a

GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Honorable Tom Daschle, 

U.S. Senate

July 2002 FOOT AND MOUTH 

DISEASE

To Protect U.S. 

Livestock, USDA Must 

Remain Vigilant and 

Resolve Outstanding 

Issues

GAO-02-808

Page i GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

Contents

Letter 1

Executive Summary 2

Purpose 2

Background 3

Results in Brief 3

Principal Findings 6

Recommendations for Executive Action 11

Agency Comments 11

Chapter 1

Introduction

12

FMD Is a Highly Contagious Animal Disease 12

Incidence of FMD Worldwide Is Extensive 15

International Community Has Guidelines to Control and Eradicate 

FMD 18

An FMD Outbreak Can Cost Billions of Dollars 19

Social Impacts of an Outbreak Can Be Significant 21

USDA Is Responsible for Protecting U.S. Livestock From FMD and 

Other Animal Diseases 22

U.S. Customs Service Supports USDA’s Efforts at Ports of Entry 24

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 24

Chapter 2

USDA Has Adequate 

Processes to Obtain 

Information on Foreign 

FMD Outbreaks, but 

Dissemination to 

Customs Can Be 

Improved

27

USDA Obtains Information on Foreign FMD Outbreaks from 

Multiple Sources 27

USDA Lacks a Formal Process to Ensure Dissemination of FMD 

Information to Customs 29

Conclusions 33

Recommendations for Executive Action 34
Contents

Page ii GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

Chapter 3

U.S. Measures to 

Prevent FMD Are 

Generally Comparable 

to Other Countries, but 

Complete Protection 

May Be Infeasible

35

USDA’s Efforts to Control and Eradicate FMD in Other Countries 

Help Reduce the Risk to U.S. Livestock 35

Despite U.S. Preventive Measures at Ports of Entry, Vulnerability to 

FMD Remains 37

U.S. Preventive Measures Are Comparable to Those Used by Other 

Countries 46

Conclusions 51

Recommendation for Executive Action 52

Agency Comments 52

Chapter 4

Despite Preparation 

Efforts, the United 

States Will Face 

Challenges in 

Responding Quickly 

and Effectively to an 

FMD Outbreak

53

The Federal Government and Many States Have Developed and 

Tested Emergency Response Plans 53

Serious Challenges to an Effective U.S. Response Are Yet to Be 

Resolved 56

Conclusions 68

Recommendation for Executive Action 68

Appendixes

Appendix I: Countries Considered FMD-Free by the United States 69

Appendix II: Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into 

Canada 71

Appendix III: Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into 

Mexico 80
Contents

Page iii GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

Appendix IV: Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into the 

United Kingdom 87

Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Department of Agriculture 96

Appendix VI: Comments from the U.S. Customs Service 100

Appendix VII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 101

Tables Table 1: Survival Time of the FMD Virus in Selected Products and 

By-Products 14

Table 2: Key USDA Information Dissemination Actions Taken After 

the 2001 Outbreak of FMD in the United Kingdom 31

Table 3: Volume/Numbers of Passengers, Vehicles, and Cargo 

Entering the United States, Inspected by APHIS and 

Resulting in Seized Products, Fiscal Year 2001 45

Table 4: Agriculture-Related Questions on the Prior and Revised 

U.S. Declaration Forms 51

Figures Figure 1: Worldwide Incidence of FMD, 1992 through 2002 15

Figure 2: Worldwide Incidence of Four Types of FMD, 1990 through 

2002 17

Figure 3: U.S. FMD Signs Posted at Ports of Entry 49

Figure 4: Canadian and Mexican FMD Signs Posted at Ports of 

Entry 50

Figure 5: Disposal of Animal Carcasses by Burial in the United 

Kingdom 65

Figure 6: Disposal of Animal Carcasses by Incineration in the 

United Kingdom 66

Abbreviations

APHIS Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

BSE bovine spongiform encephalopathy

CCRA Canada Customs and Revenue Agency

CFIA Canadian Food Inspection Agency

DEFRA Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs

FAS Foreign Agricultural Service

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
Contents

Page iv GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

FMD foot and mouth disease

FSIS Food Safety and Inspection Service

GAO General Accounting Office

NAHEMS National Animal Health Emergency Management System

OIE Office International des Epizooties

pH potential of hydrogen

SAGARPA Secretaria de Agricultura, Ganaderia, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y 

Alimentaction

USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture

WTO World Trade Organization
United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

Page 1 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

A

July 26, 2002 Letr

The Honorable Tom Daschle

United States Senate

Dear Senator Daschle:

As requested, we are reporting on the United States’ ability to prevent the introduction of foot and 

mouth disease. This report contains recommendations to the U.S. Department of Agriculture on the 

need to develop a process to expeditiously communicate information on foreign disease outbreaks to 

the Customs Service, improve some of the preventive measures used in the United States, and 

develop plans and timetables to address any outstanding issues that could impede a U.S. response.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further 

distribution of this report until 30 days from the date of this letter. We will then send copies to other 

appropriate congressional committees; the Secretary of Agriculture; the Commissioner of Customs; 

and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others 

upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please call me at (202) 512-3841. Key 

contributors to this report are listed in appendix VII.

Sincerely yours,

Lawrence J. Dyckman

Director, Natural Resources

and Environment
Page 2 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

Executive Summary

Purpose The 2001 outbreak of foot and mouth disease (FMD) in the United Kingdom 

decisively illustrated the devastation that this highly contagious animal 

disease can cause to a nation’s livestock industry and other sectors of the 

economy. By the time the disease was eradicated, about 8 months later, the 

United Kingdom had slaughtered over 4 million animals to control the 

disease, and sustained losses of over $5 billion in the food and agricultural 

sectors, as well as comparable losses to its tourism industry. Before 2001, 

the United Kingdom had been FMD-free for almost 34 years; following the 

outbreak, the country was, until recently, generally restricted from 

participating in the international trade of live animals, and animal and other 

products that could transmit the FMD virus.

The United States is an FMD-free nation and has not had an outbreak of the 

disease since 1929. In 2001, the U.S. livestock and poultry sector was 

valued at $100 billion. Because of the importance of the livestock industry 

to the U.S. agricultural sector and economy, protecting U.S. livestock from 

FMD and other animal diseases not present in the United States (foreign 

animal diseases) is an important responsibility for the U.S. Department of 

Agriculture (USDA). Senator Tom Daschle asked GAO to determine 

whether (1) U.S. processes to obtain and disseminate information on 

foreign FMD outbreaks are adequate, (2) U.S. measures for preventing 

FMD from entering the United States are effective and comparable with 

those of other selected countries, and (3) the United States could respond 

quickly and effectively to an outbreak of FMD, if it were to occur.

To respond to this request, GAO, among other things, visited seaports, 

airports, and international mail-processing facilities in New Jersey, 

Maryland, Texas, and Virginia. GAO also visited federal inspection stations 

on the U.S.-Canadian and U.S.-Mexican borders to observe inspection 

procedures for livestock imports and met with government officials in 

these countries who are responsible for protecting their nation’s livestock 

from FMD. GAO also interviewed state veterinarians in six states that are 

major producers of U.S. livestock, and international passengers and U.S. 

veterinarians who were in the United Kingdom during the outbreak. In 

addition, GAO reviewed and summarized legislation, regulations, and 

publicly available documents on the measures used by the European Union 

and the United Kingdom to prevent the introduction of FMD. (See chapter 

1 for a detailed description of GAO’s scope and methodology.)
Executive Summary

Page 3 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

Background FMD is a highly contagious viral disease of cloven-hoofed animals such as 

cattle, swine, and sheep. Infected animals develop a fever and blisters on 

their tongue, lips, and between their hooves. Many animals recover from 

an FMD infection, but the disease leaves them debilitated and causes 

severe losses in meat and milk production. FMD does not have human 

health implications.

Animals, people, or any materials that bring the virus into contact with 

susceptible animals can spread FMD. FMD is a hardy virus, and in the right 

environmental conditions can persist in contaminated items, such as soil 

and manure, for weeks or months. Only about 40 percent of countries 

worldwide are considered FMD-free, but all three North American 

countries are FMD-free.

USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) is responsible 

for protecting U.S. livestock from the introduction of foreign animal 

diseases such as FMD. In fulfilling its responsibilities, APHIS conducts 

activities to exclude animal disease, detect and eradicate it, and educate 

the public about it. APHIS inspectors are present at 144 U.S. ports of entry, 

as well as in some foreign countries, to help ensure the safety of 

international cargo, passengers, and mail. According to USDA, this 

includes all major U.S. ports.

In an effort to keep U.S. animals free of foreign animal diseases, the U.S. 

Customs Service (Customs) is an important federal partner, supporting 

USDA’s activities at each of the 301 ports of entry into the United States. 

Customs is the first line of defense at U.S. ports against the entry of 

prohibited and illegal items, particularly when the port does not have 

APHIS personnel. 

Results in Brief The United States has adequate processes for obtaining information on 

foreign FMD outbreaks and providing USDA agencies and others with this 

information, but it does not have adequate processes for sharing this 

information with Customs. The United States receives information on 

FMD outbreaks from USDA officials stationed in foreign countries, 

international agricultural and animal health organizations, and foreign 

governments directly. In particular, USDA has animal health experts 

stationed in 27 countries and agriculture trade officials stationed in 129 

countries. These officials collect a wide array of agricultural and animal 

health information about the countries and regions in which they are 
Executive Summary

Page 4 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

stationed, which allows the United States to have access to information on 

foreign FMD outbreaks in a timely manner. However, USDA’s processes for 

disseminating information on foreign FMD outbreaks are uneven. For 

example, after receiving official notification from the United Kingdom on 

February 21, 2001, about the presence of FMD in that country, USDA 

immediately alerted its relevant agencies in Washington, D.C., and their 

field locations, and during the month of March provided the public, 

industry, state and local governments, and private veterinarians with 

information and guidance about FMD prevention. But USDA has no formal 

process for providing Customs with information. As a result, Customs 

inspectors at U.S. ports of entry did not receive uniform information or 

guidance on FMD prevention activities after the U.K. outbreak. Customs 

received this information only after formally requesting it from the 

Administrator of APHIS—over a month after the United Kingdom’s 

notification. During this interval, many Customs inspectors said they felt ill 

equipped to adequately process international cargo and passengers at U.S. 

ports of entry. While USDA has taken an interim step to improve 

notification to Customs about foreign FMD outbreaks, GAO is 

recommending further improvements to establish a more permanent 

solution and ensure that Customs has clear procedures for handling 

passengers and cargo from countries affected by FMD.

U.S. measures to prevent the introduction of FMD are comparable to those 

used by other countries and have kept the United States free of the disease 

for almost 75 years. Nevertheless, because of the nature of the disease and 

the risk inherent in the ever-increasing volume of international travel and 

trade, U.S. livestock remains vulnerable to the disease. USDA has a twopronged approach to prevent FMD from reaching U.S. livestock. 

• USDA tries to keep FMD as far as possible from U.S. borders by helping 

other countries control and eradicate the disease. For example, USDA 

supports programs in Colombia and Panama to create an FMD-free 

buffer zone between North and Central America, which are FMD-free, 

and South America, which is not.

• USDA has developed and implemented specific preventive measures at 

ports of entry to ensure that international cargo, animals, passengers, 

and mail do not bring the disease into the United States. For example, in 

response to the outbreak in the United Kingdom, USDA immediately 

prohibited imports of susceptible animal products from the United 

Kingdom, including those shipped 3 weeks prior to the date of official 

notification of the outbreak. This prohibition remained in effect until 
Executive Summary

Page 5 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

USDA reassessed the United Kingdom’s animal disease status and 

determined the products for which trade could safely resume. Similarly, 

at airports, USDA uses signs and inspectors, among other things, to 

ensure that international passengers do not inadvertently bring items 

into the country that could carry the FMD virus.

However, these and other efforts cannot completely eliminate the 

vulnerability of U.S. livestock because (1) some level of risk is inherent in 

international travel and trade, (2) FMD is a hardy virus that may remain 

viable for days or even weeks on shoes and in hay or certain meat and dairy 

products, and (3) the volume of legal and illegal international trade and 

passengers entering the United States makes it impossible for U.S. 

inspectors to inspect and ensure the safety of every shipment, baggage, or 

person entering the country. Furthermore, although the preventive 

measures the United States, Canada, and Mexico have implemented are 

similar, these other countries’ implementation measures suggest 

opportunities for USDA to improve its preventive measures. For example, 

all three countries use signs at airports to alert passengers about FMD and 

the need to keep it out of the country. However, the Canadian and Mexican 

signs are much more noticeable because they are larger, bolder, and more 

colorful. GAO is recommending that USDA revise its signs to improve their 

effectiveness.

In the event of an FMD outbreak, the United States will face a number of 

challenges in mounting an effective and quick response, even though USDA 

and many states have developed and tested emergency animal disease 

response plans. For example, a high level of cooperation, coordination, 

and communication between state and federal agencies and between 

federal agencies is critical to an effective response. While USDA is making 

improvements in these areas, there is a wide variance between the states. 

Similarly, an effective response will require an adequate infrastructure, 

including a massive commitment of manpower and laboratory resources. 

USDA has developed agreements with other federal agencies, such as the 

Department of Defense and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, 

to leverage additional resources. However, gaps remain. For example, it is 

unclear how USDA will obtain the 1,200 additional veterinarians trained in 

responding to foreign animal diseases that it estimates the nation will need 

to respond to an FMD outbreak. Furthermore, several issues relating to 

animal identification, disposal, and indemnification have not yet been 

addressed. For example, the United States does not have a system to 

identify and track animal movements in the event of an outbreak, and it is 

unclear how this information would be gathered in a timely manner. USDA 
Executive Summary

Page 6 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

currently has several efforts under way to resolve these issues. However, 

the effectiveness and speed of a U.S. response may be compromised if 

these issues are not fully addressed and resolved before an FMD outbreak 

occurs. GAO is recommending that USDA develop plans with interim and 

final milestones to ensure that these issues are addressed in a timely 

fashion.

Principal Findings

USDA Has Adequate 

Processes to Obtain 

Information on Foreign 

FMD Outbreaks but Can 

Improve Dissemination to 

Customs

USDA receives information about the incidence of foreign animal diseases, 

including FMD, from a variety of sources. These include USDA’s network 

of staff stationed in foreign countries, international animal health and trade 

organizations, and the governments of affected nations. However, the 

usefulness of the information on foreign FMD outbreaks depends on a 

foreign country’s willingness to provide accurate information in a timely 

fashion. For example, in 2001, Argentine officials did not acknowledge that 

some regions of their country had been affected with FMD, although 

unconfirmed reports indicated that the disease had been present for 

several months, according to USDA officials. USDA was unable to take 

official action to prohibit FMD-susceptible products from Argentina until it 

received an official notification of the outbreak or obtained verifiable 

scientific evidence that FMD was present in Argentina.

APHIS has primary responsibility for sharing information obtained about 

foreign FMD outbreaks with other agencies within USDA, Customs, state 

governments, affected industries, and the public. These entities all need 

current information about potential FMD outbreaks because they all play 

an important role in preventing or responding to an outbreak. While APHIS 

immediately alerts USDA agencies and others, it has no formal process or 

defined procedures to distribute information on foreign FMD outbreaks to 

Customs. For example, after the U.K. outbreak, APHIS did not inform 

Customs about its decisions to prohibit or restrict certain products or more 

vigilantly screen passengers arriving at U.S. ports of entry from the United 

Kingdom. Until the Acting Commissioner of Customs formally requested 

this information in writing from the Administrator of APHIS, Customs did 

not receive any official guidance on general inspection measures for 

passengers and products. According to a Customs memorandum and 

officials we spoke to, many Customs field inspectors felt ill equipped to 

adequately process international cargo and passengers at ports of entry 
Executive Summary

Page 7 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

during the initial stages of the U.K. outbreak. Moreover, according to 

Customs officials, these inspectors are not animal disease specialists, and 

therefore need clear, nontechnical procedures to help them process 

international passengers and their luggage, especially at those ports where 

there is no APHIS presence. According to an APHIS official, although 

Customs had not been included on the FMD alert distribution list in the 

past, a Customs official has now been added to the list and will receive 

future alerts about foreign FMD outbreaks. This is a good interim step, 

however, GAO does not believe that it completely addresses the need for 

formal and well-defined communication procedures and protocols between 

APHIS and Customs. 

U.S. Preventive Measures 

Are Comparable to Those of 

Other Countries, but 

Providing Complete 

Protection May Be 

Infeasible 

The United States seeks to prevent an FMD outbreak by supporting various 

programs to control and eradicate the disease overseas and by screening 

livestock, animal and other products, and passengers at the nation’s ports 

of entry. By helping other nations eradicate or control FMD outbreaks, 

USDA reduces the potential for the disease to reach U.S. borders. For 

example, in North America, U.S. efforts to eradicate and control FMD have 

largely focused on Mexico because of the shared border and the possible 

threat that the FMD virus could move overland from South America, where 

the disease is endemic in several countries. USDA helped Mexico eradicate 

FMD in 1954 and continues to help ensure that Mexico remains disease 

free. Similarly, USDA programs have helped create FMD-free zones in 

Colombia and Panama. These zones will help alert countries in both 

Central and North America about the potential incursion of FMD from the 

south. Also, when other countries have an outbreak, USDA may provide 

support by sending U.S. veterinarians to help control and eradicate the 

disease. For example, a total of about 327 U.S. animal health professionals, 

including over 300 veterinarians, helped eradicate the 2001 outbreak in the 

United Kingdom.

USDA has also identified key pathways by which the FMD virus could enter 

the United States and has implemented measures to prevent potentially 

infected animals or products from entering the country. For example, 

USDA allows imported livestock only from countries that are free of FMD 

and other diseases of concern, when they are accompanied by appropriate 

import permits and health certificates and may subject these animals to 

quarantine. Furthermore, if a country has an FMD outbreak, USDA 

prohibits the importation of all susceptible products shipped 3 weeks prior 

to the date of official notification of the outbreak. This prohibition remains 

in effect until USDA has reassessed the disease status of the affected 
Executive Summary

Page 8 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

country and determined the level of trade that can resume. Moreover, 

USDA restricts imports of animal products from FMD-affected countries to 

those that have been processed in such a manner that they inactivate the 

virus and do not present a risk to U.S. livestock. In contrast, other 

products, such as hay used for feed or bedding, fresh meat, and some dairy 

products, are completely prohibited. Similarly, USDA has preventive 

measures for international passengers and their luggage, garbage from 

international ships and airplanes, and military personnel and equipment 

returning from overseas to ensure that they are not carrying the virus into 

the country.

USDA officials and some animal health experts believe that the United 

States’ almost 75-year disease-free status is a measure of the success of the 

department’s efforts to keep FMD out of the country. At the same time, 

these officials are also concerned that, because of the level of risk inherent 

in international trade and travel, no set of measures can ever completely 

eliminate the possibility that FMD will enter the United States. Moreover, 

these experts believe that U.S. vulnerability to an outbreak remains 

because (1) FMD is a hardy virus that can enter the country on a variety of 

animate and inanimate products and (2) the magnitude and volume of 

international passengers, mail, and products entering the United States 

creates an enormous inspection challenge for USDA and other federal 

agencies. According to USDA, it would take only one contaminated 

product coming into contact with one susceptible U.S. animal to start a 

nationwide outbreak.

Other countries face similar challenges in protecting their livestock from 

FMD. Canada, Mexico, and the United Kingdom generally use measures 

that are comparable to U.S. measures to ensure that imports of livestock 

and animal products, international mail, and garbage from international 

carriers do not present an FMD risk. However, the countries have 

implemented measures differently for international passengers. For 

example, while Canada and Mexico use disinfectant mats at ports of entry, 

the United States does not. According to USDA officials, the United States 

does not use disinfectant mats because research indicates that their use 

may cause the virus to spread. Also, while all three countries use signs at 

international airports to alert and inform passengers about the risks of 

FMD, the U.S. signs are not as noticeable as the signs used in Canada and 

Mexico. While GAO recognizes that there is a cost to developing new signs, 

more effective signs may help improve U.S. preventive measures for 

international passengers.
Executive Summary

Page 9 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

Despite Preparation Efforts, 

Serious Challenges to an 

Effective U.S. Response Are 

Yet to Be Resolved

If FMD enters the United States despite USDA’s preventive measures, the 

nation’s ability to identify, control, contain, and eradicate the disease 

quickly and effectively becomes paramount. Recognizing the importance 

of an effective response, USDA and many states have developed emergency 

response plans that establish a framework for the key elements necessary 

for a rapid and successful U.S. response and eradication program. These 

plans have been tested, to some extent, by federal and state agencies to 

determine their effectiveness. Planning and testing exercises have also 

identified the following challenges, which could ultimately impede an 

effective and timely U.S. response if they are not resolved before an FMD 

outbreak occurs:

• Ensuring the rapid identification and reporting of an FMD incident. 

A timely response depends on having livestock producers and private 

veterinarians quickly identify and report suspicious symptoms to state 

and federal officials. If they do not, FMD could become out of control 

before the federal and state governments initiate any action. Several 

federal and state animal health officials expressed concern about how 

quickly disease identification and reporting would actually occur in the 

United States. According to USDA officials, the U.K. outbreak helped 

raise general awareness among state officials, private veterinarians, and 

livestock producers about the risks and potential of an FMD outbreak in 

the United States. Consequently, in 2001, USDA and the states increased 

their efforts to inform the livestock industry about the risks and 

symptoms of FMD. The challenge to USDA will be to maintain this 

heightened awareness about FMD, now that the immediate risk from the 

United Kingdom has subsided.

• Enhancing cooperation, coordination, and communication between 

federal, state, and local agencies, private veterinarians, and the 

industry. Recent planning efforts and testing exercises have started the 

process of establishing greater coordination and improving the level of 

cooperation and communication between all levels. However, these 

efforts have also identified gaps in these areas, and according to state 

officials, the level of cooperation, coordination, and communication 

between state officials and their federal counterparts vary across states. 

To help address these gaps, USDA is working with other organizations, 

such as the National Emergency Management Association, and is 

providing funds to help states improve their planning for animal 

emergencies.
Executive Summary

Page 10 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

• Developing an adequate response infrastructure to outbreaks of 

animal disease. An effective response to an FMD outbreak depends on 

an adequate infrastructure, which should include a national emergency 

management control and command center, technical and other 

personnel, transportation and disposal equipment, and laboratory 

facilities and testing capacity. While details for some of these 

components have been developed, others are not yet fully resolved. For 

example, USDA, in partnership with the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency, has set up a mechanism that will enable it to 

leverage resources for many of the general logistical support activities 

needed to respond to an outbreak. Similarly, USDA’s memorandum of 

understanding with the Department of Defense will help provide needed 

military personnel and equipment to support a response effort. 

However, it is not yet clear how the United States will fill the shortage of 

at least 1,200 specially trained veterinarians or the laboratory testing 

and diagnostic capacity that USDA estimates is needed to respond to an 

animal health emergency. 

• Establishing methods to identify and dispose of animals, and 

indemnify livestock producers. The effectiveness of a U.S. response to 

an FMD outbreak will require an animal identification and tracking 

system that will allow responders to quickly identify, control, and 

slaughter infected and exposed animals, as well as clear animal disposal 

and indemnification policies. Recognizing the importance of an animal 

identification and tracking system, USDA began planning for it in 1999. 

However, until recently, the livestock industry has resisted the concept 

because of the costs involved and the potential for the unauthorized 

disclosure of proprietary information, according to USDA officials. 

Similarly, USDA has determined that burial, incineration, and rendering 

are the preferred methods for disposing of animal carcasses. However, 

according to federal and state officials, each of these disposal methods 

presents significant implementation challenges that have not yet been 

fully considered, such as the potential to spread the disease if on-farm 

disposal is not feasible, the potential to cause groundwater 

contamination or air pollution, high cost, and concerns about public 

perception. Finally, delays could occur during an FMD eradication 

effort, because producers—fearing that they might not be adequately 

compensated for the fair market value of destroyed animals, products, 

and materials as well as cleaning and disinfecting costs—may not 

cooperate with responders. To address this concern, USDA published a 

proposed rule on May 1, 2002, amending its FMD-related regulations 
Executive Summary

Page 11 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

that clarify how indemnity and compensation issues will be handled 

during an outbreak.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

GAO recommends that USDA collaborate with Customs to develop (1) a 

formal process to disseminate updated information on foreign FMD 

outbreaks to Customs inspectors at ports of entry and (2) nontechnical 

procedures that these inspectors can use to screen cargo and passengers 

from FMD-affected countries. GAO also recommends that USDA consider 

better signs for ports of entry to help ensure that international passengers 

do not inadvertently bring FMD into the United States. Finally, GAO 

recommends that USDA develop a plan and related milestones to address 

the outstanding issues that could compromise an effective and rapid U.S. 

response.

Agency Comments We provided Customs and USDA with a draft of this report for review and 

comment. Customs had no comments on the report. USDA stated that the 

report was generally accurate and insightful, and provided a number of 

meritorious recommendations. USDA also noted that the report provided 

an accurate portrayal of the challenges that face the continuum of federal, 

state, and industry resources dedicated to safeguarding the health of U.S. 

agriculture. USDA agreed with the report’s conclusion that because of the 

enormous volume of international travel and trade, there is no way to 

ensure zero risk of disease introduction. However, USDA also believes that 

the short- and long-term measures that it is taking to enhance prevention, 

surveillance, emergency preparedness, and coordination with other 

federal, state, and industry organizations is providing a much-needed boost 

to the United States’ overall safeguarding infrastructure. At the same time, 

USDA agreed that it would continue to look critically at the effectiveness of 

its efforts and make whatever changes are warranted. 

USDA’s and Customs’ written comments are presented in appendix V and 

VI, respectively. USDA’s comments include additional information on the 

department’s recent and other ongoing efforts to enhance the United 

States’ ability to prevent and respond to an FMD outbreak in the areas of 

(1) resources and infrastructure, (2) prevention and control measures, and 

(3) communications and outreach. We have included this information and 

the additional technical comments that USDA provided us with throughout 

the report as appropriate. 
Page 12 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

Chapter 1

Introduction Chapte1r

Foot and mouth disease (FMD) is one of the most devastating viral animal 

diseases affecting cloven-hoofed animals such as cattle and swine, and has 

occurred in most countries of the world at some point during the last 

century. Although the disease has no human-health implications, it can 

have enormous economic and social consequences, as recent outbreaks in 

the United Kingdom and Taiwan have demonstrated. These consequences 

occur because the international community values products from countries 

that are FMD-free and generally restricts international trade in FMDsusceptible products from countries affected by an outbreak. Most FMDaffected countries, therefore, take whatever measures necessary to regain 

their FMD-free status as quickly as possible. In the United States, the U.S. 

Department of Agriculture (USDA) has primary responsibility for 

protecting domestic livestock from animal diseases such as FMD. The U.S. 

Customs Service supports USDA in these efforts. 

FMD Is a Highly 

Contagious Animal 

Disease

FMD—a highly contagious viral disease affecting primarily cloven-hoofed 

animals, such as cattle, sheep, swine, and goats—has 7 types and over 80 

subtypes. Immunity to, or vaccination for, one type of the virus does not 

protect animals against infection from the other types. FMD-infected 

animals usually develop blister-like lesions in the mouth, on the tongue and 

lips, on the teats, or between the hooves, which causes them to salivate 

excessively or become lame. Other symptoms include fever, reduced feed 

consumption, and abortions. Cattle and pigs are very sensitive to the virus 

and show symptoms of the disease after a short incubation period of 3 to 5 

days. The incubation period in sheep is considerably longer, about 10 to 14 

days, and the clinical signs of the disease are usually mild and may be 

masked by other conventional conditions, thereby allowing the disease to 

go unnoticed. The mortality rate for nonadult animals infected with FMD 

varies and depends on the species and strain of the virus; in contrast, adult 

animals usually recover once the disease has run its course. However, 

because the disease leaves them severely debilitated, meat-producing 

animals do not normally regain their lost weight for many months, and 

dairy cows seldom produce milk at their former rate. The disease therefore 

can cause severe losses in the production of meat and milk.

The FMD virus is easily transmitted and spreads rapidly. Prior to and 

during the appearance of clinical signs, infected animals release the virus 

into the environment through respiration, milk, semen, blood, saliva, and 

feces. The virus may become airborne and spread quickly if pigs become 

infected because pigs prolifically produce and excrete large amounts of the 

virus into the air. Animals, people, or materials that are exposed to the 
Chapter 1

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Page 13 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

virus can also spread FMD by bringing it into contact with susceptible 

animals. For example, the virus can spread when susceptible animals 

come in contact with contaminated

• animals;

• animal products, such as meat, milk, hides, skins, and manure;

• transport vehicles and equipment;

• clothes or shoes worn by people; and

• hay, feedstuffs, or veterinary biologics.1

The FMD virus has a remarkable capability for remaining viable for long 

periods of time in a variety of animate and inanimate objects. For example, 

the virus can persist in the human nasal passages for up to 36 hours, 

manure for 1 to 24 weeks, fodder for 1 month, and on shoes for 9 to 14 

weeks. The ability of the virus to persist in the environment and other 

products depends on the temperature and potential of hydrogen (pH) 

conditions.2

 Generally, the virus can survive freezing but cannot survive at 

temperatures above 50° Celsius (122° Farenheit) and at pH levels of less 

than 6, or greater than 9. Table 1 shows the various lengths of time that the 

FMD virus can survive in some selected products.

1

 A veterinary biologic is a product used for diagnosing, preventing, and treating an animal 

disease. These products include vaccines and kits for diagnosing specific animal diseases. 

2

 The pH condition of a product is the measure of its degree of acidity or alkalinity; a value of 

7 is considered neutral while values greater than 7 are considered alkaline and values below 

7 are considered acidic. A high or low pH of a product may inactivate certain viruses, such 

as FMD.
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Table 1: Survival Time of the FMD Virus in Selected Products and By-Products

Legend: N/A=not applicable

Source: Adapted by GAO from USDA information.

FMD can be confused with several similar but less harmful animal diseases 

that also produce blisters and cause animals to salivate, such as vesicular 

stomatitis, bovine viral diarrhea, and foot rot. Two foreign swine diseases 

are also clinically identical to FMD—swine vesicular disease and vesicular 

exanthema of swine. The only way to distinguish between FMD and these 

other diseases is through laboratory analyses of fluid or tissue samples. 

FMD is also sometimes confused with mad cow disease or bovine 

spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). 3 BSE is a fatal, neuro-degenerative 

disease found in cattle in 23 countries around the world. Cattle contract 

the disease through animal feed that contains protein derived from the 

remains of diseased animals. Scientists generally believe that an equally 

fatal disease in humans—known as variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease—is 

linked to eating beef from cattle with BSE. However, unlike mad cow 

disease, FMD has no known human health implications. 

Product or by-product Processing or storage conditions Virus survival time

Bacon Salted 183 days

Bedding (straw and wood shavings) N/A 4 weeks

Buttermilk N/A 14 days

Ham N/A 16 weeks

Hay Ambient temperature Greater than 200 days

Hides or skins Air dried at 20° C 6 weeks

Manure Summer/winter 1 week/24 weeks

Shoes Summer/winter 9 weeks/14 weeks

Soil Summer/winter 3-7 days/21 weeks

Water Ambient temperature 14 weeks

Wool Ambient temperature 20 days

3

 In January 2002, we issued a report on BSE entitled Mad Cow Disease: Improvements in 

the Animal Feed Ban and Other Regulatory Areas Would Strengthen U.S. Prevention 

Efforts, GAO-02-183 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 25, 2002).
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Incidence of FMD 

Worldwide Is 

Extensive

FMD is present in about 60 percent of the countries in the world and 

endemic in many countries in Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and South 

America. The relatively few areas that are considered free of FMD include 

North and Central America, Australia, New Zealand, and the Caribbean. 

Figure 1 shows the presence of FMD worldwide for the period 1992 

through 2002.

Figure 1: Worldwide Incidence of FMD, 1992 through 2002

Source: GAO’s adaptation of information from the Institute for Animal Health (Pirbright Laboratory), 

which is designated the World Reference Laboratory for Foot and Mouth Disease by the Food and 

Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, and the Office International des Epizooties.
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In 2000 and 2001, over 40 countries reported outbreaks of FMD, and during 

the first 5 months of 2002, five countries reported outbreaks. The spread of 

certain strains of the virus also demonstrates how quickly it is spreading 

throughout the world. For example, the FMD virus serotype O, known as 

the Pan-Asia strain, was first identified in northern India in 1990 and was 

subsequently found in Nepal in 1993. It then spread westward into Saudi 

Arabia during 1994 and, subsequently, throughout the Near East and into 

Europe (Thrace region of Turkey, Bulgaria, and Greece) in 1996. The PanAsia strain was also found in Bangladesh in 1996 and in Bhutan in 1998. In 

1999 it was reported in mainland China and then detected in Taiwan. By 

late 1999 and in 2000, it had reached most of Southeast Asia. Most recently, 

the Pan-Asia strain was found in the Republic of Korea, Japan, the 

Primorsky Territory of the Russian Federation, and Mongolia (areas free 

from FMD since 1934, 1908, 1964, and 1973, respectively). The Pan-Asia 

strain is also responsible for the 2001 outbreak of FMD in the United 

Kingdom that subsequently spread to France, Ireland, and the Netherlands. 

Figure 2 shows the incidence of four types of FMD virus worldwide, 

including the type O Pan-Asia strain.
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Figure 2: Worldwide Incidence of Four Types of FMD, 1990 through 2002

Source: GAO’s adaptation of information from the Institute for Animal Health (Pirbright Laboratory), 

which is designated the World Reference Laboratory for Foot and Mouth Disease by the Food and 

Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, and the Office International des Epizooties.

In North America, the last outbreaks of FMD for the United States, Canada, 

and Mexico occurred in 1929, 1952, and 1953, respectively. The United 

States has worked closely with both Canada and Mexico to eradicate FMD 

from North America. 
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International 

Community Has 

Guidelines to Control 

and Eradicate FMD

The Office International des Epizooties (OIE)—an intergovernmental 

organization created in January 1924 by an international agreement signed 

by 28 countries—was established to guarantee the transparency of 

information on the animal disease status of member countries. In addition, 

OIE collects and analyzes veterinary scientific information and 

disseminates it to member countries, provides expertise and promotes 

international solidarity for the control of animal diseases, and guarantees 

the sanitary safety of world trade by developing rules for international 

trade in animals and animal products. In May 2001, OIE had 158 member 

countries.

OIE classifies member countries (or certain zones within these countries) 

as being FMD-free with or without vaccination if they meet certain criteria 

detailed in the OIE International Animal Health Code. For example, to 

obtain FMD-free status without vaccination, a member country should

(1) have a record of prompt animal disease reporting; (2) send a 

declaration that it has been FMD-free and has not used vaccination for 1 

year; (3) present evidence that it has an effective system of surveillance; 

(4) implement regulatory measures for the prevention and control of FMD; 

and (5) provide evidence that no vaccinated animals have been imported 

into the country, since such animals can become the source of future 

infections. Similarly, to obtain FMD-free-with-vaccination status, a country 

should (1) have a record for prompt animal disease reporting, (2) send a 

declaration that there have been no outbreaks of FMD for 2 years, 

(3) provide evidence that the country has effective surveillance systems 

and has implemented necessary regulatory measures to prevent and 

control FMD, (4) provide proof that routine vaccinations are carried out 

and that the vaccines comply with OIE standards, and (5) have an intensive 

and frequent system to detect any viral activity.

When FMD occurs in an FMD-free country or zone where vaccination is not 

practiced, the affected country must reapply after the outbreak to regain its 

FMD-free-without-vaccination status from OIE. OIE standards require a 

country to wait until 3 months after the last reported case of FMD when a 

“stamping out approach” (immediate slaughter of diseased and exposed 

animals with no vaccination) is used to eradicate the disease before the 

country can apply for reinstatement of its FMD-free status. As part of this 

process, surveillance results of laboratory-screening tests (serological 

surveillance results) must be provided to OIE to prove that the disease has 

been eradicated. If vaccination was used to control the outbreak, then the 

country must wait until 3 months after the last vaccinated animal is 
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slaughtered and serological surveillance results prove that the disease has 

been eradicated before reapplying for FMD-free status.

The international community generally places a high value on products 

from countries that are FMD-free without vaccination. Such countries can 

export both live animals and animal products easily to other FMD-free 

countries. In contrast, countries that have an FMD-free-with-vaccination 

status are restricted to trading animal products that can be treated to 

ensure that the virus is inactivated. As a result, most countries that are 

FMD-free without vaccination resort to a stamping out process to eradicate 

the disease if an outbreak occurs. The United Kingdom and Taiwan 

followed this process in 2001 and 1997, respectively. Similarly, if an 

outbreak were to occur in the United States, the current U.S. policy 

requires all infected and exposed animals to be immediately slaughtered 

and disposed of by incineration, burial, or rendering.4

 

In recent years, the international community has been encouraging the 

acceptance of regionalization policies for international trade. 

Regionalization involves declaring one or more areas of a country FMDfree while other areas are responding to an outbreak. Under a 

regionalization policy, in the event of an FMD outbreak in the United 

States, even if one state or area was infected, the nation as a whole might 

not lose its FMD-free status, and trade restrictions might not be enforced 

on all of our FMD-susceptible products.

An FMD Outbreak Can 

Cost Billions of Dollars 

An FMD outbreak could cost the U.S. economy billions of dollars in both 

direct and indirect costs. Direct costs to the government would include the 

costs of disease control and eradication, such as the maintenance of animal 

movement controls, control areas, and intensified border inspections; the 

destruction and disposal of infected animals; vaccines; and compensation 

to producers for the costs of disease containment. However, government 

compensation programs may not cover 100 percent of producers’ costs. As 

a result, direct costs would also occur for disinfection and for the value of 

any slaughtered animals not subject to government compensation. 

According to recent U.K. government estimates, the direct costs for control 

and eradication of the 2001 outbreak was about $4 billion. According to 

several estimates, the direct costs of controlling and eradicating a U.S. 

4

 Rendering is a process that subjects animal tissue to heat or chemicals to separate the fat 

from the protein and mineral components. 
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outbreak of FMD could range up to $24 billion in current dollars, 

depending, among other things, on the extent of the outbreak and the 

control strategy employed.5

 

The value of lost export sales in the event of an FMD outbreak would 

represent a significant portion of the total direct costs to the U.S. economy. 

According to USDA officials, a single case of FMD in the United States 

would cause our trading partners to prohibit U.S. exports of live animals 

and animal products. This ban could result in losses of between $6 billion 

and $10 billion a year while the United States eradicated the disease and 

until it regained disease-free status. These losses may be mitigated to some 

extent by increased domestic sales of meat from disease-free portions of 

the United States that may otherwise have been exported. However, USDA 

officials believe that many people in the United States would refuse to eat 

meat during an FMD outbreak, thus the offset probably would be minimal. 

Indirect costs of an FMD outbreak would include those costs affecting 

consumers, ancillary agricultural industries, and other sectors of the 

economy. For example, if large numbers of animals are destroyed as part 

of a control and eradication effort, then ancillary industries such as meatprocessing facilities and feed suppliers are likely to lose revenue. 

Furthermore, an FMD outbreak would result in adverse effects such as 

unemployment, loss of income (to the extent that government 

compensation does not fully reimburse producers), and decreased 

economic activity, which could ripple through other sectors of the 

economy as well. For example, the loss of agricultural income could result 

in reduced sales of consumer goods. In the United Kingdom, according to 

government estimates, the 2001 outbreak resulted in losses to the tourism 

industry of over $5 billion that were comparable to the losses sustained by 

the food and agriculture sector.

In addition, not only may consumers have to pay higher prices for the 

remaining supply of animal products affected by an FMD outbreak, but the 

price of substitutes is likely to rise, as well. For example, as the price of 

FMD-free meat increases, some consumers are likely to buy poultry or 

other meat substitutes, thus causing the prices of these substitute products 

to rise. However, the higher prices that consumers pay for substitutes do 

5

 Over 4 million animals were slaughtered during the U.K. outbreak to control the disease. 

According to a USDA preliminary estimate, a comparable outbreak in the United States 

could require the destruction of about 13 million animals.
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not result in a net cost to the economy because these higher prices result in 

increased revenues for poultry producers and others.

Social Impacts of an 

Outbreak Can Be 

Significant

An FMD outbreak can have significant social impacts, such as enormous 

psychological damage, especially on families and localities directly 

affected by the outbreak, as the U.K. experience in 2001 illustrates. For 

example, in May 2001, the Welsh Institute of Rural Health found that 

individuals affected by the FMD outbreak experienced a range of 

symptoms, including tearfulness, lack of sleep, loss of appetite, increased 

anger, irritability, and general depression. An increase in marital discord 

was also noted. One general practioner reported that 50 percent of his 

patients affected by the FMD outbreak required antidepressant drugs. 

Some farming families even sent their children away from home during the 

outbreak rather than have them witness the slaughter and disposal of the 

family’s livestock. 

Consumer confidence in the safety of the U.K. food supply was also 

adversely affected by the outbreak. A survey by the United Kingdom’s 

Institute of Grocery Distribution determined that because of the FMD and 

mad cow disease outbreaks, many consumers in the United Kingdom now 

consider meat and dairy products to be unsafe. As a result, these 

consumers have changed their grocery-buying habits.

An outbreak also significantly disrupts daily life. Normally busy livestock 

producers suddenly had almost nothing to do because their animals had 

been destroyed and their properties were quarantined. According to one 

study of the effects of FMD on farm life in the Cumbria area of the United 

Kingdom, most farming households had to curb their usual daily activities, 

and only the most essential movements on and off the farms were 

permitted. Lost income caused stress to families because they had to cut 

back on their household expenditures and some had to renegotiate loans. 

The study notes that the enforced isolation caused by the quarantines 

added to the tensions and stresses already being experienced by both 

adults and children. 
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USDA Is Responsible 

for Protecting U.S. 

Livestock From FMD 

and Other Animal 

Diseases

Within USDA, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) has 

the lead responsibility for protecting the nation’s livestock from foreign 

animal diseases, which are diseases not native to the United States as well 

as those thought to have been eradicated. Assisting APHIS in this endeavor 

are USDA’s Foreign Agricultural Service, the Food Safety and Inspection 

Service, and the Homeland Security Council. 

Within APHIS, several groups share responsibility for protecting U.S. 

livestock from the incursion of foreign animal diseases such as FMD: 

• International Services. Working with its counterpart organizations in 

foreign countries, this group seeks to reduce the international spread of 

animal and poultry diseases. Its goal is to protect U.S. livestock and 

poultry by reducing risk abroad through disease-management strategies 

provided to exporting countries before they send their animals and 

products to the United States. 

• Veterinary Services. To protect and improve the health, quality, and 

marketability of our nation's animals, animal products, and veterinary 

biologics, this group seeks to prevent, control, and/or eliminate animal 

diseases, and monitor and promote animal health and productivity. This 

group administers laws and regulations on importing animals and 

animal products, including embryos and semen, to ensure that imports 

are free from certain disease agents. In addition, Veterinary Services 

provides training for state and private veterinarians on foreign animal 

diseases of concern and provides animal disease diagnostic and 

surveillance testing. Veterinary Services has primary responsibility for 

inspecting and ensuring the safety of live animal and animal product 

imports to the United States. Within Veterinary Services, the Emergency 

Programs unit coordinates efforts to prepare for and respond to animal 

disease outbreaks, including FMD, and in the fall of 2001, published a 

draft plan for responding to an FMD outbreak. It employs veterinarians 

trained to detect and respond to an FMD outbreak. Emergency 

Programs also provides federal and state veterinarians and others with 

training on foreign animal diseases.

• Plant Protection and Quarantine. Inspectors in this group are USDA’s 

primary presence at 144 of the 301 ports of entry in the United States, as 

well as 8 foreign ports. According to USDA, inspectors are present at all 

major ports of entry, and staffing is based on risk assessments and 

supplemented with tools such as detector dogs, X-rays, and hand-held 
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remote-sensing equipment. USDA inspectors screen and physically 

inspect animal products and other cargo arriving by air, sea, or land, as 

well as international passengers and their luggage arriving via air, sea, or 

land border crossings. Most notably, the beagles in Plant Protection and 

Quarantine’s Beagle Brigade sniff travelers' luggage for prohibited fruits, 

plants, and meat that could harbor harmful plant and animal pests and 

diseases. According to USDA, by the end of this year, it will have 

increased the number of dog teams to 123, which is double the level 

available 2 years ago. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA stated that by the end of this 

year, APHIS will also have increased the number of its safeguarding 

personnel to approximately 3,870—an increase of 50 percent over its fiscal 

year 2000 staffing levels. Moreover, USDA told us that it has hired 18 

additional veterinarians who are conducting port-of-entry reviews, working 

with state counterparts, and providing technical guidance and training on 

working with and handling animal products and byproducts and 

international garbage that could pose a threat of foreign animal diseases.

In addition, USDA’s Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) operates programs 

designed to build new markets and improve the competitive position of 

U.S. agriculture in the global marketplace. FAS is responsible for USDA’s 

overseas activities, such as market development, international trade 

agreements and negotiations, and the collection and analysis of statistics 

and market information. FAS supports U.S. agricultural interests through 

its network of agricultural counselors, attachés, and trade officers 

stationed in many foreign countries. FAS officials primarily deal with 

agricultural trade issues and meet with host government and industry 

officials to discuss and facilitate agricultural trade.

USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) has primary 

responsibility for ensuring the safety of imported and domestic meat and 

meat products meant for human consumption. FSIS stations inspectors at 

ports of entry to conduct sampling and inspection functions on imported 

meat products. FSIS also has responsibility for approving countries that 

are eligible to export meat products to the United States. In fulfilling this 

responsibility, FSIS conducts periodic reviews of eligible countries. 

According to USDA, FSIS’s inspection of livestock before slaughter is an 

important surveillance tool for detecting the presence of FMD in the United 

States. 
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Finally, USDA’s Homeland Security Council is responsible for leading and 

coordinating USDA’s activities to plan for and manage agriculture-related 

crises as well as emergency programs. This council serves as USDA’s 

primary contact with the Federal Emergency Management Agency and 

facilitates coordination with other federal agencies, state and local 

governments, and private-sector organizations. 

U.S. Customs Service 

Supports USDA’s 

Efforts at Ports of 

Entry

The U.S. Customs Service (Customs) is the nation’s primary enforcement 

agency for preventing the entry of a number of potentially harmful 

products into the United States, including FMD-contaminated products. In 

addition to their Customs responsibilities to ensure that proper duties or 

tariffs are paid on imported products, Customs inspectors work to enforce 

the regulations of about 40 federal agencies, such as those of USDA. 

Customs inspectors review paperwork, such as manifests and bills of 

lading, and physically inspect cargo and international passengers and their 

luggage. Customs has inspectors stationed at all 301 ports of entry 

throughout the United States, including international airports and seaports 

and land border crossings along the Canadian and Mexican borders. 

Customs also has inspectors at some foreign locations, such as the 

international airport in Toronto, Canada, where they perform preclearance 

inspections of passengers and their luggage prior to entry into the United 

States. Customs inspectors also examine international mail and packages 

arriving in the United States at the 14 facilities handling mail of foreign 

origin. 

Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Senator Tom Daschle asked us to determine whether (1) U.S. processes to 

obtain and disseminate information on foreign FMD outbreaks are 

adequate and timely, (2) U.S. measures for preventing FMD from entering 

the country are effective and comparable with those of other selected 

countries, and (3) the United States could respond quickly and effectively 

to an outbreak of FMD if it were to occur. 

To address the first question, we obtained and reviewed relevant 

documents, and we interviewed USDA and Customs officials. In particular, 

we reviewed the adequacy and timeliness of the information obtained and 

disseminated by USDA after the 2001 FMD outbreak in the United 

Kingdom. 
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Page 25 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

For the second question, we reviewed relevant legislation, regulations, and 

other USDA documents. We also interviewed USDA, Customs, and state 

officials. To observe the preventive measures for international cargo, we 

visited three large seaports in Elizabeth, New Jersey; Baltimore, Maryland; 

and Houston, Texas. To observe the preventive measures for international 

mail, we visited international mail-processing facilities in New Jersey and 

Virginia and one international express package carrier in Kentucky. To 

observe the preventive measures for live animals imported through 

U.S.-Canadian and U.S.-Mexican land ports of entry, we visited the Sarnia, 

Ontario, and Nuevo Laredo, Mexico, border crossings. To observe the 

preventive measures for international passengers, we visited Dulles 

International Airport, and obtained information on the preclearance 

procedures used to process international passengers entering the United 

States via Canada at the international airport in Toronto, Canada. We also 

gathered information on how garbage from international carriers is 

handled at airports and seaports. In addition, we visited two nearby county 

and two state fairs in Maryland and Virginia to observe how USDA’s 

guidance for biosecurity measures to prevent the spread of disease at U.S. 

livestock and agricultural shows was implemented. 

As a result of the heightened level of security at airports after September 

11, 2001, and because our review was largely conducted after the U.K. 

outbreak had ended, we were unable to implement a portion of the review 

as originally planned. In particular, we were unable to survey passengers 

who were returning to the United States from the United Kingdom, during 

the outbreak, at the airport after they left the passenger-processing area. 

Instead, we surveyed by telephone 60 passengers who visited the United 

Kingdom during the time of the outbreak (Mar. through Sept. 2001). We 

asked them to recall various aspects of their return trip and the processing 

they underwent at U.S. airports. These results cannot be generalized and 

represent only the experiences of the people whom we surveyed. In 

addition, because we asked people to recall events after the passage of 

4 to 6 months, their recollections of certain events and processes might not 

have been as clear as they would have been immediately upon arrival. 

Furthermore, to respond to our second question, we compared the 

preventive measures used by Canada, Mexico, and the United Kingdom 

with those used by the United States. We selected Canada and Mexico for 

our review because the ability of the United States to protect its livestock 

from FMD also depends on the ability of our neighbors to prevent the 

disease; according to USDA officials, if any of the three countries has an 

FMD outbreak, the other two are also likely to have an outbreak. We 
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Introduction

Page 26 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

included the United Kingdom in our analysis because it is a major U.S. 

trading partner and because of its recent experience with FMD. To obtain 

information on the preventive measures used by Canada and Mexico, we 

visited these two countries, met with federal officials, and obtained and 

reviewed relevant documents. While in Canada and Mexico, we visited 

airports, seaports, international mail-processing facilities, and border 

crossings to observe the preventive measures used by these countries. To 

obtain information on the United Kingdom’s preventive measures, we 

reviewed and summarized legislation and regulations for the European 

Union and the United Kingdom, as well as other publicly available 

documents. To ensure the accuracy and completeness of our information, 

we shared the summaries that we prepared on the preventive measures 

used by the three countries with officials in these countries and asked for 

their review and comments. The information on these foreign countries’

preventive measures does not reflect our independent legal analysis. 

Finally, for our third question, we reviewed federal and state emergency 

response plans as well as other key documents and federal legislation and 

regulations. We interviewed USDA officials, industry representatives, and 

state officials. We also interviewed a group of selected veterinarians and 

animal health technicians who were part of the U.S. contingent that 

supported the United Kingdom’s response efforts in 2001 to obtain their 

perspectives on U.S. preparedness and observations on lessons learned 

from the U.K. outbreak. We interviewed the state veterinarian in six states 

that are major U.S. livestock producers to obtain their perspective on their 

state’s preparedness efforts as well as the overall U.S. ability to respond to 

an outbreak if it were to occur. We also attended a USDA training session 

and a conference organized by the Western States Livestock Health 

Association that included information on U.S. preparedness and response 

to an FMD outbreak.

We provided USDA and Customs with a draft of this report for review and 

comment. The written comments we received from USDA are presented in 

appendix V, and those we received from Customs, in appendix VI. In 

addition, we received technical comments from USDA that we have 

incorporated throughout the report as appropriate.

We conducted our work from August 2001 through May 2002 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Page 27 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

Chapter 2

USDA Has Adequate Processes to Obtain 

Information on Foreign FMD Outbreaks, but 

Dissemination to Customs Can Be Improved Chapte2r

USDA relies on a wide variety of sources to obtain information on 

outbreaks of FMD overseas. Its sources include APHIS and FAS staff 

stationed abroad, official notifications from international trade or animal 

health organizations, and notifications from affected countries. But USDA’s 

dissemination of this information is more problematic because it has no 

formal process—detailed procedures and protocols—for sharing 

information on foreign FMD outbreaks with Customs, which provides the 

first line of defense against potentially contaminated products entering U.S. 

ports. USDA does, however, share the information it develops with 

agencies within the department, states, public and private veterinarians, 

industry groups, and the public through various methods, including Emails, postings to USDA’s Internet site, telephone calls, and media alerts. 

USDA Obtains 

Information on Foreign 

FMD Outbreaks from 

Multiple Sources

USDA receives information about the incidence of foreign animal diseases, 

including FMD, from a variety of sources. These include USDA staff 

stationed in foreign countries; international organizations, such as OIE and 

the World Trade Organization (WTO); and the governments of affected 

nations. 

USDA officials stationed in countries around the world provide a range of 

information on agricultural issues, including the disease status of foreign 

countries. For example, APHIS’s International Services group employs 

over 300 foreign service officers and host country nationals in 27 countries 

around the world. According to APHIS officials, these foreign service staff 

collect agricultural information for the countries they are stationed in as 

well as other countries in the region. Their primary sources of information 

include (1) official notifications from foreign governments about changes 

in their country’s animal or crop disease status; (2) meetings with host 

government, local industry, and private-sector officials; (3) local radio and 

television reports, as well as newspapers and magazines, which may 

provide early information about potential animal or crop disease problems; 

and (4) informal discussions at receptions or other social events hosted by 

the foreign government or private citizens, from which they may gather 

references of potential animal or crop disease problems. According to 

APHIS officials, any information gathered from unofficial or informal 

sources needs to be confirmed through other official sources before the 

United States can initiate any formal action, such as restricting imports. 

Similarly, FAS maintains an international field structure: 63 agricultural 

counselor, attaché, and affiliate foreign national offices; 17 agricultural 

trade offices; and a number of agricultural advisers covering 129 countries 
Chapter 2

USDA Has Adequate Processes to Obtain 

Information on Foreign FMD Outbreaks, but 

Dissemination to Customs Can Be Improved

Page 28 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

around the world. According to the FAS officials we spoke with, staff 

stationed overseas have no functional responsibility for tracking foreign 

animal diseases, such as FMD. However, during their routine activities, 

they may become aware of a possible outbreak, in which case they would 

likely relay this information to FAS headquarters, in Washington, D.C. FAS 

staff obtain agricultural information from several of the same sources 

accessed by APHIS staff, such as the local media, trade and industry 

reports, meetings with host government officials, and official government 

notifications and documents. 

In addition, FSIS provides APHIS with information on the disease 

conditions present in foreign countries that it obtains as part of its 

evaluation of a country’s eligibility to export meat and meat products to the 

United States. FSIS’s technical staff review the documents provided by the 

foreign country as well as conduct in-country visits before deeming a 

country eligible to export meat and meat products to the United States for 

human consumption. FSIS also conducts audits in each eligible exporting 

country, at least annually, and shares any information obtained on diseases 

of concern with APHIS, according to USDA.

USDA also receives information from international organizations, such as 

OIE and WTO, which have reporting guidelines for member nations to 

follow during outbreaks of certain animal diseases. For example, both OIE 

and WTO require member countries affected with FMD to make an official 

notification as soon as the disease has been confirmed. These 

organizations then provide other member nations with official notification 

of the outbreak. 

In addition to reporting to international organizations, countries affected 

by FMD may report the outbreak directly to their major trading partners. 

For example, major U.S. trading partners often notify USDA officials 

directly when an FMD outbreak occurs, as the United Kingdom did in early 

2001. According to APHIS officials, the United Kingdom notified USDA on 

the same day that it confirmed the presence of FMD—February 21, 2001. In 

North America, Canada, Mexico, and the United States have an informal 

understanding that in the event of an FMD outbreak, the affected country 

will immediately report to the other two countries. 

The usefulness of information on foreign FMD outbreaks depends on a 

foreign country’s willingness to provide accurate information in a timely 

fashion. There are instances, however, when a country may fail to notify 

OIE, WTO, or its major trading partners of a disease outbreak in a timely 
Chapter 2

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Information on Foreign FMD Outbreaks, but 

Dissemination to Customs Can Be Improved

Page 29 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

manner.6 For example, Argentine officials did not acknowledge that some 

regions of their country had been affected with FMD, although 

unconfirmed reports indicated that the disease had been present for 

several months, according to USDA officials. Argentina officially notified 

OIE on March 13, 2001, and USDA then took action to prohibit imports of 

affected Argentine products. In commenting on a draft of this report, 

USDA stated that if it had verifiable scientific evidence that FMD existed in 

Argentina, it could have prohibited imports before the country notified 

OIE.

USDA Lacks a Formal 

Process to Ensure 

Dissemination of FMD 

Information to 

Customs

APHIS has primary responsibility for sharing information obtained about 

foreign FMD outbreaks with other agencies within USDA, Customs, state 

governments, affected industries, and the public. These entities all need 

information about potential FMD outbreaks because they all play an 

important role in preventing or responding to an outbreak. While APHIS 

immediately alerts USDA agencies and others, it has no formal process, 

including defined procedures and protocols, to distribute information on 

foreign FMD outbreaks to Customs. Consequently, there is no assurance 

that Customs inspectors at U.S. ports of entry, and in particular at the ports 

where APHIS does not have a presence, are adequately informed of the 

need to implement controls for potentially contaminated cargo, and 

international passengers and their luggage entering the United States.

APHIS Uses Multiple 

Mechanisms to Inform 

USDA Agencies and Others 

in the United States About 

Foreign FMD Outbreaks

APHIS uses various methods to inform its own field staff located in the 

United States and abroad, other USDA agencies, state governments, 

industry groups, the public, and the media about foreign FMD outbreaks. 

These methods include

• E-mails and electronic alerts,

• memos and letters,

• telephone calls,

• meetings,

6

 While OIE cannot sanction countries that do not comply with its reporting requirements, 

WTO can.
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Information on Foreign FMD Outbreaks, but 

Dissemination to Customs Can Be Improved

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• press releases,

• printed media (brochures, pamphlets, and posters),

• public education and outreach,

• toll free information hotline, and

• postings to the Internet (USDA’s Web page).

After the 2001 outbreak of FMD in the United Kingdom, we observed that 

APHIS used each of these methods to distribute information about (1) the 

disease, (2) the outbreak in the United Kingdom, and (3) preventing the 

introduction and spread of the disease in the United States. For example, 

APHIS field locations began receiving electronic alerts and E-mails from 

APHIS headquarters, on February 21, 2001, which was the same day that 

the United Kingdom notified APHIS about the outbreak. Similarly, by the 

second week of March 2001, USDA had issued several press releases, 

placed information on its Web site about FMD precautions, initiated an 

international travelers’ education campaign, and established a toll-free 

number for public inquiries about the disease. Also, shortly after the U.K. 

outbreak began, APHIS distributed several types of printed media to its 

field offices nationwide. According to the Veterinary Services staff in the 

field offices we contacted, they distributed these materials to state 

governments, industry associations, and private veterinarians, and placed 

posters in public transportation terminals, such as train stations. Table 2 

shows selected key actions APHIS took upon learning of the FMD outbreak 

in the United Kingdom. 
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Information on Foreign FMD Outbreaks, but 

Dissemination to Customs Can Be Improved

Page 31 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

Table 2: Key USDA Information Dissemination Actions Taken After the 2001 Outbreak of FMD in the United Kingdom

However, the effectiveness of USDA’s efforts is uncertain. For example, in 

March 2001, APHIS issued an industry alert to airlines, suggesting that they 

Date Action taken/information disseminated

Feb. 21, 2001 APHIS Alert to all its Plant Protection and Quarantine Port Offices prohibiting the importation of all meat 

products from the United Kingdom (including England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, and the Isle of 

Man). 

Feb. 26, 2001 APHIS Electronic Alert reminding Plant Protection and Quarantine inspectors to closely monitor 

international passengers, in particular those arriving from the United Kingdom, and screen for those who 

had been on a farm overseas and to check footwear and decontaminate if necessary. 

Mar. 1, 2001 APHIS Electronic Alert to Plant Protection and Quarantine inspectors providing guidance on inspecting farm 

equipment and tractors as well as other vehicles imported from the United Kingdom or the Republic of 

Ireland. 

Mar. 6, 2001 First team of U.S. veterinarians deployed to the United Kingdom to help respond to the outbreak.

Mar. 12, 2001 Beginning the week of March 12, 2001, a high-ranking APHIS official began a tour of major eastern U.S. 

ports, meeting with U.S. Customs and other federal inspection agencies to emphasize the need for 

aggressive exclusion activities. 

Mar. 13, 2001 APHIS Electronic Alerts and USDA news release announcing the prohibition of imported live swine and 

ruminants, any fresh swine or ruminant meat (chilled or frozen), and other products of swine and ruminant 

from all European Union nations (does not include cooked pork products).

Mar. 13, 2001 USDA Media Advisory announcing kick off of traveler’s education campaign starting March 14, 2001. 

Mar. 14, 2001 USDA memo to its field veterinarians and Animal Import Centers regarding guidelines for importing pets 

from areas affected with FMD.

Mar. 16, 2001 USDA news release announcing the establishment of toll-free FMD call lines—domestic and international. 

Mar. 20, 2001 APHIS begins regularly scheduled conference calls with the National Association of State Departments of 

Agriculture to discuss APHIS’s FMD exclusion efforts.

Mar. 22, 2001 Specific guidance provided to the U.S. Customs Service on FMD-related inspection procedures for cargo 

and passengers at U.S. ports of entry.

Mar. 23, 2001 Industry Alert to livestock owners and private-practice veterinarians posted to the APHIS Web site, 

reminding them to report unusual animal health symptoms.

Mar. 2001 Other information issued during the month of March includes

• meetings about FMD with industry, state, and local governments;

• FMD-prevention information developed for airlines;

• warning signs posted at airports;

• public service announcements on radio and television; and

• FMD information for USDA extension agents.

Apr. 9, 2001 Secretary of Agriculture authorizes an additional $32 million to increase inspection personnel. 

Apr. 26, 2001 Secretary of Agriculture assures the Congress that compensation would be available to producers in the 

event of an FMD outbreak in the United States. USDA begins hiring 400 new inspectors and doubling the 

size of the canine inspection teams, and reassigns 200 current inspectors to critical ports of entry. 

May 11, 2001 USDA and the Department of Defense coordinate restrictions on military exercises to ensure that FMD is 

kept out of the United States.

May 2001 USDA issues FMD-prevention guidelines for livestock shows agricultural fairs, and other agricultural events.
Chapter 2

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Information on Foreign FMD Outbreaks, but 

Dissemination to Customs Can Be Improved

Page 32 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

could assist USDA’s preventive activities by making in-flight 

announcements on international flights to raise passengers’ awareness 

about the dangers of FMD. APHIS also provided a brief text for the airlines 

to use when making these announcements. However, the passengers 

returning from the United Kingdom during the outbreak whom we 

contacted told us that not all the airlines made such announcements. 

Similarly in May 2001, APHIS issued disease prevention guidelines for 

livestock shows and agricultural fairs, such as state and county fairs. 

According to APHIS officials, these guidelines are “suggestions” for fair 

organizers and directors, and their actual use and implementation are left 

to the discretion of state and local authorities. We observed that the 

implementation of APHIS’s guidelines varied dramatically at the two 

county fairs and two state fairs that we visited. For example, USDA’s 

guidelines indicate that food should not be allowed in areas where show 

animals are housed; however, at all four fairs, we observed that no 

restrictions of this kind were in effect. Moreover, some of the livestock 

owners and show officials that we interviewed at the fairs generally did not 

know about the risks associated with FMD or the need to take 

precautionary measures to prevent its introduction or spread. For 

example, one livestock producer told us that FMD was a “European 

problem” and that the United States did not have to worry about it.

APHIS Does Not Have a 

Formal Process to Provide 

Customs with Information 

on Foreign FMD Outbreaks 

While APHIS uses a number of mechanisms for informing interested parties 

about foreign FMD outbreaks, it has no formal process to inform 

Customs—the first deterrent to the importation of potentially FMDaffected products—about these outbreaks. As Table 2 shows, after the U.K. 

outbreak, APHIS did not immediately inform Customs about its decisions 

to prohibit or restrict certain products or more vigilantly screen passengers 

arriving at U.S. ports of entry from the United Kingdom. Customs did not 

receive any consistent national guidance from APHIS until the Acting 

Commissioner of Customs formally requested this information in writing 

from the Administrator of APHIS, on March 16, 2001. As a result, Customs’

field staff did not receive uniform official guidance on general inspection 

measures for passengers and products until March 27, 2001, and specific 

information on at-risk products to be detained at the ports until April 4, 

2001—37 and 45 days, respectively, after APHIS received the United 

Kingdom’s official notification of the outbreak. According to a Customs 

memorandum and officials we spoke to, field inspectors felt ill equipped to 

adequately process international cargo and passengers at ports of entry 

during the initial stages of the U.K. outbreak. For example, one Customs 
Chapter 2

USDA Has Adequate Processes to Obtain 

Information on Foreign FMD Outbreaks, but 

Dissemination to Customs Can Be Improved

Page 33 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

supervisor told us that there was no APHIS inspector present at her port of 

entry and that she had no information on how to clean passengers’ shoes 

and what kind of disinfectant to use. According to this Customs supervisor, 

the lack of official guidance forced her staff to rely on informal and 

inadequate guidance obtained from APHIS officials located at another port 

of entry. She added that because Customs inspectors are not animal 

disease specialists, they need nontechnical, clear procedures to help them 

process international cargo, passengers and their luggage, especially at 

those ports where there is no APHIS presence. The Customs’ Assistant 

Director for Field Operations agreed that such uniform and clear guidance 

is needed for all Customs field inspectors.

APHIS officials acknowledged that they did not notify Customs of the U.K. 

outbreak. According to these officials, because Customs had not sought 

specific guidance from APHIS about prior FMD outbreaks in other 

countries, they believed that Customs knew how to handle cargo, 

passengers, and luggage arriving from the United Kingdom during the 

outbreak without specific notification and further guidance from them. As 

a result of the concerns raised by Customs during the U.K. outbreak, the 

APHIS Assistant Director for Technical Trade Services told us that in May 

2002, she added an official from the Customs Office of Field Operations to 

the list of people to whom she sends E-mail notifications of foreign FMD 

outbreaks. The Customs Assistant Director for Field Operations told us 

that this action will help his office better inform Customs’ field inspectors 

about future foreign FMD outbreaks.

Conclusions Although APHIS is primarily responsible for protecting U.S. livestock from 

FMD, it needs Customs to help it fulfill this responsibility. Customs is 

especially critical to keeping FMD-contaminated products out of the United 

States at those ports of entry where APHIS is not present. However, 

Customs inspectors can help provide a concerted, coordinated, and 

comprehensive defense against FMD at the nation’s border only if they 

receive current information on the countries that are affected by FMD and 

have clear nontechnical guidelines on how to process at-risk products and 

passengers. APHIS has taken the first interim step to notify Customs of 

future foreign FMD outbreaks, by including a Customs official on one of its 

electronic mailing lists. However, we believe that this does not provide a 

permanent solution to the lack of clear communication protocols and 

procedures between APHIS and Customs. 
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Information on Foreign FMD Outbreaks, but 

Dissemination to Customs Can Be Improved

Page 34 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

To help ensure that Customs inspectors at all U.S. ports of entry are fully 

informed about current foreign FMD outbreaks, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Agriculture direct the Administrator of APHIS to develop (1) a 

formal written agreement with the Commissioner of the Customs Service 

that will clearly delineate the process by which future information on 

foreign FMD outbreaks will be communicated with Customs and (2) 

uniform, nontechnical procedures that Customs inspectors can use to 

process international passengers and cargo arriving from FMD-affected 

countries. 
Page 35 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

Chapter 3

U.S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally 

Comparable to Other Countries, but Complete 

Protection May Be Infeasible Chapte3r

U.S. measures to prevent an FMD outbreak—control and eradication 

overseas and the port of entry screening of livestock, animal products, and 

passengers—have been successful since 1929. Nevertheless, the United 

States remains vulnerable to an FMD outbreak because of the nature of the 

virus, the many pathways by which it can come into the country, and the 

growing magnitude and volume of both legal and illegal passengers and 

cargo entering the country. Other countries face similar challenges in 

protecting their livestock from FMD and use preventive measures that are 

comparable to those the United States uses. However, the United States 

could also build on the experiences of other countries to improve its 

preventive measures. 

USDA’s Efforts to 

Control and Eradicate 

FMD in Other 

Countries Help Reduce 

the Risk to U.S. 

Livestock

As a first line of defense to safeguarding U.S. animal resources against the 

introduction of pests and diseases, USDA helps prevent, control, and 

eradicate agricultural health threats where they originate outside the 

United States. By helping other nations eradicate or control these 

outbreaks, USDA reduces the risk of agricultural pests and diseases 

reaching U.S. borders. 

In North America, U.S. efforts to eradicate and control FMD have largely 

focused on Mexico, because of our shared border and the possible threat of 

the FMD virus’s moving overland from South America, where the disease is 

endemic in some countries. USDA has staff located in Mexico working 

with the Mexico-United States Commission for the Prevention of Foot and 

Mouth Disease and Other Exotic Animal Diseases. The commission, 

formed in 1947 as a combined U.S.-Mexican effort to eradicate FMD from 

Mexico,7

 built Mexico’s animal health infrastructure and successfully 

eradicated FMD from Mexico in 1954. Today, USDA and Mexican 

veterinarians work together, through the activities of the commission, to 

provide disease surveillance, diagnostic testing, and training for Mexico to 

ensure that the country remains FMD-free. According to USDA officials in 

Mexico, the United States initially covered about 80 percent of the costs for 

the joint program; however, as the Mexican government assumed greater 

responsibility for the program, the U.S. share has decreased to about 

20 percent. In fiscal year 2001, USDA provided about $160,000 in funding 

for the commission’s activities. According to USDA officials, this funding 

7

 The commission was originally called the Mexican American Commission for the 

Eradication of Foot and Mouth Disease.
Chapter 3

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Comparable to Other Countries, but 

Complete Protection May Be Infeasible

Page 36 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

supports the commission’s high-security laboratory in Mexico City by 

providing training, supplies, and equipment. 

In addition, for over 30 years, the United States has held regular meetings 

on animal health issues with the governments of Canada and Mexico to 

harmonize North America’s import requirements and, more recently, to 

coordinate preventive actions and emergency response activities in the 

event of an FMD outbreak. For example, in 2000, the three countries held 

joint exercises—known as the Tripartite Exercise 2000—to test their FMD 

communication and response plans, and to assess their response systems. 

As a result of this exercise, the three governments signed a memorandum 

of understanding to formally establish the North American Animal Health 

Committee. This committee represents animal health issues for the North 

American Free Trade Agreement and seeks to harmonize live animal and 

animal product import requirements for North America. The committee 

will also plan emergency response activities and perform joint test 

exercises to ensure that all three countries remain prepared to respond to 

an FMD outbreak. 

The United States also supports efforts to establish FMD-control zones in 

Central and South America. For example, to help alert countries in Central 

and North America about the potential incursion of FMD from South 

America, USDA has established cooperative programs with Panama and 

Colombia. In Panama, USDA supports the U.S.-Panama Cooperative 

Program for the Prevention of Foot and Mouth Disease, which maintains 

the Darien Gap area of Panama free from FMD and other foreign animal 

diseases. This program conducts field surveillance at high-risk border 

points and annual training, analyzes technical data, and improves the 

infrastructure. The program also provides support for the Investigative 

Laboratory for Vesicular Disease, which provides bio-containment, 

diagnostic, and detection capabilities for vesicular and other foreign animal 

diseases in Central America.

Through the Colombian program, USDA helps maintain an FMD-free 

barrier along the Colombia-Panama border.8

 This barrier serves as the 

"first line of defense" for preventing the spread of FMD northward into 

Central America, Mexico, and the United States, which are all FMD-free. 

Until FMD is eradicated from South America, USDA believes that 

8 This barrier is one of two in the world; the other, in Turkey, is maintained by the European 

Union to protect Western Europe from FMD.
Chapter 3

U.S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally 

Comparable to Other Countries, but 

Complete Protection May Be Infeasible

Page 37 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

maintaining this barrier will prevent the disease’s northward spread. USDA 

provides technical assistance and half of the funding for the program. 

As part of its disease exclusion activities for the region, USDA also has 

cooperative agreements with all the other Central American countries to 

support joint monitoring and surveillance activities, including field 

investigations and the collection of laboratory samples for FMD and other 

foreign animal diseases. Through these agreements, USDA helps transfer 

surveillance and detection technologies to these countries.

When FMD strikes other nations—as it did recently, for example, in 

Argentina and the United Kingdom—the United States may assist in 

controlling and eradicating the disease. For example, a total of 327 U.S. 

animal health professionals, including over 300 veterinarians, helped 

eradicate the 2001 outbreak in the United Kingdom. The Americans came 

from USDA, other federal agencies, and state governments. Beginning in 

March 2001, they traveled to the United Kingdom, generally in groups that 

averaged about 10 per week, and assisted with the response for about a 

month. At the peak of the outbreak during March and April, about 100 U.S. 

animal health professionals were assisting in the U.K. response. The U.S. 

responders with whom we spoke participated in surveillance activities, 

such as collecting blood samples, and epidemiology tasks, such as tracking 

and predicting the path of new disease outbreaks. They also issued permits 

and licenses to move animals and products such as silage. By providing 

such assistance, the United States not only helps ensure that the disease is 

eradicated quickly, but also helps reduce the potential for FMD-infected 

products to arrive at U.S. ports of entry.9

Despite U.S. Preventive 

Measures at Ports of 

Entry, Vulnerability to 

FMD Remains

Preventive measures at U.S. borders provide the second line of defense 

against the incursion of FMD into the United States. USDA has identified 

several key pathways by which the FMD-virus could enter the United 

States. To respond to the risk posed by these pathways, USDA 

implemented measures designed to ensure that animals, products, 

passengers, and equipment arriving at U.S. borders are free of the virus and 

do not pose a risk to U.S. livestock. However, some level of risk is inherent 

9

 According to USDA officials who helped respond to the U.K. outbreak in 2001, another 

benefit of sending U.S. personnel to assist with foreign disease outbreaks is the valuable 

training they receive by handling diseased animals and responding to various aspects of a 

“real life” response.
Chapter 3

U.S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally 

Comparable to Other Countries, but 

Complete Protection May Be Infeasible

Page 38 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

in international trade and travel, and no set of measures can ever 

completely eliminate the possibility that FMD will enter the country. 

Moreover, because FMD is a hardy virus and the level of inspection 

resources cannot keep pace with the increasing volume and magnitude of 

cargo and passengers, both legal and illegal, that continue to enter the 

country, the United States remains vulnerable to an outbreak.

The United States Has 

Implemented Preventive 

Measures for Key Pathways

The FMD virus could enter the United States through a number of key 

pathways: live animal imports, imports of animal and other products, 

international passengers and their luggage, garbage from international 

carriers, international mail, and military personnel and equipment 

returning from overseas. For each of these pathways, USDA has developed 

and implemented specific preventive measures described below.

Live animal imports. The United States allows imported livestock, such 

as swine, cattle, and sheep, only from preapproved countries that USDA 

judges to be free of FMD and other diseases of concern.10 For example, in 

April 2002, USDA recognized 49 countries or geographical regions as free 

of FMD. (See app. I.) Generally, live animals can be imported only through 

designated ports of entry, the majority of which are located along U.S. 

borders shared with Canada and Mexico, and three others located on the 

east and west coasts.11 Most live cattle imports into the United States 

originate from Canada and Mexico; live hog imports, from Canada; and live 

lamb imports, from Australia and New Zealand. Livestock exported to the 

United States must be accompanied by a U.S. import permit and a health 

certificate from an official government veterinarian in the country of origin. 

The health certificate states that the animals have been in the exporting 

country for at least 60 days prior to shipment and are free of other diseases 

of concern.12 Generally, animals arriving from countries other than Canada 

and Mexico may be quarantined.13 Zoological ruminants and swine from 

10 USDA performs a risk assessment to determine a country’s FMD-free status using the OIE 

criteria described in chapter 1, and independently validates the country’s disease status 

reports sent to the OIE. In addition, USDA reviews additional information provided by the 

country and conducts verification visits to the country.

11 Twenty-six other U.S. ports of entry accept live animals on a limited basis.

12 Because the incubation period for FMD is significantly less than 60 days, the 60-day 

requirement helps ensure that if animals have been exposed to the FMD virus or other 

serious animal health diseases, they would become symptomatic within this period of time.
Chapter 3

U.S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally 

Comparable to Other Countries, but 

Complete Protection May Be Infeasible

Page 39 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

FMD-affected countries are permitted into the United States but must be 

processed through USDA’s New York Animal Import Center.

Animal and other product imports. Thousands of animal and other 

products that could be contaminated with the FMD virus could potentially 

enter the United States during the course of normal international trade. 

These products include animal products meant for human consumption, 

such as meat and dairy products; nonfood animal products, such as hides, 

skins, casings, and animal extracts; as well as nonanimal products, such as 

farm equipment, hay, and straw. USDA regulates the importation of this 

diverse range of products to help minimize the risk of introducing FMD into 

the United States.

USDA implements different import rules for FMD-free and FMD-affected 

countries. Generally, for countries free of FMD and other diseases of 

concern,14 USDA imposes few restrictions on animal product imports. For 

FMD-affected countries, USDA prohibits the importation of all susceptible 

products shipped 3 weeks prior to the date of official notification of the 

outbreak. This prohibition remains in effect until USDA reassesses the 

disease status of the affected country and determines the level of trade that 

can resume. USDA allows imports of animal and other products from 

FMD-affected countries only if they meet certain requirements. These 

requirements vary for different kinds of products, as follows: 

• Animal products meant for human consumption. Generally fresh, 

chilled, or frozen meat from cattle, sheep, and pigs, and fresh milk are 

prohibited from FMD-affected countries. However, processed meat and 

dairy products are allowed from FMD-affected countries if they meet 

certain requirements. For example, meat products can be imported 

from FMD-affected countries only if (1) the country and meat 

processing plants have been deemed eligible to export meat products to 

the United States by FSIS and (2) the processing plants also meet 

APHIS’s meat-processing standards. The APHIS standards ensure that 

meat products from these countries are not contaminated with the FMD 

virus, and require that the products be processed in a manner that will 

13 The length of the quarantine depends on the type of animals imported and the kinds of 

diseases present in the country of origin. 

14 Unrestricted trade is generally dependent on a country’s being free of other diseases of 

concern, such as cattle plague (rinderpest), and others. FMD is only one of the diseases of 

concern.
Chapter 3

U.S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally 

Comparable to Other Countries, but 

Complete Protection May Be Infeasible

Page 40 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

inactivate the virus. For example, they must be fully cooked, dry cured, 

or canned and shelf-stable, with all bones removed. Moreover, a U.S. 

import permit and an official veterinary health certificate from the 

country of origin must accompany certain meat shipments. Similarly, 

most dairy products from FMD-affected countries must meet APHIS’s 

requirements to ensure that they do not pose a risk of FMD’s 

introduction. For example, milk products that are in a concentrated 

liquid form and are shelf-stable without refrigeration are allowed from 

FMD-affected countries. Some dairy products, such as condensed milk 

require a U.S. import permit, while others, such as yogurt and butter are 

unrestricted and do not require a permit.15 

• Nonfood animal products. A variety of nonfood animal products are 

allowed from FMD-affected countries if they have been properly treated 

to inactivate the virus; however, a U.S. import permit may be required. 

For example, tanned hides, leather, and fully finished mounted animal 

trophies can be imported into the United States from FMD-affected 

countries.

• Other products. USDA does not allow imports of grass, hay, or straw 

used for feeding, bedding, or other purposes from FMD-affected 

countries. However, used farm equipment is allowed with a certificate 

from the exporting country stating that the equipment has been steam 

cleaned. APHIS officials inspect farm equipment at U.S. ports of entry 

to ensure that it is free from dirt and soil. If dirt and soil are found, then 

inspectors will determine whether they can be adequately washed with 

detergent and disinfected at an appropriate location before granting 

approval for entry into the United States.

All animal and other products arriving at U.S. ports of entry, whether from 

FMD-free or FMD-affected countries, are subject to inspection by U.S. 

federal inspectors. Customs officials, who review the documents 

accompanying the shipments, either electronically or on paper, provide the 

first level of inspection for these shipments. On the basis of this review, 

Customs is authorized to either release the shipments into commerce or 

hold them for USDA inspection. USDA provides Customs with a list of 

products to be flagged for inspection by APHIS. APHIS inspectors ensure 

that all the necessary documents accompanying the shipment, such as 

15The import permit allows USDA to evaluate the processing conditions for the product and 

determine whether the stated process will inactivate the FMD virus.
Chapter 3

U.S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally 

Comparable to Other Countries, but 

Complete Protection May Be Infeasible

Page 41 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

import permits and official health certificates, are complete and ensure 

that the shipments match their manifest. In some instances, APHIS 

inspectors will inspect the shipping containers to check their contents. 

After APHIS completes its inspection, the shipment may proceed to FSIS 

and/or the Food and Drug Administration for further inspection, depending 

on which agency regulates the safety of these products for human health 

issues, or may proceed to Customs for release into commerce.16 According 

to USDA, FSIS inspectors at ports of entry visually examine all shipments 

of products under FSIS’s jurisdiction and randomly select some for more 

in-depth examination.

In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA noted that it has primary 

inspection responsibility for agricultural cargo and manifests at those ports 

staffed with USDA inspectors. To ensure that these shipments continue to 

be referred to USDA for inspection, the department said that it is working 

with Customs and other federal agencies to develop an automated targeting 

system, which will serve as an electronic interface among federal agencies 

to identify and automatically segregate high-risk plant cargo and track 

imported animals and animal products. 

International passengers. International passengers who may have been in 

contact with the FMD virus, either through contact with infected animals 

or materials such as soil and manure, or who bring potentially 

contaminated products into the country may also transmit the virus to the 

United States. USDA provides the following FMD-prevention information 

and types of scrutiny for international passengers in an effort to reduce the 

risk associated with this pathway:

• USDA requests airlines to make in-flight announcements on 

international flights; at ports of entry, it places warning signs and it plays 

prerecorded announcements about how international passengers can 

assist in keeping FMD out of the United States. 

• International passengers must fill out a U.S. Customs declaration form 

that asks if they are bringing any animal or plant products into the 

country and if, while traveling abroad, they visited a farm or were in 

contact with animals. Passengers responding affirmatively to these 

16Certain imported animal products, such as meat, are regulated by FSIS, while others, such 

as milk and cheese, are regulated by the Food and Drug Administration to ensure that they 

are safe for human consumption before they are released into U.S. commerce.
Chapter 3

U.S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally 

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questions are sent by Customs officials to a USDA inspection area at the 

port of entry for further processing. USDA officials may x-ray and 

inspect the contents of the passengers’ baggage; ask them additional 

questions; confiscate any prohibited items, such as meat and dairy 

products; and clean and disinfect their shoes.

• USDA’s Beagle Brigade and inspectors generally rove the baggage claim 

areas at major ports of entry to help identify passengers and their 

luggage that may be carrying prohibited food items. USDA inspectors 

look not only for suspicious packages, such as bulky, misshapen, and 

leaking containers, but also question passengers about their travels to 

determine whether they present a greater risk of disease transmission. 

If the dogs or the inspectors identify such passengers, these passengers 

are referred to the USDA inspection area for further processing.

After the 2001 FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom, according to the 

international passengers we surveyed, some of these measures were not 

consistently implemented. For example, some passengers told us that the 

airlines they traveled on did not make any in-flight announcements about 

FMD. Other passengers told us that even though their Customs declaration 

form indicated that they had been in contact with animals or visited a farm 

while in the United Kingdom, they were not referred by officials to the 

USDA inspection area at the airport for further processing or they had to 

request USDA personnel at the airports to examine and disinfect the shoes 

that they wore while they were in FMD-affected areas in the United 

Kingdom.

Garbage from international carriers. Garbage from international carriers, 

such as airplanes and ships, can also transmit the FMD virus into the 

United States if the garbage contains food items contaminated with the 

virus. Therefore, USDA has developed guidelines to ensure that garbage 

from international carriers is properly handled and disposed of so that it 

does not present a risk to U.S. livestock. For example, USDA inspectors 

supervise the removal of all international garbage from airplanes and ships. 

This garbage must be transported in leak-proof containers and must be 

disposed of properly, such as by incineration or sterilization, and 

subsequent burial at a landfill. USDA has compliance agreements with 

catering firms and cleaners that outline the proper handling and approved 

disposal methods for international garbage. Before a compliance 

agreement is signed, APHIS officials will, among other things, review the 

application; visit the handling, processing, or disposal facilities; observe the 

operation of any equipment to determine its adequacy for handling 
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garbage; and certify and approve the garbage cookers and sterilizers to be 

used to process international garbage. USDA also monitors firms operating 

under these compliance agreements to ensure that they abide by the 

conditions stated in the agreement.

International mail. Prohibited animal products that could transmit the 

FMD virus may also be sent through international mail and courier services 

to U.S. residents. As a result, international mail packages entering the 

United States are subject to inspection by Customs and USDA officials. 

Customs generally reviews the declaration form on the packages and either 

visually inspects or x-rays them as part of its responsibility to screen 

international mail for illegal and prohibited items, such as contraband and 

drugs. At USDA’s request, Customs can also screen international packages 

for prohibited animal products, such as meat and dairy products from 

FMD-affected countries. Customs sets aside packages that appear to 

contain such items for USDA’s inspection. USDA officials will review the 

declaration forms and may x-ray or open these packages for physical 

inspection. If the item in the package is a permissible product, the officials 

will reseal the package and release it for delivery; otherwise it will be 

confiscated and destroyed.17 In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA 

noted that mail from high-risk countries is more thoroughly scrutinized on 

the basis of pathway analysis.

Military personnel and equipment. Because U.S. military forces are 

deployed throughout the world, troops and military equipment returning to 

the United States could introduce FMD and other diseases into the country. 

As a result, USDA provides support for the military and helps oversee the 

reentry of military cargo, personnel, equipment, and personal property to 

reduce the risk of introducing diseases into the United States. For 

example, military personnel must declare all agricultural items they are 

bringing back to the United States and identify whether they have been on 

farms or in contact with animals while abroad. Their clothing and gear 

should also be cleaned and washed before reentering the country. 

Similarly, all military rolling stock, such as humvees, trucks, weapons 

systems, and tanks, as well as other used military gear, such as canvas 

tents, must be thoroughly cleaned before reentry. Pallets, wooden crates, 

and other military equipment must be free of soil, manure, and debris. 

Military equipment used to eradicate animal diseases overseas, such as 

FMD, is not allowed reentry. For small-scale operations, the military must 

17 Senders of packages that are confiscated and destroyed are routinely notified.
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notify USDA at least 7 days in advance of arrival at a U.S. port of entry. 

USDA will determine if appropriate cleaning facilities are available at the 

first port of entry, and all items will be held at this port for inspection. If 

approved cleaning facilities are not available or if the equipment is 

contaminated to an extent that prevents cleaning, USDA will refuse to 

allow reentry. Large-scale operations require a 30-day notification.

United States Remains 

Vulnerable to FMD 

The United States has not had an outbreak of FMD since 1929, and some 

USDA officials and animal health experts believe that this healthy 

condition of U.S. livestock is directly related to the effectiveness of U.S. 

measures to prevent the incursion of the disease. However, these and other 

experts agree that the nation remains vulnerable to an FMD outbreak for 

the following reasons: 

• FMD is a highly contagious and hardy virus that remains viable for long 

periods of time. 

• FMD can be carried and transmitted by a variety of animate and 

inanimate items. Although the key pathways described earlier pose 

varying levels of risk to U.S. livestock, according to USDA, it could take 

only one contaminated product to come into contact with one 

susceptible U.S. animal to start a nationwide outbreak.

• The magnitude and volume of international passengers, mail, and 

products entering the United States creates an enormous challenge for 

USDA and other federal inspection agencies. As a result, most 

inspections at ports of entry are restricted to paper reviews of manifests 

supported by a limited number of judgmentally selected samples for 

physical inspection. For example, in fiscal year 2001, over 470 million 

international passengers and pedestrians arrived at U.S. ports of entry; 

of these, USDA inspected about 102 million. According to APHIS 

officials, about 30 percent of the items seized from passengers at 

airports were prohibited animal products or by-products. Table 3 

provides information on the volume/numbers of passengers, vehicles, 

and cargo entering the United States and the level of APHIS’s 

inspections for fiscal year 2001. Similarly, the volume of international 

mail entering the United States makes it difficult for APHIS and 

Customs to adequately screen incoming parcels for FMD-susceptible 

products. For example, APHIS inspectors at the international mail 

facility in Elizabeth, New Jersey, told us that about 30,000 international 

parcels pass through their check point every day. This volume of mail 
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provides the inspectors approximately 3 seconds per parcel to judge 

whether the package might contain FMD-susceptible products. 

Moreover, mail is processed at the facility during the day and night to 

keep up with the volume of international mail arriving daily. However, 

APHIS inspectors are present only during the day shifts and detector 

dogs are available for only 1 to 2 days per week. Although Customs’

inspectors screen packages for FMD-susceptible products during the 

time when APHIS inspectors are not available, both APHIS and Customs 

inspectors told us that the process is less effective than having an APHIS 

inspector on site. Nonetheless, according to APHIS’s Assistant Director 

for Port Operations, even doubling or tripling the agency’s inspection 

resources would not significantly reduce the FMD risk from overseas 

entries because the percentage of passengers, vehicles, and cargo 

receiving a physical inspection is likely to continue to be relatively low. 

Table 3: Volume/Numbers of Passengers, Vehicles, and Cargo Entering the United 

States, Inspected by APHIS and Resulting in Seized Products, Fiscal Year 2001

Legend: N/A=not applicable

a

Source: U.S. Customs Service.

b

Source: USDA.

c

The number of full containers. 

d

The number of bills of lading inspected. A single bill of lading may include multiple containers. 

e

The percentage cannot be calculated because APHIS and Customs report their data in differing units 

of measure.

f

The total amount of international mail that entered the United States during fiscal year 2001was not 

available; however, APHIS officials at the Port Elizabeth, New Jersey, facility told us that approximately 

30,000 parcels go past their check point every day.

• Moreover, most U.S. preventive measures are not designed to intercept 

illegal entries of products or passengers that may harbor the FMD virus. 

Commodity/mode Volume/numbera Inspected by APHISb

Percentage

inspected

Passengers

(all modes of transport)

472,000,000 101,513,792 21.5

Ships 215,328 52,016 24.2

Aircraft 1,064,923 541,109 49.0

Cargo

• Rail 

• Trucks

• Ship 

14,538,271c

1,534,566

7,878,000

5,125,705

2,181,904d N/Ae

Mail packages N/A f 434,216 N/A
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According to USDA, the volume of illegal agricultural products entering 

the United States is growing, and contraband meat products entering the 

country is the single most important risk for the introduction of FMD. In 

addition, illegal shipments of products from countries other than the 

stated point of origin and illegal immigrants also pose significant risks. 

USDA and Customs annually confiscate thousands of contraband and 

prohibited products at U.S. ports of entry. For example, in fiscal year 

2001, USDA seized 313,231 shipments of prohibited meat/poultry and 

animal by-products. According to USDA officials, these seizures are 

only a small portion of the contraband entering the United States. To 

respond to the growing threat from illegal entries, USDA recently 

created the Smuggling Interdiction and Trade Compliance program. 

Program officials collaborate with several federal, state, and private 

organizations to ensure compliance with U.S. agriculture import laws at 

ports of entry. 

U.S. Preventive 

Measures Are 

Comparable to Those 

Used by Other 

Countries

U.S. preventive measures for FMD are comparable to the measures used by 

Canada, Mexico, and the United Kingdom for four key pathways included 

in this review: livestock imports, animal product imports, international 

mail, and garbage from international carriers. The pathway that presented 

the most significant area of difference concerned the measures used to 

process international passengers entering these countries. (Detailed 

information on the preventive measures used by Canada, Mexico, and the 

United Kingdom are provided in appendixes II through IV of this report.)

Generally, U.S. preventive measures were similar to those used by the other 

three countries for the following four pathways:

• Imported livestock. The three countries allow imports of livestock only 

from approved countries that are FMD-free. Generally, these live 

animals must be imported through predetermined inspection ports that 

have adequate facilities available to quarantine the animals, if necessary. 

In addition, the countries require import permits and health certificates 

to accompany the livestock shipments unless the animals are imported 

directly for slaughter. Of the three countries, Mexico requires an official 

government veterinarian to (1) preinspect animals imported from 

countries other than the United States in their country of origin before 

they are loaded for transport to Mexico and (2) accompany the 

shipment and monitor the health status of the animals while they are in 

transit. 
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• Imported animal products. The countries generally allow animal 

product imports only from countries that they consider FMD-free and 

that meet their specific animal health and food safety standards. The 

countries also allow certain animal product imports from FMD-affected 

countries if they originate from a preapproved establishment and are 

processed in a manner that would inactivate the virus. For example, 

meat products that are fully cooked and canned and are shelf-stable can 

be imported from FMD-affected countries, but unprocessed products, 

such as fresh, chilled, or frozen meat, and untreated milk, are not 

allowed. In addition, all imported animal product shipments are subject 

to review and may be selected for physical inspection when they arrive 

at the port of entry in each of the countries.18 

• International mail. The countries handle international mail in a similar 

manner, which includes a review of the documentation detailing the 

sender, country of origin, and contents of the package. Only packages 

considered suspect, for example, because they do not include required 

information, are from high-risk countries, or have been sent by repeat 

offenders, are selected and opened for further inspection. Canada uses 

x-ray technology to help identify packages containing prohibited items, 

and Mexican officials told us that all international packages arriving 

from FMD-affected countries are opened and inspected for prohibited 

items.

• Garbage from international carriers. The countries’ federal agencies 

responsible for protecting animal health supervise the containment, 

transportation, and processing of garbage from international carriers. 

They generally dispose of international garbage by incineration or under 

certain conditions by burial at federally approved sites. For example, in 

Canada, international garbage can be buried at approved sites located at 

least half a kilometer from any premise with livestock and/or poultry 

and must be immediately covered by 1.8 meters (approx. 5.5 feet) of 

local refuse and/or other standard covering material. At the time of our 

review, none of the countries allowed domestic animals to be fed 

international garbage from airlines or ships. 

18All imported animal product shipments receive a documentary review, which usually 

involves a review of the accompanying paperwork, such as import permits and health 

certifications. A percentage of animal product shipments is judgmentally selected for 

physical inspection to ensure that the products do not present any animal or public health 

risk. Samples may be taken for laboratory analyses as part of this inspection.
Chapter 3

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In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA noted that the United 

Kingdom faces greater risk than the United States because it is a member of 

the European Union, which includes, and provides for trade among, 

countries that are FMD-free as well as some that are not.

The United States differed from Canada and Mexico in the measures used 

to prevent FMD from entering the country via international passengers. 

Specifically, we noted the following three areas of difference:

• Use of signs at ports of entry. While Canada, Mexico, and the United 

States all posted special signs at ports of entry to alert international 

passengers to the dangers of FMD, the U.S. signs were smaller and less 

visible in comparison with the signs used by the other two countries. 

For example, the Canadian signs were over 6 feet tall and warned 

passengers in large, bold letters in both English and French about FMD. 

Similarly, in Mexico the signs were also over 6 feet tall, included 

pictures, and colored text in English or Spanish. In contrast, the first 

U.S. signs were 1-by-1 foot and included relatively small-sized text on a 

white background that was difficult to read and did not easily convey 

the importance of the message. According to USDA officials, these 

signs were subsequently replaced with larger signs (3-by-3 feet) that 

included a colored graphic and larger-sized text. While larger, we 

observed at one U.S. international airport that the new signs were 

placed at a considerable distance from arriving passengers. These signs 

were placed on easels on top of the baggage carousels and therefore 

were several feet above eye level. In contrast, we observed that the 

signs in Canada and Mexico were placed in more easily visible locations 

that were in greater proximity to the passengers. According to 

agriculture officials in all three countries, they are limited in their ability 

to place signs at ports of entry because they have to negotiate the size 

and placement with the port authorities. As a result, they are not always 

able to use the most effective signs or locations. Figures 3 and 4 show 

the signs that were used in the United States and Canada and Mexico.
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Figure 3: U.S. FMD Signs Posted at Ports of Entry
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Figure 4: Canadian and Mexican FMD Signs Posted at Ports of Entry

• Modified declaration forms. In 2001, both Canada and Mexico made 

changes to the declaration forms they use to process international 

passengers upon arrival. For example, after the U.K. outbreak in 2001, 

Canada reworded its declaration form to provide examples of food 

products of concern, such as dairy products. Similarly, Mexico 

developed a separate form that passengers coming from FMD-affected 

countries must complete, and it asks clear, detailed agriculture-related 

questions. In contrast, the United States did not make any changes to its 

declaration form in 2001, and some of the international passengers we 

contacted considered the agriculture-related question on the form 

ineffective and unclear. A senior APHIS official told us that USDA was 

aware that the question on the form was confusing and ambiguous to 
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travelers. This official said that most of the confusion arises because 

the question on the form consolidates three questions into one.

In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA stated that it has 

recently worked with Customs to revise the agricultural question on the 

Customs declaration form. The form now includes two agriculturerelated questions that USDA believes will be more easily understood by 

travelers and will yield better information to the department to help 

focus its inspection efforts. The new form is currently being distributed 

throughout the country. Because USDA’s actions address our concerns, 

we have deleted our recommendation on this issue from this report. 

(See table 4 for a comparison of the agriculture-related questions on the 

prior and revised U.S. declaration forms.) 

Table 4: Agriculture-Related Questions on the Prior and Revised U.S. Declaration Forms

Note: aBoth forms require the questions to be answered with either a ”yes” or “no” response.

• Use of disinfectant mats. As a precaution, both Canada and Mexico 

developed guidelines requiring all international passengers arriving at 

airports and seaports to walk over disinfectant mats when entering the 

country. However, according to USDA officials, the United States chose 

not to use disinfectant mats because USDA research found that the 

disinfectant in the mat would become ineffective after a certain number 

of uses and may begin to harbor the virus, thus contaminating shoes that 

were otherwise clean. 

Conclusions The United States has had significant success in keeping the nation’s 

livestock FMD-free since 1929. To some extent, the success of this effort is 

directly related to the effectiveness of U.S. preventive measures both 

abroad and at the nation’s borders. However, because of the extensive 

Language on prior Customs declaration 

forma Language on revised Customs declaration forma

Q.11 I am (We are) bringing fruits, plants, 

meats, food, soil, birds, snails, other live 

animals, wildlife products, farm products; or, 

have been on a farm or ranch outside the 

U.S.

Q.11 I am (We are) bringing

(a) fruits, plants, food, insects: 

(b) meats, animals, animal/wildlife products: 

(c) disease agents, cell cultures, snails:

(d) soil or have been on a farm/ranch/pasture:

Q.12 I have (We have) been in close proximity of

(such as touching or handling) livestock:
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presence of FMD worldwide and because the magnitude and volume of 

international cargo and travel continue to expand, the nation’s vulnerability 

to an introduction of FMD remains high. The steps that other nations have 

taken to reduce the risk of FMD—such as signs to alert international 

passengers—could help improve USDA’s efforts to protect U.S. livestock. 

While we recognize that there is an additional cost to preparing new, larger, 

and more noticeable signs, we believe that, given the significant economic 

costs of an FMD outbreak to the nation, these costs are justified if they can 

help improve our preventive measures.

Recommendation for 

Executive Action

To help improve the effectiveness of U.S. measures to prevent the 

introduction of FMD by international passengers, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Agriculture direct the Administrator, APHIS, to develop more 

effective signage about FMD for ports of entry. 

Agency Comments In its comments on a draft of this report, USDA stated that it is in the 

process of developing new signage for ports of entry that will be larger and 

more mobile than the ones that we observed during the course of our work.
Page 53 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

Chapter 4

Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States 

Will Face Challenges in Responding Quickly 

and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak Chapte4r

If FMD enters the United States despite USDA’s preventive measures, the 

nation’s ability to identify, control, contain, and eradicate the disease 

quickly and effectively becomes paramount. Recognizing the importance 

of an effective response and the necessity to prepare before an outbreak 

occurs, USDA and most states have developed emergency response plans 

that establish a framework for the key elements necessary for a rapid and 

successful U.S. response and eradication program. Many of these plans 

have, to some extent, been tested by federal and state agencies to 

determine their effectiveness. However, planning and testing exercises 

have also identified several challenges that could ultimately impede an 

effective and timely U.S. response if they are not resolved before an FMD 

outbreak occurs. 

The Federal 

Government and Many 

States Have Developed 

and Tested Emergency 

Response Plans

Planning for a coordinated response to emergencies, including outbreaks 

of animal disease, is occurring at both the federal and state levels. 

Furthermore, both the federal government and many states have tested and 

revised their plans in response to the results of these tests.

Federal and State 

Governments Have 

Developed Emergency 

Response Plans

At the federal level, 26 federal agencies and the American Red Cross signed 

the federal response plan in April 1999, which is intended to guide the 

federal response to national emergencies and augment state response 

efforts. Under this plan, the Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA) is designated as the coordinating agency and is responsible for 

providing expertise in emergency communications, command and control, 

and public affairs. In the event of an FMD outbreak, FEMA would 

designate USDA as the lead agency and work closely with the department 

to coordinate the support of other federal agencies to respond to the 

outbreak. For example, under the plan, Customs would “lock down” ports 

of entry; the Department of Defense would provide personnel, equipment, 

and transport; the Environmental Protection Agency would provide 

technical support on the disposal of animal carcasses; the National Park 

Service would guide the response if wildlife become infected; and other 

agencies would provide additional support.

To supplement the federal response plan and provide specific guidelines 

for an animal disease emergency, such as implementing quarantines of 
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Despite Preparation Efforts, the United 

States Will Face Challenges in Responding 

Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak

Page 54 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

infected premises and disposing of animal carcasses, APHIS, USDA’s 

Homeland Security Council, and FEMA are taking the lead in developing a 

federal plan specifically for responding to an FMD or other highly 

contagious outbreak of an animal disease. The draft plan calls for the 

involvement of more than 20 agencies and describes the authorities, 

policies, situations, planning assumptions, concept of operations, and 

federal agency resources that will provide the framework for an integrated 

local, state, and federal response. 

At the state level, many states have developed an animal disease 

component for their state’s emergency management plans. According to 

the National Animal Health Emergency Management System (NAHEMS),19

in January 2000, only about half the states and U.S. territories had 

developed animal health emergency response plans. At that time, 

NAHEMS recommended that each state develop a plan for responding to 

animal health emergencies that links to their state’s emergency 

management plan and includes information on the following key elements:

• Animal health surveillance and detection systems.

• Control and eradication procedures.

• Communication between key partners.

• Involvement of emergency management officials.

• Collaboration between state and federal emergency responders.

• Involvement of state and federal animal health officials in responding to 

natural disasters.

According to NAHEMS, in its 2001 annual report dated March 2002, the 

number of states and U.S. territories with animal disease emergency plans 

had increased to 46, of which 45 had included the plan as part of their 

state’s emergency management plan, and 30 indicated that their plan 

included all of the elements listed above. 

19 NAHEMS is a joint federal-state-industry group whose objectives include improving the 

U.S. ability to respond to animal health emergencies.
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Federal and State Agencies 

Have Tested Their 

Emergency Response Plans

To ensure the efficacy and completeness of their plans, the federal 

government and many of the states have conducted “tabletop” and 

functional exercises. Tabletop exercises bring together key decision 

makers in a relatively stress-free setting to

• discuss the contingencies and logistics of a hypothetical disease 

outbreak;

• evaluate plans, policies, and procedures; and

• resolve questions of coordination and responsibility. 

The setting is relatively stress-free because there is no time limit to resolve 

the hypothetical outbreak. In contrast, functional exercises simulate an 

emergency in the most realistic way possible, without moving people or 

equipment. It is a stressful, real-time exercise in which people apply 

emergency response functions to a hypothetical scenario. According to 

one APHIS official, functional exercises are best described as “dress 

rehearsals” for actual emergencies. 

The federal government has held both tabletop and functional exercises, as 

described below:

• To ensure that the federal FMD emergency response plan is 

comprehensive and well coordinated, USDA conducted a tabletop 

exercise in 2001. In this exercise, USDA developed a scenario involving 

a modest, limited FMD outbreak in the United States and obtained the 

views of 21 federal agencies and the American Red Cross on how they 

could support the federal response to an FMD outbreak. USDA used 

this information to revise its draft national FMD response plan. 

• The federal government held a functional exercise in 2000—the 

Tripartite Exercise 2000—to test the plans, policies, and procedures that 

would guide the emergency response to a multifocal FMD outbreak in 

North America. The test focused on communication between the 

various entities involved in an outbreak and the use of vaccines by 

Canada, Mexico, and the United States. The test resulted in many 

recommendations to improve the three countries’ abilities to

(1) communicate effectively, (2) provide program support, and (3) use 

vaccines. According to the final report, the recommendations, if 

implemented, will improve North America’s overall response capacity. 
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The three countries have established working groups tasked with 

responding to these recommendations. 

Similarly, as of 2001, about 26 states had periodically conducted various 

kinds of exercises to test state responses to an FMD or other animal 

disease outbreak, according to NAHEMS. For example, in June 2001, the 

Texas Animal Health Commission, in conjunction with the Texas Division 

of Emergency Management within the Texas Department of Public Safety, 

conducted a 4-day modified functional exercise of the state’s draft FMD 

response plan and engaged 23 federal, state, academic, and private entities 

in the exercise. The exercise was designed to test participants’ abilities to 

control the simulated outbreak, find and deliver indemnity funds, and 

streamline the decision-making processes. Overall, the exercise 

determined that better communication and coordination could improve the 

speed and effectiveness of the state’s response. It also identified areas of 

ambiguity in the plan that left participants without clear directions at 

crucial times during the exercise. According to state officials, the plan was 

revised as a result of the exercise, and according to the Executive Director 

of the Texas Animal Health Commission, more exercises are necessary to 

continuously improve the plan. However, the state veterinarian also said 

that he does not believe that adequate resources are available either at the 

federal or state level for such activities.

Serious Challenges to 

an Effective U.S. 

Response Are Yet to Be 

Resolved

As the U.K. experience has demonstrated, responding to an FMD outbreak 

can tax a nation’s fiscal, scientific, and human resources. If a similar 

outbreak were to occur in the United States, the nation would face a wide 

spectrum of challenges that can hamper an effective and rapid response: 

(1) the need for rapid disease identification and reporting; (2) effective 

communication, coordination, and cooperation between federal, state, and 

local responders; (3) an adequate response infrastructure, including 

equipment, personnel, and laboratory capacity; and (4) clear animal 

identification, indemnification, and disposal policies. While USDA has 

made some progress in addressing some of these issues, significant work 

remains.

Rapid Disease Identification 

and Reporting

The rapid identification and reporting of an FMD incident is key to 

mounting a timely response. However, a timely response depends on 

livestock producers’ and private veterinarians’ quickly identifying and 

reporting suspicious symptoms to state and federal officials. If they do not 
Chapter 4

Despite Preparation Efforts, the United 

States Will Face Challenges in Responding 

Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak

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do so, FMD could become out of control before the federal and state 

governments could initiate any action. For example, within the first few 

days of the outbreak in the United Kingdom, before the first reports of FMD 

reached British officials, infected animals were criss-crossing the country 

in hundreds of separate movements, putting other livestock at risk. The 

main geographical spread of the disease occurred before any suspicion that 

the disease was present in the country. In contrast, in France, county 

officials quickly identified diseased animals from the United Kingdom, and 

were able to slaughter them quickly and avoid a large-scale outbreak. As a 

result, France sustained minimal animal losses and was declared FMD-free 

within months, while it took the United Kingdom almost a year to eradicate 

the disease and regain its FMD-free status.

Several federal and state animal health officials with whom we spoke were 

concerned about how quickly disease identification and reporting would 

actually occur in the United States. They told us that livestock producers 

or veterinarians may not readily identify FMD because (1) the disease 

presents symptoms that are similar to other less-serious diseases, (2) FMD 

and other foreign animal diseases are not usually included in veterinary 

school curricula, and (3) many veterinarians may never have seen FMDinfected animals. Furthermore, livestock producers and veterinarians may 

not report the disease because they are not aware of the reporting process 

or may not realize the criticality of prompt reporting. 

According to USDA officials, the U.K. outbreak helped raise general 

awareness among state officials, private veterinarians, and livestock 

producers about the risks and potential of an FMD outbreak in the United 

States. An indication of this increased awareness is the doubling of foreign 

animal disease investigations from about 400 in 2000 to more than 800 in 

2001. In addition, federal and state officials told us that the U.K. outbreak 

led to greater awareness of the need to have trained diagnosticians for 

foreign animal diseases in the field. In recent years, more field 

veterinarians have attended foreign animal disease training at USDA’s Plum 

Island facility.20

Nevertheless, as described in chapter 2, USDA intensified its efforts to 

increase public and industry awareness about FMD after the U.K. outbreak 

20 Plum Island is USDA’s high-security laboratory (with a biosafety level-III status) located 

on an island off of Long Island, New York, and is the only U.S. laboratory authorized to 

conduct diagnostic testing of FMD-suspected samples using live FMD virus. 
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in 2001. As part of these efforts, USDA also addressed industry and animal 

health associations, and sponsored workshops, conferences, and 

informational telecasts for federal, state, and local officials, and others. In 

addition, the state governments also supported and supplemented USDA’s 

informational efforts. Despite USDA and state efforts to flood the livestock 

industry with information about the risks of FMD during 2001, the 

challenge to USDA will be to maintain this heightened awareness about 

FMD, now that the immediate risk from the U.K. outbreak has subsided.

Cooperation, Coordination, 

and Communication

Cooperation, coordination, and communication between federal, state, and 

local agencies, private veterinarians, and livestock producers are essential 

for an effective FMD response. Recent planning efforts and test exercises 

have helped start the process of establishing greater coordination and 

improving the level of cooperation and communication between all levels. 

According to a USDA official, for example, USDA’s recent planning efforts 

to develop a national FMD response plan brought together officials from a 

variety of federal agencies to consider the implications of an FMD outbreak 

to their areas of responsibility and helped them develop ways in which they 

could support a federal response.

Moreover, efforts to improve communication, cooperation, and 

coordination are beginning to transcend state boundaries. In 2001, 26 U.S. 

states/territories reported to NAHEMS that they were part of a group of 

states that had agreed to support each other in preparing for and 

responding to animal health emergencies. For example, according to 

Midwestern state officials, they are now beginning to address regional 

coordination and cooperation issues. In May 2002, seven Midwestern 

states met in Iowa for a planning conference to discuss a coordinated 

response plan for the region. 

While these planning and testing efforts have improved the level of 

communication, coordination, and cooperation, they have also identified 

areas that need considerable attention. For example, although the 

Tripartite Exercise of 2000 identified generally good communication and 

cooperation between government and industry participants, it also 

identified the need for the following actions:

• Improve the technology used to ensure an uninterrupted flow of 

information.
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• Develop written agreements between national animal health and 

industry officials to ensure a continued high level of communication 

even when players change. 

• Have federal and state counterparts work together to develop 

collaborative relationships that will improve communications during an 

actual outbreak. 

We also found that cooperation and communication between federal and 

state officials varied by state. For example, while some state officials 

indicated that they had excellent working relationships with their federal 

counterpart located in the state, others told us that cooperation and 

communication were limited. According to one APHIS field veterinarian, 

the level of cooperation and communication depends to a large extent on 

the personalities of the people involved and therefore such variance is to be 

expected. While the development of written agreements as suggested by 

the Tripartite exercise report and NAHEMS could help alleviate this 

problem, as of 2001, only about 32 U.S. states/territories had such 

agreements or other documents that detailed the respective roles of federal 

and state officials.

To help improve cooperation, coordination, and communication, USDA 

officials told us that they are working with organizations such as the 

National Emergency Management Association to help states with their 

animal-emergency-planning efforts. In addition, USDA awarded 38 grants 

totaling $1.8 million in 2001 to state agencies, tribal nations, and emergency 

management organizations. According to USDA, this funding was to be 

used for training, equipment, and emergency-preparedness exercises. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA stated that in late May 2002, 

it announced that it would be making more than $43 million available as 

grants to the states for strengthening homeland security preparedness. Of 

this $43 million, $14 million is to help states meet the national standards of 

emergency preparedness established by NAHEMS. Moreover, USDA stated 

that it is working with FEMA to develop a framework for a comprehensive 

communications plan to address a foreign animal disease outbreak. The 

plan will help better ensure the timely dissemination of information to 

critical audiences, including federal agencies, states, and industries.
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Adequate Response 

Infrastructure

An effective response to an FMD outbreak requires an effective 

infrastructure, including a national emergency management control and 

command center, technical and other personnel, transportation and 

disposal equipment, and laboratory facilities and testing capacity. 

To ensure that a U.S. response to an FMD outbreak is properly coordinated 

and adequately controlled, USDA has established an Emergency 

Management Operations Center at its Riverdale, Maryland, location. In the 

event of an outbreak, USDA will activate this center to coordinate day-today activities during an FMD response and notify U.S. trading partners of 

the status of the outbreak. According to USDA’s draft FMD response plan, 

APHIS will set up the Joint Information Center—collocated with the 

Emergency Management Operations Center—to serve as the primary 

source of public information about the response and will coordinate with 

other federal and state information centers. 

In addition, as the U.K. outbreak illustrated, responding to an FMD 

outbreak requires extensive personnel resources. These include persons 

who can provide (1) specialized animal disease support for testing and 

diagnosis, epidemiology, vaccination, slaughter, and carcass disposal; (2) 

biohazard response support for controlling animals’ movement and 

decontaminating infected and exposed premises, equipment, and 

personnel; and (3) general logistics support for sheltering and feeding 

responders; the transportation, movement, and positioning of equipment 

and supplies; and general law enforcement. During the 2001 outbreak, the 

U.K. government had to request specialized animal disease support from 

several countries, including the United States, Canada, Australia, and New 

Zealand; hire thousands of private contractors to provide slaughter and 

decontamination support; and use military personnel to provide general 

logistical support. According to a U.K. government working paper issued 

in March 2002, during the peak of the outbreak, more than 7,000 civil 

servants, 2,000 veterinarians, and 2,000 armed forces personnel were 

involved in the response—making it a bigger and more complex logistical 

exercise than the United Kingdom’s involvement in the Gulf War. 

A recent test exercise in Iowa indicates that the personnel requirements to 

respond to an FMD outbreak in the United States would also be 

enormous—approaching 50,000 people to support a response. More 

specifically, according to APHIS estimates, the United States would be at 

least 1,200 veterinarians short of the required 2,000 to 3,000 specially 

trained veterinarians needed to respond to an animal health emergency. 

APHIS officials told us that while state and private veterinarians could help 
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make up some of this difference, without appropriate training, their help 

would be of limited use. 

To address the personnel challenges posed by an FMD outbreak, USDA has 

undertaken several efforts. By partnering with FEMA and other emergency 

management organizations, USDA will be able to leverage these agencies’

resources to help provide many of the general logistical support activities. 

Similarly, USDA has established a memorandum of understanding with the 

Department of Defense to provide military personnel and equipment to 

support a response effort. In addition, APHIS has implemented an 

Emergency Veterinarian Officer Program to increase the number of 

veterinarians available to assist in an animal health emergency. The 

program trains federal, state, and private veterinarians to handle 

emergency situations. As of December 2001, APHIS had trained 276 

emergency veterinarian officers, 145 of whom participated in responding to 

the U.K. outbreak. Moreover, USDA has trained 520 veterinarians across 

the country as foreign animal disease diagnosticians, and they may be 

called upon to provide specialized animal health support in the event of an 

outbreak. Finally, according to APHIS officials, USDA has informal 

arrangements with the United Kingdom and other countries to provide the 

United States with veterinary support. More formally, Australia, Canada, 

New Zealand, the United States, and the United Kingdom are currently 

drafting a memorandum of understanding that would allow the five 

countries to share veterinary resources in the event of an animal health 

emergency. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA also indicated that it has 

created a National Animal Health Reserve Corps, composed of private 

veterinarians from around the country who would be willing to assist 

APHIS veterinarians in field and laboratory operations during a foreign 

animal disease situation. According to USDA, to date, more than 275 

private veterinarians have signed on to this corps and the department is 

continuing its efforts to recruit more members. This corps will supplement 

the personnel drawn from states, and other federal agencies and 

organizations.

A response infrastructure also requires a diagnostic laboratory system that 

is capable of handling the volume of testing and analysis necessary in the 

event of an outbreak. For example, from February through December 

2001, the United Kingdom’s Pirbright Laboratory, that country’s primary 

reference laboratory, tested 15,000 samples for the presence of the FMD 

virus and performed 1 million monitoring tests to ensure that the disease 
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had been eradicated. Nationwide, a total of 2.75 million samples were 

tested as part of the response to the outbreak. Despite this level of testing, 

according to U.S. veterinarians returning from the United Kingdom, the 

United Kingdom had unmet needs for laboratory assistance. 

In the United States, USDA’s Plum Island facility—the primary laboratory in 

the United States that is authorized to test suspected FMD samples—would 

be quickly overwhelmed in the event of an FMD outbreak, according to 

many federal and state officials with whom we spoke. Recognizing this 

potential problem, the National Association of State Departments of 

Agriculture recently recommended that the United States develop a 

national strategy for animal health diagnostic laboratory services that 

would include USDA’s Plum Island facility and its National Veterinary 

Services Laboratories at Ames, Iowa, as well as state and university 

laboratories. Currently, state diagnostic laboratories have no formal role in 

a foreign animal disease response. In addition, the Director of the Plum 

Island facility stated that the nation needs to look beyond Plum Island for 

laboratory support in the event of a large-scale FMD outbreak. He 

suggested that off-site noncentralized testing, using noninfectious material 

(tests that do not use the live virus), should be considered with backup 

testing support provided by Plum Island. APHIS officials told us that while 

the idea of a regional laboratory structure has merit, several issues would 

have to be addressed before such a structure could be implemented. For 

example, laboratory personnel would have to undergo continuous training 

and certification, and facilities would have to be renovated and maintained 

to provide state of the art capabilities. This would require a significant 

commitment of resources.

In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA stated that as part of its 

efforts to strengthen homeland security preparedness, it is providing state 

and university cooperators with $20.6 million to establish a network of 

diagnostic laboratories dispersed strategically throughout the country. 

This network will permit the rapid and accurate diagnosis of animal disease 

threats. Moreover, USDA stated that earlier this year it allocated $177 

million to make improvements at key locations, including its diagnostic and 

research facilities in Ames, Iowa, and Plum Island, and that $15.3 million 

was allocated to USDA’s Agricultural Research Service to improve rapid 

detection technology for FMD as well as other animal diseases. 
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Animal Identification, 

Disposal, and 

Indemnification Policies

The effectiveness of a U.S. response to an FMD outbreak will require an 

animal identification and tracking system to allow responders to identify, 

control, and slaughter infected and exposed animals as well as clear animal 

disposal and indemnification policies. The 2002 farm bill,21 addresses 

animal disposal and indemnification issues by providing the Secretary of 

Agriculture with broad authority to hold, seize, treat, or destroy any animal, 

as well as to limit interstate livestock movement as part of USDA’s efforts 

to prevent the spread of any livestock disease or pest. The Secretary may 

also take measures to detect, control, or eradicate any pest or disease of 

livestock, as needed. In addition, the farm bill requires the Secretary to 

compensate owners on the basis of the fair market value of destroyed 

animals and related materials. USDA is currently trying to develop specific 

guidance on how these authorities will be implemented.

Many epidemiologists believe that in the event of an FMD outbreak, 

successfully tracing affected animal movements within 24 hours is 

essential if the response is to be effective. However, the United States 

generally does not require animal identification, nor does it have a system 

for tracking animal movements. As a result, according to a USDA official, 

in the event of an FMD outbreak, USDA would likely have to rely on sales 

records to track animal movements, which could take days, or weeks, 

depending on the accuracy of record-keeping and producer/seller 

cooperation.

The longer it takes to identify animals and track their movements from 

premise to premise, the more difficult it becomes to contain the outbreak. 

USDA officials told us that, depending on where the outbreak is first 

identified, it may be relatively easy or extremely difficult to trace. For 

example, if only one farm were infected and animals had not recently been 

moved on or off the premises, no tracing of live animals would be 

necessary. However, if the outbreak first appeared in a major market or 

feedlot where hundreds of animals move in and out on almost a daily basis, 

tracing would be very difficult and time-consuming. 

Recognizing the importance of an animal identification and tracking 

system, USDA began planning such a system 3 years ago, according to the 

Director of the National Animal Identification initiative. However, the 

21 The President signed the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (the 2002 farm 

bill) on May 13, 2002.
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industry resisted the concept because of the costs involved and the 

potential for the unauthorized disclosure of proprietary information. The 

Director noted that the events of September 11, 2001, as well as 

technological advances appear to be reducing the level of industry 

opposition to a national animal identification system. For example, this 

official told us that the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association recently 

indicated some support for such a system. However, the following issues 

will need to be resolved before a national system can be developed and 

implemented: 

• The responsibility for funding the system. 

• The type of technology that should be employed—strictly visual, 

electronic, or some combination.

• The amount of information that should be included on each animal’s 

identification tag or electronic-tracking device.

• The persons able to access this information.

• The information that should be shared with other federal departments 

and agencies.

• At what point on the farm-to-table continuum should identification end?

In addition, during an FMD outbreak in the United States, the disposal of 

carcasses could become a significant challenge because of the potential 

number of animals that may have to be slaughtered. For example, during 

the U.K. outbreak, over 4 million animals, primarily sheep, were 

slaughtered for controlling the disease. According to USDA estimates, if 

the United States had an outbreak of comparable magnitude (affecting 

about 8 percent of the livestock population), over 13 million animals would 

be affected, and most of them would be cattle and hogs. Generally, 

disposal can occur by burial, incineration, or rendering. In the United 

States, according to USDA’s draft FMD response plan, burial would be the 

preferred method of disposal when conditions make it practical. The plan 

states that burial is the fastest, easiest, and most economical method of 

disposal. When burial is not feasible, the plan recommends incineration as 

the alternative means of disposal even though USDA recognizes that 

incineration is both difficult and expensive. According to a USDA 

veterinarian who helped during the U.K. outbreak, a 200-meter funeral pyre 

was used to incinerate 400 cows or 1,200 sheep or 1,600 pigs. Such a pyre 
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required 1,000 railway ties, 8 tons of kindling, 400 wooden pallets, 4 tons of 

straw, 200 tons of coal, and 1,000 liters of diesel fuel. In addition, heavy 

equipment, such as bulldozers and a team of about 18 to 20 people, was 

needed to construct the pyre. Figures 5 and 6 show burial pits and 

incineration pyres used in the United Kingdom to dispose of slaughtered 

animals.

Figure 5: Disposal of Animal Carcasses by Burial in the United Kingdom

Source: USDA.
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Figure 6: Disposal of Animal Carcasses by Incineration in the United Kingdom 

Source: USDA.

According to the federal and state officials we spoke with, each of these 

disposal methods presents significant implementation challenges that have 

not yet been fully considered. For example, burial poses such challenges 

as the potential to contaminate groundwater, the need to identify burial 

sites and obtain appropriate federal and state permits and clearances in 

advance, and the potential to spread the disease if animals have to be 

transported to an off-farm burial site. For incineration, the incineration 

site has to be accessible to large equipment, and yet has to be sufficiently 

away from public view to minimize negative public reaction to the sight of 

large burning pyres. In addition, incineration could not only affect air 

quality but also may be ineffective because if not constructed properly, the 

pyres may not generate sufficient temperatures to completely incinerate 

the carcasses. According to a USDA veterinarian, in the United Kingdom 

the pyres generally burned for about 9 to 10 days before all of the carcasses 

were incinerated. Similarly, rendering poses challenges because 

transporting carcasses to rendering plants increases the risk of spreading 
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the disease, and additional cleaning and disinfecting procedures would be 

needed at the rendering facility. Some U.S. veterinarians returning from the 

United Kingdom told us that during the outbreak, the United Kingdom 

faced many of these disposal challenges and they were concerned that the 

United States might not have devoted enough attention to deciding how it 

would address these or similar disposal issues. According to APHIS 

officials, USDA is currently creating digital maps of the whole country to 

help identify appropriate burial and incineration locations. In addition, 

USDA is trying to determine alternative uses of carcasses, such as safely 

converting the meat into food, and using vaccinations to limit the number 

of animals slaughtered and thus requiring disposal.

Finally, clear indemnification and compensation criteria are needed to 

ensure producer cooperation to slaughter and dispose of infected and 

exposed livestock during an outbreak. During the U.K. outbreak, the 

government agency responsible for responding to the outbreak 

experienced delays in slaughtering animals because of farmers’ resistance 

and legal challenges. According to state and livestock association officials, 

indemnification would be a significant issue—one that could hamper a 

rapid response in the United States. 

USDA published a proposed rule on May 1, 2002, amending the indemnity 

provisions for its FMD-related regulations. This proposed rule clarifies 

how USDA will determine the value of animals and materials affected by an 

FMD outbreak and how indemnity payments will be made to claimants. 

USDA developed this proposed rule because it was concerned that 

potential delays to an FMD eradication program in the United States might 

occur because of producers’ perceptions that they might not be adequately 

compensated for the fair market value of destroyed animals, products, and 

materials as well as cleaning and disinfecting costs. Under the proposed 

rule, the federal government would pay 100 percent of the costs for the 

purchase, destruction, and disposition of animals if they become infected 

with FMD, as well as for materials contaminated with FMD and the 

cleaning and disinfection of affected premises, according to USDA.

In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA agreed that animal 

identification, carcass disposal, and indemnity are all absolutely vital areas 

that have to be addressed before any major outbreak of disease. In this 

regard, USDA stated that it is working closely with the agricultural 

industries to provide forums for a national dialogue on the issue of a 

national identification plan for American livestock. The ultimate objective 

is to establish a national identification plan that provides the essential 
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elements to improve emergency response and meet future needs. USDA 

further stated that it is investing in other options for disposing of carcasses 

on a large scale. Finally, USDA stated that it has extended the comment 

period from July 1 to July 31, 2002, for its proposed regulations that address 

how decisions regarding indemnity payments will be made in the event of 

an FMD outbreak.

Conclusions If an outbreak of FMD in the United States rages out of control, it could 

ultimately cost tens of billions of dollars and the destruction of millions of 

animals. To avoid such catastrophic consequences, the disease must be 

stamped out quickly. Although the federal government and state 

governments have made significant progress in developing and testing 

emergency response plans for an animal disease outbreak, such as FMD, 

significant issues remain unresolved. These unresolved issues could 

present major impediments to an effective and timely response if not 

addressed before an outbreak occurs. While USDA currently has several 

ongoing efforts to resolve many of these issues, the department has not 

established specific time frames for the completion of these efforts. We 

believe it is critical that adequate management attention and resources be 

made available to ensure that these issues are resolved expeditiously. 

Recommendation for 

Executive Action

To ensure that the United States is well positioned to respond effectively to 

an animal disease outbreak such as FMD, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Agriculture direct the Administrator of APHIS to develop a 

plan, which should include interim milestones and completion dates, for 

addressing the various unresolved issues that could challenge an effective 

U.S. response.
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Appendix I

Countries Considered FMD-Free by the Apendxies

United States ApendxiI

As of April 29, 2002, USDA considered the following countries/areas free of 

foot and mouth disease (FMD) and rinderpest (cattle plague):

Australia

Austria22

Bahama Islands22

Barbados

Belgium22

Belize (British Honduras)

Bermuda

Canada

Channel Islands22

Chile22

Costa Rica

Czech Republic22

Denmark22

Dominican Republic

El Salvador

Fiji

Finland22

France22

Germany22

Greenland

Guatemala

Haiti

Honduras

Hungary22

Iceland

Italy22

Jamaica

Japan22

Luxemborg22

Mexico

Netherlands22

New Caledonia22

New Zealand

Nicaragua

Northern Ireland22

Norway22

Panama

Panama Canal Zone

Papua New Guinea22
Appendix I

Countries Considered FMD-Free by the 

United States

Page 70 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

Poland22

Portugal22

Republic of Ireland22

Spain22

Sweden22

Switzerland22

Territory of St. Pierre and Miquelon

Tobago

Trinidad

Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands

22 These countries are included in special categories for FMD and rinderpest because even 

though they have been determined to be free of these diseases, one or more of the following 

conditions exist: (1) they supplement their national meat supply through the importation of 

fresh, chilled, or frozen meat of ruminants or swine from countries/areas that are not 

designated as free of rinderpest or FMD; (2) they have a common land border with 

countries/areas that are not designated as free of rinderpest or FMD; or (3) they import 

ruminants or swine from countries/areas that are not designated as free of rinderpest or 

FMD under conditions less restrictive than would be acceptable for importation into the 

United States.
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Appendix II

Measures for Preventing the Introduction of 

FMD into Canada ApendxiI

This appendix provides summary information on Canada’s preventive 

measures to ensure that FMD does not enter the country via five key 

pathways included in our review: (1) the importation of live animals; (2) the 

importation of animal products; (3) the handling and disposal of garbage 

from international carriers, such as airplanes and ships; (4) international 

passengers; and (5) packages sent through international mail.

Background The creation of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), in April 

1997, consolidated the delivery of all federal food, animal, and plant health 

inspection programs, which were previously provided by four federal 

agencies, into a single food safety agency for Canada. CFIA delivers food, 

plant, and animal inspection programs in 18 regions across Canada. CFIA 

has 180 field offices, including border ports of entry, and 408 offices in 

nongovernment establishments, such as processing facilities. CFIA also 

has 13 biosecurity level-III laboratories, including 1 that handles FMD and 

large animals.23 These laboratories provide scientific advice, develop new 

technologies, provide testing services, and conduct research.

The Health of Animals Act authorizes CFIA to prevent the introduction of 

diseases that may harm animals or humans. CFIA controls the importation 

of animals and animal products from foreign countries to reduce the risk of 

introducing serious animal diseases, such as FMD. The last outbreak of 

FMD in Canada was in 1952. CFIA has 14 inspection programs for animals, 

food, and plants produced in Canada and commodities and live animals 

imported into Canada. One of these programs is the Animal Health and 

Production program, which is applied at Canadian ports of entry. This 

program covers the issuing of import permits, quarantining of live animal 

imports, negotiating export health requirements with other nations’

government, and establishing and ensuring compliance with Canadian 

import health standards. In addition, the program is responsible for 

implementing domestic disease control programs, foreign animal disease 

preparedness, and emergency response. 

23 Canada’s biosecurity level-IV laboratory conducts tests on animals infected with 

dangerous zoonotic agents.
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Controls for Live 

Animal Imports

Canada allows live animal imports only from countries that are FMD-free 

and have been preapproved by CFIA. Generally, live animals imported into 

Canada must be admitted through approved inspection ports of entry. For 

example, live animals imported into Canada by air from countries other 

than the United States are required to enter at airports, such as Vancouver, 

Halifax, Montreal, Toronto, and Calgary. CFIA generally requires that an 

import permit application be filed in advance of the importation of live 

animals from countries other than the United States. The import permit 

contains information on the (1) importer, who must be a Canadian resident; 

(2) exporter; (3) destination of the animal(s); (4) producer; (5) port of 

entry; (6) preapproved quarantine site, if the animal is to be quarantined; 

and (7) description of animals to be imported including the number, 

species, breed, age, color, name, individual identification, and registration 

numbers or numbers from the official seal on the transporting vehicle. If 

quarantine periods are required for the animals, CFIA preapproves the 

quarantine premises. 

The inspection of shipments of live animals at Canadian ports of entry 

includes a document review and verification by Canadian Customs and 

CFIA, and in some cases, CFIA inspectors may off-load the animals for 

inspection, depending on their proposed use. As part of the physical 

inspection, inspectors may verify the animal identification numbers. CFIA 

usually requires the importer to have a license to move the imported 

animals to their final destination. Additionally, once animals have entered 

Canada, CFIA can impose post-import requirements, which may include 

the possible quarantine and testing or additional treatment of the animals. 

All live animals, regardless of their country of origin, must meet these 

general import requirements. However, once these requirements are met, 

Canada has separate procedures for live animal imports from the United 

States and those from other countries.

Live Animals Imported from 

the United States

Generally, live animals entering Canada from the United States must 

conform to entry requirements that are less stringent than those for 

animals from other countries. Depending on an animal’s state of origin and 

the intended use of the animal, tests for some foreign animal diseases that 

Canada does not have or has already eradicated, such as brucellosis, 

tuberculosis, anaplasmosis, and blue tongue, may be required. Some states 

have been preapproved by CFIA to export certain kinds of animals on the 

basis of the state’s disease status. For example, as of April 2002, the 
Appendix II

Measures for Preventing the Introduction of 

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following seven U.S. states were qualified to export restricted feeder cattle 

to Canada: Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, New York, North Dakota, South 

Dakota, and Washington.

CFIA generally does not require an import permit for most animals 

imported from the United States. For example, an import permit is not 

required for U.S. imports of breeding cattle and bob calves for fattening. 

These animals are required only to have an Official Zoosanitary Export 

Certificate signed by an official USDA veterinarian. The certificate 

contains information on the (1) name and address of the consignor; (2) 

consignee; (3) individual identification of the animals to be exported; (4) 

animal’s origin; (5) results of the veterinary examination of the animals; and 

(6) animal’s residency in the United States, which must be for a minimum 

of 60 days. Additionally, while some animals, such as bob calves and 

restricted feeder cattle, are not required to be tested for diseases that 

Canada does not have such as, tuberculosis, brucellosis, blue tongue, and 

anaplasmosis, others, such as breeding cattle, must be tested.

Similarly, a CFIA import permit and individual identification are not 

required for animals imported from the United States for direct slaughter. 

U.S. livestock to be exported to Canada for direct slaughter are placed in 

sealed trucks or containers and transported directly to the Canadian 

slaughter facility. CFIA requires all live animals imported for direct 

slaughter from the United States to be slaughtered within 4 days of 

importation.

CFIA encourages U.S. exporters to fax inspection certificates ahead of time 

to ease the border review process.24 Once a truckload of U.S. livestock 

arrives at the border, Canadian Customs performs a preclearance 

document review for CFIA and then sends the vehicle to the CFIA 

inspection area, where inspectors review the documentation to ensure that 

the information provided is correct. When required, CFIA unloads cattle 

for individual inspection. CFIA can perform inspections on the trailers if 

the load is small and it is safe to do so. U.S. livestock imported for direct 

slaughter requires only a visual inspection; however, imported breeding 

cattle are checked for health status, and their ear tags and tattoos are 

verified against the documentation provided. Every transporter is required 

24Live animals in transit by air are off-loaded only to change planes and, if destined for the 

United States, are placed in sealed trucks before leaving Canada. CFIA does not allow 

animals to transit Canada that would normally not be allowed into the country.
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to clean and disinfect the trucks, railway cars, aircraft, or shipping vessels 

that have been used to transport livestock immediately after they have 

been unloaded. 

A U.S. origin health certificate issued by a USDA-authorized veterinarian 

must accompany swine imports from the United States. The certificate 

contains the name and address of both the consignor and consignee and 

complete identification of the animals to be exported, including 

certification that the (1) United States is free of hog cholera; (2) herd of 

origin has been free of brucellosis and pseudo rabies for the past 12 

months, and that the animals exported have been tested for these two 

diseases; (3) animals have been isolated from other animals for at least 30 

days prior to export; (4) animals have been transported in cleaned and 

disinfected vehicles; and (5) animals have not been fed any garbage at any 

time. Additionally, all swine imported from the United States must be 

quarantined in Canada for at least 30 days in a CFIA-approved quarantine 

station. Swine shipments imported directly for slaughter are required to 

have an import permit.

CFIA requires shipments of bovine embryos or semen from the United 

States to be accompanied by a U.S. origin health certificate and an import 

permit. The certificate contains information such as the (1) registered 

name and identification number of the parents, (2) species and breed, 

(3) name and address of the consignor, (4) address of the collection 

premises, (5) numbers from the official seal on the transporting vehicle, 

and (6) name and address of the consignee. 

Live Animals Imported from 

Other Countries

To prevent the introduction of disease and control the importation of 

animals into Canada, the Minister of Agriculture designates countries or 

parts of countries free from specific diseases. Canada designates countries 

to be FMD-free after reviewing the (1) prevalence of disease in the country 

or part of a country, (2) time since the last outbreak of the disease, 

(3) surveillance programs in effect, (4) measures taken to prevent the 

introduction and spread of the disease, (5) natural barriers to the spread of 

the disease, and (6) the zoo-sanitary infrastructure. Importing countries 

must also be free of other Office of International des Epizooties (OIE) List 

A diseases in addition to FMD, such as rinderpest and classical swine fever. 

Importing countries that have OIE List B diseases, such as bovine 

spongiform encephalopathy, also known as mad cow disease; tuberculosis; 

and brucellosis must provide additional documentation proving that the 

herds being exported to Canada are free of these diseases. At the time of 
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our review, in addition to the United States, CFIA accepted live cattle 

imports only from Australia and New Zealand, and goats were permitted 

only from the United States. 

If CFIA recognizes a country as free of FMD and other diseases of concern, 

the importer must apply for an import permit for live animals. CFIA 

generally requires that all live animals imported into the country have a 

unique individual identification. However, there are exceptions for animals 

imported for direct slaughter. Additionally, all cattle must be tested for 

tuberculosis, brucellosis, blue tongue, and anaplasmosis, unless the 

exporting country is considered free of these diseases and certifies that it is 

free of other diseases of concern. 

CFIA has established additional requirements for importing horses into 

Canada from FMD-affected countries. Under CFIA supervision, horses 

from FMD-affected countries must be quarantined and washed with a 

disinfectant. In addition, their hooves and all equipment, such as saddles 

and tack, and all transportation vehicles must be cleaned and disinfected. 

Bedding and manure must be placed in bags and incinerated. 

Controls for Imported 

Animal Products

Canada allows only imports of FMD-susceptible animal products, such as 

fresh meat, from countries that have been preapproved by CFIA. Some 

animal products may be imported from FMD-affected countries if they 

meet certain requirements. CFIA and the Canada Customs and Revenue 

Agency (CCRA) combine investigation services at ports of entry to ensure 

that all Canadian import requirements are met prior to releasing the 

products into commerce. Animal product imports from the United States 

are generally required only to present proof of the country of origin at the 

port of entry. 

Countries or parts of countries officially considered FMD-free by CFIA can 

generally export many types of animal products to Canada. As with live 

animal imports, to designate a country as FMD-free, CFIA reviews 

information about the (1) prevalence of the disease in a country; (2) time 

since the last FMD outbreak; (3) surveillance programs in effect; 

(4) measures taken to prevent the introduction and spread of the disease; 

(5) natural barriers to the spread of the disease; and (6) zoo-sanitary 

infrastructure. 

For all countries, Canada also has a country-by-country meat inspection 

and approval system, which includes a review of the following (1) the 
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country's overall system of meat inspection, (2) the establishments 

operating within that system, and (3) the approval of individual meat 

products prepared in these establishments. Moreover, CFIA reviews 

relevant legislation and related technical information, including the 

country’s residue-monitoring program. If the requesting country has 

legislation equivalent to Canada’s, a visit is made to the country to study the 

actual implementation of the legislation in establishments. On the basis of 

satisfactory findings during the visit, establishments wishing to export 

meat products to Canada are approved. CFIA maintains a list of the 

countries and establishments that have been approved to export certain 

types of meat products into Canada. For those countries where the meat 

inspection system as a whole has not been approved, importation may be 

limited to specific meat products.

Importations from countries that are not considered free from FMD are 

normally limited, to include the following: (1) commercially sterile canned 

cooked meat products; (2) pasteurized, canned, cured, and boneless meat 

products; and (3) cooked, frozen, tubed and boneless beef from specified 

establishments in certain countries. Milk products are allowed entry if they 

have been treated properly and are certified accordingly. Establishments 

approved for meat and meat product exports to Canada are periodically 

reviewed.

All commercial shipments of imported meat products are subject to 

monitoring and inspection at the Canadian port of entry. Once a shipment 

is identified as containing meat products, it must be held until the CFIA 

inspector reviews the information, such as the Official Meat Inspection 

Certificate signed by the official veterinarian of the exporting country. The 

Official Meat Inspection Certificate contains information on the (1) name 

and address of the exporter and importer; (2) certificate number, country 

code, and exporting establishment number; (3) establishment number and 

name, and country where the animals were slaughtered; (4) name of the 

carrier; (5) port of loading and landing; (6) departure date; (7) number and 

description of the meat products; and (8) numbers from the official seal on 

the container and the container numbers. Depending on the exporting 

country, additional certifications may be required. Some animal product 

shipments are exempt from CFIA review because they are in transit 

through Canada to another country. CFIA does not review these 

shipments, provided they remain under a Customs bond and originate in a 

country and are of a type that would otherwise be eligible for entry into 

Canada. Animal product imports from the United States are generally 

required only to present proof of country of origin. However, some U.S. 
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products, such as meat and bone meal are also required to have an import 

permit. 

CFIA’s sampling and inspection procedures for all meat packed in boxes 

require the shipment to be totally unloaded and staged so that all 

containers are visible. Inspectors visually scan the shipment to identify any 

evidence of damaged or stained cartons and to verify outer labels. For 

shipments that include suspected or unsatisfactory containers, a full 

inspection of affected containers is conducted. For canned meat products, 

random inspections are carried out by the inspector on a minimum of 40 

cases, which are to be representative of the inspection lot and not include 

more than 5 containers from each of the cases. When there are fewer than 

40 cases in an inspection lot, inspectors select the appropriate number of 

containers out of each case to make up the required sample. For 

inspection lots having fewer than 200 containers, the entire inspection lot 

must be examined, and the total number of containers must be recorded on 

the report form. 

When a shipment is refused entry into Canada, the inspector must 

immediately hold the animal products and notify the area office by 

telephone. The inspector or an officer from the area office must officially 

notify the importer that the imported shipment is totally or partially refused 

and that the importer has 90 days to destroy it or remove it from Canada or 

it will be destroyed under direct supervision of a CFIA inspector.

Controls for 

International Garbage

Garbage from international airlines and ships must be disposed of and 

treated under the supervision of a CFIA inspector. Garbage from carriers 

of U.S. origin, however, is disposed of in landfills, similar to those for 

Canadian garbage. CFIA requires international garbage to be disposed of 

by incineration, heat treatment at 100° Celsius for 30 minutes, or burial at a 

CFIA-approved site. In addition, the transportation routes for international 

garbage are approved in advance along with alternative routes in case of an 

emergency. Transporters are responsible for maintaining their trucks in 

good condition and checking to ensure that there are no possible leaks.

Regarding foreign ships, CFIA monitors and inspects them to ensure that 

garbage on board the vehicle is stored and contained properly. Garbage 

can be removed only from ships at approved ports that have adequate 

incineration or burial sites. The ships’ destinations are also recorded at the 

first Canadian port of entry, and CFIA inspectors may seal galleys to ensure 

that foreign foodstuffs do not find their way onto Canadian land. At 
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subsequent Canadian ports, CFIA inspectors check the galley seals. Seals 

may be broken under CFIA presence but must be resealed prior to 

departure if the ship is going to additional Canadian ports. All foodstuffs 

and pet animals are to remain on the ship and are allowed off only with the 

written permission of CFIA. If ships do not comply with these 

requirements, CFIA can fine and bar the vessel from entering Canadian 

waters. 

Controls for 

International 

Passengers

CFIA inspectors work with CCRA officers and with specially trained 

detector dogs in all major airports to prevent the entry of prohibited plants 

and animal products. International passengers are required to declare all 

animals and animal products; the failure to declare certain animal products 

can result in fines. International passengers, except those arriving from the 

United States, are not allowed to bring meat and meat products into 

Canada but may bring up to 20 kilograms of cheese. Passengers not 

declaring prohibited items are subject to monetary penalties of up to Can. 

$400. At the main Canadian international airports, CFIA has approximately 

nine dogs trained to sniff baggage accompanying international passengers 

before they proceed through the federal inspection areas. The detector dog 

program is part of CFIA’s front line of defense against pests and diseases. 

The dogs are trained to detect items such as prohibited fruits, plants, and 

meat. When the dogs are not available, CFIA inspectors walk through the 

baggage claim area looking for anything that might be considered 

suspicious. 

CFIA made a number of changes to the international passenger controls as 

a result of the FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom and other parts of 

Europe. CFIA expanded its efforts to (1) use detector dogs at the airports, 

(2) x-ray passengers’ baggage, and (3) mount a public awareness campaign. 

As a part of the public awareness campaign, large signs were placed around 

the airport terminals informing the public about FMD and precautions that 

should be taken to prevent its introduction into Canada. Brochures were 

also printed conveying similar information and handed to international 

passengers arriving from FMD-infected countries. In addition, CCRA 

officials asked specific questions about whether the passengers had been 

around farm animals or visited farms or if they planned to visit a farm in 

Canada—even if the relevant question was not marked on the declaration 

card. This additional questioning ceased after the United Kingdom was 

declared FMD-free. Moreover, all international passengers entering 

Canada were required to step on a disinfectant mat. Passengers who 

indicated that they might present an FMD risk were asked additional 
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questions about their activities and—as deemed necessary—their shoes 

were sent out for cleaning. For example, when soccer teams came to 

Canada from countries that had FMD, their shoes were sent for cleaning at 

the teams’ expense. CFIA officials told us that even though the European 

outbreak is over, FMD still exists in many parts of the world, and they are 

planning to revamp their public awareness campaign and broaden the 

messages to cover all foreign pests and diseases. 

Controls for 

International Mail

CCRA officers inspect all international packages arriving into Canada by 

mail. Although CCRA officers are the only officials authorized to open 

mail, when inspectors find packages that need further inspection by 

agencies, such as CFIA or drug enforcement, they open it and affix a seal 

with a code indicating which agency should perform a further inspection. 

Generally, each package is then x-rayed. Problem importers/exporters are 

identified through a computer system, and these packages are given 

additional scrutiny. 

Recently, Canada passed new legislation making the recipient responsible 

for items sent through the mail, rather than the sender. As a result, 

recipients in Canada may be held responsible if they receive inappropriate 

items through the mail. For example, if personal shipments of prohibited 

agricultural products are sent through the mail, the recipient can be subject 

to monetary penalties of up to Can. $400. For commercial shipments, 

however, penalties for prohibited agricultural products can currently be as 

much as Can. $6,000. In addition, criminal penalties can also be imposed, 

depending on the nature of the offense.
Page 80 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

Appendix III

Measures for Preventing the Introduction of 

FMD into Mexico ApendxiI

This appendix provides summary information on the preventive measures 

that Mexico uses to ensure that FMD does not enter the country via five key 

pathways included in our review: (1) the importation of live animals; 

(2) the importation of animal products; (3) the handling and disposal of 

garbage from international carriers, such as airplanes and ships; 

(4) international passengers; and (5) packages sent through international 

mail.

Background The Mexican American Commission for the Eradication of Foot and Mouth 

Disease, formed in 1947, combined U.S. and Mexican efforts to eradicate 

FMD from Mexico.25 The commission built Mexico’s animal health 

infrastructure and successfully eradicated FMD from Mexico in 1954. 

Currently, the commission is responsible for performing a number of 

activities, including (1) foreign animal disease surveillance, (2) responding 

to reports of suspicious cases, (3) developing training on emergency plans 

and programs, (4) promoting public information programs, and 

(5) preparing and updating Mexico’s emergency foreign animal disease 

response plans.

Mexico’s Secretaria de Agricultura, Ganaderia, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y 

Alimentacion (SAGARPA) covers agriculture, rural development, fish, and 

food issues. SAGARPA is responsible for implementing, among other 

things, (1) the animal health laws and regulations, (2) the zoo-sanitary rules 

used by inspectors at border inspections at the port of entry, and (3) the 

animal health measures used in response to a foreign animal disease 

emergency. SAGARPA has 509 inspection offices, 105 of which are at 

international ports of entry, such as border crossings, airports, and 

seaports. For 2001, SAGARPA’s budget for borders, ports, and airports was 

about Mex. $11 million (approximately U.S. $1.1 million). All imports of 

live animals and agricultural products must be processed through one of 

SAGARPA’s offices. In addition, SAGARPA officials enforce compliance 

with Mexico’s official zoo-sanitary rules (1) at Customs offices, (2) at 

quarantine stations, (3) at inspection points, and (4) in other countries 

where treaties and accords have been approved. 

SAGARPA divides Mexico into eight regions and assigns a veterinarian 

coordinator to each region for animal disease surveillance and for 

25 The commission is currently called the Mexico-United States Commission for the 

Prevention of Foot-and-Mouth and other Exotic Animal Diseases.
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activating emergency operations in the event of a foreign animal disease 

outbreak. Additionally, to support the coordinators, Mexico established 29 

animal health emergency state groups. Active throughout Mexico, these 

groups include over 900 government and private veterinarians trained in 

identifying and responding to foreign animal diseases, including FMD. 

Mexico also has a diagnostic biosecurity level-III laboratory capable of 

testing for foreign animal diseases.26 In 2001, Mexico reported performing 

220 investigations into suspicious cases that might have been FMD. All 

investigations resulted in negative results for the FMD virus. 

Controls for Live 

Animal Imports

SAGARPA allows live animal imports only from preapproved countries. 

Live animal imports into Mexico are prohibited from countries that have 

the FMD virus. SAGARPA’s general requirements for all live animal imports 

include advance notification to SAGARPA’s official veterinarians at the 

ports of entry. The amount of time required for official advance 

notification depends on the animals’ country of origin. Before live animals 

can be sent to Mexico, SAGARPA sends official veterinarians to the 

exporting country to ensure that the live animals to be exported are free of 

disease. 

Once a live animal shipment arrives at the Mexican port of entry, official 

veterinarians review all the documents and physically inspect the animals. 

Importers are required to supply (1) a Mexican sanitary import permit; (2) a 

country of origin health certificate; (3) a dip certificate, if applicable; (4) a 

registration certificate, if applicable; and (5) a commercial license. The 

sanitary import permit certifies that the exporting country has met Mexican 

importation requirements. The health certificate contains information on 

the

• name and address of the importer,

• place of origin and destination of the animals,

• animal health production standards of the exporting country,

26 A biosecurity level-III laboratory is one that maintains a high security level and employs 

extreme control measures in the handling of samples. Such laboratories install special 

control measures to reduce the risk of pathogens escaping into the surrounding 

environment by using air filters and requiring all personnel to take disinfectant showers 

prior to leaving the facility.
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• place where the certificate was issued, and

• time period for which the certificate is effective. 

All animals imported into Mexico must have individual identification marks 

or numbers unless they are imported for immediate slaughter. If animals 

are imported for direct slaughter, the only information that needs to be 

recorded is the number of animals and their origin. Additionally, all live 

animals must walk over a disinfectant mat, and depending on how tame the 

animals are, the hooves are scraped of dirt, and the entire animal is hosed 

down with disinfectant. Additionally, the trucks and containers that 

transported the animals are disinfected, and any bedding or waste from the 

animals is incinerated at the port of entry.

Generally, all live animals, regardless of their country of origin, must meet 

these import requirements. However once these requirements are met, 

Mexico has separate procedures for live animals imported from the United 

States and those imported from other countries. 

Live Animal Imports from 

the United States

Generally, all live animals entering Mexico from the United States are 

allowed to conform to less-stringent entry requirements than animals 

imported from other countries. For example, animals from the United 

States frequently pass through Mexican land border ports on the basis of a 

U.S. veterinary inspection. U.S. animals that arrive in Mexico via air or sea 

are also allowed to enter with just a sanitary import permit when facilities 

for inspection are available at the port of entry within Mexico. 

Before crossing the border, U.S. animals must remain on the U.S. side of 

the border at an authorized facility for a minimum of 24 hours. When 

Mexican veterinarians perform entry inspections in lieu of their U.S. 

counterparts, they may (1) require additional quarantine for the animals, 

(2) perform clinical observations and inspect the animals, (3) require 

animals to be disinfected and/or immunized, or (4) apply other animal 

health safety measures.

Live Animal Imports from 

Other Countries

In addition to the general requirements listed above, all live animals 

entering Mexico from preapproved countries must meet other import 

requirements. Importers of live animals from countries other than the 

United States are required to notify SAGARPA in advance of a shipment. 

As a part of the live animal importation process, SAGARPA sends two 
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official veterinarians to the exporting country to inspect the animals before 

they are sent to Mexico. These Mexican veterinarians are responsible for 

developing an animal health report for the animals being exported, which 

will document information on the health of the animals from the time the 

veterinarians arrive in the exporting country until the shipment of animals 

arrives in Mexico. As a result, before the animals are loaded onto the ship 

for transport to Mexico, the Mexican veterinarians will examine the 

paperwork and inspect each animal. One of the veterinarians will then 

accompany the shipment and monitor the animals for clinical signs of 

disease while in transit to Mexico. According to Mexican officials, because 

the majority of live animal imports into Mexico come from Australia, 

Guatemala, New Zealand, Nicaragua, and Panama, the time in transit is 

usually considered an adequate quarantine period for the animals. For 

example, the voyage from New Zealand or Australia typically lasts 28 days 

and serves as an adequate quarantine period for live animals. Because live 

animal imports from countries such as Panama or Guatemala are also 

transported to Mexico via ship and enter the country at maritime ports, 

they too are subject to the same procedures. If the veterinarian on board 

the ship notices any suspicious animal disease signs during the trip to 

Mexico, the veterinarian will notify officials in Mexico, and the shipment 

can be rejected en route and returned to the exporting country. 

Controls for Imported 

Animal Products

SAGARPA and the Mexican Customs Service combine inspection services 

at Mexican ports of entry to ensure that all imported products comply with 

all Mexican import requirements before they are released into commerce. 

Animal products can be imported into Mexico only from countries that 

SAGAPRA has preapproved, using OIE criteria for determining which 

countries are FMD-free. SAGARPA may add additional requirements or 

restrictions to the OIE criteria if it deems them necessary. Mexico does 

allow some animal product imports from countries that have FMD, as long 

as SAGARPA has approved the animal-product-processing plants and the 

products are shipped with the required health and sanitary certificates. 

Some products, such as milk and dairy products, are allowed into Mexico 

only if they have been properly heat-treated or subjected to maturation 

processes that destroy the FMD virus. Other products, such as machinery, 

vehicles, and bullfighting equipment, must undergo disinfection 

procedures, determined by SAGARPA, before being allowed into the 

country. Products denied entry into Mexico must be immediately 

reexported or destroyed. 
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All agricultural cargo must be processed through one of SAGARPA’s 

inspection offices located at various borders, airports, and seaports. Some 

imported animal products are allowed entry only at certain ports of entry 

that have the proper facilities to warehouse them. SAGARPA officials 

review the manifest of all international carriers arriving in Mexico to 

ensure that no food items inadvertently enter the country without 

inspection. 

The broker initiates the importation and inspection process for animal 

products at the port of entry by presenting the required paperwork, 

including the sanitary import permit, and requesting inspection services 

from SAGARPA officials. The SAGARPA port veterinarian will review the 

paperwork as well as the health certificate accompanying the shipment. 

The health certificate contains information on the (1) name and address of 

the importer or proprietor, (2) place of origin and the specific destination 

of the animal products, (3) animal health production standards used by the 

exporting country, (4) place where the certificate was issued, and (5) time 

period for which the certificate is effective. If the import documents are in 

order and the products are from permissible countries, the container is 

unloaded from the vessel and transported to the official warehouse for 

further inspection. 

SAGARPA officials inspect all containers used to ship animal products or 

farm machinery and equipment. Containers from countries that Mexico 

has deemed as high-risk for FMD must be sprayed with disinfectant on the 

outside. In addition to the containers they arrive in, farm machinery and 

other equipment from high-risk countries must be completely disinfected. 

Fresh, chilled, and frozen meat products are physically inspected by 

SAGARPA inspectors while they are stored in the refrigerated section of 

the Customs warehouse. The inspection consists of (1) a paperwork 

review, including a review of the Mexican sanitary import permit and 

health certificate signed by an official veterinarian of the exporting country, 

and (2) a visual inspection of the meat packages for the meat-processing 

plant’s seal, lot number, and factory number to ensure that the product 

came from an approved plant in the country of origin. In addition, 

SAGARPA officials may collect product samples for laboratory analysis.27 

27 Mexico has a meat-product-sampling scheme, which is detailed in the country’s meat 

inspection regulations. Normally, 15 samples are taken from a shipment of 25 tons of meat. 

The system is based on a judgmental sampling process; however, importers who have had 

problems in the past are sampled more often. 
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Once all the reviews and inspections are completed, SAGARPA inspectors 

complete the inspection report and make a final recommendation on 

whether the shipment should be released. Cargo cannot leave the 

warehouse at the port of entry without forms from SAGARPA stating that 

the cargo has been inspected and deemed safe to enter the country. After 

the main SAGARPA office issues the final certificate of importation and 

releases the shipment, the broker can proceed to the Mexican Customs’

inspection. Mexican Customs helps SAGARPA ensure that prohibited or 

restricted products are not entering the country. 

Controls for 

International Garbage

SAGARPA officials supervise the off-loading and disposal of organic waste 

and garbage from airplanes and ships arriving from FMD-affected 

countries. Generally, this garbage must be incinerated. Incinerators in two 

locations accept international garbage—one in Mexico City and one in 

Cancun. Consequently, cruise ships arriving in Mexico are allowed to 

dispose of garbage only in Cancun. Ships arriving at other Mexican ports 

must take their garbage with them.

Controls for 

International 

Passengers

In addition to the regular immigration and customs forms that all 

international passengers have to complete upon entry into Mexico, all 

passengers from FMD-affected countries must fill out a special, detailed 

questionnaire. This questionnaire asks passengers to help prevent the 

introduction of FMD by (1) declaring any animal products that they may be 

carrying and (2) providing information about their contact with animals in 

the country from which they are arriving. In addition, the form asks 

passengers to avoid visiting places in Mexico where they could come into 

contact with live animals.

At airports and marine ports of entry, international passengers from highrisk countries must walk over special mats soaked with disinfectant to 

disinfect their shoes. According to Mexican officials, the disinfectant mats 

are changed every month, and before the arrival of a high-risk flight at the 

airport, SAGARPA officials apply fresh disinfectant to the mat. In addition, 

until January 2002, the outside surface of baggage arriving from high-risk 

countries was sprayed with disinfectant as it was loaded onto the conveyor 

belt and before it entered the baggage claim area of the airport. Baggage 

from high-risk flights is also x-rayed and inspected for illegal products by 

official inspectors at the airports. All confiscated products are incinerated. 
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Page 86 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

Announcements are made on the public information system at the airport 

in English, Spanish, and French requesting passengers to help prevent the 

introduction of FMD into Mexico by complying with the Mexican 

requirements described above. Signs in English and Spanish warning 

travelers about the dangers of FMD are posted throughout the airports. 

Mexico also has inspection requirements for international cargo ships 

arriving at Mexican seaports that specifically relate to the disposal and use 

of food in the ship’s galley that is intended for the crew. As part of this 

inspection process, Mexican officials (1) review the list of all the seaports 

that the ship has stopped at before arriving in Mexico to determine whether 

it docked in ports that pose a risk for FMD, (2) review the list of all food 

products on board the ship, (3) visually inspect the food in the galley, 

(4) seal the food containers in the galleys of those ships that are from highrisk countries, and (5) disinfect the stairs and main entrances of the ship. 

Crewmembers of ships docked at a Mexican port for more than 3 or 4 days 

are allowed to consume some of the products in the galley while they are 

docked. Crewmembers leaving the ship to go ashore must go through the 

same procedures as other international passengers arriving at any port of 

entry—complete immigration and customs forms, declare any products of 

animal or plant origin that they may be carrying, and walk over disinfectant 

mats.

Controls for 

International Mail

SAGARPA officials receive advance notification of all international mail 

deliveries to Mexican post offices that handle such mail. According to 

Mexican officials, SAGARPA inspectors open and inspect 100 percent of all 

the international packages arriving from FMD-affected countries but only 

randomly sample packages arriving from the United States and Canada. 

According to these officials, the post office facility in Mexico City receives 

about 500 packages per international mail delivery. Inspectors do not leave 

the postal facility until all of the packages that arrived on a particular day 

have been inspected, according to officials. Any prohibited products sent 

through international mail that are confiscated are incinerated.
Page 87 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

Appendix IV

Measures for Preventing the Introduction of 

FMD into the United Kingdom ApendxiIV

This appendix provides summary information on the preventive measures 

used by the United Kingdom to ensure that FMD does not enter the country 

via five key pathways included in our review: (1) the importation of live 

animals; (2) the importation of animal products; (3) the handling and 

disposal of garbage from international carriers, such as airplanes and ships; 

(4) international passengers; and (5) packages sent through international 

mail. Because the United Kingdom is subject to the directives of the 

European Union Economic Community, for each pathway, this appendix 

summarizes (1) the preventive measures established by the European 

Union for trade between member states and nonmember countries and 

(2) any additional measures established by the United Kingdom.

Background The United Kingdom is a member state of the European Union Economic 

Community28 and is subject to the European Union’s directives. One E.U. 

goal was to develop a common market without borders among the member 

states. The European Union established directives that approximated 

member states’ laws and developed rules applicable to all member states. 

These directives harmonized the European Union’s laws so that member 

states could consistently follow and apply the same rules uniformly in a 

common market. For example, each member state must follow guidelines 

governing the import of live animals and animal products to prevent the 

introduction of foreign animal diseases, such as FMD, into the European 

Union. In addition, each member state is allowed to have national 

provisions as needed. As a result, the United Kingdom has its own 

legislation governing the imports of live animals and animal products that 

implements the European Union’s directives and covers areas that are not 

harmonized by these directives. 

When the European Union becomes aware of an outbreak of disease in 

another member state or in a nonmember country that may constitute a 

serious threat to animal or public health, it has the power to issue a 

declaration making it an offense for any member state to import specific 

animals or animal products from the affected country or region. In the 

event of such an outbreak, the European Union can take emergency 

safeguard measures, including prohibiting the (1) export of particular 

species of animals or animal products from affected member states to 

28Member states include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 

Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Republic of Ireland, Spain, Sweden, and the 

United Kingdom. 
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Measures for Preventing the Introduction of 

FMD into the United Kingdom

Page 88 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

other member states and (2) import of live animals or animal products from 

affected nonmember countries by member states. In certain 

circumstances, member states may invoke additional safeguarding 

procedures and take "interim safeguard and protective measures." Member 

states invoking such measures and procedures must inform all members of 

the European Union of the actions taken and the reasons for them. 

The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) is the 

federal agency responsible for environmental, rural, food, and related 

issues. DEFRA is responsible for ensuring the health of livestock in the 

United Kingdom. 

E.U. and U.K. Controls 

for Live Animal 

Imports

The European Union has established separate preventive measures for 

imports of live animals from member states and those from nonmember 

states. In addition, the United Kingdom has additional controls to ensure 

that live animal imports are disease free. 

E.U. Measures for Imports 

of Live Animals from 

Member States

Live animal trade between member states requires an official veterinarian 

from the state of origin to inspect the animals prior to their movement and 

certify them as disease-free. This certification ensures that the (1) animals 

have originated from an FMD-free country or have been tested for diseases 

of concern, (2) animals have been isolated for a specified period of time, 

(3) country has an official disease surveillance program, and (4) animal 

production standards have been met. Member states must also ensure that 

the animals to be exported (1) come from approved holdings that undergo 

routine veterinary checks, (2) have official tags and identification as 

required by E.U. rules, and (3) are registered in such a way that the original 

transit holding can be traced. Although the inspections of live animals 

traded between member states are generally performed in the country of 

origin, nondiscriminatory, random spot checks in the destination member 

state are permitted. Official veterinarians in the destination member state 

are responsible for performing these checks. 

E.U. Measures for Imports 

of Live Animals from 

Nonmember Countries

Member states can import live animals only from nonmember countries (or 

areas of nonmember countries) if the European Union has approved the 

country as being FMD-free. This approval is granted on a country-bycountry basis after the following factors have been considered for the 

nonmember country:
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FMD into the United Kingdom

Page 89 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

• The general health of the livestock, wildlife, and other domestic animals, 

with particular attention to any exotic animal diseases and 

environmental health situations that may exist.

• The regularity and rapidity with which information on outbreaks of 

infectious or contagious animal diseases is supplied to trading partners.

• The rules for and implementation of measures to prevent and control 

infectious or contagious animal diseases, including those that apply to 

imports.

• The structure and authority of veterinary services, including laboratory 

services.

• Legislation covering the use of animal production substances, such as 

hormones. 

In addition, live animals are prohibited entry into the European Union 

when (1) importation rules were not followed, (2) the animals appear or 

are found to be diseased, and (3) the animals are unfit to continue to travel. 

Animals denied importation must be quarantined and reexported out of the 

country or slaughtered. 

Live animal shipments from nonmember countries must enter the 

European Union through approved member states’ border inspection 

posts. A health certificate signed by an official veterinarian from the 

exporting country must accompany all shipments. E.U. directives have 

harmonized the inspections conducted at the border inspection posts to 

ensure the quality and equality at all member states’ ports of entry. At 

border inspection posts, animal shipments undergo full documentary, 

identity, and physical checks by an official veterinarian before the shipment 

is allowed to enter into free circulation within the European Union. The 

border inspection post must ensure that only cattle and swine that show no 

clinical signs of specific diseases and no signs of FMD and brucellosis are 

allowed into the European Union. Border inspection posts are required to 

inform other member states’ border inspection posts of any live animal 

shipments denied entry and the reasons for the denial. 
Appendix IV

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FMD into the United Kingdom

Page 90 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

U.K. Measures for Imports 

of Live Animals from 

Member States

Animals can be imported from member states to go directly to slaughter 

facilities, move through approved holding centers to slaughter facilities, or 

go directly to farms in the United Kingdom. An export health certificate 

and a license for animal movement must accompany animals arriving from 

member states. Veterinary inspectors have the authority to inspect animals 

imported into the United Kingdom from member states at their point of 

destination to ensure that E.U. requirements have been met. Inspectors 

can stop a shipment of animals while in transit if the transporter does not 

have the appropriate documentation. Animals imported for slaughter are 

required to be slaughtered immediately after they arrive at an approved 

facility. Breeding animals must have remained in the exporting member 

state for 6 months prior to transport to the United Kingdom, and slaughter 

animals, 3 months. 

DEFRA maintains a list of registered haulers allowed to transport live 

animals within the United Kingdom. Haulers must maintain the following 

information for shipments of cattle and swine: the (1) place and date of 

pick-ups, including the name of the producer or business and the address 

of the animal-holding center; (2) species, origin, and number of animals 

transported; (3) the date and place of disinfection; and (4) individual 

animal identification numbers. Because of the recent FMD outbreak, as a 

temporary measure, transportation vehicles are required to have, at all 

times while in the United Kingdom, proof of disinfection.

In addition, operators or owners of holding centers must record and 

maintain information on the owner’s name, the registration number of the 

transporter, and the license number for all imported animals. For cattle, 

they must also record the country of origin, date of entry into the United 

Kingdom, identification numbers, and the date of exit and proposed 

destination if the cattle are at a holding center. For swine, operators are 

required to record only the registration number of the holding center or the 

herd of origin and the proposed destination. Owners and operators of 

slaughter facilities are generally not required to maintain this information.

U.K. Measures for Imports 

of Live Animals from 

Nonmember Countries

The United Kingdom has adopted the European Union’s directives for 

importing live animals and has spelled out the details for implementing 

these rules in legislation. Animals that have already passed through 

another member state’s border inspection post are required to have both a 

border certificate of examination and the original health certificate when 

they arrive at the U.K. destination. The United Kingdom also has 
Appendix IV

Measures for Preventing the Introduction of 

FMD into the United Kingdom

Page 91 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

procedures for post-import checks, which allow DEFRA veterinary 

inspectors to recheck any imported animals that were processed at a 

member state’s border inspection post. These post-import checks can 

occur at the imported animals’ destination or while they are in transit. As a 

result of these checks, if disease is suspected, animals may be quarantined, 

slaughtered, or reexported. The imports of live animals from nonmember 

countries are required to enter the United Kingdom through certain ports of 

entry such as, Heathrow, Luton, Stansted, and Prestwick. 

E.U. and U.K. Controls 

for Imported Animal 

Products 

The European Union has established separate preventive measures for 

imports of animal products from member and nonmember states. The 

United Kingdom has additional controls to ensure that animal product 

imports are disease free. 

E.U. Measures for Imported 

Animal Products from 

Member States

Animal products imported by a member state from other member states 

must be shipped from approved and licensed facilities that meet the 

European Union’s animal health requirements and are under the control of 

an official veterinarian. Each member state is responsible for ensuring that 

its animal products are safe and disease free. Intracommunity shipments 

of animal products must be accompanied by an official health certificate or 

commercial document that contains information on the origin and 

destination of the products. As a result of the European Union’s common 

market rules, there are no routine public health checks at member states’

ports of entry for shipments originating in another member state. However, 

E.U. rules permit random spot checks of shipments at the place of 

destination.

E.U. Measures for Imported 

Animal Products from 

Nonmember Countries

Member states can import animal products only from nonmember 

countries or parts of a nonmember country approved by the European 

Union. As with live animal imports, approval is considered on a countryby-country basis after the following factors have been considered: 

• The general health of the livestock, wildlife, and other domestic animals, 

with particular attention to any exotic animal diseases and 

environmental health situations that may exist.

• The regularity and rapidity with which information on infectious or 

contagious animal disease outbreaks is supplied to trading partners.
Appendix IV

Measures for Preventing the Introduction of 

FMD into the United Kingdom

Page 92 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

• The rules for and implementation of measures to prevent and control 

infectious or contagious animal diseases, including those that apply to 

imports.

• The structure and authority of veterinary services, including laboratory 

services. 

• Legislation covering the use of animal production substances, such as 

hormones. 

Imported animal products from nonmember countries must enter member 

states through approved border inspection posts and be accompanied by a 

health certificate signed by an official veterinarian of the exporting country. 

Official veterinarians at the member states’ border inspection post are 

responsible for ensuring that the following three types of checks on 

shipments from nonmember countries are performed and that the 

information provided is verified:

• A documentary check to review the veterinary documentation 

accompanying the shipment, the importer’s advance written notice 

specifying the number and nature of the shipment, and the estimated 

time of arrival at the port of entry. 

• An identity check to verify that the contents of the shipment are the 

same as described in the documentation. For shipments that do not 

arrive in containers, identity checks involve ensuring that the stamps, 

official marks, and health marks identifying the country and 

establishment of origin are present. In contrast, shipments arriving in 

officially sealed containers are not opened unless there is doubt about 

the authenticity of the seals or suspicions about tampering. In such 

cases, the containers will be opened and inspected to ensure that the 

stamps, health marks, and other marks identifying the country and 

establishment of origin are present on the shipment and conform to 

those on the certificate or document accompanying the shipment. 

• A physical check of the shipment involves inspecting the contents to 

ensure that they do not present an animal or public health risk. During a 

physical check, the inspectors may take samples for laboratory analysis. 

Physical checks are conducted on a predetermined percentage of 

imported shipments of animal products from nonmember countries. 

The percentage varies according to the product and the country of 

origin. For example, veterinarians inspect 20 percent of fresh meat, fish 
Appendix IV

Measures for Preventing the Introduction of 

FMD into the United Kingdom

Page 93 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

products, eggs, animal fats, and animal casings shipments and 50 

percent of wild meat products, milk, egg products, and processed 

animal protein shipments.

In those cases where the checks indicate that the shipment does not meet 

requirements for entry into the European Union, the shipment is 

reexported if it does not pose any risk to public or animal health. For 

shipments where reexportation is not possible, the product is destroyed. 

E.U. rules allow for the importation of some types of animal products, such 

as canned meat and some milk products, from nonmember countries that 

have FMD, as long as specific food-processing procedures are followed to 

inactivate the virus. For example, milk products imported from FMD 

countries must be properly heat-treated.

Imports of semen and embryos from nonmember countries are accepted by 

the European Union if the shipment (1) comes from an FMD-free country; 

(2) is accompanied by a signed health certificate attesting to the diseasefree status of the animals from which the semen, ova, or embryos are 

derived; and (3) comes through an approved collection center. The 

information in the accompanying documents is checked at the member 

states’ border inspection post to determine if the shipment meets the 

European Union’s requirements before it is released. The European Union 

has additional requirements for imported germplasm; however, these are 

currently being updated. 

U.K. Measures for Imported 

Animal Products from 

Member States

Animal products from other member states must be accompanied by all the 

documents required by E.U. rules and are deliverable only to the address in 

the United Kingdom that is identified on these documents. Official U.K. 

veterinarians perform nondiscriminatory veterinary checks for products 

imported from other member states, which may include the sampling of the 

product at the U.K. destination. 

U.K. Measures for Imports 

of Animal Products from 

Nonmember Countries

In order to ensure that animal diseases are not imported into the United 

Kingdom via animal products from nonmember countries, DEFRA enforces 

a system of controls that relies primarily on the health certification 

accompanying the shipment and post-import official veterinary inspections 

of the shipment. Imports from nonmember countries are permitted only 

through about 26 approved border inspection posts in the United Kingdom.
Appendix IV

Measures for Preventing the Introduction of 

FMD into the United Kingdom

Page 94 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

E.U. and U.K. Controls 

for International 

Garbage

E.U. rules require that garbage from international carriers, such as 

airplanes and ships, be removed under official control for destruction. In 

the United Kingdom, international garbage is known as “catering waste”

and, according to U.K. regulations, represents the most likely route by 

which a major foreign animal disease such as FMD could enter the country. 

As a result, DEFRA regulates the handling and disposal of all catering 

waste from international carriers that arrive in the United Kingdom. To 

ensure proper handling and disposal, DEFRA issues licenses, which 

delineate how the catering waste is to be transported, including the 

transportation route for the waste from the port of entry to the disposal site 

and how it is to be disposed of, which could either be at an approved 

landfill or incinerator. Livestock in the United Kingdom cannot be fed any 

imported catering waste. 

E.U. and U.K. Controls 

for International 

Passengers

E.U. rules set limits on what products international passengers can bring 

from nonmember countries into member states. For example, personal 

imports of raw meat from any nonmember country are illegal. However, 

passengers are allowed to bring some animal products from nonmember 

countries if (1) the products are meant for human consumption, (2) the 

products come from an E.U.-approved country, and (3) the quantity 

imported does not exceed 1 kilogram (2.2 pounds) per person. Passengers 

traveling within the European Union are allowed to import meat, animal, 

and milk products up to 10 kilograms per person as long as the product 

originates from another member state. 

The United Kingdom follows the E.U. rules for personal imports of animal 

products by international passengers. The United Kingdom can impose 

penalties of up to 2 years of imprisonment and fines for passengers found 

smuggling prohibited goods, such as milk and raw meat. Additional 

restrictions on personal imports of international travelers may be imposed 

as needed, owing to outbreaks of animal disease in various parts of the 

world. 

As part of a new publicity campaign to help stop illegal products, such as 

meat, from entering the United Kingdom, posters were placed at various 

ports of entry and airports to inform travelers about prohibited items and 

warn them about potential penalties for illegal imports.
Appendix IV

Measures for Preventing the Introduction of 

FMD into the United Kingdom

Page 95 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

U.K. Controls for 

International Mail

We are not aware of any specific E.U. requirements for international mail. 

However, U.K. Customs’ inspectors examine all international mail 

packages for prohibited and restricted items. For example, packages 

containing meat products may be subject to inspection and may be opened 

and closed by a post office official. Packages from approved nonmember 

countries will be allowed as long as the quantity of the product does not 

exceed 1 kilogram (2.2 pounds), the product is fully cooked in hermetically 

sealed containers, and it is intended for personal consumption only. 

Packages found in contravention of these regulations are liable to be seized 

without compensation. Meat or meat products sent to the United Kingdom 

via international mail from other member states are allowed if they are for 

personal consumption and do not exceed 10 kilograms. Additional 

evidence may be required to support claims that imports in excess of 

10 kilograms are for personal use. Further restrictions on imported items 

sent through international mail may be imposed as needed, owing to 

outbreaks of animal disease in other countries. 
Page 96 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

Appendix V

Comments from the U.S. Department of 

Agriculture ApendxiV
Appendix V

Comments from the U.S. Department of 

Agriculture

Page 97 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Appendix V

Comments from the U.S. Department of 

Agriculture

Page 98 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Appendix V

Comments from the U.S. Department of 

Agriculture

Page 99 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Page 100 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

Appendix VI

Comments from the U.S. Customs Service ApendxiVI
Page 101 GAO-02-808 Foot and Mouth Disease

Appendix VII

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiVI

GAO Contacts Lawrence Dyckman (202) 512-3841

Anu Mittal (202) 512-9846

Acknowledgments In addition to the persons named above, Erin Barlow, Clifford Diehl, and 

Eugene Wisnoski made key contributions to this report. Important 

contributions were also made by William Chatlos, Oliver Easterwood, Judy 

Pagano, and Carol Hernstadt Shulman.

(360116)
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