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United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 6, 2007

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-30771

MARIA ARIAS-BENN, Individually and On Behalf of the Class,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

(2:05-CV-6269)

Before KING, DAVIS, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

RHESA HAWKINS BARKSDALE, Circuit Judge:

Maria Arias-Benn appeals the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim) dismissal, with prejudice, of

her complaint against State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance Company,

concerning its refusal to replace policyholders’ freezer and

refrigerator units damaged by food putrefaction as a result of

power outages after Hurricane Katrina. AFFIRMED.

I.

Hurricane Katrina in August 2005 resulted in an extended loss

of electrical power. Accordingly, many residents of the affected

areas experienced refrigerator and freezer damage due to the
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spoilage and putrefaction of the contents. Arias-Benn, a State

Farm insured homeowner in New Orleans, Louisiana, submitted a claim

to State Farm for replacement of her damaged refrigerator. Her

claim was denied. 

Accordingly, Arias-Benn filed this action in Louisiana state

court, seeking damages, individually and on behalf of a putative

class of State Farm insureds. She claimed State Farm breached the

insurance policy by refusing to replace insureds’ refrigerators and

freezers damaged by the spoilage of food caused by power outages

resulting from the hurricane. She further claimed negligence,

breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, misrepresentation, and violations

of Louisiana’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law.

State Farm removed this action to district court. In response

to the court’s order to specify which provision of the homeowner’s

policy was breached, Arias-Benn amended her complaint to claim

State Farm breached its duty to cover personal property damaged by

a covered peril under “SECTION I – LOSSES INSURED – COVERAGE B –

PERSONAL PROPERTY”, quoted infra. On State Farm’s motion, pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (failure to state a

claim), the complaint was dismissed with prejudice. 

II.

The Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is reviewed de novo. E.g., Gen.

Elec. Capital Corp. v. Posey, 415 F.3d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 2005).

In determining whether Arias-Benn stated a claim sufficient to
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avoid dismissal under that Rule, the well-pleaded facts alleged in

her complaint are accepted as true and the allegations are

construed in the light most favorable to her. E.g., Muhammad v.

Dallas County Cmty. Supervision & Corrs. Dept., 479 F.3d 377, 379

(5th Cir. 2007). Nevertheless, “[w]e do not accept as true

conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal

conclusions”. Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 (5th

Cir. 2005).

Arias-Benn claims State Farm is required, pursuant to the

homeowner’s policy it issued to her and other members of the

putative class, to replace refrigerators and freezers damaged due

to the spoilage of their contents caused by the prolonged power

outage that occurred because of Hurricane Katrina. As noted, she

contends coverage exists under “SECTION I – LOSSES INSURED –

COVERAGE B – PERSONAL PROPERTY”, which states:

We insure for accidental direct physical loss

to property described in Coverage B caused by

the following perils, except as provided in

SECTION I – LOSSES NOT INSURED:

. . . .

2. Windstorm or hail. This peril does not

include loss to property contained in a

building caused by rain, snow, sleet, sand or

dust. This limitation does not apply when the

direct force of wind or hail damages the

building causing an opening in a roof or wall

and the rain, snow, sleet, sand or dust enters

through this opening.
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Based on this language, she asserts the policy covers all personal

property in a building for which there is “accidental direct

physical loss” caused by windstorm or hail, unless some exclusion

applies. 

Arias-Benn maintains: Louisiana state law interprets “direct

loss” to mean a proximate or efficient cause of the loss; and,

accordingly, by causing the power outage and preventing residents

from returning to their properties to clean their refrigerators and

freezers, Hurricane Katrina was a proximate cause of the spoilage

that damaged the units. 

State Farm responds that the policy has a provision

enumerating covered losses for damage caused by power interruption,

SECTION I – ADDITIONAL COVERAGES, subsection 7, quoted infra, which

specifically addresses the circumstances under which payment will

be made for damages associated with a refrigerator and freezer and

their contents. Because Arias-Benn’s claim does not fall within

that provision, State Farm asserts Arias-Benn has failed to state

a claim. 

Louisiana contract law governs our interpretation of State

Farm’s policy. See ACS Constr. Co., Inc. of Miss. v. CGU, 332 F.3d

885, 888 (5th Cir. 2003). “Under Louisiana law, an insurance

policy is a contract between the parties, and it should be

construed according to the general rules of contract interpretation

set forth in the Civil Code.” Riverwood Int’l Corp. v. Employers
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Ins. of Wausau, 420 F.3d 378, 382 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing La. Ins.

Guar. Ass’n v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 630 So. 2d 759, 763 (La.

1994)). According to the Civil Code, contract interpretation is

“the determination of the common intent of the parties”. LA. CIV.

CODE ANN. art. 2045 (1985). That intent, reflected by the words in

the policy, defines the extent of coverage. Samuels v. State Farm

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 939 So. 2d 1235, 1240 (La. 2006). “Such

intent is to be determined in accordance with the general,

ordinary, plain and popular meaning of the words used in the

policy, unless the words have acquired a technical meaning.” La.

Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 630 So. 2d at 763. Furthermore, “[a]n insurance

contract is to be construed as a whole, and one portion thereof

should not be construed separately at the expense of disregarding

another”. Pareti v. Sentry Indem. Co., 536 So. 2d 417, 420 (La.

1988). Any ambiguity should be construed against the insurer. LA.

CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2056; e.g., Domingue v. Rodrigue, 686 So. 2d 132,

134 (La. Ct. App. 1996). 

The policy provided coverage for personal property. That

coverage was limited to “accidental direct physical loss” from

those perils enumerated in the policy. Louisiana law equates

“direct loss” with proximate cause; an insurance policy, however,

may limit or otherwise define “direct loss”. See Lorio v. Aetna

Ins. Co., 232 So. 2d 490, 493 (La. 1970). 
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Therefore, before determining whether Hurricane Katrina could

have proximately caused the damage, we must determine whether the

policy restricts or otherwise defines “accidental direct physical

loss” to prevent Arias-Benn from recovering under the circumstances

alleged in her complaint. Along that line, the above-referenced

“ADDITIONAL COVERAGES”, subsection 7, states:

Power Interruption. We cover accidental

direct physical loss caused directly or

indirectly by a change of temperature which

results from power interruption that takes

place on the residence premises. The power

interruption must be caused by a Loss Insured

occurring on the residence premises. The

power lines off the residence premises must

remain energized. This coverage does not

increase the limit applying to the damaged

property.

Although Arias-Benn asserts this provision must be read as

expanding upon those losses covered in the “Coverages” section of

the policy, this “Additional Coverages” provision must be read in

conjunction with the policy as a whole. See Pareti, 536 So. 2d at

420. The natural implication of the “Additional Coverages”

provision is that “accidental direct physical loss” excludes

personal property damaged by a power outage other than as

specifically described in the policy. The presence of expanded

coverage for one particular type of loss attributable to power

interruption (one “occurring on the residence premises”, with

“[t]he power lines off the residence premises ... remain[ing]
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energized”) indicates the exclusion of other, unspecified types of

loss attributable to such interruption. 

Moreover, another provision in the “Additional Coverages”

section provides coverage for refrigerated products spoiled due to

power failure. Subsection 8 of SECTION I – ADDITIONAL COVERAGES

states:

Refrigerated Products. Coverage B is extended

to cover the contents of deep freeze or

refrigerated units on the residence premises

for loss due to power failure or mechanical

failure. If mechanical failure or power

failure is known to you, all reasonable means

must be used to protect the property insured

from further damage or this coverage is void.

This provision further evidences that the parties intended to

provide coverage for only particular types of damages caused by

power interruptions other than those occurring “on the residence

premises”. There is no indication they intended to include damage

to refrigerators and freezers caused by power outages occurring

outside the residence premises.

Arias-Benn does not claim the damage caused to her and others’

refrigerator and/or freezer was caused by a power outage that

occurred on the residence premises. As a result, she does not

state a breach-of-contract claim upon which relief can be granted.

Because her other claims depend on there being a valid breach-ofcontract claim, they likewise fail.
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III.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is

AFFIRMED.