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*********************************************** 
ARTHUR PETRUCELLI v. CITY OF MERIDEN

(AC 39630)

Prescott, Moll and Flynn, Js.

Syllabus

The petitioner appealed to the Superior Court from the decision of the

citation hearing officer for the respondent city upholding a citation

assessed against the petitioner for violating the respondent’s anti-blight

ordinance. The court rejected the petitioner’s appeal, which included

claims that, inter alia, the anti-blight ordinance was unconstitutional

and that there was insufficient evidence to find him noncompliant with

the ordinance. On appeal to this court, the petitioner claimed that the

trial court abused its discretion in precluding the testimony of two of

his witnesses, Y and K, and erroneously concluded that the respondent

had not violated his due process rights, that the anti-blight ordinance

was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to him, and that there was

sufficient evidence establishing his noncompliance with the anti-blight

ordinance. Held:

1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding Y’s proffered

testimony and, even if the court abused its discretion in precluding K’s

proffered testimony, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the error

was harmful; Y was called to testify out of order and K’s testimony

would not have operated to discredit the testimony of M, the respondent’s housing inspector who issued the citation, because M did not

testify that the petitioner told him he could enter the property alone at

any time and, even if he had testified to this, K’s testimony on this issue

would have been cumulative.

2. The trial court did not err in concluding that the respondent had not

violated the petitioner’s due process rights; the record reflected that

the petitioner received a written, detailed notice of the blight violation,

the respondent conducted hearings regarding the blight violation at the

petitioner’s request, granted the petitioner multiple extensions of time

to address the violations, and met with the petitioner at his property

prior to the assessment being imposed.

3. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that the anti-blight ordinance

was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him; the evidence relied on

by the petitioner did not establish that the respondent enforced the antiblight ordinance in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner.

4. The trial court did not err in determining that there was sufficient evidence

demonstrating that the property was blighted; photographs submitted

at the hearing, along with the testimony of M, established that there

was garbage, trash, litter, rubbish or debris on the property in violation

of the anti-blight ordinance.

Argued November 14, 2019—officially released April 14, 2020

Procedural History

Petition to reopen a citation assessment issued by

the respondent, brought to the Superior Court in the

judicial district of New Haven, geographical area number seven, where the court, Cronan, J., rendered judgment denying the petition, from which the petitioner

appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Jeffrey D. Brownstein, for the appellant (petitioner).

Stephanie Dellolio, city attorney, with whom, on the

brief, was Deborah Leigh Moore, former city attorney,

for the appellee (respondent).
Opinion

MOLL, J. The petitioner, Arthur Petrucelli, appeals

from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor

of the respondent, the city of Meriden (city), following

a de novo hearing held on his petition to reopen an

assessment entered against him by a citation hearing

officer for violation of the city’s anti-blight ordinance.

On appeal, the petitioner claims that the court (1)

abused its discretion by precluding, in whole or in part,

two of his witnesses from testifying, (2) erroneously

concluded that the city had not violated his due process

rights, (3) erroneously concluded that the city’s antiblight ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague as

applied to him, and (4) erroneously concluded that

there was sufficient evidence establishing his noncompliance with the anti-blight ordinance. We affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

The following facts are relevant to our resolution of

this appeal. In 2003, pursuant to General Statutes § 7-

148 (c) (7) (H) (xv),1

the city enacted chapter 159 of

the Code of the City of Meriden (anti-blight ordinance).

Section 159-2 of the anti-blight ordinance provides in

relevant part that ‘‘[n]o owner . . . of real property

. . . located in the [c]ity of Meriden shall create, allow,

maintain or cause to be maintained, continue, or suffer

to exist a blighted premises.’’ Section 159-3 of the antiblight ordinance, in defining the term ‘‘blight,’’ provides

in relevant part that ‘‘[a]ny building or structure or any

parcel of land in which at least one of the following

conditions exists shall be considered blighted . . . B.

It is not being maintained as defined herein.2

. . . F.

It is a substantial factor causing serious depreciation

of the property values in the neighborhood. G. There

exist at the property conditions promoting rodent harborage and/or infestation. H. There exist at the property

overgrown shrubs, brush or weeds. I. Parking lots/areas

are left in a state of disrepair or abandonment and/or

are used to store abandoned or unregistered vehicles.

. . . N. Garbage on the property is not stored in standard containers and/or is scattered throughout the yard.

. . . Q. There exists on the property . . . trash, rubbish, rubble, tires, brush, used materials or discarded

items of little or no value. . . .’’ (Footnote added.) Section 159-7 (A) of the anti-blight ordinance provides in

relevant part that the ordinance ‘‘may be enforced by

citation, in addition to other remedies, in accordance

with [General Statutes] § 7-152c . . . . City of Meriden

code enforcement officials shall have authority to

issue citations.’’

The trial court set forth the following relevant procedural history in its corrected memorandum of decision

dated October 10, 2017.3

‘‘On March 11, 2015, the City of

Meriden Department of Development and Enforcement

sent a letter to the [petitioner] concerning the condition

of his property located at 48 Bradley Avenue in Meriden
[(property)]. This letter . . . referenced the authority

granted to the city by the Connecticut General Statutes

and incorporated in [§] 159-2 of the [anti-blight ordinance]. The letter detailed seven separate sections of

the [anti-blight ordinance] that could be considered

blight violations. On April 8, 2015, the [petitioner]

requested a hearing before the Meriden Neighborhood

Rehabilitation Advisory Board [(board)] concerning the

notice sent to him. A hearing was held by the board on

May 14, 2015, and the [petitioner] was granted a thirty

day extension for the purpose of allowing the [petitioner] to come into compliance with the anti-blight

ordinance.

‘‘An inspection of the property was scheduled for

June 22, 2015, but the [petitioner] sought an additional

extension and one was granted by the board until July

22, 2015. When no apparent progress was made by the

July 22 date, the [petitioner] was issued a citation for

a violation of the anti-blight ordinance on July 30, 2015.

The [petitioner] requested a hearing before a citation

hearing officer. At a hearing held on September 28,

2015, the [petitioner] was granted an additional thirty

day extension to address compliance issues. On October 26, [2015],4 another hearing was held by the citation

hearing officer where it was reported that the antiblight issues were not addressed by the [petitioner].

The hearing officer assessed a fine of $500 for failure

to comply with the ordinance which could be enhanced

by a fine of $100 a day if compliance was not forthcoming.’’ (Citation omitted; footnote added.)

In November, 2015, pursuant to General Statutes § 7-

152c (g)5 and Practice Book § 23-51,6

the petitioner commenced the present action by filing a petition to reopen

the October 26, 2015 assessment.7 The petition set forth

thirteen numbered paragraphs asserting various claims.

The petitioner asserted, inter alia, that (1) the city had

denied him due process by failing to provide him with

adequate notice regarding his purported violation of

the anti-blight ordinance, (2) the anti-blight ordinance

was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him, and (3)

there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that he

had violated the anti-blight ordinance. The petitioner

requested that the trial court conduct a de novo hearing

and grant him relief, inter alia, by reversing the assessment and prohibiting the city from enforcing any assessments pertaining to the property entered under either

the anti-blight ordinance or a separate ordinance

regarding abandoned, inoperable, or unregistered

motor vehicles.

The trial court held a two day de novo hearing on

the petition in March and April, 2016. On September 2,

2016, the court rendered judgment in favor of the city.

In its October 10, 2017 corrected memorandum of decision, after dismissing each of the petitioner’s claims set

forth in the petition, the court stated that it ‘‘rejects the
appeal of the [petitioner] and returns the matter to the

[city] to reimpose the penalties assessed by the hearing

officer . . . .’’ This appeal followed. Additional facts

and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

I

The petitioner first claims that the trial court abused

its discretion during the de novo hearing by precluding

the proffered testimonies of John Yacovino, a deputy

fire marshal of the city, and Thomas Kilroy, a city housing inspector. This claim is unavailing.

‘‘It is well established that [t]he trial court’s ruling

on evidentiary matters will be overturned only upon a

showing of a clear abuse of the court’s discretion. . . .

[E]videntiary rulings will be overturned on appeal only

where there was an abuse of discretion and a showing

by the [petitioner] of substantial prejudice or injustice.

. . . [I]n determining whether there has been an abuse

of discretion, every reasonable presumption should be

made in favor of the correctness of the trial court’s

ruling . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Burns v. RBS Securities, Inc., 151 Conn. App. 451,

461–62, 96 A.3d 566, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 920, 100

A.3d 851 (2014).

The following additional facts are relevant to our

resolution of this claim. During the first day of the de

novo hearing, the petitioner called Yacovino as his first

witness. Immediately after the clerk had sworn in

Yacovino, the city’s counsel objected, arguing that

Yacovino’s impending testimony would be irrelevant

with regard to whether the petitioner had violated the

anti-blight ordinance. The court stated that it was uncertain as to the purpose of Yacovino’s testimony, as the

petition to reopen the assessment did not contain a

statement of facts. The petitioner’s counsel responded

that Peter Miller, the city housing inspector who had

issued the July 30, 2015 citation to the petitioner, had

testified during the October 26, 2015 citation hearing

that, without an administrative warrant and without the

petitioner being present, he had entered and inspected

the property on the day of the hearing. The petitioner’s

counsel proffered that Yacovino would testify that, in

his capacity as a city fire marshal, he had interacted

with the petitioner on numerous occasions over the

course of ten to fifteen years regarding fire code violations and that the petitioner had never permitted him to

enter the petitioner’s property without the petitioner’s

express authorization and without the petitioner being

present. In reply, the city’s counsel argued, inter alia,

that there were other witnesses available who could

offer testimony regarding whether Miller’s entry onto

the property was permissible and that Yacovino’s proposed testimony was not germane to the present action.

The petitioner’s counsel retorted that the issue was not

whether the petitioner had permitted Miller to enter

the property, but whether Miller, when called to testify,
would be a credible witness.

Following argument, the court determined that the

petitioner had called Yacovino as a witness out of order,

stating: ‘‘I have the petition. I don’t know what the

issues are, at this point in time. And you’re bringing

[Yacovino in] and asking him questions about his interaction, with [the petitioner], over the years. It’s – it’s

entirely out of order.’’ On that basis, the court sustained

the city’s objection and excused Yacovino.

The petitioner next called Miller as a witness. Miller

testified in relevant part as follows. During the September 28, 2015 citation hearing, the citation hearing officer

granted the petitioner a thirty day extension of time to

bring the property into compliance with the anti-blight

ordinance. That same day, at the request of the petitioner and his counsel, Miller and a few other individuals met with the petitioner and his counsel on the property and conducted a ‘‘general tour’’ of the property.

While on the property, a verbal agreement was reached

pursuant to which the city was permitted to monitor

the property periodically during the thirty day period.

Miller interpreted the agreement to mean that he had

authorization to enter the property at any time during

the thirty day period regardless of whether the petitioner was present; however, Miller admitted that the

petitioner had never told him expressly that he was

permitted to enter the property unaccompanied at will.

Thereafter, on October 26, 2015, before the start of

the citation hearing held that day, Miller entered and

inspected the property. The petitioner was not present

during Miller’s inspection.

After Miller finished testifying, the petitioner called

Kilroy as a witness. At the outset, Kilroy testified that

he had cited the petitioner for violating the anti-blight

ordinance with respect to a different property in Meriden owned by the petitioner. The city’s counsel

objected, arguing that Kilroy’s testimony regarding any

anti-blight citation issued with respect to other property

owned by the petitioner was irrelevant. The petitioner’s

counsel proffered that he intended to elicit testimony

from Kilroy that, during Kilroy’s past interactions with

the petitioner, the petitioner had never allowed Kilroy

to enter his property unattended. According to the petitioner’s counsel, Kilroy’s testimony was relevant

because it would discredit Miller’s purported testimony

that the petitioner had given him permission to enter

the property at any time, regardless of whether the

petitioner was present, during the thirty day period

following the September 28, 2015 citation hearing. The

court stated that it could take judicial notice that the

petitioner and the city ‘‘have been fighting with each

other, probably, longer than we have been around’’ and

‘‘do not see eye to eye,’’ but it agreed with the city’s

counsel that testimony from Kilroy regarding his

encounters with the petitioner that were unrelated to
the property was irrelevant. Thereafter, Kilroy testified

that he attended the September 28, 2015 citation hearing

and that, during the hearing, there had been no agreement reached permitting the city to enter the property

without the petitioner present. He further testified that

he did not attend the subsequent meeting held on the

property between Miller, the petitioner, and the petitioner’s counsel, among others, on September 28, 2015.

The petitioner next called John Rutka, an acquaintance of the petitioner, to testify. Rutka testified that

he was present at the September 28, 2015 meeting on

the property and that he did not hear the petitioner

agree to authorize Miller to enter the property unaccompanied at any time during the thirty day period following

the September 28, 2015 citation hearing. The petitioner’s

counsel then called the petitioner as a witness. The

petitioner testified in relevant part that he had never

permitted Miller or any other city official to enter the

property unless his counsel was present and the purpose of the entry was to discuss issues regarding the

property.

On appeal, the petitioner claims that the court abused

its discretion by precluding the proffered testimonies

of Yacovino and Kilroy. The petitioner asserts that

Yacovino and Kilroy would have testified that he had

never permitted either of them, respectively, to enter

his property without either him or his counsel present.

The petitioner posits that the excluded evidence would

have undermined the credibility of Miller, who, the petitioner contends, had testified that the petitioner had

given him permission to enter the property, regardless

of whether the petitioner was present, during the thirty

day period following the September 28, 2015 citation

hearing. According to the petitioner, Miller was a key

witness whose testimony was critical to the court’s

determination that he had violated the anti-blight ordinance. We address the court’s rulings as to Yacovino

and Kilroy in turn.

A

We first consider the court’s decision precluding

Yacovino’s proffered testimony. In precluding that testimony, the court determined that the petitioner had

called Yacovino as a witness out of order. According

to the petitioner, the purpose of Yacovino’s proffered

testimony was to attack Miller’s credibility; however,

Miller had not yet been called to testify. Precluding

Yacovino’s proffered testimony was reasonable given

that the evidence that the proffered testimony was

intended to discredit, namely, Miller’s testimony, had

not yet been admitted. The petitioner makes no argument that the court’s determination that Yacovino was

called out of order was improper. Thus, we conclude

that the court did not abuse its discretion by precluding

Yacovino’s proffered testimony.
B

We next turn to the court’s ruling precluding Kilroy’s

proffered testimony. Unlike Yacovino, the petitioner

called Kilroy as a witness after Miller had testified. The

court determined that Kilroy’s proffered testimony was

irrelevant because it had no nexus to the property, but

rather concerned Kilroy’s interactions with the petitioner relating to a different property owned by the

petitioner. We conclude that, even if the court’s preclusion of Kilroy’s proffered testimony constituted an

abuse of discretion, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the error was harmful.

‘‘Even when a trial court’s evidentiary ruling is

deemed to be improper, we must determine whether

that ruling was so harmful as to require a new trial.

. . . In other words, an evidentiary ruling will result in

a new trial only if the ruling was both wrong and harmful. . . . Harmful error occurs in a civil action when

the ruling would likely affect the result. . . . It is the

[petitioner’s] burden to show harmful error.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Suntech of Connecticut, Inc.

v. Lawrence Brunoli, Inc., 173 Conn. App. 321, 347, 164

A.3d 36 (2017), appeal dismissed, 330 Conn. 342, 193

A.3d 1208 (2018). ‘‘In those instances wherein a party

claims that the trial court improperly excluded testimony, we undertake a review of the relationship of the

excluded evidence to the central issues in the case

and whether that evidence would have been merely

cumulative of admitted testimony.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Doyle v. Kamm, 133 Conn. App. 25,

35, 35 A.3d 308 (2012).

Here, the petitioner sought to introduce Kilroy’s proffered testimony to discredit Miller, who purportedly

testified that the petitioner had permitted him to enter

the property at any time, regardless of whether the

petitioner was present, during the thirty day period

following the September 28, 2015 citation hearing. Contrary to the petitioner’s belief, however, Miller testified

that the petitioner did not tell him expressly that he

could enter the property alone at any time; instead,

Miller testified that he interpreted the verbal agreement

reached by the parties during the September 28, 2015

meeting on the property, permitting the city to monitor

the property periodically during the thirty day period,

as authorizing him to have such open access to the

property. Thus, Kilroy’s proffered testimony would not

have operated to discredit Miller. Additionally, even if

Miller had testified that the petitioner had given him

express permission to enter the property unaccompanied at will, both Rutka and the petitioner testified that

the petitioner had never given Miller such authorization.

As a result, at most, Kilroy’s proffered testimony would

have been cumulative. For these reasons, even if the

court had abused its discretion by precluding Kilroy’s

proffered testimony on the relevancy ground cited by
the court, the petitioner has not established harmful

error.

In sum, we conclude that (1) the court did not abuse

its discretion by precluding Yacovino’s proffered testimony, and (2) assuming that the court abused its discretion by precluding Kilroy’s proffered testimony, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the court’s ruling

was harmful. Accordingly, the petitioner’s claim challenging the court’s preclusion of the proffered testimonies of Yacovino and Kilroy fails.

II

We next turn to the petitioner’s claim that the trial

court improperly concluded that the city did not deprive

him of his due process rights.8 Specifically, the petitioner asserts that the city failed to provide him with

adequate notice and process in enforcing the anti-blight

ordinance against him. We are not persuaded.

The petitioner’s claim implicates his right to procedural due process. ‘‘[F]or more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear:

Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to

be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right

they must first be notified. . . . It is equally fundamental that the right to notice and an opportunity to be

heard must be granted at a meaningful time and in a

meaningful manner. . . . [T]hese principles require

that a [party] have . . . an effective opportunity to

defend by confronting any adverse witnesses and by

presenting his own arguments and evidence orally.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Merkel v. Hill, 189

Conn. App. 779, 786–87, 207 A.3d 1115 (2019). ‘‘Whether

a party was deprived of his due process rights is a

question of law to which appellate courts grant plenary

review.’’ McFarline v. Mickens, 177 Conn. App. 83, 100,

173 A.3d 417 (2017), cert. denied, 327 Conn. 997, 176

A.3d 557 (2018).

In rejecting the petitioner’s claim that the city had

violated his due process rights, the court stated: ‘‘In

this matter, the record reflects that the [petitioner] was

first sent a notice of order informing him of possible

blight violations on March 31, 2015.9 On April [8], 2015,

the [petitioner] requested a hearing before the [board]

and was given a hearing on May 14, 2015. The [petitioner] was further granted a thirty day extension and

a second thirty day extension [to come into compliance

with the anti-blight ordinance]. After being issued a

citation for noncompliance, the [petitioner] requested

a hearing [before a citation hearing officer] and was

given one. The [petitioner] was then granted an additional thirty day extension before the imposition of

penalties. The court finds that there is no constitutional

or legal basis on the part of the [petitioner] to claim a

violation of his due process rights.’’ (Footnote added.)

We agree with the court and conclude that the peti-
tioner has failed to demonstrate a violation of his due

process rights. As the court found, the city provided

the petitioner with a written, detailed notice of the

blight violations, conducted hearings regarding the

blight violations at the petitioner’s request, and granted

the petitioner multiple extensions of time to address

the blight violations. In addition, the record reflects

that city officials offered to meet with the petitioner

on the property to discuss the blight violations prior to

the issuance of the July 30, 2015 citation, and city officials toured the property with the petitioner on September 28, 2015, prior to the imposition of the citation

assessment on October 26, 2015. Accordingly, we reject

the petitioner’s due process claim.10

III

We now turn to the petitioner’s claims that the court

improperly concluded that (1) the anti-blight ordinance

was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to him,11

and (2) there was sufficient evidence demonstrating

that he had violated the anti-blight ordinance. We are

not persuaded.

The following additional facts are relevant to our

resolution of these claims. The March 11, 2015 letter

that the city sent to the petitioner, inter alia, notified

the petitioner that the property was in violation of § 159-

2 of the anti-blight ordinance because the conditions

described in parts B, F, G, H, I, N, and Q of the definition

of ‘‘blight’’ set forth in § 159-3 of the anti-blight ordinance were present on the property.12 The trial court

concluded that there was no evidence that the antiblight ordinance was unconstitutional as applied to the

petitioner or that the city had enforced the ordinance

arbitrarily against the petitioner. Additionally, the court

concluded that there was sufficient evidence establishing that the petitioner had violated the anti-blight ordinance and that ‘‘[n]o ‘law abiding taxpayer’ should have

to own a property in proximity to the conditions created

and maintained by the [petitioner].’’

As a preliminary matter, we discuss the scope of the

petitioner’s claims that we are reviewing. From what

we can distill from his appellate briefs, the petitioner

asserts that (1) the anti-blight ordinance, in defining

‘‘blight’’ in general, was impermissibly vague as applied

to him because ‘‘different city inspectors, different

members of a city board and/or different various homeowners could disagree as to whether a certain condition

of real property and/or an article of personal property is

blight,’’ and (2) certain specific portions of the ‘‘blight’’

definition were impermissibly vague as applied to him

on various grounds. Additionally, the petitioner contends that there was no evidence introduced at the de

novo hearing demonstrating that the conditions constituting blight existed on the property.

We need not consider whether each provision of the
anti-blight ordinance identified by the petitioner was

unconstitutionally vague as applied to him nor whether

there was evidence demonstrating that every condition

of blight for which the petitioner was cited was present

on the property. Section 159-3 of the anti-blight ordinance, in defining the term ‘‘blight,’’ provides that ‘‘[a]ny

building or structure or any parcel of land in which at

least one of the following conditions exists shall be

considered blighted . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Thus,

any one of the enumerated conditions listed in § 159-

3, if proven to exist, is sufficient to render a property

blighted pursuant to the anti-blight ordinance. The trial

court did not refer to any specific provisions of the

anti-blight ordinance in rejecting the petitioner’s claims.

Keeping in mind that, ‘‘[i]f faced with . . . an ambiguity, we construe the court’s decision to support, rather

than to undermine, its judgment’’ and that ‘‘our appellate courts do not presume error on the part of the trial

court [but], [r]ather, we presume that the trial court,

in rendering its judgment . . . undertook the proper

analysis of the law and the facts’’; (internal quotation

marks omitted) Barber v. Barber, 193 Conn. App 190,

200–201, 219 A.3d 378 (2019); we may affirm the trial

court’s judgment if we conclude that the petitioner has

failed to demonstrate that (1) any one of the provisions

of the anti-blight ordinance that he was cited for violating was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him

and (2) there was insufficient evidence establishing his

noncompliance with that provision.

We conclude that the petitioner has not satisfied his

burden with respect to part B of the definition of

‘‘blight’’ set forth in § 159-3 of the anti-blight ordinance,

which provides that property that ‘‘is not being maintained’’ is considered blighted. Elsewhere in § 159-3,

the phrase ‘‘not being maintained’’ is defined in relevant

part as follows: ‘‘A structure is not being maintained if

any of the following conditions apply: . . . C. Garbage,

trash, litter, rubbish, or debris are situated on the

premises.’’

A

We first consider whether § 159-3 of the anti-blight

ordinance, insofar as it provides that property is

blighted if it is not being maintained in that ‘‘[g]arbage,

trash, litter, rubbish, or debris are situated on the premises,’’ was unconstitutionally vague as applied to the

petitioner. We conclude that it was not.

‘‘As a threshold matter, it is necessary to discuss the

applicable standard of review. A statute is not void

for vagueness unless it clearly and unequivocally is

unconstitutional, making every presumption in favor

of its validity. . . . The party challenging a statute’s

constitutionality has a heavy burden of proof; the

unconstitutionality must be proven beyond all reasonable doubt. . . . Additionally, in a vagueness challenge, such as this, civil statutes can be less specific
than criminal statutes and still pass constitutional muster. . . . To prove that a statute is unconstitutionally

vague, the challenging party must establish that an ordinary person is not able to know what conduct is permitted and prohibited under the statute. . . .

‘‘To demonstrate that [a statute] is unconstitutionally

vague as applied to [him], the [petitioner] therefore

must . . . demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt

that [he] had inadequate notice of what was prohibited

or that [he was] the victim of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. . . . [T]he void for vagueness doctrine embodies two central precepts: the right to fair

warning of the effect of a governing statute . . . and

the guarantee against standardless law enforcement.

. . . If the meaning of a statute can be fairly ascertained

a statute will not be void for vagueness since [m]any

statutes will have some inherent vagueness, for [i]n

most English words and phrases there lurk uncertainties. . . . The determination of whether a statutory

provision is unconstitutionally vague is a question of

law over which we exercise de novo review.’’ (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ogden v.

Zoning Board of Appeals, 157 Conn. App. 656, 668–69,

117 A.3d 986, cert. denied, 319 Conn. 927, 125 A.3d

202 (2015). The foregoing principles apply equally to

municipal ordinances. See, e.g., id., 668–72 (analyzing

claim that trial court erroneously concluded that zoning

regulations were unconstitutionally vague as applied);

Booker v. Jarjura, 120 Conn. App. 1, 24–26, 990 A.2d 894

(analyzing claim that trial court erroneously concluded

that provision of city charter was not unconstitutionally

vague as applied), cert. denied, 297 Conn. 909, 995 A.2d

636 (2010).

The petitioner does not contend on appeal that the

terms ‘‘[g]arbage, trash, litter, rubbish, or debris’’ pursuant to § 159-3 of the anti-blight ordinance are ambiguous

such that he had inadequate notice as to whether those

conditions existed on the property;13 rather, the only

cognizable argument that the petitioner presents in support of his contention that the provision of the antiblight ordinance at issue was impermissibly vague as

applied to him is that different city officials and different

homeowners could disagree as to whether the conditions on his property constituted blight. In essence, the

petitioner appears to be raising the specter of the antiblight ordinance being applied in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner.

‘‘To demonstrate that [a] statute’s vagueness gives

an agency unbridled discretion to enforce the statute

arbitrarily and discriminatorily, the challenging party

must establish that he was the victim of such arbitrary

and discriminatory enforcement.’’ Connecticut Building Wrecking Co. v. Carothers, 218 Conn. 580, 592, 590

A.2d 447 (1991). The petitioner argues that the city

arbitrarily targeted him as evidenced by a small claims
decision, admitted into evidence during the de novo

hearing, wherein a magistrate rejected a claim submitted by him alleging that the city had wrongfully

destroyed flowers and small trees that he had planted

on a portion of his property. In rejecting the petitioner’s

claim, the magistrate concluded that (1) the city had

failed to follow the procedures set forth in its ordinances in removing the plants and trees but (2) the

petitioner had wrongfully planted the flowers and trees

without a permit, such that he failed to suffer any compensable damages.14 We are not persuaded that the

city’s failure to follow its ordinances in an unrelated

matter involving the petitioner establishes that it

enforced the anti-blight ordinance against the petitioner

in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner. In addition,

the petitioner thinly asserts that the city arbitrarily targeted him because Miller testified during the de novo

hearing that he used a ‘‘zoom’’ feature on his cell phone

to photograph the property. We can discern no visage

of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement on the

basis of that evidence. Accordingly, the petitioner’s void

for vagueness claim fails.

B

We next turn to the question of whether there was

insufficient evidence establishing that ‘‘[g]arbage, trash,

litter, rubbish, or debris’’ was situated on the property

in violation of the § 159-3 of the anti-blight ordinance.

This issue warrants little discussion.

‘‘Because the . . . claim challenges the sufficiency

of the evidence, which is based on the court’s factual

findings, the proper standard of review is whether, on

the basis of the evidence, the court’s finding . . . was

clearly erroneous. . . . In other words, a court’s finding of fact is clearly erroneous and its conclusions

drawn from that finding lack sufficiency when there is

no evidence in the record to support it . . . or when

although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing

court on the entire evidence is left with the definite

and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.

. . . Moreover, we repeatedly have held that [i]n a [proceeding] tried before a court, the trial judge is the sole

arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight

to be given specific testimony. . . . Where there is conflicting evidence . . . we do not retry the facts or pass

on the credibility of the witnesses. . . . The probative

force of conflicting evidence is for the trier to determine.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Seale v. GeoQuest, Inc., 189 Conn. App. 587, 592, 208 A.3d 326

(2019). Here, the petitioner cites to his own testimony

elicited during the de novo hearing that he cleaned the

property, thereby bringing it into compliance with § 159-

3 of the anti-blight ordinance. The petitioner, however,

overlooks the photographs of the property introduced

into evidence during the hearing and Miller’s testimony,

which amply demonstrate that ‘‘[g]arbage, trash, litter,
rubbish, or debris’’ was situated on the property.

Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court’s determination that there was sufficient evidence demonstrating that the property was blighted.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 General Statutes § 7-148 (c) (7) (H) (xv) authorizes a municipality to

‘‘[m]ake and enforce regulations for the prevention and remediation of

housing blight, including regulations reducing assessments and authorizing

designated agents of the municipality to enter property during reasonable

hours for the purpose of remediating blighted conditions, provided such

regulations define housing blight and require such municipality to give written notice of any violation to the owner and occupant of the property and

provide a reasonable opportunity for the owner and occupant to remediate

the blighted conditions prior to any enforcement action being taken, and

further provided such regulations shall not authorize such municipality or

its designated agents to enter any dwelling house or structure on such

property, and including regulations establishing a duty to maintain property

and specifying standards to determine if there is neglect; prescribe civil

penalties for the violation of such regulations of not less than ten or more

than one hundred dollars for each day that a violation continues and, if

such civil penalties are prescribed, such municipality shall adopt a citation

hearing procedure in accordance with section 7-152c.’’

2 Section 159-3 of the anti-blight ordinance, in defining the phrase ‘‘not

being maintained,’’ provides in relevant part that ‘‘[a] structure is not being

maintained if any of the following conditions apply . . . C. Garbage, trash,

litter, rubbish, or debris are situated on the premises. D. Abandoned,

wrecked, or junked motor vehicles are stored on the premises. E. Lawns,

landscaping, or driveways are deteriorating or unkempt. . . .’’

Section 159-3 of the anti-blight ordinance defines ‘‘debris’’ as ‘‘[m]aterial

which is incapable of immediately performing the function for which it was

designed, including but not limited to abandoned, discarded, or unused

objects; junk or collections of equipment such as automobiles, boats and

recreation vehicles which are missing parts, not complete in appearance

and in an obvious state of disrepair; and parts of automobiles, furniture,

appliances, cans, boxes, scrap metal, tires, batteries, containers, and

garbage.’’

Section 159-3 of the anti-blight ordinance defines ‘‘litter’’ as ‘‘[a]ny discarded, used, or unconsumed substance or waste material, whether made

of aluminum, glass, plastic, rubber, paper, or other natural or synthetic

material, or any combination thereof, including but not limited to any bottle,

jar, or can or any top, cap or detachable tab of any bottle, jar, or can; any

unlighted cigarette, cigar, match or any flaming or glowing material; or any

garbage, trash, refuse, debris, rubbish, glass clippings or other lawn or

garden waste, newspaper, magazine, glass, metal, plastic, or paper containers

or other packaging or construction material, which has not been deposited

in a receptacle.’’

Section 159-3 of the anti-blight ordinance defines ‘‘rubbish’’ as ‘‘[a]ny

nonputrescible waste materials, except ashes, including but not limited

to paper, cardboard, tin cans, wood, glass, bedding, furniture, crockery,

appliances, junk automobiles, demolition material, tree limbs, and industrial wastes.’’

3 The trial court decided the petitioner’s petition to reopen the assessment

on September 2, 2016; however, on that date, it inadvertently issued in the

present action a memorandum of decision pertaining to a related action,

Petrucelli v. Meriden, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket

No. CV-16-5006564-S. On October 10, 2017, the court issued a corrected

memorandum of decision setting forth its ruling on the petition filed in the

present action.

4 The corrected memorandum of decision states that the second citation

hearing was held on October 26, 2016, which we presume to be a scrivener’s error.

5 General Statutes § 7-152c provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Any municipality

as defined in subsection (a) of section 7-148 may establish by ordinance a

citation hearing procedure in accordance with this section. The Superior

Court shall be authorized to enforce the assessments and judgments provided for under this section.

***
‘‘(g) A person against whom an assessment has been entered pursuant

to this section is entitled to judicial review by way of appeal. An appeal shall

be instituted within thirty days of the mailing of notice of such assessment

by filing a petition to reopen assessment, together with an entry fee in an

amount equal to the entry fee for a small claims case pursuant to section 52-

259, at a superior court facility designated by the Chief Court Administrator,

which shall entitle such person to a hearing in accordance with the rules

of the judges of the Superior Court.’’

6 Practice Book § 23-51 provides: ‘‘(a) Any aggrieved person who wishes

to appeal a parking or citation assessment issued by a town, city, borough

or other municipality shall file with the clerk of the court within the time

limited by statute a petition to open assessment with a copy of the notice

of assessment annexed thereto. A copy of the petition with the notice of

assessment annexed shall be sent by the petitioner by certified mail to the

town, city, borough or municipality involved.

‘‘(b) Upon receipt of the petition, the clerk of the court, after consultation

with the presiding judge, shall set a hearing date on the petition and shall

notify the parties thereof. There shall be no pleadings subsequent to the

petition.

‘‘(c) The hearing on the petition shall be de novo. There shall be no right

to a hearing before a jury.’’

7 The petition was captioned as a ‘‘Petition to Reopen Assessment.’’ We

observe that § 7-152c (g) provides that a person against whom a citation

assessment has been entered may institute an appeal by filing a ‘‘petition

to reopen assessment . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) By comparison, Practice

Book § 23-51 (a) provides that an aggrieved person may appeal a citation

assessment by filing a ‘‘petition to open assessment . . . .’’ (Emphasis

added.) We will refer to the petition as a petition to ‘‘reopen’’ the assessment

in conformity with the language of § 7-152c (g).

8 We analyze the petitioner’s due process claim under the federal constitution only because he has not provided an independent analysis of an alleged

due process violation under the state constitution. See Chief Disciplinary

Counsel v. Rozbicki, 326 Conn. 686, 694 n.8, 167 A.3d 351 (2017), cert. denied,

U.S. , 138 S. Ct. 2583, 201 L. Ed. 2d 295 (2018).

9 We presume that the court was referring to the March 11, 2015 letter

sent to the petitioner by the city.

10 Throughout his appellate briefs, the petitioner identifies a litany of

purported defects in the notice and process with respect to the city’s enforcement of the anti-blight ordinance against him. We find no merit to these

claimed defects and need not discuss them further.

11 ‘‘The void for vagueness doctrine is a procedural due process concept

that originally was derived from the guarantees of due process contained

in the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution.

. . . [Our Supreme Court has] equated vagueness analysis under our state

constitution with the corresponding federal constitutional analysis.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wethersfield v. PR Arrow, LLC, 187 Conn.

App. 604, 630–31, 203 A.3d 645, cert. denied, 331 Conn. 907, 202 A.3d 1022

(2019). The petitioner has not provided an independent analysis of his void

for vagueness claim under the state constitution and, therefore, we limit

our analysis to the federal constitution. See Chief Disciplinary Counsel v.

Rozbicki, 326 Conn. 694 n.8, 167 A.3d 351 (2017), cert. denied, U.S. ,

138 S. Ct. 2583, 201 L. Ed. 2d 295 (2018).

12 The March 11, 2015 letter provides in relevant part: ‘‘Your property at

48 Bradley Avenue, Meriden, CT is in violation of [§ 159-2 of the anti-blight

ordinance] and the following issues are to be addressed:

‘‘Collect and properly dispose of any garbage, trash, litter, rubbish or

debris situated on the premises. (§ 159-3 – Blight-Parts ‘B’ and ‘N’ and Not

Being Maintained-Part ‘C’)

‘‘Remove the abandoned, wrecked or junked motor vehicles stored on

the premises. (§ 159-3 – Blight-Parts ‘B’ and ‘I’ and Not Being MaintainedPart ‘D’)

‘‘Correct the deteriorated and unkempt conditions of the lawn, landscaping

and driveway. (§ 159-3 – Blight-Parts ‘B’ and ‘I’ and Not Being MaintainedPart ‘E’)

‘‘Correct the conditions that create a substantial factor causing serious

depreciation of property values in the neighborhood. (§ 159-3 – BlightPart ‘F’)

‘‘Correct the conditions that promote rodent harborage or infestation.

(§ 159-3 – Blight-Part ‘G’)

‘‘Trim and maintain the overgrown shrubs, brush and weeds. (§ 159-3 –
Blight-Part ‘H’)

‘‘Remove all trash, rubbish, rubble, tires, brush, used materials or discarded items of little or no value. (§ 159-3 – Blight-Part ‘Q’) . . . .’’

13 The terms ‘‘litter,’’ ‘‘rubbish,’’ and ‘‘debris’’ are defined in § 159-3 of the

anti-blight ordinance. See footnote 2 of this opinion.

14 The magistrate also concluded that the petitioner had failed to present

evidence concerning the actual value of the flowers and trees.