IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2013-CA-01393-COA
GARY C. MARTER APPELLANT

v. CELESTE G. MARTER APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/13/2013 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. PERCY L. LYNCHARD JR. COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: GRENADA COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: HELEN BAGW ELL KELLY LORI MICHELLE SOLINGER ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: JAMES H. POW ELL III MARK KEVIN HORAN NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: VALUED 120 ACRES AT $110,000 DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED: 05/12/2015 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC. FAIR, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. T h i s i s t h e s e c o n d a p p e al arising f r om the Grenada County C hance r y C o u r t ’ s valuation of 120 acres o f land in a divorce proceeding. W e conclude that the chancellor did

t h e b e s t he could with t he e vidence presented to him and that the value a s signe d t o t h e property f its squarely

within the range of

estim ates available. W e af f irm

. FACTS ¶2. Gary and Celeste M arter were granted an irreconcilable-dif f erences divorce in 2010. They could not agree on a division of the m arital estate, so they subm itted that issue to thechancery

court f or resolution. Unhappy

with the result, Gary

appealed. ¶3. This C ourt, in Marter v. M arter , 95 So. 3d 733 ( Miss. C t. A pp. 2012), l argely af f irm e d the chancellor’s decision, but we rem anded the c ase f or a v a l uation of 120 acres of land owned b y G a r y a n d Celeste. The chancellor had assigned a value of $110,000 to the 120

acres, but this C ourt was concer n e d because the chancellor did not explain h ow he had arrived at that v a lue. It was unclear w hether that value was intended to include the value of trees and a workshop located on the property

. Id . at 738 (¶19). ¶4. In Marter I

, we explained the history of the 120 acres as f

ollows: Gary and C eleste owned 120 acres of l a nd in Grenada, M ississippi. Celeste h a d inherited a n undivided one-half interest in the 1 20 acres f rom he r grandf ather som etim e between the late 1 980s and e arly 1990s. Celeste’s sister held the rem aining one-half i nterest. D u r i n g the m arriage, [ in 1998,] the Marters purchased the sister’s one-hal f i n t e r e st using m arital f u nds. Gary testif ied that Celeste’s i nherited interest and the interest purchased during the m arriage were titled i n Celeste’s nam e alone. However, i n 2007, the M arters executed a deed convey ing the 120 acres to them selves as “joint t enants with f ull rights o f survivorship and not as tenants in c om m on.” T he chancery court determ ined that the 60 acres Celeste inherited was her separate property

. The court f ound that the rem a ining 6 0 a c r e s w as m a rital property subject to equitable distribution. Id. at 736 (¶5). 1 ¶5. On rem and, t he chancellor conducted a hearing to m ore thoroughly explore the value

1 T h is m ay b e an o v e rsim

p lif icatio n . A t tim es, th e p arties h av e said t h at C eleste an d h er sister in h erited 5 0 acres e ach , an d th at th e y h a d p u r c h a sed th e o th er 2 0 acres f ro m relativ es. It is u n clear e x actly w h at h a p p e n e d , b u t th e q u estio n s o f w h at p o rtio n o f th e p ro p erty w as m arital an d w h a t w as sep arate w ere f in ally d ecid e d in M

a rter I , an d th ey are n o t at issu e in th is ap p eal. 2of

the 120 acres. It was conceded that the workshop was a f i xture on the property

and that it did not have a v a lue separate f r om the land. Af

ter c onsidering all of the evidence presented

at the hearing, t h e c h a n c e l l or assigned the sam e v alue o f $110,000 to the 120 acres. Gary appeals and again asserts that the chancellor’s valuation is not supported by the evidence.
DISCUSSION ¶6. “Our scope of review in dom estic relations m atters is lim ited under the f am iliar r ule that this Court will not disturb a c hancellor’s f indings unless m anif

estly wrong [ o r] clearly

erroneous, or if the chancellor applied a n erroneous legal s tandard.” Johnson v. Johnson , 650 So. 2d 1281, 1285 (Miss. 1994) (citation om itted). ¶7. “[ P]roperty d ivision should be based upon a determ ination of [ the] f air m arket value

o f the assets

. . . .” C

uccia v. C

uccia , 90 S o. 3d 1228, 1234 (¶13) (Miss. 2 012) ( q u o t i n g Ferguson v. Ferguson , 6 39 So. 2d 921, 9 29 (Miss. 1994)). W hile expert testim ony regarding valuation m ay be helpf

ul, it is not required, and a c h a n c ery court’s f i ndings on valuation
“m ay be accom

p lished by adopting the values cited in the parties’ Unif orm Chancery Court Rule 8 .05 f

inancial d isclosures, i n the testim ony , or in o ther evidence.” Gardner v. Gardner , 130 So. 3d 1162, 1166 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013). ¶8. At the second hearing, the chancellor heard testim o ny f rom Gary , two appraisers hired by Gary , and Celeste. On the f irst day of t he f

i r s t trial, Gary had testif

ied t hat the m arital interest in the 1 2 0 acres w as worth $55,000, plus an unstated value f or lum ber o n “28 f

orest acres.” On the next day

of trial (weeks later), Gary changed his tune. He then claim ed the

3entire 120 acres was m arital property and that it h ad a value of about $308,000, valuing the

land without trees at $ 215,000, 49 acres of pine trees at approxim ately $ 62,000, and 32 acres of hardwood at approxim ately $31,000. Celeste valued the property at $50,000. ¶9. W h en a sked if his original value of $ 55,000 was based o n the price paid f or Celeste’s sister’s interest, Gary replied, “sort of .” He testif

ied that he and C e l e s t e had paid $42,000
f or Celeste’s sister’s interest. Celeste’s Rule 8.05 f inancial s tatem ent valued the 120 acres
at $50,000. She t e s t i f

i ed that this value was based on t he price she and Gary paid f or her sister’s i nterest, w hich was approxim ately $ 22,000 or $ 25,000. Several c ancelled checks

were entered into evidence that added up to a num ber that s upported Celeste’s a ccount. Gary could not docum ent the higher purchase price he claim e d

. ¶10. Gary ’s 2010 appraisal, using a m arket analy sis, had valued the l and – bare, as if it had been clear cut – at $215,000. But the appraiser testif ied that in the past 36 m onths, he had
f ound only one com

parable sale in Grenada County , so he was f orced to c o nsider properties
f rom other counties. I n f act, t he property i n t he sam e county was the least com parable because i t was u n d e r g o i n g c onstruction and was located in an area where the land values

were higher. The appraiser testif ied that land values vary widely around the s t ate , b u t t he properties in other counties he considered were located in sim ilar ma r k e t s . On crossexam ination, the appraiser was presented with current advertisem ents f or the sale of land in Grenada County i n the $1,000/acre range. Another appraiser valued the trees – this tim e, 108

acres worth – at approxim ately $79,000, but he conducted the appraisal i n 2013, several y ears

4a f

t e r t h e d i v o rce. The tim ing of the appraisal calls its relevance into question, though the appraiser t estif

ied that he believed the value of the t im ber w ould have been a little higher at the tim e of

the divorce. ¶11. The chancellor sum m arized his f indings as f

o llows:
As argued b y [ Celest e ] i n h er proposed f indings, t he e xpert testim ony presented was wro u g ht with questionable data. It u sed c om parable property that was not within t he c ounty or even the r egion (hills vs. delta) o f the subject property

. The com

parable sales were stale in connection with this property at the tim e of valuation and one of the sales was developm ental property [ ,] not f arm land as is the subject property

. That early on during t rial of this cause [ Gary ’s] opinion of the subject property was that it was of a v alue of $110,000.00, a s previ o u s l y determ ined by this Court. [ Celeste] presented evidence that the original purchase price the parties paid f or the property was $450.00 per acre, when they purchased it in 1998. Other testim ony ref

lected properties f

or sale in Grenada County , where the subject property is located, of

f e red f or sale at $1,000.00 per acre.
That the Court t akes judicial notice pursua n t t o Rule 2 01 of the Mississippi Rules of E vidence that the Grenada County Tax A ssessor valued the property and tim ber thereon at the tim e of divorce in 2010 to be $48,924.00 and taxed accordingly

. Though these valuations m ay be routinely low, accepting f or the sake of argum ent that t he property is worth twice the true value as assessed by Grenada C ounty , the property , in toto[ ,] would have a value of $97,848.00 as opposed to the original value of $ 110,000 f ound by the Court af

ter accepting the testim ony of the parties at $55,000.00 f or an undivided one[ -]half interest in the portion subject to equitable distribution. Considering all of the evidence a nd testim ony with respect to the valuation of the property , the Court f inds the value of the property subject to equitable distribution to have the value of $110,000.00 f or t he reasons set f

o rth herein. ¶12. Gary f

i r s t a r g u e s t h a t t h e c h a n c ellor erred i n valuing the 120 acres at $110,000

5because neither p a rty p l aced t hat specif ic value on the property

. But he presents no authority supporting this proposition. Instead, the chancellor is the u ltim ate f inder of f act, and as the
f inder of f act he is entitled to accept or reject the testim ony of witnesses, in whole or in part,

a n d t o g i v e t he various t estim ony the weight it deserves; the chancellor’s f i ndings can be disturbed only i f clearly w rong o r d e r i v e d f rom the application of an erroneous legal standard. Mize v
. W

estbrook Constr. Co. o

f Oxford LLC , 146 S o . 3d 344, 348 (¶6) (Miss. 2014). Our courts have repeatedly recognized that the chancellor i s entitled to m ake an independent judgm ent of a property ’s value, especially w here the e sti ma tes of the parties
vary widely

. In McKnight v. McKnight , 951 So. 2d 5 94, 596 ( ¶¶7, 10) (Miss. C t. App. 2007), this Court af

f irm ed a valuation where the chanc e l lor had a pparently just averaged the two proposed values, because the evidenc e i n the record supported the conclusion that the low estim ates were t oo low and the high estim ates were t oo h igh. W e reached t he sam e result in
W illiams v. W

i lliams , 129 So. 3d 2 33, 2 41 ( ¶32) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013). “If the court f

inds all o f t h e com

peting values to b e inaccurate, it m a y m a ke its own i ndependent valuation.” Brett R. Turner, 2 Equitable Distribution of Property § 7:12 (3d ed. 2005). ¶13. Gary next contends that the chancellor e r r e d i n c o n s i d e r ing the tax assessor’s appraisal of the property , w hich was noted t o be approxim ately $49,000. The chancellor took notice of the tax appraiser’s valuation on his own initiative, but without o bjection f rom either party

. Gary cites to W

a tson v. W

atson , 882 So. 2d 95, 106-07 (¶¶55-57) (Miss. 2004), where the
suprem e c ourt r ev e r s ed a v aluation determ ined by sim ply adding 15% to the tax roll

6assessm ent. The chancellor derived this f orm u la f r om h is own experience, and he applied it despite all the o t her evidence in the record supporting a higher value. But, in today ’s case, the chancellor did not apply a rigid f orm ula; he m erely noted that he had f o und the value of the 120 acres to be signif icantly in excess of the tax a s s e s s m e nt. T he chancellor’s observation does not dem onstrate a def ect in his reasoning. ¶14. Finally , Gary a rgues that the chancellor c om m itted reversible error when he f ailed to consider the value of the tim ber separately f

rom the land. In the judgm ent on rem and, the chancellor expressly noted that there was tim ber o n the property , but he treated it as a f ixture of the land and did not assign it a separate value. Gary of f ers no authority requiring land and tim ber t o be valued separately ; he o nly supports t his claim by say ing that “ [ C eleste] has never
p resented any evidence to contradict [ his] c ontention.” Gary suggests that the cha n c e l l o r could not disregard the t e s t i mo n y of Gary ’s t im ber appraiser, but that appraisal was done
y ears af ter the divorce, and there was greatly vary ing testim ony as t o the value of the tim ber. Celeste and the t ax a ssessor valued the land, including the trees, at approxim ately $50,000. Gary points out that both of t hese valuations have their f laws, w hich the c hancellor was very

m uch aware of

. But Gary him s elf originally valued the land at $55,000 plus the unspecif ied value of 28 acres of

trees. T he tim

ber appraisal he now relies upon was conducted several
y ears af ter the divorce and valued 108 acres of tim b er. “Expert o pinions are not obligatory

or binding on triers of f

act but are advisory in nature.” D owns v. Ackerman , 115 S o. 3d 785,
791 (¶18) (Miss. 2 013). In situations like thi s , “ w h e r e t h e re is r eason to doubt the

7trustworthiness of the appraisal,” the “cha n c e l l o r is justif ied in rejecting the v alues an appraiser places.” A & L Inc. v. Grantham , 747 So. 2d 832, 842 (¶44) (Miss. 1999).
CONCLUSION ¶15. The chancellor has twice f o und him self in c i rcum stances such a s those described by this Court in the of

t-cited c ase of D unaway v. Dunaway , 7 49 So. 2d 1112, 1121 ( ¶28) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999), in which this Court said:
It is our conclusion that the chancellor, f aced w ith p roof f

rom both parties t hat was som ething less than ideal, m ade valuation judgm ents that f ind som e evidentiary support in the record. To the extent that the evidence on which the chancellor based his opinion w as less inf orm ative t han it could have been, we lay that at the f

eet of the litigants and not the chancellor. ¶16. W e conclude that, a s i n D u n a w a y , t he chancellor did the b est he could with the

e v i d e n c e p r esented to him

. Id. at 118 (¶14). As t his Court will not disturb a chancello r ’ s f indings u nless m anif

estly wrong or clearly erroneous, our standard of review r equires that the judgm ent b e af

f irm e d. Johnson v. Johnson , 650 So. 2d 1 281, 1285 (Miss. 1994) (citation

om itted). ¶17. T H E J U D G MENT OF THE GRENADA C OUNTY CHANCERY C OURT I S AFFIRMED. A L L COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT. LEE, C.J., IRVING AN D G R I F F IS, P.JJ., BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON, MAX WELL AND JAMES, JJ., CONCUR.

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