### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-14-00059- CR

Thomas Broc k, App ellant

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F TRAVIS CO UNTY, 167 TH JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. D-1 -DC- 12- 2021 94, H ONO RAB LE P . DAVID W AHLB ERG, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

T h o ma s B r o c k w a s c h a

r g e d w it h mu r d e r in g L u i s V i g i l

. S

e e T e x . P e n a l Co d e § 1 9

. 0 2 ( b ) (setting out elements of offe nse of murder) , (c) (providing that in g ener al murder is first-deg ree felony ). I n addition, the i ndictment contained an enhanceme nt para g raph alleg ing t h at Brock had previously been convicted of the crime of attempted murder. See id. § 15.01 (g o v er n i n g at tempt offe nses). After he was char g ed, Br ock ag ree d to plead g uilty to the offe nse at issue, but he enter ed a plea of not t ru e re garding the enhanceme nt alleg ation. Once the di strict court acce pted Brock’ s plea, it sentenc ed him to 45 y ear s’ imprisonment. See id. § 12.32 (setting out punishment rang e for first-deg ree felonies)

. The judgme nt ref lects that Br ock pleade d true to the enhanc ement alleg ation.
On appea l, Br ock contends that the district “cour t err ed by failing to make a sua sponte inquiry into [hi s] competenc y to stand trial,” that the district “c ourt err ed by finding [t hat he] was compe tent,” and that the “judg ment of conviction should be amende d to ref lect that [he] enter ed a plea of not trueto the enhanc ement para g raph.” We will modify the judgme nt to ref lect that Br ock pleade d not true to the enhanc ement alleg ation and af firm the district cour

t’s judgme nt of conviction as modified.

DISCUSSIO N

Sua S ponte Inq uiry into Com petency

I n his first issue, Br ock urg es that the district court should hav e m ade its own deter minati o n rega

rding his competenc y befor e acce pting his plea after he m ade “bizarre remar ks

. . . at the outset of his t ri al

. ” S ee Turner v. State , 422 S.W .3d 676, 688 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (explaining that person who is not competent may not be put on trial without violating due proce ss);

see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 46B.004( b) (stating that “[i] f evidenc e sug g esting the defe ndant
may be incompetent to stand trial comes to the attention of t he court, the court o n i t s own m otion shall sugg est that the def

endant may

be incompete nt to stand trial”). As support for this a ssertion, Br ock points to the portion of the r ecor d in which the district court asked about his history of hear ing voices prior to accep t i n g his plea of g uilty

. That exchang e occ urre d as follows:
[C ourt]: Okay

. I think somewher e in all of the materia ls that I ’ve sort o f b riefly revie wed here, there’ s some indication that y ou have a history of hearing voices or something a long those lines; is that right? [Brock]: Yes, sir, that’s true

. [C ourt]: Sort of tell me a littl e bit about how long that’s been g oing on and what that’s like. [Brock]: Since I was 15, I ’ve heard voices t hat have told me to do things to my self and some thing s are inappropria te.

2[C ourt]: S o without asking - - I ’m not asking y ou --

[Brock]: Right. [C ourt]: -- for the de tails. I ’m just sort of try ing to g et a g ener al -- [Brock]: Yes, sir. [C ourt]: -- understanding

of y our situation. [Brock]: Yes, sir. The voic es would def initely -- they ’d make me do things. (Sotto voce discussion betwee n attorney and def endant) [Brock]: Oh, y eah, y eah. Around eig ht or nine, the invisibl e stuff started happening

. [C ourt]: W hen y ou say

invisibl e stuff, w hat ar e we talking a bout? [Brock]: I ’m talking about my uncle who w as able to use a de vice to make himself transpar ent, and he’s a fre emason and differ ent stuff. He’ s a wea lthy man. I ’ve never been able to prove it, but I ’d like to just to g et him in here , but I can’ t, y ou know. I t rea lly is shocking how he did that. Another thing t hat happened to m e wa s when I was a n infant, I was take n to the churc h of Satan a nd my head w as cut off

and -- [C ourt]: How did it g et bac k on? [Brock]: Okay , okay , g ood question. There is a replica tion device used made of front surfa ce, silver-co at ed mirrors and halog en lights and it brea ks down subatomic particle s and restabilizes them and in a matter of seconds it’s a molecular replica tor. I t w as used by Nazis at one time and now still goe s on being used by the I lluminati and people who don’t talk about i t, but I talk about it beca use it was used on me . I think what happene d was, I was thought of to have a dece nt life with my g randf ather and ever y body and they wanted me to come up and go t o the Air For ce and also become a Skull an d Bones member, an I lluminati member and do something, y ou know, spec tacular

for my family , like any family would want their c hild to growto be a doctor, et cete ra. I nstead that happene d to me and I look on being done like that an d I ’v e went over it in my mind and I tried t o write to my mom and my dad , h ey , this ha s happene d to me

. I know it sounds completely unbelievable , but I know for sure it’s happene d. And so far I haven’ t g otten any fee dback and dialog ue and I wish I could.

3I n light of this exchang e, Brock contends t hat t here was “ample reaso n t o sug g est

that his competenc y was in question” and that the district court abused its discre t i o n by failing to conduct a further inquiry into his competenc y . Moreove r, Br ock notes that he has had a history of these ty pes of delusions a

nd then chronic les the testimony and evidenc e of his extensive history of mental-he alth issues and his periods of incompetenc y that wer e prese nted to the district court prior to his entering his plea of g uilty . I n particula

r, B rock points to the following :

• Shortly afte r his arr est, he told the police that “he hear s voices and had been replica ted and reinc arna ted over the y ear s” and that he killed the victim to “instill belief.”

• Approxim ately

one month later, his counse l and the State raised the issue of compe tency

and aske d that he be e x amined by a psy chiatrist.

• Subsequent to the evalua tion, his attorney and the State ag ree d that he was incompetent to stand tri al, and he was committed for inpatient trea tment and obser vation for 120 da

y s.

• After the ex piration of t hat period, the S tate moved to extend his mentalhealth tre atment.

• During the hear ing on the State’s motion, o n e o f h is trea ting phy sicians, Dr. Maure en Bur

rows, testified that he was not competent to stand trial; that he was unable to confe r with counsel; that he was s u ff er ing from “schizo-af

fec tive disorder, bipolar ty pe”; that he was “still

. . . para noid and delusional, and experiencing hallucinations that are integ ral to his case , and it impairs his abil ity to have a rational approa ch in this case ”; that he believed that the criminal offe nse st emmed from a racial war as well as a replica tor box that copied his identity ; and that he neede d to be hospitaliz ed for tre atment.

• At the end of the hear ing, the mag istrate judge extended hi s i n patient trea tment for a pe riod not to ex cee d twelve months.

4I n light of the prec eding , Br ock insists that the district court abused its discretion by failing to further

inquire into his competency befor e ac cepting his plea.
Gene rally speaking , a “def endant is presumed competent to stand trial and shall be found competent to stand trial unless proved incompetent by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e.” Tex. Co d e Cr im

. Pr o c . a

r t. 4 6 B

. 0 0 3 ( b )

. “ A p e r s o n is in c o mp e te n t to s ta n d tr ia l if th e p e r s o n d o e s n o t h a v e ” :
(1) sufficie nt prese n t ab i l ity to consult with the person’ s lawy er with a rea sonable deg ree of ra tional understanding ; or (2) a rational as well as fac tual understanding of the proce eding s ag ainst the person.

I d

. a r t. 4 6 B

. 0 0 3 ( a )

. M o r e o v e r , th e d e f e n d a n t, th e St a te , o r th e tr ia l c o u

r t ma y s u g g e s t th a

t th e d e f e n d a n t is not competent to stand trial. Id. art. 46B.004( a). I n addition, “[o] n sug g estion that the defe ndant
may be incompetent to stand trial, the court s hall deter mine by informal inquiry whether there is

some evidenc e from any source that would support a finding that the defe ndant may be incompetent
to s ta n d tr ia l. ” I d

. a r t. 4 6 B

. 0 0 4 ( c )

. F u

r th e r , a “ s u g g e s ti o n o f in c o mp e te n c y is th e th r e s h o ld r e q

u ir e me n t for an informal inquiry

. . . and may consist solely of a repr esenta tion from any cre dible source that the defendant may be incompetent.” Id. art. 46B.004(c -1); see also id. (explaining that trial court “is not required t o have a bona fide doubt about the competenc y of the defe ndant” befor e inquiry
may be initiated). Among other fac tors, competenc y deter minations may be based on the ability of the def endant to:
(A) rationally understand the char g es ag ainst the defe ndant and the p o t en t ial conseque nces of

the pending criminal proc eeding s; (B ) disclose to counse l pertinent fa cts, eve nts, and states of mind;

5(C) eng ag e in a r easone d choice of leg al strateg ies and options;

(D) unde rstand the a dversa rial nature of cr iminal procee dings; (E) e x hibit appropriate c ourtroom behavior; and (F ) testify

.
Id. art. 4 6 B. 0 2 4(1); see also id. art. 46B.004( c-1) (providing that trial court may consider fac tors listed in article 4 6 B. 0 2 4 wh en deciding competenc y ). I n making a deter

mination, the court may also consider whether the defe ndant has a mental illness, how long the condition is expected to last, how much the condition impairs the defe ndant, and whether the defe ndant is taking medication. Id.

a r t. 4 6 B

. 0 2 4 ( 2 )

- ( 5 )

. A lt

h o u g h e v id e n c e o f a h is to r

y o f me n ta l il ln e s s mi g h t b e a r o n th is d e te r

mi n a ti o n , th a t ty p e o f e v id e n c e w il l o n ly c o mp e l f u r th e r a c ti o n b y th e tr

ia l c o u r t if it in d ic a

te s th a t th e d e f e n d a n t is c u r r e n tl y in c a

p a b le o f u n d e r s ta n d in g th e p r o c e e d in g s a g a in s t h im o r o f c o n s u lt in g w it h h is a tt o r n e y . See Iniquez v. State , 374 S.W .3d 611, 617 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, no pet.) (a pply ing bona -fide standard f rom previous ve rsion of statute). The decision by a trial court to not “conduc t further inquiry into t h e” defe ndant’s competenc y

is reviewe d for a

n abuse of discretion. See Luna v. State , 268 S.W .3d 594, 599 (Tex.
Cr im

. A p p . 2 0 0 8 )

. U n d e r th a

t s ta n d a r d , a tr ia l c o u

r t’ s r u li n g w il l o n ly b e d e e me d a n a b u s e o f d is c r e ti o n if it is so clea

rly wrong as to lie outside the zone of rea sonable disag ree ment, Lopez v. State , 8 6 S

. W

. 3 d 228, 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002), or is arbitra ry or unrea sonable, State v. Mech l er , 153 S.W .3d 435, 439 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Moreove r, the trial court’s ruli n g wi ll be upheld provided that the decision “is rea sonably supported by the rec ord and is corr ect under any theory of law applica

ble to the ca se,” a

nd revie wing courts must consider “ the t rial cour t’s ruling in light of

6what was befor e the trial court at the time the ruling was made.” Carrasco v. State , 154 S.W .3d 127,

129 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

I n addition to the evidenc e and testimony that Br o ck points to, other evidenc e

r e g a r d in g B r o c k ’ s me n

ta l h e a lt h w a s p r e s e n te d b e f

o r e th e d is tr ic t c o u

r t a c c e p te d h is p le a . Sp e c if i c a l l y , 1

a few months afte r the mag istrate approve d the reque st for extended mental-he alth trea tme n t, a n o th e r hear ing was convene d in response to B rock’ s attorney ’s re quest that Br ock be decla red competent to stand trial in acc ordanc e with the compe tency repor t prepa red by one of his tre ating phy sicians,
Dr. Michele Bor

y nski. I n the competenc y repor t, Dr. Bor y nski ex p l ai n ed t hat since Br ock was transfe rre d to the hospital, he has been trea ted with va rious medications and rec ounted how when 2
he first arr ived at the hospital, he was suffe ring from intense delusions and hallucinations, including

ones rela ted to a replica tor box and to his identity having been copied. Howeve r, Dr. Bor y nski wrote that “B rock has made prog ress with respe ct to the impairments that previously imp ac t ed his functioni n g ” and then chronic led the reduc tions in his sy mptoms over time and g ener al improvement
in his ability to function i n the fa cility

. I n fac t, reg arding her most rec ent i nterview , Dr. Bory nski explained that Br ock “did not express delusions or otherwise evidenc e sy mptoms of mental illness,”

was cooper ative and polite, and “discussed matters in an org anized, logic al, and coher ent fashion.”

W e n o t e t h at afte r Br ock made the bizarre comments that form the basis for this issue, 1 his attorney did not sug g est that Br ock was not competent t o s t an d trial. Cf. Iniquez v. State , 374 S.W .3d 611, 618 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, no pet.) (dete rmining that trial court did not abuse its d i s cr et i o n b y failing to conduct sua sponte competenc y hear ing and noting that defe ndant did not pr esent opinion of mental-hea lth pr ofessional “or an aff idavit f rom counsel that [he] could not eff ectively communicate” ). After Br ock enter ed his plea, Dr. Bur rows testified and explained that when Br ock is on his 2 medication, he distances himself from his “delusions and believes -- or can think about them more flexibl y ” and tha t the reduc tion in his “sy mptoms m ight be 90 perc ent.” 7Fur

thermore , she concl u d ed t h at Br ock understood the leg al conseque nces of being decla red competen t o r i n competent, demonstrated “an adequate fac tual and rational understanding of the char g e ag ainst him and the possible p en al ties,” discussed the alleg ations, identified the crime for which he was char g ed, understood the ty pes of pleas that he might enter and how the differ ent pleas might aff ect the nature of the proce eding s ag ainst him, discussed p o t ential leg al strateg ies, understood the adver sarial nature o f a cr i minal proce eding , demonstrated an ability to eng ag e in
appropr iate courtroom behavior , and possessed the ability to testify if he chose to. Du ri ng the 3
hear ing to restore his competenc y , Br ock confirme d that he was able to discuss his case with his attorney as well as the various t y p es of pleas that he could enter

. I n acc ordanc e with the parties’ wishes and with the rec ommendation contained in the repor t, the district enter ed an order deter mining that Br ock had been restore d to c ompetency

. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 46B.112 (authorizing trial court to deter mine that defe ndant has been restore d to competenc y if both parties
ag ree and cour

t concur s).

I n addition to the repor

t submitt ed when Br ock’s competenc y was restore d, another repor t 3 prepa red by another phy sician, Dr. David L ander s, was also admitted as an exhibi t by Br ock after the district court acc epted his plea. I n the repor t, which was prepa

red a few wee k s af

t er Br ock’s competenc y was restore d, Dr. L ander s conclude d that Br ock was competent to proce ed, corr ec t l y identified the c h a

r g e a g a in s t h im, “demonstra ted an adequate understanding of basic leg al proce sses” a n d o f th e a d

v e r s a r ia l s y s te m, “ d id n o t e xp r e s s a n y g r o s s ly u

n r e a li s ti c e xp e c ta

ti o n s a b o u t th e o u tc o me of his case ,” and expressed a desire to work with his attorney

. Howeve r, Dr. L ander s also noted that Br ock’s ability to disclose fac ts to his attorney was not “optimal ,” that Br ock become s more sy mptomatic when stressed, and that during one of his interviews with Br ock, Br ock appea red more sy mptomatic and expressed the idea that the victim might not actua lly be dead, but Dr

. L an d ers conclude d that Br o ck d i d not “hold” onto that belief “with unwave ring conviction” and that the d e lu s io n w a s n o t “ a f

f e c t i n g h i s r a

t i o n a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o th e r

w is e . ” A c c o r d in g ly , D r . L a n d e r s c o n c lu d e d that Br ock was competent but that his attorney should be “sensitive to the prospec t of deter ioration.” 8M o r e o v e r , p r io r to a c c e p ti n g th e p le a , th e d is tr ic t c o u r t a s k e d B r o c k v a

r io u s q u e s ti o n s , including questions about his prior trea tment for mental-he alth issues and about his curr ent level of competenc y , and Br ock answe red that he understood the char g es ag ainst him , t h at he had “[d] efinitely ” been trea

ted for mental-he alth issues previously , that he believed that he was curr ently competent to stand trial, that he had discussed potential leg al defe nses wi t h h i s at t o rney , that he understood the nature of the proce eding s as well as the char g es ag ainst him, that he understood the permissible punishment rang e, that the puni shment rang e mi g ht be raised due to the e nhance ment alleg ation, and that he wanted to plead g uilty to the crime char g ed but not true to the enhanc ement.

I n addition, th e d istrict court asked Br ock’s attorney whether she thought Br ock

was competent, and she reve aled that Br ock was extensively trea ted and con fi n ed i n a mental hospital for months in an eff ort to discover the rig ht medicine to trea t his sy mptoms, to allow the medicine to take eff

ect, and to g ive Br ock time to understand the char g es ag ainst him. Br ock ag ree d with his at t o rn ey ’s assessment. Br ock’s attorney also discussed the prior proce eding in which
Br ock’s competency

was restored. Next, she reveale d that afte r t hat determination, she di scussed with Broc k his options and that they ag ree d that insanity was not a viable defe nse bec ause va rious mental-he alth profe ssionals had deter mined that Br ock was s an e at the time of the offe nse. I n addition, she informed the district court that she and Br ock ag ree d that his be st option was to enter a plea but to plead not true to the e nhance ment alleg ation.

Next, Br ock’s attorney soug ht permission to question him in front o f the court to d em o nstrate his competenc y . I n response to the questi ons posed by his attorney , Br ock answere d that he was “cha

rg ed with felony murder, first-deg ree felony murder” ; that the punishment rang e was “fr om 5 to 99 y ear s in prison”; and that by pleading g uilty , he was waiving his rig hts, including the
9righ t t o re main silent and to have a jury trial. I n fac t, Br ock explained that rathe r than risk a jury

trial, he wanted to appea

r befor e the district court “and ask [i ts] favor

. That’s what I ’ve decide d to do.” After Br ock finished answe ring her questions, his attorney stated that she believed that Br ock

was c ompetent. Once Br ock’s attorney finished her quest io n in g , th e d is tr ic t c o urt clar ified that Br ock intended to g ive up his rig ht to a jury trial and desired to plead g uilty and to allow the district court
t o assess the proper punishment, and Br ock ag ree d that was his desire. Fur ther, the dist ri ct co u rt asked Br ock whether he understood that he was g iving up his rig ht to confr ont witnesses who might
t es t i fy aga i n st him and to prese nt evidenc e and call witnesses to testify on his behalf , and Br ock responde d that he understood. I n addition, the district court inquired whether Br ock understood that
if he enter ed a plea of not g uilty , the State would be require d to prove his g uilt bey ond a rea sonable doubt and that his failure to testify could not be h el d aga i n s t him, and Br ock answe red that he understood. Next, the district court asked whether his decision to enter a g uilty plea was of his “own
persona l decision-making ” and was not due to any threa ts or coer cion, and Br ock ag ree d that he had d e c id e d to e n te r a g

u il ty p le a . F in a ll y , c o n c e r n in g th e w r it

te n p le a , th e d is tr

ic t c o u r t in q u ir e d w h e th e r he discussed the plea with his attorney befor e sig ning it; whether he understood that by signing it, he waived his constitutional rig hts and ag ree d that the alleg ations ag ainst him wer e true; and whether his signatur e on the plea

was his, and B rock a

nswere d aff

irmatively

to all of the questions. Although Br ock p o ints to evidenc e conce rning his prior mental illness and to the portion of the rec ord in which he informed the district c ourt about delusions that he has had, g iven the rema inder of his interac tions with his counsel and with the district court afte r his competenc y had

10been restore d and befor e the district court acc epted his pl ea , we cannot conclude that the district

court abused its discretion by failing to conclude that there was a curr ent sug g estion that Br ock did
not have a sufficie nt ability to rationally consult wit h his attorney or that Br ock did not have a rational and fac tual understanding of the proce eding s ag ainst him. For those same rea sons, we also
cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an informal inquiry into his competenc y . Cf. Hobbs v. Stat e , 359 S.W .3d 919, 925 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (noting that history of men t al i llness and being on psy chiatric medications are insufficient “to war

rant a competenc y inquiry absent evidenc e of a prese nt inability to communicate with his at t o rn ey or understand the proce eding s”); Learning v. State , 227 S.W .3d 245, 250 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, no pet.) (explaining that to be entitled to second co m p et ency hear ing afte r being deeme d competent, “def ense counsel would have had to offe r new evidenc e of a chang e in . . . mental condition since the fir st competenc y hear ing” ).
For these re asons, we ove rrule B rock’ s first issue on appea l.

Com petency D ete rm ination

I n an alterna tive arg ument rela ted to his first issue , Br ock contends in his second issue that if this Court wer e to conclude that the district court did in fac t convene an informal inquiry into Br ock’s competenc y throug h the questions that it posed t o Br o ck , t hen we would have to deter mine that the district court abused its discretion when it deter mined that Br ock was competent
to stand trial. Montoya v. State , 291 S.W .3d 420, 426 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (e x p l aini ng that competenc y deter

minations are revie wed under abuse- of-discr etion standard) , supersede d by statute

on other grounds as stated in Turner , 422 S.W .3d at 6 9 2 n . 3 1

. ; s ee also Tex. Code Crim. Proc.

11art. 46B.005 (re quiring trial court to hold trial on compete n cy i f i t p erf orms informal inquiry and deter mines that evidenc e ex ists to support finding of i ncompetenc y ). Essentially , Br ock seems to be arg uing that if the district court did in fac t hold an informal hear ing, the statements that he made
reg arding persistent d el u sions that he has experience d plus the evidenc e of his history of mental illness, including his history of substance abuse as well as his diag nosis for schizoaffe ctive disorder and a persona lity disorder, would be enoug h to constitute so m e ev i dence to support a finding of incompetenc y , see Turner , 422 S.W .3d at 692-93 (explaining that when convening informal inquiry , trial courts set aside indications that defe ndant is competent and consider whether there is some evidenc e that would rationally lead to conclusion of competenc y ), and the district court would have been obliga ted to stay the proce eding s, see Tex. Code Crim. Proc

. art. 46B.004( d), and to or der an examination and hold a trial to deter mine his competenc y , id. art. 46B.005. I n light of the prec eding , Br ock contends that, in the absenc e of an examination and trial on the issue of his competenc y , the district court’s de termination that he wa s competent wa s prematur e.

Howe v er , having deter

mined that the district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to conduct an informal inquiry into Br ock’ s co mpetency , we need not decide whether the district court improperly deter mined that Br ock was competent afte r perf orming an informal inquiry

. For these re asons, we ove rrule B rock’ s second issue on a ppeal.

Enh ancem ent Allegation

I n his third issue on appea l, Br ock contends t h at t h e district court’s judgme nt incorre ctly ref

lects that he enter ed a plea of true to the enhanc ement al l eg ation contained in the indictment. As pointed out by Br ock, the rec ord in this case reve als that Br ock indicated his desire

12to plead not true to the enhanc ement alleg ation. I n light of the rec ord, Br ock and the State both

ag ree that the district court’s judgme nt should be modified to show that he enter ed a plea of not true
to the enhanc ement alleg ation. This Court has the authority to modify incorre ct judgme nts when it has the information nece ssary to do so. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State , 865 S.W .2d 26,
27-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Acc ording ly , we sustain B rock’ s third issue on appea l a nd modify the judg ment of convic tion to reflec t that Broc k pleade d not true to the enha nceme nt alleg ation.

CONCLUSION Having sustained Br ock’s third issue on appea l, we modify the district court’s judgme nt of conviction to ref lect that Br ock pl ea d ed n o t true to the enhanc ement alleg ation.
H a v in g o v e r r u le d B r o c k ’ s r e ma in in g tw o is s u e s , w e a f f ir m th e d is tr ic t c o u

r t’ s ju d g me n

t o f c o n v ic ti o n as modified.

David Pury ear , J ustice
Be fore J ustices Pury ear , Pemberton, and B ourland Modified and, a s Modified, Aff irmed Filed: May

22, 2015 Do Not Publish

13