Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring

Security

January 1992

OTA-ISC-511

NTIS order #PB92-152529
Recommended Citation:

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security, OTA-ISC-511 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January

1992).

FOr sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office

Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop SS0p. Washington, D.C. 20402-9328

ISBN 0-16 -036061-7
Foreword

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon, but it has become more prominent during the past

two decades. Terrorist attacks have included not only political assassinations, but also

large-scale attacks, often aimed at third parties, causing massive casualties. Two well-known

examples are car bombings, employing hundreds of kilograms of high explosives, and attacks

on commercial aircraft around the world. The U.S. Government and the American public

became acutely aware of terrorism after the bombing of Pan American Flight 103 over

Lockerbie, Scotland in December 1988. The recent war in the Persian Gulf heightened fears

of renewed terrorist attacks on U.S. targets, both overseas and at home.

In 1989, because of growing concern over terrorist threats, several Senate Committees

requested that OTA study the role of technology in fighting terrorism and the Federal effort

in promoting related research and development. The requesting Committees were: Governmental Affairs; Foreign Relations (Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International

Operations); and Commerce, Science, and Transportation, together with its Subcommittee on

Aviation. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence also endorsed the study.

This report is the second and final one in response to these requests. The frost was

transmitted to Congress in a classified version in September 1990. An unclassified summary

was released to the public separately in February 1991, and an unclassified version of the full

report was published in July 1991. This second report also has a classified annex with

additional technical data. The first report concentrated on Federal funding for research and

development in counterterrorist technology and on aspects of airline security, particularly

explosives detection. This report is devoted primarily to three other topics: interagency

coordination of efforts in counterterrorist research and development, integrated security

systems, and the role of human factors in aviation security. In addition, it furnishes details on

a number of technologies that play a role in counterterrorism.

The help and cooperation of a large number of scientists and officials from the

Departments of Defense, Justice, State, Transportation, and the Treasury are gratefully

acknowledged. Special thanks are due to the Federal Aviation Administration.

~f~

A&’ ‘ 2

u

JOHN H. GIBBONS Director

,..

111
The Use of Technology in Countering Terrorism

Advisory Panel

Marvin Goldberger, Chairman

Director, Institute of Advanced Study

Peter F. Bahnsen

Sr. Executive Vice President

MLI International, Ltd.

Terry Bearce

Manager, Program on Low Intensity Conflict

Los Alamos National Laboratory

Homer Boynton

Managing Director for Security

American Airlines

L. Paul Bremer

Managing Director

Kissinger Associates, Inc.

Chris Chicles

Security Managing Consultant

C.H. Chicles & Associates

Arthur Donahue

President of Marketing

Softworld, Inc.

Lee Grodzins

Department of Physics

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

John (Chris) Hatcher

Department of Psychiatry

Center for the Study of Trauma

University of CA, San Francisco

Carolyn Imamura

Director of Planning and Programs

Pacific Basin Development Council

Wilfred Jackson

Airport Operators Council, Intl.

James Jacobs

Director, Nuclear Security Systems

Sandia National Laboratory

Brian Jenkins

Managing Director

Kroll Associates

Michael K. Johns

President

Johns and Bhatia Engineering Consultants, Ltd.

Donald Kerr

President

EG&G, Inc.

Joseph Krofcheck

President

Yarrow Associates

Robert Kupperman

Senior Adviser

Center for Strategic and International Studies

Joshua Lederberg (ex-officio)

Rockefeller University

Vice Chairman

Technology Assessment Advisory Council

Richard Porter

Aerospace Services International, Inc.

Billie H. Vincent

Aerospace Services International, Inc.

Stanley Wiener

Professor of Internal Medicine

University of Illinois, Chicago

NOTE: OTA appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the advisory panel members. The panel does

not however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this report. OTA assumes full responsibility for the report and the accuracy of its

contents.

iv
The Use of Technology in Countering Terrorism

OTA Project Staff

Lionel S. Johns, Assistant Director, OTA

Energy, Materials, and International Security Division

Alan Shaw, International Security and Commerce Program Manager

Anthony Fainberg, Project Director

Michael Callaham

Kevin Dopartl

Deborah L. Kyle2

Russell L. Maxwe113

Edith Page4

Peter H. Rose5

Administrative Staff

Jacqueline R. Boykin

Louise Staley

Contractor

Yonah Alexander

Ion ~sipent from OTA’,S Science, Education, and Transportation Pm&Yam.

~epartment of Commerce Science and Technology Fellow, 1989-90. 3on ~siment from Sandia National ~hratories.

gon ~si~ent from OTA’S Science, Education, and ‘f’ransportation ~gam.

5~s Fellow, 1989-90.
Contents

Page

Chapter 1: Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Chapter 2: The Terrorist Threat-1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Chapter 3: Interagency and International Communication and Cooperation.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Chapter 4: Aviation Security: Aspects of Integrated Security for Commercial Air Travel . . . . . 57

Chapter 5: Human Factors in Aviation Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Appendix A: The FAA Aviation Security R&D Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

Appendix B: Explosives Detection: Dogs... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

Appendix C: Electromagnetic Detection of Metal and Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

Appendix D: Technologies To Protect Harbors, Ports, and Vessels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120

Appendix E: Physical Protection Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

vi
Chapter 1

Summary
Contents

Page

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

OUTLINE OF REPORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

FINDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chemical and Biological Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Interagency Communication and Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Aviation Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Integrated Security Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Human Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

FAA Research and Development Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

4:

5

5

6

7

8

9
Chapter 1

Summary

INTRODUCTION

In 1991, the Persian Gulf War drew the world’s

attention once again to the threat of terrorism.l Fears

arose that Iraqi agents, their surrogates, and their

allies would use the terrorist option as other options

became foreclosed to them. These concerns stimulated unprecedented security measures across the

world, at government and public buildings both in

Washington and in the capitals of other coalition

states, at diplomatic sites, and at international

airports on all continents. In the end, no major

incidents occurred (although a number of minor ones

did take place), perhaps because of the intensive

security measures taken. In many countries, suspected Iraqi agents were either deported or detained,

which may have had a telling effect on efforts to

organize successful major attacks. Nevertheless, in

the first few weeks following the outbreak of

hostilities in January 1991, the number of international terrorist incidents against U.S. targets did

increase significantly over the same period in the

previous year. Only one, however, was directly

traceable to Iraq: a failed attempt to blow up the U.S.

Information Agency building in Manila. Another,

possibly linked directly to the Gulf War, was an

attempt to explode a bomb at the residence of the

U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia in Jakarta. In general,

the increase in terrorist incidents appeared to be the

result of uncoordinated actions of solidarity with the

Iraqi regime on the part of anti-U.S. elements in a

number of countries.

Although no major terrorist actions in connection

with the Gulf War have yet occurred, such eventualities cannot be excluded in the near future. There

have often been lapses of months or years between

an event and a terrorist response. Such actions are

often complicated operations that require a lot of

time to plan and execute.

Even apart from tensions in the Gulf and the

Middle East, terrorism has not been quiescent since

the start of this study in September 1989. The most

startling recent single event was the assassination of

Rajiv Gandhi in the midst of Indian parliamentary

elections in May 1991. Other examples of continuing terrorism include the massacres of scores of rail

passengers in separate incidents by terrorists in India

and in South Africa. In Europe, terrorists have been

active, particularly in Spain, Northern Ireland, and

Germany. Single-issue terrorists (e.g., antiabortion

zealots, animal rights extremists) are still active in

the United States and Western Europe. Other domestic terrorism in the United States, while currently at

a low level, may resurge periodically. The phenomenon is global in scope and, unfortunately, continues

to demand attention and protective action by the

civilized world.

As terrorist tactics change, it will become

increasingly important to be proactive rather

than reactive in developing technologies to protect the public. Future threats should be anticipated to the degree possible so that means for

dealing with them will be developed in a timely

manner.

This report concludes an examination of the

role that technology may play in the effort to combat

terrorism. It is the second of two reports, which

together constitute an assessment of the role of

technology in combating terrorism. Requested by

three Senate committees in the summer of 1989,2

and begun in September 1989, the first report of the

study, Technology Against Terrorism: The Federal

l~s assessment uses a wor~ deftition of terrorism, presented in the fust OTA report in this series, U.S. congress, office of Technology

Assessment, TechnologyAgainst Temrorism: The Federal Effort, OTA-ISC-481 (Washingto~ DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1991), pp.

16-17:

The deliberate employment of violence or the threat of use of violence by sovereign states or subnational groups, possibly encouraged

or assisted by sovereign states to attain strategic or political objectives by acts in violation of law intended to create a climate of fear

in a target population larger than the civilian or military victims attacked or threatened.

This definotion covers a wide variety of violent acts against non-combatants, ranging from attacks on clinics by foes of abortion to mass murder by

sophisticated international terrorist groups (e.g., attacks on commercial aviation).

me requesting committees are the Committee on Governmental Affairs, the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations

of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and its Aviation Subcommittee. In additio~ the

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence later endorsed the study.

–3–
4 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

Effort,3 was delivered to the committees in September 1990. It summarized the research programs

developed by many government agencies for countering terrorist activities and investigated the state of

the art of some airline security technologies, notably

explosives detectors. Several findings were reached

that involved first, the overall Federal funding of

such research and development (R&D), the interagency component of that effort, and the program to

develop explosives detectors, especially for airline

security.

This report covers a number of remaining areas

and provides updated information on research progress in a number of fields. It discusses four principal

topics that were not previously dealt with in detail:

the terrorist threat from biological agents; interagency and international cooperation in R&D aimed

at counterterrorism; the application of an integrated

systems approach for aviation security; and the role

of human factors in security.

In addition to the findings and supporting information and analysis, this study contains a compendium of technical information on counterterrorist

R&D and technology to add to that of the past report.

Together, the two volumes include a survey of most

of the relevant work going on in the general field,

and should provide a useful reference on the state of

the technology at the time of publication.

OUTLINE OF REPORT

This chapter presents a summary and findings of

the report. The second chapter discusses a revised

update of the terrorist threat, as of June 1991. First,

some recent examples of terrorist attacks are given

to provide a sketch of the latest trends in targets,

tactics, techniques, and technologies used. The

implications of the Gulf War on potential future

threats are also presented. Further, the chapter

provides some insights on current players and

organizations on the terrorist scene. Finally, a

detailed discussion of the nature of potential biological terrorist threats is presented.

The third chapter presents the problems that arise

when many different agencies (and countries) work

in parallel on the counterterrorism problem. There

are difficulties with sharing information, with coordinating responses, and with coordinating R&D.

Some past problems are being successfully addressed, while others need more attention. The

report presents several options that Congress may

wish to consider to deal with the issue of improving

interagency coordination.

The fourth chapter discusses strategies for designing integrated systems for airline security. In particular, it makes some suggestions for approaches that

combine different types of explosives detectors in a

system that would be more effective and less

expensive than relying on just one type of device.

Chapter 5 discusses the application of the study of

human factors to airline security, a heretofore

neglected field that is now drawing deserved attention. The best equipment available will not provide

adequate security, even when automated to a high

degree and when successfully integrating many

different techniques, unless the humans running it

are able to operate it well. Humans must be able to

analyze properly the information that is provided by

the mechanical and electronic parts of the system,

and to use those elements to respond in timely and

correct fashion to alarms or attacks.

The next two chapters are presented in SECRET

versions only. Chapter 6 discusses technologies

available and under development, for assisting law

enforcement authorities and the military in responding to terrorist incidents. Chapter 7 presents a survey

of the emerging field of less-than-lethal weapons.

The desirability of disabling, while not permanently

harming, individuals within weapon range is clear in

the case of terrorists holding hostages. In addition,

such techniques, if successfully developed, could

revolutionize warfare, especially in the area of

low-intensity conflict.

The final part of the report consists of a set of

appendixes that gives technical background on

several topics. This information complements material found in this and the earlier report. Appendix

A discusses the Federal Aviation Administration’s

(FAA) R&D program for airline security. Following

recent criticism from a number of sources (including

OTA), the FAA has taken major steps to reorient and

refocus its program. The changes and new directions

of research are outlined here.

Appendix B discusses the role of animals, notably

dogs, in explosives detection. In many contexts,

carefully selected and trained dogs remain the

W.S. Congress, Oftice of Technology Assessmen~ op. cit., footnote 1.
Chapter 1-Summary ● 5

detector of choice, although their abilities may often

complement technical means of accomplishing the

same ends.

Appendix C presents the state of the art in metal

and weapons detectors.

In appendix D, technologies are presented that are

applicable to defending harbors and ports against

terrorist attacks. Of special interest is the protection

of tourist ships, which have already been targeted on

a number of occasions by Middle Eastern terrorist

groups.

Appendix E contains a summary of equipment,

generally available and in wide use, used for placing

barriers, sensors, and alarms around fixed sites and

for controlling access to them. It also contains some

discussion of technologies to incorporate into building design for defending against terrorist bombings.

The techniques covered in this chapter are applicable to many types of sites, from military and nuclear

installations (where such systems are installed and

have been for a long time) to U.S. Government

buildings that might be considered tempting terrorist

targets, such as embassies and consulates, to buildings belonging to private corporations.

The last three appendixes are only available in

classified versions. Appendix F (CONFIDENTIAL)

reviews the work being done in the area of electromagnetic techniques of detecting explosives, particularly nuclear magnetic and nuclear quadruple

resonance. Appendix G (SECRET) describes possible responses to the threat of surface-to-air missiles.

Finally, Appendix H (SECRET) gives a summary of

information on effects of biological agents and on

the capabilities of some states in this area. The

classified portions of the report are available from

OTA to those with the proper clearances and a need

to know.

FINDINGS

Chemical and Biological

FINDING 1

Terrorism

Interagency coordination for responding to

chemical and biological (CB) terrorism has shown

marked (and sorely needed) improvement recently. An interagency plan to respond to such

eventualities now exists. However, more coordination and more R&D are needed to improve

response capabilities. Because of the reality of the

CB terrorist threat and because of the potentially

disastrous consequences, a concentrated effort by

both the executive and legislative branches to

expedite such work would be appropriate.

The recent interagency plan to coordinate

agency emergency responses to a CB attack is a

welcome start in addressing the problem, but its

development should receive urgent attention. Final

implementation of the plan should be accelerated.

This would require increased financial and managerial resources.

In the chemical area, rapid “early warning”

multiagent detectors are being developed. Similar

work is proceeding in the biological area, but

considerably more R&D would be very useful there.

In a number of fields, an optimal response and

protective system requires further work. The topics

of early disease detection and diagnosis need more

effort; one problem is to determine as quickly as

possible whether an outbreak of disease is natural or

a terrorist act. The development of lightweight

protective masks that can be worn for lengthy

periods of time should be emphasized, especially

since it could be accomplished with current

technology. Another effort should be the development and stockpiling of vaccines, antidotes, antibiotics, and antiviral agents to combat the most likely

threats (as determined by intelligence estimates).

Decontarnin ation after an attack is another important

field to emphasize. The rapid development of a

real-time field device for detecting an infectious

aerosol is a further need.

Improved coordination among the agencies

involved in such research is desirable. In determining the direction of research and assigning

priorities, participation of the intelligence communnity and of the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence

Center is essential. An oversight board for coordinating major decisions on such research would be

useful. Such a board should include representatives

of military (e.g., the U.S. Army Medical Research

Institute for Infectious Diseases) and civilian (e.g.,

the Centers for Disease Control and the National

Institutes of Health) research organizations to assure

maximum expertise and breadth of perspective.
6 ● Technology Again@ Terrorism: Structuring Security

Interagency Communication and

Coordination

FINDING 2

There are still problems with interagency

communications and coordination in counterterrorist activity and research. Interagency communication, both operationally and in R&D, has

improved significantly over the past few years.

However, more coordination is required for a

better effort.

In years past, different agencies involved in

operations against criminals did not even have a

common, secure radio communications charnel.

This problem has been dealt with. In the case of a

chemical or biological terrorist threat, there was no

coordinated plan for interagency response; now, one

is being developed. In some research areas, the

previous experience of parallel research efforts with

minimal communication among the agencies working similar problems has been changed with the

organization of interagency expert working groups.

Some of these successes have been mediated by the

Technical Support Working Group (TSWG), highlighted in the earlier OTA report.4

In other areas, existing communication efforts are

poorly implemented. The ‘TECSII” database, which

links the Immigration and Naturalization Service

(INS) and U.S. Customs terminals across the world

with many U.S. Government agencies, does not

seem to receive adequate attention from domestic

law enforcement agencies. The database contains

valuable information on a large number of foreign

individuals who attempt to enter the United States

and who excite suspicions of Customs or INS agents

at ports of entry. In some cases, proof of criminal

activity is developed, and in other cases not. A

useful, organized stock of information is available

but does not appear to be widely used. One of the

interagency coordinating groups on counterterrorism

(the Policy Coordinating Committee on Terrorism

of the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism, for example) could make efforts to encourage appropriate utilization of this and other databases.

Another area of interagency confusion is reflected

in a case where classification regulations significantly slowed research into a promising area of

explosives detection. The company in question,

pursuing computerized tomography for detecting

explosives in baggage, is partly foreign-owned (a

minority share is owned by Italian and Japanese

interests). Research has been delayed for up to a year

because, following the establishment of classification guidelines regarding the capabilities of such

equipment, the company’s laboratory could not be

designated as a facility capable of performing

classified research. The legal difficulties will be

resolved, perhaps by spinning off an entirely U. S.-

owned subsidiary, but valuable months of work will

have been lost. Again, an interagency coordinating

group should have been able to shortcut the problem.

In the area of research and development, two

phenomena are salient. First, in some fields, there

are redundant research projects where different

agencies let substantial contracts, sometimes to the

same vendors, to develop similar hardware. Second,

other agencies--e.g., INS, the Secret Service, and

the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)-suffering from virtually nonexistent budgets for R&D, but

needing to develop tools for counterterrorist and

other missions, are forced to shop around for

well-heeled agencies to provide funds to support

these efforts.

In the field of behavioral research, as applied

to passenger profiling and incident management,

there appears to be insufficient coordination

among agencies.

These problems should, in theory, be solved by

the existence of the TSWG. This interagency committee is meant to coordinate R&D activities in this

area in a way that avoids redundancies and assures

that needed work gets done, even if no one agency

can provide sufficient funds by itself. However, as

noted in the previous OTA report, funding for

TSWG has been problematic, declining by 80

percent since its inception 5 years ago. Shortage of

money apparently increases the tendency to protect

turf and discourages communication among the

agencies doing the R&D. It also encourages scientists to use their own networks of colleagues and

friends in other agencies to seek funding for needed

projects—funding that should be assured and coordinated through the interagency group for such

research.

4u.s. Congess, OffIce of Technology Assessment op. cit., footnote 1, Ch. 1.
Chapter 1-Summary ● 7

One area of emphasis should be the organization by cognizant Government agencies of periodic interagency conferences in areas related to

counterterrorism, such as aviation security, behavioral sciences, and sensor development. Some

such conferences do occur now, but need to be more

regular and cover more topics.

Options

OTA presents four options for improved coordination in research among the multitude of agencies

that have R&D interests in counterterrorism. There

is no foolproof institutional method of assuring that

a given governmental project will work optimally.

Much of the result will depend on the type and

quality of people assigned leading roles. Bearing in

mind these constraints, Congress may wish to

consider the following suggestions.

Some agencies (those of the Intelligence Community and the Defense and Energy Departments in

particular) will not be interested in having counterterrorism projects that are specific to their own

missions controlled or subsumed by an interagency

group. But those projects with interagency applications, and there are many, should be coordinated by

a central, interagency group, one that has sufficient

authority and funds to run an efficient program.

Further, a larger portion of the Nation’s counterterrorism research should be subject to coordination by

a single body than is currently the case. Now, the

TSWG represents only $2 million out of over $70

million expended annually. Even if expanded to $10

million, the fraction would be only 15 percent.5

In considering these options, the following criteria should be applied. The coordinating group

should be able to act as an effective communications

channel among agency scientists. Further, agencies

must take it seriously: it should be politically strong

and have sufficient financial resources to overcome

distrust, turf protection, and secrecy among agencies. Moreover, it should be in a position to avoid

significant redundancies in research projects and to

identify important areas not being researched. It

should be acceptable to key agencies (the Departments of State, Defense, Energy, and Justice), if at

all possible. Finally, there should be significant

assurances of support for consistent funding from

Congress and from the agencies concerned.

Option 1: Continue with the TSWG and its

parent Policy Coordinating Committee on

Terrorism as now funded, run through the

Department of State, but with a large increase

in funding, as now planned, mostly originating

from the Department of Defense. Give the

TSWG its own line item in the State Department budget.

Advantages. This continues the present institutional situation, which has worked, given funding

constraints, until now. Many of the participants are

familiar and comfortable with it. An increase in

funding (to $10 million from $2 million, as proposed

in pending legislation) should be sufficient to assure

that needed projects, particularly those of researchstarved agencies, are undertaken. This set-up allows

decisions on research to be made by a committee

made up of representatives of all the participating

agencies. It is meant to assure that the large research

agencies (Defense and Energy) will not dominate or

gobble up the research pie.

A line-item status will help assure that other

components of the State Department do not drain

funds intended for the TSWG. It may also help in

providing an incentive for the State Department to

give more active support to the TSWG when

appealing for funds from Congress.

Disadvantages. There may remain some congressional opposition to funding a research program

through State, which is not a research-oriented

agency. The funding may never be assured from year

to year, unless strong advocates appear, either in

Congress or the executive branch. Power and

decisionmaking maybe perceived as tilting towards

Defense, since a large share of funds will be supplied

from its budget. Defense is already managing the

program for State, which has limited technical

expertise.

Option 2: Place the TSWG in a major research

agency, such as the Department of Defense, the

Department of Energy, or the Department of

Transportation (now with a large R&D budget

for counterterrorism). Give it line-item status.

Advantages. The Departments of Defense and

Energy both have significant experience in managing R&D programs of all sizes and at all phases.

Stable funding would be more likely; even if the

spen~g legislation hS Wocatti $7 million from DOD tids for the TSWG.
8 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

congressional process were to fluctuate, the host

agency could make up difference in lean years, since

the whole program would constitute a minute part of

the agency’s research program.

Disadvantages. There might be distrust among

other participating agencies, since the perception

will be that the host agency will take the lion’s share

of projects. A committee may make funding decisions, but the power of the purse of the host agency

might swing decisions in favor of research it

particularly wants. On the other hand, the host

agency may not want the program, since it may

perceive that the costs of TSWG research, primarily

done to satisfy other agencies’ needs, would be

deducted from its own in-house research.

Option 3: Replace the TSWG with a similar

funding group run out of a national laboratory

(within DOE) or a smaller agency with

research capability. Give it line-item status.

Advantages. A laboratory would be familiar with

science and engineering issues and research practices, which would help in finishing competent

oversight. An operational agency would be aware of

the field requirements of the equipment. In the

former case, the TSWG would be somewhat removed from interagency rivalry, although subject to

interlaboratory rivalry.

Disadvantages. This would place much, probably

too much, power in the hands of only one participating agency, even if accompanied by an interagency

oversight board. Since the TSWG would be replaced, many old players would not likely be

enthusiastic, especially State, Defense, and Energy,

all of which have leading roles. If the location were

a national laboratory, Energy could be somewhat

mollified. However, there may be resentment from

competing laboratories. Further, many observers

consider the laboratories more efficient at long-term

research than they are at rapid prototyping, which is

needed in the field.

Option 4: Replace the TSWG with a similar

funding group operating out of a technical

office close to the President with no direct

interest in doing research itself, such as the

President’s Office of Science and Technology

Policy, or the National Security Council (NSC),

or out of a new office, following the model of

the Office of National Drug Control Policy.

Specifically marked money and personnel

would have to be provided to any of these

possible homes to run the group; piggybacking

on current capabilities will not work.

Advantages. The coordinating body would be in

a strong position of power (if actively supported by

the White House) and thus able to arbitrate among

agencies and deal with rivalries and parochial

interests. A strong position would also help in

eliciting information from reluctant participants and

in fighting turf builders. Specifically marked funds

would need to be provided, since the task of

coordinating counterterrorist research is a major

one, requiring the full attention of experts. If located

in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), the coordinating group would be

likely to have strong technical input with probably

no ax to grind. It could also benefit from the

perception that the OSTP would be a disinterested,

honest broker. This would also apply to the creation

of a new office. Also, this option tight provide a

good place to take advantage of existing talent to

deal with the multidisciplinary needs of overseeing

a highly varied program. A new office would have

to receive separate research funding and control the

purse strings, otherwise participating agencies would

not be interested in playing. This option might level

the playing field among agencies in that more weight

might be given to the needs of agencies with limited

R&D budgets (e.g., Secret Service, INS).

Disadvantages. The TSWG would disappear, thus

irritating the same participants as in the previous

option. A new ballgame of counterterrorism R&D

would exist, making long-time participants uncomfortable. Major agencies might be more reluctant to

play. Congress may be unwilling to fired a new

agency or to increase significantly the budget for an

existing office. The OSTP or NSC might be reluctant

to take on the task of managing research, particularly

in a narrow area.

Aviation Security

The remaining findings all deal with aviation

security, although several of them have applications

to other aspects of countertemorism.
Chapter 1-Summary ● 9

Integrated Security Systems

FINDING 3

With current or near-term technology, a system combining profiling and bomb detection

technology could be developed that could be

expected to increase airline security.

In chapter 4, this report details an example of an

explosives detection system that incorporates profiling with three different types of detectors.6 A

combined detection probability of around 0.85 to

0.90 and a false alarm rate of about 1 percent are

estimated for such a system, based on estimates

(probably optimistic) of the performance characteristics of individual components. The suggested

system is only notional and not intended to be

definitive; the goal is to present the technique of

combining different technologies and to show how

such an explosives detection system may be more

effective and potentially less costly than reliance on

just one technology. The first stage of such a system

would be an “OR” gate (one that triggers further

scrutiny when at least one component alarms), using

profiling and an advanced x-ray detection device as

the components.7 One advantage of x-ray systems

over the thermal neutron analysis (TNA) system

(now in advanced development) for a frost stage is in

the cost; x-ray systems cost only 10 to 20 percent as

much as a TNA machine. There are other potential

advantages, such as speed of throughput, smaller

size and weight, less infrastructure needed to support

the system, etc. The second stage could use a

completely different technology, such as a vapor

detector, and the final stage could employ a more

elaborate and expensive device, such as computerized tomography or TNA.

In this system, throughput would not be a problem

if profiling were done at check-in, since it would add

negligible time. Only some bags (perhaps onequarter of the total) would pass to the second stage,

and far fewer still would go to the final stage, so the

throughput requirement for these stages would not

be stressing and probably not be an issue.8 And,

since the stage-two and stage-three equipment are

only needed in small quantities, their effect on the

total cost of capital acquisition would be reduced.

Again, this system is only posed as a suggestion; an optimized system might be different for

each airport, depending on many factors, such as

peak flow, configuration of baggage conveyors,

location of check-in counters, etc. However, optimization could be analyzed for individual airports

using simple programming techniques given the

parameters of the detection devices (i.e., detection

probability, false alarm rate, cost, rate of throughput,

and possibly size and weight).

FINDING 4

The throughput rate of an individual explosives or bomb detection device is not an appropriate parameter to regulate. What counts is the

throughput of the entire security system.

The FAA has mandated an average throughput

rate of 10 bags/minute for an acceptable explosives

detector. OTA finds that throughput is not an

important parameter in itself. First, useful throughput rates vary, depending on where the device is

used. Second, cost is a determining factor: if a slow

device is cheaper, a solution might be simply to buy

more and use them in parallel (if there is room).

Third, as noted above, the placement of a device in

the system determines its needed rate of throughput:

one that needs to handle only a small fraction of the

baggage can take much longer and still remain a

useful component. Optimizing the throughput may

be left to determination through systems analysis

and the marketplace. One might consider specifying

throughput for an entire system, but the meaningful

parameter would be additional delay time introduced over and above the check-in procedure. And

this would, again, be scenario-dependent, depending

on the configuration of the total system.

Gk addition to det~ting explosives, it may alSO be possible to detect other components of bombs, such as detonators, power sources, or ti.mer$. Most

detectors available and being researched are, in fac~ explosives detectors, but some may be able to fiid the other components as well.

7~e ~tterfi@bea backscattermachine or a refined d~-energy system. Both these types of x-ray devices react to high-density, low-atomic-weight

items, like high explosives. Or, it might be a system that looks specifically for detomtors as well as for high explosives.

8C&~W o~y abut oneq~er of the ~gs prWe~ t. the second s~ge, the latter equipment Cotid tie about Q times x long ~ the FM guideline

of 10 bags per minut-that is, 24 seconds per bag—witbout causing a bottleneck thus greatly reducing the stress on the technology. The fti stage

might take 20 times as long, or 2 minutes per bag.
10 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

Human Factors

FINDING 5

Widespread use of effective passenger profiling is essential for substantial improvements in

airline security, especially for reducing the burden on bomb detection technology.

Profiling has been used in aviation in the

United States and other countries for several years.

Israel institutionalized the use of profiles in its

aviation security system several years ago, but in the

United States, utilization has been sporadic and not

institutionalized, with the exception of a limited

requirement in high-threat areas since 1986. Some

U.S. carriers began using a more elaborate profile in

high-threat areas in late 1986 by subcontracting with

firms owned by former Israeli security personnel. To

a degree, profiling can be automated. The FAA

requires certain information regarding passenger

travel plans to be considered in judging whether a

particular passenger should receive a higher level of

scrutiny. It further requires the passenger to be asked

a series of questions regarding the contents of his

luggage. The FAA is examining, in addition, a more

elaborate system that uses a simple computer

program to evaluate a number of passenger characteristics rapidly. This has not yet been mandated for

airline use. In addition, several airlines go beyond

FAA regulations in interviewing passengers as a

basis for decisions on security processing.

However, only in the ongoing testing of an

improved TNA device at Gatwick Airport near

London has profiling been used as a frost screen by

U.S. carriers to decide which passengers’ baggage

will pass through an explosives detector. This

example of profiling reduces the number of bags to

be inspected by a large factor. Without such a

reduction in flow through the machine, it would

never otherwise be possible to vet, in some fashion,

all international travelers leaving Gatwick with just

one TNA machine. This provides an example of

profiling being employed in combination with

technical security measures. In finding 3, and in

chapter 4, a specific slot for profiling is discussed in

the context of an integrated bomb detection system.

FINDING 6

Research on profiling and on combining profiling with security technology should be conducted

by the FAA; in addition, the FAA should benefit

from discussions on this issue with other agencies

such as the INS, the Customs Service, and the

FBI.

Several agencies have experience in profiling,

applied to distinguishing terrorists and other criminals. There appears to be inadequate discussion

among these agencies. U.S. airlines should be able

to receive some guidance in this area from the

Federal Government, rather than having to rely

mainly on contracting with private security firms

with Israeli experience.

There is now enough experience with airline

profiling to begin examining how regulations requiring its use may be developed, at least at high-risk

airports. To this end, it may be useful in addition for

the FAA to consult with other Federal agencies (e.g.,

the INS, the FBI, the Customs Service) to learn what

techniques have proven useful in the past for

discovering terrorists or criminals in high-flow

travel situations. It would also be of some use to

examine whether additional behavioral science research into profiling would be useful. The establishment of databases on terrorist and criminal activities,

with a particular view to extracting information

useful for profiling, appears to be another topic

worthy of research, not just at the FAA, but, at other

agencies as well. In this regard, the TECSII system,

developed jointly by Customs and INS, appears to be

a valuable source of information that has been

overlooked, to a degree, by domestic law enforcement agencies.

FINDING 7

Passenger profiling may have civil liberties

implications, depending on which characteristics

are used to determine who will receive increased

scrutiny, and on what the consequences of increased scrutiny are. These implications should

be carefully considered in developing regulations

that mandate profiling.

All baggage screening violates privacy to some

degree. Even more intrusive than such screening are

interviews of passengers, in order to elucidate

intentions, itineraries, recent actions, etc. These

have become common in international air travel.

There has thus far been little legal challenge to such

actions on the part of airport authorities, or, for that

matter, on the part of private airlines. This absence

is, no doubt, due to the severe consequences of

in-flight sabotage. Most people and governments
Chapter l-Summary ● 1 1

apparently consider that the small sacrifice in

privacy is balanced by the resulting increase in

personal safety.

Of particular legal and ethical concern is the issue

that would arise if demographic characteristics of

passengers are used to help determine whether or not

an individual’s baggage will be more carefully

screened or sent through more detection devices. It

is not certain that establishment of such criteria will

ever be recommended by a U.S. Government agency,

but some airlines in the world may do so now and the

matter needs attention. Issues that bear on the

legitimacy of such actions include:

●

●

●

If

the weight given to the demographic characteristics relative to other profile information;

the percentage of passengers flagged by demographic criteria relative to the percentage of

passengers subject to increased scrutiny as a

result of profiling in general; and

the consequences of being selected for increased scrutiny.

the only result of being selected were an

additional delay of, say, 10 seconds in checking in

on an international flight, most would agree that

such a consequence would be negligible. On the

other hand, if a passenger were to be mistreated,

strip-searched, denied passage, or delayed to the

point of missing a flight due to profiling based in part

on demographic characteristics, then significant

consequences could be attributed to discrimin atory

behavior. A legal analysis of these matters is beyond

the scope of this report, but must be taken into

consideration in promulgating regulations.

FINDING 8

If human-factors requirements, such as profiling, are demanded of U.S. carriers on international flights, imposing the same requirements on

foreign carriers landing in the United States

should be considered as well.

The Aviation Security Improvement Act of

1990 requires that the Administrator only approve

the security program of any foreign carrier landing

in the United States if the program provides the same

level of protection provided by U.S. carriers serving

the same airports.9 Similar parity was specifically

established in the case of the explosives detection

system rule.10 Moreover, the FAA already vets the

security quality at international airports overseas

that carry passengers to the United States. However,

there are problems with sovereignty and sensitivity

of other countries involved. The United States has no

legal authority in other countries, but it does have the

option of bargaining on landing rights to carriers

from those countries with inadequate security systems. This leverage has already been exercised in a

number of cases when U.S. authorities considered

airport security in other countries to be too lax. It

could also be exercised specifically in the case of

profiling.

Currently, there are no profiling requirements

demanded of foreign carriers. These carriers used to

argue that terrorism was generally a political act

against the United States, and therefore there was no

threat against them, so such security measures were

unnecessary. The existence of the coalition that

participated in the Gulf War should invalidate this

reasoning in many cases. For others, an argument

can still be made that no one is immune from air

piracy and terrorism, even though the United States

is more frequently a target than some other nations.

Further, most foreign carriers are state-supported

and find it easier to pay for the extra cost of such

security measures. U.S. carriers do not have this

luxury, and, for small competitive margins, the

added cost of security may be a serious handicap to

the ability of U.S. carriers to compete successfully.

Congress and the FAA should consider options to

level the field, either by demanding similar profiling

security requirements of all carriers that land in the

United States, or at least by examining means of

compensating U.S. carriers directly for the associated economic disadvantage.ll

FAA Research and Development Program

FINDING 9

Examining the possibilities of hardening aircraft and cargo containers to minimize bomb

damage is a promising line of approach, and one

gAviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, Public Law 101-604, sec. 105(k)(2).

10541 F’edera/ Register, 36938-36946 (Sept. 5, 1989).

llIn ewhm drafts, mere was an additio~ OTA finding under the human factors heading, namely that FAA should place a designee of tie Assistant

Administrator for Civil Aviation Security on its agencywide human factors committee. FM has recently made this change.
12 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

that should be pursued. The FAA is proceeding in

this direction.

The FAA is pursuing this option with some

vigor. The object would be primarily to drive

upwards the amount of explosive needed to destroy

an aircraft, thereby making the explosive easier to

detect (another example of systems integration). The

most plausible approach is to work on hardening

baggage containers to allow them to direct the

venting of an explosion in such a way as to minimize

damage to the aircraft. Additional options would be

to add liners to the baggage compartment to try to

absorb or slow shrapnel that might cause catastrophic secondary damage (e.g., to hydraulic systems) and to add blow-out panels to the fuselage

itself. Difficulties with liners lie primarily in the cost

associated with extra weight. A problem with any

modification to the aircraft is the need for recertification for airworthiness and the cost of retrofit. FAA

certification personnel and airline maintenance and

operations experts should be involved at an early

stage, so that operationally impractical lines of

research are not pursued.

OTA suggests that international cooperation, on

this and related problems, would be fruitful. Such

cooperation, for example, with the British, French,

Germans, and Canadians, is ongoing in the counterterrorist arena and should be expanded and encouraged.

FINDING 10

There should be a closer working relationship

among personnel responsible for research at

FAA, personnel who set security standards in

regulations, and personnel involved in operational security matters.

A major difficulty suffered by the FAA research program lies in its placement within the

overall structure of the FAA, as well as its connection to the FAA Aviation Security R&D program.

The Director of the FAA Technical Center in

Atlantic City, NJ, reports to the Executive Director

for Systems Development (within the overall FAA

organization), who, in turn, reports directly to the

Administrator. Within the Technical Center, the

Aviation Security Research and Development Service, which conducts the program, was until recently

a part of the Airports Division in the Engineering

and Development Service. Thus, it was three adminiistrative levels removed from the Director of the

Technical Center. Last year, in response to both

external and internal criticisms, the Aviation Security R&D program was elevated to the service level.

Prior to the above change, the branch was staffed by

only 13 people. Now the Aviation Security Research

and Development Service has 37 employees, a

distinct improvement that reflects the recent threefold increase in R&D funding. The Technical

Center, and, consequently, the Aviation Security

R&D program, still have no direct line relationship

with the Assistant Administrator for Civil Aviation

Security.

However, FAA has made other changes in an

effort to open new lines of communication between the Technical Center’s security work and

those involved in operational security matters at

FAA. Closer contact is maintained between the head

of Aviation Security Research and Development

Service and the Assistant Administrator for Civil

Aviation Security, and a representative of the

Service is resident at the FAA headquarters in

Washington, DC. Further, a memorandum of understanding between the Tech Center and the Assistant

Administrator, specifying areas and divisions of

responsibility has been signed in March 1991. In

addition, following a requirement specified in the

Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, the

Department of Transportation has created a Director

of Intelligence and Security, whose missions include

development of policies, planning, and the coordination of countermeasures to terrorist threats to

transportation security. 12 These developments are

quite new, and it remains to be seen whether they

will have the effect of better coordinating responsibilities in security R&D.

Further difficulties result from the separation,

both physical and organizational, of the R&D effort

from those in FAA and Department of Transportation (DOT) headquarters who set policy and who are

familiar with airline and security operations. The

massive objections of air carriers and airport operators to the proposed mandated widespread installaion of TNA devices were, at least in part, a result of

policymakers’ isolation from the research directors

and the operational experts. On the one hand, advice

from the Tech Center on the limitations of the device

was ignored in overselling its ability to the public.

lz~blic hw 101-604,” sec. 101, op. cit., foolnote 9.
Chapter l-Summary ● 1 3

On the other hand, the large size and cost of the

device were anathema to industry; it would not

easily fit into many airports without costly retrofits.

Closer communication among the disparate elements of FAA and between DOT and FAA could

have prevented or greatly mitigated the widespread

criticism of the agency for its attempt to mandate the

mass acquisition of the device.

For the future, the requirements of the research

program should be better grounded in the context of

operational requirements. This is true, for example,

for setting the amount and type of high explosives

that a detector should be able to find. Past definitions

of detectable quantities and types of explosives were

criticized in many quarters (including OTA)13 as not

adequately reflecting past terrorist threats. This too,

can be accomplished by closer contact among

different FAA elements.

In fact, the FAA has moved in this direction

regarding the determination of the quantity of

explosives that should be detectable. It has put

together a group from several agencies to determine, from empirical data, the amounts of explosives needed to destroy various types of commercial aircraft.

Issee first rew~ in this series, U.S. Conwss, Office of Technology Assessment, op. cit., footnote 1, ch. 1.
Chapter 2

The Terrorist Threat—1991
Contents

Page

PART I: AN UPDATE ... ... ... ... ................**.**""+""""""""""""""""""""""""" 17

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Contemporary TerrorismAn Overview

The Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Terrorist Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ● ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎✎✎☛ 17

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ● ..*.. 17

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...** 17

. .

Statistical Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Modi Operandi and Targets . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Threat to the United States, 1970-91

. . . . . . . . .....**. 6......$ ....*..* ..,.*... . . 20

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....*.* . . . . . . . . . .20

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....*** .* 22

Domestic Terrorism . . . . ... ... . ..............................******""""""""""""* 23

International Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ● ● •” ● 24

Case Studies: Subnational and State-Sponsored Terrorism, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

The Future Outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

PART II: TERRORISM AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Biological Weapons: Agents and Dissemination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Possible Use by Terrorists-Availability of Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

U.S. Defense Against Biological Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Research and Development of Equipment for Physical Protection and Detection . . . . . 43

summary ... ... ... ... ... ... ... . ...................*..*****"""""""""""""'"""""""" 44

Figures

Figure Page

2-1. International Terrorist Incidents Over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

2-2. Anti-U.S. Attacks ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ..** . Q*...."*""""""""""""""" 23
Chapter 2

The Terrorist Threat—1991

PART I: AN UPDATE

Introduction

Radical changes in world politics since the late

1980s have produced an understandable euphoria in

public opinion. The communist empire has crumbled, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have

moved toward democracy, and an orderly transfer of

power to democratic institutions has occurred across

Latin America. In the Philippines the dictatorship of

Ferdinand Marcos was toppled, pluralistic governments are making a comeback across Africa, and a

freer political climate is developing in South Africa

with the legitimization of the African National

Congress and the rescission of apartheid measures.

An expectation has materialized that such favorable developments will usher in a “new world

order, with positive implications for global security and prosperity. However, the record from

mid-1990 to June 1991 underscores the vulnerability

of the emerging reconstructed international system

to continuing challenges. Threats to global peace

continue. One class of threat, diverse regional

struggles for local dominance, was typified by the

Gulf War. Another, which often derives from that

class of threat, is terrorism.

The use of both subnational and state-sponsored

terrorism persists as a cost-effective, extra-legal tool

in the struggle for power within and among nations.

Continuing terrorist operations at both the domestic

and international levels are dramatically illustrated

by the upsurge of political violence connected with

the Gulf Crisis and by the assassination of Rajiv

Gandhi, the former prime minister of India.

This chapter examines current and future challenges of terrorism, particularly as they affect U.S.

interests. The first portion of the chapter presents an

overview of domestic and international terrorist

events from mid-1990 to mid-1991. Two case

studies follow: one analyzes single-issue terrorism,

using the extreme elements in the animal rights

movement as an example; the other presents the

involvement of states in sponsoring terrorist activities. Concluding observations are offered in the final

section.

Contemporary Terrorism—An Overview

Terrorism is not new to contemporary societies.l

The failure of the international community to

recognize terrorism as both criminal behavior and as

low-intensity warfare has encouraged the expansion

of terrorist activity in the last two decades. Many

hundreds of terrorist groups have caused great

damage worldwide; some have been exploited by

state sponsors in the process. Terrorist operations

have been cheap to activate and expensive to

counter. 2

The Groups

Although springing from diverse political and

social roots and sustained by wide-ranging ideologies, terrorist groups share a common disposition,

namely, hostility toward the moral and legal norms

of the domestic and international order and glorification of violent deeds for the sake of the causes they

seek to advance. They often turn to violence after

frustration with the failure of legal or less extreme

actions to achieve their political goals. Terrorists

frequently regard themselves as morally above the

l~ere is no universally accepted definition of “terrorism.” One plausible deftition is the unlawful use of physical force or psychological

M.midationby Sukstate or clandestine state agents directed against innocent targets, primarily intended to achieve social, economic, political, strategic,

or other objectives. The U.S. Department of State uses the deftition contained in Title 22 of the U.S. Code, sec. 2656f(d). It defines terrorism as

“. . premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational or clandestine agents, usually intended to

influence an audience.” According to the Department of State view”. . . the term non-combatant target is interpreted to include, in addition to civilians,

military personnel who at the time of the incident are unarmed and/or not on duty.” The Department of State also considers “. . . as acts of terrorism

attacks on military installations on armed milkry personnel when a state of military hostilities does not exist at the site, such as bombings against U.S.

bases in Europe, the Philippines, or elsewhere.’ See Patterns o~GlobaZ Terrorism: 1990 (Washingto~ DC: Offke of the Secretary of State, Office of

the Coordinator for Counterterroris@ April 1991). For latest sources on the definitional forms see, for instance, Yonah Alexander (cd.), Terronsm:An

InternationalResource File, 19891ndex, and 1990 Index (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI, 1990-1991), and Terrorism andInternational ResourceFile, 1970-1989

Bibliography (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI, 1991), later cited as 1970-1989 Bibliography.

@or some surveys of terrorist activity, for exunple, Yonah Alexander and Ray S. Cline (eds.), “Worldwide Chronology of Terrorism-1981,”

Terrorism: An International Journal, vol. 6, No. 2 (1982), pp. 107-388; Yonah Alexander (cd.), The 1986 Annual on Terrorism, (Dordrech$ The

Netherlands: Martin“ us Nijhoff, 1987); Yonah Alexander and Abraham H. Foxrnan (eds.), The 1987 Annual on Terrorism and The 1988-1989 Annual

on Terron”sm, both published by Martinus Nijhoff in 1989 and 1990, respectively.

–17–
18 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

legal constraints of society and government and,

consequently, do not feel bound by any limits,

except those they have imposed on themselves for

purposes of revolutionary success.

Specifically, indigenous subnational groups, mostly

acting independently but sometimes as proxies of

governments, have proliferated throughout the world,

seeking to achieve ideological, nationalist, or other

goals (e.g., single-issue political objectives).3

U.S. terrorist groups represent a variety of ideologies and political and social goals. For example,

among the more active current actors is the Aryan

Nations, committed to white supremacy, including

the elimination of Jews and other minorities. It is

probably the most violent right-wing group in the

United States and provides an umbrella framework

to maintain ties among several similarly oriented

groups. Other groups active within the past two

decades have had leftist (e.g., the Weather Underground), nationalist (e.g., los Macheteros), or special

interest (e.g., Animal Liberation Front) orientations.

In Europe, a multitude of ideological and nationalist groups exist. A list of the more active ones, with

their principal arenas of operation includes:

●

●

●

•

●

●

●

●

Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)-Spain,

France;

Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC )---

France;

Direct Action (AD)-France;

First of October Anti-Fascist Resistance Group

(GRAPO)-Spain;

Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)---

United Kingdom;

Red Army Faction (RAF)-Germany;

Red Brigades (BR)-Italy; and

17 November Revolutionary Organization—

Greece.4 —

One of the most active European groups is the

Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), also

known as the Provos, an offshoot of the Irish

Republican Army (IRA). PIRA was formed in 1969

to force Great Britain to evacuate Ulster and then to

unify Ireland under a Marxist government. Acting as

a clandestine armed wing of the Sinn Fein (the legal

political arm of the IRA), PIRA operates in Northern

Ireland, the Irish Republic, Great Britain, and also in

Western Europe.5

Several Middle Eastern groups are of leading

importance. One is the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Founded in 1964 by Palestinian

nationalists seeking to establish an independent

Palestinian state in place of present-day Israel, the

PLO serves as an umbrella organization for several

constituent groups headed by Yasser Arafat, including Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of

Palestine (PFLP), the Palestine Liberation Front

(PLF), and several others. Despite Arafat’s renunciation of terrorism and his recognition of Israel, the

PLO has not relinquished the “armed struggle”

strategy or yet modified the Palestine charter, which

still calls for the elimination of the Jewish state. The

PLO is headquartered in Tunis and operates from

other bases in the Middle East and around the

world. 6 Most information indicates that, since the

official renunciation of terror by the PLO, its

terrorist activity has diminished greatly, with the

exception of attacks by the Palestine Liberation

Front (PLF), run by Abu’1 Abbas. The PLF appears

to be a semi-renegade member of the PLO. It was

responsible for the attack on the cruise ship Achille

Lauro, and for the failed attempt to kill large

numbers of civilians and tourists on Tel Aviv

beaches in 1990.

A second group is the Abu Nidal Organization

(ANO), often called the Fatah Revolutionary Council, a Palestinian movement outside the framework

of the PLO. Formed in 1974 by Sabri al-Banna, who

uses the alias Abu Nidal, ANO is also known by

other names such as the Arab Revolutionary Council, the Arab Revolutionary Brigades, Black September, and the Revolutionary Organization of Socialist

Ssee, for fi~nce, Yonah Alex~der (cd.), International Terrorism: National, Regional, and Global Perspectives (New York: Praeger, 1976); Walter

Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism (lilosto~ MA: Little, Brown & Co., 1987); and Terrorist Group Profi2es (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing

Office, 1989).

dFor a recen t s~dy, see, for ex~ple, Yoti Alex~der and Dennis A. Pluchinslq (eds.), European Terron”sm: TOdUY and Tomorrow (Mc~~* VA:

Brassey’s (US), Inc., 1991).

sFor reWnt s~dies see, for fi~ce, Yoti ~exader and Man O’Day (eds.), The In~h Te~orism Experience (Al&rsh@ U.K.: Dartmouth, 1991),

Ireland’s Terrorist Trauma: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989), Ireland’s Terron”st Dilemma (Dordrech~ The

Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986), and Terrorism in Ireland (hmdon: Croom Helm, 1984).

6See forexmple, yo~~emnder ~d Josh~ Sti, Terron’sm: The PLO Connection (New York: Crane Ru5sk 1989) ad ‘~d~e East Cotict’

in 1970-1989 Bibliography, op. cit., footnote 1, pp. 147-182.
Chapter 2—The Terrorist Threat-1991 ● 19

Muslims. It aims to undermine diplomatic moves for

negotiating a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli

conflict and to eradicate the “Zionist presence’

from the Middle East. Currently based in Iraq, where

it was headquartered in 1974-83, the ANO has also

been located in Syria (1983-87) and Libya (1988-

90). Although it has recently undergone internal

friction when 100 members rejoined the PLO

mainstream Palestinian Movement, and many others

were murdered by Abu Nidal, the ANO is still

considered as the most dangerous group in the world

operating in the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and

Latin America.7

A third Middle Eastern group, as dangerous as the

ANO, is Hizbollah, also known by other names

including the Party of God, Islamic Jihad, Revolutionary Justice Organization, Organization of the

Oppressed on Earth, and Islamic Jihad for the

Liberation of Palestine. A radical Lebanese Shi’a

group, it was formed in 1983 to realize the establishment of an Iranian-style Shi’ite Islamic Republic in

Lebanon and to bring about the elimination of

non-Islamic presence and influences from the Middle East. Closely tied to Iran, Hizbollah operates

from several bases, such as the Beka’a Valley,

Beirut, Southern Lebanon, as well as from locations

in Western Europe and Africa.*

A final group worthy of mention is the Popular

Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), run by Ahmed Jibril. This organization has been widely reported to have carried out

the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie,

Scotland in 1988, commissioned to do so by the

Iranian Government, although the United States has

now publicly accused only Libyan nationals of

participation. However, PFLP-GC has taken credit

for numerous other terrorist attacks in Europe and

the Middle East. Press reports have indicated that

this group may hire itself out for terrorist acts. It is

based in Syria, and was apparently dormant during

the Gulf War.

In Latin America, guerrilla movements are active

in most countries. Some of these movements frequently employ terrorist tactics. Among the most

dangerous is Sendero Luminoso (SL), located in

Peru. Formed as a Marxist “Shining Path to the

Future” in the late 1960s by Professor Abimael

Guzman Reynoso, it was initially formed as an

Indian-based rural rebel movement. Its aim is to

eliminate the current governmental structure and

replace it with a peasant revolutionary regime. Since

1986, SL has also resorted to urban terrorism,

particularly in Lima.9 In the countryside, SL has

cooperated with cocaine gangs in successful attempts to raise funds and pose as defenders of the

interests of the impoverished peasantry. SL’s terrorist tactics include mass murders of peasants and

peasants’ families who refuse to join their efforts or

who try to oppose them. Vicious warfare has taken

place between them and indigenous tribal peoples in

remote areas, as well as between them and the Tupac

Amaru Revolutionary Movement, another MarxistLeninist guerrilla group active in Peru. SL has not,

as yet, become active outside Peru’s borders, beyond

attempts to extend some influence to neighboring

Bolivia.

Among Asian terrorist movements operating during the past two decades, the more prominent have

included the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

(LTTE); the New People’s Army (NPA) of the

Philippines; and the Japanese Red Army (JRA).10

LTTE is a national liberation movement based

among ethnic Tamils in the north and east of Sri

Lanka, with support among Tamils in neighboring

regions of India, particularly the State of Tamil

Nadu. It has been responsible for a large number of

mass murders and bombings in Sri Lanka, often

attacking civilians among their ethnic rivals, the

Sinhalese. Many Indian officials and others suspect

the involvement of LTTE in the assassination of

Rajiv Gandhi, during parliamentary elections in

May 1991, although LTTE spokesmen have denied

the allegation.

The JRA and NPA have actively targeted American interests and citizens. The NPA was established

in 1969 as the guerrilla arm of the Communist Party

of the Philippines. It has organized an urban

infrastructure for the purpose of replacing the

Manila regime with a Maoist government.

%ossi Me- The Master Terrorist: The True Story of Abu Nia’al (New York: Avoq 1987).

8Terro~st Group Profiles, Op. Cit., fOOtnOte 3* PP. 15-18.

gf’atterns Of Global Terrorism: 1990, op. cit., footnote 1, pp. 73-74.

IOTevon”st Group Profiles, op. cit., foo~ote 3, pp. 1 l~130; and Fr~ G, MCGfic, seCU~fyln:elligenCe sourcebook (Silver Spfimg, ~: hlttXeStS,

Ltd., 1990), pp. 109-164.
20 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

The North Korean Government has used operatives in terrorist mass murders directed at South

Korean targets. Two major incidents were the

assassination of several cabinet members by bombing on an official visit to Burma and the destruction

of a Korean Air Lines aircraft over the Andaman Sea

in 1986.

Terrorist Networks

Experience over the past two decades shows that

terrorist groups thrive on collaboration across national boundaries. Shared ideologies and commitments to radical strategies, such as professed struggles against capitalism, imperialism, racism, and

Zionism, motivate groups to work together on an

international scale. Another manifestation of international terrorist activities is state-sponsored terrorism: the use of subnational surrogates that seemingly

act independently of their governmental sponsors.

State-sponsored terrorism has become a form of

low-intensity conflict that states (e.g., Iran, Iraq,

Syria, Libya, and North Korea) undertake when they

find it convenient to engage in hostile activities

without being held accountable.

The informal and formal relationships among

various terrorist groups and state sponsors has

resulted in a national, regional, and global framework for terror. The international character of many

terrorist efforts often compounds the difficulty of

identifying the initiator or sponsor of a given

terrorist act. There are many examples of international cooperation in the terrorist world. The ANO

has received safe haven, financial aid, training,

logistical assistance, and other help, including selected operational support from Iraq, Libya, and

Syria. ETA (Basque Fatherland and Liberty) received training from Libya and Nicaragua and

developed ties with PIRA. Hizbollah has enjoyed

extensive aid from Iran, including funding, training,

weapons, and logistical and operational support.

North Korea and Libya also extended help, such as

logistical support. The PLO developed extensive

links with many terrorist groups (e.g., PIRA) and

governments. Fatah, in particular, received training

and weapons from countries such as the Soviet

Union, other Eastern European states, China, Cuba,

North Korea, and Vietnam.11

An interesting aspect of terrorist networks is the

formation of a “regional’ framework within which

like-minded groups collaborate. A case in point is

the European “antiimperialist” network that consists of several Marxist-Leninist groups, such as the

Red Army Faction, Direct Action, and the Red

Brigades. From 1985 to February 1987 the RAF and

AD established the first front. After the AD leadership was arrested, the RAF joined the RB in the

second front. It folded again when the RB was

neutralized in 1988. Nevertheless, there have been

recent efforts to reconstruct the framework by the

RAF and GRAPO. It is not surprising, therefore, that

in 1990 the RAF was engaged in several proxyoperations in Germany in support of GRAPO (e.g.,

arson attacks and vandalism against several Spanish

car dealerships in Germany) .12

Because substantial state-sponsored support of

terrorist groups, particularly by the Soviet Union and

Eastern Europe, has been withdrawn, and because

international counterterrorist efforts are increasing

and apparently becoming more successful, many

subnational perpetrators will find it more critical

than ever to develop stronger linkages.

Statistical Trends

The year 1990 saw the frost annual decrease (10

percent) in both local and international terrorist

events since 1987.13

There are several reasons for the overall statistical

decline of terrorist incidents in 1990. First, the

apparent elimination of Soviet and Eastern European support of various terrorist groups, particularly

in the Third World, has resulted in disarray among

many movements. Second, the world community

has increased both security measures and internaIISee, for ins.hnce, patterns of Global Terrorism: 1990, op. cit., footnote 1, pp. 49-76.

12See Yoti Alexander and Dennis A. pl~~~~ (ed~-), European Terrorism: Today and TOWWOW (Mcb~ VA: Brassey’s (US), hlC., 1991),

ch. 2.

13~e~e ~~ti5tic~ me fmm B~siness R&5 ~termtioti, Annual Risk Assessment ~990 (1991). S@tiStiCS on terrorism V- widely. Nlmlt?rous diikl

banks focus undomestic terrorisu international terrorisw state terrorism, terrorism inspeciflc countries, etc. Also, interpretation of these statistics differ,

depending on the body organizing the data. A major private statistical source for both domestic and international incidents is the database of Business

Risks International (BFU) located in ArlingtoIL VA. Since 1979, it has issued monthly and quarterly reports which are sold to subscribers. Some of the

statistical material has been reprinted elsewhere in such publications as Terrorism: An International Journal and the Annuals on Terrorism, both edited

by Yonah Alexander. The statistical material used in this section is drawn from BRI sources. Other statistical databases consulted for this paper include

Ja.ffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University (JCSS) and RAND Corp. materials.
Chapter 2—The Terrorist Threat-1991 ● 21

tiona1 cooperation due to the Gulf Crisis and the

anticipation of Iraqi-sponsored terrorist operations.

Third, Syria, as a member of the U.S.-led international coalition, has become a moderating influence,

as apparently was the case with both Iran and Libya.

It seems these three countries applied pressures on

secular and religious Middle Eastern groups to

refrain from terrorist operations during the Gulf

Crisis. Finally, in spite of the tensions generated by

the Gulf Crisis and War, some groups were not

willing to take risks on Iraq’s behalf, since it

appeared to be ill-positioned for its confrontation

with the international coalition.

The first quarter of 1991 saw a 10-percent

increase in the number of terrorist incidents, both

local and international, over the previous quarter’s

figures, an increase that may be related to the

outbreak of the Gulf War. During this period,

anti-U.S. attacks increased by more than a factor of

4 relative to the same period in 1990.

Figures 2-1 and 2-2 furnish information on

terrorist trends during the past few years.

Modi Operandi and Targets

Terrorist groups have utilized a wide range of

tactics during the last two decades. These have

included arson, bombings, kidnapings, hijackings,

facility attacks, and assassinations. The terrorist

arsenal comprises not only explosives and arms,

such as guns, but also includes more sophisticated

weapons (including antitank rockets and ground-toair missiles).

The modi operandi of terrorist groups vary

considerably depending on the motivations and

capabilities of the perpetrators. In the 1970s, for

example, Fatah destroyed fuel tanks at Rotterdam oil

docks, murdered 11 Israeli athletes at the Munich

Olympics, and attempted a missile attack against El

Al aircraft in Rome. In Spain, GRAPO kidnapped

the president of the Supreme Military Tribunal,

assassinated the Director of Penal Institutions, and

bombed a Madrid cafe, killing 8 and wounding 40.

And the JRA carried out a machine-gun and grenade

attack at Lod Airport, killing 26 people (including

16 Puerto Rican pilgrims to the Holy Land), attacked

Shell Oil refinery storage tanks and seized a

ferryboat crew and hostages in Singapore, and

hijacked a Japan Airlines plane in Bombay .14

In the 1980s, subnational groups continued on two

paths: sometimes targets were specifically selected

and sometimes victims were indiscriminately attacked. Hizbollah bombed U.S. and French peacekeeping forces and diplomatic buildings in Lebanon,

kidnaped Western citizens in Beirut, and hijacked

Kuwait Airways flight 422. Direct Action bombed

the American School in Paris, employed a car bomb

against the headquarters of the Organization for

Economic Cooperation and Development, and murdered the Chairman of Renault. In Colombia, a local

group, M-19, kidnaped and subsequently killed a

U.S. citizen, staged simultaneous attacks on military

and police installations and banks, and seized

Bogota’s Palace of Justice, taking some 500 hostages, including many members of the Supreme

Court (who were later killed) and the Council of

State.

In 1990, both domestic and international terrorist

groups continued to conduct their operations with

similar tactics. The following few examples illustrate the nature and scope of terrorist capabilities:15

●

●

●

●

Spanish Basque deputies were shot in a Madrid

restaurant by ETA.

Italian environmentalists conducted an explosives attack, damaging some French electrical

utility operational equipment close to the

Golfech nuclear power station.

A house was blown up in Stepanakert, the

administrative center of Nagorno-Karabakh, by

unknown Armenian extremists.

Kazem Rajavi, brother of the leader of the

anti-Tehran Iranian Mujaheddin, Massoud Rajavi, was assassinated in Geneva, apparently by

Iranian agents.

IAChronolo@es of terrorist events used for this paper include a variety of sources, such as press indexes; FBIS; JPRS; NEXIS; Facts-on-File; U.S.

government reports, such as those published by the FBI, Department of Defense, and Department of State (e.g., Bureau of Diplomatic Security,

SignzjicantIncidents ofPolitical Violence AgainstAmert”cans 1988); Edward F. Mickolus, Ttid Sandier, and Jean M. Murdock, International Terrorism

in the J980s:A Chrono/ogyofEvents, V02. H, 1984-1987 (Ames, IA: Iowa State University Press); yearly reports of terrorist events prepared by the Project

onImw Intensity Warfare of JCSS, such as the latest publicationZnternationa2 Terrorism in 1989 (Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Pos~ 1990); the chronologies

published by the RAND Corp. on different types of terrorism (e.g., Brian M. Jenkins et al., “A Chronology of Terrorist Attacks and Other Criminal

Actions Against Maritime lhrgets,” Santa Moniw CA: The RAND Corp., September 1983): and the information on terrorist attacks research by the

Institute for Studies in International Terrorism, State University of New York.

IsSee, for e~ple, BRI, AnnW/ Risk Asses~nt J990, op. cit., footnote 13, and Patterns of Global Terrorism: J990, op. cit., footnote 1.
22 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

Figure 2-l—All International Terrorist Incidents, 1968-90

International terrorist incidents over time

‘ooo~

6 0 0 4

400 I

I

200

0M

1968 7 0 75 8 0 85 90

SOURCE: U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1990, 1991.

● PIRA bombed London’s Carleton Club (seriously wounding two people) and killed Ian

Gow, British Conservative Party Member of

Parliament in a car bomb.

By mid-1991, the sample of terrorist incidents for

the current year shows similar diversity of tactics.

PIRA was responsible for the mortar bomb attack

against the residence of the British Prime Minister at

10 Downing Street and the bombing of crowded

railway stations in London, the RAF sprayed the

U.S. Embassy in Bonn with over 250 rounds from

automatic weapons, and Islamic Jihad claimed

responsibility for bombing the car of an Iraqi commercial attache in Ankara.16

The Gulf Crisis tiggered an upsurge of uncoordinated violent demonstrations and terrorist attacks

worldwide, directed against U.S. or coalition targets.

Many of the attacks involved incendiary devices,

hand grenades, and small bombs. Most caused

property damage but resulted in few casualties. The

operations were usually conducted by indigenous

groups that had been engaged in similar activities in

the past. In claiming responsibility for some of the

attacks, the perpetrators have rationalized their

operations by referring to their sympathy for Iraq in

the Gulf Crisis.17

Terrorists continue to employ a variety of methods, including assassination, destruction of property,

and the murder of innocent people. They shift targets

readily, making security for their enemies difficult to

achieve.

The Threat to the United States, 1970-91

The United States is a principal target of terrorism. Not only do domestic extremist groups commit

acts of terrorism in the United States, but international groups frequently do so against the many

American targets abroad. However, it should be

noted that international acts of terrorism have rarely

occurred on U.S. soil.18

16See, for instance, BRI, Risk Assessment QuarterZy, op. cit., footnote 15; JPRS reports; and daily preSS reports.

IT~id.

18~e most remnt ~onfii~d incident of tenonsm in fie U.S. wi~ internatio~ implications OCCUITd in 1983. A bombing took place in Miami tbat

was attributed to Omega 7, a Cuban exile group. In 1989, an attempt was made to till Captain Rogers, former comman ding officer of the U.S.S.

Vincermes, presumably in retaliation for the downing of an Iran Air aircraft over the Persian Gulf in 1988. An incendiary device caused Capt. Rogers’

van to burst into flame in San Diego while his wife was driving it. She received only minor injuries. While never publicly documented, suspicions are

that agents of Iran perpetrated the attack.
Chapter 2—The Terrorist Threat-1991 ● 23

Figure 2-2—Anti-U.S. Attacks

Africa

Asia

Latin America

Middle East

North America

Western Europe

Armed attack

Arson

Bombing

Firebombing

Kidnapping

Other

1990, by region

1 I I 1 0 30 60 90 120 150

Number of incidents

1990, by type of event

FI I I I 1 -i

o 30 60 90 120 150

Number of incidents

Business

Diplomat

Government

Military

Other

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1990, by type of victim

I I 1 1 0 20 40 60 80

Number of incidents

1984-1990, casualties

//////////2~

! 1 I 4

0 50 100 150 200

- Wounded = Killed

SOURCE: U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1990, 1991.

Domestic Terrorism the 1970s. Moreover, most of these attacks occurred

in the early years of the decade.19

During the 1970s, indigenous and foreign terrorist The same encouraging trend persisted in 1990 campaigns in the United States resulted in 600 with only four events recorded, the lowest number in attacks against civilian and military targets. The any year since 1970. The most dramatic event was

success of the counterterrorism activities of the FBI the assassination of Rabbi Meir Kahane, the Israeli

and law enforcement agencies, coupled with changes leader of the Jewish Defense League (JDL), by an

in the global political environment, affected the Egyptian immigrant to the United States. Other

frequency of operations domestically in the 1980s. events included: an abortive plot by militant “skinDuring the last decade the number of terrorist heads” to pump cyanide gas into a synagogue; the

incidents reached 200, a two-thirds decrease from explosion of a bomb outside a Cuban museum in

lgsee, for fi~neq Regio~lRiskAssessment: North America (Alexandria, VA: Risks International, Inc., August 1979); “RcPort of tie policy Smdy

Group on Terrorism” (New York State: The Criminal Justice Institute, November 1985); Samuel T. Francis, The Terrorist Underground in the United

States (Wishingtow DC: The Nathan Hale Institute, n.d.); Brian M. Jenkins, “Terrorism in the United States,” TV7Journal, vol. 5, No. 1 (1984), pp.

1-4; and FBI publications such as Terrorism in the United States, J989 (Washingto~ DC: Terrorist Research and Analytical Center, Counterterrorism

sectioq criminal Investigative Division, 1990).
24 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

Miami; and the arrest in Florida of individuals

affiliated with the PIRA while attempting to purchase a heat-seeking antiaircraft Stinger missile and

other sophisticated weapons.20

The evolving Gulf Crisis increased concern for

potential Iraqi-instigated attacks in the United States

in 1990-91. Anxiety intensified as a result of specific

calls by the Iraqi leadership and Middle Eastern

terrorist groups to target America. Although the fear

of attacks was widespread, no incidents occurred in

the United States, perhaps due to the preventive

security measures undertaken by the U.S. Government and the private sector. These efforts included

reduction of Iraqi diplomatic staff; close scrutiny of

Iraqi and other nationals suspected of being linked to

radical Arab causes; upgrading security at government and military installations; and beefing-up

security procedures at airports and other commercial

industries.

When the Gulf War broke out on January 17,

1991, security measures increased even further.

These activities contributed to the absence of any

Iraq-sponsored or foreign-related incidents in the

United States linked to the Gulf War.

International Terrorism

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, U.S. interests

abroad, including cultural, economic, and military,

became a major target. Generally, about one quarter

of international terrorist attacks have been aimed at

U.S. citizens or interests. According to one source,

a total of 1,617 anti-American international attacks

occurred between 1970 and 1989. Out of a total of

939 incidents internationally during January-March

1991, 104 operations were directed against Americans and U.S. interests compared to 39 in 1990 and

32 in 1989 during the same quarter. U.S. corporate

targets were involved in 39 incidents, most of which

took place in Latin America and Europe. This

escalation was probably due primarily to the impact

of the Gulf War.21

The United States has been the most popular

single target of international terrorism. American

citizens, officials, diplomats, and military officers

have been victimized by both state-sponsored terrorism (e.g., Libya, Syria, and Iran) and substate

groups, including Marxist-oriented (e.g., Germany’s

RAF), Islamic Fundamentalist (e.g., Hizbollah),

Palestinian (e.g., ANO), and ideological mercenaries (e.g., JRA).

Some of the significant international terrorist

incidents directed against the United States during

the past decade include the following events. Although the figures cited mostly identify only U.S.

causalities, in many of the incidents a large number

of non-U.S. citizens were also killed or wounded.22

1982

● Midair explosion on a Pan Am jet bound from

Tokyo to Hawaii, killing a Japanese boy and

injuring 15 other passengers.

1983

. Bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, killing

17 Americans and many Lebanese.

. Bombing of U.S. Marine headquarters at the

Beirut airport by a Shi’ite suicide bomber,

killing 241 Marines.

. Bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait by

Lebanese and Iraqi terrorists.

1984

● Bombing of the U.S. Embassy annex in East

Beirut, killing two military officers.

. Hijacking of a Kuwaiti airliner to Iran, killing

two Americans.

1985

. Hijacking of TWA flight 847 by Shi’ite terrorists, lasting 17 days, with the torture and killing

of a U.S. Navy diver.

. Hijacking of the Italian cruise ship Achille

Lauro by members of the Palestine Liberation

Front and the murder of a disabled American

tourist.

1986

. Hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73 in Karachi,

killing two U.S. citizens.

. Bombing of TWA Flight 840 en route from

Rome to Athens, killing four Americans, including a 9-month-old baby.

. Kidnaping of two Americans in Beirut.

1987

. Attack on a U.S. military bus in Greece by 17

November, wounding 17 servicemen.

%FU, Risk Assessment Quarterly, op. cit., footnote 13, pp. 2-3.

211bid.

22 ~~o~tion is dram from various chronologies available. See footnote 14 for details.
Chapter 2—The Terrorist Threat-1991 ● 25

● Kidnaping of four Americans and a U.S.

resident alien in Lebanon.

1988

●

●

●

Kidnaping and later murder of U.S. Marine Lt.

Col. William Higgins of the U.N. Observer

Mission in Lebanon.

Attacks on U.S. military personnel in Greece

and Italy and American facilities in France,

Spain, and West Germany.

Destruction of Pan American Flight 103 over

Lockerbie, Scotland, by an onboard explosive

device killing 271 people in the aircraft and on

the ground, the former from some 20 nations,

but mostly Americans.

1989

. Col. James N. Rowe, a U.S. military adviser to

the Philippines, was shot to death in Manila.

. Seven U.S. soldiers were wounded by a bomb

in Honduras.

In 1990, similar attacks were perpetrated against

U.S. interests abroad. Among the significant incidents were:23

●

●

The U.S. Embassy in Lima, Peru, was car

bombed, injuring three guards.

A U.S. general with NATO was the target of an

unsuccessful kidnapping or assassination attempt.

In early 1991 and particularly following the start

of Operation Desert Storm, Iraq and its substate

supporters called for a Jihad (Holy War) against U.S.

and allied interests worldwide. Some 170 incidents

were recorded against the coalition members, most

of whom were Americans. For example, the U.S.

Embassy in Lima was struck on January 25,1991, by

an RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenade, causing only

superficial damage. The Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, which claimed responsibility for the

incident, condemned the United States for its

involvement in the Gulf and offered its militant

support for the Arab people who are being murdered

by U.S. troops in Iraq.24

Similar low-level attacks were perpetrated without any direct connection to Iraq itself. There were

attacks on U.S. embassies and consulates (e.g.,

Frankfurt, Berlin, Sydney, Dhaka, Mexico City,

Istanbul, Kuala Lampur); U.S. military personnel

and facilities (e.g., Jeddah, Ankara, and Izmir); U.S.

Government facilities (e.g., Voice of America transmitter compound in the Philippines); U.S. businesses (e.g., Ford, Coca-Cola, American Airlines,

American Express, Holiday Inn, Citibank, Chase

Manhattan Bank, and Kentucky Fried Chicken); and

other U.S. targets (e.g., Mormon churches in Latin

America, U.S.-Turkey Association, and the American School in Karachi) .25

Fortunately, the professional quality of the antiAmerican attacks connected with the Gulf War was

largely primitive. The low-level terrorist operations

demonstrated during Operation Desert Storm do not,

however, provide any guarantees that future incidents will not be more costly in terms of human life

and property. The past two decades provide ample

evidence of the sophistication and deadly power of

some groups, such as SL, PFLP-GC, and the RAF.

The professional execution of a U.S. serviceman on

March 2, 1991 in Greece by the 17 November group

is a recent example.26

Case Studies: Subnational and

State-Sponsored Terrorism

The frost two parts of this chapter provided an

overview of terrorist actions. This section focuses on

two case studies, which provide insights into how

terrorism functions.

Single-Issue Political Extremism:

Terrorism by Animal-Rights Extremists27

One source of terrorist acts is the single-issue

political group. While only a small fraction of such

groups engage in any illegal acts, in the United

States, sabotage and other violent acts have been

committed in the name of diverse causes, including

opposition to abortion, animal rights, anger at the

Xsee, for example, JPRS Reports for 1990; cf. footnote 14.

resee, for ktance, JPRS Reports for 1991.

~Ibid.

26BN, spec~l Repoti on Greece, Apr. 4, 1991.

27~~ section bo~ws heavfly from an edited ve~ion of an m yet unpub~hed conference Report on ‘ ‘hklid Rights and Terrorism: Threats and

Responses” held in Geneva, Switzerland, on May 9, 1991. Participants included OTA staff and a consultant and academic and operational experts in

various aspects of terrorism from several nations. Although the Report reflects the Geneva deliberations, it does not constitute a consensus of the

participants’ views.
26 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

Internal Revenue Service, and environmental grievances. The incidence of terrorism as a whole has

been quite low over the past decade, so that acts by

single-issue groups now account for a significant

fraction of domestic terrorism.

Differing from both traditional leftwing terrorists

(e.g., the Baader-Meinhof Gang) and rightwing

terrorists (e.g., the Aryan Nations) with their commitments to major political change, single-issue

terrorists confine themselves to political struggle in

one narrow area of focus. Single-issue terrorist

groups are often less structured and organized than

broadly ideological groups. Further, members are

often mainstream individuals who, in other respects,

do not differ radically from the average citizen.

Often, some care is taken not to target people in

terrorist actions. However, some of these groups

occasionally do engage in assassination attempts or

threats.

An example of single-issue terrorism is that

related to animal-rights issues.28 Various terrorist

and criminal acts have been carried out under the

banner of the Animal Liberation Front (ALF).29 The

actual degree of coordination of such activities is not

clear, but attacks claimed by the ALF have occurred

in the United Kingdom, the United States, and other

countries. 30 The ALF opposes the use of animals in

medical and scientific research, including psychological and surgical experimentation on living animals. It also generally opposes other uses of animals,

such as for testing new drugs and cosmetics, for

instructional purposes (especially in biology classes

and in medical school), and for food, clothing,

sports, circuses, and pets. To achieve their goals,

ALF attacks have been made against a variety of

targets ranging from medical and scientific research

laboratories to butcher shops and furriers. Its tactics

include theft of research animals, destruction of

research equipment, vandalism, and physical intimidation of researchers and their families.

These acts have had a significant effect on

biomedical research, slowing work in a number of

areas.

31

Government officials have become increasingly

concerned about the activities of animal-rights

groups. 32 Not only we law enforcement authorities

attentive to threats to life and property, but they have

labeled some of the acts of animal-rights extremists

as terrorist. In 1988, the FBI included the ALF on its

list of active domestic terrorist organizations. The

FBI now lists the ALF as one of the 10 most

dangerous terrorist organizations.

The Concept of Animal Rights-Concern for the

welfare of animals goes back at least to the 19th

century and has as its goal the protection of animals

from mistreatment by people. Today, this broadbased movement continues among individuals and

groups who are appalled by ill treatment of animals

in any context. In fact, most people in the United

States would probably agree with the proposition

that humans have amoral responsibility not to cause

needless suffering among other species.

Groups committed to such goals are commonly

known as animal-welfare organizations. They act

within democratic norms, using legal methods to

bring public attention to barbaric acts against

animals. Animal-welfare organizations have been at

least in part responsible for legislation providing

penalties for animal abusers and in setting norms for

the treatment of animals in research.33 They have

pointed out abuses in research and have urged the

discontinuation of the use of animals in testing

programs for new drugs and cosmetics. In some

cases, substitute techniques, avoiding the use of

animals, have been developed and employed as a

2$In addition to anhnal -rights terrorists, other single-issue political terrorists are active. For a brief overview see FBI, Terrorism in the United States

1989, op. cit., footnote 19 pp. 18-20. For bibliographicrd material see Terrorism: An International Resource File Indexes (1970-79, 1980-85,1986,1987,

1988, 1989, 1990), op. cit., footnote 19. For a recent treatmenc see for instance, David T. Hardy, America’ sNew Extremists: What You Need To Know

About the Animal Rights Movement (Washington, DC: Washington Legal Foundation 1990), from which some of the information contained in this

section is taken.

ZgSee, for exmple, FBI, Ten-orism in the United States, op. cit., footnote 19, pp. 18-20; Terry Mulg-o~ “me Animal Liberation Front” ml

Journul, vol. 5, No. 4 (1985), pp. 39-43.

% the United Kingdom, a handbook for conducting terrorist acts has been distributed by a group claiming to be the ALF.

31A s~dy on the use of -s ~ medi~ rese~h was published by he office of Technc)logy Assessment in 198&U.S. Congress, OffiCe Of

Technology Assessmen4 Alternatives to Aninud Use in Research, Testing, and Education, OTA-BA-273 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing

Office, February 1986).

qzsee, for ins~nce, Henry Cohe~ “Brief Summaries of Federal ~ Protection Statutes,” CRS Report to Congress (July 29, 1988).

33For e=ple, Public Laws 99-158 and 99-198.
Chapter 2—The Terrorist Threat-1991 ● 27

result. They have also opposed the use of animals for

teaching purposes and, in fact, such use has been

decreased, also in favor of alternative methods,

many of them computer-based.

In recent years, some animal-rights organizations

have taken extreme positions relative to those of the

traditional animal-welfare groups. Some believe that

animals are on an equal moral plane with humans.

Within this more extreme movement, small groups

of individuals have determined that violence is

justified in order to further the goals related to

perceived rights of animals. These groups often refer

to their actions as having been carried out by the

Animal Liberation Front.

Animal-Welfare Organizations and AnimalRights Organizations-Established, traditional

animal-welfare organizations include the Royal

Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals in

Great Britain, the Society for the Protection of

Animals in France, the Humane Society of the

United States, and the American Society for the

Prevention of Cruelty to Animals in the United

States. Many countries have similar groups.

The past 30 years have seen the emergence of

more extreme groups, a small fraction of whose

members engage in terrorist tactics. Among groups

of activists involved in antihunt protests in Great

Britain in the 1960s, one faction branched out into

activism against researchers. The frost animalliberation front was formed in 1972 under the name

Band of Mercy. Ronnie Lee, its founder, was

convicted of violent acts against research facilities,

went to jail, and was released in 1976. His group

reformed as the ALF, and continued violent efforts

using arson and other means to try to remove

animals from research facilities.34

A U.S. chapter of the ALF is believed to have been

organized in 1982.35 By the mid- 1980s, the ALF had

established a presence internationally. Active ALF

chapters are believed to exist now in 45 countries.

The ALF has no central organization, organized

leadership, membership lists, central funds, or command structure. The ALF is a flag of convenience for

anyone who wants to go out and perform direct

action against any form of perceived animal abuse.

People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals

(PETA), 36 formed in 1980, is the largest animalrights organization in the United States. It has

350,000 members and an annual operating budget

estimated at about $8 million. PETA leaders are

reported to have acted as intermediaries to the press

for the ALF, including distributing a videotape of an

ALF break-in.37

The Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine (PCRM) works closely with PETA. Begun in

the mid- 1980s, it provides the support of health care

professionals to the antivivisectionist cause, which

opposes any use of animals for research. The views

of PCRM appear, however, to have little support

within the medical community .38

Philosophical Underpinnings39—Animal-rights

extremists are most typically motivated by philosophical beliefs based on these ideas: 1) animal

rights are on a par with human rights; and 2) animals

have a right to physical liberty. Since animals should

have much the same rights as human beings, they

conclude that one should no more destroy an animal

than a child. The co-founder and director of PETA,

Ingrid Newkirk, was reported to have said, “Six

million people died in concentration camps, but six

billion broiler chickens will die this year in slaughterhouses. ’40

According to this line of thinking, animals should

be protected from harm caused them by all human

actions, ranging from a desire to consume animal

products as food to the use of animals for experimentation in medical research.

~See Hardy, op. cit., footnote 28, PP. 16-17.

Sssee, for mamplc, FBI, Terrorism in the United States, op. cit., footnote 19, pp. 18-20; Terry Mtigannou “me ~ Liberation Fron4° TW

Journal, vol. 5, No. 4 (1985), pp. 39-43.

36For some of pETA*~ ~tefi see, for examplqA~i~zRig~f~ Jol wo~~~oo~ (no date of pub~cation available) and l?ecorning an Activi,rt: PEi%’s

Guide to Animal Rights Organizing (no date of publication available).

m~l, op. cit., foo~ote 19, p.1 and Nature, APfl 13, 1989, P. 534.

SaSee, ~ ~ exmple, ~e~cm Medical Association, Use ofAnimals in Biomedical Research: Challenge and Response, AMA ~te PaPer (1989).

qgsee, for ~tinm, Petm Sfiga (cd.), ~n Defense ofAni~/s (Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1985) and peter Singer, Ani~l Liberation,

new ed. (New York: Random House, 1990).

~The Washington Post, NOV. 13, 1983, p. 1.

297-922 0 - 92 - 2 QL 3
28 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

Tactics-since the ALF originated in Great

Britain, it is instructive to examine the tactics it has

used there. In its formative period, the ALF engaged

in arson and raids to achieve its objectives.41 In

1982, the frost personal attacks with letter bombs

occurred. First, these letter bombs were sent to

political leaders and then to researchers. The acts

were claimed by the Animal Rights Militia. There is

good evidence that the ALF and the Animal Rights

Militia are simply different parts of the same group.

The scale of direct action by the ALF escalated in

the 1980s in Great Britain. First, there was a series

of massed daylight raids in which up to 300

animal-rights activists would attack a research

organization-often a pharmaceutical company.

Demonstrators would tear down the wire fence, rush

into the facility, grab animals and documents; by the

time the police arrived 20 minutes later, they would

be gone. From 1984 to 1986, there were about 10 or

12 of these daylight raids.

One section of the ALF went on to more serious

terrorist activities, with car bombs first being used in

1985. The ALF started with crude explosives, but

became more sophisticated. They were always

placed under cars. Timed devices were often set to

explode when the car was unoccupied, so most were

apparently designed to blow the car up rather than

kill the owners. The year 1985 was the peak of illegal

activity but this included a large amount of minor

activity, such as pouring glue into the locks of

butcher shops, smashing windows, and setting off

incendiary devices, rather than terrorism.42

According to one estimate, between 1985 and

early 1991, there were 182 incendiary or explosive

devices planted in Great Britain by animal-rights

activists. 43 This number accounted for approximately 50 percent of all explosive devices planted in

all of Great Britain, making it numerically a larger

problem in Great Britain (i.e., the United Kingdom

excluding Northern Ireland) than incidents attributed to the Provisional Irish Republican Army

(PIRA). However, the majority of these devices

were far less sophisticated and far less dangerous

than the PIRA devices.

More recently, there has been an escalation in

tactics. The use of incendiary devices by the

animal-rights terrorists, which in the past were used

against animal-research facilities but more frequently against shops, came to a head in late 1989.

There was an attack on a department store in

Guinness called Dingel’s. The goal of this sort of

attack was apparently to set off the sprinkler system,

ruining a large quantity of merchandise. The sprinkler system in Dingel’s was not operational, however. Not only did the entire store burn down, but the

rest of the city block, as well. The shop has not yet

been rebuilt, but the owner, the House of Frazer, has

estimated that the loss was 183 million pounds. In

financial terms this has probably been Great Britain’s biggest act of terrorism.

Also in 1989 in Great Britain, the frost uses of high

explosives by animal-rights terrorists took place.

These acts appear to have been perpetrated by a

small group, which had obtained a high explosive

used both in military operations and in commercial

applications, such as quarries. First it was used

against the staff restaurant at Bristol University,

where a 5-pound bomb was set off about midnight,

wrecking about two floors of the building. More

recently in 1990, the same explosive was used

presumably by the same group in two car bombs. In

one case, a passing infant was severely wounded.

According to Science magazine,44 the ALF was

responsible for 44 bombings and 422 violent incidents in the United Kingdom during 1989; 16

bombings and 338 attacks in 1988; and 33 bombings

and 708 attacks in 1987.

Since 1982, the ALF in the United States has also

been involved in illegal activities in many ways

similar to those of its British counterpart resulting in

its eventual inclusion on the FBI’s list of terrorist

organizations. In 1982 and 1983, it removed laboratory animals from Howard University Medical

School in Washington, DC, and other research

institutions in the area. In later years, it conducted

similar raids elsewhere.

The ALF expanded its activities by vandalizing

laboratories and ruining medical research records.

By means of arson, a veterinary diagnostic center at

41see Hwdy, op. cit., footnore 28, PP. 16-24

d%id.

d%id.

44Science, June 22, 1990.
Chapter 2—The Terrorist Threat-1991 ● 29

the University of California at Davis was severely

damaged. In 1989, it entered the University of

Arizona’s Pharmacy and Microbiology Building and

another building where the Office for Animal

Resources was located. It set fires and stole more

than 1,000 research animals in the Arizona raid. The

ALF has conducted many other raids on facilities in

which animals were used for medical research. The

effect of such raids and arson was to set back

scientific research on cancer, heart disease, and

cystic fibrosis.

A particularly well-known attack occurred in

1990, when the ALF raided the laboratories of Dr.

John Orem, at Texas Tech University in Lubbock,

TX. Dr. Orem had been conducting research on

Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS), known

commonly as ‘‘crib death. ’ The terrorists stole

animals used in experimentation, destroyed laboratory records, and caused 50,000 dollars’ worth of

equipment damage. Dr. Orem received death threats

later.

Another target of animal-rights extremists has

been the U.S. Surgical Corp., which is the world’s

largest producer of surgical staples. These staples

are essential in major operations, reducing the

likelihood of surgical failure. In 1988, an animalrights activist attempted to assassinate Leon C.

Hirsch, the president of the corporation, but the

effort did not succeed.

The ALF has raided meat companies and damaged butcher shops. It vandalized the cars and homes

of employees of the San Diego Zoo. On several

American university campuses, it has threatened

scientists engaged in animal research with death or

physical injury. In a few cases, animal-rights extremists planted car bombs in cars owned by medical

researchers using animals in laboratory experiments.

Some extremists claimed that these bombs were

designed as a warning and not as killing devices.

The ALF has caused millions of dollars’ worth of

damage in the United States. During 1989, animalrights extremists were responsible for numerous

incidents of break-ins, thefts, arson, vandalism, and

bomb threats in the United States. In addition to the

direct financial cost caused by this violence, there

are the additional costs borne by hospitals and

research laboratories that are now required to

provide enough security to deter or prevent terrorist

acts. Animals in these places for scientific investigation are kept under costly 24-hour guard.

Groups identifying themselves as the ALF have

engaged in such violent acts as attacking laboratories, furriers, butcher shops, and other animal-related

facilities not only in the United States but also in

other countries, such as Canada, Australia, New

Zealand, the Netherlands, Germany, France, and

South Africa.

Impact on Society-These attacks have had a

significant impact on society, most importantly, on

scientific progress in biomedical research. Following the ALF’s position that animals should never be

used for research, terrorists have delayed research,

destroyed its results, caused the diversion of research funds to security measures, and caused the

cancellation of at least one research program. Bills

to stem lab break-ins have been introduced in

Congress.

Biomedical research scientist nearly unanimously

consider animals to be vital in experimentation. But

animal-rights groups contend that scientists can find

alternative means to conduct any useful experiments. Such objections usually refer to cellular

experimentation and computer simulations as such

alternates. In reply, scientists assert that, while this

may be true in part, all experiments using animals

cannot be substituted by these alternate means.

Cellular work has, in fact, increased in recent years

with the goal of avoiding the use of animals where

possible, but such techniques cannot adequately

imitate the biological activity of an entire organism. 45 Further, computer simulations need experimental vetification before they can be trusted,

especially when human lives depend on their reliability.

State-Sponsored Terrorism: A Case Study of

Syria’s Role

It is important to assess the nature of “statesponsored’ terrorism in contradistinction to other

forms of political violence ranging from single-issue

political extremism to revolutionary subnational

activities. State-sponsored terrorism fits under the

dssee, for e~ple, u.S. COngrWS, CM7ce of Technology Assessment, op. cit., foo~ote 30.

. . . isolated systems give isolated results that may bear little relation to results obtained from the integrated systems of whole animals.
30 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

larger heading of “low-intensity conflict.”% That

term has been broadly, if vaguely, applied to

embrace forms of warfare below the formal confrontation of national armies on battlefields. It is a

category of conflict that has become more prominent

in an era of weapons of mass destruction, in which

the penalties of escalated hostilities loom prohibitively. Law-intensity conflict permits avoidance of

those penalties. And state-sponsored terrorism recommends itself especially as a means of waging

clandestine, undeclared war.

State sponsorship refers to the direct or indirect

instigation and support by an established government of surrogate forces, in their exercise of

psychological or physical violence, for purposes of

coercion and intimidation with the goal of advancing

that government’s political or strategic objectives.

What distinguishes state-sponsored terrorism from

its other forms is the extent to which the forces

carrying out the violence further the policy of an

established government beyond the latter’s boundaries. A terrorist group thus co-opted can be used to

disrupt a target country’s political stability, economic fabric, and external relations in ways which

direct military confrontation could not achieve.

The compelling benefit that this long-range warfare extends to the sponsoring government, beyond

a general modesty of operational investments, is the

keeping of its own role hidden or the subject of

‘‘plausible denial.’ Generally, however, if a government is to be held responsible internationally for the

actions of a terrorist organization, its assistance to

that group has to be measured in concrete terms (e.g.,

direction of activities, supply of funding and armaments, permission to use national territory, and

assets for training and intelligence fictions). It is

the role of accomplice or accessory to the crime that

constitutes concrete and convincing evidence of

sponsorship of terrorism.47

Sponsorship becomes more direct when a government uses its own national military to arm and train

a terrorist movement. When such a level of dependency is reached between a government and a terrorist

organization, the government can begin to fund

directly or contract out certain operations. It can

regulate the internal politics or development of a

group by conditioning their funding and supply of

armaments on acceptance of specified tasks.48

On occasion, two or more governments have been

involved in a particular terrorist operation. This

situation derives from the nature of the international

terrorist network, involving links between many

governments. Cases in which a consortium of governments are involved in the conceptual and

planning stages of an operation appear to be on the

increase.

The case of Syria as a state sponsor of terrorism

is discussed here particularly because of its important past role on the terrorist scene and the confusion

about its new position in the post-Gulf Crisis period.

Despite Syria’s participation in the international

coalition arrayed against Iraq, most experts feel it is

unlikely that Syria will relinquish its terrorist

weapon at home or abroad in the coming months and

years. The assassination of Dany Chamoun, a

Lebanese Christian leader, and his entire family on

December 21, 1990, widely thought to have been

accomplished by Syrian agents, is another indication

that Syrian-sponsored terrorism may be ongoing.

Syria has been actively sponsoring terrorist

groups and operations as an adjunct to its foreign

policy in the Middle East and in the larger international arena. Over the years, Syria has itself played

a role in terrorist operations, particularly against

Israel, the United States, and moderate Arab regimes. Many of these operations have been also

related to Syria’s long-standing interest in Lebanon.

To oversee these operations, Syria has setup centers

in Syria itself, in Lebanon’s Beka’a Valley (which is

under Syrian control), and in the major capitals of

Europe, where they are staffed by Ba’ath party

members and Syrian security personnel who recruit

additional manpower when needed from among

Syrian students at universities abroad. This latter

~See, fore~ple, J. Bowyerand J. Bell, The Myth of the Guem”lla: Revolutionary Theory and Malpractice (New York: tiopf, 1971); Rickd L.

Clutterbuck, Terrorism and Guem”lla Waq6are (Ixmdon and New York: Routledge, 1989); and Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla: Historical and Critical Study

(Bosto~ MA: Little, Brown& Co., 1976).

dTSee, for fi~nce, WY S. Che and Yonah Alexander, Terrorism as State-Sponsored Covert Wa@are (F&m, V’: HERO Books, 19*6).

~See, for example, Terrorist Group Profiles, op. cit., footnote 3,PP. 29-30.
Chapter 2—The Terrorist Threat--l99l ● 31

network is under the authority of the Syrian embassies, enabling those engaged in terrorist activities to

pass as diplomats and to use the diplomatic pouch

for the transfer of arms.49

Holding Palestine to be an integral part of territory

taken from it unlawfully, Syria has a direct emotional involvement in Palestinian terrorist activity.

Professing to be an adamant guardian of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, Syria was the first

Arab state bordering Israel to offer Palestinian terrorists a sanctuary for launching operations against

that nation. In addition to providing the PLO and its

terrorist elements with training facilities, expertise,

equipment, and personnel, Syria also has backed its

own organizations within the PLO, especially AsSaiqa.

Over the past 40 years, Syria has been involved in

coups d’etat, political assassinations, and mass

murder of civilians. Several examples illustrate the

varieties of President Assad’s tradition of terrorism: 50

●

●

●

Abed Elohab Albachri, exiled leader of the

Muslim Brotherhood, was murdered in Amman,

Jordan, on July 30, 1980. Two Syrian nationals

were charged with the murder and were executed in Jordan.

As an expression of opposition to the May 17,

1983, Israel-Lebanon Accord and the presence

of multinational peacekeeping forces in Lebanon, Syria at least acquiesced in support for

attacks on American diplomatic and military

targets.51

Syria was involved in attempted bombings of

El Al aircraft in London and-Spain (1986).

Training-Syrian provision of military training

to terrorist groups includes:

● Training camps and facilities.

● Arms transfers to terrorist groups.

. Sponsorship of mercenary terrorist groups.

Syria has collaborated with and provided logistical and other support to terrorist groups that

have an independent existence but followed

general guidelines formulated by Syrian intelligence with regard to their targets. Among these

groups are ANO, PFLP-GC, and PFLP.

Drug Trafficking and Narcoterrorism-According to the U.S. State Department:

Syria is a transit point for illicit drugs as well as

a refiner of heroin. Lebanese-produced hashish and

heroin, destined for Europe and the U. S., transit

Syria. Morphine base and opium from Asia enter

Syria via Turkey en route to processing labs in the

Beka’a Valley in Lebanon . . . Much of Syria’s

trafficking activity stems from Lebanon’s Beka’a

Valley, where Syria maintains a military presence

but fails to enforce antinarcotics controls. Of greatest

concern are numerous credible reports of the involvement of some Syrian officers and soldiers in

facilitating the Beka’a drug trade through bribes and

other corruption . . .

The [U.S. Government] has reliable reports that

individual Syrian soldiers and other officials stationed in Lebanon’s Beka’a Valley, as well as

higher-level Syrian military officials are involved in

the drug trade. While this is in clear violation of

Syrian and Lebanese law, there is no evidence that

any of these military officers or soldiers has been

prosecuted for this activity.52

Further, according to an interagency report on the

supply of illegal drugs in the United States:

Most of the warring factions in the country

[Lebanon], as well as some known terrorist organizations, are involved in one or more aspects of the

illicit narcotics trade. Sixty-five percent of the

country is controlled by Syria. Periodic reporting

suggests Syrian Army control over drug production

in the Beka’a Valley.53

There have also been press reports that many of

the terrorist groups sponsored by Syria in Lebanon

or headquartered in Damascus derive much of their

income from drug trafficking.

Summary and Conclusions—In spite of Syria’s

record in terrorism, can we expect anew opportunity

dgsee, for example, Yonah Alexander, “The Politics of Terror” (Special Report-Syria), The World&Z (February 1987), pp. 16-25; and U.S.

Department of State, “Syrian Support for International Terrorism: 1983-86” (December 1986), Special Report No. 157.

=e examples axe drawn from the available chronologies on terrorism and press reports.

51u.s. Govemen4 D~artment of Defense, Repo~ of the DOD co~i~~ion on Beirut Internafio~l Airport Terrorist Act (Oct. 23, 1983)

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Offke, 1984), p. 122.

SZU.S. Department of State, “Intermtional Narcotics Control Strategy Report” (WashingtorL DC: March, 1991).

53u.s. ~vernmen~ National Narcotics Intelligence Consumer’s COmmitt% “TheNNICC Report: 1990-The Supply of Illicit Drugs to the United

States” (Washington DC: June 1991).
32 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

in the post-Gulf War period for U.S .-Syrian cooperation in combating terrorism? The question remains

open. Indeed, Syria could become an invaluable ally

in combating terrorism, having been a prime sponsor

of it in the past, and having a strong influence over

many Middle East terrorist organizations. Syria was

an ally of the United States in the Gulf Crisis, and a

radical change in its policy cannot be ruled out.

The Future Outlook

Future Threat Assessment

The allied victory in the Middle East drastically

changed the political and military balance of power

in the region. At the same time, it affected the

constellation of power within and among Middle

Eastern terrorist groups. For instance, the failure of

secular extremists to deliver their promised attacks

against members of the international coalition,

Israel, and other targets has resulted in internal

upheaval within these groups.

The Islamic-oriented groups may ultimately emerge

as preeminent in the ‘‘armed struggle’ to regain

possession of Palestine. A case in point is the Islamic

Resistance Movement (Hamas), whose publicized

platform asserts, “it is the personal religious duty

(Fard’ Ayn) of each individual Muslim to carry out

this Jihad in order to bring redemption to the

land.’ ’54 The importance of the Harnas lies not only

in its uncompromising message but in its growing

popularity in the West Bank and Gaza as well as in

Israel itself.

In addition to the Hamas, other fundamentalist

extremist groups, such as Hizbollah, will continue to

pose threats to regional stability. Not only does

Hizbollah have its own agenda in Lebanon, including establishing a Shi’a Islamic State, but it also

serves as a surrogate of Iran committed to eliminating non-Islamic influences and force Western interests out of the region.

Although Iranian sponsorship of terrorism

dropped to 10 incidents in 1990 from 24 in 1989, and

during the Gulf Crisis the number of incidents were

small in number,55 Iran continues to maintain ties

with a wide variety of Moslem extremists in the

region and beyond. To be sure, Iran may cooperate

with the international community in regard to some

specific cases, such as the release of the Western

hostages (including Americans) in Lebanon, provided it obtains political or economic rewards.56 Yet

Tehran’s utilization of terrorism, particularly against

its domestic opponents and its support of Moslem

and even of secular groups, such as PFLP-GC, is

expected to remain intact.

Middle Eastern terrorists, whether secular or

Moslem, will probably continue to strike not only in

the region but also elsewhere in the world. Following the pattern established in the 1970s and 1980s,

in the post-Gulf War period these groups will

probably attempt to carry out indiscriminate attacks

resulting in mass casualties. American interests,

both civilian and military, will likely be affected,

and the location of such attacks will not be confined

to the Middle East.

Neither Middle East national groups nor regional

states have abandoned the use of terrorism as a

cost-effective tool. The threat has not diminished

with the crushing defeat of Iraq although, for tactical

reasons, revenge may take some time. As Ambassador Morns Busby, then coordinator for counterterrorism at the U.S. Department of State, recently

warned: “Every war in the Middle East for the last

three decades has had an aftermath of terrorism."57

The compounded danger is that Middle East

groups-whether radical fundamentalists or secular-will make common cause with indigenous

movements overseas to wage war against the West,

particularly the United States. While joint operations are not likely, proxy operations, operational

support, and logistical assistance are well within the

realm of possibility.

Greece’s 17 November is such a potential partner

to Middle East groups.58 Responding to Operation

Desert Storm, 17 November carried out eight

attacks, including two bombings against U.S. firms,

a rocket attack on a U.S. business, and the assassination of a U.S. Air Force officer on March 12, 1991.

~Cited~RaphaelI sraeli, ‘nec~erof~~: The Platform of the Islamic Resistance Movement (IWnas), inAlexanderand Fomna~ TheAnnual

on Terron”sm, 1988-1989, op. cit., footnote 2, p. 104.

SsPatterns of Glo~l Terrorism: 1990, Op. cit., footnote 1, p. 33.

SGSee, for ex~le, The Washington Post, June 11, 1991.

sTQuoted in The Guurdian (Imdon), Mar. 2, 1991.

Sssee, for ex~ple, Mexander and Pluchinslcy, European Terron”sm Today and Tomorrow, Op. cit., fOOtnOte 4, ch. 3.
Chapter 2—The Terrorist Threat-1991 ● 33

Because no member of the 17 November group has

ever been arrested during its 16-year history, little is

known about its internal dynamics, composition,

leadership, decisionmaking process, weapons inventory, or organizational structure. Its air of perceived

invincibility creates, therefore, an operational audacity that could make this group even more

dangerous and unpredictable in terms of future

linkages and attacks.

The 17 November group is not the only European

terrorist organization that may evolve from a minor

threat to a major security problem for U.S. interests

in Europe. The RAF is another potential danger,

considering its history of anti-American operations.59 Since its formation in the early 1970s, the

RAF has been responsible for the deaths of more

Americans than any other single European movement. During the Gulf War, it strafed the U.S.

Embassy in Bonn with over 250 rounds from

automatic weapons. With its infrastructure and

operational capability intact, it can be expected that

the RAF will pursue its “anti-imperialist” goals in

the future with greater vigor. In recent attacks, its

technical ability, involving difficult split-second

detonations of explosives, has been manifest.

A third group is Dev Sol or ‘Revolutionary Left’

in Turkey.60 A Marxist-Leninist group committed to

establishing a proletarian dictatorship in Turkey, it

was active in the 1970s, along with some 60 other

leftwing and rightwing movements. These perpetrators were involved in over 170 anti-American

operations, including the assassination of nine U.S.

nationals. Although Dev Sol was neutralized by the

Turkish military during most of the 1980s, it

reemerged once again several years ago. Currently

consisting of some 100 to 150 hardcore members

operating in cells called “armed revolutionary

units,” Dev Sol carried out 24 low-level bombings

against U.S. military, diplomatic, and business

interests in Turkey, assassinated two American

businessmen, and attempted the murder of a U.S. Air

Force officer during the Gulf War. In claiming

responsibility for the first assassination in the wake

of the war of a U.S. Department of Defense civilian

employee, Dev Sol warned: “We reject every

agreement that fortifies the dependency on imperialism. We oppose every aspect of the economic,

political, and military presence in our country.”61 

This message only reinforces Dev Sol’s political

determination to remain an active member of the

anti-American terrorist network.

Another security concern in the European context

is the removal of frontier controls under the 1992

integration program. The elimination of traditional

border checks will facilitate the movement of

terrorists and complicate the capability of the

European security forces to discharge their responsibilities. One question is whether the European

intelligence services can be integrated without

compromising sources of information and sensitive

collection methods. These issues have taken on

greater significance as a result of the Gulf Crisis. In

its aftermath, the problem of a borderless Europe

will pose a more acute challenge not only to the

region but also to U.S. security interests.

Finally, other threats elsewhere will face the

United States in the coming months and years.

Regardless of the consequences of the Middle East

war, terrorist dangers remain in Asia and Latin

America, and single-issue terrorists will likely

continue to operate in many Western nations. A

major threat exists in the Philippines where a

communist insurgency is ongoing. Domestic and

political violence in India, the sectarian insurgency

in Sri Lanka, and ultraleftist extremists in Japan

might also affect American interests.62 In Latin

America, where some two-thirds of all antiAmerican international terrorist attacks took place

and where U.S. targets were the principal foreign

victims of indigenous groups in 1990,63 violence

against U.S. citizens and interests will continue

unabated.

An added factor that will encourage antiAmerican terrorism in Latin America is narcoterrorism. It is a growing threat that combines drug

criminals with political criminals. The deterioration

of the situation in Colombia caused by the interna-

%bid., ch. 2.

60See, for ~~nce, Herq W. Dege~dt(ML), &voIutiorIury and Dissident Movements @SSeX, U.K.: ~n~~ 1988), P. 377.

61 Cited ~ ~eu~ by De~s ~uc~s~ ~ a speech on terro~ to a co~e~nce Spomored by me heric~ Society of hdustid S~tity, Apr. 2,

1991, Washington D.C.

Gzpatterm of Glo&d Terrorism: 1990, op. cit., footnote 1, p. 18.

G%id., pp. 18-25.
34 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

tional drug cartel over the past several years is a

dramatic illustration of narcoterrorism. Indeed, terrorist groups worldwide are quickly learning that

international drug trafficking offers a high-profit,

low-risk way to finance their activities. These

activities have become so lucrative that the drug

trade has become the second largest source of

terrorist funding, after state sponsorship. The United

States, a leader in combating this danger, will

inevitably be a prime target of these narcoterrorists.

Future Strategic and Technological Challenges64

Despite the latest favorable trends in the international political and military situations, as exemplified by the dramatic events in Eastern Europe and the

discrediting of communism in most countries, the

foreseeable environment poses three primary concerns for U.S. policy and defense strategy. Future

threats-often localized in the Third World but

containing regional and global security implications

—will include terrorism, insurgency and revolution

(often with anti-American overtones), and international drug trafficking.

Several factors make Third World countries

especially vulnerable to these forms of low-intensity

conflict:

Soviet retrenchment in some regions (e.g.,

Middle East) and the withdrawal of direct and

indirect Soviet bloc support to various terrorist

groups (e.g., the PLO). This retrenchment

means that the Soviet bloc will have less

control over this area and, consequently, individual terrorist groups will be less disciplined

and more prone to violent acts.

The continued utilization of terrorism by some

states.

The continued existence of repressive authoritarian regimes (e.g., right and left ideologically) in Latin America.

Pronounced ethnic fragmentation under pressure from cultural diversity and economic

adversity (e.g., Africa).

Regional conflicts that are deeply rooted and

defy efforts at quick solutions (e.g., South

Asia).

Future technical threats must be anticipated in

order to maintain a proactive R&D policy. If

currently popular explosives become too difficult to

bring aboard aircraft, for example, terrorists may try

different explosives or incendiaries. A frightening

future prospect is the employment of weapons of

mass destruction. Serious consideration should be

given the possibility that subnational groups, with

the direct or indirect support of some states, may turn

to this tactic. It has been suggested, for example, that

attempts to bring terrorism under control through

national and international legislation and increased

security and enforcement measures might, in fact,

frustrate routine terrorist actions and spur more

daring types of terrorism. Vulnerable mass targets,

now available because of technological advances in

contemporary society, are likely to become more

attractive to terrorists.

Of course, weapons differ in terms of their

characteristics and modes of actions.65 Radiological,

chemical, or biological weapons are more likely to

be used than nuclear explosives. More specifically,

there are no serious technological impediments to

the utilization of chemical or biological agents (e.g.,

fluoroacetates, organophosphorous compounds, botulinum toxin). They are relatively easily obtainable,

their delivery systems are manageable, and their

dispersal techniques are efficient. In fact, terrorists

desiring to make nerve gases themselves rather than

obtain them directly from Libya, Iraq, or even the

commercial market, can still find the formulas at

some libraries despite attempts by some governments (e.g., Great Britain) to remove them from

public access.

Once in possession of such information, a terrorist

with some technical know-how could synthesize

toxic chemical agents from raw materials or intermediates. In fact, many poisonous radioactive or

chemical substances (e.g., Cobalt-60 or TEPP insecticides) are commercially available. They can either

be bought or stolen. Covert and overt options for

dispersing chemical agents are virtually limitless.

As in the case of chemical violence, biological

terrorism-the use of living organisms to cause

disease or death in human beings, animals, or

~~s s=tion ~nefits from as yet unpublished proc-gs of two conferences on ‘Terrorism and Technology: Threats and Responses. ” The first

was organized by the Ministry of Science and Technology of Israel and the Israel Security Research Center and held in Tel Aviv on Aug. 8, 1990. T’he

second gathering on the same topic was held in Geneva, Switzerland on May 8, 1991, under the auspices of the Institut Henry-Dunant of the International

Committee of the Red Cross. OTA staff and a consultant participated in both conferences.

GsFor soWWs on us destruction threaw see, for example, Terrorism: An Znternafional Resource File, Bibliography (1970-89), pp. 191-195.
Chapter 2—The Terrorist Threat—1991 ● 35

plants—is technically possible. Many agents are

relatively easy to acquire, cultivate, and disseminate.

Chemical and biological weapons, then, have

many advantages for terrorists. These benefits include their low cost, the ease and speed of their

production, and the fact that they can be developed

by individuals without much advanced training.

Weapon development requires only a minimum

amount of tools and space, and equipment can be

improvised or purchased without arousing suspicion. A more detailed discussion of biological

weapons is presented in the following section of this

chapter.

Since chemical and biological weapons could also

be “weak” states’ nuclear substitute for weapons,

their proliferation, particularly in the Third World, is

a disturbing trend. Libya and Iraq have provided

recent lessons of the challenges that will confront us

in the post-Gulf War period, and as noted earlier,

both sponsor terrorist groups. The great danger is

that if one terrorist group succeeds in achieving its

goals through the utilization of mass destruction

weapons, then the temptations for other extremists to

escalate their operations may become irresistible.

These eventualities force us to develop adequate

strategic and technological responses if future terrorist challenges are to be minimized. Because future

threats will be novel, the responses of both

governmental and nongovernmental bodies must

be as well.

PART II: TERRORISM AND

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Biological Weapons: Agents and

Dissemination

Biological warfare agents include living microoorganisms (bacteria, rickettsia, viruses, fungi) capable of entering the human body (e.g., by inhalation

or ingestion), multiplying, and causing illness or

death-some of these can produce epidemics.

They also include toxins produced by microorganisms, plants, or animals; and chemicals that regulate

biological functions. This last category of agents

(e.g., hormones, sleep peptide) has normal physiological effects in low and moderate doses but pathophysiological effects at high doses. Unlike living

micro-organisms, toxins and chemical regulators

only affect people directly exposed to the agent—

they cannot spread from person to person.

Introduction of a specific agent or the mixture

of biological agents into a delivery system (aerosol

generator, aircraft spray tank, missile, artillery shell,

or bomb) constitutes a biological weapon. Human

delivery (e.g., a saboteur carrying a container fried

with bacteria or toxin to be used to contaminate food,

water, or medications) can also be utilized.

Tactics, weapons, and choice of agents will differ,

depending on whether biological agents are to be

used for military or terrorist purposes. In the former

case, the aim will usually be to disable enemy troops

so that an action may be successfully carried out

with the least possible difficulty for the attacker. A

fatal scourge, while fitting the requirement, may not

be necessary; it may even be seen as excessive. The

weapons should disperse quickly, the geographical

area of interest maybe relatively small, and the time

to develop symptoms should be relatively short,

perhaps a few hours. The attacker may also gain an

advantage if the agent can be disseminated without

detection-countermeasures then become harder to

effect. Finally, the choice of agent should not be one

that the enemy can defeat with a vaccine or treat

rapidly with antidotes, antitoxins, or antibiotics.

In the case of terrorism, there is more latitude for

the attacker. Civilian populations are less likely to be

immunized or protected against biological attacks as

military populations may be. Nor will there likely be

a nearby supply of appropriate medication. Also, the

time to develop symptoms need not be short and the

attack does not have to be surreptitious (although if

it is, any defensive reaction becomes more difficult).

The purpose, after all, is to sow terror. For this same

reason, the terrorists might wish to cause mass

casualties, as they do in aircraft bombings, rather

than simply to disable victims temporarily, as in the

military case.

Entry Into the Target

Biological weapons are usually designed to allow

the selected agent to enter the human body by the

aerosol route. Once in the lung, it invades the

bloodstream and lymphatic and, in the case of

micro-organisms, initiates infection. Similarly, drinking or eating contaminated food or beverages leads

to infection by entry of the agent through the mucous

membrane of the intestinal tract. Toxins may be

ingested or inhaled. Most chemical regulators require the inhalation route, and little is known about

the effects of their ingestion.
36 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

Inactivation of Biological Agents by the

Environment

Many biological agents, especially living organisms, may be rapidly inactivated by ultraviolet light

or by specific climatic conditions. However, stabilizing compounds or environment-resistant microorganisms have been developed to prolong the

useful half-life of weapon agents. Further, some

toxins are quite resistant to moderate heat and

ultraviolet light. Also, staging attacks at night would

avoid the degrading effects of ultraviolet light.

Nighttime is also frequently a period of temperature

inversion (warm air below dense cooler air) of the

surface atmosphere. Inversion can trap an aerosoled

agent near the Earth’s surface, increasing the inhalation exposure time and the concentration of aerosol

inhaled by the target population.

Detection of an Attack

An aerosol attack and food/beverage/medication

contarnination are not normally detectable by the

human senses (the agents are invisible, silent,

odorless, and tasteless).

No reliable, sensitive, and specific system, whether

based on mechanical, laser, electrical, or chemical

detectors, is yet available to detect an aerosol attack

in time to allow the target population to put on

protective masks and clothing, and thus avoid

inhalation and infection. This deficiency means that

there is risk even from those agents that produce

illnesses that can be successfully treated.

Similarly, there is no testing system in place to

ensure against food/beverage/medication contamination. In some cases, attacks may be detected by

finding delivery vehicles (bomblets, rockets, or

bombs containing remnants of agent) or by intercepting aircraft with spray tanks, but such attacks

could be planned for miles upwind of the target and

go undetected.

Vulnerability of Human Target Populations

Both civilian and military populations are vulnerable to the effects of these weapons. To ensure

complete protection against aerosol infection, it

would be necessary for troops and civilians to

constantly wear masks and protective hoods and

suits. HEPA (high-efficiency particulate air) filter

masks do exist that can protect against aerosols

(Racal Corp., Frederick, MD). These require a

battery-driven motor to ensure adequate ventilation,

since the masks are bulky and require fatiguing

respiratory effort to draw air through their filter

systems. Masks and suits do work and are practical

for short periods of time (a few hours), especially for

military personnel, although they may cause a drop

in ability to function effectively. It is, however, not

practical for a military or civilian population to

spend 24 hours a day in protective masks or suits.

Differences Between Biological and Chemical

Agents

Biological weapons are difficult to detect while

the attack is occurring, and there may be a long

period of time between an attack and the onset of

clinical symptoms of illness. Chemical weapons, on

the other hand, may produce a specific odor (cyanide-bitter almonds; phosgene-newly mown hay).

Rapid chemical tests are available in the field. These

weapons produce casualties rapidly, giving early

warning to the unaffected members of the target

population and allowing them to don protective

masks and suits in time to prevent further casualties.

Biological weapons can be effective in such low

concentrations that attempts to detect them reliably

in aerosol form by laser methods or by rapid

biochemical tests have, thus far, been unsuccessful.

Targets-Tactical and Strategic

In the military field, biological agents may be

used in tactical weapons to inflict casualties on a

specific site (e.g., an airfield, aircraft carrier, missile

silo, the Pentagon, the White House, the Capitol,

etc.), or as a strategic weapon of mass destruction,

the aim being to produce large numbers of casualties

rapidly (e.g., among the U.S. and allied forces of

Desert Shield, or the civilian population of a large

U.S. city).

Attacks on these types of targets with biological

weapons were probably possible as far back as the

late 1960s (based on research done within the U.S.

military offensive biological weapons program).

Computer-modeled scenarios have pointed to the

effectiveness of biological attacks on localized

targets or large civilian populations. Livestock and

plants are also vulnerable to attack. The purpose of

the latter type of targeting would be to interfere with

food production and damage the U.S. economy.
Chapter 2—The Terrorist Threat-1991 ● 37

Possible Use by Terrorists-Availability of

Technology

There has been, as yet, no major case of a terrorist

attack with biological weapons. Nevertheless, terrorists have not balked at mass killing, so this

possible consequence of the use of biological

weapons cannot be considered to have been the

principal deterrent to their use in a major attack.

Such weapons may pose a risk to their users, but this

can be overcome, at least to a degree, by the use of

protective clothing and masks, or, in some cases, by

vaccines. An advantage for the terrorists is that, in a

well-planned and well-executed attack, there is less

likelihood of apprehension than in case where more

conventional weapons are used—they may be thousands of miles away when the first casualties occur.

Such attacks also may leave no signature unless the

participant terrorist group or its sponsor claims

credit. It is possible that an outlaw state could utilize

terrorists to deliver biological agents at a distant site.

Biological agents manufactured in a terrorist state

might also be stockpiled in the United States or

Europe by terrorists. They could be sent in small

amounts in valises, parcels, or trunks and, over a

period of months, stockpiled in major U.S. cities for

later use. Since it is impossible, at present, to stop the

arrival of relatively large amounts of drugs in the

United States, it would similarly be impossible to

prevent the arrival of much smaller quantities of

living micro-organisms or toxins. Such shipments

could even enter through normal shipping or

airfreight routes. Alternatively, seed cultures could

be smuggled into North America and the agents

mass produced in clandestine laboratories in the

United States or Canada.

The technical requirements for culturing microorganisms or producing toxins for use in bioweapons are not particularly high. Most estimates are that

second-year or third-year medical or microbiology

students would have enough laboratory experience

to prepare an agent with minimal danger to themselves. Further, some states that are suspected or

known to have bioweapons programs also are

known to have sponsored terrorist groups. While

this does not mean that the technology for

producing bioweapons will be transferred by

such states to a surrogate group, the possibility of

such technology transfer, either witting or not,

cannot be excluded. U.S. authorities must consider this possibility as a matter of prudent

planning.

Possible Agents for Terrorist Bioweapons

Some specific biological agents that are considered most likely to be produced by terrorists are

listed and briefly discussed below.

Bacillus anthracis(anthrax)-Large numbers of

organisms are required to cause the disease. If a

diagnosis of aerosol exposure to B. anthracis is

made prior to the onset of symptoms (i.e., within 48

hours of exposure) high-dosage penicillin therapy

may reduce mortality, which is otherwise very high.

Use of Reynier or Anderson air samplers, containing bacterial culture plates, would allow detection of

an attack prior to the onset of clinical illness in those

exposed. This relatively crude, but sensitive and

specific system, was used during the U.S. offensive

weapons program (canceled about 20 years ago) to

quantify the concentration of organisms used in

simulated aerosol attacks. A diagnosis of respiratory

anthrax can also be made rapidly from a blood

culture and a blood smear or a fine needle aspirate of

a swollen node (i.e., culture and Gram-stained

smear).

As with other micro-organisms, there is a risk of

lethal infection for those working with B. anthracis

from accidental release of the agent in aerosol form

during preparation for use in weapons. Immunization against anthrax (as well as the use of protective

masks and clothing) can prevent terrorist casualties

during the manufacture and delivery process.66

Francisella tularensis-This bacterium is highly

infectious in aerosol form. The onset of illness is

more rapid when a larger number of organisms is

inhaled. The severity of the illness and the frequency

of pneumonia produced are also dose-dependent. Far

fewer organisms are needed to cause onset of

symptoms than for anthrax. Serious pleuropulmonary tularemia has a mortality rate of up to 30 percent

without therapy, but this can be reduced to a few

@B. anthra~”s is tie agent that caused a large outbreak of fatal anthrax in Sverdlovs~ USSR in April 1979. U.S. intelligence believes tit here were

over 1,000 deaths and that the epidemic resulted from the accidental release of a large number of B. anthracis spores from a Soviet bioweapon

production/storage facility. The Soviets continue to claim tbat the outbreak was the result of eating infected meat. They state that ordy 64 deaths occurred.

The controversy over the mture of the epidemic continues.
38 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

percent by antibiotic treatment. The drugs of choice

for therapy are streptomycin or gentamicin. Partial

protection prior to exposure maybe achieved by use

of a live attenuated tularemia vaccine.

Detection of exposure prior to illness or pneumonia onset is possible, but such equipment is currently

not available for field use. Rapid diagnosis of mass

casualties could be improved by developing better

techniques (i.e., DNA probes with or without

amplification of the target material by the poly -

merase chain reaction). Work on such systems is in

progress.

Yersinia pestis (Plague)-Aerosol exposure may

cause plague pneumonia. As with anthrax, large

doses are usually required to cause disease.

Early detection of Y pestis in clinical samples is

now possible using a new Y. pestis-specific DNA

probe. Test sensitivity could be increased by use of

the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) to amplify the

genetic material present. Use of streptomycin or

doxycycline can reduce mortality if started before or

at the onset of clinical symptoms.

Shigella flexneri-This organism or a related

species could be used to contaminate water or food

supplies of civilian populations. Military water and

food supplies are usually safeguarded and are

difficult to reach.

S. flexneri causes a wide spectrum of illness

ranging from mild watery diarrhea without fever, to

severe dysentery. S. flexneri and other shigella

species are an attractive choice for use in contaminating food and water supplies, since only a small

number of organisms are required to cause infection.

S. dysenteriae (Shiga bacillus) is capable of causing

extensive epidemic disease. This organism caused

an epidemic in Central America in 1969 involving

500,000 people and had an unusually high mortality

rate. With moderate infectious doses, shigellosis

(dysentery) is a self-limited disease with a limited

mortality. Doxycycline prophylaxis has been shown

to be effective against this organism in field trials in

military units. An oral vaccine for shigella species is

under development. Several options exist for treatment, among them ampicillin and sulfamethoxide.

Quinolone (e.g., ciprofloxacin) antibiotics are effective against shigella dysentery and also have activity

against dysentery produced by Campylobacter jejuni and Salmonella infections. However, they may

have negative side effects for children and early

adolescents. The broad activity of the quinolones

against the major causes of bacterial dysentery

allows for rapid institution of therapy without the

need to wait for culture results.

Salmonella species-Salmonella may be used to

contaminate food, water and other beverages. Large

numbers of organisms (106 to 109

) must be ingested

to produce illness, so contamination must be massive. Salmonella typhi causes typhoid fever. The

incubation period after ingestion varies with the

dose (typical numbers: 105 organisms-9 days, and

109 organisms —5 days; the range can be extended,

depending on the state of the host’s defenses).

Therapy with, for example, chloramphenicol, amoxicillin, or ciprofloxacin usually leads to resolution of

fever and other symptoms within several days.

Salmonella organisms are not ideal agents for use by

terrorists because they require a large ingested dose

to produce disease, and because effective therapy is

available. Salmonella species are included as threat

agents because of evidence of prior production or

use by terrorist groups (e.g., Order of the Rising Sun,

a U.S. fascist group in the Midwest, and Rajneesh

cult, Oregon). These events are described in a

following section.

The following agents are toxins, not organisms.

They cannot cause epidemics, and only affect

persons directly exposed:

●

●

Botulinum toxin-Botulinum toxin can be harvested from anaerobic cultures of Clostridium

botulinum. The toxin can be used as an aerosol

or for the covert contamination of the food and

water supplies of the target population.

Administration of polyvalent (A,B,E) antitoxin at the onset of symptoms, and to asymptomatic individuals exposed to the aerosol, may

decrease rates of sickness or death. Several

vaccines are undergoing evaluation, but none is

available for large scale use.

Staphylococcus enterotoxin B—This organism

can be used in aerosol form. The toxin may

cause severe asthmatic-like respiratory distress, pulmonary infiltrates and fever within

hours of exposure. The disease is generally not

fatal.

Biological Weapons of the Future

Terrorists are unlikely to have access to these

future weapons unless they are supplied by a

state with an advanced offensive biowarfare
Chapter 2—The Terrorist Threat-1991 ● 39

program. Current weapons are crude relative to what

is possible with the use of advances in molecular

biology and recombinant DNA technology. These

suggestions, are speculative and, even if feasible,

would require years of careful work with state-of-theart technology.

The following are some of the more frightening

possibilities:

Production of hardened agents resistant to the

environment-genes may be inserted into the

genome of an infectious agent that render it

resistant to ultraviolet light, temperature, moisture and other environmental factors that currently adversely affect the effective half-life of

the organism. Such alterations would make a

more efficient weapon agent.

Production of highly lethal and infectious

agents-converting a highly infectious organism, like F. tularensis (tularemia) into more

rapidly lethal agents by inserting genes for

lethal toxins into the genome.

Production of large amounts of toxins and

regulators—genes for toxins that are in limited

supply could, at least in principle, be inserted

into the common stool organism, Escherichia

coli. Similarly, large amounts of peptide or

protein regulators (i.e., sleep peptide, tuftsin)

could be synthesized for weaponization.

Biological Agent Selection by Terrorists

The microbiological skill and the size and type of

equipment available to a terrorist group will determine, to some extent, the agents that would be

weaponized and utilized. Some analysts (i.e., from

the Armed Forced Medical Intelligence Center)

think that terrorist groups, whether state-sponsored

or not, would select and use the same types of

biowarfare agents. These would most likely be

living bacteria such as B. anthracis (anthrax), F.

tularensis (tularemia-rabbit fever), Y pestis

(plague), and Shigella (dysentery), and toxic agents

that are relatively easy to manufacture (e.g., botulinum toxin, staphylococcal enterotoxin B). Although a terrorist group might recruit Ph.D.-level

microbiologists and have a well-equipped clandestine laboratory (i.e., analogous to drug manufacturing laboratories in the Colombian jungle), it is

unlikely that they would attempt to weaponize

highly infectious and lethal agents like the hemorrhagic fever viruses, nonlethal viral agents like

Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis, or Histoplasma

capsulatum, a fungal agent. Smallpox is an unlikely

agent since there are only two sites in the world

where cultures of variola (smallpox) exist and

violation of these sites could be detected and

thwarted.

Protection for the User

The first level of protection would be appropriate

protective suits and masks, which are in commercial

production. This would be of use to a terrorist

delivering a weapon and for military applications as

well. If technically advanced, the producer of such

weapons could develop a vaccine to immunize its

soldiers and civilians against the carrier organism

(i.e., F. tularensis or C. burnetii) or the toxin of

choice. In this way, the producer could protect its

army and civilians against the organism. The targeted group would have no time to produce a vaccine

and use it before it sustained a large number of

casualties.

Infection of other species (i.e., cattle, rodents,

domestic animals) or spread to other neutral countries might be a major problem with the use of such

agents in war or for terrorist attacks. Such problems

would have to be taken into account by any state or

sub-national group considering use of biological

weapons.

Why Have Biological Weapons Not Been Widely

Used by Terrorists?

There has been much speculation as to the reasons

for the absence of use of these weapons, considering

their effectiveness and relatively low technical

requirements. Analysts have suggested the following possible explanations:

. Terrorists are familiar with things that go

‘‘bang’ and are able to achieve their objectives

with the use of explosives and firearms. Since

current, familiar methods appear to work, there

is no need to change.67

GT~e idea that terrorists are sati~l~ with current methods may have to be altered if better security thwarts the use of bombs, rockets and smw arms.

In additio~ stat~sponsored terrorists maybe called upon to inflict large numbers of U.S. civilian and military casualties in support of a power at war

with the United States. Use of biological agents is an escalation which can lead to an increased number of fatalities or sick personnel, whose care would

deplete the logistical resources of the U.S. militmy.
40 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

●

●

●

●

●

Terrorists may fear that they will alienate their

supporters by use of biological weapons to

produce large numbers of fatalities (e.g., tens of

thousands) in a civilian population.

Terrorists may fear that successful use of such

weapons may lead to an extreme response by

the target country that would result in many

terrorist casualties and destruction of their

group.

68

Terrorists are fearful of biological weapons and

are unwilling to work with them.

Terrorists may be under the control of sponsoring countries or groups of financial benefactors. Use of such weapons may be currently

prohibited by these support groups.

Terrorists may be awaiting a successful first use

that leads to an important positive result. A

successful use could result in “copy cat”

attacks.

These suggestions are speculative; there may be

other reasons that terrorists have not yet taken the

bioweapon route. None of the above proposed

reasons provides a guarantee that there will be no

such attacks in the future.

Advantages for the terrorist of the use of biological weapons:

Creation of fear and terror among the civilian

population or military of the target country. The

target government may be seen as unable to

protect its citizens. Severe repressive measures

taken by the target country may cause further

governmental instability.

Disruption of the economy of the target nation.

Infliction of military casualties to weaken

target forces that are in combat against the

sponsoring state.

Ability of terrorists to escape before illness

begins in the target population, due to the

invisible nature of the attacks and the time

delay before onset of symptoms.

Production of more terror, disruption, and

casualties than conventional weapons.

Past Occurrences

A number of incidents related to threats, preparation for use, or actual use of biological and chemical

agents by terrorists, are on record. These suggest that

future use of these agents cannot be excluded since

they already have been used or proposed for use in

the past. There have been many more threats to use

these agents than known preparation for use or actual

use. Some of the incidents with actual evidence of

terrorist group possession of an agent or its use are

listed below:

●

●

●

1972—United States. Members of the Order of

the Rising Sun were found in possession of 30

to 40 kg of typhoid bacteria cultures for use

against water supplies in major Midwest cities.

1980-The Baader-Meinhof gang of Germany

was discovered to possess a Clostridium botulinum culture and a home biological laboratory

in a Paris apartment.

1986-Rajneesh cult in Oregon. Salmonella

typhi (typhoid) were allegedly used to contaminate salad bars in local restaurants to influence

the outcome of a local election. Seven hundred

and fifty cases resulted.

Many threats have been made to poison municipal

water supplies, food, and pharmaceuticals by terrorists with political, social, and religious motivations,

as well as by criminals (extortionists), disgruntled

employees, and (possibly) mentally disturbed individuals.

Terrorist groups most likely to use biological

weapons may have one or more of the following

characteristics:

1. A large base of popular support that they are

not concerned about alienating.

2. A history of large-scale violence with high

numbers of casualties per attack.

3. Prior use of sophisticated weapons.

4. State sponsorship

Terrorist groups that have some of these characteristics include the Japanese Red Army, Red Army

Faction, U.S. white-supremacist groups (Aryan Nations), Hizbollah, and the Abu Nidal Organization.

U.S. Defense Against Biological Weapons

An overview of defensive measures that U.S.

military forces and the civilian population could use

during the next few years is presented in this section.

These measures are possible, but have not yet been

~However, such fms @ve not been inhibitory to terrorists responsible for mass casualties (e.g., Hizbollah’s attack on the Marine b~ach in Beirut

and the bombing of several jetliners, including Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in December 1988) in the recent past. Despite the large number

of casualties, the perpetrators have thus far escaped unscathed.
Chapter 2—The Terrorist Threat-1991 ● 41

rigorously tested in the field, implemented, and

presented with appropriate training to our military

forces or civilian populations. Options for improving the U.S. defense against bioweapons are also

given.

Pre-attack Intelligence

Pre-attack warning is possible through intelligence. Terrorists associated with a sponsoring state

are likely to use agents in the bioweapons arsenal of

that state. The choice of agents available to unsponsored groups is limited to those listed and discussed

above, and possibly a few others not listed because

their characteristics make them unattractive offensive weapons.

Tracking known terrorists and intercepting suspicious individuals and groups moving from country

to country offer some hope of preventing an attack.

Attempts by unsponsored terrorists groups operating in the United States might be detected by

monitoring microbiology equipment and culture

orders from noninstitutional buyers. Some attempts

by individuals to acquire cultures of potential

biological agents have been intercepted by such

surveillance. It is unclear as to whether similar

surveillance related to the purchase of laboratory

equipment is in force.

Sale of cultures and equipment to individuals or

groups of terrorists or terrorist suspects could be

prevented.

Physical Protection

Long-term physical protection for civilians or

military targets is not available at present. Collective

protection for buildings using air intake biofilters

(HEPA filters) is feasible, but no plans are in

progress to facilitate this intervention.

Individual protection by use of light-weight

masks on an almost continuous basis is not now

possible because the current commercially available

masks are not adequate to prevent aerosol infection.

Hoods and masks used for contact with highly

infectious patients at research centers are heavy and

bulky and require a battery-driven motor to facilitate

air movement into the mask. These masks are costly

($650) and the batteries require replacement and

recharging every 8 to 16 hours. They are, however,

effective in preventing aerosol infection. Research

to produce comfortable, light-weight masks with

similar effectiveness should be supported with a

high priority. At present, physical protection is the

best generic defense against living organisms

and/or toxins.

Masks in current use by our military forces will

protect against biowarfare and chemical agents.

These masks, however, can only be worn for brief

periods. Evacuation to an unexposed area and

decontamination would be necessary before removal

of protective clothing would be safe.

Detectors

Rapid, portable detectors are not available for

living agents or toxins. Human illness will be the

first sign of an attack. The air breathed by people

concentrated in a specific area or building could be

monitored by deploying Anderson or Reynier air

samplers with culture plates that will grow aerosoled

B. anthracis (anthrax), F. tularensis (tularemia) or Y

pestis (plague). The cultures would have to be

changed several times a day to pinpoint the time of

an attack. Such detection after the attack and before

human illness occurs would allow use of pre-illness

treatment and could limit casualties.

Prior attempts to develop a detector that utilized

a large volume air sampler and a generic test for

living agents or toxins were unsuccessful. The

detectors developed were too sensitive and nonspecific (i.e., there were too many false alarms). These

detectors were designed to warn of an attack in time

to put on a protective mask. Because of the frequent

false alarms that triggered mask usage during tests,

the detectors were never manufactured in large

numbers or deployed.

Detection of the attack hours later and prior to the

onset of illness, may be more successful than

attempts to rapidly diagnose an attack in time to put

on a protective mask.

Medical Defense

Pre-attack Cataloging of Epidemics—It would

be useful to record all epidemics occurring worldwide. The causative agent, area of the world,

symptoms and signs, mortality rates, and total

number of cases should be recorded. Epidemic data

should be collected for each country or region.

Serological surveys in countries of interest are also

useful, since they further catalog subclinical epidemics. Background natural disease data are helpful

for deciding if an epidemic occurring in a specific
42 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

area of the world is natural or due to a biological

attack.

It may be possible to develop computer algorithms that could utilize epidemiologic data to help

give an assessment of whether an epidemic is a

natural or man-made disease. The epidemiological

characteristics of a biological attack are listed below.

These would be compared by the algorithms with the

data from a suspicious outbreak of disease.

Epidemiological Characteristics of a Biological

Attack-A successful attack will appear as a point

source epidemic (i.e., a large number of ill patients

appearing at neighboring medical facilities over a

brief time interval). A bioweapon-caused epidemic

may have some of the following characteristics:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

a record number of cases;

a high attack rate;

a high rate of very severe illness;

a large percentage of cases with lung involvement;

sick or dead animals in the area;

disease confined to those who were in a

specific area at a given time;

presence of more than one disease-producing

agent;

presence of an agent that is not normally an

epidemic problem in the area where the attack

occurs (e.g., respiratory anthrax in Washington, DC);

detection of the aerosol device (i.e., bomblets

or other means of dissemination).

The maintenance of a corps of experts is

important to the ability of the Nation to defend

itself against potential biological attack.

Specific Diagnosis

Clinical symptoms and signs, routine laboratory,

and imaging methods (x-ray, computerized axial

tomography, nuclear magnetic resonance imaging)

can be used to narrow the list of possible causative

agents of an outbreak to a manageable number.

Clinical samples of body fluids or tissues can be

collected from ill or dead patients, and tested to

provide rapid diagnosis and characterization of the

causative agent(s) or toxin. Rapid laboratory diagnosis of specific infectious agents can be accomplished

by the following types of approaches:

1.

2.

3.

4.

antigen-capture using ELISA,69 DNA probes,

or DNA probes with the target genetic material

amplified by the polymerase chain reaction;

bacterial or viral cultures;

microscopic examination of tissue by special

stains, electron microscopy and immunofluorescence; or

detection of a specific antibody within 3 to 4

days of the onset of illness.

Therapy

Specific Therapy—Selection of an antimicrobial

drug is best if the agent and its sensitivity profile are

known. This could be rapidly obtained by clinical

and routine laboratory methods.

Multiple drug and therapeutic trials-If the

agent and/or its sensitivities remain unknown, then

multiple drugs may be given to most of the patients

while small groups of patients are treated with only

one drug. The drug giving the best clinical response

could then be used to treat all patients and the

ineffective drugs discontinued. This strategy was

used in the Legionella pneumonia outbreak and

rapidly identified erythromycin as the most effective

drug.

Other Defensive Measures

Warning—A central authority could collect detailed information regarding an outbreak and issue

warnings to military and civilian groups. This would

include information regarding prophylaxis and therapy.

Care—The number of available intensive care and

support beds as well as specialized medical treatment personnel could be cataloged and kept

updated.

Prophylaxis—Antibiotics could be administered

when appropriate (i.e., doxycycline for F. tularensis

or Y pestis).

Vaccination-Since vaccines (of varying effectiveness) exist for B. anthracis, Y pestis, and F.

tularensis, their adminstration could be initiated

among a group at risk if immunization had not been

started prior to an attack.

@ELISA s~ds for e-e.1~~ immmospeciflc assay. The ELISA assay is a standard test for agents (micro-organisms or inert chemicals) hat

cause antibody reactions in larger organisms, generally humans.
Chapter 2—The Terrorist Threat-1991 ● 43

Stockpiling—Antibiotics, antifungal, antiviral,

and vaccines and antitoxins could be procured and

be readily available for a potential target group.

Decontamination-Aerosoled bacteria such as B.

anthracis, Y pestis and F. tularensis do not usually

adhere to clothing or skin in high enough concentrations to create a problem of secondary aerosol. Since

there will most likely be no sign of an attack for 1 or

2 days, most bacterial agents remaining in the

environment will already have been inactivated or

diluted. A safe approach is use of soap and water and

a change of clothing after an attack has been

documented. Enspor can be used to decontaminate

skin and clothing for B. anthracis if clothing

changes are not available. Dilute bleach 1:5 or 1:10

is also useful for decontamination of B. anthracis

and viral hemorrhagic fever agents.

Improving U.S. Defenses Against Biological

Attacks

It is important to develop vaccines against biological agents most likely to be used by terrorists or

states against U.S. targets. To do so first requires

information and gathering by intelligence agencies

and analysis by experts including those at the Armed

Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) at Ft.

Detrick, MD. Beyond the obvious information on

construction and operation of suspect research

facilities abroad, attention needs to be paid to

noninstitutional purchases of cultures and laboratory

equipment that could be used to produce biological

weapons. Coordination with foreign intelligence

agencies could be employed to obtain information

about specific state-sponsored terrorist groups. This

is already being done to a limited extent. Continued

surveillance of foreign bioweapon programs is

necessary so that threat lists of weaponized agents

remain current. The U.S. should also continue

surveillance of nations suspected of providing states

with an active offensive bioweapons program with

laboratory equipment and scientists for production

of such weapons. To improve border controls, U.S.

Customs officials could be trained to recognize

biological weapons to the degree possible.

Decisions on the direction of research to pursue

should be coordinated among the intelligence agencies, who analyze likely threats, and the military

(USAMRIID) and civilian researchers (e.g., at the

National Institutes of Health and the Centers for

Disease Control) responsible for developing vaccines and working on other related research, such as

early detection and diagnosis of biological attacks.

An interagency oversight board composed of the

above participants, would be a useful device to

assure efficiency in research and to assign priorities.

Research and Development of Equipment for

Physical Protection and Detection

Protection. A well-supported program for research, development and testing of motor-driven and

other types of biodefense mask/hoods should be

initiated. A mask that is light-weight, comfortable,

tolerable for prolonged periods, and effective against

toxins and biological agents should be the major

goal of this program. Filter systems for the protection of buildings and other collective shelters are

also important.

Post-attack pre-illness detection. Development of

air sampling detection systems should be supported.

Even detection of an attack after inhalation, but prior

to the onset of symptoms, may result in the saving of

many lives by initiation of early therapy.

Diagnosis and treatment. A computer database

should be established to store epidemic disease

information. This database could be used to help

determine whether an epidemic in a specific area of

the world is natural or man-made.

Tables and algorithms for the differential diagnosis of epidemic diseases using symptoms, signs,

laboratory work and imaging studies, should be

provided to physicians. Laboratories dedicated to

perform rapid diagnostic tests for the identification

of causative agents should be established near the

attack site or at an accessible central location in the

U.S. or Europe.

Antibiotics, vaccines and antitoxins should be

stockpiled in high threat areas.

Vaccines for the major threat agents should be improved, tested, and then administered to those at risk.

Decontamination methods and useful disinfectants should be developed and tested against the

major threat agents. This has only been done on a

limited basis.

Pre-attack disaster planning should be done. This

should include cataloging available medical personnel, intensive care beds, respirators and dialysis

machines in the threat region, and in back-up

hospitals outside the region.
 44 • Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

Summary

Currently, U.S. targets are Vulnerable to a biological attack. Present medical defense is reactive,

designed to limit mortality after the attack has

occurred.

No adequate long-term physical protection against

aerosoled agents is available for soldiers or civilians.

Stockpiles of drugs and vaccines being held for these

groups may not be adequate. No program of

pre-exposure vaccination or antibiotic use has been

implemented, except in limited circumstances during the Gulf War. The principal defense against a

bioweapons attack by terrorists or a sovereign state

consists of identification of the attack as man-made,

diagnosis of the causative agent(s), and initiation of

specific therapy.

More coordination among military and civilian agencies would lead to a more effective

program of research, particularly in areas related to vaccine development and early detection

and diagnosis of agents. The development of

effective vaccines against most likely threat agents,

such as anthrax and botulinum toxin, should be

given high priority.

A physical defense in the form of effective,

light-weight masks that could be worn for long

periods of time is not available and has had a low

priority. It would be important to have such

hood/masks available in the event that bioweapons are used by terrorists or terrorist states.

Antimicrobial drugs, vaccines and antitoxins effective against the threat agents should be stockpiled in

threat areas. Improved intelligence is required to

provide the United States with information that

would allow prevention of a planned biological

attack.
Chapter 3

Interagency and International

Communication and Cooperation
Contents

Page

INTRODUCTION-EXAMPLES OF PROBLEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Interagency Exchange of Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Interagency Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Classification Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Scrabbling for Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

EXAMPLES OF IMPROVEMENTS IN INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

AND COMMUNICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Interagency Communications Links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Redundant Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49

Response Plan for Chemical or Biological (CB) Terrorist Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Special Operations Expo ’90 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50

Findings and Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

OPTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Chapter 3

Interagency and International

Communication and Cooperation

INTRODUCTION—EXAMPLES

OF PROBLEMS

About 25 U.S. Government agencies deal with

aspects of terrorism.1 They are represented on the

Policy Coordinating Committee on Terrorism, its

technical subcommittee, the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG), and other interagency working

groups. Coordination of activities among these

participants has improved over the last several years,

at least in part due to the availability of the TSWG

as a forum. This chapter deals with problems of

assuring adequate communication and coordination

in the fight against terrorism.

Examples of difficulties in communication and

coordination extend over a multitude of areas, from

the relatively straightforward matter of exchanging

information on current research or on terrorist

organizations and threats to crisis coordination.

OTA has not performed a detailed study of all

aspects of interagency communication among the 25

(or so) government agencies that participate in

counterterrorism work. However, during the course

of the project, OTA has become aware of a number

of problems, past and present. This chapter will

provide examples of these problems. Some have

been successfully resolved; others have not. Following the exposition of examples, which indicates the

scope of the problem, OTA presents a series of

options for improving interagency coordination for

Congress to consider. In addition, there is a brief

discussion on international coordination of counterterrorism R&D.

Interagency Exchange of Information

Some difficulties in communication simply involve red tape. During the course of this study, OTA

staff were asked on two occasions to facilitate

transfers of R&D information between one agency

and laboratories belonging to another. It was not that

the information was otherwise unavailable to the

requester, but it was felt that due to lengthy bureaucratic procedures, going through established channels would delay information transfer by months.

There are problems regarding the dissemination

of vital data of relevance to terrorism. A useful and

interesting source of information, the TECSII database, is managed by the U.S. Customs Service and

the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). It

contains information, such as description and passport number, regarding individuals who may have

excited suspicions on the part of Customs or INS

agents when they presented themselves at a U.S. port

of entry. Some may have been found carrying

contraband, others may have violated other laws,

and still others may have matched a suspicious

profile, based on their recent travels or on other

factors.

This database is available to various government

agencies. However, only a very small number of

terminals connected to TECSII are available to the

agency with chief responsibility for domestic counterterrorist activities, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Further, this source of information

does not appear to be frequently accessed by the FBI,

even during time of increased international tensions,

such as during the period prior to the Gulf War in late

1990 and early 1991. True, this source of information is limited: no one who does not appear at a port

of entry is included. Nevertheless, the database may

contain much valuable information, particularly at

times when there is reason to think that an effort may

be underway to introduce terrorists into the United

States.

Interagency Arguments

Another category of communication difficulties

involves turf protection and institutional disputes

among agencies. On one occasion, two different

agencies were funding closely related research by

the same contractor into explosives detection. The

two agencies had different applications for the

technologies, and, consequently, different specifications for a workable system. One agency ran a test on

Isee Uos. c~~~e~~, (Jfic~ of T~~ology ~sessmenq Te~hn~/~gy Against Terr~~i~m: The Federal Effo~, O’TA-ISC-481 (wdlhlgtO~ DC: U.S.

Government Prinfing Office, July 1991), app. E for a listing of Federal participants in countertemxism R&D.

-47–
48 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

a prototype that did not yield very favorable results.

The second agency had run tests on similar equipment that looked significantly better, at least for that

agency’s purposes. As a result of the first agency’s

negative results, however, the research program of

the second agency was nearly canceled by higher

officials. This eventuality was averted but the upshot

was a bad feeling between the program monitors of

the respective agencies that became counterproductive. Fortunately, this dispute was resolved fairly

quickly, but the fact that it occurred at all (in spite of

the existence of the TSWG, which should have

provided a natural path of communication among

the individuals) is disturbing. This episode represents a serious problem of coordination among

agencies involved in related research.

Turf problems, now happily resolved, were evident in another arena. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is responsible for overseeing security procedures at U.S. airports. Some regulations

require the display of identification badges by all

personnel in protected areas at airports, particularly

those areas with access to aircraft. This is to facilitate

the detection of unauthorized personnel in those

zones. However, the Customs Service considered

that Customs officials in uniform were not required

to obey such regulations. The problem, from a

security point of view, is that a malefactor could

conceivably obtain a reasonable facsimile of such a

uniform, and would then be immune to challenge by

airport authorities or local police. The refusal of

Customs officials to display airport identification

led, at least on one occasion, to a confrontation, with

guns drawn, between a Customs agent and a local

policeman.

This problem has since been resolved by discussions at high levels among leading officials in the

responsible agencies. However, matters should not

have been allowed to deteriorate to that point.

Classification Issues

Another example of a snafu in interagency R&D

coordination involves Imatron Corp., the manufacturer and developer of a promising device to detect

explosives—a rapid computertized tomography machine. Imatron performed some tests in late 1990

under contract with the FAA. The results appeared

interesting and deserving of more rigorous evaluation. However, during this period, classification

guidelines were promulgated by the Department of

Transportation that labeled information on the

effectiveness of potential explosives detectors as

‘‘confidential. ’

A problem then arose because Imatron has some

foreign minority shareowners (Italian and Japanese).

Even though the company is over 50 percent

U.S.-owned, foreign participation was enough to

prevent Imatron’s laboratory facilities from being

designated as capable of handling classified data.

Imatron has had to cease testing and other related

work for the FAA until the problem can be resolved.

The legal solution, spinning off an entirely U.S.-

owned subsidiary to do the classtified work, will take

months to accomplish, resulting in months of time

lost.

In addition, there are some examples of redundancy of effort in some lines of research applicable

to counterterrorism (and to counternarcotics). One

case is the existence of several projects in different

agencies developing the same technology (using

relatively high-energy garoma rays) to examine

large cargo containers for contraband, including

narcotics, weapons, or explosives.

The existence of the TSWG has reduced the

incidence of this type of duplication, but has not

eliminated it. The TSWG tried, on one occasion, to

assemble an updatable database of relevant R&D

progress. The availability of such information would

make such redundancies of effort considerably less

likely. However, due to limited funding, this database was never set up.

OTA considers the establishment of an interagency database on the state of the art in

technology and R&D applicable to counterterrorism to be an important part of the development of adequate coordination of the Nation’s

counterterrorism effort.

Scrabbling for Funds

Some agencies with limited R&D funding resources are currently forced to seek funds from more

affluent agencies in order to pursue research projects

that they feel are essential. An example is the INS,

which has only $400,000 per year available for

R&D. In addition, the Forensic Laboratory of INS,

even though highly regarded, is barely able to

purchase the chemicals it needs to function normally, and has no funds at all for R&D.
Chapter 3-interagency and lnternational Communication and Cooperation ● 49

An area of interest to INS is automated facial

recognition. Pattern recognition technology, using

video images and sophisticated software algorithms,

has progressed to the point where useful and

interesting facial recognition equipment may be

feasible to develop. The object would be to provide

assistance in identifying individuals at ports of

entry, when applying for U.S. visas, using photographs or direct observation. In the counterterrorism

area, comparison could be made with a file of

pictures of known terrorists, because facial measurements preserve a number of known parameters in

spite of attempts at disguise and changes due to the

aging process.

Although INS has need and use for such work (as

do other parts of the Government), it was unable to

fund it adequately alone. Therefore, it was forced to

seek the assistance of other agencies to find resources to keep such research alive. While INS

officials have been somewhat successful in this

particular effort, at least up to the present (enabled

by informal contacts among scientists working in the

field), the haphazard nature of such means of

funding is not conducive to an efficient and effective

research program. This anecdote, like others previously mentioned, argues for the existence of a better

endowed interagency R&D funding group with

more effective coordination than now exists.

EXAMPLES OF IMPROVEMENTS

IN INTERAGENCY

COORDINATION AND

COMMUNICATION

Interagency Communications Links

Perhaps the most literal example of lack of

effective communication involved the lack of common, secure communications channels among different elements in law enforcement operations (e.g.,

FBI, Coast Guard, Customs, INS). This deficiency

could result in difficulties during combined operations against relatively sophisticated narcotraffickers trying to run contraband into the United States.

The efforts of an interagency working group on the

topic have resulted in the establishment of secure,

common channels that are now available for use.

Redundant Research

In one area of counterterrorism, several highly

classified projects were underway in diverse agencies to develop a vital protective tool. There was

little communication among the specialists working

on the problem, so there was not only a duplication

of effort, but also a rate of progress slower than

would have been the case if there had been adequate

interchange of ideas and information. However, in

part due to the forum created by the existence of the

TSWG, and in part due to an informal network of

contacts among agencies, the problem was identified, and an interagency working group set up in

1990 to coordinate R&D efforts.

As a footnote, an overseas firm and a domestic

one are openly marketing a device similar to the one

being developed in great secrecy within the government.

Response Plan for Chemical or Biological

(CB) Terrorist Attacks

Extensive interagency plans for coordinating a

Federal response to nuclear or radiological attacks

by terrorists have existed for many years under the

leadership of the Department of Energy, with

support from the Department of Defense. The

implementation of these plans is aided by an array of

sophisticated technical equipment. Cooperation among

a number of highly specialized response teams from

different government agencies has been a principal

element in devising these systems.

Until very recently, however, there had been no

plan for preparing and coordinating such a response

in the case of attack by means of chemical or

biological agents, beyond designating the FBI as the

response agency and providing for some support by

the U.S. Army. This was in spite of assessments by

many experts that a CB terrorist attack would be

much more likely than a nuclear one.

Fortunately, this deficiency is now being remedied by the development of a response plan involving a large number of agencies, under the leadership

of the FBI. Other participating agencies include the

Environmental Protection Agency, the Department

of Health and Human Services, the Department of

Defense, the Department of Agriculture, and the

Federal Emergency Management Agency. Appropriate expertise from the most knowledgeable agencies is now being brought to bear on the subjects, and
50 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

trained and equipped response forces are being

assigned responsibilities in case of such an event.

Procedures for rendering assistance to local authorities have been developed. While the plan has not yet

been finally implemented, the Nation now has a

capability for dealing with this eventuality.

Special Operations Expo ’90

In order to stimulate communications among

scientists and engineers of the National Laboratories

and the military professionals responsible for special

operations, the Department of Energy and the U.S.

Special Operations Command (SOCOM) of the

Department of Defense held a joint exposition in

March 1990. Each of the Laboratories working on

related technical questions set up exhibits to demonstrate their capabilities to military and technical

personnel of SOCOM.2

Although this field is not identical to counterterrorism, special operations do include military

actions against terrorism, so many of the technologies being researched would apply directly to the

topic of this study. Further, other technologies (e.g.,

sensors) that are useful for low-intensity conflict (the

main concern of special operations) would also have

applications in the counterterrorist arena.

Many of the participants felt that the exposition

was useful in bringing together for the first time

technical experts from the laboratories with experts

in the operational field. Another such conference

was held in November 1991.

Findings and Summary

Direct contact of the above sort between the

technical and operational cultures is often an efficient process that cuts through red tape and facilitates transferring information on operational

requirements to scientists and information on technological possibilities to the military professionals.

This principle could be profitably extended to

other fields of counterterrorist endeavor, especially in the relevant areas of the behavioral

sciences (in which interagency communication

could be improved, see ch. 5) and in aviation

security. Periodic symposia and conferences,

bringing together experts from different agencies

to exchange ideas and information, are useful and

should be increased. There should be an effort to

arrange such conferences at least on an annual

basis. This might be another function that the

TSWG could perform.

In fact, some such conferences do take place.3

However, there is a need for more of them sponsored

by government agencies in the counterterrorism

field, so that technical experts from diverse agencies

who rarely communicate with each other could

interact. When necessary, they could be held in

classified formats.

Insummary, there have been a number of recent

improvements in interagency coordination. However, there are several areas where coordination of

counterterrorist efforts could be upgraded. This

applies both to R&D and to technology related to

operations.

OPTIONS

In counterterrorism research and development,

two institutional phenomena are salient. First, in

some fields, there is redundancy in research projects.

Typically, different agencies spend significant funds,

sometimes paying the same vendors, in order to

develop similar hardware. Second, some agencies

(e.g., INS, the Secret Service, and the FBI), suffering

from virtually nonexistent budgets for R&D, yet

needing to develop tools for counterterrorist missions, are forced to shop around for well-heeled

agencies to provide funds to support these efforts.

Both these difficulties should, in principle, be

avoided because of the existence of the TSWG and

its parent, the Policy Coordinating Committee on

Terrorism. These interagency committees are meant

to coordinate activities in this area in a way that

avoids redundancies and assures that needed work

gets done, even if no agency can alone find the funds

to perform it. However, as noted in the previous

OTA report on technology and terrorism,4 funding

z~e DOE Laboratories includ~ Wem Argonne National Laboratory, Remote Sensing Laboratory/Las Vegas, 1~0 Nation~ Em@m@

Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Lawrence LivermoreNational Laborato~, OakRidge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest Laboratory,

Sandia National Laboratory, and the Special Technology Laboratory.

3For emple, tie ~eficm Defense fiep~~~s Association (~PA) ~been orga~~g ann~ rneefigs on security technology fOr 7 yeaTS.

Also, the Department of Transportation, together with private sector organiza tions, has presented yearly meetings on transportation security, and the

Federal Bureau of Investigation has periodically put together meetings on explosives detection.

Iu.s. Conwess, Office of Technology Assessmen4 op. cit., footnote 1.
Chapter 3-interagency and International Communication and Cooperation ● 51

for the TSWG has been problematic, declining by 80

percent in fiscal year 1991 relative to the level at its

inception 5 years ago. Shortage of money apparently

increases turf protection and discourages communication among the agencies doing the R&D. It also

encourages scientists to use their own informal

networks of colleagues and friends in other agencies

to seek funding for needed projects-funding that

should be assured and coordinated through the

interagency group for such research. This approach,

while practical for the individual, results in a

haphazard allocation of resources.

Politically, it will not be easy to put all counterterrorism R&D under one umbrella, and that should not

be the goal. Some agencies (in particular, those of

the Intelligence Community and the Defense and

Energy Departments) would likely not be interested

in having those counterterrorism projects specific to

their own missions controlled or subsumed by an

interagency group. But those projects with interagency applications, and there are many, both

ongoing and proposed, should be coordinated by a

central entity. This measure is needed to avoid

redundancy of effort and to increase contacts and

interaction among scientists doing similar work.

Otherwise, current inefficiencies and barriers to

communication will continue, hurting the national

counterterrorist R&D effort.

The coordinating group should have sufficient

funds, respect, and, thus power, to run an efficient

program. If substantial research funds are not under

control of the coordinating group, it will not be taken

as a serious player by the member agencies. To

improve communication among participating experts, a larger fraction of the Nation’s counterterrorism research should be subject to coordination

from a single source than is currently the case. Now,

the TSWG represents only $2 million out of over

$70 million. Even if expanded to $10 million, this

fraction would still be only about 15 percent.

Effective interagency coordination would avoid

significant redundancies in research projects. However, coordination is also needed beyond the R&D

arena. Efficient interagency exchange of information needs to be implemented. On the R&D plane

this could be accomplished by holding interagency

technical seminars, for example, and on the operational level by establishing, maintaining, and using

interagency charnels of communication. Effective

coordination should provide databases on technology and databases and alerts on terrorists and their

activities. These should be accessible to all agencies

with need for the information.

OTA has identified four options for improved

coordination among the many agencies that have

R&D interests in counterterrorism.

Option 1: Continue with the TSWG and its

parent Policy Coordinating Committee on

Terrorism as now funded, run through the

Department of State, with a large increase in

funding, as now planned, mostly originating

from Department of Defense funds. Give the

TSWG its own line item in the State

Department budget.

Advantages. This continues the present institutional situation, which has worked until now,

although hampered by funding constraints. Many of

the participants are familiar and comfortable with it.

The increase in funding (proposed to $10 million

from $2 million), if implemented, should be sufficient to assure that needed projects, particularly of

research-starved agencies, are undertaken. This setup allows decisions on research to be made by a

committee made up of representatives of all the

participating agencies. It is meant to assure that the

large research agencies (e.g., Defense and Energy)

will not dominate or gobble up the research pie.

A line-item status will help assure that other

components of the State Department do not drain

funds intended for the TSWG. It may also help in

providing an incentive for the State Department to

give more active support to the TSWG when

appealing for funds from Congress.

Disadvantages. There may remain some congressional opposition to funding a research program

through State, which is not a research-oriented

agency. The funding may never be assured from year

to year, unless strong advocates appear, either in

Congress or the executive branch. Power and

decisionmaking maybe perceived as tilting towards

Defense, since a large share of funds will be supplied

from their budget. Defense is already managing the

program for State, which has limited technical

expertise.

Option 2: Place the TSWG in a major research

agency, such as the Department of Defense, the

Department of Energy, or the Department of
52 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

Transportation (now a major participant in

counterterrorism R&D). Give it a line item.

Advantages. The Departments of Defense and

Energy both have significant experience in managing R&D programs of all sizes and at all phases.

Stable funding would be more likely; even if the

congressional allotments were to fluctuate, the host

agency could make up differences in lean years,

since the whole program would constitute a minute

part of the agency’s research program.

Disadvantages. There could be distrust among

other participating agencies, since the perception

will be that the host agency will take the lion’s share

of projects. A committee may make funding decisions, but the power of the purse of the host agency

might swing decisions in favor of research it

particularly wants. On the other hand, the host

agency may not want the program, since it may

perceive that the cost of TSWG research, primarily

done to satisfy other agencies’ needs, would be

deducted from its own in-house research.

Option 3: Replace the TSWG with a similar

funding group run out of a DOE national

laboratory or a smaller agency with research

capability. Give it a line item.

Advantages. A laboratory would be familiar

with science and engineering issues and research

practices, which would help in furnishing competent

oversight. An operational agency would be aware of

the field requirements of the equipment. In the

former case, the TSWG would be somewhat removed from interagency rivalry, although subject to

interlaboratory rivalry.

Disadvantages. This would place much power,

probably too much, in the hands of only one

participating agency, even if accompanied by an

interagency oversight board. Since the TSWG would

be replaced, many old players would likely not be

enthusiastic, especially State, Defense, and Energy,

all of which had leading roles. If the location were a

national laboratory, Energy might be somewhat

mollified.

Option 4: Replace the TSWG with a similar

funding group operating out of a technical

office close to the President with no direct

interest in doing research itself, such as the

President’s Office of Science and Technology

Policy, or the National Security Council (NSC),

or out of a new office, following the model of

the Office of National Drug Control Policy.

Advantages. The coordinating body would be in

a strong position of power (if actively supported by

the White House) and thus able to arbitrate among

agencies and deal with rivalries and parochial

interests. A strong position would also help in

eliciting information from reluctant participants and

in fighting turf builders. If located in the White

House Office of Science and Technology Policy

(OSTP), the coordinating group would be likely to

have strong technical input. It could also benefit

from the perception that the OSTP would be a

disinterested, honest broker. This would also apply

to the creation of a new office. Also, this option

might provide a good place to take advantage of

existing talent to deal with the multidisciplinary

needs of overseeing a highly varied program. A new

office would have to receive separate research

funding and control the power of the purse strings,

otherwise participating agencies would not be interested in playing. This option might level the playing

field among agencies in that more weight might be

given to the needs of agencies with limited R&D

budgets (e.g., Secret Service, INS).

Disadvantages. The TSWG would disappear, thus

irritating the same participants as in the previous

option. A new arrangement for counterterrorism

R&D would exist, making long-time participants

uncomfortable. Major agencies might be more

reluctant to play. Congress maybe reluctant to fund

anew agency or to increase significantly the budget

for an existing office. The OSTP or NSC might be

reluctant to take on the task of managing research,

particularly in a narrow area.

INTERNATIONAL

COOPERATION

The United States engages in cooperative efforts

in the field of counterterrorism with a number of its

allies and in some international forums. The United

States works most closely with Canada and the

United Kingdom. Collaboration with the Canadians

is especially active in the areas of explosives

detection and airline security. Several firms with

competitive vapor detectors are Canadian; Canadian

experts participate with U.S. agencies in discussions

regarding research into airline security. Periodic

counterterrorism exercises are held with the Canadians.
Chapter 3-Interagency and International Communication and Cooperation ● 53

The United States also exchanges information

with the United Kingdom in a number of areas

relevant to counterterrorism. One thermal neutron

analysis (TNA) machine for explosives detection,

developed for the Federal Aviation Administration

(FAA), is being tested at Gatwick airport near

London, in cooperation with British airport authorities. There are also exchanges of information with

other European allies. In all cases, however, there is

technical information considered so vital to national

security that no party will exchange it with another.

Some research projects in other countries are

funded by U.S. agencies. For example, scientists at

the Soreq Nuclear Research Center in Israel are, in

collaboration with scientists from Los Alamos

National Laboratory, working on developing the

nuclear resonance absorption technique for explosives detection. The joint effort is funded by the

FAA. This project also involves interagency cooperation, since Los Alamos is a National Laboratory of

the Department of Energy: an interagency agreement between the FAA and the Department of

Energy enabled this collaboration on a national

level. The FAA is examining a Soreq bomb detecting device employing advanced x-ray techniques. A

Memorandum of Cooperation between the FAA and

the Israeli Airports Authority was signed to permit

the international effort between FAA and Soreq.

There are efforts to establish research collaborations on other topics between U.S. and foreign

scientists, particularly those in Western Europe.

Recently, the Soviets have expressed an interest in

technical exchanges on counterterrorist technology,

probably reflecting a concern with internal ethnic

discontent and the large number of hijackings within

the past 2 years. Such collaborations and exchanges

of information also may have the added advantage of

saving money in research efforts.

In addition to formal collaborations at the intergovernmental level, there are periodic international

conferences on explosives detection that result in

useful exchanges of information.

Regarding international organizations, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), an

agency of the United Nations, has recently concluded a draft treaty on tagging explosives during

manufactures The United States and Canada, together with France, the United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia, and other European countries were particularly active in bringing this effort to fruition. ICAO

is continuing efforts to examine the uses of technology to further international airline security.

Another international effort in which the United

States participates is Interpol, the international

police organization, which exchanges information

on criminals. U.S. officials are assigned to Interpol

work, both in the United States and at Interpol’s

headquarters in Lyons, France. Information on

terrorists that is not classified is sent to Interpol by

the appropriate U.S. agencies. The United States

also receives such information for use when domestic action is feasible. Interpol has recently improved

its communications capability and can now send

specific pieces of information through secure channels to only those nations authorized to receive it.

The United States also has observer status with

the TREVI group, an organization of Western

European Interior Ministries, that is concerned with,

among other things, exchanging vital information on

terrorist activities in Europe.

Contacts between the United States and friendly

states in the field of counterterrorist technologies

could usefully be expanded. In particular, security

practices at airports in Switzerland and Israel are, in

many aspects, more advanced than those in the

United States. U.S. agencies have, in fact, participated in discussions with officials of both countries,

but more exchange of information would be advantageous. Moreover, researchers in other countries,

notably Israel, Canada, Australia, and the United

Kingdom, have made some technical advances that

could be of use to the United States. Much U.S.

technology could be made available to friendly

states without compromising national security interests.

%jee u.S. CO~SS, Offke of Technology Assessmen~ op. cit., footnote 1, pp. s@sl.
Chapter 4

Aviation Security:

Aspects of Integrated Security

for Commercial Air Travel
Contents

Page

INTRODUCTION ... ... ... ..*. .. ...............................******..***"*"*""" 57

INTEGRATED SECURITY SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....57

COMBINED TECHNOLOGIES FOR AN EXPLOSIVES DETECTION SYSTEM . . . . 57

Statistics of Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Detection Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Flow Rate or Throughput . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN DETECTION TECHNOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

X-ray Systems for Bomb Detection in Baggage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

New Results With TNA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

New Results With Vapor Detectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Electromagnetic Techniques for Explosives Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Associated Particle Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

PASSENGER/BAGGAGE MATCHING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64

Research and Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

AIRCRAFT. HARDENING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .68

BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL DEFENSES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

ACCESS CONTROL AND EMPLOYEE SECURITY AT AIRPORTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

Background Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

THE ROLE OF HUMANS IN PROFILING AND SCREENING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

COMBINED USE OF SEVERAL DETECTORS WITH PROFILING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

CARGO AND AIRMAIL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

SUMMARY AND COMMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

Figures

Figure Page

4-1. Generic Frequency Distributions of Detections and False Alarms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

4-2. Notional System Combining Different Explosives Detection Technologies . . . . . . . . 75
Chapter 4

Aviation Security: Aspects of Integrated Security for

Commercial Air Travel

INTRODUCTION

Over the last 10 years, high-capacity international

aircraft have become favorite targets of terrorists.

Consequently, much research and development in

counterterrorist technology has been focused on

means of safeguarding this mode of transportation,

in part by developing better means of detecting the

small quantities of explosives believed to have

caused the most recent fatal tragedies. That effort

has included some attention to controlling access to

the aircraft and other critical areas at airports, and to

the human aspects of the security system. However,

to date, the question of how best to combine

technologies and people to provide maximum security is very much open.

Although most past research has looked at each

concept or device as a stand-alone answer to the total

problem of explosive detection, it is now generally

recognized that no single detector either exists or

will likely exist in the near future that can provide

practical, reliable detection of explosives of the

types and quantities of concern to aviation security.

Recent reports by the National Academy of Sciences

(NAS),l as well as by the Office of Technology

Assessment (OTA),2 concluded that a combination

of techniques and devices is the most promising

means of attaining high-confidence protection from

explosive devices.

To determine how such a combination may

reasonably be achieved, the performance of current

and near-term technologies must be analyzed. Further, it is necessary to consider how various technologies and techniques best complement each other.

INTEGRATED SECURITY

SYSTEMS

A systems approach to overall airport security is

under development in a major program sponsored by

the FAA Technical Center, using the Baltimore/

Washington International Airport (BWI) as a model.

The development is being supported by Sandia

National Laboratories, under contract to the FAA

Technical Center.3 This program is attempting to

find the proper balance among risk, technology, and

operational considerations for a typical airport

environment, using BWI as a typical airport model.

The program also will attempt to generalize the

results found at BWI to other airports, by means of

computer modeling. This program considers all the

fictions of a security system, from detection to

delaying intruders and response to intrusion.

COMBINED TECHNOLOGIES

FOR AN EXPLOSIVES

DETECTION SYSTEM

The explosives detection problem is one of

surveying all means of bringing explosives aboard

aircraft. First, this means screening passengers as

well as hand-carried baggage and checked baggage

that go on board. Mail and cargo must also be

considered as possible pathways for introducing

explosives aboard aircraft. Screening all flightcrew

and service and airport contractor personnel is yet

another issue, covered by the BWI program but not

considered here.

INatio@ Academy of science, Committee on Commercial Aviation Securi~-, National Materials AdvkoV Bowd, “S umrnary: Reducing the Risk

of Explosives on Commercial Aircraf4° NMAB-463, 1990.

~.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technology Against Terrorism: The Federal Effort, OTA-ISC-481 (Washington.L DC: U.S.

Government Printing Office, July 1991).

3~e FM B~p~~w is a m~tiye~ systems study of secfity at tie @ofi. me project ~gan wi~ an aIlalYSiS of the aiIpO~tiClllft aC=s5

problem, utilizing computer modeling and (human) expert input, new procedures, and training. It will follow with implementation, using these inputs

and also encompassing hardware at the BWI airport at one of the domestic piers and the surrounding aircraft operations area.

–57–
58 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

Some general concepts must be considered in

quantifying the explosives detection problem. These

include the statistical parameters generally used to

define the performance of detection devices, the

statistics used to describe systems composed of

combinations of detectors, the flow rate through the

baggage checking system, and the throughput of a

single device.

Statistics of Detection

The performance of a detection system can be

characterized by two primary parameters: the detection probability, Pd

, and the false alarm or false

positive rate, Fa

. A good detector has a very high

detection probability (as close to 100 percent as

possible), while still maintaining a very low rate of

false positives or false alarms. These two parameters

are coupled, primarily through the detection threshold: the more sensitive the detection threshold, the

higher the false alarm rate. Unfortunately, to detect

small quantities of explosives with high probability

requires that the threshold for detection (the lower

limit on the amount of explosives that may be

reliably detected) be set as low as possible; consequently, the false alarm rate is high. This effect is

shown graphically in figure 4-1. The curve on the

left represents the distribution of measured nitrogen

content (or other detection parameter) for bags with

no explosives. The curve on the right represents the

distribution of measured nitrogen content for bags

with a given amount of explosives that should be

detected. The shaded area of overlap represents the

probability of a signal being caused by either a clean

piece mistakenly identified or by a piece of contraband material.

As the threshold is moved to the left, i.e., the

device is adjusted to detect lesser quantities of

explosives, the detection probability for explosives

increases (i.e., a greater percentage Of the total

explosives population is correctly identified) but a

larger area of the signals from clean items is included

in the uncertain population, representing a higher

false alarm rate.

Any detection scheme depends on a separation of

the two peaks: the probability distribution of the

clean items and that of the explosive. Figure 4-1 also

demonstrates that as the quantity of explosive to be

detected decreases, the two curves move together

(i.e., the distribution of signals from bags with

Figure — 4-l—Generic Frequency Distributions of

Detections andFalse Alarms

Parameter of detection

(e.g., nitrogen content or density)

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

explosives will be shifted to the left), making

discrimination more difficult.

One way of increasing the effectiveness of a

detection system is to combine several diverse

detection techniques that make use of different

phenomena. When two independent measurements

are both required in order to produce an alarm (an

“AND” gate) in a single detection system, the

combined effectiveness in terms of overall detection

probability, Pdc, is the product of the two individual

probabilities, or Pdc = pd1 * pd2, and the false alarm

rate, Fac, is the product of the two individual rates,

always smaller than the individual ones. Since

detection with a high probability is the name of the

game (Pd on the order of 0.90 or better is usually set

as the goal), all stages of a system must individually

have high detection probability. Combining two

poor detectors thus does not necessarily make a

better system in terms of detection probability. It is

also possible to combine two detectors so that an

alarm from either one may trigger remedial action or

examination by yet another device (an “OR” gate).

In this case, the resulting detection probability (and

false alarm rate) combine as Pdc = Pd1 + (1 – Pall) *

Pd2. The detection probability will increase relative
Chapter 4-Aviation Security: Aspects of Integrated Security for Commercial Air Travel ● 59

to that of the individual detector, but so will the false

alarm rate.

Significant gains can be made in the area of false

alarm reduction by combining several detectors,

each with moderate performance in the false alarm

area. Two detectors each with an unacceptably high

false alarm rate of, say, 20 percent would combine

in an “AND’ logic to produce a false alarm rate of

only 4 percent, if the two measurements were truly

independent. (In fact, they often will not be totally

independent, so these arguments apply only to an

idealized case. However, for some combinations of

detectors (e.g., vapor detectors and TNA), the

phenomena used are totally distinct, approximating

the ideal.) A strategy of multidetector systems can be

based on the goal of achieving an acceptable false

alarm rate (often 5 percent or less) with acceptable

detection probability. Depending on the parameters

of the component devices, this may require AND

gates, OR gates, or some combination of the two.

The true combined detection probabilities and

false alarm rates can only be determined by

measurements in an operational environment.

Because of real interferants (e.g., objects that

really contain large amounts of nitrogen and are

dense), the combined probabilities will never be

as good as the theoretical ideal. The above

statistical arguments only provide an indication

of possible improvements in combining systems,

not a precise theoretical prediction of operational

results. 4

Detection Criteria

What actually constitutes acceptable detection

probability and false alarm rate is not easily determined. The former is a question of acceptable risk

while the latter is an operational problem. Setting the

minimum acceptable detection probability is a

subjective issue. If there were 10 attempted bombings per year (out of 40 million international

enplanements), a detection probability of 0.90 would

allow one expected dangerous situation (and sometimes more) to go undetected per year. If there were

only one bomb attempt per year, the statistical

expectation would be for one to go undetected about

every 10 years. Would a terrorist be deterred by these

odds and would the flying public accept them as

“safe”? The operational part of the problem can

be analyzed reasonably objectively, yet it, too, is

difficult to specify precisely.

Flow Rate or Throughput

The Air Transport Association (ATA) contracted

with the Institute of Transportation Studies of the

University of California at Berkeley5 to perform an

analysis of the operational problems of installing a

TNA-based explosives detection system (EDS) as

specified by the FAA.6 This study focused primarily,

but not exclusively, on a false alarm rate of about 5

percent, as specified by the FAA for an EDS. Among

other findings, the study found that the throughput of

the Xenis (TNA plus x-ray)7 EDS had to be slowed

down by 28 percent for automatic detection (from an

already degraded throughput of 6 to 7 bags per

minute, due to the mechanics of preventing a

radiation hazard) to allow the TNA image to be

maintained long enough so that it can be correlated

automatically with the Xenis X-Ray image. (This is

a real effect but not necessarily a permanent problem, since a storage buffer could be added to the

TNA computer to maintain the image data from one

object while a new object is being viewed.) The

study also found that attention must be paid to the

space requirement for rejected luggage for any false

alarm rate, whether the alarming bags are recycled,

sent to another detector, or hand searched. For a

300-bag-per-hour throughput rate, a 5-percent false

alarm rate requires space for handling another 15

bags per hour. This could be a serious consideration

at the much higher false alarm rates currently

encountered by the Xenis EDS. Such operational

issues make it difficult to set a generally applicable

criterion for the throughput performance requirements of detection systems.

dme F.. Technical Center is planning to fititute a progmm called x-~ S, which will put a variety of detection devices (covering passengers,

cargo, and other potential pathways for the introduction of explosives aboard aircraft) and other elements of an integrated security system in operating

airport environments. Such operational experiments are the best way to assess the capability of the elements of a security system and the combined

efficacy of parts of the system at the same time.

5Gmfiey Dm GOsl~and ~kM. H~ew “~actiubilityof screening ~te~tio~ checked Baggage foru.s. Airlines,’ mtihlte of Transportation

Studies, University of California at Berkeley, Research Report UCB-ITS-RR-90-14, July 1990.

Gsee 54FederalRegiSter 36938, (Sept. 5, 1989).

7me ~Stem test~ at Ga~ck and Kenne@ Airports Combine a TNA device wi~ an x-my System @ Cornpme and co~kte hfollllatiorl 011 eXCeSS

nitrogen density with information on higher density objects in the bag.
60 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

The analytical model developed in the Berkeley

report has some capability for investigating the

impact of higher false alarm rates on the operational

difficulties of the airlines and consequently could be

used to set objective guidelines for the maximum

acceptable false alarm rate in a given operational

situation.

The FAA, both in its research and development

program and in its rule making process, has arbitrarily settled on a handling rate of 600 bags per hour (or

10 per minute). Realistically, however, the throughput requirement should vary greatly, depending on

where in a chain of detectors a specific instrument is

being used (and where the device is located). For

instance, a device used only on a small number of

bags could take much more time for its inspection.

If only 10 to 15 percent of the passengers were

selected for detailed inspection as a result of a

well-defined profiling system, the throughput of the

subsequent detection system would be greatly relieved. Further, location of the instrument and

detector cost also greatly influence the throughput

requirement. Inexpensive systems placed at the

check-in counter could certainly allow as much as 30

seconds per passenger since the check-in process

takes at least that much time. The issue of throughput requirement may be left to the marketplace,

where different instruments with different throughput rates could be combined by the individual

purchaser.

In this context, the variability of international

airports and gateways should also be emphasized.

U.S.-flag international air carriers enplane international passengers at 190 different airports, the top 20

of which carry 52 percent of the 38 million

enplanements (19.5 million). The largest five airports handle an average of 1.8 million passengers per

year and the other 15 of the top 20 carry only an

average of 700,000 passengers per year. The other

170 airports handle considerably fewer passengers,

on the average only about 100,000 per year. Thus,

the high-volume gateways are an exception, rather

than the rule, and much of the equipment required

for a national security system will need to handle

only moderate rates of baggage throughput. The

detection system criterion for throughput will

vary greatly; the choice for any specific operation

may best be left to the users, based on operational

considerations.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN

DETECTION TECHNOLOGY

X-ray Systems for Bomb Detection

in Baggage

X-ray technologies for airport security are developing rapidly as advanced systems used for medical

and industrial imaging are adapted for screening

luggage. The FAA tested some advanced commercial x-ray systems in late 1990 for specific purposes

in baggage screening. The results of these tests have

not yet been released.

The standard x-ray machine for airport security

produces an image of the distribution of x rays that

have passed through the observed object. These

pictures have excellent spatial resolution-thin wires

are readily seen—but the operator cannot find a

lightweight object behind a denser one, nor tell

whether a dark image is due to a thin sheet of a heavy

material, such as steel, or a thick sheet of plastic,

which can produce the same x-ray absorption.

During the past few years, a number of companies,

using a variety of approaches, have been trying to

overcome these shortcomings.

Dual-Energy

Dual-energy x-ray inspection produces two images, each taken with a different range of x-ray

energies. Comparing the images yields information

on the average atomic number of the elements in the

material traversed by the beam.8 Such machines can

distinguish between metals (e.g., steel) and plastics.

As yet, however, no commercial machine of this

type can distinguish between some plastics and

explosives or books. Moreover, none can detect a

lighter object behind a heavier one. This latter

problem is being addressed by applying image

processing and by employing multiple-view systems.

Image-Processed Dual-Energy

Dual-energy combined with automated image

subtraction is being developed by several x-ray

companies. The images, stored as an array of

8~e ~tofic ~m~r of ~ element is the n~ber of ~roton5 (or, ~~valently, the n~ber of el~~~) irI MI atom. Atomic weight is proportional

to the number of protons and neutrons in an atomic nucleus. For light elements, the atomic number is roughly proportional to atomic weight for heavier

elements, atomic number increases at a slightly lower rate than atomic weight.
Chapter 4-Aviation Security: Aspects of Integrated Security for Commercial Air Travel ● 61

numbers, are manipulated by sophisticated computer algorithms that try to identify and isolate

objects from their backgrounds. The dual-energy

method is then applied to the isolated objects and an

alarm produced if the characteristics of the object

match those of a presumed explosive. Although a

clear technical advance over simple dual-energy, it

remains to be proven how well such a technique will

work in a real airport environment.

Vivid Technologies of Waltham, MA, starting

from expertise developed in producing special

purpose medical x-ray equipment, has produced a

refined dual-energy, single-view x-ray machine that

can, it is claimed, very precisely determine the

effective atomic weight and x-ray absorption density

of all items in a piece of luggage. It does this by

comparing high-resolution images at two x-ray

energies and then using advanced computing techniques to analyze the images. Explosives of interest

are claimed to give a definite signature of welldefined effective atomic numbers and densities.

Dual-Axis, Dual-Energy

EG&G Astrophysics, of Long Beach, CA, under

contract with the FAA, is developing a dual-energy,

dual-view system (T-ScanTM—a trademark) that may

determine effective atomic numbers by comparing

views at different energies. EG&G uses two perpendicular views, rather than highly sophisticated computing algorithms, to resolve confusion in the

images due to overlap of objects. The system is

intended to have the ability to determine average

atomic numbers along the perpendicular directions

of view.

X-ray Compton Scattering

American Science and Engineering (AS&E) obtains backward x-ray scattering and x-ray transmission images simultaneously. A comparison of the

two images gives the atomic number of interior

objects with definition comparable to that from

dual-energy techniques.9 It has the advantage in

some cases, such as bombs hidden in baggage

linings, of being more sensitive than other techniques. However, the backward scattered image is

made by lower energy x rays that are more easily

absorbed by heavy material. AS&E is also developing image processing techniques and employing

different scattering strategies to improve detection

capabilities and is working on an automated algorithm to alarm in the presence of explosives.

Multi-Energy Imaging

Instead of imaging at two energies, it is possible

to image many energies at the same time. One

company, Magal of Israel, is marketing an instrument that manipulates the information generated

with pattern-recognition algorithms. A great deal of

additional information is thus available for analysis.

The device is purported to give automatic alarms in

the presence of bomb components.

Computerized X-ray Tomography

During the past year there has been a series of

FM-sponsored tests at Imatron Corp., to evaluate

the current performance of an x-ray computerized

tomography (CT) scanner under development there.

Whereas the original development at Imatron had

aimed at a stand-alone EDS system, these tests

emphasized its compatibility in combination with

the SAIC/TNA. A group of bags that had alarmed

the TNA system were delivered to Imatron with the

location of the suspected area marked on the outside

of each bag. Some of them actually contained real

explosives (PETN and SEMTEX). Since the TNA

has only moderate spatial resolution, the marking

essentially consisted only of information on which

quadrant of the bag contained the suspected explosives. The Imatron CT then looked only at the

suspect area by making 3 to 10 CT slices of this area

to produce reconstructed images (a l-cm thick

segment of the object is imaged in each slice).

The results from this series of tests, although

preliminary due to the small sample size and ad hoc

nature of the tests, were quite encouraging.

The current Imatron CT seamer has a 60-cmdiameter detector ring and is not large enough to

handle many common pieces of luggage. A new

model with an 80-cm-diameter ring, which can

handle baggage equal in size to that handled by the

current SAIC/TNA, is currently under construction

(under FAA contract). The biggest problem of the

system is its scan speed, which is currently about 6

seconds per slice. It is claimed by the vendor, that,

in the future, this scan time will be reduced to only

2 to 3 seconds in the new system. The primary issue

to be resolved is the number of slices required to

provide the needed detection probability (i.e., the

9See U*S. Con=e5s, OKIW of Technolo~ Assessment op. cit., footnote 2, PP. 78-79.
62 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

required resolution upon reconstruction). Another

important issue is the eventual false alarm rate under

operational conditions at an airport. At present, it

cannot be ascertained whether the total detection

time will be on the order of 10 seconds or a minute

or more.

However, any scan time in the above range could

find significant applications if the CT scanner were

incorporated properly into a total detection system.

With a l-minute total detection time, the CT seamer

could still resolve false alarms for a system running

at TNA speeds having a false alarm rate of almost 20

percent. If the time requirement were relaxed, the

system could handle larger first-pass false alarm

rates, greater baggage throughput, or could be used

at an earlier stage of the detection cascade.

Imatron has also been developing a dual-energy

CT detector. A prototype has been built and tested.

It is slow, but could be used for close inspection of

areas of luggage flagged by other means of screening.

Coherent X-Ray Radiography

Solid explosives are crystalline materials. Each

type-PETN, RDX, dynamite, etc.—has a unique

crystal structure that is different from that of other

explosives and of innocuous materials. The distance

between layers of atoms in the structure is revealed

by using x rays in a method called Bragg scattering,

after its discoverer. If the distance between the

planes of atoms in a particular crystal is d, then

Bragg scattering will be at a maximum (i.e., will

have a peak in intensity) when x rays of energy E are

scattered through an angle w, given by

sin w = k/(Ed)

where k is a constant. Alternatively, one can send a

broad energy spectrum of x rays through an object

and observe the scattered x rays at a fried angle w.

Bragg peaks corresponding to crystalline spacings

are then looked for in the scattered energy spectrum.

The method looks for the characteristic spacing of

crystals of explosives that may constitute a bomb.

The question to resolve is how often other crystals

found in luggage or in other examined objects may

have a similar characteristic spacing, resulting in

false alarms. Scientists at Philips Gmbh of Hamburg, Germany, are developing the method for

medical applications and have licensed Scan-Tech

of New Jersey for applications in the area of security.

Scan-Tech, in collaboration with scientists at

Rutgers University, has successfully completed

proof-of-principle tests. These early results give

some hope that coherent x-ray scattering may

become useful for airline and other security applications. The next stage is to build a prototype and test

it under realistic airport conditions.

Evaluation of all these new developments, both

for detection probability and false alarm rates,

awaits rigorous testing by outside parties.10

The Use of Pattern Recognition in X-Ray Images

Automated pattern recognition schemes to enhance the ability of x-ray systems to locate threat

items such as guns, knives, and electronic components are under development. Such systems are not

only automation schemes but are also ways to

overcome the human fatigue problem ever present in

a repetitive procedure such as x-ray image inspection.

One company in Canada, Array Systems Computing, Inc., has developed (under contract with Transport Canada) a neural-network based system for

detecting guns, knives, and hand grenades and is in

the process of extending the technique to detecting

electronic components. That system uses a dedicated

computer that can be added to a standard highresolution x-ray system. In tests conducted by the

company, their system was able to detect guns with

over 95-percent detection probability and about a

10-percent false alarm rate. Separate, independent

tests conducted by Transport Canada have confirmed these results. The use of such techniques as

an operator assist, allowing the operator to concentrate only on high-threat items that alarm the

automatic system, appears to be a productive approach to an important aspect of a security system.

Use of such procedures to identify bomb components is also under development. The critical questions are the eventual performance of the system and

the difficulty of disguising or hiding such components from such a system. Until the technology is

perfected and tested under controlled conditions, it

is too early to evaluate the potential of this technique.

I~c ~rmious OTAs~dyont~hnology andte~orismr~mmended that a testing agency outside the FW should be empovwed to assess explosives

detectors for efficacy. See U.S. Congress, Offke of Technology Assessment op. cit., footnote 2, pp. 8-10.
Chapter 4-Aviation Security: Aspects of Integrated Security for Commercial Air Travel ● 63

Early developmental work on such a technique is

under way. The goal is to provide x-ray vendors with

a plug-in computer card with sufficient capacity and

speed that would perform the analysis of the image

and make the decision. If such a system can be

developed to have a high-detection probability, even

with moderate false alarm rates, it may represent a

very powerful add-on which could make an ordinary

x-ray detection system semi-automatic.

Microdose X-Ray Images for Examining People

A new x-ray approach has been developed that

uses extremely small doses of radiation to examine

people to find if they are concealing weapons,

explosives, or other contraband under their clothes.

American Science and Engineering of Cambridge,

MA, has adapted its x-ray backscatter technique to

this end. A similar approach was developed by AGS

Corp. of Hammond, IN, later acquired by IRT of San

Diego, CA. The images produced by both techniques

are quite clear, indicating a potential effectiveness,

but immediately raising legal issues of privacy.

Radiation doses are equivalent to a few minutes of

natural radiation exposure, and much less than the

increased level of exposure to radiation suffered on

a flight. Although these are insignificant levels,

there would likely be strong public resistance to the

mandated use of x rays for airport security. However, this technique would protect against a principal

route for bringing explosives aboard aircraft.

New Results With TNA

Further FAA testing of a TNA system at Gatwick

Airport near London has been reported to show an

improvement over its earlier performance. 11 Whereas

earlier tests on goal quantities of explosives showed

detection probabilities somewhat lower than desirable, the most recent tests were reported to show

higher detection probabilities for quantities in the

high range of estimates for the size of the Lockerbie

bomb. More importantly, the false alarm rate for

similar quantities was also reported to have been cut

substantially. These results were said to have been

obtained mainly through the development of improved detection algorithms and by the education

that the neural network system has gained in

observing large numbers of real passenger baggage

items. However, even the improved false alarm rate

is too high to allow use of the TNA device by itself

as the only bomb detection mechanism. The TNA

system will have to be combined with profiling (as

at Gatwick) and, probably, with other technologies.

Further, it may be necessary, pending a new

assessment of the desired goal quantity of explosive

to be detected, to reduce detection thresholds still

further. This would require further improvements in

the system to keep the false alarm rate to manageable

proportions.

The newer results are in the process of being

verified by outside consultants, and a final assessment of the capability of TNA awaits confirmation.

If TNA devices are inherently limited by false

alarm rates, as some skeptics claim, one possible

application could be to use the device only for close

examination of individual items selected by other

screening methods (e.g., x rays). As an example, if

a screening device finds a suspect electronic device

in a bag or carry-on item, a TNA device could be

used just to inspect it for explosives content. Since

electronics equipment would have a low nitrogen

fraction, and the mass of the equipment would be

less than that of large bags, confusing background

would be reduced and the false alarm rate would be

much lower.12

New Results With Vapor Detectors

Several vapor detectors were tested by the FAA in

late 1990 for specific applications in screening

luggage. The results of these tests have not yet been

made available.

Electromagnetic Techniques for

Explosives Detection

A detailed discussion of nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) and nuclear quadruple resonance

(NQR) techniques for detecting explosive compounds is given in CLASSIFIED appendix F. Both

methods involve applying radiofrequency radiation

to an examined object while observing the electromagnetic response of molecules contained therein.

Another method, dielectrometry, measures the dielectric constant (a physical property of matter) of an

object, to determine whether anomalous items are

IILPe o~mu~, Offlce Ofcivfl Aviation SWti~, FAA, testimony at hearings before the Senate Governmental AfftiS COIIUII@% Feb. 26, 1991,

and Ken Lautersteiq FAA, personal communicatio~ Feb. 1991.

Iz’r’his suggestion WaS -de by John Baldesdwider, Professor of Chemistry, California Institute of Technology, and Cti of the National Actiemy

of Sciences Committee on Commercial Aviation Secnrity, personal commuoicatiou July, 1991.
64 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

present. The latter technique does not detect explosives, just anomalies in dielectric constant. All these

methods can, in principle, be defeated by wrapping the explosive in metal foil. However, it is

easy to test for the presence of metal foil, for

example, with standard metal detectors (see app.

C). For carry-on baggage, there would be a high false

alarm rate. However, for screening individual items

targeted by other techniques, these methods might

be useful. For screening people, NQR might become

a candidate detector.

The relative values (among themselves) of NMR,

NQR, and dielectrometry depends on the details of

the particular application: on the explosives compound, on the nature of the objects that would be

used to conceal the explosives, and on the acceptable

trade-off between the probability of detection and

the false alarm rate. But there are generic differences

among the three techniques.

Dielectrometry is the cheapest and most portable

option, and it can be very sensitive. However, the

response is nonspecific: not only is there little ability

to discriminate, but the false alarm rate will be high,

as many materials will appear to be anomalies.

Nevertheless, in some applications, such as items

concealed on a person, the technique maybe useful.

NQR has high specificity, and therefore might

produce the lowest false alarm rate. However, the

technique may be limited in the number of explosives reliably detectable. One developer has estimated that aversion might cost about $50,000, much

more than a dielectrometer, but half as much (or less)

as an NMR device. In combination with a metal

detector, NQR might be a very useful technique for

frisking people for contraband explosives (and could

be used for drugs as well).

For baggage inspection, NMR would probably

not be as specific as NQR, but it might be effective

for a greater number of explosive species. NMR

would require the imposition of a strong magnetic

field on the baggage, presenting other operational

problems (data on magnetic disks carried in baggage

would be destroyed, etc.).

Throughputs for all three techniques might eventually be as high as a few seconds per bag.

Associated Particle Production

This technique has been looked at for a number of

years, and some researchers have received FAA

funding to examine its feasibility for a number of

applications.

13 It utilizes a nuclear reaction between

two kinds of hydrogen that produces helium nuclei

and neutrons at a well-defined energy. Characteristic

garoma rays are produced by each element when

neutrons strike their nuclei. It is, in principle,

possible to measure the relative amounts and locations of nitrogen, carbon, and oxygen in a sample

using this method. This technique would greatly

reduce false alarm rates because all important

elements that constitute explosives could be measured.

However, problems with this approach in the past

have included limited accelerator tube lifetimes and

slow measurement times. If the reaction is made

more intense to produce more neutrons, the tube

tends to burnout earlier and a requirement for a large

amount of unwieldy shielding is generated.

Nuclear Diagnostic Systems, Inc., of Springfield,

VA, asserts that it can produce a useful system based

on this technique within a few months. The company

claims that it has a tube that lasts sufficiently long to

be practical for a number of applications, including

airport security, and that needs to function at such a

low level of neutron production that no shielding

would be required. The researchers have received

support from private sources for this development.

Again, testing by outside parties will be needed for

a proper evaluation of the claims.

PASSENGER/BAGGAGE

MATCHING

In June 1985, an Air India flight enroute from

Montreal to London was destroyed by an explosion

over the North Atlantic; Sikh terrorists claimed

responsibility. Investigators believe that an unaccompanied checked piece of luggage contained the

bomb that caused the explosion. Since most terrorists are not suicidal (despite press attention to the

contrary), 14 ensuring that all checked luggage belongs to passengers who have actually enplaned is an

effective frost line of defense against this threat.

13u.s. Conmss, C)fflce of Technology Assessment, op. cit., footnote 2, pp. 74-75.

14~omS s~en~, FBI/FAA Profihg contractor, personal COmIUti~tiOIL NOV. 9. 1~.
Chapter 4-Aviation Security: Aspects of Integrated Security for Commercial Air Travel ● 65

Effective December 1990, the FAA required all

U.S. carriers to ensure that all personal baggage

carried on international flights of U.S. airlines be

positively matched to passengers who board the

flight. Unaccompanied baggage can be transported

only after “close scrutiny. ”15 These FAA requirements are similar to current International Civil

Aviation Organization guidelines. FAA does not

mandate a specific technology to accomplish this

task; airlines are free to choose the approach that

suits their traffic levels and organizational structure.

Most airlines use a manual approach, especially

where traffic levels are low, by inspecting each

passenger’s baggage claim tickets at the aircraft gate

and coordinating the loading of the corresponding

bags. For example, American Airlines baggage tags

have peel-off sections that the baggage handlers

attach to the cargo containers when the bags are

loaded; a telephone or radio link is maintained

between the gate and the loading area and the

handlers annotate the corresponding tags and a

master list as the passengers board the aircraft.l6

Some airlines are testing bar-code-reading equipment to speed the matching process and are using

information systems to track where each bag is

placed, permitting quick baggage retrieval when

necessary. On aircraft that are not wide-bodied, such

as the Boeing 727, baggage cannot easily be

containerized, making the retrieval process more

time consuming. Northwest Airlines has installed

bar-code-reading and data-communication equipment at all stations, and uses it for all international

(and some domestic) flights.17 Trans World Airlines

has also begun applying bar-code technology.

For domestic travel, airlines cite the volume of

traffic and the use of smaller aircraft as reasons

making passenger/baggage matching difficult (without enormous delays and drastically altered current

flight schedules). However, in the domestic case, it

would be possible at least to apply matching on a

limited basis: using profiling information to

select a subset of passengers and bags for close

scrutiny, or giving priority to matching interline

baggage, for example.

In spite of these disparate efforts, there has

been no standard defined nor has there been a

demonstration of generally available equipment

that makes this process operationally practical. A

key problem is the difficulty of interline and

intraline baggage checking. Further, it is essential to check that baggage introduced as interline

transfers be matched to an enplaned passenger or

subject to careful examination.18 The transfer of

baggage between connecting flights at the points of

departure to or from the United States must be

controlled, whether the same or a different airline is

used. This is a much more formidable problem for

outbound international flights because of the U.S.

system of airline hub cities. A simple solution would

be not to allow through checking, but this would be

unacceptable to the airlines and, probably, to the

flying public. Straight-through checking is very

important to U.S. airlines as a major selling point.

One solution to the problem of controlling baggage

checked through to international destinations presents airlines with the difficulty of checking baggage

to international standards at additional airports that

by themselves do not handle any international

traffic. Current practice for most airlines appears to

be the use of modern x-ray equipment at the first

check-in point. This is not currently a very good

detection scheme for explosives.

However, it appears that all the technological

elements of an effective automated (or at least

semi-automatic) positive baggage matching system

are available. For instance, one might use bar codes

or magnetic tape, scanners, and dedicated local area

computer networks. Bar codes on the baggage tag as

well as on the passenger ticket already identify all

baggage in some airlines. These bar codes on the

baggage could also track the baggage from the

check-in counter to the aircraft. The attendant

checking tickets at the airplane gate could scan the

code while taking the ticket, thereby releasing that

bag to be placed on the aircraft. The scanner would

be networked to a terminal on the apron that relays

the information to the baggage handlers. Each

baggage container could have a manifest, listing

each bag in the container (either with bar codes or in

ISclose Scmfiy” is l~~age from tie gllideties developed by the International Civil Aviation Organization. Lynne osmus, offiCe Of Aviation

Security, FAA, personal communicatio~ Feb. 22, 1991.

16Homer Boynto~ Ctief of Securiw, tieric~ Airlines, personal communication and Sk! VklL Dec. 3, 1990.

17r)ouglasR. r&d, Dir@or of Security, Northwest Airlines, personal communication, Feb. 22, 1991.

181t appws that he luggage Contigthe bomb that destroyed Pan Am 103 was introduced as interline baggage at Fr-.
66 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

the apron computer terminal) and baggage could be

held out from loading until the passengers owning

the listed baggage had boarded.19 A key operational

problem is how to handle the bags awaiting the

passenger’s arrival. Since aircraft are commonly

loaded by seat numbers, it has been suggested that

the baggage could be loaded into containers in

similar order. Missing or last-minute passengers

could present problems, and some containers may

have to be held out until the last passenger shows.

Another alternative would be to load passengers by

paging, with the roster correlated to containers. All

these procedures could be foiled by last-minute

arrivals, but these passengers do not usually have

their checked baggage placed in containers anyway.

Interline passengers, often late, also sometimes fall

into this category. If the bar-code systems are

made sufficiently uniform between airlines, application of these techniques could solve the

interline baggage problem.

Finally, positive matching of baggage with

passengers is useful only insofar as the baggage

handlers are trustworthy. If suborned, they could

subvert any mechanical system. As in many other

aspects of security, the human element is essential

(see further discussion on background checks for

airline and airport employees under section on

access control, below).

Research and Development

A few years ago, FAA considered conducting

R&D for passenger/baggage matching technologies,

but the airline industry position was that the airlines

could handle it themselves (and they did). However,

the FAA Aviation Security Research and Development Service has recently issued a contract for

ongoing R&D to develop further refinements of the

technology for future systems.

AIRCRAFT HARDENING

The difficulty of developing explosives detectors

for currently accepted minimum threat levels for

aircraft has focused new attention on the possibility

of hardening either the aircraft or the baggage

containers so that they could withstand a threat

substantially in excess of this minimum. Both the

President’s Commission on Aviation Security and

Terrorism20 and the study of the Committee on

Commercial Aviation Security of the National

Academy of Science21 recommended serious efforts

to evaluate the potential of this approach. Success at

such an effort could greatly simplify the detection

problem. Of the two, aircraft or container hardening,

the latter seems to be a more feasible approach since

any change to the aircraft structure would require

significant airworthiness recertification efforts and

costs.

The susceptibility of modern aircraft to fatal

damage by explosives has been under study at the

FAA for some time. However, this effort has so far

been primarily an empirical approach. In particular,

aircraft have been tested by exploding various

quantities of explosives in diverse locations to

attempt to determine a least-damage location on

board the aircraft, as well as to find the minimum

quantity of explosive that could cause catastrophic

damage in flight. Unfortunately, such tests are

usually nonflying, static tests and they involve many

variables (location of bomb, types of surrounding

baggage, etc.). Exploring the effects of all these

variables would take an inordinate amount of tests

and would thus be impractical.

In 1990, the FAA Technical Center conducted a

3-day meeting to discuss and plan a new program to

evaluate the potential of these techniques. The result

of this meeting has been the development of a

multiyear plan of attack on the problem of aircraft

hardening to resist in-flight explosions.22 The report

has been submitted to the administrator for approval.

A key ingredient of this new program is a strong

analytical effort to adapt and apply currently existing computer codes, both for the effect of the

explosion (e.g., several DOD-developed codes or

DOE’s LASNIX) and for the structural response

(e.g., NASA’s NASTRAN) to the problem. Use of

such numerical simulation is a vital addition to the

lgsome filfies, no~bly NOfiW@ and Trans World, are now implementing such SYStems.

%I%eWhiteHouse, Report of the President’s Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, (Washington DC: The White House, May 15, 1990),

p. 66, mcommendation5: “The FAA should conduct research to develop the means of minimizing airframe damage that may be caused by small amounts

of explosives.”

zlNatio~ Academy of Sciences, Committee on Commercial Aviation Security, op. cit., footnote 1, pp. S-5.

22Dep~ent of Tr~po~tio~ Fedm~ Av~tion AWs@ation Twbni~ Center, Aviation secu~”fy Research and Development Plan for Aircraft

Hardening (Washingto~ DC: Federal Aviation Administration, August 1990).
Chapter 4-Aviation Security: Aspects of Integrated Security for Commercial Air Travel ● 67

FAA program. Such codes, combined with carefully

designed calibration tests to anchor them to reality,

will be of use in defining the problem and synthesizing possible countermeasures.

The last line of defense against an airline terrorist

is the aircraft itself. Although the design and

operating environment of a passenger airliner (lightweight structure, sensitive controls, pressurized

fuselage) make it very vulnerable to internal detonations, there are potential ways to limit explosive

damage. Possibilities include the containing, controlled venting, or the absorption of explosive shock

waves and gas pressures. By raising the minimum

quantity of explosives needed to destroy an aircraft,

hardening could complement airport-based passenger and baggage screening technologies, since the

detection probability of all devices increases with

the amount of target explosive, and the concomitant

use of higher detection thresholds would also reduce

the false alarm rate.

The British Department of Transport, following

its investigation of the Lockerbie incident, recommended that government authorities, aircraft manufacturers, and other interested parties “undertake a

systematic study with a view to identifying measures

that might mitigate the effects of explosive devices

and improve the tolerance of aircraft structure and

systems to explosive damage. ’ ’23

This report was able to rely on an unusually

complete analysis, because the accident occurred

over land and a large fraction of all the parts involved

in the explosion were recovered and reconstructed.

The investigation found that there were at least three

separate effects that contributed to the loss of the

aircraft. First, the direct or blast damage, resulting in

a relatively small hole (the shattered region was only

45 to 50 centimeters) through the skin of the

fuselage; second, the propagation of cracks emanating from this jagged hole to distances as large as 12

meters, which were driven both by the blast pressure

and by the aerodynamic forces on the peeled back

skin; and finally, further skin ruptures, driven by

overpressure from the blast and from gas dynamic

shock propagation through open passages between

the skin and the baggage containers (and other

ducts), which occurred at large distances away from

the hole. These latter shock waves finally met

obstructions that created local areas of high overpressure due to shock reflections. According to the

British analysis, it was the combined phenomena of

these forces that led to the disintegration of the

aircraft. Other investigators, however, remain skeptical as to the importance of distant shock wave

propagation within the fuselage and feel that static

pressure was the principal cause of the catastrophic

failure. The issue may be resolvable by further

testing. The British report indicated that the failure

was a complex process and was specific to the local

geometry.

Explosive devices of the size used in airline

terrorist events to date are deadly not because they

directly cause catastrophic failure (i.e., blow the

aircraft to pieces) but because they start a domino

effect where the aircraft destroys itself. Possible

scenarios include:

●

●

●

the explosion blows several holes in the skin, as

described above, in such a way that they are

opened further by pressurization or aerodynamic forces until the aircraft structure fails;

the explosion destroys critical components

causing safe control to be lost; and

material ejected from a hole caused by an

explosion damages critical aircraft components.

Some technological options discussed in the U.K.

report (and elsewhere) include:

●

●

●

●

modifying cargo containers to absorb shock

waves, prevent fragmentation, and vent overpressures to prescribed pathways;

adding cargo bay liners to keep fragments from

penetrating the cabin floor or fuselage;

incorporating blow-out panels on the fuselage

at container vent positions to control skin

ruptures and limit skin tearing;

closing cavities and pathways that exist between cargo containers and inside aircraft

structures (e.g., between floor beams); such

cavities can serve as conduits for shock waves

and supersonic gas flows, permitting damage at

aircraft locations far removed from the explosion site; the U.K. investigation decided that

cavities played a role in the Lockerbie incident;

and

~Dep~ent of TI~pOfi (United I@@@, Air Accidents Investigation Branc& Aircraft Accident Repo~ February 1990: Report on rheAccident

to Boeing 747-121, N739PA at Lockerbie, Dun@-iesshire, Scotland on 21 December 1988, p. 58.
68 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

. using energy-absorbing material (e.g., in the

cavities) to attenuate shock waves.

These options entail numerous cost and engineering problems, including design difficulties stemming from the potential variations in charge size,

location within the aircraft, and the nature of the

materials in the immediate vicinity of the charge.24

The combination of engineering and recertification

efforts required to structurally modify a commercial

transport would likely make most of these options

prohibitively expensive. Moreover, some of these

options would add to the aircraft weight or reduce

cargo and passenger loads, in either case reducing

profits by cutting revenue or increasing fuel costs.

These options will be more practical in the distant

future, if they can be incorporated in aircraft during

the design process. The FAA is examining this

option.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

The FAA has researched the effects of explosives

on aircraft in the past, with the focus on where to

place an explosive device discovered onboard an

aircraft during flight to minimize the catastrophic

potential. Also, tests were done on baggage containers to estimate the size of the explosive charge used

on Pan Am 103. Recently, FAA held a conference to

discuss R&D into examining the aircraft hardening

issue. A program along these lines has been implemented at the FAA Technical Center. The following

points emphasize the cooperation with outside

experts that can be brought to bear in the problem:

●

●

Coordination with military researchers and

engineers is valuable (survivability studies

have been done on virtually all military aircraft—

data on transports would be applicable to

airlines). FAA is proceeding to investigate the

issue of aircraft vulnerability and hardening in

cooperation with the Air Force’s Wright Aeronautical Laboratories, the Naval Surface Weapons Center, and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. Experimentation with

explosives tests is continuing.

Aircraft manufacturers also have expertise and

technology to address explosive decompression problems, although they are reluctant to

discuss it; FAA issued contracts during the

●

1980s to aircraft manufacturers to analyze the

optimal on-board location to place a discovered

bomb (to minimize potential damage) for each

aircraft type flown by U.S. airlines.

Coordination with FAA aircraft certification

officials and airline maintenance and engineering people would be advisable in attacking this

problem, so that the R&D efforts focus on

concepts that have the hope of economic

feasibility.

The FAA is currently assembling its research

and development program in aircraft hardening

and survivability and is cooperating with aircraft

manufacturers in applying computer codes on

structural failure to the problem of on-board

explosions. 25

BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL

DEFENSES

The confined space and recirculated airflow

within airliners could increase the effectiveness of

chemical or biological agents. Many (although not

all) biological agents take many hours to produce

symptoms. However, chemical attacks as well as

attacks with very fast-working biological agents

could well be a terrorist option. Few possibilities

exist for dealing with this problem beyond attempting to detect the agents when being brought on

board-and this would be difficult to do. For

aerosols, a separate air system for the flight deck to

insulate the flying crew from the effects of the gas

would be one tactic. Controlled, but rapid, depressurization in the cabin, to be followed by repressurization, might mitigate effects on the passengers.

ACCESS CONTROL AND

EMPLOYEE SECURITY AT

AIRPORTS

Access Control

On December 7, 1987, a recently dismissed

Pacific Southwest Airlines employee used an ID

badge (which was not collected upon his dismissal)

to circumvent security checkpoints and board a

flight. While the flight was enroute he shot both the

pilot and copilot, resulting in a crash and the death

of all 43 people on board. One Federal response was
Chapter 4-Aviation Security: Aspects of Integrated Security for Commercial Air Travel ● 69

a rule26 that emphasizes technological solutions to

the problem of unauthorized access. Each commercial airport operator is required to implement a

“system, method, or procedure’ that ensures that

only authorized persons have access to secured areas

of the airport. While the rule does not specify the

technology choice, FAA’s intent was that airports

install computer-controlled card access systems.

Airports and airlines have found fault with this

rule since its initial proposal in March 1988. The

main concern of the airports is avoiding FAA

enforcement penalties. Institutional problems (coordiation between FAA and other Federal agencies

that must operate at airports-Customs, INS, Agriculture; FAA regional differences; state and local

employment and privacy laws) cause many of the

security management difficulties for airports. Airline management and pilots are concerned that the

hodgepodge of airport access/control systems being

deployed in response to the rule will hamper

operations and raise the fees airlines must pay for

airport services. Issues include how to deal with

itinerant aircrews (single access card for whole crew

used at some airports, escorts used at others-airline

control of airport badges); overlap of some airline

‘‘exclusive use areas”; need for some form of a

national system-one proposal was a $15 million

communication system to handle transient aircrews

for all domestic airports but this was rejected

because airports are unwilling to pay for transient

benefits.

Some sections of the FAA recognized that problems could arise from incompatible access systems

used at multiple airports-in an early version of the

rule, FAA inspectors (who travel to many different

airports as part of their duties) would have been

allowed to circumvent computer-card security systems. Vehement airport and airline protests caused

the FAA to drop this provision.

Passenger airlines already accomplish a significant access control function-passenger and baggage screening. But cargo airlines are not covered

under the same security rules as passenger carriers

(14 CFR 108) and consequently cannot be given

security authority like the passenger carriers. Therefore the airport must remain responsible for security

at cargo facilities, increasing the difficulties in

meeting 14 CFR 107.14 access control requirements, a problem for both the airport and the airline.

Background Checks

An additional problem lies in the difficulties

associated with checking on the backgrounds of

airport employees with access to sensitive areas. The

Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990 permits

airport authorities or airlines to check on the

backgrounds of prospective employees, who would

have access to aircraft. However, authorization is

given only to receive information on convictions for

certain serious felonies, such as murder, robbery,

and rape, that transpired during the previous 10

years. Records of convictions for other crimes or

earlier convictions would not be available to the

employer.

Currently, up to 90 days are needed for this

information to arrive from the Federal Bureau of

Investigation. A prospective job applicant may not

always be willing to wait this long before accepting

a job, which makes it harder to hire. If the applicant

were hired in the interim, dismissal after 90 days on

receipt of a bad record might induce the individual

to use the knowledge acquired to sabotage airport

operations. Further, the records are sometimes up to

2 years out of date. Such delays can, in principle, be

remedied. For instance, new hires at Baltimore/

Washington International Airport have their records

in the State of Maryland checked in a matter of

minutes. It would be possible to improve on the

current nationwide system, at least for a subset of

reporting States.

A further problem is the question of current

employees. If someone has worked at an airport for

years and proved reliable, should a past conviction

require termination? Currently, all present employees must be investigated. If nothing else, this will

create an enormous backlog in background checks.

Some decisions may need to be made on circumstances in which employees of long and good

standing might be permitted to remain without

undergoing such checks.

To improve airline security and implement an

integrated security system, it would be desirable

to check in a better fashion on the trustworthiness

of employees with access to aircraft. This might

mean checking for more than just serious felony

2614 ~107.14.
70 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

convictions (although complete background investigations, such as now done for those with jobs that

require access to national security information,

would probably be impractical). For example, other

felony convictions or serious misdemeanor convictions could be relevant. Even if a person has no

violent history, past dishonesty could raise questions

of susceptibility to bribery or blackmail. This

situation could be used by terrorists as part of a plan

to sabotage aircraft.

To reduce negative impacts on individual

privacy, a clearinghouse might be established to

receive information on individuals, with only the

minimum necessary data passed on to the employer.

Finally, steps must be taken to speed the

process for accomplishing the checks.

THE ROLE OF HUMANS IN

PROFILING AND SCREENING

Chapter 5 contains a detailed description of

human factors and their role in airline security. This

section presents a summary of some contributions

that this field can make in the specific areas of

security profiling and screening at airports.

According to the Presidential Commission on

Aviation Security and Terrorism, human factors in

the implementation of an airline security system

have not received the attention that they deserve.27

OTA concurs with this observation. A major application of human factors concerns the type of

personnel (and their responsibilities and training)

utilized in the security system. In the United States,

they are often minimally trained, unmotivated,

minimum wage personnel, usually working for a

contract security services firm, performing boring

and repetitive work in a very low-threat-frequency

environment. On the other hand, the Israeli model

relies heavily on maximum human involvement by

a highly trained and motivated force. It is generally

agreed from the investigations of the Pan Am 103

accident that better use of security personnel is in

order.28

The most controversial use of security personnel

is in the screening or profiling process that is used to

determine which passengers constitute a potential

threat and therefore should be given greater scrutiny.

However, human factors are also a major factor in

the selection and even the design of detection

systems (i.e., whether they should be totally automatic, as required by the current FAA EDS rule) and

in specifying the degree of automation and human

interaction desired. Techniques currently under development, such as the pattern recognition discussed

above, can sharpen the attention of screeners in the

x-ray image observation process.

When it comes to screening or profiling passengers, the techniques employed by the security

division at Ben Gurion Airport in Israel are probably

the most stringent. In fact, selection criteria for

extended interviews used in Israel could probably

not be used in the United States. At this airport,

which has just under 20 percent of the international

enplanements that occur at Kennedy Airport in New

York, a highly motivated and well-trained security

force of mostly college-age personnel perform a

personal, in-depth interview and profile evaluation.

The profiling depends on the travel documents (the

airline tickets and passports) plus responses to a set

of questions, but most importantly, the integrity of

the security system depends on the observations and

the personal initiative of the highly trained staff. The

aim of this process is to eliminate a large fraction of

the passengers, who do not appear to represent any

possible threat, from the time-consuming, thorough

search process and to select only that small segment

of the passengers who for any reason present some

suspicions for such a search. The other passengers

are allowed to proceed through security with a

minimum of surveillance and only a few questions

about their checked baggage. However, there is a

further, last-minute positive baggage match of all

passengers and all checked luggage at the entry point

to the aircraft. No flight leaves with a piece of

unaccompanied baggage that has not been thoroughly searched for weapons, explosives, or other

contraband.

A number of U.S. airlines (e.g., American, Trans

World, and Pan American) have employed Israeli

consultants with knowledge of these techniques to

devise similar programs, tailored for their operations, as well as to train their personnel. The standard

2TThe white House, the President’s Commission on Aviation Security and TerrorisnL op. cit., footnote 21, p. 122: “The FM must take tie lead in

stressing the role of human factors in the security equatiow training must be improved. ”

~See, for e~ple, the white Howe, the President’s Commission on Aviation Securi& and Terrorism, Op. cit., footnote 21.
Chapter 4-Aviation Security: Aspects of Integrated Security for Commercial Air Travel ● 71

argument against the Israeli approach is that it is too

expensive (22 percent of the Ben Gurion Airport

operating budget goes to security), that it is too

time-consumin g (passengers are requested to be at

the airport 2 to 3 hours prior to departure time), and

that it is too disruptive. Most of the consultants are

attempting to devise systems that will overcome

these shortcomings without compromising the quality of security.

The FAA has been experimenting with a semiautomated profiling system, the Comprehensive

Passenger Screening Profile (CPSP), in which the

security person keys the answers (yes/no only) to a

set of 7 questions into a portable computer terminal,

which then compares the answers against a database

and produces a risk assessment. The operator uses

the results to dispose of the case. The system

constantly adds new data to an original, intelligencebased, database of the profiles of threatening passengers for future use by both the airlines and the FAA.

The FAA is considering making the CPSP mandatory for all U.S. airlines, and, as an incentive to the

airlines, the FAA has offered to assume liability for

failure to detect: airlines can blame the FAA if the

system fails to detect an actual security threat.

However, some airlines have objected to sharing

their passenger profile data with the FAA.

The incorporation of an effective profiling

system into an overall security system could

eliminate a large number of passengers from

further screening. To date, the FAA has considered profiling apart from the overall security

process and has not included it in considering the

performance requirements of detection equipment. In fact, the definition of the screening system

has been handled by the FAA Aviation Security

Division intelligence group, quite separate from

those responsible for security R&D. Profiling makes

slower, more complex detection systems more

interesting in high-traffic situations, where they

could not possibly handle all the items arriving at the

check-in counter. Incorporation of profiling is another argument against setting throughput standards

for detection equipment at the R&D stage. The

Xenis EDS at Gatwick Airport near London, has

been used with a profiling system that requires only

a small fraction of the baggage to be viewed by the

TNA.

Human-factors design has also proven useful in

the process of heightening the attention of security

personnel operating repetitive and boring tasks such

as viewing the x-ray images. One vendor (EG&GAstrophysics) has produced a false alarm data

package (a cassette or disk) that randomly superimposes various threat objects on the images of

luggage on the viewing screen.29 The operator can

attempt to clear the threat by pressing a key if he/she

recognizes it (the program clears the threat unless it

is real). An operator who fails to do so can be

disciplined. This technique can also be used as a

positive reward system for all threats “caught.”

The degree of automation that is demanded of a

detection system is another human engineering

consideration that must be considered at the design

or even system conception stage. The human brain

can often be the most powerful discriminator,

especially when well-trained personnel are involved.

The use of an automatic system to alert the human

operator of a suspicious situation is a powerful tool.

This is actually the way in which the Xenis was used

in the tests at Kennedy Airport. There was always an

operator who made the decision whether to call the

passenger to open the bag when the Xenis signals

showed an alarm. In this way the automatic system

is used to counter a major human fallibility, lack of

attentiveness, rather than replacing the humans. At

the Gatwick tests, however, if the machine alarms,

the operator cannot overrule it, and the bag is

automatically given careful scrutiny by security

personnel, usually including a hand search.

COMBINED USE OF SEVERAL

DETECTORS WITH PROFILING

Choosing a practical architecture of detectors to

provide the best possible security system is an

important challenge. Such an analysis should be

performed for various levels of detector technology:

current state-of-the-art, likely near-term capability,

and long-term potential.

A problem with such an effort is that the necessary

performance data on various candidate sensors is not

available, and consequently any such effort must, at

this time, depend on guesswork and conjecture.

However, even an attempt to perform such an

analysis would be informative.

z9This Wm tided Wdm tie FM Small Business Innovative Research program.
72 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

Appendix C of the National Academy of Sciences

study presented a hypothetical example of a detector

system architecture for illustration. It focused on the

cost of the overall system but left out the connection

to possible solutions that may meet the requirements

of the various stages.

The following discussion is not meant to provide an optimal architecture for a combined

explosives detector system. It is only an example

presented for purposes of illustration.

From a systems point of view, the sensitivity

always gets worse in any cascade of detectors and

only the false alarm problem can be improved by the

repeated use of AND gates (see discussion in section

on statistics, above). It has been generally accepted

that the overall detection probability of any chosen

system should be high (at least 0.85, or so). This

means that the individual detector Pd

’s must be very

high, higher than 0.90, in order to yield this overall

system performance. Three stages, each of Pd = 0.90

would result in an overall Pdc of only 0.73, which

might not be considered acceptable.

It follows that, for several stages operated as an

AND gate, it would be desirable to use individual

detectors with detection probabilities that are close

to perfect, on the order of 0.98 to 0.99. There is

currently nothing known that can claim such sensitivity, the R&D programs are not even directed at

achieving such a high value, and current test

protocols are not capable of determiningg whether

such a value has actually been achieved. On the false

alarm side, the objective of a combined system

should be to bring the need for final hand search

down to a number of bags that can be handled by one

or several security personnel per given station.

Allowing for 5 minutes per hand search, one should

thus look for systems that would not require more

than 12 to 24 bags per hour to be hand searched per

station. In a situation with very high throughput,

such as exists at some of the major international

airlines at Kennedy Airport where the throughput

can be as high as 4,000 bags per hour, this would

require an overall false alarm rate of about 0.5

percent. It is interesting to note that three independent stages, each operating at a false alarm rate of

about 20 percent would almost be able to meet this

requirement (0.8 percent v. 0.5 percent).

A possible system might thus theoretically consist of three different stages of detection equipment

all operating with Pd approximately 0.97 and Fa

about 0.20. The first would be a high-throughput

stage (this stage may have to be a number of parallel

inexpensive detectors), the second stage could be of

more moderate speed and possibly somewhat more

expensive, and the last stage could be quite slow and

possibly expensive, since a single unit should suffice

due to the smaller number of bags handled. It is

worth repeating that the multiple detector approach

puts the strain on achieving very high sensitivity

(high Pd

) at each stage, while allowing for much

more relaxed false alarm criteria than if a single

stage of detection is utilized. It is not clear how close

this ideal will be approached in the foreseeable

future.

The characteristics of the frost-stage screening

detector are very critical since it must handle the

largest throughput of luggage. In a high-throughput

situation, such as encountered by some of the major

airlines at the major gateways, this is a demanding

requirement. The candidate detectors for this use

should be as inexpensive as possible, since it is

likely that many or several parallel detectors maybe

required to handle the traffic. For instance, the FAA

requirement of a throughput of 600 bags per hour for

the EDS still would demand as many as 5 to 10

systems in high traffic. This strongly argues against

the use of expensive systems such as the SAIC/TNA

as a first stage.

Probably the primary candidate for a first-stage

screen is a well-designed, thorough, profiling system operated by motivated, well-trained security

personnel. Profiling systems typically identify a few

percent of the sample as potentially threatening and

requiring further investigation (the actual percentage

is very situation- and process-sensitive). It is extremely difficult to identify a quantitative detection

probability and false alarm rate for a profiling

system.

Another measure, which is not specifically a

detection stage but should be a part of any overall

system, is a foolproof, positive, passenger/baggage

match for all boarded passengers to prevent the

shipment of any unaccompanied baggage (unless

baggage separated from passengers-e. g., by airline

error-is subject to specific stringent security measures). Such a system would raise the stakes for any

terrorist group, by isolating the potential threat to

dupes who do not realize that they are carrying a

bomb, or suicidal terrorists who are willing to

sacrifice their own lives.
Chapter 4-Aviation Security: Aspects of Integrated Security for Commercial Air Travel ● 73

When it comes to existing detection hardware,

advanced x-ray imaging systems will probably be a

significant component of any integrated security

detection system. Included among the advanced

x-ray concepts for consideration should probably be

the T-ScanTM(dual-energy, dual-view), Z-ScanTM

(backscatter) systems, and probably other similar

systems including those that emphasize pattern

recognition. These systems all have some ability to

detect masses of materials with low atomic number

that could be explosives but could also be many

other common materials. They should be effective in

identifying electronic hardware, which have been

popular hiding places for explosives in the past. A

recent assessment of the capability of certain of

these systems for this specific purpose has been

conducted by the FAA Technical Center.30

Currently, the performance of these systems when

used in realistic environments is not known. It is

quite possible that the specificity of these systems is

quite high, but the false alarm rate is a completely

unknown factor. How many suitcases contain some

sort of electronic equipment that would require the

security inspectors to take a second look? How many

other objects with low atomic number would be

mistaken as explosives? Could the false alarm rate of

such a system be kept in the 20-percent range?

Some advanced x-ray systems, such as the American Science and Engineering (AS&E) Z-ScanTM

concept, could be particularly sensitive to the

popular terrorist technique of lining a standard

suitcase with a thin layer of Detasheet-like explosives inside the normal lining. The Z-ScanTM has

somewhat limited penetration capability but is very

effective at or near the surface facing the x-ray

source, and consequently, with its double-sided

illumination, it should be especially sensitive to

explosives hidden in the lining.

There has been some recent interest in coupling

vapor detection sniffers with advanced x-ray systems used in the above manner to detect electronics

and other threatening masses. In this coupling, the

sniffer is used only on those items identified by the

x-ray system as presenting a potential threat. Thus

the vapor sniffer has the specific role of detecting

explosive particles or vapors on electronic components and of differentiating low-Z (low atomic

weight) masses that are made of harmless materials.

Any vapor detector, no matter how good, is always

susceptible to the technique of sealing the explosives

in impervious wrappers; however, there has been

great controversy about the practicability for terrorists to achieve this level of cleanliness.

A candidate for the final detection screen could be

the x-ray CT scanner currently being developed by

Imatron. With the CT scheme, it is possible to

determine the mass density of each volume element

due to the many cuts being taken through the same

element. This knowledge, combined with the excellent spatial resolution inherent in the CT system,

allows for a automated identification of masses that

have both the correct density and a suspicious shape.

Further, the suspect region identified automatically

can be viewed by the operator in a three-dimensional

reconstruction from various aspects. Although the

ability of this scheme to identify unambiguously the

various candidate explosives has not yet been

demonstrated quantitatively, the primary shortcoming of this scheme is the questionable speed of the

system. The speed is a function of the time required

to achieve one slice through the suspect object as

well as the number of slices required to achieve the

needed resolution for three-dimensional reconstruction.

Currently, the prototype system at Imatron requires about 6 seconds per viewed slice of l-cm

thickness, with the promise of being able to reduce

this to 2 to 3 seconds. The number of slices required

is a more subjective issue and depends also on what

information is available before the CT scanner is

utilized. In one current scenario, an advanced x-ray

system might indicate the presence of a suspicious

mass in one quadrant of a luggage piece, thus

allowing the search to be conducted over a restricted

predetermined area. If one then assumes that 6 to 10

slices are required (there are no published data on

this question), it follows that current technology

might require about 1 minute per bag, while there is

hope for reducing this time to 10 to 15 seconds. In

a third stage detection application, where the flow of

baggage may have been reduced to roughly 4 percent

of the total throughput, one device may be able to

handle the high-throughput requirement of most of

the high-traffic airports (i.e., operate at about 1 or 2

~At tis writing tie reSUItS of this assessment have not been publicly released by the FAA, but it is understood that the vendors tive been info~ti

as to the FAA assessment of the performance of their hardware.
74 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

bags per minute). Such a system may leave very few

bags to be opened for hand inspection.

It is also possible that the current SAIC/TNA

system could serve the purpose of the third stage

detector in a multistage detection system. Since the

throughput of a third-stage system could be relatively modest even for highest traffic use, it maybe

possible to achieve somewhat better performance by

slowing down the SAIC/TNA system from its

current 6-seconds-per-bag goal.

From the above discussion, it maybe possible to

synthesize a multistage explosives detection system,

based on current or near-term technology, by guessing reasonable performance values for the systems

used where the data are not available. First, the

system should have a positive passenger/baggage

match for each flight segment, which, however, does

not affect the performance. The first detection stage

could be profiling with a false alarm rate of 0.05. The

main shortcoming of the use of profiling at this

position in the system is that it is not the ideal, cheap

stage, since the personnel requirements, and consequently cost, for this process are high. Furthermore,

its detection probability is unknown.

In addition, the first stage could contain an

advanced x-ray system, automated to respond to

low-Z masses and electronic hardware. It is possible

that such a system might operate with high detection

probability, but would have a significant false alarm

rate, perhaps 0.20. The cost of the x-ray system

could be between $50,000 and $200,000 each. For

the purposes of this analysis, the assumption of a

0.90 Pd is used.

All items alarming the first stage would be passed

to a second stage, which could be a vapor detector.

The vapor detectors could be collocated with the

x-ray system or could take the luggage from several

such stations. Vapor detectors might operate at a

relatively high Pd and a false alarm rate of 0.20,

provided that the luggage had been previously

screened by the x-ray system. Again, for the sake of

the argument, the optimistic assumption of a Pd of

0.95 is made. Vapor detectors that show some

promise are on the market now. There is considerable variation in their cost: $50,000 to $150,000 per

station is an approximate range.

The final stage could be an Imatron CT scanner.

If enough time were available and enough cuts are

taken, the detection probability of this system might

be very high, say 0.95 to 0.98, while the false alarm

rate could be quite moderate. An estimate for this

discussion is 0.10. The CT scanner would probably

cost about $500,000 to $700,000.

In a high-traffic situation (like TWA at Kennedy

Airport) of about 3,000-4,000 bags per hour, such a

system might consist of one to three Imatron CTs

(depending on whether they can process one or two

bags per minute), which would result in about 10-15

bags per hour being hand searched. The secondstage devices would need to handle 150 to 800 bags

per hour (depending on whether the first stage is a

profile or an x-ray system). If we assume that a vapor

detector requires 30 seconds per bag, three to seven

such detectors would be required.

The first-stage x-ray detectors have a fairly high

throughput. Current systems can easily handle 600

bags per hour. If we assume that the data processing

will not slow down the systems, it might take about

six of these systems to handle the high traffic.

As far as cost is concerned, using the lower range

figures, this complete station would cost about

$1,00,000 in equipment, while the upper end might

be as high as about $4,000,000. This would be less

than the cost for 19 TNA machines (probably over

$20 million for capital costs), thought necessary for

Kennedy Airport in the absence of other technologies for explosives detection. The overall detection

probability, Pdc, would be 0.81 to 0.84. The false

alarm rate would be 0.004 (if all devices were

statistically uncorrelated, which is probably not

strictly true). Although we have had to assume the

performance values used in this example, it does

give hope that respectable detection performance

might be achieved with near-term hardware.

An improvement on this technique (see figure

4-2) would be to begin with an OR gate, combining

profiling and the first x-ray screen. An alarm on

either technique (or both) would send the bag on to

the more sophisticated detectors. That way, failure

by either profiling or x-ray alone would not cause the

system to fail as a whole. The x-ray device might be

a backscatter machine, or a refined dual-energy

system. Both types of detectors react to high-density

items of low atomic weight, like high explosives.

The advantage of x-ray systems over TNA for a first

stage is in the cost, which is a factor of 5 to 10 less.

The detection probability for profiling is unknown; it is certainly greater than zero. The Murphy
Chapter 4-Aviation Security: Aspects of Integrated Security for Commercial Air Travel ● 75

Figure 4-2—Notional System Combining Different Explosives Detection Technologies

Profiling

p d .0.5 0

F a ■ 0.0 5 L. P d ■ 0.9 5

F a ■ 0.2 4

P d ■ 0.9 0 System Pd = 0.86

F a ■ 0.0 5 System Fa ■ 0.01

X-ray

P d ■ 0 . 9

Fa

■ 0 . 2

Vapor r

pd 9 0.95

F~ ■ 0.2 0

Large system

pd - 0.95

F a ■ 0.2 0

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

case in London-among others-where an El Al

security agent discovered, through interviewing and

then examination, a bomb placed in an unsuspecting

woman’s carry-on luggage by her terrorist boyfriend, attests to that. It is certainly less than 1.0,

evident through common sense and through some

experiences that have indicated the rare passage of

bombs through a careful profiling system. By using

an “OR” gate between profiling and a good

mechanical system, the system would scrutinize a

bag that fails either technique, resulting in a

detection probability greater than that of either

alone.

As an example, if the x-ray system had a detection

probability of 0.90 and the profiling one of 0.50, the

combined system would have a probability of 0.95

= (0.90+ 0.50– 0.90 * 0.50);31 if the profile has a

better detection probability, say 0.80, the overall

probability is better, too-O.98; and if the profiling

doesn’t work at all, the system still retains a

0.90-detection probability. The false alarm rate of

the profiling is set by the user, generally at 0.02 to

0.05. If the false alarm rate of the x-ray device were

high (say, 0.20) the combined false alarm rate would

be 0.22 to 0.24. This would mean that 22 to 24

percent of the luggage would proceed to the next

level of scrutiny.

Following this stage, one could add another stage

with a totally different technology, say, a vapor

(e.g., TNA, CT)

detector, which would be especially appropriate for

carry-on baggage. In this context, assume, again

optimistically, that the vapor detector had a detection probability as high as 0.95 with a false alarm

rate of 0.20. Finally, one might add a TNA or a

computerized tomography system. Assume for this

system as well a detection probability of 0.95 and a

false alarm rate of 0.20. These numbers are consistent with or more conservative than earlier proposed

FAA criteria for acceptability of single explosives

detection systems. The combined detection probability of the system is relatively high (0.86, assuming

only 50 percent effectiveness of profiling and the

false alarm rate is low (about 1 percent). Excessive

reliance on one technology (the first-stage x-ray)

would be reduced using OR gates with profiling.32

CARGO AND AIRMAIL

To be complete, a security system would have to

protect against bombs being brought aboard aircraft

through the cargo route. At least two countries,

Switzerland and Israel, currently employ a variety of

techniques to counter this eventuality. These include

delaying shipment of packages and exposing them to

the altitude profile of the flight by subjecting them

to depressurization, extra use of x-ray equipment for

examining packages with care, and special equipment for probing packages that are suspect. Switzerland also has special equipment for examinin g mail

31This assllrnes that there is no correlation between the two techniques, profding and x-rays, as ap p

32Ag~ ws ass~es a perfect si~tiorl in Which there k no correlation among the different detection systems. ‘l’his *IIOt be hUe, d~OUgh tie

correlation will often be quite small, so the combined probabilities and false alarm rates should be close to the theoretical ones cited in the text.
76 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

bound for “high-risk” destinations, such as the

United States and other Gulf War Coalition countries. Special x-ray equipment and other means of

examining packages are used.

In the United States, where the volume of air

traffic is much larger than in the above two

countries, the FAA is considering several possibilities for increasing security of air cargo. One approach would be to require forwarders to open and

inspect shipments from sources unfamiliar to them.

In addition, FAA now requires that international

shipments to the United States handled by on-board

couriers be x-rayed before the couriers board the

aircraft. During the Gulf War, the U.S. Postal

Service shifted all mail, except for the smallest

parcels, to all-freight flights. In another development, British Airways is planning to install x-ray

machines at U.S. gateway airports to check small

and express shipments for explosive devices.

SUMMARY AND COMMENTS

The fundamental problem in explosives detection

is to design an EDS that has acceptable detection

probability and false alarms rate but does not unduly

inconvenience travelers. One approach is to combine detectors based on different phenomenologies

to provide independent assessments of whether

items boarding an aircraft contain explosives. A

suggestion for such a system has been presented.

The need for a detailed systems study to optimize

such a system has been recognized by the FAA

Technical Center and a research program to this end

is underway.

An approach synergistic with the first is to harden

aircraft, raising the amount of explosives needed by

the terrorist, and making detection correspondingly

easier for counterterrorist systems. Research in this

direction is being pursued; first indications of the

promise of this line of work will not be known for at

least a year or two.

In addition to detecting explosives brought aboard

by passengers in checked or carry-on baggage, a

complete system would have to prevent passengers

from carrying explosives on their persons and to

prevent explosives from being hidden among cargo

or secreted on the aircraft by personnel with

unescorted access to aircraft. Some vapor detectors,

x-ray microdose, or radiofrequency methods of

explosives detection may solve the problem of

explosives carried by passengers. As for mail and

cargo, the bulk methods of detection (x-ray and

nuclear) could be engineered for this application at

current levels of technology. Also, delay and depressurization of cargo (as done in Switzerland and

Israel—following the altitude and time profile of the

specified flight) could be used to detonate cargo

bombs in bunkers on the ground. Wider systems

studies, such as those being done at Baltimore/

Washington International Airport, would also help

in solving these problems.

Finally, in designing security systems, it would

be advisable to “red team” individual devices

and entire systems. That is, the FAA might

arrange for outside experts to consider how a

device or system might be circumvented, to assess

the ease of doing so, and to consider countermeasures against circumvention. This information

would be helpful both for the FAA and any outside

testing evaluators33 in deciding what kinds of

systems are acceptable, and for airport operators and

airlines to understand better their security capabilities.
Chapter 5

Human Factors in Aviation Security
Contents

Page

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Background on Human Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

FAA AND HUMAN FACTORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

FAA Policy and Plans for Human Factors and Aviation Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

FAA Requirements for Aviation Security: Human-Factors Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

Other Issues for Human Factors and Profiling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

Policy Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

Box

Box Page

5-A. UAL Hi-Tech Screening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Chapter 5

Human Factors in Aviation Security

INTRODUCTION

Human resources are critical to aviation security.

Security personnel—passenger and baggage screeners, guards and law enforcement officers, and airport

and airline employees in general-are important

elements of a system that prevents and deters hostile

acts against air carriers. Technology can enhance,

but cannot replace, the capabilities of these people

and the many services they provide. Moreover,

management practices based on behavioral research

findings can further improve human performance.

This chapter considers the function of screeners in

weapons and explosives detection, and the role of

guards, officers, and other aviation employees in

discovering (and deterring) suspicious individuals

or situations. Within the past 20 years, technology

has greatly increased the capability and productivity

of these security people. Metal detectors and x-ray

devices are faster, more accurate, and more socially

acceptable tools for screening passengers and baggage than manual searches. Remote television and

other monitoring devices, computer-controlled access to restricted areas, and communication and data

systems allow comprehensive surveillance and

threat assessment. While these technologies raise the

capabilities of a security system to new levels, their

ultimate success and actual performance depend on

the people who design, operate, and maintain them.

Many security assignments require repetitive

tasks and close monitoring for rare events—

functions that humans perform poorly. Selecting

well-suited individuals, training them properly,

designing their work environment and rotation

schedule to elicit the best possible performance, and

providing motivating incentives are fundamental

requirements for successful operations, regardless of

the type of technology in place. These functions

involve human performance; application of human

factors in these cases can greatly improve the

utilization of technology for airline security.

Dramatic accidents caused by human errors in the

nuclear power, chemical, and transportation industries have increased public attention to human

performance issues during the past decade. Additional training requirements, revised operating

procedures, warning devices, and expanded government oversight are typical recommendations following accident investigations. However, these stopgap measures address only the surface of problems

that are rooted in the complex interactions of people

and equipment within the larger system and the

institutional and organizational structures and procedures that drive the planning, design, and management of these systems. Following the ground collision of two jetliners in Detroit in December 1990,

Dr. John Lauber, a member of the National Transportation Board, said that “basically the [aviation]

system, the way we’re operating it, almost demands

nearly error-free [human] performance. ’ Similar

concerns can be echoed for the aviation security

system—a number of successful airline terrorist

events have been traced to a human failure.2 “The

challenge is to design a system. . which is tolerant

of those errors when they do occur and which detects

and traps them before we have [a catastrophe]. ”3

Multilayered defenses are employed at many commercial airports and airline terminals, and security

managers and government authorities are turning to

new technologies to buttress these systems. Heretofore, Federal requirements and industry use of

security technologies have usually been with specific functions in mind. As long as the technical

goals could be met effectively, the equipment was

considered satisfactory and human performance

problems related to the technology were resolved

through revised training and procedures. Technology use in counterterrorism will likely increase

dramatically over the next decade, but if early and

IJohn Lauber quoted by John H. Cushmau Jr., “Test for Aviation: Coping with Human Shortcomings,” The New York Times, Dec. 10, 1990,

p. A17.

~ne example was the destruction of a Korean Air Lines flight over the Andaman Sea by a bomb planted by North Korean agents. The device, in

a carry-on bag, was ahnost detected at a security checkpoint in Baghdad at an earlier stop. When a security guard wished to remove the batteries from

a radio, one terrorist turned the radio on, proving it operated, and then raised a hue and cry, yelling and complaining. Instead of using this as a reason

to stop the two suspect individuals and to examine their belongings minutely, the security forces decided to avoid trouble by allowing them to proceed.

sLau~r, op. cit., footnote 1.

–79–
80 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

methodic attention is not given to human performance issues, we may expect that system efficiency

and effectiveness will be substantially impaired.

Background on Human Error

The human role in a security system is complex;

thus the nature of human errors, from mental to

physical, varies widely. Mental or cognitive errors

can include improper judgment or decisionmaking,

while physical errors may stem from motor skill

deficiencies or faulty equipment design. A combination of physical and mental processes may influence

other kinds of errors, such as those involving

communication, perception, or alertness.

Human factors, a discipline combining behavioral

sciences and engineering, focuses on improving the

performance of complex systems of people and

machines. Designing and operating a system so that

it does not induce human error (in fact, designing it

so that human error may be minimized) is one

critical component of human factors and limiting the

impact of a human error once it occurs is another

aspect.

Many types of human error are systematic,

following certain predictable patterns; once these

patterns are identified, countermeasures can be

developed. For example, poor location of switches

or dials can induce manual or perceptual errors. For

those types of human error that do not follow

predictable patterns, mitigation techniques are difficult to develop. Some examples of mitigation

techniques include automatic monitoring and warning devices. These subsystems, when properly

designed and implemented, can be invaluable tools

for negating human error.

Employee selection—allowing into the system

only those people least likely to make mistakes—

and continued quality control maintained through

training and monitoring are basic steps for minimizing human errors. Potential errors can be forestalled

by the use of standard procedures and checklists for

routine and emergency tasks, planning work shifts

and assignments so as not to induce inattention and

fatigue, and properly designing the work environment. “If human factors engineering is done properly at the conceptual and design stage, the cost is

high, but paid only once. If traning must compensate for poor design, the price is paid every day. ”4

According to one expert, there does not appear to

be a strong need for new basic research in human

factors related spectifically to security-behavioral

science findings in general and experience with

human performance problems in other industries are

probably sufficient to enhance current security

operations.5 For example, such knowledge is being

used to upgrade security screener selection by

airlines, and to improve training standards. However, the mechanisms to identify early on and to

address effectively the human performance issues

stemming from new security technologies, such as

explosives detection systems, are not yet in place in

industry or the Federal Government.

Shifting boring and repetitive tasks that people

perform poorly to machines is an approach that can

reduce errors. However, automated devices (or any

new technology) may create new sources of human

error.6 Excessive false alarms unnecessarily distract

operators and may lead to the device being ignored

or disabled. During unusual or emergency circumstances, the lack of flexibility in many automated

systems can be a serious limitation and the human

backup may not be mentally or physically prepared

(or possibly even capable) to take over. Consequently, a full system approach is required for

reducing total human errors.

FAA AND HUMAN FACTORS

FAA Policy and Plans for Human Factors

and Aviation Security

In a report released in July 1988, OTA concluded

that FAA attention to the spectrum of human

performance problems in commercial aviation fell

far short of the level warranted, since human error is

the leading cause of aviation accidents.7 Later that

same year, Congress passed the Aviation Safety

4EM1 L. wiener, $~cw~it Automation’ Hu~n ~ac~or~ in Aviation, Eu1 L. wiener and David c. Nagel (eds.) (Sm Diego, CA: Academic PESS,

hlC., 1988) p. 454.

SH. c~fion FoUShee, c~ef scien~lc and Tec~~ Advi,qor for Human FaCto~, FAA p~so~ wmmunimtio~ 1991.

6see wiener, op. cit., f~~ote 4, Ch. 13 for a discussion of new and subtle types of human error that have resulted from the introduction of automation

into aircraft cockpits.

W.S. Congress, OffIce of Technology Assessment Safe Skies for Tomorrow: Aviation Safefy in a Competitive Environnzent, O’E4-SET-381

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Offke, July 1988).
Chapter 5-Hurnun Factors in Aviation Security ● 81

Research Act, which directed the FAA to expand its

research efforts on human performance in aviation

and authorized funds specifically for that purpose.8

The FAA responded by creating the position of

Chief Scientific and Technical Advisor for Human

Factors, responsible for coordinating for the FAA

various human-factors research efforts within the

FAA NASA, and the DOD and for opening lines of

communication within the FAA and industry. Communication among Federal agencies is critical, since

decisions made by the aviation industry and the

operational and regulatory sections of the FAA often

drive the need for new human-factors research and

could benefit from an understanding of humanfactors research findings and products.

The FAA has made progress in addressing the

earlier criticism of its human-factors programs and

understanding in aircraft and air traffic control

(ATC) equipment and operations. However, the key

shortcomings in FAA human-factors efforts that

OTA cited in its 1988 study-insufficient agency

expertise, uncoordinated research efforts, and regulations and certification standards that do not reflect

human-factors principles-still exist within FAA

civil aviation security programs. During the course

of its study, OTA examined closely many of the

technology development programs and regulatory

efforts underway in the security sections of FAA

and found a general lack of awareness and understanding of the human-factors issues involved with

possible new security technologies. An exception to

this situation, however, and a hopeful indicator of a

new trend, has been the hiring of a human-factors

expert at the FAA Technical Center to oversee

human-factors research as it relates to airline security.

However, at present, it appears that the FAA is

ill-prepared to identify and address possible

human-factors concerns with the increasingly

complex and diverse security technologies now

under development. The dearth of trained humanfactors specialists in areas of the FAA responsible

for civil aviation security is a serious deficiency.

Until recently, the Aviation Security R&D Service

of the Technical Center would have merited similar

concerns, but this shortcoming is being redressed, at

least in part. Some of the expertise that the FAA is

developing on human factors for other uses could

also be applied to security issues.

One potential vehicle for bringing human-factors

knowledge into aviation security efforts is the

National Plan for Aviation Human Factors (HF

Plan), the first major product of the heightened FAA

attention to human performance issues following the

enactment of the Aviation Safety Research Act. The

HF Plan identifies significant human performance

issues and lays out a 10-year blueprint for establishing and coordinating research programs and conveying the results across Federal agencies and industry.

The HF Plan’s development depended strongly on

advisory committees composed of a cross-section of

research, operational, and regulatory representatives

from government and industry and approximately 50

of the nation’s leading human-factors researchers.9

The good news for aviation security is that the

Plan appears to provide a strong foundation for

multi- and cross-disciplinary efforts and understanding in human factors and has begun to institutionalize and focus consideration of human-factors issues

in FAA decisionmaking. The bad news is that

nowhere in the Plan is security mentioned—the Plan

addresses the following five aviation environments

only: aircraft flight deck, air traffic control, aircraft

maintenance, airway facilities maintenance, and

flight deck/ATC integration. This should not be

construed as criticism of the general thrust of the HF

Plan—the human-factors categories considered have

historically been more critical to aviation safety and

are considerably more complex than human performance issues in security-and it is beyond the

scope of this study to analyze in detail the specifics

of the HF Plan. However, some objectives and

products of the HF Plan maybe directly transferable to aviation security, provided that lines of

communication are established and security experts are included in committee structures.

The Plan has eight objectives, all of which can

apply to aviation security, but the following two are

especially pertinent, given the present attention to

technologies for countering terrorism:

. to encourage the development of principles of

‘human-centered’ automation and the design of

SAviation Stieu Research A@ I%blic bW100-591.

%J.S. Department of Transportation Fedeml Aviation Administratio~ “The National Plan For Aviation Human Factors,” vol. I, draf~ November

1990.
82 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

advanced technology that will capitalize on the

relative strengths of humans and machines;

. to develop human factors-oriented validation

and certification standards for aviation system

hardware and personnel that will enhance both

safety and efficiency .10

The HF Plan is designed to be reexamined and

revised periodically and aviation security could be

added explicitly as a focus area if need and resources

warrant.

Crucial to the development and future success of

the HF pian is the Human Factors Coordinating

Committee (HFCC), formed by the FAA administrator in September 1989.11 HFCC has representatives

from each major division of FAA and serves as ‘‘an

advisory body for senior management of FAA in all

matters involving human performance and [is]

intended to assure that human factors issues are

represented in all FAA activities. ’ ’12 Until very

recently, the Assistant Administrator for Civil Aviation Security was not represented on this committee.13 However, this omission has since been rectified.

FAA Requirements for Aviation Security:

Human-Factors Implications

Aviation security personnel and equipment have

not received (and have not needed) the same level of

regulatory and certification attention that the FAA

places on flightcrew, air-traffic controllers, and

ground support personnel and their respective aviation equipment. The FAA has focused its regulatory

efforts on elements of the aviation system essential

to flight safety. For example, the performance of

pilots and aircraft systems are continuously critical

for maintaining safety-a failure could cause an

accident. On the other hand, the performance of the

security system (other than as a deterrent) is rarely

critical-flight safety is at risk only when security

performance fails at the same time that a threat

occurs. Moreover, FAA staff and the agency “culture” are predominantly interested in aviation technology and operations and protecting facilities and

countering terrorism are not an inherent part of

aviation,l4 However, the increasing Complexity of

screening technologies and the continuing (possibly

increasing) terrorist threat make the performance of

aviation security systems more critical to flight

safety.

Aviation terrorist events in the 1980s made

apparent the shortcomings of the minimum Federal

security requirements. The FAA and the airlines

both focused attention on screener selection and

training, detection and screening technologies, and

airline management of security programs and systems. The FAA has increased requirements and

oversight of security personnel (selection, training,

and management) and equipment (weapons and

explosives detectors), but has not yet addressed how

security personnel and equipment perform as components of a system.

Screener Selection and Training

For years, the people who screened airline passengers and baggage for domestic flights generally

received little training, low wages, and few benefits. 15 Consequently, alarming numbers of domestic

screeners failed unannounced FAA tests (22 percent

failure rate in 1988).16 Since there has not been a

severe domestic terrorist threat against aviation in

the United States, these shortcomings have not

resulted in life or property losses.17

In light of public pressure following the Lockerbie disaster and costly fines stermming from FAA

inspections, the Air Transport Association (ATA)

developed an extensive set of screener selection,

training, and compensation standards. ATA pro1%id., p. 3.

lllbid., p. 28.

l%id., p. 28.

lsundm tie FAA ~rga~tio~ s~c~e fi plaW in 1988 ~ou@ 1990, tie Office of Aviation Security wu represented @ the Executive Director

for Regulatory Standards and Compliance, to whom it reported.

14fiowl~ge of aviation tw~olow ~d Operatiom i5 impo~t to fic~t ad @ofis~ty. For e~ple, spec~ characteristics of aviatio~ Such

as large volumes of people and luggage that must be screened quickly, drive the security system design and functions.

IsHowever, ~~es ~ustom~y ~ve ~gher s~n~ds for security personuel working h ktWtEitiOlld OpelZitiOllS.

16Lpe Osmus, office of Aviation Security, FW, personal COllMIluIlktitiOIL Feb. 22, 1991.

ITDepend@ on tie deffitio~ he des~ction of a PSA ftight in 1987, caused by a disgruntled ex-emPIOYW Who Shot tie flying Crew in f@h4 @@t

be considered a terroris4 as well as criminal, act. In this case, the ex-employee had an identifkation card with which he gained access to the aircraft

so screener training was not an issue.
Chapter 5-Human Factors in Aviation Security ● 83

posed that airlines (or their security contractors)18

consider education and health criteria, the ability to

speak English, and aptitude test results before hiring

screeners, and that they offer competitive wages,

benefits, and incentives and follow a comprehensive

training curriculum. In March 1990, the ATA asked

the FAA to adopt its proposal as requirements for all

airlines. Based on this cooperative industry effort,

the FAA has required some of these suggested

upgrades in training measures for screeners. (Most

U.S. airlines have adopted at least some of the ATA

recommendations; the failure rate on random checks

has since dropped significantly. )19 The FAA decided

not to include selection and wage standards because

such a change would require public comment (i.e.,

through the Federal Register), thereby calling attention to perceived or actual security weaknesses.

Management Practices and Human Performance

The FAA mandates certain positions in an airline’s organizational structure, such as a security

director for the airline and security coordinators at

each airport, but airline management practices and

philosophy usually fall outside the scope of FAA

regulatory authority. In Safe Skies for Tomorrow,20

OTA found that the effect of airline operating or

management practices on airline safety, and changes

in those practices, were rarely addressed in FAA

safety analyses.21 The FAA's Human Factors plan

cites the influence of management “culture” on

human performance as one area where basic research

is needed.22 If the organizational “climate” (i.e.,

working conditions, wages, management, organizational culture, etc.) does not allow an individual to

perform at his or her peak, it may not matter how

well he or she is trained or how well designed the

technology is.23 The ATA proposal for upgrading

screener standards suggests giving screeners employee benefits common in many industries (vacation, holiday, medical) that contractors often don’t

receive); offering to contractors the advantages of

airline employment (e.g., low-cost travel) and career

opportunities to top performers; providing monetary

rewards to those who detect test weapons and

explosives (and even higher rewards to those who

find the real thing); and increasing wages to at least

the “local prevailing rate.” For comparison, in

Israel, screeners are paid at a level considered a

“good” salary, far higher than minimum wage. In

Switzerland, they are paid at the rate of about $lOper

hour. In the United States, rates are often near

minimum wage.

The United Airlines’ approach to improving

screener performance on all flights from selected

airports delineates one set of management techniques (box 5-A). Another approach has been

undertaken by American Airlines, although only for

its international flights.24 American treats its international screeners as part of the American team.

They are hired as full-fledged airline employees, not

employees of a contracted security agency, and

enjoy the same salary levels and benefits that

ticketing agents do. The educational level of entrants

appears relatively high, with a few individuals

having advanced degrees. There appears also to be

a real opportunity for advancement within American

Airlines, and not just in the security division. Before

starting work, the entrants are brought to Dallas

(from across the world; many screeners are hired

from the countries in which they will be working) for

2 weeks of training at American’s headquarters. The

training includes emphasis on the screening questions as well as on what to look for on the x-ray

screens. The screeners ask the standard questions as

to who packed the baggage and whether anyone

could have placed contraband in it. But they also ask

general questions regarding destination and travel

plans, somewhat akin to the lines of questioning

performed by El Al. Indeed, American has used

Israeli security consultants in designing their security system. The screeners look for a number of

specific characteristics, which remain proprietary to

the company. If too many of the characteristics

match a passenger, the individual’s baggage will

receive much closer inspection. Screeners are ro18Most scree~g for domestic flights in the United States is conducted by security Contractors, nOt airhe employC%S.

l~we Osmus, op. cit., footnote 16.

~u.s. Conwss, OffIce of Technology Assessment, op. cit., fOOtiOte 7.

211bid., p. 88.

22U.S. Department of Transportatio~ Federal Aviation Administration op. Cit., fOOtnOte 9, p. 15.

‘Ibid.

24s0~~: Site visit t. D* A@o% December 1$)90, and Homer Bo@oq Chief of Sedty, American Airlines, perSOIlal COmm~CatiO~

December 1990.
84 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

tated between looking at x-ray screens and interviewing passengers.

Periodically, security systems are tested by contractors, who choose an American employee to play

a terrorist. A specific scenario is given to this

impostor, and the reaction of the security personnel

is noted. If they do not perform their functions, they

may be subject to severe discipline, including

termination.

The result of the overall approach, using incentives and threat of discipline for negligence, appears

to be a well-motivated and alert force.

Security Equipment

Currently, the FAA requires airlines to employ

relatively few types of security equipment—

primarily x-ray devices and metal detectors. The

FAA established minimum performance standards

for detecting weapons and explosives, and since

these technologies are radiation-based, the FAA also

requires that they meet Federal health and safety

standards .25 There are no standards governing operator interaction with the equipment, such as the layout

of controls and display symbology options. At the

time the FAA established x-ray and metal detector

requirements (early 1970s), it had little expertise in

human factors. Moreover, these technologies were

relatively simple compared with aircraft cockpit and

ATC consoles that the FAA had to certify without

objective human-factors criteria, making humanfactors standards for security a relatively low

priority. However, many behavioral experts argue

that properly developed human-factors standards

could improve system performance for aviation

security as well as safety.

In recent years, the FAA has issued regulations for

security technologies-computer-controlled access

at airports and explosive detection systems—that are

considerably more complex and have wider system

implications than x rays and metal detectors. As has

been commonly the case whenever new technology is used to solve a problem, attention is focused

on the positive aspects of the technology—how

effective it is—without giving full consideration

to possible new human-factors problems caused

by the technology. The lack of attention to man/

machine human-factors and system operating issues

Box 5-A—UAL Hi-Tech Screening

United Airlines is focusing on management

practices in its program, called Hi-Tech Screening,

to improve the quality of pre-departure screening

and the public perception of this highly visible

function. Begun in 1987 at Chicago O’Hare and San

Francisco Airports, the program incorporated many

of the selection and incentive steps later recommended in the ATA proposal, and also attempted to

integrate technology and people by reconfiguring

the screening environment to make it more pleasant

for screeners and passengers as well as to improve

operations. Although wages are still low, successful

workers have the opportunity to join the UAL

organization, instead of working as contract security personnel. Improvements include direct communication links to supervisors for oversight and

advice to screeners, layout designed to minimize

passenger delays, and multiple cues to passengers

that security measures are being taken in a professional reamer (security supervisor in an elevated

booth, passengers see themselves on video monitors as they go through metal detectors, signs

describing procedures are clear and concise). United

believes that the program has been successful to

date in increasing public awareness and employee

morale and competence. At Chicago, the employee

attrition rate dropped by half and weapon detections

and FAA test scores increased significantly (79

percent detection rate on FAA weapons tests prior

to Hi-Tech and 92 percent subsequently). United

has also installed Hi-Tech Screening systems in

Denver, LOS Angeles, Seattle, and Washington

Dunes, with plans for additional implementation in

the future.

SOURCE: Site visit to O’Hare, April 1990, and Richard Davis,

Operational Security, United Airlines, Jan. 3,1991.

is evidenced in the explosive detection system

(EDS) regulations published in September 198926

and the subsequent performance of TNA, the only

device to date that could meet the FAA standards.

Beyond setting detection criteria, which are critical

to the security system performance, the FAA also

included requirements for throughput of the device

(which is primarily an economics issue—see ch. 4)

and a requirement for 100-percent automated detection decisionmaking. Several lines of reasoning

could lead to a design goal of total automation,

including lower operating costs over the long run

~F~r ~xmple, ~.ray ~y~tms ~~~ P-Y for cW.on baggagemust meet tie s~n~dsset by the Food and Drug Administration.

x54 Federal Register 36938 (Sept. 5, 1989).
Chapter 5-Human Factors in Aviation Security ● 85

and possibly removing human error from the operating loop. However, it maybe useful, and sometimes

vital, to keep the human in the operating/decisionmaking loop, especially if he or she must respond

during emergency or unusual conditions. As has

been shown so far in TNA tests, the false alarm rate

is well above earlier goals and human intervention is

required quite often. While automation, in the

context of an EDS, is a useful tool, and total

automation may be an understandable goal, requiring 100 percent automated functions in an

EDS is not justified at this time. The E D S

regulations provide an example of where input from

a group such as the FAA’s Human Factors Coordinating Committee could help flag potentially troublesome human-factors aspects of security regulations.

Passenger Profiling

In-depth questioning of all airline passengers and

detailed examination of each of their personal

belongings and baggage is impossible in a modern

transportation system. Since most of the millions of

passengers that fly on U.S. airlines each year pose no

security risk, targeting security resources on the

small number of passengers who exhibit some

elements of the threat “profile” is one way to

increase security without clogging transportation

flows. profiling can be a valuable component of a

transportation security system, providing an independent complement to hardware-based (and often

more expensive) explosives and weapons detection

technologies. Successful profiling depends on a

large support system including comprehensive intelligence networks and threat analyses, information

system technology to process large databases, behavioral research and analysis, and trained and

motivated screening personnel.

There are two general approaches to operational

profiling. One compares passenger demographic and

other background data (age, sex, nationality, travel

itinerary, etc.) to historic or recent intelligencederived “threat profiles.” The other is based on the

examiner’s psychological assessment of the passenger, taking into account nervousness, hostility, or

other suspicious characteristics. Most profiling systems currently use elements of both approaches to

varying degrees.

Airline passenger profiling, in most cases, must

be fast (and consequently cursory) enough so as not

to impose excessive delays. In other security contexts, such as screening for the “insider threat”

profile within an organization where time is not so

critical, much more detailed background data and

questioning is possible. A different, although overlapping, form of profiling is used by law enforcement and investigatory agencies. Given pertinent

data and evidence from a crime scene or threat,

experts compile a profile of likely social, psychological, and physical characteristics of the criminal.

However, much of the work and methodology could

be transferred from one of the broad profiling

regimes to the other.

FAA Requirements for Profiling-Under Federal regulations, U.S. airlines must apply a relatively

simple form of passenger profiling for international

flights (e.g., questions regarding electronic devices),

although airlines are not prohibited by FAA/DOT

from conducting any form of profiling at any time.

Whether or not a passenger is selected for closer

scrutiny, such as a manual baggage search, depends

on where his passport was issued (a factor that varies

based on threat intelligence) and on responses to a

series of questions aimed at identifying potential

terrorist “dupes.” Additionally, airlines must conduct random baggage inspections on a small percentage of otherwise unselected passengers for each

flight. These requirements do not apply to domestic

flights or to foreign airlines, which results in an

obvious gap in protection for Americans. The fact

that foreign airlines that compete with U.S.

airlines on international routes do not have to

satisfy these requirements imposes an economic

penalty on domestic carriers and weakens their

ability to compete successfully with foreign carriers, which, in addition, are usually statesubsidized. Domestic airlines complain, with

justification, that a “level playing field” should

be established to avoid this unfair disadvantage.

An option would be to compensate U.S. airlines for

the additional costs, either from Federal subsidies or

from the Airport Trust Fund.27 Alternatively, foreign

carriers could be required to apply similar security

measures on flights landing in the United States to

those demanded of U.S. carriers. The United States

has forced better security practices in foreign

2% l$)7(j, Congress estiblishedaprecedent for compensating U.S. air carriers forsecuritymeasures incurred in international operatiombyautioritig

nearly $10 million for fiscal years 1976-78 (Public Law 94-353, sec. 24). In 1982, Congress extended the authorized limit to $15 million (Public Law

97-248, sec. 524(d). Nearly this much was actually disbursed to four U.S. carriers.
84 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

airports by threatening revocation of landing rights

of carriers from those countries in the absence of

improvements.

U.S. airlines operating on European routes have

been permitted to substitute their own profiling

programs for FAA requirements.28 Most U.S. airlines and many foreign carriers conduct more

extensive profile screening than minimum FAA

requirements at foreign airports and some U.S.

international gateways. Some airlines train their

international employees in profiling techniques

while others hire contractors to handle security for

their international flights. Proprietary profiling procedures used by these airlines are modeled generally

on the Israeli El Al method of profiling which is

more comprehensive (and intrusive) than FAA

requirements and reportedly includes psychological,

social, and political factors. Complaints by certain

groups, such as Arab-Americans, claiming harassment, stem from carrier-initiated profiling, not

Federal requirements.29

During the past 5 years, the FAA has developed

and tested a computer-based profiling tool aimed at

potential terrorist hijackers and saboteurs. The

Comprehensive Passenger Screening Profile (CPSP)

is both a checklist and decision aid for field officers

and a data collection system to support profiling

enhancements. It encompasses the current FAA

required profiling procedures plus additional factors

based on a data profile of terrorists, using historical

and intelligence sources.

The decision process for selecting a passenger for

further examination is automated through a series of

mathematically weighted yes/no questions (some of

which do not require passenger interviews), that the

security officer responds to via a keyboard. CPSP is

designed for easy modication if intelligence or data

analysis indicates a need. In early 1990, the FAA

offered CPSP as an option for airlines to meet

profiling requirements. Continental Airlines and

United Airlines have tested versions of CPSP at a

few locations, and have been generally pleased with

its performance, especially as a tool for centrally

coordinating security management decisions and for

providing a conduit for a detailed database.30

The FAA is considering making CPSP mandatory, but a number of carriers oppose it, citing

security officer vigilance problems caused by distraction by computer keyboard and display. Knowledgeable FAA and airline personnel claim that

airline opposition stems mainly from the increased

oversight capabilities that such a system would give

the FAA CPSP would provide a detailed record of

all airline profiling actions (and errors or failures)

that could be used for civil penalty proceedings.

Presently, the FAA oversees airline profiling procedures through random or scheduled field visits.

The FAA counters that if a would-be malefactor

sneaks through, CPSP also can provide documented

proof that the airline followed FAA-required procedures, shifting some liability for a profiling failure to

the FAA.31 Additionally, there is substantial

analytic value to the large data set that would

come from CPSP. As discovered during TNA

testing, little is known about the baseline average

passenger and baggage; therefore, general background data, regardless of how well CPSP works

operationally, would be valuable for security planning. No names of passengers are (or legally can be)

included in such a data set maintained by the Federal

Government. 32 However, as private entities, airlines

can and do maintain such lists.

Other Issues for Human Factors

and Profiling

Research and Development

Due to security and proprietary concerns, profiling systems in place today are shrouded in secrecy.

The technical aspects of their development and

quantitative measures of their performance are

difficult to obtain, although the widespread use at

airports across the world attest to airline confidence

in profiling Given industry acceptance of profiling

technology, the unregulated environment in which

profiling systems were developed, and the potential

enhanced capabilities and future needs, there is a

~ho Boiv@ FAA htelligence, personal communication Oct. 1*, 1990-

%llid.

~JO~Be~~l~q Director, Comorate s~~~, COntinenM fi~es, ~rson~ commtication, od. 15, 1990 and Glen W- Director, @XtitiOI.Ud

Security, United Airlines, personal communication, Oct. 16, 1990.

31c)P. cit., footnote 27.

qzfiid.
Chapter 5-Human Factors in Aviation Security ● 87

role for a concerted Federal (DOT) effort in profiling

R&D.

The primary research fields of interest are in the

behavioral sciences and in large database collection

and analysis. A useful but neglected approach would

be to investigate the role of cultural differences in

establishing profiles. Since patterns of behavior

considered anomalous in one culture are normal in

others, understanding cultural effects better could

lead to more effective and, possibly, less discriminatory use of profiles.33 Relevant behavioral research

with applications for profiling is being conducted by

a number of Federal agencies, although they generally do not coordinate these research efforts.

There is a need to coordinate research and

experience in developing terrorist profiles among

concerned agencies. Also, some work is going on to

establish databases of past incidents and known

terrorists in order to help develop profiles. The FAA

conducts a modest profiling research effort that

produced the CPSP and is analyzing profiling field

tests. However, this effort is housed in the

intelligence section under the Assistant Administrator for Civil Aviation Security with no direct

link to FAA’s R&D division.

Historically, the FAA pioneered the use of

profiles in aviation in the late 1960s and early 1970s

during the upsurge of hijackings to Cuba. A team of

experts under the leadership of the FAA Office of

Aviation Medicine was involved in the development

of the initial profiles. Limited use of profiles was

made during the early 1970s and again in 1980,

when immigrants from the Mariel Boatlift began

hijacking aircraft to Cuba. [Profiles were employed

on a limited basis to help stem the wave of hijackings

to Cuba by some “Marielitos”. ]

In the 1970s, the FAA also developed a profile for

domestic use to identify persons who might be

carrying explosives or incendiary devices in checked

baggage. This “checked bag” profile included

several objective elements and was intended for use

by airline personnel at ticket counters. This profile

was never applied rigorously, although some of its

elements were automated by at least one U.S. air

carrier.

Thus, the FAA has had substantial experience

with developing and implementing profiles for use

in aviation security. It has worked with in-house

experts, with other agencies, and with behavioral

scientists under contract. There should be steps

taken to guarantee that this institutional knowledge is not lost, due to needed secrecy or

personnel turnover.

There should also be an effort to bring

together knowledge on profiling from the Intelligence Community, from the Federal Bureau of

Investigation, from the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and from the FAA, so that all

agencies may profitably pool their knowledge.

One way of helping assure such interagency

communication would be the institution of annual interagency conferences on the topic (see ch.

3).

Profiling techniques and related technologies

are being added to current security R&D plans at the

FAA Technical Center. The operational aspects of

using automated profiling systems, such as data

entry and human/computer interaction, are similar to

those of many other technologies, and could benefit

from further research and development.

A near-term research need is how best to

combine profiling systems with the new security

technologies now in the pipeline. In fact, arguments have been made that the TNA device can only

function effectively when combined with profilebased selection of baggage to inspect, since false

alarm rates are high. This is, in fact, being done at the

Gatwick tests. Presently, the profiling process results in binary decisions—let the passenger pass into

the normal security process (more than 95 percent of

passengers) or conduct a manual search of the

passenger and his baggage. One possibility would

be to expand and refine the decision outcome

from profiling to provide multiple screening

paths for passengers depending on the level of

threat and the availability of advanced detection

equipment (see ch. 4).

A longer term research option is to investigate

new technologies to enhance profiling. Rapid

access in the field to Federal, international, and,

possibly, private databases (i.e., hotel, credit card)

could greatly enhance capabilities. Remote sensing

of respiration and heart rates and other biological

parameters, combined with large population databases, automated facial-recognition systems, and

SsCustom offici& in the Northern ~“ a Islands, a U.S.-flag territory, incorporate cultural characteristics in looking for anomalies for profding.
88 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

biometric passports, all offer new possibilities for

on-the-spot psychological and physiological assessments.

Civil Liberties

Security systems in general, and profiling methods in particular, trade certain freedoms (e.g.,

privacy) for safety. profiling methods, based on

specific individual characteristics, may be derived

from historical experience (e.g., the large number of

Cuban refugees who hijacked aircraft to Cuba in the

early 1970s or the examples of hijacking engaged in

by members of various Middle Eastern terrorist

groups). These characteristics sometimes include

physical and cultural features, since these traits are

the easiest indicators to verify. Often such subjects

belong to readily distinguishable minority groups.

Therefore, people who possess the characteristics in

question but who have no ill intentions (obviously,

the great majority) could be subjected to scrutiny

that could be considered to encroach on individual

freedoms.

This study describes measures to meet compelling

public safety interests. It is, however, beyond the

scope of this study to discuss the many legal and

societal civil liberties issues involved (e.g., how

much intrusiveness on privacy is countenanced by a

compelling interest of the state?). It is certain that the

technical ability to investigate and record personal

histories and characteristics and the demand for the

use of such ability will greatly expand, thereby

increasing the potential for crossing the fine line

protecting constitutionally guaranteed individual

liberties. Legislative attention will have to address

the tradeoff between public safety and welfare and

civil liberties.

Incident Management

Human factors also play a role in managing

incidents abroad. When U.S. citizens are held

hostage in a foreign country, the United States often

plays a role in resolving the incident. Some foreign

security officials are trained in the United States

under assistance programs. But the United States

also may participate actively, as it did in responding

to a number of airline hijackings in the 1980s.

From past experience, cultural factors particular

to the country where the event is taking place

frequently influence decisionmaking by local authorities. Some observers report that U.S. officials

who were involved would, on occasion, have

benefited by a more detailed knowledge of the

dynamics of local social systems. For example, in

some cases, although crisis management officials

were supposed to be in charge of handling an

incident, local cultural or political factors have

resulted in the crisis being directed instead by senior

office holders, who are untrained for the purpose and

unable to provide the rapid decisionmaking that is

often required.

Some research into systematizing knowledge of

relevant aspects of different social systems would be

useful. In this area, as in profiling, the construction

of appropriate databases would be of use to U.S.

officials who may be called on to participate in

resolving a crisis. At present, there appears to be

little coordination among agencies in understanding

behavioral aspects of incident management. This

lack provides another argument for strengthening

interagency coordination in counterterrorism (see

ch. 3).

Policy Options

The following policy options address human

factors and aviation security.

1. Enhance FAA attention to human factors in

security: 34

●

●

Explicitly address aviation security in agencywide human-factors planning.

The FAA has taken measures to move in this

direction.

Bolster human-factors expertise under the

Assistant Administrator for Civil Aviation

Security and the Aviation Security Research

and Development Service at the FAA Technical Center by adding professionals to their

respective staffs, especially in light of plans

to increase staff levels of both sections

significantly during the next few years. One

such professional has already been added.

~~e follo~ r=omenhtiom included in earlier drafts of this repofi has already been implemented by tie FAA

● Add a designee of the Assistant Administrator for Civil Aviation Security to the FAA’s Human Factors Coordinating Committee.
Chapter 5-Human Factors in Aviation Security ● 89

2.

3.

Consider conducting R&D on combining pas- 4.

senger profiling techniques with other security

technologies.

Give consideration to methods for “leveling 5.

the playing field” when imposing requirements on U.S. carriers but not on competing

foreign ones.

Give consideration to civil liberties issues

stemming from Federal aviation security requirements.

Coordinate behavioral research into profiling

and incident management being conducted in

the Federal Government. Arrange periodic

interagency conferences on related topics.
Appendixes
Appendix A

The FAA Aviation Security R&D Program

Introduction and History

The most applied, mission-specific, and largest research and development program in the area of counterterrorism technology, and certainly the one most in the

public’s eye, is the FAA Aviation Security R&D program,

conducted by the FAA Technical Center in Atlantic City,

NJ. This program has been the focus of considerable

attention, being reviewed by the President’s Commission,l the National Academy of Sciences,2 and by the

FAA itself.3

This program suffers from its placement within the

overall structure of the FAA, as well as its connection to

the FAA Aviation Security program. The Technical

Center Director reports to the Executive Director for

Systems Development (within the overall FAA organization), who reports directly to the Administrator. Within

the Technical Center, the Aviation Security Branch,

which conducted the program, was until recently4 a part

of the Airports Division in the Engineering and Development Service. Thus, it was three administrative levels

removed from the Director of the Technical Center. Last

year, in response to both external and internal criticisms,

the Aviation Security R&D program was elevated to the

service level. Prior to the above change, the branch was

staffed by only 13 personnel. The Technical Center, and,

consequently, the Aviation Security R&D program, still

has no direct line relationship with the Assistant Administrator for Civil Aviation Security (CAS). Figure A-1

shows an organization chart for the FAA as of August

1990.

The FAA’s research and development programs started

in the early 1970s to provide means of countering the

perceived hijacking threat, Early research and development work was primarily in the area of metal detectors,

resulting in the successful suppression of this threat. The

September 1975 bombing at LaGuardia Airport first

focused attention on the problem of detecting explosives,

which has been the central focus of the R&D program ever

since. In 1976, the R&D budget of the branch was about

$1.5 million. The first proposal to investigate the use of

thermal neutron analysis (TNA) to detect explosives was

originated by Westinghouse in 1977. Over the next

decade, two primary research areas grew to the prototypehardware stage: vapor detection by chemiluminescent

detectors and fast chromatography, and the TNA program. In 1984, Thermedics, Inc., of Waltham, MA, a

subsidiary of Thermo-Electron Corp., became the primary

contractor for the development of the vapor detection

system and in 1985, Science Applications International

Corp. (SAIC) and Westinghouse were chosen to demonstrate the TNA concept (in 1987, the Westinghouse

funding was terminated). In the eighties, the FAA’s R&D

budget grew from $7 million to over $9 million per year,

augmented by the procurement of six prototype TNA

units (monitored by the Technical Center but funded out

of the Office of Civil Aviation Security). In fiscal year

1990, the R&D budget was over $16 million; the budget

for fiscal year 1991 was about $30 million. It is a rapidly

growing program in a period of retrenchment in Federal

budgets. Table A-1 shows funding levels for FAA

Aviation Security R&D.

The main area of emphasis of the FAA Aviation

Security R&D program is explosives detection. This is

still by far the dominant effort in the program. A second

area of investigation that has been pursued over the past

several years has been a systems analysis of the airport

security problem. The analysis includes system components such as training, procedures, technologies, and

controlling access to guard all the ways and physical paths

that threats (e.g., hijackers, weapons, explosives) may

take to the aircraft. This program has been conducted by

the Sandia Laboratory of the Department of Energy

(DOE) under contract from the FAA Technical Center.

One new area of emphasis is aircraft hardening against

explosives and another new field of effort involves the

study of the application of human factors to aviation

security.

In response to the several intense reviews and

criticism (particularly by the Presidential Commission)

of the overall R&D program, dramatic and rapid

changes are currently being implemented in its staffing, organization, funding, and outlook. The comments made in this report are primarily aimed at the

situation that existed until very recently; many of the

identified problems are well on their way to being

corrected. However, some other problems discussed

l~e ~te House, Repo~ of the president’s CoM”ssion on Aviation Security and Terrorism (Wad@jtoq DC: my 15, 1990).

Zcommittee on Aviation Sec~ty, National Materials Advisory Board, National Reseamh Council, “Reducing the Risk of Explosives on Commercial

AircrafL” Publication NMAB-463 (Washingto@ DC: National Academy Press, 1990).

3u.s.Dq~entof TramP~tion, F~er~ Av~tion Atistratiom“Bluepfit for ~qe: A New Sectity ~g~ation,’ Repofi by tie Wice

of the Deputy Associate Administrator for Appraisals, No. 90-2, Aug. 14, 1990.

A~rmpome to the President’s COmmis sionon Aviation Security and Terrorism, the program was elevated to a “Service” level, the highest technical

level in the Technical Center, reporting directly to the Center Director, and its staffii increased significantly (to 37 slots) as approved by the

Administrator in July 1990.

–93–
94 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

Figure A-l—Organization of the FAA

I Administrator I

I Deputy Administrator I

I

r

Asst. Admin.

for Civil

Aviation

Security

I

I

Office of

Civil Rights

1

Asst. Admin.

for Aviation

Safety r

Asst. Admin.

for Policy,

Planning, &

Int’1 Aviation

—

Office of

—

\ Assistant 1----- Office of

the Chief

Counsel

Office of

Public I

Affairs

J

Government

& Industry

Affairs L ———————

Administrator for

Airports

E

Executive Director

for System

Operations

Executive Director

for Regulatory

Standards &

Compliance

Executive Director

for Acquisition

EE

Assistant Administrator

for Civil Aviation

Security

~..

Evaluation

and Data

Analysis Staff

Resource

Management

Staff

Policy and

Planning

Staff

.~ 1

Invest igat ions

and Security

Division

[

Civil Aviation

Security

Division

Special

Programs

Division

Intelligence

Division .

I

1

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, “Blueprint for Change: A New Security Organization,” Report by the Office

of the Deputy Associate Administrator for Appraisals, No. 90-2, Aug. 14, 1990, p. 3, figure 1a.
.

Appendix A—The FAA Aviation Security R&D Program ● 95

Table A-l—FAA R&D Funding Levels for

Aviation Security

Fiscal year Funding (in $ million)

1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $7. 4

1986 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.0

1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.4

1988 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.5

1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.9

1990 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.9

1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30.3

SOURCE: Federal Aviation Administration, 1991.

hercin are still unsolved program and require further

attention.

Current FAA Technical Center Research

and Development Program

During fiscal year 1990, the FAA Technical Center

security research and development program became

involved in some controversial issues, notably the question of TNA testing and deployment, It has since

undergone a complete reorganization and change of

personnel. During these major diversions, the program

has continued to function and is operating at ever higher

funding levels, partially due to the infusion of new

congressionally appropriated money, which was motivated by the report of the Presidential Commission.

The fiscal year 1990 program emphasized a continuation of research that had been ongoing since the previous

year, with a few new starts made possible at the end of the

year by the new money. A major innovation was the

issuance of a Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) in

November 1989,5 a new way of inviting industry and

academia to propose new ideas to the FAA for exploratory

funding. The announcement specified the areas of FAA

interest as follows:

explosives detection-with a great deal of detail

given about interest in various technologies of bulk

and vapor detection of explosives,

weapons detection,

airport security,

security systems integration, and

aircraft hardening and blast/fragmentation containment.

During the year, the FAA received over 300 inquiries,

over 80 white papers, and 68 actual proposals under this

BAA. However, only five of these proposals were actually

funded by the end of fiscal year 1990. Many of the

industry groups that submitted formal proposals to the

FAA under this BAA felt that the responses that they

received were neither prompt not satisfactory. Of course,

those that received no funding would naturally complain.

However, a principal complaint was rather that no

responses at all were provided for a long time. The

apparent logjam in dealing with the BAA was likely due,

in large measure, to the massive self-examination and

reorganization that the FAA security program and the

security part of the Technical Center were undergoing at

the time.

In the bulk explosives detection area, the program was

driven primarily by the conflict surrounding the SAIC/

TNA. Testing programs were elaborated to allay criticisms of earlier tests of the system, TNA enhancements

were funded to improve its performance, and, finally,

other concepts were investigated, such as coupling TNA

to other sensors to achieve better performance than

achieved by the current XENIS (i.e., the TNA coupled to

a conventional x-ray) system. A major program to

develop a gamma ray resonance absorption explosives

detection system under a joint program of Soreq Nuclear

Center of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission and Los

Alamos National Laboratory of the DOE was restarted. It

had begun in 1987 as exploratory work, but had stalled

when the program had matured into a more focused effort.

However, the complexity of creating such a joint program

delayed the start of actual new work on this program until

well into fiscal year 1991. An upgraded program of

research into the puked fast-neutron detection scheme

was also initiated. Some new work was also started in

NMR/NQR and on advanced x-ray systems, as well as on

a positron emission spectroscopy scheme.

Another major funding area of the Technical Center has

been the technology of vapor detection of explosives. A

number of the past programs in this area were continued

and several new ones started, including several basic

technology investigations of the underlying science of

vapor detection.

A third effort, the systems category, has been continuing. A major part of it, the integrated security system

study at Baltimore/Washington International Airport, is

moving from the conceptual stage to the hardware

demonstration phase. A new program on aircraft hardening was also initiated under this element, initially looking

at container hardening. This program element also

includes the work at the National Academy of Sciences in

support of the FAA program (both the overall evaluation

resulting in the NAS report as well as support of the test

program), Architectural and Engineering work on a new

FAA explosives testing laboratory, and some miscellaneous expenditures.

The approximate program expenditures by element for

fiscal year 1990 are listed in table A-2.

5u.s. Dep~ent of Tr~~wrtati~~ Feder~ Av~ti~n A-stratio~ T~~cal Center, Aviation Secufity Brach Broad Agency kll101UlCfXIlf311t

(BAA), TCBAA-9(MX11, ACD-120, November 1989.
96 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

Table A-2—Program Elements for Aviation

Security R&D—Fiscal Year 1990

(figures in thousands of $)

Element T 1801A—TNA and other bulk explosives

detection systems:

TNA assessment support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 561

TNA enhancements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 681

Other bulk detectors/dual sensor modifications . . . . . 551

$1,793

Element T 1801B-Vapor systems:

Chemiluminescent detectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 500

(Work at Sandia) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300

Mass spectrometers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,065

Systems support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 700

Research support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

$2,665

Element T 1801C—New technology:

Gamma ray resonance absorption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 1,035

Pulsed fast neutron technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,300

Advanced x-ray technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200

Biotechnological detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257

Vapor systems research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,233

Bulk technology R& D.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,080

National Academy of Sciences support . . . . . . . . . . . . 588

$5,693

Element 1801C—Concourse access and miscellaneous:

Millimeter wave technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 465

BWI demonstration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,000

Aircraft hardening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 338

New laboratory-A&E study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 500

Academic fellows program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200

Miscellaneous. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 600

$5,103

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $15,254

SOURCE: Federal Aviation Administration, 1990.

Because of the FAA’S contracting procedures, in

particular the late-in-the-fiscal-year commitments, much

of the above work was scheduled to start in fiscal year

1991 and consequently could only be done in that year.

Current Problems

According to several studies, the FAA Aviation Security R&D Service suffers from a number of difficulties.

There are some technical problems, including a thin staff

of experienced technical managers; a lack of systematic

planning, particularly with respect to scope and requirements; problematic administrative support (insufficient

number of contracting specialists) for timely contracting,

and insufficient outside scientific advice and guidance.

Further, there are a number of institutional problems,

primarily due to the place of the Service in the FAA

organizational hierarchy. There is a lack of coordination

with the decisionmaking and operational groups in the

FAA This R&D activity, in particular, requires strong

coupling to the R&D work to the Civil Aviation Security

operations groups. Some of these problems have been

discussed in the report of the Presidential Commission,

some in the National Academy of Sciences report, and

some are enumerated in the FAA report on changing its

security organization.6

Critique by the President’s Commission

The FAA has not met the challenge of developing

effective detection technology to meet the progressively

more sophisticated threat of terrorists.

The agency has not planned for the future but has

reacted to past events. . . specifications were at best,

of doubtful utility for terrorists have used plastic

bombs at least since 1982 that are lighter than the

weight specification for detection of plastic explosives by an EDS [explosives detection system]

machine. . . today’s TNA machines cannot, without

an unacceptably high rate of positive false alarms,

detect the amount of Semtex widely believed to have

blown up Pan Am 103. . . . The TNA machine . . .

although never scientifically tested, was approved by

the Administrator of the FAA for use as meeting the

specifications for detection of plastic explosives. . .

without approval of the Technical Center that the

TNA met the EDS standards. . . . The FAA needs to

bridge the gap between what can destroy aircraft and

what can be reliably detected. . . . Can steps be taken

to modify airframes to minimize the damage? . . .

The FAA for years did not have a continuing

scientific and engineering advisory committee of

independent, acknowledged experts to advise on its

research programs. . . . The FAA must give higher

priority and allocate more federal funds to R&D.7

The commission made recommendations generally in line

with these comments.

Critique by the National Academy of Sciences8

The National Academy of Sciences, National Materials

Advisory Board, has probably performed the most

detailed study of the FAA Aviation Security R&D

program to date. A committee of 10 (primarily academic)

experts with expertise in analytical instrumentation,

forensic analysis, explosives chemistry, and nuclear

sciences met 8 times between January 1989 and May

1990. The committee was briefed by the FAA officials

and program managers and contractors, as well as by

groups whose concepts were not currently funded.

Committee members also visited specific laboratories to

get briefings in more depth on some developments. A

limited-attendance workshop was held to solicit new

6u.s. r)~~~ent of Tra~pOmtiOn, Federal Aviation Administration oP. cit., footnote 3.

T~e Wte House, op. cit., footnote 1, pp. 63-66.

sco~ttee on Aviation Security, op. cit., fOO~Ote 2.
Appendix A-The FAA Aviation Security R&D Program ● 97

ideas from knowledgeable scientists with innovative

concepts of how to attack the problem.

An important conclusion of the NAS study was that it

is unlikely that any single technological means will

significantly reduce our vulnerability to a sophisticated

terrorist threat. Consequently it is clear that a succession

of screening techniques or stages will be appropriate and

explosives detection must be looked at from a systems or

integrated point of view. Further, there are various costs

involved in the implementation of any screening procedure: the direct costs of the equipment and the personnel

required as well as the indirect costs of the delays or

changed operational procedures that are demanded of the

airlines. Consequently, any choice for security improvement is necessarily a compromise between the degree of

security achieved and the costs imposed. This furnishes

an argument for a well-thought-out systems approach to

the specification of security requirements.

The National Research Council report came up with a

specific set of nine recommendations and some program

priority recommendations, which are summarized below:

a.

b.

c.

d.

e.

Define a search strategy to optimize the mix of

technologies that are available. No single detection

technology is currently capable of providing the

needed sensitivity and specificity required to provide security; a combination of currently available

devices may well provide significantly better security than is now provided.

Implement low technology and human-factors-type

improvements. Assure positive passenger/baggage

matching on all aircraft, eliminate curbside luggage

check-in, give specific consideration to passengers

and baggage that disembark at intermediate stops,

implement risk profiling of passengers, and bring

about improvements in training, motivation, and

monitoring of security personnel.

Define performance criteria of detection systems. A

minimum detectable-explosive quantity and a minimum vapor-detection sensitivity of 1 to 100x 10-15

gram was recommended. The quantity was in

disagreement with the higher explosives quantities

used currently by the FAA

Explore reinforcing aircraft baggage containers.

Investigate the possibility of relatively simple

inexpensive modifications that could increase the

capability of the aircraft to withstand small explosions to the point where detection is made easier.

Establish standardized operational test procedures

and testing facilities for explosives detection systems. A government operated (e.g., FAA) or superf.

g.

h.

i.

J.

k.

vised, yet completely neutral, test facility should be

established to conduct standard tests and acceptance

procedures on any detection hardware available.

Field tests under realistic airport conditions were

recommended.

In testing bulk or vapor explosives detectors, develop standard positive controls for routine checks

of sensitivity of instruments and for blind checks of

the system and observers.

Take advantage of systems integration opportunities for vapor detectors. Combine the best stages

of various commercial instruments to create a more

effective total system.

Explore the tagging of explosives and detonators to

make them easily detectable. It has been suggested

that the addition of small amounts of materials

added to explosives and detonators could make

them easily observable by inexpensive means.9

Continue the support of the exploration and the

development of new methods that maybe applicable

to explosives detection. The committee could not

identify any approaches that were neither monitored

nor funded by the FAA and recommended that the

FAA continue its R&D program to keep abreast of

the state of the art. This constituted an endorsement of a good part of the FAA R&D program.

Program priorities:

Establish an explosives detection systems analysis

and architecture group.

Demonstrate passenger/luggage correlation

schemes.

Solicit and fund proposals for aircraft hardening

analysis.

Establish an operational testing facility.

Solicit and fund proposals for developing positive

controls for bulk and vapor phase systems.

Select a prime contractor or systems architect to

optimize vapor phase systems.

Solicit and fund proposals to demonstrate explosives tagging schemes.

Solicit and fund exploratory research proposals

for new methods of explosive detection.

Funding recommendations:

Major funding areas

● airport-based nuclear accelerator

. improved x-ray explosives detection

. nuclear resonance absorption (NRA)

● thermal neutron activation (TNA)

. x-ray computerized tomography (CT)

. x-ray methods for bomb detection

90TA &sape= with tbis recommendation, as regards explosives: see U.S. Congress, OffIce of Technology Assessment Technology Against

Terrorism: The Federal Effort, OZ4-ISC-481 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Oftlce, July 1991), p. 51. OTA concluded that this proposal

ignores tbe problem of the large amounts of plastic explosives currently available to terrorists as well as the fact tbat some plastic explosives can be

manufactured by terrorist groups or can be obtained from state sponsors.
98 . Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

Moderate funding areas

●

●

●

●

●

●

chemiluninescent vapor detection systems

fast-neutron activation associated

particle

glow discharge ionization tandem mass

spectrometer system

ion mobility vapor phase system

nuclear quadruple resonance (NQR)

pulsed fast-neutron activation (PFNA)

Modest funding areas

. fast-neutron activation (FNA)

● nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR)

. vapor phase component technologies

Critique by the FAA Report10

“The office of Civil Aviation Security (CAS) has not

provided adequate direction and oversight in defining and

documenting adequate research requirements and has not

set program priorities. . . . The Center currently works

under a 1986 memorandum for explosive detector requirements. . . . There is no current comprehensive security R&D plan which delineates requirements for R&D

projects and lists goals. . . . Communications between the

CAS and the Technology Center have not been adequate. . . . There has not been continuous dialogue between CAS and the Technology Center. . . . The security

R&D program does not contain the same operational test

and evaluation or independent test and evaluation procedures that other agency R&D programs currently use to

evaluate new technologies . . . the program has focused

narrowly on technological solutions rather than thinking

of aviation security as a system. ”

OTA Comments on Concentration

and Priorities

In any R&D program, concentration and priorities are

a matter of judgment. However, several of the previously

cited critiques point out, and OTA concurs, that the

technical center program has been too narrowly focused,

decoupled from the real world with respect to requirements, and devoid of an overall plan with goals and

schedules.

As an example of the narrow focus, the vapor detection

program, although doing excellent work in this detection

technology, focused on the concept of a personnel

inspection booth using vapor detection equipment. The

program should have asked the broader question: what is

the basic capability of the equipment and how could such

equipment be utilized in an aviation security system?

Vapor detection capabilities are very scenario-dependent;

the same equipment that may function well in one

particular use may be useless in another mode.

There is strong evidence that some vapor detectors are

able to detect plastic explosives. This case has been made

by the Department of State as well as by several foreign

governments and appears to be confirmed by some recent

FAA tests. The issue is to devise a viable scenario for

applying this ability to the aviation security problem.

Several tests have recently been run to determine the

capability of commercial vapor detection equipment in

searching for explosives in electronic equipment as

identified from x-ray images.11

A similar criticism applies to the FAA approach with

respect to their evaluation of the SAIC/TNA. The TNA

was pursued as an all-encompassing first and final

inspection system. When its performance fell short for

that application, both at the higher explosives quantities

set by the FAA and at the lower value widely believed

more appropriate, the FAA looked for supplemental

measurements that could be used to fix its shortcomings.

A more effective approach would ask what functions

TNA can perform; possibly it could function as the

high-cost, low-throughput device at the end of a chain of

other systems that only inspects a few questionable items

left indeterminate after other screening. Such an approach

would run counter to the FAA’S earlier attempt to

implement TNA as its chosen EDS.12

The R&D program also needs to make a clear decision

on to what level of development a concept should be

taken: should the FAA take technology all the way to a

fully developed commercial prototype (as it is doing in the

case of the SAIC/TNA) or is it the FAA’S responsibility

to demonstrate the feasibility of a technology and to

certify that it has demonstrated requisite performance

levels? This issue touches on the definition of requirements for instrumentation developed by the R&D program. For example, the inclusion of a probably unnecessary throughput requirement that makes R&D difficult

and expensive (see ch. 4). For long-term projects (on the

order of 3 years or more), the R&D program should spend

its effort on demonstrating sufficient measurement accuracy to satisfy the FAA performance requirements for

sensitivity and specificity at given threshold quantity

levels (which may be kept classified to protect information on the vulnerability of a future security system).

From there on, the vendors and the airline (or airport

authority) could negotiate the specific technologies they

wish to implement to meet the FAA specifications,

10u.s. Department of Transportation Federal Aviation Administration op. cit., foo~ote 3, ch. 1.

1 l~e FAA recenfly conducted an assessment of four commercial vapor detection systems for checking carry-on baggage iu combination tihotier

sensors (x-ray screeners), with some encouraging results that have not been released to date. Further, the Massachusetts Port Authority at Logan A@ort,

Boston, recently also conducted a series of tests utilizing Thermedics equipment.

Izsee 54 Federal Register 36938 (Sept. 5, 198$0.
Appendix A—The FAA Aviation Security R&D Program ● 99

subject to operational testing of the commercial products

for compliance.

A related question is the issue of how much help the

FAA should give: a single source can achieve a favored

commercial position through significant government

support. In lieu of being able to afford multiple approaches, which would be the fairest and best procedure,

it may be preferable for the FAA not to fund one

competitor all the way to a production prototype, but

rather to restrict Federal funding to demonstrating the

required measurement ability. The FAA should insist on

proper and timely documentation of the results and the

distribution of data gathered under federally funded

programs to all interested competitors to the degree

legally permitted. An exception to this strategy maybe

in order in the case of an urgent need to field

equipment as soon as possible, such as might have

arisen during the Gulf War, because of an increased

terrorist threat. In such cases, rapid funding to

prototype of a single project would probably be the

most efficient path.

The issue of a properly designed and implemented

qualification test program for any and all detection

systems was highlighted in the first OTA report.13 As

discussed in that report, the interpretation and use of test

results was the root of much of the controversy for the

SAIC/TNA. In particular, there was lack of agreement

about the meaning of test results between the Technical

Center and FAA officials responsible for regulations. The

FAA Technical Center has taken a large number of

constructive steps in the direction of developing proper

protocols for such tests and for carrying them out.14 The

design and conduct of testing is another area where

the utilization of a broadly based scientific advisory

group, as recommended by several of the investigations, would be very constructive.

OTA Comments on R&D

Program Requirements

The lack (or obsolescence) of realistic technical requirements for the Technical Center research program has

been identified as a serious problem by several of the

investigations. The setting of these requirements is an area

where much better and closer cooperation is required

between the Technical Center and the Assistant Administrator for Aviation Security. Inherent in the proper use of

requirements to guide the research program is the need for

the operational part of the organization to be in full

agreement with these requirements, to coordinate with the

Technical Center in their implementation and rulemaking

process, and to be consistent in the interpretation of the

test results regarding certification.

The issue of the proper mass of explosives that a

detection system must be able to detect has been much

discussed. Although it is true that some secrecy on the

topic is a good idea, this does not obviate the need to set

this requirement from a proper empirical and analytical

base and to provide justification for the choice (even if the

details are classified). There are ample data in various

U.S. Government agencies, such as the FBI, as well as

with foreign governments and agencies, to guide this

choice. FAA is currently collaborating with a number

of agencies and with airframe manufacturers to derive

a justifiable quantitative analysis of this problem.

Aside from the primary issue of the weight of

explosives to be used as the threshold, there is also some

confusion about the type of explosives that should be

specified. When a performance value is quoted for TNA

testing, it is usually given as a weighted average of five

commonly used explosives, including Semtex and TNT.

Different threshold values are used for each explosive in

an effort to account for the differences in the explosive

power of the various products. Consequently, when a

specific threshold is quoted, that value is an average and

not necessarily applicable to all explosives.

One serious omission was propagated in this averaging

process, with regard to testing the TNA system: the

omission of a particular explosive that, in fact, has been

a favorite of airline bombers for nearly 10 years. This

omission has been redressed in recent independent tests at

Gatwick.

A similar but less discussed issue is the FAA-specified

requirement for throughput for a candidate detection

system. This standard (currently set at 6 seconds per bag

or 10 bags per minute for luggage checking) has been used

in the past to decide that some concepts are not acceptable

or are too SloW.

15 Though apparently straightforward, this

standard is actually vague and performance with respect

to this parameter is not well known, even for the muchtested SAIC/TNA. In fact, throughput performance is

very application-specific. First, there has been no clear

determination of the throughput requirement, which is

location-specific—it can differ by over an order of

magnitude between locations. The best work in this area

is probably the recent report by the University of

California at Berkeley done for the Air Transport

13u.s. CoWess, (_Mf& of Technology Assessmen4 op. cit., footnote 9.

ldThe Natio~ Academy of Sciences has been asked to follow its previous study with a test protocol design for bulk detectors; Sandia Laboratories

has conducted some studies of a test protocol; a group of four outside consultants setup a test protocol for and carried out a set of tests performed at

Kennedy airport in April 1990 and at Gahvickin June 1991; Idaho National Engineering Laboratory has been tasked with developing protocols for testing

vapor detectors and with carryhg out some evaluations.

Issee ~so discussion in ch. 4.
100 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

Association (ATA).16 This work defines the required

throughput in terms of bags per hour required to eliminate

or minimize queuing of luggage to practical levels.

However, to relate this work to a given machine presents

further problems since the specific use must be defined.

This work also discusses the interpretation of the

throughput of the TNA system. The current TNA machine

has a belt speed of 30 feet per minute, which gives it the

theoretical ability to pass 10 bags per minute, if they are

spaced with 36 inches between bag center lines. In that

sense it meets the FAA EDS specification. However, at

this spacing, the three radiation trap doors that contain the

radiation would not be able to close, and consequently the

machine would present a radiation hazard (according to

Bureau of Radiological Health standards). In order to

allow the doors to close, the spacing between bag centers

needs to be about 52 to 60 inches, slowing the maximum

rate to 6 to 7 bags per minute. This is the real maximum

rate that a stand-alone TNA system with an automatic

decision algorithm and a mechanism that can handle and

remove the rejected bags.

If the system is coupled to another sensor, such as in the

XENIS option, the correlation time of the two observations can become another rate-determining step. ‘Throughput” lacks a simple definition and depends almost

entirely on the specific operational use. Consequently the

use of throughput in a certification protocol is probably

misguided; throughput should be a consideration for the

user to choose so as to meet the FAA’s (and its own)

operational requirements at a given location in the most

effective and economic manner.

There is no reason why a comparatively slow (e.g.,

1 to 2 bags per minute) system, with a high confidence

(detection probability) and a high specificity (low false

alarm rate), could not be a very attractive system when

used in combination with other devices. In fact, it is

quite probable that in a chain of different detectors, such

as is likely to be used in overall detection systems, a slow,

high-cost, final-stage filter will find a niche.17 The

throughput should not be an FAA-specified parameter, particularly at the R&D stage, but rather

should be machine-performance information that

needs to be considered in the selection of the specific

role in which a detector is utilized.

In the area of vapor detection systems, current

requirements are equally soft. It is difficult to specify the

minimum amount of explosives that a device should be

able to detect and to account for first-order countermeasures (e.g., wrapping explosives to trap the vapor).

Again, the throughput is entirely dependent on the

application scenario. The setting of specifications and

standards is also a problem for current x-ray systems,

since being able to differentiate the density steps of a test

wedge, the currently used standard, is not very meaningful when x-ray systems are employed to attempt to detect

explosives.

Finally, the issue of automation as stated in the

requirements for an EDS needs to be clarified. The FAA

EDS specification calls for an “automated” system.

However, automation should be utilized so as to minimize

the use of the human operator, yet should retain for the

final decision process the powerful ability of the human

to discriminate between many unknown items. In currently proposed systems, there is an operator that performs the final clearance of the automatically rejected

bags, either from a careful study of a high-resolution

sensor (usually an x-ray image) or, in the last resort, by a

hand search. This level of automation may serve the

requirement of relieving the boredom of human operators,

which is generally cited as the primary reason for

automation, except for extremely low false alarm levels.

Of course, FAA officials are aware of this. A precise

definition is, however, required to clarify the use of the

term “automation” in the certification process.

The FAA Technical Center is currently developing

a program plan to address, among other things, the

setting of realistic technical requirements for security

hardware. As part of this plan, possible future threats,

such as new explosives or incendiaries, will also be

covered. This effort is intended to resolve many of the

problems noted above.

OTA Comments on Technical and

Administrative Support

The technical staff available to manage the FAA

Aviation Security R&D program has been limited in

numbers; however this problem is apparently well on its

way to being corrected.18 One area where the lack of

technical staff was very evident was in the responses

offered to the BAA respondents. OTA heard many

complaints of lack of FAA response from contractors that

had submitted inquiries, white papers, and proposals

under this BAA. Five contracts were issued under this

request, specifically for:

. testing a competing TNA system at GammaMetrics;

. vapor detection work at CPAD, Canada;

● aircraft container hardening work at Jaycor;

● automation of the AS&E Z-Scan system; and

16Geoffrey D. Gosling and Mark M. fime% “Practicability of Screening International Checked Baggage for U.S. Airlines,” Institute of

Transportation Studies, University of California at Berkeley, UCB-ITS-RR=90-14, July 1990.

ITThis topic is discussed in greater detail inch. 4.

18Under the reorga~ation of the Proga ~to a T~.c~ Center Service, the number of perso~el Wetted to tie progfw hM been incremed from

13 to 37.
Appendix A-The FAA Aviation Security R&D Program . 101

. SAIC work in vapor detection.

OTA draws several conclusions. First, five awards do

not constitute a sufficient number to encourage innovation and diversity; second, at least two of these awards

were for work that was proceeding at the companies at the

time; work that was well known to and even desired by the

FAA-therefore, these contracts were not really the

“innovation” thrust of the BAA, which was aimed at

producing new ideas and concepts;19 third, not all

respondents in such a request received notifications of the

evaluation and disposition of their submittals in reasonable time-they should have; and finally, all respondents

should be informed of the actions taken and contracts

issued so that confidence is built up in the community that

BAA requests are a worthwhile place for industry to

present their new ideas. The staff time to prepare these

responses is a good investment in future relations with

sources of innovation.

It also appears that the contract administration support

given to the research and development program at the

Technical Center was not very effective. Research and

development organizations have a very difficult time with

contracts that start and stop on a yearly basis. When the

release of most of a fiscal year’s funds are delayed until

the last few months of that year, as has repeatedly

happened in this program, great difficulties face those

groups that have continuous programs. It also appears that

the FAA has frequently taken an inordinate length of time

from decision to signed contract.

Outside Scientific Advice

Some of the previously cited reviews of the FAA R&D

program have recommended that the program make

greater use of outside experts for advice and guidance in

scientific and other technical matters. Suggestions have

ranged from direct involvement of outside consultants in

the program management to scientific advisory committees to give the program greater validity and “clout.”

OTA agrees with both of these suggestions and believes

that liberal use of outside ‘‘experts’ could be very

beneficial to the program. FAA is moving in this

direction, following the requirement of the Aviation

Security Improvement Act of 1990, which mandated the

establishment of a scientific advisory panel as a subcommittee of FAA’s Research, Engineering, and Advisory

Committee.20

The FAA Technical Center program has used several

university personnel as expert consultants with considerable success. Expansion of this type of use is highly

recommended. The FAA R&D program is very broadly

based, utilizing a wide variety of technologies, from

nuclear physics to sophisticated electronics, from state-ofthe-art artificial intelligence to physical optics and

spectroscopy. Each of these areas has many experts who

could be very helpful in giving advice in their areas. It is

very easy for a generalist program manager to be

“snowed” in some specialty area and either miss some

obvious error or be trapped into “re-inventing the

wheel.” Outside experts are usually familiar with the

technical leaders in their area of knowledge. These

people, even if not knowledgeable about the FAA

program, could make significant contributions to progress

of the FAA program by relating the program to current

research. Liberal use of outside consultants can also be

very effective in assisting evaluation of new programs.

Institutional Problems

A research and development program can only be

useful to an organization if it is properly connected to the

overall management of the organization and to the

fulfillment of the organization’s mission. In the case of

R&D into aviation security technologies, institutional

disconnect has been a major problem. Not only was the

program conducted by a minor part of the FAA Technical

Center (as noted, this has recently been changed) but it has

been decoupled from the functions of the former Office of

Civil Aviation Security, now the Assistant Administrator

for Civil Aviation Security. The latter situation manifested itself in improper and outmoded requirements (e.g.,

the amount of explosives to be detected), a lack of overall

planning, and a variety of inconsistent interpretations of

data and results, often by personnel far removed from the

technology programs. The presence of these problems has

not allowed the R&D program to serve FAA management

well in its decision processes.

As mentioned earlier in this appendix, the FAA

Technical Center reports to the FAA Administrator

through the Executive Director for Systems Development. The Assistant Administrator for Civil Aviation

Security also reports to the Administrator. Such an

arrangement can only work if great care is taken in

assuring the coordination between all pertinent functions,

and if specific agreements exist covering the jurisdiction

of the various groups. This has not been the case in the

past.

Several groups have been directly involved with

various aspects of the R&D program and with the

applications of the results and data of that program. The

R&D program is primarily located at the Technical

Center. However, human factors as used in screening or

profiling of passengers, was the concern of the Intelligence Division within the Office of Civil Aviation

1~~ my Mve b~n due, ~ p- @ a m~~ tendency on tie pm of tie contractors to present mo~~tiom of id= tit were fanded k the pint,

rather tban to be very innovative.

zOAviation &XXU@J hprovement Act of 1990, Public hW 101-604, sec. 107.
102 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

Security. For years there was, within the Office of Civil

Aviation Security, only one individual assigned to

monitoring the R&D program. For the FAA in general,

regulatory standards are produced under an Executive

Director for Standards; however, for aviation security,

this function was subsumed under the Office of Civil

Aviation Security (now under the Assistant Administrator

for Civil Aviation Security). Thus, this function was

removed from both other standards-setting functions and

from the FAA Technical Center’s expertise. The issue of

aircraft vulnerability or hardening was pursued by the

Investigations and Security Division. The relations between that program and the Technical Center were not at

all clear; the Technical Center has only recently asserted

leadership in this area. It is not surprising that aircraft

hardening and human-factors consideration did not enter

the Technical Center R&D program planning until very

recently.

The notoriety and public attention given to certain

aspects of the R&D program by congressional hearings,

the President’s Commission, and the publicity in the

aftermath of the Pan Am 103 tragedy have also created

difficulties for the R&D program. The threat (via the FAA

rulemaking process21) to require a new-technology explosives detection system at many airports created the

potential of major business for a confused explosives

detection equipment industry. Seeking guidance in order

to plan the allocation of their resources, industry sought

out interviews with all levels of the FAA and also with

congressional members, both those directly involved with

the FAA security issue and those who represented home

districts. It was not uncommon to hear of visits to all

levels of FAA management, right up to the Administrator,

by contractors wishing to either sell or emphasize the

virtue of their devices. This environment is not conducive to conducting a balanced R&D program.

The Technical Center’s R&D program should be

open and responsive to the needs of those responsible for

planning and supervising aviation security operations.

However, a R&D program should be conducted in an

atmosphere of responsibility and understanding by the

people who are actually doing the R&D. Personnel

responsible for security operations should not also be

responsible for the R&D. However, they should and must

play an important role in the planning and setting of the

desired requirements as well as priorities, with R&D

decisions left to R&D management. As has been suggested by FAA officials, this could be accomplished by

developing a memorandum of understanding (MOU)

between the representatives of the Assistant Administrator for Civil Aviation Security and the Director of the

Technical Center.22 Such an MOU was signed by the

Assistant Administrator and the Director of the

Technical Center on March 19, 1991. This is a very

positive step.

Ideally, in this coordination, the CAS representative

should speak for all aspects of the security operation,

including rulemaking and intelligence functions, and the

Technical Center for all R&D, including human factors.

Further, CAS should insure that the data and results

obtained in the R&D program will be used only as

agreed to and warranted by the R&D personnel. The

Technical Center, in turn, should be responsive to the

needs of the CAS in setting their research goals and

requirements. Following the achievement of the MOU, a

coordinating committee for security research and development should be formed to meet on a regular basis and

provide the feedback and assurance that coordination is

accomplished on a timely basis.

Certain aspects of the proposed new FAA organization

are in accord with these suggestions. Under CAS, a R&D

staff is suggested. This is the proper place to focus all the

coordination functions within the CAS and for the

primary interface with the Technical Center. The new

organization of the Technical Center, with its elevation of

the aviation security program to the highest operational

level, should place the responsibility for coordination

properly with the Director of the Aviation Security

Research and Development Service.

The Future-Beyond Fiscal Year 1991

As a result of the attention showered on the FAA

Security R&D program an opportunity to make significant progress has developed. There has been a major

reorganization of the Technical Center aviation security

R&D program and the organization has been elevated in

status to the highest level. A new Director of the Service

has been appointed and a radical change in technical and

program management personnel has occurred.

It is not known to what degree past institutional

problems have been resolved. There may still be questions concerning the relationship of the Assistant Administrator for Aviation Security with the Technical Center

program. Will the Technical Center be allowed to run its

own R&D program? How will the planning and requirements effort be coordinated with the operational side

(CAS)? Most important, how will the technical results be

protected from misinterpretation by the operational personnel charged with implementing the new technology

through standards and rulemaking?

With a budget of $30 million for fiscal year 1991, a

significant increase in effort (from $16 million in 1990)

occurred. Many projects compete for these increased

funds. Further, there is strong pressure to produce new

ZISee FAA rules FR 5436938 and 28985, dated Sept. 5, 1989, and July 10, 1989 resP~tivelY.

zzDep~ent of Trampo~tion, Federal Aviation Administration, Op. Cit., fOOtnOte 3.
Appendix A-The FAA Aviation Security R&D Program . 103

prototype detection systems that will provide answers to

the airport security problem in a short time. This trend

must be balanced against a carefully laid out program to

provide the basic foundations of detection-technology.

There will be pressures to jump to demonstration

prototypes of systems that are still in the research stage,

resulting in large long-term commitments that may

interfere with a more deliberately planned and balanced

approach. The role of the FAA aviation security R&D

program should be carefully assessed: is it desirable to

bring completed prototypes to the field-testing phase,

resulting in commercial advantages gained by groups that

perform the development contracts, or should the role of

the FAA be to demonstrate the ability of a given

technology to make the measurements required for its

purposes to the specificity and selectivity required, but

leave the prototype development to the competitive

market? The latter lends itself much better to a broad

attack on a problem where there is no single, simple

answer and where a group of technologies must be

established that, in various combinations, can provide the

needed increment in security. The former maybe favored

if there is urgent need to deploy equipment as soon as

possible.

OTA’S Comments on Specific Technologies

A number of detection technologies in the nearprototype stage are at the point where they should be able

to make a contribution to improving security within the

next 18 months. With the experience gained from four

field units, the capabilities of the SAIC/TNA should be

well understood and its optimum role could be determined. This role may not necessarily be as the primary

detector that handles all the checked luggage. The Imatron

Computerized Tomography X-Ray Scanner may find its

niche in the coming year. A key need there is to determine

the length of time required for the system to discriminate

bombs, possibly when guided by simpler x-ray scanners.

The x-ray technique for looking at bomb components may

prove valuable, if its performance can be properly

defined. Further, the role of pattern recognition in x-ray

technologies should be further evaluated.

If there are competing TNA systems under commercial

development, the companies should be encouraged to

bring these systems to the test phase where their

capabilities and performance can be assessed. The

creation of a test facility and an independent testing

group, complete with impartial and well accepted test

protocols and standards, should be a priority. Standards for testing new bomb detection devices should

include a large set of passenger baggage (probably

obtained from airlines’ unclaimed luggage), reflecting a

diversity of locations and seasons. The approach to the

testing and certification effort must be broadly based so

that all types of detectors can be brought into this program

and evaluated on an equal basis.

The development, or at least the evaluation, of the

accelerator technology required by all the nuclear bulk

detection methods, specifically for their use in public

installations as required by the airport security program,

should also be a prime objective. Without the requisite

accelerator technology, most of the nuclear detector

techniques will fall by the wayside due to practical

considerations. The nuclear resonance absorption (NRA)

concept is such a candidate: without a viable proton

accelerator it is just an idea; with one, it may be a very

competitive scheme. It appears premature to define a

prototype for the NRA system at this time. An aggressive

program to obtain the key answers to questions such as

accelerator feasibility, detection threshold, detector

scheme, and data requirement for discrimination, should

lead to the knowledge base that is needed to define the

optimum use of this technique. Such a sequential program

will require considerable time, probably 3 years at least.

An aggressive program directed at one of the other nuclear

techniques (possibly pulsed fast neutrons or associated

particle production) that measures both elemental and

spatial distributions may also be promising. Which

technique should best be pursued may well rest on the

comparative ease with which the required accelerators can

be developed.

Apart from detection devices, there are several areas

that may bear fruit in the coming year. Increased attention

to human assessment of the threat, the so-called profiling

of travelers by skilled security personnel, is desirable.

Positive passenger/luggage matching at the entry to the

aircraft is another need. The role of the FAA Aviation

Security R&D Service could be to bring the technologies

together to develop an integrated system, since many of

the technical pieces already exist commercially. It is a

matter of giving the operators the best data and help so

they can make the right compromises among cost,

operational complexity, and effectiveness.

The work being conducted by the FAA Technical

Center at the Baltimore/Washington International Airport, supported by Sandia National Laboratory, to implement a totally integrated airport security system is also of

prime importance. This effort should operate with input

from other groups, including FAA operations, airport

operators, airlines, and those involved in the other

technology R&D programs.

The final high-priority area for the future is aircraft

hardening, discussed by both the President’s Commission

and the NAS study. In June 1990, the FAA Technical

Center convened a meeting of government employees

active in explosives and structural research and related

topics to discuss and conceive such a program. This group

developed and published a program plan that has served
104 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

the purpose of guiding this activity since that time.23 the required guidance to the program. Since that report,

Although it is a comprehensive and broad-based approach more technically oriented efforts are taking place both

to the issue and recommends a combined analytical and within FAA and in cooperation with the Department of

empirical approach with frequent cross-checks, this report Defense.

does not seem sufficiently technically based to provide

zqFm Tec~c~ Center Pla~ “Aviation Security Research and Development Plan for Aircraft Hardening,” August 1990.
Appendix B

Explosives Detection: Dogs

This appendix and the following one will discuss two

important areas of explosives detection that were only

mentioned in passing in the previous OTA report on

terrorism and technology.l

Introduction

The dog has been “man’s best friend” since neolithic

times, 10,000 years ago. As people learned to modify the

dog’s physical appearance and even its temperament

through selective breeding, they were able to produce

animals capable of performing a wide variety of services.

These included refinements in the hunting process such as

pointing, retrieving, tracking, and burrowing; herding;

draft work (pulling and carrying); guard duties; providing

companionship; and, more recently, assisting the disabled

such as the blind or wheelchair-bound. Quite recently,

police work has been added to the list.

In this last capacity, the dog has been making major

contributions to the fight against terrorism, in no area

more critically than in the search for hidden explosives.

There is a lively debate between those who favor the dog

as an explosives detector and those who place more faith

in mechanical ‘‘sniffers. ” There are good arguments to

support both sides. But to date, despite the best efforts of

many talented scientists and technicians, there is no

machine that is as widely used and accepted as the dog for

the detection of explosives. This section will describe

how and why the dog’s nose has been applied to the task

of detecting hidden explosives.

Disadvantages and Advantages

There are a number of disadvantages to using dogs as

explosives detectors. First and foremost, adequately

maintaining a canine operation, especially in the one-handlerto-one-dog mode preferred by many law enforcement

organizations, is very expensive. Costs include initial

acquisition of the animals, training for both the dog and

the handler, veterinary and other maintenance expenses

for the dogs, and the salary and other expenses associated

with the handler, this last constituting the largest fraction

by far.2

Explosives sniffer dogs do not and cannot operate by

themselves. They always function in tandem with their

handler. The leash that connects man and dog is not so

much a means of control as a channel for communication.

This is both a strength and a weakness. When a team is in

top form, the dog and his handler function with amazing

efficiency. But the dog works only as well as his master.

Security searches are frequently boring, monotonous

chores, the sort of task for which humans have trouble

staying alert. If the dog senses a lack of commitment on

the part of his human teammate, the dog’s effort similarly

diminishes. Also, it is inaccurate to say that the dog finds

the explosive. It is up to the handler to recognize the

sometimes subtle changes in the dog’s behavior that

signal interest in a faint scent. This reliance on the

handler’s judgment introduces a second opportunity for

error.

Dogs have a number of weaknesses when compared to

mechanical sniffer devices. Being a living creature, dogs

cannot be worked as intensely as a piece of machinery.

Depending on temperature and humidity conditions, a

dog may be able to work only about 20 minutes before he

needs a rest. Dogs are also vulnerable to distraction by

loud noises, bright lights, new surroundings, fatigue, and

alluring scents left behind by canine members of the

opposite sex. Dogs have a limited attention span. They

cannot be positioned beside a conveyor belt, even under

comfortable conditions, and be expected to sniff luggage

effectively hour after hour. They must be actively

engaged in the search or their acuity will sharply

diminish. They also are prone to personality quirks. Some

dogs refuse to go in glass elevators. Some won’t fly in

helicopters. Some dogs bond very strongly to their

handlers, some are more aloof. And it is the rare machine

that produces the embarrassing “accidents” for which

dogs are so infamous.

The dog also shares many of the shortcomings of the

mechanical explosives sniffers. Because they rely on

sensing airborne molecules or particles, dogs will not be

able to detect an explosive that is perfectly wrapped. Also

like machines, dogs can respond to the wrong thing. The

U.S. Secret Service found that their dogs were reliably

responding to the double stick tape regularly used to hold

down small equipment in Air Force One. Perhaps a

cellulose nitrate was used in the adhesive. But this

tendency to generate false alarms is apparently so

unpredictable that the Irish Republican Army terrorists in

the United Kingdom have been trying for years without

success to devise a reliable masking odor for the bombs

they plant.

Probably the most serious liability of the canine

approach is that it is largely unpredictable and essentially

unquantified. How does the dog do his job? Is it just smell

IUCS. conge~s, Office of Technolo~ Assessment, Technology Against Terrorism: The Federal Eflort, OTA-lSC-481 (Washington, DC: U.S.

Government Printing Office, July 1991).

ZFor some ~ic~ values, see the section of this appendix, below, in which the experiences of the U.S. Secret Service WC discussed.

–l05–
106 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

or are cues from other senses, such as vision or hearing,

involved? Is it possible to tell, before investing a lot of

time and money, which puppies will make good sniffer

dogs? These questions and others related to dog performance could probably be answered with some R&D effort.

In the face of these disadvantages, why would anyone

choose to use these animals? Basically, because they

work. The primary advantage of using sniffer dogs over

other methods of sweeping an area for explosives is that

it has been shown to be effective. There is no mechanical

device that is as accurate, fast, sensitive, mobile, flexible,

and durable as a well-trained dog/handler team. Many

organizations claim their dogs can even detect lowvolatility explosives, such as TNT and the plastic

explosives, RDX, PETN and Semtex.3 No mechanical

sniffer has been reliably shown to match this performance

under field conditions. The dogs can go anywhere a

human can go and can operate under any conditions

tolerable to humans (although performance degrades with

increasing temperature and humidity). They don’t need

electricity or batteries. They can be transported by

helicopter, truck, car, or plane. They generally do not

break. Service life is an average of 7 to 9 years. Thus,

while they are expensive, they can be cost-effective for

many uses. The dog/handler team operates in a real-time

mode and thus can be much quicker than some sniffers

that rely on sample collection followed by preconcentration and analysis steps. Also, the dog offers much more

directional information than most mechanical sniffers and

is usually better able to pinpoint the location of an

explosive as opposed to merely alerting to its general

presence.

Legally, a canine search is not considered invasive

under the fourth amendment in distinction to methods that

use any kind of penetrating radiation. Thus the searches

can be conducted without a warrant. Finally, dogs are

socially acceptable, at least in this culture. People are used

to being sniffed by dogs and do not take offense or

become fearful or belligerent.

It looks as if there probably will be a place for dogs in

security work for the foreseeable future. But considerable

progress has been made in the development of mechanical

vapor detectors. Some people in the field estimate that

within 10 years, possibly fewer, technology will be able

to challenge or even surpass the detection capabilities of

the dog.

Technology is also being applied to the animal systems

in order to ameliorate some of the problems mentioned

above. A number of organizations are considering efforts

to better understand the operation of the dog/handler team

and to optimize it. These efforts will be discussed below.

The Sense of Smell 4

Of all the dog’s senses, it is the sense of smell that is

most renowned. Humans have made use of the dog’s

olfactory talents in a wide range of endeavors. Dogs now

are used routinely to hunt for contraband such as drugs or

weapons. They track escapees and other criminals. They

locate earthquake victims buried in rubble. They assist in

the investigation of suspected arson by searching for

accelerants typically used by the criminal to start a fire.

They even are used to find termites lurking in dark

basements. Yet despite having used and relied on the

dog’s sense of smell for millennia, man still has little

understanding of how this sense works.

Even in humans, much less in dogs, the sense of smell

is not terribly well understood. It is known to be a

chemical sense, requiring physical contact between the

stimulant and the sensory organ. There are three pathways

for reception of stimuli generally called odor or smell:

receptor cells, pain endings of the trigeminal nerve, and,

for some animals, the vomeronasal, or Jacobson’s, organ.

Anatomically, in dogs, as in humans, receptor cells are

located high in the nasal cavity. The receptor cells are long

and thin, terminating in about 6 to 12 olfactory cilia

(delicate hair-like structures) that extend into the mucus

layer that normally covers the inner lining of the nasal

cavity. The other end of the receptor cell narrows to a fine

nerve fiber and, joining with others of its kind, becomes

the olfactory nerve which passes through the bony roof of

the nasal cavity and then connects with the olfactory

bulbs, stem-like projections under the front part of the

brain. From there, additional complex neural connections

are made to centers higher in the brain. Typically, there

are millions of receptor cells in the olfactory mucosa

patch, but for some animals, such as the dog or the rabbit

for whom scent is very important, there can be tens of

millions.

The second channel for sensory input, the pain or “free

nerve’ endings of the trigeminal nerve, are found

throughout the nasal cavity and are also activated by many

of the same stimuli that trigger the receptor cells. For

example, these cells respond to orange oil, a relatively

mild odorant, as well as scents more obviously irritating,

such as ammonia.

The third channel is the vomeronasal organ, typically

located in the hard palate of the mouth or the floor of the

nasal cavity of some animals. It is believed to be

3S=, for ~xwple, Counter.Temorism & Security Intelligence, Bethesda, MD, Sept. 24, Iggo) P. 6.

4~e ~OmtiOn ~~s Section comes from: ‘ ‘Semo~R~eptio~’ The NewEnqclopedia Britannica, VO1. 27 (acago, IL: Encyclopedia Britannica

Educational Corp., 1986) pp. 170-171; “Olfactiou” McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Science and Technology, 6th cd., vol. 12 (New York+ NY:

McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1987) pp. 340-344; and Lawrence J. Meyers, “Dysosmia of the Dog in Clinical VeterinaryMedicine,” Progress in Veterinary

Neurology, vol. 1, No. 2, 1990, pp. 171-179.
Appendix B--Explosives Detection: Dogs ● 107

important in detection of nonvolatile compounds and, for

some species, pheromones. Its function in normal conscious scent sensation is not well understood.

In terrestrial mammals, the physiological steps involved in detecting odors can be broken down as follows:

● airflow and sampling of odors,

● concentration of odors in mucus,

● odor-receptor molecular interaction,

● transduction, and

. neural coding.

While the receptor cells are located surprisingly far

from the main airflow path (it is estimated that only 1 to

2 percent of the odor molecules inhaled during normal

breathing actually reach the receptor sites)5

, apparently

eddy currents carry just enough stimulus to the cells to

cause arousal, whereupon sniffing will occur. Sniffing

changes the airflow pattern and dramatically increases the

number of molecules coming in contact with the nasal

mucosa.

Odor molecules concentrate in the olfactory mucus on

the order of 1 to 10,000 times their concentration in air.

An apparently general olfactory binding protein in the

mucus or in the ciliary membrane immersed in the mucus

is involved with a reversible binding of the odor

molecules to the receptors.

The exact manner in which the odor molecule and the

receptor interact is another area that is not well understood. Mammals have a relatively small number of

different kinds of receptors, estimated to be between 7 and

30, and each responds to a broad range of odorants. Yet

thousands of different odors can be distinguished.

Once the odor molecule becomes attached to the

receptor cell, the cell generates electrical signals to be sent

to the brain in a process called transduction. Again, the

mechanism by which this takes place and determination

of the critical elements of the signal (pattern, repetition

rate, signal strength, and so on) are areas in need of

investigation.

Neural coding refers to the processing of the signals

from the olfactory receptors in the various areas of the

brain and is not well understood. Of all the senses, the

pathways of the olfactory system through the central

nervous system are uniquely complex. Some paths,

apparently carrying strictly sensory information, link

three different parts of the brain. Others are connected to

structures of the limbic system, which are closely

involved with control of emotions, feeding, and sex. This

is consistent with observations of a strong influence of

odors on behaviors and physiological regulation.

What makes something have a smell? Typically, the

stimulant is a volatile organic molecule (only a handful of

the chemical elements have odors although, obviously,

some inorganic compounds such as ammonia and hydrogen sulfide (H2S) are fragrant). To be detected by smell,

the material must be volatile and, typically, the volatile

organic compounds are soluble in water or fats. There are

about half a million such compounds. Apparently, the

nature of the perceived odor is influenced by both the

shape of the molecule as well as the character of the

chemical groups of which the molecule is made. Perception also varies depending on what other odorants are

present.

The sense of smell in humans is said to be 10,000 times

more sensitive than the sense of taste but sensitivity to

odors varies from individual to individual and from

compound to compound. For example, humans can detect

3-methoxy-3-isobutyl pyrazine (green bell pepper odor)

at concentrations of about 1 part per 1012 parts of air, but

methanol is far less easily detected and must be present as

1 part in 104 to be noticed. Temperature, humidity, age,

respiratory infections, phase of the female hormonal

cycles, and hunger all seem to affect sensitivity to odors.

Among mammals, rats and dogs are credited with being

the most sensitive to olfactory stimulation, one test

showing dogs able to detect an odor at concentrations 103

to 105 times lower than humans.6

Continuing Investigations

Scientific work continues in an effort to better understand olfaction in general and the sense of smell in the dog

in particular. Several years ago, animal studies were

conducted at the University of Pennsylvania under

support provided by the FAA, but were not followed up

after the death of the researcher. Some work with rats has

recently been reinitiated at the same laboratory, again

under the aegis of the FAA. But the research is too

embryonic to have yielded reportable findings yet.

Another group professes to be ready, willing, and able

to perform serious study of olfaction in dogs but is having

trouble securing funding. The Institute for Biological

Detection Systems (IBDS) of Auburn University (Auburn, AL) was created in 1989. IBDS is made up of a team

of scientists, veterinarians, and engineers whose aim is to

improve existing methods of odor detection and to

develop advanced sensing technology. They also would

like to coordinate similar efforts at other institutions and

corporations. They have received contracts and other

support from private industry, foundations, the Department of Defense, and the FAA, but are interested in

expanding their operation. In October 1990, they were

expecting a memorandum of understanding from the

SD.A. Marshall et al.,‘‘Olfactory Sensitivity to Alpha-Ionone in Humans and Dogs,’ Chemical Senses, vol. 6, No. 1, 1981, pp. 53-61.

61bid.
108 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

Department of State, the U.S. Secret Service, and the FAA

that would provide funding, but as of this writing, the

Federal budget situation leaves this arrangement unconsummated.

This group has put a good deal of thought into

developing a list of areas in which research should be

performed and in developing preliminary outlines of

experimental protocols to support such research. The

range of questions these investigators would like to look

into is an indication of the depth of human ignorance

about this topic.

In response to an expression of interest by the U.S.

Secret Service (although almost all security organizations

relying on dogs expressed a similar need), IBDS considered means to investigate how to optimize the dog/handler

team. They saw this effort as breaking down into several

subsections. First, IBDS would like to devise a way to

quantitatively and reliably evaluate the dog/handler

team’s detection capability. They would also like to

improve the system for selecting dogs to be trained as

sniffers and they want to establish means to evaluate and

improve the training process. Finally, they want to

explore possible ways to enhance the olfactory function

of dogs.

In order to optimize the dog/handler team, the IBDS

researchers want to start with an investigation of the

sensory function of the dog. As an example of the means

by which one may investigate the limits of a dog’s sense

of smell and the factors that affect these limits, IBDS

proposed the following series of experiments. A test

substance would be analyzed, using gas chromatography

and mass spectrometxy, to determine the number and

nature of its volatile constituents. Some preliminary work

along these lines has recently been conducted by the

Transportation Systems Center of the Department of

Transportation. Explosives would be hidden in various

detection “scenarios,’ simulations of real-life situations,

and the concentration ranges of the volatiles in the air

surrounding the hidden samples would be measured.

Then, the detection thresholds of dogs to each of the major

volatile constituents would be gauged. This would

involve selecting a fairly large group of dogs (at least 10)

matched for such factors as age, sex, breed, and response

to predetermined concentrations of baseline substances

such as eugenol.7 The detection threshold of the dogs to

the test substances would be determined by olfactory

methods (electroencephalography8 [EEG] and behavioral

olfactometry9) and by operant conditioning methods.10

These procedures would be repeated under different

conditions to determine the effect of variables likely to

influence the dog’s performance, including such factors

as gender, temperature and humidity, circadian rhythms,

and number, order, duration, and intensity of stimuli

presentation.

Finally, the actual components detected by trained dogs

would be determined by using a setup such as that shown

in figure B-1. A sample of the test material would be

injected into a gas chromatography (GC) where the volatile

constituents would be separated. The passage of each

separated component past the exit of the device is

recorded as a peak on the chromatogram. A dog trained to

respond to the test material would be positioned at a

“sniff port” at the exit of the gas chromatography and the

dog’s response would be correlated to the various peaks.

Because it is likely that dogs cue on a mixture of scents

rather than on any single component, the IBDS team also

proposes performing this experiment while exposing the

dog to a blend of peaks from the GC.

Obviously, even this fairly limited endeavor is going to

involve a lot of dogs, a lot of time and effort to train and

support them, and, critically, a lot of money. In April

1990, IBDS estimated that it would need $480,000 to

perform these tasks. Even if all these needs were met,

there is some question about how reliably the results of

such artificially constrained experiments could be translated to the field. But the desire for quantification of the

dog’s performance is very strong among the organizations

that rely on them and was a repeatedly expressed need.

Experiments such as these were recognized as a necessary

first step in the process of understanding, and thereby

optimizing, the performance of the complex biological

system that is the dog.

IBDS would also like to be funded to explore optimizaion of the selection process and the training routine for

both the dog and handler. For example, they would like

to develop a battery of assessment procedures that would

predict a dog’s physical suitability (that is to say, freedom

from disabilities), its trainability, and its performance

after training. They propose a $100,000 project aimed at

determining what factors (e g., olfactory capability, motor

capability, intelligence, trainability, temperament, and

medical/veterinary factors) and what tests for measuring

these factors are most predictive of a dog’s future success

in explosives detection work.

For example, a panel of experts might be able to assess

a dog’s temperament based on a review of a videotape of

7~e~~wessenti~ oil in clove oil.

8E1ec~ode5 ~fiached t. &e ~~~*5 s~p r~ord c~ges in elmtri~ patterns in tie br~ in response to olfactory Stimuli.

9(_JbSe~atio~ of an ~te (perhaps reflexive) movement of tie head tow~ds or away from a s~~us red/Or Sniffing Or fiChg.

IOme dog is ~~n~d t. give a perceivable phYSiC~ response upon det~ting a s~ple. men tie concen@ation Gf tie s~ple material wotid be lowered

in stages until no response is given. This technique has the disadvantage of being extremely time consuming, taking about 8 weeks to adequately train

a dog to give the proper response.
Appendix Explosives Detection: Dogs . 109

Figure B-l—Determining the Components of a Volatile Mixture

to Which a Trained Dog Responds

~ — J

Clean air Gas flow

source controller

Gas

chromatography

Response

[ w I

 L -J 0-3 Sample generation

champer

M

Sniff port Conditioner

i A

I Animal

response

Time ~

SOURCE: Institute for Biological Detection Systems, Auburn University, April 1990.

an animal’s behavior. Motor capabilities might be best

evaluated by an analysis of gait and conformation, range

of motion, or endurance tests. It is not easy to evaluate

sensory capabilities in a nonverbal species. Some tests are

based on detecting changes in electrical activity in the

brain in response to sensory stimuli. Most tests rely on

eliciting innate or reflexive behavior. Several means of

assessing olfactory sensitivity already exist and may

prove applicable. These include olfactory electroencephalograph and behavioral olfactometry that have already

been mentioned.

Behavioral gustometry is a means of assessing taste

acuity. Increasingly concentrated solutions of a taste

compound are administered intravenously until a predictable response (usually a lick or a gag) is observed. This

procedure can only be used to test sweet or bitter

compounds because infusion of salty or acidic materials

could adversely alter the dog’s physiology.

Visual acuity can be assessed using the phenomenon of

optokinetic nystagmus (OKN). In all species with moveable eyes, if the visual field is perceived to move, the eyes

will follow the motion and then rapidly move back. To

test for visual acuity, the dog is presented with a moving

grid pattern. The pattern is gradually made finer and finer.

If OKN is observed, then it can be concluded that the

animal can resolve the grid lines. At some point, the dog

ceases to perceive a moving grid but sees only a constant

grey background and OKN stops. This threshold is an

indication of visual acuity.

Behavioral audiometry is a technique for measuring the

threshold for sound detection. The dog is exposed to

sounds of various loudness and pitch and a reflexive

response such as ear twitching or startle is noted.

Unfortunately, this technique is not very good for

determining minimum threshold sensitivity because the

animal does not reliably respond to noises that are

detected but apparently not considered as needing further

investigation. The IBDS team would like to investigate

whether electroencephalograph might be a more suitable

test.

A separate proposed study would investigate the

suitability of several new physical screening methods. In

particular, a number of musculoskeletal abnormalities

(e.g., hip dysplasia, common in German Shepherds)

render a dog unusable. Yet this particular problem is not

necessarily visible using conventional x rays until the

animal is several years old or the disease well advanced.

Work recently completed at the University of Illinois has

demonstrated that the technique of gait analysis is

effective in predicting the onset of hip dysplasia at age 2

in dogs 6 to 12 months old. This technique measures the

relative amount of weight the dog places on each limb as

he trots over a pressure sensitive plate. The IBDS

researchers would like to investigate whether this technique should be included in the battery of physical
110 . Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

examinations conducted on dogs who are candidates for

explosives detection work. They would also like to follow

up on work done at the University of Pennsylvania using

a new radiographic technique that measures hip joint

laxity.11 There maybe a correlation between this phenomenon and the later onset of musculoskeletal diseases

thereby allowing for early diagnosis of such problems.

Finally, there is some evidence that changes in bone

metabolism could also be predictive of dysplasia. These

changes in growth and resorption can be monitored by

following the movement of a radioactive taggant and

using a high-resolution tomographic imager. Auburn

estimates that it would need about $120,000 to develop

these physical screening procedures.

Another study proposed by the Auburn team would

involve investigating training procedures for both the

dogs and their handlers. To do this, they would perform

a survey of existing detection training techniques for

dogs, analyze which of those techniques are effective

(which, of course, would require development of some

measures of effectiveness), and develop improved training techniques based on these analyses. They expect that

a number of factors might influence the success of a

training program. These would include:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

the number and duration of daily training sessions,

the sequence in which “subtasks” are trained,

the optimal proficiency required on one “subtask”

before training is begun on the next “subtask”

the type and schedule of reinforcement for correct

performance,

the type of consequences delivered for incorrect

performance, and

the role of the handler in detection tasks.12

IBDS estimates that $400,000 would be needed for this

study.

There are several other avenues for investigation

proposed by the Auburn team. One of these involves a

proposed $180,000 study exploring the influence of drugs

on behavioral measures of olfactory function in order to

try to find some agent that could enhance odor detection.

There is some speculation that drugs could be used to

alter:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

olfactory sensitivity,

odor discriminatory capacity (e.g., by increasing the

signal-to-noise ratio),

olfactory memory,

attention mechanisms, or

motivation. 13

Some preliminary work along this line was done by

R. Doty at the University of Pennsylvania and the

researchers at IBDS. Some of this work suggested that, in

rats, low doses of amphetamines enhanced odor detection

capability. Of course, this approach runs the risk of

altering the behavior of the animal due to the intoxicating

effects of the drugs. Other very preliminary research, for

which the IBDS team would like $10,000 to run a pilot

project, suggests that the sense of smell in the dog could

be enhanced by ingestion of the target odorant.

This discussion of proposed projects came from a paper

prepared by the Auburn group. It was designed to spark

the interest of various governmental agencies that would

have an interest in improving the explosives detection

capabilities of dogs. Some of these projects may not be

feasible, some may cost considerably more than estimated. However, IBDS was, at this writing, the only

facility attempting to address the question of canine

sensory capabilities in such a comprehensive, scientific

way.

Other Avenues of Investigation

Several other groups are looking at novel ways to make

use of animal olfaction to enhance security. A group in

South Africa is marketing a system that it hopes will prove

to be the best of both worlds. They use a mechanical

device to collect and concentrate vapor samples. A

vacuum source draws large quantities of air through

cartridges containing an adsorbant material. In this

manner, large volumes such as freight cars on trains,

shipping containers, airmail pallets, airplane cargo holds,

and so on can be sampled quickly and efficiently without

unpacking. The saturated cartridges are then presented to

a dog specially trained to detect odors from contraband.

The manufacturers claim that this process works faster

and better than normal dog operation. Objective evaluation of their claims is not presently available. Others have

suggested that odorants easily detected by dogs should be

used as taggants in explosives.

Animals other than dogs have been suggested for use.

Some rodents, notably rats and gerbils have already been

tested for this role with less than satisfactory results. Pigs

apparently have an excellent sense of smell but their use

by law enforcement agencies has been ruled out for

aesthetic and practical reasons.

Finally, 10 to 15 years into the future, research into the

“artificial nose” may pay off. Again at IBDS at Auburn

University, researchers have taken small bits of natural

membrane from olfactory receptor cells and fused them

onto an artificial lipid substrate. When odorants bind onto

1 l~e ~owt of mobility in a joint.

IZ” A Discussion Document on Efiancement of tie Dog.H~dler Team and Development of Antibody-Based Sensors, ’ submined to tie U.S. Smret

Service, by the Institute for Biological Detection Systems, Auburn University, April 1990, p. 11.

1%id., p. 15.
Appendix B--Explosives Detection: Dogs ● 111

receptor sites in the membrane, electrical impulses are

given off. In the living creature, these would be transmitted to the brain, which would decode the signals and

identify the odor. In the ‘artificial nose’ these signals are

detected by sensitive electrodes and processed by a

computer. The “nose” is very sensitive, responding to

very low levels of odorant. But so far it is not very

specific. “It cannot yet distinguish between different

odors,” says main researcher Vitaly Vodyanoy. Future

research is aimed at improving selectivity. The researchers speculate that different odors may cause different

electrical patterns to be produced. Alternatively, receptor

cells may be differentially sensitive to different kinds of

odorants.

The U.S. Secret Service Canine Explosives

Detection Teams

Many organizations rely on dogs for part of their

physical security routine. The Federal Aviation Administration, the U.S. Customs Service, all military services,

the U.S. Park Police, the U.S. Capitol Police, many State

and local law enforcement agencies, and numerous

foreign organizations, such as the Royal Canadian Mounted

Police, and the Royal Ulster Constabulary in Northern

Ireland, use canine teams. 14 Since 1975, the U.S. Secret

Service (USSS) has also trained and maintained a canine

unit, the largest single canine bomb detection squad in the

country. The background and operation of this organization are fairly typical and give a good insight into the pros

and cons of using dogs.

The USSS is charged with protecting a long list of

notables including the President and Vice President, their

families, visiting heads of state, and other dignitaries.

They also provide security at the White House complex,

other Presidential offices, and foreign diplomatic missions. 15 Part of this security involves searching structures,

vehicles, and individuals for threats including explosive

devices. For this task, the USSS employs dog/handler

teams. It should be noted, however, that the USSS never

relies on these teams as the sole means of explosives

detection. They are always used as part of an overall

Explosive Ordnance Demolition Unit and in conjunction

with another search technique, either manual or mechanical, although the decision as to which search means is

primary and which is backup depends on the situation.

The dogs’ place is as a tool for use by the security

professionals.

The USSS canine corps currently consists of about

30 dog/handler teams. Generally, these teams spend about

80 percent of their time doing detection work with the

remainder spent performing patrol functions. It is uncommon, for cost and operational considerations, for any

organization to dedicate dogs solely to detection work and

so, frequently, the same animal is used for both detection

and patrol duties. This cross use is not necessarily bad.

The obedience training that is a necessary part of the

patrol training process, improves the control and operation of the animal in the detection mode. The USSS dogs

are trained to detect only explosives. They are not

cross-trained to detect both explosives and narcotics (or

other drugs). This is for safety reasons. If a dog were

trained to give the same response to both types of

contraband, the handler would never know which type of

threat he was dealing with. If the dog were trained to give

different responses, there still would be the lingering

doubt about whether he was giving the proper signal.

Because the courses of action following detection of these

two types of contraband are drastically different and

because the consequences of making the wrong response

can be so dire, the USSS did not want to risk having their

dogs give an improper alert.

Many breeds of dogs are probably suitable for detection

work but patrol and guard dogs must be large and

trainable to present credible attack behavior. For this

reason, German Shepherds are frequently the breed of

choice although several factors count against them. These

include a difficulty getting physically sound dogs because

careless breeding, especially in the United States, has

resulted in the proliferation of animals genetically predisposed to physical disorders such as hip dysplasia. Also,

German Shepherds, while controllable, are not as easy to

work with as other breeds. Labrador Retrievers, for

example, are less expensive, longer lived, more tractable,

have good noses and (to date) no predisposition for

debilitating diseases. However, their generally genial

disposition renders them not particularly suitable for

criminal apprehension16 work Beagles, even poodles,

have been considered for use as detection dogs but to date,

no scientific comparison of the olfactory capabilities of

various breeds has been undertaken.

The USSS is a great believer in the use of dogs and they

are willing to pay quite a price for the privilege. Their

expenses start with acquisition of the animals. The USSS

relies on a breeder in the Netherlands who selects young

(1- to 3-year-old) dogs, usually German Shepherds or

ldThis list is far from complete.

ls~e USSS is pm of the u-s- Dep~ent of the Tr~sW and investigates many v~ed c~ency.~lat~offenses such as forge~, ViOhibOJIS Of the

FDIC Ac~ and those pe rtaining to electronic funds transfer frauds, credit and debit card frauds, false identification documents, computer access fraud,

and misuse of U.S. Department of Agriculture food coupons. But these activities do not involve the use of dogs and so will not be further discussed.

16A euphemism for ‘‘attack. ’
112 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

Belgian Malanois. 17 The Service has found that this

individual is their most reliable source of high-quality

dogs. Because the dogs will also be used for patrol work

the generally larger males are preferred. The dogs usually

have had preliminary obedience and patrol training and

cost about $2,000 apiece. Shipping adds another $400 to

$500.

The handlers are selected from the ranks of uniformed

USSS officers. They are chosen based on an evaluation of

how well they work with the dogs and their general

seniority in the ranks.18 The only physical requirement,

beyond those normally associated with the Service, is the

ability to pickup and carry 80 pounds, the average weight

of a dog. Both men and women serve as handlers. The

canine corps is considered desirable work among the

USSS officers. At the very least, there is the free use of a

car and the opportunity for improved income. Dog

handlers are considered “technicians” which, by itself,

justifies a pay raise of about 6 percent. In addition,

considerable travel is inevitable, which translates into

considerable overtime pay and, for care and feeding of the

dogs, the handlers receive 2 hours of overtime pay every

day for as long as their dogs are alive and working.

Training is conducted at the USSS Canine Training

Facility in Beltsville, MD. Small groups of new dogs and

rookie handlers, typically four or five at a time, are trained

as the need arises, about every 2 years. Deciding which

dog to assign to which handler is more art than science.

Some assessment of size (the larger dog goes to the larger

handler) and home situation (the touchier dogs are not

assigned to officers with small children) is made.

The USSS currently uses four dog trainers who are

civilian employees of the USSS. Initial training lasts 20

to 26 weeks (40 hours per week) during which time, the

teams are drilled in obedience, criminal apprehension,

and detection techniques. For the obedience work, both on

and off the leash, the dog is schooled to respond to the

commands ‘‘heel” (maintain a position at its handler’s

knee at any pace and through changes in direction),

“stay’ (remain in position even while the handler walks

away or walks past), “down” (lie down on command,

even if the handler is some distance away), and ‘‘come”

(return to the handler). To test and improve agility, the

dogs are taught to cope with a variety of obstacles such as

fences, windows, tunnels, broad jumps, ladders, and

elevated cat walks.

Criminal apprehension training involves teaching the

dog to chase and grab the arm of a suspect and to hold on

until the handler arrives. On command, the dog must

release the suspect and return to his handler. The dog then

stands guard as the handler searches the suspect for

weapons and will reengage if the suspect makes a

threatening move. The dog must also obey a command to

stop a chase, even if he is in full flight, and return to his

handler.

For detection, the dogs are taught a three-step sequence: smell a target compound, alert, receive reward.

To do this, the dogs are exposed to the scent of one of the

target compounds, then the handler manually positions

the dog into the “alert” posture, then the reward is

provided. After an adequate number of repetitions, the

dog comes to realize what is expected of him. The dogs

must also be taught to follow the ‘scent cone” to the site

of the strongest odor. Training the handler to observe the

environment and interpret the dog’s behavior is critical

here for the strength and location of the scent is strongly

influenced by any air currents and eddies. The handler

must be able to work the dog in a search pattern that takes

best advantage of the air movements and he must be able

to recognize when his dog is interested but not yet sure

enough to alert. Commands are given verbally, with body

signals (a wave of the arm, a sweep of the hand), or by

using both modes simultaneously.

The USSS trains its dogs to signal detection of an

explosive (alert) by sitting. Drug-detecting dogs are

frequently trained to bite, scratch, and otherwise attack a

suspect package. The passive ‘‘sit” response is clearly

more appropriate when dealing with a potential hazard

such as an explosive. The dogs learn to look for scents on

the ground, in the air, and coming from objects, and they

are trained to search for both humans (with the command

“find him”) or explosives (“search”). The dogs are

trained to find about 13 of the most common military and

civilian explosives including TNT, RDX, Semtex, and

black powder. They do not train on peroxides which are

considered too unstable to work with.

This seems like an impressive list of accomplishments.

Yet, some dog-training experts estimate that a single dog

can learn 150 tasks. A complex operation may involve a

number of tasks but the USSS dog trainers believe that

their dogs are asked to perform at a level of only about half

their maximum capability.

Dogs require 70 to 130 iterations of a task before they

can be considered trained in it. This time might be shorter

for a very intelligent, talented animal or if the task is

related to one already learned. For example, to learn to

respond properly to the detection of a first explosive

might take the full number of repetitions but to learn

another explosive (where all that is required is to

17A brwddeveloped ~Emope dfigtie ~mly ~m5 of ~s cen~w by cmss~g Ge~an Shepherds ~~ hounds. The IJSSS finds them more suitable

than German Shepherds because they have abetter ‘nose,’ they have abetter drive to work especially in hot weather, their bite is about 100 psi stronger

than a Shepherd, and they area little smaller and a lot faster.

18A mmurn of 5 years on the force is required.
Appendix B-Explosives Detection: Dogs . 113

recognize the new scent, the response procedures being

already familiar) would be quicker.

Motivating the dogs is a supervisor’s dream come true.

The dogs generally will work to please their handlers who

are lavish with praise when it is due. Furthermore, for

criminal apprehension work, the dogs find biting the

subject very rewarding in itself. Also, when they have

performed successfully, the dogs are allowed to play with

a ball. Usually this play is allowed to go on only for a few

seconds before the handler removes the ball but it seems

to satisfy the dog.19 Food is used as a reward only as a last

resort. The dogs are never punished for a false alert. They

may not be rewarded if the handler feels the dog is

“faking,” but he won’t be punished. False positives are

tolerable, false negatives are not. The USSS does not want

the dogs or their handlers to feel constrained about

alerting.

At the conclusion of initial training, the dogs and their

handlers are ready to join the canine patrol corps

(although, as a practical matter, it may take an additional

6 to 18 months of experience before the dog and his

handler become really comfortable working together).

But formal training does not end at this point; in fact, it

never ends. During regular working hours, the handlers

repeatedly challenge their dogs by hiding ‘‘training aids”

scented with different explosive compounds. This not

only gives the handlers a chance to test and hone their

dogs’ skills, but it also is very satisfying to the dogs, who,

like people, can get very frustrated and bored if their work

never seems to accomplish anything. All influencing

factors are varied as much as possible. Therefore, the

locale in which this training takes place, the kinds of

explosives used, and the concentration of the explosive

are randomly altered.

Additionally, on a weekly basis, every dog returns to

the Beltsville facility for a full day (8 hours) of continuing

training as part of a recertification process. During this

time, he is tested against three or four explosives other

than those used by the handler during the course of the

week such that, over a span of a month or two, the trainers

can be assured that the dog is still properly responding to

the whole range of explosive threats. Should an animal

fail recertification, it would return to Beltsville for

additional training. This USSS recertification routine is

much more stringent than that of many agencies. The

FAA for example, recertifies their dogs only four times

a year. Of course, the FAA generally uses their dogs for

narcotics detection and if they should fail to perform

correctly the consequences are not as immediately disastrous as a failure to detect an assassin’s bomb.

The dogs go everywhere the USSS protectees go. The

dogs are transported all over the country and, occasionally, all over the world. They ride like other animals, in

travel kennels in the pressurized, but dark and noisy,

baggage compartment. Despite this travel arrangement,

most of the dogs seem to enjoy the excitement of being on

the road and willingly enter their travel kennel. The dogs

can suffer from jet lag, though, and several have washed

out of the program from an inability to cope with travel.

An important feature of the USSS program is that the

handlers have absolute authority to determine the fitness

of their dogs for use on any given day. If the officer does

not feel that the dog is performing properly, he or she can

withdraw the animal from service without concern about

being overruled by a supervisor.

Atypical day finds the dog and his handler reporting for

the day shift (6 a.m. to 2 p.m.) at USSS headquarters in

Washington, DC, where they receive their assignment.

They might be sent to work 4 hours at the White House

where the dog would be used to sniff a motorcade and then

spend the next 4 hours on patrol around the embassies and

other foreign missions.

The performance of the dog at explosives detection

depends on several factors: the temperature, the humidity

level, the amount of air movement, and, most critically,

the skill of the handler in reading changes in the dog’s

behavior that signal a possible detection. As an example,

for a search of a line of cars conducted outdoors, the

handler would start the search downwind so that the dog

would have the best chance to pickup odors. Handlers are

issued small smoke generators to help them gauge wind

direction. The animal is walked to the first car and given

the command to search. The dog and the handler then

circle the car. If the dog seems interested but does not alert

(sit), the handler will note the behavior and continue the

search, returning to the suspect spots later for a recheck.

Ironically, newer cars are so tightly sealed around the

doors, windows, and trunk that it can be hard for odors to

seep out. Therefore special attention is paid to ventilation

outlets and locks. Frequently, drivers are required to open

the trunk to allow a closer inspection.

On cool, crisp days, the dogs can do sniffing work for

an hour at a time, sometimes longer, before a break (on the

order of 20 minutes duration) is needed. On hot, humid

days, they may be able to work only about 20 minutes

before they are exhausted. This behavior is quite the

opposite of mechanical sniffers, which operate better

under warmer conditions because more target molecules

are evaporated and therefore are available for detection.

Pavements are a particular problem. By catching and

retaining the heat of the sun, the temperature around

pavement level, where the dog’s nose and feet have to do

most of their work, can easily reach pain levels.

1gSepwat~g tic dog from its orb is not always a trivi~ operation. Sometimes it is necessary to lift the dog by its collar until blood flOW to the brain

is choked off enough to cause partial unconsciousness before the dog can be persuaded to relinquish its grip.
114 . Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

Another distinction of the USSS program is that they

dedicate one handler to one dog and the animals actually

live with their handlers. Some organizations maintain a

central kennel where the dogs are all housed communally.

In some cases, there is not even any effort made to

maintain a constant dog/handler team. Despite these

apparent liabilities, some of these dogs still manage to

work quite well. But given the mission of the USSS they

cannot afford to have animals who are not well acclimated

to humans in all their variations. They feel this is best

accomplished by maintaining the dogs in a family

environment complete with small children and other pets.

The bond between the team members seems to be a

strong one. When the dog is retired from service, he is

usually offered to his handler. Despite the necessity of

signing mountains of paperwork acknowledging the risks

of assuming ownership of a trained attack dog, most

handlers choose to accept their teammates. One officer

even delayed his own retirement in order to have it

coincide with that of his dog so the two could stay

together.

The average service life of the dogs is 7 to 9 years.

Typically, when the dog retires, the handler also leaves

the canine corps, either to retire himself or to assume other

duties. The USSS generally has not recycled handlers

through the program. This allows the maximum number

of officers to participate, although some argue that this is

a waste of a valuable resource, namely the trained handler.

In the end, has it been worth all the effort and expense?

By maintaining the program, the USSS has clearly voted

in the affirmative. But objective data is hard to come by.

The problems of quantitatively assessing the dogs’

performance have already been discussed and the USSS

is not immune to these problems. To date, the sniffer dogs

have never found an explosive that would have actually

threatened a protectee (apparently, they have not missed

one either), although they have detected various weapons.

No dog has been killed or wounded in action. Under

training conditions, a detection rate of 75 percent is

considered very good. A machine offering similar performance might not survive on the market. But finding

plastic explosives 75 percent of the time is still a lot better

than finding them none of the time. And as long as this

performance level is acknowledged and the dogs are not

relied on as the sole means of explosive detection, the

Service is still ahead of the game.

Furthermore, there is an undeniable deterrence factor in

the use of dogs, especially in their guard and patrol

functions The USSS feels this has inhibited the curious,

and others with darker motivations, from trying to

penetrate security boundaries.

Conclusion

As explosives detectors, dogs are about in the same

boat as the FAA’s thermal neutron analysis (TNA) device:

they do not work very well, but they work better than

anything else, at least so far. Again like TNA the

competition is moving up fast.

There is some promise that research will enhance the

dog’s usefulness by: 1) improving our understanding of

how the dog functions thereby making the dog’s performance more predictable, and 2) by actually improving the

dog’s acuity. But research into mechanical sniffers is also

proceeding apace. Devices capable of matching the dog’s

performance, at least in some respect, are nearly perfected.
Appendix C

Electromagnetic Detection of Metal and Weapons

Introduction

This appendix describes and assesses the potential of

radiofrequency electromagnetic methods of detecting

metal and weapons. The two major categories of methods

are inductive methods, such as those used by metal

detectors in airports, and reflectometry, including dielectrometry and short-range imaging radar.

Inductive Metal Detectors

Most metal detectors used at airports function either by

detecting changes in mutual inductance caused by additional presence of metal in the portal or by detecting eddy

currents produced in metal within the portal by a

radiofrequency pulse. Those using the former technique

are called mutual-inductance metal detectors (MIMD).

Those using the latter, more modern technique are called

eddy-current metal detectors; they can, in principle,

acquire more information about metal objects and use it

to improve specificity-i. e., discrimination of weapons

from innocuous objects. Older systems used other techniques. All use the principle of electromagnetic induction

and can be called inductive metal detectors.

Inductive metal detectors are likely to be useful for

some time; however, they cannot detect nonmetallic

weapons and, in order to reduce false alarms to an

acceptable level, they require subjects being inspected to

empty their pockets of metal objects. This slows inspection and precludes covert inspection. Designers polled by

OTA believe there is some room for improvement in

performance.

If a system is well sited to avoid electromagnetic

interference (EMI), the signals of innocuous metal objects

on searched persons may limit the performance of the

system. However, if a system is poorly shielded or located

near a strong source of EMI, the performance of the

system may be reduced. In such a case, performance

might be improved by better shielding or by relocating the

system. If neither of these is practical, it is possible to

improve performance by using a stronger magnetic signal

to produce a stronger signal from metal objects-strong

enough to be distinguished from the EMI.

However, the magnetic field to which the public may

be exposed is limited to 1 gauss (1 G) by a standard

(NILECJ-Std.-0601 .00) issued by the National Institute

of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (now the

National Institute of Justice) in June 1974 and by

exposure guidelines set by the Bureau of Radiological

Health (BRH) of the Food and Drug Administration

(FDA). The limit was set at 1 G because of concern that

stronger fields might upset the operation of cardiac

pacemakers. Some designers speculate that modern

pacemakers are less susceptible to such EMI from metal

detectors and that the maximum field could be increased

without harmful effect. A committee of the American

Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) debated for

several years a proposal to increase the limit to 3 gauss but

has now abandoned pursuit of this aim, convinced that

they cannot induce a disinterested third party, such as the

National Institutes of Health, to do the human experimentation that would be required to prove safety at this level.

They doubt that an ASTM standard, which would be

characterized as an “industry standard,” would be

credible to all stakeholders.

Some passengers wearing hearing aids have complained of the loud noise that an eddy-current metal

detector can cause in some hearing aids, and some hearing

aids have apparently been damaged by existing metal

detectors. Allowing 3-G fields might exacerbate this

problem.

Radio reflectometry is the measurement of radiofrequency electromagnetic (RFEM) waves reflected by an

object. It is widely known that metal objects such as

airplanes reflect radio waves that can be detected by radar

receivers.1 Smaller metal objects, including firearms,

knives, and other weapons, can be detected at short range

(a few meters) by low-power radar systems that maybe

used to “frisk” suspects electronically. Because of

concerns about health, x-ray or nuclear methods of

inspection would be controversial or prohibited for this

important application.

Simple, inexpensive systems can detect weapons but

cannot generally distinguish them from innocuous objects. More expensive millimeter-wave (MMW) radar

systems (so called because they use radio waves having

wavelengths of a few millimeters) can display TV-like

radar imagery of weapons concealed under clothing,

permitting an operator to distinguish weapons from

innocuous objects, reducing false alarms. Nonmetallic

objects also reflect radio waves and can be detected and

imaged by radio reflectometry. This is called dielectrometry; it maybe used to ‘‘frisk’ suspects electronically for

nonmetallic weapons or explosives.

lofigtiy ~~:~ acronm for RAdio Detection And Ranging.

–115– 297-922 0 - 92 - 6 QL 3
116 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

Dielectrometry

If an RFEM wave propagating through the air inside a

suitcase encounters a material with a different refractive

index, it will be partially reflected.2 The refractive index

of a medium is proportional to the square root of its

dielectric constant (also called its relative permittivity)

and to the square root of the magnetic permeability.

Common nonmetals and nonferrous metals have nearly

the same magnetic permeability as air, but in most cases,

a different dielectric constant, so they will partially reflect

an incident wave propagating through air. Estimating the

dielectric constant of a reflecting material by irradiating

it with radio waves and measuring the amplitude of the

reflected wave is called dielectrometry. Some portable

and relatively inexpensive dielectrometers designed to

detect concealed explosives, weapons, and other contraband are already on the market. More sophisticated

versions are in development.

SDA Model M600P, M600L, and M1800L

Dielectrometers

Spatial Dynamics Applications, Inc. (SDA) of Acton,

MA markets dielectrometers for use in detecting concealed items with a different dielectric constant than that

of the material or space within which they are placed. One

such device is the model M600P Portable Drug and

Contraband Detector (see photo), which has been tested

for operational effectiveness in detecting weapons

(knives, firearms) concealed in various objects, and has

been used to detect a concentrated solution of cocaine

hydrochloride concealed in beer bottles. It is also capable

of discriminating beverages from liquid explosives within

bottles, and could thus play a role in many security

applications, including airline security.

In response to a Broad Agency Announcement solicitation by the FAA (see app. A), SDA has proposed

modifying the M1800L Laboratory Dielectric Tester to

screen people for explosives or weapons. The modification would involve equipping the M1800L with an

extended lens “suitable for screening people. ” SDA also

proposed designing an automatic scanning unit for the

system. Extensive testing would be required to determine

the device’s capability and false alarm rate.

GDE Vehicular Detection System

The Electronics Division of General Dynamics Corp.

(GDE) has developed and is marketing a Vehicular

Detection System capable of detecting buried metallic

objects, such as firearms (see figure C-1), as well as

nonmetallic objects such as explosives, and displaying

Photo credit: Spatial Dynamics Applications, Inc.

M600P portable drug and contraband detector

low-resolution images of them. This technology uses

long-wavelength radar that is able to penetrate the ground

to various depths (depending on the wavelength and

power of the device and on the water content of the

ground) and provide return images.

GDE Improved Hand-Held Detector

Under contract to the Defense Advanced Research

Projects Agency, GDE is developing an improved,

imaging version of a hand-held mine detector it expects

to complete in 1991 (see figure C-2). The Improved

Hand-Held Detector will be technologically similar to the

GDE Vehicular Detection System.

Millimeter-Wave Radar

Several short-range, high-resolution, imaging radar

systems for detecting weapons concealed in clothing are

now being developed. In weapons-detection applications,

these compete with the commonplace mutual-inductance

and eddy-curent metal detectors and with the existing and

proposed reflectometers described above. Potential advantages of radar over such devices are: 1) radar images

would allow weapons to be distinguished from coins,

prostheses, etc., so the false-alarm rate would be low, and

2) suspects would not have to empty their pockets of

innocuous metallic items; hence 3) suspects could be

‘‘electronically frisked’ covertly.

Distinguishing a pistol, for example, from a prosthesis

requires imagery showing details as small as about 1 cm.

Obtaining such resolution requires using waves with

wavelengths shorter than about 1 cm—i.e., millimeterwave radar.

2~he ~cident wave S~eSme ~tefi~b~~~&id~,&c r~flected electric field s~eng~ ~equ~ tie incident elwtric field strength ~dtiplid by

(n’- n)/(n’ + n), where n is the refractive index of the medium in which the incident and refleeted waves propagate, and n’ is the refractive index of the

dissimilar medium encountered by the incident wave.
Appendix C-Electromagnetic Detection of Metal and Weapons • 117

Au

10

Figure C-l—Vehicular Detection System and Imagery of Buried Automatic Rifle

‘2G t r 1

-36 -24 -12 0 12 24 36

(Inches)

Signal strength plotted as height.

SOURCE: General Dynamics Corp., Electronics Division, 1990.

Figure C-2—Hand-Held Detector

This hand-held detector, under development by GDE, can detect

buried, or similarly concealed, explosives. An improved version, to

be completed in 1992, is being developed to produce imagery

similar to that of GDE’s technologically similar Vehicular Detection

System.

SOURCE: General Dynamics Corp., Electronics Division, 1990.

The FAA has funded competitive development of

weapons-detecting MMW radars at two companies:

Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories (PNL) and Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC). At present,

the FAA is funding only the Battelle PNL work. Other

companies developing millimeter-wave radar technology

du

24 :

12 ‘

01’ “ 1 . . . I

-36 -24 -12 0 12 24 36

(Inches)

Dot-density plot with contours.

applicable to weapons and explosives detection include

Westinghouse (Advanced Technology Division, Baltimore), EVI, Inc. (Baltimore), and General Dynamics

Corp.

This section describes technology development by

Battelle and Westinghouse. EVI, a leading designer of

eddy-curent metal detectors, is still exploring conceptual

designs for MMW weapon detectors. The General Dynamics system was developed for a different application.

It is described in greater detail in chapter 7, incident

Response (SECRET); only aspects relevant to weapons

detection are mentioned here.

Battelle MMW

Battelle PNL is developing a “Millimeter-Wave HighResolution Holographic Surveillance System” to permit

security personnel to “frisk” suspects electronically and

covertly for concealed metal or plastic weapons. Figure

C-3 shows an artist’s concept of an operational system.

The device would obtain and store in computer memory

a digitized millimeter-wave hologram (a three-dimensional image obtained using coherent radiation) of a

“suspect” (possibly an ordinary airline passenger) recorded by mechanically scanning the subject with a linear

array of millimeter-wave antennas. Presumably the suspect must be momentarily still while being scanned-i. e.,

move no more than a small fraction of a wavelength,

which, at 35 GHz, is about 9 mm. Holographic images

may be reconstructed from the stored hologram computationally and displayed on a computer graphics terminal.

An operator may select and change the depth at which the

reconstructed image is focused. If desired, a closed-circuit

TV image of the suspect maybe displayed on a separate

video monitor.

In 1989 Battelle demonstrated a developmental version

of the system, obtaining the images shown in figures C-4

and C-5 by scanning the test objects in two directions with
118 . Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

Figure C-3—Artist’s Concept of Millimeter-Wave Radar for Detecting Concealed Weapons

SOURCE: Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories, 1991.

a single antenna. Battelle is currently developing a linear

array of antennas to permit recording of a hologram faster,

in a single scan, and is investigating the possibility of a

two-dimensional array real-time scanning system.

Westinghouse MMW Radar Technology

Westinghouse Advanced Technology Division in Baltimore is developing millimeter-wave radar technology

applicable to weapons and explosives detection systems.

The Westinghouse Electronic Systems Group responded

to the FAA’s Broad Agency Announcement of interest in

weapons-detection systems by proposing to develop

enabling components for a millimeter-wave weapondetection system and to assess the potential of such a

system. The system would use large (wafer-scale) gallium

arsenide monolithic microwave integrated circuits (GaAs

MMICs) similar to some that Westinghouse developed

for DARPA and the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL).

It would be used for short-range detection of weapons

concealed on persons or in baggage.

For the NRL, Westinghouse developed GaAs tiles

(large chips), each containing an array of 16 antennas and

integral detectors of 93- to 95-GHz millimeter waves. An

array of such tiles was covered with a metal plate drilled

with conical holes-one over each antenna-to concentrate received millimeter waves, increasing power at each

antenna tenfold. The entire assembly would be used at the

focus of a parabolic (“dish”) reflector to provide a

low-resolution image of millimeter-wave radiation sources.

For weapons detection, a similar system could provide

imagery of millimeter-wave radiation reflected by weapon

parts--e. g., a firing pin. Westinghouse estimates that a

10-milliwatt source would suffice for some applications

and that the power-flux density of the millimeter-wave

radiation at the target (e.g., skin) would be less than 10

milliwatts per square centimeter. Such an exposure, if

shorter than 3 minutes, would comply with the current

ANSI standard and NCRP guidelines. A weaponsdetection system would include an appropriate millimeterwave source.

Researchers at Westinghouse are interested in developing critical components-schottky-barrier diodes—for a

weapons-detection system operating at 183 GHz. At this

frequency, radiation from the source would be absorbed

by the atmosphere in a much shorter distance than at 94

GHz, thereby reducing the potential of one weaponsdetection system to interfere with a nearby one.
Appendix C---Electromagnetie Detection of Metal and Weapons ● 1 1 9

Figure C-4—Millimeter-Wave Radar Image of Metal Gun Concealed Under Clothing

Left: Photograph of plastic mannequin wearing cotton/acetate

suit concealing metal pistol.

Right: 35-GHz radar image of mannequin and concealed pistol.

SOURCE: Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories, 1991.

Figure C-5—Radar Imagery of Glock-17 Plastic-Handled Pistol

35-GHz radar image of Glock-17 pistol in air. 35-GHz radar imageofGlock-17 pistol behind one layer of heavy

wool and one of light polyester fabric.

90-GHz radar image of Glock-17 pistol in air.

SOURCE: Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories, 1991.

90-GHz radar imageofGlock-17 pistol behind one layer of heavy

wool and one of light polyester fabric.
Appendix D

Technologies To Protect Harbors, Ports, and Vessels

Introduction

A long list of obvious targets of potential interest to

terrorists exists at the interface where land meets water.

Shipping (especially cruise ships and ships with dangerous or expensive cargo), ferries, dikes, dams, levees,

pipelines, oil platforms, cooling water intake ducts,

canals, locks, ship yards, crowded beaches, coral reefs,

oyster shoals, and other centers of ecological or economic

value come immediately to mind. A more careful

consideration, in addition, would highlight the importance of maritime industries to national priorities and their

consequent attractiveness to terrorists. The importance of

maritime trade is reflected in the fact that a very large

proportion of the world’s trade (by bulk) is carried by

ships. In addition, millions of passengers board cruise

ships every year.

Yet most Americans, if they contemplate the threat of

terrorism at all, do not associate it with ports and harbors.

Airplanes, embassies, and military facilities overshadow

other targets in the minds of the American public.

Actually, attacks against shipping or other maritime

targets are far from rare. Exact figures are hard to come by

due to problems with data collection (many acts go

unreported) and diverging definitions (e.g., terrorism v.

piracy). But according to the International Maritime

Organization, 179 known cases of piracy against merchant ships occurred between 1982 and 1989. Other

sources claim that as many as 1,000 attacks have taken

place from 1979 to 1989.1 Some of these have been quite

spectacular. In 1988,9 people were killed and another 46

were injured during a terrorist shooting spree aboard the

Greek vessel City of Poros. In May 1990, Libyan-based

terrorists belonging to the Palestine Liberation Front of

Abu’1 Abbas swarmed down in speed boats upon vacation

beaches in Israel with the intention of directly attacking

civilians along the Tel Aviv waterfront. Their mission was

foiled by a rapid response by Israeli Naval, Air, and Land

Forces, but only by the slimmest of margins.

Despite their number, only a few of these attacks have

won much notoriety within the United States, probably

because few directly involved U.S. citizens either as

victims or perpetrators. About the only exception is the

1985 attack on the Italian-flag cruise ship Achille Lauro

(also organized by Abu’1 Abbas), in which American

Leon Klinghoffer was killed. 2 The Achille Lauro affair

touched off a lot of uproar including congressional

hearings and court actions that continue to this day.3 But

the public interest accorded this event is much more the

exception than the rule.

It is impossible to determine with precision why there

have not been more and costlier incidents involving our

maritime industries. It is likely that something more than

luck is involved. Insofar as the hijacking of transportation

targets is concerned, several reasons for ruling out ships

in favor (from the terrorists’ perspective) of airplanes can

be pretty easily formulated. For example, in the words of

one analyst:

. . .Terrorist and nonterrorist hijackings have plummeted in recent years . . . Takeovers of nonaerial

means of transportation (buses, trains, and ships)

have not risen to fill the operational void created by

the decline in aerial attacks. [Byway of explanation:]

Threatening to force the plane into a power dive

credibly jeopardizes the lives of more individuals

than does any comparable threat against other modes

of transportation. Moreover, it is simpler to control

the actions of a large number of people on board a

plane in flight than it would be to prevent the escape

of passengers from a ship.4

Another points out:

Whether on the ground or in the air, an aircraft is

more fragile than a ship by far, and the density of its

cargo, passenger or freight, is high. It boasts of

mobility on the order of forty times that of a ship, an

important consideration in the hijacker’s calculations of his chances for success. What is more, while

high-value freight tends to be transported by air,

more bulky, low-value commodities go by ship. The

conclusion is easy to reach that ships are poor targets

for hijacking compared to aircraft. Still, if a terrorist

is seeking publicity as his primary objective, the

uniqueness of a ship hijacking might have great

appeal.5

While some of the above arguments might explain why

ships have been relatively immune to the threat of

hijacking, it fails to explain why the American maritime

IM. wisefiu~ “p~acy and tie Threat to USTR.A.NSCOM,’” Defense Transportation JOWMZ, VO1. M, No. A, August 1990, pp. 16-18.

2For a good Hative accomt of this event see Scott C. Truver, “Maritime Terrorism 1985,’ United States Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 112,

May 1986, pp. 160-173.

3A ~o~ recenfly decided tittie daughters of Mr. ~ghoffer were entitled to sue tie pLO for -ges resulting from the incident.

d~wwd F. Mickolus, TransMtioml Terro~sm: A Chronology of Events, ]968.]979 (westport, CT: Greenwood press, 1980), p. XXiV.

5R.J3T. B~net~ ‘ ‘The U.S. Navy’s Role in Countering Maritime Terrorism, ” Terrorism: An International Journal, vol. 6, No. 3, 1983, pp. 469-480,

at 472-473.

–120-
121 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

industry has been spared other forms of terrorism, for

example: mass murder; or the destruction or the threat of

destruction of other marine structures with concomitant

economic and ecological damage; or ransom, for example

of a multimillion-dollar vessel or an off-shore oil platform.

Few port authorities are so optimistic as to think that

‘‘It hasn’t happened here’ can be reliably extrapolated to

“It can’t happen here.” But even fewer sense any

immediate need to reallocate perpetually limited funds

from immediate, pressing issues to address what is

currently a theoretical problem. However, as airlines

toughen their security measures, as military and government facilities become better defended, as businesses

abroad become more astute in providing security, as

piracy and smuggling become a means to replace money

formerly provided by East Bloc state sponsorship, as

temptingly colossal new targets in the form of huge

5,000-passenger liners make their advent, and as the

criticality of shipping to the support of our troops abroad

(especially in the Middle East) becomes more apparent,6

it is more than likely that terrorists will turn to untraditional, less hardened targets including ports, harbors and

ships.

In addition to apathy, there are other impediments to

the orderly implementation of further security measures

around ports, harbors, and ships. One of these is confusion

over responsibilities. As with any environment as complicated as a port, diverse authorities have hands in many

facets of operations, including security. Should an incident occur, any one or several of a bewildering array of

frequently overlapping and conflicting authorities could

be involved, depending on the nature of the act and the

location in which it takes place. Private security companies; port, municipal, local, State, and Federal law

enforcement agencies; the U.S. Coast Guard; the U.S.

Navy; the U.S. Customs Service; the Immigration and

Naturalization Service; the Drug Enforcement Agency;

port owners and operators; and the master and owner of

each vessel all bear some measure of responsibility for

security. Complicating matters, the rivers, lakes, and

other bodies of water associated with ports and harbors

frequently are used to define municipal, state, or even

international boundaries. Therefore, it is not unusual to

have to double or triple this already unwieldy list

depending on the number of governments involved. And

many other entities, including insurance companies,

shipping companies, even passengers, unions, and the

workers and crewmen they represent, clearly have a stake

in a port’s security arrangements.7

This problem is well recognized and some efforts are

now being made to assign security duties unambiguously.

Legislatively, the Coast Guard bears primacy in the

area of domestic port and harbor security. However, it is

the FBI which is recognized as having primary responsibility for responding to terrorist incidents within the

territory of the United States. In order to avoid confusion,

these two agencies have signed a memorandum of

understanding clearly designating the FBI as lead agency

in the event of a domestic terrorist incident. A similar

arrangement exists with the Department of State for

response to terrorist incidents outside the United States.

In the event of an incident, the Coast Guard would follow

the direction of the lead agency and supply vessel, air and

communication support, trained boarding personnel, and

specialized expertise concerning maritime operations.8

Another group, the National Port Readiness Steering

Group, composed of representatives of the Maritime

Administration (MARAD), the Coast Guard, the Military

Sealift Command (MSC), the Navy Control of Shipping

Organization (NCSORG), the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), the U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers (USACE) and the commands of the Maritime

Defense Zones (MDZ), is preparing a study, due out soon,

with the goal of ensuring that in the event of a national

emergency, the ports and harbors will be up to the task of

mobilization. This study will result in a memorandum of

understanding among the group members clearly assigning duties including security responsibilities. The group

is also a conduit for the exchange of information and

communication among its members.

But much confusion still exists among the many other

players who face the myriad possible situations and

disasters imaginable along the waterfront or on board a

ship.

Many questions still remain. For example, while the

Magnuson Act and subsequent legislation place ultimate

responsibility with the U.S. Coast Guard, implementing

regulations (33 CFR 6 et seq.) imply a somewhat shifted

burden:

Nothing contained in this part shall be construed

as relieving the masters, owners, operators, and

agents of vessels or other waterfront facilities from

their primary responsibility for the protection of such

vessels or waterfront facilities.9

Even in the absence of a coherent chain of command,

some security measures are already in existence, although

the main thrust of these measures is towards deterring and

%ee H.W. Stephens, “Port Readiness for Military Mobilization” Naval Forces, vol. 9, No. 5, 1988, pp. 14-15.

7For mom info~tion see Hugh W. Stephens, “Barriers to Port Security, ” Journal of Security Administration, vol. 12, No. 2, 1989, pp. 29-41.

8Adfial Joel D. Sipes, “Maritime Terrorism, ” Proceedings of the Joint Government-Industry Symposium on Transportation Security,

Williamsburg, VA, Mar. 21-22, 1990.

933 CFR 6.19-1.
Appendix D-Technologies To Protect Harbors, Ports, and Vessels ● 122

responding to conventional criminal activities such as

theft and smuggling. And there are several efforts under

way to assess waterfront security needs and develop new

equipment to meet them. As has been shown in our earlier

report, 10 the first and best line of defense against any

criminal or terrorist security threat lies not with technology nor with new machinery. Rather, there is clearly no

substitute for vigilant, well-trained human beings alert to

and reporting on suspicious activity. Still, to the extent

that technology can assist these efforts, it should be

supported. This appendix will describe technologies

currently in use, on the drawing board, and just being

envisioned for helping to ensure the safety of people and

equipment in and around ports and ships.

U.S. Coast Guard Activities and Other U.S.

Government Measures Against Terrorism

Any good security system, wherever located, must be

capable of providing several functions, including prevention, detection, assessment, denial, delay, and response. In

many instances, the equipment and procedures for providing these capabilities for land-based facilities are equally

applicable to the marine environment. This is not

particularly surprising since the two frequently face the

same challenges: intrusion prevention and detection,

contraband detection, access control, identity verification,

site hardening, and so on. Many of these technologies are

dealt with in appendix E and will not be further treated

here except insofar as measures unique to the maritime

environment are concerned.

However, one significant feature differentiates ports,

harbors, ships, and other maritime structures from dry

land: the presence of water. Water allows means of

intrusion that find no parallel in considerations of shore

security including swimmers, divers, fast surface boats,

subsurface vessels (e.g., minisubs), and floating debris.

This section will present some of the actions currently

being taken and some of the technologies currently in

place to combat the threat of terrorism in this environment.

Historically, the Coast Guard has borne the primary

burden for domestic port and harbor security starting with

enactment of the Espionage Act of 1917, although at the

time this act was considered to apply only under wartime

conditions.11 In addition to its well-known inspection, with

patrol, and safety functions, the Coast Guard administers

several measures for improving port security by controlling access to port facilities, preparing contingency plans,

and training personnel, which will be described below.

One of the most effective ways to prevent an incident

is to block access to a vulnerable area. In addition to the

obvious expedients of fences and locks, some means must

be applied to permit entrance of authorized individuals

while denying it to others. One of the current methods

centers around the U.S. Coast Guard Port Security Card.

In 1950, President Truman signed Executive Order No.

10173 (later amended by Executive Orders Nos. 10277,

10352, and 11249) prescribing the creation of regulations

“relating to the safeguarding against destruction, loss, or

injury from sabotage or other subversive acts, accidents or

other causes of similar nature, of vessels, harbors, ports,

and waterfront facilities. ’ This led to Part 6, Subchapter

A, Chapter I, Title 33 of the Code of Federal Regulations:

Protection and Security of Vessels, Harbors, and Waterfront Facilities.12

The only significant security measure engendered by

these regulations was the requirement for persons seeking

access to certain port facilities at certain times to possess

an acceptable identification credential, most commonly a

U.S. Coast Guard Port Security Card. This is a traditional

picture ID with a signature and descriptive data. The card

and surrounding procedures have been little changed over

the 40 years of their existence and are now clearly

antiquated. An applicant fills out a form and undergoes a

background check. Problems with the card system include

ease of forgery, relatively low durability, and, perhaps

most importantly, lack of flexibility. Early court challenges established that wholesale denial of access to the

general dock area by noncard holders was improper

because such a procedure arbitrarily cuts off a worker

from his livelihood. Therefore, the card system is now

used (for official access control) only in areas of

designated national security interest or under conditions

of documented threat.

Controlling access to port facilities from the waterside

is also a necessity although it is a little trickier. Insofar as

overt waterside entrance is concerned, the Coast Guard

has implemented various rules and regulations concerning entry into U.S. ports by foreign shipping, especially

from what used to be known as the Eastern Bloc.

However, terrorists, who have little interest in a long-term

commercial relationship with their victims, would belittle

inclined to advertise their arrival by voluntary compliance

with these regulations. Still, to the extent that many

terrorist groups operate out of known geographical areas

and are likely to travel from these areas, these regulations

do permit some control over the arrival of high-risk

individuals. Routine controls by the U.S. Customs

1w.S. Congess, OffIce of Technology Assessmen~ Technology Against Terrorism: The Federal Effort, O’121-ISC~81 (Washington Dc: Us.

Government Printing Office, July 1991).

ll~s limitation was MWI in 1950when the Magnuson Act (50 U.S.C. 191) amended the earlier legislation and madeport security a permanent Coast

Guard duty. The Ports and Waterways Security Act (codified as 33 U.S.C. 1221-1227), passed in 1972, further broadened the Coast Guard’s authority

to take actions regarding security and provided some mechanisms for doing so.

Izsee also 33 CFR 125 et Sq.
123 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service

at all ports of entry help to deter and detect terrorist efforts

to enter U.S. ports overtly from overseas. The Coast

Guard is also involved in other counterterrorist efforts,

primarily of an assessment and planning nature (see next

section).

Role of the International Maritime

Organization

In the aftermath of the Achille Lauro hijacking in 1985,

the International Maritime Organization (IMO), which

operates under the aegis of the United Nations, drafted

proposed guidelines for security for passenger vessels and

the facilities that service them (IMO Circular 443,

published 1986). This proposal was largely the product of

the United States’ representatives (specifically, the U.S.

Coast Guard and State Department) to the IMO. While the

guidelines present a useful framework for assessing port

security needs and implementing appropriate measures,

they are strictly voluntary. The degree of compliance with

the measures, both national and international, varies

considerably from port to port but, while progress is

slowly being made, concrete changes have generally been

modest. 13

The IMO measures were acknowledged and enlarged

upon in the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Title IX of which relates to

International Maritime and Port Security .14 This law in

part amended the Ports and Waterways Security Act,

encouraged the President to continue to seek improved

international seaport and shipboard security and suggested several measures to help reach that goal. The law

also mandated that the Secretaries of Transportation and

State produce various annual studies and reports on the

topics of maritime terrorist threats and security at foreign

ports. If the situation in a foreign port were found to be

serious enough, and no remedial action were taken,

issuance of a travel advisory was authorized. To date, no

such advisory has been found necessary.

Congressional support for these measures has been

minimal. For example, of the $12.5 million annual

expenditure authorized by the bill, only $903,000 was

appropriated in the first year.15

In large measure, implementation of the law fell to the

Coast Guard. The text accompanying publication of the

IMO Circular in the Federal Register16 made clear that the

Coast Guard intended to avoid across-the-board requirements, opting instead for a ship-by-ship and port-by-port

appraisal and voluntary compliance. Other Coast Guard

actions in support of the IMO Circular and the law

included the creation and support of local Port Readiness

Committees as a forum for coordination among the

participating agencies concerned with the issues of port

security especially where support of a military mobilization is concerned. The Department of Transportation is

planning to issue regulations shortly for implementing

IMO guidelines in the United States. In his 1989 report to

Congress, the Secretary of Transportation noted that over

80 percent of the ports surveyed had established a Port

Readiness Committee and over 50 percent of these

included a Security Subcommittee.

The Coast Guard has also developed or supported

several training programs designed to improve security

awareness and capabilities for both domestic and international (under the Antiterrorism Assistance Program of the

State Department) port authorities:

Port Security Committees.

Port Readiness Committees. The primary purpose of

a Port Readiness Committee (PRC) is to “foster

communication, cooperation and coordination among

member agencies to strengthen the capability of

commercial seaports to support deployment of

military personnel and cargo in the event of mobilization or national defense contingencies." 17

Maritime Counterterrorism Contingency Plans.18

USCG Training Programs.

U.S. Training Programs for the Maritime Industry.

U.S. Port Security Assessments.

Foreign Port Security Assessments.

While these measures are laudable insofar as they go,

they have been criticized as being too lenient and

misdirected.

. . . [T]o the degree Title IX and Coast Guard actions

go beyond recommendations, the focus is upon

inspections, training, and lighting, fences and other

means to discourage casual entry. In their aggregate,

these efforts suggest that government and industry

have concluded that physical barriers and supporting

practices designed to limit physical access to ports

and ships are sufficient protection against plausible

Iqsee “A Report to congress onpassengerVessel and Port Security, ’ prepared by the U.S. Department of Transportation in compliance with Title

IX of U.S. Public Law 99-399. This report evaluates national and international port and harbor security and is prepared yearly by the DOT as part of

the United States’ implementation of the IMO guidelines.

144.6 u.s.C. app. 1801 et seq. and 33 U.S.C. 1226.

15 Stephem, op. cit., footnote 6, 1989.

~s52 Federa/Register, 11,587-11,594 (1987).

1vFor more See A Report t. congre~~ on pa~~enger ve~~ef ~~ Port Securio prep~ed by the U.S. DOT in compliance with Title ~ C)f Public Law

99-399, Feb. 28, 1989.

181bid.
Appendix D-Technologies To Protect Harbors, Ports, and Vessels ● 124

terrorist threats. Indeed, these may help to frustrate

the isolated terrorist strike. But well-armed and

trained terrorists or enemy special operations units

bent on wreaking destruction and casualties will

certainly not be deterred and scarcely inconvenienced by such measures.19

The Coast Guard is making some efforts to develop

new responses to the threat of terrorism. Some of these

will be described in the next section. However, in the

absence of clear national priority or documented terrorist

threats, it is unlikely that the Coast Guard will be allotted

the resources to design and develop more exotic countermeasures.

In countering terrorism, forewarned is forearmed.

Another service of the U.S. and other governments

involves making sure mariners have up-to-the-minute

information on factors affecting their safety. For some

time now, it has been governmental practice to provide

mariners with information affecting the safety of the

shipping lanes including severe weather alerts, shipping

lane blockages, and buoy or lighthouse changes. The

Defense Mapping Agency is responsible for collecting

and disseminating such Notice to Mariners. To do so, they

have developed an Automated Notice to Mariners System

(ANMS) containing information dealing with navigational safety. This system is part of DMA’s Worldwide

Radio Navigational Warning Broadcast System. Mariners

around the world can connect to the system via satellite,

telephone, radio, or computer hookup and access current

information on a variety of topics. They can also file

reports to be added to the database. In the early 1980’s, the

need for information about piracy and other attacks

against shipping was recognized. Not only were these data

of obvious interest to the mariners venturing into highactivity areas, but the governmental bodies charged with

countering the threat of maritime terrorism had been

hampered by the lack of accurate, comprehensive data on

the magnitude of the problem. The U.S. Interagency

Working Group on Piracy and Maritime Terrorism asked

the DMA to expand its NAVINFONET system to include

such warnings. With a few software changes, DMA

complied with the creation of an automated message

subsystem: the Anti-Shipping Activities Message File or

ASAM of the Broadcast Warning System. Generally

speaking, the incidents reported on this service are

gathered from open sources such as newspaper accounts.

Warnings and reports filed by mariners themselves are not

checked for accuracy and NAVINFONET accepts no

legal liability for the accuracy of the information. The

purpose of the service is to provide warnings and this

mandate can be fulfilled even with slightly faulty data.

There have also been initiatives from the private sector

to beef up security. These are motivated not only by

humanitarian concerns about risks to the lives and limbs

of passengers and employees, and financial concerns

about loss of property, but also by a rising consciousness

of possible legal liability and insurance problems arising

from failure to take reasonable precautions in today’s

hostile world.

Legal liabilities for negligent security practices

are increasing and, as a result, the need for better

maritime security is increasing. During the lo-year

Persian Gulf War over 500 crewmembers aboard

commercial vessels were either killed or wounded.

These casualties have spawned all sorts of litigation,

particularly in the United States, and one of the

issues raised in these lawsuits is the seaworthiness of

the vessels themselves. Insurance coverage very

often depends upon the seaworthiness of the vessel

insured at the time her voyage begins, and if it can

be shown that a particular vessel was not seaworthy

(that is, not fit for her intended use) because she was

inadequately prepared for the security threats she

faced, a precedent may be established which the

maritime industry cannot afford to ignore. . . Shipowners, offshore installation operators, and port authorities are going to be held accountable in the future

when their negligent security practices allow a

terrorist incident to occur.20

These security efforts have been primarily directed

access control and baggage screening.

at

About 3.2 million cruise-line passengers pass through

the Port of Miami every year21 making it the largest

cruise-line port in the United States. (Miami alone handles

about one-third of all scheduled departures of major

cruise ships from U.S. ports.22) At all the passenger

terminals, the private cruise lines have provided x-ray and

metal-detection equipment for screening all passengers

and their carry-on luggage, much the way airlines do

today. These units are not particularly expensive, as

security equipment goes, about $120,000 per portal. But

Miami alone needs about 12 of them to cope with its

passenger flow. Furthermore, there are two gaping

shortcomings in this scheme. First, there is no screening

of checked baggage. Not only does this allow the

emplacement of time bombs and other remotely operated

devices but, unlike their airline counterparts, cruise

lgstephe~, op. cit., footnote 6, pp. 31-32.

zoFrom ‘‘Mva[e Security Services and the Maritime ~dus~, ’ a speech by Kenneth Gale Hawkes, Vice President, Maritime Security, Wackenhut

Services, Inc., 1990.

zleapt~ Herman Gomez, Director, Tr aining, P1 arming & Development Seapoxt Authority, Port of Miami, personal communicatio~ Oct. 11,1990.

zz~cord~g t. tie Oficial Steamship Guide as quoted ~ repofi on tie hag held oct. 23, 1985 before the House Committee on Foreign AffaiIs

on Overview of International Maritime Security.
125 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

passengers have access to their checked baggage, which

is placed in their cabins before departure. Anyone who

wanted to bring firearms aboard ship would not find it

difficult. A second big problem is that passengers

routinely disembark and reboard at ports throughout the

cruise itinerary. Frequently these ports are either too small

or too poor to offer much in the way of security services.

Again, there would be little impediment to the smuggling

of weapons or undesirable individuals on board by even

the least resourceful of terrorists. Still, these measures by

the Port of Miami are an important beginning.

One cruise line, Royal Viking, is taking matters into its

own hands. It is arranging to equip its vessels with a

portable security office: a small container furnished with

x-ray and metal-detection equipment. The container is

carried on board to be deployed when necessary. Returning passengers would pass through it as they reboarded.23

Some cruise-line organizations are now considering

bringing pressure to bear against ports in particularly

risky areas by threatening to exclude such ports from their

itinerary unless security is improved.

There are some problems with applying even these

tried-and-true technological measures to port security.

The environment around ports, harbors, and marine

structures is particularly harsh: high humidity, salt water,

motion, and storms are factors that find no parallel in the

typical airport scenario. Therefore, it is not surprising that

equipment for cargo and passenger inspection cannot be

simply transferred from one mode to the other. Still, the

concepts of x-ray and metal detection are viable although

the implementation must be more rugged.

Insofar as self defense is concerned, civilian shipping

generally employs few technological novelties. Many

mariners are reluctant to bear weapons. They would rather

not engage in literal combat with terrorists and pirates,

seeing this as a task for the Coast Guard or Armed Forces

who are better trained and better equipped for such

activities. Generally speaking, this is the same approach

recommended by the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Maritime Administration whose position on the

subject can be summed up in the title of its small brochure,

Piracy Countermeasures: Anticipate Trouble, Be Vigilant, Don’t Be Heroic. The measures suggested by this

brochure are commonsense precautions such as posting

guards, keeping unauthorized personnel off the ship, and

making sure that the ship and surrounding areas are well

lit. If pirates actually board, crewmen are advised to

barricade themselves and any critical areas of the ship

(e.g., the bridge) and radio for help. The most aggressive

measure suggested by this brochure is the use of

searchlights to dazzle suspected hostile boarding parties.

Some industry activists would like to see a little less

passivity. A small but growing maritime security industry

is specializing in assessing the vulnerabilities of port

facilities and ships themselves and providing recommendations on measures to discourage criminal and terrorist

activity. For example, Wackenhut, a corporation long

involved with land-based security systems, recently

started anew division devoted to maritime security. These

recommendations include measures up to and including

what sort of force to apply to repel unwanted boarders.

High-pressure water hoses are a favorite.

Proposed Security Systems and Their Costs

U.S. Coast Guard Entry Cards

As previously noted, several deficiencies exist in the

Coast Guard’s antiquated identity card system. The Coast

Guard is now in the process of developing and procuring

a replacement for the current system to be known as the

Port Access Control System (or PACS). This system will

involve anew, more rugged and tamper-resistant identification card and a computerized local database. The card

will not contain any visible identifying information but

will be imprinted with a hidden computer readable bar

code. At the time an individual applies for the card, a

video image of the applicant will be made and stored on

the database along with other biometric and identifying

information. The cards will ordinarily be stored at the

office of the local Captain of the Port. However, in times

of emergency, they will be distributed to the port workers.

In order to gain access to a controlled access area, a port

worker would have to enter through a manned checkpoint

equipped with a card reader. On inserting the card into the

reader, a picture of the worker’s face and other data appear

on a television monitor where the guard can verify

identity. By making use of computer technology, a system

much more flexible than the current Port Security Card is

possible. Access rights could be tailored to each individual’s duties. Updating of information would be possible

without having to reissue cards. Finally, tapes could be

exchanged nationwide so that individuals found to be

suspect in one area of the country could be quickly barred

from ports in other areas. A prototype system has recently

performed satisfactorily during testing and evaluation in

New Orleans and is slated for further testing this year.

Based on cost figures for the prototype, the Coast Guard

estimates that each PACS will cost about $33,000. No

finds are designated for this project in fiscal year 1991.

A budget funding request for $2 million in fiscal year

1992 has been submitted for procurement and national

distribution of the PACS to USCG field units.

USCG Underwater Sensing System

Another USCG innovation is the Surface Contact and

Underwater Tracker or SCOUT, a multiple sensor system

for detecting, locating, and identifying waterborne or

submerged intruders. SCOUT is being developed jointly

ZSNom wm, ScmTech Corp., NJ, personal communication oct. 10, 1990.
Appendix D-Technologies To Protect Harbors, Ports, and Vessels ● 126

with the Naval Sea Systems Command. The novelty in

this system lies not with its instruments and sensors that

are all conventional (sonar, radar, low-light closed-circuit

TV), but the fact that they are integrated and carried on a

mobile platform, specifically a van. This allows coverage

of a large geographical area with only a few units. SCOUT

is expected to be deployable by the end of fiscal year

1992. An enhanced workstation for optimizing sensor

placement is expected in fiscal year 1993. The frost unit

will cost about $2.5 million. Additional units, assuming

no major overhauls, would run about $1 to $1.5 million

each.

Underwater Acoustical System

Finding an underwater intruder is a difficult task

Human hearing was designed to operate in air and is less

effective when immersed in water. Sight is limited by

water turbidity, particularly in many ports. Regular

human patrols of the immediate area are usually not

feasible. Therefore, detection of unauthorized swimmers

or submersible craft must depend on mechanical surveillance. Several systems for this purpose have been

proposed.

A major problem with controlling access from and

through the water is that few means for reasonable

escalation of force are currently available, Once detection

is accomplished there are few options short of deadly

force to deter or stop an intruder.

One corporation, GT-Devices, a subsidiary of General

Dynamics, is trying to interest the Navy and other

authorities in their system, which, they believe, can stop

an intruder without use of deadly force.24 The Underwater

Deterrent Security System is advertised as a nonlethal

human-swimmer defense system. It is based on an array

of electrothermal sources that would be permanently

emplaced underwater. The sources are capable of quickly

generating energetic plasmas and thereby producing a

high-intensity, directional acoustic emission. The magnitude and direction of the pulses are supposed to be

adjustable. The acoustic pulses are generated by the rapid

(microsecond time scale) discharge of high energy (on the

order of kilojoules) electrical pulses. These cause explosive formation of plasmas in the water and resultant

pressure waves. Several plasma generators are organized

into a phased array. The company has actually produced

a 16-generator array for testing purposes. By controlling

the amount of power to each plasma generator, the

magnitude and direction of the resulting pressure pulse

and the location in which the pressure waves combine to

reach maximum intensity may be controlled. At low

power, the pressure waves may be used as sonar to detect,

track and range. As power and pulse repetition frequency

are increased, the effects of the system increase, going

from unpleasantness to pain to physical injury. Because

it can be focused, the manufacturer asserts that collateral

damage to adjoining structures or organisms can be

controlled. The useful range of operation for the steerable

device is up to 1.5 kilometers from the fixed underwater

installation, according to GT-Devices. Some observers

are skeptical of this estimate. The true effective range

would have to be determined by testing in open water.

The system has demonstrated (in the laboratory) an

ability to bend metal, indicating that it may also be

suitable for deterring intrusion by underwater craft. The

system is reported to operate with a 4-kilowatt generator,

although the generator size will depend on the desired

range. The Navy, for example, is interested in a 600-meter

warning zone and a 200-meter keep-out radius. With their

test array of 16 emitters, the manufacturer indicates that

the system can achieve a focus spot only a couple of

meters wide at a range of 200 meters.

Following an initial development contract, the Navy

has not been interested in supporting this technology

further, making several arguments. First, that it still needs

too much money to get to advanced development. This

would be inconsistent with the Navy’s ‘‘off-the-shelf”

philosophy. The Defense Nuclear Agency has shown

some interest in the project, but would have to cancel

other programs to pay for it. It is said to use too much

power in a realistic configuration. Further, its function

comes under active denial, which is handled by the Air

Force. The focus is at a preselected distance and spot and

the beam is very narrow. The Navy asserts that it would

need a unit every 100 feet or so.

The Navy Waterside Security System

Following several intrusions in 1984 at the Electric

Boat facilities in Groton, CT, where much of the Navy’s

nuclear powered submarine development work is carried

out, the Navy decided that current waterside security

capabilities were inadequate. They felt the need to

improve their ability to detect, assess, and respond to

intrusions by high- and low-speed boats, surface swimmers, scuba divers, and explosives and other inanimate

threats hidden in floating debris. In conjunction with the

Coast Guard, NASA, the Department of Energy and the

Canadian Government, the Navy set about developing an

integrated, multi-sensor, automated system, dubbing the

project the Waterside Security System. The plan originally envisioned a nearly fully automated and integrated

system whereby, for a site the size of the submarine base

at Bangor, ME, a single human operator could monitor the

waterside security status for the entire installation. The

operational requirements of the system were:

~seeN.K. IWnsor and R.B. Ashby, “Underwater Deterrent Security System (UDETSS),” GTD-90-2, 1990.
127 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

Underwater and surface Detection to 200 yards

swimmer @ 0.90 detection probability

Surface craft Detection to 1,000 yards

@ 0.95 detection probability

Operational availability 0.90

False alarm rate (FAR) 1 per 2 hours

FAA (long-term goal) 1 per 8 hours

System cofilguration Fixed and transportable

The first approach attempted to use off-the-shelf

technology as much as possible. This generally turned out

to be possible for the sensing systems that consist of

sensitive but conventional radar, closed circuit television

(both normal and low-light systems), and forwardlooking infrared (FLIR) detectors. An exception to this

rule was the sonar system, which requires some developmental work. The communications, command, and control (C3

) system has turned out to be more complicated.

No off-the-shelf system was capable of providing the

automatic targeting and alarm capabilities the Navy felt

were critical to successful implementation. With the help

of the Canadian government, which has funded about 55

percent of the research and development costs of the C3

system, the Navy expects to test systems operation in

1991, perform additional testing in 1992, and field

operational systems in 1993.

It does little good to know that an intruder is present if

there is no way to deter his mission. One problem in the

waterside environment is the lack of credible, escalatable

countermeasures. Frequently, commanders find that there

is little in their arsenal short of deadly force (e.g.,

dropping hand grenades in the water) with which to

respond to a waterborne threat.

The Navy is working to develop several such measures.

The first is straightforward: light. Not only is it harder for

a intruder to get away with his plan when the targets of his

malfeasance are well illuminated, but, the Navy has

found, with sufficient power, light itself is capable of

delaying, even disorienting, an intruder. For this reason,

part of the Waterside Security System consists of a

4-million-candle-power lighting system capable of casting a beam over a mile. Like the other parts of the system,

the high-power lights are controllable from the console of

the security watchman.

Another response measure on which the Navy relies is

marine mammals. The animals can be trained to do many

of the actions for which police departments frequently use

dogs. They can detect intruders and raise an alarm. They

can also be trained to act aggressively towards an intruder.

Training and maintaining marine mammals is not easy,

however. Unlike dogs, marine mammals are not pack

animals and are not motivated by a desire to please the

putative pack leader (the trainer). They will work for food

but when their hunger is satisfied or when they get tired,

they stop. It takes about 2 years to train a dolphin and, of

course, there are considerable costs connected with the

care of the animal once it is released to service. Still, to

date, many Navy security personnel consider patrol by

marine mammals one of the most effective measures

available.

A comprehensive security system includes delay tactics as well as detection and response components.

Toward this end, the Navy is working on development of

waterside barriers. A 1985 effort aimed at a barrier

capable of stopping a high-speed boat would have cost

$2,000 per foot (just for hardware and installation;

maintenance was extra). Antiswimmer nets are similarly

expensive and invoke a host of environmental problems.

The United Kingdom, facing a very real threat from IRA

terrorists, has been willing to make large investments in

barriers. The Navy would like to be a little more frugal.

Still, for a fast boat attack, the Navy recognizes that a

barrier is the only defense option. There is no time

between detection and disaster to formulate any other

response.

Work is now going on to develop a rapidly deployable

(on the order of a day), low-cost (on the order of $200 per

linear foot) barrier capable of stopping a 50-foot cigarettetype boat approaching at 45 knots. The latest model is

down to a promising $500 per linear foot with most of the

cost arising from the preparation of permanent mooring

fixtures on the bottom. This kinetic barrier, a floating

arrangement of PVC piping and wire, has a submerged

foil. When struck at high speed, the foil “digs” into the

water, causing the barrier, and with it the speed boat, to

flip over. Scale models have been tested at California

Polytechnic University, San Luis Obispo, and full-scale

crash tests are planned shortly at Port Hueneme, CA. This

approach has several advantages. Except for the moorings, the system components can be stored in a protected

environment. This sheltering from the elements substantially reduces maintenance costs. In the event of a

documented threat, the barrier can be installed fairly

quickly and on a‘ ‘low-tech’ basis. The moorings, on the

other hand, even in the absence of the fencing, are useful

for clearly defining the security perimeter. Such a clear

demarcation is a useful legal tool for specifying what level

of action is appropriate at what distance from the facility.
Appendix E

Physical Protection Systems

Introduction and Summary

Typical fixed-site targets of terrorists are private

corporations’ assets (e.g., buildings, pipelines, electric

pylons), vehicles (planes are a current favorite), bridges,

monuments, and diplomatic buildings.

Since a terrorist can seldom be identified before the act,

the first line of defense against terrorists is usually

proactive physical protection of the target (a barrier

between the terrorist and the target). Depending on the

degree of protection needed, the physical protection may

range from a simple wall or fence, such as a boundary

marker, to a sophisticated physical protection system

(PPS). A physical protection system is a collection of

system elements, combined to achieve protection according to a plan. The classical physical protection system

incorporates two substantial surrounding fences with a

clear zone between and includes many high-tech sensors

and interconnecting communications.

Physical protection systems at different sites are

seldom identical because of the differences in facilities,

targets, and threats. The basic design for physical

protection systems is quite well established but considerable engineering and design tailoring is usually required

for each site.

The four basic functions of a modern physical protection system are:

● entry control,

. detection of the intrusion,

. delay of the intruder, and

• response to the intrusive action.

All of these elements must be present in any effective

physical protection system to the degree necessary to

meet the threat expected. The last three functions must be

performed in sequence and within a period of time that is

less than that required for the adversary (i.e., terrorist) to

overcome the physical protection system and commit the

act (e.g., property destruction, kidnaping and hostage

taking, personal injury, or murder).

The components of a physical protection system will be

discussed in more detail below. Elements to be presented

include description, applications, technology, operational

limitations, existing deficiencies, development status and

activity, costs, and expected new capabilities.

Threat assessment is usually the first step in any

physical protection system design, followed by site

assessment, physical design, construction, operation, and

functional assessment. The system elements must be

balanced so as not to create weak links. For example, an

adversary is not likely to take time to burn a crawl hole in

a steel door if the hinges can be easily dismantled. Several

useful computer programs are available to aid in assessment of specific site security plans and in the design of a

protection system (e.g., SAVI, ASSESS, and SENLAX

are a few available at Sandia National Laboratories).

A physical protection system can also provide deterrence because it may be viewed by the terrorist as a

formidable object requiring many tools and people to

penetrate and thus may result in a delay in his plans, or

better, a decision on his part not to act at all. Deterrence,

however, is difficult to measure and cannot be depended

on.

Brief Assessment of Current Physical

Protection Technologies

Except for explosives detection, the technologies and

hardware for entry control into a protected area are

available and are reasonably adequate for screening

personnel and packages.

The common and widely used coded photo badge

technology is mature but, by itself, provides minimum

security.

A variety of high-security identity verifiers based on

personal biometric features are now available and functionally adequate for personnel screening. They are more

reliable than using guards to screen entrants, especially

for large populations and are operationally less expensive,

but they do not present the deterrent and response value

of guards.

The technology for metal detectors is mature; they are

available and substantially adequate for most weapon

screening except for a few selected handguns.

The familiar x-ray package search machine is widely

used but some kinds of explosive devices are difficult to

detect. Nuclear radiation-based detection systems are still

bulky, expensive, and slow. The sensitivity can be set to

detect a small mass of explosives if the corresponding

false alarm rate can be tolerated.1

A perimeter system of a large physical protection

system typically consists of two 8-foot chain link fences

spaced about 30 feet apart with the area between graded

15ee tie f~~t ~epofi ~ ~s se~es, U.S. ConHess, Office of Technology Assessment, Technology Against Terrorism: The Federal EflortP

OX4-ISC-481 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1991), p. 10.

–128–
Appendix E-Physical Protection Systems ● 129

Photo credit: Sandia National Laboratories, 1990.

View of intrusion detection and assessment system.

and covered with rock. A disturbance detector (perhaps a

seismic or a taut-wire sensor) is attached to the outer fence

and one or two overlapping intrusion detectors, such as an

electric field sensor and a beam type sensor are located

between the fences. An array of surveillance TVs with

matched lighting is typically also installed in this ‘‘clear

zone,” (see figure E-l). All sensors are then connected to

a common alarm, assessment, and control center. The cost

of such a perimeter system is typically about $1,000 per

foot.

Tests have shown that some barriers that appear to be

impenetrable can be breached quite rapidly by determined

terrorists who are trained and well equipped.

Although some improvements are being made in the

more conventional structural barriers in terms of materials, designs, and construction, more visible technical

advances have been achieved in the unusual quickdeployment barriers. These more exotic dispensable-oncommand barriers are less developed, but first-generation

versions are available for tactical and special defensive

applications.

A risk in the use of quick deployment barriers,

however, is that in addition to containing or slowing down

the terrorists, they may also create a difficult escape path

for the evacuees and the response force.

Reliable intrusion sensors are readily available from

several suppliers. They are used extensively as single

units and in multiple-unit networks in detection systems

of all sizes. Internal-intrusion detectors, usually involving

the use of a different set of sensors from those deployed

along external perimeters, are usually mounted on the

walls, windows, or doors of a building. Intrusion detectors

are often used in overlapping arrays for mutual protection

and reliability.

Closed circuit television (CCTV) is usually used for the

initial assessment of an alarm. TV in a large system is

usually cost-efficient since one person can monitor

several areas at the same time from one central location.

Based on the principle of detection, delay, and response, Sandia Laboratories has developed, under the

sponsorship of the U.S. Army RD&E center at Fort

Belvoir, a medium-size, flexible physical protection

system named SAFER that is quickly deployable on

command. It was developed primarily to protect field sites

and high-value military assets deployed in antiguerilla or

countemarcotics operations. The system hardware is

procured and stored in kit form and costs about $360,000

per kit. Each kit consists of infrared sensors, both passive

and active, seismic sensors, an assessment platform with

low-light TV, and a public-address-system speaker. A

video display console is included. The system also

includes a razor-tape concertina type of wire barrier,

hand-held radios, electromagnetic fence-disturbance sensors, and night-vision binoculars. The kit may be retrieved

for redeployment. Several have been procured and

stocked and more are scheduled for procurement in 1991.

Entry Control

Entry control refers to the admission of authorized

personnel to and the blocking of unauthorized personnel

from a physically protected area; it includes screening

personnel and material.

After a perimeter barrier is established around any

protected area it must be provided with an entrance and

exit corridor for the movement of personnel, material, and

equipment for operation and maintenance. This entry

control corridor must include a screening and separation

enforcement system. Such systems range from totally

manual to fully automatic and may be used for screening

on the way out of as well as on the way into the area.

To prevent theft, sabotage, hostage taking, or other

terrorist acts, it is necessary to search for concealed

contraband, not only on persons but also in packages and

vehicles passing through entry control. The items usually

looked for are weapons, explosives, drugs, strategic and

precious materials, special tools and parts, and hazardous
130 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

Figure E-l—Intrusion Detection and Assessment System

. . . .

30 foot IDA zone

Sensors

● Microwave

● Infrared

● Taut-wire

Assessment

● CCTV

● Lights

SOURCE: Sandia National Laboratories, 1990.

materials. Hand-searching, with or without hand-held

sensors, is usually too slow or socially objectionable for

a population of more than a few.

Personnel Screening, Manual

In a fully manual screening system inspection is done

by a guard or security inspector on an individual basis.2

At a facility where there are many authorized persons and

the guard force is large, this system becomes ineffective

and impractical without at least some minimal aid, such

as the familiar photo badge, which is frequently coded for

L\ .’

.—

—-—

——. -=

\ ———— \

\

\

‘\\

\

\

/

//

machine reading. The use of the photo badge requires that

the screening guard make only a comparison between the

person’s face and the photo for admittance. This system

assumes that the badge is authentic and is being presented

by the authorized user. In the interest of cost and at

additional risk, this comparison is sometimes accomplished remotely using closed circuit TV. Heavy dependence on the photo badge can be a security risk for several

reasons: 1) photo badges can be counterfeited, 2) an

impostor’s face can be made up to match the photo on a

stolen, borrowed, or found badge, 3) the guard’s inattenZAII exmple of such a system is at OIA, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue SE, Wastigto% DC.
Appendix E-Physical Protection Systems ● 131

tiveness due to boredom, distraction, preoccupation, etc.,

can make his activities ineffectual. However, as a first line

of personnel screening the guard-plus-photo-badge system is often adequate and such systems are well developed and widely used. Photo badges cost from about $1

to $10 depending on the amount and kind of encoding

used.

The cost of a full-time (three-shift) guard position is

about $185,000 per year. Therefore, in the interest of cost

saving, to say nothing of security quality, a reduction in

the size of the guard force at entry control locations by

using a machine-aided or fully automatic screening

system may be attractive. A machine-aided system, for

example, using a coded photo badge and a badge reader

and leaving only the final approval for each entry attempt

to the guard, may speed entry, improve security, and, in

the long run, reduce screening costs. A much greater

economic advantage may be gained from the use of an

automatic screening system.

Personnel Screening, Automated

An automated entry control system, usually with only

guard overview, can make use of personnel identity

verification devices for screening. Such devices make a

close assessment of a personal biometric feature, such as

a hand profile, a fingerprint, a voice pattern, a retinal

pattern, or the way a signature is written, then automatically compares that verification sample with a previously

stored reference sample of the same biometric feature.

These devices have existed in development form for a

decade and are now available from several manufacturers

who can supply not only hardware and software but also

the necessary spare parts and technical assistance for

installation, operation, and maintenance. Indeed the

supply of a variety of functionally adequate identity

verifiers is now available to fill the requirements of the

security industry. The capital cost of a typical personnel

identity verifier ranges from about $1,000 to $5,000 per

verifier, which is generally small compared to the total

cost of an operational entry control system. The total cost

of using verifiers must also include not only machine

procurement, but also installation, maintenance, user

instruction, user enrollment, and many times the design,

procurement, and installation of a management-system

network.

The number of verifiers required in an entry control

system depends on the speed of the verifier, the number

of personnel to be screened, the number of portals, and the

patience of the waiting users. Verified performance tests

show that about 3 to 7 seconds are required for the

verification of a claimed identity. A false acceptance of an

unauthorized person and a false reject of an authorized

person can occasionally occur, but broadly speaking, the

frequency is less than 1 percent. These error rates are

interrelated, however, and are dependent on machine

adjustment. This kind of accuracy is acceptable for most

well-designed entry control systems. More accuracy and

speed and less cost is desired, of course, and those goals

are the object of current development efforts.

The use of an identity verifier, now commercially

available, in place of a guard is usualIy cost-effective but

can also be justified because of fewer errors and better

reliability. The deterrence associated with guard presence

may be lost if the guard position is totally eliminated in

favor of a verifier. However, some security personnel are

generally required to oversee the screening operation,

help visitors, provide occasional help for the handicapped, care for equipment breakdowns, prevent vandalism, and be available to challenge a suspected impostor.

Successful operation of the verifiers requires cooperation on the part of the user and a minimal amount of

operator skill. A personnel screening machine, such as a

facial-recognition device that could be used nonintrusively to scan a succession of people at a port of entry or

at an airport security screening portal, would be extremely

useful to search for certain wanted persons. For example,

a known terrorist, who had previously been registered into

the recognition system from a photograph could be

covertly identified with such a system. With the recent

advent of neural networks and other powerful algorithms,

Photo credit: Sandia National Laboratories, 1990.

Hand profile identity verifier.
132 . Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

Photo credit: Sandia National Laboratories, 1990.

Fingerprint identity verifier.

several facial-recognition systems have been developed device for this entry control task, but it is bulky (3 to 5 feet

to a prototype state. Two developers are David Sarnoff square), slow (about 20 seconds per entry sequence),

Research Center in Princeton, NJ, and International expensive ($20,000 to $60,000 per portal), and not widely

Imaging Systems in Milpitas, CA. No device is yet available. The development of a much simpler, faster, and

commercially available. less expensive doorway monitor is needed.

Entrance barriers in an entry control corridor, including Weapons Detection intrusion-resistant doors and turnstiles with associated

latching hardware that can be operated remotely, have Terrorist activities frequently involve the use of

been in use for years. However, the technology required weapons and tools, usually made of metal. Therefore, an

to insure that only one person, the person whose authority entry control system must also screen for unauthorized

has just been verified, passes through a single door when metal objects that may be carried on a person. The

it is released, is not yet commercially available. The hand-held scanning metal detectors are the most sensitive

two-door-portal assembly is an operationally adequate but their use is slow and manpower intensive and
Appendix E-Physical Protection Systems ● 133

therefore not practical for screening large populations at

a reasonable rate.

The basic portal metal detector has changed little in a

decade. It senses a change in an electromagnetic field

pattern when a metal object is moved into the active area

of the portal. The pattern is sensed after a short

electromagnetic field pulse is applied by the portal

electronics. 3 The sensitivity of a weapon detector is

effected by the weapon’s shape, size and orientation, the

kind of metal used, the size of the carrier, velocity and

direction through the portal, and by other objects in and

near the sensing magnetic field. Recent improvements,

primarily centered around sensing only during various

“time windows” after the interrogating pulse, have

provided more sensitivity and more stable operation than

previous models were able to attain. The metal detector is

limited by its inability to distinguish between a weapon

and a piece of innocent metal of the same or smaller size.

It may be reasonable to expect that continued development will produce a metal detector that will find these

weapons among other pocket clutter but it is unlikely that

it will ever be able to find the emerging totally nonmetal

gun, in the absence of metallic tags emplaced by the

weapon manufacturer.

A software program is being developed for metal

detector operation that will provide high sensitivity,

regardless of the kind of metal (e.g., iron, copper, zinc,

stainless steel, or aluminum) being passed through the

portal. There is also some continuing effort toward the

development of a very low-power microwave imaging

device that will be able to search for high-density objects

under clothing (see app. C).

The (regulatory) magnetic field intensity limitation of

1 gauss for metal detectors is restrictive and imposes

limits on sensitivity and accuracy. However, in spite of its

limitations the use of metal detectors at airports has

apparently been effective in greatly reducing the number

of weapons carried onto aircraft, as evidenced by the

reduction of skyjackings in recent years. The cost of a

portal-type weapon detector is about $6,000.

Explosives Detection

Explosives detection has been discussed in detail in the

first OTA report of this study and in chapter 4 of this

report and so will be discussed only briefly here.4 An

explosives detector is necessary in an entry control system

because explosives are not only commonly used by

terrorists for forceful entry but also for sabotage and

injury within a protected area. Explosives detection is

complicated by the variety of carriers to be searched such

as personnel and their clothing, briefcases, packages, tool

boxes, instruments, and other places where explosives can

be hidden for smuggling. The basic methods used for

bomb detection are explosives-material analysis (vapor

and solid) and object identification with the aid of x rays

and hand searching. Important features of a good searching system are high sensitivity, high resolution, high

scanning rates, low false alarms, and safety.

Explosives Carried by Personnel

The material-analysis techniques being developed for

explosives detection are based on well-known physical

and chemical properties of explosives. Currently available explosive-vapor detectors, which use the only

automated technique now acceptable for searching people, cannot detect all types of explosives that might be

used by a terrorist. Several hand-held detectors based on

explosive-vapor collection, concentration, and analysis

are commercially available. The use of these devices,

however, is manpower intensive and slow. Further, the

devices are not sensitive to all types of explosives.

However, technical developments in this area have become

rapid and new, radically improved devices are now

available.5

Package Search

For packages, a conveyor-belt search system, as seen in

airports for baggage inspection, is frequently used. This

scanning system, using x-rays, is limited to generating

video images of concealed objects (of various densities)

which, if suspicious, must be further assessed by inspectors. This technique relies heavily on the operator. Much

attention is now being given to alertness enhancement

techniques (part of human factors applications-see ch. 5)

such as frequent rotation of inspection personnel and a

reward program for the detection of planted test objects.

Various x-ray inspection aids, such as color and image

enhancement, zoom control, and density highlights are

available.

Modern x-ray inspection systems, such as those found

at airports, are designed to insure radiation safety. First,

the x-ray dose per package scan is very low compared to

medical and dental sources. Radiation shields effectively

limit radiation levels anywhere immediately external to

the search machine to less than 0.0005 Roentgens per

hour, which is much less than the maximum allowable set

by the Bureau of Radiological Health and Safety. By

comparison, cosmic radiation at 35,000 feet is 0.0001

Roentgens per hour or more, so a passenger will receive

far more radiation from a high-altitude flight than from

x-ray screening of his luggage prior to boarding. These

3SW app. C’ for more detailed discussion on metal and weapons detectors.

Au.s. Congess, Office of Technology Assessment, op. cit., footnote 1, ChS. 4-5.

Sfiid., chs. 4-5 and app. C.
134 ● Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

radiation levels are not damaging to pharmaceuticals,

computers, magnetic tape, food, or and almost all other

substances. 6

Dual-energy x-ray inspection, as the name implies,

makes use of two x-ray beams of different energies. This

system, besides obtaining item profiles, can also provide

information about an object, such as atomic number,

when the images of the two beams are compared. By

exposing objects to two or more x-ray beams from

different directions, three dimensional information can

also be obtained (this technique is called tomography). By

employing computer processing the maximum image

information can be obtained for better item identification.

Dual-energy computerized tomography is well developed

for the medical industry but is expensive. The radiation

backscatter variation of x-ray imaging from materials of

different density is also useful in identifying scanned

materials. Minimal success has thus far been gained in the

development of a computerized system using using neural

networks for object recognition from the x-ray image. A

fully automated x-ray system, without the human discriminating link, is not yet available, although one firm, AS&E

of Cambridge, MA, claims to be close to marketing such

a system.

Neutrons of normal thermal energy can also be used to

screen packages for explosives materials. The procedure

involves exposing the package and its contents to a very

low dose of neutrons which interact with nitrogen to

generate characteristic secondary radiation, which is

detected. Such a machine was developed by Science

Application International Corp. and sponsored by the

FAA Several of these very large baggage search machines were then built at a cost of something over a

million dollars each.7 The use of high-energy neutrons in

a similar system is being considered by other developers.

The use of other types of radiation for package searching

is an interesting and promising technology but further

development is yet required to provide a practical

time-efficient machine for the detection of explosives at

airports.

Searching for explosives in vehicles such as cars and

trucks is usually done by hand searching and sometimes

with the aid of hand-held vapor detectors or with wipe

patches that are later analyzed for traces of explosives.

Dogs are still used to determine the presence of

contraband. Their sniffing time span is quite limited

(about 20 minutes per session) and they are strongly

dependent on interaction with a specific handler, thus

making their availability and use relatively costly (see

app. B).

Development activities in the area of explosive detectors has, in the last few years, improved sensitivity and

reduced operating times by factors of 10 and 100.

However, so far the urgently needed fast, sensitive, and

accurate explosives detector for personnel and packages

searches has not arrived. A practical and reliable detector

for the more commonly used bomb explosives is urgently

needed.

Reference 1 in the bibliography to this appendix

contains additional information about entry control technology.

Intrusion Detection

Detection is the discovery of an intrusive action at any

point in the protection system. Detection is usually

reported by an intrusion sensor and announced through

the alarm communication subsystem. The intrusion alarm

must then be followed by an assessment; if appropriate,

the response force will then be notified.

The detection of an intrusion or an attempted intrusion

into a protected area is one of the four basic functions of

a physical protection system. It is important to make this

detection as soon as possible after the start of the intrusive

action to provide the maximum time for assessment and

response. Maximum delay usually means detection as far

from the target as possible.

Exterior Sensors

Several fence-disturbance sensors have been developed

to detect attempts at fence scaling or cutting. Personnel

and vehicles used for forceful entry by ramming the fence

can usually be detected by the same exterior sensors.

A fence disturbance caused by climbing can be

detected by special sensors fastened to the fence. The

heart of one such sensor consists of a magnet-and-coil

arrangement; another utilizes piezoelectric crystals. These

measure slight disturbances in the geometry of the fence

caused by the intruder. Another relatively unsophisticated

sensor utilizes a taut wire, usually barbed wire, stretched

along the inside of the perimeter fence. Whenever the wire

is stretched, cut, or misaligned by an intruder an alarm is

generated by a contact closure. The Israelis are generally

given credit for most of the development of the taut-wire

sensor. Most of the fence-disturbance sensors are subject

to defeat if the intruder avoids touching the fence.

More sophisticated detection sensors have also been

developed, tested, and successfully used and are commercially marketed. A microwave intrusion sensor consists of

a microwave transmitter and a receiver at opposite ends of

a straight section of perimeter boundary. The received

6~tie fitereSt ofS~e~~d for f~er ~idance here exists an AS~ spmificatio~ desi~ted F-792.82, entitled Strmdwd Practice for Design ad

Use of Ionizing Radiation Equipment for the Detection of Itcms Prohibited in Controlled Access Areas.

YU.S. ConWess, Office of Techology Assessment, Op. cit., foo~ote 1! c~. 1, 4.
Appendix E-Physical Protection Systems ● 135

Photo credit: Sandia National Laboratories, 1990.

A taut wire fence sensor.

signal is the sum of the directly transmitted signal and the

signals reflected from the ground and other objects in the

intervening distance. When any object, for example an

intruder, moves into the stable monitored field, the

microwave signal received is altered, generating an alarm.

These sensors are subject to defeat by a knowledgeable

intruder. This deficiency can be overcome by overlap with

another sensor such as a radar or infrared sensor.

Microwave sensors, like other ray-type sensors, operate

across a line-of-sight, so surface grading in the clear zone

between the transmitter and the receiver may be required

to eliminate a blind ground depression that could create a

crawl space under the microwave beam. The height and

alignment of the antennas and the distance between them

are important factors. Adverse environmental conditions

including heavy rain, water puddles, very deep or blowing

snow, windblown dust and debris, fog, vegetation, birds,

and wild animals can cause nuisance alarms or malfunctions. Deep snow can obscure a careful crawling intruder.

Microwave sensors are available from several suppliers.

Infrared (IR) sensors, both active and passive, are also

frequently used for intruder detection. The active infrared

sensor generates an alarm when the IR light beam from a

transmitter, similar in many respects to that used in the

common remote TV-channel changer, is broken. The

transmitter and receiver are located at each end of the

detection zone. Multiple infrared beams are often used,

especially at gates and doors, to create a web of rays that

make the system more impenetrable. Passive infrared

sensors operate on the fact that all animals emit IR energy,

the amount and wavelength being dependent on their

body temperatures. A passive IR sensor sends an alarm

when it detects a change in the incoming IR energy from

its field of view, as would be generated by an intruding

person. The probability of not detecting an intruder and of

getting a nuisance alarm is influenced by the speed of the

object, by the ambient temperature, and other environmental conditions.

A video motion detector monitors the electronic signals

from a video camera and detects changes in any designated part of the video scene as would occur when an

object moves within the field of view. Sometimes only a

portion of the total field of view is monitored for motion.

Objects other than a person, such as animals and birds,

blowing debris, and snow moving through the field of

view, can cause nuisance alarms. The size of the moving

object or its speed (consider a flying bird) can sometimes

be used to distinguish a person from other alarm objects.

In addition to the beam type sensor described above

there are several other devices now commercially available for intrusion detection at a perimeter. One known as

the E-field detector sounds an alarm upon the disturbance

of an established electric field near a conductor. It senses

changes in capacitance between the sensor elements such

as wires on a fence or between fence wires and the ground.

The dielectric constant of human flesh is about 100 times

that of air, so as an intruder approaches an E-field fence,

the capacitance changes and a resulting alarm is issued,

even when the person is not yet directly between the

wires. Changing weather conditions, such as humidity,

cause a change in circuit characteristics, but frequently the

Photo credit: Sandia National Laboratories, 1990.

E-Field fence.
136 . Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

Figure E-2—Coaxial Cable Sensor

Air

SOURCE: Sandia National Laboratories, 1990.

rate and size of the change can be analyzed to determine

whether the change is likely to have been caused by an

intruder. Unlike the beam from active sensors, the terrain

along the monitored path can be crooked and irregular,

providing an advantage for this type of detector. The

E-field sensor is not sensitive to wind unless it carries with

it snow or rain. However, the E-field sensor fence must be

kept clear of moving vegetation.

Buried line sensors are designed for intrusion detection. These sensors are usually buried in the ground for

stability and protection but some are marginally suitable

for stabilized temporary deployment above ground, for

example around a parked aircraft or a building to be

temporarily secured. Some lines are sensitive to seismic

or magnetic disturbances, or both, that are transmitted

through the ground to the sensing elements.

The seismic line sensor employs transducers, which

sense pressure waves from an intruder’s footstep or

vehicle. Piezoelectric crystals and strain gauges respond

to stresses in the sensor cable due to any disturbance of the

material around it. The balanced-pressure seismic sensor

determines the pressure change between the two parallel

segments of the buried flexible tubes caused by the added

weight of a passing intruder. Another seismic-sensitive

buried line responds to changes in the cable’s magnetic

core due to stress.

A buried line magnetic sensor generates an electrical

signal that triggers an alarm when an intruder carries or

drives an object containing a magnetic material across the

line. In the geophone line sensor a coil of wire is moved

through a freed magnetic field by any seismic disturbance, thereby triggering an alarm.

Disturbances that contribute to nuisance alarms are

generated by animals, hail, blowing debris, nearby train or

truck traffic, and some industrial noises. Nuisance alarms

in magnetic sensors can also be generated by lightning or

nearby unshielded power lines.

Another type of sensor consists of two coaxial cables

buried in the ground about 6 inches deep and parallel to

each other (see figure E-2). These cables are of a

conventional coaxial design except that the outer conductor is ported (made with many closely spaced small holes

through the shield). When electrical energy is injected

into one cable, some radiates out through the cable shield

and is coupled through the ground and the air above the

ground into the nearby receiver cable through similar

small ports. When an intruder comes near one of the

cables the change in coupling is sensed and an alarm is

generated. The sensing zone extends out about 3 feet from

the cables and is effective under the cables too, so it can

detect tunneling as well as aboveground activity. Surface

water from any source, however, is a major cause of

nuisance alarms, and animals and tall plants in the vicinity

of the cables can also contribute to false alarms.

See reference 2 in the bibliography of this appendix for

more detailed information about exterior intrusion detection.

Interior Sensors

A different group of sensors is available for detecting

intrusion into a building that houses a protected target.

Some of the intrusion sensors used at the external

perimeter can also be used internally.

The widely applied balanced magnetic switch is used

for indicating whether a door is open or closed and is an

extension of the conventional magnetic switch used on

doors and windows in home protection systems. A defeat

technique is to place an overriding steel plate (or magnet)

on the switch to keep the switch closed regardless of door
Appendix E--Physical Protection Systems ● 137

position. In the balanced magnetic switch system the act

of adding the steel plate or the defeat magnet creates an

alarm.

Sonic and vibration sensors listen and feel for intrusion

indicators, such as breaking wood or glass at walls and

windows, For monitoring areas like rooms during uninhabited times motion detectors are often used. Active

devices for this purpose include the use of sound waves

of various frequencies and beams of microwave radiation

or infrared light. A very practical nonemitting (passive)

infrared sensor is available that detects heat emitted from

a warm object, such as a human body. An intrusion sensor

that can be used very close to a target is a capacitance

blanket that can be conveniently draped over a suitable

target and will alarm if touched or even approached

closely by an intruder.

Interior sensors are not without their vulnerabilities,

which can be exploited by a knowledgeable intruder. This

provides motivation for research into the operational

characteristics of a sensor system prior to application.

Altering power or signal lines to kill the sensor or mask

its output or even interject false information is another

countermeasure. Where the risk warrants, a device that

monitors the line for tampering can be added.

Since commercial power sources and distribution lines

are frequently vulnerable to failure due to generating

equipment malfunction, storms, etc., uninterruptible

electrical supplies with limited life are widely available.

The size and capacity of such power supplies cover a wide

range from a few cubic inches of batteries with backup

energy for a few minutes to a multikilowatt diesel-electric

powerplant that can be located and protected within the

physical protection system.

Special design thought must be given to the routing and

protection of power and signal cables to prevent exposure

to adversarial attack and to protect them from ground

erosion. Further, to minimize nuisance alarms, the routing

of signal cables should be done so as to avoid inductive

coupling with other circuits

Alarm Assessment

Alarm assessment is the next step in the security system

after a sensor has detected and reported an alarm of any

kind. By definition, a false alarm is caused by the

malfunction of a sensor or a subsystem such as an

intermittent electrical circuit or a power outage or a stray

magnetic pulse (perhaps from lightning). A nuisance

alarm is generated by a disturbance similar to that caused

by a real intrusion but not actually generated by intruding

personnel (e.g., blowing debris or animal activity). These

invalid alarms, indicating intrusion activity when in fact

there is none, are not only undesirable but, if frequent, are

intolerable. Nuisance alarms may be eventually ignored

or, worse, the offending sensor may be deliberately shut

off by the irritated assessment personnel, leaving a hole in

the detection system. This problem emphasizes the

importance of reliability in physical protection systems.

The validity of alarms in an in-depth system can

frequently be determined by the simultaneous reporting of

an alarm from an overlapping sensor, perhaps of a

different type, detecting the same event in the same

vicinity.

Closed circuit television is usually used for initial

assessment of an alarm. TV is usually cost-efficient in a

large system since one person can monitor several areas

at the same time from one central location. In addition, the

TV can be ideally located and thus have a better field of

view, especially with custom lighting. Personnel safety is

also enhanced by the use of CCTV.

An extensive variety of surveillance cameras is available, including the older electron tubes type and the newer

solid-state cameras each with pros and cons concerning

illumination required, field of view and magnification,

repositioning capabilities, power consumption, sensitivity, resolution, reliability, environmental resistance, maintenance, and cost. Additional hardware required to extend

the capabilities of surveillance TV systems is available

including special lenses, signal synchronizers, switches,

transmission equipment, and video displays. The assessment ability of a surveillance camera is very dependent

upon its mounting location and the illumination provided.

The TV monitors at the central alarm and communication

center are frequently operated in the standby or blank

mode until an alarm is generated. They then may

automatically be turned on for viewing, perhaps on a

preplanned priority basis, and at the same time maps and

views of the associated facility and other visual aids may

be automatically brought into view to aid assessment.

Another frequently used high-tech device is the alarmtriggered video recorder which can be used to provide

immediate play-back of the alarm event. Recording on

magnetic disc or tape or on optical disc, can be done

continuously but is usually done intermittently in the

interest of conserving recording media and recorder life.

The TV equipment discussed above for surveillance and

alarm assessment is practical, well developed, commercially available, reasonably priced, and widely used.

Many suppliers are available to provide installation and

maintenance information and service. Installation and

maintenance is sometimes expensive, especially for

retrofits.

See references 3 and 4 in the bibliography of this

appendix for supporting and additional information about

intrusion assessment and about alarm communications.
138 . Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

Response Force Communication

Communication is a vital function in a physical

protection system. The system most commonly used to

maintain effective control and coordination of the protective force and response personnel is the popular, small,

hand-held, battery-powered FAA voice radio. These radios

have a range of about 1 to 3 miles, which is marginally

adequate in some applications. Dead spots in the operating area are frequently experienced. The use of elevated

repeaters can effectively reduce this problem. The ease

with which an adversary can eavesdrop on unscrambled

messages is a concern. Furthermore, deceptive messages

can be injected into a radio conversation to distract and

confuse the security force personnel. Message scrambling

or encryption can be used to avoid this drawback.

However, as a system becomes more secure, it also

becomes more complex and costly and the messages

become more noisy and less intelligible. Jamming, or

flooding the radio transmission with noise by the adversary to make the conversation unintelligible, is also a

potential vulnerability. Techniques, such as programmed

frequency hopping, can be used to combat this problem.

Other message-transmission media such as phone lines,

intercom networks, public-address systems, and even

hand signals can frequently be used as alternatives to or

in conjunction with radios. See reference 5 for more

detailed information about protecting security communications.

Delay Barriers

Most conventional security barriers at industrial facilities are designed to deter or prevent occasional acts of

thievery or vandalism. In the case of determined terrorist

activity, however, the traditional fences, building walls,

doors, locks, etc., will not prevent intrusion but each may

contribute some delay. Barriers around a protected area

simply slow down the adversarial penetration into the

controlled area. Delay after intrusion detection contributes to the time needed for response-force notification,

deployment, and action. Each additional second required

by the adversary after detection provides that much more

time for the security response force to interrupt the

terrorist action. It should be emphasized that if the

adversarial action is not detected early in the penetration

attempt, barriers will be much less effective.

Tests have shown that some barriers which appear to be

impenetrable can be breached quite rapidly by determined

terrorists who are trained and well equipped. In keeping

with the theme of protection-in-depth, the use of several

different kinds of barriers may demand of the adversary

more penetration equipment, a larger team, more transportation equipment, and more penetration time. If the

imperviousness of a barrier (or the perception thereof) is

sufficient to deter or prevent the attack, it has accomplished its purpose.

Large protected sites occasionally include natural

barriers such as rugged coastlines, high cliffs, mountains,

or long, clear distances. Most barriers, however, must be

constructed and installed.

Perimeter Barriers

Perimeter barriers form the outermost elements of most

physical protection systems. The most common type of

outer perimeter is the chain-link fence. Security fences are

usually about 8 feet tall and have extension arms angled

upward at the top with several strands of barbed wire and

are sometimes also topped with a roll of concertina

(entanglement barbed wire). If appropriate, the lower

edge of the fence can be buried deep enough to discourage

shallow tunneling. Although chain-link fences may serve

as a deterrent to the casual intruder, most industrial

perimeter fences can be scaled or penetrated with

handtools very quickly and they do not delay determined

adversaries for more than a few seconds. Common

handtools (manual and power), thermal cutting tools,

explosives, and ram vehicles are the favorites for penetrating barriers. However, if one or several rolls of barbed

wire or razor tape are placed on or near a perimeter fence,

penetration can be made more difficult in some cases and

more time consuming. Several configurations of barbed

wire and razor tape, usually in rolls, have been developed

and tested for delay efficiency. Some razor tapes have

built-in sensors to detect cutting, thus making penetration

without detection more difficult.

Much characteristic information regarding perimeter

barriers of all types, including the approximate times to

defeat have been determined from penetration tests. This

sensitive information regarding effectiveness about many

kinds of imposing barriers can be found in reference 6 in

this appendix’s bibliography and can be used for design

and operational purposes.

Several lethal barriers, such as electrified fences and

fields of explosive mines, have been considered as

perimeter barriers, but many problems are involved in the

installation, maintenance, safety, and legality of lethal

barriers and they are seldom used except for high-risk

military installations.

Vehicle Barriers

Personnel barriers are usually ineffective against even

small vehicles such as cars and pickup trucks, so specially

designed vehicle barriers must be erected where the threat

of ramming is sufficiently high. There are many kinds of

vehicle barriers to choose from, such as earthen ditches

and banks and other fixed barriers (e.g., filled steel tubes),

movable heavy concrete (e.g., ‘‘Jersey bounce blocks’ or

heavy earth-filled concrete planters), and convertible

barriers like the pop-up wedge. Loaded trucks and rail

cars are sometimes used for quickly obtainable temporary

barriers. Large, half-buried tires make reasonably effec-
Appendix E--Physical Protection Systems ● 139

tive barriers for some applications. An alternate to

ramming a barrier is bridging it. Bridging may be

especially applicable for excavated, earthen, and other

low-level barriers. A motorcycle may be used by the

adversary especially if the intrusion and escape equipment can be carried on such a vehicle and if the other

onsite vehicle restrictions are designed against only larger

vehicles.

The concrete Jersey bounce and conventional highway

guardrail cost about $40 per foot installed. Half-buried,

large tires cost about $5 per foot installed.

Barriers On Buildings

Doors and windows are logical points of attack. Attack

methods for these portals include the use of manual and

power handtools, oxygen-fed burn bars, explosives, and

ramming vehicles. Attack-resistant windows and doors,

doorframes, hinges, and locks are available for secure

buildings at increased cost. A full-height turnstile is the

functional equivalent of a security door and is generally

subject to the same kinds of attacks. Other openings such

as ventilation ducts, large water pipes, and other utility

ports are also vulnerable points and must be considered.

Walls of buildings, vaults, and other structure are

usually considered to be more resistant to penetration and

less attractive as targets for forced entry than are doors,

windows, air vents, and other conventional openings.

Because of their structural reputation and rugged

appearance, concrete walls are almost universally believed to be formidable barriers. However, in conventional construction, the kind and shape of the concrete and

the size and spacing of reinforcing bars are located for

structural requirements and not to prevent penetration.

Testing has shown that standard reinforced concrete walls

are vulnerable to rapid penetration.

Explosives are especially effective against concrete

walls. The shock waves produced by an explosion

propagate through the concrete and result in fragmentation and spalling. The fragments are forced out, leaving a

relatively clean hole except for the rebar, which often

requires more time to remove than the concrete. The use

of precast T-section walls or roofs generally provides little

delay because of the lack of rebar. A technology for

security walls, not usually used for conventional construction, includes the use of special aggregate ingredients

such as steel wires or balls of ceramic or lead to provide

more resistance to penetration by using cutting and

burning tools or explosives. The use of a stand-off wall,

located a few inches ahead of the main protection wall,

requires added time for its removal or requires the use of

a much larger or a second explosive charge. These

supplementary features add cost to the protective structure.

One advantage of concrete barriers, even if penetration

time is less than might be expected, is the sophistication

and weight of tools that must be carried by the adversary.

Vaults

A vault is considered hereto be a strong repository the

size of a small room, usually within a larger building. It

is constructed to secure its content from unauthorized

persons and is usually not a workplace. With the right

equipment, the time required to penetrate an 8-inch

reinforced-concrete vault wall and a half-inch steel door

is only a few minutes. Earthen overburden when appropriate, can add appreciable time and adversary exposure to

the breaching process, depending on its thickness and the

removal equipment used. New facilities requiring heavy

physical protection might appropriately be totally buried.

Although subterranean construction is not frequently

used, the technology and basic design considerations have

been well established. The comparative cost range per

square foot of several wall materials in place is about $15

for 1 inch of steel, $8 for 10 inches of conventional

concrete, $40 for expanded metal/concrete (the kind

frequently used in safe-deposit vaults), and $0.50 for 30

inches of soil overburden often used on the top of large

vaults.

Dispensable Barriers

Barriers may be passive, like walls and fences, or active

and quickly dispensed into place. Dispensable barriers

and deterrents are designed to add physical encumbrances

and to interfere with an adversary’s personal sensory and

motor processes. Such barriers include rapidly dispensable rigid foams, sticky foams, aqueous foams, sticky

sprays, slippery sprays, sand columns, noise, lights,

smoke, and rubble piles. Most of these materials can be

stored in a compact form in an out-of-the-way place and

dispensed quickly when sufficient threat warrants. This

dispensable denial technology augments the usual protective structures. If such items are used, the adversary must

conduct his breaching activities, which now may be more

taxing or hazardous, while in personal protective gear

further reducing his speed and endurance.

Obscurant materials include smoke of various kinds

and aqueous foams. Techniques for generating obscuring

and irritating smokes are quite well known from military

literature.

Psychological stresses, such as flashing lights at

various frequencies and intensities, are believed to be of

little deterrent value. Likewise, the use of sound at very

high and very low frequencies is not considered to be an

effective adversarial deterrent. However, high-intensity

audible sound, besides being very uncomfortable to the

unprotected ear, makes audible communication between

adversary team members very difficult, adding more time

to the barrier breakthrough task. The cost of such a noise
140 . Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

generator is quite minimal. A very high-intensity continuous light (above 1 million candle power) has been

determined by Navy security organizations to be effective

in temporarily blinding an adversary and thus causing

delay.

Polyurethane is a popular rigid foam that can be

expanded to 30 times its stored volume. It can be used on

short notice to block a passageway or sometimes directly

to encapsulate a protected item. Many formulations of

polyurethane foams for this purpose are commercially

available and cost about $50 per cubic meter of foamed

volume. The dispensing equipment costs about $5,000 to

$10,000. There are hazards to a person caught in the

foaming process such as entombment, exposure to 130 ‘C

temperature, and possible chemical toxicity.

Sticky foam has an expansion ratio of about 30 to 1 for

the frost few hours. It effectively entangles the adversary

and fouls his equipment. When appropriate, it may even

be applied to the target. The foam costs about $50 per

cubic meter dispensed. Similarly, sticky spray, with little

expansion, is intended to be applied on command with

entangling effects similar to sticky foam. These sticky

materials are very effective mechanical impediments.

However, as one might imagine, the clean up operation

after dispensing the sticky stuff is laborious and expensive.

Slippery materials greatly reduce normal friction on

smooth walkways and equipment, making the terrorists’

progress slower and more hazardous. The material is

applied in dry powder form but when sprayed with water

becomes an “instant banana peel. ”

An airborne obscurant can render the adversary “blind”

and slow his progress by making it difficult for him to

recognize targets, tools, team members, and entanglements. Several smokes and smoke generators are now

commercially available. Smoke generators cost from

about $25 for a single military smokepot to a more exotic

and much faster system for about $10,000.

Aqueous foam is generated by spraying a detergentlike surfactant solution onto a screen while blowing air

through the screen, resulting in a material expansion

factor of from 100 to 1,000. A dispenser that makes about

100 cubic meters of soapsuds-like foam per minute costs

about $2,000. This foam is also a fire suppressant and can

absorb significant energy from an explosion, which may

be of some interest. About the only hazard to personnel is

becoming sufficiently covered so that the person can no

longer breathe.

Sensory irritants, such as tear gas, respiratory irritants,

and some pain-producing agents, quickly produce an

incapacitating effect once in contact with the skin, eyes,

and nose. Distress symptoms soon disappear when

exposed to fresh air. The large margin between incapacitation and lethality makes some substances, such as “CS”

and “CR,” agents of choice.

The social acceptance of dispensable deterrents and the

related legal aspects must be considered in determining

their applications.

Physical protection systems range in size from one

building with a few protection features to a multi-acre site

with the full array of entry control, detection, assessment,

delay, and response systems and the appropriate security

and operating personnel.

Response Force

The last element of a physical protection system is the

response force, made up of trained security personnel, and

the necessary equipment, such as weapons, body protection, transportation, communication, etc. Clearly, a physical protection system without a response force would be

of little use in many applications (although for some

situations, the eventual response force may be local law

enforcement personnel not actively involved in the site

security plan). An intrusion alarm would get little

response and any barrier, however formidable, would be

eventually surmountable with no opposition. The purpose

of the response force is to intercept and neutralize the

intruding adversary.

A part or all of the response force may be located

on-site or off-site. The response force maybe made up of

local or State police, military force, a dedicated response

team, or some combination thereof, which mayor may not

include regular security system operating personnel.

Because of the variety of response-force compositions, it

is difficult to generalize about specific procedures and

tasks that the force may be expected to perform but the

final objective is clearly to prevent the adversary from

accomplishing his objective.

Accurate and timely communications with the response

force must contain as much information as possible about

the adversary force size, actions, tools, weapons, location,

direction, etc., and instruction for response-force deployment. Aside from the personal safety of the individuals,

it is clear that the response force must survive intact and

so must be trained in tactics for the safety of its personnel.

Training includes instruction about the facility’s corridors

for cover and concealment and to avoid ambush. A

computer-based technique known as surrogate travel is

available to aid in deployment and tactical movement.

Tactical practice is necessary for response-force proficiency and will provide realistic estimates of response

times and tactical plan validity.

A group of firearms that project laser beams has been

developed. When used with jackets and helmets that

detect the laser light, response training may be devised

with little risk to the trainees. These devices for shooting
Appendix E--Physical Protection Systems . 141

“laser bullets’ are commercially available in the form of

handguns, rifles, submachine guns, and other weapons.

To ensure adversary neutralization in the most timeeffective manner, a balance is necessary among the

several response-force constituents, including the number

of force personnel, planning, training and practice, and the

available equipment. Members of the response force must

have rapid access to the needed weapons, vehicles, radios,

and personal protection equipment (i.e., body armor,

helmet, protective clothing, and sometimes gas masks and

contained breathing equipment), all consistent with the

environment and the expected conflict. The equipment

required for the response force is strongly dependent on

the other characteristics of the physical protection system.

Construction Technologies and Strategies

Above, a number of technologies have been presented

that help protect fixed sites against unauthorized entry.

These fell into three broad categories: perimeter barriers,

sensors and alarms, and access control. In addition to

these fields, there is the important area of architecture and

engineering applied to buildings that may become targets

of attacks. The primary threat discussed below is bombing, perhaps the most common and certainly the most

deadly tactic used by terrorists against U.S. diplomatic

installations and military installations.

Obviously, it is far easier to implement protective

measures by incorporating them into the design of a

facility before it is built, rather than to retrofit fixes

after the fact. However, there exist options for reducing

vulnerability to attack with explosives even in the latter

case. Most of the technical aspects that follow are not

“high tech,” but, rather, are in the domain of classic civil

engineering and architecture. What follows is a brief

survey of a developing field.

Bombs may be introduced into a site by brute force

(e.g., a vehicle bomb), by throwing or launching, or by

stealth (e.g., inside mail). The first tactic is the most

difficult to defend against, since a very large quantity of

high explosive (several tonnes) may be used. If this threat

is successfully opposed, lesser tactics, such as throwing a

bomb over a wall, can be dealt with relatively easily. To

put the matter in perspective, the amount of explosive

needed to destroy an aircraft is on the order of hundreds

or thousands of grams; a tonne is a million grams. Car and

truck bombs, made of up to a tonne or two of dynamite or

plastic explosive, have been commonly used across the

world, from Beirut (against the U.S. Marine Barracks and

against diplomatic buildings), to Belfast, to Bogota,

Colombia. They are able to cause the collapse of

multistory buildings made of reinforced concrete, even

when the bomb is located tens of meters from the target.

The design response to such a threat incorporates

several elements. The first relies on enforcing a standoff

distance around the potential target.8 The standoff distance will depend on the size of the threat and on the

inherent resistance of the building to overpressure. Only

carefully screened vehicles would be allowed within this

distance from the target. For some purposes, a 150-foot

(about 45-meter) distance is used. Clearly, for retrofitting

existing buildings, it is usually impossible to satisfy this

requirement. However, the requirement can often be met

when starting from scratch, that is, before site acquisition

and design are completed for a new building.

Another layer of defense against vehicular bombs is the

use of barriers and of layout and landscaping. The strength

of the barriers is determined from the speed and the

weight of the postulated threat vehicles. The energy that

needs to be “absorbed” in order to stop a vehicle

attempting to traverse a barrier is proportional to its

weight (strictly speaking, to its mass) and to the square of

its Speed.9 Some types of barriers have been mentioned in

the previous section (e.g., the Jersey Bounce blocks);

there are others, ranging from large reinforced “flower

pots’ to concrete-filled cylinders, pyramids, cubes, tires,

and 55-gallon drums. Stopping power for each in terms of

vehicle speed and mass can be calculated and tested.

Some barriers are active, rather than passive; normally not

deployed, they can be rapidly activated in case of alarm.

A familiar version is the drum type, which, when dormant,

is flat, allowing easy passage. When activated, a plate,

supported by a heavy cylinder, rapidly rotates upward

from the ground to block a vehicle. In addition, one might

place ditches or earthen berms in strategic places around

a target building. The ditches would cause trucks to tip

down if they attempt to cross; any blast would then be

partially broken by the ditch. Berms also function to break

the path of the blast wave through the air.

In order to reduce the speed to which vehicles may

accelerate, barriers and obstacles may be laid out along

access roads. Right angle turns, S-curves, traffic circles,

movable barriers, are all options to this end. Maximum

speed at turns are determinable from the turn radius;

likewise, the maximum speed achievable between barriers (from a dead start) can be easily determined in

planning traffic layouts.

In designing a building that maybe a target, both the

layout and the strength of individual elements must be

calculated. Those areas containing critical facilities

SIMS discussion of protwtionagfist bombing atbcks against fixed site facilities relies largely on information from U.S. Army COWS of Engineers,

SecuriryEngineenng Manual (Official Use Only), Protective Design Center, Missouri River Division-Omaha District (Omaha, NE: U.S. Army Corps

of Engineers, January 1990).

g~e ~etic energ of a moving object is one-half the product of its mass and its speed squared.
142 . Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security

should be placed towards the interior of the structure.

Corridors and less essential rooms may be placed as

buffers around the more critical areas. Windows in

exterior walls provide a clear vulnerability; it is preferable

to place windows around an interior courtyard.

Exterior walls should be designed to resist blast effects,

given the standoff distance and the quantity of explosive

taken to be the credible threat. For engineering design,

tables have been calculated showing, e.g., the protection

levels afforded against a 1,000 pound high explosive by

reinforced concrete walls of various thicknesses, as a

function of the standoff distance. Similar analyses are

available for blast resistance in doors and windows. Roofs

should be designed of reinforced concrete with a maximum span of 1.5 times the supporting wall spans. The

thickness of roof slabs can be determined from similar

tables that provide the blast resistance as a function of

thickness and stand-off distance. Additional safety measures to take include using shatterproof lenses on light

fixtures and bracing suspended fixtures, ductwork and

plumbing.

The structural framing system should be able to resist

forces and torques applied when the building suffers the

blast load. Exterior exposed columns must be hardened to

withstand blast effects. The framing structure should be

designed to avoid a concatenation of failures, in case of

failure of an element. This criterion must be incorporated

to avoid catastrophic collapse of the entire building under

blast load.

The above discussion can be amplified by tables from

reference 1. Technical experts present, in addition, abroad

set of design features to avoid, such as long spans,

prestressed load-bearing cables, masonry buildings, and

bar joists. Implementation of the blast-resistant features

provides protection similar to hardening buildings against

earthquakes.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Appendix E Bibliography:

“Entry-Control Systems Technology Transfer Manual,”

SAND87-1927 (Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National Laboratories, May 1989).

‘‘Exterior Intrusion Detection Systems Technology Transfer

Manual,” SAND89-1923.UC-515 (Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National Laboratories, May 1990).

“Video Assessment Technology Transfer Manual,” SAND89-

1924.UC-515 (Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National Laboratories, October 1989).

‘‘Alarm Communications and Display Technology Transfer

Manual, ” SAND90-0729.UC-515 (Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National Laboratories, November 1990).

‘‘Protecting Security Communications Technology Transfer

Manual,” SAND90-0397.UC-515 (Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National Laboratories, March 1990).

“Access Delay Technology Transfer Manual,” classified

UCNI, SAND87-1926/l .UC-5 15 (Albuquerque, NM: Sandia

National Laboratories, September 1989).

All the above documents may be obtained from Director,

Office of Safeguards and Security, U.S. Department of Energy,

on a need-to-know basis.