J-S49042-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

JIAN LI ZHU IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. 

ZHAOJIN DAVID KE 

Appellant No. 6 WDA 2017

Appeal from the Order December 13, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County 

Civil Division at No(s): 10255-2013

BEFORE: DUBOW, SOLANO, and FITZGERALD,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED OCTOBER 06, 2017

Appellant, Zhaojin David Ke, appeals pro se from the order of the Erie 

County Court of Common Pleas entering a final decree in divorce. Appellant 

challenges the November 28, 2016 order of the court denying his exceptions 

and affirming the report and recommendations of the master. We affirm. 

The trial court summarized the procedural posture of this case as 

follows:

[Appellee]-wife Jian Li Zhu (“Zhu”), filed her Complaint 

in Divorce (“Complaint”), on January 31, 2013 requesting 

a 3301(c)[1][mutual consent] divorce and equitable 

distribution. The complaint was later amended to add a 

count for a divorce under section 3301(d) [irretrievable

breakdown]. The divorce Master, Mary Alfieri Richmond, 

Esquire (“Master”), was appointed in March of 2014. 

Master’s hearings solely on the issue of date of separation 

 

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 23 Pa.C.S. § 3301(c).
J-S49042-17

- 2 -

were held on June 16 and July 9, 2014. The report 

resulting from those hearings was filed November 3, 2014. 

The Master concluded that the date of separation coincided 

with the date the Complaint was served on [Appellant], 

that being February 22, 2013. [Appellant] filed exceptions 

to the Master’s report on date of separation on November 

24, 2014, which were dismissed by Memorandum Opinion 

and Order of the Honorable Stephanie Domitrovich on 

February 2, 2015. [Appellant] sought to appeal Judge 

Domitrovich’s Order, but the appeal was denied as 

interlocutory.[2]

The Master’s hearing on equitable distribution issues 

was held on May 25, 2016 (“Master’s Hearing”). The 

Report and docket indicate that [Appellant] was served 

notice of the hearing, including notice of permission to 

attend the hearing by telephone,[fn1] by regular mail, 

certified mail, and personal service. There is no indication 

the regular mail was retuned. The certified mail was 

“unclaimed.” The affidavit of personal service indicates 

that an adult male who refused to identify himself was 

served by hand delivery at [Appellant’s] address on May 4, 

2016 by a process server. In his Exceptions, [Appellant] 

admits having received notice of the hearing by email, 

which has been [Appellant’s] preferred method of 

communication on procedural matters throughout these 

proceedings, so apparently it was sent to him via email as 

well. Also, the Master points out that [Appellant] must 

have received the hearing notice because he attached a 

copy of it to a pleading he filed with the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court styled as mandamus action on May 16, 

 

2 See Caplan v. Caplan, 713 A.2d 674, 675 (Pa. Super. 1998) (granting 

motion to quash appeal based upon claim that “the order establishing the 

date of the marriage as part of a divorce action is interlocutory and not a 

final order under Pa.R.A.P. 341”).
J-S49042-17

- 3 -

2016[3](that action was denied by the Supreme Court on 

July 25, 2016).[4]

[fn1] [Appellant] is allegedly disabled and lives in 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He is routinely granted 

permission to attend court proceedings in Erie 

County by telephone.

Nevertheless, [Appellant] did not attend the Master’s 

Hearing on May 25th, or seek to continue or reschedule it. 

The two-hour hearing commenced after a delay of one-half 

hour to allow additional time for [Appellant] to call, and 

concluded upon presentation of testimony and evidence by 

[Appellee], who appeared, represented by counsel. 

Though [Appellant] disputes virtually every 

recommendation made by the Master in his 26-page 

Exceptions,[5] he does not raise the issue of improper 

notice, nor does he make any effort to explain his failure to 

appear at the Master’s Hearing.

Trial Ct. Op., 11/28/16, at 1-2. 

On October 7, 2016, a hearing was held on the exceptions filed by 

Appellant to the master’s report and recommendation. Following the hearing 

on the exceptions, the trial court dismissed the exceptions and approved the 

Master’s Report. Id. at 2. The trial court issued a decree in divorce on 

December 13, 2016. This timely appeal followed. Appellant filed a court-

 

3 See Application for Extraordinary Relief in the Nature of Action in 

Mandamus and Prohibition, 5/16/16, at Ex. 31.

4 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court entered a Per Curiam Order denying the 

Application for Extraordinary Relief. Zhoajin David Ke, Pet’r v. Court of 

Common Pleas of Erie County, Resp’t, 59 WM 2016 Pa. 2016). 

5 We note the Master’s report was filed on July 18, 2016, and served on July 

28, 2016. Appellant was granted an extension of time to file exceptions until 

September 5, 2016. He filed his exceptions on September 2, 2016.
J-S49042-17

- 4 -

ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal.6 

The trial court’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion incorporated its November 28, 

2016 opinion.

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

deliberately denying [Appellant] economic justice just 

because [Appellant] failed to attend the [M]aster’s third 

hearing, as conceded by the trial court.

2. Whether it was logically and physically possible─when 

[Appellee] “resides in Erie County and [Appellant] has 

resided primarily in Philadelphia since January 2008”─for 

the parties to be “still acting as a marital unit by taking on 

DAILY activities synonymous with a healthy marital 

relationship,” as the trial court fictitiously insisted in its 

2/2/2015 “Memorandum Opinion” at 9 with respect to the 

parties’ date of separation.

 

6 Appellant raised forty-five allegations of error in his Rule 1925(b) 

statement and nine issues in his brief. We endorse the following:

With a decade and a half of federal appellate court 

experience behind me, I can say that even when we 

reverse a trial court it is rare that a brief successfully 

demonstrates that the trial court committed more than one 

or two reversible errors. I have said in open court that 

when I read an appellant’s brief that contains ten or twelve 

points, a presumption arises that there is no merit to any 

of them. I do not say that this is an irrebuttable 

presumption, but it is a presumption nevertheless that 

reduces the effectiveness of appellate advocacy. Appellate

advocacy is measured by effectiveness, not 

loquaciousness.

Andaloro v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 799 A.2d 71, 83-84 (Pa. 

Super. 2002) (citation omitted).
J-S49042-17

- 5 -

3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

indiscriminately embracing the Rule 3301 definition of 

“date of separation” when there is sufficient evidence 

pointing to January 1, 2008[,] as the date of separation.

4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by using 

multiple valuation dates for [Appellant] but a single 

valuation date for [Appellee] without providing a shred of 

justification.

5. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

excluding [Appellant’s] probative evidence filed on the 

docket.

6. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying 

[Appellant] a de novo hearing on his Exceptions when he 

asked for it.

7. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing 

to review all of the Exceptions item by item at the hearing 

on the Exceptions.

8. Whether there is any statute or caselaw providing that . 

. . Erie County is exempted from Pa.R.C.P. 1920.55-3 with 

respect to a hearing de novo on Exceptions before the trial 

court.

9. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by willfully 

depriving [Appellant] of his due process and equal 

protection rights in refusing to conduct a de novo hearing 

on asset distribution.

Appellant’s Brief at 5.7

 

7 Although Appellant raises nine questions presented, the argument section 

of his brief is not divided accordingly and his analysis of each question is not 

clearly delineated, in contravention of Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 2119(a). See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (“The argument shall be divided 

into as many parts as there are questions to be argued”); see also 

Commonwealth v. Kane, 10 A.3d 327 (Pa. Super. 2010). “The brief must 

support the claims with pertinent discussion, with references to the record 

and with citations to legal authority. . . . [W]hen defects in a brief impede 
J-S49042-17

- 6 -

We address issues two and three together because they are 

interrelated. Appellant contends “facts clearly point to January 1, 2008 as 

the clear-cut date of separation . . . .” Id. at 28. He claims the master 

erred in finding the date of separation to be the date the complaint in 

divorce was served. Id.8

Where the parties dispute the date of final separation, “[o]ur standard 

of review is one of an abuse of discretion. Absent an abuse of discretion, the 

trial court’s findings of fact, if supported by credible evidence of record, are 

 

our ability to conduct meaningful appellate review, we may . . . find certain 

issues to be waived.” Kane, 10 A.3d at 331; see PHH Mortg. Corp. v. 

Powell, 100 A.3d 611, 615 (Pa. Super. 2014) (refusing to quash appeal 

despite numerous violations of appellate briefing rules). We decline to 

quash. See id., 100 A.3d at 615. 

Although this Court is willing to liberally construe materials 

filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status confers no special 

benefit upon the appellant. To the contrary, any person 

choosing to represent himself in a legal proceeding must, 

to a reasonable extent, assume that his lack of expertise 

and legal training will be his undoing.

In re Ullman, 995 A.2d 1207, 1211-12 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations 

omitted). 

8

In its opinion in response to Appellant’s exceptions to the divorce Master’s 

report regarding equitable distribution, the trial court dismissed the 

exception to the date of separation. The court opined: “Date of separation 

was previously litigated before the Master, and affirmed by trial court, 

therefore it is not subject to challenge here.” Trial Ct. Op., 11/28/16, at 6. 

However, since the decree in divorce has been entered, the order 

establishing the date of separation is appealable. See e.g., Colagioia v. 

Colagioia, 523 A.2d 1158, 1160 (Pa. Super. 1987) (holding “a pre-divorce 

order of equitable distribution is interlocutory and cannot be reviewed until 

rendered final by the entry of a divorce decree”). 
J-S49042-17

- 7 -

binding upon a reviewing court.” Teodorski v. Teodorski, 857 A.2d 194, 

197 (Pa. Super. 2004).

In McCoy v. McCoy, 888 A.2d 906 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court 

opined:

the date on which the parties begin living separate and 

apart, is established upon the filing and serving of a 

divorce complaint, unless an earlier date can be 

substantiated through the presentation of evidence 

confirming an earlier date. A presumption . . . is a 

procedural device which not only permits an inference of 

the ‘presumed’ fact, but also shifts to the opposing party 

the burden of producing evidence to disprove the 

presumed fact. Failure to meet this burden of production 

will normally result in [a decision] . . . in favor of the party 

invoking the presumption. In short, [t]he party 

attempting to rebut the presumption has the burden of 

proof.

Id. at 912 (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Separate and apart is defined by statute as follows: “Cessation of 

cohabitation, whether living in the same residence or not. In the event a 

complaint in divorce is filed and served, it shall be presumed that the parties 

commenced to live separate and apart not later than the date that the 

complaint was served.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 3103. Furthermore, 

“[t]here must be an independent intent on the part of one 

of the parties to dissolve the marital union” and “the intent 

must be clearly manifested and communicated to the other 

spouse.” Sinha v. Sinha, [ ] 526 A.2d 765[, 767] ([Pa.] 

1987).

McCoy, 888 A.2d at 910. In McCoy, this Court concluded:

Here, Husband, as the party with the burden of proof 

because he opposes the presumed fact, needed to prove 
J-S49042-17

- 8 -

that either he or Wife had the “independent intent . . . to 

dissolve the marital union” and that the intent was “clearly 

manifested and communicated to the other spouse.” 

Sinha, 526 A.2d at 767. Although both the master and 

the trial court found that the marriage had not been a 

particularly good one, neither found evidence that would 

support a finding that an intent to dissolve the marriage 

had been communicated by one spouse to the other prior 

to the filing of the divorce complaint by Wife. Following 

our review of the record, we must agree. Accordingly, we 

conclude that Husband has failed to carry this burden of 

proof that the parties’ separation occurred prior to the date 

Wife filed and served the divorce complaint. Husband has 

not rebutted the presumption.

Id. at 912 (footnote omitted).

Instantly, the trial court opined:

After review of testimony and evidence received by the 

Master at the two Master’s Hearings held June 16th and 

July 9th 2014, . . . this [court] finds [Appellant’s] 

Exceptions regarding the parties’ date of separation are 

without merit. The testimony and evidence submitted by 

[Appellee] at both Master’s hearings contradicted 

[Appellant’s] allegations of an unhappy marital 

relationship. [Appellee] produced several photographs . . . 

of herself and [Appellant] in seemingly good company from 

2005 to 2011, including the parties together in their 

garden, sharing a meal at their kitchen table, together with 

their son at Presque Isle State Park, kayaking together, 

working on [Appellant’s] federal discrimination lawsuit 

against Edinboro University together, and leaving St. 

Vincent’s Hospital together after [Appellant’s] surgery. 

Although [Appellant] claims those photographs are not 

indicative of a happy marital relationship and are simply 

the parties “putting on the appearance of a married family 

unit,” others outside of the parties’ family unit could easily 

conclude the parties were in a happy marital relationship.

In addition, at the time [Appellant] was filing and 

preparing his two lawsuits─one for medical malpractice 

against several medical providers in August of 2007 and 

one for discrimination against Edinboro University in 
J-S49042-17

- 9 -

September 2008─he listed [Appellee] as his wife (for a loss 

of consortium claim in the medical malpractice lawsuit) 

and listed 533 Indiana Drive, Erie, Pennsylvania 16505 as 

his address. Also, during his discrimination lawsuit against 

Edinboro University, [Appellee] frequently accompanied 

[Appellant] to trial and was introduced by him as his wife. 

[Appellant] even admitted signing Verifications in his 

lawsuits affirming he and [Appellee] were still married. As 

[Appellant’s] discrimination lawsuit was in September 

2008, eight (8) months after [Appellant] claimed he 

“clearly lived separate and apart from [Appellee,]” this 

evidence again contradicted [Appellant’s] allegations of an 

unhappy marital relationship and is in opposition to 

[Appellant’s] contention that the parties’ date of separation 

was January 1st, 2008.

 * * * 

Finally, there is substantial testimony indicating the 

parties never seriously discussed a divorce until [Appellee] 

filed her Complaint for divorce on February 1st, 2013.

 * * *

Therefore, while [Appellant], by and through his actions 

after moving to Philadelphia in 2008, may have had an 

independent intent to dissolve the marital union, the fact 

the parties never seriously discussed divorce until 

[Appellee] filed her Complaint for Divorce undoubtedly 

shows [Appellant’s] intent was not clearly manifested and 

communicated to [Appellee].

Trial Ct. Op., 2/2/15, at 7-10 (citations omitted).

The trial court found “the Master properly concluded the parties’ date 

of separation was February 22nd, 2013, which is the date [Appellant] was 

served with [Appellee’s] Complaint for Divorce, as this conclusion was 

pursuant to statutory and case law and supported by the testimony and 

evidence on the record.” Id. at 10. We agree no relief is due. 
J-S49042-17

- 10 -

In the case sub judice, Appellant testified on cross-examination, inter

alia, as follows at the first Master’s hearing on the issue of the date of 

separation:

Q: . . . After you claim that you were maritally separated 

and your marriage was over, you’re doing yard work [at 

533 Indiana Drive] and staying there for a while, even 

though you’re trying to tell us that you made it clear to 

[Appellee] that you were no longer married? Are you 

saying that that happened?

A. I never said marriage was over. Okay.

Q. You never said─

A. I said we stopped cohabitation December 31, 2003. I 

never say we were like [sic] no longer married or 

whatever.

N.T., 6/16/14, at 73.

At the second Master’s hearing in relation to the date of separation, 

Appellant testified as follows, reproduced verbatim:

[Master:] Mr. Ke, let me back up a little so that I’m clear 

on one point. [Appellee] testified that the night before she 

left Philadelphia in May of 2012 that you and she had a 

discussion about divorce.

A: Yeah.

Q: It’s my understanding that your testimony is that 

discussion never took place, correct?

A: That’s right.

Q: And it’s my understanding from your testimony that 

you and your wife did have that type of discussion in 

February of 2013; is that correct?
J-S49042-17

- 11 -

A: No. I will not say discussion, because she had file a 

divorce complaint already. She wanted settle with me 

peacefully. She said, I live here. I would like to have] 

house. I said, okay. Go ahead have house. That was 

[sic] kind of discussion I was talking about. Not discussion 

about whether we should stay in the marriage, we should 

divorce each other. Not anything like that.

Q: And that type of─that discussion took place after she 

filed the divorce complaint?

A: Yeah. After. Because divorce was filed on February 

1st.

Q: Of 2013?

A: Yeah. After that─after that, I think, we─I don’t 

remember if I e-mail her first or she e-mail me first.

Q: And that’s when the two of you─

A: I can find out easily. I can find out easily.

Q: No, that’s all right. My understanding from what you’re 

testifying to is that that discussion about the mechanics of 

the divorce were first─

A. Not about divorce. I already─I file answer,[9]you know. 

In the same month I said, I agree to divorce 100 percent.

N.T., 7/9/14, 231-32.

Following our review of the record, the evidence does not support a 

finding that an intent to dissolve the marriage had been communicated by 

Appellant to Appellee prior to the filing of the complaint in divorce. See 

McCoy, 888 A.2d at 910, 912. Appellant had the burden of proof and has 

 

9 Appellant filed his answer to the complaint in divorce on March 18, 2013. 
J-S49042-17

- 12 -

not rebutted the presumption that the serving of the complaint in divorce 

established the date on which they began living separate and apart. See id.

at 912. We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court. See Teodorski, 

857 A.2d at 197. Accordingly, there is no merit to Appellant’s claim that 

January 1, 2008, was the date of separation. 

We address the remaining issues together because they are 

interrelated. Appellant claims that the trial court “erred by not giving [him] 

a hearing de novo on his Exceptions.” Appellant’s Brief at 35.10 Appellant 

avers the court “erred by excluding [his] admissible evidence and admitting 

[Appellee’s] false testimony, proven so in [Appellant’s] Exceptions . . . .” 

Id. at 36. He maintains the court erred in holding it was “limited to the 

evidence presented before the Master.” Id. at 41. Appellant contends he 

was entitled to a de novo hearing pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1920.55-3. Id. at 

40, 42. Appellant claims he was deprived of economic justice. Id. at 45, 

47.

 

10 We note that Appellant mischaracterizes footnote two of the trial court 

opinion. The court stated as follows:

The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure provide 

alternative hearing procedures for matters referred to 

Masters. Pa.R.C.P. 1920.55-3 contemplates de novo

review at the trial court level if exceptions are filed. 

Pa.R.C.P. 1920.55-2, which is adopted in Erie County, 

calls for a hearing on the record at the Master’s level, and 

argument only on any exception before the trial court. 

See: Official note to Pa.R.C.P. 1920.55-1. 

Trial Ct. Op., 11/28/16, at 3 n.2 (emphasis added). 
J-S49042-17

- 13 -

Our review is governed by the following principles: “The interpretation 

and application of a Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure presents a question 

of law. Accordingly, to the extent that we are required to interpret a rule of 

civil procedure, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is 

plenary.” Keller v. Mey, 67 A.3d 1, 5 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). 

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1920.55-1 provides as follows:

(a) Matters referred to a master for hearing shall proceed 

as prescribed by Pa.R.C.P. No. 1920.55-2 unless the court 

by local rule adopts the alternative procedure of Pa.R.C.P. 

No. 1920.55-3.

(b) The president judge or the administrative judge of 

Family Division of each county shall certify that all divorce 

proceedings which are referred to a master in that county 

are conducted in accordance with either Pa.R.C.P. No. 

1920.55-2 or Pa.R.C.P. No. 1920.55-3. The certification 

shall be filed with the Domestic Relations Procedural Rules 

Committee . . . .

Pa.R.C.P. No. 1920.55-1. The explanatory comment to the rule provides:

The 1995 amendments created alternative procedures for 

appeal from the recommendation of a master in divorce. 

Pa.R.C.P. No. 1920.55-1 states that, if the court chooses 

to appoint a master, the exceptions procedure set forth in 

proposed Pa.R.C.P. No. 1920.55-2 will be used unless the 

court has, by local rule, adopted the alternative procedure 

of proposed Pa.R.C.P. No. 1920.55-3.[11]

 

11 Rule 1920.55-3 provides:

 

(a) No record shall be made of the hearing in proceedings 

held pursuant to this rule. 

(b) After the conclusion of hearing, the master shall:

(1) file the report within;
J-S49042-17

- 14 -

In lieu of continuing the practice of including in the Note a 

67-county list identifying the hearing procedure selected 

by the local county court, the list can now be found on the 

Domestic Relations Procedural Rules Committee website. 

Pa.R.C.P. 1920.55-1, Cmt. 

Rule 1920.55-2, adopted in Erie County, provides as follows:

(a) After conclusion of the hearing, the master shall:

(1) file the record and the report within;

(i) twenty days in uncontested actions or;

 

(i) twenty days in uncontested actions or;

(ii) thirty days in contested actions; and

(2) immediately serve upon counsel for each party, or, if 

unrepresented, upon the party, a copy of the report and 

recommendation, and written notice of the right to 

demand a hearing de novo.

(c) Within twenty days of the date the master’s report is 

mailed or received, whichever occurs first, any party may 

file a written demand for a hearing de novo. If a demand 

is filed, the court shall hold a hearing de novo and enter a 

final decree.

(d) If no demand for de novo hearing is filed within the 

twenty-day period, the court shall review the report and 

recommendation and, if approved, shall enter a final 

decree.

(e) No Motion for Post-Trial Relief may be filed to the final 

decree.

Pa.R.C.P. 1920.55-3.
J-S49042-17

- 15 -

(ii) thirty days from the last to occur of the receipt of 

the transcript by the master or close of the record in 

contested actions; and

(2) immediately serve upon counsel for each party, or, if 

unrepresented, upon the party, a copy of the report and 

recommendation and written notice of the right to file 

exceptions.

(b) Within twenty days of the date of receipt or the date of 

mailing of the master’s report and recommendation, 

whichever occurs first, any party may file exceptions to the 

report or any part thereof, to rulings on objections to 

evidence, to statements or findings of fact, to conclusions 

of law, or to any other matters occurring during the 

hearing. Each exception shall set forth a separate 

objection precisely and without discussion. Matters not 

covered by exceptions are deemed waived unless, prior to 

entry of the final decree, leave is granted to file exceptions 

raising those matters.

(c) If exceptions are filed, any other party may file 

exceptions within twenty days of the date of service of the 

original exceptions. The court shall hear argument on the 

exceptions and enter a final decree.

(d) If no exceptions are filed, the court shall review the 

report and, if approved, shall enter a final decree.

(e) No Motion for Post-Trial Relief may be filed to the final 

decree.

Pa.R.C.P. 1920.55-2. “[I]n counties in which no new hearing is held before 

the trial court, the trial court is limited to the evidence presented 

before the master.” Cunningham v. Cunningham, 548 A.2d 611, 613 

(Pa. Super. 1988) (emphasis added).

Instantly, the trial court opined:

The respective roles of the Master and the trial court under 

Rule 1920.55-2, are for the Master to create the 
J-S49042-17

- 16 -

evidentiary record and make recommendations, and for 

the trial court to review the Master’s recommendations and 

hear argument on any exceptions to same.

* * * 

In light of this [c]ourt’s standard of review, 

[Appellant’s] failure to appear at the Master’s Hearing 

presents an insurmountable challenge to his Exceptions, 

which are based largely, if not exclusively, on a written 

narrative of facts and sixty-three exhibits submitted for the 

first time with his Exceptions. The narrative and exhibits 

were not offered or admitted at the time of the Master’s 

hearing and are not properly the part of the Masters record 

under review.

Trial Ct. Op., 11/28/16, at 3.

In the case sub judice, the complaint for divorce was filed in Erie 

County. Therefore, the procedures set forth in Rule 1920.55-2 were 

applicable. Consequently, Appellant was not entitled to a de novo hearing 

on his exceptions to the Master’s report. See Pa.R.C.P. 1920.55-2(c); see 

also Cunningham, 548 A.2d at 613. The trial court was limited to the 

evidence presented to the Master.12 See id. We discern no error of law by 

the trial court. See Keller, 67 A.3d at 5. Accordingly, we affirm the order 

of the trial court.

Order affirmed. Motion for Leave to File Addendum denied.13

 

12 Given our resolution of this issue, we need not address any other claims 

raised by Appellant.

13 Appellant asks this Court to determine whether the Master abused her 

discretion in the rate she charged for the third Master’s hearing.
J-S49042-17

- 17 -

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/6/2017