Filed 7/16/24 P. v. Sanchez CA2/7

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

LESTER RENE SANCHEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B323029

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. Nos. BA495806)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Mildred Escobedo, Judge. Affirmed.

Tanya Dellaca and Patrick J. Hoynoski, under appointment 

by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Nicholas J. Webster and Michael C. 

Keller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

________________________
2

INTRODUCTION

Lester Rene Sanchez was convicted of first degree burglary 

(Pen. Code, § 459), violating a court order with a prior domestic 

violence conviction (§ 166, sub. (c)(4)), and misdemeanor battery

(§ 242).1 After trial, he stipulated to the truth of six aggravating 

circumstances, including that he “engaged in violent conduct that 

indicates a serious danger to society.” (Cal. Rules of Court, 

rule 4.421(b)(1).

2) 

At sentencing, Sanchez presented evidence he had suffered 

childhood trauma in the form of physical abuse. He requested a 

probationary sentence to pursue substance abuse treatment. The 

trial court, citing the newly amended sentencing provisions in 

section 1170, agreed Sanchez had suffered childhood trauma and 

that this trauma was connected to his offenses. But the court 

imposed the middle term sentence of four years based on the 

aggravating factors, specifically Sanchez’s danger to public 

safety. 

Sanchez argues the court abused its discretion because the 

court did not follow section 1170’s lower-term presumption for 

defendants whose childhood trauma “was a contributing factor in 

the commission of the offense.” (See § 1170, subd. (b)(6)(A).) 

Because the court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the 

aggravating factors against its finding of childhood trauma, we 

affirm.

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal 

Code.

2 All rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
3

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Sanchez’s Conviction

Sanchez was charged in connection with the harassment of 

his former girlfriend, Ashley S., who was pregnant at the time

with his child. Sanchez was abusing drugs and alcohol, and the 

couple argued frequently. In February 2021, Sanchez punched a 

hospital security guard who would not let him attend Ashley’s

ultrasound appointment. After Ashley moved out of their shared 

apartment, in April 2021, Sanchez broke into Ashley’s new 

apartment through a window, pushed her up against a door, and 

tried to take her cell phone as she called 911. After Ashley

obtained an emergency protective order against Sanchez in May 

2021, Sanchez texted and called Ashley, threatening to shoot her.

Ashley had another young child, Robert, who was present 

when Sanchez broke into Ashley’s apartment and who allegedly 

witnessed other instances of abuse.

Sanchez was charged with first degree residential burglary 

(§ 459); dissuading a witness by force or threat (§ 136.1, 

subd. (c)(1)); three counts of criminal threats (§ 422); stalking 

with a temporary order in effect (§ 646.9, subd. (a)); violation of a 

court order with a prior domestic violence conviction (§ 166, 

subd. (c)(4)); child abuse under circumstances likely to produce 

great bodily injury or death (§ 273a, subd. (a)); assault with a 

deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)); assault by means of force 

likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)); and 

misdemeanor battery (§ 242).

The People alleged six aggravating circumstances relating 

to Sanchez’s sentence: (1) Sanchez committed a crime involving 

great violence, cruelty, viciousness, or callousness 
4

(rule 4.421(a)(1)); (2) Ashley was a particularly vulnerable victim 

(rule 4.421(a)(3)); (3) Sanchez dissuaded a witness or otherwise 

interfered with the judicial process (rule 4.421(a)(6)); (4) he 

engaged in violent conduct that indicated a serious danger to

society (rule 4.421(b)(1)); (5) he was on probation, post-release 

supervision, or parole when the crime was committed 

(rule 4.421(b)(4)); and (6) his prior performance on probation, 

post-release supervision, or parole was unsatisfactory 

(rule 4.421(b)(5)).

Sanchez proceeded to trial, and a jury found him guilty of 

first degree residential burglary, violating a court order with a 

prior domestic violence conviction, and misdemeanor battery. 

Sanchez was acquitted on the remaining counts.

B. Sanchez’s Sentencing

After Sanchez was found guilty, but before the jury was 

discharged, the trial court addressed the six alleged aggravating 

circumstances with counsel. The court stated that “the new 

statutory framework of [section] 1170” applied “wherein on any 

counts that the jury has found the defendant guilty, there now 

has to be a finding by the jurors of aggravating factors.” Sanchez 

expressly waived his right to a jury trial on the aggravating 

factors, and stipulated that all six factors were true.

Before sentencing, the trial court requested sentencing 

memoranda from Sanchez and the People. The court advised 

Sanchez’s counsel that, since the “statutory language has now 

changed,” counsel should “present any and all evidence that you 

have with regard to [section] 1170,” including “the psychological, 

physical or childhood trauma, for instance, abuse, neglect, 

exploitation, sexual violence, et cetera.”
5

Sanchez’s sentencing memorandum asked the court to 

impose a sentence of probation and order him to participate in a 

substance abuse program, based on his substance abuse issues 

and traumatic childhood. Sanchez described his “turbulent 

family life, wherein his father would physically and verbally 

abuse his mother. . . . [Sanchez] acted as a human shield to 

protect his mother and siblings from his father’s drunken rage. 

He would take the blows for them from a very young age.” 

Sanchez stated that the trauma he suffered from this experience

was “[t]he primary reason” for his substance abuse.

The People’s sentencing memorandum requested an upper

term prison sentence on the burglary count, based on “the 

numerous factors in aggravation.”

The trial court sentenced Sanchez on July 28, 2022. The 

court first discussed Sanchez’s criminal history and his history of 

violating domestic violence court orders. It stated that Sanchez 

“shows a very clear history of . . . not following the rules, [and] 

disregarding all laws.” The court observed Sanchez “had three 

DV victims in his past.”

Sanchez addressed the court, explaining his “rough 

childhood” and “my stepdad beating my mom and beating me up, 

showing me . . . bad things, like drinking [and] drugs.” His 

counsel argued that “[Sanchez] had a lot of issues in his life 

stemming from a traumatic childhood as well as drug and alcohol 

abuse.”

After hearing from Sanchez and his counsel, the court 

addressed mitigating factors. The court stated: “Pursuant to 

statute 1170, et seq., the Court must consider the rearing of the 

defendant and any and all childhood traumatic experiences that 

may have impacted him. Here, the defendant points out the 
6

beatings he received as a child from his father.” The court 

observed, “[Sanchez] has adopted what he learned from his 

family rearing. . . . Rather than helping people and protecting the 

women, he takes part in the wrongdoing to others, to women, to 

his family[.]”

The court further noted Sanchez had completed several 

rehabilitative programs while incarcerated. But the court also 

observed Sanchez was “still contacting the victim” as recently as 

June 2022, and Sanchez had already received rehabilitative 

programs after his previous convictions. The court remarked, “I 

have to focus on the conduct of the incident, as well.” And the 

court further stated: “I understood you grew up in a really bad 

situation. Unfortunately, a lot of us do. The difference is you’re 

going to make that choice whether you’re going to do the right 

thing or not. You chose to do the wrong.”

The court concluded: 

[T]he aggravating factors were found true beyond a 

reasonable doubt by stipulation and admission.

Pursuant to the People’s brief on pages 4 and 5, the 

Court finds that the defendant is a public safety 

concern and a public safety issue, thereby complying 

with [section] 1170 in that I have found that the 

childhood trauma is true but that the defendant is a 

public safety concern. And the aggravating factors 

have been found true permitting this Court to 

consider all triad options.

However, because the defendant has never served in 

state prison, in addition to the mitigating factors, the 

Court shall sentence to the mid-term of 4 years. I 

will not take the high term.
7

Sanchez received a total sentence of five years and two 

months, including consecutive terms of eight months for violating 

a court order with a prior domestic violence conviction and six 

months on the battery count. 

Sanchez timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

Sanchez’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court 

abused its sentencing discretion under the recent amendments to 

section 1170, subdivision (b).

A. Legal Background and Standard of Review

“Section 1170, subdivision (b) governs imposition of a 

judgment of imprisonment when a statute specifies three possible 

terms.” (People v. Suazo (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 681, 704.) 

Through Senate Bill No. 567 and Assembly Bill No. 124, effective 

January 1, 2022, the Legislature amended section 1170, 

subdivision (b), “in several fundamental ways.” (People v. Flores

(2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1038.) These amendments took 

effect approximately eight months before Sanchez’s sentencing.

As relevant here, “the new statute creates a presumption 

that the sentencing court ‘shall’ enter a lower term sentence 

when, among other things, a ‘psychological, physical, or childhood 

trauma’ contributed to the offense. [Citation.] The sentencing

court may only depart from this lower term presumption if it 

finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating 

circumstances such that the lower term would be contrary to ‘the 

interests of justice.’” (People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 

419 (Salazar), quoting § 1170, subd. (b)(6) & (b)(6)(A).)
8

“Discretionary sentencing decisions, such as whether ‘the 

aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating 

circumstances [so] that imposition of the lower term would be 

contrary to the interests of justice’ (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)) are 

reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” (Salazar, supra, 15 Cal.5th

at p. 428, fn. 8; accord, People v. Hilburn (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 

189, 205 (Hilburn).) A sentencing court must exercise “‘“informed 

discretion”’” and abuses its discretion when it misunderstands 

“‘the scope of its discretionary powers.’” (People v. Gutierrez

(2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391.) “‘To prove an abuse of discretion, 

“‘[t]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly 

show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary.’”’” 

(People v. Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 988.)

B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Sentencing 

Sanchez to the Middle Term

Appellate courts generally “presume that the [trial] court 

‘knows and applies the correct statutory and case law.’” 

(People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 361.) Sanchez concedes 

this general principle, but argues the trial court misunderstood 

and therefore abused its sentencing discretion under 

section 1170, subdivision (b)(6). He asserts the trial court was 

required to apply a presumption of the lower term sentence 

because his childhood trauma was a contributing factor in his 

offense and the court “never mentioned the low term 

presumption.”

As a threshold matter, Sanchez did not argue in his written 

sentencing memorandum or oral arguments presented to the trial 

court that the lower term presumption applied to his sentence. 

“Generally, if a party does not object to the sentence in the trial 
9

court,” that party “may not claim on appeal the trial court failed 

to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing 

choices.” (People v. Tilley (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 772, 778 (Tilley)

[defendant forfeited claim to the lower term presumption because 

he “did not seek the lower term based on section 1170, 

subdivision (b)(6) [or] object to the imposition of the middle 

term”]; accord, People v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 730-731; 

cf. People v. Panozo (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 825, 840 [forfeiture 

does not apply where a defendant challenges a sentencing court’s 

“apparent misapprehension of statutory sentencing obligations”].) 

But even considering Sanchez’s argument on the merits, we 

conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Sanchez 

relies on People v. Lee (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 861 (Lee) and argues 

the record “‘affirmatively demonstrate[s]’” that the trial court 

misunderstood its discretion. (See id. at p. 866.) In Lee, the trial 

court expressly stated it lacked discretion to reduce a wobbler to 

a misdemeanor when the court actually had such discretion 

under section 17, subdivision (b). (See id. at pp. 867-869.) Lee 

does not support Sanchez.

The record before us does not “affirmatively demonstrate” 

that the trial court was unaware of its new discretion under 

section 1170, subdivision (b). (See Lee, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 866.) Unlike the trial court in Lee, the trial court here did not 

misunderstand its sentencing authority under section 1170. 

Although the court did not expressly refer to the lower term

presumption in section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), the record before 

us clearly reflects the court conducted its sentencing in 

conformity with the statute and the presumption. 
10

The court first determined that Sanchez had suffered 

childhood trauma, and it discussed how this experience 

contributed to Sanchez’s offenses. The court then balanced the 

six aggravating factors against the mitigating factor of Sanchez’s 

childhood trauma and concluded that the aggravating factors 

supported a middle term sentence. In ruling that Sanchez

presented “a public safety concern,” the court examined the 

aggravating factor under rule 4.421(b)(1) that Sanchez’s conduct 

“indicates a serious danger to society,” citing the portion of the 

People’s sentencing memorandum addressing this factor.

The court also demonstrated an understanding of how the 

lower term presumption applied to Sanchez’s case, explaining

that its middle term sentence “compl[ied] with [section] 1170 in 

that I have found that the childhood trauma is true but that the 

defendant is a public safety concern.” With this statement, the 

court recognized Sanchez’s childhood trauma was “true” and 

connected to his offenses, which would warrant a lower term

sentence under section 1170’s statutory presumption. But the

court ultimately found the aggravating factors overcame the 

presumption, and imposed a middle term sentence in accordance 

with section 1170.

Because the court determined that Sanchez experienced

childhood trauma, examined the trauma’s connection to his 

offenses, and then carefully weighed the aggravating and 

mitigating factors, the court did not abuse its discretion by 

selecting a middle term sentence. (See Salazar, supra, 15 Cal.5th 

at p. 428, fn. 8 [observing a court would not abuse its “broad 

sentencing discretion” by imposing a middle term or lower term

sentence after weighing aggravating circumstances against the 

mitigating circumstance of childhood trauma]; Hilburn, supra,
11

93 Cal.App.5th at p. 206 [court did not abuse its sentencing 

discretion where “the record establishes the court carefully 

considered the relevant aggravating and mitigating 

circumstances” and determined the aggravating factors 

warranted the middle term].) In other words, the court did not 

abuse its discretion by declining to impose the lower term

sentence because in its assessment, the six aggravating factors 

that Sanchez stipulated to outweighed the mitigating factors, 

effectively rebutting the presumption. 

Sanchez further argues the trial court erred by “seemingly 

us[ing] [his] childhood trauma to justify selecting the mid-term.” 

Sanchez cites the court’s remark that experiencing “poverty,” 

“physical abuse,” and “substance use” as a child “should have 

shown [Sanchez] right from wrong.” The court did not improperly

consider Sanchez’s childhood trauma. The court acknowledged 

Sanchez “grew up in a really bad situation” and stated “he wasn’t 

given [a] chance when he was just a child.” But, despite this

childhood trauma, the court concluded Sanchez “knew” his 

conduct “was wrong” and “the conduct of the incident” shows “a 

complete lack of thought process” and “maturity.” Under these 

circumstances, the court’s consideration of the circumstances of 

the offense alongside Sanchez’s childhood trauma was not an 

abuse of discretion. (See Hilburn, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 206

[no abuse of discretion where court considered mitigating 

circumstance of youth and “the circumstances of the crime 

itself”].)3

3 Sanchez further argues he received ineffective assistance of 

counsel because his attorney “never specifically argued that the 

low term presumption under the newly amended section 1170 
12

DISPOSITION

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

MARTINEZ, P. J.

We concur:

SEGAL, J. 

FEUER, J.

applied.” He requests that, if we find his argument forfeited, we 

consider whether his attorney was ineffective. Since we 

addressed Sanchez’s argument on its merits, we need not 

consider his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.