J-S17026-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

RANDY JEROME NORRIS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1439 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 27, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-43-CR-0001112-2021

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: October 4, 2023

Appellant, Randy Jerome Norris, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered on October 27, 2022,

1 as made final by the denial of post-sentence 

motions on November 21, 2022, following his jury trial convictions for burglary 

(overnight accommodations with person present), criminal trespass (breaks

into occupied structure), and indecent exposure.

2

 We affirm Appellant’s 

convictions but vacate and remand for resentencing.

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1 Appellant alleges that this appeal lies from the original sentence entered in 

open court on October 25, 2022. As explained in greater detail below, 

however, the trial court, on October 27, 2022, entered a subsequent written 

order that amended Appellant’s sentence. Where the trial court amends the 

judgment of sentence during the period it maintains jurisdiction, the direct 

appeal lies from the amended judgment of sentence. See Commonwealth 

v. Garzone, 993 A.2d 1245, 1254 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2010). Accordingly, we 

have corrected the caption to reflect that the appeal lies from the amended 

sentencing order. 

2

 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3502(a)(1)(ii), 3503(a)(1)(ii), and 3127, respectively.
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We briefly set forth the facts and procedural history of this case as 

follows. On August 28, 2021, in Sharon, Pennsylvania, Appellant entered the 

home of an adult female through an open window, without permission, while 

she slept. The victim awoke to find Appellant in her bedroom exposing his 

genitals and masturbating. Following a two-day jury trial concluding on July 

13, 2022, the jury found Appellant guilty of the aforementioned crimes. 

On October 25, 2022, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 25 to 50 

years of incarceration for burglary, including a mandatory sentencing 

enhancement as a third time violent offender pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714. 

The trial court imposed concurrent terms of incarceration for the remaining 

charges, resulting in an aggregate sentence of 25 to 50 years of incarceration. 

On October 27, 2022, the trial court entered an amended sentencing order, 

adding 12 months of re-entry supervision consecutive to the original 

sentence.3 On November 4, 2022, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion,

which the trial court denied by order entered on November 21, 2021. This 

timely appeal resulted.4

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3

 Although not at all clear from our review of the record, the trial court 

presumably amended its sentencing order to conform with 61 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 6137.2 which provides that any person sentenced to “an aggregate 

minimum sentence of total confinement [ ] of four years or more ... shall be 

sentenced to a period of reentry supervision of 12 months consecutive to and 

in addition to any other lawful sentence issued by the court.” 61 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 6137.2(a)-(b).

4

 Appellant filed a notice of appeal on December 8, 2022. On December 20, 

2022, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

1. Did the lower court err when it denied [A]ppellant[’]s motion 

for [judgment] not withstanding the verdict of the jury being 

against the weight and sufficiency of the evidence[?]

2. Did the lower court err in imposing a mandatory sentence 

based upon facts not found by the fact finder[?]

3. Did the lower court err in imposing sentences for [b]urglary 

and for [c]riminal [t]respass based upon a single entry into a 

residence[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 9.

In his first issue presented, Appellant maintains that “[t]he case boiled 

down to the allegation and identification of [A]ppellant” by the victim. Id. at 

16. Appellant argues that at trial the victim testified that “she immediately 

knew who was in her bedroom” but admitted that she told the police 

dispatcher, responding officer, and investigating detective that she did not 

know Appellant. Id. Appellant alleges that the victim further “testified that 

she lied to the detective about her prior involvement with [A]ppellant after 

implicating” him. Id. As such, Appellant argues that “[w]here the sole 

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complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) within 21 days. The 

order further stated that issues not included in a timely filed Rule 1925(b) 

statement shall be deemed waived. Appellant filed an untimely Rule 1925(b) 

statement on February 3, 2023. The trial court issued an opinion pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on February 3, 2023. The trial court first noted that 

Appellant failed to timely file a Rule 1925(b) concise statement and, instead, 

waited until “one business day before the record, and [the trial court’s Rule 

1925(a) o]pinion [were] due” to this Court. Trial Court Opinion, 2/3/2023, at 

1. Accordingly, the trial court found “all issues [] waived” but summarily 

addressed each issue in its brief, two-page Rule 1925(a) opinion. Id. at 1-2.
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witness to implicate [A]ppellant, under the allegations of this case, admits to 

lying to [the police] dispatcher, the initial officer and the detective, any verdict 

relying on said witness shocks one[’]s sense of justice.” Id.

Initially we note that the trial court found this issue waived because 

Appellant failed to file a timely Rule 1925(b) statement. For the reasons that 

follow, we agree. Our Supreme Court has previously stated “[t]he provisions 

of [Pa.R.A.P.] 1925(b)(4) establish the basic requirements which all 

statements of errors must meet, and further state that issues not raised in 

accordance with those requirements ‘are waived.’” Commonwealth v. 

Parrish, 224 A.3d 682, 692 (Pa. 2020), citing Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii). 

Moreover, our Supreme Court has “determined that counsel's untimely filing 

of such a statement also completely waives such claims for purposes of 

appellate review, even though the trial court authored an opinion addressing 

the issues presented in the untimely filed statement.” Id. at 693, citing

Commonwealth v. Castillo, 888 A.2d 775 (Pa. 2005). Our Supreme Court 

found that a bright-line waiver rule was necessary to avoid situations “where 

trial courts were forced to anticipate which issues the appellant might raise 

and appellate courts had to determine whether they could conduct a 

meaningful review despite an appellant's failure to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statement or to include certain issues within a filed statement.” Id. (citation 

omitted). Here, there is no dispute that Appellant filed an untimely Rule 

1925(b) concise statement and, therefore, waived his sufficiency and weight 

claims. 
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Assuming arguendo that Appellant had not waived these claims, 

however, we find no merit to Appellant’s first issue. We adhere to the 

following standards:

Whether sufficient evidence exists to support the verdict is a 

question of law; our standard of review is de novo and our scope 

of review is plenary. We review the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the verdict winner to determine whether there is 

sufficient evidence to allow the jury to find every element of a 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we 

may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the 

fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances 

established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every 

possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt 

may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak 

and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may 

be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth 

may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record 

must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be 

considered. Finally, the finder of fact while passing upon the 

credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, 

is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Soto, 202 A.3d 80, 93 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation 

omitted).

Furthermore, we have previously determined:

A victim's in-court testimony, identifying the defendant as the 

perpetrator of a crime, is by itself sufficient to establish the 

identity element of that crime. Thus, [ ] attempts to enhance [a 

sufficiency of the evidence] argument by asserting that the 

Commonwealth failed to present any corroborating evidence to 

support the victim's in-court identification testimony does not 

establish that the identity evidence was insufficient. Moreover, 

[an] assertion that the victim's testimony was contradicted by [an 

appellant's] own [testimony] is irrelevant to [a] sufficiency 
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analysis. “Variances in testimony ... go to the credibility of the 

witnesses and not the sufficiency of the evidence.”

Commonwealth v. Galloway, 495 Pa. 535, 434 A.2d 1220, 1222 (Pa. 1981).

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 180 A.3d 474, 478 (Pa. Super. 2018) (some 

internal citations omitted). Moreover, “the uncorroborated testimony of a 

single witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction for a criminal offense, so 

long as that testimony can address and, in fact, addresses, every element of 

the charged crime.” Id. at 481.

An appellate court's standard of review when presented with a weight 

of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of review applied by the 

trial court:

Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of 

discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict 

is against the weight of the evidence. Because the trial judge has 

had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an 

appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the findings 

and reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial 

court's determination that the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for granting or 

denying a new trial is the lower court's conviction that the verdict 

was or was not against the weight of the evidence and that a new 

trial should be granted in the interest of justice. This does not 

mean that the exercise of discretion by the trial court in granting 

or denying a motion for a new trial based on a challenge to the 

weight of the evidence is unfettered.

In describing the limits of a trial court's discretion, we have 

explained:

The term “discretion” imports the exercise of judgment, 

wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion 

within the framework of the law, and is not exercised for the 

purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge. Discretion 

must be exercised on the foundation of reason, as opposed 

to prejudice, personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary 
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actions. Discretion is abused where the course pursued 

represents not merely an error of judgment, but where the 

judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not 

applied or where the record shows that the action is a result 

of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.

Soto, 202 A.3d at 97 (citation omitted).

Here, the trial court determined that there was sufficient evidence to 

support Appellant’s convictions and that the verdict did not shock the 

conscience of the court so as to warrant relief on his weight of the evidence 

claim. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/3/2023, at 2. Upon our review of the record, 

we agree. The victim testified that she had a previous interaction with 

Appellant at a charity event several months before the crimes at issue. N.T., 

7/13/2022, at 26-27. The victim testified that Appellant messaged her dozens 

of times through social media thereafter and she eventually blocked his 

communications. Id. at 36. The victim further testified that she immediately 

recognized Appellant when the incident occurred and positively identified him 

in open court at trial. Id. at 26. The victim also explained that she did not 

tell the police that she knew the perpetrator because she “felt bad and didn’t 

want to get anyone in trouble.” Id. However, she admitted at trial that she 

initially lied to the police. Id. at 52. The jury was free to believe all, part, or 

none of the evidence and determine the victim’s credibility. Based upon the 

facts of record, we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law by the trial 

court in denying Appellant’s weight and sufficiency claims. For all of the 

foregoing reasons, Appellant is not entitled to relief on his first issue.
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Unlike his first issue, Appellant’s second and third issues implicate the 

legality of his sentence and those issues are not waived. See 

Commonwealth v. Warunek, 279 A.3d 52, 54 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation 

omitted) (“A challenge to the legality of the sentence can never be waived and 

may be raised by this Court sua sponte.”). More specifically, in his second 

issue presented, Appellant claims that the trial court erred by sentencing him 

to a mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714 for “two 

prior convictions for crimes of violence” when those “allegations were not 

found by the finder of facts, the jury in the case at bar.” Appellant’s Brief at 

17. Appellant concedes that the Section 9714 “statutory scheme” has been 

“recognized as valid” but argues that he was “still subject [] to incarceration 

beyond the statutory limits for the [convicted] crimes based upon a lower 

standard [which] deprive[d the trial] court[] of a proper consideration of 

[A]ppellant’s rehabilitative needs pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9721(b).” Id.

at 18-19.

“Interpret[ing] Section 9714 of the Sentencing Code, [] presents the 

Court with a question of law. As such, our standard of review is de novo, and 

our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Griffin, 207 A.3d 827, 

830 (Pa. 2019) (citation omitted). Section 9714 provides, in pertinent part:

(2) Where the person had at the time of the commission of the 

current offense previously been convicted of two or more such 

crimes of violence arising from separate criminal transactions, the 

person shall be sentenced to a minimum sentence of at least 25 

years of total confinement, notwithstanding any other provision of 

this title or other statute to the contrary. Proof that the offender 

received notice of or otherwise knew or should have known of the 
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penalties under this paragraph shall not be required. Upon 

conviction for a third or subsequent crime of violence the court 

may, if it determines that 25 years of total confinement is 

insufficient to protect the public safety, sentence the offender to 

life imprisonment without parole.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714(a)(2).

We have previously recognized:

In Alleyne [v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 133 S.Ct. 2151 

(2013), the Supreme Court of the United States established that 

“[a]ny fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an 

‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 2155. However, the 

Supreme Court has recognized a narrow exception to this rule for 

prior convictions. Id. at 2160, n.1 (citing Almendarez–Torres v. 

United States, 523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 

(1998)). In Commonwealth v. Reid, 117 A.3d 777, 785 (Pa. 

Super. 2015), this Court specifically found that Section 9714 is 

not rendered unconstitutional under Alleyne as it [allows] for 

mandatory minimum sentences based on prior convictions.

Commonwealth v. Bragg, 133 A.3d 328, 332–333 (Pa. Super. 2016), aff'd 

sub nom., Commonwealth v. Bragg, 169 A.3d 1024 (Pa. 2017); see also 

Commonwealth v. Valentine, 101 A.3d 801, 804 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(emphasis in original) (“The Alleyne decision ... renders those Pennsylvania 

mandatory minimum sentencing statutes that do not pertain to prior 

convictions constitutionally infirm insofar as they permit a judge to 

automatically increase a defendant's sentence based on a preponderance of 

the evidence standard.”). Here, neither Alleyne nor Section 9714 required

the trial court to submit Appellant’s prior convictions to a jury before 

sentencing him properly to an enhanced mandatory minimum sentence based 
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upon his two prior convictions of crimes of violence.5 Moreover, the text of 

Section 9714, which requires a 25-year minimum sentence where two or more 

violent crime convictions predate the commission of a third, displaces any 

need for the court to inquire into Appellant’s rehabilitative needs under Section 

9712(b). See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714(a)(2) (imposing a 25-year minimum 

sentence notwithstanding other statutory provisions). Thus, Appellant’s 

second claim has no merit.

Next, Appellant argues that the lower court erred “in imposing separate 

sentences for [b]urglary and [c]riminal [t]respass based upon a single entry 

into [the victim’s] residence.” Appellant’s Brief at 20-21. Appellant concedes 

that “[u]nder a strict merger analysis, [burglary and criminal trespass] would 

not merge as all the statutory elements of one offense are not included in the 

other.” Id. at 20, citing Commonwealth v. Quintua, 56 A.3d 399 (Pa. 

Super. 2012). Instead, Appellant maintains:

Here, the argument is not a merger argument, but rather, where 

the allegation and testimony at trial are for one entry, that entry 

was either made with the intent to commit a crime [or not, as 

A]ppellant was not accused of multiple entries. The two offenses 

appear to be mutually exclusive. To argue otherwise would result 

in every burglar also being guilty of criminal trespass. 

Id. at 20.

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5

 Appellant does not contest that his prior convictions for rape and rape by 

forcible compulsion (in one criminal episode) and two counts of arson (in a 

later, unrelated criminal episode) were violent crimes under Section 9714.
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When an appellant challenges the imposition of separate sentences, this

Court has stated:

Whether appellant's convictions merge for sentencing is a 

question implicating the legality of appellant's sentence. 

Consequently, our standard of review is de novo and the scope of 

our review is plenary. See Commonwealth v. Collins, 764 A.2d 

1056, 1057 n.1 (Pa. 2001).

Our Sentencing Code, at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9765, provides:

§ 9765. Merger of sentences

No crimes shall merge for sentencing purposes unless the 

crimes arise from a single criminal act and all of the 

statutory elements of one offense are included in the 

statutory elements of the other offense. Where crimes 

merge for sentencing purposes, the court may sentence the 

defendant only on the higher graded offense.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9765.

The statute's mandate is clear. It prohibits merger unless two 

distinct [components] are present: 1) the crimes arise from a 

single criminal act; and 2) all of the statutory elements of one of 

the offenses are included in the statutory elements of the other. 

Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 985 A.2d 830, 833 (Pa. 2009).

Commonwealth v. Talley, 236 A.3d 42, 52–53 (Pa. Super. 2020) (original 

brackets omitted). 

“A person commits the offense of burglary if, with the intent to commit 

a crime therein, the person ... enters a building or occupied structure, or 

separately secured or occupied portion thereof that is adapted for overnight 

accommodations in which at the time of the offense any person is present.” 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a)(1)(ii). Whereas, Section 3503(a)(1)(ii) states that a 

person commits criminal trespass “if, knowing that he is not licensed or 
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privileged to do so, he breaks into any building or occupied structure or 

separately secured or occupied portion thereof.” 18 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 3503(a)(1)(ii). We have previously determined:

Examining the elements of criminal trespass, a conviction for that 

offense requires a person: (1) to break or enter into with 

subterfuge any building or occupied structure; (2) knowing he is 

not licensed or privileged to do so. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(a)(1). 

On the other hand, to commit burglary, a person must: (1) enter 

a building or occupied structure; (2) with intent to commit a crime 

therein. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a). The plain language of the 

respective statutes demonstrates why they do not merge. 

Criminal trespass contains an element of knowledge—a person 

committing that offense must know he is not privileged to enter 

the premises. Burglary has no such knowledge requirement. 

Burglary does, however, require intent to commit a crime within 

the premises, an element that criminal trespass lacks. As each 

offense requires proof of an element the other does not, the 

sentences should not merge. See [Commonwealth v.] Jones, 

[] 912 A.2d [815,] 827 (Newman, J., dissenting) (stating: “[N]ot 

every burglary is a criminal trespass, and vice versa.”).

Quintua, 56 A.3d at 402. Appellant concedes that the two offenses, burglary 

and criminal trespass, have different statutory elements and upon our review 

of Quintua, Appellant is not entitled to relief on his third issue presented.

However, upon further review of the record, we sua sponte determine 

that the trial court entered an illegal sentence when it amended Appellant’s 

sentence outside his presence. Thus, we are constrained to vacate Appellant’s 

sentence. As this Court has previously determined:

[W]hether the trial judge had the authority to correct an alleged 

sentencing error, poses a pure question of law. Accordingly, our 

scope of review is plenary and our standard of review is de novo. 

It is well-settled in Pennsylvania that a trial court has the inherent, 

common-law authority to correct clear clerical errors in its orders. 
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A trial court maintains this authority even after the expiration of 

the 30-day time limitation set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505 for the 

modification of orders. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505.

A trial court's inherent authority to correct clerical errors, while 

considered a time-honored tradition has been described by our 

Supreme Court as a limited judicial power in its scope.

* * *

In addition to the restraints imposed by the double jeopardy 

clauses on a trial court's authority to correct clerical errors, an 

alleged error must qualify as a clear clerical error (or a patent and 

obvious mistake) in order to be amenable to correction. In 

discussing a trial court's authority to correct illegal sentences, our 

Supreme Court has stated that it is the obviousness of the 

illegality, rather than the illegality itself, that triggers the court's 

inherent power. The High Court has also cautioned that the 

inherent power to correct errors does not extend to 

reconsideration of a court's exercise of sentencing discretion. A 

court may not vacate a sentencing order merely because it later 

considers a sentence too harsh or too lenient. As a matter of 

general guidance, our Supreme Court has sanctioned the use of 

the inherent authority in cases that involve clear errors in the 

imposition of sentences that were incompatible with the record or 

black letter law.

This Court[] has addressed the situations where [] the terms of a 

defendant’s sentence as stated at the sentencing hearing conflict 

(or are deemed incompatible) with the terms of the defendant’s 

sentence as stated in [a subsequent written] sentencing order. 

In these circumstances, for a trial court to exercise its inherent 

authority and enter an order correcting a defendant's written 

sentence to conform with the terms of the sentencing hearing, the 

trial court's intention to impose a certain sentence must be 

obvious on the face of the sentencing transcript. Stated 

differently, only when a trial court's intentions are clearly and 

unambiguously declared during the sentencing hearing can there 

be a clear clerical error on the face of the record, and the 

sentencing order subject to later correction.

If, on the other hand, a trial court's stated intentions during the 

sentencing hearing are ambiguous, then the terms of the sentence 

in the sentencing order control, and the trial court cannot correct 

its perceived mistake. This is because the alleged error in the 
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sentencing transcript is not a clear clerical error, but rather, is an 

ambiguity that must be resolved by reference to the written 

sentencing order. 

Commonwealth v. Borrin, 12 A.3d 466, 471–473 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en 

banc) (internal case citations, quotations, original emphasis, and original 

brackets omitted), affirmed, 80 A.3d 1219 (Pa. 2013).

Upon our review of the sentencing hearing, the trial court did not impose

a consecutive term of 12 months of re-entry supervision in open court at the 

time of original sentencing. See N.T., 10/25/2022, at 13-16. We noted above 

that whenever the trial court imposes an aggregate sentence of incarceration 

exceeding four years, reentry supervision is mandated by Section 6137.2. As 

such, the subsequent amended order was not entered merely to correct a 

clear clerical error. Instead, the trial court added additional terms to 

Appellant’s sentence that were not imposed at the original time of sentencing 

or the corresponding original written sentencing order. Moreover, there is no 

indication on the trial court docket that the trial court held a resentencing 

hearing or that Appellant was present in court when the amended sentence 

was imposed. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 602 (“The defendant shall be present at every 

stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the 

verdict, and at the imposition of sentence[.]”). As such, the trial court 

entered an illegal sentence. Accordingly, we vacate the amended sentence 

and remand for resentencing consistent with this decision. Compare 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 297 A.3d 719 (Pa. Super. 2023) (unpublished 

memorandum) (“After the trial court amended its original sentencing order to 
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include a consecutive term of mandatory probation, [Johnson] filed a 

post-sentence motion in which he argued that the trial court erred because it 

did not impose the amended sentence in open court. On March 28, 2022, the 

trial court granted Appellant's post-sentence motion, vacated the previous 

judgment of sentence, and held a new sentencing hearing.”).

Convictions affirmed. Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded 

for resentencing consistent with this memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 10/4/2023