COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Elder and Bumgardner 

KAMAL DATT 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 2276-97-4 PER CURIAM 

 APRIL 21, 1998 

ALEXANDRIA DIVISION 

 OF SOCIAL SERVICES 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA 

Donald M. Haddock, Judge 

 (Gwena Kay Tibbits, on briefs), for 

appellant. 

 (Molly A. Smith, Assistant Commonwealth's 

Attorney, on brief), for appellee. 

 Kamal Datt (mother) appeals the decision of the circuit 

court terminating her residual parental rights. Mother contends 

that the trial court erred by (1) finding that she, without good 

cause, was unwilling or unable within a reasonable time to remedy 

substantially the conditions which resulted in her children's 

foster care placement; (2) finding that she was suffering from an 

emotional illness and mental deficiency of such severity that 

there is no reasonable expectation that she will be able to 

undertake responsibility for the care of the children; (3) 

finding that termination of her residual parental rights was in 

the best interests of the children; and (4) not attempting to 

place the children with a relative. Upon reviewing the record 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is 

without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of 

the trial court. See Rule 5A:27. 

 "In matters of a child's welfare, trial 

courts are vested with broad discretion in 

making the decisions necessary to guard and 

to foster a child's best interests." The 

trial court's judgment, "when based on 

evidence heard ore tenus, will not be 

disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or 

without evidence to support it." 

Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 

128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991) (citations omitted). 

 The Alexandria Division of Social Services (DSS) was 

required to present clear and convincing evidence sufficient to 

satisfy the requirements of Code § 16.1-283. 

 Code § 16.1-283 embodies "[t]he statutory 

scheme for the . . . termination of residual 

parental rights in this Commonwealth" [which] 

. . . "provides detailed procedures designed 

to protect the rights of the parents and 

their child," balancing their interests while 

seeking to preserve the family. However, we 

have consistently held that "[t]he child's 

best interest is the paramount concern." 

Lecky v. Reed, 20 Va. App. 306, 311, 456 S.E.2d 538, 540 (1995) 

(citations omitted). 

Substantially Remedying Underlying Conditions

 Code § 16.1-283(C) provides, in pertinent part, that the 

court may terminate residual parental rights to a child placed in 

foster care as a result of court commitment, an entrustment 

agreement or other voluntary relinquishment, "if the court finds, 

based upon clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best 
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interests of the child" and that the parent, without good cause, 

has been "unwilling or unable within a reasonable period not to 

exceed twelve months to remedy substantially the conditions which 

led to the child's foster care placement," despite "reasonable 

and appropriate efforts" from "social, medical, mental health or 

other rehabilitative agencies to such end." Code 

§ 16.1-283(C)(2). Evidence that the parent failed, without good 

cause, "to make reasonable progress towards the elimination of 

the conditions which led to the child's foster care placement in 

accordance with . . . a [jointly designed and agreed upon] foster 

care plan" is prima facie evidence that the parent was unwilling 

or unable to substantially remedy the underlying conditions. 

Code § 16.1-283(C)(3)(b). 

 DSS presented evidence concerning mother's problems with 

housing, employment, and parenting issues which caused the 

neglect and abuse suffered by the children, and husband's ongoing 

alcohol addiction. The evidence, including mother's testimony, 

indicated that mother failed to recognize, acknowledge, or accept 

any responsibility for her children's neglect, or see any need 

for improving her parenting or relational skills. Moreover, 

although mother testified that she addressed the problem of 

father's alcoholism by separating from him, the evidence 

indicated that she continued to have an ongoing relationship with 

him. Evidence of mother's psychological profile indicated that 

mother was resistant to criticism and had difficulty 
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incorporating suggested changes in behavior. 

 The record contains credible evidence to support the trial 

court's findings. Therefore, we find no error. 

Emotional Illness

 Mother contends that the trial court erred in finding that 

clear and convincing evidence proved that she suffered from "an 

emotional illness and a mental deficiency of such severity that 

there is no reasonable expectation that she will be able to 

undertake responsibility for the care needed by the children in 

accordance with their ages and stages of development." 

 Dr. Gloria Morote, a clinical psychologist with the 

Multicultural Clinical Center, interviewed and tested mother in 

March 1997. Dr. Morote testified that, based upon her interview 

and testing of mother, she concluded that mother did not lack 

intellectual ability, but that mother lacked the emotional 

ability to parent effectively. Dr. Morote stated that mother was 

rigid, inflexible, socially immature, lacked self-awareness, and 

had poor interpersonal skills. Mother was unable to benefit from 

feedback because she denied that her answers were wrong and 

refused to incorporate suggestions to improve her performance on 

tests. In addition, mother denied any history of spousal abuse, 

denied that father had serious trouble with alcohol, and denied 

neglecting or abusing her children. 

 The trial court also saw and heard the mother testify. 

Thus, the court was able to determine what weight to afford her 
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testimony in light of the other evidence presented. In her 

testimony, mother minimized the problems faced by the family and 

her responsibility for the children's placement in foster care. 

 The record supports the trial court's finding that DSS 

established by clear and convincing evidence that mother suffered 

from an emotional illness and a mental deficiency and that there 

was no reasonable expectation that she would be able to be 

responsible for the care needed by her children. 

Best Interests of the Children

 The evidence established that the children faced neglect and 

abuse while in the custody of their parents. DSS repeatedly 

identified hygiene, housing, supervision, parenting issues, 

school attendance, and domestic violence as problems within the 

family. The oldest child, who has cerebral palsy, regularly came 

to school with unclean clothing and underwear, an unwashed face, 

and unbrushed teeth and hair. He was unable to feed himself with 

a fork, and he indicated that he felt like a dog when his parents 

expected him to eat his food face down from his plate. When 

questioned about this practice, mother's answers were evasive. 

The boy's wheelchair was encrusted with dead roaches. Mother 

rejected the use of an appliance which would have allowed the son 

to toilet himself because it would require her to empty the 

toilet. 

 The younger children had better hygiene, but their 

attendance at school was poor, and they dressed in clothing that 
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was inappropriate for the weather. A DSS social worker testified 

that the parents continued to have problems with housing and 

domestic violence. 

 While in foster care, the children have thrived, physically 

and emotionally. Although they expressed desires to see their 

parents, the children consistently expressed concerns about being 

returned to mother's custody without their father being present. 

 Visitations with mother were often marked by her indifference to 

the children, including one incident when mother had to be 

instructed to aid the youngest child, who was vomiting into a 

waste basket. 

 Credible evidence supports the trial court's finding that 

DSS proved by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the 

children's best interests to terminate mother's parental rights. 

Placement with Relatives

 Mother contends that the trial court erred by not attempting 

to place the children with her sisters. "Before termination of 

parental rights by the court, the agency seeking termination has 

an affirmative duty to investigate all reasonable options for 

placement with immediate relatives." Sauer v. Franklin County 

Dep't of Soc. Servs., 18 Va. App. 769, 771, 446 S.E.2d 640, 641 

(1994); see also Code § 16.1-283(A). 

 The evidence indicated that DSS explored placement with the 

family even before the children were placed in foster care. The 

family did not respond or attempt to visit the children until 
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near the time of trial and did not cooperate in completing 

paperwork or by contacting DSS. Mother's younger sister, Shaleen 

Mishra, testified that she was interested in adopting all three 

children. However, Mishra admitted she was in the process of 

divorcing her third husband, that she had not seen the children 

in over three years, and that she had testified at the district 

court that she would adopt the two younger children only. 

Mother's older sister, Purnima Sidig, did not testify. However, 

there was evidence that Sidig was instructed to bring her husband 

to a meeting with DSS to discuss the possibility of adoption, but 

failed to do so. Sidig did not contact DSS further. 

 Based upon the evidence, including Mishra's testimony, the 

trial court did not believe that the sisters presented a serious 

alternative. The trial court determined that placement with the 

relatives would amount to returning the children to their 

parents' custody. We cannot say that the trial court erred in 

finding that placement of the children with the relatives was not 

in the children's best interests. 

 Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.