IN THE COURT OF A PPE A LS OF TENNESSE E A

T JA CKSON

) MA RY A NN QUINN, ) 

# FILED

-2 R.D. March 2 5, 1 999 000 89 Cecil Crow son, J r. Plaint if f /Ap pellan t, ) Shelby

C hance ry

N o. D 277 44 ) VS. ) A ppeal No. 02 A 01-9 803 -CH ) GREGORY M. QUINN, ) ) Def end ant /Ap pellee

. )

A PPE A L FROM THE CHA NCERY COURT OF SHELBY COUNTY

A T MEMPHIS, TE NNESSEE THE HONORA BLE FLOYD PEE TE, J R., CHA NCELLOR

MITCHELL D. MOSKOVITZ LIS A

E. CIRCEO Memp his, T enn essee Att orne y s f or App ellant

WE NDY S. DA BBOUS Memp his, T enn essee Att orne y f or Ap pellee

A FFIRMED IN PA RT, REVERS ED IN PA RT A ND REMA NDED

A LA N E. HIG HERS, J

.

CONCUR: ( . FRA NK CRA

WFORD, P .J., W.S . HOLLY KIRBY

LILLA RD, J. Mary Ann Quinn (“W if e” or “Ap pellan t”) app eals t heju dgme nt of the trial court w hich orde red Gregory M. Quinn (“Husband ” or “Appe llee”) to pay f or the partie s’ min or child’s priv ate schoo l tuition in mo nth ly increm ent s designat ed as alimo ny; orde red Husba nd to pay a portio n of W if e’s atto rney f ees; and classif ied the f ollowi ng prop erty of the partie s: 1. A me r. Express IDS Flexible An nuity Accou nt ($ 58, 775 ) Husba nd 2. Ch arles Sch w ab Accou nt ($ 54, 190 )Husba nd

3. Re siden ce a t 23 68 Circl e ($1 00, 000 ) 40% Husba nd/ 60% Marital

I. Fa ctual a nd Proce dural His tory

W if e and Husba nd w ere divorced on Februa ry 3, 199 8, af ter f ourte en y ears of
ma rriag e. Most of the issues of the divorce w ere agreed upo n bet w een the partie s and
ann oun ced to t he court prior to trial.

In classif y ing the partie s’ prop erty as ma rital or sepa rate, the trial court det ermin ed tha t the Am erican Express IDS Flex ible Ann uity Accou nt (“IDS accou nt”), and the Charles Schwab Accou nt (“Schw ab accou nt”) w ere Husba nd’s sepa rate prop erty. T he trial court f urthe r classif ied the partie s’ residen ce at 236 8 Circl e as 60% ma rital and 40% Husba nd’s sepa rate prop erty. T he trial court ruled W if e and child shou ld be allowed to reside in the hom e unt il the child reach es the age of ma jor it y, wit h Husba nd paying 60% and W if e paying 40% of the mo rtgag e. At tha t time , Husba nd mu st p a y to W if e one half of the equity accrue d during the ma rriag e (app rox ima tely $6, 000 .00 ), and one half of the f utu re equity w hich will accrue in th e h om e while W if e a nd child co ntinu e to reside the re.

At the time Husba nd inhe rited the Circ le A ve n ue prop erty it w as v alue d at $10 0,0 00. 00 and H usba nd inhe rited a 25 % inte rest. Husba nd purch ased an addition al 15% intere st in the prop erty f rom his siblings w ith f und s he inhe rited f rom his f ath er. T he partie s t h en obt aine d a mo rtgag e to purch ase the rema ining intere st (60%) f rom Husba nd’s sib lings. Husba nd also inhe rited an investme nt accou n t h is f ath er had ma intain ed w ith Schwab. Af

ter his f ath er’s dea th, Husba nd w as inf orme d tha t he w ould have to re-title the
accou nt into his own nam e. He the n put t h e a c c o u n t in bot h his and W if e’s nam e. No
ma rital f und s w ere ever dep osited into this accou nt, nor w as any mo ney ever w ithdra w n.

Lik e the Schwab accou nt, the f und s used to ope n the IDS accou nt w ere also inhe rited by Husba nd f rom his f ath er. T h e f u nds origi nally cam e f rom a First Am erican saving s accou nt w hich w as owned by Husba nd’s f ath er. T he f und s w ere the n transf erred into a n ewl y -ope ned joint accou nt of the partie s w here the y rem aine d f or less t han on e
mo nth bef ore bein g w ithdra w n to ope n the IDS accou nt. T he partie s me t jointly w ith Vera Feldm an, a f inan cial advisor, to set up certain IDS accou nts. Feldm an testif ied tha t bot h Husba nd and W if e have set up individual f und s w ith mo ney the y had sepa rately inhe rited.

Feldm an v erif ied t hat W if e h ad no cont rol over the IDS a ccoun t. Husb and na me d W if e as th e b ene f iciary

of the IDS a ccoun t.

2At trial, bot h partie s agreed the ir son shou ld rema in in priv ate schoo l. W if e state d

tha t if she did not receive som e f orm of f inan cial assistan ce she w ould be una ble to af f ord priv ate schoo l tuition . Husband w as ordered to pay $68 8.0 0 per mont h as child supp ort in accord ance w ith the child supp ort guidelines. Add itiona lly , the Court orde red tha t Husba nd pay the priv ate scho ol tu ition e ach y ear t o W if e in the f orm of alim ony.

T he trial court esta blished a f ormu la f or the payme nt of W if e’s atto rney f ees. T he court held Husba nd w as to pay one -half W if e’s atto rney f ees incurred prior to Janu ary 31, 199 8, or $1, 500 .00 , and one -half W if e’s atto rney f ees incurred since Janu ary 31, 199 8, not to e x ceed $2 ,50 0.0 0.

II. Re al P roperty

T he hom e at 236 8 Circl e Avenue w as inhe rited by Husba nd and his siblings during the course of the ma rriag e w hen Husba n d ’s f a t her died in 199 3. At the time Husba nd inhe rited the prop erty, it w as v alue d at One Hund red T hou sand Dollars ($10 0,0 00. 00) and Husba nd inhe rited a tw ent y f iv e perce nt (25%) intere st. Husba nd purch ased an add itiona l f if tee n perce nt (15%) intere st in the prop erty f rom his siblings w ith f und s he inhe rited f rom his f ath er. Husba nd and W if e the n obt aine d a mo rtgag e to purch ase the rema ining six ty perce nt (60%) intere st f rom Husba nd’s siblings. Husba nd, W if e and the ir min or son mo v ed into the ho use and the ho me w as join tly titled in th e p arties’ n am es.

Evi den ce at trial esta blished tha t the Circl e Avenue hom e had bee n in Husba nd’s f am ily f or mo re tha n f if

ty y ears. Husba nd’s gr and f ath er origi nally purch ased the hom e and raised his f am ily the re. W hen he died , Husba nd’s f ath er inhe rited the hom e and raised his f am ily in it. Husba nd w ished to raise h is son in th e a ncest ral ho me be f ore W if e f iled f or divorce. W hen W if e requeste d Husba nd leave the hom e, Husba nd returne d to the partie s’ f orme r residen ce on Chocta w Avenue w hich the partie s still own

. Hu s b a n d testif ied he
w ant ed to min imize the disrupt ion in his son’s life so he conse nte d to W if e and c hild
rema ining in the Circl e Avenue hom e pen ding the divorce. Husba nd tes t if ied he never inten ded to aba ndo n h is ance stral ho me

.

T he trial court ruled tha t the f orty perce nt (40%) intere st in the hom e w hich Husba nd inhe rited or purch ased w ith inhe rited f und s is Husba nd’s sepa rate prop erty. T he trial court dee me d the rema ining six ty perce nt (60%) intere st in t h e h o m e to be ma rital prop erty. T he court ruled tha t W if e a nd min or child shou ld be allowed to con tinue to reside in the hom e unt il the child reach es the age of ma jority

. At tha t time , or if W if e choo ses to mo v e prior to tha t time , Husba nd mu st pay to W if e one half of the equity w hich accrue d during the ma rriag e and one half of the f utu re equity which w il l a c c rue in the hom e w hile W if e

3and child cont inue to reside the re. T he court orde red Husba nd to pay six ty perce nt (60%)

and W if e to pay f orty perce nt (40%) of the mo rtgag e w hile W if e and min or child reside in the ho me

.

At t he out set o f

ou r discussion w e n ote tha t in a ccorda nce w ith T enn .R.Ap p.P

. 13(d ), the role o f

this Co urt is to revi ew the reco rd m ade in th e trial co urt d e n ovo w ith the presu mp tion tha t th e trial court's f indings o f f act are correct u nless the evidence prep ond erate s oth erw ise. T hus, w e wil l af f irm th e trial co urt's de cision unle ss the re is an error of law af f ecting th e resu lt or u nless t he evidence prep ond erate s against the trial cou rt's f actu al de term inatio ns. Ca mp ana li v

. Cam pan ali, 69 5 S .W .2d 19 3, 1 94 (Te nn. Ap p.1 985 ) (citations om itted ).

W if e cont end s tha t the trial court erred in f inding the Circl e Avenue prop erty to be only six ty perce nt (60%) ma rital. W if e argues tha t the hom e w as inhe rited b y Hu sban d during the ma rriag e, treat ed as the “f am ily hom e,” and jointly titled. W if e asserts tha t the hom e is ma rital prop erty in its ent irety pursu ant to the equitab le doct rine of transm uta tion, and tha t th e p rope rty

sho uld h ave bee n a w arde d to W if e.

T his Cou rt ad dresse d th e d octrine of tran smu tatio n in the case of McClellan v. McClellan, 8 73 S.W .2d 35 0 (T enn . Ap p. 1 993 ).

T ransm uta tion occurs w hen sepa rate prop erty is treat ed in such a w ay as to giv e evidence of an inten tion tha t it beco me ma rita l prop erty. O ne me tho d of causin g tra nsm uta tion is to purch ase prop erty w ith sepa rate f und s but to take title in joint ten ancy. T his ma y also be don e by placing sepa rate prop erty in the nam es of bot h spou ses. T he ration ale und erly ing b oth of the se doct rines is tha t dea ling w ith prop erty in the se w ays create s a re b u t t able presu mp tion of a gift to the ma rital esta te. T his presu mp tion is base d upo n the provisi on in ma ny m arital prop erty statu tes tha t prop erty acquired durin g t h e ma rriag e is presu me d ma rita l. T h e presu mp tion can be rebu tted by evidence of circumsta nces or com mu nicatio ns clearly indicat ing an inten t tha t the prop erty rema in sepa rate. Id. at 3 51. In the McClellan case, a husb and and w if e purch ased a hom e using f und s inhe rited by the husb and ($20 ,00 0.0 0) f or the down payme nt. T he prop erty w as titled in the nam es of bot h partie s. T he trial court f oun d the prop erty to be ma rital and awarded the hom e to t h e husb and

. T he w if e app eale d the judgme nt assertin g tha t she shou ld have be e n awarded at least one half of the ma rital residen ce. T he husb and argued tha t the trial court shou ld ha v e f oun d the residen ce to be his sepa rate prop erty a s he only a gr eed to have the prop erty title d in bot h the ir n am es beca use the w if e threa ten ed to sue f or divorce if the prop erty w as not also titled in her n am e. T he Court of App eals f ocuse d on the husb and ’s testim ony tha t he intend ed to h ave the ho use f or the fa mily and aff irmed the trial court’s f inding tha t the prop erty w as ma rital. T he Court also af f irmed the award of the prop erty to th e h usba nd.

4In the case at han d, W if e argues tha t the hom e w as titled jointly, f inan ced jointly,

and treat ed as a “f am ily h o m e

. ” Husba nd cont end s tha t altho ugh the re is a rebu ttab le presu mp tion tha t he inten ded to ma ke a gif t to the m arriage, McClellan a lso sta tes t hat the presu mp tion can be rebu tted by evidence of circumsta nce or com mu nicatio ns clearly indicat ing tha t the prop erty rema in sepa rate. Altho ugh the McClellan court did not def ine
w hat tho se circum stan ces m ight be, Husba nd cont end s tha t th e p resen t case prese nts
an app ropriate set of circumsta nces. Husba nd argues tha t a hom e w hich has bee n in Husba nd’s f am ily f or over f if ty y ears shou ld be v iew ed dif f eren tly tha n a hom e w ithou t this designat ion w hi c h p a rties purch ase togeth er using inhe rited f und s f or the down payme nt, as in McClellan.

T he evidence in this case prep ond erate s against the trial court’s f inding tha t the hom e is f orty perce nt (40%) sepa rate and six ty perce nt (60%) ma rital. Altho ugh Husba nd used his own f und s to purch ase 40% of the hou se on Circl e Avenue , the hom e w as jointly titled in bot h Husba nd’s and W if e’s nam es. T he presu mp tion tha t a gift to the ma rital esta te
w as inten de d c a n b e rebu tted by e v iden ce clearly indicat ing a n inten t tha t the prop erty
rema in sepa rate. T here is no indicat ion in the record tha t Husba nd ever treat ed the Circl e Avenue prop erty as if it w ere his sepa rate prop erty. Base d upo n the statu s of the title of the Circl e Avenue prop erty, and in the abse nce of proo f tha t Husba nd clearly inten ded tha t the hom e w ould rema in his sepa rate prop erty, w e f ind tha t the hom e w as ma rital prop erty.

Our sta tute s provide th at in divorce case s the court shall e quitablydiv ide the ma rital prop erty of

the pa rties. T enn . Cod e A nn. §3 6-4-12 1(a). A n e quitable divi sion h owev er is
not nece ssarily an equal o ne. Ba rnhill v . Ba rnhill, 82 6S. W .2d 443 , 45 6(T enn .Ap p. 1 991 ).
T rial courts are af

f orde d w ide di s c r et i on i n di v iding the intere sts of partie s in jointly owned prop er ty

. Ac c or di ngly , the trial court’s distribut ion w ill be giv en gr eat we ight on app eal, and w ill be presu me d to be correct unle ss w e f ind the prep ond eran ce of the evidence is oth erw ise. Id. at 4 49.

Pursua nt to T enn

. Code Ann

. §36 -4-121 (c), trial courts are guided by ma ny f acto rs in ma king an equitab le divi sion of ma rital prop erty. One imp ortan t f acto r is “the cont ribution of each party to the acquisition, prese rv ation , app reciation or dissipat ion of the ma rital or sepa rate prop erty, includin g the cont ribution of a p a rty to the ma rriag e as hom em aker,
w age earn er, or pare nt.” (Te nn. Code Ann

. §36 -4-121 (c)(5 )). Unde r this f acto r and the catch all provisi on, “Such oth er f acto rs as are nece ssary to consid er the equities bet w een the partie s” (Te nn. Code Ann

. §36 -4-121 (c)( 10)), the trial court w as able to f acto r in Husba nd’s u se o f

inhe rited f und s to purch ase f orty percent ( 40% ) of the ho me , an d th e length o f tim e th e h om e h as b een in Husb and ’s f am ily

. 5Altho ugh the Cir cle Av enu e p rope rty be cam e marital prope rty under the doct rine of tra n s m u t a t io n, Husba nd’s use of inhe rited f und s to purch ase the hom e, and the f act tha t the hom e has bee n passed down throu gh several generat ions in Husba nd’s f am ily , are relevant to the equitab le divi sion of the prop erty. T he evidence doe s not prep ond erate against the trial court’s divi sion of the Circl e Avenue prop erty. W hile the prop erty shou ld prop erly be classif ied as ma rital, the divi sion of the prop erty shall rema in the sam e. W if e shall be ent itled to half of the equit y wh ic h a c c rued during the ma rriag e (app rox ima tely $6, 000 ) and half of the f utu re equity which w ill a ccrue while W if e and child are residing in the hom e, to be paid by Husba nd at the time W if e and child leave the hom e. T he trial court’s judgme nt regarding occup ancy of the hom e, payme nt of mo rtgag e, and sale of the hom e sh all also rema in th e sa me

.

III. IDS a nd Schw ab A ccounts

W he nH us ba nd ’ s fat he rdied in 199 3, Husba nd inhe rited an investme nt acco un t w i th Charles Schwab and a First Am erican saving s accou nt. Initia lly , the Schwab accou nt
rema ined in Husba nd’s f ath er’s nam e unt il Husba nd w as advised tha t the accou nt mu st be und er a liv ing p erson ’s social security n um ber. Husba nd t e s tif ied tha t he retitled the
accou nt in t o h is a n d W if e’s nam e in an ef f ort to prote ct W if e in case of Husba nd’s unt ime ly

dea th.

Similarly, the IDS accou nt w as open ed by Husba nd w ith f und s inhe rited f rom his f ath er’s First Am erican saving s acco unt . Like the Schw ab accou nt, Husba nd eventua lly had to retitle this accou nt or mo v e the f und s out of his f ath er’s nam e. T he partie s ope ned
w hat later beca me the FAIR accou nt w ith First Am erican Ban k and Husba nd dep osited the f und s from his f ath er’s First Am erican accou nt (approximat ely $50 ,00 0.0 0) into the joint
accou nt in Decem ber of 199 4. On Janu ary 30, 199 5, Husba nd transf erred the mo ney out of tha t accou nt to Am erican Express Finan cial Advisors to ope n the IDS accou nt. Husba nd ope ned the IDS accou nt in his nam e solely and n am ed W if e as benef iciary i n the event of his u ntim ely death

.

T he trial court f oun d bot h the IDS and Schwab accou nts to be the sepa rate prop erty of Husba nd and awarded the m t o Husba nd. W if e cont end s tha t the IDS and Schwab
accou nts are ma rital prop erty und er the doct rine of transm uta tion. T he Schwab accou nt
w as jointly titled, giv ing rise to the presu mp tion tha t Husba nd inten ded to ma ke a gift to the
ma rriag e. T he IDS accou nt w as f und ed w ith mo ney f rom the joint FAIR accou nt

. W if e 6cont end s the com min gli ng of the ma rtial and sepa rate prop erty resulte d in transm uta tion

of the IDS a ccoun t.

T he Schwab accou nt w as jointly titled in the partie s’ nam es. Unde r the doct rine of transm uta tion, this create s a rebu ttab le presu mp tion of a gift to t h e m a ri t al esta te. As spelled out in McClellan, the presu mp tion can be rebu tted by evidence of circumsta nces
or com mu nicatio ns clearly indicat ing an inten t tha t the prop erty r emain sepa rate. McClellan at 351

. Husba nd testif ied that he titled the Schwab accou nt in bot h partie s’ nam es in an ef f ort to prote ct W if e in case of Husba nd’s unt ime ly dea th, as Husba nd is a police of f icer. Husba nd testif ied tha t having recen tly bee n throu gh the prob ate proce ss w ith his f ath er’s esta te, Husba nd f elt th is w as th e m ost re ason able an d p rude nt t hing to do.

T h e jointly- titled Schwab accou nt consists ent irely of Husba nd’s inhe rited f und s. W if e state d tha t no f und s had bee n w ithdra w n by eithe r party since the accou nt w as put in b o t h partie s’ nam es nor have any ma rital f und s bee n dep osited into the accou nt. Husba nd of

f ered a plau sible explanat ion f or titling the accou nt in bot h partie s’ nam es. T he evidence doe s not prep ond erate against the trial court’s f inding tha t the Schwab accou nt
w as th e se para te p rope rty of Husba nd.

T he IDS acco u n t wa s titled in Husba nd’s nam e only. T he accou nt w as f und ed ent irely w ith mo ney inhe rited by Husba nd. W if e’s only avenue f or assertin g tha t this
accou nt be dee me d ma rital prop erty is the f act tha t the inhe rited mo ney w as transf erred out of Husba nd’s f ath er’s accou nt and in t o a joint accou nt of the partie s f or a period of
one mo nth bef ore it w as transf erred to the sepa rately titled IDS accou nt. W if e asserts tha t such com mi ng ling of ma rital and sepa rate f und s invokes the doct rine of transm uta tion and the presu mp tion tha t Husba nd in ten ded a gift to the ma rital esta te. T he evidence doe s not sup port this a rg um ent

.

W hile the inhe rit e d f und s w ere brief ly in the joint accou nt, no ma rital f und s w ere dep osited into the joint accou nt nor w ere any f und s w ithdra w n f rom the accou nt. “Th e me re f act tha t the f und s w ere place d f or a time in a joint accou nt doe s not require tha t the y be
c on s i de r edma rital prop erty.”F end ley v

. Fend ley, No. 01A 01-9 509 -CH- 004 18, 199 7 LE X IS 469 , at *6 (Te nn. Ct. A pp. July 2, 19 97).

“A presu mp tion arises tha t w hen dep osits are ma de into a joint ban k accou nt bet w een spou ses, the partie s share a joint ownership in the f und s on dep osit. T his presu mp tion, howev er, is rebu ttab le by e ither spou s e wis h in g to show t hat the accou nt consists of his sepa rate prop erty only.” Moshe r v

. Moshe r, No. 2, 198 8 LEXIS 212 , at *4 (Te nn. Ct. App

. March 3, 198 8) (citation s om itted ). W hile the f und s used to ope n the IDS

7am oun t cam e out o f the partie s’ joint accou nt, the f und s in the accou nt consiste d of

Husba nd’s sepa rate prop erty. T he circumsta nces here indicat e Husba nd’s inten t tha t the prop erty remain sep arate

.

W if e argues tha t the IDS accou nt could not have bee n titled jointly. How ever, Vera Feldm an, Am erican Express f inan cial advisor, testif ied tha t Husba nd chose an a n n u it y
w hich could hav e only one ow ner instea d of r equestin g an ann uity allowi ng bot h partie s to be listed as owners. Add itiona lly , Husba nd state d to Feldm an tha t the f und s f or the ann uity w ere p art o f his inh eritan ce.

T he brevity of the per io d in w hich the f und s w ere place d in the joint accou nt, coup led w ith Husba nd’s titling t he IDS accou nt in his nam e o n ly, evidenced Husba nd’s inten t tha t the f und s rema in his sepa rate prop erty. T he evidence doe s not prep ond erate against t he trial cou rt’s f inding th at t he IDS a ccoun t was Husban d’s sep arate prop erty.

For all th eab ove state d rea sons, the trial cou rt did not err in ho lding tha t the Charles S chwab acco unt an d th e IDS acco unt w ere t he sepa rate prop erty of Husba nd.

IV. Priv ate S chool Tuition

T he trial court ruled tha t W if e w ould be designat ed the prima ry custo dial guardian of the partie s’ min or child and Husba nd w ould be respo nsible f or the payme n t o f child supp ort pursu ant to the Depa rtme nt of H um an Services Guide lines. Th e parties agreed tha t the child shou ld cont inue to atte nd priv ate schoo l bet ter to add ress his Atte ntion Def icit Disorder. T he trial court orde red Husba nd to pay f or the child’s priv ate schoo l tuition and designat ed Husba nd’s payme nt of tuition as alimo ny, ded uctible to Husba nd and taxable to W if e. W if e cont end s tha t the trial court erred in designat ing the payme nt of child’s tuition
as alimo ny as it is exclusiv ely f or the ben ef it of the child and is thu s, in the nat ure of child supp ort.

As Prof essor Clark has state d " [ t ] h e purp ose of alimo ny is to care f or the w if e's
nee ds af ter divorce

. . .” H. Clark, Law of Dom estic Relation s § 14. 9(4) (196 8). T enn essee courts have consiste ntly held tha t nee d is one of the mo st imp ortan t f acto rs in the award of alimo ny, w ith the sole purp ose of alimo ny bein g to provide f or a disad v ant aged spou se's
nee ds af ter divorce. Lan caste r v

. Lan caste r, 671 S.W .2d 501 , 503 (Te nn. Ct. App

. 198 4); Alesh ire v

. A le s h ir e , 642 S.W .2d 729 , 733 (Te nn. Ct. App .19 81). T enn essee Code Ann ota ted §36 -5-101 (d), sets out the f acto rs the court mu st consid er in settin g alimo ny, and the do es n ot m ent ion sp ecial e duca tion nee ds o f children

.
8W hile the child supp ort am oun ts set f orth in the Guide lines do not include priv ate

schoo l t u it io n, the Guide lines provide f or the upward adju stm ent of child supp ort f or extraordinary edu cation al expen ses:

(1) Since the se perce nta ge am oun ts are min imu ms, the court shall incre ase the award calcula ted in Rule 12 40-2 -4-.03 f or the f ollowi ng reaso ns: (c) Ex traordin ary edu cation al expense s and extraordina ry me dical expense s not covered by insuran ce shall be add ed to t he perce nta ge calculat ed in th e a bove rule. T enn . Com p. R. & Regs. tit. 10 , ch. 12 40-2 -4-.04-.0 4(1)(c) (1994 ). In Dw ight v. Dw ight, 936 S.W .2d 945 (Te nn. App .19 96), this Court f oun d tha t priv ate schoo l tuition is not t o be consid ered as a portio n of child supp ort und er the Guide line perce nta ges and tha t child supp ort can be adju sted upward f or priv ate schoo l tuition

. Id.
at 9 50.

Husba nd poin ts to the case of Sm ith v

. Sm ith, No. 01-A-0 1-97 05-CH-002 16, 199 7 LEXIS 733 (Te nn. App

. Octob er 29, 199 7) as supp ort f or his positio n tha t a min or child’s priv ate schoo l tuition ma y be prop erly designat ed as alimo n y

. In Sm ith, the Court of App eals held tha t the trial court w as w ithin its discretion in orde ring a redu ction in alimo ny
w hen part of the alimo ny had origi nally bee n awarded to help W if e pay f or the min or child’s priv ate scho ol tu ition a nd min or child w as lat er en rolled in pu blic scho ol.

Altho ugh the Sm ith case is certain ly one instan ce of a trial court classif y ing tuition
as alimo ny, the issue on app eal w as not the prop riety of tha t classif ication , but w het her the trial court erred in decre asing th e alimo ny award upo n the child’s enro llmen t in pub lic schoo l. T he Court of App eals f oun d t h a t t h e trial court did not abu se its discretion in redu cing the alimo ny award. T he issue in Sm ith w as not w het her the tuition shou ld have bee n classif ied as child supp ort v ersus alimo ny. How ever, the Court of App eals did ma ke
me ntion of

this issu e: W e believe tha t bot h partie s w ould conce de tha t T enn

. Code Ann

. §36 -5-101 (d), w hich sets out the f acto rs the court mu st consid er in settin g alimony, does not specif ically ment ion specia l edu cation nee ds of the children , and tha t such nee ds are add ressed in t h e provisi ons f or deviation f rom the child supp ort guidelines f oun d in T enn

. Rules & Regs. 12-2 -4- .04 (1)(c). Sm ith a t *5 -6. Ultimat ely, the Co urt in Sm ith d id no t rule upo n th e p ropriety of classif y ing priv ate tuition as a limon y

an d is th eref ore n ot co ntrolling in th e ca se a t ha nd.

Husba nd’s p a y me nt of tuition is clearly f or the ben ef it of the min or child. W hile p ri va t e schoo l tuition is not to be consid ered as a portio n of child supp ort und er t h e Guide line perce nta ges, the Child Sup port Guide lines and T enn essee case law provide tha t child supp ort can be adju sted upward f or priv ate schoo l tuition

. Furthe rmore , the f acto rs 9to be consid ered by the court in settin g alimo ny ma ke no me ntion of specia l edu cation

nee ds of min or children

. T he priv ate schoo l tuition is clearly child supp ort and the trial court abu sed its discretion in designat ing Husba nd’s payme nt of the min or child’s priv ate schoo l tuition as a limon y

.

T enn essee Code Ann ota ted §36 -5-101 (e)(1) requires the trial court, w hen deviating f rom the Child Sup port Guide lines, to ma ke a w ritten f inding th a t t h e a pplicat ion of the Guide lines w ould be unju st or inap prop riate. Altho ugh the trial court f oun d tha t the partie s’ min or child shou ld cont inue to atte n d Ca t h o lic Hig h Scho ol, the f inding w as not in the cont ext of child supp ort, and is insuf f icient to const itute a w ritten f inding tha t the app lication of the G uide lines is inap prop riate in this case. Accordin gly , this case is rema nde d f or 1 add itiona l w ritten f indings con sistent w ith th is opin ion.

V. A ttorney Fee s

T he trial court esta blished a f ormu la f or the payme nt of W if e’s atto rneys’ f ees. T he court held tha t Husba nd w as to pay one half of W if e’s atto rneys’ f ees in c u rr ed prior to Janu ary 31, 199 8, or $15 00. 00, and one half of W if e ’s a ttorn eys’ f ees incurred since Janu ary 31, 199 8, not to exceed $25 00

. 00. W if e incurred tota l atto rneys’ f ees and suit expense s of

$7 ,52 2.0 5 a t th e tim e o f trial.

W if e cont end s tha t giv en the com para tiv e nee ds of the partie s and the ir ability to pay the ir atto rneys, the trial court shou ld have required Husba nd to pay all of W if e’s atto rneys’ f ees. Husba nd argues tha t as W if e received half of the partie s ma rital asset s, alimo ny, child supp ort and has consid erab le am oun t of sepa rate prop erty, W if e clearly has ade quate f und s f rom w hich to pay h er atto rney’s f ees. Husba nd cont end s this hold ing shou ld be reversed an d e ach party ordere d to pa y the ir ow n a ttorn ey’s fe es.

T he trial court has w ide discretion in det ermin ing the am oun t, if any, of atto rney's f ees to b e a w arde d. Crouch v

. Crouch, 53 T enn

. App

. 594 , 605 ; 38 5 S .W .2d 28 8, 2 93 (196 4). At the conclu sion of a divorce case, if the w if e is w ithou t suf f ic ie n t resou rces prop erly to com pen sate her atto rney, and if the f inan cial provisi ons ma de f or the w if e by
w ay of alimo ny, period ic or in solido , do not include the me ans out of w hich coun sel f ees
can reaso nab ly be paid , the court is aut horized to gr ant to the w if e add itiona l alimo ny f or the purp ose of ena bling her to pay her atto rney. Palm er v

. Palm er, 562 S.W .2d 833 , 839 (T enn

. App

. 197 7); Ligon v

. Ligon, 597 S.W .2d 310 (Te nn. App

. 197 9); an d L ig o n v.

1 W e no te, h ow ever, th at a w ritte n fi ndi ng t hat the chi ld had a spe ci al dis abi lit y and t hat he h as parti cul arly ben efit ted from private sc hoo l edu cat ion in the pas t, w ill sat is fy the requ irem ent. See Quarry v. Quarry, No. 02 A01-9 111 -CH-0026 2, 1 992 W L 14 179 6, a t *2 (Tenn. App. Jun e 25 , 19 92). 10Ligon, 556 S.W .2d 763 (Te nn. App

. 197 7). T hus, this Court w ill not disturb the trial court's

decision regarding atto rneys' f ees unle ss the decision is not supp orted by a prep ond eran ce of the evidence

.

T he rig ht to an allowance of legal expense s is not abso lute. It is cond itione d upo n
a lack of resou rces to prose cute or def end a suit in good f aith. T his rule is to ena ble the
w if e, w hen dest itute of me ans of her own, to obt ain justice and to prevent its den ial. Fox
v . Fox, 65 7 S .W .2d 74 7, 7 49 (Te nn. 198 3).

In the f inal decre e of divorce, Husba nd w as or d e re d to pay to W if e the sum of Fourte en T hou sand Nine Hund red Forty- Four Dollars ($14 ,94 4.0 0) to ef f ectu ate an equal divi sion of

the parties’ retirem ent /pe nsion accou nts and the sum of One Tho usan d Fiv e hun dred Dollar s ($ 1 , 5 0 0

. 00) as W if e’s share of the 197 8 Harley mo torcycl e sold by Husba nd during the divorce proce edin gs. W if e w as awarded one half of the First Am erican Ban k FAIR accou nt bala nce of Sevente en T hou sand Ninety-Three Dollars ($17 ,09 3.0 0). W if e w as awarded the exclusiv e use of the hom e on Circl e Avenue w ith Husba nd bein g orde red t o pay si x ty percent (60%) of the mortgage and W if e f orty percen t (40 %). Add itiona lly , W if e retain ed sepa rate prop erty tota ling in excess of Six ty T hou sand Dollars ($60 ,00 0.0 0).

T he trial court assesse d costs against Husba nd and orde red Husba nd to pay a tota l
sum of Four T hou sand Dollars ($4,0 00. 00) to W if e f or atto rneys’ f ees, leaving W if e to pay the bala nce of T hree T hou sand Fiv e Hund red T w ent y -Two Dollars ($3,5 22. 05). T his Court is of the opin ion tha t W if e has received suf f icient resou rces to com pen sate her atto rneys f or any rema ining f ees and expense s incurred on her beh alf

. T aking into accou nt bot h the prop erty settle me nt and the relative incom e levels of the partie s, it doe s not app ear to us tha t th e e v iden ce p repo nde rates against t he decision of the trial cou rt.

W if e also cont end s tha t Husba nd shou ld be required to pay the reaso nab le
a t t o rneys' f ees f or W if e on app eal. T his Court is of the opin ion tha t this case doe s n o t require an award to W if e f or atto rneys' f ees on app eal. A s we h a ve state d in our discussion of atto rneys’ f ees abo v e, W if e has ade quate f inan cial re s ource s w ith w hich to co mp ensa te h er at torne y s.

VI. Conclusion

T he judgme nt of the trial court is af f irmed in part, rev ersed in part, and rema nde d f or a w ritten f inding required on the child su p p o rt gu id eline deviation issue. Costs on 11app eal a re ta x ed to a ppe llant.

HIGHERS, J.

CONCUR:

CRAW FORD, P.J., W .S.

LIL LARD, J.

12