GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to Congressional Committees

March 1999 FORCE STRUCTURE

Opportunities for the 

Army to Reduce Risk 

in Executing the 

Military Strategy

GAO/NSIAD-99-47

United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548 Letr

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

GAO

National Security and

International Affairs Division Letr

B-281688

March 15, 1999

The Honorable John Warner

Chairman

The Honorable Carl Levin

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Floyd D. Spence

Chairman

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The fiscal year 1996 National Defense Authorization Act requires us to 

annually assess, through 2001, the Army's plans to allocate its end strength 

to meet the force structure requirements of its combat and support forces.1

 

This is the third in a series of reports to respond to this congressional 

mandate.2

The Army's force structure requirements are based on the national military 

strategy to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major theater wars. In 

1996, the Army completed its biennial force structure review and 

concluded that it faced a moderate risk in carrying out the strategy because 

of significant shortfalls in support forces.3

 This report addresses the 

Army’s risks after completing its 1998 force structure review. To respond 

to the act's requirement, we (1) compared the Army’s 1996 and 1998 

reviews to determine if there were changes in the Army’s risk of not having 

sufficient forces to implement the national military strategy and (2) 

assessed the Army’s potential for mitigating risk by reallocating its existing 

end strength. To assess risk for the 1998 review, we considered factors that 

1

End strength is the total number of positions authorized annually by Congress. Force structure is the 

Army’s organization of its forces into units.

2Our two previous reports were Force Structure: Army Support Forces Can Meet Two-Conflict Strategy 

With Some Risk (GAO/NSIAD-97-66, Feb. 28, 1997) and Force Structure: Army's Efforts to Improve 

Efficiency of Institutional Forces Have Produced Few Results (GAO/NSIAD-98-65, Feb. 26, 1998).

3

Support forces deploy to sustain combat forces in wartime and include specialties such as chemical, 

engineering, quartermaster, and transportation.
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the Army used to measure risk in its 1996 review, including support force 

shortfalls, the number of support forces not expected to arrive on time, and 

challenges expected if a second war were to occur. We also assessed the 

Army’s underlying assumptions for determining its war-fighting 

requirements using available criteria such as the Quadrennial Defense 

Review (QDR).

Results in Brief The Army did not assess risk in its 1998 force structure review, but our 

analysis shows that the Army’s risk in implementing the national military 

strategy increased since its 1996 review. A comparison of both reviews 

shows that war-fighting requirements for two wars increased at the same 

time the Army’s forces decreased; support force shortfalls are higher; and 

the number of support forces arriving late has increased. Further, risk is 

higher in a second war because few active forces are planned to be 

deployed in the second war and support force shortfalls are higher in the 

second war.

The Army’s risk may be even higher than this comparative analysis 

indicates for two reasons. First, the Army’s 1998 force structure review 

was based on the following “best case” assumptions which are consistent 

with defense guidance—limited chemical use by the enemy; immediate 

access to ports and airfields; and immediate redeployment of forces 

involved in contingencies to a major theater war. In contrast, the (QDR) 

stated that U.S. forces should be prepared to encounter adverse conditions 

such as enemy use of chemical weapons. Second, support force shortfalls 

may be higher than Army data indicates because the Army’s analysis did 

not include all the QDR reductions in reserve component end strength. 

Finally, the 1998 analysis assumed that the National Guard will convert 

nonwar-fighting positions to war-fighting support forces. Shortfalls will be 

higher if the conversions do not occur as planned.

Although the risk of not having sufficient forces to implement the strategy 

has increased, the full extent of the increase is unknown since the Army did 

not perform all the analyses needed to assess and quantify its risks. 

According to defense guidance, Army components are encouraged to 

conduct analyses to explore the implications of different assumptions. 

Such analyses may assist the Army in identifying and reducing the risk 

involved in carrying out the strategy. The Army did perform sensitivity 

analyses in its 1996 review that concluded additional support forces would 

be needed if these “best case” assumptions did not occur.
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The Army has several options to mitigate its risks. The Army’s end strength 

exceeds its war-fighting requirements, yet the Army has allocated 

significant end strength to nonwar-fighting missions. One option to 

mitigate risk is its plan to convert nonwar-fighting positions in two National 

Guard divisions to war-fighting support forces. This would reduce 

shortfalls if implemented as planned. Another option is to analyze the 

extent to which nonwar-fighting missions may be performed by civilians or 

contractors rather than by military personnel. If the Army used civilians or 

contractors to perform more nonwar-fighting missions, it could then 

allocate a larger proportion of military positions to meet war-fighting 

support requirements. Lastly, if the Army had more current data on the 

type and availability of host nation support, it could use such resources to 

reduce shortfalls. 

Background The 1993 Bottom-Up Review and the 1997 QDR require that U.S. forces be 

able to fight and win two nearly simultaneous theater wars. The QDR also 

determined that this strategy could be implemented with a smaller force at 

an acceptable level of risk and, for the Army, recommended reductions of 

60,000 military positions. Accordingly, the Army plans to eliminate 35,000 

positions by fiscal year 2000: 15,000 active, 17,000 National Guard, and 

3,000 Army Reserve positions. These reductions will bring the Army's end 

strength to 1,035,000. The remaining 25,000 reductions will be allocated to 

the National Guard and Army Reserve as part of the Army’s next force 

structure review, Total Army Analysis (TAA) 2007, which will be completed 

in November 1999. 

The Army performs TAA every 2 years to determine the number and types 

of support forces needed by combat forces and to allocate end strength to 

these requirements. The TAA process focuses on support forces because 

combat forces are defined in defense guidance and allocated 100 percent of 

their end strength requirements.4

 The combat and support force structure 

is projected to be maintained within the resources available in the 

Department of Defense's (DOD) Future Years Defense Plan. The TAA force 

structure drives development of the Army’s Program Objective 

Memorandum (POM), which is the Army's input into the Future Years 

Defense Plan. 

4The combat force is defined in defense and Army guidance and consists of 10 active Army divisions, 2 active 

cavalry regiments, and 15 National Guard enhanced brigades.
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In its TAA, the Army uses a series of models to simulate the two nearly 

simultaneous major theater wars described in the national military strategy. 

The defense guidance describes the various phases of the campaign, 

including the buildup of support forces, launching the counteroffensive, 

and post-hostility stability. The models also include assumptions about 

campaign conditions (see app. I). The Army models project support force 

requirements based on the simulated campaigns and the defined combat 

force. The Army then matches existing force structure units to the 

requirements until the inventory is exhausted. Shortfalls occur when the 

requirements exceed the available inventory. The Army calls these 

shortfalls unresourced requirements.

According to defense guidance, Army components are encouraged to 

conduct analyses to explore the implications of different assumptions. 

Such analyses may assist the Army in identifying and reducing the risk 

involved in carrying out the strategy. The Army made the following "best 

case" assumptions which are consistent with defense guidance—limited 

chemical use by the enemy; immediate access to ports and airfields; and 

immediate redeployment of forces involved in contingencies to a major 

theater war. In its 1996 force structure review, the Army performed various 

analyses that identified the effects on support force requirements if these 

assumptions changed.

The Army completed its most recent TAA (TAA 2005) in March 1998 and 

projected total combat and support war-fighting requirements of 747,000 

positions through fiscal year 2005 for a two-war scenario. The Army 

initially projected support force shortfalls of 91,300 positions but reduced 

them to 72,500 because it plans to convert almost 19,000 nonwar-fighting 

positions in National Guard divisions by 2005 to meet war-fighting support 

requirements. The Army plans to convert an additional 26,000 

nonwar-fighting positions in National Guard divisions by the end of fiscal 

year 2009, for a total of 45,000 converted positions.

The Army's Risk Has 

Increased

The Army's risk in its ability to implement the national military strategy has 

increased since its force structure review in 1996, when the Army assessed 

its risk as moderate. Risk increased for the following reasons: 

• Army war-fighting requirements increased at the same time that the 

QDR planned significant force reductions. 
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• Army requirements would have been even higher had the Army included 

requirements for all campaign phases and accounted for adverse 

conditions such as enemy use of chemical weapons.

• Army support force shortfalls have increased since the 1996 review and 

may increase further if the conversion of National Guard 

nonwar-fighting positions to war-fighting support positions does not 

take place as planned.

• The number of support forces arriving late in the first 30 days of the first 

war has increased since the 1996 review.

Further, risk is higher in a second nearly simultaneous war because fewer 

active forces are planned to be deployed in the second war and support 

force shortfalls are higher in the second theater. 

Despite these indicators, the full extent of the Army's risk is not known 

because the Army has not performed all the analyses needed to assess and 

quantify risk. A risk assessment should include analyses of adverse 

conditions to determine their effect on requirements and analyses of 

effects on war-fight timelines under more severe conditions than those 

identified in defense guidance. 

Requirements Increased as 

the Force Decreased

The Army's war-fighting requirements increased by 75,000 positions from 

672,000 in the 1996 analysis (TAA 2003) to 747,000 in TAA 2005. At the 

same time, the Army began implementing QDR reductions, which 

decreased its end strength by 35,000. The growth in requirements is mostly 

attributable to defense guidance changes and increases in the Army’s 

requirements to support other services. For TAA 2005, defense guidance 

directed the Army to include all the National Guard enhanced brigades, 

which added about 40,000 combat positions. In addition, Army 

requirements to support other services increased by about 25,000 positions, 

including 13,000 positions to provide chemical decontamination for the 

Navy and the Air Force. In response to theater commander plans and 

defense guidance, the Army included four corps5

 in TAA 2005 compared 

with three in TAA 2003. Although some support decreased,6

 the net change 

5Some support forces are assigned to a corps that provides nondivisional support for two to five 

divisions. Each theater is assigned two corps.

6

Support requirements for medical, equipment use, and some classes of supply decreased but, overall, 

support requirements increased. 
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from TAA 2003 to TAA 2005 was an increase in combat and support 

requirements of 75,000 positions as shown in table 1. 

Table 1: Army War-Fighting Requirements

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

In fiscal year 1998, the Army's congressionally authorized end strength was 

1,070,000 and consisted of 495,000 active, 367,000 National Guard, and 

208,000 Army Reserve. In TAA 2005, the Army assumed an active end 

strength reduction of 15,000 and a decrease in reserve component end 

strength of 20,000 by fiscal year 2000. Assuming Congress authorized an 

end strength consistent with the QDR recommendations to reduce Army 

end strength by a total of 60,000 positions, the Army will need to allocate an 

additional 25,000 reduction to the reserve components. 

The QDR asserted that the Army would be able to implement these 

reductions because of more efficient support through the redesign of its 

heavy divisions and implementing "just in time" logistics. But until Army 

doctrine is revised and TAA models are updated to reflect the new concept 

of operations, no estimate can be made of future support force efficiencies. 

TAA 2005 modeling did not include redesigned divisions or corps as 

envisioned in Force XXI,7

 even though two divisions and one corps will be 

redesigned by 2005. The two digitized active divisions will save only about 

2,500 active combat positions, but the active force will be reduced by 

15,000 positions by the end of fiscal year 1999. According to an Army 

official, the full effect of digitization on Army force structure may not be 

known until TAA 2011, since the Army will be in various stages of transition 

until then. 

 TAA 2003 TAA 2005 Increase

Combat 199,031 240,006 40,975

Support 440,850 449,723 8,873

Support to other services 32,119 57,447 25,328

Total 672,000 747,176 75,176

7

Force XXI is the Army’s reorganization of its divisions to incorporate new operational and 

organizational concepts.
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TAA Assumptions Limited 

Support Force 

Requirements

War-fighting support force requirements would have been higher had the 

Army included all the campaign phases of both theaters and accounted for 

adverse conditions. For example, the Army did not calculate or include 

additional support forces that would be required if opponents use chemical 

weapons. Also, the Army did not assess the effects on support force 

requirements of U.S. forces being denied immediate access to ports and 

airfields. Finally, the Army assumed that forces deployed in ongoing 

contingency operations would be available immediately for redeployment 

to a major theater war and did not assess the effects on support force 

requirements if this were not the case. 

The Army Did Not Include

Requirements for Two Campaign 

Phases

During TAA 2005, the Army modeled requirements for only three of five 

campaign phases. Army officials stated that defense guidance does not 

clearly require the Army to identify requirements for the last two campaign 

phases. Army officials believe the defense guidance is very vague on the 

fifth phase and that the extent of the Army’s role and involvement in this 

phase is unclear. The Army therefore never attempted to identify 

requirements for the final phase. The Army did calculate 14,000 support 

force requirements for the fourth phase but, consistent with its 

interpretation of the guidance, did not include them in the total 

requirement for 747,000 war-fighting positions. By not incorporating 

requirements for all five campaign phases for both theaters, the Army does 

not know its total requirements and cannot fully assess its risks in 

implementing the strategy. 

Theater commanders, on the other hand, develop war-plans for the entire 

campaign. We found that one theater commander had identified 

requirements for nearly 30,000 additional support positions needed in the 

last two phases. Most of these spaces were for the engineering, field 

artillery, medical, and transportation specialties. 

The Army Did Not Include

Requirements for a Chemical 

Environment

Support force requirements would also have been higher had the Army 

included the additional forces required in a chemical environment. 

However, TAA 2005 assumed enemy forces would employ only limited use 

of chemical weapons in both theaters and thus did not increase 

war-fighting requirements. The Army later modeled more intense chemical 

use in one theater but did not identify or include additional support 

requirements in TAA 2005 results. According to Army officials, the 

chemical analysis was not completed until after the TAA requirements 

phase, and the Army did not accomplish all of the study goals. The Army 
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did not complete this analysis sooner because it redirected its resources 

toward performing QDR analyses. 

Even though the Army followed defense guidance, the QDR stated that U.S. 

forces must plan to fight and win theater wars in which adversaries use 

chemical or biological weapons because this is a likely condition of future 

warfare. The QDR also stressed the importance of increased investment in 

capabilities to prevent and defend against the use of chemical and 

biological weapons. 

The Army Did Not Include 

Requirements Needed if U.S. 

Forces Are Denied Immediate 

Access to Ports and Airfields

In TAA 2005, the Army assumed that U.S. forces would have immediate and 

unobstructed access to ports and airfields in both theaters. The Army did 

not identify the effects on support force requirements if access were 

denied, although it initially planned to do so. Army officials said they did 

not have time to perform this analysis. As a result, TAA 2005 requirements 

do not include forces that may be needed if the U.S. does not have access 

to primary ports and airfields. 

In TAA 2003, the Army did assess the effects on support force requirements 

if U.S. forces were denied immediate access to primary ports and airfields 

in a one theater war. The results showed a requirement for additional 

positions above that needed for two nearly simultaneous wars. Ninety 

percent of the increase was in the transportation and quartermaster 

specialties. 

Officials at one theater command stated that their current war-plans are 

consistent with defense guidance—the plans assume immediate access to 

primary ports and airfields. However, the officials recognized there could 

be significant effects if U.S. forces are denied access. In a 1997 memo, the 

theater commander stated that the use of weapons of mass destruction 

against airports or seaports would delay the buildup of forces and would 

severely impede the ability to blunt an initial attack. As a result, the 

command is planning analyses to identify the impact of such events on U.S. 

forces. 

Army Assumed Forces Can Be

Redeployed Immediately From

Contingency Operations

In TAA 2005, the Army initially planned to analyze the effects that 

redeploying forces from a contingency operation to a major theater war 

would have on requirements, but, according to officials, the Army did not 

complete this analysis because it redirected its efforts to support the QDR. 

The assumption that forces involved in contingency operations can be 

immediately redeployed to a major theater war is consistent with defense 

guidance. However, we reported in 1997 that this assumption is risky 
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because the critical support forces needed in the early stages of a major 

theater war are needed to facilitate the redeployment of military forces 

from the contingency operation.8

 DOD agreed that the assumption used in 

TAA 2003 that made all units involved in contingencies immediately 

available for war-fighting is “flawed and overly optimistic.” One Army 

study on strategic risks assumed that 20,000 Army active component 

resources would be committed to one or more contingency operations and 

would not be available to participate in the two-war scenario.

The Army does not know how many additional support forces would be 

required to extract forces from a contingency operation and redeploy them 

to a major theater war or how such a redeployment would affect 

war-fighting timelines, according to Army and theater command officials. 

The European Command Deputy for Operations has estimated that it 

would take 90 days to disengage forces from Bosnia and redeploy them to a 

major theater war. Further, the President's 1998 National Security Strategy 

for a New Century and defense guidance state that U.S. forces must be 

prepared to withdraw from contingency operations to deploy to a major 

theater war. 

Support Force Shortfalls 

Increased but May Be 

Understated

The Army's estimate of its support force shortfalls9 increased by 14,000 to 

72,500 positions since TAA 2003 but may still be understated. The Army 

has accepted most of its risk in three support specialties—transportation, 

quartermaster, and chemical—which account for 75 percent of the 

shortfalls.10 For example, TAA 2005 includes a requirement for nearly 

13,000 spaces for the Army to provide chemical support to other services. 

This resulted in a requirement for 110 chemical decontamination 

companies, but the Army allocated end strength to only 36 of these units. 

Therefore, the Army's overall chemical support requirement is significantly 

under resourced, with only about 12,300 of 23,600 required positions 

allocated end strength during TAA 2005. 

8

Force Structure: Army Support Forces Can Meet Two-Conflict Strategy With Some Risks

(GAO/NSIAD-97-66, Feb. 28, 1997).

9Shortfall refers to units that are not allocated any end strength and exist only on paper.

10Appendix II shows the number of positions the Army requires in each specialty in a two-war scenario 

and the end strength allocated to each speciality. 
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TAA 2005 support force shortfalls of 72,500 positions may be understated 

for two reasons. The Army had initially estimated shortfalls of 91,300 but 

then reduced the estimate because it plans to convert 19,000 

nonwar-fighting positions in National Guard divisions to war-fighting 

support positions. However, similar conversion plans that were part of 

TAA 2003 (66,400 active and reserve positions were supposed to be 

converted to higher priority support units) were never implemented. Army 

officials said the conversions did not take place because the National 

Guard announced it would convert combat positions to support positions. 

If the conversions planned in TAA 2005 are delayed, shortfalls will increase. 

Second, the Army allocated end strength as of 2000, not 2005 when the 

Army expects it will have completed the QDR reductions. By not including 

the remaining 25,000 reductions in TAA 2005, the Army has allocated 25,000 

more positions than DOD plans to request in congressional end strength 

authorizations for fiscal year 2005. Implementing these reductions will 

increase support shortfalls if the cuts are allocated to the National Guard 

and Army Reserve war-fighting support force structure. In contrast, 

allocating the reductions to the reserve components' 228,000 position 

nonwar-fighting structure will not increase war-fighting support force 

shortfalls. If Congress chose not to reduce reserve force levels further, the 

Army would not necessarily have more support forces because it would 

still have to convert nonwar-fighting positions to war-fighting support 

positions. 

The Army relies heavily on reserve components for support force structure. 

As table 2 shows, over 70 percent of the resourced war-fighting support 

force requirement is met with reserve end strength allocations in the civil 

affairs, public affairs, quartermaster, transportation, chemical, ordnance, 

and engineering specialities. 
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Table 2: Support Specialties Predominately in the Reserve Components

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

Support Forces Required in 

the First 30 Days Arrive 

Late, Increasing Risk

Defense and Army guidance stipulate that support units needed in the first 

30 days of the first theater war should be predominately active forces. 

Army officials stated that they do not expect most reserve component units 

to be able to begin moving to the theater until about 30 days after they are 

mobilized because of the time needed to call up, train, and begin moving 

forces. The Army estimated in TAA 2005 that over 105,000 support forces 

would not arrive in the first 30 days as required. This estimate is higher 

than the 79,000 support forces that TAA 2003 estimated would arrive late. 

Furthermore, the requirements for several support specialties will probably 

not be met within the first 30 days because significant portions of these 

forces are in the reserve components. For example, about 71 percent of 

engineering forces, 58 percent of ordnance forces, 57 percent of 

quartermaster forces, and 54 percent of the transportation forces needed in 

the first 30 days are in the reserve components. 

We compared one theater commander's requirements to execute the first 

30 days of the campaign, against the Army's TAA requirements for the same 

theater. The theater commander's requirements for the first 30 days were 

less than the TAA requirements and were met mostly with active forces. 

The commander’s support force requirements were about 37,500 positions, 

of which 80 percent were active Army. In contrast, the TAA 2005 

requirements for this theater, were about 177,000 positions of which only 

about 40 percent were active Army. Whereas TAA uses the doctrinally 

correct force flow—the number, mix, and sequencing of forces needed to 

support combat forces—the theater commander may stagger the flow of 

forces and plan to have some support forces arrive after the first 30 days. 

Active component Reserve components

Specialty

End strength

allocation Percent

End strength

allocation Percent

Civil Affairs 131 2.49 5,139 97.51

Public Affairs 108 7.61 1,312 92.39

Quartermaster 6,757 16.79 33,482 83.21

Transportation 12,206 20.91 46,173 79.09

Chemical 3,356 27.25 8,961 72.75

Ordnance 12,186 27.96 31,405 72.04

Engineering 20,764 28.90 51,077 71.10
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Theater command officials stated that, given limitations in lift, the priority 

in the first 30 days is to move combat forces into the theater. However, 

both the TAA models and the theater commander's plans achieve 

sufficiency of support forces at about the same time. 

Risks in the Second Theater 

Are Higher

Risks in implementing the national military strategy are higher in the 

second of two theaters because shortfalls are higher and the proportion of 

active support forces is significantly less in the second theater. TAA 2005 

showed that support shortfalls are 11,500 spaces higher in the second 

theater than the first. Also, active forces comprise only 15 percent of the 

total required support forces in the second theater compared with 

36 percent in the first. Fewer active forces in the second theater increases 

risk if the mobilization of reserve forces is delayed or if the second war 

occurs with little warning time. The significance of the second theater was 

highlighted by the QDR, which asserted that maintaining forces capable of 

winning two nearly simultaneous wars is essential to the credibility of the 

overall national security strategy. The QDR also stated that a one theater 

war capacity would undermine the deterrence and credibility of U.S. 

commitments. 

Another indication that risk in the second theater is higher came from one 

theater commander who estimated higher shortfalls if his forces are 

involved in the second of two wars. The theater commander stated that if 

his theater was second, he was concerned about the lack of support forces 

to sustain the fight and delays in execution that may be caused by support 

force shortfalls. 

Full Extent of Army's Risk 

Is Not Known

The Army does not know the full extent of its risks in implementing the 

national military strategy because it did not perform a risk assessment in 

TAA 2005. Even though TAA 2005 used assumptions that were generally 

consistent with defense guidance, the guidance also encourages analyses 

to identify risks under conditions different from these best case 

assumptions. In TAA 2003, the Army performed sensitivity analyses that 

concluded additional support forces would be needed if (1) an adversary 

used chemical weapons, (2) access to ports and airfields was denied, and 

(3) forces deployed in a contingency operation were not immediately 

available. Officials at one theater command stated they routinely perform 

analyses to identify the effects of worst case conditions. The Army planned 

to perform some of these sensitivity analyses in TAA 2005 but, according to 

Army officials, did not do so because resources were shifted to support 
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QDR analyses. As a result, the Army does not know the full extent of its 

risk. We believe sensitivity analyses are essential in assessing risk. 

Without them, the Army cannot specify the additional support forces 

required under adverse conditions.

For example, in TAA 2005, the Army did not run the transportation, 

campaign, and support models with the resourced force11 to determine the 

impact of support force shortages on war-fighting timelines. The Army did 

run the transportation and support models with the TAA 2005 required 

forces and, according to Army officials, determined that there was no 

significant change in combat and support unit arrival dates and therefore, 

the Army did not re-run the campaign models. While this "relook" analysis 

is a positive change from TAA 2003, re-running the transportation model 

using the required force does not assess the effects on war-fighting 

timelines or identify risks resulting from support force shortfalls that could 

be assessed if the Army re-ran the campaign models with the resourced 

force. As many as 72,500 support force positions are unresourced with 

many shortages falling in specialities such as transportation, quartermaster, 

and chemical. Re-running the models with the resourced force would 

identify any effects on war-fighting timelines because the models' transition 

to counteroffensive is based on the level of support forces in the theater. 

Also, re-running the campaign models with the resourced force would 

enable the Army to better assess risks of shortages in specific specialties 

such as transportation, quartermaster, and chemical.

Army officials stated that the objective of TAA modeling is to identify the 

required forces. While the Army has modeled deployments with the 

resourced force on special requests from the theater commanders, it has 

not included such analyses in TAA. Army officials agreed, however, that 

re-running TAA models with the resourced force would improve the Army's 

ability to assess risk. 

Options to Mitigate 

Risk

The Army has several opportunities to mitigate its risks in executing the 

national military strategy. The Army's total end strength exceeds its 

requirements to fight two wars, but the Army has allocated 417,000 end 

strength positions to force structure that does not have a war-fighting 

mission, such as for institutional or unique positions. In TAA 2005, the 

11The resourced force is that portion of the required force for which the Army allocated end strength.
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Army did not determine whether the military end strength allocated to 

institutional or unique force structure was essential. If this structure could 

be filled with civilians or contractors, then more military end strength 

would be available to meet war-fighting requirements. The Army could also 

reduce shortfalls by converting military positions that do not have a warfighting mission to war-fighting support positions. If implemented, the 

Army’s National Guard Division Redesign Program will convert 45,000 

positions in two National Guard divisions to war-fighting support positions 

by 2009. But, the conversion program is not effectively managed. Finally, 

the Army could consider support from host nations to help meet its warfighting requirements, but theater commanders will need to provide more 

current data on how much support will be available and when. 

Significant Portion of End 

Strength Does Not Have 

War-Fighting Mission

The Army's congressionally authorized end strength exceeds war-fighting 

requirements, yet the Army still has support force shortfalls because a 

significant portion of its end strength is allocated to nonwar-fighting 

missions. In TAA 2005, the Army projected its end strength in fiscal 

year 2000 would total 1,035,000, which exceeds the war-fighting 

requirement of 747,000. For purposes of TAA, the Army actually allocated 

1,073,000 spaces, which includes additional spaces for the National Guard. 

But the Army has allocated about 417,000 end strength spaces to 

nonwar-fighting structure, leaving 656,000 spaces to allocate to war-fighting 

requirements. The nonwar-fighting structure includes institutional 

positions, National Guard divisions, trainees, transients, holdees, students, 

uniques, and uncommitted forces (see table 3). As a result, the Army 

initially projected 91,300 unresourced positions before accounting for the 

National Guard conversions. Table 4 shows how the Army allocated end 

strength in TAA 2005. 
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Table 3: End Strength Allocated to Nonwar-Fighting Force Structure

aThe Institutional force is generally nondeployable and supports Army infrastructure activities such as 

training, doctrine development, base operations, supply, and maintenance. 

bTTHS = trainees, transients, holdees, and students. TTHS make up the portion of the active force in 

temporary status. 

c

The uncommitted force structure, consisting primarily of engineering units, is not required for 

war-fighting. 

dForce structure that did not match war-fighting requirements but that the Army has retained to meet 

nonwar-fighting needs such as joint, DOD, and alliance commitments.

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

Nonwar-fighting force 

structure Active

National

Guard

Army

Reserve Total Army

Institutionala 115,000 36,000 63,000 214,000

TTHSb 61,000 0 0 61,000

Guard divisions 

(strategic reserve) 0 112,517 0 112,517

 Subtotal 176,000 148,517 63,000 387,517

Uncommittedc 0 2,719 0 2,719

Uniquesd 12,932 10,853 3,103 26,888

Total 188,932 162,089 66,103 417,124
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Table 4: Army Force Structure Allocations 

aThe Army assumed end strengths as of fiscal year 2000. However, in the case of the National Guard, 

the Army allocated 388,000 force structure Guard spaces rather than the 350,000 assumed end 

strength.

bThe Army has units that are under resourced, i.e., the units are not allocated all required positions. 

However, when mobilization occurs, the Army fills these vacancies using the Individual Ready 

Reserves or recruits. 

c

These shortfalls should be reduced by converting positions in two National Guard divisions to warfighting support positions.

Source: GAO analysis of Army data. 

Army Process for Allocating End 

Strength Is Not Consistent With 

Defense Guidance

The Army's process for allocating 417,000 spaces to nonwar-fighting 

functions is not consistent with defense guidance. Defense guidance states 

that the services should reduce forces not required to support missions 

envisioned by the national military strategy and minimize the number of 

military personnel assigned to support organizations. The guidance further 

states that positions that do not meet military essential requirements will 

be eliminated or converted to civilian positions. The QDR also addressed 

this topic, stating that DOD should improve the efficiency of support 

activities and consider nonwar-fighting support functions as candidates for 

outsourcing. 

Army officials stated they did not assess, as part of the TAA 2005 process, 

whether civilians or contractors could perform the functions of 

institutional or unique military forces. Army institutional functions in 

particular have received increasing scrutiny in recent years because the 

Army has been unable to support requirements based on workload and 

ensure that these functions are carried out in the most efficient and 

cost-effective manner. As shown in table 3, 214,000 military positions are 

Active

National

Guard

Army

Reserve Total

End strength (as of fiscal 

year 2000) 480,000 388,000a 205,000 1,073,000

Minus nonwar-fighting force 

structure 188,932 162,089 66,103 417,124

Force structure available for 

war-fighting requirements 291,068 225,911 138,897 655,876

Minus war-fighting requirements 747,176

Initial support force shortfallsb 91,300c

Minus National Guard 

conversions by 2005 18,846

Remaining shortfalls 72,454
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allocated to institutional functions. A previous GAO report found that the 

Army's efforts to establish workload-based requirements and redesign 

institutional functions had not been very successful.12

If the Army reduced the number of military institutional forces, then more 

would be available to meet war-fighting requirements. The Force XXI 

Institutional Army Redesign Pamphlet 100-1, published in March 1998, 

acknowledged the potential benefits of reducing military forces that 

perform institutional functions. The pamphlet states that many of the 

services currently being performed at all levels of the institutional force, 

"support military missions, but, are not uniquely military in nature." It 

states that privatization on an Army-wide basis, if done with proper 

analysis, could achieve the objective of greater cost savings for more 

efficient operations. 

Army Could Reduce Allocation 

of Military Positions to

Nonwar-Fighting Unique 

Structure

According to Army officials, there were nearly 27,000 unique force 

structure positions left after TAA 2005 matched the existing structure with 

war-fighting requirements (excluding the strategic reserve). The officials 

stated that much of the 27,000 unique structure is required to meet joint, 

DOD, and alliance commitments. However, they acknowledged that they 

have not assessed this structure to determine whether unique positions 

require military personnel or could be filled by civilians or contractors. 

The Army could reduce unfilled war-fighting support requirements by 

allocating unique force structure to war-fighting missions. Some of the 

unique structure is in the same specialty as unfilled war-fighting 

requirements, although it does not provide the same capability. For 

example, unique structure in the transportation specialty contains 

minimum equipment, and its units contract for port services. In contrast, 

some of the unresourced transportation requirements are for units with 

heavy equipment such as cranes and forklifts. The Army has not identified 

the additional training or equipment modifications that would be needed in 

order to convert these units to fill war-fighting requirements. Table 5 

shows Army unique force structure by component.

12Force Structure: Army's Efforts to Improve Efficiency of Institutional Forces Have Produced Few 

Results (GAO/NSIAD-98-65, Feb. 26, 1998).
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Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

Table 5: Army Unique Force Structure

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

Potential Exists to Apply 

Nonwar-Fighting National Guard 

Division Assets to Meet 

War-Fighting Support 

Requirements

The Army may be able to reduce its support shortfalls and thus its risk by 

using resources in the National Guard divisions to meet war-fighting 

requirements. In 1997, we recommended that the Army determine whether 

war-fighting support missions could be assigned to the National Guard 

division force structure.13 As a result, in TAA 2005 the Army assigned 

war-fighting missions to a few units in National Guard divisions that did not 

previously have a war-fight mission. These units—totaling about 3,600 

spaces—consist of two National Guard division aviation companies, one 

attack helicopter battalion, seven chemical companies, and three field 

artillery battalions.

In addition, the National Guard gave us a list of about 21,800 Guard division 

spaces that are currently on theater commanders' deployment rosters. 

These represent the theater commanders' assessment of the units needed 

for war-fighting. We compared this list to the TAA 2005 unresourced 

requirements and found over 1,800 spaces in 11 aviation units that closely 

or exactly matched the 2,400 space aviation war-fighting shortfall. This 

illustrates the potential for the Army to further reduce its unresourced 

requirements by assigning war-fighting missions to units in National Guard 

divisions.

National Guard Conversions 

Can Reduce Support 

Shortages, but Program Is 

Not Effectively Managed

As part of the National Guard Division Redesign program the Army plans to 

convert about 45,000 positions in two Guard divisions from nonwar-fighting 

missions to war-fighting support between 2000 and 2009. If the program is 

successful, it will halve the TAA 2005 support force shortfall from 91,300 to 

Force structure Unique spaces Percentage of total

Active 12,932 48.1

National Guard 10,853 40.4

Army Reserve 3,103 11.5

Total 26,888 100.0

13Force Structure: Army Support Forces Can Meet Two-Conflict Strategy With Some Risks

(GAO/NSIAD-97-66, Feb. 28, 1997).
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Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

46,300 spaces by the end of fiscal year 2009.14 Even though about 

68 percent of the spaces will convert to specialties with the largest number 

of unresourced requirements—transportation, quartermaster, and 

chemical--only 25 percent are planned to convert by 2003. Further, the 

program's success will depend on buying new equipment according to 

Army officials. In 1997, the Army estimated the program to cost about 

$5 billion, which does not include costs to upgrade facilities. However, 

only $1.9 billion are programmed in the Army's fiscal year 2000-05 POM, 

most of it (66 percent) is programmed for fiscal years 2004-05. Army 

officials stated that they have not updated the program's costs since 1997 

when they prepared the 1999-2003 POM, and do not have a current estimate 

of how much money will be needed to convert all 45,000 positions.

Most Spaces to Convert After 

2003

About 75 percent (almost 34,000) of the conversions are planned to take 

place in 2004 or later. Table 6 shows near-term and long-term planned 

conversions by support specialty.

14In 1996, we reported that the National Guard combat divisions were not needed for the two-war 

strategy and recommended that some be converted to support roles or eliminated if the forces 

exceeded validated requirements.
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Table 6: Planned National Guard Conversions

aAccording to Army officials, the conversions planned for fiscal years 2006-09 may change as a result 

of subsequent TAAs and POM programming decisions. 

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

The Army's fiscal year 2000-05 POM shows the planned conversion of 

18,846 spaces from six brigades. However, as of December 1998, the Army 

had identified only three of the six brigades and only about half the spaces 

it budgeted to convert in the POM. Army officials stated that the next three 

brigades may be identified in February 1999.

The Army Did Not Convert 

66,000 Positions as Planned in 

TAA 2003

Prior Army efforts to reduce support force shortfalls have not been 

implemented as planned. In February 1997, when we reported on the 

results of TAA 2003, the Army had two major plans to significantly reduce 

unresourced requirements. The first was to shift 66,000 active and reserve 

positions from support units excess to the war-fight to higher priority 

support units. Converting these positions was estimated to cost 

$2.6 billion. The second plan was to convert 42,700 positions in National 

Guard divisions from combat to support. This plan was estimated to cost 

an additional $2.8 billion. In total, both plans would eliminate 108,700 

unresourced requirements and cost $5.4 billion. We also reported in 

January 1997 that procurement for converting the 66,000 spaces was to be 

fully funded before any of the National Guard redesign would be 

undertaken. However, Army officials stated that none of the 66,000 spaces 

have been converted and that the Army currently plans to implement only 

Specialty

Fiscal years

2000-03

Fiscal years

2004-09a Total

Air Defense 406 4,488 4,894

Army-level headquarters 32 0 32

Aviation 0 1,448 1,448

Chemical 720 3,021 3,741

Engineer 92 1,008 1,100

Field Artillery 0 1,305 1,305

Military Police 647 0 647

Ordnance 965 1,330 2,295

Quartermaster 3,628 8,810 12,438

Signal 624 2,131 2,755

Transportation 4,196 10,113 14,309

Total 11,310 33,654 44,964
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Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

the National Guard division redesign. Table 7 shows the changes in the 

Army's plans.

Table 7: Changes in Army Plans to Reduce Support Shortfalls

aTotal cost unknown. This amount does not include all equipment, training, and facilities costs 

expected during fiscal years 2006 through 2009.

Source: GAO analysis of Army data. 

Total Cost for National Guard

Redesign Program Is Unknown

The total program cost is unknown because the Army's fiscal year 2000-05 

POM did not include an estimate for facilities costs, and Army officials said 

that procurement costs for fiscal years 2006-09 have not been updated. 

However, the Secretary of the Army in August 1997 wrote that the Army 

was committed to the conversions and that meeting this objective would 

require about $586 million per year through 2007 to buy equipment. If 

funding is provided at this level, procurement costs would add $1.17 billion 

to the $1.9 billion programmed in the POM. However, Army officials stated 

that the costs for the years beyond the POM can change depending on how 

the composition of unresourced requirements is changed by subsequent 

TAAs and which brigades are identified for conversion. For example, 

converting a unit to aviation (combat support) is much more expensive 

than converting a unit to quartermaster. 

Although the largest cost is for equipment procurement, the conversions 

will also require funding for training and facilities. But the Army's most 

recent POM did not include any funding for facilities. Military construction 

to upgrade facilities will be needed to support the change in units. For 

example, Army officials stated that an armor unit may not have the 

facilities or infrastructure needed to support an aviation or truck company. 

The National Guard has estimated that facilities costs for converting the 

first 3 brigades would total $130 million and that facilities costs for all 

12 brigades could be as high as $590 million. However, National Guard 

officials cautioned that, because only the first three brigades have been 

identified, facilities cost estimates for the remaining nine brigades are very 

Plan as of TAA 

2003

Plan as of TAA 

2005 Difference

Spaces to convert 108,700 45,000 63,700

Conversion cost $5.4 billion $1.9 billion through fiscal 

year 2005a $3.5 billion

Conversion timeline 1998-2012 

(15 years)

2000-2009 (10 years) 5 years
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Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

preliminary. Estimates can change depending on units selected and the 

type of units to which they are converting.

The POM shows a total training cost estimate of $85.5 million, of which 

$76.7 million has been programmed. The Army estimates that training 

costs for fiscal years 2006-09 will total $214 million, which means that the 

POM only funds 26 percent of the total estimated training cost. 

Redesign Program Not

Effectively Managed

It is difficult for the Army to monitor the program's progress because no 

office provides consolidated, periodic reporting on the program's status. 

For example, Army officials agreed that no office is responsible for 

monitoring or reporting periodically on all program costs, including for 

equipment, training, and facilities expected between 2000-09; unfunded 

requirements; comparisons between planned converted units and 

unresourced requirements to show whether the most critical shortfalls are 

being addressed first; risk assessments if conversions are delayed; and 

comparisons between actual conversions and conversion plans to assess 

progress. 

The only current program oversight is provided by a Process Action Team, 

which has been tasked with identifying total resource requirements 

through 2009.15 The Secretary of the Army approved the redesign program 

in May 1996, yet the team has only met three times since then and has not 

yet identified the total resource requirements. According to Army 

documents, the team agreed that it would be prudent to give visibility to the 

total program costs to avoid giving the impression that the POM will cover 

all the costs. However, because there is no separate budget line item or 

project code for the program, the program's costs can not be identified in 

the POM, according to Army officials.

Further, fragmentation of program oversight among the many different 

offices that have representatives on the team creates ambiguity concerning 

who is responsible for program implementation issues such as ensuring 

that the most urgent conversions take place first. For example, only 

8 percent of the total program spaces are in the chemical specialty, even 

though 48 percent of the chemical war-fighting requirement is unresourced.

15An Army Headquarters office chairs the team, which consists of 32 members representing 10 different offices.
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Host Nations Can Provide 

Some Support, Potentially 

Reducing Army Shortfalls 

Both Army and theater command officials agree that host nations can 

provide some types of war-fighting support, potentially helping to reduce 

Army support force shortfalls. According to Army guidance, the Army 

should consider the availability of host nation support to reduce unmet 

requirements. However, Army officials told us that theater commanders 

had not provided updated host nation support data for use in TAA 2005 

because agreements were still being negotiated. As a result, the Army only 

matched 1,300 spaces of host nation support against its war-fighting 

requirements, although Army "best estimates" suggest as many as 30,000 

spaces of host nation support could potentially be available in the two 

theaters. 

According to Army officials, since the end of the Cold War, theater 

commanders have found it difficult to determine how much host nation 

support would be available in their theaters and when. For example, the 

Secretary of Defense has repeatedly told Congress that at least one theater 

commander has had significant problems with the host nation support 

program because the command has few assurances that host nation 

support will be available when or where it is needed. The theater 

commander has begun to review host nation capabilities, but command 

officials told us that validating available resources from host nations will be 

a long-term process.

Conclusions The Army's risk in carrying out the national military strategy has increased 

since the Army's TAA 2003 force structure review because requirements 

have increased, optimistic assumptions about war-fighting conditions have 

limited requirements, and support force shortfalls have increased. In 

addition, a higher number of support forces would not be expected to 

arrive at a major theater war within the first 30 days as required, and few 

active support personnel would be available to deploy to the second war. 

The Army does not know the full extent of its risk because it did not 

perform the analyses needed to do so. For example, the Army did not 

re-run its models with the resourced force. Doing so would provide the 

Army information on how force structure decisions affect the war-fighting, 

including the availability of support forces and how the late arrival of 

support units affects war-fighting timelines. Another reason the Army does 

not know the full extent of its risk is because the Army did not include 

requirements for all campaign phases and did not identify what effects 

varying war-fighting conditions contained in defense guidance would have 
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on requirements. For example, the Army did not identify requirements in 

cases where the adversary uses chemical weapons or for the redeployment 

of forces from a contingency operation to a major theater war, even though 

the guidance encourages such analyses. It is important to quantify the 

effects of including all phases and adverse conditions on support 

requirements since this data could influence Army force structure 

decisions and could be used to modify future defense guidance and modify 

force structure decisions to mitigate risk.

Since the Army still has substantial forces in excess of its war-fighting 

requirements, it can mitigate risk by converting positions from 

nonwar-fighting to war-fighting structure without increasing the force. 

Converting the two National Guard divisions from nonwar-fighting 

structure to war-fighting support positions as planned is a sound concept 

that would increase the proportion of end strength performing war-fighting 

missions and help reduce shortfalls. However, the program requires 

careful management, and the Army has not yet identified the total cost. 

Also, the Army could further mitigate risk by assessing whether other 

nonwar-fighting structure—such as institutional and unique—must be filled 

by military personnel. If these positions were filled by civilians or 

contractors, more military structure could be used to reduce support force 

shortfalls. Lastly, as theater commanders develop more current data on the 

availability of host nation support, the Army could consider such support 

when filling war-fighting requirements, as called for in Army guidance. 

Recommendations To improve the Army's ability to accurately determine war-fighting 

requirements, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense clarify 

guidance to require that the Army include all campaign phases in 

determining its war-fighting requirements.

To determine the risks in implementing the national military strategy, we 

recommend that the Secretary of the Army include the following as part of 

the next TAA:

• an analysis of the number of support forces needed under a range of 

conditions such as the small, medium, or large use of chemical agents by 

an adversary;

• a re-run of TAA models using the resourced force to assess the effects of 

end strength allocation decisions on war-fighting, including the late 

arrival of critical support forces;
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• an assessment of the differences between TAA models and theater 

commanders' plans in support force requirements in the first 30 days of 

a conflict; and

• an analysis of the support forces required to extract forces from ongoing 

contingency operations and redeploy them to a major theater war and 

the effects of such redeployment on war-fighting timelines. 

To improve the Army's ability to effectively monitor the progress of its 

National Guard Division Redesign program, we recommend that the 

Secretary of the Army require the Process Action Team to prepare a 

periodic report on the program that includes: (1) total program costs 

(including equipment, training, and facilities); (2) unfunded requirements; 

(3) a comparison of planned converted units with unresourced 

requirements to determine whether the most critical shortfalls are being 

addressed first; (4) an assessment of the risks arising from delays in 

conversion; (5) a comparison of actual conversions with plans; and 

(6) identification of obstacles. 

To allocate end strength to nonwar-fighting force structure consistent with 

defense guidance, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army identify 

which nonwar-fighting positions could be filled by civilians or contractors, 

fill them with either civilians or contractors, and allocate the military 

positions saved to reduce war-fighting support force shortfalls. 

To more accurately identify support force requirements, we recommend 

that the Secretary of the Army expedite the incorporation of Force XXI 

concepts into doctrine that would provide the necessary information to 

update TAA models.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with the 

report and indicated that the Army plans to incorporate several of our 

recommendations in the ongoing TAA 2007. Overall, DOD said it was 

confident that the Army’s initiatives would yield the right mix of trained 

and fully equipped ground forces to support the national strategy. DOD’s 

comments are reprinted in full in appendix IV.

In response to our recommendations relating to TAA requirements 

determination and risk analysis, DOD stated that the Army plans to capture 

the projected land force requirements generated in all phases of both 

campaigns for inclusion in TAA 2007 requirements. DOD also stated that 

the Army would focus its efforts on the most likely weapons of mass 
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destruction employment case in TAA 2007, based upon the best available 

intelligence estimates of enemy capabilities. We believe this will be an 

improvement over TAA 2005, but continue to recommend that the Army 

conduct additional analyses to better assess the risks of war-fighting 

conditions that are different than expectations. DOD also said the Army 

plans to implement our recommendation to rerun TAA models with the 

resourced force to assess the effects of available end strength on warfighting. The Army will also assess the differences between theater 

commanders’ and Army support force requirements. In conducting this 

analysis, we encourage the Army to fully consider the theater commanders’ 

war-plan troop lists to ensure, for example, that the Army is able to 

resource, with predominantly active forces, the theater commanders’ 

requirements for early arriving support forces. Last, DOD noted that TAA 

2007 will consider the forces required to disengage from on-going 

contingencies and redeploy forces to a major theater war.

DOD also concurred with our recommendation to improve the Army’s 

monitoring of the National Guard Division Redesign program and stated 

the program will be focused on determining the total costs and benefits of 

this effort. To ensure the conversion program is successful, we believe it is 

imperative that the Army implement our recommendation immediately, to 

include identifying total costs through fiscal year 2009, identifying 

unfunded requirements, and assessing risks if the program is delayed. 

DOD also noted that the Army is participating in a rigorous program to 

identify military positions for potential conversion to civilian or contractor 

positions. A successful conversion program could make more military 

personnel available to alleviate support force shortfalls; however, at the 

time of our review, the Army was unable to tell us how many military 

positions were candidates for conversion. With respect to updating Army 

models to reflect Force XXI concepts, DOD stated that the Army is 

continuing to develop doctrine and to design the force structure necessary 

to support the Force XXI digitized division and corps organizations and 

that this work is proceeding in a disciplined manner. We recognize that 

updating Army doctrine to incorporate Force XXI concepts is a challenging 

process but note that the intent of TAA is to focus on the Army’s future 

force structure requirements (i.e., 2005) and any delays in incorporating 

Force XXI logistics or war-fighting concepts will result in a force structure 

that is linked more to past concepts than to the Army’s future direction.

DOD further noted that, according to the Joint Staff, theater commanders 

are responsible for assessing the availability and appropriate use of host 

nation support to offset a portion of the Army’s requirement. We agree that 
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Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

theater commanders are responsible for validating host nation support and 

for assessing the potential risks of host nation support offsets to 

war-fighting. But as our report notes, neither theater commander has been 

able to provide the Army with current host nation support data for use in 

TAA and one theater commander has reported significant deficiencies in 

his host nation support program. According to TAA guidance, the Army 

should consider host nation support during its resourcing process, and the 

Army has attempted to do this to some extent in both TAA 2003 and TAA 

2005, despite shortcomings in the data.

Our scope and methodology are described in appendix III.

We conducted our review from April to December 1998 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. 

We are providing copies of this report to Senator Wayne Allard, Senator 

Robert C. Byrd, Senator Max Cleland, Senator Pete V. Domenici, Senator 

Daniel K. Inouye, Senator Frank R. Lautenberg, Senator Joseph I. 

Lieberman, Senator Ted Stevens, and Senator Fred Thompson, and to 

Representative Neil Abercrombie, Representative Rod R. Blagojevich, 

Representative Dan Burton, Representative Stephen E. Buyer, 

Representative John R. Kasich, Representative Jerry Lewis, Representative 

John P. Murtha, Representative David R. Obey, Representative Christopher 

Shays, Representative John M. Spratt, Jr., Representative Henry A. 

Waxman, Representative C. W. Bill Young in their capacities as Chair or 

Ranking Minority Member of Senate and House Committees and 

Subcommittees. We are also sending copies of this report to the 

Honorable William Cohen, Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Louis 

Caldera, Secretary of the Army; and the Honorable Jacob Lew, Director, 

Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be made available to 

others upon request. 
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Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 

contact Gwendolyn Jaffe at (202) 512-4691. Major contributors to this 

report are listed in appendix V.

Henry L. Hinton, Jr.

Assistant Comptroller General
Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I

Key TAA 2005 

Assumptions

31

Appendix II

Army Requirements for 

Two Wars, Resourced 

and Unresourced

32

Appendix III

Scope and 

Methodology

33

Appendix IV

Comments From the 

Department of Defense

35

Appendix V

Major Contributors to 

This Report

39
Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

Tables Table 1: Army War-fighting Requirements 6

Table 2: Support Specialties Predominately in the Reserve 

Components 11

Table 3: End Strength Allocated to Nonwar-Fighting Force Structure 14

Table 4: Army Force Structure Allocations 15

Table 5: Army Unique Force Structure 17

Table 6: Planned National Guard Conversions 18

Table 7: Changes in Army Plans to Reduce Support Shortfalls 20

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review

POM Program Objective Memorandum

TAA Total Army Analysis 

TTHS Transients, Trainees, Holdees, and Students
Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

Appendix I

Key TAA 2005 Assumptions ApenIxdi

TAA 2005 Assumption Army Rationale

By fiscal year 2000, Army end strengths will be 480,000 active, 

205,000 Army Reserve, and 350,000 National Guard. 

These end strengths reflect QDR reductions of 15,000 active and 

20,000 reserves. TAA 2005 did not include 25,000 reductions 

recommended by the QDR for reserve components because the 

Army had not decided how the reductions would be apportioned 

between the National Guard and Army Reserve.

The Army will deploy all 10 of its active divisions and make 

available all enhanced brigades in the two-war scenario. Army 

force structure will also contain eight National Guard divisions as 

strategic reserve.

Consistent with defense guidance, all 10 active divisions and all 15 

enhanced brigades will flow into the two-war scenario. Previously, 

the Army only deployed those enhanced brigades that could arrive 

before cessation of hostilities. The National Guard divisions are a 

strategic reserve to respond to adverse situations.

The Army will employ four corps--two in each theater. Each corps 

will have a doctrinal war-fighting mission. The Army will source the 

4th corps as much as possible in accordance with doctrine.

Defense guidance lists four corps.

Presidential Selected Reserve Callup occurs on the day of 

unambiguous warning of the first war.

This is consistent with defense guidance.

The Army will have immediate access to ports and airfields in the 

theaters of operation.

This is consistent with defense guidance.

There will be limited use of chemicals by adversaries consisting of 

both persistent/nonpersistent agents which will have limited 

operational/tactical effects.

Defense guidance contains conflicting statements about the level of 

enemy chemical use U.S. forces can expect. Army interpretation of 

defense guidance was "limited use" which meant that no force 

structure was added to the 747,000 war-fighting requirement.

Army requirements will be based on the first three phases of the 

campaign. 

Army interpretation of defense guidance is not to add requirements 

for the last two phases of the theater campaign. 

Units due to arrive in the first 30 days of the first war will be 

composed predominately of active forces.

This is consistent with defense and Army guidance. The Army 

determined that time delays associated with the mobilization of 

reserve forces generally preclude their arrival in the first 30 days. 

The Army will begin the counteroffensive of a major theater war 

when adequate support forces arrive in the theater.

Army models and one theater commander's plans are consistent in 

their estimate of when adequate support forces would arrive. 

There will be no delays or degradation of capability resulting from 

the transfer of support forces from a contingency operation to a 

major theater war.

Defense guidance assumes that U.S. forces assigned to a 

contingency operation are immediately available to redeploy to a 

major theater war.
Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

Appendix II

Army Requirements for Two Wars, Resourced 

and Unresourced ApenxIdi

aResourced units are those allocated end strength and the Army assumes in TAA that these units are 

at 100 percent of wartime strength. During peacetime, some support units are authorized fewer 

positions than required. In TAA 2005, these shortfalls totaled 17,843 positions.

bThese are positions in units that are not authorized end strength and exist only on paper. The 

shortages in this column assume successful conversion of 18,846 nonwar-fighting spaces in National 

Guard divisions between fiscal year 2000 and 2005.

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

Specialty Required Resourceda Unresourcedb

Percent

resourced

Logistics 45,136 45,136 0 100.00

Public Affairs 1,420 1,420 0 100.00

Army Level 

Headquarters

 4,538 4,538 0 100.00

Brigade & Division 

Headquarters

 7,693 7,693 0 100.00

Civil Affairs 5,270 5,270 0 100.00

Psychological 

Operations

 2,556 2,556 0 100.00

Armor 37,965 37,965 0 100.00

Infantry 71,116 71,116 0 100.00

Medical 39,352 39,154 198 99.50

Military Police 35,606 35,425 181 99.49

Personnel Service 

Support

 17,617 17,501 116 99.34

Special Operations 

Forces

 4,719 4,677 42 99.11

Field Artillery 69,337 68,032 1,305 98.12

Military Intelligence 16,122 15,704 418 97.41

Engineering 75,104 71,841 3,263 95.66

Aviation 41,551 39,125 2,426 94.16

Signal 34,235 31,840 2,395 93.00

Ordnance 46,932 43,591 3,341 92.88

Air Defense 25,285 21,203 4,082 83.86

Quartermaster 57,289 40,239 17,050 70.24

Transportation 84,749 58,379 26,370 68.88

Chemical 23,584 12,317 11,267 52.23

Total 747,176 674,722 72,454 90.30
Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

Appendix III

Scope and Methodology ApenIxdi

To determine if there were changes in the Army’s risk of not having 

sufficient forces to implement the national military strategy, we compared 

the Army’s 1996 and 1998 force structure reviews. We obtained and 

reviewed the Army's documentation on its Total Army Analysis (TAA) 

processes, assumptions, and results at Department of Army Headquarters, 

Washington D.C.; Concepts Analysis Agency, Bethesda, Maryland; U.S. 

Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia, and Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas; Army National Guard Bureau; and Office of the Chief 

of Army Reserve. To better understand how the requirements of the joint 

war-fighting commands are considered in the TAA process and how theater 

commands are affected by TAA results, we requested information from the 

Commanders in Chief of the U.S. Central Command and the U.S. Pacific 

Command. 

Our review of TAA 2005 included analyses of the risks associated with the 

number and type of active and reserve support forces allocated to support 

war-fighting requirements including comparisons with TAA 2003 results 

and theater commander war-plans; the Army's assumptions compared with 

those in defense guidance, TAA 2003, theater commander war-plans, and 

more recent Department of Defense (DOD) assessments; and the major 

assumptions used in TAA and how they affect force structure outcomes 

(including measures of risk). We did not evaluate logistical data used in the 

TAA process, however, prior GAO recommendations to establish valid and 

consistent data have been implemented. 

We compared the Army's TAA 2005 reported results with automated data 

from the Army's MERLIN system. MERLIN is an analytical tool that allows 

programmed resources to be aligned against war-fighting requirements. 

The programmed resources are imported from the Army's official force 

structure data base (SAMAS). Based on our analysis, we were satisfied that 

the Army's automated data and reported results were in substantial 

agreement. We did not test the Army's management controls over its 

automated system.

To assess the Army’s potential for mitigating risk by reallocating its existing 

end strength, we obtained the Army's justification for its nonwar-fighting 

force structure, including institutional forces; transients, trainees, holdees, 

and students; and National Guard divisions (strategic reserve). We 

considered the Army's recently reported material weakness and corrective 

action plan to determine if the plan included steps to ensure that the Army’s 

institutional force is efficiently organized and comprises the minimum 

number of personnel. We also reviewed Army Pamphlet 100-1, which 
Appendix III

Scope and Methodology

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

provides the redesign objectives for the institutional force. We also 

ascertained whether the Army determined that these institutional forces, as 

well as other support forces such as its unique force structure, are military 

essential. 
Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

Appendix IV

Comments From the Department of Defense ApeVnxIdi
Appendix IV

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure
Appendix IV

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure
Appendix IV

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure
Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

Appendix V

Major Contributors to This Report ApenVxdi

National Security and 

International Affairs 

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Gwendolyn R. Jaffe, Assistant Director

Irene A. Robertson, Senior Evaluator

Kenneth W. Newell, Senior Evaluator

Norfolk Field Office Brenda M. Waterfield, Evaluator-in-Charge

Dawn R. Godfrey, Senior Evaluator

(701140) Lert
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