THREAT ASSESSMENT

IN SCHOOLS:

A GUIDE TO MANAGING

THREATENING SITUATIONS

AND TO CREATING

SAFE SCHOOL CLIMATES

UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE AND

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

WASHINGTON, D. C.

July 2004
i

THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS:

A GUIDE TO MANAGING THREATENING SITUATIONS

AND TO CREATING SAFE SCHOOL CLIMATES

UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE

AND

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

by

Robert A. Fein, Ph.D.

Director

National Violence Prevention and Study Center

Bryan Vossekuil

Director

National Violence Prevention and Study Center

William S. Pollack, Ph.D.

Director, National Violence Prevention and Study Center

Assistant Clinical Professor

Harvard Medical School / McLean Hospital

Randy Borum, Psy.D.

Associate Professor

University of South Florida

William Modzeleski

Associate Deputy Under Secretary

Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools

U. S. Department of Education

Marisa Reddy, Ph.D.

Chief Research Psychologist and Research Coordinator

National Threat Assessment Center

U. S. Secret Service

Washington, D. C.

July 2004
PREFACE

iii

Joint message from the Secretary, U.S. Department of Education, and from the

Director, U.S. Secret Service

Since June 1999, the U.S. Department of Education and the U.S. Secret Service have

been working as a team to try to better understand–and ultimately help

prevent–school shootings in America. When we began this collaboration nearly

three years ago, we did not know what information we might uncover in the course

of our joint study on targeted violence in schools, known as the Safe School Initiative.

However, throughout our collaboration, our two agencies have focused on one

common goal: to develop accurate and useful information about prior school attacks

that could help prevent some future ones from occurring.

We believe the results of this effort have given schools and communities real cause

for hope. Through the Safe School Initiative, staff from the U.S. Department of

Education’s Safe and Drug-Free Schools Program and the U.S. Secret Service’s

National Threat Assessment Center have found that some school attacks may be

preventable. The companion report to this document, The Final Report and Findings

of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the

United States, details findings from the Safe School Initiative and includes several key

findings relevant to prevention efforts. In particular, the Safe School Initiative

findings indicate that incidents of targeted violence in school were rarely impulsive;

that the students who perpetrated these attacks usually planned out the attack in

advance–with planning behavior that was oftentimes observable; and that, prior to

most attacks, other children knew that the attack was to occur. Taken together, these

findings suggest that it may be possible to prevent some future school attacks from

occurring–and that efforts to identify, assess, and manage students who may have the

intent and capacity to launch an attack may be a promising strategy for prevention.

This document, Threat Assessment in Schools: A Guide to Managing Threatening

Situations and to Creating Safe School Climates, takes these findings one step further

by setting forth a process for identifying, assessing, and managing students who may

pose a threat of targeted violence in schools. This process–known as threat

assessment–was first pioneered by the U.S. Secret Service as a mechanism for

investigating threats against the president of the United States and other protected

officials. The Secret Service threat assessment approach was developed based upon

findings from an earlier Secret Service study on assassinations and attacks of public

officials and public figures.

This Guide represents a modification of the Secret Service threat assessment process,

based upon findings from the Safe School Initiative. It is intended for use by school

personnel, law enforcement officials, and others with protective responsibilities in

our nation’s schools. This Guide includes suggestions for developing a threat

assessment team within a school or school district, steps to take when a threat or

THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE

Disclaimer

The findings, conclusions, and

opinions expressed in this document

are those of the authors, and do not

necessarily reflect the official

position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Education or the

U.S. Department of the Treasury.

ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

v

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors of this Guide are grateful to many agencies and individuals for their

assistance in planning and carrying out the Safe School Initiative and for assistance in

the development and writing of this Guide. First and foremost, the authors owe a

debt of gratitude to the representatives of the numerous law enforcement and

criminal justice agencies that permitted Secret Service personnel to review

investigative files on the school attacks in their respective communities; provided

other key information and materials about these attacks; and assisted and supported

Secret Service personnel in seeking permission to interview 10 attackers. Moreover,

the authors are grateful to the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice

Programs’ National Institute of Justice for providing critical financial support that

helped make the study possible. 

This Guide would not have been possible without the support and assistance that the

authors received from several key officials and personnel at the Department of

Education and the Secret Service. Absent the significant contributions of these

individuals, the Secret Service’s experience in researching and preventing targeted

violence could not have been translated into a useful guide about threat assessment

and targeted school violence. At the Department of Education, these individuals are:

Secretary of Education Rod Paige, Assistant Secretary for Office of Elementary and

Secondary Education Susan B. Neuman, and Connie Deshpande. Secret Service

officials who provided guidance and support for this project include: Director Brian

Stafford, Special Agent in Charge George Luczko, Assistant Special Agent in Charge

Matt Doherty, Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge Cindy Rubendall, and

Resident Agent in Charge John Berglund.

The authors extend special thanks to Assistant Director Barbara Riggs, Office of

Protective Research, U.S. Secret Service for her support of the Safe School Initiative

and the National Threat Assessment Center.

The Guide benefited from the thoughtful comments of a focus group of education

and law enforcement leaders that was organized by the Department of Education.

Participants in the group included: Ahndrea Blue, James Campain, Marilyn

Copeland, Melissa DeRosier, Steve Edwards, David Friedberg, Jeff Heller, Liz

Karnes, James Kelly, Wesley Mitchell, Lawrence Porte, Frank Sanchez, Jr., Kate

Stetzner, Melorra Sochet, Betsy Thompson, and John Van Dreal. 

Finally, the authors acknowledge the contributions of Mary Rowe, Paul Gebicke,

Gwen Holden and several anonymous reviewers from the Department of Education,

whose observations and comments helped to shape the Guide. Special thanks go out

to Gwen Holden and Paul Kelly, who helped edit the Guide.

Robert Fein William Modzeleski

Bryan Vossekuil Marisa Reddy 

William Pollack Washington, D.C.

Randy Borum May 2002

THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE

iv

other information of concern comes to light, consideration about when to involve law

enforcement personnel, issues of information sharing, and ideas for creating safe

school climates. 

We applaud all of you working to keep children safe in school. We hope that the

information in this Guide, and the companion Final Report, assist you in your

continued efforts to do so. 

Rod Paige W. Ralph Basham

Secretary Director

U.S. Department of Education United States Secret Service

May 2002
TABLE OF CONTENTS

vii

Chapter I: Introduction: Threat Assessment and the

Prevention of Targeted School Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

Chapter II: Creating Climates of School Safety:

A Foundation for Reducing School Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

Chapter III: Key Findings of the Safe School Initiative’s

Study of Targeted School Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15

Chapter IV: Implementing a School Threat Assessment Process . . . . . . . . . . .27

Chapter V: Conducting a School Threat Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41

Chapter VI: Managing a Threatening Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .61

Chapter VII: Action Plans for School Leaders:

Creating a Safe and Connected School Climate and

Implementing a Threat Assessment Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67

Chapter VIII: Conclusion: Threat Assessment as a

Decision-Making Tool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75

Appendix: Annotated Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79

Author Brief Bios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .87

THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE

vi
THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE

viii
CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION:

THREAT ASSESSMENT

AND THE PREVENTION

OF TARGETED SCHOOL

VIOLENCE
CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION

3

The vast majority of the nation’s students will complete their schooling without ever

being touched by peer violence. Nevertheless, recent school attacks carried out by

students have shaken the image of schools as reliably safe and secure environments

in which the qualifications of teachers and the efficacy of the educational curricula

are the most pressing concerns of educators and parents. Televised images of

frightened and injured students fleeing school grounds have imprinted themselves on

the American consciousness. "Columbine," the Littleton, Colo. high school that on

April 20, 1999, was the scene of the most violent of the school attacks recorded to

date in the United States, has entered contemporary vocabulary as a national symbol

of the violence that claimed the lives of 14 students and a teacher on that day. 

Incidents of targeted school violence1 occurred in 37 communities across the country

between December 1974 and May 2000. Compared to the other types of violence

and crime children face both in and outside of school, school-based attacks are rare.

While the Department of Education reports that 60 million children attend the

nation’s 119,000 schools, available statistics indicate that few of these students will

fall prey to serious violence in school settings.2

However, highly publicized school shootings have created uncertainty about the

safety and security of this country’s schools and generated fear that an attack might

occur in any school, in any community. Increased national attention to the problem

of school violence has prompted educators, law enforcement officials, mental health

professionals, and parents to press for answers to two central questions: "Could we

have known that these attacks were being planned?" and, if so, "What could we have

done to prevent these attacks from occurring?" 

For example, what should happen when a student comes to attention for saying

something or behaving in a manner that causes concern, as in the following

instances?

• "The kids are saying that Johnny told his friends not to go to the cafeteria at

noon on Tuesday because something big and bad is going to happen." 

• Marty, who has appeared withdrawn and irritable the past few weeks, handed

in a story about a student putting a bomb in an empty school. 

• Sandy brought bullets to school to show friends.

• Rafael, who got pushed around again after gym class, stormed out in tears,

shouting "You’re all going to pay!"

1 “Targeted violence” is defined as any incident of violence where a known or knowable attacker selects a

particular target prior to their violent attack. See Fein, R.A., Vossekuil, B. & Holden, G. "Threat Assessment:

An Approach to Prevent Targeted Violence." Research in Action. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of

Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice: Washington, D.C. (September, 1995), at 1-7. NCJ 155000

2 U.S. Department of Education. National Center for Education Statistics (2000). Digest of Education

Statistics 2000. Washington, D.C.: Authors
CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION

5

The Safe School Initiative was patterned after the Exceptional Case Study Project

(ECSP), the Secret Service’s earlier five-year study of the thinking and behavior of

individuals who carried out or attempted lethal attacks on public officials or

prominent individuals in the United States since 1949.4 The purpose of the ECSP

was to generate a better understanding of attacks against public officials that, in turn,

would inform Secret Service agents’ investigations of threats against the president

and other Secret Service protectees, and the development of strategies to prevent

harm to these public officials.

In July 1998, the Secret Service and the Justice Department’s National Institute of

Justice released the publication, Protective Intelligence and Threat Assessment

Investigations: A Guide for State and Local Law Enforcement Officials, in an effort to

make the Service’s threat assessment protocols available to a wider law enforcement

audience. That publication offers state and local police officials guidance in carrying

out and evaluating the findings of threat assessment investigations.5

The Safe School Initiative study reinforced the findings of the Secret Service’s ECSP

study concerning the thinking and behavior of attackers. In particular, like the ECSP,

the Safe School Initiative concluded that most attackers did not threaten their targets

directly, but did engage in pre-attack behaviors that would have indicated an

inclination toward or the potential for targeted violence had they been identified.

Findings about the pre-attack behaviors of perpetrators of targeted violence validated

the "fact-based" approach of the threat assessment process. This process relies

primarily on an appraisal of behaviors, rather than on stated threats or traits, as the

basis for determining whether there is cause for concern. These findings argue

favorably for pursuing adaptation of this threat assessment process for use by school

administrators and law enforcement officials in responding to the problem of

targeted school violence.

The Guide is intended to provide school administrators and law enforcement officials

guidance in incorporating the threat assessment process for investigating, evaluating,

and managing targeted violence into strategies to prevent school violence. The

purpose of the Guide is to contribute to achieving the broader goal of creating safe

and secure school environments by helping school and law enforcement officials

respond responsibly, prudently, and effectively to threats and other behaviors that

raise concern about potential violence.

Effective threat assessment can only occur in a larger context of school safety.

Cultures and climates of safety, respect, and emotional support can help diminish the

THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE

• Casey, who was suspended last year for bringing a knife to school, left a "hit

list" on his desk.

• Terry submitted an essay in which an assassin blew up the school, attacked the

governor, and then killed himself.

Given the enormous concern about targeted school violence, these reported

statements and behaviors cannot be ignored. But how should school officials and

other responsible adults respond?

This publication, Threat Assessment in Schools: A Guide to Managing Threatening

Situations and to Creating Safe School Climates, is the product of an ongoing

collaboration between the U. S. Secret Service and the U. S. Department of

Education to begin to answer these questions. Its focus is on the use of the threat

assessment process pioneered by the Secret Service as one component of the

Department of Education’s efforts to help schools across the nation reduce school

violence and create safe climates. As developed by the Secret Service, threat

assessment involves efforts to identify, assess, and manage individuals and groups

who may pose threats of targeted violence.

Development of the School Threat Assessment Process

This Guide is an outgrowth of the joint Secret Service/Department of Education Safe

School Initiative. This initiative, begun in June 1999, was undertaken to explore the

potential for adapting the threat assessment investigative process developed by the

Secret Service to the problem of targeted school violence. 

The Safe School Initiative, implemented through the Secret Service’s National Threat

Assessment Center and the Department of Education’s Safe and Drug-Free Schools

Program, combined the Department of Education’s expertise in helping schools

facilitate learning through the creation of safe environments for students, faculty, and

staff, and the Secret Service’s experience in studying and preventing targeted

violence.

The Safe School Initiative began with a study of the thinking, planning, and other preattack behaviors engaged in by students who carried out school shootings.3 That

study examined 37 incidents of targeted school violence that occurred in the United

States from December 1974 through May 2000 when researchers concluded their

data collection. 

4

3 Vossekuil, B., Fein, R., Reddy, M., Borum, R., & Modzeleski, W. The Final Report and Findings of the Safe

School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the United States. U.S. Secret Service

and U.S. Department of Education: Washington, D. C. (May 2002), at 15. [hereinafter The Safe School

Initiative Final Report]. For a fuller discussion of the Safe School Initiative, its methodology, and findings,

please refer to this report.

4 Fein, R. & Vossekuil, B. "Assassination in the United States: An Operational Study of Recent Assassins,

Attackers, and Near-Lethal Approachers." Journal of Forensic Sciences, 44 (1999), at 321-333. 5 Fein, R. & Vossekuil, B. Protective Intelligence and Threat Assessment Investigations: A Guide for State

and Local Law Enforcement Officials. U. S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National

Institute of Justice: Washington, D. C. (July 1998).
CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION

7

threat assessment inquiry or investigation.6 Chapter VI addresses the issue of

managing threatening situations. 

Chapter VII presents an action plan for creating safe school cultures and climates

and an action plan to help school leaders implement a threat assessment program.

In the final chapter of the Guide, Chapter VIII, the authors reassert the importance

of the threat assessment process as a component of broader school safety and

violence prevention strategies. In addition, the authors offer some concluding

observations on the efficacy of the threat assessment process as a tool that can help

school administrators, law enforcement officials, and others to make critical

decisions about responding to situations involving the threat of targeted school

violence. 

Readers will find additional resources to inform the development and

implementation of school threat assessment processes in the appendix that is

included at the end of the Guide. The appendix provides an annotated list of

publications and other resources on threat assessment and related topics.

THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE

possibility of targeted violence in schools. Environments in which students, teachers

and administrators pay attention to students’ social and emotional needs–as well as

their academic needs–will have fewer situations that require formal threat

assessments.

In an educational setting where there is a climate of safety, adults and students

respect each other. This climate is defined and fostered by students having a positive

connection to at least one adult in authority. In such a climate, students develop the

capacity to talk and openly share their concerns without fear of shame and reprisal.

They try to help friends and fellow students who are in distress, bringing serious

concerns to the attention of adults.

Ideally when this climate of safety is created, students

experience a sense of emotional "fit" and of respect.

Problems are raised and addressed before they

become serious. As a result, the potential for school

violence diminishes. When a member of the school

community shows personal pain that might lead them

to harm themselves or others, someone is available.

Young people can find an adult to trust with this

information, so that it does not remain "secret" until it

is too late.

A young man who brought a rifle into school, killing

two students, and wounding several others, told us

from his prison cell: "I was really hurting. I didn’t

have anybody to talk to. They just didn’t care." 

Organization of the Guide

The remainder of this Guide is organized into seven chapters. Chapter II of the

Guide discusses characteristics of safe school climates. Chapter III presents the key

findings of the Safe School Initiative and discusses the implications of these findings

for the prevention of targeted school violence. Chapter IV describes the principles

underlying the threat assessment approach to preventing targeted violence, and

outlines the central elements of a threat assessment process.

Chapters V and VI will be of particular interest to school administrators, law

enforcement officials, and others who wish to pursue the development of a threat

assessment process as a component of a broader school violence prevention strategy.

Chapter V outlines the approach to identifying students whose behavior may suggest

the potential for targeted school violence, and discusses the steps in carrying out a

6

6 This Guide distinguishes between a threat assessment inquiry and a threat assessment investigation.

Threat assessment inquiries are initiated, conducted, and controlled by school officials (often with input or

participation from law enforcement professionals), while threat assessment investigations are initiated,

conducted, and controlled by law enforcement officials. Each school system or community should decide

where to place the line between an "inquiry" and an "investigation." For further discussion, please see

Chapter V.

A young man who

brought a rifle into

school, killing two

students, and wounding

several others, told us

from his prison cell: "I

was really hurting. I

didn’t have anybody to

talk to. They just didn’t

care."
THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE

8
CHAPTER II - CREATING CLIMATES OF SCHOOL SAFETY

CHAPTER II

CREATING CLIMATES

OF SCHOOL SAFETY: 

A FOUNDATION FOR

REDUCING SCHOOL

VIOLENCE
CHAPTER II - CREATING CLIMATES OF SCHOOL SAFETY

11

"What I hate about this school is that I'm being picked on in the halls

and just about everywhere else"–A 14-year-old student

"School has always been hard for me, literally from the first day I

started elementary school. People saw me as a ... good target. They

just started picking on me for no reason ... they made fun of me [and,

now] I'm going through self-esteem issues because of the 11 years I

was a target."–An 18-year-old student.

"They want me to open up, express myself. Quite a funny notion,

ironic! If someone had helped me do that several years ago, I

probably would have turned out okay."–Comment in a diary by a 17-

year-old student who attacked others at school, then killed himself.

The threat assessment process described in this Guide is presented as an approach to

addressing the problem of targeted school violence. Incidents of targeted school

violence are extreme and, thankfully, rare events. However, targeted school violence

is arguably only the tip of the iceberg of pain, loneliness, desperation, and despair

that many students in this nation’s schools deal with on a daily basis. 

Threat assessment should be looked upon as one component in an overall strategy to

reduce school violence. The threat assessment process by itself is unlikely to have a

lasting effect on the problem of targeted school violence unless that process is

implemented in the larger context of strategies to ensure that schools offer their

students safe and secure learning environments. The principal objective of school

violence-reduction strategies should be to create cultures and climates of safety,

respect, and emotional support within educational institutions. 

Fostering a Culture of Respect 

In educational settings that support climates of safety, adults and students respect

each other. A safe school environment offers positive personal role models in its

faculty. It provides a place for open discussion where diversity and differences are

respected; communication between adults and students is encouraged and supported;

and conflict is managed and mediated constructively.

Cultures and climates of safety support environments in which teachers and

administrators pay attention to students’ social and emotional needs as well as their

academic needs. Such environments emphasize "emotional intelligence" as well as

educational or intellectual pursuits.7 Students experience a sense of emotional "fit"

7 Goleman, D. Emotional Intelligence. New York: Bantam Books, (1995).
THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE

and of respect within the school body and may be less likely to engage in or be

victimized by harmful behavior.8

A culture of safety creates "shame-free zones" in which daily teasing and bullying is

not accepted as a normal part of the adolescent culture.9 School environments

characterized by bullying and meanness can lead to student isolation and fear. At

best, school environments that turn a blind eye to bullying and teasing inhibit the

work of school–learning and growth. At the worst, such environments allow

behavior that fosters fear and fury that stunts the healthy development of the victims

of that behavior, and may lead to psychological and physical violence.

Creating Connections Between Adults and Students

Connection through human relationships is a central component of a culture of safety

and respect. This connection is the critical emotional glue among students, and

between students and adults charged with meeting students’ educational, social,

emotional, and safety needs.10

In a climate of safety, students have a positive connection to at least one adult in

authority. Each student feels that there is an adult to whom he or she can turn for

support and advice if things get tough, and with whom that student can share his or

her concerns openly and without fear of shame or reprisal. Schools in which

students feel able to talk to teachers, deans, secretaries, coaches, custodians,

counselors, nurses, school safety officers, bus drivers, principals, and other staff

support communication between students and adults about concerns and problems. 

Schools that emphasize personal contact and connection between school officials and

students will take steps to identify and work with students who have few perceptible

connections to the school. For example, during staff meetings in a school in a

California School District, the names of students are posted, and school faculty

members are asked to put stars next to the names of those students with whom they

have the closest relationships. Faculty members then focus on establishing

relationships with those students with few stars next to their names. 

12

CHAPTER II - CREATING CLIMATES OF SCHOOL SAFETY

13

Breaking the "Code of Silence"

In many schools there is a pervasive sense among students and some adults that

telling grownups that another student is in pain or may pose a threat violates an

unwritten, but powerful, "code of silence." A code of silence has the potentially

damaging effect of forcing students to handle their pain and problems on their own,

without the benefit of adult support. These codes also suggest that a student should

not bring any concerns that he or she may have about a peer’s behavior to the

attention of responsible adults. 

The findings of the Safe School Initiative suggest that silence is far from golden. In

fact, study findings indicate that silence may be downright dangerous. The study

found that most school shooters shared their potentially lethal plans with other

students, but that students who knew of planned attacks rarely told adults.

In a climate of safety, students are willing to break the code of silence. Students are

more likely to turn to trusted adults for help in resolving problems. Moreover,

students are more willing to share their concerns about the problem behavior of

peers with their teachers and other adults in positions of authority within the school

without feeling that they are "snitching" or "ratting" on a buddy or friend. 

As a result of responsible bystander behavior, serious problems come to adult

attention earlier, before these problems lead to violence. Problems are raised and

addressed before they become serious, and the potential for school violence arguably

is diminished. In an environment that encourages communication between students

and adults, information does not remain "secret" until it is too late. In fact, it is

considered good citizenship or even heroic to go to a teacher to share the fact that a

fellow student is in trouble and may be contemplating a dangerous act.

Major Components and Tasks for Creating a Safe/Connected School Climate

The major components and tasks for creating a safe school climate include:

• Assessment of the school’s emotional climate;

• Emphasis on the importance of listening in schools;

• Adoption of a strong, but caring stance against the code of silence;

• Prevention of, and intervention in, bullying;

• Involvement of all members of the school community in planning, creating,

and sustaining a school culture of safety and respect;

• Development of trusting relationships between each student and at least one

adult at school; and

• Creation of mechanisms for developing and sustaining safe school climates.

Discussion of these components and tasks may be found in Chapter VII of this

Guide.

8 See, for example, Resnick,M.D., Bearman,P.S., Blum, R.W. et. al., (1997) "Protecting Adolescents from

Harm," JAMA, 278(10) pp. 823-832. See also www.allaboutkids.umn.edu. 9 See Pollack, W. Real Boys: Rescuing Our Sons from the Myths of Boyhood. New York: Henry Holt, Inc.,

(1998).; Pollack, W., & Shuster, T. Real Boys’ Voices. New York: Random House, (2000).; Pollack, W., &

Cushman, K. Real Boys Workbook. New York: Villard, (2001). 10 Pollack, W. Real Boys. (1998). See note #9.
THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE

14
CHAPTER III - KEY FINDINGS

CHAPTER III

KEY FINDINGS OF THE

SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE’S 

STUDY OF TARGETED

SCHOOL VIOLENCE
CHAPTER III - KEY FINDINGS

17

This chapter summarizes the Safe School Initiative and the findings that support a

threat assessment process to identify, assess, and manage threatening situations in

schools. The Safe School Initiative examined incidents of targeted school violence

from the time of the incident backward, to identify the attackers’ pre-incident

behaviors and communications and to explore whether such information might aid in

preventing future attacks.

The findings of the Safe School Initiative suggest that there are productive actions

that educators, law enforcement officials, and others can pursue in response to the

problem of targeted school violence. Specifically, Initiative findings suggest that

these officials may wish to consider focusing their efforts to formulate strategies for

preventing these attacks in two principal areas:

• developing the capacity to pick up on and evaluate available or knowable

information that might indicate that there is a risk of a targeted school attack;

and

• employing the results of these risk evaluations, or "threat assessments," in

developing strategies to prevent potential school attacks from occurring. 

Support for these suggestions is found in the 10 key findings of the Safe School

Initiative:

• Incidents of targeted violence at school are rarely sudden, impulsive acts.

• Prior to most incidents, other people knew about the attacker’s idea and/or

plan to attack.

• Most attackers did not threaten their targets directly prior to advancing the

attack.

• There is no accurate or useful "profile" of students who engage in targeted

school violence.

• Most attackers engaged in some behavior, prior to the incident, that caused

concern or indicated a need for help.

• Most attackers were known to have difficulty coping with significant losses or

personal failures. Many had considered or attempted suicide.

• Many attackers felt bullied, persecuted, or injured by others prior to the attack.

• Most attackers had access to and had used weapons prior to the attack.

• In many cases, other students were involved in some capacity.

• Despite prompt law enforcement responses, most shooting incidents were

stopped by means other than law enforcement intervention. 

An overview of these findings, and their implications for the use of threat assessment

protocols to identify, assess, and manage possible targeted school violence, follows.
THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE

Implications of Key Findings for the Use of Threat Assessment Protocols

Key Finding 1

Incidents of targeted violence at school rarely are sudden, impulsive acts.

Explanation

Students who engaged in school-based attacks typically did not "just snap" and engage

in impulsive or random acts of targeted school violence. Instead, the attacks

examined under the Safe School Initiative appeared to be the end result of a

comprehensible process of thinking and behavior–behavior that typically begins with

an idea, progresses to the development of a plan, moves on to securing the means to

carry out the plan, and culminates in an attack. 

Example: One attacker asked his friends to help him get ammunition for one

of his weapons; sawed off the end of a rifle to make it easier to conceal

beneath his clothes; shopped for a long trench coat with his mother; and cut

the pockets out of the coat so that he could conceal the weapon within the

coat while holding it through one of the cut-out pockets. This same attacker

had a well-known fascination with weapons and frequently told his friends

that he thought about killing certain students at school. 

Implications

The process of thinking and planning that leads up to an attack potentially may be

knowable or discernible from the attacker’s behaviors and communications. To the

extent that information about an attacker’s intent and planning is knowable and may

be uncovered before an incident, some attacks may be preventable. However, the

Safe School Initiative found that the time span between the attacker’s decision to

mount an attack and the actual incident may be short. Consequently, when

indications that a student may pose a threat to the school community arise in the

form of information about a possible planned attack, school administrators and law

enforcement officials will need to move quickly to inquire about and intervene in that

possible plan.

Key Finding 2

Prior to most incidents, other people knew about the attacker’s idea and/or plan to

attack.

18

CHAPTER III - KEY FINDINGS

19

Explanation

In most cases, other young persons–friends, schoolmates, and/or siblings–knew

about the attacker’s idea or plan for a possible attack on the school before that

attack occurred. However, this information rarely made its way to an adult.

Example: One attacker had planned to shoot students in the lobby of his

school prior to the beginning of classes. He told two friends exactly what he

had planned and asked three other students to meet him in the mezzanine

overlooking the school lobby the morning of the planned attack, ostensibly so

that these students would be out of harm’s way. On most mornings, few

students would congregate in the mezzanine before the school day began.

However, on the morning of the attack, word about what was going to

happen spread to such an extent that, by the time the attacker opened fire in

his school lobby, 24 students had gathered in the mezzanine waiting for the

attack to begin. One student who knew about the attacker’s plans brought a

camera so that he could take pictures of the event. 

Implications

First and foremost, this finding suggests that students can be an important part of

prevention efforts. A friend or schoolmate may be the first person to hear that a

student is thinking about or planning to harm someone. Nevertheless, for a variety

of reasons, those who have information about a potential incident of targeted school

violence may not alert an adult on their own. Schools can encourage students to

report this information in part by identifying and breaking down barriers in the

school environment that inadvertently may discourage students from coming forward

with this information. Schools also may benefit from ensuring that they have a fair,

thoughtful, and effective system to respond to whatever information students do

bring forward. If students have concerns about how adults will react to information

that they bring forward, they may be even less inclined to volunteer such information.

In addition, this finding highlights the importance in a threat assessment inquiry of

attempts to gather all relevant information from anyone who may have contact with

the student. Efforts to gather all potentially relevant pieces of information, however

innocuous they may appear on their own, from all individuals with whom the student

has contact may help to develop a more comprehensive picture of the student’s ideas,

activities, and plans. In the end, investigators likely will find that different people in

the student’s life may have different pieces of the puzzle. 
THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE

Key Finding 3

Most attackers did not threaten their targets directly prior to advancing the attack.

Explanation

The Safe School Initiative found that most attackers in fact did not threaten their

target directly and some made no threat at all. Instead, other behaviors and

communications that may prompt concern, such as hearing that a young person is

talking about bringing a gun to school, are indicators of a possible threat and

therefore should prompt the initiation of efforts to gather information. 

Implications

This finding underscores the importance of not waiting for a threat before beginning

an inquiry. School administrators, of course, should respond to all students who

make threats because the lack of response could be taken by the threatener as

permission to proceed with carrying out the threat. In the end, however, it is

important to distinguish between someone who makes a threat–tells people they

intend to harm someone–and someone who poses a threat–engages in behaviors that

indicate an intent, planning, or preparation for an attack. Those conducting threat

assessment inquiries should focus particular attention on any information that

indicates that a student poses a threat, regardless of whether the student has told a

potential target he or she intends to do them harm.

Key Finding 4 

There is no accurate or useful "profile" of students who engage in targeted school

violence. 

Explanation 

The demographic, personality, school history, and social characteristics of the

attackers varied substantially. Moreover, knowing that an individual shares

characteristics, behaviors, features, or traits with prior school shooters does not help

in determining whether a particular student is thinking about or planning for a

violent act.

Example: In one case, the dean of students had commended a student for

improving his grades and behavior a few weeks before that student carried

out an attack at his school. 

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CHAPTER III - KEY FINDINGS

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Implications

The use of profiles to determine whether a student is thinking about or planning a

violent attack is not an effective approach to identifying students who may pose a risk

for targeted violence at school or–once a student has been identified–for assessing

the risk that a particular student may pose a risk for targeted school violence.

Reliance on profiles to predict future school attacks carries two substantial risks: (1)

the great majority of students who fit any given profile of a "school shooter" actually

will not pose a risk of targeted violence; and, (2) using profiles will fail to identify

some students who in fact pose a risk of violence, but share few if any characteristics

with prior attackers.

Rather than trying to determine the "type" of student who may engage in targeted

school violence, an inquiry should focus instead on a student’s behaviors and

communications to determine if that student appears to be planning or preparing for

an attack. Rather than asking whether a particular student "looks like" those who

have launched school-based attacks before, it is more productive to ask whether the

student is on a path toward a violent attack, if so how fast the student is moving

toward attack, and where intervention may be possible.

Key Finding 5

Most attackers engaged in some behavior, prior to the incident, that caused others

concern or indicated a need for help.

Explanation

Several key findings point to the fact that young people send signals–both direct and

indirect–to others regarding their problems. The boys and young men who engaged

in the targeted school violence examined by the Safe School Initiative were not

"invisible" students. In fact, nearly all of these students engaged in behaviors that

caused concern to at least one person, usually an adult–and most concerned at least

three people.

Implications

This finding highlights the range of behaviors in a student’s life that may be

noticeable to adults and that could prompt some additional probing by a caring adult.

As was true in some of the incidents covered in the Safe School Initiative’s study,

individuals in contact with the attacker each may have observed something of

concern about that student’s behavior, but not of sufficient concern for them to

notify anyone in a position to respond. 
THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE

Educators and other adults can learn how to pick up on these signals and make

appropriate referrals. By inquiring about any information that may have prompted

some concern, an investigator may be able to develop a more comprehensive picture

of the student’s past and current behavior, and identify any indications that the

student is intent on or planning to attack. However, discretion should be exercised

in determining whom to talk to about the student, so as not to alienate or stigmatize

the student of concern. 

Key Finding 6

Most attackers had difficulty coping with significant losses or personal failures.

Many had considered or attempted suicide.

Explanation

Many students, not just those who engaged in school-based attacks, experience or

perceive major losses in their lives. Most students who face a significant loss, or who

have difficulty coping with such a loss, are not going to be at risk for a school-based

attack. However, information that indicates a student is facing or having trouble

dealing with a significantly difficult situation may indicate a need to refer the student

to appropriate services and resources.

In addition, more than three-quarters of school shooters had a history of suicidal

thoughts, threats, gestures, or attempts. Most of these students were known to have

been severely depressed or desperate at some point before their attacks. 

Example: One school shooter submitted a series of poems describing his

thoughts of suicide and homicide to his English teacher. One poem read:

Am I insane

To want to end this pain

To want to end my life

By using a sharp knife

Am I insane

Thinking life is profane

Knowing life is useless

Cause my emotions are a mess

Am I insane

Thinking I’ve nothing to gain

Considering suicide

Cause love has died

Am I insane 

Wanting to spill blood like rain

Sending them all to Hell

From humanity I’ve fell

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CHAPTER III - KEY FINDINGS

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The teacher became concerned and recommended that the student receive

help. Help, however, was not offered. After failing to kill himself, this student

killed two adults at school. He hoped to be convicted of capital murder and

executed by the state.

Implications 

In cases where there is concern about the possibility that a student may engage in

targeted violence, an inquiry or investigation should include attention to any

indication that a student is having difficulty coping with major losses or perceived

failures, particularly where these losses or failures appear to have prompted feelings

of desperation and hopelessness. An inquiry or investigation also should anticipate

changes in the life of a troubled student, and consider whether these changes might

increase–or decrease–the threat that the student poses.

Key Finding 7

Many attackers felt bullied, persecuted, or injured by others prior to the attack.

Explanation

Bullying was not a factor in every case, and clearly not every child who is bullied in

school will pose a risk for targeted violence in school. Nevertheless, in a number of

the incidents of targeted school violence studied, attackers described being bullied in

terms that suggested that these experiences approached torment. These attackers

told of behaviors that, if they occurred in the workplace, likely would meet legal

definitions of harassment and/or assault.

Example: In one situation, most of the attacker’s schoolmates described the

attacker as "the kid everyone teased." In witness statements from that

incident, schoolmates described how virtually every child in the school had at

some point thrown the attacker against a locker; tripped him in the hall; held

his head under water in the pool; or thrown things at him. Several

schoolmates had noted that the attacker acted differently in the days

preceding the attack in that he seemed more annoyed by and less tolerant of

the teasing than usual.

Implications 

The prevalence of bullying found by the Safe School Initiative’s examination of

targeted school violence and in other recent studies should strongly support ongoing

efforts to reduce bullying in American schools. Educators can play an important role

in ensuring that students are not bullied in schools and that schools not only do not

permit bullying, but also empower other students to let adults in the school know if

students are being bullied.
THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE

Key Finding 8

Most attackers had access to and had used weapons prior to the attack.

Explanation

Almost two-thirds of attackers used a handgun in their attack. Almost half used a

rifle. Most attackers acquired weapons from their home or the home of a relative.

Approximately two-thirds of attackers had a history of using guns prior to the attack.

Implications 

Access to weapons among some students may be common. However, when the idea

of an attack exists, any effort to acquire, prepare, or use a weapon or ammunition,

including bomb-making components, may be a significant move in the attacker’s

progression from idea to action. Any inquiry should include investigation of and

attention to weapons access and use and to communications about weapons.

The large proportion of attackers who acquired their guns from home points to the

need for schools and law enforcement officials to collaborate on policies and

procedures for responding when a student is thought to have a firearm in school. In

particular, schools should be aware of the provisions of the Federal Gun-Free

Schools Act, which generally requires a minimum one-year expulsion of students who

bring a gun to school and that all violations be reported to local law enforcement

officials.

Key Finding 9 

In many cases, other students were involved in the attack in some capacity.

Explanation

The Safe School Initiative found that in over half of the incidents, others assisted in

the planning or execution of the attack by actively encouraging the attacker to shoot

others at school, or even helping to select targets and train the shooter in how to use

a weapon.

Example: One attacker’s original idea had been to bring a gun to school and

let other students see him with it. He wanted to look tough, so that the

students who had been harassing him would leave him alone. When the

attacker shared this idea with two friends, however, they convinced him that

he could not just show up with a gun, but actually had to shoot at people at

the school in order to get the other students to leave him alone. It was after

this conversation that he decided to mount his school attack.

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CHAPTER III - KEY FINDINGS

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Implications

This finding highlights the importance of considering what prompting or

encouragement a student may receive from others in his life that influences any

intent, planning, or preparations for a potential attack. Any inquiry or investigation

of potential targeted school violence should include attention to the role that a

student’s friends or peers may be playing in that student’s thinking about and

preparations for an attack. It is possible that feedback from friends or others may

help to move a student from an unformed thought about attacking to developing and

advancing a plan to carry out the attack. 

This finding speaks to the importance of school officials paying attention to the

"settings" and climates of their schools. Peers exert enormous influence over their

friends and schoolmates. And principals, teachers, counselors, coaches, and other

adults at school may make all the difference in preventing violence. An environment

in which it is clear that violence doesn’t solve problems, but only makes them worse,

may help prevent tragedy. A climate in which a young person is seen as a "snitch" or

a "rat" for telling an adult about a student in distress differs from one in which young

people know that they can call on adults to help students who are in pain.

Key Finding 10 

Despite prompt law enforcement responses, most attacks were stopped by means

other than law enforcement intervention and most were brief in duration.

Explanation

Law enforcement authorities responded quickly to almost all calls from schools about

attacks. However, most attacks were resolved within minutes, without law

enforcement intervention.

Implications

The short duration of most incidents of targeted school violence argues for the

importance of developing preventive measures in addition to any emergency planning

for a school or school district. The preventive measures should include protocols

and procedures for responding to and managing threats and other behaviors of

concern. 

In summary, the findings of the Safe School Initiative suggest that some future school

attacks may be preventable. The fact that most attackers engaged in pre-incident

planning behavior and shared their intentions and plans with others, suggests that

those conducting threat assessment inquiries or investigations could uncover these

types of information. The remainder of this Guide sets forth how to develop a

capacity for and conduct a threat assessment process.
THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE

26
CHAPTER IV - IMPLEMENTING A PROCESS

CHAPTER IV

IMPLEMENTING A

SCHOOL THREAT

ASSESSMENT

PROCESS
CHAPTER IV - IMPLEMENTING A SCHOOL THREAT ASSESSMENT PROCESS

29

The primary purpose of a threat assessment is to prevent targeted violence. The

threat assessment process is centered upon on analysis of the facts and evidence of

behavior in a given situation. The appraisal of risk in a threat assessment focuses on

actions, communications, and specific circumstances that might suggest that an

individual intends to mount an attack and is engaged in planning or preparing for

that event. 

In a situation that becomes the focus of a threat assessment inquiry or investigation,

appropriate authorities gather information, evaluate facts, and make a determination

as to whether a given student poses a threat of violence to a target. If an inquiry

indicates that there is a risk of violence in a specific situation, authorities conducting

the threat assessment collaborate with others to develop and implement a plan to

manage or reduce the threat posed by the student in that situation. 

Six principles form the foundation of the threat assessment process. These

principles are:

• Targeted violence is the end result of an understandable, and oftentimes

discernible, process of thinking and behavior.

• Targeted violence stems from an interaction among the individual, the

situation, the setting, and the target.

• An investigative, skeptical, inquisitive mindset is critical to successful threat

assessment.

• Effective threat assessment is based upon facts rather than on characteristics

or "traits."

• An "integrated systems approach" should guide threat assessment inquiries and

investigations.

• The central question in a threat assessment inquiry or investigation is whether

a student poses a threat, not whether the student has made a threat.

In addition, three elements guide the development and operation of an effective

school threat assessment program. These elements are:

• authority to conduct an assessment;

• capacity to conduct inquiries and investigations; and,

• systems relationships.

These principles and elements are discussed below.

Principles of the Threat Assessment Process

This Guide is about the systematic use of threat assessment as a central component

in preventing targeted school violence. The threat assessment process involves
THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE

identifying, assessing, and managing individuals who might pose a risk of violence to

an identified or identifiable target. Implementation of a threat assessment process is

informed by six underlying principles.

Principle 1: Targeted violence is the end result of an understandable, and oftentimes

discernible, process of thinking and behavior.

Findings of the Safe School Initiative indicate that students and former students who

committed targeted attacks at schools almost always thought about their attacks in

advance and did not "just snap" suddenly. These findings suggest that students who

carry out school attacks may consider possible targets; talk with others about their

ideas and intentions; and record their thinking in diaries and journals or on a Web

site. They may seek out weapons to use in the attack, and they may practice with

these weapons in preparation for the attack. The actions of these attackers may be

deliberate and occur over days and weeks, months or years.

Principle 2: Targeted violence stems from an interaction among the person, the

situation, the setting, and the target.

Understanding and preventing acts of targeted violence require a focus on these four

component parts and their interaction: the person, the situation, the setting, and the

target. 

• The potential attacker: To determine the risk of targeted violence, a threat

assessor must gather information about the potential attacker. In a threat

assessment inquiry or investigation, a major question is: How has this student

dealt with situations that have led him or her to see life as unbearably

stressful? Individuals who in times of great stress have considered or acted

upon ideas of suicide or violence toward others, or both, should be considered

persons of increased concern.

• The situation: Investigators should examine circumstances and significant

events in the life of the individual, especially recent events that have been

overwhelmingly stressful. For students who engaged in school-based attacks,

those events included having been bullied and humiliated, especially in public;

loss of significant relationships; and perceived failures or loss of status.

Almost all school shooters experienced some major situational stress at some

point before their attack.11

• The setting: The third factor to consider is the specific setting at the time that

the student came to authorities’ attention as possibly posing a threat of

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targeted school violence. Do fellow students, friends, or others say–directly or

indirectly–that violence is not a solution to problems? Do these people

suggest ways to get help and assistance? In a school, are there respectful

connections among students and adults, networks of trusting relationships,

that facilitate non-violent problem-solving? Or is the idea of violence proposed,

supported, accepted, or ignored by those who know the potential attacker?

In many school shootings, other young persons knew about the shooter’s

interest in mounting an attack. In some cases, clear warnings were dismissed

or ignored. In others, friends and fellow students of the shooter encouraged

or helped the attacker in his pursuit of violence. Messages about the

acceptability of violence that are communicated directly or subtly to a potential

attacker by students and/or adults in his or her environment may facilitate, or

alternatively help to prevent, an attack.

• The target: When assessing the risk of an attack at school, investigators and

others with protective responsibilities also must pay attention to the

individual’s choice of a potential target. The attacker may target a particular

individual or group of individuals over some perceived injury or loss. In some

cases, attackers chose a specific target, such as a particular student or teacher.

In other instances, the target was more general: the school itself, "jocks," or

"kids in the cafeteria." 

Principle 3: An investigative, skeptical, inquisitive mindset is critical to successful

threat assessment.

An investigative mindset is central to successful application of the threat assessment

process. Threat assessment requires thoughtful probing; viewing information with

healthy skepticism; and paying attention to key points about pre-attack behaviors.

Authorities who carry out threat assessments must strive

to be both accurate and fair.

Moreover, threat assessors should question the

information in front of them continuously. Ideally, there

should be credible verification of all essential "facts."

Information about a potential attacker’s interests,

statements, and actions should be corroborated,

wherever possible.

The investigative mindset and perspective also rely on

common sense. Threat assessors working to understand

a given situation should step back periodically from the

individual details of an inquiry or investigation and ask

whether information gathered makes sense and supports

any hypothesis developed concerning the risk posed by

the subject of the threat assessment inquiry.

11 It should be emphasized again that many young people experience losses, failures, humiliations, and

other kinds of situational stressors and that few become school shooters.

The investigative mindset and

perspective also rely on

common sense. Threat

assessors working to

understand a given situation

should step back periodically

from the individual details of

an inquiry or investigation

and ask whether information

gathered makes sense and

supports any hypothesis

developed concerning the

risk posed by the subject of

the threat assessment inquiry.
THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE

Principle 4: Effective threat assessment is based on facts rather than characteristics

or "traits."

A major principle of threat assessment is that each investigation stands on its own.

Inferences and conclusions about risk should be guided by an analysis of facts and

behaviors specific to the person of concern and the given situation. Any student with

the motive, intent, and ability potentially is capable of mounting a targeted attack at

school. Judgments about a student’s risk of violence should be based upon analysis

of behaviorally relevant facts, not on "traits" or "characteristics" of a given individual

or of a class of individuals.

In the climate of fear that followed recent attacks, students in high schools across the

country who appeared angry and wore trench coats were marked as possible school

attackers. They were so labeled because of appearance and demeanor. Blanket

characterizations, or student "profiles," do not provide a reliable basis for making

judgments of the threat posed by a particular student.12 Even worse, the use of

profiles can shift attention away from more reliable facts and evidence about a

student’s behavior and communications.

Principle 5: An "integrated systems approach" should guide threat assessment

investigations.

In a threat assessment, bits of information might be viewed as pieces of a puzzle.

Each bit may appear inconsequential or only slightly worrisome by itself. But, when

the pieces are put together–as oftentimes has occurred in "after the fact" analyses of

school attacks–the behaviors and communications of a student may coalesce into a

discernible pattern that indicates a threat of violence. In many school attacks,

information existed within the school and community that might have alerted

authorities to the risk of attack posed by a particular student. 

Relationships with agencies and service systems within the school and the

surrounding community are critical to identifying, assessing, and managing students

who are on a path toward carrying out a school attack. An integrated systems

approach recognizes the necessity of cooperation and partnerships between schools

and systems outside of the school. These may include law enforcement, social

services and mental health providers, the courts, community agencies, families,

worksites, religious organizations, and others. 

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Principle 6: The central question of a threat assessment is whether a student poses a

threat, not whether the student made a threat.

Although some individuals who threaten harm may pose a real threat of targeted

violence, many do not. The Safe School Initiative found that fewer than 20 percent of

school shooters communicated a direct or conditional threat to their target before the

attack. By contrast, individuals who are found to pose threats of violence frequently

do not make threats to their targets. The study found that in more than 80 percent

of the cases, school shooters did not threaten their targets directly, but they did

communicate their intent and/or plans to others before the attack. 

These findings underscore the importance of making

judgments in threat assessment investigations based upon a

student’s behaviors and communications, rather than upon

whether or not that student threatened his or her target.

Authorities conducting threat assessment investigations

must distinguish between making a threat, e.g., telling a

potential target that he or she may or will be harmed, and

posing a threat, e.g., engaging in behavior that indicates

furthering a plan or building capacity for a violent act. 

Nevertheless, threats of violence should not be dismissed

out of hand. Students may make threats with a variety of

intents and for a wide range of reasons, e.g., to get

attention; to express anger or frustration; to frighten or

coerce their peers; as a part of joking or "playing around;"

or, in some cases, to communicate intent to attack.

Consequently, every threat should receive prompt attention. Although voicing a

threat should not be used as the principal determinant in making judgments about

the likelihood of a school attack, it likewise would be a mistake to assume that

individuals who make threats in every instance are unlikely to follow through on

those communications. 

Elements of a School Threat Assessment Process

Authorities involved in carrying out a threat assessment inquiry or investigation

should gather and analyze information about the behavior and communications of

the student of concern. This information, in turn, will permit these authorities to

make reasonable judgments about whether the student of concern is moving along a

path toward an attack on an identifiable target. Three elements are essential to the

development and operation of an effective school safety threat assessment program.13

12 Please refer to Reddy, et. al. (2001), "Evaluating Risk for Targeted Violence in Schools: Comparing Risk

Assessment, Threat Assessment, and Other Approaches," for a discussion of the use and limitations of

profiling as a tool for assessing the risk of targeted school violence. The full citation for the article is

provided in the Appendix, Annotated Resources, of this Guide.

13 See Chapter VII, Action Plans for School Leaders, for further guidance in creating school

threat assessment programs.

Authorities conducting

threat assessment

investigations must

distinguish between

making a threat, e.g.,

telling a potential target

that he or she may or

will be harmed, and

posing a threat, e.g.,

engaging in behavior

that indicates furthering

a plan or building

capacity for a violent act.
THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE

1. Authority to Conduct an Assessment

A teacher comes to the principal’s office to report "the kids are saying that Johnny

told his friends not to go to the cafeteria at noon on Tuesday because something big

and bad is going to happen." What did Johnny mean by that statement? Is Johnny

planning to attack the school? Perhaps Johnny is engaging in idle talk. Perhaps the

report of Johnny’s statement is inaccurate. Perhaps Johnny is planning an attack on

the school or has knowledge about other students’ plans. 

Clearly, this information cannot be ignored. How, then, should the principal respond

to this report? Should the principal call Johnny to the office and ask him about the

report? Should other students be queried about the report? What if Johnny denies

making the statement that has been reported, while other students assert otherwise?

Schools should have in place clear policies on collecting and reacting to information

on potentially threatening situations and determining whether this information merits

further attention through a threat assessment inquiry and investigation. Threat

assessment inquiry and investigation should be initiated if there is credible

information that passes a critical threshold of concern. 

In creating these policies, school administrators should be aware of and consult with

the school’s legal counsel about legal issues related to the conduct of a threat

assessment inquiry or investigation. These legal issues include the effects of laws

pertaining to: (1) access to and sharing of information, and (2) searches of a

student’s person or property. Each of these issues should be discussed with the

school’s legal counsel. 

Establishing Authority to Conduct an Inquiry or Investigation

A formal policy authorizing school officials to conduct a threat assessment should

cover the following topics:

• the purpose and scope of the policy;

• the role of educators and the threat assessment team in relation to the role of

law enforcement;

• the identity of, and delegation of authority to, school officials concerning

determination that a threat assessment inquiry or investigation should be

pursued;

• the definition of the threshold of concern for initiating a threat assessment

inquiry or investigation, i.e., a description of the nature and extent of behavior

or communication that would trigger a threat assessment inquiry or

investigation;

• the description of the types of information that may be gathered during the

assessment;

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• the designation of the individuals or group of individuals who would be

responsible for gathering and analyzing information; and

• the steps and procedures to be followed from initiation to conclusion of the

threat assessment inquiry or investigation.

Information-Sharing in Support of the School Threat Assessment Process

Much emphasis in this Guide is placed upon the importance of sharing information

about a student who may pose a risk of violence. In most previous school shootings,

there was information available prior to the incident that suggested that the student

was planning an attack at school. 

However, when conducting an inquiry or investigation regarding a potential threat,

the inquirer or investigator will find that different people in the student’s life may

have different–and possibly small–pieces of the puzzle. It is the responsibility of the

threat assessment team to gather this information from what may be multiple

sources–teachers, parents, friends, guidance counselors, after-school program staff,

part-time employers, and others. 

Once information is gathered from the various sources contacted during a threat

assessment inquiry, the threat assessment team may wish to explore options for

storing this information in an accessible format. The team likewise may wish to

consider keeping the information in a central location. 

Legal Considerations in Developing Information-Sharing Policies and Procedures

Although the need to gather information about a student who may pose a threat of

violence is clear, the ability to share this information requires some advance

consideration. Laws, rules, regulations, and policies, for example, may place

limitations on access to student records and restrict the use of accessible information

in conjunction with investigations. In formulating information-sharing policies and

procedures, threat assessment teams should consult with their respective school’s–or

school district’s–legal counsel to ensure that team members are well-briefed on

existing laws and regulations and their implications for the development of policies

and procedures for accessing and disclosing student information. In particular,

threat assessment teams should examine provisions of these laws and regulations to

identify opportunities for including threatening situations in schools as exceptions to

constraints on the disclosure of information contained in education records. 

Two principal areas of law–federal statutes and state statutes–may affect access to

and sharing of information about a particular student. An overview of the

implications of these areas of law for conducting threat assessment investigations is

provided in the following. 
THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE

Federal Statutes

Under existing federal law, a school’s authority to release information about a

student is governed by the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA).14

The intent of FERPA is to protect the privacy of "education records," a term that is

defined as any records that contain information directly related to a student and that

are maintained by the educational agency or institution or by a person acting for the

agency or institution. Under provisions of FERPA, a school may not disclose

personally identifiable information about a student from any education records

without the prior written consent of the student’s parent or, in the case of students

who are 18 or older, the consent of the student.

FERPA does allow for various exceptions to privacy protections covering access to

student records, specifying situations and conditions under which a school may

disclose information from a student’s education records without consent. A detailed

analysis of these exceptions is beyond the scope of this Guide. However, there are

two exceptions that are worth noting because of their specific relevance to accessing

and sharing information for threat assessment inquiries:

• Health and Safety Emergencies: FERPA provides that schools may disclose

information from a student’s education records in situations where there is an

immediate need to share that information in order to protect the health or

safety of the student or others.15 Under this exception, schools must define the

term "health or safety emergency" narrowly and are permitted to disclose

information from education records only to those individuals who need the

information in order to protect the student and others.

• Law Enforcement Unit Records: FERPA regulations draw a distinction between

records created by a school law enforcement unit for law enforcement

purposes, such as the enforcement of a local, state, or federal law, and records

created by a school law enforcement unit for non-law enforcement purposes,

such as the enforcement of school policies concerning behavior or disciplinary

actions. FERPA also distinguishes between student information that school

law enforcement unit officials gathered from education records and student

information that unit officials obtained from other sources. With respect to

disclosure of student information contained in school law enforcement unit

records, FERPA provides that:

- Personally identifiable information about a student may be disclosed by

school officials if that information is held in a school law enforcement unit

record that was created to enforce a federal, state, or local law.

- Information in school law enforcement unit records that was not obtained

from a student’s education records may also be disclosed without the

consent of the student’s parents or the student. 

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It is important to note that FERPA regulations govern the disclosure of student

information from education records and any information about the student that is

based upon information contained in education records. FERPA regulations do not

restrict the authority of school officials to share other information about a student

that is not contained in education records. For example, information such as a

school official’s personal observations about or interactions with a student that is not

contained in education records may be disclosed.

State Law and Access to Student Records

State laws governing access to and sharing of information about students vary from

state to state. Moreover, in the wake of highly publicized school shootings in the

1990s, several states enacted laws that revise restrictions on disclosure of

information contained in student records. In some states, these amendments, in

effect, make it easier to share this information among schools, law enforcement

agencies, and others in furtherance of protecting the safety of students at school.16

2. Capacity to Conduct Inquiries and Investigations

Proactive planning is a critical element in the implementation of a school threat

assessment program. School administrators should consider creating a

multidisciplinary threat assessment team that is based in the school or the school

district. Schools should not wait until a crisis occurs to establish a threat assessment

team. Many schools across the country already have established teams to respond to

a wide range of situations, from suicides to meeting special education needs. The

expertise and knowledge of any existing teams may be useful in developing a threat

assessment team.

The roles and responsibilities of the team as a whole, and of members of that team

individually, should be clearly defined. The information gathering and assessment

procedures to be used by the team should be formalized. Team members should be

trained together in the threat assessment process. Multidisciplinary training sessions

provide opportunities for professionals in different systems to build relationships and

to consider how to address issues before a crisis arises. Training that uses practical

exercises–"what should we do if ..."–can enhance threat assessment and management

programs and processes.

The multidisciplinary threat assessment team’s principal responsibility is to guide the

assessment and management of situations of concern. A senior school administrator

should chair the team. Regular members of the team ideally should include: 1) a

respected member of the school faculty or administration; 2) an investigator, such as

14 20 U.S. C. 1232g. See "Information Sharing" in the Appendix, Annotated Resources, of the

Guide for referral to additional sources of information on FERPA. 15 34 CFR 99.31(a)(10).

16 See "Information Sharing" in the Appendix, Annotated Resources, of the Guide for references

that review some of the more recent changes to state laws that affect access to and disclosure of student

information contained in education records.
THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE

a school resource officer or other police officer assigned to the school; 3) a mental

health professional, such as a forensic psychologist, a clinical psychologist, or a

school psychologist; and 4) other professionals, such as guidance counselors,

teachers, coaches, and others, who may be able to contribute to the threat

assessment process.

In addition, the chair of the threat assessment team may wish to consider including

as an ad hoc member of the team someone who knows the student of concern in the

threat assessment inquiry. This ad hoc position might be held by an individual from

the school community, such as a teacher, counselor, coach, nurse, other school

employee, or someone from the community who may know or have knowledge of the

student, such as a probation officer, member of the clergy, or a social service worker.

If the student of concern is being provided services under the Individuals with

Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA), a representative from the team that developed

or manages that student’s Individualized Education Plan (IEP) also should be

brought onto the threat assessment team as an ad hoc member for the inquiry

regarding this particular student. 

Skills and Training

Developing the capacity to conduct school threat assessments involves recruiting,

training, and supporting professionals with special skills. The qualifications, skills,

knowledge and experience of the members of the threat assessment team should

include:

• a questioning, analytical, and skeptical mindset;

• an ability to relate well to parents, colleagues, other professionals, and

students;

• familiarity with childhood and adolescent growth and development, the school

environment, the need for safe schools, and the community;

• a reputation within the school and the community for fairness and

trustworthiness;

• training in the collection and evaluation of information from multiple sources;

• discretion, and an appreciation for the importance of keeping information

confidential, and of the possible harm that may result in the inappropriate

release of information; and

• cognizance of the difference between harming and helping in an intervention.

3. Integrated Systems Relationships

In order to identify, assess, and manage students who might pose threats of targeted

violence, a threat assessment program must build relationships among individuals

and organizations both within the school and external to the school. These

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relationships can help the team acquire and use information about a given situation,

and aid those with protective responsibilities in developing strategies to prevent

targeted school violence.

Ideally, community systems concerned with education, safety, and child welfare

would have well-established policies and procedures for cooperation and

collaboration. In practice, these systems oftentimes are large and overburdened and

tend to carry out their functions independently. In a well-functioning threat

assessment program, effective systems relationships are most likely to occur between

individuals, not institutions. 

Individuals who build and maintain these relationships across disciplines and

agencies are called "boundary spanners."17 They serve as a formal link or liaison

between various systems and meet regularly with them. Boundary spanners have

credibility, respect, and strong interpersonal skills. In addition, they should

understand the needs and operation of other systems. This understanding helps in

integrating ongoing interagency relationships, in developing written protocols, and in

facilitating the resolution of conflicts.

17 Steadman, H., "Boundary Spanners: A Key Component for the Effective Interactions of the Justice and

Mental Health Systems." Law and Human Behavior. 16 (February, 1992): 75-87. 
THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE

40
CHAPTER V - CONDUCTING AN ASSESSMENT

CHAPTER V

CONDUCTING A

SCHOOL THREAT

ASSESSMENT 
CHAPTER V - CONDUCTING A SCHOOL THREAT ASSESSMENT

43

This chapter focuses specifically on carrying out the threat assessment process. The

sections that follow address the issue of identifying threatening situations; describe

the information that should be sought in a threat assessment; identify potential

sources of information; and set out 11 key questions that may provide members of

the threat assessment team guidance in making judgments about whether a student

of concern poses a threat. 

The approach presented is highly detailed but should not be read as suggesting that

most, or even many, threat assessments will require extensive or elaborate gathering

and analysis of information. Threat assessments may be brief and limited, or

extensive and complex. The facts of a situation, together with information developed

about a student of concern, will determine the scope of the threat assessment

process. Many situations can be understood and resolved after initial informationgathering and evaluation.

The Threat Assessment Process as a Continuum

In previous chapters of this Guide, the terms "threat assessment inquiry" and "threat

assessment investigation" generally have been used interchangeably. In this chapter,

threat assessment inquiries and threat assessment investigations will be addressed as

two complementary parts of a threat assessment continuum. Under this model of the

threat assessment process, evaluation of a threatening situation proceeds from a

threat assessment inquiry, carried out by the school threat assessment team, to a

threat assessment investigation, carried out by a law enforcement agency, if the initial

inquiry determines that there is a valid threat of targeted school violence. 

There may be several "right ways" to designate responsibility for conducting a threat

assessment. One community or school system may decide to give primary

responsibility to specially trained law enforcement professionals. Another may keep

responsibility for most threat assessment and management within the school system.

Still other communities develop "blended" systems. School, law enforcement, and

community leaders should consider the principles of threat assessment, the functions

needed for a successful program, and local resources and relationships before

deciding what delineation of responsibilities makes the most sense.

The threat assessment process is being presented in this manner as a means of

underscoring the proposition that not all situations that become the focus of school

threat assessment inquiries will require referral to and follow-up threat assessment

investigations by law enforcement officials. For example, some preliminary inquiries

by members of the school threat assessment team will find that information about a

student was false or unfounded, or that the behavior of the student who is the subject

of this inquiry does not present a risk of targeted violence and can be managed by

school administrators and other officials on an informal basis. The situations

examined in these inquiries do not pose threats to the school, the student body, or
THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE

the community, and therefore generally would not be referred to law enforcement

agencies. By contrast, threat assessment inquiries that conclude that a valid threat of

targeted school violence exists will require referral to law enforcement officials for

further investigation. 

Central Distinctions Between Threat Assessment Inquiries and Investigations

The central distinctions between a threat assessment

inquiry and a threat assessment investigation are defined

by the management of these two parts of the threat

assessment continuum. The primary objective of both a

threat assessment inquiry and an investigation is to

determine whether a particular student poses a threat of

targeted school violence. Both an inquiry and an

investigation ask "Is there information to suggest that this

student is on the path to an attack? What is the risk of

targeted violence?" 

A threat assessment inquiry is initiated and controlled by school authorities (often

with law enforcement consultation and participation). Information is gathered at the

school and by persons known to the school. If information collected suggests that the

student of concern is considering mounting an attack at school, it may be

appropriate to refer the situation to law enforcement for an investigation. Also, if

information gathered in a threat assessment inquiry suggests that it is likely that a

violation of law has occurred, it may be appropriate to refer the situation to law

enforcement.

A threat assessment investigation also asks: "Does this student pose a threat of

targeted violence?" In addition, investigators may ask: "Has this student violated a

law?"

With respect to their management, the threat assessment inquiry and the threat

assessment investigation differ as follows:

• threat assessment inquiries are initiated, conducted, and controlled by the

school threat assessment team;

• threat assessment investigations are initiated, conducted, and controlled by law

enforcement agencies.

The line between a threat assessment inquiry and a threat assessment

investigation–the point along the threat assessment continuum at which a school

threat assessment team decides that a threatening situation must be referred to a law

enforcement agency for investigation–will be determined by the school threat

assessment team in consultation with school administrators and law enforcement

officials. These determinations, in turn, will be made on a case-by-case basis.

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Nevertheless, in developing policies and procedures for carrying out a threat

assessment inquiry, the threat assessment program should establish a general

threshold for initiating inquiries and referring threatening situations to law

enforcement agencies.

Identifying Students of Concern

As discussion of the threat assessment process in this Guide indicates, that process is

not about the wholesale examination of the student body to identify students who

may be at risk of committing acts of targeted school violence. Instead, threat

assessment is a tool for responding to threatening situations in which there is

concern about a particular student who has come to the attention of school

administrators or other authorities. 

Students who become the focus of threat assessment inquiries and investigations may

come to the attention of authorities in a number of ways.

Circumstances That Bring a Student to Official Attention

Some students may bring themselves to the attention of authorities by engaging in

communications that cause concern:

• A student submits a story for an English assignment about a character that

shoots other students in his school. 

• Two students in a video class make a movie about kids who bring bombs to

school. 

• A dean receives an e-mail stating, "I’m going to kill everyone in this asylum." 

• A seventh-grader, who is known to be feared by his classmates, cocks a finger

at another boy on the playground and says "you’re gonna die." 

• The personal Web page of a high-achieving student has links to Web pages

with information about cyanide.

In each of the situations described above, a student has behaved in a manner that

causes concern to school administrators and other authorities. Each situation

requires some kind of follow-up inquiry or investigation. In each case, the identity of

the student is known or potentially knowable. In some cases, the student’s

communication is a direct threat. In other cases, the communication is ambiguous.

Other students of concern come to the attention of authorities through second or

third parties: 

• A school bus driver tells the principal of a school that a group of students has

been overheard whispering about bringing a gun to school.

• A ninth-grader reports that he has been threatened by another student and

warned not to tell anybody about the threat.

The primary objective of

both a threat assessment

inquiry and an

investigation is to

determine whether a

particular student poses

a threat of targeted

school violence.
THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE

• A student reports overhearing a lunchroom conversation between two other

students in which one of the students says that he "isn’t going to take it any

more. I’m going to get even for good."

• A neighbor of a student calls the school to report suspicions that the student is

experimenting with bomb-making materials.

In still other cases, students come to the attention of authorities through anonymous

communications: 

• A parent anonymously calls a tip line to report concerns about the behavior of

a student.

• The school district superintendent’s office receives an anonymous call stating

that a bomb will go off in one of the middle schools at 1:45 p.m.

• An anonymous letter signed "Fans of Eric and Dylan Club" arrives at a high

school. The letter states "Remember Columbine" and warns that "Judgment

Day" is coming.

Information provided anonymously requires careful evaluation by the school threat

assessment team. Some information may be accurate. Some information may be

partial or incomplete. Some may be false and/or fabricated with malicious intent. 

In situations where a student is not easily identifiable from an anonymous

communication, more sophisticated identification techniques may be required.

These methods and techniques may necessitate involvement of law enforcement

organizations, particularly in situations where there are anonymous warnings of

imminent danger, such as bomb threats.

Managing Communications about Students of Concern

Policies regarding the handling of communications that raise concerns about students

should address the following topics:

• Establishing low barriers for reporting for those who may have information of

concern.18

• Advising students and adults of the kinds of information that should be

brought forward: threats; weapon-seeking and weapon-using behavior;

homicidal and suicidal behaviors; behaviors suggesting that a young person is

contemplating, or planning, an attack. 

• Ensuring that a thoughtful process is put in place in the school or school

district to assess information that is brought forward about a potential

attacker. This process should be perceived as credible by students and adults.

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• Recognizing that what is reported may often be different than what actually

was said or occurred.

• Establishing and continually reinforcing a policy that it is everyone’s

responsibility to help develop and maintain a respectful, safe school

environment.

• Reinforcing positive behaviors by teachers, students, and staff in the school.

• Building linkages to individuals, groups, and organizations that can offer

support and assistance to students and to the school. Sometimes these

persons and groups may provide information that can help prevent targeted

violent attacks.

Creating a Central Point of Contact 

Individuals who have information about students that is cause for concern should

know how to refer this information and to whom. The threat assessment team

should designate a member of the team to serve as the initial point of contact for

information of possible concern. The availability of this point of contact should be

made known community-wide. An anonymous tip line may be of use if there is a

process in place to carefully evaluate the information that is received by means of this

approach. The threat assessment team member who serves as initial point of contact

will screen information and determine whether to initiate a threat assessment inquiry

or to consult other members of the team.

Schools should publicize the name of the designated point of contact to faculty, staff,

parents, and students as the person to contact with any information of potential

concern. Students, faculty, staff, and parents should be instructed and encouraged to

bring forward information about any activity that evokes concern about possible

targeted violence. Information of interest includes threatening statements and

writings; behavior that indicates that an attack is being planned; and attempts to

acquire weapons.

Individuals who provide information concerning a student should receive follow-up

acknowledgments of their communications from the central point of contact, such as:

"We have carefully considered the information you shared with us" or "We appreciate

your bringing this situation to our attention." A follow-up acknowledgment can be

made without revealing confidential or inappropriate information, and it reinforces

the proposition that individuals in the community can play an important role in

alerting school officials and other authorities of suspected threatening situations. 

The Threat Assessment Inquiry

This section describes the process for conducting a threat assessment inquiry. The

information developed during the inquiry will inform the threat assessment team’s

analysis of a potentially threatening situation and provide the basis for deciding

whether that situation should be referred to a law enforcement agency for a threat

assessment investigation.

18 There is a growing body of literature on lowering barriers for persons with concerns and on integrated

conflict management systems that may be of interest to school administrators. See for example Designing

Integrated Conflict Management Systems: Guidelines for Practitioners and Decision Makers in Organizations,

Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, 2001, http://www.spidr.org/article/icmsD.html
THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE

In the event that a threatening situation is referred to a law enforcement agency, the

information gathered and analyzed by the threat assessment team during the threat

assessment inquiry will be forwarded to the investigative law enforcement agency.

That information will provide direction to police officials’ more in-depth examination

of the behaviors and communications of the student of concern. 

When should a threat assessment inquiry be initiated?

When information about a student’s behavior and

communications passes an agreed-upon threshold of

concern, school officials should initiate a threat

assessment inquiry. Upon receiving information

concerning a potentially threatening situation, the threat

assessment team must first consider: "How much time do

we have?" An inquiry should be initiated immediately

(within hours of notification) in any situation of concern. 

If information concerning a threatening situation suggests

that violence is imminent–for example, a student has

acquired a weapon and is on his way to the school with

the intention of shooting another student–that matter of

course should be referred immediately to police.

When information is received concerning a potentially threatening situation, the

safety of the school and the community is the priority consideration. The threat

assessment team therefore should consider how to handle a student of concern while

an inquiry or investigation is being conducted. In making decisions about how to

handle a student pending the outcome of a threat assessment inquiry or investigation,

care should be exercised to ensure that a student of concern is not treated

inappropriately, since any allegations regarding the behavior or perceived

dangerousness of the student may be unfounded. 

What information should be sought in an inquiry?

Once a decision has been made to conduct an inquiry, the threat assessment team

should develop an information plan. A school threat assessment inquiry should seek

information in five areas: 

1. The facts that drew attention to the student, the situation, and possibly the targets

The first area of inquiry concerns how the student came to the attention of school

officials. What behaviors and/or communications were reported, and by whom?

What was the situation? Who, if anyone, witnessed the reported behavior of

concern? What was the context for the reported behavior, i.e., what else was going

on at the time of the reported behavior?

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Individuals who report information about possible threatening situations may have

multiple motives. Alleged accounts of behaviors may be inaccurate and may be

subjective interpretations of events. Careful attention to the facts–with

corroboration wherever possible–will help determine whether the situation warrants

scrutiny.

2. Information about the student

Three kinds of general information about a student should be gathered: identifiers,

background information, and information about the student’s current life situation

and circumstances.

A. Identifying information:

• name;

• physical description;

• date of birth; and

• identification numbers (e.g., Social Security number, student ID, etc.).

B. Background information: 

• residences; 

• family/home situation; 

• academic performance; 

• social networks;

• history of relationships and conflicts; 

• history of harassing others or of being harassed by others;

• history of violence toward self and others;

• history of having been a victim of violence or bullying;

• known attitudes toward violence; 

• criminal behavior;

• mental health/substance abuse history; 

• access to and use of weapons; and

• history of grievances and grudges. 

C. Current life information: 

• present stability of living and home situations; 

• nature and quality of current relationships and personal support; 

• recent losses or losses of status (shame, humiliation, recent breakup or loss of

significant relationship); 

• current grievances or grudges; 

• perceptions of being treated unfairly; 

• known difficulty coping with a stressful event; 

• any "downward" progression in social, academic, behavioral, or psychological

functioning; 

Upon receiving

information concerning

a potentially threatening

situation, the threat

assessment team must

first consider: "How

much time do we

have?" An inquiry

should be initiated

immediately (within

hours of notification) in

any situation of concern.
THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE

• recent hopelessness, desperation, and/or despair, including suicidal thoughts,

gestures, actions, or attempts; and

• pending crises or change in circumstances.

Of particular note is whether the student has any trusting relationships with adults

who are emotionally available to him or her, or whether the student is known to be

consistently respectful to any adult. If there is an adult who is "connected" to the

student, that adult may have useful information about the student’s thinking and

behavior. In addition, such an adult may be able to help the student if he or she

appears to be on a path toward mounting a targeted school attack.

3. Information about "attack-related" behaviors

Examination of the thinking and behaviors of school shooters suggests that most

attacks are preceded by discernible behaviors, as the student plans or prepares for

the attack. These behaviors are referred to as “attack-related behaviors. “

Behaviors that should raise concern about potential violence include:

• ideas or plans about injuring him/herself or attacking a school or persons at

school;

• communications or writings that suggest that the student has an unusual or

worrisome interest in school attacks;

• comments that express or imply the student is considering mounting an attack

at school;

• recent weapon-seeking behavior, especially if weapon-seeking is linked to ideas

about attack or expressions about interest in attack;

• communications or writings suggesting the student condones or is considering

violence to redress a grievance or solve a problem; and

• rehearsals of attacks or ambushes.

4. Motives

Motives for actual school attacks have included: 

• revenge for a perceived injury or grievance; 

• yearning for attention, recognition, or notoriety;

• a wish to solve a problem otherwise seen as unbearable; and

• a desire to die or be killed.

Knowledge of the motives of a student of concern may help the threat assessment

team in evaluating the risk of targeted violence. Understanding the circumstances

that may have prompted a student to consider attacking others may permit

authorities to direct the student away from violence. 

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For example, a student who feels he has been treated wrongly and unfairly by a

teacher or an administrator and who is thinking about "revenge" may be offered or

taught non-violent ways to address his concerns and problems. Mediation; personal

support; clarification about the disciplinary process; education about how to write a

letter of concern to authorities who might intervene in the student’s problems; or

other dispute resolution efforts might turn that student away from a potentially

violent course of action. A student who is suicidal and who wants to get "even" with

his bullies before ending his life may be provided mental health services and support.

In addition, school administrators should intervene on this student’s behalf to stop

the bullying.

As stated in previous chapters of this Guide, students make threats and engage in

other risky behaviors for a range of reasons. Many threatening statements and

actions do not reflect the student’s actual movement on a path to attack.

Adolescents occasionally say and do "outrageous" things, so a single utterance or

action should not be seen as determinative in a threat assessment.19

5. Target selection

Most school shooters identified their targets to friends and fellow students before

advancing the attack. Almost half of school shooters had more than one target.

Threat assessors should consider whether and how a potential attacker’s interest in a

target may shift to another target over time. Information about a student’s targets

may provide clues to the student’s motives, planning, and attack-related behaviors.

Information about the student’s motives also may inform the question of whether

there are additional targets.

What are sources of information for the inquiry?

1. School information

A school threat assessment inquiry should begin with what is known about the

student from records, teacher interviews, and other information easily accessed at

the school and from school officials. In utilizing information from school records in

a threat assessment inquiry, the threat assessment team should follow school policies

and relevant laws regarding information-sharing.20

Answers to the following questions may be drawn from information at school:

• Is the student well known to any adult at the school? 

19 Please note that all comments and behaviors should be understood in their context: the words "get him"

may have very different meanings at a football game when linemen are chasing the quarterback than in a

hallway after a student has been bullied and tormented.

20 See Chapter IV of this Guide for a more in-depth discussion of the issue of information-sharing.
THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE

• Has the student come to attention for any behavior of concern? If so, what? (email, Web site, posters, papers, rule-breaking, violence, harassment,

adjustment problems, depression or despair, acting-out behavior, etc.)

• Has the student experienced serious difficulties or been in distress? 

• Is there anyone with whom the student shares worries, frustrations, and/or

sorrows? 

• Is there information that the student has considered ending his or her life? 

• Has the student been a victim and/or an initiator of hostile, harassing, or

bullying behavior directed toward other students, teachers, or other staff? 

• Is the student known to have an interest in weapons? If so, has he or she made

efforts to acquire or use weapons? Does the student live in a home in which

there are weapons (whether or not the weapons are secured)?

2. Collateral school interviews

Students and adults who know the student who is the subject of the threat

assessment inquiry should be asked about communications or other behaviors that

may indicate the student of concern’s ideas or intent. The focus of these interviews

should be factual: 

• What was said? To whom?

• What was written? To whom?

• What was done? 

• When and where did this occur?

• Who else observed this behavior? 

• Did the student say why he or she acted as they did?

Bystanders, observers, and other people who were there when the student engaged

in threatening behaviors or made threatening statements should be queried about

whether any of these behaviors or statements concerned or worried them. These

individuals should be asked about changes in the student’s attitudes and behaviors.

Likewise, they should be asked if they have become increasingly concerned about the

student’s behavior or state of mind. 

However, individuals interviewed generally should not be asked to characterize the

student or interpret meanings of communications that the student may have made.

Statements such as "I think he’s really dangerous" or "he said it with a smile, so I

knew that he must be joking" may not be accurate characterizations of the student’s

intent, and therefore are unlikely to be useful to the threat assessment team in

carrying out a threat assessment inquiry. 

3. Parent/guardian interview

The parents or guardians of the student of concern usually should be interviewed. 

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Parents may be protective of their children. They may be frightened and/or

embarrassed about the inquiry and the possibility that their child may be

contemplating a violent act. The threat assessment team therefore should make it

clear to the student’s parents or guardians that the objective of the threat assessment

inquiry is not only to help prevent targeted school violence and diminish the chance

that the student and possibly others would be harmed, but also to help their child. 

The threat assessment team should seek the help of the student’s parents in

understanding the student’s actions and interests, recognizing that parents may or

may not know much about their child’s thinking and behavior. Questions for parents

should focus on the student’s behaviors and communications, especially those that

might be attack-related. The student’s interest in weapons should be explored, as well

as his or her access to weapons at home.

It may be useful for a member of the threat assessment team to visit and observe the

student of concern’s home. The threat assessment team should have policies and

procedures in place regarding home visits.

4. Interviews with the student of concern

Interviews with a student of concern oftentimes are critical in a threat assessment

inquiry. School administrators and law enforcement officials and their respective

legal counsels should follow existing policies or develop policies regarding interviews

with students of concern. Issues that should be considered include:

• If and when to notify parents/guardians of an interview;

• Whether or when to invite parents/guardians to be present during an

interview;

• Whether and how to use information from an interview for criminal justice

proceedings; and

• Whether and when legal representation should be allowed, offered, or

provided. 

State and local laws differ with respect to requirements regarding these questions. 

In some instances, the threat assessment team may determine that important

information might be obtained through a search of a student’s person or property, or

the property of another individual to which the student has access. The search of a

student in any context is a sensitive and legally complex issue that should be

examined thoroughly by school administrators and their legal counsel and addressed

in policies and procedures governing the conduct of a threat assessment inquiry.21

21 The U.S. Supreme Court has established that Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable

search and seizure apply to students on school property, but the court has recognized school officials’

authority to conduct searches that are reasonable (New Jersey v. T.L.O.).
THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE

The primary purpose of a student interview is to learn about the student’s thinking,

motives, and behavior. The tone of the interview should be professional, neutral, and

non-confrontational, rather than accusatory or judgmental.

Before conducting an interview with a student of concern, the threat assessment

team should be well-acquainted with the facts that brought the student to the

attention of school administrators and others. In addition, prior to conducting the

student interview, the threat assessment team should have reviewed available

information concerning the student’s background, interests, and behaviors.

Background information can inform the threat assessment team’s approach to and

questioning of the student. This information may help the threat assessment team

determine whether the student poses a threat to particular targets. In addition,

knowledge of background information concerning the student prior to the interview

may help the threat assessment team judge whether the student is forthcoming and

straightforward. Generally, a student should be asked directly about his or her

intentions. Often, adolescents will respond forthrightly to a direct question.

A student interview conducted during a threat assessment inquiry can elicit

important information that permits the threat assessment team to better understand

the situation of the student and possible targets. This understanding, in turn, will

help the threat assessment team to assess the risk of violence that the student may

pose in a given situation. Interviews with a student of concern also can generate

leads for further inquiry. 

An interview can also send the message to the student that his or her behavior has

been noticed and has caused concern. Interviews give students of concern the

opportunity to tell their personal stories, to be heard, and to reassess and redirect

their behavior away from activities that are of concern. The interview may suggest to

a student who has mixed feelings about attacking that there are people who are

interested in his or her welfare, and that there are better, more effective ways to deal

with problems or with specific people. 

Although an interview with a student of concern can provide valuable information,

relying too heavily on that interview as a basis for making judgments about whether

that student poses a threat may present problems. The information offered by the

student may be incomplete, misleading, or inaccurate. It therefore is important to

collect information to corroborate and verify information learned from the student

interview. 

5. Potential target interview

Individuals who have been identified as potential targets of the student of concern

also should be interviewed. The threat assessment team should inform the subject of

the interview that the primary purpose of that interview is to gather information

about a possible situation of concern. 

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A potential target should be asked about their relationship to the student of concern

and queried about recent interactions with that student. The interviewer should

gather information about grievances and grudges that the student of concern may

hold against a target or against others.

Interviews with potential targets should be conducted with special sensitivity. Care

must be taken to gather information without unduly alarming a potential target. If

the threat assessment team believes that there may be a risk of violence to an

identified target, that target should be offered assistance and support. 

How should information be organized and analyzed?

Information gathered in a threat assessment inquiry should be examined for evidence

of behavior and conditions that suggest that the student of concern is planning and

preparing for an attack. Analysis of this information should, in the end, answer these

questions: Is the behavior of the student consistent with movement on a pathway

toward attack? Do the student’s current situation and setting incline him or her

toward or away from targeted violence? 

Evaluation of information gathered from research and interviews conducted during a

threat assessment inquiry should be guided by the following 11 key questions:

1. What are the student’s motive(s) and goals?

• What motivated the student to make the statements or take the actions that

caused him or her to come to attention? 

• Does the situation or circumstance that led to these statements or actions still

exist? 

• Does the student have a major grievance or grudge? Against whom?

• What efforts have been made to resolve the problem and what has been the

result? Does the potential attacker feel that any part of the problem is resolved

or see any alternatives?

2. Have there been any communications suggesting ideas or intent to attack?

• What, if anything, has the student communicated to someone else (targets,

friends, other students, teachers, family, others) or written in a diary, journal,

or Web site concerning his or her ideas and/or intentions?

• Have friends been alerted or "warned away"?

3. Has the subject shown inappropriate interest in any of the following?

• school attacks or attackers;

• weapons (including recent acquisition of any relevant weapon); or

• incidents of mass violence (terrorism, workplace violence, mass murderers).
THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE

4. Has the student engaged in attack-related behaviors? These behaviors might

include:

• developing an attack idea or plan;

• making efforts to acquire or practice with weapons;

• casing, or checking out, possible sites and areas for attack; or

• rehearsing attacks or ambushes.

5. Does the student have the capacity to carry out an act of targeted violence?

• How organized is the student’s thinking and behavior? 

• Does the student have the means, e.g., access to a weapon, to carry out an

attack?

6. Is the student experiencing hopelessness, desperation, and/or despair?

• Is there information to suggest that the student is experiencing desperation

and/or despair?

• Has the student experienced a recent failure, loss and/or loss of status? 

• Is the student known to be having difficulty coping with a stressful event?

• Is the student now, or has the student ever been, suicidal or "accident-prone"?

Has the student engaged in behavior that suggests that he or she has

considered ending his or her life?

7. Does the student have a trusting relationship with at least one responsible adult?

• Does the student have at least one relationship with an adult where the student

feels that he or she can confide in the adult and believes that the adult will

listen without judging or jumping to conclusions? (Students with trusting

relationships with adults may be directed away from violence and despair and

toward hope.)

• Is the student emotionally connected to–or disconnected from–other students? 

• Has the student previously come to someone’s attention or raised concern in a

way that suggested he or she needs intervention or supportive services?

8. Does the student see violence as an acceptable–or desirable–or the only–way to

solve problems?

• Does the setting around the student (friends, fellow students, parents, teachers,

adults) explicitly or implicitly support or endorse violence as a way of resolving

problems or disputes?

• Has the student been "dared" by others to engage in an act of violence?

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9. Is the student’s conversation and "story" consistent with his or her actions?

• Does information from collateral interviews and from the student’s own

behavior confirm or dispute what the student says is going on?

10. Are other people concerned about the student’s potential for violence?

• Are those who know the student concerned that he or she might take action

based on violent ideas or plans?

• Are those who know the student concerned about a specific target?

• Have those who know the student witnessed recent changes or escalations in

mood and behavior?

11. What circumstances might affect the likelihood of an attack?

• What factors in the student’s life and/or environment might increase or

decrease the likelihood that the student will attempt to mount an attack at

school? 

• What is the response of other persons who know about the student’s ideas or

plan to mount an attack? (Do those who know about the student’s ideas

actively discourage the student from acting violently, encourage the student to

attack, deny the possibility of violence, passively collude with an attack, etc.?)

Thoughtful consideration of the answers to the above 11 questions will produce a

sound foundation for the threat assessment team’s response to the overarching

question in a threat assessment inquiry: Does the student of concern pose a threat of

targeted violence at school? If the threat assessment team concludes that:

a. there is enough reliable information to answer the 11 key questions; and

b. the weight of the information is convincing that the student does not pose a threat

of targeted school violence; then

c. the threat assessment team may conclude the threat assessment inquiry.

The threat assessment team may determine that closure of the inquiry is warranted,

but conclude that the student, or previously suggested targets, need help coping with

the behavior or problems that initially brought the threatening situation to the

attention of authorities. In such situations, the team should work with school

administrators and others to ensure that these individuals receive the assistance and

continued support that they may need. 

For example, if the student who was the focus of the threat assessment inquiry came

to the attention of authorities because of behavior or communications that suggested
THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE

that he or she was contemplating suicide, that student should be offered–and

receive–appropriate counseling or other services. Likewise, if the threat assessment

team concludes that the student was a victim of false allegations, the team may wish

to consider recommending actions to deal with malicious accusers. 

Regardless of the outcome of the threat assessment inquiry, the threat assessment

team should document carefully the inquiry and any actions taken. This

documentation should be carried out in compliance with any applicable school or

other relevant policies and/or legal considerations, and should include a record of

the sources of, and content for, all key information considered in the threat

assessment as well as the date that the information was acquired. In addition to

documenting the facts that provided the basis for the findings in the threat

assessment inquiry, it also is important to document the reasoning that led the threat

assessment team to its decision in that inquiry.

If the team concludes that 

a. there is insufficient information for the threat assessment team to be reasonably

certain that the student does not pose a threat; or 

b. the student appears to be on a path to attack; then 

c. the team should recommend that the matter be referred to the appropriate law

enforcement agency for a threat assessment investigation.

The Threat Assessment Investigation

As explained earlier in this chapter, the focus of a threat assessment investigation–the

information sought and questions asked–will be similar to that of a threat assessment

inquiry. However, the scope of the threat assessment investigation’s collection and

analysis of information will be broader than in an inquiry, reaching outside the

school and across systems within the community. 

In carrying out a threat assessment investigation, investigators should explore a

student’s prior contacts with civil authorities and criminal and juvenile justice

officials. These investigators may re-interview, in greater depth, individuals contacted

during the threat assessment inquiry, such as a student’s family members; fellow

students and friends; neighbors; and employers. Investigators will focus particularly

on attack-related behaviors exhibited by the student, including efforts to acquire, buy,

or gain access to weapons.

Investigators also may request the permission of the student or his parents to search

a student’s computer, room, home, car, or workspace. In some cases, investigators

may seek to obtain search warrants.

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Investigators should evaluate information gathered during a threat assessment

investigation in accord with the 11 key questions identified in the above discussion of

procedures for conducting a threat assessment inquiry. Threat assessment

investigators may consult with colleagues and with professionals in other fields and

disciplines who possess special skills and experience in handling situations involving

potential targeted violence. These professionals may include other law enforcement

officers, mental health service providers, social workers, physicians, and others

knowledgeable about stalking, domestic violence, and workplace violence. The

knowledge, experience, and insights of these professionals may help the threat

assessment investigator in evaluating and organizing information concerning

situations that involve the threat of targeted school violence.

In addition, as investigators proceed with a threat assessment investigation, they

continuously should ask themselves the following questions:

• Does the information collected prompt more concern or less concern about

the possibility that the student is moving on a path toward a school attack?

• What information might prompt less concern?

• What information might heighten concern?

• What options exist for intervening in the behavior of or redirecting the student

away from ideas of or plans for a school attack?

• Should potential targets be contacted, warned, and/or protected?

As with a threat assessment inquiry, it is critical that investigators document and

keep a record of the information that they gather and evaluate in carrying out a

school threat assessment investigation. A well-documented record provides baseline

information about a student’s thinking and actions at a certain point in time. This

information can be useful if the student comes to authorities’ attention again, or if at

some point in the future investigators need to determine whether the subject has

changed patterns of thinking and behavior. Also, should a threatening situation

result in civil or criminal action against a student or others, a carefully documented

investigative file will be an important asset in demonstrating that a threat assessment

investigation was conducted properly and in compliance with applicable laws,

policies, and procedures. 
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60
CHAPTER VI - MANAGING A THREATENING SITUATION

CHAPTER VI

MANAGING A

THREATENING

SITUATION
CHAPTER VI - MANAGING A THREATENING SITUATION

63

Threat assessment and threat management are integrated and interdependent

functions. Many students who come to the attention of threat assessment teams may

need help and support. Assisting, directing, and managing these young people and

the situations they are in should be high priorities for threat assessment team

members.

When the findings of a threat assessment inquiry or investigation suggest that a

student has the interest, motive, and ability to mount a school attack, and has started

down a path toward attack, the primary mission is to prevent the attack and protect

possible targets. Accordingly, an individual management/monitoring plan should be

developed for any student who is identified in a threat assessment inquiry or

investigation as posing a threat of targeted school violence. 

Key Components and Functions of a Management Strategy

Who should manage the threatening situation, and what the components of the plan

are, will depend on the specific threatening situation. For example, a student who is

under the jurisdiction of the juvenile or criminal justice system could be supervised

or managed by court or justice system officials. If the student remains in school,

school administrators might work with parents to impose and monitor the student’s

compliance with a supervision or management plan.

Successful management of a threatening situation requires substantial time and

effort. Management of these situations comprises three related functions:

1. Controlling/containing the situation and/or student in a way that will prevent the

possibility of an attack;

2. Protecting and aiding possible targets; and

3. Providing support and guidance to help the student deal successfully with his or

her problems.

Considerations in Developing a Management Strategy

Managing Threatening Situations for the Short Term

Managing a student of concern involves short-term and longer-term considerations.

In the short term, after a threat assessment investigation has concluded that a

student poses a risk of targeted school violence, authorities must move immediately

to intervene with that student to contain the threatening situation and reduce the

potential for violence. 

In some cases, subjecting the student to a threat assessment inquiry or investigation

may have the added effect of containing future threatening behavior. As a result of
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the inquiry or investigation, the potential attacker receives help in addressing the

problems that may have prompted his or her action and abandons plans for the

attack, believing that an attack is not feasible or necessary. 

In other situations, there must be more overt containment of potential attackers.

Containment and control in these situations may include supervision and/or

confinement of the student of concern and the protection of possible targets.

Managing Threatening Situations for the Long Term

Once the immediate threat of a situation is believed to be under control for the short

term, the threat assessment team should turn its attention to longer-term safety. The

threat assessment team should address two central questions: What steps should be

taken to contain a potential attacker over the longer term? What course of action

should be pursued to deter the potential attacker from posing a future threat of

violence?

The primary goal in a school threat assessment is to prevent an attack. The

intervention or management strategy selected therefore should be the one with the

greatest potential for long-term preventive power. 

Threat managers should ask: "What will be the most effective and least damaging

course of action?" When confronted with a problem, professionals often choose the

tools with which they are most familiar: Police officers arrest; mental health

professionals commit; workplace managers fire; principals suspend or expel.

Caution should be used in a given situation of concern to make sure that the

response of authorities is appropriate to the problem.

The most familiar response may or

may not be the best response, the

best course of action for the longer

term. For example, school

administrators may feel pressured to

"get tough" or "set an example" by

suspending or expelling a student

who threatens to bring a weapon to

school. However, suspension or

expulsion of a student can create the

risk of triggering either an

immediate or a delayed violent

response unless such actions are

coupled with containment and

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support. A student who is expelled may conclude: "I have lost everything. I have only

a short time to act. I will give them what they deserve." Acting upon those beliefs,

the student may return to school with weapons and attack others. In addition, a

student who is suspended or expelled without alternative educational placement may

be under less supervision than if he or she were to remain in a school setting.

Those with responsibility to manage a student assessed as posing a threat of targeted

violence should consider options for the long-term management of threatening

situations in the context of the primary goal of prevention. The response with the

greatest punitive power may or may not have the greatest preventive power.

Although arresting a student may be necessary in a particular situation, without

careful attention to the need for confinement, weapons removal, or interpersonal

intervention, that action may be insufficient to prevent an eventual attack at school

or otherwise protect a target. Similarly, referring a student to the mental health

system, without seeing that referral in the context of an overall monitoring/

management plan, may not be sufficient to prevent targeted violence.

An Integrated Systems Approach to Managing Threatening Situations

The Safe School Initiative found that school attackers’ formulation of ideas about

carrying out an attack oftentimes followed failed efforts to solve problems and reduce

emotional pain through nonviolent means. Helping a student to see that he or she

has a future, and directing that student to effective, non-violent ways to resolve

disputes and conflicts, takes sensitivity, commitment, and an integrated systems

approach to meeting the needs of that student.

An integrated systems approach can enhance the potential effectiveness of both

short- and long-term strategies for managing threatening situations. Those

responsible for managing a situation and student of concern–school officials, law

enforcement officers, mental health professionals, youth service workers, court,

probation, or correctional staff–should identify existing resources within the

community that can play roles in managing students who pose threats of targeted

school violence. 

Discontinuation of Monitoring 

A key focus of the threat assessment process is to connect the student to services and

support systems that provide encouragement and hope, and reduce the likelihood

that the student will engage in future threatening behavior. The ultimate objective is

to enable the student to function without monitoring by responsible adult authorities. 

Monitoring of a student may be discontinued after responsible authorities have

completed the following tasks:

Those with responsibility to manage a

student assessed as posing a threat of

targeted violence should consider options

for the long-term management of

threatening situations in the context of the

primary goal of prevention. The response

with the greatest punitive power may or

may not have the greatest preventive

power.
THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE

• Assessing whether (and to what extent) the student has changed unacceptable

thinking and behavior over time; and

• Developing and supporting intervention strategies that encourage and help the

student to change.

After a determination is made that the subject no longer poses a threat of targeted

school violence, formal monitoring is ended. However, the student still may remain

involved with service systems within the community that will support his or her

continued successful functioning.

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CHAPTER VII - ACTION PLANS FOR SCHOOL LEADERS

CHAPTER VII

ACTION PLANS

FOR SCHOOL LEADERS: 

CREATING A SAFE AND

CONNECTED SCHOOL

CLIMATE AND

IMPLEMENTING A THREAT

ASSESSMENT PROGRAM
CHAPTER VII - ACTION PLANS FOR SCHOOL LEADERS

69

Creating a Safe and Connected School Climate

Creating cultures and climates of safety is essential to the prevention of violence in

schools. How can a school, its teachers and administrators, and its students work

toward implementing cultures of connection and climates of safety? 

Major Components and Tasks for Creating a Safe/Connected School Climate

1. Assess the school's emotional climate.

Although no one wants to believe that this country’s educational institutions are

anything other than safe and positive environments that support the learning

experience, it is incumbent upon those in positions of responsibility to take a step

back and gain perspective on the emotional climate of their schools. This perspective

can be gained by systematically surveying students, faculty, and other important

stakeholders, such as parents, administrators, school board members, and

representatives of community groups who interact with the school about the

emotional climate of schools. Anonymous surveys, face-to-face interviews, focus

groups, and psychological measures integrated into a total assessment package all

have been used to varying degrees to gather key "real time" data. It is essential that

school administrators, parents, and community leaders not assume that they know

school climates as do those individuals–especially students–who are most directly

affected by the educational experience on a daily basis. Absent a thorough

assessment of climate process, school officials and leaders may never have the

opportunity to find out what they did not know. 

The findings of climate surveys can inform efforts to plan ways to enhance safety and

respect within the educational environment. It is important to give feedback about

school climate data to all involved and affected parties. Sharing climate data

establishes a foundation for building an integrated systems approach that will bring

the central "players" to the table; empower students to make change; and connect the

school to the community and parental support. 

2. Emphasize the importance of listening in schools. 

Pupils must listen respectfully to adults and to their peers, and teachers,

administrators, and other adults must listen respectfully to their students and to each

other. Grownups often expect that students listen to adults in authority. However,

all too frequently adults forget that respectful listening is a two-way street. A school

with a culture of two-way listening will encourage and empower students to have the

courage to break the ingrained code of silence.

Listening also must be expanded beyond academic concerns. Communications

between teachers and students also should include listening to feelings, especially

those of hurt and pain. In addition, it is important to "listen" to behaviors. Many
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students, including some who consider violence an appropriate way to solve

problems, have a difficult time finding the words to articulate the

disenfranchisement, hurt, or fear that they may feel. Not knowing how to express

their problems and feelings may prompt these students to take action. Adults who

listen to behavior and assist students in learning how to articulate their feelings and

experiences provide students with critical skills that can contribute to preventing and

reducing violence.

3. Take a strong, but caring stance against the code of silence. 

Silence leaves hurt unexposed and unacknowledged. Silence may encourage a young

person to move along a path to violence.

4. Work actively to change the perception that talking to an adult about a student

contemplating violence is considered snitching.

A school climate in which students connect to each other and to adults is one that

promotes a safe and secure educational environment. A student who finds the

courage to tell a caring adult about a friend in pain may save a life. 

5. Find ways to stop bullying. 

Bullying is a continuum of abuse, ranging from verbal taunts to physical threats to

dangerous acts.22 Bullying is not playful behavior. In bullying, one student assumes

power by word or deed over another in a mean-spirited and/or harmful manner. In a

school with a culture of safety and connection, both the bully and the student who is

the victim of the bullying are attended to in a respectful manner. Schools with

climates of safety and respect are establishing foundations for pro-social behavior.

These climates teach conflict resolution, peer mediation, active listening, and other

non-violent ways to solve problems. In a safe school climate, adults do not bully

students and do not bully each other - and they do not turn a blind eye to bullying

behavior when they know that it is going on in the school.

6. Empower students by involving them in planning, creating, and sustaining a school

culture of safety and respect. 

Creating a safe school climate is a process that should involve all members of the

school community, including teachers, students, parents, counselors, administrators,

health staff, security professionals, and support personnel. Climates of safety should

be collaborative ones. Helping students to engage in positive, productive activities or

work in their local community can diminish isolation and enhance connection and

safety.

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7. Ensure that every student feels that he or she has a trusting relationship with at least

one adult at school. 

Trusting relationships between adults and students are the products of quality

connection, interaction, and communications. These relationships evolve and do not

develop simply because an adult, such as a homeroom teacher or a guidance

counselor, and a student have been ordered or assigned to interact with one another.

Schools with cultures and climates of safety monitor students on a regular basis.

School administrators should take steps to ensure that at least one adult at school

knows what is happening with each student. 

8. Create mechanisms for developing and sustaining safe school climates. 

A mechanism for developing and sustaining safe school climates should serve as a

vehicle for planning and monitoring the climate and culture of the school. This

mechanism may involve administrators, teachers, counselors, students, school law

enforcement and security staff, and other personnel. Questions to be considered in

implementing this mechanism might include: What should be done to develop and

support climates of safety? To what extent are teachers, administrators, and other

school staff encouraged to focus on students’ social/emotional learning needs? How

close is the school to achieving the goal of ensuring that every student feels that there

is an adult to whom he or she can turn for talk, support, and advice if things get

tough?

9. Be aware of physical environments and their effects on creating comfort zones.

Building structure, facility safety plans, lighting, space, and architecture, among other

physical attributes of educational institutions, all can contribute to whether a school

environment feels, or is in fact, safe or unsafe. In large schools, school

administrators may wish to explore changes in the physical characteristics of the

school that would permit the assignment of teachers and students to smaller,

mutually intersecting and supportive groupings within the broader educational

community.

10. Emphasize an integrated systems model.

People support most what they believe they have had genuine input in creating. This

requires the difficult but necessary task of bringing all of the stakeholders to the

table. Stakeholders include: students, teachers, administrators, school board

members, parents, law enforcement personnel, after-school and community-based

groups, and others. Stakeholders must struggle with questions such as the definition

of "fairness," "threat," "consequence," and "change" as these concepts fit into the

unique context of each school, school system, and the surrounding community.

22 For more detailed references on bullying, please refer to the Appendix.
THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE

11. All climates of safety ultimately are "local."

Many local factors contribute to the creation of a culture and climate of safety. These

factors include: the leadership–"open-door"-role of the school principal; empowered

buy-in of student groups; connections to the local community and its leaders; and the

respectful integration into the safe school climates process of "safekeepers," such as

parents and law enforcement personnel close to the school.

Schools that have succeeded in creating safe school climates have done so because of

their recognition that such climates of safety actually raise the bar on sound

educational expectations, which, in turn, keep students engaged and learning at high

levels. Such schools achieve their aims by realizing that safe school climates are not

created overnight. Implementation of the safe school climates process requires

planning and dedicated work. Participants in this process need adequate feedback

and evaluative processes to sustain and continually improve educational

environments. To work effectively, safe school climates that create relationships of

respect and connection between adults and students must be accepted as integral to

the mission of threat assessment and management, and understood from the top

down as integral to the success of the learning experience. 

Implementing a Threat Assessment Program

Threat assessment policies and programs work best as components of school

violence prevention strategies if these policies and programs are authorized,

developed, and implemented by local officials, and developed in consultation with

representatives of the broader community. The following course of action should be

pursued in establishing a threat assessment approach in a community or school

district.

1. A principal, superintendent, school board member, or other school official

initiates a request to develop a process to evaluate and respond to threatening

situations. The request is forwarded to the school board or other responsible

oversight entity for policy approval. 

Threatening situations might include: threats made directly against students,

teachers, or other school officials; threats made indirectly by telephone, in writing,

over the Internet, or through interpersonal contacts; communications or behaviors

suggesting a student’s intent to mount an attack at school; and allegations of bombmaking or that a student possesses a firearm. 

2. The school district creates a planning team to develop or further refine a process

to identify, assess, and manage threatening situations. 

Members of the team should be drawn from the school district and the community.

Team members should include representatives of law enforcement and mental health

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agencies who work with the schools. Representatives from the school district should

include administrators, teachers, attorneys, school security officials, and school

psychologists and mental health workers.

The team appointed to develop a process to evaluate threatening situations should

determine the status of each of the following: 

• Information-sharing: What are the existing policies, procedures, and legal

parameters in place for access to and sharing of school, law enforcement, and

mental health records? The team should ascertain what information

concerning students is available; where that information is located; how and

under what conditions that information can be accessed; and who can access

available information.

• Existing policies regarding threats and threatening situations: The team should

review all existing school disciplinary policies, including those related to

threats and threatening situations. This review should cover definition of

threats and threatening situations and sanctions for engaging in threatening

behavior. The team should assess the effectiveness of existing school discipline

policies in this area.

• Existing policies regarding the roles and responsibilities of law enforcement: The

team should review policies that cover when police are to be contacted by the

school; what options are available to police officials for intervening in a

situation once they are contacted; and interaction of the police and local

school officials, such as principals, in responding to and managing threatening

situations.

• Existing approaches to creating and maintaining safe and respectful school

climates and cultures: The team should engage in an assessment of the

emotional climate of the school. This assessment should include a review of

policies; rules and regulations; and physical aspects of the school that may

affect the overall safety and security of the educational institution. 

3. The planning team should determine what policies, rules, regulations, procedures,

and/or processes should be revised or created. Some schools already may have

policies and protocols in place to deal with certain kinds of threats and threatening

behaviors, such as e-mail threats, internet threats, potential suicides, and other

behaviors that raise concern about potential violence. In particular, the planning

team’s deliberations in this area should produce answers to the following questions:

• What should be the roles and responsibilities of school administrators,

teachers, security personnel, and other school officials in responding to threats

and threatening situations? When should parents be contacted concerning a
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threatening situation? Which situations should be handled within the school?

Which situations require notification of, and intervention by, law enforcement

officials?

• What should be the roles/responsibilities of law enforcement officials in

responding to threats and threatening situations in schools?

• Under what conditions will information concerning a student or a threatening

situation be shared? What types of information will be shared? With whom

will it be shared?

• When should students who engage in threatening behavior be referred to

outside services, such as mental health agencies, for assistance? How should

referrals to outside agencies be handled?

• What actions should be taken to develop and support climates of safety within

the educational institution? What steps could be taken by school officials to

encourage students to come forward with concerns about potentially violent

situations? What policies or actions would encourage students to bring their

problems to the attention of adults? How can school officials and other adults

work with students to resolve problems and remedy underlying conditions? 

4. School administrators, teachers, law enforcement officials, parents,

representatives of other community agencies and organizations, and representatives

of the student body, where appropriate, review and provide feedback on revised

and/or new recommended processes for threat assessment. These processes should

include recommendations for implementation, training, and the periodic review,

evaluation, and updating of the threat assessment program.

5. The school board reviews and acts upon recommended changes and additions to

the threat assessment program.

6. Upon approval by the school board or other appropriate authorities, school

officials will implement the threat assessment process.

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CHAPTER VIII - CONCLUSION

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION:

THREAT ASSESSMENT AS

A DECISION-MAKING

TOOL 
CHAPTER VIII - CONCLUSION

77

Developing a strategy to prevent and respond to potential incidents of targeted

school violence is a challenging and complex task. There is no single, universal

prescription that will be effective in dealing with every situation or crisis that will

confront school administrators, law enforcement officials, parents, and other

individuals and organizations in the community. 

When a student’s behavior raises the specter of potential violence, responsible adults

will be forced to make judgments about the risk associated with that student’s actions

and how to respond to that threatening situation. The threat assessment process

outlined in this Guide will not eliminate the need to make difficult judgments when

the actions of an individual suggest that the safety and security of a school is at risk.

Instead, the Guide is intended to assist officials in implementing a process that will

inform these judgments and increase the likelihood that actions based upon these

judgments will prevent incidents of targeted violence in schools.

The threat assessment process is rooted in the proposition that each situation of

concern should be viewed and assessed individually and that targeted violence is the

end result of a discernible process. No two cases involving the potential for targeted

school violence are likely to be similar in all aspects. Application of that process is

guided by the facts of that situation and carried out through the analysis of

information about behaviors and situational references. Instead of basing judgments

of risk on student traits or whether that student made specific threatening

statements, the threat assessment process focuses upon evaluating that student’s

behaviors and communications and determining whether those behaviors and

communications suggest that the student has the intent and capacity to carry out a

school attack.

The work of the Secret Service and the Department of Education in examining the

problem of targeted school violence suggests that the threat assessment process can

help to develop and maintain key relationships between the school and the

community. These relationships are critical elements in creating safe school climates.

Schools and communities that think clearly about threat assessment and management

will develop relationships, processes, and protocols that will contribute to reducing

school violence and to creating safe and secure learning environments in this nation’s

schools. 
THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE

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APPENDIX

Appendix

ANNOTATED

RESOURCES 
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81

The following section offers suggestions for further reading on specific topics related

to responding to threatening situations in schools and to creating safe school

climates. Each topic area is accompanied by a brief description of the documents

listed within that topic. The list that follows is not intended to be exhaustive or allinclusive. Instead, the list is offered as a starting point for additional reading in

selected areas. 

Bullying and the Creation of Respectful Climates

The following resources provide specific information on bullying behavior and more

general information on the experiences of boys and young men in school and in

society. The work by Olweus and related work by Graham and Juvonen review

bullying behavior in schools. Olweus pioneered research on bullying behavior and

provides an overview of decades of research on this topic. "Bullying behavior among

U.S. youth" provides recent data on the prevalence of bullying behavior in America.

The three books by William Pollack and his colleagues describe Pollack’s work

talking with boys and young men about their experiences in school and in the

community. Real boys and Real boys’ voices include findings from Pollack’s work on

the culture of boyhood in America; review certain assumptions that parents and

other adults may bring to their interactions with boys and young men; and include

suggested approaches and strategies for improving relationships with boys and young

men. Real boys workbook contains specific exercises for parents and teachers to help

enhance their interactions and communications with boys and young men. Olweus

and colleagues’ and Pollack and colleagues’ work encourages parents, school leaders,

and others to work to create respectful and safe school climates.

• Graham, S, & Juvonen, J. (2001). An Attributional Approach to Peer

Victimization. In Juvonen, J. Graham, S. (eds.), Peer Harassment in School:

The Plight of the Vulnerable and Victimized, pp. 49-72. New York: Guilford

Press.

• Olweus, D. (1993). Bullying at School: What we know and what we can do.

New York: Blackwell.

• Olweus, D. (1996, Spring). Bully/Victim Problems at School: Facts and

Effective Intervention. Reclaiming Children and Youth, pp. 15-22.

• Nansel, T., Overpeck, M., Pilla, R., Ruan, J., Simons-Morton, B., & Scheidt, P.

(2001). Bullying behavior among U.S. youth. Journal of the American Medical

Association, 285, pp. 2094-2100. 

• Pollack, W. (1998). Real boys: Rescuing our sons from the myths of boyhood.

New York: Henry Holt, Inc.
THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE

• Pollack, W., & Cushman, K. (2001). Real boys workbook. New York: Villard.

• Pollack, W., & Shuster, T. (2000). Real boys’ voices. New York: Random

House.

Information-Sharing / Legal Issues

These resources provide an overview of the issues impacting the sharing of

information about students in schools. Sharing information is a primer on the Family

Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), the federal regulation governing

protection of educational records and other student information in schools. It

includes the full text of FERPA, as well as detailed explanations on exceptions to

FERPA restrictions. "Establishing and maintaining interagency information sharing"

provides guidance on developing and implementing appropriate policies to permit or

facilitate sharing of information about juveniles across agencies. School violence:

Sharing student information provides further information on the protections afforded

to student information and reviews recent state legislative initiatives designed to

make sharing information about students easier to accomplish.

• Medaris, M.L., Campbell, E., & James, B. (1997, June). Sharing information: A

guide to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act and participation in

juvenile justice programs. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice,

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention and U.S. Department of

Education, Family Policy Compliance Office.

Please also see the following Web site for updates on FERPA regulations since the

1997 publication of this document: 

http://www.ed.gov/offices/OM/fpco

• Slayton, J. (2000, March). Establishing and maintaining interagency

information sharing. JAIBG Bulletin. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of

Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.

• Thomerson, J. (2001, May). School violence: Sharing student information.

Denver, Colo.: National Conference of State Legislatures.

School Violence and Crime

As of the publication date of this Guide, the resources included below represent

some of the most recent data and statistics on violence, crime, and other behavior in

American schools as well as in the community. Since currently there is no one

central mechanism for reporting violence and crime perpetrated and experienced by

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83

youths in American schools, these reports collectively represent a fairly

comprehensive picture of school violence and crime in America.

• Anderson, M., et. al. (2001). School-associated violent deaths in the United

States, 1994-1999. Journal of the American Medical Association, 286, pp.

2695-2702 (2001).

• Kaufman, P., et. al. Indicators of School Crime and Safety, 2000. U. S.

Department of Education (NCES 2001-017) and U. S. Department of Justice

(NCJ-184176): Washington, D.C. (2000). Available at:

http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2001/quarterly/winter/elementary/e_section4.html.

• National Research Council and Institute of Medicine, Committee on Law and

Justice and Board on Children, Youth, and Families. (2001). Juvenile Crime,

Juvenile Justice. Panel on Juvenile Crime: Prevention, Treatment, and Control.

McCord, J., et. al. (Eds.). National Academy Press: Washington, D.C.

• Snyder, H.N., & Sickmund, M. (1999). Juvenile offenders and victims: 1999

National Report. Washington, D.C.: Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency

Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice. Available at:

http://www.ncjrs.org/html/ojjdp/nationalreport99/index.html. 

• U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics

(2002). Digest of Education Statistics 2000; Washington D.C.: Authors.

• U.S. Department of Education and U.S. Department of Justice (1999). 1999

Annual Report on School Safety. Washington, D.C.: Authors.

Risk Assessment and General Aggression / Violence

"Assessing violence risk among youth" presents an overview of the known risk factors

for general aggression and violence among youth. It summarizes the current

scientific knowledge base on the topic and includes recommendations for clinicians

tasked with assessing the risk of general aggression and violence (i.e. not targeted

violence) in youth. Manual for the SAVRY presents a similar review of risk factors for

general aggression and violence in youth and provides specific guidance and a

structured assessment tool to help guide clinicians’ assessment of risk for general

aggression and violence within a particular individual (youth).

• Borum, R. (2000). Assessing violence risk among youth. Journal of Clinical

Psychology, 56, pp. 1263-1288.
THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE

• Borum, R., Bartel, P., & Forth, A. (2002). Manual for the Structured

Assessment of Violence Risk in Youth (SAVRY). Tampa: Fla.: University of

South Florida.

• U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. (2001). Youth violence: A

report of the Surgeon General. Rockville, Md.: U.S. Department of Health and

Human Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services

Administration, Center for Mental Health Services, National Institutes of

Health, National Institute of Mental Health. Available at:

http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/youthviolence.

Threat Assessment and Targeted Violence

The following documents represent a sample of information currently available on

various types of targeted violence and on threat assessment as a strategy to help

prevent targeted attacks. "Defining an approach for evaluating targeted violence" is

an academic paper that presents the general concepts of threat assessment and 10

key questions that investigators and others can use when gathering information about

someone who may pose a threat of targeted violence. "Assassination in the United

States" is also an academic paper that reviews the Exceptional Case Study Project

and presents the study’s findings. Protective intelligence & threat assessment

investigations is a guide for state and local law enforcement officials and others with

protective responsibilities. It sets forth guidelines for developing a threat assessment

capacity for targeted violence against protected officials and others in a manner

similar to that contained in this Guide. It also includes findings from the Exceptional

Case Study Project. "Threat assessment" provides a brief and straightforward

description of the threat assessment approach. "Evaluating risk for targeted violence

in schools" presents and compares the various assessment approaches schools

currently have available for gauging the threat that a particular student may pose.

The paper reviews profiling, structured clinical assessment, automated decisionmaking (e.g., the use of software or Web-based decision tools), and threat

assessment.

• Defining an approach for evaluating risk of targeted violence. Behavioral

Sciences & the Law, 17, pp. 323-337. Available at

http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac.htm.

• Fein, R.A., & Vossekuil, B.V. (1999). Assassination in the United States: An

operational study of recent assassins, attackers, and near-lethal approachers.

Journal of Forensic Sciences, 44, pp. 321-333. Available at

http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac.htm.

• Fein, R.A., & Vossekuil, B. (1998). Protective intelligence & threat assessment

investigations: A guide for state and local law enforcement officials

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(NIJ/OJP/DOJ Publication No. 170612). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department

of Justice. Available at http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac.htm.

• Fein, R.A., Vossekuil, B., & Holden, G.A. (1995, September). Threat

assessment: An approach to prevent targeted violence. National Institute of

Justice: Research in Action, 1-7. Available at

http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac.htm.

• Reddy, M., Borum, R., Berglund, J., Vossekuil, B., Fein, R., & Modzeleski, W.

(2001). Evaluating risk for targeted violence in schools: Comparing risk

assessment, threat assessment, and other approaches. Psychology in the

Schools, 38, pp. 157-172. Available at http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac.htm.
THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE

Web Sites

United States Department of Education . . . . .www.ed.gov

United States Secret Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . .www.secretservice.gov

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Author Brief Bios

Robert A. Fein, Ph.D.

Robert Fein is a forensic psychologist who is a director of the National Violence

Prevention and Study Center. Dr. Fein has worked with the U.S. Secret Service for

the last 20 years in the area of threat assessment. Recently, he has served as codirector of the Secret Service Safe School Initiative. Together with Bryan Vossekuil,

Dr. Fein is author of Protective Intelligence and Threat Assessment: A Guide for State

and Local Law Enforcement Officials and of other publications concerning targeted

violence. He holds appointments at Harvard Medical School and the University of

Massachusetts Medical School. Dr. Fein can be reached at rfein@nvpsc.org.

Bryan Vossekuil

Bryan Vossekuil is a director of the National Violence Prevention and Study Center.

He retired as a special agent from the U.S. Secret Service, where he served as

executive director of the National Threat Assessment Center. He also served as codirector of both the Secret Service's Safe School Initiative and Exceptional Case

Study Project. He has a special interest in the assessment and management of

threatening persons and situations and has co-authored a number of publications on

threat assessment. He can be reached at bvossekuil@nvpsc.org.

William S. Pollack, Ph.D.

William Pollack is Director of the Centers for Men and Young Men at McLean

Hospital in Belmont, Mass. Dr. Pollack is Assistant Clinical Professor in the

Department of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School and is a director of the

National Violence Prevention and Study Center, as well as founder and director of

the REAL BOYS(R) Educational Programs. He has served on the U.S. Presidential

Initiative, and the National Campaign Against Youth Violence and is a consultant to

the United States Secret Service, including its collaborative Safe School Initiative with

the U.S. Department of Education. The author of three popular books re-framing

the roles of boys in the family: Real Boys, Real Boys' Voices and the Real Boys

Workbook, his work has also focused on the roles of violence and depression in

American society, the impact of emotional cognition/roles within organizations--most

especially in creating "safe climates" in schools and the workplace, and male-female

relationships. He may be reached at wpollack@williampollack.com.

Randy Borum, Psy.D.

Randy Borum is Associate Professor in the Department of Mental Health

Law & Policy at University of South Florida. Dr. Borum is a licensed psychologist

and is Board-Certified (ABPP) and fellowship-trained in Forensic Psychology. He has
THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE

served as a sworn police officer for municipal departments in Maryland and Florida,

and is currently a consultant to the U.S. Secret Service National Threat Assessment

Center, where he worked on the Safe School Initiative, and Advisory Board Member

for the FBI's Behavioral Science Unit.

William Modzeleski

Bill Modzeleski currently serves as the associate deputy under secretary of the Office

of Safe and Drug-Free Schools at the U.S. Department of Education. Mr. Modzeleski

has over 30 years of experience working on issues related to the care and well-being

of youth. He has served in several capacities at the U.S. Department of Justice and at

the local level. President Bush recently named Mr. Modzeleski as a Meritorious

Executive for his work in the area of school safety.

Marisa Reddy, Ph.D.

Marisa Reddy is the chief research psychologist and research coordinator

for the U.S. Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center. Dr. Reddy oversees

all research conducted by the U.S. Secret Service on targeted violence and threat

assessment, and serves as co-director of the Safe School Initiative. Dr. Reddy is coauthor of "Evaluating Risk for Targeted Violence in Schools: Comparing Risk

Assessment, Threat Assessment, and Other Approaches," as well as additional

publications on the prevention of various types of targeted violence. She can be

reached at ntac@secretservice.gov.

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U.S. Department of Education

Rod Paige

Secretary

Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools

Deborah Price

Deputy Under Secretary

William Modzeleski

Associate Deputy Under Secretary

U.S. Secret Service

W. Ralph Basham

Director

Office of Protective Research

Michael Stenger

Assistant Director

National Threat Assessment Center

Matthew Doherty

Special Agent in Charge

First printed in May 2002. Revised in July 2004.

This report is in the public domain. Authorization to reproduce it in whole or in

part is granted. While permission to reprint this publication is not necessary, the

citation should be: Fein, R., Vossekuil, B., Pollack, W., Borum, R., Modzeleski, W., &

Reddy, M. Threat Assessment in Schools: A Guide to Managing Threatening Situations

and to Creating Safe School Climates. U.S. Department of Education, Office of

Elementary and Secondary Education, Safe and Drug-Free Schools Program and U.S.

Secret Service, National Threat Assessment Center, Washington, D.C., 2004.

To order copies of this report,

write to: ED Pubs, Education Publications Center, U.S. Department of Education,

P.O. Box 1398, Jessup, MD 20794-1398;

or fax your request to: (301) 470-1244;

or email your request to: edpubs@inet.ed.gov or ntac@secretservice.gov;
THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS GUIDE

or call in your request toll-free: 1-877-433-7827 (1-800-4-ED-Pubs). If 877 service is

not yet available in your area, call 1-800-872-5327 (1-800-USA-LEARN). Those who

use a telecommunications device for the deaf (TDD) or a teletypewriter (TTY),

should call 1-877-576-7734.

or order online at: www.edpubs.org

This report is also available on the Department of Education’s Web site at:

www.ed.gov/offices/OESE/SDFS and the U.S. Secret Service Web site at:

www.secretservice.gov/ntac. 

On request, this publication is available in alternative formats, such as Braille, large

print, or computer diskette. For more information, please contact the Department of

Education’s Alternate Format Center (202) 260-9895 or (202) 205-8113.

90