 1903, with pilot Brwstcr Slimw. miision specialists Bob Parker nnd Owen Cmrriott. and 

pyload apecialiau Byron LichtanberE of the USA, and UIf Merlmld of West Germany. The mission 

auccershlly completed all 94 of it8 flight test objectives For 10 da) s the 6 man crew worked 12 hour 

shUU around.Lhe.clock. periorming more than 70 experiment8 in the flelds of atmospheric physics, earth 

observations. BWCC plasma physics, astronomy nnd solar physics, rnateriala processing and life scielicp5 

The mission rrturnrd more wientific and technical data than all the previous Apollo and Skylab missions 

put together The Spacelab was brought back for reuse, making Columbia the heaviest Orbiter ye1 

returned, at 11 1 tons. as Young landed the spaceship at Edwards Air Force Base, Cnlllornia 

Young was also on hour backup crews - backup pilot in &mini 6. backup command pilot of Aprllo 7. and 

hckup spacrcrafl commander for Apollo 13 and 17 In preparation for prime and backup crew positions 

on LOspaceflights, Young has put more than 11.100 hours into training so far. mostly in sirnulstioni and 

aimulatorr 

InJanuary 1073 Young was assigned the Space Shuttle Brnnch of the Astronaut Ofice. providing 

op.rCIiona1 and engineering astronaut support for the design and development of the Space Shuttle 

January 1974 he was made Acting Chiefofthe Astronaut OiYlce, and, in January 1975, Chiefofthe 

AIvonaut Omce, wlth responsibility for the coordination, scheduling. and control of activities of more 

than 90 artroneuts 

In 

JANUARY 1985 
MAHlIAL STATUS la, ricd 10 the hrmtr Su~unne M Hcrvy orllnrhozrlcek, I'enn.yludni~ hr., 1d:hr.r I, \I 

dohnH Berry 

CHILDREN Mnlthcw J Seplemkr 23. 1958. Cynthia A, Sprembrr 25, 1961 

HECHEATIONAL INTERESTS HunlrnKund fifihing ere umon,: hi- hohbiw 

ggg

we’ll intersperse with other questions and then tie up some loose 

ends toward the end before we have our next panel. 

As we approach the question of flight safety, part of the reason 

for calling this hearing today was to approach it from Admiral 

Truly’s memo in looking to the future how we can get ourselves 

straightened out so that we have that confidence and assurance for 

the future. 

Part of it, however, also was sparked by virtue of the memo that, 

Mr. Aldrich, you had written on January 14 while STS 61-C was 

on orbit, right after it had launched, discussing a number of things 

that you were concerned about, and a memo subsequently written 

by Mr. Young in which he had discussed a number of things of 

flight safety. 

We don’t want to necessarily dwell on that. The thrust of this is 

to look to the future as to how we correct and make sure that we 

have the assurance. Nevertheless, I need to look to those two particular instances with regard to STS 61-C. 

Now, for example, both of you in your memos mention that had 

a scrub not occurred on January 7, which was a scrub that occurred by virtue of unacceptable weather conditions in Dakar, Senegal, and Moron, Spain, had we launched. I think both of you in 

your memos use words to the effect of, it could be potentially catastrophic to the vehicle and to the crew, and you noted that that 

was due to the fact that after the scrub and you detanked, you 

found this temperature probe from the ground support equipment 

had flowed through the lox line and stuck into a prevalve and 

stuck it open, and you described what the consequences would have 

been at main engine cutoff with that valve stuck open. 

Let me turn to you, Mr. Aldrich. Would you elucidate and give 

us some ideas as to that particular incident and what we can do for 

the future as it applies to the overall ensuring of flight safety? 

Mr. ALDRICH. Mr. Chairman, let me address that and try to describe that briefly but in a way that characterizes what went on 

there. 

The space shuttle main engines are very complicated engines, 

and they have a lot of characteristics that we’ve worried about over 

the years. One of those characteristics is the shutdown sequence, 

and if it is not performed correctly with the two propellants, it can 

in fact detonate or explode rather than shut down correctly. 

That was addressed in the mid-1970 timeframe, and the design 

feature for the shuttle system that was selected to allow for proper 

shutdown was utilizing prevalves in the orbiter aft end that are not 

part of the space shuttle main engine directly to cut off the liquid 
lodged in this prevalve in the orbiter system, and in fact had that 

temperature sensor been lodged there and had we flown, it’s quite 

likely the prevalve would not have closed correctly, would not have 

cut off the oxidizer supply correctly, and you would have had a 

much higher risk of an untoward occurrence at main engine shutdown. 

Having found that situation, we addressed that particularly and 

uniquely at the time. We looked at the oxidizer and liquid hydrogen probes, temperature probes, in both those lines leading to the 

vehicle and found that we could remove the probes completely 

from the hydrogen side, and they were removed and capped so that 

there would be no future threat of a probe coming loose downstream of the screens in that system. 

On the oxidizer sides, those probes are required for the loading 

sequence to be handled safely, and therefore they were removed 

and reinspected, and in fact the problematic probe that failed was 

found to have a deficient weld in its manufacture. The probes were 

inspected thoroughly and tested to be sure that all welds and all 

characteristics of those probes that were reinstalled were adequate. 

In fact, they were reinstalled, and we proceeded with the 61-C and 

subsequent operations with that configuration-that is, reverified 

probes in the oxygen system, probes missing in the hydrogen 

system. 

For the downstream, as part of the re-review process, we have directed that final filters now be placed downstream of all elements 

in the oxidizer system. That was a prior design consideration in the 

system. However, there was a misunderstanding about whether 

these probes, which are made out of stainless steel, were structure 

or were active elements, and, rather than revisit that discussion, 

we are now planning to reinstall filters downstream of everything 

in both those hydrogen and oxygen lines. 

Additionally, all other propellant servicing lines leading to the 

space shuttle vehicle are being reassessed for this particular kind 

of problem occurrence. 

Mr. NELSON. Including the ground support equipment? 

Mr. ALDRICH. Yes, sir. They are ground support equipment lines, 

and they will be addressed at the interface with the space shuttle 

to be sure there are no active components in critical lines that can 

break loose and not be trapped by a final filter. 

Mr. NELSON. Is there any less reliability in the welds for such 

items such as this temperature probe in the ground support equipment as opposed to the welds that are within the lines on the orbiter? 
now so that you have those filters. 

Mr. ALDRICH. Yes, sir. 

Mr. NELSON. But you’re not considering a filter that would go on 

the ground support equipment line before it ever comes into the orbiter? 

Mr. ALDRICH. Itwould be the final component on the ground support line. It would not change the characteristic of the orbiter or 

the other elements of the shuttle vehicle. So it is a ground support 

equipment change, but it becomes a totally final element of the 

system. 

Mr. NELSON. OK. 

Mr. Young, as you look back on this, what do you think aboutis this just part of a highly complicated machine that we learn 

about as we go about in adjusting our designs? What are your feelings about that? 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, that particular thing is certainly a complex 

thing. If that failure would cause the engine to overspeed and fail 

catastrophically, I still think that somebody needs to look at running this zero G test, because there are things that-you want to 

make sure that valve is reliable. It has a lot of single point failures 

in it. 

It’s not only that valve, but it has to be serviced by the Pogo 

system, which is a totally different system with check valves in it; 

there are single points; and the main engine controller has to 

work. So you want to look at all these things. You want to run the 

proper test. 

There’s some data that says it might not be catastrophic. So if 

you run your proper test and find out it’s not catastrophic, you 

don’t have to fix anything and we’ve made a big fuss over nothing. 

Mr. NELSON. All right. And you’re saying there needs to be a 

zero G test. 

Mr. YOUNG. If they can do it. 

Mr. NELSON. Has it been done before? 

Mr. YOUNG. We had it on the books many years ago, but we had 

to drop it because we didn’t have enough money or something. Mr. NELSON. OK. Would you pull that mike just a little bit 

closer. 

Well, let’s go to another example in which I think both of you 

have cited. It occurred the previous day, on January 6. Just before 

T minus 31 seconds and counting, one of the people in the launch 

control center noticed that a temperature red line had been exceeded as to the coolness of part of the lox lines, and a decision was 

made at that point to stop the count, which it stopped at 31 seconds. 
Mr. YOUNG. Well, theres a number of things when you have an 

incident like that happen to you, I think you need to stop and find 

out what really happened in real time before you proceed on further downstream, and that’s not hard to do. 

I’m glad that the Marshall Space Flight Center didn’t relieve 

that temperature constraint, because you might not have had all 

the propellant you needed in the tank to get to orbit if you had 

launched, so that was a good thing there. 

I think the safety committees that will be in process in the 

future, if something like that happens, we won’t proceed as rapidly 

as we might, and we’ll take a look and see what happened, just like 

you do in any other incident when you’re operating with things 

that you don’t understand. You’ve got to understand them before 

you go on further, and that’s a reasonable thing to do. 

Mr. NELSON. All right. So that the checks and balances were 

there. There was an alert fellow from Marshall and his contractor 

that noticed that temperature red line exceeding, and so that 

caught the system even though the mistake actually had been 

made that was not caught when the lox was accidentally being drained out of the tank. 

Mr. YOUNG. That’s very true, and the Kennedy people caught it 

also, and they stopped everything. But still and all, at the time it 

wasn’t a well understood idea of what happened. But they did the 

right thing. 

Mr. NELSON. Had we ever seen in all of the previous 24 

launches-had we seen anything like that before, to your knowledge? 

Mr. YOUNG. No, sir. 

Mr. NELSON. To the knowledge of anybody-anybody on the 

panel? 

Mr. MOORE. No, sir. 

Mr. ALDRICH. No, sir. 

Mr. NELSON. OK. How about the temperature probe sticking in 

Mr. MOORE. No, sir. 

Mr. ALDRICH. No, sir. 

Mr. YOUNG. One of the things we are trying to do for the Kennedy people is to get them a better ability to be able to simulate a 

malfunction so that they can get some real time practice on these 

kinds of things. That’s very difficult to do when you have something as complicated as the launch process, but they’re working on 

that. 

Mr. NELSON. As we talk about these things from my questions 

and the questions of other members, we might continuously refer 

the prevalve, sticking it open? Had we ever seen that before? 
the nose. 

If I recall, about a day before the reentry, this test was canceled 

at the recommendation of Rockwell, and it was canceled on the 

basis that they thought it was too risky for the reason, as explained 

by the commander, Mr. Gibson, that if those jets did not fire precisely at the same time, one on the left and one on the right, you 

might have some action like that which could throw you out of 

your angle of attack coming down through the atmosphere. 

Subsequent to that, it is my understanding that it was discovered 

that the RCS jets on that orbiter, Columbia, were of an older variety, not like the other three orbiters, that there was a potential 

that, although they were fine for use in the vacuum of orbit, that 

they may not have been fine for use as you came back through the 

atmosphere, and therefore a potential explosion. 

Could any of you all address the accuracy or nonaccuracy of that 

statement, and what are its implications, and what are its implications for the future? Who would like to take that? 

Mr. Aldrich. 

Mr. ALDRICH. I’ll take that, Mr. Chairman. 

The test to determine the feasibility of dumping the propellant 

from the Ford RCS system during entry was one that the program 

elected to bring into the program early in 1984 for the purpose of 

causing the vehicle to be lighter for particularly abort landings, 

RTLS and transAtlantic landings, where the landing limit for the 

total vehicle and payload combination is 240,000 pounds, and for 

cargoes to be manifested later in this decade, we would regularly 

be required to deal with potentially exceeding that abort landing 

weight. 

Analyses were initially done at the Johnson Space Center and at 

Rockwell that said that it was likely that Ford RCS propellant 

could be really burned through the engines rather than dumped as 

we already were doing with the aft RCS systems on the orbiter, 

and during 1985 wind tunnel tests were done at the Langley Research Center which confirmed aerodynamically that this should 

be acceptable. 

So in the summer of 1985, the program moved forward with a 

multiflight plan to do tests during entry with what we call design 

test objectives-DTO’s-in this regard, and it did require multiple 

firings of yaw RCS engines both sides simultaneously to test the 

characteristics of system performance and aerodynamic performance. 

This was reviewed thoroughly and formally through the program 

through a process of reviewing DTO’s that we use on all design test 

objectives and was thought by the technical community to be sound 
one, but the technical issue that arose had to do, rather, with respect to the second issue you mentioned, and that is the age of several of the engines on Columbia. 

We proceeded with the plan, we had the test built, we started the 

flight. About 2 days into the flight, we began to see the actual temperature of the propellant system, including the tanks, and so the 

team in the evaluation room in Houston and in Downey began reviewing this test to be sure those temperatures and all aspects 

were correct. 

The Marquardt Corp., which provides these RCS engines, was 

brought into those discussions, and in that deliberation it was recalled-I would think would be a good word-that there were eight RCS engines in the program which had oxidizer splitters made out 

of titanium in their oxidizer system as opposed to columbium, 

which is on all other RCS engines. 

The concern we’re talking about is a concern called a zot. When 

you fire an engine repetitive times, the oxidizer from an early 

firing can condense in the valve area, and then when the second 

firing happens, the fuel can mix with this lead of oxidizer and 

cause a detonation. It would, in its worst case, damage the valve 

seats, and the concern for 61-C was primarily oxidizer leakage 

from that kind of a zot postlanding and be a hazardous condition 

during the phase immediately after landing of the vehicle. 

There are four engines with this titanium valve configuration on 

Columbia and four of them on Discovery. Those are the only eight 

remaining in the program, and they were allowed to remain in the 

program because, as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, the forward 

RCS has never been used up to now during entry, and these zots 

only occur with aerodynamic pressure interacting with the detonation in the engine. So they were completely satisfactory for orbital flight, and the 

fact that they existed had been overlooked in all of the prior reviews and discussions of this detailed test objective. 

Probably the most specific single characteristic of why that occurred is that when the RCS valves were upgraded from titanium 

oxidizer splitters to columbium, the part number was not changed, 

so all valves carry the same part number, and this characteristic of 

titanium to columbium was tracked only by serial number. 

Mr. NELSON. All right. You said that they were fine for orbital 

flight. 

Mr. ALDRICH. Yes, sir. 

Mr. NELSON. Were they fine for the reentry test? 

Mr. ALDRICH. The valves with titanium seats had been tested 

only down to 120,000 feet, and related testing had indicated that 
gy 

either-the altitudes that you would be in in an abort. 

Mr. ALDRICH. Control in an abort is done the same as it’s done 

during a normal entry, and that is, the aft engines are used. So the 

forward RCS is really not implicated in a below 120,000 activity in the normal or intact abort landing sequences, and it was this DTO 

that got us into realizing we had this-- 

Mr. NELSON. Unless you were trying to dump your fuel. 

Mr. ALDRICH. Yes, sir. 

Mr. NELSON. As was the purpose of the test. 

Mr. ALDRICH. Yes, sir. 

Mr. NELSON. OK. 

Now, out of all of that, Mr. Young, is Mr. Aldrich saying that the 

system caught itself on this question of flight safety? 

Mr. YOUNG. That’s very true, and it catches itself many times 

wken people are flying. I wish I had a nickel, and I could probably 

name you a whole bunch of instances, but while people are up there flying, you get a lot more interest from both the contractors 

and every place, and I’m sure glad they brought it up then instead 

of postlanding. 

Mr. NELSON. As this test-any of you-to Mr. Weitz, Mr. Crippen, Mr. Young-as this test was being considered, why do you 

think the system didn’t percolate up that concern before the mission ever started? 

Mr. Weiiz. 

Mr. WEITZ. I think, as Mr. Aldrich put it, it was just an oversight, Mr. Chairman. It was somewhat muddied, I think, by the 

fact that the engines were tracked by serial number only rather 

than a different part number. 

Mr. NELSON. OK. Does everybody basically agree with that? 

OK. All right, well, that’s what we want to get, examples of, it’s 

a complicated machine, and it’s one in which you’ve got all kinds of 

checks and cross-checks, and you all had the response at the right 

time for that. 

OK; Mr. Andrews. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Truly, your May 24 memo assesses that in the coming 

months all of you will be reassessing the safety factors in accordance with that memo. Will that primarily take place at the Johnson Space Center? 

Admiral TRULY. No. As a matter of fact, the assessment is done 

throughout the system, depending on the specific item. Mr. Aldrich 

will direct a particular organization to do it. 

Most of the mission planning, for example, assessments will be 

done in Houston with a mission planning and operations organiza- 
pg py g, , 

importantly, can we anticipate more short-term layoffs before we 

accelerate the program again? 

Admiral TRULY. That’s a good question, and I cannot give you a 

specific answer, except to say that we have been very careful in the 

layoffs that we have not wanted to do but had to do during our 

downtime to make sure, from a flight safety point of view, that we 

kept a core capability both at the Cape and at other places. 

As we progress through the redesign and the qual, and as we approach the first flight date, we will have an integrated plan that 

will rebuild those work forces to match the planned first flight and 

the flight rates. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Will there be more workers laid off? Can you 

answer that this morning? 

Admiral TRULY. I can’t. Can you, Arnie-I mean-I’m sorryJesse? 

Mr. MOORE. Mr. Andrews, let me try to give you a perspective 

from JSC. As has been laid out here, we’ve really got our plate full 

at the Johnson Space Center, so I see our civil service team being 

employed very heavily in the shuttle recovery activities in addition 

to working the Space Station Program. 

What we’ve done at the Johnson Space Center is just not build 

up as rapidly in some of our contract transitions that are currently going on right now. We have the shuttle operations contract which 

was selected not too long ago. We’ve basically slowed down the rate 

of buildup of that particular contract. In addition, we have a flight 

equipment processing contract which has also just been recently announced. 

So our plans will be not, per se, to lay off people but not to build 

up as rapidly as we would have built up in our previous plan prior 

to this accident. So I don’t anticipate, at least with the data that I 

have available now, any layoffs at the Johnson Space Center in the 

near term. 

Mr. ANDREWS. All right. 

Mr. NELSON. We have the Dannemeyer substitute before the 

House right now. We’ll break and vote, and then we’ll come back 

and resume with Mr. Andrews. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. NELSON. The meeting will come to order. 

Under the rule, on consideration for the budget, there will be 

now 2 hours on the Leland substitute, 2 hours of debate. So we’ll 

have 2 hours now before we’re interrupted for the next vote. So we 

will continue with Mr. Andrews and his questioning. 

Mr. ANDREWS. I’d like to go back to my last question and ask it 

again, and let’s discuss it in a little more detail. 
their job security in the coming months, short run and long term? 

And I’d like for Jesse Moore and Dick Truly, if you would please 

comment again. The question, I think, is, do you anticipate there 

will be further layoffs or discharges before we get this program 

back on track again? 

Admiral TRULY. Let me comment briefly on the major layoff locations other than the Johnson Space Center, and I’ll let Jesse 

Moore remark to that. 

The layoffs that occurred at the Thiokol plant have essentiallyall the people have been recalled except for about 70. We don’t anticipate future layoffs at this time there, and we have gone back 

from a 4-day work week back to a 5-day work week, and this represents a step up in their support, in their design efforts, in preparation for testing. 

At Michoud, it’s my understanding that most of the people were 

transferred to other divisions within the Martin Co., and they have 

terminated some service contracts. However, I think mostly it’s 

been an internal movement. 

The situation down at KSC is approximately 1,100 people were 

laid off, which has been previously announced. At this time, we do 

not anticipate further layoffs, and of course that will depend on us 

making the schedule that we believe is possible, which is a July 15, 

1987, launch, and that will have to be reassessed as the budget unfolds and the schedule unfolds during this year, and then, based on 

the flight rate, we’re going to have to just reassess the situation at 

KSC, and we’ll be as forthcoming as we possibly can when that’s 

done. 

With that, I’d like to turn it back over to Jesse and let him comment on the situation at Johnson. 

Mr. MOORE. Mr. Andrews, as I had said earlier, you know, we’re 

putting in place at Johnson two major contracts. One is the shuttle 

operations contract, which has been won by the Rockwell, and at 

the present time what we’re trying to do there is to hold our current level until we get back flying again and start building our rate 

back up. 

So I’m not anticipating any reductions in that particular area as 

far as the ops contract is concerned that we’ve got in terms of the 

long-term operations aspect. 

We also have initiated and selected Boeing for the FEPC contract, which is the Flight Equipment Processing Contract. Our 

plans there will be also to kind of retain a level through this period 

of time until we get back in the air and not build up as rapidly as 

we had anticipated building up, so we’ll have a slower transition 

period in that period of time. 
p, 

y g

in fiscal year 1987, and we’re in the process now of preparing our 

request for proposals for the C/D contracts part of the space station at this point in time. 

In other activities we’re putting a lot of effort at the Johnson 

Space Center on some new astronaut areas-automation, robotics, 

biotechnology, and so forth-and, in addition to that, during the 

down time, Mr. Crippen, Mr. Young, and Mr. Weitz can speak a 

little about a lot of the activities the crews are doing with respect 

to training, running our simulators, doing some things that we had 

planned to do over a longer period of time; we now have some time 

to do it. 

So I think our people will be Froductively employed during this 

period of time, and, as I said before, I do not expect any additional 

layoffs. In fact, I don’t think we’ve had any layoffs at the Johnson 

Space Center. So I really don’t expect any layoffs at the Johnson 

Space Center over the near term based on today’s forecast of the 

work to be done. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Admiral Truly, at an earlier hearing you and I 

discussed the Civilians in Space Program. It concerns me greatly 

that we now face the loss of an orbiter and are attempting aggressively to get back on schedule to do the things we think we must 

do, not only on the military side but on the civilian side, and where 

every inch of that shuttle bay becomes precious, every pound becomes important, every moment is paramount in trying to do the 

research and the experiments that are so necessary to get us back 

on track, I really question whether or not the Civilian in Space 

Program is appropriate at this time. 

Then, finally, in view of the safety problems that are involved, is 

it not appropriate to delay that kind of program to a future stage 

of the Shuttle Program? Does it really make sense now, with the 

facts we have before us today, to put a journalist in space, or a 

senior citizen, or, as my friend and colleague, Mr. Walker, would 

like, a handicapped American? Does that really make sense based 

on the facts that we know them today? I noted that you were quoted in the Washington Post that you’re 

reassessing that program. That is a change, if that quote’s correct, 

and I always believe what I read in the Washington Post. But I 

wonder if you would comment on your thoughts on the Civilian in 

Space Program. 

Admiral TRULY. Yes, I’d be happy to, and I am happy to comment, because I was not totally quoted accurately in the article. 

As you may know, a few years ago when the NASA Administrator had a task force that looked at the various issues about flying 

citizens in space, I was put on that task force, and I was the one 
pp, 

group what is now the Citizens in Space Program, the Teacher in 

Space, the Journalist, and so forth. 

I think the situation has changed now, and, as I said in the other 

hearing-there was the part where that quotation came from-I 

think the situation has changed in that we now have a practical 

problem of getting back into flight. 

The early flights are going to be, quite obviously, looked at very 

closely, and as a part of my strategy we certainly will not be flying 

citizens in space or other than pilots and mission specialists in the 

front end of the program. 

I think it’s a policy question. 

Mr. ANDREWS. I’m sorry, Admiral. What do you mean when you 

say “the front end of the program”? What does that mean? 

Admiral TRULY. The first few flights, although other than the 

first flight itself, we have not decided how many flights that we 

will not fly pilots or mission specialists, but that is what I was 

going to get to here. 

We have made a number of commitments to fly payload specialists on future flights prior to the accident. What I believe that we 

need to do is use this down time to assess this question from a 

policy viewpoint, and I think Dr. Fletcher agrees with this. We 

need to reassess where we’ve been in the past, determine how 

many flights we should go with professional crews, and that is 

what I have proposed that we do. I think it’s high time that we 

have a relwk at that issue. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Young, Mr. Crippen, I wonder if you would 

comment on the Civilian in Space Program and what your 

thoughts are about where we are today and what we should be 

doing in the coming flights. 

Mr. CRIPPEN. Ithink Admiral Truly summed it up fairly well. I 

believe that in the past when that question was addressed, we were 

at a point in the program that we thought we could carry citizens 

in space, and we elected to go ahead and do that. 

We’re at a point now that, based on the accident and the priorities that we have in front of us, we should sit back and reevaluate 

it. 

I personally thought in the past that it was a statement of confidence in the vehicle that we could carry civilians in space. I think 

maybe some of that confidence is not there amongst the entire 

country right now, and we need to go back and prove it. 

I think at some point in time it will be appropriate to continue 

that program, but I’m not sure exactly where that is right now. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Young. 
I’m concerned about what a policy like this will mean on space 

commercialization and specifically what it may mean to those companies, especially these small entrepreneurial companies, that anticipate using the bay, that are ongoing in developing their activity. One in particular that I can think of intends to use the whole 

bay for its payload; they need the whole thing to get their satellite-their working equipment into space. 

What does this mean to a company like that? What are the ramifications of a policy that the administration, we anticipate they’re 

going to recommend? 

Admiral TRULY. Well, if you were puzzled by the article on the 

front page of the Post today, I must tell you that so was I. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Have you seen the report of the recommendations? 

Admiral TRULY. No, sir, I have not. 

As you know, the Senior Inter-Agency Group for Space has been 

dealing with a number of policy issues since the accident that 

range-that cover a broad range of supplemental-the question of 

a replacement orbiter, and one of the issues has been the policy of 

supporting the national initiative to create in this country a viable 

commercial ELV capability. I’ve not personally participated in a single one of the working 

group meetings or the SIG meeting that has been deliberating this. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you know why you were not included? 

Admiral TRULY. Well, I was busy doing the things that I’ve been 

doing in the accident investigation. 

However, from everything that I’ve heard, it’s been my understanding that, first of all, that the commercial or privatization of 

an ELV industry has been one that’s been debated and has not 

been decided. 

We think that the crucial issue is the question of a supplemental 

so that we know where we stand in the recovery, because I personally think that the most important thing about assured access to 

space is getting the space shuttle back on the line. Also, we think a 

crucial item is a national decision on a replacement orbiter. 

But in all of the things that I have heard that have been discussed, I have not heard anything about an increased militarization of the space shuttle. As a matter of fact, in some testimony 

that the Secretary of the Air Force and I have made together-we 

have worked very closely with the DOD-and a part of their plan 

to help the national situation is a proposal for an expanded complementary ELV capability that actually unloads military and national security payloads from the shuttle to help us deal with this na- 
Is it possiblefirst let me ask you, was Mr. Graham in any of 

the meetings with the SIG group, do you know? Admiral TRULY. Dr. Graham has participated at one time or another in the group, but I have not. 

Mr. VOLKMER. All right. Now the question I have, is it possible 

that perhaps you and Secretary Aldrich could get together and pro- vide this subcommittee with a proposed list of payloads and numbers that you would have, let’s say, starting-if we do start again, let’s say, in July 1987, that would be dedicated payloads, whether 

it’s the Galileo mission or the space telescope or what, and DOD 

missions, to see where we are as far as requirements are concerned, assuming, of course, we’re only going to have three and 

that by 1987 we’re still-DOD’s still not going to have their ELV’s 

ready, as I understand, until 1988. 

Admiral TRULY. Yes, sir. The answer to the question is yes. As 

soon as we can, we are developing such a manifest that will result 

in a total national status, and we’ll be pleased to provide it. 

If I might, let me tell you where we are and the difficulties 80 far 

in having that information in enough-as much detail as you need, 

you know, quickly. 

The first tough decision in order to be able to lay out that manifest was choosing a first flight date, which we now have estimated 

to be no earlier than July 15, 1987, and that’s the date that we 

have said, and that is based primarily not so much on the specific solid rocket motor fix but on the test schedule that’s going to be 

required to certify and qualify that repair. The next major question that we’re dealing with, and it’s being done primarily by Arnie Aldrich at level 2, and in dealing with the 

DOD, and that is the fact that we have three orbiters. They are of 

different configurations and the Columbia has a different payload capacity than the Atlantis and Discouery. We have the question of 

the planetary missions, and the Centaur processing, and the Vandenberg launch vehicle-or launch facility testing that needs to be 

done, and we’re sending the Columbia out there this summer to do 

that. 

So that the next big decision that needs to be rnade-and we’re 

dealing with that as quickly as we can-is the first year’s flight schedule, because the first year flight schedule tells us how we 

have to flow the vehicles in the ground flow to do that, and then, 

once that’s done, we can run out an out-year manifest, looking at 

our various requirements and the backlog and have more definitive 

data, and all I can say is, in the time that we have to struggle with 

these problems, we’re doing it just as quickly as we can. 

We are over the first hump, which is a flight date, and as quickly 

as we can resolve them, we will provide that to you. 
gygg 

g 

parts of the bay out at Kennedy. Can you give us that information 

a lot sooner-just the numbers, the dedicated flights, et cetera-so 

we can have some idea? I’m very concerned about that article that 

came out this morning. 

Admiral TRULY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. VOLKMER. And I don’t know how accurate that SIG article is, 

and I’m sure that you probably-if it is accurate, you probably 

have some disagreement with it, I’m sure. I’m not going to ask you 

necessarily to say so, but I have some concerns on what it means in 

the commercial sector. 

Admiral TRULY. Yes, and so do we. 

Let me take action to get you as accurate and as general data, 

and as quickly as I can, but it is going to take a while to be specific, and I can assure you we’re working on it as quickly as we can. 

Mr. VOLKMER. Iyield back to the gentleman from Texas and 

thank him for yielding. 

Mr. ANDREWS. In truth, I think what we all realize and recognize 

is that we can’t do it all with three orbiters, that we’re severely 

handicapped, and if the policy that is suggested by this article is 

accurate, the commercialization goals that we have as a nation will 

be severely handicapped, and we will certainly lose to the French 

and other competitors-international competitors-if we can’t 

allow commercial interests full participation in the shuttle, and 

what the article implies is that the administration may be moving 

away from that, and I’m concerned about it, and I think every 

member of the committee is, and I assume that you share that concern and alarm by that kind of suggested policy shift. 

Admiral TRULY. Well, I’m not so alarmed by the article, because 

it goes-it’s at odds with what I’ve heard about the serious policy 

debate that is going on. However, I think the issue is and should be 

of major national concern, and that is why it has been debated and 

will be going quickly to the President for decision. 

I’m just saying that the thrust of that article dealt with or implied a policy decision or implied a policy decision that implied 

more militarization of the space shuttle, and in all of the things that I’ve heard and dealt with in the past couple of months, I just 

haven’t run into that one. 

It is true that when we get to flying again the DOD has important major payloads that need to get into space, but so does the 

NASA science community and so do our companies that we have 

commitments to in the future, and we need to deal with all of 

those, and it’s a very serious issue. But that article implied things 

that I just had not heard before. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you. 
repeated over and over so that as the Department of Transportation tries to articulate their position in that SIG space meeting, 

that they understand that that’s not going to be backed up by the 

Congress. 

Our chairman of the full Science and Technology Committee is 

here. I want to call on him. 

Mr. Fuqua. 

Mr. FUQUA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me welcome our 

witnesses. 

Admiral Truly, how far along are you, or what progress is being 

made on the review of the flight safety operations that have beenI understand is being reviewed by your office? How far along are 

those? 

Admiral TRULY. If I could, since Arnie Aldrich is here-- 

Mr. FUQUA. Well, I didn’t know. Maybe Mr. Aldrich might-- 

Admiral TRULY [continuing]. And is specifically dealing with 

them, and I assume you are talking about the critical items list 

review and the overview. 

Mr. FUQUA. Also, and safety review procedures for future flights, 

once we resume flights. 

Admiral TRULY. OK. If I might, let me ask Arnie to tell you 

where ~~.~. he ~~. is. 

Mr. FUQUA. Very good. 

Mr. ALDRICH. Mr. Fuqua, the reviews that I discussed earlier, to 

a large degree, are structured across the whole space shuttle program from the level here at NASA Headquarters to my level at the 

NSTS Program at JSC, and, even more importantly, to each of the 

projects at the various NASA Centers and to their contractors. 

Most of the reviews of the failure mode and effects analysis, the 

critical items list, the operations and maintenance procedures, are 

being applied with a bottoms up complete re-look that has to start 

in significant detail at the contractor level in the organization to 

be sure we get to the full depth of the technical aspects and issues 

to be considered. 

Because of that scope of involvement, these reviews are going to 

take a good part of the remainder of this year to complete in each 

of those areas. However, we have assigned responsibilities to lead 

those efforts to various individuals within the NSTS program, and 

they in turn have put together specific plans and processes for each 

review to be conducted. Those are all under way. We review them 

each week in my office, and we’re having regular reviews every 

month to 6 weeks face to face around the program. 

One of the issues we’re dealing with, however, is that in many of 

these key technical areas the same very strong technical people are 
tailed schedules are in process, we are interacting regularly to 

review the progress of those reviews, and as the detailed work 

comes forward, there will be formal meetings, first at the contractor then at the level three project elements at each of the NASA 

centers, then at my level, and finally at Admiral Truly’s level here 

at NASA Headquarters. That is almost the pattern across each of 

the reviews in the program in this safety reassessment arena. 

Mr. FUQUA. Mr. Aldrich, what are your plans to involve, once 

flight operations are resumed-involving the flight crews in 

making some of the critical decisions regarding flight safety? 

Mr. ALDRICH. There is a broad discussion-- 

Mr. FUQUA. And through the process of leading up to launch. 

Mr. ALDRICH. There is a broad discussion in the program right 

now in support of Admiral Truly to reexamine the whole management control process, the management communication process, and 

the very structure of how the reporting is done leading up to 

flights and even as flights are in process. 

Our efforts in the past have intended to involve members of the 

flight crew in our various program technical and formal deliberations. We certainly are reemphasizing that activity, and I personally will recommend to more formally involve crewmen in each of 

our program activities in the pre-flight preparation and in the 

flight assessments. 

I think there are other elements of the program that also must 

be more formally involved than they have been in the past-for instance, our major contractors in the program-and I view a broader, more formal, more interactive process at each level as we 

review these flights. 

Mr. FUQUA. Let me commend you on that. 

Admiral Truly, one last question. How soon after-you indicated 

a target date of July 15, that there may be a possible next launch. 

How soon after that launch would NASA be prepared to launch 

out of the Vandenberg launch facility? Is there a time frame, or is 

that possible at this particular time? 

Admiral TRULY. As I discussed just a minute ago, that is the key 

next decision that we have to make, and that is the first year’s operation, and it’s so crucial to us because it dictates the flows of orbiters that we can make. 

Mr. FUQUA. In other words, it could impact the schedule at KSC. 

Admiral TRULY. It will impact. All of these things impact each 

other, and what I don’t want to do is get, well into the schedule 

and close to flight and have a problem crop up, say, at Vandenberg 

or perhaps with any one of the other threat areas, and have it 

undo the entire schedule. That’s what we’re struggling with. 
first flight. If the simpler fixes are deemed to not be adequate, the 

schedule for them will delay it later in the year. You also need to remember that we are going to have to 

flight-- 

Mr. FUQUA. During the spring of 1987 or 1988? 

Admiral TRULY. I’m sorry, 1988. 

Mr. FUQUA. OK. 

Admiral TRULY. We also are going to need to do a flight readiness firing at Vandenberg prior to the first launch, as we have 

done for safety purposes at the Cape. So, as I said earlier, this is the next difficult decision we need to 

make about which major payloads-how to schedule those first 

major payloads. Once we do that, then we ought to be able to very 

quickly run out an out-year manifest and move oil to the next decision. 

Mr. FUQUA. There has been-Dr. Graham has been quoted as 

saying that there would be no safety waivers. I believe maybe 

you’ve been quoted as saying that on any of the launches. Is that 

still the policy or is that still your intent? 

Admiral TRULY. I wouldn’t say there will never be another safety 

waiver. I will tell you that we will never launch without being satisfied that we have made the right decisions based on flight safety. 

Safety waivers, for example, come in various categories, depending on specifically what the decision is. 

For example, we have set landing weights, and if we are 500 

pounds even over an agreed upon certified landing weight, that 

does require a waiver, and you could refer to that as a safety waiver. We have done that in the past. But I can assure you that 

we’re not going to launch again and we’re not going to keep 

launching without flight safety being our first concern. 

Mr. FUQUA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. NELSON. Yes, sir, Mr. Fuqua. 

Mr . Walker. 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have here in front of me the two flight safety memos that I 

think the committee is probably working from for the hearing 

today, the one first of all generated from John Young on March 4 

about the concerns that he had with shuttle program flight safety, 

and then the one generated by Admiral Truly on March 24 regard- ing returning the space shuttle to flight status and the safety concerns there. 

Let me ask you first, Admiral Truly, do you regard your March 

24 memo as responsive to the March 4 Young memo? 

Admiral TRULY. No. 
first go to the commission, which I did, assure them that they had 

my absolute, full, and unqualified support in their investigation, 

and to organize or to better organize the total NASA effort, which I 

did, to support them in their investigation. This took several weeks 

to accomplish. 

The next thing I saw, that even though at various levels of the 

organization, primarily at the direction of Arnie Aldrich, that a 

number of things that had been set in motion, no one had had the 

time or had put together a total overall strategy that put all the 

things that we thought needed to be done in order to safely return 

to flight, and so I decided to sit down and take on that task, and 

the result of that was the March 24 memo which was my strategy 

for returning to flight. 

Certainly a part of that was talking to John and to other crewmen. A part of it was talking to Arnie. A part of it was looking at 

what was going on in the public view of the investigation, and I 

just felt like it needed to be pulled together so that the Congress 

and the public and, very importantly, the people within NASA 

could have a single strategy and be able to face up to this mountain of work that we knew would be required, a.nd so that was 

really the reason that I put that memo together, and it was not in 

response to John’s-any conversation that I’d had with John, any 

of his memos, or any other single thing. 

Mr. WA.LKER. Is this still the operative memo within NASA with 

regard to return to flight safety? 

Admiral TRULY. It is. 

Mr. WALKER. Has it been at all amended since it was drafted and 

distributed? 

Admiral TRULY. No, it has not. 

Mr. WALKER. It has not. 

So, in other words, the policies as defined in that memo of March 

24 are the policies of NASA for returning to flight safety, and what 

you are now doing is expanding upon the details within that memo. 

Is that a fair assessment? 

Admiral TRULY. That is exactly correct. I don’t remember the 

words, but for each of the actions in the memo, for each one except 

for the program management assessment and the organizational 

assessment, I assigned the level 2, Arnie Aldrich, to take charge of 

the detailed work that would be required to implement the specific 

direction. 

In the case of the program management and organization, that’s 

one, since I felt like it would certainly come above the level 2 and 

up to the headquarters and was so crucial, I took personal responsibility for that one. 
nizational look of the entire agency, both program management 

and institutional relationships, and I view those two things-what’s in my March 24 memo and Dr. Fletcher’s direction to Sam Phillips 

to get that help-to be possibly the most important thing that’s 

going to come out of this year, but I’ve got a lot of work to do. 

Mr. WALKER. Well, if this is in fact the operative document of 

which NASA is now working, it seems to me that it includes a 

large number of things that are having to be changed in the 

agency with regard to flight safety. 

Do you regard the memo as an indictment of the way things 

were operated in the past? 

Admiral TRULY. No, as a matter of fact, I don’t. Nothing in the 

memo directs change, with the single exception of the SRM design 

group. What the memo does is, it requires us to reassess our entire 

structure. 

I, frankly, think that much of our structure that is in place is a 

good one. I think you can’t change everything by changing organization, and I am not making any apology for the mistakes that we 

have uncovered that we have made and we will change where required. But I think what we need is an honest relook at ourselves, 

and that’s what the memo directs. 

Mr. WALKER. Well, Mr. Young, if the memo is the operative 

memo and it does not necessarily require change in the way the 

agency has been proceeding, then is the memo and the process that 

has followed the memo responsive to the concerns that you raised 

on March 4? 

Mr. YOUNG. Let me go back and not quite answer your question right off, why I wrote that memo. 

This was a month after the accident. We were attending panels, 

and boards, and meetings all over NASA. We had a lot of people participating in the accident reviews, and it wasn’t clear to me, it 

wasn’t clear to a lot of people in the Astronaut Office, that we were 

going to do anything different on the next flight than we’d done on 

the one before, and so I wrote that memo. 

It was an internal memo in NASA, trying to get people enthusiastic about doing it a little differently next time, and that calls for 

a change mostly of attitude, I think, across the agency, and so I 

wrote that memo, and I’m not sorry that I wrote it. And I wouldn’t 

take back a word of it. 

When you go to meetings and you sit in those things, and people 

say you’ve got to do this and that and the other thing because it’s a 

technically correct thing to do, and it’s a safe thing to do, and 

somebody next to you says, “But that might hurt the launch probability,” why, after you just lost seven people, you take a very dim 
a pup, and we ought to do those kinds of things; I think it’s very 

important. I think it’s a good outfit and we can do it. 

Mr. WALKER. But you raise some legitimate, specific concerns in 

your memo, and what I guess I’m interested in, as a member of 

somebody who has to fund the program of recovery, is whether or 

not you think that the fixes are going to be made under the program that is now in place in the legitimate, specific concerns that 

you brought forward in your memo. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, every one of the design type concerns that I 

have in my memo were not discovered by myself; they had been 

discovered by people in subsystem levels all over the agency, and 

we discussed them. 

Every one of those design concerns right now, to my knowledge, 

has a design review number associated with a change request that 

Arnie’s addressed already, most of them many weeks ago. The 

operational concerns are being reviewed in this Launch Abort Reassessment Committee, which is 150 people working to reassess the 

safety of that, and the other concerns are also being addressed in 

various areas all over the center. 

I think that the process is not specifically addressed in that 

memo, but the process we’re going to have to go through to get 

back on track is being done, yes, sir. 

Mr. WALKER. But you say in your memo, “An urgent request 

that whatever management method it takes, we must make flight 

safety first.” Now are you convinced that the process that we are 

now going through is going to make flight safety first, particularly 

when you hear a discussion a moment ago that suggests that we 

might allow some safety waivers in the future? 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, you have to understand what Dick is talking 

about. For example, the landing weight of the space shuttle orbiter 

is 211,000 pounds, and if you go above that, you have to get a 

waiver for it. We landed STS-9; it weighed 220,000 pounds, and of 

course we did it on a lake bed. So you do have waivers that come 

along that aren’t particularly critical, just because it hadn’t gone 

through all the certified wickets. 

Now there are some waivers that people have made in the past 

that I don’t think will be made in the future, and that’s the important change that’s being made. You won’t make a safety waiver 

just to meet a launch schedule. 

Mr. WALKER. You don’t think they’ll be made in the future. Do 

you know that they won’t be made in the future? 

Mr. YOUNG. We’re going to be following that very closely. 

Mr. WALKER. Well, do you think that you should be sure that 

they won’t be made in the future? 
and those of Mr. Andrews concerning the possibility of a retreat in 

formation by the administration on the question of a continuing 

NASA role in the deployment of commercial satellites. 

If it is anyone’s intention in this administration to lead such a 

change in national policy, they had best be prepared to meet a congressional buzz saw of opposition, because those sentiments are certainly not shared, in my judgment, by many members of this institution. 

Let me ask you, Admiral. As you are looking at the universe of 

possible design and engineering changes of the entire shuttle 

system, are any of those possible changes so fundamental to the 

design of the orbiter itself as to warrant further delays in the beginning of construction of the fourth orbiter? 

Admiral TRULY. Let me answer you very briefly and let Arnie 

comment, because the way the system works is, he sees the 

changes corning before the controversial ones will get up to level 1. 

There are some changes being debated-and I don’t know whether they will be required or not-that could delay that flight date 

that I gave you. 

Mr. TORRICELLI. Beyond the flight date, I’m talking about the 

construction of the replacement orbiter, and the thrust of my question is whether the intentions of many of us to have this country to 

begin immediately-- 

Admiral TRULY. OK. I understand now. 

Mr. TORRICELLI [continuing]. Funding and reconstruction, the 

design changes can be incorporated during that construction to 

warrant all possible concerns without any further delay in beginning the purchasing of parts and the basic construction of the vehicle. 

Admiral TRULY. I believe the answer to your question is no, but 

let me let Arnie do a double check. 

Mr. ALDRICH. I would agree, Mr. Torricelli, with Admiral Truly 

on that, with one exception. In my opening statement, I mentioned 

that I’m sponsoring a complete reassessment of the crew survival 

and abort capabilities from the space shuttle and consideration of 

enhancements to that system that the organization might deem 

feasible. 

There are some flight phases of the space shuttle missions that 

would be very difficult with our current design of the space shuttle 

systems to provide significant additional crew survival capabilities. 

For instance, the first 2 minutes while the solid rocket boosters are 

burning. 

In the course of these deliberations on crew survival and additional abort provisions, if in fact the agency, not up through myself 
completely firm answer to your question that we might not want 

major features-- 

Mr. TORRICELLI. Well, what in your estimation now is the lead 

time on the construction of a fourth orbiter? How much time are 

you currently seeing for the parts acquisition and construction 

phase? 

Admiral TRULY. Because of the availability of the structural 

spares that have been funded in previous years, it’s my understanding that from authority to proceed to roll out at Palmdale is 

about a 3-year period, and from then to first liftoff at the Cape is 

about another 6 months. So it’s about 3% years. 

Mr. TORRICELLI. So can I summarize your remarks that during 

the course of that 3 years you see opportunities to do design 

changes and retrofitting to meet all safety concerns while acquisition of parts and construction is in progress? 

Mr. ALDRICH. I would see our ability to make the critical design 

changes that we must make before first flight to proceed and hopefully support the July 1987 goal of a first launch. 

We will also be addressing additional enhancements to safety 

and performance that are good for the shuttle program, and I’m 

hoping to see them progress in the months following first flight to 

be incorporated not only in the orbiter fleet that we will be flying but in later downstream orbiters as they’re approved. 

I would not see, hopefully, the fleet departing with a new vehicle 

with a significantly different configuration, but hopefully forward 

work and retrofitting will achieve all of the good features that 

come out of our reviews. 

Mr. TORRICELLI. If there’s a 3-year construction time and then 6 

months to launch of the fourth orbiter, should we assume that the 

months that have now followed from the time of the Challenger accident are simply lost in putting that fourth orbiter into operation 

again? 

Mr. ALDRICH. I believe we’re essentially waiting for that decision. 

We have, as Mr. Moore mentioned, retained some of the manufacturing work force for a fourth orbiter, and the structural spares 

program is proceeding. So some progress is being made, but it s not 

the kind of start that gets you moving-- 

Mr.TORRICELL1. But, in effect, our country has lost the time. 

I make the observation, obviously, because I think we all followed the President in his determination that the loss of the Challenger would not be reflected in the loss of a national will, that we 

all shared a continuing commitment to the Space Program 

But, in fact, our words have not to date been followed by deeds. 

We may have a national commitment, but we have not committed 
Thiokol is involved in that process. I think you are also aware of 

an intent by many Members of Congress, and some on this committee, on the possibility of bringing other companies into that process, either fully in a second source or immediately, using their expertise. 

Could you, Admiral, explain to me why it is that other corporations that have an expertise in the solid rocket technology are not 

at this point working on an equal basis with Morton Thiokol, assuring that we have the best national talent available in the redesign 

of the solid rocket boosters? 

Admiral TRULY. Well, as a matter of fact, the design team is getting technical assistance. Morton Thiokol, as you know, is our 

prime contractor for the solid rocket booster, and the design team 

itself is made up-even though it’s located at the Marshall Space 

Flight Center-it is made up of people not only from Marshall but 

from other NASA centss and is getting support from other external organizations, and an oversight committee to that entire effort, 

including not only design but certification and testing, will be 

shortly announced that will report to Dr. Fletcher and will stay 

with us from now, into flight. 

Mr. TORRICELLI. Maybe I should have phrased it more in a philosophical vein. It would appear to me that if our priority is the redesigning of the solid rocket boosters, and that our priority is safety, 

it could be agreed by all that safety would be enhanced the most by 

going out to various corporations that have the technology and suggesting to them, “We want to see design changes by each of you, 

we want to give an opportunity for each of you to participate in the 

future of this program; fight it out; let’s see who has the best technology; let’s see who can do the best re-engineering,” and use what 

is our best national resource, which is competition. 

It appears to me that, despite the sad history perhaps of what 

has happened internally in the Thiokol Corp., we are returning back to base one rather than home plate and letting new people back-letting new people participate from the beginning here. 

Admiral TRULY. Well, I think that the design team has invited 

and is searching for a variety of the best ideas from the best people 

that they can find. I’m confident that that is in fact what’s going 

on. 

I do think that the studies that we’ve made in the past for 

second sourcing of a solid rocket motor are ones that are important 

to us and we are addressing. As a matter of fact, I have the action 

to report to Dr. Fletcher just as soon as I can as to my recommendations about second sourcing for the solid rocket motor contracts. 

That effort was started before I arrived on the scene. As a matter 

of fact, Mr. Moore may be able to talk to it better than I because 

63-144 0 - 86 - 3 
management at Marshall, is to look at any place they can find for 

any idea that is to assure th2.t whatever fix we choose meets our 

requirements of flight safety. 

Mr. TORRICELLI. I understand that, Admiral, but let us just conclude this issue then by saying that there have been strong congressional suggestions in the past on the need for a second source 

on the solid rocket boosters. Those are suggestions that NASA has 

seen fit in the past not to take. 

Suggestions in this institution have a way of evolving into commands over time, and that mag be the slage - in which we are now 

entering. 

But I think it’s fair to say that many of us hold the belief that 

our country would be better served at-this point by having more 

than one company involved in the final development and preparation of those solid rocket boosters. 

Let me finally then ask, this now well cited Washington Post article today contains several other words that I found startling. If I 

could quote it, it refers to the space station as a recently revealed 

“scaled down version.” I had not seen on this committee any congressional intent, based on our current problems in the space program, to scale down a space station, and I knew of no such direction from the President. Could you please explain what the Post 

may have had in mind by citing a “scaled down” space station? 

Admiral TRULY. No, sir, I can’t explain what the Post had in 

mind in the article, and the space station is one thing that is not 

my principal responsibility. I might ask-- 

Mr. TORRICELLI. Well, let’s ask Mr. Moore then. 

Admiral TRULY. Imight ask Jesse Moore, who is the lead center 

for the space station, to comment, though. 

Mr. MOORE. Well, Mr. Torricelli, I don’t think we’re working any 

scaled down space station. I think what the agency has testified 

before to this committee and what it’s testified at other congressional committees is where we’re going forward on the space station, and the implications of the Washington Post article on scaled 

down space stations is unknown to me at this point in time. 

Mr. TORRICELLI. That’s reassuring, and from this member let the 

intentions be clear that in the development of the space shuttle 

and space station there will be no national retreats. I don’t believe 

that scaled down versions of anything are appropriate. 

We have had a national tragedy, and we will respond with our 

best national resources and talent and go forward. But I am troubled that the early commitments after the tragedy of the shuttle 

have not been followed by equal will, and each time someone talks 

about a lessening national effort, if only in these veiled terms, I 
pg py 

We spent some time in NASA evaluating this and internally reviewing whether or not we should go forward with the second 

source, and we were trying to identify points of rationale as to why 

it’s important to go forward with a second source-economics, to 

have a second supplier in the event something happens to our primary supplier, and so forth, and we came to the conclusion several 

months ago that the agency should go forward with a second 

source, provided the industry was willing to up front fund some of 

the facilitization. 

We had seen numbers in the cost of getting facilities in place on 

the order of $80 million to roughly $100 million to put the necessary facilities, the test systems in, in order to qualify, and so we 

had gone out back in the late fall with a solicitation to see if the 

industry were interested in providing that up front and then guaranteeing the potential winner of a second source competition provided that a competitor was able to successfully demonstrate to 

Government standards that they qualified to build the solid rocket 

motors from a standpoint of reliability and safety and performance, 

and once that was demonstrated, then NASA would guarantee a 

percentage of buy of the follow-on procurements of the second 

source. 

So that’s kind of where we left it around the end of the year/ early part of the new calendar year, 1986, and I think Admiral 

Truly is right. He now has the action, to come forward with what 

NASA’s recommendation is on where we are today. 

Mr. TORRICELLI. If the gentleman would yield just for a moment, 

I think that those actions were a positive development, and I genuinely commend you for them. As you know, it is the belief of some, 

however, that a genuine second source must contemplate the different corporations competing on an equal basis. 

Mr. MOORE. Yes. 

Mr. TORRICELLI. It is not a competition between Ford and General Motors if the Government offers to build Ford’s factory and then 

see who comes up with the cheapest car. That is a little bit of what 

we are considering here, and I understand the restraints in the 

Government making investments at this point in developing a 

second source, but, nevertheless, I think the bottom line by all of 

us, we would agree, is that long term, if we do make a national investment in developing a second source, there are tens of millions 

of dollars to be saved by that competition within NASA bringing 

down the cost of that solid rocket fuel. 

Mr. MOORE. Yes. 

Mr. TORRICELLI. And so we have the same objective, saving 

money. It is simply the belief of some of us that if we did in fact 
y yg, g, 

and that’s on the order of several years to do that. So time is another element in this whole equation. 

Thank you. 

Mr. TORRICELLI. Thank you. 

Mr. NELSON. Was a recommendation made to Administrator 

Beggs, and what was his response? 

Mr. MOORE. The NASA position in the last part of the calendar 

year, Mr. Chairman, was that we would go forward and solicit industry again to see if they were interested in the proposition that 

NASA had laid on the table, like the industry would provide some 

of the up-front facility capital, and so forth, to get them in a posi- tion to be competitive, and we were in the process of planning to go out with a solicitation to make sure the industry was interested in 

pursuing this activity, and if they in fact were, then it was NASA’s 

plans to go forward with an RFP to select a competitor. 

Mr. NELSON. Was that the Administrator’s decision? 

Mr. MOORE. I believe that was the Administrator’s decision, yes, 

sir. 

Mr. NELSON. OK. You need to get to your 12:30 appointment. 

Mr. MOORE. Yes, sir. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. NELSON. All right. Let’s turn to Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’d like to follow up on a point that Mr. Andrews made earlier. I 

think it was you, Mr. Crippen, who responded to it. As you know, 

one of your colleagues in the shuttle was a resident of New Hampshire, Christie McAuliffe, and if there was anybody, that I know, 

that really displayed more enthusiasm for the space program than 

she did. 

In response to what Mr. Andrews asked you regarding future 

flights for private citizens, if you will, I didn’t detect a great deal of 

enthusiasm on your part from that. How do you feel as astronauts 

regarding the private citizen on board the shuttle in the future? 

Mr. CRIPPEN. I think that you will get a varied amount of enthusiasm throughout the Astronaut Office if you talk about having 

what we would refer to as potentially a passenger on board, because we’ve had people that have trained for many years to go fly, 

and I think some of them do view it as sort of an infringement 

upon something that they’re doing when such passengers are put 

on board. 

But my personal opinion is that that is a positive thing to do. I 

personally agree that those are reasonable things to pursue. 

The question is at this particular time-which I believe is different than what it was when we made the decision to put them on 

board-since we’ve had an accident, we have to renew our faith in 
gpg, , 

pull back from that now, that faith has to come from the people, 

from the populace, if you will, a trust and faith in the program, not only for the financial support that we’ll give on this committee and 

in the rest of Congress and the administration, but also just the 

support and faith of the populace itself. 

It would seem to me that we should not pull back from that. If 

we’ve made that decision earlier because we believe that the shuttle could be successful and we need the enthusiasm, it seems to me 

we should stay with it. 

I guess what I’m getting at is, personally, I don’t think your life 

as an astronaut is any more or less important than the life of another individual, and I think I know what you’re saying. You’re 

saying that you guys, you’re paid to take the risk, and I commend 

you for that. But I think that as long as individuals-private citizens-make these decisions and know-you know, they know 

they’re taking the risk, why not? 

It just seems to me, to suddenly say, “Well, we’re not going to 

put a private citizen on board now because, well, something else 

might go wrong,” it seems to me it sends a wrong signal. 

If someone else would like to comment-I’m not trying to argue 

with you; it’s just a personal opinion. I respect yours, and maybe 

someone else-another astronaut-might like to comment before I 

go on to the next question. 

All right. 

Just two more questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral, in your opening statement, you mention a number of 

specific points regarding safety, technical points about the solid 

rocket, and so forth-a long litany of them. At the top of one of the 

pages, you say, “We are restructuring the environment in which 

we work to further emphasize the methods by which technical and 

safety concerns are considered.” 

Could you just elaborate on that a little bit? In terms of the environment, of how you come up with these safety features, what are 

we going to do differently, and what were we doing wrong in the 

past in terms of the environment for coming up with these safety 

features? I’m interested in the term, specifically, “the environment.” 

Admiral TRULY. I think that despite the fact that people in 

NASA have historically had a tremendous-flight safety has 

always been in the very front of the minds of the engineers and 

people that work on it. But wher, you lose a vehicle and you lose a 

crew, and in the investigation where you realize that you, collectively have made a mistake, you feel a responsibility for that. Now 

your task is-because you believe in the program, and you funda- 
would say thats the environment that has changed, and the focus 

on flight safety now has never been higher than it is today. 

Mr. SMITH. One followup question on that, and then that’s the 

last one, Mr. Chairman. 

In the safety aspect-anyone can answer this, if they like; I’d 

like a point of view from the astronauts as well as from the engineers on this thing-you put a great deal of emphasis on redesigning the rocket, the booster rocket, obviously, because of what happened, and, at the same time, we made a decision a few years ago 

in the design of the latter shuttles not to have an escape hatch, not 

to have a way to get off of that thing or out of it in the early stages 

of the flight as we lift off. 

It just seems to me to be a dichotomy to say now, We’re going to 

really work to make sure this booster is perfectly safe, and, at the 

same time, you are looking at the possibility-or are you looking at 

the possibility of going back to an early abort method or perhaps 

even an ejection mechanism? I’m not sure what you have in mind. 

I’m not asking you to be that specific. But it seems to me that the 

astronauts, in flying in the last few years with the shuttle, pretty 

much put your faith in those boosters in getting you up there and 

therefore did not have that kind of safety mechanism. 

I’d be interested in the response from both of you on that. Are 

we going back? Are we going to stay with that, or are we going to 

go back to the further safety point, which is, both work on the 

booster rocket safety and, at the same time, have a means to eject 

early or abort early? 

Mr. WEITZ. Well, as Mr. Aldrich said earlier today, we are reassessing all aspects and considerations of the STS system, one of 

those being crew escape and survivability. 

It was decided, for a multitude of reasons, that we could not 

practically and still meet, as best we could, the system capabilities 

that were laid on as design requirements early on and put a complicated crew escape system into the vehicle. When those decisions 

were made, I was doing other things, and John or Arnie may want 

to add to that later. I know it was accepted by all members of the 

Astronaut Office. 

Mr. SMITH. What would change your mind now? Supposing the 

same engineers came forth and said, as they did a few years ago, 

The rocket boosters are safe, no problem, we don’t need the escape 

hatch. What would be your reaction now in light of what has hap- pened? I mean, would you fly again and support that? 

Mr. WEITZ. I think all of us have already made that decision and 

in our previous appearance before the commission have stated that 

we accept as a reality that providing an any-time survivable escape 

capability into the present orbiter is not practical. 
yp

national capability. 

Mr. SMITH. So your emphasis then, both from the astronauts’ 

point of view and from the design, is that to perfect-further perfect the rocket? 

Mr. WEITZ. Yes, sir, and it’s very similar-well, it turns out, not 

by design, but all of us, sir, are carrier-aviators in other lives and 

at other times, and there are many things that can go wrong when 

you’re operating around a ship, both in getting off the ship and getting back on. But we must have a system that addresses crew survivability in that situation also, and you do it by design to the best 

of your capability. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Mr. WEITZ. And if you choose to engage in such endeavors, then I 

think you must be willing to accept some risk. 

Mr. SMITH. All right. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. NELSON. And that’s certainly part of the reason we asked the 

three of you here today, to reflect from your point of view, as part 

of the active astronaut corps, on these questions of flight safety. 

Mr. Smith, in part, on your question on emergency egress, going 

back to a question from Mr. Torricelli to Mr. Aidrich, on the question, if they decided they were going to have a major redesign, could it be incorporated within the 3-year time period of building that next orbiter? And I’m not sure that Mr. Torricelli clearly got 

your answer, Mr. Aldrich. 

Mr. ALDRICH. Well, Mr. Chairman, a major augmentation to the 

space shuttle for a crew escape capability, particularly during first 

stage, is probably not consistent with the characteristic of the 

space shuttle overall configuration as we know it today, and therefore my answer would be no, I do not believe that it is consistent 

with that kind of a time period and maybe not consistent with any 

time period. 

Mr. NELSON. That’s specifically with regard to crew escape. With 

regard his overall question-and since he’s not here, I’m asking the 

questions for him-overall flight safety, you see that within that 3- 

year period in which the next orbiter-replacement orbiter-would 

be built, you all would have sufficient time to incorporate any 

design changes into that orbiter, that is? 

Mr. ALDRICH. Yes, I believe we could incorporate all of the ones 

which we would say would be required for first flight and many of 

the ones we’d like to see evolve as the program continues-forward. 

Mr. NELSON. Captain Crippen, you might imagine, since Mr. 

Smith is from New Hampshire, he was asking some of the questions with regard to the Teacher in Space, and I just want to point 
Mr. Monson. 

Mr. MONSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Truly, could you tell me where we are in Lhe redesign of 

the SRB and what the schedule is from this point forward? 

Admiral TRULY. Yes, sir. The redesign team has looked at many, 

many possibilities. We have not chosen a design. The schedule is 

based on our ability to use the hardware that we have. We ordered, 

I think, last summer, 72 case segments that have enough metal on 

them to accommodate a number of redesigns. 

Our status is that we have-or the team has defined some design 

requirements for tooling so that that hardware could be machined 

to a future design when it is selected. 

The preliminary design review is scheduled-help me, John; I 

think it’s in July or around the first of July-and the critical 

design review is December of this year on the schedule. 

There is a lot of development testing on competing designs that 

will be done in the next several months. As a matter of fact, some 

we have already begun testing on. 

For example, one of the problems is, there is a so-called putty in 

the design that, in our investigation, apparently has not performed 

as we expected it to, and we intend to have a design that has no 

putty in it, so that we don’t have that problem. So we have done 

some early small solid rocket motor firings without putty, with 

thermocouples at the joint, to begin to understand the phenomena 

of that. 

Moving beyond the preliminary design review and the critical 

design review, the primary schedule drivers are full-scale development and qualification tests of a flight full-scale motor that we will 

fire and then tear down and examine the actual design as a result 

of those tests. 

So it’s primarily-the first flight in July 1987 is primarily driven 

by the test schedule rather than the specific design which has not 

been selected. 

Mr. MONSON. Do you have a date in mind for that first firingtest firing? 

Admiral TRULY. If I remember correctly, we’re hoping to fire an 

engineering test motor to get some early data in, I believe, October 

of this year, and then the first motor firings that will encompass 

what I would call a flight design would be a development test 

motor after the first of the year, 1987. 

Mr. MONSON. Getting back to the second sourcing issue, is it anticipated that they would use a completely different design, or 

would they fundamentally use the same design as the primary 

source is using right now? 
Mr. MONSON. Dr. Fletcher? 

Admiral TRULY. Yes. 

In the Office of Space Flight, I have the action to assess the various factors that-you know, economic and so forth--that will allow 

the agency to make a decision. 

As I said before, unfortunately, with so many other things, I’ve 

had to put that on the back burner. I know it is frustrating to all, 

including myself, and I’m a proponent of second sourcing where it 

makes sense. It’s frustrating that we haven’t been able to get to 

that, but it just is not as important as getting this investigation 

done, assisting the commission, and getting the design work in 

progress. 

Mr. MONSON. Well, I can understand that, and I appreciate your 

priorities at this point in time. I’m just trying to get some idea of 

where we might be in deciding whether or not an RFP will be 

issued, and if you could help me understand that, I’d appreciate 

that. 

Admiral TRULY. Iam hoping to get my people to have the time to 

make that assessment and get a recommendation to Dr. Fletcher, 

in the next several weeks. I just haven’t been able to get to that 

yet. 

Mr. MONSON. One further question then. Inasmuch as requalifi- cation will be necessary, though, and since a second source would 

be using primarily the same design, does it make any sense to try 

and qualify two sources at the same time, or would the timing just 

be impossible? 

Admiral TRULY. I think our present prime contractor, in qualification-and maybe Arnie could help me more. It’s primarily, the 

building of facilities, the certification of those facilities, the test 

motors, demonstrating that a full-scale test motor firings can be 

made, and so forth, and essentially we’ve already done that with 

the present prime contractor. 

Mr. MONSON. I understand. 

Admiral TRULY. That qualification in the case of our present 

solid rocket motor went on over a period of years, and I would anticipate that that would happen again. 

Mr. MONSON. It’s not something that could be done quick enough 

then to meet the schedule of a July 1987 flight? 

Admiral TRULY. No, it could not. 

Our approach to that is to involve national expertise in the 

design effort so that we first can argue out what a redesign should 

be, and, as you can imagine, it is a lively argument on the various-considering the accident and the investigation, and we are 

not-we have had to start without the benefit of the recommenda- 
have a live quorum call followed by a 5

minute vote. When we 

break here in about 4 or 5 minutes, that will give an opportunity 

for-if you all would like a sandwich, let’s go ahead and take your 

order, and we’ll have it sent down there to the snack bar and bring 

up your saadwich, and we’re going to continue on. So let’s proceed 

on that basis. 

I’d also like to invite the members of the committee just to interject at any time, and we will get a free flowing of ideas at this 

point. All right. 

I’ll start it off, and I want to talk to the gentlemen from the Astronaut Office about, to what degree were you involved in the decision to launch or not to launch in the past? 

The first questim: Were you a part of the flight readiness 

review? 

Mr. YOUNG. Yes, we participated in the flight readiness reviews 

in the past, and we attend, at least here, the L minus one briefings. 

But the kinds of things that were asked about in flight readiness 

reviews never involved flight crews or never were any issues that 

the crew could participate in. I don’t think that if we had raised 

issues-and sometimes they were raised in a background sort of 

sense-I just don’t think that the flight readiness review is the 

place for interjecting no-go’s from the standpoint of the flight crew, 

unless you know something that nobody else knows anything about; that’s not the place to do it. 

The flight crew knows how to fly the space shuttle. They know 

how to operate the space shuttle. They know how to run all its systems. They know the capabilities and limitations of those systems. 

If there’s something that’s being done that is not, from a mission 

operations sense, being done correctly, they should have solved 

that problem long before they ever get to a flight readiness review, 

and most of those are solved to everybody’s satisfaction before we 

ever get there. 

So flight crew participation in flight readiness reviews, although 

we’re there and we hear the issues, and we sometimes have concerns about them, and they’re brought up, I don’t think that we 

ever are in a no-go position in a flight readiness review or in the L 

minus one review either. 

Mr. NELSON. Well, what degree did you or a representative of 

you representing the Astronaut Office participate in the decision, 

other than the flight readiness review, which you’ve discussed, and 

the L minus one review? 

Mr. YOUNG. To launch 51-L? 

Mr. NELSON. Excuse me? 

Mr. YOUNG. To launch what mission? Any of them? 

Mr. NELSON. Any of them. 
solutely correct. We have been represented at all times at the 

flight readiness review, at the L minus one review. We’re represented in the firing room, we’re represented in the mission control, 

and we hear everything that’s going on. While we’re not formally 

asked, Are we go or no go? we are represented, and if we have a 

serious concern, we are in a position to bring it up. 

So maybe it’s a matter of perception. We are involved, and most 

of the kinds of things that we would bring up we bring them up 

much earlier than these particular kinds of reviews. Normally the 

kinds of things that we would be concerned about at the FRR or 

the L minus one, Arnie would also be concerned, and so those 

things are discussed. 

Mr. NELSON. So the question is, are you involved in the information loop early enough in making the decision as this vehicle is prepared and the decision is ultimately made, go or no go? Is that the 

question? 

Mr. CRIPPEN. The question starts coming up on a mission. It’s 

worked, like, a year prior to the time, and we are constantly involved with decisions that are made regarding the mission. As you 

approach the actual lift-off, the formality of it, you go through 

some loops, and which we’re involved there, not so much from a 

formal, Are you go or no go? but yes, we are involved. At least 

that’s my opinion. 

Mr. NELSON. OK. Then I guess the appropriate question at this 

point is, what, in the opinion of the three of you-and we will 

recess right now to go vote, and think about this: What, in your 

opinion, could improve the process in order to involve the Astronaut Office and this very valuable cumulative knowledge in the 

launch decision of go or no go? And I’ll let that hang there as we 

vote, and we’ll be back. 

[Whereupon, at 1:00 p.m., the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene the same afternoon.] 

AFTERNOON SESSION 

Mr. NELSON. The question that was left addressed to the three 

members of the Astronaut Corps is what improvements in the 

future, in order for you to have part of what you consider to be essential in the decisionmaking as to launch or not to launch. SO any 

one of you please share with us. 

Mr. YOUNG. In terms or’ whether to launch or not to launch, I 

think the decision process is better made by the line organization 

that does it, and of which the flight crew is part. They are asked if 

they are ready to go or not to go. Part of the go/no-go decision in 

the vehicle prior to that time in a formal sense, it might be good if 
ppg g

kind, things that we can do something about. 

I think other concerns such as systems problems or safety issues 

would have to be generally addressed in some other forum, and I 

think they will be in the future. 

Mr. NELSON. Mr. Weitz and Mr. Crippen. 

Mr. WEITZ. I agree with John, Mr. Chairman. The reason we are 

all here is because we had a failure on our last launch attempt 

which turns out to have been a design deficiency, and even if we 

wanted to, we do not have enough people or the proper expertise within the Astronaut Office, for example, for us to be able to intelligently discuss problems with and potential fixes to the field joint 

problem, for example. 

I think that what is beholden upon the agency as a whole is to 

put in place a flight safety system adjunct, or whatever we want to 

call it, that is functional, and we have an obvious vested interest 

for desiring that. I think that that is one of the major tasks that is 

facing the agency because that is a lot easier said than done. 

The ongoing system as we progress down toward any given event 

hopefully a flight or a design review or what have you, will have 

identified potential protlem areas or soft areas, and that we would 

institutionally make our inputs into the resolution of such problems, which we do now. 

Mr. NELSON. Mr. Crippen. Mr. CRIPPEN. I think we are all saying the same thing. Perhaps 

we are saying it a little bit different. Formally with regard to what 

we are doing today with the launch decision process, I would not 

modify it to, say, put an astronaut in and then have Arnie, or whoever, ask will you go? I think that we are adequately covered. 

Perhaps we should stress a little bit more in some of the assessments or meetings coming up to a flight the operational concerns. 

We have a forum for doing that today when prior to each flight we 

take the flight rules that are specific to a particular flight and go 

over them with our management, including level 2, and have an 

opportunity at that time to address any concerns we have. We 

might make that a little bit more formal so that we do drag any 

concerns out. But, again, nothing of that nature would have had 

any impact on this particular accident. It was a matter of a lack of 

knowledge that was throughout the NASA management that was 

making the decisions about it, so nothing that we could have done, 

or even putting an astronaut in that decision loop, would have 

made any difference to it. 

Mr. NELSON. All right. Other than the question of the Challenger 

tragedy, you all are saying, the three of you, that you don’t think 

that there should be more astronaut involvement in the decision- 
Mr. NELSON. That comes as a surprise to me because I got the 

tenor of Mr. Young’s memo being different than that. What about 

that, Mr. Young? 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, I think when it comes to safety issues there 

shouldn’t be consensus type votes on the system, and I think in 

terms of operations the people who operate the machinery, which 

is flight crews and missions operations have to have a major say in 

that. What I was addressing was issues that I didn’t feel were receiving adequate attention for that time, and I don’t know that astronaut participation in those kind of things would help resolve 

those issues. 

Still, I think it doesn’t hurt to have people participating in every 

forum that they can have in these meetings and to have those 

people listened to throughout the agency. There is nothing wrong 

with that. That’s the way NASA does business. 

Mr. WEITZ. Mr. Chairman, if I might clarify; my response is 

based totally on the assumption that the agency will in fact have 

in place when we go fly next a viable working safety organization, 

and that the astronaut office will be represented at the signoff 

level when necessary as the system addresses safety issues. That is 

fundamental to everything I have said to you so far. 

Mr. NELSON. Iunderstand. Now help us understand, is that different from the way the system has been operating? Mr. WEITZ. That is different from my perception of the way the 

system has been operating, yes, sir, because-well, because I don’t 

know. That is what is going to make it difficult. 

Mr. NELSON. That’s different from your perception. 

Mr. WEITZ. Yes, sir. 

Mr. NELSON. But it is not different from your perception, Mr. 

Crippen? 

Mr. CRIPPEN. There are two different levels, I guess, we are talking about. I am talking about the normal programmatic level 

where we work problems and address them when we are ready to 

go fly, and I don’t think we are talking about streamlining that a 

little bit better and setting up ways to communicate better. That is 

what Admiral Truly is working. 

In addition to that, we have proposed that there be a parallel 

Flight Safety Organization that would address problems, would 

give us a second line of communication to address those things that 

to my mind could or could not have astronaut direct involvement; 

but if we had a concern, that would certainly be a way to work it, 

although I would hope that we would primarily work it through 

the normal programmatic decision levels. 

Mr. NELSON. All right, Mr. Weitz, you said that you want to 

ensure that there is this astronaut involvement on these decisions. 
ion is that what has to be, then, is some organizational element 

within NASA that, in fact, would report directly only to the administrator and no other levels within, and would have the authority 

and the responsibility to understand what is going on the field, to 

have the members of this organization be able go to any contractor’s manufacturing facility, offices, drafting room, go to the Cape, 

any facility there, to JSC, to the simulator to find out really what 

is going on at the working level. 

If you then raise the flag, it goes directly to the Administrator. 

Obviously, the concerned elements within NASA are aware of it 

and must then be answered by the people responsible for that element. 

Mr. NELSON. You know, we spend a lot of time around here, up 

here on the hill, worrying about organization. You think such an 

independent flight safety office-is that sort of the concept that 

you are talking about? 

Mr. WEITZ. That is what I am talking about, yes, sir. 

Mr. NELSON. How about you, Mr. Young? 

Mr. YOUNG. I think our organization charts are very interesting 

things, but I think unless you have the right people that it is totally academic to talk about flight safety, and that is the kind of thing 

that I recommend as being a pervasive organization that is up and 

down throughout the agency at every level that needs to be set up 

so that we don’t let any of these safety issues, either operational or 

design or procedures get away from us. Sometimes we are all so 

close to the forest, we can’t see it for the trees, and that is what we 

got to prevent, if you know what I mean. 

Mr. NELSON. Yes, sir; we are trying to learn what you mean. 

Let me go back to you, Mr. Weitz. You were giving an analogy 

there with a military operating model where they have a separate 

flight safety office. If that has been a model after which organizations have patterned themselves, particularly in hazardous kinds of 

activity, why has that not been instituted in the NASA operation? 

Mr. WEITZ. I don’t know the answer to that, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. NELSON. Does anybody at the panel know? 

Mr. WEITZ. My point of view is prejudiced by my background. 

Mr. NELSON. Iunderstand. 

Mr. WEITZ. I never had the responsibility-- 

Mr. NELSON. Let me ask Mr. Aldrich. Can you shed any light on 

that? 

Mr. ALDRICH. No, Mr. Chairman, I really cannot. I think our 

NASA system and way of doing business has evolved over a 

number of manned programs starting with programs that were 

small, but had a lot of uncertainties, and we have a style of doing 

business and perhaps there should have been more self-reflection 
Mr. WALKER. IfI could. 

Mr. NELSON. Sure. 

Mr. WALKER. Let me get to a specific with regard to the system. 

Who, if anyone on the Mission Management Team, has primary institutional responsibility for flight safety issues in the present 

system? 

Mr. ALDRICH. If I could answer that, Mr. Walker, I believe that 

all the members of the Mission Management Team have that primary responsibility. 

Mr. WALKER. But the problem is if everybody has that responsibility, then everybody thinks everybody else is taking care of details. My question is, under the present system who is it that really 

has the responsibility to make crucial decisions and to take the 

crucial look at the details? And I guess what your answer is is that 

there is nobody with that principle responsibility assigned to them. 

Mr. ALDRICH. I think all of the key people that have the authority and the knowledge to investigate the different areas of the shuttle flight and ground systems make up that team, and they do have 

flight safety as their primary responsibility. 

Mr. WALKER. I am willing to buy that everybody is concerned 

about flight safety and that they regard that as foremost in their 

concerns, but in terms of the management of the responsibilities of 

getting everything done, all of those people also have all kinds of 

other things that they have to be concerned about, which is their 

primary function, which is the reason why they are on the team in 

the first place, and while that may be a foremost concern in a ge- neric sense, my concern is who has as a foremost concern within 

that operational element safety as their principal generic responsibility? Is the answer no one? 

Mr. ALDRICH. Well, I hate to answer you the same way three consecutive times. Some of the people on that mission management 

team do not have a wide range of other responsibilities. They are 

specifically the managers for the shuttle hardware elements that 

we are addressing, and so they are directly involved in depth technically in those elements. 

I am not trying to say that an augmentation of additional safety 

consideration is incorrect. I am simply trying to answer your question about our understanding of today’s makeup. 

Mr. WALKER. Let me put the question in another way. Would it 

make some sense, given what we now know, to have such an augmentation of the management ieam that would be essentially a 

safety representative? 

Mr. ALDRICH. It is my personal belief, Mr. Walker, that we have 

strong cause to consider augmentation of the safety organization 
g 

tion. 

I personally feel that it would be appropriate to have some 

person on the mission management team whose only hat he was 

wearing is safety. 

Mr. WALKER. And who kind of looked at the rest of the systems 

as they are being developed and analyze them to make certain that 

as people were making decisions they were in fact taking the overall priority of safety and gearing that in. I mean that would essentially be the mission of that person; would that be your understanding? 

Mr. WEITZ. Yes, that is correct. 

Mr. NELSON. Let me follow that up. 

Mr. WEITZ. Excuse me, but an individual can’t do that. That is 

why I am hesitating, because we now come to a meld where we are 

going to interject, in your example, a member of the Astronaut 

Office into another relatively large organization. So he would have 

to become part of that. There is nothing necessarily wrong with 

that, but we can’t just send somebody in and say, “Hey, look at me; 

I am an astronaut therefore I know all there is to know about 

safety.” 

Mr. WALKER. But you could do this-that is a legitimate concern, 

I think, but you know the reason why I think that I raised the 

issue of the Astronaut Office before is because the nature of the 

responsibilities of the astronaut in their training and everything 

else has tended to make them generalists about the system as a 

whole. 

Mr. WEITZ. Exactly, and so many safety issues are very detailed, 

specific, engineering type issues that you will face up to such as a 

seal, such as a bearing or a turbine or a pump or what have you 

that a member of the astronaut office may not be the appropriate 

individual to be that safety representative. 

Mr. WALKER. But yet-I would be Flad to yield in just a moment. 

But yet in, for instance, John Young s memo, I assume that, for example, John would not regard himself as an engineer who is absolutely competent in all aspects of the seal, but he indicated at that 

point that there were some concerns about the seal. 

What I am suggesting is that shouldn’t there be somebody who 

would be raising those concerns in an appropriate time within each 

mission model? 

Mr. WEITZ. Yes, sir, we have now gone full circle. I agree wholeheartedly with you on that. 

Mr. WALKER. OK. All right. 

Mr. NELSON. And that might be the point, whereas Mr. Weitz is 

suggesting that it might not be wise or they could afford the as- 
y , 

perienced astronaut, who is head of a newly formed safety office 

within the astronaut office and he has three people who are working for him in the various aspects of every phase of our operation, 

including airplane flight which includes not only the orbiter, but 

the entire STS and the payloads implications on safety as well. 

Mr. NELSON. Just to clarify, earlier, however, you were speaking 

about something totally separate and independent-- 

Mr. WEITZ. Yes. 

Mr. NELSON [continuing]. In an independent flight safety office 

within NASA that would report directly to the Administrator. 

Mr. WEITZ. Yes, sir. 

Mr. NELSON. All right, now where do you think such an office 

ought to be placed? 

Mr. WEITZ. Physically? 

Mr. NELSON. Physically and functionally. What should be its 

functions and what should be its authority? 

Mr. WEITZ. Well, I have never been a safety officer. I haven’t 

been to safety officer school, and we have lots of folks-- 

Mr. NELSON. I know. Neither have we. 

Mr. WEITZ [continuing]. Who are more qualified than I. 

You have to have resident offices at every facility that serves the 

shuttle. Now, in the past we have had that and I don’t know why 

this system didn’t work. I guess my only objection with the system 

as I see it now is that it did not report directly to the Administrator. Perhaps it is the Associate Administrator for space flight, 

rather than the Administrator of NASA. But the safety organization must have a presence at every component facility that serves 

the program. 

Mr. NELSON. What do you think about in the chief engineer’s 

office? 

Mr. WEITZ. I don’t know. 

Mr. NELSON. Iwould like for Mr. Young to answer that because 

he had an interesting smile there. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, I don’t know either, except that I think the 

head of the organization-if you are going to run a program where 

you are going to fly so many flights every year, and it is not just 

based on previous successful programs like that, there sort of needs 

to be a line organization with the straight lines of authority, and I 

think the person that is in charge of safety should report directly 

to the person who is responsible for it, because the person who is 

responsible for it has to make the decision of how many flights 

they fly, and that may be directly against safety in some times. He 

has to know how much it is going to cost. That may be against 

safety. 
Mr. WEITZ. Let me state, if I might, Mr. Chairman, that I hesitated on your answer because we don’t want to build an octopus that 

strangles the program. It has to be functional, and therefore we 

would like to-and these are a lot easier to say than to accomplish, 

that you would like a lean and mean safety organization. 

In retrospect, you gave me a breather while John was talking. I 

think it would be essential to have a safety representative in the 

chief engineer’s office. 

Mr. NELSON. Before I get to you, Admiral, let me ask Mr. Crippen, now do you have a different perspective on this? Do you feel 

that this might be an organizational kind of strangle hold that 

wouldn’t allow the decisionmaking process to operate efficiently? 

Mr. CRIPPEN. No, not at all. I guess I am in agreement with 

having what I would call a parallel safety office that was specifically concerned about flight safety. We have a safety organization to 

date, and it has worked through our chief engineer. My perception 

is that most of those concerns are really what I would relate to as 

industrial safety more so than specifically looking at a mission and 

looking at it from operational standpoint and judging how safe it 

is. 

I think that we can not have a large organization, but need 

people that are located at key places who can hear all concerns 

that might relate to flight safety and make sure those get to the 

top, so I think that is a viable thing to do. It is like anything else. I 

think Admiral Truly or somebody said it earlier, we can draw line 

organizations all day long, and it usually ends up being the people 

that are put in it that make it work independent of the way the 

lines are drawn. So I don’t really have any strong desires to sit 

here today and try to tell you exactly how we should organize it, 

but I think it needs to be in place, and I think that we have that 

support throughout the agency right now to go off and make something like that work. So that is in the bucket. It is being worked. 

Mr. NELSON. Now that is a point of departure, Admiral Truly. 

We are here with you to look to the future. We are here using your 

memo as the base from which to exercise our oversight and investigatory authority to help you make sure we are going to have flight 

safety for the future. Now what are your comments about this 

thought that has been injected in here in this discussion? 

Mr. TRULY. Well, as a matter of fact, I think Crip just said what 

I was going to make an observation about to try to put it in another way to help you understand what I think is being said here. 

Institutionally we have an SR&QA organization that is integral 

to safety within NASA, and it does report to the chief engineer. 

There is debate even today about numbers of quality assurance 

people and so forth, and I think there is going to need to be some 
autoty to 

ooto aywee e wats to, ad e bugs te pots 

if they’re not carrying their survival knife, and he looks at weather. 

The shuttle, when we get into flying a lot of flights, is in exactly 

that business except in a far different and more complex way. I 

think what is being suggested, or at least as I understand it, is that 

some sort of a flight safety organization might be conceived, and 

that is our job to conceive it and argue it out, and I think it is a 

very good point that we don’t want to strangle the system with it. 

Whereas in a squadron, that junior officer who is a safety officer 

and is bugging everybody else to make sure they have got their 

survival gear, can go directly to the commanding officer of that 

squadron, but yet if you have an airplane accident, safety has to be 

pervasive to the crew in that airplane and to the guys on the line 

that take care of it. 

Frankly, I think that after Apollo, the SR&QA organization that 

was set up is a good one, and I am sure that the chief engineer is 

going to be looking at it, and there is going to be a lot of people 

looking over his shoulder just as it is one of his responsibilities to 

look over ours. But as a part of that memo that I wrote, I said that 

we are going to look at our entire management organization and 

this is a part of it. How it will come out, I don’t know. I think it 

would be a mistake to design it by committee or in this forum or 

whatever. It is going to take a lot of bright ideas to improve what 

we are going to do, but we are going to do it. 

Precisely where the astronauts fit into the organization is to be 

determined. You heard a unanimous vote, I think, or at least that 

is what I heard and frankly I concur with it because for 14 years I 

saw the world from that office, and that is that the astronauts very 

much need an input, but that does not necessarily mean that they 

have to run the FRR, or have to run the L minus 1 review. As a 

part of this effort, we are going to have an organization. I imagine 

it will be different from what we had going into 51-L, but I think 

there are going to be a lot of similarities. 

In some cases, as I said before, changing an organization doesn’t 

necessarily solve problems. In some cases, reinstituting discipline in a good organization can change it from being a bad one back to 

being a good one. We just haven’t faced up to that, but we will. 

Mr. NELSON. I appreciate your comments. I just want to make 

sure that everybody here understands that by virtue of me having 

a rather extraordinary learning experience, I saw firsthand how 

Mr. Young would worry and fret over the concerns and the safety 

of the individuals, and, I, for one appreciate that characteristic as 

he has exemplified in his professional duties. I want you to know 

that. 
about, but in large part, it may be the case of reimposing discipline 

on the existing organization? Is that a fair characterization? 

Mr. TRULY. That is my personal view, yes. 

Mr. WALKER. Is that a part of what the team which Mr. Fletcher 

has just announced is going to be looking at the agency? Is that a 

part of what they are going to be doing as well, taking a look at 

those kind of questions? 

Mr. TRULY. Ithink what undoubtedly will really happen is that 

we are going to have to get on with taking a look at the Shuttle 

Program Organization before General Philips will have his study 

ccmplete. And I am delighted, incidentally, in this situation, because I think there will be interrelationships, and we can adjust. 

Organizations can change. 

I think what I would like to do, frankly, is to let the Presidential 

Commission make its report so that we know their view of what we 

should do in the area of program management, get the ideas from 

Arnie and the background and experience of the work they have 

done, and set about with some specific direction in some specific 

areas like this one, an independent flight safety organization, and 

cause some people to go off and make some changes that then later 

in the year, based on the larger NASA organizational look that 

Philips is going to do for Dr. Fletcher, see if that needs to be reiterated. 

In this case, we have the time to do that. I have put it off a bit, 

frankly, because of the immediacy of some of the early things, and 

I don’t think we have lost a thing in putting it off. I think it is 

appropriate. I do want to get on with it because it is a hard job. 

Everybody thinks they know how to draw an organization on a 

little piece of paper, but we have been living with the Shuttle Program for several years, and I don’t want to undo some good things 

that we have going for us. 

Mr. WALKER. And one thing that just strikes me as being a cautionary note with the situation that you have just described is I 

don’t think we want a situation where you make changes based 

upon what you now know and implement those only to have the 

Philips Commission come back and suggest other changes that then 

undoes what you have put in place. I mean we could run up the 

pole and down the pole so many times that what we do is lose a lot 

of the momentum that we need in order to get back to fly. 

I see that becoming a legitimate concern. If we have enough 

people studying the organization and enough people making recommendations, ultimately you can study it to death and recommend it 

to death, too. I mean there is in fact a problem there that we have 

got to spend some time considering as well. 
that what Sam Philips would recommend would undo that kind of 

decision. On the other hand, there are other organizational decisions, for example, the way that the program is run, the Shuttle 

Program, the level 1, level 2, level 3, and the centers, you know, 

the Johnson Space Center, the Kennedy Space Center, the Marshall Space Center. That also will have an effect on the Shuttle 

Program, but that is at a macrolevel that is going to have to wait 

his study. So even though hypothetically I don’t want to change 

things too many times either, I think we can strike a proper balance by keeping him informed early as to what we are doing, make 

some early decisions-certainly not too early, but some appropriate 

decisions and stop talking about this and set some new shuttle policies, whatever they may be, in place before too long. 

However, I would like the opportunity for the Commission to 

report out and time for the system to reflect on that. 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. NELSON. One of the questions that we will be asking in this 

committee you have just raised, and we would be happy to have 

any ideas from you all as to whether or not we ought to have a 

system, and would it affect flight safety and efficiency and so forth, 

as was the case under Apollo in which there was no lead center 

concept, rather that it was operated out of headquarters, and 

would that cause the centers to cooperate more with each other as 

opposed to little baronial fiefdoms springing up that may or may 

not occur. 

Do you have any ideas on that you want to share with us? I am 

talking about any of you. 

Mr. TRULY. The only idea I would share is I think that it is a 

legitimate thing that Sam Philips is going to have to look at. My 

personal view is that we could make some changes and make program management more in line, but I think we can solve our flight 

safety concerns in the present organization or in any different organization. 

We can instill in the system an increased awareness of flight 

safety which we already have because of the accident, and we can 

sure beef up our shuttle program organization to include flight 

safety at a lower level of organizational decision, I think. 

Mr. NELSON. Well, that in part is an unfair question. We will 

take that up with the Administrator, but we will be taking that up. 

All right, let’s talk about flight safety and crew training. You 

have enough of it? Do you have enough nioney for it? Do you have 

enough facilities? Now on the scaled down version of flight rates, 

do you have enough simulators? With what you have, is that getting you to where you need to be in crew training? 
tors, and the airlines get 20 hours a day out of their simulators. We 

have a far different thing because we have different vehicles, different mission models, different loads. We have a flight software 

load that has to come in every time, on time, and it is a totally 

different process. But we certainly would need to look at making 

those training operations more efficient to up the flight rate because you are really critically interested, as you well know, in the 

crew working together and being trained as a team. That is critically important, and the only place you can do that is a good old 

simulator. 

We have three shuttle training aircraft that we train in right 

now and two of them have high time structural components. You 

flew in one of them. It has a scatter factor of 4. That means they 

have reached the hours where people expect things to start failing 

on them, and we have had some secondary structures fail. We have 

to inspect them frequently, and sooner or later they are going to 

fail some parts that have to go down for mods. So we need another 

shuttle training aircraft, a fourth shuttle training aircraft. 

To make those simulators more efficient, it is going to take some 

additional resources, and to get an ascent and entry trainer which 

will off load the shuttle mission simulator some and allow not crew 

training, but individual training to get basic background of the 

complexities of flying the good old space shuttle. For example, to go into orbit, which I am sure you know, there are 175 different procedures that most of the crews have to know by heart, not to mention 

all the abort modes and all the things that people have to learn to 

operate this vehicle successfully. 

So crew training is a key issue, and we need to upgrade our facilities. We need another training aircraft to operate at reasonable 

flight rates now that we are starting to run into fatigue failures on 

our shuttle training airplanes. 

Mr. NELSON. All right, I would like to ask our staff to follow up 

with Mr. Young on exactly that question that directly impacts the 

funding questions for NASA for the future, and it directly relates 

to the subject of this hearing, which is flight safety. 

Mr. Aldrich, I was quite impressed as I saw you operate a meeting of where you were pushing the system to the limit to try to get 

an updated computer program for another TAL site on STS 61-C, 

and as it turned out, the next day rolled around. There was not 

that computer update. 

Tell me what you know about updating those kind of computer 

programs, of being able to slip in additional information in the mission’s computer program. It seems like that you had a rigidity 

there that once a program was set, it was very difficult to change 

even though you had considerable updated information. In this par- 
easily be applied. 

The situation with regard to adding a TAL site on 61-C had to do 

with a change in iocation not only with respect to the characteristics of the site itself, but an adjustment to the guidance profile of 

the ascent trajectory so that if it was selected, the vehicle would fly 

correctly during its powered flight to get there. That is more complicated to produce quickly and needs to be generated in the simulation math models that are used by the flight design community. 

Once it is generated and tested and produces the parameters, 

then they must be put in the flight software and again tested to be 

sure they were correctly entered. We have the capabilities to do 

that kind of work, but particularly ones that deal with the guidance and control functions of the spacecraft need to be very carefully handled and tested and be assured that they are correct 

before we would want to load them. So, I think the process is rigorous and sound and we need to be sure that we don’t try to circumvent it. 

However, my real thrust with respect to TAL sites is that I think 

we have not done as rigorous a job as we should on providing the 

complete set of facilitated TAL sites across the Atlantic, both in 

the European continent and in Africa so that we have the best 

sites available. We have them readily available to select in our 

computer loads as we put them together in a standard way, and we 

provide all of the landing and navigation aids at each site that optimize it for use. 

That is a campaign that I am continuing to pursue, and we have 

a number of actions underway to be sure that when we resume 

flight that we have a very solid and complete set of transatlantic 

and later transpacific abort sites to serve the shuttle aborts. 

Mr. NELSON. Are you getting the cooperation from the State Department that you want? 

Wr. ALDRICH. Yes, in fact we get excellent cooperation from the 

State Department. Prior to the 51-L mission we determined the 

need to have a site in Moroco, and it was provided very cooperatively on short notice and was completely ready to support the 51- 

L launch. 

Mr. NELSON. Was that only for 51-L or was that for all future 

flights? 

Mr. ALDRICH. Ittreated a need that was specific for 51-L. However, it reflects the fact that we should have a more standard and 

broad-based characteristic set of sites, and it would be very applica- ble to many other launch trajectories on later flights. 

Mr. NELSON. That is good to hear. Your weather is much better 

there most of the year around than the other sites; is it not? 
more complete set of NAVAIDS and landing lights. We were not 

able to commit to it for night landing, for example, because we 

could not step to the full outfitting that would be desired. 

Mr. NELSON. Did you have a crew on site at Casablanca? 

Mr. ALDRICH. We had a crew on site at Casablanca, and we also 

had Karol Bobko fly over and inspect it for us to be sure we understood its characteristics and that we had accepted it in the correct 

way and understood that it would be what we need. 

Mr. NELSON. Mr. Hall. 

Mr.HALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don’t particularly have 

any questions, and I understand the thrust here is basically 011 

safety and making inquiries that have already adequately been 

made, and I am late arriving so I do not know what has been covered. 

Let me just say that one of the things that I hear as I go around 

my district, which is the old Rayburn district in Texas. They lay 

advice, and I am looking for an answer for it, and Chairman 

Nelson has done a very good job of vaccinating me for the fourth 

shuttle. Their attitude, and I think these are things that you need 

to know and need to be said and need to be heard, is that, well, we 

had a shuttle and then we decided we needed the shuttle in the 

event that one shuttle had difficulty to go after them, and then we 

got a third one in the event the second one was disabled, and now 

with typical bureaucracy we have four. 

Of course, that is not the facts, and I understand that and Chairman Nelson has done yeoman’s service along that line, but I will 

study your testimony here today and do feel the right to call on 

you for additional advice to shore it up. I support the program totally and am extremely proud of everyone at that table and everyone that is associated with you. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. I will read the record as to what has 

been stated heretofore and not burden you with additional questions, but I thank you for your time. 

Mr. NELSON. Well, you jump in any time. 

Let me ask you on the question of flight safety about the hatch 

door. As I understand it, after the Apollo fire, the door was redesigned so that instead of swinging outward like an airline door 

does, that it swung inward, exactly the reverse-that it swung 

inward like an airline door and then it was redesigned for safety 

reasons so that it swung outward, and so to with the shuttle door. 

I noticed a bit of-well, I guess the best way to put it in extreme 

caution when moving around that door handle, even though a little 

metal clip had been designed to put over it, realizing that if you 

flip that handle only a small portion of an inch, that thing would 

suddenly open with the pressure differential on orbit. 
g g

p with. We have come up with what we call a lock-lock device to 

ensure that while we are on orbit the handle does not get moved 

and that is why you saw probably a little anxiety amongst your 

fellow crew members if people were bouncing around the hatch 

and the handle and weren’t aware of it. 

With the lock-lock device all of us are satisfied that it is safe, and 

we just make sure that everybody on board understands its criticality so that nobody goes around and fools with it. That’s all. 

Mr. NELSON. Do the rest of you agree with that? And you, too, 

Admiral Truly. 

Mr. YOUNG. That old door and I have been in a fight since 1972, I 

think an outward opening hatch on a spacecraft is very much like 

an inward opening hatch on a submarine. 

Mr. NELSON. Well, your position is made intimately clear. 

Mr. TRULY. I don’t have anything to add to whaL Crippen says. 

There is no question that on orbit you have to have absolute certainty that the handle cannot be moved inadvertently, and you 

have to have absolute certainty that everybody on board, whether 

they are a payload specialist or the commander of the mission is 

critically aware of it. 

Mr. WALKER. Can I raise some questions with regard to centaur? 

Mr. NELSON. Yes. 

Mr. WALKER. Primarily to the astronauts, as presently designed, 

as I understand it, the shuttle centaur has a single dump channel 

for both the liquid hydrogen and the liquid oxygen. In the case of a 

return to launch site in an abort mode, if a failure occurred on the 

shuttle they would have to land, as I understand it, with full tanks 

in the pay load bay. Is that a matter of safety concern? 

Mr. WEITZ. John is much more conversant with centaur than I, 

but it is absolutely a safety concern. Not only is your landing 

weight increased significantly, but you now have hypergols or cryogenics back in the cargo bay. 

Mr. WALKER. Well, is it an acceptable risk to fly such a system in 

a manned vehicle? 

Mr. WEITZ. With the single dump valve? We think not. 

Mr. WALKER. So, can I assume that you would probably favor 

modifying the centaur to provide for a redundant dump channel? 

Mr. WEITZ. I would really prefer to refer to John because he has 

been in on more discussions than I have. 

Mr. YOUNG. Congressman Walker, we looked at that extensively, 

and our engineering people tell us you would like to put in, parallel dump valves or a series of parallel dump valves so you have 

more redundance in that system. There is not enough room in the 

orbiter to do that, so you have an interesting trade here. It is typi- 
yygp

Mr. WALKER. Well, I assume that by ruining your whole day you 

mean that we could have a potential for a catastrophic loss of the 

entire crew and orbiter at that point. 

Mr. YOUNG. That is correct. 

Mr. WALKER. So that we really are talking about something 

which has the same kind of serious consequences as the bad seals 

on the SRB’s. 

Mr. YOUNG. That’s very true. 

Mr. WALKER. And so the question, then, becomes is that really 

an acceptable risk to fly such a system in a manned vehicle. 

Mr. YOUNG. That certainly is the question. Mr. NELSON. We are going to follow up on this in detail, and I 

think Mr. Young has said, you know, it is a question, and the question is you get out of everybody everything you can get out of here, 

and then we are going to follow it up with additional hearings. 

Mr. WALKER. And I think that is obviously one that we should, 

but I mean it really is a very very serious question for flight safety, 

because I think in large part that what most Americans are concerned about now as we deal with these issues are precisely those 

things which can result in catastrophic loss of crew and vehicle, 

and it is really that kind of concern. There was not adequate concern about that particular aspect with the SRB’s, and we do want 

to identify those areas where that is potentially the major problem. This certainly appears to be one of those places where not only 

are there serious questions, but I think the entire public perception 

of what we do in getting back to flying status is wrapped up in how 

we deal with those questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. NELSON. Mr. Andrews. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Just one or two questions to follow up. I note 

while I was absent during the testimony today, you have talked 

about the astronaut input on launch or no launch. I am curious, 

and I don’t think this was covered. On the date of the launch, what 

kind of role does the astronaut corps play? As I understand it, Captain Young flies the weather. I am curious-correct me if I am 

wrong, and I am curious what other activities take place on your 

part and what kind of immediate input do you have or would you 

have should you make a detnrmination to not launch? 

Mr. WEITZ. OK, I get this one. 

We have a system whereby representatives from the Astronaut 

Office are integral parts of this system. As such, we do not presently have the capability to stand up and say in that capacity I say we 

don’t launch right now. We have on every launch, at least in the 

past, we have had two cap coms in the control center in Houston. 

Mr. NELSON. Two what? 
system which is designed to consider such inputs from all elements 

of the organization. 

Mr. YOUNG. For example, the weather guy, he really doesn’t say 

go or no go. He just tells them what the weather is, and the mission rules say whether you go or no go. And that is the way it 

should be. 

Mr. NELSON. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. ANDREWS. I surely would. 

Mr. NELSON. There is a specific case I want to ask about, and it 

was brought up in your memo, Mr. Young, dealing with STS 51-1, 

which was last August. The question was not so much if there was 

a hole in the clouds over the launch pad, but the question was was 

there acceptable minimums of what the weather would be like in 

about 25 minutes after launch in case you had an RTLS. 

What was the essence of your comment in your memo of which 

you cited six examples and that was one of uncertain-and I am 

quoting-(‘uncertain operational conditions or events which we 

routinely accept now in the Space Shuttle Program.” 

Mr. YOUNG. I was referring to the fact that on 51-1 we launched 

through two decks of clouds, and the first deck of clouds had no 

rain coming out of it, so we were OK. And we went through the 

second deck of clouds that didn’t have rain in it, if the second deck 

of clouds had had rain in it above 5,000 feet, it would have done 

severe damage to the tiles of the orbiter, and then on reentry it 

would have been a very bad thing. Then I was also referring to the 

return to landing site weather conditions which are 6 or 7 miles 

away. And we had thunderstorm off the end of the runway there 

that was raining light to moderate rain. If we had had to do an 

intact return to landing site abort-and that would have been the 

first one that we had ever done-that we would have also, at the 

very least, damaged the tiles, and at the worst, if they had run into 

real drag problems which the engineering people would like to 

assess in a wind tunnel right now, we might have been worse off 

than that. 

Frankly, I would opt for being a little more conservative in fiying 

in weather down at the good old cape because, as you know, there 

are plenty of good weather days to fly. The day before and the day 

after that launch were just absolutely beautiful. It just turned out 

that we got everybody all tanked up and ready to go in the bad 

weather where we didn’t have to because two out of three were 

good. 

Mr. ANDREWS. IfI could regain my time, I think the chairman’s 

example is a good one. You also mention in your memo on that 

particular flight that I assume when you got up there your feel was 

that you just couldn’t anticipate what the rain severity might be. 
p

that, I think we will find out we have a higher probability of success and would not subject ourselves to so much worry about flying 

in weather. Even though I get to be the weather pilot, I am not 

interested in flying around in those things either. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, the point of my questioning to all three of 

you, do the astronauts themselves have adequate input at that critical time? John, should you have felt like on that particular flight 

that there should not have been a go, are you three confident that 

you would have the authority or the input that your message back 

would be followed up? I ruean some of that evaluation, I assume, is 

just your feel of the situation like your are suggesting here. 

You can’t put a feel on whether there is going to be a bad thunderstorm right after lift off, but should you get up there and your 

instincts tell you, and I assume that is one reason that you have 

this little procedure is to get somebody with your experience up 

there. If you had that sense, and your recommendation was not to 

lift off, was to wait for another day, are you confident that they 

would listen to you and follow up on your suggestion? 

Mr. YOUNG. Idon’t think NASA should listen to instinct. I think 

we ought to do it on rational logic if we are going to be successful. 

One of the things that we have learned about weather since we 

have been flying out of the cape is, for example, we launched Karol 

Bobko’s flight, 51-D, through clouds that went from 12,000 feet to 

33,000 feet, and there were little bitty pin drop raindrops in there, 

and after I got back I was talking to the weather guys, and they 

said they couldn’t tell when those little raindrops were going to 

turil to big raindrops. 

So that tells me that although instinctively we were going by 

what the Rockwell people told us about, you know, no moisture, 

that was not the right thing to do instinctively and practically, too. 

After you have talked to the weather people, you find they can’t 

predict what you are going to be flying through. You don’t want to 

take a chance of hurting your orbiter real bad. So we are smarter 

now, and we won’t do that again, I’m quite sure, but you learn the 

hard way. 

I also found out that the weather radar, they told me, didn’t pick 

up all the raindrops that were in clouds, which I thought was a terrible thing to find out after we launched this bunch through that 

first cloud deck in rain on 51-1. 

Mr. ALDRICH. Mr. Andrews, I would like the opportunity to comment on this subject, because I am directly involved. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Sure. 

Mr. ALDRICH. I started doing this job in August of last year, and I 

was responsible for the final launch recommendation to Mr. Moore 
pg

This is probably the closest area that the crewmen you are talking to have a direct input into the launch decision process, and 

while we do ask them to give us a hard go or no go from flying in 

their STA and evaluation the weather, it generally turns out to be 

the very best interpretation of the weather condition that can be 

made to us, and we can vary what they do. They can assess the 

approaches to the RTLS landing strip. They can fly through the 

clouds over the launch pad, or they can make assessments of rain 

clouds that are further off in one direction or another. 

Some of the most difficult days I have had in my life have been 

on days we did and did not launch during that time period and in 

dealing directly with John Young and P.J. Weitz and trying to interpret our rules and their reports and come to the right conclusion on that day. It is clear to me that in the future we need to 

baseline some more conservative rules in this area, but it is an extremely complex and difficult thing to deal with, and one that the 

shuttle will have to pay a lot of note of in the future. 

Mr. NELSON. Admiral Truly, we are dealing from your forward 

looking projection in your memo, and this of course is certainly one 

of the items that you have raised in which you say the weather 

forecasting capability will be reviewed and improved where possible to allow for the most accurate reporting, and also these ques- tions about launch assessment and reassessment. Now we have an 

example where we have two different opinions within your agency 

under your responsibility as we look to the future as to a specific 

example in the past, 51-1. So we are going to be needing to visit 

with you more about how do you solve this in the future. 

Mr. TRULY. I’m not sure that I understand what you mean about 

the two different views. Frankly, I believe that John and the crew 

guys and Arnie’s objective to make the correct weather decision, 

are 100 percent in synch, and you have heard the difficulty of it. 

We obviously need, if we can, to invest in better weather prediction 

capability. I don’t know whether that has been dealt with yet or 

what it will cost, but we need to do that. 

We need conservative rules, but I think John is exactly right. 

You would like not to have to make judgment calls. You would like 

to have rules and be able to go out and measure the conditions and 

then get the go or no go based on that kind of analysis, but the 

subject of weather-it is complex walking outside this building and 

trying to figure out what Washington weather is, and I don’t think 

I have ever been anywhere where it is more difficult to predict 

than down at the cape. 

When I was down there we spent many an hour trying for STS 

flights or something, and 45 minutes later after looking at the 
in the clouds, we launched through them. I am saying that from 

what I know now, I don’t think we would have launched. What I 

know now, I think that was not the conservative, proper thing to 

do based on the fact that the radar people just told me they 

couldn’t see precipitation in the rain clouds, and we certainly were 

reviewing the rain clouds before we made that launch. 

I also think it would be helpful if the first return to landing site 

abort was to be very conservative in the weather around the cape 

area, and I think that is what will happen as a result of some of 

our in-house working groups back there in Houston. The first one 

of those that the program ever does is going to be very exciting. 

And we want to make sure that it ends up successfully. 

Mr. NELSON. All right, thank you for clarifying that. 

Let me ask you, other than what appears to be the problem on 

the SRB regarding Challenger, how confident are the three of you 

that there are not other fundamental design flaws? 

Mr. WEITZ. I am not confident at all because we think we have 

identified some, and that is what Arnie described earlier as a process on his special PRCB’s in these other activities. Perhaps you 

want to say more about it Arnie, but we have got these three or 

four different categories in which every element within NASA has 

identified what they see as problems or issues--- 

Mr. ALDRICH. I would like to say these things we feel require critical looks for first flight may not be, in fact, fundamental design 

flaws, at least in all cases, but rather areas where there is discomfort with the amount of safety margin, and we feel the safety 

margin should be enhanced to give us confidence. A design flaw is, 

I think, a more serious finding, and I am not sure that we are running across a large number of those. 

We are running across things that we have accepted before, and 

in the light of new assessment, we say now is the time to strengthen these areas. 

Mr. NELSON. Yes, Mr. Walker. 

Mr. WALKER. In that sense of evaluation, is the shuttle centaur 

question that we raised a little while ago, is that a design flaw in 

your evaluation? 

Mr. ALDRICH. I would like to address your earlier comment on 

centaur. We have been very concerned about the centaur system, 

particularly with respect to safety and particularly with respect to 

abort conditions where we have to bring it back in the orbiter. 

There were a number of design corrections that were in work by 

the centaur program during this last fall and winter leading to the 

potential launches of two planetary flights in May of this year. 

And Ne were not at all satisfied that we were going to achieve the 
copoets, oweve, tat s aso beg studed, ad tat s te 

total mission abort profile and hazard and the results related 

thereto and how the vehicle can perform, where it can fail, and 

how those anomalies can be handled. We have a complete design 

assessment team in that specific area reviewing those conditions. 

What their findings will be, I think, are open yet in terms of the 

de ee of comfort that will come out. 

ge also are looking at the pressure control of the two tanks. The 

two tanks in the centaur, the liquid oxygen and the liquid hydrogen, are separated by a single bulkhead, and the pressure control 

schemes for the ascent and for the aborts are elaborate and they 

are computer contidled, and some of them are worked in algorithm schemes as opposed to direct pressure sensing. That also is 

being reviewed in depth for comfort with the engineering team 

across both centers. 

This relates to many changes that are potential to the stage. It 

relates to concerns that we may or may not arrive at comfort with, 

and these are going to be brought forward in detail both to myself, 

of which I have reviewed many of them already, and to Admiral 

Truly for a total assessment of the kind that you are suggesting. 

Specifically on each change, but the aggregate also do we feel comfortable with this centaur as an element to fly in the shuttle, and 

as you point out, the abort is probably the focus of the most level of 

concern. 

Mr. WALKER. I’m not certain. Do we have-I’m not asking you so 

much as I am asking other people hsre, I guess, but maybe you, 

too. Do we have a list of the specific items that you are considering 

on shuttle and on centaur for redesign? 

Mr. ALDRICH. I don’t have one here with me today, but I certainly could provide them to you in a short turnaround. We have them 

in Houston. 

Mr. WALKER. Yes, if you provide a detailed list on both where 

things are being considered for redesign for the committee, I think 

that would be very helpful for our records. 

Mr. ALDRICH. For example, when you say both, one of the design 

changes that we are already moving out with to the orbiter is a 

way so that if we do land with some of the hydrogen propellants on 

board, there will be a safe way to vent those propellants. The earlier vent was located down near where the vertical tail comes out of 

the fuselage, and there were a number of concerns related to how 

that manifested itself in hazard to the vehicle, and we are, in fact, 

extending the vertical vent to the tip of the orbiter tail so it can 

vent clear of all personnel and all vehicle hardware. 

That is one of many, and I will provide you with that list. 

Mr. WALKER. I thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
it to be done on a schedule. I guess that debate will go on over the 

next few months. 

Mr. NELSON. We will continue to visit with you on that question. 

Now, how about the question of quality control. We are going to 

start scratching at this next week on Wednesday. You want to give 

us some pointers as we get into this question of quality control? 

Mr. TRULY. Well, let me make a couple of brief comments about 

it. The quality assurance and the reliability of the system is an integral part of the fabric of us being able to operate safely. It is absolutely crucial to us, and it is crucial that it is done right, and 

that we have a good program that is well understood. This has 

been a part of NASA since its beginnings, and a major look at it 

was made after the Apollo 204 fire, and it is still a major part of 

our program. 

What I would suggest, though, that you do when you have your 

hearings, and I am sure that this will come up, is to make sure 

that everybody is working from the same data base on numbers, 

because like all these things, it is a complex subject. Quality assurance, as I understand it, is a joint NASA/industry objective just 

like the rest of our program is run, and so I think we ought to 

make sure the Congress and the public and we are working from 

the same set of facts in order to decide whether or not the quality 

assurance program that we have is the proper one, and if it is not, 

I can assure you that you will never find a supporter more vocal or 

vehement than I to get it the support that it needs. 

I think, frankly, that the first thing that I would make sure of is 

that all of us that are interested in this are working from the same 

set of numbers and understanding of the makeup of that program. 

Mr. NELSON. Mr. Aldrich, when you wrote your memo January 

the 14th, did you have any data at that point that you wrote your 

memo from the SRB’s and the joints? 

Mr. ALDRICH. I want to make sure I understand your question. I 

did not feel sensitive to a concern about the SRB’s or the joints in 

that time period, nor was anything-- 

Mr. NELSON. And that is perfectly reasonable, and I understand 

that. 

Now, looking back on it, was there a degradation of the O-rings 

on flight 61-C? 

Mr. ALDRICH. I can’t recall. 

Mr. NELSON. Does anybody? 

Mr. CRIPPEN. Arnie, if I may. 

Mr. NELSON. Mr. Crippen. 

Mr. CRIPPEW. There was erosion on the left-hand segment SRB by 

a small amount, yes. 
perature at launch one year later on the STS 61-C was 51 degrees 

with less degradation of the O-ring. Do you have any idea of why 

that might be? 

Mr. CRIPPEN. I’m not prepared to go into detail on that, but the 

temperature you quoted for 61-C is lower than what I remembered 

it ever being, but we can go back and get that for you. 

Mr. NELSON. Well, there are many other factors, and of course 

we will be getting that from the commission as it comes. The question of roundness, that was my question also on the SRB segments 

on 61-C. 

Mr. CRIPPEN. That’s correct. There is more than just temperature 

involved. 

Mr. NELSON. Admiral Truly, you want to venture to us at this 

point some suggestions on how you can improve the communications and coordination process within the agency? 

Mr. TRULY. I guess my answer would be to do two things: one is 

to do this organizational assessment, make sure that the lines of 

authority are clear. I am a firm believer in authority and accountability. I think we ought to make sure that from top to bottom we 

relook at the organization, change it where we must or should, and 

make sure everybody understands it, and make it clear. So that 

would be the first thing. 

The second is that where we leave the organization to be the 

same, but run into areas which would require increased attention 

to what I referred to discipline, for example, in the example I gave 

before, when you have a critical review, should you allow it to be 

done on the telecon, or should you do it face to face? 

The review stays the same. The organization stays the same, but 

the discipline-maybe that is the wrong word. The rigor in which 

you do it, and beyond that I don’t have any comment. 

Mr. NELSON. Anybody else want to comment on that? 

Dr. Byerly? Dr. Smith? Mr. Tate? Mr. Clement? 

Well, gentlemen, it is almost 3 o’clock. We have kept you a long 

time, but we needed to start this dialog, and this is just the beginning. As we continue on this question of flight safety-of course, 

we are continuing on with our next panel here, but this today is 

just the beginning of the continuous oversight process that we will 

assure will be exercised, and you all have been most generous with 

your time. We appreciate it very much. You have been forthcoming. Your answers have been clear, and we appreciate it. 

We are basically all in this boat together, and that is to get us 

back in the space launch business as soon as possible, as safely as 

possible. That’s the goal for all of us. Thank you very much. Have 

a good day. 
STATEMENTS OF JOHN BRIZENDINE, CHAIRMAN, AEROSPACE 

SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL: NORMAN R. PARMET, AEROSPACE 

SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL; HERBERT GRIER, AEROSPACE 

SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL; SEYMOUR C. HIMMEL, AEROSPACE 

VISORY PANEL 

Mr. BRIZENDINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and other distinguished members of the subcommittee. I think my associates from 

the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel are identified at the table. I 

will mention their names. Beginning on my left is Mr. Grier, Mr. 

Parmet, Dr. Himmel on my right, and Dr. Krone on my right. Also 

in our audience is our able Staff Director, Mr. Roth. 

I will be very brief in our remarks, Mr. Chairman, to try to respect the manner in which you would like to conduct this hearing, 

to allow the maximum amount of time for response to your inquiries. There are a few matters which perhaps might be useful for us 

to mention. 

You are aware, of course, that our annual reporting to the Congress, this year’s report was completed prior to the 51-L accident, 

and thus did not address it. Out of regard for the unique circumstances, we have sort of rearranged our manner of reporting and 

tried to look into the matters that we have observed during the 

past year that might have bearing on the 51-L associated activities. 

We have also thought it might be well if we looked at the past 

years panel’s observations as they might be useful to the team in 

exploring things affecting the overall safety of the program, and it 

might be useful in the future. 

Of course, we have been looking at how the panel might be of 

value in returning to safe space flight as promptly and as safely as 

possible. I think a point of our report last year that is worth mentioning is that the panel did state it felt that safe and productive 

space flight could be achieved with the STS Program if the real 

state of the art of the system is understood and other limitations 

around it are recognized, and these are integrated into the program planning and scheduling. 

We recounted the matter that the hardware is still developmen- tal. It has not yet achieved the reliability that is desired for a longterm operational system, and in some cases the durability needs to 

be improved, in some cases performance. Most of these things are 

identified, but they are yet to be achieved. We noted that at the 

higher rates of launches, annual launch rates, additional facilities 

are needed for processing and maintenance of this operational 

fleet. 

SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL; AND NORRIS J. KRONE, SAFETY AD- 
cal from the standpoint of what is needed to operate the STS Pro

gram and the competition for funds between other programs and 

between centers. We need to do realistic planning, we believe, 

within the means of the actual funding whether that permits one 

launch a year or “x” launches a year. I think this is part of the 

overall safety approach, recognizing how much money you have to 

do a given job with, and then doing the job within the means of 

those funds. 

I think the panel would like to address the subject of SRB’s very 

briefly since we are supposed to be an oversight panel, and we are 

supposed to recognize the hazards of these things. We looked carefully at our own practices and procedures to see why we didn’t recognize the O-ring issue, the field joint issue on the 51-L. 

For whatever reason, we didn’t recognize it. We had been exposed to the field joint discussions over the prior years, although in 

1985 we had really focused our attention on the filament wound 

case because of its upcoming urgency and the soon planned 

launches at Vandenburgh. We did note and do note that none of 

the development testing, the qualification testing or the laboratory 

testing on these joints showed any problem or revealed the rotation 

or the O-ring problem of that joint. That came from feedback from 

the hardware during flight operations. 

Mr. NEISON. You say you did notice that or you did not? 

Mr. BRIZENDINE. None of those activities revealed an indication 

of a problem, and on the database that we received, there was on 

indication of a problem with the joint. The panel, as I said, has 

taken a hard look at its own practices and trying to be introspective ourselves to see that we do the best job we can of focusing on 

the real serious or potentially serious issues. 

On the subject of the filament wound case, incidentally, we did 

recommend that it not be used until its strength margins and its 

dynamic characteristics are sorted out, and these are two separate 

issues from the field joint, although the field joint question will 

probably have to be applied to the filament wound case, as well. 

But as we ponder the field joint issue, it leads to some thoughts 

that might be useful for the future. STS now has a 25-flight data 

bank, if you care to look at it that way. The hardware has been 

telling us something during those 25 flights. It has been giving us 

feedback. This further leads to the philosophy of management of 

operations that involve repetitive-use hardware of this operational 

fleet, if you will, and it is somewhat different from a single event 

type of operation in procedures and discipline. The outgrowth of 

that is that risk management takes on a new perspective, and you 

have a repetitive-use hardware operating fleet. 
g

This means that every anomaly from every flight has to have a 

solution or a satisfactory fix or be satisfactorily understood and explained prior to the next flight, because the hardware is telling you what you really should be thinking about. It is not an analysis anymore, it is telling it like the real world really is. 

Now, one may have to make hardware changes, software changes, process changes, interim fixes, or even hold up your flying 

for a while if you can’t satisfactorily explain the anomalies from 

each and every flight, but you must deal with every known criticality, and I emphasize the word, “known” because there was a tendency to talk about safety and absolutes, and I don’t know of any 

absolutes in safety. 

The thing that you worry the most about may not bother you, 

and the thing that you haven’t even thought about may bite you, 

so it is a matter of perspective in that sense. The next flight we 

believe will be essentially a test flight, and the launch should be 

within the experience base to the extent possible and practicable. Obviously, some SRB changes will be made. 

The panel certainly endorses Admiral Truly’s strategy in returning to safe space flight. I think the panel would urge a couple of 

things. One, I think launch pressure is going to be greater than we 

have ever seen before once we get back into the flight status, because the backlog is building up, and backlog is pressure. Second, 

return to flight, however, from what I heard this morning, an 

awful lot of changes are contemplated, and that starts to violate 

rule 1. You fly within your base experience. Something has to hold constant. Something has to be your reference data. You can’t change everything at once, so I just would 

urge caution and good judgment, which I am sure that Admiral 

Truly’s team will use in accepting and allowing the extent of 

change prior to the next flight. Make all the changes one feels are 

needed, but phase them in so that you only have a manageable number of variables to deal with in making the risk assessment for 

the next flight. 

In reviewing the critical item list, I think the panel would like to 

comment on that, and we know that a thorough review is in process. We urge that they be, themselves, critically reviewed to sort 

out those that demonstrate an operating margin. There are probably some real difficult ones involved. We call them “zingers,” that 

really require risk management assessment probably every flight, but we believe there is a need to reduce the number of critical 

items on that list to a manageable number. 

How do you manage nearly 1,000 category 1, l-R items? I don’t 

know. I don’t know how you allow anything to fly with that many 
as promptly and safely as possible. We heartily endorse and recommend the solid open communications, and I think everything needs 

to be on the table, out in the open. Teamwork. There is a need to 

establish confidence between these various agencies that I mentioned, and I mention them on a macro level, yourselves, DOD and 

NASA and the contractors. Mutual confidence, I believe, will go a 

long way in helping reach these solutions the way we all want to 

see them. 

That’s all the prepared remarks I would make, and we would be 

happy to the best of our ability, address any questions that you 

may have, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brizendine follows:] 
and Applications 

Committee on Science and Technology 

House of Representatives 

Statement by: 

Mi. John C. Brizendine 

Chairman 

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel 

100 Congress 
Chairman of the 

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel 

before the 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

Mr. Chairman and Distinquished Members of the Subcommittee: 

The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel shares in the nation's qrief 

over the loss of the Space Shuttle Challenqer and its dedicated crew. As a result of that accident and the associated 

activities, the Panel has adjusted its aqenda of planned 

activities to better Serve NASA in reassessment of critical 

safety items of the Space Transportation System. The Panel's 

written report to you this year was completed prior to 

January 28, 1986 and covers our activities durinq calendar year 

1985. Therefore it does not discuss the 51-L mission loss. 

In consideration of the unique circumstances this year the Panel 

would like to present its report to this Subcommittee in three 

separate but mutually supportinq parts: 

I. Significant points made in our Annual Report dated January 

1986 with emphasis on those potentially bearinq on 51-L 

associated activities: 

11. A revisit of points previously made by the Panel that may 

be applicable to the current introspective examination of 

the National Space Transportation System proqram; and 

111. The Panel's projected activities reqardinq how it can support the viqorous efforts to safely fly once aqain, and 

to maintain its overview of other space and aeronautics 

activities such as the Space Station and NASA's Research 
operations at both Kennedy Space Center and Vandenberq Air Force 

Base: 

2. The proqram definition phase of the Space Station and its 

current and projected manaqement approach: 

3. NASA aircraft operations, includinq the development of the 

forward-swept wing X-29 and the "X-Wing" Rotor Systems Research 

Aircraft: and 

4. Special areas of intprest, includinq the Shuttle/Centaur 

upper staqes, Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators used on 

planetary space vehicles, and Life Sciences applicable to manned 

space fliqht now and in the future. 

The Panel conducted a total of 54 fact-findinq sessions in 

addition to its appearances before conqressional committees and 

its annual meetinq with the NASA Administrator and his senior 

manaqers. The annual report delivered to NASA, the Congress, and 

the public contains substantial detail in support of the Panel's 

sixteen Findinqs and Recommendations; a listing of the Panel 

members, consultants and staff: and discussions of past and 

tentative future activities. As in previous annual reports, 

NASA'S response to last year's report is included. 

SPACE 'TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM 

The Space Transportation System performed in a highly credible manner durinq 1985. With an increasinq launch frequency coupled 

with a number of organizational, operational, and kev personnel 

changes, the government and industry proqram team demonstrated 

its ability to successEully contend with real-time anomalies in 

both hardware and plans. An outstandinq example of this was the 

Leasat (or Syncom) salvaqe mission in mid-1985. 

The annual report notes: 'I. . . that a safe and productive STS 

Program can be carried out if the System's real state-of-the-art 

and other limitations are recoqnized and inteqrated into the 

proqram planninq and schedulinq." In support of this thesis, 

five specific points are made: these are: 

1. A number of the principal systems and components of the 

-, 
3. 

4. 

5. 

pg 

Human resources applied to the various STS e1ement.s and 

the launch processinq cannot fully compensate for 

shortfalls in physical resources: for example, spare 

parts shortqaqes, frequent. cannibalization €or needed 

parts, immature component durability, and lengthy 

turnaround time for component renair/overhaul: 

Loqistics support, includinq sustaininq engineerinq and 

maintenance plans, remains a current and future concern: 

and 

The impact of budqetary allocations, and new and 

challenqing proqrams such as the Space Station and the 

Transatmospheric Vehicle or Snace Plane. 

Those specific Findinqs and Recommendations we wish to note here are in some cases a follow-on to those found in previous annual 

reports and those which are, I will only mention briefly. Of 

those dealinq with the Orbiter, structural capability and the 

brakes and nosewheel steering reinforce what has been stated 

previously. Two new points are made: 

1. In order to ~rovide 85% launch probability redlines, the 

structural modifications should be made to the winqs on 

all orbiters. Redlines on orbiters 103 and 104 should be 

reexamined and chanqes made as required: and 

2. Althouqh we have been assured that no chanqes will be 

required in the applications Software for the new. 

uprated qeneral purpose computers, NASA must monitor this 

most carefully since applications software can be very 

expensive to change and retest. 

Flight crew training continues to concern the Panel in that the 

uniaue Shuttle Orbiter flyinq qualities and the 

time-between-missions for the commander and pilot dictate the use of up-to-date, accurate simulators on the ground, and an 

adeauately-sized fleet of Shuttle Trainina Aircraft. to maintain 

the overall traininq syllabus. The Panel recommends that NASA 

commit the necessary funds to ensure that these requirements are met. 
the lonq run, such expenditures are usually cost effective. 

Durinq 1985 the Panel's focus included the Solid Rocket Motor 

with the Filament Wound Case rather than the curently used steel 

case. With regard to the Panel's exposure to the STS 51-1. most 

frequently mentioned probable cause, the "field joints": Panel 

fact-finding sessions over the past years have taken our members 

and consultants who are knowledgeable of propulsion systems t.o a number of sites dealinq with the solid rocket motors: that is, 

Morton Thiokol Inc., Marshall Space Flight Center, Kennedy Space 

Center, and Hercules Aerospace Inc. The type of field joint used 

was discussed a number of times and no indication was qiven that 

the joint was a major concern based on the available data base. 

Development motor tests, qualification tests, laboratory tests 

and actual fliqht with the steel case, and the use of a similar 

desiqn (with an added "capture" feature or "double clevis" to account for the far more flexible filament wound case) on the 

newer and lighter composite case provided assurance that there was an awareness of the joint and its capability to "do the ioh." 

With reqard to the filament wound case the Panel's findinqs and 

recommendations noted: "The Panel wishes to note . . . the 

uncertainty of the structural strenqth of the Filament Wound Case 

for the Solid Rocket Boosters. Tests and analyses to dat.e leave 

considerable question as to the strenqth marqins of safety in t.he 

transition areas between case seqments. Until the issur? can he 

resolved with a hiqh level of confidence, The Panel believes t.he 

Filament Wound Case solid rocket boosters should not he used €or 

STS launch . . .I' 

Loqistics and Launch Processinq have been topics for discussion 

in a number of the Panel's prior rep0rt.s and continue as rnqr>r 

subjects of interest today. Three areas are covered here: the 

Vandenberq Air Force Base launch complex, the Kennedy Space 

Center, and their supportinq loqistics. From the human resources 

viewpoint the Shuttle Processinq Contractor continues to struqqlc, 

to handle the burden of work associated with each mission at KSC 

overlaid with the activities at VAFR. The past year has seen 

some proqress in resolvinq these problems, hut there remains much 

to he done. Actions which require cohtinuous overtime on the 

part of technicians and engineers must be alleviated, and means 

of assurinq that there are sufficient incominq qualified 

personnel to satisfy the demand €or personnel replacements and 

chanqing technical demands are a must. Loqistics is not just a 

"spares availability proqram," hut noes far heyond that. 
perfection is more important than schedule has chanqed with 

Galileo and Ulysses (missions). Manaqement must now schedule 

with sufficient marqin so that adequate technical performance can 

he obtained for fixed schedules. It is the difference between a 

development proqram and a transnortation system. The case in 

point is that more than a few systems are to he verified or 

qualified as a result of the "wet countdown" on the pad. This 

simply does not allow any time for corrective measures should 

problems develop. Proqram manaqement should prioritize the 

remaininq work so that, if necessary, items essentially in the 

confirm for the record class can be waived." Since the 

postponement of the two Centaur missions, a number of 

Shuttle/Centaur replanninq meetinqs have taken place. The object 

is to further reduce hazards and to make the most constructive use oE the time heEore the new Eliqht date. The Panel is nleaserl 

to see such activities since a reassessment is in itself a step 

that can only increase the safety of such missions. 

The Space Station tindinqs and recommendations were three in 

number. This is the time to implement basic nhilosophy into the 

program, before the Phase "8". System Definition and Preliminary 

Design, is complete. These recommendations are: 

1. NASA should reexamine the resources required to conduct the 

many facets of the Space Station syst-ems enqineerinq and 

integration effort to ensure that the orqanization and human 

resources are sufficient to properly fill this role (at JSC), now 

and in the future; 

2. NASA should determine possible means to a1leviat.e the Orbiter 

payload bay interface environment desiqn requirements which drive 

some of the Space Station elements and "user" desiqns; and 

3. "Build-to-cost" manaqement for the Space Station may involve 

many of the same or similar activities that confronted the Space 

Shuttle in its formative days. NASA should establish a small 

team composed of current and retired NASA/contractor persons who 

have first-hand knowledqe of the early activities on the Shuttle 

program. The team should define t.he "lessons learned" in b0t.h 

rnanaoement and technical areas, includincl the real possibility of 

using today's technoloqy to meet Space Station needs. 

This covers applicable portions of our Icrtcst annua 1 report. 
1. (January 1985) " . . . recoqnition that the STS is a 

proqram still in transition from 'sinqle event 

demonstration' staqe to 'operational' staqe, and will 

remain such until the full operational capabilities (and 

limitations) are known in quantitative terms based on 

scientific/enqineering proofs: . . .I' "recoqnit-ion that 

complacency bred of repetition is an inborne human hazard 

and conscious steps to avoid same are essential: . . ." "the loqistics system, at a minimum, 

must be supported by its current level of attention and 

f u n d i nq . 

2. (January 1984) "NASA make a concerted effort to assist 

contractors and subcontractor to produce the hiqhest 

quality of product, oriented toward operational 

suitability . . . rather than increased performance as the dominant qoal." "Excessive landinq speed and control 

sensitivity result in: a continuing potential for a 

landing accident to occur; limitations on choice of abort 

sites: risk of destructive brake malfunctions: 

non-survivable open sea ditchinqs: lenqthy and expensive 

traininq proqrams . . . a major reduction in landinq 

velocity, and an improvement in the apparent stability 

(and consistency) in pitch control near the t.ouch down 

point, would substantially improve the operat.iona1 

flexibility and safety potential €or the Orbiter." 

3. (January 1983) "The Panel recommends that extreme caution 

be used in decreasing structural Eactors of safety for 

weiqht purposes before all the pertinent fliqht 

variations are explored and all relevant data has been 

analyzed and taken into account." "As a first step, the 

manaqement core of this onerational orqanization should 

be established as soon as possible and qiven authority to 

resolve major management and budqet issues that will 

inevitably arise among the development Centers as they 

support Shuttle testinq and enhancement durina the 

transition period. This core group would logically be 

situated at NASA Headquarters. This is another way of 

saying that someone at or near the top must clearly be in 

charge to control the natural competition amonq the 

Centers . . . . . . . NASA Headquarters institute a I, I, 
y/y 

concepts and criteria have been employed in tihe desiqn. 

Where such consistency does not exist, the team should 

recommend desiqn chanqes to provide such uniformity." 

It is the Panel's sugqestion that NASA and its contractors take 

the time to once again study the Panel's prior reports, their 

responses to them, and see if there are "lessons" to he learned 

that can he applied during this stand-down period and prior to 

defininq those steps to he taken to ensure a safe and successful 

new "first" mission. 

There are three areas of "Systems Manaqement" that crime to mind 

in meetinq the stringent demands for ground and €light saEety 

associated with extremely complex manned systems such as the 

Space Transportation System: 

1. Systems inteqration which refers to the manaqement 

functionsvide for systems enqineerinq, 

technical inteqration, and test and qround operations. 

These management functions include the program level 

office for systems inteqration (Level I1 at JSC) and a 

larqe number of technical workinq panels (ad hoc and 

continuous); 

2. Technical conscience which refers to those forums which 

provide people throughout the orqanization suitable 

opportunities to express their concerns to manaqement. 

The Panel itself and the contractor and NASA Reviews are examples: and 

3. Check and balance referring to the technical manaqement 

capability outside of these day-to-day operations to 

provide independent assessments on key technical and 

management issues. 

NASA has had and continues to have these qualities applied to the 

current Space Transportation System: however, with aqe they may 

have qrown somewhat stale or perhaps too routine. If this in 

€act turns out to be the case, rather than conceivinq a whole 

"new" structure it might be well to look into revitalizing and 

streamlining the current proqram/project structure and reportino 

lines. (This same thinkinq, of course, could well apply to the 

Space Station proqram). 
Part I11 

The Panel believes that the followinq three major areas or 

activities must be considered in the planninq and implementation 

necessary to return to safe space fliqht in a timely manner: 

1. Minimum funding levels which allow a proqram to be 

constructed, consistent with a reasonable timetable, to 

accomplish hardware redesian and certification testinq 

resulting from the STS 51-I. accident investiqation. 

Anything less would reduce both the level of safety and 

performance below that required to achi.eve r3 viable Space 

Transportation System: 

2. The overall National Space Transportation System must be a mix of expendable launch vehicles and the Shuttle 

fleet: and 

3. Coordination with and understanding by NASA, DOD, their 

contractors and the Conqress on a continuinq basis is 

required in returning to space fliqht as safely and 

quickly as practical. 

More specifically, the Panel recommends that an internal or external group be established to gather and analyze the data 

necessary to establish the operational margins for the various 

Space Transportation System elements so as to allow better risk 

management. Thus the assessment of risks, identification ot 

margins, and the subsequent operational controls needed to remain 

within the identified margins becomes an inherent part of the 

flight readiness and certification process. 

In viewinq the current situation the Panel has given 

consideration to several areas in tentatively defining its 

activities for the remainder of this year, and up to and 

including the initial launch followinq the reestablishment of 

flight schedules. These are: 

1. The Panel's support for those organizations investigating 

and reviewing NASA and contractor. activities to determine 

the required steps to get the National Space 

Transportation System back on track: 
With regard to these three aspects of Panel operations over the 

coming months we have some suggestions, but look forward to the 

Subcommittee's comments in settinq forth an agenda. 

Panel reports have been forwarded to the Presidential Commission 

through the NASA focal points at hoth Headquarters and JSC. As 

Chairman of the Panel I had the opportunity to meet with Mr. Rogers and his executive director, Dr. Keel, after our own 

statutory public meeting with the NASA Acting Administrator on 

February 12, 1986. 

In reviewing our own operations we have been looking at the 

Panel's information gatherinq, fact-findinq process to see that 

it has been conceived and focused appropriately to reveal the 

important and critical issues affecting safety. The Panel is 

examining what should be done during the hiatus of the accident 

investigation, such as specific issues the Panel should emphasize 

to NASA. Other thoughts include: 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

Because changes to the Shuttle system are expected, the 

first post-STS 51-L flight will, in reality, constitute a test flight. Therefore, the Orbiter, fliqht crew, and 

Shuttle manifest should be configured to reflect the test 

nature of the flight, and that should be NASA flight 

Policy. This will also mean revised launch commit 

criteria, and so on, that must be factored into KSC 

operations; 

Should there be an unmanned fliqht test of the Centaur? 

This is a cost/schedule/manned VS. unmanned evaluation? 

As important as the flight details are, the ground 

processing operations at the KSC and VAFB must be viewed 

with a critical eye: beyond the review of pr-ocedures now 

used, are there documentation requirements (video-tapes, 

photographs, etc.) that can be used to sharpen the 

personnel and their approach to the launch processinq? 

Mandatory inspection points for all Shuttle elements have 

been reduced with time. Should these be reintroduced or another set up be used? Certainly an inteqr-ated 

maintenance plan is essential: 
7. 

There are two major and complementary activities in the 

development of complex hardware. One is the production 

of the desired performance and the other the 

identification of uncertainties and the assessment of the 

associated risk. The two require different mental 

attitudes. At the operatinq levels, results are most 

objective and complete if carried out by different groups 

supporting and complementinq each other. At decision 

makinq, the avai1abilit.y of two points of view of 

comparable competence, one focused on performance and the 

other on risk, is likely to prove of considerable value. 

In the field of risk management, the principle of 

developinq systematically a branch for performance and 

one for risk is not limited to complex hardware proqrams. In this area NASA can make a major contribution by 

refininq the process €or complex hardware programs, thus 

providinq a foundation on which to develop the manaqement 

or risk for other areas. It can he useful in many areas of goverment and industry. 

********** 

Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. 'The Panel 

members and consultants present with me today would be pleased to 

respond to questions you and other Members of the Committee may 

have. 
development, military and commercial aircraft. A partial list of 

these aircraft includes the C-124, SFD-1, D558-I1 (the first 

aircraft to exceed a speed of twice the speed of sound), X-3. 

A3D. C-133, DC-8. He was proqram manager of the DC-8 and DC-9 

and program director on the DC-10. Mr. Brizendine held a number 

of executive positions including Assistant to the Vice President, 

Aircraft Division, then to Vice President of Engineerinq, 

Executive Vice President then as President of the Douglas 

Aircraft Company in 1973 until his retirement. He is a fellow of 

the AIAA. Durinq World War 11, he was a naval aviator. 

HERBERT E. GRIER 

(Consultant) 

Mr. Grier was the first President of Edqerton, Germeshausen and 

Grier, Inc. (EGSG). He became involved in atomic weapons 

research for the Manhattan Engineering District and its 

successor, the Atomic Energy Commission. In 1953, he directed a qroup of EGLG scientists assigned by the Atomic Energy 

Commission to support its nuclear test operations. Since then the 

company has desiqnerl, built and operated the equipment that has 

armed, timed, fired, photographed and acquired Derformance data on almost every nuclear test blast in the Pacific and Nevada. 

They also provided instrumentation and photographic support for 

nuclear rocket tests. 

Until his retirement in 1976, Mr. Grier was President of CER 

Geo-Nuclear Corporation, a company of which he was a founder, 

formed in 1965 by Continental Oil Company, EG&G, Inc., and 

peveral other companies. CER's principal endeavors have been 

concerned with the development and implementation of methods 

usinq the power of nuclear explosives in commercial applications, 

with primary emphasis on improving methods for the extraction 

of underground natural resources. Mr. Grier has numerous patents 

and publications in hiqh speed liqhtinq equipment and techniques, 

nuclear explosive design, timing and firing. 
In 1966 he was appointed Assistant Director for Launch Vehicle at 

Lewis; responsible for both the Aqena and Centaur Projects. 

In 1970, Dr. Himmel's responsibilities were broadened when he was 

appointed Director of Rockets and Vehicles adding three research 

and technology divisions to the launch vehicle project offices 

under his direction and management. In 1972 he was assigned to 

NASA Headquarters for a tour of duty as Deputy Associate 

Administrator (Technology), Office of Aeronautics and Space 

Technology. Subsequently, he was appointed Associate Director 

for Flight Programs in which capacity he provided center-level 

oversiqht and management of all Lewis launch vehicle and 

spacecraft progams. 

In 1976, Dr. Himmel was appointed Associate Director of the Lewis 

Center in which capacity he was responsible for the internal 

cooperation of the Center with emphasis on oroqram development 

and long-range planning. In 1980, he was assigned the additional 

responsibility of Acting Director of Science and Technology. In this caDacity he was responsible for creating a new directorate 

of some 450 professionals dedicated to research in the generic 

technical and scientific disciplines pertinent to aerospace and 

terrestrial propulsion and energy conversion systems. Having 

completed the orgaization of this directorate and establishing 

its programs, objectives and goals, Dr. Himmel retired from NASA 

in 1981. He is now enqaqed in consulting in his fields of 

expertise. He is an Associate Fellow of the AIAA. 

DR. NORRIS KRONE, JR 

(MEMBER) 

Dr. Krone is the Executive Director of the University Research 

Foundation, University of Maryland. His past positions include 

Vice President for Special Projects BDM Corporation, McLean, 

Virginia: Office Director, Air Vehicles Technoloqy Office, 

Defense Advanced Research Projects Aqency, Washington, D.C.; 

Program Manager, Forward Swept Wing, X-Wing Defense Advanced 

Research Projects Agency, Washington, D.C.: Assistant to the CDR 

for Acquisition and Cost Analysis, Andrews Air Force Base, 

Maryland: Chief, Joint Services Action Group (JLC), Air Force 

Systems, Command, Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland: Manager of 

Advanced Development for Reconnaissance, Hg, USAF, Washinqton, 

D.C.: Technical Manaqer - Aeroelastic Programs, Chief of 

C-133Airframe Design Review, Aeronautical Systems Division, 

Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. 
ad costuctooew acat types ad tesystes. (3) 

Quality Assurance which has overall responsibility to assure compliance of all technical standards set by engineering and the 

manufacturers. 

From 1973 to 1978, he was Trans World Airlines Vice President for 

Materials Manaaement and Vice President for Procurement. He 

directed the operation of the purchasing and stores department. 

In 1971 throuqh 1973, he was Vice President Quality Assurance, 

directing the operation of the Quality Assurance Department. 

This included overall responsibility to assure compliance with 

all technical standards of the airline. The department also 

provided field audits to quide shops and outside stations as to 

their performance compliance. 

As Vice President for Equipment Development, from July 1962 to 

Septemer 1971, he directed the technical division of the plannino 

and research major department. 

From 1956 to July 1962, he was Director of Aircraft Development 

and a Power Plant Engineer from 1947 to 1953. He was supervisor 

power plant engineering from February 1953 to May 1956. Mr. 

Parmet served as a pilot in U.S. Army Air Force from 1943 to 1946 

in command of the 8-17 and 8-29 aircraft. He is a Fellow of the 

American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, and Memher of 

Technical Board Societv of Automotive Enqineers and is the author 

of numerous technical papers many of which have been published by 

the AIAA, SAE,and ATA. 
yppg

He joined NASA in 1964, after 17 years of aerospace research, 

design and development work with General Electric Co., 

COnVairDiViSiOn of General Dynamics, North American/Rockwell, and 

other aerosDace companies. He is the author of more than 35 

papers on propulsion, heat transfer, fluid dynamics, 

instrumentation, Droqram/project management and other technical 

disciplines. He is the recipient of numerous industrial and NASA 

awards. 
issues that there isnt a margin for or a backup for or some kind of 

an operational margin that you can control that enables you to fly 

safely. 

Mr. NELSON. And you raised the question how in the world are 

you ever going to fix all of these critical items, something less than 

1,000 in the space shuttle. 

Mr. BRIZENDINE. I cannot believe there are that many by my definition of a critical item. 

Mr. NELSON. Well you all are one of the wisest panels assembled. 

Are you saying that there has got to be less critical items in order 

for us to be safe, or are you saying space flight is risky business, or 

are you saying both? 

Mr. BRIZENDINE. All of that, yes. 

Mr. NELSON. All of the above? 

Mr. BRIZENDINE. All of them. 

Mr. NELSON. Yes, sir, Dr. Krone. 

Mr. KRONE. Yes, sir, I would like to make a comment relative to 

the aircraft question on a program that is sort of similar to the 

space shuttle problem that I happened to have participated in, in a 

ke position. 

&Vera1 years ago, there was some unexplained losses of the C133, and this is a few years ago, about 20 years ago, as a matter of 

fact. There was seven losses, and no one had any idea of why the 

aircraft had-any of the seven had been lost. I won’t go into the 

details. It is almost a Bermuda Triangle type situation. 

The Air Force, at the time, organized a design review team, in 

which I was the airframe director, and we came up with 155 critical items that could be causing these accidents. This was starting 

from a base where we had no idea of what the cause was. In that 

one respect, we are kind of fortunate relative to the space shuttle 

problem. 

What we did was we took some action on those 155 items. The 

exact reason for the accidents was never known, but after a review 

of the 155 items and some action taken, the aircraft was returned 

to service in about 6 months, incidentally, as I recall, and it served 

out its fleet usefulness successfully with no additional accidents. So 

that is the only comparison that I can think of. 

Mr. NELSON. Does your advisory panel ever participate in any of 

the readiness reviews leading up to a space shuttle launch? 

Mr. BRIZENDINE. The panel has in the past sat in on the flight 

readiness reviews as observers. 

Mr. NELSON. You have sat in as observers. You have never participated. 

Mr. BRIZENDINE. We are welcomed to participate if there is a 

comment to make in the open communications loop. 
Mr. NELSON. But that has not been every flight. 

Mr. GRIER. No. 

Mr. NELSON. Do you think that you ought to have participation 

every time as a voting member? 

Mr. GRIER. No. 

Mr. NELSON. You don’t? Why? 

Mr. GRIER. We just simply don’t have the people nor the staff to 

get into the depth required to become a line voter really. I mean 

we are not line; we are staff. 

Mr. NELSON. Do all of you agree with that? Everybody is nodding. 

Mr. BRIZENDINE. We don’t have the depth of attention to the dayto-day detail that are needed to make intelligent votes. If somebody 

came up with a specific question, we might be able to add a judgment to it. 

Mr. NELSON. Mr. Walker. 

Mr. WALKER. Is the shuttle centaur as presently designed safe to 

fly in a manned system? 

Mr. BRIZENDINE. We don’t think so. 

Mr. WALKER. Do the redundancies requested by the crew make 

sense if they are going to fly that system? 

Mr. BRIZENDINE. I am not personally familiar with what they all 

are, but I would say some redundancies are needed. There may be 

some solutions that are almost those for the “too-hard file”, that is, 

too hard to solve. 

Mr. WALKER. And if you can’t make the modifications would we 

be wiser to go to ELV launches rather than flying in the shuttle? 

Mr. BRIZENDINE. I think we would all sleep a little better, which 

doesn’t mean that it isn’t possible to do it safely in the shuttle. 

What we have seen to date, and I will have my colleagues comment 

if the wish. We are happy it isn’t being launched this month. 

Mr. WALKER. Anybody else have any comments? 

Mr. GRIER. I think that you are tinkering with a very successful 

system. The shuttle centaur has had a great deal of success. I think 

as we make more and more changes to it to make it safer, you invalidate the historical record of its successes, and you better do 

very careful testing of that much changed system. For instance, the Fairchild valve that is a single valve that is in 

the drain path, by the time you take four valves, but you have to 

now put them all different places because you have got space constraints. You have to put in the wiring harnesses and the systems 

and the redundant systems to run each valve, you don’t have a 

Centaur anymore. You have got something else, and you can’t look 

back and say there has been “x” number of successful flights of 
Mr. BRIZENDINE. We are confident that competent expertise is 

being applied to the question. Assessment of the design, the testing 

to date and the suggestion of additional testing to be done, it remains to be seen whether the structure can be proven to have adequate strength margins or not with the current design. 

Mr. WALKER. And the problem is in the strength of the system is 

your principal concern. 

Mr. BRIZENDINE. That is correct. It is in the vicinity of the joint, 

we believe, but again it is not the field joint itself, but is the vicinity of the filament wound portion that is modified and cross-sectioned to enable it to be adapted to the next section. 

Mr. WALKER. Yes, Dr. Himmel. 

Mr. HIMMEL. In the junction between the filament wound and 

the composite material and the metal part of the joint, the issue of 

how the load is carried through that buildup is of concern and the 

testing program which has been stipulated for the proof of that is 

going to be the proof of the pudding because the analytical techniques available to treat that are not at the highest level of development. So you better rely on tests and more than one. 

Mr. WALKER. It has been my understanding, and perhaps I am 

wrong, but it has been my understanding all the way along that in 

order to launch out of Vandenberg that that is a very important technology in terms of the system. I guess the question becomes 

should we be planning launches out of Vandenberg if we have not 

yet proven the strength of those cases? 

Mr. BRIZENDINE. Well, the question is how much payload can you 

get out of Vandenberg. 

Mr. WALKER. Well, yes, that’s right. 

Mr. BRIZENDINE. So the idea of the filament wound case is to 

save weight. 

Mr. WALKER. Right. Precisely. But there is not much sense looking toward major launches out of Vandenberg that cannot meet 

the weight capacities because really that is part of the reason for 

launching out of Vandenberg. 

Mr. BRIZENDINE. It is not a matter that has been determined yet. 

Mr. WALKER. What about the 109 percent efficiency rating or 109 

percent power rating that would be required? Have you taken any look at that, and are you in agreement that that can be done? 

Mr. BRIZENDINE. We have taken quite a look at it, and of course 

it was going to be used first on the shuttle centaur. 

Mr. WALKER. Right. 

Mr. BRIZENDINE. It is also required out of Vandenberg, I believe. 

I would like to ask Dr. Himmel if he would care to address that 

question. 
tear it down and examine it again and not reuse it. SO basically 

you would be in a similar position to an expendable system. 

The improvements that are being made and that are being developed by Rocketdyne have as their objective the increase of the 

margin. Our concern in that regard is that we truly demonstrate a 

margin sufficient so that we know where we are and how much we 

can tolerate. That is the critical program of testing which is in 

process and which recently, I gather, was interrupted by the discovery of a new phenomenon, some cracked blades, which has to be 

resolved. 

Mr. WALKER. So it is your considered judgment that the 109 percent power rating would be acceptable if you were going to fly the 

engine once. 

Mr. HIMMEL. Yes, with a lot of other provisos about pedigree of 

the hardware and things like that. 

Mr. WALKER. OK, but then that takes us to another question that 

relates to this, then, because if in fact we are going to fly a number 

of flights in any given year where you can only use engines once, 

then you have to look at the backlog of engines that you have, the 

refitting of engines to orbiters, and your ability to do all of that 

within a safe scheduled time. Have you looked at that whole blend 

of sequences, and is there something that this committee ought to 

be aware of in terms of those kinds of problems? 

Mr. HIMMEL. I think that it boils down to the same question of 

logistics that has been raised any number of times by other members of the panel. You have to blend that into your thinking, and 

you, at the same time, have to take steps to mitigate or ameliorate 

the situation with respect to the margin you have got. If the improvements work, then you will extend the number of flights which 

you will be able to use the engine at 109 or some mix of 104, 100, 

109, and this requires a good sized data base with hardware which 

is identifiable and whose pedigrees you understand. 

But it does come down, as you say, Mr. Walker, that you must 

also factor it into a logistical program. 

Mr. WALKER. But the fact is we only have-the staff has just informed me-four spares for all three orbiters. 

Mr. HIMMEL. Yes, sir. 

Mr. WALKER. And I don’t know what the timeframe would be €or 

refitting an engine or recertifying an engine each time, but my 

guess is that if you are talking about a total tear-down and rebuild 

of the engine, you are talking about a considerable amount of time. 

It seems to me that has a very very significant impact on your 

flight schedule. 
Mr. WALKER. Absolutely. 

Mr. BRIZENDINE. We are hoping to see three engines tested together in the fairly near future, and we believe that is essential 

before you fly at 109, because we don’t know what the interaction 

is yet to be. 

Mr. WALKER. Let me ask you of these figure jell with what you 

now know, because I think we are into an area here that can get 

somewhat serious if that is the kind of thing we are talking about. 

It takes four years to build a new engine? Is that approximately 

right, and the next three are going to go into the replacement orbiter would be the plan in order to meet the time deadline of building that orbiter within 3Yi-year period. 

NASA spends about 3 man-years just to inspect an SSME after 

each flight? 

Mr. BRIZENDINE. I don’t know those numbers. Does anyone else? 

But 3 man-years might be reasonable. It is a complex machine and 

a lot of parts. 

Mr. WALKER. So we really are talking about each time we fly at 

109 percent, we are talking about a very severe limitation on the 

program. That is something we are really going to have to look at 

in terms of the flight safety issue. 

Mr. BRIZENDINE. We recommend the full improvement program, 

some of which has been deferred because of funding availability, 

and we think in the long run, the full improvement program will 

save money because you will produce a more durable engine. 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you 

Mr. HIMMEL. Iwould just like to point out that I think that 3 

man-year is probably tearing down three engines that will run at 

109, completely tearing them down rather than flight to flight at 

104. I don’t think there is 3 man-years of effort in inspecting an 

engine that has flown at some other condition. 

Mr. WALKER. OK, thank you. 

Mr. NELSON. You gentlemen heard our previous conversation 

with the gentlemen from NASA about the independent safety 

office and the advisability thereof. May we have your comments 

about that? 

Mr. BRIZENDINE. Yes, sir. The panel believes that the line organization, the system must be made to work, and adding an overlay, 

an independent safety office to those that are already in existence 

has some hazards. One is it tends to remove the responsibility from 

the line people for making the safety decisions, and obviously you 

don’t want to do that. They must have both the authority and the 

responsibility. 
safety, reliability and quality assurance, and there is a built

in 

means of focusing on safety issues that leads directly to the administrator, and it goes around every other organization and has, 0stensibly, the clout and the wherewithal1 to go anywhere and everywhere to speak up anytime and wherever. 

It is our thought that an astronaut assigned to that office would 

contribute to the thing that the astronauts are searching for. I 

don’t mean permanently. An individual could be rotated, say, 6 

months at a time or something like that, and it would be good experience and good training information for the astronaut, but it 

would give them a direct line into the chief engineer’s office, the 

headquarters and into all the tentacles that they have through the 

centers and the programs related to safety reliability. 

It should allow them to sense things early in the system as they 

are flushed up the system, as the technical conscience of the 

system works and the engineers and the technicians flush up concepts. We do believe that that would give a member of the astronaut corps a direct vote in the chief engineer’s office. So in that 

sense, yes, but to add another independent group without doing 

something with some of the others or understanding how it is going 

to affect the line management-I wouldn’t touch it with a 10-foot 

pole. 

Mr. NELSON. Is your recommendation borne out of a different 

kind of experience that you have had in industry as opposed to 

some of the astronauts reflecting upon their military experience? 

Mr. BRIZENDINE. Well, I don’t think it is all that different. I 

think it is an assessment of how one executes his responsibility 

under his delegated authority, and if you start taking away the decision-making process from them, he is just going to hold up his 

hands and turn his back on his responsibility. 

Mr. Parmet has been in this business. He would like to add 

something. 

Mr. PARMET. As a member for a number of years for an operating organization, albeit much simpler devices called airplanes, I 

have some views on responsibilities for safety. No. 1, I believe you 

have to build safety into the product, so you have to inculcate this 

at the lowest level of the people building the device and make 

them responsible for the job they are doing. If they know someone 

is going to inspect their work, immediately they have less responsibility and they can fall back on the inspector. 

From the top management standpoint, you must permeate your entire organization with that concept, and then QA becomes a 

functioning organization that examines the operating portion to 

see whether they have proper methods for doing the job and 

whether they live up to those methods, and then finally to audit 
should be built into the line organization and not have oversight 

controlling what they do. I think NASA has a chief engineer’s or- ganization that can do the technical oversight, and it certainly has 

an astronaut’s organization that can oversee the operational part. 

End of comment. 

Mr. BRIZENDINE. I believe the astronaut should be involved in 

signing off on each mission. I think it should begin months ahead 

of the mission when the mission plan is established, and the flight 

crew that is assigned and their office should be a part of the sign off. If they have done that, they will be involved, and as time proceeds to the mission any exceptions to that plan that are flushed 

up and reviewed and subject to further sign-off. Mr. NELSON. Will you have an opportunity to be visiting with the 

NASA management on this subject? 

Mr. BRIZENDINE. I believe so, yes, sir. 

Mr. NELSON. Obviously, we would encourage you to bring your opposite opinion from what was expressed here by the earlier 

panel. 

Mr. BRIZENDINE. I’m not sure we are all that opposite. Maybe we 

are only a few degrees off rather than 180. 

Mr. NELSON. Are there any other organizational or procedural 

changes that you think ought to be brought about within NASA? 

Mr. BRIZENDINE. That is a pretty tall order, a difficult question, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. NELSON. Sure. 

Mr. BRIZENDINE. NASA’s organization is very complex, and I 

think we recognize that. It probably can be streamlined, and I 

think we would like to have the opportunity to discuss it with the 

administrator-some views that we have on it. 

Mr. NELSON. So you would prefer not to discuss that here? 

Mr. BRIZENDINE. I think out of courtesy to the administrator, we 

really ought to lay them in his lap first. 

Mr. NELSON. OK, once you lay them in his lap, will you come back and see us? 

Mr. BRIZENDINE. We’d be happy to. 

Mr. NELSON. Because we have got to oversee this whole thing. 

Mr. BRIZENDINE. We understand, and I think the most honest 

reason for ducking the question today is we haven’t sorted them 

out ourselves yet. 

Mr. NELSON. OK, fair enough. What do you think about the questions and the discussion that 

we had on crew training? 

Mr. BRIZENDINE. We fully support the need for the crew training, and I think the successful landings demonstrated by the shuttle 

crew demonstrates the success of the training program. As you rec- 
think a good syllabus has been established. We ought to live to that 

standard and not compromise it. 

Mr. NELSON. What do you think about the flight rate projections? 

Mr. BRIZENDINE. Well, they are aggressive? 

Mr. NELSON. Optimistic? 

Mr. BRIZENDINE. I think in general we would tend to say optimistic. We believe, I think, that you can probably handle a turnaround 

of, say, every 4 months for each orbiter, where we have a threeorbiter fleet. Ostensibly that would give you about nine flights a 

year after you have got things oiled-up pretty well. Probably with a 

mature system, that is, hardware, the people are experienced, the 

logistic system is in place, you could probably squeeze another orbiter per year. So maybe you could get 12 a year in 4 or 5 years 

from now out of a three-orbiter fleet. 

Mr. NELSON. And with a four-orbiter fleet? 

Mr. BRIZENDINE. Well, probably 12 to 15 growing to, perhaps, one 

more bird per year with the maturity that I was talking about. 

Mr. Parmet, do you have any comment on that? 

Mr. PARMET. I would agree with that general assessment. I would 

say that basically NASA’s schedules have been optimistic, but I 

think they should be optimistic as long as they are not committed 

to a flight simply because it is put on a piece of paper, and they 

have to ascertain each time whether they can meet that. In the 

past, the original layout for the year has never been achieved, and 

we felt if things had gone smoothly this year, the numbers that 

John gave you were probably going to be the results, probably 12 

flights this year if you hadn’t had this accident. 

Mr. NELSON. So with a four-orbiter fleet you are looking at 12 to 

15 flights. You think that is it vis-a-vis safety? 

Mr. BRIZENDINE. Well, again with the mature hardware and 

mature operating system, you might squeeze another bird per year with adequate logistics. 

Mr. NELSON. What do you mean by squeeze another bird? 

Mr. BRIZENDINE. You might get one more flight per orbiter per 

year, so that would add 4 to other 15. 

Mr. NELSON. Instead of 12 to 15, 16 to 19. 

Mr. BRIZENDINE. That’s correct, sir. 

Mr. NELSON. Any questions from the staff? Yes, Dr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just wanted to ask one 

question related to the general area of risk analysis that the subcommittee has addressed before, and I just want to know from your 

perspective does it make sense for a quantitative risk analysis 

structure to be used in setting the overall safety goals or safety objectives for a particular launch. 
cussing shuttle centaur and indicating that it was based on a great 

deal of experience with atlas centaur. Isn’t it true that shuttle centaur is not in fact an exact replica of the atlas centaur and in fact 

is two entirely new spacecraft, shuttle centaur G and shuttle centaur G prime, which are both derivations but are entirely new 

spacecraft. 

Mr. GRIER. That’s correct, but a lot of the certification, if you 

will, goes back to its previous use and its previous successful history. For instance, the waiver-it must have to be a waiver to use a 

single valve in the vent line or the drain line. It goes back to the 

history of that valve in the single string centaur operation that it 

had over the years. 

Mr. CLEMENT. And that operation was in an unmanned system 

where you did not have the considerations of the necessity of returning a manned vehicle during an abort mode. 

Mr. GRIER. That’s correct, but the further away you get the configuration of that valve from the old valve, the more fact there is 

to your statement that it is a new vehicle. 

Mr. CLEMENT. Just as the Titan 34-D7 is an entirely new vehicle 

over the Titan 34-D. 

Mr. GRIER. Right, and it probably requires more testing and 

more certification than-well, it certainly did than they could give 

it by this May, this month, and that is sort of behind our statement 

that we didn’t want to see it fly this spring. 

Mr. CLEMENT. I understand. 

Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to establish that they are similar 

but not identical vehicles. 

Mr. NELSON. Gentlemen, I thank you very much. I am down to 7 

minutes to vote, so I am going to excuse myself, and instead of 

being able to thank you personally, I want you to know how much 

we appreciate this. We are going to look forward to a continuing 

dialogue on this subject, and I thank everyone for their time today. 

The meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:35 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.] 

0 

63-144 (125)