Filed 4/6/22

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re I.F. et al., Persons Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

 H049207

 (Santa Clara County Super. Ct.

 Nos. 19-JD-026208; 20-JD-026455)

SANTA CLARA COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND 

CHILDREN’S SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

K.F.,

Defendant and Appellant.

Mother K.F. appeals the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and disposition orders

pertaining to her children I.F. and B.F. Her contentions on appeal relate solely to the 

findings that the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) 

does not apply to the dependency proceedings. She argues evidence of her children’s 

Native American ancestry triggered the duty under state law to further investigate 

whether her children come within the federal Act. Because the Department of Family 

and Children’s Services failed to comply with the statutory duty to further investigate 

whether the children are Indian children, mother contends the juvenile court’s negative 

ICWA findings are based on insufficient evidence.

We argee with mother that the Department’s initial investigation triggered the duty 

of further inquiry under state law, and will remand the matter to allow the Department 

and juvenile court to remedy the violation.
2

I. BACKGROUND

I.F.’s Initial Petition 

In December 2019, the Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s 

Services (the Department) filed a dependency petition under Welfare and Institutions 

Code section 300 (undesignated statutory references are to this code) on behalf of threeyear-old I.F., alleging the child came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court due to 

his mother’s incarceration and substance abuse. The social worker spoke with I.F.’s 

maternal grandparents when I.F. was in protective custody. The grandfather reported that 

the maternal great-grandfather (his father) was from Minnesota and may have Native 

American ancestry. (The maternal grandmother reported having no Native American 

ancestry.) The social worker indicated on the initial hearing report that there was “reason 

to believe that [I.F.] is or may be an Indian child.” 

Mother filed an ICWA-020 Parental Notification of Indian Status form on which 

she checked the box stating she “may have Indian ancestry.” She told the court at the 

initial hearing that she “might” have Native American ancestry on her grandfather’s side, 

but she was unaware of any tribal affiliation or membership. The court found that ICWA 

“may apply.” The social worker who prepared the jurisdiction report wrote that ICWA 

“does or may apply,” referring to the maternal grandfather’s statement that “a maternal 

great grandfather may have Native American ancestry in Minnesota.” 

I.F. was returned to his mother’s care in January 2020. The following month the 

social worker wrote that I.F. should continue in mother’s care and that ICWA did not 

apply. In March 2020, the court sustained the allegations in the first amended petition

and declared I.F. a dependent of the court. No ICWA finding was made at that time. I.F. 

remained in mother’s care, with court-ordered family maintenance services.

B.F.’s Initial Petition

In May 2020, the Department filed a dependency petition on behalf of newborn 

B.F., due to mother’s inability to care for and protect her. Mother reported to a third
3

social worker that she may have Native American ancestry on her father’s side. Mother 

had no information about that ancestry, and she related that any relatives with 

information had passed away. The initial hearing report for B.F. referred to the 

December 2019 interview with the maternal grandfather, and the social worker checked 

the box stating, “There is reason to believe [B.F.] is an Indian child based on information 

provided about the child’s possible heritage, and further inquiry is required.” (We note 

that the initial hearing report for B.F. also stated (incorrectly) that the court found ICWA 

did not apply to I.F. at I.F.’s February 14 disposition hearing; ICWA was not discussed 

on February 14, nor did the court’s minutes address ICWA.) 

At the initial hearing, the court found there was “reason to believe that [B.F.] is an 

Indian Child,” and “further inquiry is required regarding ICWA.” Shortly thereafter, 

mother told the social worker she had no additional information regarding her Native 

American ancestry. 

The petition on behalf of B.F. was sustained and dismissed at the June 2020 

jurisdiction hearing, with the understanding that mother would continue with family 

maintenance services in I.F.’s dependency action. No ICWA findings were made. 

New Allegations

I.F. and B.F. were taken into protective custody in April 2021, and the Department 

filed new petitions on behalf of the children. The initial new hearing report for B.F. 

indicated “no reason to believe” B.F. is an Indian child. That report, prepared by a fourth 

social worker, did not document the December 2019 interview with the maternal 

grandfather. The social worker reported that mother had not been interviewed because 

she was incarcerated, and reported (again incorrectly) that the court had determined 

ICWA did not apply in the previous proceeding involving I.F. A fifth social worker 

prepared the new initial hearing report for I.F. She also failed to note the December 2019 

interview with the maternal grandfather; reported incorrectly that the court had made an 
4

earlier finding that ICWA did not apply to I.F.; and indicated “no reason to believe” I.F. 

is an Indian child. 

At the initial hearing on the new allegations, the court asked mother whether she 

was aware of any Native American heritage or ancestry on her side of the family. Mother 

responded: “I think we’ve gone over this many times, and the thing is that I know we do,

but we’re not – I just don’t have that information. That would have [come] from my 

grandfather or my grandmother, and I never got that from them.” Mother elaborated that 

she understood from her paternal grandmother (who raised her and had passed away in 

March 2020) that her paternal grandfather had Native American ancestry. But her 

grandmother “just could not remember things to tell me when I asked her.” Her 

grandfather had “moved away from his family”; his family was “out of state”; and she 

did not know where he was from. She did not know whether anyone in her family was 

enrolled in a tribe, or whether her children were eligible for enrollment in a tribe. She 

was not aware of any family member receiving medical care from a Native American 

health clinic or attending a Native American school. Neither she nor or her children had

lived on a reservation or been involved with a tribal court. Mother’s newly appointed 

attorney added, “She needs to do some further research with regard to that side of the 

family.” When asked about any relatives on her paternal grandfather’s side of the family 

whom the social worker could contact with additional questions, counsel stated that 

mother “is still trying to find who those people are, but if she does, she will give that 

contact information to the social worker. But the answer is no.”

The maternal grandmother told the court that there was no Native American 

ancestry on her side of the family, and she was unaware of any Native American ancestry 

on the maternal grandfather’s side of the family. The children’s presumed father stated 

that his family was from Mexico and had no Native American ancestry.

The Department asked the court to find “no reason to believe the [children are]

Indian [children] at this time.” The deputy county counsel argued: “[A]t this point, all [] 
5

mother has made are very vague statements about possible ancestry with no identified 

tribes, no family members who had – would have no additional information and nothing 

to meet any of the criteria to show that there is either reason to know or reason to believe 

that the children are actually Indian children under the Indian Child Welfare Act.” 

Counsel argued if “any new or additional information [is] provided that raises the level of 

assessment here to ‘reason to believe’ or ‘reason to know,’ then further inquiry would be 

required.” The court agreed, and found no reason to believe the children are Indian 

children “based on all the facts that we have today.” The court continued, “I think a little 

bit more investigation is in order, but I agree with you that there really hasn’t been any 

basis for making a reason to believe finding today based on the information we have and 

that we’ve been trying to receive over the life of this case.” The children were detained

and continued in foster care.

In May 2021, the children’s social workers contacted the maternal grandfather, 

who said his father, who was from Minnesota, told him the family had Native American 

ancestry, but had never mentioned a particular tribe. The maternal grandfather said his 

brother John may have information about their ancestry, and he agreed to speak with his 

brother and to provide his brother’s phone number to B.F.’s social worker. The maternal 

grandfather related that he never lived on an Indian reservation, never attended an Indian

school or clinic, did not have a tribal identification number, and did not know whether he 

or his children were eligible for enrollment in a Native American tribe. Following that 

interview, the Department recommended that the court find there “was reason to believe 

that [I.F.] is an Indian child;” the social worker had “conducted a diligent inquiry into 

[I.F.’s] possible Indian heritage, including contacting the possible tribes, the BIA, and 

CDSS;” there “is no reason to know [I.F.] is an Indian child”; there is “no reason to 

believe or know that [B.F.] is an Indian child”; and ICWA does not apply.

According to an addendum report, B.F.’s social worker followed up with the 

maternal grandfather, who did not provide his brother’s phone number. The maternal 
6

grandfather reported he contacted his brother “for other issues,” but he did not ask for his 

brother’s phone number, and he would not reach out to his brother about the family’s 

Native American ancestry because I.F. and B.F. were not his brother’s grandchildren.

At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing in June 2021, the court sustained 

amended petitions as to both children. B.F. was declared a dependent child of the court;

I.F. was continued as a dependent child of the court; the children remained in a foster 

placement; and family reunification services were ordered. The court adopted the ICWA 

findings recommended by the Department: The court found there was a reason to believe 

I.F. is an Indian child; the social worker “conducted a diligent inquiry into [I.F.’s] 

possible Indian heritage, including contacting the possible tribes, the BIA, and CDSS”; 

there is “no reason to know [I.F.] is an Indian child”; “no reason to believe or know that 

[B.F.] is an Indian child”; and ICWA did not apply to the hearing.

II. DISCUSSION

ICWA was enacted “to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote 

the stability and security of Indian tribes and families” by assuring that Indian children 

who are removed from their families are placed in foster or adoptive homes reflecting the 

unique values of Indian culture. (25 U.S.C. § 1902.) Under ICWA, an Indian child’s 

tribe has a right to intervene in or exercise jurisdiction over a dependency proceeding 

involving the Indian child. (Id., §§ 1911(b)–(c), 1912(a).) To that end, ICWA requires 

that appropriate tribes be notified of a state court dependency action which may result in 

termination of parental rights or a child’s placement in foster care when the state court 

“knows, or has reason to know” the proceeding involves an Indian child. (Id., § 1912(a); 

§ 224.3, subd. (a) [same].)

1

1

ICWA defines an Indian child as an unmarried person under age 18 who is either 

“a member of an Indian tribe” or “is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the 

biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).) An Indian tribe 

is defined as “any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or community of 

(Continued)
7

The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) promulgated regulations in 2016 to promote 

ICWA’s uniform application in state courts. The regulations require state courts to 

inquire of each participant in a dependency proceeding whether the participant “knows or 

has reason to know that the child is an Indian child” (25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a)) and identify 

circumstances establishing “reason to know.” (Id., § 23.107(c)(1)–(6).)2

The California Legislature adopted as state law the BIA’s initial inquiry mandate 

and circumstances establishing “reason to know.” (§ 224.2, subd. (c), (d)(1)–(6).) In 

addition, the Legislature independently imposed on dependency courts and county social 

services agencies the “affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child ... is or 

may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) When a child is placed in the temporary 

custody of a social services agency, state law requires a social worker to inquire of “the 

child, parents, legal guardians, Indian custodian, extended family members, and others 

who have an interest in the child” whether the child “is, or may be, an Indian child.” 

(§ 224.2, subd. (b).)

State law also imposes on the dependency court and social worker a duty to make 

“further inquiry” regarding the possible Indian status of a child if there is “reason to 

Indians recognized ... by the Secretary [of the Interior].” (Id., § 1903(8).) “[A] child 

may qualify as an Indian child within the meaning of the ICWA even if neither of the 

child’s parents is enrolled in the tribe.” (Dwayne P. v. Superior Court (2002) 

103 Cal.App.4th 247, 254.)

2 Those circumstances are set forth in the federal regulation: (1) the court is 

informed by a participant in the proceeding, court officer, Indian Tribe, Indian 

organization, or agency that the child is an Indian child; (2) the court is informed by a 

participant in the proceeding, court officer, Indian Tribe, Indian organization, or agency 

“that it has discovered information indicating that the child is an Indian child”; (3) the 

child gives the court reason to know he or she is an Indian child; (4) the court is informed 

that the child, the child’s parents, or Indian custodian resides or is domiciled on a 

reservation or in an Alaska Native village; (5) the court is informed that the child is or 

has been a ward of a Tribal court; (6) the court is informed that either parent or the child 

possess an identification card indicating membership or citizenship in an Indian Tribe. 

(25 C.F.R. § 23.107(c)(1)–(6).) 
8

believe that an Indian child is involved in a [dependency] proceeding.” (§ 224.2,

subd. (e).) Further inquiry requires interviews to collect biographical data regarding the 

known names of the child’s biological parents, grandparents, and great-grandparents, 

“including maiden, married, and former names or aliases, as well as their current and 

former addresses, birth dates, places of birth and death, tribal enrollment information of 

other direct lineal ancestors of the child, and any other identifying information, if 

known”; contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the State Department of Social 

Services to assist in identifying tribes in which the child or parent may be a member; and 

contacting tribes and persons who may reasonably be expected to have information

regarding the child’s tribal membership, citizenship status, or eligibility. (§§ 224.2, 

subd. (e)(2)(A)–(C), 224.3, subd. (a)(5).)

Formerly, the duty of further inquiry under California law was coextensive with 

the duty of notice—both were triggered by a “reason to know the child is an Indian 

child.” (Former § 224.3, subds. (b)–(d).) Early ICWA Guidelines urged state courts to 

verify a child’s Indian status with the Bureau of Indian Affairs or the child’s tribe when 

the state court had “reason to believe a child involved in a child custody proceeding is an 

Indian.” (Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 

44 Fed.Reg. 67584, 67586 (Nov. 26, 1979).) Circumstances demonstrating a “reason to 

believe” included “information which suggests that the child is an Indian child.” (Ibid.) 

California adopted its former “reason to believe” threshold as a basis for providing a 

“reason to know the child is an Indian child” (former § 224.3, subd. (b)(1)), which in turn 

triggered the duty to further inquire and the duty to provide notice. (Former § 224.3, 

subds. (c), (d).) California conformed its definition of “reason to know” a child is an 

Indian child to the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ 2016 regulations. (§ 224.2, subd. (d)(1)–(6); 

25 C.F.R. § 23.107(c)(1)–(6).) The Legislature maintained the “reason to believe” 

standard in new section 224.2 as a benchmark for further inquiry into a child’s possible 

Indian status to assist in making the “reason to know” determination. (§ 224.2, subd (e).) 
9

In 2020, section 224.2 was amended to articulate when the “reason to believe” 

standard is met. (Stats. 2020, ch. 104 (A.B. 2944), § 15, eff. Sept. 18, 2020.) Harkening 

to the early ICWA Guidelines, the “reason to believe” standard is met “whenever the 

court [or] social worker [] has information suggesting that either the parent of the child or 

the child is a member or may be eligible for membership in an Indian tribe.” (§ 224.2, 

subd. (e)(1).) “[I]nformation suggesting membership or eligibility for membership” 

includes “information that indicates, but does not establish, the existence of one or more 

of the grounds for reason to know.” (Ibid.) California Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(4) 

also mandates further inquiry if a social worker “knows or has reason to know or believe 

that an Indian child is or may be involved” in a dependency proceeding. 

We review the juvenile court’s ICWA findings for substantial evidence. (In re 

D.F. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 558, 565.) Where the facts are undisputed, we independently 

review whether ICWA’s requirements have been satisfied. (Ibid.) “[W]here the issue on 

appeal turns on the failure of proof at trial, the question for a reviewing court becomes 

whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law.” (In 

re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528.)

The Social Worker’s Initial Inquiry Established a Reason to Believe I.F. and B.F.

are Indian Children

Mother challenges the finding in the June 2021 jurisdiction and dispositional 

orders that ICWA does not apply to the dependency proceedings. She argues that the 

information she and her father provided to the Department regarding her Native 

American ancestry provided “a reason to believe” I.F. and B.F. are Indian children, 

thereby triggering the duty of further inquiry under section 224.2, subdivision (e), which 

the Department failed to undertake. She asserts the finding that ICWA did not apply to 

the proceedings was thus based on insufficient information. (We note mother does not 

challenge the ICWA findings as they relate to the children’s paternity.) 
10

As amended in 2020, section 224.2, subdivision (e)(1) specifies that “[t]here is 

reason to believe a child involved in a proceeding is an Indian child whenever the court, 

social worker, or probation officer has information suggesting that either the parent of the 

child or the child is a member or may be eligible for membership in an Indian tribe.” 

(§ 224.2, subd. (e)(1).) Courts have broadly construed the reason to believe standard. 

(In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 744 [“ ‘Reason to believe’ is broadly 

defined as ‘information suggesting that either the parent of the child or the child is a 

member or may be eligible for membership in an Indian tribe’ ”]; In re S.R. (2021)

64 Cal.App.5th 303, 316 [new subdivision (e) “forecloses [a] narrow interpretation of 

what constitutes reason to believe”].) Its broad application is essential to the remedial 

purpose of the affirmative and ongoing duty to inquire under California law. (In re T.G. 

(2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275, 295, review denied (March 24, 2021).) “Synonyms for the 

term [‘]suggest[’] include ‘imply,’ ‘hint,’ ‘intimate’ and ‘insinuate.’ ” (Dwayne P. v. 

Superior Court (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 247, 255, 258 [referring to the phrase 

“information which suggests that the child is an Indian child” in ICWA Guidelines].)

The duty of further inquiry existed in In re T.G. where the mother believed she 

had Cherokee ancestry through her mother and possible Native American ancestry 

through her paternal grandfather. (In re T.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at pp. 280, 283.) 

The appellate court rejected as “fundamentally at odds with well-established ICWA law” 

the argument that a “ ‘mere possibility of Indian ancestry’ ” does not trigger the need for 

further inquiry, citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978) 436 U.S. 49, 65, fn. 21 (an 

Indian tribe is the final arbiter of its membership rights) and section 224.2, 

subdivision (h) (“ ‘Information that the child is not enrolled, or is not eligible for 

enrollment in, the tribe is not determinative of the child’s membership status unless the 

tribe also confirms in writing that enrollment is a prerequisite for membership under 

tribal law or custom’ ”). (In re T.G., at p. 294.) Broadly applying the reason to believe 

standard, the court in In re D.F. found that a mother’s statement “that she may have 
11

Indian heritage from a tribe in New Mexico” was sufficient to trigger further inquiry. (In 

re D.F., supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 569.) 

The court in In re T.G. observed: “[T]he imposition of a duty to inquire that is 

significantly more expansive than the duty to provide ICWA notice is premised on the 

common sense understanding that, over time, Indian families, particularly those living in 

major urban centers like Los Angeles, may well have lost the ability to convey accurate 

information regarding their tribal status. [Footnote omitted.] As a result, the information 

available at the outset of dependency proceedings will often be inadequate to ensure the 

necessary protection of the rights and cultural heritage of Indian children, Indian families,

and Indian tribes. [Citation.] General information from the family about its ancestry 

frequently provides the only available basis to believe an Indian child may be involved.” 

(In re T.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 295; accord, In re Benjamin M., supra, 

70 Cal.App.5th at p. 743 [“in any case where information about Indian ancestry is 

unknown, the probability of such ancestry is reason[] enough to require the agency and 

court to pursue it”].) 

We agree with those observations, and we conclude as a matter of law that 

mother’s statements that she had been told by her paternal grandmother that she had 

Native American ancestry through her paternal grandfather, coupled with the maternal 

grandfather’s statements that his father told him the family had Native American ancestry 

in Minnesota, established a reason to believe I.F. and B.F. are Indian children and thus 

triggered the duty of further inquiry under California law.3

3 However we reject mother’s argument that the Department failed in its initial 

duty of inquiry under section 224.2, subdivision (b) by not asking “ ‘extended family 

members’ ” and “ ‘others who have an interest in the [children]’ ” whether I.F. and B.F. 

may be Indian children. Social workers interviewed mother, the maternal grandmother, 

and the maternal grandfather regarding the children’s Native American ancestry through 

the maternal grandfather. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); § 224.1, subd. (c) [extended family 

members include the child’s “grandparent, aunt or uncle, [adult] brother or sister, brother-

(Continued)
12

The Duty to Inquire Further is not Satisfied by an Ongoing Initial Inquiry 

Early in the dependency proceedings, it was the Department’s position that there 

was a reason to believe I.F. and B.F. are Indian children. In the social worker’s May 

2021 report, the Department asked the court to find the social worker had conducted a 

diligent further inquiry into I.F.’s possible Indian heritage which resulted in no reason to 

know I.F. is an Indian child. Those findings were adopted by the juvenile court.

On appeal, the Department takes the conflicting position that the duty of further 

inquiry was never triggered. The Department now views its entire inquiry, which began 

in December 2019 and concluded in June 2021, as coming within (and satisfying) its 

initial duty of inquiry under subdivision (b). It contends substantial evidence supports the 

juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply because “the vague information 

provided by family” did not create a reason to believe either child is an Indian child, even 

under the low quantum of proof found sufficient in In re D.F., supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 569. But the Department provides an incomplete description of the social workers’ 

investigation here. The Department focuses in its briefing on mother’s and the maternal 

grandfather’s limited knowledge of their ancestry without any mention that the maternal 

grandfather connected his Native American ancestry to Minnesota. As we have 

explained, that information is sufficient to trigger the duty to inquire further.

The Department argues there is no reason to believe the children are Indian 

children in part because there is “no evidence that anyone in the family has ever been 

enrolled in a tribe, held a tribal membership identification card, lived on a reservation, 

received services from an Indian health clinic, attended an Indian school, or been 

involved with a tribal court.” But while any of those circumstances may provide a 

in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or cousin, or stepparent”].) Mother does 

not identify others who should have been but were not initially interviewed, nor how she 

was prejudiced by an initial inquiry that gave rise to the duty to inquire further.
13

“reason to know” a child is an Indian child (§ 224.2, subd. (d)(1)–(6); 25 C.F.R. 

§ 23.107(c)(1)–(6)), they do not inform the threshold determination of whether there is a 

“reason to believe” the children are Indian children. 

The duty of further inquiry was triggered when the social worker had reason to 

believe I.F. was an Indian child. Once triggered, the statutory scheme does not 

contemplate that continued inquiry under subdivision (b) would negate reason to believe. 

(In re Benjamin M., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 742 [“If the initial inquiry gives the 

juvenile court or the agency ‘reason to believe’ that an Indian child is involved, then the 

juvenile court and the agency have a duty to conduct ‘further inquiry’ ”].) California law 

requires that further inquiry be undertaken by the social worker (§ 224.2, subd. (e)), and 

only after that further inquiry has concluded may the court find that ICWA does not 

apply to the proceedings. (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2) [“If the court makes a finding that proper 

and adequate further inquiry and due diligence as required in this section have been 

conducted and there is no reason to know whether the child is an Indian child, the court 

may make a finding that [ICWA] does not apply to the proceedings”].) The proper focus 

is therefore not on a continuing initial inquiry under subdivision (b), as the Department 

urges, but on the adequacy and results of further inquiry under subdivision (e), which the 

Department concedes did not occur here.

Further Inquiry Would Not be Futile

The Department argues that further inquiry would be futile, and specifically that 

contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs or the State Department of Social Services would 

be an idle act, relying on In re J.S. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 678, 689 (without “the identity 

of a tribe, let alone a federally recognized one, or at least a specific geographic area of 

possible ancestry origin, the BIA could not [be expected to assist] the Department in 

identifying the tribal agent for any relevant federally recognized tribes”). But this is not a 

case where, “considering the entire record, it [is] obvious that additional information 

would not have been meaningful to the inquiry.” (In re Benjamin M., supra, 
14

70 Cal.App.5th at p. 743.) A specific geographic area of ancestry was identified by the 

maternal grandfather—the state of Minnesota—where there is a finite number of 

federally recognized Indian tribes. (See https://www.bia.gov/service/tribal-leadersdirectory/federally-recognized-tribes [as of April 6, 2022], archived at 

<https://perma.cc/5MZ3-GPCR>.) It would not be futile to contact the Bureau of Indian 

Affairs or the tribes themselves to seek assistance regarding the children’s possible tribal 

membership, citizenship status, or eligibility. (In re D.F., supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 570 

[contacting 21 tribes in New Mexico and nine tribes in New York to further inquire].) 

“Additional investigation may not develop further information establishing the need for 

ICWA notice, but it is essential to the enforcement of the court’s and [Department’s] 

‘affirmative and continuing duty to inquire.’ ” (In re T.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 295.) On remand, the Department must diligently gather the biographical information 

related to the maternal great-grandfather and provide that information to the Bureau of 

Indian Affairs and the federally recognized tribes in Minnesota. (§§ 224.2, 

subd. (e)(2)(A)–(C); 224.3 (a)(5).)4

III. DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s findings that ICWA does not apply are vacated. The matter is 

remanded to the juvenile court for the Department to conduct further inquiry as required 

by Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2, subdivision (e), and California Rules of 

Court, rule 5.481(a)(4). The juvenile court must determine whether further inquiry has 

been adequately and diligently conducted (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2)), and make a finding 

under California Rules of Court, rule 5.481(b)(3)(A)–(C). If the juvenile court thereafter 

4 There is no record of the social worker asking the maternal grandfather for his 

father’s biographical information under section 224.3, subdivision (a)(5). Indeed, it is 

unclear on this record whether the maternal great-grandfather is living or deceased. The 

social worker’s June 6, 2020 ICWA notice incorrectly states that the maternal grandfather 

is deceased, and no information is provided regarding the maternal great-grandfather.
15

finds that ICWA does not apply, the inapplicability findings shall be reinstated. If the 

juvenile court finds that ICWA applies, notice of the dependency proceedings shall be 

sent to the relevant tribal entities consistent with federal and state law, and California 

Rules of Court, rule 5.481(c). If, after proper notice, no response is received from a tribe 

indicating that I.F. and B.F. are Indian children, the inapplicability findings shall be 

reinstated. If a tribe determines that I.F. and B.F. are Indian children, the juvenile court 

shall proceed in conformity with ICWA, and I.F., B.F., mother, and the tribe may petition 

the court to invalidate any orders that violate ICWA. (See 25 U.S.C. § 1914.) In all 

other respects, the June 17, 2021 jurisdiction and disposition orders are affirmed. 
____________________________________

Grover, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________

Greenwood, P. J. 

____________________________

Elia, J. 

H049207 - In re I.F. et al.; Santa Clara County DFCS v. K.F. 
Trial Court: Santa Clara County Superior Court

Superior Court Nos. 19-JD-026208, 

20-JD-026455

Trial Judge: Hon. Frederick S. Chung

Counsel for Plaintiff/Respondent:

Santa Clara County Department of 

Family and Children’s Services

James R. Williams, County Counsel 

Braeden L. Sullivan, Deputy County Counsel 

Office of the County Counsel 

County of Santa Clara 

Counsel for Minors:

I.F. and B.F.

No appearance for Minor

Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:

K.F.

Under appointment by the Court of Appeal

Elizabeth Klippi