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S. HRG. 108–37

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF AFGHANISTAN:

AN UPDATE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

FEBRUARY 12, 2003

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

BARBARA BOXER, California

BILL NELSON, Florida

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia

JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Staff Director

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Democratic Staff Director

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, prepared statement . 10

Hagel, Hon. Chuck, U.S. Senator from Nebraska, prepared statement ............. 24

Johnson, Hon. David T., Coordinator for Afghanistan Assistance, Department

of State, Washington, DC .................................................................................... 4

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 7

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 3

Rodman, Hon. Peter W., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International

Security Affairs, Department of Defense, Washington, DC .............................. 12

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 14

Shahryar, Hon. Ishaq, Afghanistan Ambassador to the United States of America .......................................................................................................................... 44

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 48

(III)

(1)

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF AFGHANISTAN:

AN UPDATE

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2003

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room SD–

419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chairman of the committee), presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Coleman, Biden, Sarbanes, Feingold, and Corzine.

The CHAIRMAN. This meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee

is called to order. Today the committee meets to review the United

States’ policy toward Afghanistan and our ongoing efforts to assist

that country in recovering from the damage incurred under the

rule of the Taliban and former tenants, such as Osama bin Laden

and the al-Qaeda.

In the months ahead the United States will be focusing increased

attention on threats posed by Iraq and North Korea, but we cannot

abandon our commitments or lose sight of our goals in Afghanistan.

The international community will take notice of our staying power

in Afghanistan. If we are able to help Afghanistan transition into

a secure democracy, we will bolster our ability to attract allies in

the war against terrorism.

Our commitment to Afghanistan is also a demonstration of how

we will approach post-conflict Iraq, the subject of our hearing yesterday. American credibility is on the line in these situations and

we must understand that failure to follow through could have extremely negative consequences in the war on terror.

While military experts have been saying for some time that the

war against the Taliban and the al-Qaeda is winding down, American troops remain in harm’s way. Estimates suggest that as many

as 1,000 al-Qaeda fighters remain active inside Afghanistan. Most

recently, allied forces took action at Spin Boldak in eastern Afghanistan, and just 2 weeks ago four American Marines were killed

when their Blackhawk helicopter crashed 7 miles from the Bagram

Air Base. To date 47 American service members have lost their

lives since operations in Afghanistan began last fall.

In addition to ongoing military operations, the United States is

leading the way in the reconstruction and revitalization of Afghanistan. More than 2 million refugees have returned, crops are being

planted, mines are being cleared, children are returning to school,

and women are emerging as a critical force in the future of AfghanVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Jun 13, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 87575 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
2

istan. We should be proud of all that has been accomplished thus

far under very difficult circumstances.

Early on, President Bush announced that the United States

would, and I quote, ‘‘not just simply leave after a military objective

has been achieved.’’ But in response to the President’s commitment,

the United States in fact provided more than $500 million in humanitarian reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan in fiscal year

2002, and I am hopeful the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act

which Congress passed last year will accelerate the already substantial progress being made in the country.

Despite this progress, the challenges ahead are daunting. While

humanitarian aid and emergency assistance has been generous, the

recent fighting in the south and the continued control of warlords

in various locales demonstrate the fragility of the situation. The

United States is taking the lead in training a new Afghan National

Army [ANA], but this is a slow process.

In the meantime, security in Afghanistan depends upon U.S.

military power and the International Security Assistance Force,

[ISAF]. The ISAF was created by the Bonn Agreement and has

reached its agreed strength of 4,900 troops. But the need to expand

the ISAF and issues surrounding its leadership and force levels

continue to be topics of debate.

I agree with those who suggest that ISAF must expand its area

of operations beyond the capital. The need to maintain security,

distribute aid, and establish the credibility of the interim government exists throughout the country, not just in Kabul, the capital.

Furthermore, the challenge of finding nations willing and able to

lead the ISAF is becoming increasingly difficult. The United Kingdom and Turkey have previously led the force and Germany and

the Netherlands recently took command. But efforts to identify a

followup leader have thus far been unsuccessful.

Late last year, the Defense Department announced plans to establish eight joint regional teams, composed of U.S. combat and

civil affairs officers, in order to provide security for reconstruction

efforts and to help extend the Afghan Government’s reach into the

countryside. This is an important initiative, but it cannot fully compensate for the value of an expanded ISAF.

The issue of counternarcotics is closely linked with the overall security situation in Afghanistan. Experts report that as much as $1

billion in heroin is being shipped out of the country each year. A

large portion of these profits are lining the pockets of some of the

same warlords who are threatening the stability of the Karzai government. The United States must formulate a long-term plan to address the threats associated with narcotrafficking. I am hopeful the

administration will submit to Congress a plan of action to address

these threats.

With this in mind, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses,

not only on the successes achieved to date, but the administration’s

future plans and policies for Afghanistan, specifically those to be

achieved through the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act.

Before turning to Senator Biden—and I will do so when the Senator appears—he has had a train delay and will be with us shortly

for his opening statement—I want to welcome today’s witnesses.

We are pleased to have them. We will call first upon David JohnVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Jun 13, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 87575 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
3

son, the State Department’s Coordinator for Afghanistan; and then

we will hear from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Peter Rodman, on the United States’ policies and plans.

We are especially pleased that the Afghanistan Ambassador to

the United States of America will join us to provide an Afghan perspective in the second panel.

Finally, let me point out that this hearing represents the first in

a series designed to investigate reconstruction efforts and the ongoing security challenges in Afghanistan. Upon the Senate’s return

from recess, the committee will host a meeting with Chairman

Hamid Karzai. Dr. Karzai has provided important leadership to Afghanistan at a critical time in its history. It will be a great privilege to have him with us for that meeting.

We look forward to the witnesses this morning and I call now

upon our first witness, the Honorable David Johnson, for his report. Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Senator Lugar follows:]

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Today the Committee meets to review U.S. policy toward Afghanistan and our ongoing efforts to assist that country in recovering from the damage incurred under

the rule of the Taliban, and from former tenants such as Osama bin Laden and alQaeda.

In the months ahead, the United States will be focusing increased attention on

threats posed by Iraq and North Korea, but we cannot abandon our commitments

or lose sight of our goals in Afghanistan. The international community will take notice of our staying power in Afghanistan. If we are able to help Afghanistan transition into a secure democracy, we will bolster our ability to attract allies in the war

against terrorism. Our commitment to Afghanistan is also a demonstration of how

we will approach post-conflict Iraq. American credibility is on the line in these situations, and we must understand that failure to follow through could have extremely

negative consequences on the war on terror.

While military experts have been saying for some months that the war against

the Taliban and al-Qaeda is winding down, American troops remain in harm’s way.

Estimates suggest that as many as 1,000 al-Qaeda fighters remain active inside Afghanistan. Most recently, allied forces took action at Spin Buldak, in eastern Afghanistan; and just two weeks ago, four American Marines were killed when their

Blackhawk helicopter crashed seven miles from Bagram airbase. To date, 47 American service members have lost their lives since operations in Afghanistan began

last fall.

In addition to on-going military operations, the United States is leading the way

in the reconstruction and revitalization of Afghanistan. More than two million refugees have already returned; crops are being planted; mines are being cleared; children are returning to school; and women are emerging as a critical force in the future of Afghanistan. We should be proud of what has been accomplished thus far

under very difficult circumstances.

Early on, President Bush announced that the United States would ‘‘not just simply leave after a military objective has been achieved.’’ In response to the President’s commitment, the United States provided more than $500 million in humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan in fiscal year 2002. I am hopeful that the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act, which Congress passed last year,

will accelerate the already substantial progress being made in Afghanistan.

Despite this progress, the challenges ahead are daunting. While humanitarian aid

and emergency assistance have been generous, the recent fighting in the south and

the continued control of warlords in various locales demonstrate the fragility of the

situation in Afghanistan.

The United States is taking the lead in training a new Afghan National Army.

But this is a slow process. In the meantime, security in Afghanistan depends upon

U.S. military power and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

The ISAF was created by the Bonn Agreement and has reached its agreed

strength of 4,900 troops. But the need to expand the ISAF, and issues surrounding

its leadership and force levels continue to be topics of debate. I agree with those who

4

suggest that the ISAF must expand its area of operations beyond the capital. The

need to maintain security, distribute aid, and establish the credibility of the interim

government exists throughout the country, not just in Kabul. Furthermore, the challenge of finding nations willing and able to lead the ISAF is becoming increasingly

difficult. The United Kingdom and Turkey have previously led the Force, and Germany and the Netherlands recently took co-command. But efforts to identify a follow-up leader have thus far been unsuccessful.

Late last year, the Defense Department announced plans to establish eight ‘‘Joint

Regional Teams,’’ composed of U.S. combat and civil affairs officers, in order to provide security for reconstruction efforts and to help extend the Afghan government’s

reach into the countryside. This is an important initiative, but it cannot fully compensate for the value of an expanded ISAF.

The issue of counter-narcotics is closely linked with the overall security situation

in Afghanistan. Experts report that as much as $1 billion in heroin is being shipped

out of the country each year. A large portion of these profits are lining the pockets

of some of the same warlords who are threatening the stability of the Karzai government. The United States must formulate a long-term plan to address the threats

associated with narco-trafficking. I am hopeful that the administration will submit

to Congress a plan of action to address these threats.

With this in mind, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses—not only on the

successes achieved to date but on the administration’s future plans and policies for

Afghanistan, specifically those to be achieved through the Afghan Freedom Support

Act.

Before turning to Senator Biden for his opening statement, I would like to welcome today’s witnesses. First we will hear from David Johnson, the State Department’s Coordinator for Afghanistan, and then from Assistant Secretary of Defense

for International Security Affairs, Peter Rodman, on U.S. policies and plans. We are

especially pleased that Afghanistan’s Ambassador to the United States, Ishaq

Shahryar, will join us to provide an Afghan perspective.

Finally, let me point out that this hearing represents the first in a series designed

to investigate reconstruction efforts and the ongoing security challenges in Afghanistan. Upon the Senate’s return from recess, the committee will host a meeting with

Chairman Hamid Karzai. Dr. Karzai has provided important leadership to Afghanistan at a critical time in its history. We look forward to receiving him and listening

to his recommendations.

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID T. JOHNSON, COORDINATOR FOR

AFGHANISTAN ASSISTANCE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the

opportunity to testify today before your committee.

Mr. Chairman, 17 months ago Afghanistan was mired in more

than 2 decades of conflict. Its people were living under the brutally

repressive Taliban regime, suffering human rights abuses on a dramatic scale. Afghan women were oppressed, girls were denied an

education, religious minorities were persecuted, and citizens had

virtually no rights. For most people, it was almost a reign of terror.

Humanitarian problems were immense and there was no prospect

for a productive economy. Afghanistan was a haven for drug producers and drug traffickers. Tragically for the United States and

its citizens, Afghanistan was also a parasitic host for al-Qaeda.

Today, Mr. Chairman, the Taliban is history. Its surviving terrorist elements have been forced into hiding. Afghans relish their

new-found freedom. June’s emergency Loya Jirga created a representative government with broad popular support. Afghanistan’s

first peaceful transition of power in decades occurred with the

handoff from the previous Afghan interim authority to the current

transitional government headed by President Karzai.

The quick and generous response of the international community

last year to the plight of Afghans helped to avert a major humaniVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Jun 13, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 87575 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
5

tarian disaster. Now, though humanitarian assistance remains a

necessary part of international aid to Afghanistan, we are placing

a greater emphasis on reconstruction. Major infrastructure projects

are getting under way, in addition to innumerable small-scale

projects across the country.

The United States, together with Saudi Arabia and Japan, is rebuilding the key segment of the ‘‘ring road’’ which links Kabul to

Kandahar to Herat. Together with improvements in communications, an opening of transportation routes can help tie the country

together economically as well as politically. Already goods and services are available to a degree previously unimaginable to most Afghans, and the seeds of a developing market economy have now

been planted.

In other positive developments, an independent media has begun

to take root, a small disarmament program has begun in the north,

and schools have reopened across Afghanistan. More than a million

girls have enrolled in schools and women are reentering universities.

President Karzai issued an important decree in December outlining the size and character of a civilian-controlled Afghan National Army and the United States and France are training the

core of that military force. Similarly, Germany has taken initial

steps to train a national police force.

Afghanistan is clearly moving in the right direction. This is no

small accomplishment and the people of Afghanistan deserve great

credit for this achievement.

Despite my upbeat assessment, there is clearly an underlying

fragility. Taliban and al-Qaeda remnants remain in Afghanistan.

They continue their attempts to disrupt the efforts of the Afghan

Government and the international community, using

disinformation, intimidation and violence. Poppy production increased this past year. The central government’s institutions are

growing in strength, but the challenges of training, equipping,

housing, and paying government employees, including law enforcement and military personnel, are indeed daunting.

While we must continue to rely in some areas on local leaders

to provide security and stability, in the longer term we have to help

Afghans create national institutions with national sources of support, rather than relying indefinitely on regional leaders with independent militias. Only by doing this will we draw the center and

the regions together.

To create a viable central government and establish the basis for

a stable democracy and developing market economy, it is critical

that the Bonn Agreement be fully implemented. Most of the commissions called for in the Bonn Accords—the judicial, human

rights, and civil service commissions—have been established and a

constitutional drafting committee is now in place.

But the challenges ahead are considerable. The timetable for

holding national elections in June 2004 is ambitious. The process

of drafting and securing popular support for the country’s constitution will be difficult. There are profound social, religious, and political crosscurrents which must be addressed in this document.

The constitution must offer the fundamental framework for a society and a judicial system based on respect for human rights and

6

the rule of law. While it does not have to settle all of these issues,

it must set the terms of their debate, create a government based

on the consent of the governed, and provide for the basic rights of

citizens required by international standards, including freedom of

conscience.

To achieve these objectives, the United States will continue to

work with Afghanistan as well as with other donors to help rebuild

and reform Afghanistan’s judicial system. This is an enormously

complicated task. Lawyers and judges must be trained, laws rewritten, courts and prisons must be rehabilitated. In an underdeveloped country that began marching backward in the 1970s, the

to-do list is indeed a very long one.

Moreover, for the rule of law to prevail Afghanistan must have

an effective, professional police force. Germany has taken responsibility as the lead nation to work with the Afghan Government to

create such a force. But the road ahead will not be easy nor fast.

The estimated 75,000 police in Afghanistan have no strong central

authority and the various police forces in the country’s 32 provinces

operate with considerable autonomy. Corruption in many areas is

rife. Although the initial focus of training will be to get the police

in Kabul up to speed, we also need to train and equip police in

other parts of the country.

Ultimately, Mr. Chairman, Afghanistan must be able to provide

for its own internal and external security if it is to be fully established as a strong and stable nation State. The United States recognizes the need to build an Afghan National Army and to do it

right. We and the French have been careful and deliberate in training the first five battalions of this army. It will take time to build

an effective military force and there are challenges that must be

confronted and overcome. We must also link the building of an

army to a broader effort to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate Afghan veterans.

Despite these challenges, we are determined to succeed. Afghanistan’s long-term stability demands a national military force that is

multi-ethnic, disciplined, subordinate to civilian authority, adequately armed and equipped, and sustainable.

In Kabul, the International Security Assistance Force retains the

critical task of keeping the capital and its environs stable and secure. The British and Turkish forces have led ISAF well in the past

year and the United States will support the German and Dutch colead of ISAF which began formally on February 10, just 2 days ago.

We believe ISAF will need to maintain its presence in Kabul at

least through the Afghan elections in June 2004, at which point the

Afghan National Army should be able to begin to pick up increasing responsibility for security in the capital and beyond. That is the

point at which we can reexamine this issue.

With respect to security in the provinces, Operation Enduring

Freedom continues. U.S. and other coalition forces remain at work

hunting Taliban and al-Qaeda remnants and dealing with other

threats to peace and security. We are also establishing, in concert

with the central government, Provincial Reconstruction Teams

throughout Afghanistan. The first team was deployed in Gardez in

late December, a second deployed to Bamiyan in January, and a

third will be established in Kunduz before the end of this month.

7

Sites for future teams include Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, Malwan,

Jalalabad, and Kandahar.

The composition of these teams will vary by location depending

on local reconstruction and security requirements, but generally

the teams will consist of civil affairs specialists, engineers, medical

personnel, linguists, and U.S. regular and special forces, as well as

U.S. diplomats and assistance personnel. Afghanistan national

army personnel and personnel from our coalition partners will also

participate in some of these teams.

The presence of these teams should enhance security where they

operate, permitting Afghan Government authorities, international

organizations, representatives of donor nations, and NGOs to go

about the crucial business of reconstruction in a more secure and

stable environment.

There is obviously much to do, but we are committed to the future of Afghanistan and our investment in terms of lives and national treasure has already been considerable. The President has

repeatedly reaffirmed his intention for the United States to remain

engaged for the long haul. To do that, we must continue to work

with you in the Congress. We need your support, your ideas, and

your engagement. They are an integral part of our government’s effort to support Afghanistan.

I am delighted to be here today and I will do my best to address

your questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID T. JOHNSON, COORDINATOR FOR AFGHANISTAN

ASSISTANCE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify today before the Committee. As I will outline in my remarks, we have many reasons to be upbeat about

developments in Afghanistan.

Some seventeen months ago, Afghanistan was a country still mired in more than

two decades of conflict. The vast majority of its people were living under the brutally repressive Taliban regime and suffering human rights abuses on a dramatic

scale. Afghan women were oppressed, girls were denied an education, religious minorities were persecuted, and the common citizen had absolutely no democratic

rights whatsoever. The humanitarian problems besetting the country were immense,

and there was no prospect for economic recovery. Afghanistan was a haven for drug

producers and traffickers. Tragically for this nation and the scores of others that

lost citizens on September 11, Afghanistan was also a haven for international terrorists.

Today, the Taliban regime is history. Surviving terrorist elements have been

forced into hiding, their networks and plans disrupted. Afghans are relishing a newfound freedom. The Emergency Loya Jirga in June of last year succeeded in creating

a representative government with broad support from the population. The first

peaceful transition of power in Afghanistan in 23 years occurred with the handoff

from the previous Afghanistan Interim Authority to the current Transitional Government headed by President Karzai. President Karzai and his government are actively pursuing implementation of the Bonn Agreement and creating the various

commissions needed to draft a constitution and create a democracy in which human

rights—including the rights of women and ethnic and religious minorities—are protected.

The quick and generous response of the international community to the plight of

Afghans in the immediate post-conflict period helped avert a major humanitarian

disaster caused in part by drought and the unexpectedly large number of returning

refugees. Now, though humanitarian assistance will remain a necessary part of

international aid to Afghanistan for the foreseeable future, a greater emphasis is

being placed on reconstruction activities. Major infrastructure projects are underway

in addition to innumerable small-scale projects across the country. The United

States—together with Saudi Arabia and Japan—is contributing to a major project

to rebuild a segment of the ‘‘ring road’’ linking Kabul to Kandahar and Herat. ToVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Jun 13, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 87575 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
8

gether with improvements in communications, an opening of transportation routes

will help tie the country together both economically and politically. Reconstruction

is a long-term commitment, one that the U.S. and international community have

made. It will require significant resources over the coming years. We and the other

donor nations need to begin planning for these resources now. The results of this

effort are clear: Already, goods and services are available to a degree previously unimaginable to most Afghans, and the seeds of a developing market economy have

been planted.

In other positive developments, an independent media is taking root, a small but

useful disarmament program has begun in the northern part of the country, and

schools have reopened across Afghanistan. Over a million girls have enrolled in

school, and women are entering universities. President Karzai issued an important

decree in December outlining the size and character of a civilian-controlled Afghan

National Army, and the United States and France are engaged in training the core

of that military force. Similarly, Germany has taken initial steps to train a rational

police force. Both of these training efforts emphasize human rights as an integral

part of the conduct of the military and police. Almost across the board, things are

moving in the right direction for Afghanistan. This is no small accomplishment, especially for a poor country emerging from decades of conflict, and the people of Afghanistan deserve great credit for coming together to make it happen.

Despite this upbeat assessment, we must be forthright in assessing the underlying fragility of many of these accomplishments. Former Taliban and Al-Qaeda

remnants remain in Afghanistan and the region, and they will continue to try to

disrupt the aims of the Afghan government and the international community using

disinformation, intimidation and violence. Poppy production increased this past year

and we must continue to combat that scourge. The central government’s institutions

are growing in strength but the challenges of training, equipping, housing, and paying government employees—including law enforcement and military personnel—are daunting. While we must continue to rely to some degree on local leaders and their

fighters to provide security and stability in many parts of the country, in the longer

term Afghanistan’s history strongly suggests that the existence of regional leaders

with independent militias and outside financial sources will undermine the goal of

creating a stable and effective central government. We are working with Karzai to

draw the center and the regions together.

Ultimately, Afghanistan must be able to provide for its own internal and external

security if it is to be fully established as a strong and stable nation state. The

United States recognizes the critical value of building an Afghan National Army

(ANA) and building it right, and we and the French have been careful and deliberate in the training of the first five battalions of the ANA. It will take time to build

an effective military force, and there are challenges that must be confronted and

overcome. Recruitment will remain problematic—even if ANA salaries are increased—because the pool of potential recruits we must deal with remains largely

uneducated and rived by ethnic divisions and old loyalties. We must also somehow

]ink recruitment efforts to the broader process of Disarmament, Demobilization and

Reintegration (DDR) of Afghan fighters, recruiting into the ANA or providing other

employment to those demobilized as appropriate. Despite these challenges, we must

persevere. Afghanistan’s long term stability demands a national military force that

is multi-ethnic, disciplined, subordinate to civilian authority, adequately armed,

equipped and maintained, and sustainable.

In Kabul, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) retains the critical

task of keeping the capital and its environs secure. British and Turkish forces have

led ISAF well in the past year, and the U.S. Government will support the German

and Dutch co-lead of ISAF, which began formally on February 10—just two days

ago. We believe ISAF will need to maintain a presence in Kabul at least through

the Afghan elections in June 2004, at which point we hope the ANA will have

picked up increasing responsibility for security in the capital and elsewhere.

We will therefore need to work within the United Nations to see ISAF’s mandate

extended past December 2003—the end of its current authorization. In response to

calls from some quarters that ISAF be expanded to other parts of the country, it

should be noted that the United States does not oppose the expansion of ISAF. It

would be a significant challenge, however, to expand its operations to cover a country the size of Afghanistan, and no country has volunteered for this task.

In terms of security in the provinces, Operation Enduring Freedom goes on and

U.S. and coalition forces remain at work hunting Taliban and Al-Qaeda remnants

and dealing with other threats to peace and security. We are also establishing in

close concert with the central government ‘‘Provincial Reconstruction Teams’’

throughout Afghanistan. The first PRT was deployed in Gardez in late December.

A Second team deployed to Bamiyan in January, and a third will set up in Kunduz

9

this month. Proposed sites for future PRTs include Mazar-i Sharif, Herat, Parwan,

Jalalabad and Kandahar. The composition of individual PRTs will vary by location

depending on local reconstruction and security requirements, but generally the

teams will consist of civil affairs specialists, engineers, medical personnel, linguists,

and U.S. regular and Special Forces. Afghan National Army personnel and personnel from our coalition partners may also participate in some capacity. We hope

that the presence of these teams will enhance security in the areas in which they

operate, permitting Afghan government authorities, international organizations,

representatives of donor nations, and NGOs to go about the crucial business of reconstruction in a more secure environment.

To create a viable central government and establish the basis for a stable democracy and developing market economy, it is critical that the Bonn Agreement continue to be implemented. The Judicial, Human Rights and Civil Service Commissions called for in the Bonn Accords have been established, and a Constitutional

Drafting Committee is at work and expects to have a draft constitution by early

March. The challenges ahead are considerable, however. The timetable for holding

national elections in June 2004 is ambitious. The process of drafting the new constitution and obtaining public buy-in for it will also prove a complicated task. There

are profound social, religious, and political currents that somehow must be satisfied

in the final document. The constitution must offer the fundamental framework for

a society and a judicial system based on respect for human rights and the rule of

law.

In that vein, the United States will continue to work with Afghanistan, Italy and

others in the international community to help rebuild Afghanistan’s judicial system.

This is an enormously complicated task. Lawyers and judges must be trained, laws

rewritten, courts and prisons rehabilitated—the list of things to do is long. In addition, in order for the rule of law to prevail, Afghanistan must have the security provided by an effective and professional police force. Germany is the lead nation in

working with the Afghan government to create such a force, but the road ahead will

not be easy or fast. The estimated 75,000 police in Afghanistan have no strong central authority, and the various police forces in the country’s 32 provinces operate

with considerable autonomy. Corruption is rife in many areas. Although the initial

focus of training will be to get the police in Kabul up to speed, the need to train

and equip police in other parts of the country is obvious. Active international engagement on this issue will remain vital for the foreseeable future.

Narcotics production and trafficking pose a critical threat to security in Afghanistan. We and our international partners see narcotics as a crosscutting issue for all

reconstruction and developmental assistance. The 2002 estimate for opium poppy

cultivation shows an increase of approximately 30,000 hectares in Afghanistan and

we expect another large crop this year. Weak institutions, corrupt officials, impoverished farmers, and strong warlords and drug traffickers hobble implementation of

the Afghan government’s opium ban. Insecurity in many poppy-growing areas

hinders NGOs from full implementation and monitoring of development programs.

U.S. counter-narcotics support for the UK lead on this issue and the Afghan government focuses on alternative livelihood programs, building up Afghan law enforcement capacity, and running a vigorous public affairs campaign against drugs. With

our G-8 partners, we are encouraging neighboring countries to strengthen interdiction capabilities and increase crossborder cooperation to stop the regional drug

trade. These strategies will develop over the long term in tandem with progress in

overall security and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan.

We appreciate the strong support of Congress for our commitment to Afghanistan.

The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act has helped reinforce the message that the

United States will not walk away from this war-torn country. We plan to put its

provisions to good use, by providing assistance to the Afghan National Army

through drawdown. I thank the Committee for its key role in the enactment of this

legislation last year.

There is obviously still much to do in Afghanistan. We have made a necessary

commitment to the future of that country, and our investment—in terms of lives

and rational treasure—has already been considerable. The Bush Administration has

repeatedly stated its resolve to remain engaged in Afghanistan. Regardless of the

other challenges that our nation may have to face, our commitment to Afghanistan

will hold strong. To confront our challenges effectively, we must continue to work

with Congress, and I am delighted to be here today as part of that process.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Johnson.

At this point I want to recognize the distinguished ranking member of our committee for his opening statement.

10

Senator BIDEN. I will be very brief, Mr. Chairman. I would ask

unanimous consent that my statement be placed in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be published in full.

Senator BIDEN. And I apologize for being late.

Just 2 months ago, the President signed the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002, and Senator Hagel and Senator Lugar

and I cosponsored that. It was pushed forward by this committee,

and we finally got it passed. But the act authorizes $3.3 billion for

reconstruction and security of Afghanistan over and above the

funds the President might see fit to allocate from other sources. In

recognition of the fact that Afghanistan recovery is a long-term effort and in recognition of America’s continued commitment, the

sum was structured as a 4-year authorization.

The President’s budget proposes funding for Afghanistan for fiscal 2004 that remains approximately the same level as it did in

2002 and 2003. But none of this will make much of a difference

without security, and security is jeopardized, in my view, by the

administration’s decision not to seek an expansion of the U.N.-mandated peacekeeping force.

We are already seeing Afghanistan drop off the radar screen, not

with our witness, but in the country at large and the world at

large. What level of commitment will the administration display

once Afghanistan winds up behind Iraq and North Korea and whatever comes next?

So Mr. Chairman, I think we have to remember why you and

Senator Hagel and I and our colleagues on the committee decided

to pass this Afghanistan Freedom Support Act in the first place. I

can sum it up in three words: warlords, drugs, and terrorism. We

have made precious little progress in any of the three. We did it

to prevent future Afghans from becoming a replay of the past and

we did it for the sake of the people of Afghanistan.

But we also did it for the sake of our own national security, and

I am anxious to hear from our second witness. We are able to talk

about—I am going to tell Mr. Johnson others now, I am going to

want to know—I want to know precisely what warlords are in

charge, what areas do you have little or no impact? Tell me who

our greatest problems are, the names of them? Is it Ismail Khan?

Is he cooperating with Iran, which he is. What is going on with regard to Tajikistan’s involvement in the north?

These are things I am very anxious to hear about, not just generic assertions about our long-term commitment. And I look forward to hearing that.

As I said, I ask unanimous consent my entire statement be

placed in the record. I thank you for your indulgence.

[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Mr. Chairman, I congratulate you on calling this important and timely hearing.

With war clouds gathering over Iraq and an unacknowledged crisis looming in

North Korea, public attention has shifted from our unfinished business in Afghanistan.

At this time last year, I had just returned from a visit to Kabul. Every day I spent

in that city, I was asked the same question over and over: Will America help to rebuild Afghanistan, or will we just declare victory and go home?

11

There was tremendous good will toward the United States, but also a great deal

of suspicion. The Afghans I met were grateful to us for ousting the Taliban, but worried about our long-term commitment.

The people of Afghanistan have long memories: After helping drive the Soviets out

of the country in 1989, the United States quickly lost interest in the war’s untidy

aftermath. Nation-building was slow, frustrating, and, above all, expensive. So, as

my hosts in Kabul reminded me, we quickly left the Afghans to fend for themselves.

In some parts of this administration, ‘‘nation-building’’ is a dirty phrase. But the

alternative to nation-building is chaos—a chaos that churns out bloodthirsty warlords, drug-traffickers, and terrorists. We’ve seen it happen in Afghanistan before—

and we’re watching it happen in Afghanistan today.

Warlords, drugs, and terrorists. The connection is as clear as a bell: Terrorists use

drug profits to buy safe haven from warlords. That pretty much defined the state

of Afghanistan throughout the 1990s—and, sadly enough, it looks like it may define

Afghanistan for the forseeable future.

As President Bush said in another context, ‘‘This looks like a rerun of a bad

movie, and I’m not interested in watching it.’’ Well, we’ve already seen the coming

attractions, and the feature is loaded on the next reel.

Warlords: Instead of accepting our NATO allies’ offer to help share the burden

of peacekeeping in Afghanistan, we have placed responsibility for security on the

unsteady shoulders of Afghanistan’s warlords. We call them ‘‘regional commanders’’

now, but many observers would have less savory names for them. We pay them millions of dollars, and we don’t demand much in exchange.

Let’s remember that it was the brutal anarchy of the warlords that caused the

people of Afghanistan to welcome the Taliban’s rise to power. In the mid-1990s,

even the rough justice meted out by the Taliban was regarded by some in Afghanistan as preferable to the utter chaos that preceded it.

Today, many of the very same warlords ousted from power are back in their old

lairs. And, as relief workers, journalists, and human rights advocates tell us, they’re

up to their bloody old tricks. Murder, rape, theft and torture—they’re instruments

of policy now. And the central government, with few resources of its own, is powerless to do much about it.

Drugs: One sector of the Afghan economy has chalked up an astounding recovery

from the devastation of the Taliban era. According to UN figures released last week,

Afghanistan has now regained its status as the world’s largest source of opium.

In 2002, the report stated, Afghanistan produced 3,400 tons of the drug—that’s

more than 18 times the amount produced during the last year of Taliban rule.

The value of this harvest to growers and traffickers was $2.5 billion—more than

double the entire amount of aid given to Afghanistan by all nations combined for

2002.

Terrorists: We’ve seen what happens when warlords and drug-traffickers take

over a country—they soon make their nation a haven for terrorists. This happened

under the Taliban, and it is happening in Afghanistan once again.

One year ago, we were hunting high and low for a fellow named Osama bin

Laden. One year later, we’re still hunting for him—along with his top deputy, and

Taliban leader Mullah Umar. One year later, it seems Bin Laden is very much alive,

most likely hidden somewhere in or near Afghanistan.

In November, our intelligence agencies and the White House confirmed the likely

authenticity of an audiotape made by Bin Laden. He was gloating about attacks on

Western targets in Indonesia and Kenya, and promising future terrorist assaults.

Just yesterday another Bin Laden audiotape, not yet definitively authenticated, was

described by Secretary Powell and aired on CNN.

One year ago, we were hoping to roll up al-Qaeda and its allies like an old rug.

One year later, we’re in an Orange Alert—the second-highest threat level, only

reached twice since 9/11—due to continuing al-Qaeda activities.

Mr. Chairman, these facts make one thing very clear: We have a great deal of

work left to do in Afghanistan.

Just two months ago, the President signed the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act

of 2002. I am very proud of the fact that this landmark piece of legislation, sponsored by Senator Hagel and cosponsored by me and Senator Lugar, was pushed forward by this committee during the period of my chairmanship. Your own leadership

on this issue, Mr. Chairman, was crucial in winning passage for the vitally important Act.

The Act authorized a total of $3.3 billion for the reconstruction and security of

Afghanistan—over and above whatever funds the President might see fit to allocate

from other sources.

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In recognition of the fact that Afghanistan’s recovery is a long-term effort, and

in recognition of America’s continuing commitment, this sum was structured as a

4-year authorization.

The President’s budget proposes funding for Afghanistan for fiscal year 2004 that

remains at approximately the same level as funding for fiscal years 2002 and 2003.

But none of this will make much of a difference without security—and security is

jeopardized by the Administration’s decision not to seek an expansion of the UNmandated peacekeeping force.

We’re already seeing Afghanistan drop from the radar screen—what level of commitment will the administration display once Afghanistan has to line up behind

Iraq, North Korea, and whatever comes next?

And, Mr. Chairman, let’s remember why you, Senator Hagel and I (along with our

colleagues on this committee) decided to pass the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act

in the first place. I can sum it up in three words: warlords, drugs, terrorism.

We did it to prevent Afghanistan’s future from becoming a replay of its past.

We did it for the sake of the people of Afghanistan, but we also did it for the sake

of our own national security.

Mr. Chairman, we have several distinguished witnesses before us today. I look

forward to their testimony—and to finishing the job that we’ve started in Afghanistan.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Biden.

I want to recognize now our second witness, Peter Rodman, a

good friend of our committee, a frequent testifier, whose timely testimony today is important to us. Please proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. PETER W. RODMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. RODMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to

apologize for being late myself. As you know, I had another commitment. I am hosting the Defense Minister of Colombia for a

working group. But I was able to fulfill that obligation and come

here, and I thank you for your courtesy and your indulgence.

I have just had a chance to see a copy of the chairman’s opening

statement and I certainly agree with the statement about the necessity to follow through. If we fail to follow through as a country

on what we have begun and undertaken in Afghanistan, then that

will impact not only the war on terrorism, but American credibility

generally.

But the commitment of the administration is to do precisely that,

and it is a unified commitment of the Department of Defense, the

Department of State and every other agency that is engaged there.

I have submitted a formal statement which you have for the

record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be published in full in the record.

Mr. RODMAN. I thank you for that, and if I may I would like to

make a few general remarks.

Our fundamental goal as we define it is to help the Afghans

build their institutions. It is not for us to do it for them. It is for

us to do what we can do, what we need to do, to help them create

conditions for the political and economic construction that is going

on.

For the Department of Defense, the most important dimension of

course is the security dimension, and this includes not only helping

buildup the army. This is a means, not a end. It is a means, as

I said, to help them provide security and an environment in which

this political and economic task of construction can go forward.

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Our assessment, however, is that most of the country is basically

stable. Our assessment is that 75 to 80 percent of the violent incidents occur in about 20 percent of the country, and that 20 percent

is to an increasing degree al-Qaeda and Taliban elements attempting to regroup and American and coalition forces going after them.

Most of the country seems by our assessment to be generally stable. Moreover, there is a structure of stability, which was the accomplishment of the Bonn process, an equilibrium among the different political forces in the country, learning the habits of getting

along with each other, while we help build the central institutions

and help strengthen the central government over a period of time.

As Ambassador Johnson has mentioned, 2 million refugees have

returned and—2 million—and that is not a phenomenon that suggests the country is inhospitable to people getting on with starting

their lives up again. There are thousands of humanitarian projects

under way, some of which the Department of Defense is contributing to, others of course USAID, and of course the international

community.

The other thing I want to point to is what David referred to,

what we call the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. We think this

is a very flexible and creative instrument for addressing the security problems that remain in most of the country, and we think it

is responsive to the needs that were perceived by those who are arguing for ISAF expansion. These Provincial Reconstruction Teams

are a more robust version of small teams we had around the country in liaison with the different regional leaders. But these teams

will have military forces as well as other agencies, to provide a

sense of security, to facilitate the efforts of all those involved in the

humanitarian and economic reconstruction effort.

These teams we think are a flexible instrument for, as I said,

providing a sense of reassurance, exerting our influence in the different regions on behalf of the unity of the country. It, by the way,

will help in the training of the ANA because Afghan National Army

units will accompany some of these teams where they go.

President Karzai has received this idea very enthusiastically and

I think Ambassador Brahimi as well. So this is an American initiative which responds to what we see as the need. These teams will

go all over the country where needed and the teams will be adapted to the circumstances that they find. In some cases there will be

a minimal security problem and most of the team will be doing the

humanitarian work. In other areas, where needed, the military element will be robust enough to provide the sense of security that is

needed.

Let me stop there, however, Mr. Chairman, and I am happy to

contribute to this discussion. But I do want to emphasize that the

administration is united and I think with the Congress in doing the

job and staying as long as needed to do the job. We did not come

this far to walk away from it. We think the problems are manageable. We think this country, Afghanistan, has come a tremendously

long way in one year’s time, and it is certainly our commitment to

stay and do the job as is necessary.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rodman follows:]

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. PETER W. RODMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF

DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

POST-CONFLICT AFGHANISTAN

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I thank you for the opportunity to discuss with you the Administration’s planning and policy with respect to Afghanistan.

President Bush summed it up best in his State of the Union Address: ‘‘In Afghanistan, we helped liberate an oppressed people. And we will continue helping them

secure their country, rebuild their society, and educate all their children—boys and

girls.’’

The Department of Defense is committed to this goal in Afghanistan. We cannot

permit Afghanistan to become again a safe-haven for global terrorism, and we will

not. The best assurance of that is to help the Afghan people and their government

lay the foundation for lasting peace and stability.

The Afghan people have suffered enormously over the last 25 years. Their sacrifices have been great, and the United States is committed to helping them raise

themselves from the ashes of war and destruction—not only to assure them a better

future, but so that Afghanistan can be a model to others of peace, moderation, and

well-being in the region and in the Muslim world.

Before the fall of the Taliban, Afghanistan was ruled by tyrants and terrorists,

and impoverished by them. Whatever the problems that remain, there cannot be

any doubt that Afghanistan is a story of accomplishment and progress:

Over 3 million schoolchildren, many of them young girls, are filling the classrooms of Afghanistan.

Schools, hospitals, clinics, and wells are being rebuilt by Afghans, with U.S.

and international assistance.

Over two million Afghan refugees have returned to their native land from

neighboring countries and abroad. They are voting, with their feet, their confidence in their country.

Our military Civil Affairs teams are making a difference in the lives of many

Afghan villagers across the country.

Afghanistan will also adopt a new constitution by the end of the year with

elections to follow in June 2004.

The United States will do its part, in this international effort, to help provide

Afghans with the resources and support they require. We are confident that the

overwhelming majority of Afghans welcome and support our presence in their

country as a force for liberation, security, and progress.

In the dimension of security—the Defense Department’s special concern—there

are certainly challenges that remain. I will discuss them in a moment. But a structure of stability has been built in Afghanistan, and a strong basis for national unity.

Our job is to support our Afghan friends as they strengthen their national institutions.

This is a point I want to stress: Afghanistan belongs to the Afghans. We do not

aspire to ‘‘own’’ it or run it. We want to help Afghans achieve their goals for peace,

freedom, and security. We want to help them create the conditions that will enable

them soon to take complete charge of their own affairs as rightful members of the

international community, sharing the same rights citizens of so many freedom-loving countries enjoy. We do not want to overstay our welcome, or become the target

of various resentments, or foster a relationship of dependency that retards Afghan

progress instead of promoting it. It is a delicate balance. So far, I believe we have

maintained that balance.

But, as the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act shows, the Administration ald Congress clearly share the goal of doing what is needed to finish the job.

Operation Enduring Freedom—Update

Remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaeda remain in outlying areas, and the Coalition war to defeat them continues. In cooperation with the Afghan government and

our Coalition partners, U.S. forces are continuing combat operations, particularly in

be South and Southeast of the country. Most recently [27 January], U.S. Special

Forces, with the help of local Afghans, identified and defeated a terrorist sanctuary

near the southern town of Spin Buldak close to the Afghan-Pakistan border. U.S.

forces in Operation Mongoose [27 January] killed a number of terrorists and seized

arms caches and cave complexes. While all terrorist forces have not been enumerated, our forces are playing offense, not defense. We have eliminated terrorist sanctuaries in the country and are continuing to pursue them in the rugged terrain of

15

the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area—with the active cooperation of both governments.

Security/ISAF

The overwhelming majority of Afghans live free of terrorism. Seventy-five to

eighty percent of the relatively few continuing terrorist-related incidents occur in

twenty percent of the country—and that is the South and Southeast portions of the

country where the Taliban and al-Qaeda threat persists.

In Kabul, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), first under British

and more recently under Turkish lead, has been a force for peace and stability.

Whether patrolling the streets of Kabul, lifting the 24-year old curfew or helping

to renovate schools, ISAF troops—about 4,500 strong—have helped to restore a

sense of normalcy in a city that has been ravaged by war. In November of last year,

the United Nations Security Council voted to extend the ISAF mandate until December 2003. Following Turkey’s successful tenure, we look forward to continued cooperation with the Germans and Dutch as they take over as lead nations in this

important mission. And we are already considering who might be able and willing

to take on the follow-on responsibility.

ISAF’s mandate in Kabul, as its name suggests, is to assist the Afghans in providing security. This only underscores the importance of rebuilding Afghanistan’s

own national security institutions. The most important of these tasks are the training of the Afghan National Army, National Police, and Border Guard, and the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of Afghanistan’s regional militias.

Security Sector Reform

We recognize the key role of building an Afghan National Army. As President

Bush said to newly selected Chairman Karzai last January ‘‘we are going to help

Afghanistan develop her own military. That is the most important part of this visit.’’

Following the President’s direction, the United States has taken the lead in assisting the Afghans to build a new national army. Our immediate objective for the Afghan National Army (ANA) is to build a strong Central Corps in Kabul that can

protect the government of Afghanistan, give that government a counterbalance to

existing regional forces, and conduct internal security operations without Coalition

support.

• To date, U.S. and French trainers have trained six battalions, with a seventh

currently undergoing training.

• These battalions are all multi-ethnic and broadly representative of the country.

The personnel are also vetted with respect to human rights standards.

• Over the next year and a half, we will continue to assist the Afghans in developing a capable Ministry of Defense and General Staff and a Support Command

capable of providing logistical and administrative support to the Army.

• Two companies from the 3rd battalion of the ANA have deployed to Orgun-E

in Paktika province, with a Special Forces team. These U.S.-trained Afghan soldiers have effectively carried out both combat missions and civil presence tasks.

The Afghan National Army is a top priority for President Karzai and for this Administration. A well-equipped and well-trained national army will be the foundation

for security and national unity in Afghanistan. We look forward to working closely

with Congress in allocating the needed resources, and we welcome your continued

support in the weeks and months ahead.

The U.S.-led effort to build the Afghan National Army is just one element of the

international effort for security reconstruction. Major General Karl Eikenberry

serves as the U.S. Security Coordinator in Kabul and Dr. Dov Zakheim, the Department of Defense Comptroller, also serves as the Department’s Reconstruction Coordinator for Afghanistan. A key part of their mission is to spur as well as coordinate

efforts among the lead nations for security reconstruction.

Germany has the lead for training the Afghan police force, and Italy is the lead

for reconstruction of the Afghan judicial sector. Japan and the UN are responsible

for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. The UK has the lead in working

with the Afghan government to fight the scourge of narcotics. The United States is

also working to identify and assist a lead nation for the Afghan border police, which

has been transferred from the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of Interior. Here

in Washington, the State Department coordinates U.S. assistance for these sectors.

Economic Reconstruction

Economic reconstruction is a cornerstone of long-term stability in Afghanistan.

President Karzai and Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani are leading Afghanistan’s effort to recover from years of war, drought, and Taliban mismanagement. ReconVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Jun 13, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 87575 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
16

struction and security are mutually reinforcing. Clearly, conditions of security facilitate economic reconstruction. But economic progress is also a long-term condition of

stability—and perhaps also short-term. The international community has pledged

more than $6.6 billion in aid over 5 years at a series of donor conferences. For its

part, the United States last year in Tokyo pledged nearly $300 million for the first

year of Afghanistan’s reconstruction, but we have delivered twice that. Since October 2001, in fact, the United States has delivered over $840 million toward Afghanistan’s humanitarian aid and economic reconstruction.

Coordination of U.S. Government assistance to Afghanistan is the responsibility

of the State Department under the guidance of Ambassador David Johnson—major

roles in the delivery of that assistance are played by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the State Department’s Bureau of Population,

Refugees, and Migration (PRM). The United States devoted $200 million worth of

emergency food assistance to Afghanistan in fiscal 2002, helping to prevent a famine

and reduce hunger. The United States has helped vaccinate 4.3 million children

against measles, treat 700,000 cases of malaria, and provide basic health services

for more than two million people last summer. The United States is contributing

$80 million to a $160 million effort by the United States, Japan, and Saudi Arabia

to rebuild the southern half of the ‘‘ring road’’ linking Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat.

The United States is also helping with other infrastructure projects, including efforts to rebuild more than six thousand wells, springs, and irrigation canals, and

to restore the water supply to Kabul, Kandahar, and Kunduz.

While the State Department and USAID lead the effort, the Department of Defense also supports and assists reconstruction. U.S. military Civil Affairs troops in

Afghanistan implement projects that support both the military mission and the reconstruction priorities of the Afghan central government and the U.S. Government.

This support has included more than 200 projects worth over $11 million to help

reconstruct 127 schools benefiting over 200,000 students, 26 medical facilities benefiting over two million people, and 400 wells benefiting 631,000 people.

The Afghan government has called for accelerated reconstruction assistance, and

rightly so. We are in consultation with President Karzai and his associates on priorities.

In 2001 we overthrew a terrorist regime in Afghanistan. Last winter we helped

avert a humanitarian disaster. Our goal in 2003 is to build on the successes of the

preceding years by working with the Afghan government, other nations, and the

United Nations and other international organizations to help accelerate reconstruction across the country.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams

The improved security situation in Afghanistan as a whole has made it possible

for us to begin a transition from combat operations to what we call stability operations in most of the country. This transition will include the deployment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), two of which have already been deployed to

Gardez and Bamiyan, and a third will be deployed to Konduz later this month. They

will be deployed in other locations, to include Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif

Jalalabad, and Parwan over the next few months. The PRTs will work with central

government and regional authorities, and with the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), to assist in securing the conditions for economic,

civic and other programs.

The teams will be Coalition-led, multi-national and inter-agency in composition.

The size of each team will differ based on regional requirements (approx. 50-60 personnel). Each team will include a range of military and civilian disciplines including

Special Forces, engineers, medical personnel, State, USAID and other U.S. government agency representatives, working in close coordination with Afghan governmental ministries, local authorities, UNAMA, NGOs, and other international organizations. They are meant to facilitate the efforts of others, not substitute for them.

Conclusion

We are realistic about the difficulties and about how far we have to go. But it

is not ‘‘realistic’’ to fail to recognize how far we have come. We value Congress’s vital

and constructive role in the evolution of U.S. policy. We also emphasize the essential

role that other nations must play—this cannot be only an American responsibility.

But I can assure this Committee of the Defense Department’s strong positive commitment to support the President’s goal of helping the Afghan people secure their

country and rebuild their society.

Thank you once again, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to brief you and the

other members of this Committee.

17

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Rodman.

We have attendance of five Senators at this point. Let me consult

with the ranking member. Shall we try 7 minutes at the outset?

Senator BIDEN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. I will start the clock running on my

questions now.

I want to quote from an article that appeared in the Wall Street

Journal yesterday called ‘‘The Other Front,’’ by Ahmed Rashid. You

may have seen this, but let me just cite the sentences that I think

are important. He says, ‘‘Hundreds more extremists are mobilizing

in Waziristan in the Pakistan tribal belt adjacent to eastern Afghanistan for a spring offensive calculated to coincide with a U.S.

assault in Iraq. They come from a variety of groups—al-Qaeda,

former Taliban, Afghans loyal to the renegade commander

Hekmatyar, and members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.’’ Then later in the article: ‘‘Western diplomats in Islamabad and

Kabul, Afghan officials, and U.S. Army officers at Bagram now

strongly believe that segments of the Pakistan Intelligence Services

and its religious parties are allowing the Taliban to regroup on the

Pakistani side of the border. U.S. officers at Bagram say 90 percent

of attacks they face are coming from groups based in Pakistan. ‘I

think the security situation in Pakistan is going to be a problem

for some time because of freedom on the border,’ says General

Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in an address to U.S. troops there on December 21.’’ As the article by Mr. Rashid says, ‘‘Simply put, Pakistan’s strategy appears to be to continue hunting down non-Afghan members

of the al-Qaeda hiding in Pakistan, so a level of cooperation with

the U.S. continues, while at the same time allowing the Pashtun

Taliban and others to maintain their presence in Pakistan.’’ Further in the article, ‘‘India and Russia, who are arming several

non-Pashtun warlords, are giving support to the President of Tajik

and Russia has proposed,’’ according to the article ‘‘$100 million

worth of weapons to Mr. Famm’s army, which is outside the U.S.-

led initiative to build a multi-ethnic Afghan National Army. Interference in Afghanistan by all the neighbors’’—and cited are ‘‘India,

Russia, Iran, the central Asian republics are involved in one warlord group or another in the process of this.’’

I mention this not because it is a total surprise to both of you,

but because we had compelling testimony yesterday about the future of Iraq and the point that was made by at least two of our

witnesses in the second panel, that after the hostilities are over we

can anticipate activity by all the neighbors, vigorous activities.

I believe that those are occurring in Afghanistan, and I suspect,

as my opening statement said, I believe the ISAF span of control

is too small, that the aid arrangements and defense being prescribed out there are important. Giving full credit to all the good

things that are occurring, the fact of the matter is that this is a

situation which came upon us, the United States of America, very

unexpectedly. We did not anticipate the attack by the terrorists on

the World Trade Center or the Pentagon, nor that very shortly

thereafter we would be engaged in military activity in Afghanistan.

But we were and we are still, with our Armed Forces in harm’s

way. And I find I sense, not a quietude about this, but, as the rankVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Jun 13, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 87575 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
18

ing member pointed out, a sliding almost off the radar screen of a

situation that militarily is still in play and in terms of the politics

is a jumble of areas covered by warlords, with a valiant Chairman

Karzai in the capital hoping to work with Americans to get a national police force or some control of the roads that do not rely

upon the warlords, and with a whole segment of the country, as

Secretary Rumsfeld has briefed us, in military play, with Pakistan

and the inroads back and forth—hardly stability in any respect.

Now, this has got to move, it seems to me, into a much more successful, confident pattern. I stated frankly yesterday that I find it

astonishing that in our preparation for Iraq we are so far behind

the curve of our military preparation. We heard one witness after

another point out that there will be chaotic conditions if military

success is visited there. There still are law and order problems, a

problem of justice, a problem of how to feed the people, two-thirds

of which are now receiving food from 40,000 stations.

In Afghanistan, mercifully, the numbers of persons were smaller.

The world community, working through the World Food Program

and other organizations was well-equipped. The United States facilitated that, as did other nations.

But we are coming to the end of the line even with ISAF, including with the Germans and the Dutch, unless somebody volunteers.

As one final thought—and I ask for a comment if you have one— from time to time there has been discussion that NATO—Lord Robertson made this suggestion—might be very helpful in trying to

find volunteers for ISAF. There might be assignments. This may be

a way in which the international community enters very visibly

and effectively.

I hope that might be the case. But nevertheless, I am not quieted

at this moment by the situation in Afghanistan. I think this is

fraught with potential difficulty militarily, quite apart from terms

of the civil economy. And I have great respect for all who are working with a problem that we had not anticipated, but one with

which we have to have success because our credibility is on the

line. Failure would be to witness the question of another vacuum

and the recurrence of all the problems that have been visited upon

us by 9/11.

This is an editorial, a statement, a summary, a plea. But I ask

either one of you for comment, Mr. Johnson or Mr. Rodman.

Mr. RODMAN. Let me start. I first want to say that it should not

fall off our radar screen. We agree with you completely. As a nation

we have to follow through. The committee is doing a service by

holding this hearing and is doing a service by keeping us on our

toes, and it should be in the Nation’s consciousness until the job

is done.

But let me just respond to two points you made. First of all, the

last point. ISAF is not coming to ‘‘the end of the line.’’ I can say

that we are already engaged in looking for follow-on candidates and

there are some countries that—they haven’t yet made public commitments—so I don’t want to mention them—but I am reasonably

optimistic that there will be interest in taking the next turn.

You are right, NATO can have a role. It is already playing a role

in helping force generation and planning. Whether NATO would

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tries or countries taking the lead and NATO supporting it, then I

think its future is assured.

And as you know, the mandate was extended through the end of

this year, and I think there is plenty of international support for

ISAF.

Second, I just wanted to address one of the first points you made,

about the Wall Street Journal article. It is true that Taliban and

al-Qaeda elements are attempting to regroup in the Pakistan-Afghan border area. But first of all, that is a war-fighting job. That

is what our forces are doing and coalition forces. That is not an

ISAF job in any circumstance. That is not ISAF’s mandate. It is not

its capability.

ISAF is well suited to helping provide a backstop to security

where the Afghans are able to do some of it. The war-fighting is

in the south and southeast part of the country. That is our job,

which we are handling as best we can. Some of the fighting is shifting; some of the Taliban and al-Qaeda are shifting to the south

from the southeast, partly because we are more active in the southeast in chasing them.

As I said in my statement, our forces are playing offense, not defense, and a lot of the clashes that go on come from circumstances

in which we are actively patrolling and catching people and going

after people. So even the statistics of violence reflect that to some

degree.

But you have to separate the war-fighting job and the job that

ISAF does and ISAF-like operations can do and the job of our Provincial Reconstruction Teams, which again is not war-fighting.

The CHAIRMAN. Can we separate, though? The point I am trying

to make, the Pakistan view here is unclear. The allegation of the

article in essence is that on the one hand Pakistan is cooperating

fully, trying to pin down Taliban and send them to Guantanamo

and what have you; on the other hand, a part of Pakistan is sending people across the border or allowing them liberally to come into

this picture as a part of establishing Pakistan influence, in the

same way Iran is establishing influence or Russia or India.

In other words, there is an impact of all of these countries that

I presume our statesmen, the two of you and others, are aware of,

but clearly is bigger than ISAF. This is international politics impinging upon a very small country.

Mr. JOHNSON. If I could attempt to address a couple aspects of

that. I think, with all due respect to Mr. Rashid, he probably writes

in a little more detail than is known there. But we are actively engaged with all the States that you had mentioned, that are neighbors or have had traditional interests in Afghanistan, some of them

not very helpful interests, some of them very destructive interests.

We believe that President Musharraf is fully committed to this

fight, but I think it is also clear that portions of the territory of

Pakistan are not completely controlled by the central government.

That is not a new situation, and that is the area where the exchanges go back and forth.

We have worked through various fora both directly, bilaterally,

and in multilateral exchanges with all the countries you mentioned

to encourage, cajole, in every way we can to bring them into the

process of creating these institutions, working with us. In parVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Jun 13, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 87575 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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ticular, I had a discussion as late as yesterday with representatives

of the Russian Federation about how to integrate what they wish

to give to Afghanistan into our program of training the Afghan National Army. They have had a long-term relationship with the

Northern Alliance and so those ties are longstanding, but I think

that ultimately they see their interests with building the central

government.

There are probably some hedging of bets going on with all these

States, but we are particularly encouraging and working with those

States who have traditionally used Afghanistan as a forum to work

out bilateral differences not to do that and to see their future in

terms of encouraging stability in Afghanistan.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. The author of that article may not know much

about Afghanistan, but I am going to say something outrageous: I

do, and the fact of the matter is they are all hedging their bets.

Not one single solitary surrounding country has any faith there

will be a central government—none, n-o-n-e, and both of you know

it. Not one surrounding government is betting on the staying power

or that there will be a central government controlling all of Afghanistan.

What bothers me, gentlemen, is not you personally. What bothers

me is the administration redefinition of what constitutes security

and stability. I have had this longstanding discussion up until recently on a weekly basis with the White House and with the National Security Adviser, for whom I have great respect. You have

redefined what constitutes stability: lack of violence.

That was not the mandate. The mandate was a central government controlling all of Afghanistan that was multi-ethnic and violence-free. You cannot get in an automobile, either one of you, without a military escort and travel from Kabul to Herat. You cannot

do it. You would not do it.

There is no stability in Afghanistan as we defined it initially.

And what is exactly happening here is Musharraf is hedging his

bet. Musharraf is wondering whether or not when Afghanistan goes

down and Karzai leaves or is assassinated, whether or not—what

does he face at home? You have parts of the International Security

Service for Pakistan once again either turning a blind eye to or cooperating with part of the Pashtun. Why? Because Ismail Khan is

cooperating with the Iranians, because the Tajiks are cooperating

with the Russians.

This is a replay, a replay of the last 100 years of history. And

we knew that. I wish we would stop talking about stability. Give

me a break, Mr. Rodman. You cannot, Karzai cannot, go outside of

Kabul. There is no stability. Ismail Khan does not have to pick up

the phone and ask whether or not any program is going to be developed in his part, his part, of Afghanistan, that comes from the

central government.

The whole purpose of the central government and us funneling

the money through in the first place, as I sat there for hours in

Karzai’s office, was that he had to have something to give. Otherwise he has no—he needs one of two things: He either has to have

a goody basket that decides when he is going to build a road, he

21

decides whether a road gets built in Herat or a well gets dug; or

he has to have the military force to be able to do it, to control it.

Now, as the young kids say, ‘‘we ought to get real here.’’ I mean,

look, we have made progress. Americans are out there risking their

lives every single day. They are trying to track down the Taliban

and they are trying to track down the al-Qaeda. But right from the

beginning the way we characterized this—how many al-Qaeda, how

many Taliban forces did we say as we moved in we expected to

have to confront? 50,000, 100,000, 150,000?

Do any of you remember the number that we talked about? Mr.

Rodman, Defense Department, what do you think? What was the

number we were talking about?

Mr. RODMAN. A year ago?

Senator BIDEN. A year ago, before we invaded, as we prepared.

Mr. RODMAN. I do not remember the number.

Senator BIDEN. Well, it was well over 100,000. Now, it does not

take a mathematician for us to figure out every single Taliban

killed, even with the exaggerated estimates, every single Taliban

captured, every single Taliban member who came along and said,

I have changed my ways, I have seen the Lord. Add them all up,

that leaves somewhere between 50,000 and 90,000 of them out

there.

Where do we think they all went? Do we think they all of a sudden had a, as we Catholics say, ‘‘an epiphany?’’ They are there.

They are there, and it frustrates the devil out of me, as you can

tell, by us sort of sugar-coating this. It is a terrible job, but the sine

qua non is that no outside power other than us and an international force would mold Afghanistan, and Iran is molding western Afghanistan, Pakistan is molding parts of southeast Afghanistan, and the list goes on.

So my frustration is you still cannot travel in the west. Ismail

Khan has now decided that women should wear burkhas again.

Man, that is stability. That is real stability. I do not mean this to

be humorous. I am not trying to be a wise guy. But speaking for

myself, what I am worried about is if the same standard is set

down, if this is what we call commitment and, the phrase, ‘‘stability-building, because I know ‘‘nation-building’’ is not a good thing

to say—whatever we call it, if this is the standard we are in, as

they say on the east side of my city, ‘‘in a world of hurt’’ when we

decide what our policy is with regard to Iraq.

I will come back because I have questions and I have used up

my time editorially here. But you know, when you have Atta,

Dostum’s rival, the Tajik former Northern Alliance commander,

Ismail Khan, you have Gul, you have these guys who are out there

who are the strongest of the warlords, and there is zero, zero, zero

control from the central government, zero, that is not stability.

That was not what we said and announced in Bonn was our objective. We are changing the definition of what success is.

My last comment, Mr. Rodman is, you say ‘‘we will stay there

until the mission is finished.’’ Have we redefined the mission? Is

the redefinition of the mission that not that many people are being

killed, because all the women are wearing burkhas again, the men

are required not to shave any more, that we have ourselves in a

22

situation where no one dares travel the roads, where the university

is not functioning as was intended?

That is stability. If that is how we define it, you are right, we

are approaching stability. But if the mission is a centralized government that is able to be strong enough to resist the pressure of

the surrounding States to alter the environment in Afghanistan, we

are on the first rung on the ladder.

So I need at some point a clear definition from the administration of what constitutes the mission, the mission. When do we

know we have succeeded? When everyone salutes Ismail Khan—I

keep picking on that one example, but—in Herat and no one is

dying? Is that success, when we know his relationships with Iran,

we know they are increasing? Is that stability? Is that the mission?

If it is, that is not the one I signed onto.

I would be happy to invite comments and I will be back with

very specific questions.

The CHAIRMAN. At this point let me proceed and then we will be

back with another opportunity.

Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Gentlemen, thank you for coming before this committee this

morning. As Senator Biden and Senator Lugar have stated, we are

aware of the difficulty that you all are charged with, your colleagues. So you should know that we appreciate the kind of challenges that you are dealing with in this imperfect world.

That recognized, which I think is important to recognize, the

questions and comments we have just heard—and we will hear

more before this hearing is complete this morning—are relevant for

all the reasons you understand.

Before I get to a couple specific questions, I was struck by both

your testimonies, as I was with your colleagues’ yesterday who

were here to talk about a post-Saddam Iraq, in how many times

you referenced our allies, our partners, coalitions to assist us. And

as a result of that, I am further struck with certainly this administration’s understanding that we cannot do this alone in Afghanistan or Iraq or North Korea or wherever. That should guide our acceleration of an enthusiasm about going to war in Iraq, but you are

not here to talk about Iraq.

But all of this does connect, I think. There is linkage to this, because we are talking about regions of the world. We are not talking

about Afghanistan in a vacuum, as Chairman Lugar said, nor were

we yesterday talking about Iraq in a vacuum. We have world terrorism. We are in Afghanistan for a number of reasons, but we are

there as a result of world terrorism being visited on the United

States of America.

So even the much-maligned NATO allies Germany and France

get some credit from the two of you this morning, so I am sure they

appreciate that, and Americans must have some sense that France

and Germany occasionally do their part. And I make that point because I hope your leaders are appreciating what you are saying

today and what was said yesterday and what Tenet will say, I suspect is saying now, before the Senate Armed Services Committee

and what I heard in the Intelligence closed door hearing yesterday,

that in fact America cannot take on world terrorism alone.

23

So we should slow down a little bit here and understand that

others might have a different view of the world than us. But it may

well be that that is important, to accommodate those views, because if we are to fulfill the commitments that you have laid out

as a result of what the President of the United States said our

commitment was going to be—and I think we all support that commitment up here for all the reasons we understand—then it is

going to take a tremendous coalition of common interests, working

with institutions like the United Nations and like NATO, to accomplish it.

Now, with that said, let me get to some budget numbers. We talk

about reconstruction projects, the provincial reconstruction teams,

the ‘‘ring road’’. I would like to get into some of the specifics of how

much money have we actually spent on reconstruction projects, infrastructure projects, job-producing projects, the kind of economic

power that Karzai needs to give some semblance of governance and

some indication to the people of Afghanistan that he has a government, that there is somebody supporting him, rather than Special

Forces in the mountains dealing with the east and western borders

of Afghanistan.

When, for example, is the ‘‘ring road’’ to begin? Has it begun? How much money in the $6.1 billion that was just asked for by the

administration goes to reconstruction? It would be very helpful if

the two of you could lay out some of those numbers for the committee and additional anticipated reconstruction numbers. And either can begin.

Thank you very much.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator. Allies are important in what

we are doing in Afghanistan. The Germans and the Dutch working

together in ISAF is a great move for us in the right direction and

so we are grateful for their help. We are also grateful for the more

than 1,000 troops who are participating in the coalition itself.

With respect to the question about providing President Karzai

with the resources that he needs in order to provide services, I

would like to say that our primary goal in this entire undertaking

is helping Afghans build the Afghan State. We have provided more

than $20 million in the last year to help rebuild the ministries. We

have provided more than $10 million for children’s and women’s institutions in health care.

The President has committed $80 million to build this ‘‘ring

road.’’ The first of the contracts for the first 50 kilometers has already been let. Surface preparation has already begun. It is the

equation between the cost and the temperature. It is not appropriate right now to start laying blacktop, but that will begin probably on or about the end of March because that is when it will be

appropriate to do so in terms of construction techniques.

The Japanese will begin this month their survey of their portion

of the road, which begins in Kandahar and heads back in the direction of Kabul. It will be our goal and intention to complete the section of this road from Kabul to Kandahar in advance of the elections in 2004. That is a big goal to meet, do not know if we can,

but the President has publicly committed to complete the entire

road within 3 years. There is going to be some funding required beyond the 2004 report that the President has placed before the ConVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Jun 13, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 87575 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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gress in order to do that. But we will be working on those numbers

into the future.

I think that our commitment and our goals and even our methods of trying to help the Afghan Government create these institutions are actually quite similar: trying to give him the textbooks he

needs, the funding for the schools that he needs in order to provide

education for his people. We are committed to doing this through

the center, providing the central government with these types of resources, so that the population sees those good things coming from

the central government.

And it is not just in terms of the military that our allies and

partners are important. It is also in terms of this reconstruction effort. European Union countries and the European Commission

have themselves provided about a half a billion dollars in assistance during the first year of this project and will continue to provide more over time.

Senator HAGEL. May I ask, Secretary Rodman. I think this is the $6.1 billion that was requested from DOD, is that right, in additional moneys?

Mr. RODMAN. I am not sure.

Senator HAGEL. Is that correct, the $6.1 billion in additional

moneys for Afghanistan for the war on terrorism, for the fiscal year

2003 budget? Is that coming out of DOD or is that coming out of

State?

Mr. RODMAN. That is what I assume.

Senator HAGEL. You assume?

Mr. RODMAN. I do not have the budget figures in front of me.

Senator HAGEL. Are you aware that that request was made?

Mr. RODMAN. Yes.

Senator HAGEL. And you cannot tell me anything about it?

Mr. RODMAN. No, I am not up on the details of the budget. But

I can reply for the record.

[The following information was subsequently supplied.]

In the consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003 (P.L. 108–7), the Congress

appropriated $6.1 billion for Department of Defense activities. The majority of these

funds will be used to fund the operations and personnel costs for Operation Enduring Freedom and the Global War on Terrorism. Some of these funds, however, may

be used to fund ‘‘Operation Noble Eagle’’ (homeland defense and civil support missions, including air patrols over New York and Washington, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2000). DOD currently estimates these later costs at

approximately $1.6 billion per month.

Senator HAGEL. Did you understand the purpose of this hearing

this morning, really?

Mr. RODMAN. Yes.

Senator HAGEL. OK. Well, we would appreciate it if someone at

DOD could explain to us why they asked for $6.1 billion and what

that $6.1 billion would be used for.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Hagel.

[Prepared statement of Senator Hagel follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHUCK HAGEL

Afghanistan has come a long way since its liberation from the Taliban, but it remains a country on the razor’s edge. The Government of President Hamid Karzai

has made great gains in setting Afghanistan on the path to stability and progress,

25

and in gaining the respect and support of the international community, but the job

is far from complete.

Afghanistan continues to need our help to construct its economy, health-care, education systems, and democratic political infrastructures. The general population of

Afghanistan remains, for the most part, poor and malnourished. The forces of reaction and oppression still exist in Afghanistan’s political culture and society. The

reach of President Karzai’s government does not yet extend very far beyond Kabul.

Stability in many of the outlying provinces depends on the good graces of warlords

whose interests and intentions cannot be trusted.

Afghanistan is early into a long-term transition to stability. America and the

international community must assure that Afghanistan does not slip off the precarious road it has taken away from civil war and oppression and toward a hopeful

future.

Afghanistan cannot be considered in a vacuum. America’s commitment to Afghanistan is not simply for the benefit of the Afghan people, although that is all to the

good. Our commitment to Afghanistan is also an investment in the security and future of the United States and our allies. What we do in Afghanistan is directly

linked to our interests in fighting the global war on terrorism; to combating illegal

narcotics trafficking; and to promoting regional stability in Central and South Asia.

The struggle in Afghanistan is far from over. We must prevent Afghanistan from

again becoming either a ‘‘Great Game’’ for outside powers or a refuge for despots

and terrorists.

Afghanistan is the first test in the global war on terrorism, and we cannot fail.

The world is watching. Failure in Afghanistan would be a failure for U.S. power and

prestige everywhere. America’s security interests would suffer. The stakes are high

and the margins of error are low. As other events dominate the headlines of our

media and the agendas of our policy-makers, we cannot forget the stake that we

have in Afghanistan, and how its future is now linked to our security.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you to the witnesses, and let me first compliment both the

chairman and the ranking member. I do not want anything from

either of you yet, but I just want to say that the hearings that were

held under Senator Biden’s chairmanship on Iraq at the end of

July and early August were really some of the most useful hearings. I am not necessarily happy with the way we have headed, but

I really felt that they set the stage for a lot of what has happened

since then in our inquiry on this.

Mr. Chairman, this series of hearings that you have set forth in

the first few weeks of your chairmanship on North Korea and Afghanistan and Iraq have really allowed this committee to live up

to what I think is its role—is to examine these matters in connection with each other rather than in isolation. I think it is a comfort

to the American people that this committee is really stepping up

to the plate and asking the tough questions.

So I thank you for that and I look forward to more of these hearings.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator FEINGOLD. Following on what Senator Hagel was talking

to you about, if you could give me a general sense: What is the administration’s assessment of total aid requirements, what is the

plan for reaching that level, and what portion of the total burden

does the United States expect to shoulder and what kind of commitments do we have from other donors to date indicating that the

expectation about our own involvement will be realistic? Sir?

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. The World Bank provided the estimate

that was used for the Tokyo conference and that is what we are

basing our best estimates on at this point. Their estimate was over

a 10-year period approximately $10 billion would be required. The

26

Tokyo pledges covered a range of dates up to 5 years. Ours was for

1 year. Some States pledged for a longer period of time. And the

total pledges from that period were $4.5 billion over that period of

time.

I think that, if anything, the assessments over time are going to

rise, because the degree of destruction is becoming more and more

apparent, as is the expense of addressing that. So I think that,

while the World Bank estimated that a year and a half ago, if they

were to provide us a current estimate it would exceed the amount

that they provided in that point.

We have not posited a specific percentage that we wished to

pledge against on this. Instead, we have sought moneys for specific

programs that we think would provide the most impact in terms

of helping build the Afghan State. For that reason, we have—the

President decided this past fall that, in a turn from the traditions

that we had provided general infrastructure over the last dozen to

20 years—we had left that to the international funding institutions, but because of the political impact of rebuilding this transportation network we stepped up and we began the effort to organize the reconstruction of the ‘‘ring road.’’

We anticipate that at a meeting that will take place on the 16th

of March scheduled for Kabul, where the Afghan Government will

present its next year’s budget and its development budget, that the

World Bank will make some announcements, pending their decisions over the next several weeks.

Senator FEINGOLD. I understand that, but if you can help me

with this.

Mr. JOHNSON. Sure.

Senator FEINGOLD. Because if a constituent asks me, and they

will, constituents will ask me, of the $10.2 billion or higher figure,

how much are we paying and how much are other people paying,

could you give me a rough estimate of what you expect?

Mr. JOHNSON. I think I can tell you what the—I can give you a

rough estimate of what the pattern has shown so far, and the pattern has shown so far, if my head math is correct, that we are paying around a third of the amount that is being disbursed.

I would also hastily add that our money is leaving our hands and

going to projects more quickly than other people’s, as is the historical trend. On the other hand, a lot of those other States have a

great deal of staying power. So I do not doubt that they are going

to come through on their commitments. We have provided I think

only in the last few days a set of estimates of the payments that

have been made by other States to the Congress that goes into

some detail on this question.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you.

What is the major impediment to expanding ISAF’s scope of operations outside the immediate vicinity of Kabul?

Mr. RODMAN. I can take that one on. There are a number of reasons why this has not occurred. One is that none of the countries

in ISAF is interested or willing to do it. In fact, the Turks and the

Germans and Dutch who followed them made it almost a condition

of their acceptance of the role. They wanted the mandate limited

to Kabul, as it was in the original resolutions.

27

Second, as we assessed this over the course of the past year

thought we had other ways of addressing the problems that others

were raising. The first solution we came up with was small teams

around the country of Special Forces with an admixture of State

Department personnel and other personnel, in a liaison role with

the different regional figures, who have had a demonstrable effect

in exerting American influence to avoid and minimize clashes

among the different figures.

That we thought served reasonably well as a more economical

way of exerting our influence in the interest of stabilizing the situation.

Finally, as we looked over the whole picture toward the end of

last year, we came up with this idea I was discussing of Provincial

Reconstruction Teams. We looked at the mission that our forces

were carrying out and we discovered that the war-fighting mission

was really confined to this small portion of the country, the south

and the southeast. In the rest of the country we really were not

doing war-fighting any more, because the problem was not Taliban

and al-Qaeda any more.

So we came up with the idea of sort of expanding this concept

of the smaller teams, having American forces and coalition forces

get into a phase of what we call stability operations. We think we

have addressed the concerns that a lot of people were raising about

the sense of insecurity around the country. What we have come up

with we think is a very flexible instrument, which adds to a sense

of security, which facilitates the humanitarian efforts which are

going on. One of the concerns that was expressed to us was that

the agencies doing humanitarian work felt nervous about the security of where they were operating. So we think we have a partial

answer to that in most of the country.

The question of expanding ISAF is still open in theory, but President Karzai, Ambassador Brahimi and so on are very intrigued— ‘‘excited’’ may not be too strong a word—by this new idea we have

come up with, and I think we should give that a test and see

whether it provides a sense of security that people have wanted in

most of the country.

Senator FEINGOLD. Mr. Chairman, I know my time is up. I just

want to comment that we went to war in Afghanistan because we

were attacked and it seems to me we have an urgent need for real

stability country-wide. I am, at least at this point, certainly not

persuaded that this approach will work.

If I could just ask a quick question that maybe has a very brief

answer, how would you characterize the morale of U.S. troops currently in Afghanistan, Secretary Rodman?

Mr. RODMAN. Our sense is that it is quite good. I have an assistant of mine who spent 6 months in Kandahar on reserve duty as

a corporal in the Special Forces, and he finds our people highly motivated, at least the Special Forces. They are on the front line, they

are doing something vital. They interact with the population and

their sense is that they are a welcome presence.

I know General Pace, various officials, Paul Wolfowitz, who have

been out there recently have the same sense, that our people are

motivated and know that they are doing something important.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the extra time.

28

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.

Senator Chafee.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Following up on some of the previous questions, I think the direction we are going in was the risk of our unilateralism or perceived unilateralism in Iraq and how that might affect ISAF. And

is there any overt pressure from any of the 18 countries to your

boss, to Mr. Johnson, to Secretary Powell, that if you are going to

go it alone in Iraq you can go it alone in Afghanistan also? Is there

any of that going on?

Mr. JOHNSON. In a word, no. I think that all of the countries

which are participating in ISAF, as well as those who are participating in the civilian reconstruction effort, are fully committed to

what we are all trying to do in Afghanistan. Many of them see

their own bilateral interests affected. They see the security of their

own populations affected. And I think that it is—I have not found

a single instance where they have asked me any question related

to other things outside of Afghanistan. They want this to work and

they want to participate in it, and it is very much an effort which

includes a range of countries, including alliance countries, but also

including countries well beyond the NATO alliance.

Senator CHAFEE. Yes, Mr. Rodman.

Mr. RODMAN. Senator, may I add a note to the same answer. If

anything, it may be the opposite effect. I cannot psychoanalyze allied leaders, but some of them who are uneasy about Iraq seem

eager to show that they are helping us in Afghanistan. The Germans and Dutch are quite eager to step up to this. Even when

some of the recent tensions with Germany had begun several

months ago, the Germans and Dutch were very eager to show they

were going to step up to this responsibility.

In any of the other countries, I do not detect any falling off of

willingness to participate.

Senator CHAFEE. So you can pretty much flatly say in the next

few weeks we cannot expect to pick up the paper and see any of

these 18 countries withdrawing from the Bonn Agreement?

Mr. RODMAN. I do not see any sign of that.

Senator CHAFEE. My next question is on the elections. They are

scheduled for June 2004, a year and a half away. Do you have any

fears that there could be anti-American candidates elected, and

what would we do in that instance?

Mr. JOHNSON. The process of the elections is just getting under

way. The International Foundation for Election Systems has just

put a team on the ground. They are doing some early planning.

They have got I think a very sound group that has got a lot of experience, that we have relied on in the past.

I think, because this process has not really gotten very far, the

constitution has not taken shape, that even the type of election this

is going to be and whether there would be opportunities for opposition candidates that may not be popular with us to emerge is still

open to question. So I think how we would deal with that is at this

point, a bit hypothetical.

That we would deal with it is not, though. If there were indeed

candidates who represented a threat to our interests, if they were

29

al-Qaeda candidates, to choose the most extreme example, we

would have to take steps to protect our interests.

Senator CHAFEE. So would you say that you are beginning to

think about ways of preventing, as you said, the opportunities for

those people to be involved in the democratic process?

Mr. JOHNSON. We are in the process of assisting the Afghans, as

we have said before, and assisting the U.N. in this case, in creating

the structures for these elections. So we are aware of this potential.

We will pay a great deal of attention to it. I think it is probably

premature to say that we have thought about steps to prevent it

at this point, because we have to see how the situation emerges as

to what sort of election process is going to be created, what sort of

candidacies are out there. But it is not something that we are going

to take our eye off, that is for sure.

Senator CHAFEE. Over and over we heard yesterday and today,

yesterday about Iraq and here today, Afghanistan for the Afghans,

Afghanistan is for the Afghans. Are you completely committed to

that as we go forward to that democratic process? It is coming. A

year and a half, it is not that far away.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is absolutely correct. Eighteen months—even

less than that now—16 is not a long time to plan an election, to

provide the structure for it, to engage in the civic education process

for a country which is not used to having elections at all.

So we have to get and we are getting accelerated on that timetable. We do believe that it is possible. We do think that the elections in the Bonn timetable are a timetable we should stick to

there, in a sense an action-forcing event, so that compromises are

forced to be made and we can move along the path that we think

we need to move toward in order to keep the Bonn process intact

and to help the Afghans build this government.

I think we are talking about Afghanistan for the Afghans, if you

will, and helping them build their institutions, not having us or

any other institution of international power take over their country, remold it, and then hand it back to them. We want to assist

them in building up their own institutions.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you. I know it is a prodigious task, herculean in fact, to try and transform into a democratic process. But

it is relevant because of what we could be doing in Iraq, and what

we heard yesterday is the same pitch, that we are going to have

democracy in Iraq. So this could be the test tube for what might

happen west of there. So thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Corzine.

Senator CORZINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to the witnesses for being responsive.

Let me identify first with the difficulty that I know reconstruction, rebuilding, and nation building may be. I had the good fortune

of actually visiting Afghanistan last March and it is a high task,

a hard task, that we are talking about here today.

I also want to identify with the concepts that we have to think

about the world on a comprehensive basis and allies in one area

may be influenced. I am glad to hear that people are lining up to

help us in Afghanistan. I presume that will follow through and that

$10 billion World Bank target of resources, hopefully we will even

be able to spread it more than just one-third to the United States.

30

I have a question that I guess will probably be more forcefully

asked by Senator Biden, but we continue to have discussions about

what is our mission here. I have one—I get this simple question

regularly at town hall meetings: Wasn’t our mission to bring to justice Mullah Omar, the leadership of al-Qaeda? We heard the simple, back of the envelope numbers that Senator Biden talked about.

Are we fulfilling that mission in our war-fighting areas?

Then I have the general question, since we are beginning to see

a re-imposition of some of the Islamic enforcement measures—we

heard the part talked about in western Iran with Ismail Khan. But

there seem to be a number of steps, whether it has to do with cable

television or whether the rights of women, that are seeming to be

eroded relative to where we started out this process. Is that consistent with our mission?

And third, do we really think that these provincial or regional

teams, which we have not heard described in numbers, but are

they really able—we heard numbers from 10 to 60 people, scattered

in regional teams—to bring about the accomplishment of the kind

of mission that is so broad-based? I can only say that if that is

what we are going to do in Iraq, where weapons of mass destruction are scattered about, one has a serious concern about whether

we are going to be able to do it.

And I think again I compliment the chairman for holding these

hearings in a sort of a back to back context, because one is a guidepost for what might happen in the future. So on all three of those

basic fronts, I would like to hear your commentary.

Mr. RODMAN. Let me start off. The first question was about the

war-fighting mission, catching Mullah Omar. I think the President,

at the beginning of this, stated multiple goals. Certainly finding

some of these individuals was something we wanted to do and are

still pursuing. But we also defined the goal in terms of making

sure that Afghanistan was no longer a sanctuary and a training

area and a headquarters for terrorists.

So the terrorists are hiding, they are on the run. One thing they

have not been able to do is to reconstitute and take back Afghanistan. We took Afghanistan away from them, and I still would hold

to the view that most of the country is in the hands of the Afghans

that we wanted to give it back to, not the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

I cannot vouch for the number that Senator Biden said of how

many al-Qaeda and Taliban there are. I do not know what the

number is. I can ask people in our intelligence agencies. I am not

sure that is the benchmark of what we were setting ourselves to

do. We had, as I say, multiple goals and I think we have achieved

a number of them.

And the al-Qaeda and Taliban are in a particular area, in the

border area, and we are chasing them. We know that al-Qaeda is

around the world and possibly planning to come after us. But I do

not think they are doing this planning in Afghanistan any more,

and that was part of the goal we set for ourselves.

Let me say a word about the Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

I have no idea whether this is an adaptable model for Iraq. This

is something we devised in the Afghan situation, not for the warfighting mission, but to facilitate reconstruction and to help to provide a general sense of security for the civilian tasks of rebuilding

31

that are going on. We think it addresses the problem that it was

meant to.

Senator CORZINE. Are these numbers credible in trying to provide

that kind of security for, a sense of security for the communities

and regions that they are responsible for?

Mr. RODMAN. It is consistent with our assessment that most of

the country is basically stable in terms of violent incidents. I am

sorry Senator Biden is not here, but I think reducing the number

of incidents is not a small matter. That is precisely the issue that

the humanitarian organizations have been raising to us, saying

they are nervous about operating in certain parts of the country because of violent incidents. So if that can be reduced and they have

some sense of security, that is one of our objectives.

And we have been accomplishing this up to now with even smaller teams, in liaison with the regional commanders. We are now

doing that on a more robust basis. The numbers I think you have

seen; these teams might have 50 or 60 people, some of whom would

be military, others would be civilian, and it would depend on the

need. Gardez is a place with a certain amount of insecurity.

Bamiyan I do not think is a place where there is a lot of violence

going on, so the team in Bamiyan is probably differently constituted than the other teams.

But people spoke about the ‘‘ISAF effect,’’ wanting some psychological effect of a presence, international presence, that buttressed

the sense of security, that was a kind of surrogate for the central

authority of the Afghan Government and a representation of the

international community, and that presence was thought to have a

beneficial effect politically, psychologically, as well as being able to

help with security functions.

We think this idea is certainly worth trying out, and that is what

we are doing right now.

Senator CORZINE. Human rights and women’s rights, with respect to that?

Mr. RODMAN. David, why do you not take that.

Mr. JOHNSON. I think one has to bear in mind that there are ‘‘conservative elements,’’ to use a term, that are in Afghanistan.

This society does not look at things in one single way. So we are

seeing some resurgence of that. In the particular case that has

caught the most attention, and rightly so, in the west, I think our

assessment is that Ismail Khan is losing support rather than gaining it in behaving the way that he is. And we think that over time

that is going to affect him and his ability to maintain any influence

in the west of Iran. That is not going to be a one-day operation.

I think that one of the things that I would emphasize here is

that, whether we are on the first rung of the ladder or the second

or the third or however many rungs the ladder has, we are involved in a process here that is going to have a long period of time

associated with it, working with the Afghan authorities to help

them build their institutions and assisting them over a very long

period of time. So this is not a—we are not stopping now.

If I could also say a little bit about the teams that you referred

to, whether you describe it as learning by doing or we too are capable of responding to external stimuli, we have changed the way we

have dealt with this. Peter referred to some efforts we had a year

32

or so ago that were successful, but over time we adapted and this

is another idea to try to address this.

They are not cookie-cutters each one. They are different. And the

command is going to deploy the first three and take what it calls

a pause and assess how it is doing and then decide how to configure or to change the configuration of the remaining ones as it

goes on. So this is not something where we have decided this is

going to be the way it is done. We are going to learn as we go

along. We are going to engage our partners in this process and we

are going to, I think, do a better job as the summer goes on.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Corzine.

Senator Coleman.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I was not part of this esteemed body when U.S. forces entered

Afghanistan, but as a lay citizen I really thought there was a singular mission, with the goals being a subpart of that. The President spoke very forcefully about nations that harbor terrorists and

that the mission would be to ensure that Afghanistan was a place

that no longer harbored the terrorists that were responsible for

September 11, depriving terrorists of their sanctuary.

I thought that was the mission, and it appears to me then there

are various goals that if you want to make sure that mission stays

successful you do not want to step back. So clearly we need longterm stability in Afghanistan. We need to deal with and have concerns about the influence of Afghanistan’s neighbors, and I want to

get back to a question about that. We want to understand and be

cognizant of and deal with the fragility of the Karzai regime and

what are its long-term prospects for success. We are obviously concerned about the limited geographic reach of ISAF.

So there are a series, then. If the mission—and again my sense

is, and please correct me, that we were successful in the principal

mission as established by the President, that Afghanistan was no

longer going to be a place that was going to harbor terrorists responsible, provide sanctuary for terrorists who were responsible, for

September 11.

My concern is about the long-term, the success of that mission,

and in particular a question raised by the chairman when he

talked about the influence of the neighbors. Iran has been described as part of the ‘‘axis of evil.’’ If Iran is having an influence,

do we run the risk of in portions of Afghanistan losing the success,

losing what we have achieved in terms of the mission?

So if you can help me on that one, and then I will throw out one

other question. There was an article in the Christian Science Monitor just the other day that talked about the Afghan National

Army, 600 new recruits being entered, and I presume that is a

long-term, long-term prospect. But can you talk to me a little bit

about the prognosis for the impact of the Afghan National Army in

terms of providing the kind of stability that will allow for the continued success of the mission, which is to make sure that Afghanistan is not a place that is providing sanctuary for terrorists?

Mr. RODMAN. I do not think there is a dispute here. Maybe it is

a semantic question. The main mission was to clean out Afghanistan and make it, as you said, no longer a haven for al-Qaeda, and

33

we are still chasing the al-Qaeda remnant. And that is not a secret.

We have not finished that job, but we think the great bulk of the

country is now in the hands of the Afghans that we want to run

their own country.

And just as you say, our interest in stability or our interest in

helping this country rebuild its political system is precisely to

make sure the post-Taliban vacuum, is filled by the good guys as

the best long-term insurance against its being filled by the bad

guys.

On the interference of neighbors, I will leave to Dave to elaborate, but it is clear that the neighboring countries want to have

their hand in it. They play favorites; they have their own clients

in the country. They all like to do this. Now, whether they are succeeding is a judgment call, and our assessment is a little less dire

than what we have heard today.

And all of these outsiders worry about the influence of somebody

else. They are rivals. It may be that everybody’s second choice is

the Bonn Agreement, so that if they cannot dominate, they do not

want some other neighboring country to dominate. And that is the

space that we have to strengthen the Afghan legitimate government, to make it more resistant to this outside interference.

As I said, our assessment is that, yes, there are a lot of people

trying to interfere. But whether they are undermining the process

is a judgment call and we do not think it is in such danger.

On the Afghan National Army, I can just say that it is progressing slowly but successfully. For the first several battalions, we

were not able to recruit the full number of about 600. We turned

them out and trained them, but they were understrength. The most

recent battalion is at full strength, and there will be a seventh battalion that will be used mainly for filler units.

So what we see is that the recruitment process is succeeding.

There seems to be more interest among Afghans to join it. And we

will continue this process of training, at least for the next year or

so, at least through the election process, and we will keep going.

One of the limiting factors has been up to now our ability to recruit, but we think that is clearly improving.

Second, one of the benefits of these Provincial Reconstruction

Teams is to bring Afghan units with us. So they will do missions

and they will benefit from that experience.

But in addition, the Afghan units have gone out on their own

and done missions on their own.

So we think this is working. The numbers are small, but they are

multi-ethnic units. They are meeting the criteria that we set out.

They are vetted according to human rights standards, and they are

multi-ethnic. As the central authority grows in this dimension, it

will have a political effect.

Senator COLEMAN. If I can, Mr. Chairman, just raise one other

question with the time that I have, and this is an area that I have

not touched upon. But a U.N. report released in February 2003

noted that Afghanistan was the world’s largest source of raw opium

in 2002. I am concerned about in this country the rise again in heroin abuse and addiction and wondering what is being done to reduce opium production. How aggressive has the Afghanistan GovVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Jun 13, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 87575 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
34

ernment been in enforcing, in enforcing the ban on production,

given these alarming statistics?

Mr. JOHNSON. We have a slight dispute with the U.N. numbers,

but even our number is quite large, so we do not have any dispute

with the overall assessment.

In terms of trying to divide up responsibilities and share burdens, the United Kingdom has taken on the role of the lead donor,

the lead State, to help in the counternarcotics effort. That is because they have a very selfish interest since most of the heroin

coming into London comes out of Afghanistan, whereas most of

ours comes from Latin America.

They had a program last year of so-called compensated eradication that they estimated managed to destroy about a third of the

crop, which was quite successful given the circumstances. But that

still leaves a very large amount outstanding.

The Karzai Government we thought took a relatively—not just a

relatively—a courageous step in pushing back and banning the production of opium. They have told us this year that they wish for

foreign donors, foreign actors, to work on the Alternative Livelihoods Program and they are going to work on the eradication. The

Governors in the various provinces have taken on that responsibility. There have been various assertions of how much of the crop

they have destroyed at this point, but I think the jury is very much

out on how that program is going to work and it is something that

is going to bear a lot of watching by us.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Coleman.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yesterday commended you for scheduling this hearing and I want to

repeat that commendation this morning, and also the fact that this

is but the first in a series of hearings that the committee will hold

with respect to Afghanistan.

I very strongly support your opening statement that if we are

able to help Afghanistan transition into a secure democracy we will

bolster our ability to attract allies in the war against terrorism.

American credibility is on the line and we must understand that

failure to follow through could have extremely negative consequences for the war on terror. I think that is absolutely on point.

I am encouraged that you and Senator Biden and others on this

committee have been pushing this very hard. In fact, it is my own

perception that it is the prompting of the Congress that has moved

the administration to take more interest, although in my view nowhere near the interest that needs to be taken.

I would say to the two witnesses at the table, we have a leadership now in Afghanistan that was arrived at through a process that

bestows a legitimacy upon it within the country, as I perceive it at

least, and a leader in Mr. Karzai who from all impressions is seeking to institute in his country a system and a commitment to values that would command our respect and international respect.

So the Afghans have produced a leadership with which we can

work closely and coordinate, and the rest of the international community as well. And I am concerned that we are not doing enough.

35

Clearly we are falling short of the Afghanistan Freedom Support

Act of 2002, which the Congress approved.

Let me put this question to each of you. If the President were

to call you in and say, I do not think we are doing enough on Afghanistan, I read Senator Lugar’s opening statement and I listened

to Senator Biden and others and I think they are right, we need

to do more, I think our credibility is at stake, we have a government there we obviously can work with, and I want an action program to step up the U.S. and the international involvement to try

to address some of these pressing issues that exist there and to

make sure that a military operation which by all estimation was

a success, that we do not lose it, what action program would you

have for the President?

Suppose he said, I think the Congress would give me more

money. They obviously have indicated as much. They have passed

this authorization act. We are falling far short of it. I think that

is correct. You are nowhere near the authorized figures, I think, in

your efforts. And the President said, What is your significantly upgraded action program to try to make sure that we get the stability

and reconstruction and reform in Afghanistan? What would you

put forth?

Mr. RODMAN. We are asking ourselves the same kind of question

all the time. Our policy has evolved over the past year. We have

talked about the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, which are

meant to address a need that a lot of people thought was not being

addressed. That is a concept that can expand to do the job of supporting stability.

The Afghan National Army is clearly the priority. It is a priority

of President Karzai; it ought to be one of our main priorities. We

have contractors looking at that training program constantly to see

how we can expand that training program.

As I say, one of the limiting factors had been getting recruits and

part of our job is to work with the Afghans to make sure that the

Afghan leaders, both in Kabul and around the country, are cooperating with—— Senator SARBANES. How much are they paid, those recruits?

Mr. RODMAN. I do not have the exact number, but I am told that

it is a salary that is competitive with other things.

Senator BIDEN. If the Senator will yield—— Senator SARBANES. How much is it? I mean, you are the Department of Defense. You are involved.

Senator BIDEN. It is $50.

Mr. RODMAN. It is $50 after they graduate, $30 while they are

in training.

Senator BIDEN. And the guy who sweeps the barracks floor, according to Green Berets we have talked to, gets paid more money.

A U.N. driver gets paid considerably more money. It is not competitive.

Senator SARBANES. I think you responded—— Senator BIDEN. I think I interrupted you.

Senator SARBANES. No, that is all right.

Mr. RODMAN. Those are the numbers. I asked the same question

myself when I was visiting CENTCOM a few months ago. Their assessment was that the salary was drawing recruits and it now

36

clearly is drawing recruits. The most recent battalion was at full

strength. The seventh battalion, the number of candidates is over

what they sought. So the recruiting, the number of recruits, is not

the obstacle to the same extent it was at the beginning.

Senator SARBANES. Well, are you getting the kind of recruits you

want? I have the impression that this is a situation in which the

commitment of some additional money, not in large amounts, can

make a big difference. What is happening?

All the external reports we get raise alarm and concern that this

thing is not going to work, that it is going to fall apart on us. You

all are responsible for making it work. When we meet we get kind

of a defensive reaction to what is being done, and I am just kind

of searching for some sort of positive vision of what can be done,

of a further upgraded program to try to assure ourselves that this

thing can be a success.

Mr. RODMAN. Let me finish the answer. The setting of salaries

is something we do in consultation with the Afghans, and President

Karzai has a hand in this. Our impression, rightly or wrongly, is

that this is not the main obstacle right now. So you are right to

ask the question what should we do if we had more resources. This

may not be the missing piece.

Senator SARBANES. Well, can I get an answer out of—what would

you do if you had more? I still do not have any answer as to what

you would do if you had a significantly upgraded program.

Mr. JOHNSON. I think we are——

Senator SARBANES. What needs to be done?

Mr. JOHNSON. I think we are on the right track. If there were

no need to make decisions, if money was never a scarce object, we

would of course accelerate what we are doing.

With respect to the salary levels for these individuals, Senator

Biden is correct. If anyone has a foreign language skill and is employable by a funding NGO or the United Nations, they command

a very high salary level compared to those who do not. So in the

marketplace this is bringing people in.

I was in Afghanistan about 3 weeks ago, observed a live fire exercise from these troops who had been trained, and the military

people who were with us—I do not count myself an expert in this,

but they were very impressed with what they had been able to do

with these troops in a very short period of time. They are being

formed into two brigades, in the course of the next couple of weeks

will be providing we believe a force that is available to President

Karzai as commander in chief, and this is very much moving in the

right direction.

Senator SARBANES. Well, Mr. Chairman, I see my time is up. I

would just note I did not get an answer to my question. Neither

of these witnesses was able to lay out to the committee any sort

of view or vision of what they might do if you really stepped up

the American and the international commitment in Afghanistan in

order to address these problems.

I thought I gave you an easy hypothetical. I mean, I tried to

structure it with the President calling you in and saying he is

ready to respond to what Senator Lugar and Senator Biden and

others have been saying; what is the action program? I did not get

any response to that question.

37

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Yes, Mr. Rodman.

Mr. RODMAN. Just to add a point. A lot of the challenges we

wrestle with from day to day are not resource problems. A lot of

them are political challenges—for example, making sure that the

defense establishment is not dominated by a particular group.

There are issues of political structure and political stability which

we wrestle with all the time. Maybe that is why I did not have an

answer how to spend the money if you were generous enough to

give us more money, because a lot of the issues are about political

balance, political reconciliation, making sure the central government and its institutions are functioning properly.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I am going to make

this——

Senator SARBANES. Let me just make this observation. I think if

the administration had a well thought through approach and were

to request the Congress for additional money, they would get the

additional money, and I just want to underscore that.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the Senator.

I just want to make a short comment and then I will turn to my

distinguished ranking member, Senator Biden. It seems to me as

I have listened to the reports since September 11 and onward on

Afghanistan, both in front of witnesses like yourselves and behind

closed doors, an evolution of thinking has occurred. And I would

trace it, just as a personal comment, in about this way.

I think Senator Biden is probably on track in trying to say that

it is very difficult to have the plan or the vision that Senator Sarbanes asked of you today without our government having come to

a definitive policy of what we hope for in the country. I do not

think we have gotten to that point. So my advice to the President

or to anybody else was that we need to do that.

It is still a work in process and it has been on an ad hoc basis

really from the beginning an emergency. What our committee has

been trying to think through with Secretary Powell last week is the

fact that American diplomacy is an extremely important component, not only of Afghanistan or any other situation, but of all the

ways in which we try to bring together coalitions with allies, as

well as public policy in terms of administration of humanitarian,

financial, business affairs.

Secretary Rumsfeld has said much the same sort of thing when

he is questioned closely by Senators. And that is that the military

has an important role. It was to go to Afghanistan with Special

Forces or other people, to work with the Northern Alliance, to work

with the Afghans, to repel the Taliban, and to root out al-Qaeda.

But then Secretary Rumsfeld very rapidly realized that he feels

he is being saddled with the thought of administering the country,

administering relations with all the surrounding countries—in

other words, the same sort of problems that Dr. Cordesman raised

yesterday with regard to our thinking about Iraq.

It will be one thing to have a well-executed military plan if we

or others are called upon to do this, and we are confident that it

will be successful. But the interim problem of what happens as people begin to fight each other or they starve or they have all kinds

38

of needs requires a huge amount of planning that flows right along

with the military planning. Well, we did not have that option in Afghanistan, and so we have been improvising with our allies and

with ourselves.

But it appears to me that, even if we are getting better at it, we

really have to define more of the goalposts or what we are about

here, and I hope that we will do it. That is one of the purposes of

the hearing today, to not only jog the memory of where we are, but

likewise how we got there and some success story.

Now, I started this morning by pointing to the intrusion of other

powers into Afghanistan. Not unusual—the history of the country.

The real option is will there be a different history for Afghanistan,

and I hope that there will be. I think that we have in the United

States, with our allies and with our diplomacy, an opportunity to

make a historic situation come true for the people of that country,

and they clearly want it to come true, as we are going to hear from

the Ambassador from Afghanistan in the next panel.

Here is a gentleman, a patriot of Afghanistan, a citizen of our

country for a long time, as are many people from Afghanistan, who

have risen to the occasion now to serve because they appreciate the

historic opportunity for a breakthrough, as we do.

But this is going to take some doing. So I will not hector you

with more questions as to why we have not done more, why your

vision is incomplete. That may be true for all of us. Maybe we have

some responsibility in this committee, in the Senate, and with our

colleagues to help fashion this, and we tried in a way by authorizing money. And in due course this requires an administration

prepared to spend the money, to flesh out the programs.

Perhaps our fault was failure maybe to have more mandates, to

be more specific, to write the plan, to write the vision. That I do

not think is our role. The President ought to do that as well as the

Secretaries of State and Defense and others. But ultimately somebody has to be in charge.

I get back to one of our themes yesterday. One of our witnesses

suggested that the President of the United States as the Commander in Chief and maybe Secretary Rumsfeld then as the boss

of General Franks would be the ultimate authority in Iraq. But

General Franks will not be able to administer Iraq indefinitely.

There will have to be somebody else, and an extensive structure beyond that. Who are the Assistant Secretaries?

That we have not thought through as a country and we must,

quickly. We never thought through it in Afghanistan and I would

suggest there is a good opportunity to do so even now. That is a

personal opinion sort of arising from listening to some people who

have thought a lot more about this than I do and have had a lot

more experience in the field.

But once again, I appreciate your coming today and the reports

that you have, and I think the assessments of all of us have been

that remarkable things have occurred and would not have without

United States leadership. But at this point we still have a distance

to go to define what we want to do and to find the means, the allies, and the structure within our own government to administer it.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

39

Gentlemen, please do not take my frustration personally. My

frustration has existed from this time a year ago in Bagram to

today, and I have seen—and I can say this without equivocation,

without fear of being contradicted, and there is no way you could

have seen this. I have seen the transition, to use the popular

phrase, a morphing of the policy. You know as well as I do—and

it is a legitimate position—that there are senior administration officials who believe that—and I will quote one—that Afghan is ‘‘ungovernable, it has never been governable,’’ it is a polyglot—my

word; so far it is a quote—‘‘ungovernable, it has never been governable,’’ and the idea that we can govern it or set up a central government that is going to be capable of governing it is an unrealistic

expectation. And therefore—and this is a legitimate position—it is

in our interest to see to it that ‘‘the center,’’ quote—it is not even

the center, but Kabul—is stable, that it has a relationship with the

rest of the country, not a dominant relationship in the sense that

it is the central government, but it is the titular center of the

State, where you have replacing in effect the Governors of the various provinces individual warlords who are able to maintain security in their region, the underlying premise being if they gain security in the region it is unlikely that the swamp can fill back up

again and we will have a reenactment of what happened before,

that is the Taliban in control, because the Taliban did control. They

did a pretty good job of controlling the whole country and

subsuming the warlords in most cases to their will. But that is not

what our announced policy is.

I do have a few specific questions, but that is my frustration, our

announced policy not mirroring our actions. ISAF. I sat for a couple

hours with the previous commander of ISAF over a year ago in a

tent outside of—actually, it was in the city limits of Kabul. Very

impressive guy, General McCall, a Brit.

And he went on, along with two American liaisons, a colonel, two

American colonels, one, if I am not mistaken, in Kandahar—I

mean, excuse me, one, if I am not mistaken, from Bagram and one

from Kabul. But they were assigned liaison to ISAF. And McCall

was just staffing up his force. He was at about 1,700, 1,800, going

to 4,000, I think the number was. I cannot recall the exact number.

And they gave me a very detailed brief.

And I said, well, you need to expand ISAF beyond. And I am not

going to attribute, because I do not want to get anyone in trouble,

I am not going to attribute what I am about to say to any one person. But I can say to you there was the consensus of all the military personnel representing more than one country sitting in that

tent. You are going to have to extend ISAF beyond Kabul. Uniform

view? Absolutely, yes.

I turned to McCall and I said, are you—is your government, your

parliament, going to allow you to stay. And I remember what he

said. He said, ‘‘If the big dog is not in the pen, the small dogs are

not going to be there.’’ He said, ‘‘Are you going to stay?’’

Now, what ‘‘stay’’ meant—remember the discussion that took

place, Mr. Rodman, about a year ago? The discussion was would we

provide intelligence, would we be the source for all the intelligence

or the primary source of intelligence for ISAF, would we supply for

40

ISAF as well the lift capacity, and would we be the guarantor of

extraction? They were the things we were discussing and debating.

I came back and talked with my friend Senator Hagel about this,

talked with a number, John McCain, others who had been in and

out. And the question was and the debate was: Was our military

ready to make, in effect, that guarantee without us having boots

on the ground with ISAF?

And I remember talking about that at length and being told— and there was a debate that ensued between State and Defense as

to the efficacy, the utility, the wisdom of expanding ISAF, and it

was a relatively hard-fought debate. State was saying, you got to

expand. They are not saying that now. And Defense was saying, do

not sign us up to that, for the reason my friend from Indiana the

chairman said: Do not make us the lord and master of the whole

area and take on the whole responsibility.

So then I later heard: Well, you know, the other countries will

not expand, they do not want to expand. Sure they will not expand.

They were not guaranteed that we would be part of the operation.

They were not guaranteed that we would meet the three missions.

We said: Look, do not worry; we are still in the country; we have

got 4,000 forces still in the country. And they said: That is not good

enough; are you in on the deal? You the United States, are you

committing your forces, your resources, your guarantee that if we

are up against it you will be the ones to come in.

The Brits do not, NATO does not have the capacity to lift into

that region without us.

To the best of my knowledge—I may be mistaken. I ask Dr.

Blank behind me to correct me if I am wrong, but we never gave

that guarantee to the best of my knowledge.

So now we are told that no one wants to expand. We also, as I

remember—I do not want to implicate my good friend the chairman

here. If I am not mistaken, he and I both wrote a letter or asked

the President to be able to see him for the sake of NATO unity,

to suggest to him that the advice he was getting of not accepting

front end, unrelated to ISAF, 1,000 German crack forces that

Schroeder risked a vote of confidence on wanting to deploy and I

think it was 3,000 French, was it? I cannot remember the numbers.

And Defense said, ‘‘No,’’ thank you, we do not need them.

We importuned the President to say: Whether you need them or

not, take them, because these guys just declared an article 5. These

guys said—the French newspaper La Monde said, ‘‘we are all

Americans,’’ and now you are telling them: ‘‘We do not need you.’’

So now we are at a point where the argument is being made to

folks like me, when I say why are we not expanding it, the White

House says, ‘‘Well, no one else wants to expand.’’ So that is a long

prelude to a short question. Mr. Rodman, Mr. Secretary: If you

know—and you may not know; it may be an unfair question to ask

you, and if it is you just tell me and I will seek an answer from

Defense—is the United States prepared to guarantee lift, intelligence, and extraction if our NATO and other allies are prepared

to expand the ISAF force beyond Kabul into other regions? Do you

know the answer to that question?

Mr. RODMAN. It is a hypothetical question because we have never

engaged in a negotiation with our allies on an expanded ISAF——

41

Senator BIDEN. Oh, yes, we did, unless they have misrepresented

to me.

Mr. RODMAN. Let me start by separating two issues.

Senator BIDEN. OK.

Mr. RODMAN. The commitments you have recited are commitments we have made to ISAF with respect to their present

mission——

Senator BIDEN. Right.

Mr. RODMAN [continuing]. Intelligence, emergency extraction,

and lift, to help them with lift as available and as needed. Now,

with the Turks in fact we and the British helped them hire lift; it

does not have to be American lift. So certainly in the Turkish case,

we fulfilled the commitment to help.

On the expansion issue, I have to say I have been involved in

these discussions with the successive ISAF commanders and talked

to the Europeans and asked them at various times when there was

a debate here about expansion outside of Kabul: Is it a good idea?

And when I was asking, I was asking the question in an open way

I got a negative reaction from the military personnel of other countries that I talked to.

At the policy level we never reached the point of engaging in a

negotiation or trying to push them to do it or push them from another direction.

Senator BIDEN. But in fairness, did we not publicly say we would

not, we would not make those guarantees?

Mr. RODMAN. Secretary Rumsfeld has hedged. He has tried for

many months to be more agnostic and to point correctly to the fact

that we were not getting a positive response or interest from others.

I can also tell you that the Turks made it a condition of their

taking over the lead that they would take no responsibility outside

of Kabul, and the Germans and Dutch similarly. And that is where

we are. Now, we never pushed it because we were looking for alternative ways of addressing the same problems that ISAF expansion

was meant to address.

Senator BIDEN. I will not beat a dead horse, but I will get from

the record the early statements, if my memory serves me correctly,

of the Secretary of Defense about expansion of ISAF, before we had

any discussions with anybody, about our unwillingness to be part

of it, our unwillingness to make any guarantees. Now, I will let the

record correct me if I am wrong about that, but I will get that information.

If I may make just one last point and a very short question. My

understanding—now, this is about—so this is almost 5 months old,

what I am about to say, first-hand knowledge. It is my understanding that one of the reasons why we were having trouble initially recruiting the first two classes of Afghan integrated military

under the control of Mr. Karzai was not the money—the money

was a problem, it still is a problem; I will be interested what the

Ambassador thinks—but was that the warlords who control the

bulk of those fighters who have a capacity to command were very

unwilling to give up their best and wanted to keep the bulk of their

force structure in place.

42

Initially we were actually getting people out of mental hospitals

and they were emptying institutions the first time out, I am told

by one Green Beret who was doing part of the training. This was

the first time out, when we were trying to fill up the difference between what we needed to fill the first classes and the difference between what was sent to us and not, because if I understand it— it is a two-part question: No. 1, is the way in which U.S. military

trainers and others get these forces is that they are sent—we seek

support from the Tajiks, from other, from the Northern Alliance,

from the various warlords, to suggest sending, so we have a multiethnic military? And No. 2, is there a—well, I will just stick to

that. Is that how we get them? Is that the place from which they

come, or is it a recruiting poster hanging on a storefront in

Kandahar? How do we get these folks?

Mr. RODMAN. I think it is a combination of these things.

Mr. JOHNSON. The regional Governors are the ones who have

been responsible for providing these recruits, and I have not heard

exactly the anecdote that you ascribe to the first individuals who

were provided, but I think it is clear that, at least with some of

these people, we were being tested as to what we were up to.

I think there was also a questioning on the part of some of these

people who were leaving their homes and potentially taking part

in this as to just what they themselves might be getting into. I

think as these people have shaken out, even the early ones, the

ones that we retained have proven to be capable individuals, capable of education.

There is not a dearth of individuals who can become soldiers in

Afghanistan, able-bodied people. So it is not as though we have to

take people out of a militia army, if you will, and bring them into

this army. We were quite happy with able-bodied individuals what

were capable of learning, and so we are looking for that.

We have worked a long time on the recruitment process and we

have had various models that have been offered to us. The Defense

Commission, which is beginning to show some real activity and

productive capacity in Afghanistan, has now taken on this responsibility and, I think at least in part because of that, we are seeing

these battalions come in at full strength.

Senator BIDEN. I will followup with some questions. I thank you

for your answer. I have some more detailed questions. I will followup in writing. I appreciate both of you being here and your testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Biden.

I want to move on fairly soon to the Ambassador, but, Senator

Hagel, you have just a question?

Senator HAGEL. I have two short questions. Thank you, Mr.

Chairman.

Could either of you tell the committee who now provides the security detail for President Karzai?

Mr. JOHNSON. Senator, I happened to be in Afghanistan this

summer when we made this offer to President Karzai. The Special

Forces, because they were on the ground, moved in rapidly to take

this responsibility over. In the fall, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, working with a contractor, took this responsibility from the

Special Forces.

43

They have done a multiple set of jobs. They began providing the

direct security immediately upon taking over from the military.

They began a process of providing a range of security upgrades to

the compound for perimeter security so that it would be less susceptible to threat to President Karzai. They have already begun a

process of training Afghans to take over this responsibility eventually.

So it is a multi-phased project, but we have dedicated significant

funds to it. As late as yesterday, we got a report from our embassy

in Kabul that President Karzai was not only quite pleased with

what had been done, but he was especially pleased with what he

had observed as to the Afghans who are being trained eventually

to take over this responsibility.

Senator HAGEL. When do you think that will occur?

Mr. JOHNSON. Sir, the training is ongoing. I do not want to put

an X on a calendar. I think we want to see how this develops and

make sure that we do not do it prematurely. We are committed to

doing this right.

Senator HAGEL. I would suspect that has a direct effect on the

attitude and the evaluation and the confidence that an Afghan

army would instill in the people in Afghanistan, if in fact that security force is Afghani and can protect an Afghani President, rather

than outside forces. Would you connect that?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, as I have said in response to a number of

questions here, our model, our objective, is to build the Afghan

State. So we want to train Afghans in all capacities, to provide assistance to them. Yes, I would agree with you that having Afghans

provide security for their President is the objective that we and

they want to secure.

Senator HAGEL. A last, very brief question. On the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, we do not need to go into it now because the

chairman wants to move on, but would you provide the committee

a budget for those? What kind of resources are you dedicating to

those teams, and break it down specifically, security, reconstruction, all the things you generally touched in your testimony, so how

much money are we dedicating to those teams? Thank you very

much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Hagel.

Do other Senators have any further questions?

If not, we thank you both very much for your testimony and for

coming to us today.

The chair would like to now call to the witness table Ambassador

Ishaq Shahryar, Afghanistan’s Ambassador to the United States.

Ambassador Shahryar, we are delighted that you have been able

to be with us today. You have benefited, as we have, by hearing

testimony from our Department of State and our Department of

Defense, parts of our government that are clearly charged with

many responsibilities, and we have been discussing their successes

and likewise the challenges and parameters at least we seek for

them.

We look forward to your testimony as someone who has a responsibility on behalf of his country, looks at all of this perhaps in a

different perspective, although sometimes the same, as you have

44

visited widely with colleagues in the Senate and the House, as well

as obviously you have worked with the administration.

We welcome you and ask for your testimony this morning.

STATEMENT OF HON. ISHAQ SHAHRYAR, AFGHANISTAN

AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Ambassador SHAHRYAR. Thank you very much. It is a great

honor to be with you today and to share some thoughts about the

vital work and progress in Afghanistan. I feel particularly honored

since I understand that only on rare occasions you seek the views

of the Ambassador of a foreign country.

I believe that, given the heroic investment of American dollars

and American lives in the liberation and rebuilding of Afghanistan,

it is appropriate that you have a progress report directly from the

beneficiary.

I have a written statement that I would like to place in the

record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be published in full in the record.

Ambassador SHAHRYAR. Thank you.

In my summary remarks, I would like to begin by thanking you,

Mr. Chairman, for the invitation to appear today and for your

thoughtful vision for an Afghan Enterprise Fund that will be critical for Afghanistan’s journey and arrival. I also wish to thank Senator Biden for his consistent voice of support through our early

months of liberation and rebuilding and for his particular focus on

the plight of women in Afghanistan.

I believe there can be redemption through suffering. In Afghanistan the world saw the systematic brutalization and discrimination

against women by the Taliban and was horrified. I believe that this

moved leaders of the world and leaders in this chamber to mount

a renewed effort to end all forms of discrimination against women

in all nations of the world. To achieve that lasting end would indeed serve to redeem the suffering of so many women in Afghanistan.

I also wish to thank you, Senator Hagel, for your leadership in

sponsoring the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act and to thank all

the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for their

generous support of Afghanistan.

On behalf of President Karzai and the Afghan people, I wish to

thank President Bush and the leadership of his administration for

our liberation. We are a grateful nation. There is also a long list

of men and women in the military and many others from U.S. Government agencies, especially USAID, and in private companies who

have embraced the cause of freedom in Afghanistan whom I would

dearly like to say thank you.

I would like to begin with a simple observation. The official name

of my country is the Transitional Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

‘‘Transitional’’ is a key word. We are a work in progress and this

work occurs in the context of history and in the context of regional

instability.

Two decades ago a very bright professor named Brzezinski referred to our region in the Middle East, the north and west side

of the great Hindu Kush Mountains that divide Asia from Europe,

as the ‘‘arch of instability.’’ In recent years, without question that

45

arch has become a ‘‘circle of instability,’’ matched by an arch that

extends across Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and reaches as far as

Indonesia. At the center of this circle is Afghanistan.

But this is not new. This is history repeating itself. For 4,000

years, Afghanistan has been a portal for history—more than just

a crossroads; a portal. For all of human history, overland travel

from Europe or the Middle East to Asia could only pass one way,

through Afghanistan and the Khyber Pass. Ghenghis Khan,

Tamerlane, Alexander the Great, to name a few, crossed Afghanistan and left their mark on Afghan government, arts, and sciences.

Others of course entered and occupied Afghanistan, but were not

so benevolent.

I offer this brief history lesson to suggest the following. Afghanistan is literally the moral ‘‘high ground’’ of history. Control the Afghanistan high ground and you will influence for good or for evil

that which flows into Europe and into Asia.

If the Western world has a lapse of attention and turns elsewhere, the institutional memory of the region will reach back into

a weak Afghanistan with drugs, corruption and terror, and invariably the circle will turn toward conflict. If the Western world sustains support and stays focused until democracy and prosperity are

firmly rooted, then Afghanistan will become a hub, a hub for the

wheel of regional stability, democracy, prosperity, that will become

self-sustaining.

This is not theory. It is a model and a replay of recent and successful deployment of U.S. and international will on a smaller

scale. I invite you to compare landlocked, impoverished, but historically significant Afghanistan to that of landlocked, impoverished,

but historically significant Macedonia. As you know from history,

Macedonia in many ways is the historic portal that connects Europe with the Middle East in the same way that Afghanistan is the

portal that connects Asia and the Middle East.

There in Macedonia, for the first time ever, the United States

and NATO very smartly deployed a military presence before conflict spilled into that historic tinderbox. Yes, there has been flashes

of conflict in Macedonia, as flashes of conflict continue today in Afghanistan. But that historic center of Balkan instability was made

secure and major conflict was avoided, a conflict that might have

brought two NATO powers to blows.

The analogy of that successful and modest investment holds for

Afghanistan and the current circle of instability in the Middle East.

Consider the following comment from Ahmed Rashid, which was

mentioned earlier, writing in the Far Eastern Economic Review in

an article titled ‘‘A Desire to be Left Alone, Alone.’’ In summary,

it reads:

‘‘Russia is arming one warlord, Iran another. Some central Asian

republics are backing their ethnic allies. India and Pakistan are

playing out an intense rivalry in the playing fields of Afghanistan.’’

This is pretty straight talk. It does not get more concise in describing what could reemerge or can be prevented if the United

States and world community invest in the security and rebuilding

of Afghanistan.

We must hold firm to the principle that Afghanistan, like every

other sovereign nation, is for the Afghan people and not the playVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Jun 13, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 87575 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
46

ing field for regional rivalries, and that is what President Karzai

with his Kabul Declaration is trying to do so.

The people of Afghanistan have turned to President Karzai as

the one person who is truly able to unify Afghanistan and turn the

nation from a past filled with war and oppression to a future focused on prosperity and democracy.

We began our future last year, flushed with liberation. The greys

and blacks imposed on us by the Taliban are now being replaced

by color. Our men can again play music, our women and girls are

returning to schools, and our children can fly a kite again.

You have seen these things on CNN. You also know that we have

a long way to go. One of five children born today will not reach the

age of 5 years. One in ten Afghan women will die in childbirth,

leaving her other children as orphans. Of Afghanistan’s 27 million

people, the United Nations estimates that nearly a quarter are refugees, and Afghanistan is the most heavily mined country in the

world and, as is the case in other war zones, children at play will

become the victims of leftover land mines.

Addressing the humanitarian issue, the security issue, the rebuilding issue, and the economic development issues are not simple. It has meant an international collaborative effort, and the date

this multinational collaboration is working and working better

than perhaps any comparable effort since the Marshall Plan. In

many ways Afghanistan for the moment still lingers in a honeymoon period, where we are designing and building a new nation

from a clean sheet of paper.

In the immediate post-Taliban defeat in Afghanistan, there were

no universities, no army, no police, no TV, no newspaper, no banking system, no judiciary, very little food, and even less in the way

of health care, the only thing in abundance—guns and land mines.

We established a triage plan to urgently fill institutional vacuums and quickly moved to right the most terrible wrongs of the

Taliban, such as immediate administration of free elections and

restoration of women workers and students to their pre-Taliban positions. Today women constitute over 50 percent of civil servants

and teachers.

Those were tangible acts of immediate reform, but there are urgent needs under the heading of cultural reconstruction. The reestablishment of a national sense of identity, that will take longer.

For 20 years the moral compass of our nation has been spinning

like a top. Today we are telling our children that most of what they

have known has been wrong, that in the 21st century open societies, freedom of thought, freedom of speech, freedom of commerce,

freedom from want, fear and intimidation is where the world is

going and this is where Afghanistan must go, too.

But for us to do that while living in the center of the circle of

instability will require significant support. The landmark Afghanistan Freedom Support Act that originated in this committee provides a strategic framework for U.S. policy on the political and economic development of Afghanistan. We respectfully urge the Congress in this appropriation cycle to fully fund the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act.

I also ask this committee to continue to support the expansion

of ISAF and I hope that the administration will make every effort

47

to press American friends and allies to join in this effort. Afghanistan’s internal security remains fragile. Noninterference from our

regional neighbors is key and the expansion of ISAF and the establishment of a national army will support noninterference and demonstrate international support for the central government, weaken

the influence of regional leaders and their personal armies, speed

reconstruction and economic recovery, increase the confidence of

private investors, will promote stability and our ability to form a

national army that needs to be trained at a faster pace and bigger

size.

The expansion of ISAF is good for all of the Afghan people, who

have known only war for the last generation. It will also help finish

the job of extinguishing all vestiges of the Taliban and al-Qaeda in

Afghanistan, so democracy has a chance. All nations stand to benefit from new elements of stability in the Middle East, from any

source.

Yes, the situation in Iraq is a very serious problem and should

be dealt with. But let us also secure the victories that we have already won, and the best way to secure our victory in Afghanistan

is to secure democracy and build prosperity. We have the basic elements for building wealth in our nation. We have natural resources

and they need to be mapped and thoughtfully developed. We are

located in a strategically important location in Central Asia. There

can be a logistics and transportation industry in our future and we

have an entrepreneurial tradition.

But these elements will never be organized and mastered independent of peace and security and a business plan. We have recently created a private sector development task force for Afghanistan to accelerate capacity-building and institution-building of the

Afghan Government and strengthen infrastructure. We are working to write laws and protect private investment. We are setting up

private banks, getting started with exploiting our natural resources, and later this year we will host an international trade

show in Kabul, and you are hereby invited to attend.

In closing, I hope I have offered a useful assessment of where we

are and where we hope to go. But I must be candid: We are not

there yet.

My summary concerns cover five points: One, we urgently request funding support for fiscal year 2003 to meet the levels in the

Afghanistan Freedom Support Act.

Two, we support the expansion of the current 4,800-member

ISAF force to at least three times that level, with these forces to

be stationed around the country, not just in Kabul.

Three, work with the Tokyo donors and the international financial institutions to apply as quickly as possible the pledges made

during the Tokyo Round.

Four, wherever possible reconstruction funding should be directed to the central government under President Karzai to reinforce its national reach.

Fifth, encourage the return to Afghanistan of the many dedicated

citizens of Afghan origin in the United States who want to return

to our country to help in the rebuilding effort. But again, this help

should not be viewed as altruism by the U.S. or world community.

48

The return to the United States and global security will be commensurate with the investment.

President Karzai and I are passionately determined not to squander this moment in Afghanistan history. Afghans are a remarkably

resilient people and a proud people, proud to learn, proud to do a

good job. As Churchill widely stated, ‘‘give us the tools and we will

get the job done.’’ Thank you for your attention and I will be most happy to take

your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Shahryar follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ISHAQ SHAHRYAR, AFGHANISTAN AMBASSADOR

TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

THE RESTORATION AND REBUILDING OF AFGHANISTAN

It is a great honor and to be with you today and to share some thoughts about

an important, perhaps even vital, work in progress in Afghanistan.

Given the heroic investment of American dollars and American lives in the liberation and rebuilding of Afghanistan it is most appropriate that you have a progress

report direct from the beneficiary.

And that is what I will provide here today—with the overarching theme that

America’s investments in Afghanistan are commensurate with the returns—greater

progress in the war against terrorism, enhanced regional and global security—and

with enhanced security comes enhanced economic growth.

I wish to thank you, Chairman Lugar, for the invitation to present testimony this

morning, and to thank you for your thoughtful vision of what Afghanistan can become, and your support for an Afghan Enterprise Fund—that will be critical for our

journey and arrival.

I also wish to thank you, Senator Biden—for your consistent voice of support

through our early months of liberation and rebuilding—and for your particular focus

on the plight of women in Afghanistan.

I believe there can be redemption through suffering. And in Afghanistan, the

world saw full force—the systematic brutalization and discrimination against the

women by the Taliban gangsters—and was horrified.

I believe that these revelations moved leaders of the world and leaders in this

chamber to mount a renewed effort to end all forms of discrimination against all

women in all nations of the world—and to achieve that lasting end, would indeed

serve to redeem the suffering of so many women in Afghanistan.

And I also wish to thank you, Senator Hagel, for your leadership in sponsoring

the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act authorizing $3.3 billion in economic, political,

humanitarian and security assistance for Afghanistan during the next four years.

And while I have the microphone, on behalf of President Karzai and the Afghan

people I wish to thank the members of this Committee, the Members of the U.S.

Senate and the House, Secretaries Powell and Rumsfeld, their senior staff, and of

course President Bush—for liberation.

We are a country the size of Texas and we have a great deal to be thankful for.

We are a grateful nation. And there is a long list of men and women in the military,

our government agencies, NGOs and private companies—who have embraced the

cause of freedom and restoration in Afghanistan, and I would dearly like to thank—

but it would consume all my time this morning.

Instead, I would prefer to turn to the actions and plans in place and going forward

that will bring lasting and positive change to the region—and best represent the

gratitude of the Afghan people, for those who have invested so much there.

I would like to begin my remarks with a simple observation—and to present and

context for this hearing.

The observation: The Official Name of my Country is ‘‘The Transitional Islamic

Republic of Afghanistan.’’ ‘‘Transition’’ is a key phrase and umbrella theme for my

remarks this morning.

We are a work in progress—and in a context—the context of history and the context of regional instability.

Two decades ago a very bright professor named Brezinski, referred to our region

in the Middle East—the north and west side of the great mountains that divide Asia

from Europe—As the ‘‘Arch of Instability.’’

But in recent years—without question, that arch has become a Circle of Instability—matched by an arch that extends across the southern and eastern side of the

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mountainous continental fence—and includes Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and even

as far as Indonesia.

At the center of this circle—is Afghanistan. Afghanistan is at the center of today’s

‘‘Circle of Instability.’’

But this is not new. It is history repeating itself. For 4,000 years, Afghanistan

has been a ‘‘portal’’ for history . . . more than just a crossroads . . . a portal.

For all of human history, overland travel from Europe or the Middle East to Asia

could only pass one way—through Afghanistan—and through the Kyber Pass.

Ghengis Kahn, Tamerlane, Alexander the Great, to name a few—crossed Afghanistan and left their mark on Afghan government, arts and sciences.

Others, of course entered and occupied Afghanistan as well—but left behind only

destruction and chaos. In our generation, it was the Soviets in the 1980s, and the

Taliban of the 1990s.

I offer this brief history lesson—to suggest the following:

Afghanistan is literally the ‘‘high ground’’ of history.

Control the Afghanistan high ground, and you will influence for good or for evil—

that which flows into Europe and into Asia.

If the Western World has a lapse of attention and turns elsewhere, the ‘‘institutional memory’’ of the region will leach back in to a weak Afghanistan with drugs,

corruption, and terror—and invariably—‘‘the circle’’ will turn back toward terror

and conflict.

If the Western World sustains support—and stays focused and present until democracy and prosperity are firmly rooted—then Afghanistan will become a hub—a

hub of wheel of regional stability, democracy and prosperity—that will become selfsustaining.

This is not theory—it is a replay of another recent and successful deployment of

U.S. and international will on a smaller scale—where foresight was acted upon—

indeed the foresight of this Committee was acted upon—and conflict on a broad

scale was essentially prevented.

I invite you to compare the regional geopolitical situation of land-locked, impoverished—but historically significant Afghanistan in the Middle East and Asia—to that

of land-locked, impoverished—but historically significant—Macedonia—in the Balkans.

As you know from history—Macedonia in many ways is the historic portal that

connects Europe and the Middle East—in the same way that Afghanistan is the portal that connects Asia and the Middle-east.

There, in Macedonia, for the first time ever—The U.S. and NATO—very smartly—

deployed a military presence BEFORE conflict spilled into that historic tinderbox.

Yes, there have been flashes of conflict in Macedonia—as flashes of conflict continue today in Afghanistan. But that historic ‘‘Center of Balkan instability’’ was

made secure and regional conflict was avoided—a conflict that might have brought

two NATO powers to blows.

The analogy of that successful—and modest investment—holds for Afghanistan

and the current Circle of Instability in the Middle East.

Consider the following comment from Ahmed Rashid writing in the Far Eastern

Economic Review in an article titled: A Desire To Be Left Alone—with a tagline:

‘‘Afghanistan’s power-hungry neighbors threaten to revive the ruinous civil

war of the early 1990s that gave rise to the Taliban.

‘‘Russia is arming one warlord, Iran another. Wealthy Saudis have resumed funding Islamic extremists and some Central Asian Republics are

backing their ethnic allies. India and Pakistan are playing out an intense

rivalry as they secretly back opposing forces. The playing field is Afghanistan, and the interference threatens to revive a multifaceted power struggle

that in the early 1990s eventually gave way to a near-ruinous rule by the

Taliban.’’

This is pretty straight talk.

It doesn’t get more concise in describing the cycle of the 1990s—and what could

re-emerge—OR—can clearly be prevented if the U.S. and world community remain

invested in the security and rebuilding of Afghanistan.

Perhaps it is a stretch to ever envision Afghanistan as a ‘‘Switzerland of the Middle East.’’ But I find it useful to think in those terms.

We must begin with the premise that Afghanistan, like every other sovereign nation—is for the Afghan people—AND NOT the playing field for regional rivalries.

And we must begin with this premise and hold firmly to it.

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The institutional memory in the region that reaches back 4,000 years. And regrettably that institutional memory favors dictatorship over democracy—and economic

suppression over economic prosperity.

And the bad habits that go with that history also include devoting resources to

developing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons to enforce repression—at the

expense of economic opportunity and prosperity for people.

Look at Iran and Iraq—two countries blessed with immense petroleum wealth—

where people live in poverty.

Repression is a medieval concept—that does not belong in the 21st century.

• The denial of personal liberty removes transparency in government that leads

to corruption.

• Corruption repels investment and economic development.

• Poverty is the soil where terrorism takes root—and makes the whole process

of democracy, stability, and security impossible.

Now—I know that I am preaching to the choir here.

These concepts are second nature to you. But there are novel—if not radical concepts to the 100s of millions of people in the Middle East and South Asia.

I have heard some say that openness and democracy conflict with our Middle

Eastern culture and tradition.

Nonsense.

It was Cyrus the Great of Persia who issued the world’s first declaration of

human rights.

Yes, there have been periods of greatness in the Middle East. But to date, the

ancient cultures have failed to translate themselves into modern times, because

there has been no one to lead beyond the past—with the knowledge and convictions

that——

• Theocracies fail;

• Dictatorships fail; but

• Democracy—somewhat more cumbersome to implement—works.

But I believe, however, that the cycle of history in Afghanistan is being broken

by leadership with a new vision.

The people of Afghanistan have rallied to President Hamid Karzai as the one person who is truly able to unify Afghanistan, and turn the nation from a past filled

with war and repression—to a future focused on prosperity and democracy.

We began our future last year with liberation—and with the restoration of our

spirit. For a country that has literally been reduced to rubble—it is our creative

spirit and our culture that anchors our new beginning.

To be frank—there is little else in our country that will hold an anchor.

With liberation—we’ve had the opportunity to reclaim our culture—our art, our

music, our educational systems, our entrepreneurship—our freedom to create was

given back to us. The grays and blacks imposed on us by the Taliban—are being

replaced by color.

• Our men can again play music.

• Our women and girls are returning to schools.

• And our children can again fly kites.

You’ve seen these things on CNN. You also know that we have a long way to go:

• 1 in 5 children born today will not reach the age of 5 years;

• 1 in 10 Afghan women will die in childbirth—leaving her other children as orphans;

• Of Afghanistan’s 27 million people—the United Nations estimates nearly a

quarter are refugees; and

• Afghanistan is the most heavily mined country in the world. And as is the case

in other war zones—children at play, will become the victims of left-over land

mines.

Addressing the humanitarian issues, the security issues, the rebuilding issues,

and the economic development issues are not simple.

It has meant an international collaborative effort—and to date, this multi-national collaboration is working—and working better than perhaps any comparable

effort since the Marshall Plan.

REBUILDING—CULTURAL AND TANGIBLE

We have a rare and historic opportunity in Afghanistan—to change the course of

a region that has triggered substantial global turmoil for the last generation, and

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been the focus of U.S. foreign policy for the last 18 months—and I dare say will

be for the next 18 months.

With respect to Re-building and Security Concerns I would like to briefly describe:

• Where we have been;

• The works in progress being crafted with the tools at our disposal focusing on

security and reconstruction;

• Where we can go—according to a rather urgent timeline.

THE LAST 12 MONTHS

In many ways Afghanistan still lingers in a honeymoon period—where we are designing and building a new nation from a clean sheet of paper.

In the immediate post-Taliban defeat in Afghanistan, there were no universities,

no army, no police, no TV, no newspapers, no banking system, no judiciary, very

little food and even less in the way of health care. The only thing in abundance:

Guns and land mines.

Looking back 12 months—we established a triage plan to urgently fill institutional vacuums. It began with the Bonn Agreement that provided the political road

map and an interim administration to make a start. We then quickly moved to right

the most egregious wrongs of the Taliban.

• All women workers and students were immediately restored to their preTaliban positions. Today, women constitute over 50% of civil servants and

teachers.

• Some three million children have gone back to school.

• His Majesty King Zahir Shah returned to Afghanistan after almost three decades.

• The Grand Decision Making Assembly known as the Loya Jirga was convened

and 1501 representatives from all over Afghanistan participated. And a woman

was a candidate for the Presidency.

• Over two million refugees from outside and internally displaced have gone back

to their homes and villages.

• Liberal investment laws were passed to attract foreign and Afghan investors

and free enterprise has re-gained a foothold.

• All state enterprises have become subject to open bidding.

• A neighborly conference was held in Kabul on the anniversary of Bonn Conference to mark our neighbors’ commitment to non-interference, good neighborliness and mutual respect. This has resulted in the Kabul Declaration.

• National Defense Council, National Security Council, Civil Affairs Commission,

Human Rights Commission, Constitutional Commission and many other entities

have been established to speed up the work of the government.

• A Constitutional Commission was established, drafting began, and is now nearly completed. By the end of the year it will be completed and ratified by another

Loya Jirga.

• And just like here in the United States, in 2004, we will again hold free and

fair general elections.

Those were tangible acts of immediate need. There have also been needs to lay

foundations for Cultural Reconstruction—the re-establishment of a national sense of

identity—and providing an education to the Afghan people—both of which are critical to ending factionalism of the sort that plagued Afghanistan in the aftermath

of the Soviet defeat and withdrawal.

You see, for over 20 years the Afghan people have endured two attempts at brainwashing. First by the brutal far-left extremes of communism. Then by the brutal

far-right extremes of the Taliban’s ‘‘Thug Theocracy.’’

Is it any wonder the brains of our young people are scrambled?

For years, the moral compass of the nation has been spinning like a top.

Today, we need to remind the adults of Afghanistan who they are, where they

have been.

And at the same time we are telling our children—that their entire lives, all that

they have known for 20 years—is an aberration. That in the 21st Century—Open

societies, freedom of thought, freedom of speech, freedom of commerce, freedom from

want, fear and intimation—are the models for Civil Society—and where the world

is going.

To that end:

• Work urgently to restore our libraries, our museums, our cultural monuments,

and our national parks

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• We must also encourage the direction where the invisible hand of freedom has

already led us—the creation of free and independent media. Indeed, there are

already 150 new News Organizations in Kabul, and Kabul Radio is now up 24

x 7 and broadcasting to a national audience.

• We are working hard to create a Judiciary System—that is transparent, based

on the rule of law and representative of the entire nation. Our new Judiciary

Commission and Commission on Human Rights have been hard at work, and

I am pleased to day that 200 women Judges have been restored to the bench.

I think we have made great progress. Here is the testimony of Robert Oakley,

former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan in a recent Op-ed from the Washington Post:

‘‘Starting from zero a year ago, the administration of President Hamid

Karzai has achieved many attributes of a responsible government.

• It has a long-term national development framework and budget, worked out

with the World Bank, the United Nations, the United States and other donors,

and is carefully applying it to ensure that donor proposals meet Afghan realities.

• A central bank, fiscal discipline and a new national currency have been established.

Construction of the large-scale ‘‘ring road’’ program has begun; large-scale community development projects will soon follow smaller efforts.

• An Afghan Defense Commission (including senior ‘warlords’) has reached agreement on the size, makeup and training of the new army and the demobilization

of local militias.’’

Ambassador Oakley goes on to say what I firmly believe:

The key to this trend line continuing in a positive direction—is the continued

presence and focused attention of the United States of America.

The American effort has already been heroic, creative, and generous.

Consider, just in recent months:

• The Congress and Administration produced the $3.3 billion Afghan Freedom

Support Act;

• Secretary Powell unveiled the Administration’s U.S.-Middle East Partnership

Plan; and

• The President dispatched a special delegation of American women to Kabul

under the auspices of U.S.-Afghan Women’s Council.

But this trend line of attention and active support must continue into 2003.

If it does—and I believe it will—the good news will continue and Afghanistan will

become the first example in this new century and centuries to come—of what democracy can do for a struggling nation.

AID AND RECONSTRUCTION

Last year began with $5 billion being pledged for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, including $1.8 billion for 2002, at the January 2002 Donor Conference in

Tokyo. An additional $1.2 billion has been pledged for 2003. Although many major

reconstruction projects had begun towards the end of the year, the majority of our

population is living in poverty, below the pre-war 1976 levels in many cases.

The Loya Jirga that was held last June helped to spur activity on a numbers of

projects, including small scale initial recovery efforts, macro-reconstruction projects

such as roads, energy and power, many of which were supported by funds channeled

through UN agencies.

But, as Nigel Fisher, the UN Secretary General’s Deputy Special Representative

for Reconstruction, noted:

‘‘Tokyo pledges have largely been met, but the fundamental problem is

that those pledges fall far short of the level of international assistance required to really kick-start Afghanistan’s recovery. In per capita terms, the

assistance provided to Afghanistan falls far short of aid provided for recovery from other major crises—in the Balkans, East Timor or Rwanda.’’

What’s more, for the pledges that have not been met, checks are still in the mail,

grants have been converted to loans, and many loans have become conditional or

placed on hold.

The softening of global commitments to rebuild Afghanistan makes the U.S. commitment—as declared in last fall’s Afghanistan Freedom Support Act—all the more

important.

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Our needs, living at the center of the ‘‘Circle of Instability’’—remain most urgent

and we require significant financial support.

The landmark Afghanistan Freedom Support Act—that originated in this Committee provides a strategic framework for U.S. policy on the political and economic

development of Afghanistan—to provide that support.

• It protects and enhances the security of Afghanistan by authorizing military

and security assistance, and supports counter-narcotics, crime control and police

training activities for our government.

• The legislation also authorizes $1.7 billion in economic, humanitarian and development assistance in Afghanistan.

• Through the efforts of Members of this distinguished panel, $300 million was

provided for an Enterprise Fund to promote job creation and private sector development, and another

• $300 million in draw-down authority for military and other security assistance

is authorized.

• The bill also provides a total of $1 billion to support ISAF, if the President

makes the necessary determinations.

We respectfully urge the Congress, in this appropriations cycle to fully fund the

Afghanistan Freedom Support Act.

The Act created a template for reconstruction funding at not less than $450 million in fiscal year 2003. The need is urgent. Yet, the FY 2003 Omnibus Budget looks

like it will fall considerably short of the mark. I would urge you and your colleagues

to bring the actual funding level up to the authorization mark so that funds can

be deployed—not next year, but in the months ahead—to enhance education, improve health, especially for children, to strengthen our democratic institutions and

to empower the women of Afghanistan.

As you are aware, President Bush will meet President Karzai in Washington toward the end of the month for talks on postwar reconstruction. President Bush has

indicated that he looks forward to discussing with President Karzai ‘‘the progress

being made toward our shared goals of rebuilding the country’s society and economy, and securing a nation free from terror, war and want.’’ We certainly are aware

that President Bush has a great deal on his plate at this time. Thus, we are particularly grateful to him, to Secretary of State Powell and others in the Administration

for their continued attention to Afghanistan and their commitment, in Secretary

Powell’s words, ‘‘to create an Afghanistan where terrorists and traffickers can never

again flourish.’’

And that leads me back to security—and the critical role of ISAF and its expansion to corners of Afghanistan.

As you know, the transition to Dutch and German oversight of ISAF has gone

smoothly. And going forward, we believe that this force, as it expands its mission

beyond Kabul, will guarantee the long-term security of our entire country and make

it possible for reconstruction efforts to succeed without terror or intimidation. Eventually—and I hope it will be sooner rather than later—we will establish, with the

help of our allies, an effective military and police force to allow us to control our

own destiny and our own affairs.

I urge this Committee to continue to support the expansion of ISAF, and I hope

the Administration will make every effort to press America’s friends and allies to

join in this effort. As you once remarked, Senator Biden, ‘‘ISAF is the vital security

blanket without which rebuilding efforts will be in grave jeopardy and the strength

of the Central Government eroded and weakened.’’

Afghanistan internal security remains fragile. Recent outbursts of fighting—including air strikes yesterday against residual presence of Taliban and Al Qaeda

forces reminds us of the specter of oppression and terrorism that was only too real

18 months ago.

Non-interference from our regional neighbors is key. And the expansion of ISAF

and the establishment of a national army will:

• demonstrate international support for the central government

• weaken the influence of regional leaders and their personal armies

• speed reconstruction and economic recovery

• increase the confidence of private investors

• will promote stability and our ability to form a national army

Afghan Army needs to be trained at a faster pace and bigger size. 2000 men in

one year are just not enough. Experts say that at least 700,000 guns are unaccounted for and it takes a strong army not only to collect them but also to counter

the warlords. And their rapid deployment along with U.S. forces would not only

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make them better soldiers but also amount to smaller number of casualties of U.S.

armed services.

The expansion of ISAF, is very good for all of the Afghan people—who have

known only war for the last generation.

The expansion of ISAF—will also help finish the job of extinguishing all vestiges

of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan—so democracy has a chance—good for

the Afghan people AND the global community.

To that end—it is critical even in these times of global economic slow-down—that

Afghanistan receive the promised security and financial assistance to help Afghanistan to recover, and rebuild.

Clearly—all nations stand to benefit from all new elements of stability in the Middle East—from any source.

Yes, Saddam Hussein is a very serious problem.

I am heartened that America and the world community are determined to deal

with that despot.

And I pledge to you that Afghanistan will support whatever direction the U.S. and

Allied nations take in dealing with Saddam Hussein—and winning another victory

for democracy.

But let us also secure the victories that we have already won.

And the best way to secure our victory in Afghanistan is to secure democracy and

build prosperity. And, the task of doing that centers squarely on the shoulders of

the new government in Kabul and the international business community. And to no

surprise, there is much to do.

• We need to make a major commitment toward ‘‘big infrastructure development’’ like rebuilding our roads—that will bring jobs, and add to a national psychology

of peace and security.

• Because 85% of the Afghan people are farmers, we need to embark on a massive

program to support new agricultural initiatives—dams, irrigation canals and

systems—that would employ millions of Afghans. This, combined with an Alternate Crop Substitution for poppy farmers, could curtail illicit drug production

tremendously.

• There needs to be a gradual shift from short-term humanitarian help to longterm sustainable development projects.

• We need reliable electric power.

• We need to re-fill the hundreds of empty factories in our cities with workers—

making textiles, cement, and other finished goods.

• We need capacity building for the central authority means attracting the Afghan Diaspora, particularly, from the U.S.. I appeal to you to consider additional funding for their provisional return back home to utilize their professional skills.

• We need to keep focused on Afghan’s women—and the establishment of centers

for mothers and children in need—in need of literacy, vocational training, and

especially medical care. And,

• Money is needed to fight the campaign against narcotics, production, processing

and trafficking, including its nexus to narco-mafia and cross-border instability.

The Karzai government has organized with remarkable speed and transparency

to organize and get on with the business of rebuilding. And we are making progress

against a very long checklist. Here are highlights:

• We have implemented a plan for efficient processing of economic development

assistance—housed in the Ministry of Finance—under a program that would

make the Director of 0MB proud.

• We have introduced our new national currency—the Afghani.

• We have embarked upon a highway ‘‘ring-road’’ reconstruction program to build

arteries connecting a country the size of Texas. Additional road building will

begin with the arrival of spring.

• The Voice of America and the Afghan Information Ministry, with $10 million

from the Pentagon, are installing transmitters to create a national radio network.

• Also with America’s help, through Transition Initiatives funding in the amount

of $6 million, we are empowering Afghan-run NGO’s, particularly focusing on

women’s groups and community development projects. We want to make sure

that women are full participants and full beneficiaries in the economic growth

that is part of Afghanistan’s future.

I believe that with the restoration of civil society and the rule of law—the international private business community will see a welcome mat for business and priVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Jun 13, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 87575 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
55

vate investment. And in recent months, we have begun reaching out to the private

business and financial communities—with an invitation to come and do business.

indeed—this is the mission I have personally embraced in my role as Ambassador.

We have great wealth in our undeveloped natural resources in Afghanistan. But we

also understand that international businesses will not invest and joint-venture with

us until they see:

• a safe environment,

• the banishment of corruption,

• adherence to commonly accepted business practices, and

• re-establishment of reliable transportation and telecommunications infrastructure.

And with the generous support of international institutions and the U.S. we are

working hard to bring these things to pass.

We have the basic elements for building wealth in our nation.

• We have Natural resources—and they need to be mapped and thoughtfully developed;

• We are located in a strategically important location in Central Asia—much like

Denver, there can be a logistics and transportation industry in our future;

• And we have an entrepreneurial tradition . . .

but these elements will never be organized and mustered—independent of peace and

security—and the establishment of a civil society.

Security and Economic Development—are the two rails of our track toward the

future.

Better security paves the way for businesses and investment.

Businesses provide freedom with jobs, money for education and personal empowerment—and more opportunities for women.

We know where we want to be—and here is part of our strategy—our business

plan—to get there.

I have helped to create the Private Sector Development Task Force for Afghanistan. It is a

• Coalition of private companies, non-governmental organizations and volunteer

experts—dedicated to accelerating the development of a private enterprise-driven market economy in Afghanistan.

• The primary goal of the Task Force is to promote capacity building and institution building of the Afghan government and strengthen infrastructure.

• We are working with the Ministry of Justice to create laws that will protect private investment.

• We are setting up private banks.

• We are working with the U.S. Geological Survey and private energy companies

to explore our natural resources.

• We are bringing in the most recent and cost-effective telecommunications technologies—and a new license for a new wireless company was just recently let.

• And later this year, we will host an international trade show in Kabul and

YOU—are hereby invited to attend.

When you arrive, just tell them Ishaq sent you.

It will be good for top accommodations—not 4 star . . . yet. But . . . one with relative luxuries—a beautiful carpet on the floor—and reliable electric power.

In closing, I hope I have offered a useful assessment of where we are and where

we hope to go.

I must be candid—we are not there yet, by any means. And if the progress that

we have made in the past year or so is to continue, we will need help—financial

help, technical assistance, and a certain amount of patience.

But I will say again, should not be viewed as altruism by the U.S. or world community. The returns to the U.S. and global security will be commensurate with the

investment.

And I will also tell you that President Karzai and I are passionately determined

not to squander this moment in Afghanistan’s 4,000 year history.

Afghanistan has had enough political revolutions.

Afghanistan has been invaded and occupied by the armies of soldiers.

What we need today is to be occupied by a new benevolent kind of army: an army

of teachers, doctors, builders, farmers, civil engineers, merchants, bankers and public safety experts—and perhaps even a few lawyers.

The goal here is a jump-start. Not a permanent occupying force. And many of you

here in this room—are in many ways part of this benevolent army.

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We all need to make sure that the work undertaken on behalf of rebuilding Afghanistan is done in a manner which empowers the people of Afghanistan to take

matters into their own hands.

As the Afghan proverb says, ‘‘A river is made drop by drop.’’ Any great project,

any important human undertaking, takes time and requires a long-term commitment. Clearly, the rebuilding of Afghanistan after more than 20 years of war and

foreign occupation will take sustained effort and patience. And the timing is urgent.

Afghans are also a remarkably resilient people and a proud people—proud to

learn; proud to do a good job.

As Churchill wisely stated, ‘‘Give us the tools and we will get the job done.’’

Thank you for your attention. I would be most happy to take your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Ambassador. And I appreciate, as I think all members do, your programmatic suggestions at

the last, the five suggestions.

Let me ask, if I may, once again have a 7-minute round so that

all members can participate. I will start the clock on my questions

now.

Ambassador, in addition to the specific suggestions that you

made on the Freedom Support Act and ISAF, the construction activities through the President, the encouragement of many Afghans

who are here in the United States to offer their talents, maybe

their presence, you have made some profound statements in your

testimony that I just want to underline. The thought that you will

attempt to teach the children of Afghanistan something entirely

different, maybe opposite, to all that has been taught for years is

an extraordinary statement and, if possible, an extraordinary

achievement. But then you have illustrated that already the learning curve is substantial. Your comment that 50 percent of the public servants in Afghanistan now are women, reflects a remarkable

achievement in a very short period of time as you push uphill with

regard to the learning curve of the whole country, given the doctrine that, as you have pointed out, was a part of the teaching of

children and maybe some adults, too.

I was struck by the comment that 25 percent of your population

in fact as of the moment are refugees. In due course, each of these

persons will be settled and will become less refugee and more Afghan all the time. That is a remarkable transition in itself simply

in the population of the country, probably with more people on the

way. But the assimilation of these 2 million people, or 25 percent

of the population, is once again astonishing in this period of time.

I thought it was profound that you said you were starting with

a clean sheet of paper as you think about the governance of the

country, maybe about the fundamental ideals, quite apart from the

language of a constitutional framework that you are working with.

That is important. Some nations have tried that and not done well.

Things either lapsed back into an agenda that was already ingrained, or people could not be taught something new or move

ahead.

But nevertheless, up front as a representative of your country,

representing your President, you said, that is our status. Now, you

ask us to look at this not as a charitable offering, but as an investment in our security, our future, our interests and the rest of the

world, by describing your country as a part of a crescent that

brings together Asia and the Middle East, with Afghanistan right

in the middle.

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This reinforces some of our questioning of the last panel, that

this is not an Afghan specific situation. Your country is described

by those who do try to think of a business plan for the country as

a potential crossroads, in the event the transportation system

would be enhanced, the infrastructure be built, a place in fact

where a good number of countries could ship their goods and services, could in fact enrich not only your country but themselves, in

a degree of international trade that the area has never seen because of safety reasons or simply lack of infrastructure.

That gets to an important point. How will people in the country

make a living? How can the gross national product and the individual incomes of persons increase? So that is a quest of some, but

it is not a casual one. It almost once again has to be a crash program. The expectations of people as they discover the rest of the

world or as they become a crossroads likewise escalate to a point

well beyond that which you have experienced.

So all of this I simply say as one who has listened carefully and

I appreciate the thoughtfulness that accompanied the statement on

behalf of your country.

Now, my question normally would have been, OK, what can we

do? Now, you have offered five things and these are reasonable.

Even the ISAF augmentation to three times the 4,800, 4,900 people

would not appear in the whole scheme of things in the world to be

an outrageous item. As a matter of fact whether 1,500 people can

cover a country as large as your own and provide the degree of

safety—and Senator Biden has graphically described his own experiences in the country and others—I suppose is open to some question. But I will not quibble over that. It is a modest request, that

we fund the authorization that we have already described.

But I want to at least contemplate, just picking up again on my

colleague’s thought—really, the vision in terms of United States

policy. What should be our goal? If we had this hypothetical conversation with the President of the United States that we have

been talking about today—we are all addressing the President. He

is not here today, but maybe he will be to visit with us some time.

So as a result we are preparing for that conversation, and what we

want the President to suggest, because only he can coordinate ultimately. Our State Department, the Defense Department, the security people, the Commerce people, the NGOs, the whole lot come

and go from our contribution.

We are going to have to reorganize, I think, our own thoughts

about Afghanistan and how we respond to these challenges. But

can you offer us some vision of that sort? You are not constrained

by the fact that you are an employee of the Department of State

or the Department of Defense or reporting to anybody except the

President of Afghanistan. You are our guest today, at this open

hearing in which we are inquiring of you what the vision ought to

be or how we could better realize our own objectives for security

in the area, which has been a vacuum for a long time.

Can you respond at all to that inquiry?

Ambassador SHAHRYAR. Yes. Well, as a former businessman, Mr.

Chairman, I believe that economic development will bring stability

and security, and security brings stability, and stability brings democracy. So I suggest really an aggressive sort of Marshall Plan for

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Afghanistan’s reconstruction. I think that is most important. The

people of Afghanistan are expecting a great deal from the international forces, from the United States, to put them to work.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you and your experts flesh out such a plan?

I am not certain on our side we are able to for the moment. Maybe

you could.

Ambassador SHAHRYAR. I think, as I had mentioned in my testimony, Afghanistan is very rich in terms of natural resources. It has

oil, it has gas. There is already, I was told by the Minister of Mines

and Industry who was here, there is already in the north that the

former Soviet Union developed—it went up as far as about 1,000

meters down and found a lot of oil and gas, and that is capped up

now. That is needed to be piped into Kabul, and that alone was

worth about $7 billion.

To develop that further and do that, it will put a lot of people

to work. And also, investigate and map out the natural resources

in the south. We believe there is tremendous resources of oil and

gas in the south also.

Afghanistan is very rich in terms of minerals. Afghanistan has

the best copper, the best iron. It has coal. Afghanistan has tremendous resources of precious metals—emeralds, gold, lapis lazuli, and

many others, all of that to be in a rapid case to be started up and

developed.

I think a reform in agriculture would help a great deal to put

people back to work. Afghanistan always was an agroeconomy. I

believe that immediate, the next 18 months before the election— the concerns, what happens in the elections of extremists or others

take an advantage? I think if we can start an aggressive reform in

terms of putting people to work and bring some visible, tangible,

large-scale projects to Afghanistan such as the ‘‘ring road.;;

I believe that if we can put the Afghans to work—I believe the

jobs should be given to Afghans, not to others to come and do the

job for Afghanistan. I believe that there is hundreds, if not thousands, of factories that have been disabled during the war. I believe

that those factories should be put back, rehabilitated, and get them

started and put the Afghans to run them.

I believe that the free enterprise economy should be started in

Afghanistan and the private sector should be developed. I think the

idea of yours of the Enterprise Fund would probably help jumpstart all of these projects that we talk about.

So I emphasize a tremendous jump-start and an aggressive economic reconstruction for Afghanistan. I think that will not only

help to create jobs, it will demobilize the regional leaders, as we

call them. It will probably put all the people to work and bring security faster to the country than any other means.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you very much. I thank you for mentioning the Enterprise Fund, which was really your idea that I put

in the bill.

Ambassador SHAHRYAR. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The Enterprise Fund concept had good success in

Poland, and it can be an effective way to help build an economy.

You have an ambitious idea here for investment, and maybe most

Americans do not realize the possibilities for oil, gas, diamonds,

gems, minerals. But a lot of investment is required for extraction.

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Perhaps we can help you form the international partnership and

attract the expertise that you will require.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much.

Welcome, Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador SHAHRYAR. Thank you.

Senator BIDEN. One point I would make. Being an American citizen, having been an American citizen, you know that it would be

helpful if you acknowledge the altruism of the American people.

This idea of us not doing this for altruism—my folks back home do

not understand the other reasons. They think they are doing it to

help. So the extent that you are grateful for what is being done is

a useful thing, because they are not interested in helping any Islamic republic or State for any reason. So it is born out of some

altruism and it would be nice if you occasionally acknowledge that,

No. 1.

But No. 2, let us take the gas and oil that you said should be— that is worth several billion dollars and, quote, ‘‘piped into Kabul.’’ When I last had—and I occasionally, as you know, have spoken to

President Karzai, not only in person but on the phone to find out.

Last time I—and this is a stale conversation, but let us take the

practical problem of, assuming the economic investment is there to

develop the gas and oil in the north.

You have Dostum, you have General Atta, you have Fahim, who

is, I know, Defense Minister, but has another little hat he wears,

and you have Sayyaf, who is a very good friend of Mr. bin Laden’s,

all in the north, all competing for the affections and attention of

the people in the north. Tell me how you think, no matter how

much money got sent to the north, there would be a reasonable

prospect of being able to safely begin to develop those oil reserves,

which I strongly support us doing?

The reason I ask the question, so you do not think I am attempting to ‘‘mousetrap’’ you here, as we say, is that President Karzai

has always made the point to me: ‘‘Unless I can secure the area

first, there is no likelihood that the resources in the rest of my

country are going to be the province of or under the control of the

central government.’’ Maybe you could speak to that question for

me, specifically using the gas and oil as an example.

Ambassador SHAHRYAR. Well, Senator, your point is well taken.

As I have indicated, No. 1 is the security of the region. ISAF is

very, very important. Many businesses, oil companies or gas or

other businesses, in the United States I talked to, they do not dare

to go inside unless there is security. So my condition for developing

all of that, to give an incentive to push up and jump-start the ISAF

and increase the security of the country, while we can do all of

that.

Senator BIDEN. I think that is a very important point for you to

continue to make, because the President makes it to me every time

I see him. And I think it is a central and critical point in order to

be able to give people who are reluctant, whether they are members of the administration, Members of Congress, leading business

people in and out of the United States, in the region, and that is

that there is a prescription here, but it all rests upon the idea that

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opment initiatives can come in and feel they can operate without

finding themselves in the crosshairs of these competing interests in

the region, in whatever region we go into.

So it is not merely—and that has been one of my primary arguments with the administration when they tell me, ‘‘do not worry,

there is basically calm and peace,’’ quote unquote, in the region.

And I am going to be very hardhearted about this for a moment

to make a point. I am more concerned about the duct tape and the

plastic that is being sold in the stores today in Washington, DC,

and around the country than I am about making sure the human

rights of the people of Afghanistan are returned, although I think

I have demonstrated by my record I am very concerned about that.

And so it is very difficult for us to convince the administration,

at least the dominant view in the administration, and our colleagues—I should not say us. It is very difficult for me anyway to

convince them that we in fact should be taking a greater risk by

extending ourselves even more relative to Afghanistan, unless it

can be demonstrated that there is a direct correlation between our

failure to do that and the duct tape that is going up on people’s

windows here in the United States, or potentially.

So to the extent that you can make the argument—because you

are persuasive, you are a very successful businessman, you are an

Afghani by birth and now an Afghani by choice in terms of a citizen, but you made your fortune here in the United States, you

know how this place operates. To the extent that you are able to

connect the dots for people like that, I think it would be very helpful. I think it would be a very helpful point.

I know you are trying very hard to do that, but I want to reinforce the broad point you are making. When you talk about—what

is your impression—let me put it another way. The President of the

United States, not Chairman Lugar or Joe Biden or Chuck Hagel

or Paul Sarbanes, the President of the United States is the one

what used the phrase ‘‘Marshall Plan for Afghanistan.’’ I do not recall any of us using that phrase, and the President used that word

in talking to us privately and publicly as a nation, that we needed

a Marshall Plan, and he sent Colin Powell to a donor’s conference

in Japan immediately after the fall of the Taliban or very close to

thereafter, and a man who I have an inordinately high regard for,

the No. 2 man at the State Department, Secretary Armitage, came

back and he said that number for the next several years was about

$10 billion.

I thought it was closer to $19 billion, but about $10 billion. Now,

from your perspective, from Mr. Karzai’s perspective—and I realize

you are in a tough spot because you are here and you know you

have to convince the administration to stay the route, so you do not

want to be publicly criticizing anybody—not that you necessarily

would—because you are here, not with hat in hand, but with petition in pocket, and so it is kind of hard to, you know, to say some

things.

But to the extent you can with us, I would like to ask you, have

we from your perspective met our specific commitment under the

$10 billion umbrella that was—almost became the definition of a

Marshall Plan by the President, which I do not think is a Marshall

Plan. Have we met that commitment? And to what degree and with

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how much timeliness, have the other donor countries met their

commitment? If they have met it, tell us they have. If they have

not, why do you think they have not?

Would you speak to that for us, please.

Ambassador SHAHRYAR. Yes. Senator, thank you.

The United States has met its commitment. The United States

I think—the country, as you know, went through war, destruction,

and it was rubble for 23 years. Relatively speaking, tremendous

progress has been made, and this is due to the help and commitment of the United States of America.

We are grateful for that and the people of Afghanistan understand this, President Karzai understands it. I think we are extremely happy with the progress being made. But unfortunately

other donor countries have not made that commitment yet. And

Senator, if I knew the answer I would be doing something about

it. I do not know it.

Senator BIDEN. Is it your view that we have the ability—and I

am truly agnostic on this. I do not know the answer to this. Is it

your view that we have the ability to impact on their keeping their

commitment?

Ambassador SHAHRYAR. I believe so. I believe that if the administration and the Senate would persuade the donors why they have

not met their obligations, I think they would probably do something about it.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much.

Ambassador SHAHRYAR. And I like very much that effort that you

do on behalf of Afghanistan. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Biden.

Senator Coleman.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, I thank you very, very much for being here. It

is very clear that Afghanistan is just kind of on the tip of a precipice. Using your words, you have an opportunity to turn the nation

from a past filled with war and oppression to a future focused on

prosperity and democracy. Certainly the great challenge is to get

there. You have recognized that relationship. I think it is a very

critical relationship. You cannot have economic security without

national security.

Certainly we have talked today about a number of the challenges

to get that national security. The distinguished ranking member

before the earlier panel raised an issue about what has happened

to the Taliban, where are they today. We have got some sense of,

you know, they are on the run. I am interested in getting from you

an assessment of, as we focus on this issue of national security,

how are we doing? Have the Taliban, have they kind of melted

back into the general populace and do we run the threat of them

simply reappearing? Should there be any difficulties with the

Karzai administration?

Can you give me your best assessment of where we are at with

the Taliban today?

Ambassador SHAHRYAR. Well, again, in 1 year again, I look at everything as relative. Relatively, tremendous progress is being

made. And there are two types of Talibans, the moderate Talibans

and then the Talibans of extremist Talibans. I believe that some

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of the moderate Talibans have been incorporated into the public

and getting to become parts of the new Afghanistan, and hopefully

that will be working and hopefully that will be a process of inclusion and to make them to become a better citizen and working toward building a nation.

The extreme Talibans, I do not have enough statistics about it,

but hopefully that most of them are eliminated. But there are a

great deal or number of them are in the border States, as has been

discussed before. I believe that a number of them are in Pakistan

and they are still very active into causing problems within Afghanistan.

I also believe that the Government of President Musharraf has

been a courageous man joining the international community fighting against terrorism and Talibans and al-Qaedas, that needs to be

helped to sort of root out the remainder of the Talibans and alQaedas in the borders between Afghanistan and Pakistan. And I

think that is why, again, that we emphasize the increase of security and ISAF and that other part to sort of root out the rest of

them within Afghanistan.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Coleman.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Ambassador, I join my colleagues in welcoming you before the committee and also to thank you for the fine

work which you have been doing.

It would be helpful, I think, if you would sketch out for us the

steps ahead directed toward achieving political stability in Afghanistan. I gather there is a constitutional commission now at work

and if you could set out for us how that is progressing, how and

when the constitution will be put into place, and then what would

follow from that as we look ahead over the next year or two, I

think that would be a helpful entry for the record.

Ambassador SHAHRYAR. Yes. We are very grateful again to the

United States for helping to build the infrastructure of Afghanistan, the capacity of the institutions, and developing a country to

be a democratic Afghanistan. Based on that, President Karzai has

appointed commissions on the constitution. There is a commission

working on army and military forces and a commission working on

judiciary and commissioners working on women’s rights and commissions working on humanitarian, commissions are at work.

The commission on constitution—I had the honor to be part of

the Bonn conference—is based on the preliminary suggestions that

were made in the Bonn conference and the constitution to follow

that. The constitution is declaring a democratic Afghanistan, Afghanistan is for all Afghans, equal rights for men, women, freedom

of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of press.

Already, Mr. Senator, there is about 150 newspapers in Afghanistan, operating freely. There are many, many radio stations being

installed around Afghanistan and talking very freely. There are

women running for offices, women on the cabinet. So a great deal

of the beginning, the birth of democracy, is taking place in Afghanistan.

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That constitution that to my understanding was to be, the draft

was to be completed some time this month, but already it has been

ahead of itself. The draft has been completed in October, and is

being presented for discussing it and more evaluating it to come

out with a final draft. And hopefully the final draft of the constitution would be ready for the election to be submitted and approved

by the constituents.

Senator SARBANES. When do you expect that to happen?

Ambassador SHAHRYAR. Well, the next loya jirga election, general

election, is set for June 2004.

Senator SARBANES. Will the constitution be adopted before or

after the general election?

Ambassador SHAHRYAR. I think the constitution is going to be

preliminarily looked at, but then it would be submitted to the election body for approval.

Senator SARBANES. Now let me ask you this question. Are the

pressing needs which the population faces in Afghanistan being

met at a sufficient rate that their outlook for the future is one of

hope and optimism? Or are we falling short of responding quickly

and openly enough, so that their attitude is lapsing into one of pessimism?

Ambassador SHAHRYAR. Well, I was in Kabul last year and the

people that come from Afghanistan, they are telling me that the Afghanistan of today is an Afghanistan of hope, opportunities, and

challenges. The people are very much hopeful. The people feel very

good about what is happening. Eighty-five percent of Afghans are

supporting the Karzai Government. Eighty-five percent of the people in Afghanistan are supporting democracy and freedom. They

are sick and tired of fighting and wars and destruction.

So there is a tremendous atmosphere of hope and opportunity

among the people. And they all say that, we see the light in the

tunnel. They are all very hopeful for a good future.

But we need to aggressively create jobs and employment for

them. There is still poverty in the country. People have no jobs.

People have no place to stay. So I suggested the projects such as

the ‘‘ring road’’ aggressively should be pursued and aggressively be

put to action, and other jobs should be created, projects, to create

many jobs.

I think special funding for the agroeconomy should be allocated

to start the agriculture. A lot of Afghans are farmers, and get them

started on that.

So that is what the people are very hopeful on. If we can be able

to provide that, to put those people to work, I think it will go a long

way.

Senator SARBANES. In the agricultural sector primarily. What

about the housing——

Ambassador SHAHRYAR. Mostly agriculture, and others also.

Senator SARBANES. What about the housing issue? There was a

story recently in the New York Times about that.

Ambassador SHAHRYAR. Well, absolutely the cities that I saw,

Kabul is totally down to rubble. So I think the housing issue is a

very important project and is taking place now. Many homes are

being built. People are building homes, people are building roads

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in their neighborhoods. So the housing project has been started and

needs to be aggressively moved forward.

Senator SARBANES. What are the projects that you would put at

the top of the list that, if a renewed effort were to be made, should

be moved forward quickly as a very visible demonstration to the Afghan people that this is really going to be a real departure from

the past and a new start for Afghanistan?

Ambassador SHAHRYAR. Restoration of the disabled factories and

businesses in Afghanistan that put a lot of people to work, No. 1.

Building more roads and construction and building homes and

highways are second or in the same category. Building airports

and, most importantly, building the energy capacity. The electrical

power plants were destroyed, need to be restored. So these kind of

projects to put electricity and energy back, and communications

and telecommunications, restoration of all these projects would be

very much helpful to get things started.

Senator SARBANES. Well, good. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes.

Senator Biden, do you have a final comment?

Senator BIDEN. I just have one, not a comment, one closing question if I may.

Mr. Ambassador, can you give us a sense of—I was going to say

how confident; that is the wrong way to phrase it—your and President Karzai’s most optimistic assessment of when he would be in

a position to have a military that had some actual capacity, if need

be, to secure anything from highways to gubernatorial provinces if

need be, that he would have confidence in?

How far out is that?

Ambassador SHAHRYAR. Well, it is very hard to quantify the timing of it. The process has been started and 2,000, 3,000 armies or

10,000 up to, to my estimation if I am correct on that, has been

a great deal of progress in the time it has been started.

I think the problem that I was trying to find out, what is it to

jump-start this and aggressively train them is recruitment. And

earlier was mentioned that if you pay more; I think you will have

probably more quality people come forward and take the job. So if

that kind of allocation will be made for increasing their salaries,

I think you will see more people volunteer to come.

Senator BIDEN. One of the things that I will respectfully suggest

that I found last year when I spent so much time with President

Karzai, I asked him to do something and he initially thought that

I was—that maybe it was a little bit too, I do not know, too precise.

But his brother was with him, who is a Maryland citizen——

Senator SARBANES. And a constituent of mine.

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. And a constituent, a Baltimore restaurant owner. And I remember him sitting in the room with us

and turning to his brother and saying: ‘‘This is a good idea; you

ought to do this.’’ And what I asked was specifically, not generally,

what his most urgent need was. And he said—he gave me a general answer about administrative facilities, meaning buildings that

you could occupy, electricity you could turn on.

I said, can you be more precise, to make a point? And he then

began to get down to specifics. A gentleman walked in who worked

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for the President—I mean worked for the executive, maybe not personally for the President—and he said, ‘‘For example, I am going

to lose the man who just brought in these papers for me because

I cannot pay him and because he does not have what is the equivalent of a computer terminal or even an old typewriter.’’ And I met with the Minister of Women’s Affairs, a woman, who

said—I asked what she needed and she said, ‘‘I need a desk.’’ I

mean, she was not being facetious. She needed a desk.

So I came back and we talked about what that immediate need

was and it was about—what was the actual number? Was it $20

million? About $20 million that was needed just to keep the lights

on, if you will. And literally, as we were talking the lights flickered

on and off in the President’s office.

So I came back and I went to a guy I like dealing with very much

because he gets things done. I went to the Assistant Secretary of

State—the Deputy Secretary.

Senator SARBANES. Armitage.

Senator BIDEN. Armitage.

The CHAIRMAN. Deputy.

Senator BIDEN. Deputy. And I said, this is what we need. And

he said, ‘‘Well, we do not have the money.’’ I said, No, there is a

thing in your Department where you have this fund that you can

use. So he immediately released $20 million. I got a note and a call

from the President saying it was transforming, it had immediate

impact.

The reason I bother to tell you that is this. To the extent that

you can—and the President is coming to see us.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator BIDEN. To the extent that you can advise him about

what—not even asking for a specific amount, what specific things

that are totally able to be digested by our colleagues, myself included, that are, to use American slang, ‘‘bite-sized,’’ that would

make a difference. Case in point?

Ambassador SHAHRYAR. I would say one case in point would be, ‘‘bite-sized’’ as you mention it, is that all the funding and all the

money to be channeled through Karzai himself.

Senator BIDEN. Well, see, that I totally agree with you on that.

But that is a programmatic, that is a policy decision we have been

having trouble getting the administration to sign on.

Let me be more specific. The American people understand that,

because we have told them, you have told them, everyone has told

them, that very conservative elements of Islam, particularly

Wahabi in origin, out of primarily Saudi Arabia, over the past

years have built roughly 7,000 madrassas in parts of Afghanistan

and in Pakistan. We spent some time, Dr. Blank and I spent some

time, and got a very hard number and checked it out with your

people at the department of education as well, whatever you exactly call it.

You can build a school in Afghanistan that will house warmly

and cleanly boys and girls, teach them reading, writing, arithmetic,

and hire competent teachers, because you have this plethora of

women qualified to teach—and by the way, the 50 percent of the

women in the bureaucracy, 50 percent of the bureaucracy are

women, most of those are teachers and they are not employed. You

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are not paying them. There are no schools for them to go to. So it

is a bit of an exaggeration on your part to talk. It shows intent.

It shows that you are open to, that you are committed to a society

that includes women. But they are not working. So we actually worked up some figures. It costs $20,000 to build

from scratch and operate an Afghani school. I think you should be

coming back to us and saying things like: Build us 1,000 or 5,000

or 10,000 schools now and here is where I would build them. I

promise you, as somebody who sat here for 30 years, we can get

you that money. We can get you that money, because it is virtually

impossible for anybody, including the administration, to say ‘‘no,

we will not support that.’’ So the irony is the more you are able to, in addition to your macroeconomic requirements and fiscal requirements for the government and the country as a whole, to the extent that you can pinpoint for us, particularly as an American who understands what

appeals to Americans’ hearts, interests, and desires, I think we can

be of some immediate help beyond what is already occurring, that

in fact might have some cumulative impact on your ability to do

what you are going to have to do, is show progress.

The irony is the burden is on you to show progress. The irony

is we are not giving, the world is not giving you all the tools you

need to be able to demonstrate progress, and so you are going to

be held accountable to a standard that we imposed but did not help

apply.

So that is unsolicited advice as your unpaid counsel. But I promise you—— Ambassador SHAHRYAR. Thank you.

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. I promise you it is worth the effort.

As they say, trust me. I may not know much about a little—about

foreign policy. I have a little bit of knowledge of politics, and it

would be a very useful thing, I suggest. Schools are a single example. I am not suggesting anything beyond that.

You, you decide what those needs are. To the extent that the

President can come giving illustrations to the American people and

the administration, I think it may be helpful.

Ambassador SHAHRYAR. Thank you, Mr. Senator. The 50 percent

I said, you are right, was intention.

Senator BIDEN. Yes. I was not implying you were trying to mislead us. I was just trying to make the point.

Ambassador SHAHRYAR. But your point is well taken and I will

be happy when I come with President Karzai to visit you, I will

give you a shopping list for what is to be done. But you have to

remember——

Senator BIDEN. Well, again, I would be like my daughter, not my

son. My daughter is smart enough to give a list she knows I can

fulfill. So I would not overdo it, but I would come with some specifics.

I really mean it, seriously. I think you will find you will get some

help. Our friend Senator Coleman is an extremely qualified guy,

new to this committee, new to the Senate. I will bet you a thousand

dollars there is no way as mayor he could have known that. To

build 1,000 schools at $20,000 a school, if he could do that in Minneapolis-St. Paul area he would have done it.

67

So my point is this is doable, this is doable, and I think you

might find you get some support.

Ambassador SHAHRYAR. We would be happy to do that. Thank

you very much, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Coleman, do you have any comment

about that?

Senator COLEMAN. Former mayors understand the importance of

doable, doable. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank all Senators. Let me just mention that

President Karzai will be with us on February 26, Wednesday, February 26. So we are looking forward to that.

As you have observed, Senator Biden is a consultant in addition

to a great United States Senator, and this process of a hearing

today has turned into much more of a consultation, but that is constructive and we appreciate that.

I would just add that, with the school idea, I would suspect there

are many people in the United States that would perhaps give the

money to dedicate a school.

Ambassador SHAHRYAR. Absolutely.

Senator BIDEN. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. It is something that unites the people, and I

think Senator Biden’s political judgment is, as usual, impeccable

with regard to that.

Let me also mention to committee members that we will have

the distinguished President of Ecuador, Lucio Gutierrez, with us

this afternoon at 3 o’clock in S–116. So we look forward to this distinguished new leader in Latin America, an opportunity to visit privately with him.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

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