FEDERAL AVIATION

ADMINISTRATION

Challenges in

Modernizing the

Agency

Statement for the Record by

Gerald L. Dillingham, Associate Director,

Transportation Issues, Resources, Community, and

Economic Development Division

United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Committee on the Budget and the

Subcommittee on Transportation, Committee on

Appropriations, U.S. Senate

To Be Released on Delivery

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST

Thursday

February 3, 2000

GAO/T-RCED/AIMD-00-87
1

Messrs. Chairmen and Members of the Committee and Subcommittee:

We appreciate the opportunity to provide our perspective on the challenges the Federal

Aviation Administration (FAA) faces in continuing to provide for the safe, orderly, and

expeditious flow of air traffic in U.S. airspace. The nation’s airspace carries by far the

largest volume of air traffic in the world, a volume that is projected to increase

significantly within the decade. If not managed effectively, this projected growth could

affect safety and cause aviation gridlock. This situation creates a limited window of

opportunity, which is prompting FAA to undertake numerous initiatives to improve

performance and the Congress to provide FAA with greater flexibility in procurement

and personnel matters. However, continuing dissatisfaction with FAA’s efforts has given

rise to proposals on alternative organizational structures for the entire agency or for its

air traffic service function.

Our testimony today highlights some key areas we and others have identified that have

hampered FAA’s ability to achieve desired outcomes. We will also discuss various

proposals for restructuring FAA and talk about next steps for FAA and the Congress to

take to ensure that the agency can address its challenges effectively and efficiently.

In summary:

• FAA’s efforts to implement initiatives in five key areas—air traffic control

modernization, procurement and personnel reform, aviation safety, aviation and

computer security, and financial management—have met with limited success. For

example, FAA has established an acquisition management system to reduce the time

and cost of fielding new products and services. However, in many of the five areas,

FAA has frequently not developed comprehensive plans, thus underestimating the

complexity involved in developing new systems, and has often not adequately

overseen the development and implementation of these systems. As a result,

although progress has been made in each of these areas, cost overruns, delays, and/or

performance shortfalls have occurred.
2

• The proposals to restructure FAA, although significantly different from one another,

have a common objective—the more efficient and effective modernization of the air

traffic control system. These proposals include creating a government-owned or

private corporation or emphasizing performance for air traffic control through a new

performance-based structure within FAA. In addition, one proposal would establish

FAA as an independent agency to better achieve its mission, including its efforts to

modernize the air traffic control system. However, to be effective, restructuring will

need to address the fundamental problems affecting the modernization of the air

traffic control system, such as the lack of a complete systems architecture, a

sophisticated process for acquiring software acquisitions, sound financial

management practices, and an effective organizational culture.

• As we have indicated, while FAA’s initiatives have met with some success, our work

shows that many of these initiatives have been undertaken without paying enough

attention to factors critical to achieving the desired results—establishing baseline

data, priorities, a game plan for addressing root causes, and an evaluation plan to

measure progress. These deficiencies need to be addressed promptly because, with

the projected growth in air travel, FAA has a limited window of opportunity for

making the changes we and others have recommended.

• With this pressing need for improved FAA performance, overseeing FAA’s

implementation of its initiatives and critical management reforms is of paramount

importance. For this reason, we believe continuing congressional oversight is critical

to ensure that FAA successfully meets the challenges of maintaining safety and

improving efficiencies in light of the expected growth in air travel.

Progress and Problems With Implementing Efforts in Key Areas

Over the years, reviews by us and others have identified problems in five key areas: (1)

modernizing the air traffic control system, (2) implementing procurement and personnel
3

reform, (3) ensuring the safe operation of aircraft, (4) improving the security of both

aviation and critical computer systems, and (5) implementing the financial systems and

controls needed to effectively manage the agency. Overall, FAA has agreed with the

problems identified and has undertaken initiatives to mitigate these problems, as we and

others have recommended. However, these initiatives have often fallen short because

FAA establishes overly ambitious implementation schedules, proceeds without adequate

plans, and does not adequately oversee their implementation. I would like to highlight

some of the progress and problems we have identified with FAA’s implementation of

efforts in these five key areas.

Modernizing the Air Traffic Control System

Faced with rapidly growing volumes of air traffic and aging equipment to control this

traffic, FAA initiated an ambitious 10-year, $12 billion program in 1981 to modernize its

air traffic control system. This effort—which involves acquiring a vast network of radar

and automated data-processing, navigation, communications equipment, and air traffic

control facilities—has been expanded and is now expected to cost $40 billion through

fiscal year 2004.1

Despite this investment, the air traffic control modernization program has not measured

up to expectations. It has experienced cost overruns, delays, and performance shortfalls

of large proportions. For example, in 1994, FAA restructured its Advanced Automation

System,2which was intended to be the centerpiece of the air traffic control

modernization program, after the estimated cost to deploy the system had tripled,

capabilities were shown to be significantly less than promised, and delays were expected

to run nearly a decade.

1

The total cost of modernization includes appropriations for all actual and projected facilities and

equipment from fiscal year 1982 through fiscal 2004 for projects in FAA’s financial plan.

2

This system was designed to provide, among other things, new work stations for controllers and related

computer hardware and software.
4

We found that FAA’s problems with the Advanced Automation System and other

modernization projects were caused primarily by design and implementation factors,

such as underestimating the complexity of developing systems and inadequate

management oversight. Because of the program’s size, complexity, cost, and problemplagued past, we designated it as a high-risk information technology initiative in 1995.3

In addition, we identified four specific implementation issues—root causes—of the

modernization program’s problems. These include the lack of

• a complete systems architecture, or overall blueprint, to guide the program, which

has resulted in unnecessarily higher spending to buy, integrate, and maintain

hardware and software;

• reliable cost-estimating processes and cost-accounting practices, which puts the

agency at risk of making ill-informed decisions on procuring air traffic control

systems;

• an effective approach for acquiring software, which places the agency at greater risk

of not delivering promised software capabilities on time and within budget; and

• an effective organizational culture to assist the acquisition process by encouraging

staff to work cooperatively within the agency and with the aviation community.

FAA has taken a number of steps to address these root causes. For example, it has

initiated activities to develop a complete air traffic control systems architecture, costestimating processes and cost-accounting systems, and to improve software acquisition

capabilities and organizational culture. However, it will take several years for these

efforts to reach fruition. Additionally, in January 1999, FAA appointed a Chief

3

FAA’s modernization program is one of four high-risk system development and modernization efforts.

See High-Risk Series: An Overview (GAO/HR-95-1, Feb. 1995); High-Risk Series: Information Management

and Technology (GAO/HR-97-9, Feb. 1997); and High Risk Series: An Update (GAO/HR-99-1, Jan. 1999).
5

Information Officer, who reports directly to the FAA Administrator. This action is

consistent with the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, which requires each executive agency to

have a chief information officer in order to establish an effective structure for managing

information technology investments. Furthermore, FAA has moved away from its prior

practice of taking on large, complex projects all at once and is now acquiring new

systems by using a more incremental approach. Finally, the agency is no longer making

unilateral decisions about air traffic control modernization. Instead, it has been working

actively with the aviation community—airlines, unions, and equipment manufacturers—

to make decisions more collaboratively.

Nevertheless, problems remain. For example, we recommended that FAA disclose the

inherent uncertainty in projects’ cost estimates in order to increase the estimates'

decision-making value and credibility. We recommended that in providing cost estimates

to the Congress, FAA not provide simply a single cost estimate for a project but instead

estimate a cost range and indicate the level of confidence it had in that range. Although

FAA agreed with this recommendation, it does not always report estimates in this way;

consequently, congressional decisionmakers cannot be confident in the estimates FAA

provides. Furthermore, FAA often begins acquisition projects without establishing

baseline data and an evaluation plan to measure progress.

Reforming Procurement and Personnel Practices

As problems with the air traffic control modernization program mounted in the early

1990s, FAA attributed the delays with implementing air traffic control projects, at least in

part, to burdensome federal acquisition regulations and governmentwide personnel rules

that impeded its ability to acquire equipment and systems and to hire, train, and deploy

the personnel involved in the modernization effort. In response to these claims, the

Congress exempted FAA from many federal acquisitions and personnel-related

regulations, and the agency began implementing procurement and personnel reforms in
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1996.4Nevertheless, external reviews have found problems with FAA’s implementation

of both the procurement and personnel reforms.5

Procurement Reform

FAA introduced an acquisition management system to reduce the time and cost to field

new products and services. The agency established three broad objectives for the

system: (1) the development of a new procurement system that provides flexibility in

selecting and managing contractors, (2) the development of a new investment

management system that spans the entire life cycle of an acquisition, and (3)

organizational and cultural reform that supports the new investment and procurement

systems. FAA has had the most success with the first objective. Booz-Allen & Hamilton

found that FAA has reduced by 50 percent the time it needs to award contracts, awarded

a greater percentage of contracts competitively, and awarded more contracts on the

basis of best value rather than on the basis of the lowest bid. It appears the new policy

on contracting has been successful because FAA’s offices and regions across the

country have adapted it to their specific missions.

Achievement of the acquisition management system’s second objective—the life cycle

investment management system—includes acquiring, deploying, maintaining, and

replacing equipment in the air traffic control modernization program. This process is to

result in more timely and cost-effective acquisitions. FAA has made some progress on

this objective. For example, for its investment management system, FAA has developed

a set of policies, procedures, and reporting requirements to analyze mission needs;

assess the affordability of proposed projects; and establish cost, schedule, and

4 Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-50).

5

For reviews of acquisition management systems see Air Traffic Control: FAA’s Modernization Investment

Management Approach Could Be Strengthened (GAO/RCED/AIMD-99-88, Apr. 30, 1999) and Independent

Assessment of the Federal Aviation Administration’s Acquisition Management System, prepared by BoozAllen & Hamilton for FAA’s Office of Program Evaluation and Configuration Management, July 6, 1999.

For a review of the personnel system, see Personnel Reform in the Federal Aviation Administration: Three

Year Status Report. A Report for the Congress by the National Academy of Public Administration, Aug.

1999.
7

performance parameters to control projects. Furthermore, an FAA senior management

investment review group—the Joint Resources Council—makes key decisions about

which investments best meet the agency’s needs and are to be funded.

However, implementation of this objective has fallen short. FAA has not fully achieved

its objective of managing its modernization projects as a totally integrated program—that

is, as a complete investment portfolio—because it is not consistently applying

acquisition management policies and procedures to all of its modernization projects.

Instead, it limits its oversight of projects mainly to those that are under development or

being implemented, excluding those that are operational. As a result, FAA is not

examining the costs of maintaining existing systems versus investing in new ones;

comparatively ranking projects according to the expected costs, benefits, and risks; and

reaching decisions based on a project’s overall contribution to the most pressing

organizational needs. Furthermore, in July 1999, Booz-Allen & Hamilton reported that

FAA had made little progress toward achieving the acquisition management system’s

stated goal of executing more timely and cost-effective programs. For example,

programs such as the Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System and Wide

Area Augmentation System are still experiencing delays and cost overruns.6

Finally, FAA continues to experience problems in implementing its third objective—

organizational and culture reform. As part of its effort to reform its culture, FAA is using

a team approach to acquiring acquisitions. Members of a team include all stakeholders

who are involved in the acquisition, maintenance, and eventual disposal of a

product/system. However, team members have reported that they do not feel

empowered to make binding, team-based decisions that would be supported by the

different organizations within FAA. As a result, they have had to consult with their

6

The Wide Area Augmentation System augments the Department of Defense’s global positioning system to

satisfy aviation’s navigation requirements. The Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System

replaces 15- to 25-year old controller workstations and supporting computer systems. The early phases of

these projects, such as mission and investment analyses, were implemented prior to the implementation of

the acquisition management system; however, this system’s requirements for overseeing these projects

apply.
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respective organizations on all issues, which extended the time it took to make

decisions, and might have prolonged the acquisition process.

Personnel Reform

Following congressional approval, FAA established a new personnel system to meet its

unique needs. According to the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA), this

system provides some flexibility in hiring, training, compensating, and deploying

personnel. For example, FAA has reduced the time taken to fill vacancies from months

to weeks. Moreover, over the last 3 years, more than 70 executive-level positions have

been filled as a result of tools provided by the new personnel system, such as on-the-spot

hiring authority, temporary promotions to executive positions, and recruitment and

retention bonuses. However, NAPA concluded that these efforts have not made FAA

more effective in carrying out its mission.

NAPA identified issues that have made FAA’s implementation of personnel reforms less

than fully successful:

• FAA lacks baseline data and specific performance measures, which hampers its

efforts to assess the effectiveness of personnel reform and establish a basis for

continuous improvement.

• The decentralized personnel structure that resulted from FAA’s reform has caused (1)

morale problems, (2) communication gaps and inconsistencies in technical advice

and leadership within FAA organizations, and (3) insufficient understanding

throughout the workforce about the intent of reforms. As a result of these problems,

FAA lacks a broad base of support and accountability for reform initiatives among

employees below the highest management levels.
9

Ensuring Aviation Safety

Ensuring that all components of the air transportation system—including the airports,

aircraft, and key personnel such as pilots—operate in a manner that maximizes aviation

safety is a fundamental responsibility for FAA. FAA’s aviation safety programs provide

for the initial certification, periodic surveillance, and inspection of airlines, airports,

repair stations, other aviation entities, pilots, and mechanics. These inspections are

intended not only to detect actual violations but also to serve as part of an early warning

system for identifying potential systemwide weaknesses. In October 1997,7

we reported

that work performed by aviation repair stations—the 2,800 facilities that repair and

maintain nearly half of all U.S. passenger and cargo aircraft—was cited by the National

Transportation Safety Board as a factor in several accidents. FAA had systems in place

to monitor the performance of repair stations, but its implementation of these systems

has inhibited the agency’s effectiveness. We found that FAA inspections of these

stations relied primarily on reviews by individual inspectors, even though inspection

teams provide more effective reviews because they uncover more systemic and longstanding problems. We also found that when deficiencies were discovered, sufficient

documentation did not exist to determine how well FAA followed up to ensure that the

deficiencies were corrected.

These problems are compounded by FAA’s lack of complete information on compliance

in the aviation industry and by the information’s limited use in providing early warning of

potential risks and in targeting inspection resources to the greatest risks. We reported in

1998 that some inspectors reported less than half of the problems or violations they

observed, and many inspections were not thorough or structured enough to detect many

violations.8 We also noted that the impact of FAA’s enforcement actions on compliance

was difficult to assess because the agency had not followed up on the aviation industry’s

implementation of corrective action.

7

Aviation Safety: FAA Oversight of Repair Stations Needs Improvement (GAO/RCED-98-21, Oct. 24, 1997).

8

Aviation Safety: Weaknesses in Inspection and Enforcement Limit FAA in Identifying and Responding to

Risks (GAO/RCED-98-6, Feb. 27, 1998).
10

We recommended actions to FAA to improve its oversight of repair stations and to

improve the usefulness of its inspection and enforcement efforts. FAA agreed with our

recommendations and has developed and begun to implement a fundamentally

reengineered system—the Air Transportation Oversight System—to oversee airline

safety. While this system is definitely a positive action by FAA to address prior

problems, it is not fulfilling its potential because of implementation problems. In June

1999, we reported that FAA’s ability to conduct effective inspections remains limited

largely because of an overly ambitious implementation schedule that compressed

complex, critical steps into a very short time frame.

Improving Aviation and Computer Security

Aviation and computer security are of paramount concern. U.S. aircraft are widely

believed to be a target of terrorist actions, which has heightened the need to improve

domestic aviation security. FAA is implementing recommendations made in 1997 by the

White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security (the Gore Commission) and

mandates contained in the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 to improve

security at airports.

FAA has made some progress in five critical areas—passenger profiling, explosives

detection technologies, passenger-bag matching, vulnerability assessments, and the

certification of screening companies—as recommended by the Gore Commission and

mandated by the Congress. However, given the current implementation schedule, it will

take years for FAA and the aviation industry to fully implement all the initiatives. We

reported in April 1998 that FAA had encountered delays of up to 12 months in

implementing these initiatives, in part, because they are more complex than FAA

originally envisioned and involve new and relatively untested technologies. 9

These

delays are still occurring. In January of this year, FAA issued a notice of proposed

9

Aviation Security: Implementation of Recommendations Is Under Way, but Completion Will Take Several

Years (GAO/RCED-98-102, Apr. 24, 1998).
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rulemaking requiring the certification of screening companies, but the issuance of the

final rule may not occur for another 12 months, nearly 2 years later than the planned

issuance date.

Security is a concern not only for preventing and deterring terrorist and criminal acts

against aircraft but also for protecting critical information and computer systems that

are relied on by pilots, air traffic controllers, and others. A failure to adequately protect

these systems, as well as the facilities that house them, could cause a nationwide

disruption of air traffic or even the loss of life in collisions. Consequently, FAA’s policy

requires that air traffic control systems and facilities be certified as having appropriately

implemented security safeguards. However, in May 1998, 10 we reported that FAA was

ineffective in all critical areas we analyzed. For example, FAA had not assessed the

physical security controls at 187 facilities since 1993 and therefore did not know how

vulnerable they were. Additionally, FAA had not performed the analysis necessary to

determine system threats, vulnerabilities, and safeguards for 87 of 90 operational air

traffic control computer systems nor had it consistently included well-formulated

security requirements in the specifications for new air traffic control modernization

systems. Further, we noted that FAA’s security structure was ineffective—

responsibilities were distributed among three organizations, all of which were remiss in

their security duties.

We made a number of recommendations to FAA that address these computer security

concerns, and FAA has initiated efforts in response to these recommendations. For

example, FAA reported that it completed inspections of the 187 facilities that it had not

assessed since 1993 and that it established a Chief Information Officer position in

February 1999 with responsibility for developing, implementing, and enforcing the

agency’s information security policy. However, in December 1999, 11 we reported that

10 Air Traffic Control: Weak Computer Security Practices Jeopardize Flight Safety (GAO/AIMD-98-155, May

18, 1998).

11 Computer Security: FAA Needs to Improve Controls Over Use of Foreign Nationals to Remediate and

Review Software (GAO/AIMD-00-55, Dec. 23, 1999).
12

computer security problems continued to exist. In its efforts to address Year 2000

computer problems—which were largely successful—FAA used contractor employees to

perform repairs to mission-critical systems. However, the agency did not follow its own

policy requiring background checks on all of these contractor employees, and in some

instances no background checks were conducted. As a result, the air traffic control

system may be more susceptible to intrusion and malicious attacks.

Applying Sound Financial Management

As with any organization, sound financial management is critical to the effective and

efficient operation of FAA. Weak financial management renders FAA vulnerable to

waste, fraud, and abuse; undermines its ability to manage its operations; and limits the

reliability of the financial information it provides to the Congress. Beginning with fiscal

year 1994, the Department of Transportation’s Office of the Inspector General has

audited FAA’s financial statements and has consistently been unable to determine

whether the financial information is reliable. This pattern has continued with the

Inspector General’s most recent report—a disclaimer of opinion—on FAA’s fiscal year

1998 financial statements.

Related to the financial problems identified by the Inspector General, we reported in

February 1998 that many problems in the property and equipment accounts affect FAA’s

ability to efficiently and effectively manage programs that use these assets.12 For

example, the lack of adequate physical controls over equipment could result in the

costly, unnecessary acquisition of additional assets or the misuse of assets. We reported

that until FAA implements effective policies and procedures to provide accountability

over property and equipment, it remains vulnerable to significant mismanagement of

appropriated funds.

12 Financial Management: Federal Aviation Administration Lacked Accountability for Major Assets

(GAO/AIMD-98-62, Feb. 18, 1998).
13

FAA also has problems in its cost accounting system. Federal financial accounting

standards require federal agencies to maintain a cost accounting capability.13 The

Congress has specifically required that FAA develop a cost accounting system. However,

the agency has not achieved this mandate. We reported in February 1998 that many of

the problems in the property and equipment accounts result from the lack of a reliable

system for accumulating cost accounting information on individual projects. As a

consequence of weak cost accounting practices, the agency did not have reliable and

timely information about the full cost of program activities. Furthermore, the lack of

cost accounting information limits FAA’s ability to (1) make effective decisions about

resource needs and adequately control major projects, such as the multibillion-dollar air

traffic control modernization program; (2) estimate future costs in order to prepare and

review budgets; (3) control and reduce costs in order to increase efficiency and avoid

waste; (4) develop a system of user fees based on the cost of services provided; and (5)

meaningfully evaluate performance measures in terms of efficiency and costeffectiveness.

In January 1999, we designated FAA’s financial management as a high-risk area because

of serious and long-standing accounting and financial reporting weaknesses.14 In March

1999, we testified that FAA senior management recognized the urgency of correcting

their financial management deficiencies and had taken steps to address them, including

efforts to continue to develop a cost accounting system, which FAA expects will be fully

operational in 2001.15 However, much still remains to be done. Until full accountability

is achieved, FAA will continue to be exposed to waste, fraud, abuse, and

mismanagement. In addition, the Congress will have no assurance of receiving accurate

financial management information to help make informed decisions about future funding

and oversight of FAA activities.

13 Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standards, no. 4, Managerial Cost Accounting Concepts and

Standards for the Federal Government.

14 High-Risk Series: An Update (GAO/HR-99-1, Jan. 1999).

15 Federal Aviation Administration: Financial Management Issues (GAO/T-AIMD-99-122, Mar. 18, 1999).
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Proposals to Resolve Modernization Problems Through Restructuring

Over the years, a number of fundamentally different proposals have been offered for

restructuring FAA. The impetus behind most reform proposals lies in congressional

frustration with the slow pace of modernization and concerns about the potential for

aviation gridlock. Two types of proposals have been designed principally to improve

FAA’s air traffic control modernization efforts: (1) establishing a public or private air

traffic control corporation or (2) making performance-based changes within FAA. In

addition, another type of proposal would make FAA, in its entirety, an independent

government agency to improve overall mission effectiveness, including air traffic control

modernization.

The common theme in the restructuring proposals is the need to make FAA more

effective, accountable, and results-oriented. Proponents of these proposals contend that

restructuring FAA, in whole or in part, will provide the agency with flexibility in

managing its budget, implementing regulations, and making policy decisions. They also

contend that such restructuring will enable additional resources to be tapped, such as

user fees. However, any restructuring will need to address the fundamental problems

affecting the implementation of air traffic control modernization, such as the lack of a

complete systems architecture, a sophisticated process for acquiring software, sound

financial management practices, and an effective organizational culture. While each of

these proposals offers potential advantages, each also raises a number of issues:

• Create a separate federal or private air traffic control corporation while leaving safety

oversight with the federal government. This proposal has raised a number of safety

and oversight issues. For example, an air traffic control corporation would be

responsible for operating the air traffic control system and making long-term

decisions that affect safety and efficiency. At the same time, however, the FAA

Administrator would presumably have ultimate authority on all safety matters. It is

unclear how these two separate organizations would share responsibilities and

preserve the margin of safety. Additionally, if this independent entity were a private
15

organization, it is unclear how the Congress would oversee this independent

organization’s activities.

• Make performance-based changes within FAA.16 If a performance-based organization

or a Chief Operating Officer position with set performance expectations were

established within FAA for air traffic control modernization, congressional oversight

would be preserved because the organization would remain under the Department’s

jurisdiction. However, like the proposed air traffic control corporation, the margin of

safety could suffer if there were ambiguity and lengthy conflict between the FAA

Administrator and the Chief Operating Officer. Also, while the congressionally

established National Civil Aviation Review Commission advocated a performancebased organization for the air traffic control system, the Commission noted that FAA

initiatives to quantify and measure the agency’s performance are in their infancy and

need to be expanded.

• Make FAA an independent government entity. Opponents of this proposal have noted

that the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 gave FAA final authority to

issue certain types of regulations and make other decisions, thus alleviating the need

to separate FAA from the Department of Transportation. They also note that

removing FAA from the Department would hamper efforts to develop and implement

an integrated national transportation system.

FAA Is at a Critical Crossroads for Resolving Outstanding Problems

With the projected growth in air travel, FAA has a limited window of opportunity for

correcting the critical deficiencies we and others have identified. While FAA has agreed

16 In its 1998 proposal for reauthorizing FAA, the administration proposed a separate performance-based

organization within FAA managed by a Chief Operating Officer. In1999, separate House and Senate FAA

reauthorization proposals included provisions to establish a Chief Operating Officer who would be

required to enter into an annual performance agreement with the FAA Administrator. In addition, the

proposals provide for the Chief Operating Officer to submit an annual performance report to the Secretary

of Transportation and the Congress. However, these proposals did not provide for a separate

performance-based organization. Reauthorization is still pending.
16

with recommendations made by us and others, its implementation has often gone awry

or proceeded too slowly. This raises a larger question: What should FAA do differently

to ensure that it implements its initiatives successfully and on time?

We believe that FAA should develop a systematic approach to completing its initiatives.

The framework for such an approach has been laid out in recent governmentwide

management reforms, such as the Government Performance and Results Act. As these

acts make clear, such a framework should include the establishment of baseline data,

clear priorities, time-sensitive strategies that respond to recommendations for

addressing root causes of existing problems, and an evaluation plan to measure progress.

While FAA has made a concerted effort to resolve outstanding problems, it has not done

so in the context of such a framework. Without this framework, FAA will not realize its

potential for accomplishing its mission, whatever its structure. Furthermore, the

Congress’ ability to monitor FAA’s progress will be impaired.

The Congress Needs to Continue Its Oversight of FAA

The Congress has put into place mechanisms to better ensure efficient and effective

government operations—the Government Performance and Results Act, the Chief

Financial Officers Act, and the Clinger-Cohen Act. Taken together, these laws provide a

framework for developing and fully integrating information about (1) FAA’s mission and

strategic priorities, (2) the results-oriented performance goals that flow from those

priorities, (3) the extent to which goals are being achieved, (4) the relationship of

technology and other investments to the achievement of goals, and (5) the reliability of

financial information on the costs of achieving mission results.

FAA, like other federal agencies, is responding to these directives. However, FAA’s

ability to successfully implement these directives is impeded by the problems we have

identified in modernization, procurement and personnel, safety, aviation and computer

security, and financial management.
17

Given the extent of these problems, we believe that continuing congressional oversight is

of paramount importance to ensure that FAA meets the challenges presented by the

exponential growth in air traffic projected for this decade.

Contacts and Acknowledgments

For future contacts regarding this testimony, please contact Gerald L. Dillingham at

(202) 512-2834. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included John C.

Fretwell, Belva M. Martin, Colleen M. Phillips, Yvonne C. Pufahl, John R. Schulze, and

Carol Herrnstadt Shulman.
18

Related GAO Products

Air Traffic Control Modernization

Air Traffic Control: FAA’s Modernization Investment Management Approach Could Be

Strengthened (GAO/RCED/AIMD-99-88, Apr. 30, 1999).

Air Traffic Control: Status of FAA’s Modernization Program (GAO/RCED-99-25, Dec. 3,

1998).

National Airspace System: FAA Has Implemented Some Free Flight Initiatives, but

Challenges Remain (GAO/RCED-98-246, Sept. 28, 1998).

Air Traffic Control: Immature Software Acquisition Processes Increase FAA System

Acquisition Risks (GAO/AIMD-97-47, Mar. 21, 1997).

Air Traffic Control: Complete and Enforced Architecture Needed for FAA Systems

Modernization (GAO/AIMD-97-30, Feb. 3, 1997).

Aviation Acquisition: A Comprehensive Strategy Is Needed for Cultural Change at FAA

(GAO/RCED-96-159, Aug. 22, 1996).

Aviation Safety

Aviation Safety: FAA’s New Inspection System Offers Promise, but Problems Need to Be

Addressed (GAO/RCED-99-183, June 28, 1999).

Aviation Safety: FAA Has Not Fully Implemented Weather-Related Recommendations

(GAO/RCED-98-130, June 2, 1998).
19

Aviation Safety: Weaknesses in Inspection and Enforcement Limit FAA in Identifying

and Responding to Risks (GAO/RCED-98-6, Feb. 27, 1998).

Aviation Safety: FAA Oversight of Repair Stations Needs Improvement (GAO/RCED-98-

21, Oct. 24, 1997).

Aviation Security

Computer Security: FAA Needs to Improve Controls Over Use of Foreign Nationals to

Remediate and Review Software (GAO/AIMD-00-55, Dec. 23, 1999).

Air Traffic Control: Weak Computer Security Practices Jeopardize Flight Safety

(GAO/AIMD-98-155, May 18, 1998).

Aviation Security: Implementation of Recommendations Is Under Way, but Completion

Will Take Several Years (GAO/RCED-98-102, Apr. 24, 1998).

Financial Management

Federal Aviation Administration: Financial Management Issues (GAO/T-AIMD-99-122,

Mar. 18, 1999).

High Risk Series: An Update (GAO/HR-99-1, Jan. 1999).

Financial Management: Federal Aviation Administration Lacked Accountability for

Major Assets (GAO/AIMD-98-62, Feb. 18, 1998).

Air Traffic Control: Improved Cost Information Needed to Make Billion-Dollar

Modernization Investment Decisions (GAO/AIMD-97-20, Jan. 22, 1997).
20

Other Related Products

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Transportation

(GAO/OGC-99-13, Jan. 1999).

Airport Development Needs: Estimating Future Costs (GAO/RCED-97-99, Apr. 7, 1997).

Airport Privatization: Issues Related to the Sale or Lease of U.S. Commercial Airports

(GAO/RCED-97-3, Nov. 7, 1996).

(348214)