THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD ...................................................................................................................................................................... 1 

CHAPTER ONE: KATRINA IN PERSPECTIVE...................................................................................................................... 5 

CHAPTER TWO: NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS — A PRIMER............................................................................................ 11 

CHAPTER THREE: HURRICANE KATRINA — PRE-LANDFALL........................................................................................ 21 

CHAPTER FOUR: A WEEK OF CRISIS — AUGUST 29 – SEPTEMBER 5 ........................................................................... 33 

CHAPTER FIVE: LESSONS LEARNED .............................................................................................................................. 51 

CHAPTER SIX: TRANSFORMING NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS.......................................................................................... 65 

CHAPTER SEVEN: EPILOGUE ......................................................................................................................................... 83 

APPENDICES................................................................................................................................................................... 85 

Appendix A – Recommendations .................................................................................................................. 87 

Appendix B – What Went Right .................................................................................................................. 125 

Appendix C – List of Acronyms .................................................................................................................. 145 

Appendix D – Staff Page.............................................................................................................................. 149 

Appendix E – Endnotes................................................................................................................................ 151 

THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 

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FOREWORD 

On August 23, 2005, Hurricane Katrina formed as a tropical storm off the coast of the Bahamas. Over the next 

seven days, the tropical storm grew into a catastrophic hurricane that made landfall first in Florida and then along 

the Gulf Coast in Mississippi, Louisiana, and Alabama, leaving a trail of heartbreaking devastation and human 

suffering. Katrina wreaked staggering physical destruction along its path, flooded the historic city of New Orleans, 

ultimately killed over 1,300 people, and became the most destructive natural disaster in American history. 

Awakening to reports of Katrina’s landfall on the Gulf Coast the morning of Monday, August 29, American citizens 

watched events unfold with an initial curiosity that soon turned to concern and sorrow. The awe that viewers held 

for the sheer ferocity of nature was soon matched with disappointment and frustration at the seeming inability of the 

“government”—local, State, and Federal—to respond effectively to the crisis. Hurricane Katrina and the subsequent 

sustained flooding of New Orleans exposed significant flaws in Federal, State, and local preparedness for 

catastrophic events and our capacity to respond to them. Emergency plans at all levels of government, from small 

town plans to the 600-page National Response Plan—the Federal government’s plan to coordinate all its 

departments and agencies and integrate them with State, local, and private sector partners—were put to the ultimate 

test, and came up short. Millions of Americans were reminded of the need to protect themselves and their families. 

Even as parts of New Orleans were still under water, President Bush spoke to the Nation from the city’s historic 

Jackson Square. He stated unequivocally, that “[f]our years after the frightening experience of September the 11th, 

Americans have every right to expect a more effective response in a time of emergency. When the federal 

government fails to meet such an obligation, I, as President, am responsible for the problem, and for the solution.”1

 

In his address, the President ordered a comprehensive review of the Federal response to Hurricane Katrina so we as 

a Nation could make the necessary changes to be “better prepared for any challenge of nature or act of evil men that 

could threaten our people.”2

 The President’s charge has resulted in the material and conclusions of this Report—

The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned. 

WHAT WENT WRONG 

In general terms, the challenges to our collective response to Hurricane Katrina are not difficult to identify. 

Hurricane Katrina, its 115-130 mph winds, and the accompanying storm surge it created as high as 27 feet along a 

stretch of the Northern Gulf Coast from Mobile, Alabama, to New Orleans, impacted nearly 93,000 square miles of 

our Nation—roughly an area the size of Great Britain. The disaster was not isolated to one town or city, or even one 

State. Individual local and State plans, as well as relatively new plans created by the Federal government since the 

terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, failed to adequately account for widespread or simultaneous catastrophes. 

We were confronted by the pictures of destroyed towns and cities, each with their own needs. Smaller cities like 

Waveland, Mississippi, were completely devastated by Hurricane Katrina and required smaller scale yet immediate 

search and rescue efforts as well as large volumes of life saving and sustaining commodities. New Orleans, the 

largest affected city—which dominated much of what Americans saw on their televisions—suffered first from the 

initial impact of Katrina and then from the subsequent flood caused by breaches in its 350 mile levee system. Over 
FOREWORD

THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 

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an estimated eighteen-hour period, approximately 80 percent of the city flooded with six to twenty feet of water, 

necessitating one of the largest search and rescue operations in our Nation’s history. 

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 

The President made clear that we must do better in the future. The objective of this Report is to identify and 

establish a roadmap on how to do that, and lay the groundwork for transforming how this Nation—from every level 

of government to the private sector to individual citizens and communities—pursues a real and lasting vision of 

preparedness. To get there will require significant change to the status quo, to include adjustments to policy, 

structure, and mindset. 

While the Report notes that disaster preparedness and response to most incidents remains a State and local 

responsibility, this review did not include an assessment of State and local responses. The President specifically 

requested that we review the response of the Federal government. Where actions at the State and local level had 

bearing on Federal decisions or operations, they are included in order to provide full context. We note that although 

incident response remains a State and local responsibility, we must strengthen Federal support for their efforts and 

be better prepared for the Federal response to a catastrophic event. Furthermore, we were mindful of how simple 

and lucid a situation can appear with the clarity of hindsight. And so, judging in retrospect the decisions made and 

actions taken in the midst of a major disaster, without consideration of that fuller context, would have been a 

disservice to all. The scope of the review did not focus on recovery operations that continue to this day. Those 

important efforts are ongoing and require our continued commitment. Instead, the review’s emphasis centers on 

identifying systemic vulnerabilities and gaps in our response and “fixing government.” 

The Report is organized in a manner to give the reader the most comprehensive and clear understanding possible of 

what happened during the Federal response to Hurricane Katrina. It begins with a discussion of the magnitude and 

complexity of the response challenge by discussing “Katrina in Perspective”—providing an historical comparison 

both of the hurricane itself and the resultant flood. Only by understanding what the storm was, and was not, can an 

appropriate and measured assessment of the response take place. A National Preparedness “Primer” on the current 

Federal framework is then provided to give the reader an understanding of how the current system was supposed to 

function. This chapter points out some fundamental confusion in the Federal planning and identifies potential 

shortcomings in the applicability of our plans to catastrophic widespread incidents. 

Two major chapters of the Report follow with an analytical, narrative chronology that provides a detailed account of 

Hurricane Katrina. The first discusses the storm’s development in the days “Pre-Landfall,” and the next chronicles 

both the “Week of Crisis” from August 29 through September 5, and concludes with the transition from response to 

recovery. We note for the reader that the narrative is not meant to be a comprehensive, definitive account of all that 

transpired, and future information inevitably will shed additional light. We then present a detailed chapter on 

“Lessons Learned.” Here, we describe the seventeen most critical challenges that were problematic before, during, 

and after Hurricane Katrina’s landfall. 

We conclude with the most important chapter: “Transforming National Preparedness.” It describes the imperative 

and remedies for fixing the problems that Hurricane Katrina exposed. The foundations of the recommended reforms 

result in two immediate priorities: We must institutionalize a comprehensive National Preparedness System and 

concurrently foster a new, robust Culture of Preparedness. 

The Report also contains several appendices, including 125 specific recommendations distilled from a four-month 

review. These recommendations are written for policy makers and emergency managers and contain more technical 

information not appropriate for the narrative. We have also included some stories of successes and heroic efforts we 

encountered by responders, volunteers, agencies, and public officials that must not be overlooked. 

CONCLUSION 

During a visit to the Gulf Coast, President Bush put our efforts in perspective, saying, “[o]ne of the lessons of this 

storm is the decency of people, the decency of men and women who care a lot about their fellow citizens, whether 

they be elected officials or just folks on the ground...trying to make somebody else’s life even better than it was 
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THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 

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before. So we learned some lessons about how to respond, and we’re going to change. But some of the lessons 

shouldn’t change, and that is the decency and character of the American people.” 

Hurricane Katrina prompted an extraordinary national response that included all levels of government—Federal, 

State, and local—the private sector, faith-based and charitable organizations, foreign countries, and individual 

citizens. People and resources rushed to the Gulf Coast region to aid the emergency response and meet victims’ 

needs. Their actions saved lives and provided critical assistance to Hurricane Katrina survivors. Despite these 

efforts, the response to Hurricane Katrina fell far short of the seamless, coordinated effort that had been envisioned 

by President Bush when he ordered the creation of a National Response Plan in February 2003.3

Yet Katrina creates an opportunity—indeed an imperative—for a national dialogue about true national preparedness, 

especially as it pertains to catastrophic events. We are not as prepared as we need to be at all levels within the 

country: Federal, State, local, and individual. Hurricane Katrina obligates us to re-examine how we are organized 

and resourced to address the full range of catastrophic events—both natural and man-made. The storm and its 

aftermath provide us with the mandate to design and build such a system. 

We hope that this Report marks the beginning of a truly transformational state of preparedness throughout all levels 

of our Nation. Hurricane Katrina will undoubtedly be regarded by history as one of the most destructive, costly, and 

tragic events our Nation has ever endured. Yet with collective determination, unity of effort, and effective 

organizational change, the true legacy of Katrina can be that of a catalyst that triggered a real and lasting 

improvement to our national preparedness. 

THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 

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CHAPTER ONE: KATRINA IN PERSPECTIVE

Hurricane Katrina was one of the worst natural disasters in our Nation’s history and has caused unimaginable 

devastation and heartbreak throughout the Gulf Coast Region. A vast coastline of towns and communities has 

been decimated.

—President George W. Bush, September 8, 20051

Terrorists still plot their evil deeds, and nature’s unyielding power will continue. We know with certainty that there 

will be tragedies in our future. Our obligation is to work to prevent the acts of evil men; reduce America’s 

vulnerability to both the acts of terrorists and the wrath of nature; and prepare ourselves to respond to and recover 

from the man-made and natural catastrophes that do occur. The magnitude of Hurricane Katrina does not excuse our 

inadequate preparedness and response, but rather it must serve as a catalyst for far-reaching reform and 

transformation. To do this, we must understand Hurricane Katrina in its proper context. 

HURRICANE KATRINA AMONG OTHER DISASTERS 

Hurricane Katrina was the most destructive natural disaster in U.S. history.2

 The overall destruction wrought by 

Hurricane Katrina, which was both a large and powerful hurricane as well as a catastrophic flood, vastly exceeded 

that of any other major disaster, such as the Chicago Fire of 1871, the San Francisco Earthquake and Fire of 1906, 

and Hurricane Andrew in 1992.3

 

Hurricane Katrina’s devastating effects were felt before the storm even reached the Gulf Coast on August 29, 2005. 

In the Gulf of Mexico, Hurricane Katrina battered the offshore energy infrastructure and forced the evacuation of 

more than 75 percent of the Gulf’s 819 manned oil platforms.4

 Two days before landfall, U.S. energy companies 

estimated that the approaching storm had already reduced Gulf of Mexico oil production by more than a third.5

 

Seventy-five hurricanes of Katrina’s strength at landfall—a Category 3—have hit the mainland United States since 

1851, roughly once every two years.6

 Yet Katrina was anything but a “normal” hurricane. First, Katrina was larger 

than most. Hurricane Camille, a Category 5 storm that devastated the Gulf Coast in 1969,7

 had top wind speeds that 

exceeded those of Katrina upon landfall, but Camille’s hurricane force winds only extended seventy-five miles from 

its center,8

 whereas Katrina’s extended 103 miles from its center.9 As a result, Hurricane Katrina’s storm surge 

affected a larger area than did Hurricane Camille’s.10 In all, Hurricane Katrina impacted nearly 93,000 square miles 

across 138 parishes and counties.11 The extreme intensity that Hurricane Katrina reached before landfall on the Gulf 

Coast, as well as its size, meant that its storm surge was consistent with a more powerful storm. In fact, the National 

Hurricane Center concluded that the height of Hurricane Katrina and Camille’s respective storm surges were 

comparable to each other.12 
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THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED

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Hurricane Katrina’s winds and a storm surge that crested up to twenty-seven feet high dealt a ferocious blow to

homes, businesses, and property on the coast and for many miles inland.13 This storm surge overwhelmed levees all

along the lowest reaches of the Mississippi River and the edges of Lake Pontchartrain.14 The consequences for New

Orleans, which sits mostly below sea level, were dire. Significant levee failures occurred on the 17th Street Canal,

the Industrial Canal, and the London Avenue Canal. Approximately 80 percent of the city was flooded.15

The flooding destroyed New Orleans, the Nation’s thirty-fifth largest city.16 Much as the fire that burned Chicago in

1871 and the earthquake and fire that leveled San Francisco in 1906 destroyed the economic and cultural centers of

an entire region, so too did Hurricane Katrina destroy what many considered to be the heart of the Gulf Coast. The

destruction also called to mind the Galveston Hurricane of 1900, which thoroughly devastated the town of

Galveston, Texas. At the time, Galveston was an economic and cultural center of Texas and was the State’s fourth

largest city.17

Even beyond New Orleans, Katrina’s span of destruction was widespread. Indeed, one of the gravest challenges

presented by this particular disaster was the vast geographic distribution of the damage. Towns and cities, small and

large, were destroyed or heavily damaged up and down the Gulf Coast and miles inland. From Morgan City,

Louisiana, to Biloxi, Mississippi, to Mobile, Alabama, Hurricane Katrina’s wind, rain, and storm surge demolished

homes and businesses. Large parts of the coastal areas of these States were devastated. As Mississippi Governor

Haley Barbour stated, “The 80 miles across the Mississippi Gulf Coast is largely destroyed. A town like Waveland,

Mississippi, has no inhabitable structures—none.”18

Hurricane Katrina contradicts one side of an important two-part trend. For at least a century, America’s most severe

natural disasters have become steadily less deadly and more destructive of property (adjusted for inflation).19 Figure

1.1 depicts this trend. Yet, Hurricane Katrina not only damaged far more property than any previous natural

disaster, it was also the deadliest natural disaster in the United States since Hurricane San Felipe in 1928. The dark

blue bars in the figure below show the decreasing number of deaths caused by natural disasters in the period from

1900 – 2005. The light blue bars show the increasing amount of damage caused by these same natural disasters

adjusted to third quarter 2005 dollars.20

Figure 1.1 U.S. Natural Disasters that Caused the Most Death and Damage to Property in Each Decade,

1900-2005, with 2004 Major Hurricanes Added21Damage in Third Quarter 2005 Dollars

Damage

$100 B

$90 B

$80 B

$70 B

$60 B

$50 B

$40 B

$30 B

$20 B

$10 B

10,000

9,000

8,000

7,000

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

1900 1906 1919 1927 1928 1938 1944 1955 1957 1965 1969 1972 1989 1992 1993 2004 2005

Galveston

Hurricane

Atlantic-Gulf

Hurricane Mississippi

Floods

Hurricane San

Felipe and

Okeechobee Flood

New England

Hurricane Northeast

Hurricane

Hurricane

Audrey

Hurricane

Betsy Hurricane

Camille

Hurricane

Agnes

Hurricane

Hugo

Hurricane

Andrew

East Coast

Blizzard

2004 Major

Hurricanes (Charley,

Frances, Ivan,

Jeanne)

Hurricane

Katrina

Hurricane

Diane

San Francisco

Earthquake and

Fire

Deaths
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MEASURING HURRICANE KATRINA: THE PATH OF DESTRUCTION

Estimating disaster damage is not an exact science, and, in the case of Hurricane Katrina, it is further complicated by

ongoing recovery efforts. Estimates vary but, considering property damage alone, Hurricane Katrina is America’s

first disaster—natural or man-made—to approach the $100 billion mark (See Table 1.1).22

Table 1.1 Estimated damage from Hurricane Katrina and the New Orleans Flood23

Housing $67 billion

Consumer durable goods $7 billion

Business property $20 billion

Government property $3 billion

Total $96 billion

Hurricane Katrina devastated far more residential property than had any other recent hurricane, completely

destroying or making uninhabitable an estimated 300,000 homes.24

This far surpasses the residential damage of Hurricane Andrew, which destroyed or damaged approximately 80,000

homes in 1992.25 It even exceeds the combined damage of the four major 2004 hurricanes, Charley, Frances, Ivan,

and Jeanne, which together destroyed or damaged approximately 85,000 homes.26 Figure 1.2 charts the effects of

Hurricane Katrina against other major hurricanes in recent U.S. history, comparing homes damaged or destroyed,

property damage, and deaths.

Figure 1.2: Hurricane Katrina Compared to Hurricanes Ivan, Andrew, and Camille27

300,000

Homes

27,772

Homes

79,663

Homes

22,008

Homes

$14.5 Billion

$96

Billion

61

Deaths

57

Deaths

335

Deaths

1,330

Deaths

$33

Billion

$6

Billion

Homes Damaged or Destroyed Property Damage Deaths

Camille (1969) Andrew (1992) Ivan (2004)

Katrina (2005)
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THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 

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Hurricane Katrina’s damage was extensive. The storm destroyed so many homes, buildings, forests, and green 

spaces that an extraordinary amount of debris was left behind—118 million cubic yards all told.28 In comparison, 

Hurricane Andrew created 20 million cubic yards of debris.29 The debris from Katrina, if stacked onto the space of a 

football field, would reach over ten and a half miles high.30 

Hurricane Katrina’s effects on the economy have yet to be fully reckoned. The worst consequences were local: 

between August and September, the unemployment rate doubled from 6 to 12 percent in the most affected areas of 

Louisiana and Mississippi.31 In Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, salaries and wages fell by an estimated $1.2 

billion in the third quarter of 2005.32 But short-term, economic ripples reached the entire country through the rising 

cost of gasoline. The approach of the storm forced the temporary shutdown of most crude oil and natural gas 

production in the Gulf of Mexico. In the immediate wake of Hurricane Katrina, gasoline prices rose sharply 

nationwide.33 The combined effects of Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita, which made landfall on the border 

between Texas and Louisiana early on September 24, 2005, were such that, between August 26, 2005, and January 

11, 2006, 114 million barrels of oil production capacity were left unused, equivalent to over one-fifth of yearly 

output in the Gulf of Mexico.34

The storm devastated the regional power infrastructure. In Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, approximately 2.5 

million power customers reported outages.35 By contrast, Hurricane Ivan denied 1.8 million customers power.36 

Communications suffered as well. The storm crippled thirty-eight 911 call centers, disrupting local emergency 

services,37 and knocked out more than 3 million customer phone lines in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama.38 

Broadcast communications were likewise severely affected, as 50 percent of area radio stations and 44 percent of 

area television stations went off the air.39

Much more than any other hurricane, Katrina’s wrath went far beyond wind and water damage. In fact, Hurricane 

Katrina caused at least ten oil spills, releasing the same quantity of oil as some of the worst oil spills in U.S. history. 

Louisiana reported at least six major spills of over 100,000 gallons and four medium spills of over 10,000 gallons.40 

All told, more than 7.4 million gallons poured into the Gulf Coast region’s waterways, over two thirds of the amount 

that spilled out during America’s worst oil disaster, the rupturing of the Exxon Valdez tanker off the Alaskan coast in 

1989.41

The wave of destruction created environmental and health hazards across the affected region, including standing 

water, oil pollution, sewage, household and industrial chemicals, and both human and animal remains. The storm 

surge struck 466 facilities that handle large amounts of dangerous chemicals, thirty-one hazardous waste sites, and 

sixteen Superfund toxic waste sites, three of which flooded. The surge also destroyed or compromised 170 drinking 

water facilities and dozens of wastewater treatment facilities.42

Most terrible of all and most difficult to measure, however, were Hurricane Katrina’s human effects. 

MEASURING THE IMMEASURABLE: THE HUMAN TOLL 

When the winds and floods of Hurricane Katrina subsided, an estimated 1,330 people were dead as a result of the 

storm.43 The vast majority of the fatalities—an estimated 80 percent—came from the New Orleans metropolitan 

area; Mississippi suffered greatly as well, with 231 fatalities.44 Many of the dead were elderly or infirm. In 

Louisiana, approximately 71 percent of the victims were older than sixty, and 47 percent of those were over seventyfive.45 At least sixty-eight were found in nursing homes, some of whom were allegedly abandoned by their 

caretakers.46 Of the total known fatalities, there are almost two hundred unclaimed bodies remaining at the Victim 

Identification Center in Carville, Louisiana.47 As awful as these horrifying statistics are, unfortunately they are not 

the end of the story. As of February 17, 2006, there were still 2,096 people from the Gulf Coast area reported 

missing.48 

For the survivors, the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina has been characterized by a mixture of grief, anxiety, and 

frustration. Around 770,000 people were displaced—the largest since the Dust Bowl migration from the southern 

Great Plains region in the 1930s.49 After Hurricane Katrina, housing options often arrived slowly to those who 

could not return to their ruined homes; by the end of October, there were still more than 4,500 people staying in 
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shelters. The numbers of evacuees residing in such transient emergency shelters had dropped significantly by 

January 2006, and families have slowly begun to find permanent housing.50 

Moreover, many victims found it difficult to reconstruct their shattered lives. In many cases, they had either lost or 

forgotten basic documents, such as insurance information, birth certificates, and marriage licenses, which would 

later prove essential to rebuilding their lives.51 Most of the evacuees did not have access to their medical records, 

which increased the risk of complications when receiving medical treatment.52 For those who returned to their 

homes in the Gulf region, basic services were still wanting. By January, 85 percent of public schools in Orleans 

parish had still not reopened; in the metropolitan area, approximately two-thirds of the retail food establishments, 

half of the bus routes, and half of the major hospitals remained closed.53 For Katrina’s victims, a sense of “back to 

normal” still seems far away. 

Of the 1.1 million people over the age of sixteen who evacuated in August 2005, approximately 500,000 of those 

evacuees had not returned home by late December. For the evacuees who have not returned to their homes, jobs 

have been scarce. Their unemployment rate was just below 28 percent in November and over 20 percent in 

December. The former evacuees who did return to their homes in the Gulf region had better access to work with an 

unemployment rate of 12.5 percent in November, which fell to 5.6 percent in December.54 In July, before Katrina 

hit, the unemployment rate in the most affected areas of Louisiana and Mississippi had been 6 percent.55 

By any measure, Hurricane Katrina was a national catastrophe. Similar to the images of grief and destruction on 

September 11, 2001, the images of suffering and despair from Hurricane Katrina are forever seared into the hearts 

and memories of all Americans. Those painful images must be the catalyst for change. 

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CHAPTER TWO: NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS — A PRIMER 

Disaster response in America traditionally has been handled by State and local governments, with the Federal 

government playing a supporting role. Limits on the Federal government’s role in disaster response are deeply 

rooted in American tradition. State and local governments—who know the unique requirements of their citizens and 

geography and are best positioned to respond to incidents in their own jurisdictions—will always play a large role in 

disaster response. The Federal government’s supporting role respects these practical points and the sovereignty of 

the States as well as the power of governors to direct activities and coordinate efforts within their States. While we 

remain faithful to basic constitutional doctrine and time tested principles, we must likewise accept that events such 

as Hurricane Katrina and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, require us to tailor the application of these 

principles to the threats we confront in the 21st Century. In later chapters, as we discuss the breakdowns in 

delivering Federal support and capabilities in response to Hurricane Katrina, the need for a flexible Federal response 

and a larger Federal role in catastrophic contingency planning becomes clear.1

FEDERALISM 

The Founders created a constitutional framework in which each State, upon ratification of the Constitution, ceded 

some of its powers to the Federal government to create one united yet limited central government.2

 The Constitution 

sets forth the specific and delegated powers that delineate Federal and State roles. It tells us which branches and 

offices will be part of the Federal government, what powers they may exercise, and what limitations constrain 

them.3

 The Constitution also respects State powers by reserving those powers not given to the Federal government 

to the States or to the people.4

 Our Federal system provides a structure to enable coordination between the United 

States government and State governments to create a balance that respects the sovereignty of both entities. 

The United States has long operated on the general premise that governments exist to do those things that 

individuals, alone or in free and voluntary association (e.g., families and charities), are not best positioned to do for 

themselves, such as ensuring public safety and providing law enforcement. Following these principles, the Founders 

created the Federal government to do those things that States cannot or should not do individually, such as defending 

the Nation, conducting foreign relations, and ensuring open and free interstate commerce.5

 

Accordingly, State and local governments assume the first and foremost line of defense against civil disturbance and 

threats to public safety. The Federal government guarantees its assistance to protect the States in their existence as 

representative republican governments from the external threat of invasion or attack, and against internal subversion 

or rebellion.6

 Federal laws reinforce the concept that the Federal government should respect State sovereignty. For 

example, section 331 of the Insurrection Act requires the State legislature or, in its absence, the State governor, to 

make a formal request of the Federal government before the President may send in Federal troops to assist State 

efforts to restore order.7

 

The role of the Federal government in disaster response has evolved significantly throughout the past 200 years.8

 In 

1803, in what is widely seen as the first instance of Federal intervention in a disaster scenario, Congress approved 

the use of Federal resources to assist the recovery of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, following a devastating urban 

fire.9

 Between 1803 and 1950, the Federal government intervened in over 100 incidents (earthquakes, fires, floods, 

and tornados), making Federal resources available to affected jurisdictions.10 These interventions were limited and 

were delivered in an ad hoc manner without an established Federal role or coordinated response plan.11 The Federal 
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government also quickly recognized the role that private non-profit organizations can play. In 1905, Congress 

chartered the American Red Cross as a charitable organization to provide disaster relief support during crises. The 

value of this decision was demonstrated a year later, when the Red Cross provided key assistance during the San 

Francisco Earthquake and Fire of 1906.12 

During the Great Depression, the approach of the Federal government became more proactive. For example, 

Congress endowed the Bureau of Public Roads with the authority to provide continuous grants to States for the 

repair of disaster-damaged infrastructure and charged the Army Corps of Engineers with the task of mitigating 

flood-related threats.13 This piecemeal legislative approach was eventually replaced by the Civil Defense Act of 

1950—the first comprehensive legislation pertaining to Federal disaster relief.14

In 1952, President Truman issued Executive Order 10427, which emphasized that Federal disaster assistance was 

intended to supplement, not supplant, the resources of State, local, and private sector organizations.15 This theme 

was echoed two decades later in President Nixon’s 1973 report, “New Approaches to Federal Disaster Preparedness 

and Assistance.” The report clearly stated that, “Federal disaster assistance is intended to supplement individual, 

local and state resources.”16

Today, the centerpiece legislation for providing Federal aid in disaster relief, the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief 

and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act), reinforces the principle that response efforts should first utilize State 

and local resources.17 The Stafford Act establishes a process for State governors to request assistance from the 

Federal government when an incident overwhelms State and local resources.18 To provide and coordinate Federal 

aid to the people and the State and local governments impacted by a disaster using all Federal agencies, the Act 

authorizes the President to issue major disaster or emergency declarations, and to appoint a Federal Coordinating 

Officer (FCO) to coordinate the administration of Federal relief. The Stafford Act is frequently invoked in disaster 

and emergency response. Since 1974, an average of thirty-eight major disasters have been declared annually. In 

2004, a near record disaster season, the President issued sixty-eight major disaster declarations and seven emergency 

declarations.19

In a 21st Century world marked by catastrophic terrorism and natural disasters, the Federal government must build 

upon our foundation of disaster relief and prepare for the larger role we will be called upon to play in response to a 

catastrophic event. 

DISASTER RESPONSE STRUCTURE 

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the Federal government realized that additional measures were 

needed to ensure effective coordination with State and local governments and took steps to alter how it responds to 

emergencies. In the National Strategy for Homeland Security, issued in July 2002, President Bush called for a major 

initiative to build a national system for incident management and to integrate separate Federal response plans into a 

single, all-discipline20 incident management plan. The President proposed that the initiative be led by the yet-to-becreated Department of Homeland Security (DHS).21 In creating DHS in November 2002, Congress included the 

initiative as part of the Secretary of Homeland Security’s responsibilities.22 The Homeland Security Act was 

officially signed into law by the President on November 25, 2002.23 On March 1, 2003, DHS assumed operational 

control of the nearly 180,000 employees from portions of 22 departments, agencies, and offices that were combined 

to constitute the newly created Department.24 

In February 2003, the President issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5). Homeland Security 

Presidential Directives are presidential orders that establish national policies, priorities, and guidelines to strengthen 

U.S. homeland security. In HSPD-5, the President specifically directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to: (a) 

create a comprehensive National Incident Management System (NIMS) to provide a consistent nationwide approach 

for Federal, State, and local governments to work effectively together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from 

domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity, and; (b) develop and administer an integrated National 

Response Plan (NRP), using the NIMS, to provide the structure and mechanisms for national level policy and 

operational direction for Federal support to State and local incident managers.25 
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HSPD-5 further directed the heads of all Federal departments and agencies to adopt the NIMS, use it in their

individual domestic incident management activities, participate in the NRP, and assist the Secretary of Homeland

Security in its development and maintenance.26 The NIMS and the NRP were completed in 2004 and provide the

foundation for how the Federal government organizes itself when responding to all disasters, including Hurricane

Katrina.

The National Incident Management System

The National Incident Management System (NIMS) establishes standardized incident management protocols and

procedures that all responders—Federal, State, and local—should use to conduct and coordinate response actions. It

sets forth a “core set of doctrine, concepts, principles, terminology and organizational processes to enable effective,

efficient, and collaborative incident management at all levels” of government.27 The NIMS provides a common,

flexible framework within which government and private entities at all levels can work together to manage domestic

incidents of any magnitude.28 In March 2004, the Secretary of Homeland Security approved the NIMS and sent a

memorandum to officials at all levels of the government asking for continued cooperation and assistance in further

developing and implementing the NIMS.

The central component of the NIMS is the Incident Command System (ICS). The ICS was developed and refined

over many years by incident commanders at the Federal, State, and local levels and was being successfully

implemented throughout the country prior to being included in the NIMS. 29 The ICS provides a means to

coordinate the efforts of individual responders and agencies as they respond to and help manage an incident. The

ICS organization, the structure and size of which can be tailored to the complexity and size of any given incident,

comprises five major functional areas—Command, Planning, Operations, Logistics, and Finance/Administration.30

This system grew out of the challenges of interagency coordination experienced when fighting wildfires in western

states.

ICS requires that a command system be

established from the onset of incident

operations, thereby ensuring a unified

command and the efficient coordination

of multi-agency and multi-jurisdictional

efforts.32 Recognizing that most

incidents are managed locally, the

command function under ICS is set up at

the lowest level of the response, and

grows to encompass other agencies and

jurisdictions as they arrive. Some

incidents that begin with a single response

discipline (e.g., fire or police department)

within a single jurisdiction may rapidly

expand to multi-discipline, multijurisdictional incidents requiring

significant additional resources and

operational support.33 The concept of unified command is both more important and more complicated when local,

State, and Federal commanders are required to coordinate their efforts. ICS clarifies reporting relationships and

eliminates confusion caused by multiple, and potentially conflicting, directions and actions. The National Response

Plan requires senior officials from multiple levels of government to come together at a single location to establish a

common set of objectives and a single incident plan. This group, referred to as the “Unified Command,” provides

for and enables joint decisions on objectives, strategies, plans, priorities, and public communications.34

The National Response Plan

Adopted by the Federal government in December 2004, the NRP is an all-hazards plan that establishes a single,

comprehensive framework for managing domestic incidents across all levels of government and across a spectrum

of activities that includes prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery.35 It provides the structure and

Unity of Command vs. Unified Command 31

Unity of command: The concept by which each person within an

organization reports to one and only one designated person. The

purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one

responsible commander for every objective.

Unified command: An application of the Incident Command

System used when there is more than one agency with incident

jurisdiction or when incidents cross political jurisdictions.

Agencies work together through the designated members of the

Unified Command, often the senior person from agencies and/or

disciplines participating in the Unified Command, to establish a

common set of objectives and strategies and a single incident

action plan.
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mechanisms for coordinating Federal support to State and local incident managers and for exercising Federal 

authorities and responsibilities incorporating the NIMS structure. 

The NRP is based on a number of fundamental precepts. Consistent with the traditions and customs that have 

developed under American federalism, the NRP is built on the premise that incidents are generally handled at the 

lowest jurisdictional level possible.36 Local authorities provide the initial response capabilities to every incident, 

including man-made and natural disasters, and when overwhelmed, request assistance from neighboring 

jurisdictions. When incidents are of such a magnitude that these resources are overwhelmed, resources are 

requested from the State, which draws on its own internal emergency response capabilities or requests assistance 

from neighboring States through mutual-aid agreements. Many large and devastating events are handled this way 

without any Federal assistance.37 When Federal response assistance is required, the NRP employs a systematic and 

coordinated approach to incident management at the field, regional, and Federal agency headquarters levels, 

establishing protocols for such activities as reporting incidents, issuing alerts and notification, coordinating response 

actions, and mobilizing resources.38 Though the NRP generally seeks to preserve the primary role of State and local 

bodies as first responders, it does recognize some events will be so catastrophic that they will require a greater 

proactive Federal government response (as discussed in further detail in the “Planning a Proactive Federal 

Response” section of this chapter).39 However, while the NRP recognized the need for a proactive Federal response 

in a catastrophe, no final plan has been put in place to make this operational. 

What Triggers the NRP 

The NRP “covers the full range of complex and constantly changing requirements in anticipation of or in response 

to threats or acts of terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies.”40 It applies to “all Federal departments and 

agencies that may be requested to provide assistance or conduct operations in the context of actual or potential 

Incidents of National Significance.”41 The NRP is also designed to be flexible and scalable: “Consistent with the 

model provided in the NIMS, the NRP can be partially or fully implemented in the context of a threat, anticipation 

of a significant event, or the response to a significant event.”42 The NRP can be used to selectively implement 

specific components in unique situations or can be fully implemented to bring to bear the full efforts and resources 

of the Federal government. 

 

However, the specific triggers for the National Response Plan and its various components are unclear. In HSPD-5, 

the President instructed the Secretary of Homeland Security to coordinate the Federal government's resources 

utilized in response to or recovery from terrorist attacks, major disasters, or other emergencies if and when any one 

of the following four conditions applies: 

(1) A Federal department or agency acting under its own authority has requested the 

assistance of the Secretary; 

(2) The resources of State and local authorities are overwhelmed and Federal assistance 

has been requested by the appropriate State and local authorities; 

(3) More than one Federal department or agency has become substantially involved in 

responding to the incident; or 

(4) The Secretary has been directed to assume responsibility for managing the domestic 

incident by the President.43

The NRP bases the definition of Incidents of National Significance (INS) “on situations related to” these HSPD-5 

criteria.44 However, the NRP lacks sufficient clarity regarding when and how an event becomes an INS. There are 

two dimensions to this issue. First, it is unclear whether satisfaction of one or more of the stated criteria is sufficient 

for an INS to exist, or whether additional considerations must apply. Second, the NRP is unclear as to whether the 

Secretary must formally declare an INS or, alternatively, whether an INS is triggered automatically when one or 

more of these criteria are satisfied, including when the President declares a disaster or emergency under the Stafford 

Act. With respect to Hurricane Katrina, when the Secretary of Homeland Security formally declared the event to be 

an INS on Tuesday, August 30, 2005, arguably an INS already existed, because two of the four HSPD-5 criteria 

noted above had already been satisfied.45
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The lack of clarity on the second issue is illustrated by two seemingly inconsistent NRP provisions; the Scope and 

Applicability section states that the Secretary is responsible for declaring an INS,46 which supports an interpretation 

that an INS cannot be in effect without a declaration by the Secretary, while the Planning Assumptions section states 

that “all Presidentially declared disasters and emergencies under the Stafford Act are considered Incidents of 

National Significance,”47 which supports a conclusion that the President’s issuance of an emergency declaration for 

Louisiana on August 27, 2005, put an INS into effect. 

Most importantly, however, regardless of how an INS is defined or whether an INS must be formally declared by the 

Secretary or not, the NRP fails to articulate clearly which specific actions should be taken and what components 

should be utilized under the NRP as a result of an INS coming into effect. As a practical matter, many of the NRP’s 

functions and structures were already being utilized at the time that the Secretary declared an INS.48

Since the NRP was adopted in December 2004, many parts of the Plan had been used to various degrees and 

magnitudes for thirty declared Stafford Act events to coordinate Federal assistance.49 Yet, an INS had never 

formally been declared prior to Tuesday, August 30, 2005—during the Hurricane Katrina response. The lack of 

clarity discussed above caused confusion. The process and the operational consequences of declaring an INS should 

be further defined and clarified.50 

NRP Concept of Operations 

When applied together, the components of the NRP should provide for a unified command structure to serve as the 

local, multi-agency coordination center for the effective and efficient coordination of Federal, State, local, tribal, 

nongovernmental, and private-sector organizations with primary responsibility for incident-related prevention, 

response and recovery actions.51 In many cases, this takes place at a Joint Field Office (JFO). The JFO co-locates 

the Principal Federal Official (PFO) and Federal Coordinating Officer in situations not involving multiple FCOs.52 

In HSPD-5, the President designated the Secretary of Homeland Security as the “principal Federal official for 

domestic incident management.”53 The NRP allows the Secretary to delegate his responsibility, defining a PFO “as 

the Federal official designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security to act as his/her representative locally to 

oversee, coordinate, and execute the Secretary’s incident management responsibilities under HSPD-5 for Incidents 

of National Significance.”54 The FCO, a position created by the Stafford Act, manages Federal resource support 

activities and is responsible for coordinating the timely delivery of Federal disaster assistance resources to affected 

State and local governments, individual victims, and the private sector.55 At the regional level, a Regional Response 

Coordination Center (RRCC) coordinates disaster response activities until a JFO can be established.56 

At DHS headquarters, the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) coordinates “incident information-sharing, 

operational planning, and deployment of Federal resources” together with its component element at the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) headquarters, the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC), a 

“multiagency center that provides overall Federal response coordination for Incidents of National Significance and 

emergency management program implementation.”57 Strategic-level coordination and resolution of resource 

conflicts unresolved by the NRCC occurs at the Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG), an interagency 

body housed at DHS headquarters.58 

The coordination of the Federal response—to include capabilities and resources—occurs at the field, regional, and 

Federal agency headquarters levels through the Emergency Support Function (ESF) framework. ESFs are organized 

groups of government and private sector entities that provide support, resources, and services. An ESF is staffed by 

specialists from multiple Federal departments, agencies, and the private sector. The purpose of the ESFs is to 

integrate skills and capabilities that reside in disparate organizations to coordinate support to State and local 

response agencies, including both physical resources and staff. The ESFs are structured so that resources and 

capabilities that are required to assist State and local officials in response and recovery operations can be handled by 

the appropriate Federal agency. A detailed break-down of each ESF by function and the primary Federal 

department or agency charged with leading each ESF can be found in Table 2.1.59
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Table 2.1 Emergency Support Functions

ESF Primary Department or Agency

ESF #1 Transportation DOT

ESF #2 Communications DHS (IAIP/NCS)

ESF #3 Public Works and Engineering DOD (USACE) and DHS (FEMA)

ESF #4 Firefighting USDA (Forest Service)

ESF #5 Emergency Management DHS (FEMA)

ESF #6 Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services DHS (FEMA) and American Red Cross

ESF #7 Resource Support GSA

ESF #8 Public Health and Medical Services HHS

ESF #9 Urban Search and Rescue DHS (FEMA)

ESF #10 Oil and Hazardous Materials Response EPA and DHS (U.S. Coast Guard)

ESF #11 Agriculture and Natural Resources USDA and DOI

ESF #12 Energy DOE

ESF #13 Public Safety and Security DHS and DOJ

ESF #14 Long-Term Community Recovery and

Mitigation

USDA, DOC, DHS (FEMA), HUD,

Treas, and SBA

ESF #15 External Affairs DHS (FEMA)

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

President Carter created FEMA through a 1978 reorganization plan that merged several elements of the Federal

response into one agency.60 In 2003, FEMA became a component of the newly created Department of Homeland

Security. Within the Department, FEMA is the primary agency charged with coordinating Federal assistance during

disasters.61 Pursuant to its responsibilities under the NRP, FEMA has primary responsibility for emergency

response and recovery coordination.62 It maintains the NRCC and, as the Federal government’s chief steward of

disaster response, FEMA also continuously monitors for potential disasters and mobilizes resources when it

anticipates Federal assistance will be requested. This occurs frequently during the hurricane season.

FEMA is not, however, the operational provider of most Federal response support. It is a small organization that

primarily manages the operational response, relief, and recovery efforts of the rest of the Federal government.
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FEMA does not, for instance, provide mass care or transportation after a disaster. Instead, pursuant to the NRP 

structure, FEMA tasks the Departments of Health and Human Services, Defense, and Transportation, as well as the 

American Red Cross, to perform these operations. Generally, State and local officials and first responders identify 

necessary missions and required commodities which FEMA—through its organizational structure, coordination 

practices, and administrative support—will assign to a Federal department or secure from the private sector. The 

organization exists primarily to coordinate other Federal agencies and departments during emergency response and 

recovery—acting as an honest broker between departments and agencies, providing a command structure, and 

serving as the single point of entry for State and local officials into the Federal government. It does not have its own 

critical response assets, such as buses, trucks, and ambulances. 

The operational teams that FEMA is responsible for administering, such as the Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) 

teams, are State and local first responders from around the country that volunteer to be activated, deployed, and 

reimbursed by FEMA for their help during response activities. FEMA enforces standards, certifications, and 

qualifications for participation in such programs and provides funding for equipment and training. 

To handle national needs, FEMA operates ten regional offices and two area offices that work directly with States in 

planning for disasters, developing mitigation programs, and meeting needs when disasters occur (see Figure 2.1).63 

Each of the offices maintains full-time staff who work with Federal, State, and local partners year-round. 

Additionally, each office can draw upon civilian reservist personnel to support the response when a Presidential 

major disaster or emergency declaration is issued.64 When State governments request Federal assistance, FEMA 

deploys personnel to the appropriate regional office and the incident area. Also, the regional office controls the 

RRCC, from which FEMA coordinates its assistance.65 Because Hurricane Katrina was advancing toward Louisiana 

(Region VI), and Florida, Mississippi, and Alabama (Region IV), both FEMA regions conducted response and 

recovery operations.66 

PLANNING A PROACTIVE FEDERAL RESPONSE 

Under the Stafford Act, requests for major disaster declarations must be made by the Governor of the affected State. 

The Governor’s request must be based on “a finding that the disaster is of such severity and magnitude that effective 

response is beyond the capabilities of the State and the affected local governments and that Federal assistance is 

necessary.”67 Emergency declarations can be made in the same manner or, in limited circumstances, can be made by 

the President unilaterally.68 

The system for providing Stafford Act assistance, set forth in the NRP and FEMA regulations, reflects the American 

system of federalism, allocating roles and responsibilities between levels of government by utilizing a layered 

system that requires local governments to first request assistance from their State. States, in turn, must use their own 

resources, if available, before requesting Federal assistance. As a prerequisite to major disaster assistance under the 

Stafford Act, a requesting Governor must “take appropriate response action under State law and direct execution of 

the State's emergency plan.”69 Similarly, State emergency operations plans are based on this layered system. For 

example, the State of Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan states that “[t]he initial actions . . . are conducted by 

local government. Local authorities will exhaust their resources, and then use mutual aid agreements with volunteer 

groups, the private sector and/or neighboring parishes.”70When local and State governments require additional 

resources, they generally call upon neighboring jurisdictions and other States through mutual assistance agreements 

and through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), a Congressionally ratified agreement71 that 

provides form and structure to interstate mutual aid, and through which States make available to each other in time 

of crisis their emergency response assets, such as National Guard troops.72 

Traditionally, it is only after local, State, and mutual assistance resources are depleted, or prove insufficient, that the 

Federal government is requested to help. The Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan further explains that, “State 

assistance will supplement local efforts and federal assistance will supplement State and local efforts when it is 

clearly demonstrated that it is beyond local and State capability to cope with the emergency/disaster.”73 Should 

State and affected local governments become overwhelmed, the President may declare either a major disaster or 

emergency through his authorities under the Stafford Act. 
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After a Stafford Act declaration, FEMA, on behalf of the Federal government, receives State requests for assistance

and fulfills them by tasking other Federal departments or agencies with the appropriate expertise or resources to

meet the specific needs. This is often referred to as a “pull” system for Federal assistance because local and State

governments must identify needs and make specific requests for assistance before the Federal government can

deliver—they “pull” assistance from the Federal government. Equally important to understanding the current “pull”

system is the method in which Federal assistance is delivered to those in need—relying on the State as an

intermediary between the Federal government and any other entity. In many cases, the Federal government will

satisfy a State request by providing commodities or assets to the State. In so doing, the Federal government is

helping the State meet the needs of their local governments and first responders, as well as various operational

components of the State. The Federal government does not always directly deliver its assistance to local

governments or others in need. The State’s role has been compared to retail sales in terms of organization, delivery,

and management. Under this description, the Federal government’s role is comparable to wholesale. This generally

works well and should continue in the majority of instances.

However, in some instances the State and local

governments will be overwhelmed beyond their

ability to satisfy their traditional roles in this

system. Indeed, in some instances, State and

local governments and responders may become

victims themselves, prohibiting their ability to

identify, request, receive, or deliver assistance.

This is the moment of catastrophic crisis—the

moment when 911 calls are no longer answered;

the moment when hurricane victims can no

longer be timely evacuated or evacuees can no

longer find shelter; the moment when police no

longer patrol the streets, and the rule of law

begins to break down.

During the development of the NRP, such a

catastrophic scenario was considered and planning for such an eventuality began. The NRP includes a Catastrophic

Incident Annex which “establishes the context and overarching strategy for implementing and coordinating an

accelerated, proactive national response to a catastrophic incident.”74 The intent behind this Annex was to plan for a

case in which the Federal response posture would switch, upon a declaration by the Secretary of Homeland Security

of a catastrophic incident, from the traditional “pull” system to one that includes a proactive “push” system, moving

assets to the affected areas without waiting for State requests. Under the current Catastrophic Incident Annex,

however, the general operating presumption is that Federal pre-deployed resources remain at staging areas until

requested by the State and local incident command authorities. Thus, this Annex provides for proactive deployment

of resources to the area, but the actual employment of the resources depends to a good degree on requests from State

or local authorities and very often their participation in delivering the aid to those in need.

The National Response Plan defines a catastrophic incident as:

Any natural or man-made incident, including terrorism, that results in extraordinary levels of mass

casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment,

economy, national morale, and/or government functions. A catastrophic event could result in

sustained national impacts over a prolonged period of time; almost immediately exceeds resources

normally available to State, local, tribal, and private sector authorities in the impacted area; and

significantly interrupts governmental operations and emergency services to such an extent that

national security could be threatened.75

Because it was recognized that a proactive Federal response can create strains on Federal resources and presents

practical challenges for Federal responders not familiar with the terrain or infrastructure in a disaster area, the NRP

Catastrophic Incident Annex required that a “more detailed and operationally specific NRP Catastrophic Incident

Supplement . . . be approved and published independently of the NRP Base Plan and annexes.”76 The Catastrophic

Emergency vs. Major Disaster: Under the Stafford Act, the

President can designate an incident either as an “emergency”

or a “major disaster.” Both authorize the Federal

government to provide essential assistance to meet

immediate threats to life and property, as well as additional

disaster relief assistance. The President may, in certain

circumstances, declare an “emergency” unilaterally, but may

only declare a “major disaster” at the request of a Governor

that certifies the State and affected local governments are

overwhelmed. Under an “emergency,” assistance is limited

in scope and may not exceed $5 million without Presidential

approval and notification to Congress. In contrast, for a

major disaster, the full complement of Stafford Act programs

can be authorized, including long term public infrastructure

recovery assistance and consequence management.
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Incident Supplement (CIS) is meant to address the “resource and procedural implications of catastrophic events to 

ensure the rapid and efficient delivery of resources and assets, including special teams, equipment, and supplies that 

provide critical life-saving support and incident containment capabilities.”77 The draft CIS by its current terms only 

applies to short notice or no notice events. On August 29, at the time Hurricane Katrina hammered into the Gulf 

Coast, the draft CIS had not been finalized and promulgated. It began final circulation for approval as part of the 

regular Federal staffing process shortly after Katrina made landfall.78 

Ultimately, when a catastrophic incident occurs, regardless of whether the catastrophe has been a warned or is a 

surprise event, the Federal government should not rely on the traditional layered approach and instead should 

proactively provide, or “push,” its capabilities and assistance directly to those in need. When the affected State’s 

incident response capability is incapacitated and the situation has reached catastrophic proportions, the Federal 

government alone has the resources and capabilities to respond, restore order, and begin the process of recovery. 

This is a responsibility that must be more explicitly acknowledged and planned for in the NRP, and we must 

resource, train, and equip to meet this obligation when such a contingency arises. It is also important that we work 

with State and local governments to ensure they are better prepared to respond immediately, until Federal resources 

can arrive.

MOVING FORWARD 

Hurricane Katrina was the most destructive natural disaster in U.S. history. However, there is no question that the 

Nation’s current incident management plans and procedures fell short of what was needed and that improved 

operational plans could have better mitigated the Hurricane’s tragic effects. As President Bush acknowledged from 

Jackson Square in New Orleans, “the system, at every level of government, was not well-coordinated, and was 

overwhelmed in the first few days.”79 A true national preparedness system should ensure that all levels of 

government effectively work together to keep the American people safe and secure at home. 

THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED

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CHAPTER THREE: HURRICANE KATRINA — PRE-LANDFALL

Hurricane Katrina is now designated a category five hurricane. We cannot stress enough the danger this

hurricane poses to Gulf Coast communities. I urge all citizens to put their own safety and the safety of their

families first by moving to safe ground.

 —President George W. Bush, August 28, 20051

HURRICANE SEASON FORECAST

On May 16, 2005, Brigadier General David L. Johnson

(ret.), Director of the National Oceanic & Atmospheric

Administration (NOAA), National Weather Service

(NWS), released the 2005 Atlantic hurricane outlook to

kick off National Hurricane Preparedness Week. In its

report, NOAA assessed a 70 percent chance of an aboveaverage hurricane season, predicting twelve to fifteen

Atlantic tropical storms, with seven to nine becoming

hurricanes and three to five of those becoming major

hurricanes (equivalent to Categories 3, 4, and 5 on the

Saffir-Simpson scale). 2 NOAA also noted that the

previous year had been “extremely active,” with fifteen

Atlantic tropical storms, including nine that developed

into hurricanes.3 That same day, Max Mayfield, Director

of the National Hurricane Center (NHC), cautioned,

“[l]ast year’s hurricane season provided a reminder that

planning and preparation for a hurricane do make a

difference. Residents in hurricane vulnerable areas who

had a plan, and took individual responsibility for acting

on those plans, faired [sic] far better than those who did

not.”4

The first two months of the 2005 hurricane season confirmed NOAA’s predictions, with a record seven Atlantic

tropical storms developing in June and July.5 Two of these storms developed into major hurricanes, including

Hurricane Dennis, “an unusually strong July major hurricane that left a trail of destruction from the Caribbean Sea to

the northern coast of the Gulf of Mexico.”6 Dennis prompted mandatory evacuations in the lower Florida Keys and

major disaster declarations in Alabama, Florida, and Mississippi.7 Louisiana Governor Blanco declared a state of

emergency.8 While Cuba ultimately received the worst of the damage inflicted by Dennis, the NHC still estimated

U.S. damages in excess of two billion dollars.9

On August 2, 2005, NOAA released an updated 2005 Atlantic hurricane season outlook that projected the formation

of an additional eleven to fourteen tropical storms, with seven to nine becoming hurricanes, including three to five

major hurricanes. Based on the developments in June and July, NOAA revised its assessment to a “95 to 100

Hurricane Season: The official Atlantic hurricane

season takes place each year between June 1 and

November 30, with peak hurricane activity

generally occurring between mid-August and midOctober.

In an average year, ten tropical storms develop in

the Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea, or Atlantic

Ocean; six of these storms become hurricanes. In a

typical three-year span, five hurricanes hit the

United States mainland; two are designated major

(Category 3 – 5) hurricanes. The southeastern

United States is the region most vulnerable to a

hurricane strike. The States most likely to be hit by

a major hurricane are Florida, Texas, and Louisiana.

—National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration, Hurricanes: Unleashing

Nature’s Fury and U.S. Mainland Hurricane

Strikes by State
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percent” chance of an above-normal 2005 Atlantic Hurricane

season. It reported that “the atmospheric and oceanic conditions

favoring hurricane formation that were predicted in May are

now in place. These conditions, combined with the high levels

of activity already seen, make an above-normal season nearly

certain.” Moreover, while there already had been “considerable

early season activity,” NOAA emphasized that the next three

months constituted the peak of hurricane season.10 NHC

Director Mayfield explained, “Knowing precisely where a

hurricane will strike and at what intensity cannot be determined

even a few days in advance.” He urged that “residents and

government agencies of coastal and near-coastal regions should

embrace hurricane preparedness efforts and should be ready well

before a tropical storm or hurricane watch is posted.”11 With

four more months remaining in hurricane season, the NOAA

outlook proved an ominous forecast.

KATRINA’S BEGINNINGS

August 23, 2005

On Tuesday, August 23, the NWS reported Tropical Depression Twelve had formed over the Bahamas from the

remnants of Tropical Depression Ten.12 The NHC released the first in what would be a series of sixty-one

advisories over the next seven days reporting on and tracking the development of the storm.13

The Federal government began monitoring the storm as a potential hurricane shortly after the NWS announced

Tropical Depression Twelve had formed. Federal department and agency Emergency Operation Centers (EOC)—

bases used to coordinate and direct response activity—began to closely monitor NWS bulletins and incorporate them

into their own updates and situation reports.

The U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), the military command charged with defending the U.S. homeland

and providing military support to civil authorities, also began monitoring the Tropical Depression at its Operations

Center in Colorado Springs, Colorado, on August 23.14

August 24, 2005

On Wednesday, August 24, the Tropical Depression strengthened into a Tropical Storm and was given the name

Katrina, the eleventh named storm of the 2005 hurricane season.15 The Federal Emergency Management Agency

(FEMA) activated its Hurricane Liaison Team (HLT), consisting of FEMA, NWS, and State and local officials. The

HLT deploys to the National Hurricane Center to assist in the coordination of advisories with Federal, State, and

local emergency management agencies, providing forecast updates and technical advice.16 FEMA Region IX was

notified to prepare for possible back-up should Mississippi or Georgia be affected. USNORTHCOM also issued a

Warning Order for supporting commands to prepare for requests for Department of Defense (DOD) assets should

the need arise.17

August 25, 2005

Katrina continued to gain strength throughout the day on Thursday, as it approached the southeastern coast of

Florida.18 At 3:30 PM EDT, Katrina was upgraded to a Category 1 hurricane and forecast to make landfall in Florida.

Meanwhile, advisories issued by the NWS Tropical Prediction Center (TPC) and the NHC predicted Katrina would

turn toward the Alabama-Florida panhandle area after it crossed Florida and entered the Gulf of Mexico.19 At 6:30

Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale

Category Winds

1 74 – 95

mph

2 96 – 110

mph

3 111 – 130

mph

4 131 – 155

mph

5 Greater than

 155 mph

* To be a Tropical Storm, winds must be

between 39-73 mph.
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PM EDT, Hurricane Katrina made landfall in south Florida near the Miami-Dade and Broward County line, with

sustained winds of up to 80 miles per hour and dropping as much as 14-16 inches of rain in some regions.20

The Florida landfall resulted in more than a dozen deaths,21 over 1.4 million power outages,22 and pockets of severe

flooding. Damage costs in south Florida amounted to just under $2 billion,23 with an estimated $400 million in

agricultural losses.24

Gulf Coast States and localities began hurricane preparations on Thursday, August 25, even as the storm approached

its first landfall in Florida, by activating their emergency response elements, issuing emergency declarations, prepositioning response assets, and planning for evacuations and sheltering. Because NWS advisories predicted

Katrina would enter the Gulf and make landfall on the Northern Gulf Coast area, Alabama and Mississippi activated

their Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) to coordinate information and their State’s resources for emergency

response operations.25

In preparation for Florida landfall, FEMA delivered 100 truckloads of ice to staging areas in Georgia, and thirty-five

truckloads of food and seventy trucks of water to Palmetto, Georgia. Also, anticipating a potential second Gulf

Coast landfall, FEMA pre-staged over 400 truckloads of ice, more than 500 truckloads of water, and nearly 200

truckloads of food at logistics centers in Alabama, Louisiana, Georgia, Texas, and South Carolina.26 This was the

beginning of the pre-staging efforts that increased to the largest pre-positioning of Federal assets in history by the

time Hurricane Katrina made its second landfall on August 29, 2005.27 At this time, FEMA placed Rapid Needs

Assessment and Emergency Response Teams – Advance Elements (ERT-As) on alert. An ERT-A is “the portion of

the Emergency Response Team (ERT) that is the first group deployed to the field to respond to a disaster

incident.”28 FEMA also conducted their first video teleconference, a call held each day at noon from August 25

until well after landfall. These video teleconferences helped synchronize Federal, State, and local responders and

were a means of defining and coordinating assistance and support needs.29

Numerous private sector entities took action as well. Norfolk Southern Railroad, for example, recognized the

potential impact of the loss of certain key bridges and pre-staged repair barges in order to be able to move in quickly

to make repairs after the hurricane made landfall. The Cargill Corporation, an agricultural products and services

company, also pre-positioned freighters offshore so that it could continue shipping grain internationally immediately

after landfall.

KATRINA ENTERS THE GULF OF MEXICO

August 26, 2005

Katrina briefly weakened to a Tropical

Storm as it passed over Florida in the

early hours of Friday, August 26, but by

5:00 AM EDT, the NHC reported that the

storm had once again strengthened to a

Category 1 hurricane.30 The hurricane

continued moving further west,

intensifying over the warm waters of

the Gulf, rather than north toward the

Alabama-Florida panhandle area as

NWS had originally predicted.31 This

westward direction enabled the storm to

strengthen first to a Category 1 and then

intensify to a Category 2 hurricane over

the course of the day.

In the afternoon of August 26, the NHC

released a track forecasting the eye of

Hurricane Katrina would pass just east

of New Orleans on Monday, August
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29.32 This forecast and all subsequent NHC forecasts projected Hurricane Katrina would make its second landfall as

a Category 4 or 5 storm along the Gulf Coast, in the Mississippi-Louisiana region.33 The Center also forecasted that

the accompanying coastal storm surge would cause flooding fifteen to twenty feet above normal tide levels where

the eye of the hurricane would make landfall.34 National Weather Service Director Johnson later testified before

Congress that “forecasts of where Katrina would go were more accurate than usual, with all of the forecast tracks

during the last forty-eight hours lining up almost directly on top of the actual track.”35 The last NHC Hurricane

Katrina forecast on Friday, August 26, as the storm intensified in the Gulf of Mexico, gave Federal, State, local, and

private sector officials, in hindsight, approximately fifty-six hours advance notice that the hurricane would make

landfall near the City of New Orleans.36

Preparations took on a greater urgency on Friday, August 26, due to Hurricane Katrina’s continuing intensification

and west-southwest track from Florida into the Gulf of Mexico. Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco and

Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour declared states of emergency for their respective States.37 Gulf Coast States

and localities expanded their EOC staffing and operations schedules in anticipation of Hurricane Katrina.38 The

Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi State EOCs soon were activated to their highest levels.39

State agencies began putting their response plans into action. The Louisiana State Police notified personnel assigned

to the Traffic Control Center that they should report to the State EOC the following day, at 6:00 AM CDT, to prepare

for emergency response operations.40 The Louisiana National Guard began mobilizing 2,000 personnel while the

Joint Forces headquarters-Louisiana National Guard activated its Joint Operations Center (JOC) at Jackson Barracks

in New Orleans to coordinate their emergency response operations.41 Governor Barbour issued an Executive Order

that directed Major General Harold Cross, Adjutant General of the Mississippi National Guard, to prepare to use the

Mississippi National Guard for disaster relief operations.42 The Mississippi National Guard alerted military police

and engineers, activated 750 personnel, and activated its EOC in Jackson.43

 Worst Case Scenario

 A catastrophic hurricane striking Southeast Louisiana has been considered a worst-case scenario that the region

and many experts had known and feared for years. Much of Southeast Louisiana is at or below sea level, and

experience had shown Gulf Coast hurricanes to be deadly. At the turn of the 20th Century, an unnamed Category

4 hurricane made landfall on September 8, 1900, in Galveston, Texas. With storm surges higher than fifteen feet

and winds stronger than 130 mph, over 8,000 people perished—making it the deadliest disaster in American

history.44 Sixty-five years later, on September 9, 1965, Hurricane Betsy made its second landfall near Grand Isle,

Louisiana, as a strong Category 3 storm. As an omen of things to come, Hurricane Betsy’s storm surge and high

winds hit Lake Pontchartrain just north of New Orleans, overtopping levees and flooding the city. Breaching the

Florida Avenue levee, flood waters consumed the Lower 9th Ward of New Orleans, drowning many in their attics

as they tried to escape. In total, seventy-five people were killed and over 160,000 homes were flooded.45 Only

four years later, Hurricane Camille, a Category 5 hurricane, struck the mouth of the Mississippi River on the night

of August 17, 1969. Storm surges measuring over twenty-five feet, combined with winds estimated close to 200

mph, caused an estimated 335 deaths, destroyed or damaged 22,008 homes, and injured thousands in Louisiana,

Mississippi, and Virginia.46 In the decades that followed, experts attempted to model the likely impact of future

hurricanes to improve protection in the Gulf Coast region.47 In 2000, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’

(USACE) modeled the effects of a slow moving Category 4 or any Category 5 hurricane on the region.48

According to the Corps, New Orleans would be inundated by over twenty feet of water if such a hurricane took a

“critical path” towards the city.49 A weaker, slow moving hurricane can be as dangerous as a more powerful,

faster moving storm because it can generate as much or more flooding by dropping more rainfall.50 Vice Admiral

Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr., Undersecretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere, stated in 2002 that the

overtopping of the levees and subsequent flooding of the city could occur during slow moving Category 3, 4 or 5

storms.51 Recognizing that current Federal, State, and local disaster response capabilities overall needed to be

enhanced to better address possible effects of catastrophic disasters, FEMA provided funding for a Southeast

Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Planning Project, which brought together responders and decision makers

from all levels of government and the American Red Cross to identify, analyze, and address the overwhelming

operational complexities that would be involved in responding to a catastrophic hurricane striking southeast

Louisiana.52 (continued next page)
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 (continued from previous page) Planning workshops using a hypothetical catastrophic hurricane scenario

(Hurricane Pam) to frame the discussions were used to identify and qualify the scale of requirements needed to

build a plan for responding to a catastrophic hurricane. The initial planning group meeting was held between July

16 and July 23 in 2004 and included as many as 300 Federal, State, and local emergency response officials.53 The

results of this exercise revealed to the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness

(LOHSEP) and FEMA the shortfalls in existing plans and were to be used to inform future development of State

and Federal plans to address this potential catastrophe. At the first session, LOHSEP and Federal representatives

identified a list of planning topics as the most urgent or complex topics needing discussion, including pre-landfall

issues, search and rescue, and medical care, as well as mass sheltering and housing. Subsequent after-action

review workshops did not reconvene until late July 2005, mere weeks before Hurricane Katrina made landfall.

Although they failed to generate a comprehensive, integrated, and actionable plan in time for Hurricane Katrina,

these workshops did have some positive impact. To quote one official: “the workshops and planning process—

knowledge of inter-jurisdictional relationships and capabilities, identification of issues, and rudimentary concepts

for handling the consequences—have been beneficial to all involved in the hurricane response.”54

FEMA headquarters in Washington, DC, conducted the daily video teleconference from their National Response

Coordination Center (NRCC) to exchange information and reconcile response activities among the FEMA Regions,

the NHC, liaisons from various Federal agencies and departments responsible for disaster support, representatives

from the States projected to be affected by the storm, and States monitoring and providing mutual aid to support

their neighbors.55

August 27, 2005

Hurricane Katrina strengthened to a Category 3 storm before dawn on Saturday, August 27, and nearly doubled in

size over the course of the day; tropical storm-force winds extended 85 miles from the storm’s center at 2:00 AM EDT

and 160 miles from the storm’s center at 9:00 PM CDT.

56 National Hurricane Center forecasts warned the storm

could continue to intensify and was expected to become a Category 4 storm,57 pushing a powerful storm surge ahead

of its path.58 The Center issued updated hurricane watches and warnings throughout Saturday, with a hurricane

watch eventually extending across the North Central Gulf Coast from Intra-coastal City, Louisiana, to the FloridaAlabama border.59

Despite hurricane watches and warnings throughout the day, it appeared many people along the Gulf Coast either

remained unaware or unconcerned about the storm that would soon ravage their communities. For instance,

according to Governor Blanco, State Representative Cedric Richmond called the Louisiana Governor on Saturday

after visiting a ballpark where “approximately 700 people were present, and [he] learned that some people had not

paid attention to the weekend news and did not realize the severity of the hurricane aiming at New Orleans.” She

recalled that he worried “many may have thought the hurricane was still targeting the Florida panhandle, as reported

by the National Hurricane Center up until late Friday afternoon.”60

As the storm strengthened, Louisiana and Mississippi State officials took steps to begin the evacuation of areas

threatened by Hurricane Katrina throughout Friday evening and into Saturday morning. Early Saturday morning,

Louisiana State Police Superintendent Colonel Henry Whitehorn and Louisiana Department of Transportation and

Development Secretary Johnny Bradberry recommended to Governor Blanco that she implement the State’s contraflow plan. Governor Blanco and her staff had determined that a major evacuation of coastal Louisiana and New

Orleans would be required. She and Governor Barbour discussed implementing their respective contra-flow plans

on Saturday for interstate highways and other major roadways; the plans would reverse the flow of traffic on

inbound lanes to facilitate the evacuation of the New Orleans metropolitan area.61 Shortly thereafter, Louisiana

Department of Transportation and Development officials informed Mississippi Department of Transportation

officials that contra-flow in Louisiana would begin later that afternoon.62 Louisiana State agencies also began

implementing Phase I of the Louisiana Emergency Evacuation Plan, which included public communications, staging

of assets, and other activities.63 Louisiana and Mississippi implemented contra-flow plans on major highways at

4:00 PM CDT.

64 State law enforcement officers were deployed along the routes and in communities to assist

evacuation operations. Louisiana established a Traffic Control Center (TCC) within the State EOC and began

monitoring traffic volume and rate of flow.65 Traffic increased throughout the day. By 7:00 PM CDT, traffic had
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begun to back up at the Louisiana-Texas border.66 Louisiana and Mississippi had jointly revised their respective 

evacuation plans after encountering problems during Hurricane Ivan in 2004.67 

Still, State and local officials knew that tens of thousands of Gulf Coast residents either could not or would not 

evacuate. A large number of residents who did not own a vehicle depended on relatives, neighbors, charitable 

organizations, or public transportation to evacuate; New Orleans hurricane plans estimated that over 100,000 

residents did not own an automobile.68 Evacuation also presented particular risks to the special needs population, 

which includes older adults and individuals with a disability. Individual and institutional caregivers faced the 

difficult choice between the dangers of evacuation and attempting to ride out the hurricane.69 

In an effort to reach as many citizens as possible, Governor Blanco and her staff contacted clergy throughout 

Saturday night and early Sunday morning to ask them to urge their parishioners to evacuate immediately.70 In 

addition, Louisiana churches had implemented “Operation Brother’s Keeper,” a program developed to help evacuate 

those who lacked transportation, but only four congregations were participating in the pilot program when Hurricane 

Katrina made landfall.71 

Local governments across the northern Gulf Coast issued evacuation orders throughout Saturday. Voluntary 

evacuations for areas in Louisiana outside the levee protection district began in the morning. Lafourche, 

Plaquemines, St. Charles, and parts of St. Tammany Parishes ordered mandatory evacuations for their citizens 

during the day.72 Mandatory evacuation orders were also issued for parts of Jefferson Parish. In New Orleans, 

Mayor Ray Nagin hosted a press conference that afternoon, during which he recommended evacuations of Algiers, 

the Lower Ninth Ward, and low-lying areas of the City.73 Later, at 5:00 PM CDT, he formally called for voluntary 

evacuations of the City.74 He also declared a state of emergency for New Orleans, which advised residents to 

undertake several precautionary measures such as stocking up on bottled water, batteries, and non-perishable food.75 

In a joint press conference with Governor Blanco, Nagin warned residents, saying “this is not a test. This is the real 

deal.” By late afternoon, Mississippi’s three vulnerable coastal counties—Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson—had 

also begun urging residents to evacuate, especially those living in low-lying areas and mobile homes.76

Many Gulf Coast residents had become so accustomed to hurricanes and tropical storms that they refused to 

evacuate despite the warnings.77 As Hurricane Katrina approached Louisiana, Governor Blanco was concerned “that 

many people would play a familiar game of ‘hurricane roulette’—tempting fate and staying home in a gamble that 

this storm would be no worse than the last one they weathered in their home.” 78 

Hurricane Katrina’s impending landfall required massive shelter operations in order to temporarily house thousands 

of people fleeing the Gulf Coast. On Saturday, August 27, shelters began opening throughout the region. In 

Mississippi, the American Red Cross opened shelters in schools and churches.79 It also established an information 

center to direct evacuees to shelters in the Jackson area.80 By 4:00 PM CDT, Louisiana’s Office of Emergency 

Preparedness reported that four special needs shelters were open in Alexandria, Baton Rouge, Bossier City and 

Monroe, with four more scheduled to open at 8:00 PM CDT that evening.81 Mayor Nagin also announced that the 

New Orleans Superdome would be open to City residents with special needs.82 A special needs shelter “is intended 

for individuals who have no other resources and who need assistance that cannot be guaranteed in a regular shelter, 

i.e. medication that requires refrigeration, oxygen equipment, etc.” However, it is not intended for patients who 

need substantial or constant medical care. 83 Texas officials also opened shelters on Saturday, including a 1,000 

person capacity shelter at the Ford Center in Jefferson County.84

Louisiana and Mississippi State agencies deployed personnel and pre-positioned resources in the final two days 

before Hurricane Katrina’s second landfall. The Mississippi Emergency Management Agency also deployed six 

area coordinators to six Gulf Coast counties to serve as liaisons with their EOCs.85 Mississippi’s State Emergency 

Response Team (ERT) deployed to Camp Shelby while National Guard emergency rescue assets were deployed to 

three coastal counties.86 The Louisiana National Guard deployed liaison officers to the thirteen southernmost 

parishes projected to suffer the greatest impact from the storm.87 Alabama officials began pre-positioning supplies 

at staging areas and other locations throughout the State.88 Alabama National Guard troops were positioned in 

Mobile and Baldwin Counties in preparation for landfall, and Governor Bob Riley of Alabama, after being informed 

that Louisiana and Mississippi would suffer the brunt of the storm, offered Governors Blanco and Barbour whatever 

assistance his State could provide.89 The Texas Governor’s Division of Emergency Management deployed one 
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Regional Liaison Officer to Baton Rouge “to assist, coordinate, and monitor any requests for assistance that may 

develop as evacuations begin.”90 

As State and local governments were preparing their response and initiating evacuations, the Federal government 

was continuing preparations to support State and local responders. On the morning of August 27, forty-eight hours 

before Hurricane Katrina’s second landfall, FEMA headquarters commenced Level 1 operations, requiring full 

staffing on a round-the-clock, seven-days-a-week basis.91 FEMA was now at its highest alert. FEMA’s regional 

headquarters for Regions IV (Atlanta, Georgia) and VI (Denton, Texas) went to Level 1 activation at Noon EDT and 

11:00 AM CDT respectively.92 At this point, all fifteen National Response Plan (NRP) Emergency Support Functions 

(ESFs) had been activated as well.93 

With the regional and national headquarters at full alert, FEMA held another daily video teleconference at 12:00 PM 

EDT. “FEMA Region VI announced that its Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS) detachment was en route 

to Camp Beauregard, Louisiana, to provide communications and operational and logistical support. It also 

announced that it had requested the deployment of the Denver MERS unit to Region VI headquarters in Denton to 

serve as a backup.”94 In addition, Region VI had staged at Camp Beauregard 270,000 liters of water, 680,000 

pounds of ice, 15,120 tarps, and 328,320 Meals Ready to Eat (MRE).95 By 5:00 PM EDT, the quantity of water stored 

at Camp Beauregard had doubled to 540,000 liters.96 More commodities were pre-staged elsewhere in Region VI. 

The FEMA Logistics Representative reported that 102 trailers were “uploaded with water and MREs” at the FEMA 

Logistics Center in Ft. Worth, Texas.97 Also at Noon that day, the ERT-N Blue Team was activated and deployed to 

Baton Rouge.98 The ERT-A Blue Team is one of the Nation’s three standing ERT-N teams. One of three teams—

code-named Red, White, and Blue—is on call every month.99 The ERT-N teams are the scalable principal interagency units that staff the JFO “for large-scale, high-impact events.” 

FEMA was working to pre-stage supplies in Region IV, too. At 1:15 PM EDT, FEMA issued its first Mission 

Assignment to USNORTHCOM “to provide NAS Meridian [Mississippi] as a FEMA operational Staging Base for 

pre-staging of FEMA supplies prior to landfall.”100 USNORTHCOM granted this request later that afternoon, 

releasing an Execute Order making Naval Air Station Meridian available to FEMA.101

Additionally, FEMA began activating the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), Disaster Medical Assistance 

Teams (DMATs), and Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) teams102 The DMATs are mobile self-contained medical 

teams with equipment and medical professionals trained and certified to provide emergency medical care to disaster 

victims. These teams are comprised of professionals from around the country organized and deployed by FEMA to 

support disaster response activities. The Urban Search and Rescue teams are similarly structured, but comprised of 

emergency responders, firefighters, and law enforcement personnel from around the country. 

That evening, President Bush signed a Federal emergency declaration for the State of Louisiana, following a request 

from Governor Blanco earlier that day. President Bush issued additional emergency declarations for Mississippi and 

Alabama the following day, after requests from the governors of those States.103 These declarations authorized 

Federal expenditures to assist State and local governments by providing resources and making other preparations to 

save lives and property from Hurricane Katrina’s imminent impact.104 These decisions were particularly important 

as they allowed delivery of pre-deployed Federal assistance. The issuance of a Presidential emergency declaration 

before landfall is extremely rare, and indicative of the recognition that Katrina had the potential to be particularly 

devastating. Since 1990, only one such incident, Hurricane Floyd in 1999, resulted in declarations before landfall.105 

By declaring emergencies in these three States, the President directed the Federal government to provide its full 

assistance to the area to save lives and property from Hurricane Katrina’s imminent impact.106 

On the evening of August 27, William Lokey, the ERT-N team leader, arrived in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and was 

appointed Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO). As the senior Federal official in charge of supporting the State of 

Louisiana, he immediately began coordinating efforts with the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and 

Emergency Preparedness.107

Hurricane Katrina’s growing intensity on Saturday led NHC Director Mayfield to make personal calls to State and 

local officials in the region that evening to emphasize the threat posed by the storm. He warned Jefferson Parish 

officials that this could be the “big one.” That evening, Director Mayfield briefed Governor Blanco, Governor 
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Barbour, Mayor Nagin, and Alabama Emergency Management Agency Chief of Operations Bill Filter about 

Hurricane Katrina’s magnitude and the potential storm impacts.108 Director Mayfield testified before Congress that 

he had only made such a call to warn a governor once before in his thirty-six year career.109 Mayfield stated that “I 

just wanted to be able to go to sleep that night knowing that I did all I could do.”110

At FEMA headquarters, the FEMA Director shared Mayfield’s concern. Closing the noon video teleconference with 

his FEMA regional staff and the State EOCs, Michael Brown urged them to be vigilant, saying, “I know I’m 

preaching to the choir on this one, but I’ve learned over the past four and a half, five years, to go with my gut on a 

lot of things, and I’ve got to tell you my gut hurts with this one. It hurts. . . . So we need to take this one very, very 

seriously. . . . I want you guys to lean forward as far as possible. . . . Why is this important? Because I worry about 

the people in New Orleans, Louisiana, and Mississippi right now, and they’re going to need our help . . .”111 

August 28, 2005 

Hurricane Katrina developed from a Category 4 to a Category 5 storm over a six-hour period on Sunday, August 

28.112 The storm had become “not only extremely intense but also exceptionally large.”113 The National Weather 

Service office in Slidell, Louisiana, issued a detailed, urgent warning of Hurricane Katrina’s impending devastating 

impact on the Gulf Coast. The warning stated, “The majority of industrial buildings will become non-functional . . . 

High-rise office and apartment buildings will sway dangerously—a few to the point of total collapse. All windows 

will blow out. Airborne debris will be widespread—and may include heavy items such as household appliances and 

even light vehicles . . . Persons—pets—and livestock exposed to the winds will face certain death if struck.”114 The 

NHC issued advisories that warned the levees in New Orleans could be overtopped by Lake Pontchartrain and that 

significant destruction would likely be experienced far away from the hurricane’s center.115 The warning continued, 

“[m]ost of the area will be uninhabitable for weeks . . . Perhaps longer . . . Power outages will last for weeks . . . 

Water shortages will make human suffering incredible by modern standards.”116

Prior to Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, State and local officials did not use the Emergency Alert System (EAS) in 

Louisiana, Mississippi, or Alabama. However, the National Hurricane Center (NHC) disseminated warnings and 

forecasts via NOAA Radio and the internet, operating in conjunction with the EAS.117 Initially, these reports were 

issued every six hours; however, as the storm neared landfall they were updated with increasing frequency.118 In 

accordance with NOAA policy, local weather offices took over responsibility for these broadcasts shortly after 

Hurricane Katrina made landfall. At this time, Weather Service offices like the one in Slidell, Louisiana, began to 

transmit real-time hazard information using both NOAA Radio and the EAS. These reports were distributed to all 

area media outlets as well as local emergency management personnel. When the severity of the storm finally forced 

the Slidell weather office offline, operations were successfully transferred to weather centers in Mobile and Baton 

Rouge. 

Taking heed of the continual warnings, most citizens evacuated, others showed up at a “shelter of last resort” and 

some hunkered down in their homes and would soon be struggling to survive the destructive forces of Katrina. For 

the region and its residents, Hurricane Katrina would bring devastation and the incredible human suffering that the 

NHC had predicted. 

By early morning on Sunday, three State Liaison Officers (SLOs) had been deployed to Alabama, Florida, and 

Mississippi.119 The U.S. Coast Guard, in preparation for anticipated operations, placed Disaster Assistance 

Response Teams (DARTs) on standby for deployment to Southeast Louisiana and evacuated its District 8 New 

Orleans Command Center to Integrated Support Command, Saint Louis, Missouri.120

Also early that morning, President Bush called Governor Blanco to urge that mandatory evacuation orders be issued 

for New Orleans.121 After receiving a call from President Bush, Governor Blanco and Mayor Nagin held a joint 

press conference during which the Mayor ordered a mandatory evacuation of New Orleans.122 Later that day, the 

President also participated in FEMA’s daily video teleconference with DHS headquarters, FEMA headquarters, 

FEMA’s regional offices, the National Hurricane Center, and representatives from Alabama, Florida, Georgia, 

Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia. The President personally encouraged State and local 

officials to take all precautions and get word out to their citizens; he offered the full support and resources of the 

Federal government.123 The President “received regular briefings, had countless conversations with Federal, State, 
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and local officials, and took extraordinary steps prior to landfall.”124 The Louisiana EOC reported that evacuations 

were going well, that it had no unmet needs, and that FEMA was “leaning forward” as far as possible. The 

Mississippi EOC similarly reported that “FEMA has been great” and that, after a slow start, evacuations were going 

well.125 Despite State assurances, the FEMA Director told all those on the call to be prepared for the impending 

requests for emergency aid from the States, expressed concern about the evacuation progress and the Superdome as 

a shelter of last resort, and echoed his previous day’s comments about the need to remain vigilant.126 Secretary 

Chertoff inquired into DOD’s level of engagement with FEMA, to ensure coordination of DOD support should it 

become necessary, and was assured by Director Brown that DOD was fully engaged.127 Following the video 

teleconference on Sunday, FEMA Director Michael Brown deployed from Washington to Baton Rouge.128 

After the video teleconference, Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff spoke with the participating State 

governors to ensure that their needs were being met. He later explained, “[m]y concern then was to talk off-line to 

the governors, to make sure the governors weren’t going to tell me something privately that maybe they didn’t want 

to share publicly, and they seemed satisfied at that point with the help they were getting.”129 

The President also issued a public statement, saying “[w]e cannot stress enough the danger this hurricane poses to 

Gulf Coast communities. I urge all citizens to put their own safety and the safety of their families first by moving to 

safe ground. Please listen carefully to instructions provided by State and local officials.”130

By afternoon on August 28, States and localities across the Gulf Coast had just hours before tropical storm-force 

winds would curtail their contra-flow and other pre-landfall preparations. State and local officials in Alabama and 

Mississippi issued evacuation orders for low-lying areas vulnerable to Hurricane Katrina’s storm surge and 

encouraged people in other areas to evacuate as well.131 

The Gulf Coast States’ planning and the contra-flow operations facilitated the safe evacuation of hundreds of 

thousands of people on Sunday, August 28.132 However, by the late afternoon, Hurricane Katrina began to affect 

evacuations even though landfall remained over twelve hours away. Increasing winds around New Orleans’ Louis 

Armstrong International Airport caused air carriers to begin reevaluating their plans and canceling flights. The last 

passenger flight departed at 4:30 PM CDT and the airport was officially closed at 6:43 PM CDT.

133 Contra-flow 

operations throughout the region ceased at 5:00 PM CDT due to high winds from Hurricane Katrina. Louisiana and 

Mississippi State officials continued to encourage people to evacuate even after contra-flow operations ceased. 

Governor Blanco later estimated that 1.2 million people, 92 percent of the affected population, evacuated prior to 

Hurricane Katrina’s second landfall.134 Still, tens of thousands, many of them the region’s most vulnerable, 

remained in areas most threatened by the approaching hurricane. 

By Sunday evening, shelter operations that had begun the previous day were in full force. Thousands of people 

displaced by Katrina were in shelters across the region. Federal, State, and local governments worked with the 

American Red Cross and other non-profit organizations to establish at least 114 shelters for over 28,000 people.135 

Texas had opened or placed on standby thirty-one shelters with room for 7,275 evacuees and established “shelter 

welcome centers” along I-20 and I-10 “to provide shelter information to evacuees.”136 The City of New Orleans, 

which had previously provided the Superdome as a shelter only for the special needs population, now opened it as a 

“shelter of last resort” for the general population.137 Additional supplies were brought in to support the growing 

Superdome population despite increasingly worsening conditions.138 It was estimated that there were 10,000 – 

12,000 people at the Superdome by midnight, including 300-500 special needs evacuees.139

As Hurricane Katrina drew nearer, the requests for Federal assistance increased. The day before landfall, FEMA 

received numerous requests for resources from Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi.140 Some last minute Louisiana 

requests were not met due to deteriorating weather conditions. For example, at noon on August 28, Louisiana 

requested 180,000 liters of water and 109,440 MREs for the Superdome. However, FEMA was only able to supply 

90,000 liters of water and 43,776 MREs before the storm struck or high winds forced other trucks to turn back 

before they could reach the stadium.141 Officials at all levels were unsure of who and how many people would come 

to the Dome and were modifying their special needs and commodities requests throughout the day. The American 

Red Cross determined the Superdome did not meet their safety criteria and refused to put their staff in harm’s way, 

choosing rather to deliver any necessary aid to the Dome as soon as the storm had passed.142
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During a press conference, in response to a question about the Superdome, the Mayor asserted that “the Superdome

can probably accommodate 50,000, 60,000, 70,000 people.” He advised that anyone seeking shelter there should

“come with enough food, [non] perishable items to last for three to five days. Come with blankets, with pillows. No

weapons, no alcohol, no drugs.”143

The Louisiana National Guard also pre-positioned some supplies at the Superdome. Approximately 10,000 MREs

and over 13,000 bottles of water were brought in on Saturday, when the stadium was opened as a special needs

shelter for evacuees with heightened care requirements.144 In addition to stocking the Superdome with food and

water, the Louisiana National Guard sent additional personnel to the Superdome throughout the day on Sunday,

August 28. The National Guard’s Special Reaction Team, a unit “highly trained in Law Enforcement missions,”

arrived at 7:00 AM CDT with forty-six members.145 The team “began conducting Law and Order/Area Security

missions.”146 More National Guard forces got to the Dome in the early afternoon. By 3:00 PM CDT, the 527th Ready

Reaction Forces had arrived in the Superdome with 220 personnel, and had as their principal mission crowd

control.147 The 225th Engineer Group joined that evening with 220 soldiers “to assist with security operations.”

Another 100 personnel from the 159th Fighter Wing came to help out with security.148 Medical personnel arrived at

the Superdome from the Louisiana National Guard contingent as well. “Five physicians, four nurses, six NCOs and

twenty medics” deployed to the Superdome on August 28.149 In all, “the total medical complement at the

Superdome totaled 71 medical personnel.”150

In addition to the mandatory evacuation order, Mayor Nagin announced Sunday that he had authorized New Orleans

Police Department members and other City officials to commandeer private property for evacuation and shelter

purposes, if necessary. Mayor Nagin said, “[t]he storm surge most likely will topple our levee system. So we are

preparing to deal with that also.”151 The Louisiana State Police reported that one of its 800 MHz communications

towers had been rendered inoperable and some troopers had been forced to seek shelter at hospitals.152 Additionally,

by August 28, fifteen of Louisiana’s sixty-four parishes had issued mandatory, recommended, or precautionary

evacuation orders.153

Hurricane Katrina: Federal Commodities on Hand Pre-Landfall (as of August 29, 2005)

Austin

El Paso

San

Antonio

Corpus Christi

Dallas

Fort Worth

Arlington

Oklahoma City

Tulsa

Little Rock

Houston

Memphis

Nashville

Baton Rouge

New Orleans

Jackson Montgomery

Atlanta

Columbia

Charlotte

Miami

Tampa

Jacksonville

Raleigh

Tallahassee

Fort Worth, TX:

Ice: 8 trailers (320,000 lbs.)

MREs: 42 trailers (919,296)

Camp Beauregard, LA:

Water: 39 trailers (702,000 liters)

Ice: 22 trailers (880,000 lbs.)

MREs: 14 trailers (306,432)

Alexandria, LA:

Ice: 17 trailers (680,000 lbs.)

Maxwell AFB, AL:

Water: 53 trailers (954,000 liters)

Ice: 16 trailers (640,000 lbs.)

MREs: 30 trailers (656,640)

Meridian, MS:

Water: 40 trailers (720,000

liters)

Ice: 21 trailers (840,000 lbs.)

Craig Field/Selma, AL:

Ice: 54 trailers (2,160,000 lbs.)

Palmetto, GA:

MREs: 46 trailers (1,006,848)

Superdome, New Orleans,

LA:

Water: 5 trailers (90,000 liters)

MRE 2 il (43 776)

Homestead, FL:

Water: 29 trailers (522,000 liters)

MREs: 15 trailers (328,320)

Mc Entire, SC:

Water: 30 trailers (540,000 liters)

MREs: 6 trailers (131,328)

Atlanta, GA:

MREs: 5 trailers

Montgomery, AL:

Ice: 25 trailers (1,000,000

Thomasville, GA:

Ice: 230 trailers (9,200,000 lbs.)

San Antonio, TX:

Ice: 45 trailers (1,800,000 lbs.)

Saufley Field, FL:

Water: 20 trailers (360,000

liters)

Barksdale AFB, LA:

Ice: 1 trailer (40,000 lbs.)
CHAPTER THREE: HURRICANE KATRINA — PRE-LANDFALL

THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 

-31- 

Pre-deployed assets were placed throughout the region to encircle the forecasted impact area. The amount of space 

required to house the large volumes of commodities and people required large industrial and military staging 

areas—often filling entire runways with hundreds of trailers—accessible to heavy equipment and aircraft. The 

staging areas were dispersed outside the projected path of the storm to avoid destruction of critical commodities and 

to maximize the ability to deploy to affected areas in the wake of the hurricane. On Sunday, FEMA opened a 

Federal logistics mobilization center at Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana,154 quickly placing a MERS team 

there with a mobile communication command vehicle.155 MERS assets were also deployed on-site into Mississippi, 

Florida, Georgia, and Texas, and other parts of Louisiana to support response operations.”156 Other Federally 

deployed teams in the region included seven Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces and thirty-three National 

Disaster Medical System teams, including Disaster Medical Assistance Teams, medical Strike Teams, a National 

Medical Response Team, Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams, and Veterinary Medical Assistance 

Teams. As of pre-landfall on the next day, a total of 43,776 MREs and 90,000 liters of water had been staged at the 

Superdome. Throughout the region there were pre-staged over 3.7 million liters of water, 4.6 million pounds of 

ice—with 13 million additional pounds of ice in cold storage ready to be deployed— and over 1.86 million MREs. 

Another 2.1 million MREs were positioned in Logistics Centers outside the region ready to be distributed (see 

Federal Commodities Map).157 

THE STORM APPROACHES 

As the sun set on Sunday, August 28, rain began to fall and the Gulf Coast had already started to feel Hurricane 

Katrina’s effects.158 The storm’s high winds and hail forced public safety agencies across the Gulf Coast to curtail 

their operations. Traffic remained heavy on some highways as people tried to escape the storm in the final hours 

before second landfall. In shelters, hospitals, nursing homes, and residences across the Gulf Coast, people held their 

breath, hoping that Hurricane Katrina’s impact would not be catastrophic. Federal, State, and local governments 

were poised to continue emergency activities as soon as Hurricane Katrina had passed. State and local governments, 

supported by the Federal government and FEMA, had carried out unprecedented preparations in comparison to those 

made for previous, “average” hurricanes. But Hurricane Katrina was not average, as would soon become vividly 

clear—it was a fierce hurricane with high wind speeds and a near-record storm surge that was heading directly 

toward a densely-populated urban area, much of which lay below sea level—six feet below on average across the 

city.159 In less than twenty-four hours, Hurricane Katrina would change the region, its people, and the Nation. 

THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 

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CHAPTER FOUR: A WEEK OF CRISIS — AUGUST 29 – SEPTEMBER 5 

Eastward from Lake Pontchartrain, across the Mississippi coast, to Alabama into Florida, millions of lives were 

changed in a day by a cruel and wasteful storm. 

—President George W. Bush, September 15, 20051

This chapter examines the response to Hurricane Katrina during the first week after landfall. The storm 

overwhelmed and, in some cases, incapacitated State and local emergency capabilities across the Gulf Coast, 

requiring an unprecedented Federal response to help evacuate, rescue, shelter, care for, and safeguard Hurricane 

Katrina’s victims. The chapter discusses some of the extraordinary efforts taken by Federal departments and 

agencies in concert with our partners from the State and local governments, non-governmental organizations, and 

the private sector to respond to the storm’s devastating impact. It also identifies deficiencies in actions taken and 

highlights actions we must take to improve our collective efforts in the future. 

LANDFALL 

Hurricane Katrina made landfall as a powerful Category 3 storm at 6:10 AM CDT on Monday, August 29 in 

Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana. The massive storm continued to move north, rolling over portions of the Louisiana 

coast before its eye came ashore near the mouth of the Pearl River in Mississippi. At the time, Hurricane Katrina 

had sustained winds over 115 mph and reported gusts as high as 130 mph.2

 The storm rapidly lost strength as it 

pushed inland through southern and central Mississippi; by 1:00 PM CDT, it had weakened to a Category 1 

hurricane.3

 Six hours later, as it passed northwest of Meridian, Mississippi, Hurricane Katrina was further 

downgraded to a tropical storm.4

Hurricane Katrina generated violent waves and a massive storm surge before colliding with the Gulf Coast.5

 

According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Hurricane Katrina produced a storm 

surge as high as twenty-seven feet in Louisiana and Mississippi. Surge waters flooded over six miles inland in many 

parts of coastal Mississippi and up to twelve miles inland along rivers and bays. Hurricane Katrina also produced 

“very significant” storm surges approximately ten feet high as far east as Mobile, Alabama, where it caused flooding 

several miles inland along Mobile Bay.6

Disaster in the Gulf Coast 

Hurricane Katrina’s powerful winds, storm surge, and subsequent flooding destroyed communities and 

infrastructure along the Gulf Coast. The storm inflicted a terrible toll of human suffering, killing at least 1,330 and 

injuring thousands.7

 The Nation empathized with the harrowing stories of survival, loss, and family separation. 

President George W. Bush described this hurricane as “one of the worst natural disasters in our Nation's history.”8

The nightmare scenario that some had predicted prior to Hurricane Katrina’s landfall became a reality as those on 

the ground saw the devastation for the first time. According to NOAA, “entire coastal communities were 

obliterated, some left with little more than the foundations upon which homes, businesses, government facilities, and 

other historical buildings once stood.”9

 Destroyed homes, beached vessels, collapsed bridges, uprooted trees, and 
CHAPTER FOUR: A WEEK OF CRISIS — AUGUST 29 – SEPTEMBER 5 

THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 

-34- 

other debris littered the ground and blocked waterways. After surveying the region from the air on August 30, 

Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour likened the scene to that of a nuclear detonation, stating, “I can only imagine 

that this is what Hiroshima looked like sixty years ago.”10

Mississippi suffered extensive damage in all counties south of Interstate 20 and east of Interstate 55.11 The city of 

Biloxi was “decimated,” according to municipal government spokesman Vincent Creel. “It looks like a bomb hit 

it.”12 Major east-west highways in southern Mississippi became impassable due to storm debris: US-90 closed 

across the entire state and I-10 east-bound closed to the public, with only one west-bound lane open for emergency 

responders.13 Hurricane Katrina left the downtown streets of Gulfport, Mississippi, under ten feet of water14 and 

structures flooded for miles inland.15 A Department of Homeland Security (DHS) report described the 

communications infrastructure in Biloxi and Gulfport as “non-existent.”16 In the words of Transportation Secretary 

Norman Mineta: “The Port of Gulfport, Mississippi was left with virtually nothing and must rebuild almost from 

scratch.”17 The storm devastated Waveland, Mississippi, wiping out all the local resources, including those that 

municipal officials had staged ten miles north of town.18 Ninety-five percent of Waveland’s residential and 

commercial structures were severely damaged.19 Testifying before Congress a week after landfall, Governor 

Barbour lamented: “The 80 miles across the Mississippi Gulf Coast is largely destroyed. A town like Waveland 

Mississippi has no inhabitable structures—none.”20 Alabama suffered significant damage as well. For example, 

large amounts of debris necessitated the closure of Mobile’s port.21

Hurricane Katrina inflicted devastating damage upon the region’s energy and communications infrastructures. The 

Department of Energy (DOE) reported “unprecedented damage” to the U.S. energy sector22 and noted that 2.5 

million customers in Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi reported power outages.23 Hurricane Katrina devastated 

communications infrastructure across the Gulf Coast, incapacitating telephone service, police and fire dispatch 

centers, and emergency radio systems. Almost three million customer phone lines were knocked out, telephone 

switching centers were seriously damaged, and 1,477 cell towers were incapacitated.24 Most of the radio stations 

and many television stations in the New Orleans area were knocked off the air.25 Paul McHale, the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, summarized the damage by stating, “The magnitude of the storm was 

such that the local communications system wasn’t simply degraded; it was, at least for a period of time, 

destroyed.”26

The Gulf Coast region’s health care infrastructure sustained extraordinary damage.27 Such damage was particularly 

evident in New Orleans, where Hurricane Katrina destroyed several large hospitals, rendered many others 

inoperable, and forced the closure of nearly all other health care facilities. The region’s most vulnerable residents 

and those individuals with special needs suffered terribly from Hurricane Katrina’s impact and inadequate or 

nonexistent evacuation operations.28 In addition, the storm stranded hundreds of hospital patients inside dark and 

flooded facilities that lacked basic supplies.29 Some patients succumbed to the horrible conditions before they could 

be evacuated.30 At St. Rita’s Nursing Home in St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana, thirty-four nursing home residents 

drowned in the floods resulting from Hurricane Katrina.31

New Orleans 

New Orleans sustained extensive damage as Hurricane Katrina passed to its east on the morning of August 29. 

Many high-rise buildings suffered blown out windows, while roof sections of the Louisiana Superdome—where 

over ten thousand people were sheltered—were stripped away. Mayor Ray Nagin later reported that in New 

Orleans, “primary and secondary power sources, sewerage and draining systems and communication and power 

lines were incapacitated.”32

The storm surge, extreme amounts of rain, and high winds stressed the city’s complex 350 mile levee system to its 

breaking point.33 Several of the levees and floodwalls were overtopped, and some were breached throughout the day 

of landfall. It was these overtoppings and breaches of the levee system that led to the catastrophic flooding of New 

Orleans. In addition to the levee and floodwall breaches, many of the pumping stations—which would have 

otherwise removed water from the city and prevented some of the flooding—stopped working due to power outages 

and flooded pumping equipment. 
CHAPTER FOUR: A WEEK OF CRISIS — AUGUST 29 – SEPTEMBER 5

THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED

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On the day of landfall, authoritative reporting from the field was extremely difficult to obtain because of the

widespread destruction of communications infrastructure, the incapacitation of many State and local responders, and

the lack of Federal representatives in the city. As a result, local, State, and Federal officials were forced to depend

on a variety of conflicting reports from a combination of media, government and private sources, many of which

continued to provide inaccurate or incomplete information throughout the day, further clouding the understanding of

what was occurring in New Orleans. In fact, some uncertainty about the specific causes and times of the breaches

and overtoppings persists to this day.

In addition to the dearth of reliable reporting regarding the situation in New Orleans, there was widespread

confusion and misuse of the terms ‘breach’ and ‘overtopping’ by observers and reporters who did not fully

understand the distinction between the two terms, or whose observations were not sufficient to enable differentiation

of one from the other. Some overtopping of the levees was expected due to the intensity of the storm, which would

result in localized flooding.34 However, such overtopping would not have led to the catastrophic effects that

occurred due to the levee and floodwall breaches. Further, the New Orleans Flood and Hurricane Protection System

is designed so that individual breaches will not lead to catastrophic flooding. The compartmented design, with four

main basins, is intended to minimize the threat of flood to the entire system.35 Thus, had only one basin experienced

serious overtopping or a breach, it would have been possible to avoid the catastrophic flooding New Orleans

experienced.

Since some flooding was expected and severe flooding feared, the most important priority of local, State, and

Federal officials was search and rescue. In anticipation of the storm on Sunday night and Monday morning,

emergency responders were standing by to begin search and rescue as soon as it was safe to proceed.36 This

emphasis on search and rescue continued throughout Monday evening, with officials encouraging those who had

evacuated prior to landfall to stay away so they did not impede emergency responders’ efforts.37 By Tuesday

morning when the breaches of the levees had been confirmed, Federal, State, and local officials were already fully

The New Orleans Flood and Hurricane Protection System

Much of New Orleans is located below sea level; with the Mississippi River to the south, Lake Pontchartrain to

the north, and Lake Borgne to the east, the area is prone to flooding from the river, the lakes, and the Gulf of

Mexico. Development of a system to protect the city from flooding began when the city was founded in the

early 1700s and has grown with the increase in population and expanded into additional flood prone areas. The

New Orleans Flood and Hurricane Protection System is complex and massive, consisting of 350 miles of levees,

which are embankments, usually earthen, that serve as flood barriers. The System also includes floodwalls,

hundreds of bridges, closable gates, culverts and canals that facilitate transportation in and out of the system. It

is comprised of a series of four main compartmented basins designed to limit the flooding impacts on the entire

system resulting from individual failures of levees and floodwalls. In addition, large pump stations are used to

pump out and redirect water from the city. These pumps are designed to mitigate flooding that results from

significant rainfall and can, over time, remove water from moderate overtoppings.

Currently, the levees offer protection ranging from eleven up to approximately seventeen and a half feet above

sea level. The current system was designed to withstand a Mississippi River flood the size of the Flood of 1927

and a hurricane with wind conditions similar to a very strong Category 2 hurricane.

Breaching and Overtopping

Overtopping is a term used to describe the situation where the water level rises above the height of the levee or

floodwall and consequently overtops, or flows over the structure. A breach is a break in the levee or floodwall.

A prolonged overtopping can actually cause a levee or floodwall breach. In general, a breach can lead to more

significant flooding than an overtopping since breaches take time to repair and until repaired continue to allow

water to flow until the water level has receded below the height of the breach. Overtopping, on the other hand,

will stop as soon as the water level recedes below the top of the levee or floodwall. Although the consequences

are significantly different, from outward appearances, it is often difficult to differentiate a breach from an

overtopping.
CHAPTER FOUR: A WEEK OF CRISIS — AUGUST 29 – SEPTEMBER 5

THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED

-36-

engaged in search and rescue efforts.38 Regardless of the cause of the flooding, search and rescue had been and

continued to be the first response priority.

As early as 9:12 AM EDT on August 29, the National Weather Service (NWS) received a report of a levee breach and

shortly thereafter issued a flash flood warning, stating, “A levee breech [sic] occurred along the Industrial Canal at

Tennessee Street. Three to eight feet of water is expected due to the breach.”39 However, as late as 6:00 PM EDT that

day, the DHS Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) reported to senior DHS and White House officials

that, “Preliminary reports indicate the levees in New Orleans have not been breached, however an assessment is still

pending.”40

A sampling of additional reporting follows.

The first DHS HSOC report that referenced potential levee issues was distributed at 10:50 AM EDT on August 29,

and stated, “Some levees in the greater New Orleans area could be overtopped.”41 At 11:32 AM EDT, a DHS HSOC

report stated that, after a call with State and Parish officials, “Major General Landreneau [Adjutant General for

Louisiana] said that emergency personnel stationed at Jackson Barracks have confirmed that the waters are rising,

although he could not say whether the cause was a levee breach or overtopping.”42 At a Noon FEMA

teleconference, local officials gave spotty reporting to participating State and Federal officials. As DHS

summarized the reports, “Some of the LA Parishes have 8 to 10 feet of water. . . . Some levee leakage, but no

reported failures to date . . . levee in New Orleans is overflowing.”43

Mid-afternoon on August 29, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) notified DHS of a reported levee

overtopping in St. Bernard’s Parish, a reported levee breach in the West Bank, and a small breach in Orleans Parish

reported by local firefighters.44

At 6 PM EDT aboard a U.S. Coast Guard helicopter, Marty Bahamonde, a FEMA Public Affairs Official, observed

the extent of the flooding and was “struck by how accurate” the earlier local reporting was of the levee breaches.45

He then called FEMA Director Michael Brown and other FEMA officials with his eyewitness account at

approximately 8 PM EDT that day.46 Director Brown has testified that he subsequently called the White House to

report the flooding information he received from Bahamonde.47 Following the calls, Mr. Bahamonde arranged a

conference call with State, regional, and FEMA officials to recount what he had seen.48 An HSOC report marked

10:30 PM EDT, but not received at the White House until 12:02 AM EDT the next day, summarized the conference call

and reported Mr. Bahamonde’s observations on the extent of flooding throughout New Orleans.49

By morning light and with the passage of the storm, the extent of the flooding was apparent. At 6 AM EDT on

August 30, the HSOC issued a report describing levee breaches at the Industrial Canal, 17th Street, and at Lake

Ponchatrain.50

Throughout the morning and early afternoon on August 30, the USACE continued to determine the extent of the

damage and assess whether the levees could be repaired.51 At Governor Blanco’s 3 PM EDT press conference on

August 30, FEMA Director Michael Brown stated that no resources in fixing the levees would be spared, and that

the USACE was diligently working on a repair plan.52 The USACE worked throughout the remainder of Tuesday

but despite best efforts, by Wednesday morning, it was becoming clear that the repairs could take weeks or months.

New Orleans flooded as the levees and floodwalls

gave way and the pumping stations stopped

operating; at its height, approximately 80 percent of

New Orleans was filled with water up to twenty feet

deep.53 This unprecedented flooding transformed

Hurricane Katrina into a “catastrophe within a

catastrophe”54 as the storm shattered the lives of countless residents and presented State and local officials with

challenges far exceeding their capabilities.

LESSON LEARNED RECOMMENDATION 15:

Establish a National Operations Center to coordinate the

National response and provide situational awareness and

a common operating picture for the entire Federal

government.
CHAPTER FOUR: A WEEK OF CRISIS — AUGUST 29 – SEPTEMBER 5

THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED

-37-

Hurricane Katrina’s Impact on State and Local Response

Many State and local public safety agencies suffered extensive damage to their facilities and equipment. The Grand

Isle (Louisiana) Fire Department suffered “total destruction.”55 Fire departments in the Mississippi cities of Biloxi

and Gulfport experienced similar fates, while Slidell, Louisiana, had to close over half its stations.56 The Pascagoula

(Mississippi) Police Department lost one-third of its vehicles. Some emergency personnel did not report to work.

Warren J. Riley, Superintendent of the New Orleans Police Department, testified before Congress that, “Much has

been said about officers abandoning their position during the storm, and it is true that about 147 officers abandoned

their positions. However, they are no longer a part of the New Orleans Police Department.”57 Flooding in New

Orleans on August 30 forced the closure of the Orleans Parish Emergency Operations Center (EOC).58 In fact, the

New Orleans Mayor’s Office operated out of a Hyatt Hotel for several days after Hurricane Katrina’s landfall,

unable to establish reliable communications with anyone outside the hotel for nearly forty-eight hours.59 This meant

that the Mayor was neither able to effectively command the local efforts, nor was he able to guide the State and

Federal support for two days following the storm.

The complete devastation of the communications infrastructure left responders without a reliable network to use for

coordinating emergency response operations. Flooding blocked access to the police and fire dispatch centers in New

Orleans; neither 911 service nor public safety radio communications functioned sufficiently.60 In addition, the State

of Louisiana’s 800 MHz radio system, designed to be the backbone of mutual aid communications, ceased

functioning, and repairs were delayed for several days.61 Louisiana State Senator Robert Barham, chairman of the

State Senate's homeland security committee, summed up the situation in Louisiana by stating, “People could not

communicate. It got to the point that people were literally writing messages on paper, putting them in bottles and

dropping them from helicopters to other people on the ground.”62

Local emergency response officials found it difficult or impossible to establish functioning incident command

structures in these conditions. Such structures would have better enabled local response officials to direct

operations, manage assets, obtain situational awareness, and generate requests for assistance to State authorities.

Without an incident command structure, it was difficult for local leaders to guide the local response efforts, much

less command them. Members of the Hammond (Louisiana) Fire Department reported receiving “a lot of ‘I don’t

knows’ from [local] government officials”; another Louisiana firefighter stated, “the command structure broke

down—we were literally left to our own devices.”63

State and local emergency responders throughout the

affected region struggled to perform urgent response

missions, including emergency medical services,

firefighting, law enforcement, search and rescue, and

support to shelters. Emergency responders operated

in an environment involving extreme heat, chemicals,

contaminated mud, downed power lines, and standing

water.64 The storm’s surge flooded three Superfund65

toxic waste sites in the New Orleans area, and

destroyed or compromised at least 170 drinking

water facilities and forty-seven wastewater treatment

works along the Gulf Coast.66 Emergency responders

repeatedly exposed themselves to floodwater,

chemicals, bacteria, and debris to perform life-saving

missions.67 Their willingness to work in these hazardous conditions is a powerful testament to their bravery and

professionalism.

Governors Barbour and Blanco requested additional National Guard assets from other states through the Emergency

Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) to assist State and local emergency responders.68 National Guard forces

continued to deploy to the region as States responded in the days following landfall.69

LESSON LEARNED: The Department of Homeland

Security, in coordination with the Environmental

Protection Agency, should oversee efforts to improve

the Federal government’s capability to quickly gather

environmental data and to provide the public and

emergency responders the most accurate information

available, to determine whether it is safe to operate in a

disaster environment or to return after evacuation. In

addition, the Department of Homeland Security should

work with its State and local homeland security partners

to plan and to coordinate an integrated approach to

debris removal during and after a disaster.
CHAPTER FOUR: A WEEK OF CRISIS — AUGUST 29 – SEPTEMBER 5

THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED

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Search and Rescue

Hurricane Katrina’s storm surge and subsequent flooding necessitated one of the largest search and rescue

operations in the Nation’s history. Thousands of firefighters, police officers, and medical personnel across all levels

of government, together with citizen volunteers, braved life-threatening conditions to rescue people and animals

from flooded buildings. Search and rescue missions were most urgent in New Orleans, where thousands needed to

be plucked from rooftops and attics after the levee system failed. As Mayor Ray Nagin stated: “Thousands of

people were stranded on their rooftops, or in attics, needing to be rescued. . . . Our first responders were jumping

into the water to rescue people as 911 operators were consumed with traumatic calls for rescue. They received

thousand upon thousands of frantic and desperate calls.”70

Federal search and rescue assets from the Coast Guard, FEMA Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Task Forces,71 the

Department of Defense (DOD),72 and other Federal agencies worked in concert with State and local responders to

rescue tens of thousands of people. Coast Guard teams alone ultimately rescued and evacuated over 33,000

people—over six times the number in an average year—73earning themselves the name the “New Orleans Saints.”74

Immediately following Hurricane Katrina’s second landfall, Coast Guard assets began conducting rescue operations

throughout the Gulf Region. Governor Barbour later testified that, “The night Katrina struck, Coast Guard

helicopter crews from Mobile conducted search and rescue operations on the Coast. These fearless young men, who

hung from helicopters on ropes, dangling through the air in the dark that first night, pulled people off of roofs and

out of trees.”75 FEMA US&R teams also performed exceptionally well, ultimately rescuing over 6,500 people.76

Within four hours of landfall, Army National Guard helicopters were airborne and actively performing rescue

missions, with other National Guard personnel joining the effort on the ground.77

Despite these successes, search and rescue efforts revealed the need for greater coordination between the two

constituent components of search and rescue: Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) and civil search and rescue (SAR).

US&R refers to the specialized mission of rescuing victims trapped in collapsed structures.78 In contrast, SAR

constitutes all other missions, such as maritime, aeronautical, and land rescues.79 However, there is no overarching

plan that incorporates both aspects of search and rescue. The absence of such a plan led to coordination problems

between US&R teams and SAR teams. Some teams displayed their own initiative to fill the gap in unified

command, determining their own rescue priorities, areas to be searched, and locations to drop off the people they

rescued.80 Unfortunately, in some cases, rescuers were forced to leave people on highways where they were

exposed to the elements and in continuing need of transportation, food, and water.81

Under the NRP, FEMA is authorized as the primary

agency to coordinate US&R through Emergency Support

Function-9 (ESF-9).82 However, because the NRP

focuses only on urban search and rescue, combined with

the fact that US&R teams are neither adequately nor

consistently trained or equipped to perform rescues in a water environment, the NRP failed to anticipate, plan for,

and ultimately integrate all of the Federal government’s search and rescue assets during Katrina. For example, the

Department of Interior (DOI) has valuable expertise in operating watercraft and conducting civil search and rescue

operations. Unfortunately, because DOI is not formally considered a part of ESF-9, DOI’s offers to deploy shallowwater rescue boats during the response apparently never reached the operational level. Had DOI been considered a

supporting agency under ESF-9, its water assets would likely have been effectively integrated into response

operations.

Post-Landfall Evacuations in New Orleans

As conditions in New Orleans worsened on August 30, due to the massive flooding, State and local officials began

organizing a mass evacuation of the city. Since neither the Louisiana nor the New Orleans evacuation plans

addressed evacuation protocols for post-landfall,83 State and local officials worked with FEMA, DOD, and the

Department of Transportation (DOT) to conduct the post-landfall evacuation.84

The Superdome presented the most immediate concern to officials. The population at the stadium continued to grow

as thousands of people migrated there from their flooded homes.85 The high floodwaters cut off access to the

LESSON LEARNED: The Department of

Homeland Security should lead an interagency

review of current policies and procedures to ensure

effective integration of all Federal search and rescue
CHAPTER FOUR: A WEEK OF CRISIS — AUGUST 29 – SEPTEMBER 5 

THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 

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Superdome, which made re-supply, evacuations, and other operations extremely difficult.86 The facility had lost 

power during the storm, leaving only dim lighting from emergency generators. Louisiana National Guard personnel 

worked to protect the stadium’s emergency generators from rising floodwaters.87 The Louisiana National Guard 

later reported that, “The vast majority of the sheltered evacuees were good people who were trapped in a bad 

situation.”88 Conditions at the stadium became increasingly difficult due to the large numbers and the lack of air 

conditioning or running water. 89 On the morning of August 30, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 

(HHS) assessed the Superdome as “uninhabitable.”90 

Governor Blanco visited the Superdome on August 30 and concluded the stadium needed to be evacuated “as soon 

as possible.”91 Louisiana State and local officials could not manage a post-landfall evacuation operation of this 

magnitude without additional support. Shortly thereafter, FEMA personnel at the Superdome requested that FEMA 

headquarters provide buses to transport evacuees from the stadium. Within an hour of receiving the call, FEMA 

tasked the Department of Transportation—as coordinator of ESF-1, Transportation—to support the evacuation 

operations. DOT began assembling a bus fleet of over 1,100 vehicles, equal in size to some of the largest transit 

agencies in the Nation to evacuate thousands of persons from the Superdome and other parts of New Orleans. 

Louisiana and Federal officials began contacting other States to relocate evacuees to their cities.92 They worked 

together to develop plans to transport the people in the Superdome to out-of-state shelters. By the morning of 

August 31, Governor Blanco reached an agreement with Texas Governor Rick Perry to evacuate the thousands at the 

Superdome to the Houston Astrodome.93 Significant numbers of federally-contracted buses began to arrive at the 

Superdome the evening of August 31.94 Initially, evacuees were loaded onto buses and driven all the way to 

Houston. As the Houston Astrodome began to fill, however, Federal and State officials identified alternative 

destinations in multiple States and the District of Columbia.95 

Both DOD and DOT worked with State and local officials to deliver food and water as well as develop plans to 

evacuate people from three other locations in the city: Algiers Point, the Convention Center, and the Interstate-10 

(I-10) cloverleaf.96 The Governor’s office received reports of the crowds at the Ernest N. Morial Memorial 

Convention Center and the I-10 cloverleaf on August 31.97 Reports began to arrive that large crowds had gathered 

at the Convention Center even though city officials had never intended it to be a shelter.98 Without strong public 

messaging to inform them otherwise, many of these people had simply assumed that the Convention Center—as a 

large public building on high ground—would be a safe gathering place.99 No food or water was pre-staged there 

because the facility was neither a shelter nor a designated evacuation point.100 

In addition, large numbers of people gathered or were deposited by search and rescue teams—who were conducting 

boat and helicopter rescue operations with neither a coordinated plan nor a unified command structure—atop raised 

surfaces, such as the I-10 cloverleaf downtown. People brought to the raised surfaces as they transitioned to safety 

had little shelter from the sun and were in ninety-eight degree heat.101 Faced with this increasingly dire situation, 

Governor Blanco used her executive authority to commandeer private school buses as evacuation assets, since many 

of the city’s buses had been parked in lots that had flooded.102 The Governor directed school buses to ferry the 

people atop the I-10 cloverleaf to safety outside of the city.103 

By the morning of September 2, approximately fifteen thousand people had been evacuated from the Superdome, 

leaving approximately 5,500 remaining. Reports on exact numbers vary because the Superdome and Convention 

Center populations swelled after landfall, as additional evacuees continued to arrive while the evacuation was 

underway. “The last 300 [people] in the Superdome climbed aboard buses Saturday... Evacuations of the last 

remaining [people] at the arena were halted before dawn Saturday as authorities diverted buses to help some 25,000 

refugees at the New Orleans Convention Center... The Texas Air National Guard estimated that between 2,000 and 

5,000 people remained at the Superdome early on Saturday...” On Saturday, September 3, a representative of the 

State “Office of Emergency Preparedness put the figure at 2,000, and said [people] had recently begun flocking 

there not for shelter, but to escape New Orleans after they heard buses were arriving.”104

Except for the ill or injured, no one was evacuated from the overcrowded Convention Center until Saturday, 

September 3.105 By that point, however, over 35,000 people had been evacuated from New Orleans, including all 

the ill or injured at the Superdome.106 As the evacuation progressed, the situation at the Convention Center and the 

Superdome stabilized, with food, water, and medical supplies available at both locations.107 By September 4, DHS 
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reported that the “Superdome and Convention Center have been evacuated; however, displaced persons continue to

migrate to these sites and [will be] evacuated as required.”108

In addition to ground operations, a joint DHS, DOT, and DOD airlift successfully evacuated over 24,000 people,

constituting the largest domestic civilian airlift on U.S. soil in history.109 Federal departments and agencies worked

with State, local, and private sector officials to coordinate the operation. After the Federal Aviation Administration

restored traffic control and runway operations at New Orleans’s Louis Armstrong International Airport, DOT

coordinated with private air carriers and the Department of Defense’s Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)

to begin the massive airlift. DOT invited the Air Transport Association, the trade organization of principal U.S.

airlines, to come to the NRCC to help coordinate with air carriers volunteering their services. In addition to these

civilian flights, the Department of Defense simultaneously conducted a major medical airlift from the airport.110 The

DHS Transportation Security Administration (TSA) provided screeners and Federal Air Marshals to maintain

security. Search and rescue helicopters brought people directly to the airport, while Federal Protective Service

personnel escorted busloads of evacuees from the Superdome.111 The TSA and other security personnel confiscated

hundreds of weapons from evacuees at the airport, including ninety in the first three days of the airlift.112

Federal transportation coordinators had little situational awareness regarding the movement of evacuees due to the

complete breakdown of the region’s communications infrastructure. Specifically, Federal and State officials often

had difficulty coordinating the departures and destinations of the large number of buses, trains, and aircraft involved

in the evacuations. In one case, a fully provisioned train with room for six hundred evacuees left the city with fewer

than one hundred passengers.113 Buses

and flights of evacuees were sometimes

diverted, while en route, to new

destinations without the knowledge of

officials at either the original or new

destinations. Without prior notice of the

evacuees’ arrival times, States sometimes

had difficulty accommodating the enormous influx of people. In addition, some passengers reported that they had

not been informed of their destinations when they boarded the evacuating flights and had no idea where they were

when their flights landed. Speaking about the evacuees, Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee relayed, “They have

been treated like boxes, in many cases, warehoused.”114

Public Safety and Security

Law enforcement agencies across the Gulf Coast region faced countless challenges in the aftermath of Hurricane

Katrina. People began looting in some areas as soon as the storm relented.115 Violent crimes were committed

against law enforcement officers and other emergency response personnel.116 The storm’s damage to equipment,

facilities, communications, and jails limited the ability of authorities to respond to calls for help and to combat

lawlessness.117 It is clear that violent crime was less prevalent than initially reported, although reliable crime

statistics are unavailable. Exaggerated, unconfirmed claims of violent crimes and lawlessness took on a life of their

own in the absence of effective public information to counter them.118

Security problems in the Gulf Coast, both actual and perceived, obstructed the speed and efficiency of the Federal

response and in some cases temporarily halted relief efforts.119 Security concerns suspended search and rescue

missions,120 delayed the restoration of communications infrastructure,121 and impeded medical support missions.122

On August 31, most of the New Orleans police force was redirected from search and rescue missions to respond to

the looting, detracting from the priority mission of saving lives. The lawlessness also delayed restoration of

essential private sector services such as power, water, and telecommunications.123 Federal officials attempted to

have law enforcement officers protect emergency responders against security threats.124 However, due to a lack of

planning, arranging this support took several days, during which the situation grew worse.

A limited number of Federal law enforcement personnel were already assigned to local offices in New Orleans

following the storm and immediately began organizing efforts to restore law and order, but additional Federal

assistance was clearly needed. The Secretary of Homeland Security and the U.S. Attorney General directed their

respective departments to send Federal law enforcement officers to assist the beleaguered city.125 By September 3,

LESSON LEARNED: The Department of Transportation, in

coordination with other appropriate departments of the Executive

Branch, must also be prepared to conduct mass evacuation

operations when disasters overwhelm or incapacitate State and local

governments.
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over 1,600 Federal law enforcement officers were in New Orleans.126 The Louisiana Governor submitted a request

to the Attorney General on September 4, formally seeking assistance from the Department of Justice (DOJ) pursuant

to the Emergency Federal Law Enforcement Assistance Act. After coordinating with the Secretary of Homeland

Security, the Attorney General granted the request the same day. Two days later, Governor Blanco sent a similar

request to the Secretary, requesting DHS law enforcement support. The Secretary granted the request and sent

additional DHS law enforcement officers to Louisiana.127

By September 5, the Department of Homeland Security had provided 1,444 officers and the Department of Justice

had deployed 566 officers.128 The numbers of Federal law enforcement officers continued to grow as the

Department of Agriculture (USDA), Department of Interior, the Department of Treasury, the Department of

Veterans’ Affairs, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service deployed

personnel to the Gulf Coast.129 Federal law enforcement officers performed such missions as protecting Federal

property, conducting search and rescue missions, and assisting local law enforcement, particularly in New Orleans.

However, several departments and agencies noted that they were impeded in their ability to provide immediate

assistance due to the need for deputization to enforce State or Federal laws.130 Federal planning should have

anticipated the need for such deputization procedures.

Hurricane Katrina also crippled the region’s criminal justice system. The exodus of the Gulf Coast population

resulted in a significant loss of accountability of many persons under law enforcement supervision (e.g., registered

sex offenders, probationers).131 The court systems in

the disaster area ceased to function, causing a

backlog of criminal prosecutions.132 Prisoners were

often hastily evacuated which created significant

challenges for recordkeeping associated with prisoner

movement. There was some initial confusion in the

process of identifying and relocating prisoners;

however, each eventually was accounted for.133 The

strain on the criminal justice system is largely attributable to the absence of contingency plans for these problems at

all levels of government. While these issues remain foreseeable consequences of any major disaster, disaster plans

did not adequately address the response necessary to prevent the problems encountered during the aftermath of

Katrina.

Federal Incident Management

The magnitude of the storm’s destruction presented three immediate challenges for the Federal government. First,

the sheer amount of destruction over such a large area created an enormous demand for emergency assistance such

as fuel, medical supplies, food, shelter, and water. This demand, coupled with the austere conditions throughout the

Gulf Coast following Katrina’s landfall, exceeded FEMA’s standard disaster delivery capabilities and processes.

Mr. Scott Wells, who served as Deputy Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) in Louisiana, later testified to Congress

that “the response was not robust; it was not enough for the catastrophe at hand.”134 Second, localities needed

assistance to perform emergency response operations and re-establish incident command. However, Hurricane

Katrina’s impact across the Gulf Coast region limited the use of normal mutual aid agreements, which rely on

neighboring cities and counties for assistance. In this case, the neighboring jurisdictions were overwhelmed

themselves and unable to provide assistance elsewhere. Assistance had to come from States outside the region and

from the Federal government. This requirement for an active Federal role in emergency response operations was

most pronounced in New Orleans. Finally, the communications problems had a debilitating effect on response

efforts in the region and the overall national effort. Officials from national leaders to emergency responders on the

ground lacked the level of situational awareness necessary for a prompt and effective response to the catastrophe.

This was a recipe for an inefficient and ineffective Federal response.

On August 30, Secretary Chertoff declared Hurricane Katrina to be an Incident of National Significance (INS), the

first ever formal declaration of this designation.135 On the same day, he also appointed FEMA Director Michael

Brown as the Principal Federal Official (PFO) for the Hurricane Katrina response.136 A PFO is designated to

facilitate Federal support to the unified command structure and coordinate overall Federal incident management.

 The PFO also provides a primary point of contact and situational awareness locally for the Secretary of Homeland

LESSON LEARNED: The Department of Justice, in

coordination with the Department of Homeland

Security, should examine Federal responsibilities for

support to State and local law enforcement and criminal

justice systems during emergencies and then build

operational plans, procedures, and policies to ensure an

effective Federal law enforcement response.
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Security. However, according to the NRP, “The PFO does not direct or replace the incident command structure

established at the incident, nor does the PFO have directive authority over the [Senior Federal Law Enforcement

Official], FCO, or other Federal and State officials.” 137 The FCO retains his authorities to coordinate Federal

response activities under the Stafford Act.138 As PFO, Brown had no authority over the FCOs. However, as the

Director of FEMA, Brown was vested with the authority to directly oversee the FCOs,139 thereby mitigating the PFO

limitations. His subsequent PFO replacement had no such authority to work around this impediment, and as a result,

was eventually made FCO as well. The multiple Federal coordinators with varying authorities frustrated State and

local officials in the region.140

Also on August 30, DHS initiated a virtual National Joint Information Center (JIC)141 and conducted the first of

what would become daily National Incident Communications Conference Line (NICCL) calls with other Federal

departments and agencies.

An important limiting factor of the Federal response, as discussed in the Primer chapter, is that the Federal response

is predicated on an incident being handled at the lowest jurisdictional level possible. A base assumption to this

approach is that, even in cases where State and local governments are overwhelmed, they would maintain the

necessary incident command structure to direct Federal assets to where they are most needed. In the case of Katrina,

the local government had been destroyed and the State government was incapacitated, and thus the Federal

government had to take on the additional roles of performing incident command and other functions it would

normally rely upon the State and local governments to provide.

The Joint Field Office (JFO), which builds upon

the State and local incident command structure,

provides a single location for all Federal

departments and agencies to acquire situational

awareness, direction, mission assignments, and a

forum to interface with other agencies.142 It is

essential for ensuring that all Federal response

elements possess a common operating picture and synchronize their response operations and resources. However, in

the case of Hurricane Katrina, the JFO was not established at the outset, and did not function as envisioned when it

was established. Key PFO staff positions had not been identified prior to landfall, which forced Director Brown to

assemble his staff in the midst of the disaster.143 Brown was still working on a PFO organizational chart on the

evening of August 31, almost sixty hours after landfall. Key components of the Baton Rouge JFO were still being

assembled in the two weeks that followed.144

The JFO was located in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, near the State of Louisiana Emergency Operations Center (EOC).

A Federal coordination center was not immediately established in New Orleans. The NRP does not contemplate

subordinate structures to the JFO to coordinate Federal response actions in the event of multiple or geographically

widespread catastrophes (i.e., multiple “ground zeros”).145 In the absence of a command center near the major

incident sites and a fully functioning JFO, agencies independently deployed resources, operated autonomously, and

generated disparate reporting streams back to Federal authorities locally and in Washington.146 This resulted in an

often inconsistent and inaccurate operating picture of the disaster area for senior decision makers, duplication of

efforts, gaps in addressing requests for assistance, and the inefficient allocation of resources.

Military Assistance

Active duty military and National Guard personnel provided critical emergency response and security support to the

Gulf Coast during the height of the crisis. State active duty and Title 32 National Guard forces that deployed to

Louisiana and Mississippi operated under the command of their respective Governors.147 Title 10 active duty forces,

on the other hand, fell under the command of the President and had more limited civil response authority.148 On

August 30, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England authorized U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM)

and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take all appropriate measures to plan and conduct disaster relief operations in support

of FEMA.149 USNORTHCOM established Joint Task Force Katrina (JTF-Katrina) at Camp Shelby to coordinate

the growing military response to the disaster.150

LESSON LEARNED: The Federal government should work

with its homeland security partners in revising existing plans,

ensuring a functional operational structure—including within

regions— and establishing a clear, accountable process for

all National preparedness efforts.
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By September 1, JTF-Katrina, commanded by LTG Honoré, included approximately 3,000 active duty personnel in

the disaster area; within four days, that number climbed to 14,232 active duty personnel. LTG Honoré’s leadership,

combined with the Department of Defense’s resources, manpower, and advanced planning, contributed to the

military’s success in the Federal response, especially in areas such as search and rescue, security, and logistical

support. Two C-130 firefighting aircraft and seven helicopters supported firefighting operations in New Orleans.151

By September 5, military helicopters had performed 963 search and rescue, evacuation, and supply delivery

missions.152 Military personnel also assisted Federal, State and local agencies with other needs as well. For

example, DOD aircraft flew mosquito abatement aerial spraying missions over 2 million acres to prevent the spread

of mosquito- and water-borne diseases.153 Military personnel also performed such missions as salvage, sewage

restoration, relief worker billeting, air traffic control, and fuel distribution.

The standard National Guard deployment

coordination between State Adjutants

General (TAGs) was effective during the

initial response but was insufficient for

such a large-scale and sustained

operation.154 To address this shortfall,

LTG Blum, Chief of the National Guard

Bureau, held a conference call on August

31with all fifty-four TAGs to distribute

requests for forces and equipment to all

TAGs.155

Guardsmen performed a range of missions, including search and rescue, security, evacuations, and distribution of

food and water. In Mississippi, National Guard forces prepared Camp Shelby as a staging point for incoming forces

and also engaged in law enforcement support, debris removal, shelter support and other vital operations.156

Guardsmen from Texas and Pennsylvania supplied satellite phone communications to the response. 157 When a

group of Pennsylvania Guardsmen arrived to fix a Louisiana woman’s roof, she told the group: “That’s a long way

to come to help us. We’re really grateful ... you boys are going to heaven, I tell you.”158 By August 29, sixty-five

National Guard helicopters were positioned throughout the Gulf Coast.159 By September 2, nearly 22,000 National

Guard soldiers and airmen had deployed to the region —including 6,500 in New Orleans alone160—breaking the

National Guard’s previous record for the largest response to a domestic emergency.161 Eventually, over 50,000

National Guard members from fifty-four States, Territories, and the District of Columbia deployed to the Gulf

Coast, providing critical response assistance during this week of crisis.162 The robust active duty and National

Guard response played a crucial role in the effort to bring stability to the areas ravaged by Hurricane Katrina.

A fragmented deployment system and lack of an integrated command structure for both active duty and National

Guard forces exacerbated communications and coordination issues during the initial response. Deployments for

Title 32 (National Guard) forces were coordinated State-to-State through EMAC agreements and also by the

National Guard Bureau. Title 10 (active duty) force deployments were coordinated through USNORTHCOM.

Once forces arrived in the Joint Operations Area, they fell under separate command structures, rather than one single

command. The separate commands divided the area of operations geographically and supported response efforts

separately, with the exception of the evacuations of the Superdome and the Convention Center in New Orleans.163

Equipment interoperability problems further hindered an integrated response. Similar issues of bifurcated

operations and interoperability challenges were also present between the military and civilian leadership.164 This

lack of interoperable communications was apparent at the tactical level, resulting from the fact that emergency

responders, National Guard, and active duty military use different equipment.165

Federal Communications Assistance

Although the Federal government pushed assets into the Gulf Coast region to fill communication gaps created by

Hurricane Katrina we could have and should have done more. FEMA had pre-positioned two of their five Mobile

Emergency Response Support (MERS) detachments in the Gulf and quickly moved them to the affected areas in

Louisiana and Mississippi soon after landfall.166 MERS detachments consist of an array of vehicles and trained

personnel and provide mobile communications, operational support, and logistical power generation assets—

LESSON LEARNED: The Departments of Homeland Security and

Defense should jointly plan for the Department of Defense’s support

of Federal response activities as well as those extraordinary

circumstances when it is appropriate for the Department of Defense

to lead the Federal response. In addition, the Department of Defense

should ensure the transformation of the National Guard is focused

on increased integration with active duty forces for homeland

security plans and activities.
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including satellite communications, dozens of phone and data lines, heating and air conditioning, power generation,

fuel, potable water, and office functionality— to support the operations of Federal, State, and local authorities.167

Because MERS is a system of divisible assets and not a rigid unit, a single MERS detachment can provide limited

support to multiple field operating sites within the disaster area simultaneously.168

The Federal government must keep some MERS

detachments at locations outside the incident area in

case there is another catastrophe or event, but

additional MERS support should have been deployed to

the Gulf when it became apparent that those prepositioned were insufficient for an incident of Katrina’s

magnitude. At the time, some key Federal officials

both on the ground and back in Washington did not

know that there were additional MERS available.

To augment FEMA’s efforts, DOD deployed available

communications assets to the affected areas, such as its Deployable Joint Command and Control System.169 On

August 31, National Guard Bureau Chief LTG Blum reported that DOD was “pushing every communications asset

that we have.”170 Further, the National Interagency Fire Center provided 3,200 radios, thirty-eight satellite systems,

and several other communication modules in order to supplement the Gulf region’s damaged communication

networks.

The DHS National Communications System (NCS) also contributed to communications recovery efforts following

Hurricane Katrina. NCS linked the telecommunications industry with the relevant government agencies through the

National Coordinating Center (NCC).171 The NCC coordinated with MCI and AT&T, as well as USNORTHCOM

to identify and deploy mobile communication assets to the Gulf region both prior to, and following, landfall.172

Further, due to the destruction of the communications infrastructure, the NCS was required to perform new

functions, such as providing interim Land Mobile Radio systems, used to connect two-way radio users to a central

dispatcher, to first responders in devastated Louisiana parishes.173 By September 1, mobile communications systems

were beginning to provide much needed telephone and two-way radio communications in Louisiana and Mississippi

with additional systems en route to support the entire affected area.174

Federal Resource Challenges

The aftermath of Hurricane Katrina left the Gulf Coast in desperate need of resources and assistance. Nearly a

quarter of a million people in shelters relied on shipments of ice, food, and water to meet their basic needs.175

Hospitals, shelters, and other critical facilities required diesel fuel to run their back-up generators. Many evacuees

lacked access to medical providers and supplies. Emergency responders conducting life-saving operations

demanded additional supplies and fuel. FEMA’s pre-positioned supplies proved inadequate to meet these demands

throughout the region after landfall.176 To fill this gap, the Federal government sent more resources to Louisiana in

the first two weeks after Hurricane Katrina than it had sent to Florida for all of the previous year’s hurricanes

combined.177

As Hurricane Katrina made landfall, Director

Brown provided public assurances that FEMA

was prepared to act to meet the logistical

challenge.178 FEMA personnel soon

discovered, however, that the quantity of

material requested post-landfall outstripped

their logistical capabilities. FEMA simply

could not procure enough resources to match

the rate at which commodities were being

consumed. The agency’s contracts with

private companies, though sufficient for

smaller disasters, were incapable of supplying

LESSON LEARNED: The Department of Homeland Security,

in coordination with State and local governments and the

private sector, should develop a modern, flexible, and

transparent logistics system. This system should be based on

established contracts for stockpiling commodities at the local

level for emergencies and the provision of goods and services

during emergencies. The Federal government must develop

the capacity to conduct large-scale logistical operations that

supplement and, if necessary, replace State and local logistical

systems by leveraging resources within both the public sector

and the private sector.

LESSON LEARNED: The Department of Homeland

Security should review our current laws, policies,

plans, and strategies relevant to communications.

Upon the conclusion of this review, the Homeland

Security Council, with support from the Office of

Science and Technology Policy, should develop a

National Emergency Communications Strategy that

supports communications operability and

interoperability.
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the enormous quantities of resources needed.179 As a result, shortages plagued the affected area. In Mississippi,

FEMA personnel were unable to meet requirements submitted by staging areas.180 William Carwile, the FCO for

Mississippi, recalled that there was a huge gap “between what we required on the ground and what they were

sending us.”181 In some areas, local officials who requested high-demand resources, such as generators, received no

shipments of those supplies from FEMA until weeks after landfall.182

Ineffective communications between FEMA and other Federal departments and agencies prevented available

Federal resources from being effectively used for response operations. The USDA observed that its personnel “had

difficulty in getting FEMA to take advantage of the resources available to them because of the unfamiliarity of some

FEMA employees with USDA programs. Likewise, many USDA employees were unfamiliar with FEMA programs

and procedures.” The Department of Interior also offered valuable assistance. In the aftermath of the hurricane,

DOI delivered a comprehensive list of its deployable assets that were immediately available for humanitarian and

emergency assistance, including such items as 300 dump trucks and other vehicles, 119 pieces of heavy equipment,

300 boats, eleven aircraft, fifty to seventy-five maintenance crews. Although DOI repeatedly attempted to provide

these assets through the process established by the NRP, there was no effective mechanism for efficiently integrating

and deploying these resources. DOI offered 500 rooms and other sites for shelters or housing. The Departments of

Veterans Affairs (VA), Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and Agriculture (USDA) also offered thousands

of housing units nationwide to FEMA for temporary assignment to evacuees. FEMA officials said that the need to

negotiate conditional requirements in some cases prevented them from accepting some Federal agencies' offers of

housing resources. Most of the thousands of housing units made available by other Federal agencies were not

offered to evacuees and were never used.

The private sector too met roadblocks in its efforts to coordinate with the Federal government during the response.

For example, the American Bus Association spent an entire day trying to find a point of contact at FEMA to

coordinate bus deployment without success.183 Federal procurement officers also neglected to draw upon retailers’

supply lines to get the resources that victims needed. To this end, despite an acute shortage of blue tarps to cover

damaged roofs, Federal officials were slow to draw upon the corporate supply chains that deliver tarps to the stores

that sell them. For example, one private sector company had 600,000 tarps available.

Throughout the weeks following Hurricane Katrina,

the Department of Commerce worked to close the

gap between the private and the public sector. The

Department set up an informational website and

hotline to provide businesses with a one-stop source

of information on contracting opportunities.184 The

Department also granted certain companies

prioritized access to the raw materials needed to

restore the region’s crippled infrastructure, even

when the resources had previously been contracted to

other parties.185

As logistics problems were now obvious to all, FEMA turned to DOD for major support in this area.186 On

September 3, Secretary Rumsfeld directed USNORTHCOM to execute greater logistical support operations in both

Louisiana and Mississippi.187

Offers of Charitable Assistance

FEMA could neither efficiently accept nor manage the deluge of charitable donations.188 Private sector companies

also encountered problems when attempting to donate their goods and services to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina

response efforts.

Other countries made generous offers of assistance that the Federal government had difficulty integrating into the

ongoing response operations. Absent an implementation plan for the management of foreign material assistance,

valuable resources often went unused, which frustrated many donor countries. Inadequate planning delayed the

overall process of accepting and receiving disaster aid from abroad. For example, after Switzerland had loaded

LESSON LEARNED: The Department of Homeland

Security, working collaboratively with the private

sector, should revise the National Response Plan and

finalize the Interim National Infrastructure Protection

Plan to be able to rapidly assess the impact of a disaster

on critical infrastructure. We must use this knowledge

to inform Federal response and prioritization decisions

and to support infrastructure restoration in order to save

lives and mitigate the impact of the disaster on the

Nation.
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relief supplies onto an aircraft, FEMA requested that the country send only the portion FEMA required to meet

response needs. As the generous contribution of supplies could not be unloaded quickly and repackaged into the

smaller quantities in a timely manner, the U.S. Embassy in Bern and the Government of Switzerland cancelled the

entire flight.189 A German company offered the use of a $3 million integrated satellite and cellular telephone system

capable of handling 5,000 calls at once, only to wait five days for a written deployment order from

USNORTHCOM.

The same was true of foreign financial assistance.

There was no means of accepting, allocating and

disbursing funds that would also ensure transparency

and acknowledgement of donors. The Federal

government eventually developed a process to accept

financial gifts from foreign countries,190 but because

there was no pre-established plan, implementation

was a slow and often frustrating process. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) sent liaisons to

FEMA field locations on September 2 to coordinate the delivery of foreign disaster relief.191 However, it took

several days for the international aid staging area at Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas, to become operational.192

Before this staging area was established, foreign aid could not be efficiently unloaded and distributed. The Federal

government’s inability to utilize its own resources, or those offered to it, caused great concern for the American

public.

Federal Health and Medical Support

The public health and medical situation throughout the Gulf Coast required substantial Federal resources to prevent

even further loss of life. On August 31, HHS Secretary Leavitt declared a Federal Public Health Emergency for the

Gulf Coast region. This emergency declaration allowed HHS to waive certain requirements for such programs as

Medicare, Medicaid, and the State Children’s Health Insurance Program. It also allowed HHS to make grants and

enter into contracts more expeditiously.193 Immediate public health and medical support challenges included the

identification, triage, and treatment of acutely sick and injured patients; the management of chronic medical

conditions in large numbers of evacuees with special health care needs; the assessment, communication, and

mitigation of public health risks; mortuary support; and the provision of assistance to State and local health officials

to quickly reestablish health care delivery systems and public health infrastructures.194

Federal departments and agencies worked together to attempt to meet these challenges, beginning before Hurricane

Katrina’s landfall and continuing long after. HHS and DOD health officials collaborated with State and local health

officials, maintained situational awareness for their respective agencies, and hastened the direction of medical and

public health assets. National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) teams also formed an integral component of the

medical response to Hurricane Katrina, collectively treating over 100,000 patients.195 Several agencies assigned

responsibilities in the NRP under ESF-8, Public Health and Medical Services, sent liaisons to the HHS Operations

Center in Washington, D.C., and the HHS Secretary’s Emergency Response Teams (SERTs) in the affected States.

The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) used its extensive resources to deliver care to evacuees and veterans from

the affected region.

HHS deployed medical supplies and personnel to bolster State and local public health capacity in the region. It

provided pharmaceuticals and other medical supplies from the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) beginning with

pre-landfall deliveries to the Superdome. By September 3, HHS had delivered 100 tons of medical supplies from

the SNS to Louisiana. HHS also deployed twenty-four public health teams that included epidemiology, food safety,

sanitation, and toxicology experts.

Medical and public health assets provided excellent care to thousands of displaced patients with both acute injuries

and with chronic medical conditions, many of whom had multiple complex medical requirements. According to the

Governors from the Gulf Region, medical and public health professionals were true heroes of the Hurricane Katrina

response. They often had to improvise and use their own initiative because the system was slow to deploy them

from staging areas or failed to adequately supply them. A member of an American Red Cross inspection team, Dr.

Hilarie H. Cranmer, wrote, “[i]n a little over four days, our multidisciplinary and interagency teams assessed more

LESSON LEARNED: The Department of State, in

coordination with the Department of Homeland

Security, should review and revise policies, plans, and

procedures for the management of foreign disaster

assistance. In addition, this review should clarify

responsibilities and procedures for handling inquiries
CHAPTER FOUR: A WEEK OF CRISIS — AUGUST 29 – SEPTEMBER 5

THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED

-47-

than 200 shelters housing nearly 30,000 people. Amazingly, in a majority of cases, the basic public health needs

were being met.”196 Federal, State, local, private sector, and volunteer health care providers across the Gulf Coast

took the initiative to overcome the inefficiencies of the medical support system and meet their patients’ needs.197

Louisiana State University worked with the State Office of Emergency Preparedness, Federal personnel, and

responders from outside the region to turn its Pete Maravich Assembly Center into an acute care medical facility.

Within a week, the facility processed approximately 6,000 patients and more than a thousand prescriptions.198

HHS struggled in its NRP role as coordinating agency for ESF-8. HHS lacked control over vital medical assets,

over-relied on departmental routines, and did not have adequate disaster plans. FEMA compounded HHS

coordination difficulties. FEMA deployed NDMS teams without HHS’s oversight or knowledge. FEMA

administrative delays in issuing mission assignments exacerbated the lack of coordination within ESF-8 and created

additional inefficiencies. In order to

respond swiftly, HHS felt compelled

to take emergency response actions

without mission assignments,

bypassing FEMA. While this may

have pushed additional assets to the

region, it also had a deleterious effect

on the Federal government’s

situational awareness of its deployed

assets.

FROM RESPONSE TO RECOVERY

Federal Coordination

After a week of crisis, Federal, State, and local officials began transitioning to a more organized and sustained

response. As requirements eased and material flowed into the region, Federal departments addressed those problems

that had afflicted their response during its first week. The establishment of JFOs in several States across the Gulf

Coast in the following weeks enhanced the Federal response by providing the coordination and management that

had been largely absent.199 On September 5, Secretary Chertoff appointed Vice Admiral (VADM) Thad Allen to the

position of Deputy PFO. At that time, the Louisiana JFO was still a temporary office near the Louisiana Emergency

Operations Center in Baton Rouge, almost eighty miles from New Orleans. However, to gain greater visibility of

the disaster area, VADM Allen stood up a “PFO-Forward Headquarters” in New Orleans on the USS Iwo Jima on

September 7.200 The PFO-Forward rapidly increased the effectiveness of the Federal response by providing a

Federal unified command close to the disaster scene. On September 9, Secretary Chertoff appointed VADM Allen

to replace Michael Brown as PFO for Hurricane Katrina.201 Director Brown returned to Washington to assume his

duties as FEMA Director, rather than managing the field operations for Katrina.202 On September 21, VADM Allen

was given additional authorities when he was appointed FCO, in addition to PFO.203 VADM Allen’s appointments

ultimately proved critical for energizing the JFO and the entire Federal response to Hurricane Katrina.204

The formation of Federal coordination entities also improved law enforcement operations. On September 6, the two

Senior Federal Law Enforcement Officials (SFLEOs) 205 each representing the DOJ and DHS, respectively,

established a Law Enforcement Coordination Center (LECC)206 in New Orleans to help coordinate law enforcement

personnel operating in the city and surrounding parishes. For the first time during the hurricane response, New

Orleans now had a unified command for law enforcement comprised of the New Orleans Police Department, the

Louisiana State Police, the National Guard, and all Federal law enforcement personnel.207 Improved coordination,

combined with increased Federal law enforcement assistance, strengthened public safety and security in New

Orleans. On September 12, the DOD stated that there was “[v]ery little criminal activity” in New Orleans, and that

the “military presence deters criminals before damage can be done.”208 By September 13, the City of New Orleans

reported law enforcement and military personnel had successfully reestablished security in the City.209

Improved security and the deployment of additional Federal personnel also facilitated search and rescue operations,

particularly in New Orleans. By this point, most of the people stranded on rooftops had been rescued, so operations

focused more on door-to-door searches. Rescue teams completed primary ground searches in New Orleans on

LESSON LEARNED: In coordination with the Department of

Homeland Security and other homeland security partners, the

Department of Health and Human Services should strengthen the

Federal government’s capability to provide public health and medical

support during a crisis. This will require the improvement of command

and control of public health resources, the development of deliberate

plans, an additional investment in deployable operational resources, and

an acceleration of the initiative to foster the widespread use of

interoperable electronic health records systems.
CHAPTER FOUR: A WEEK OF CRISIS — AUGUST 29 – SEPTEMBER 5

THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED

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September 12, and spent the next two weeks entering buildings to locate trapped survivors and deceased victims. 210

FEMA Urban Search and Rescue teams completed all Mississippi assignments on September 10 and ended all

operations in Louisiana twenty days later.211

The DHS Public Affairs Office established a

Joint Information Center (JIC) in Baton

Rouge on Wednesday, September 6, to

provide accurate and timely information on

the Federal response and relief efforts as

well as to counter misinformation.212 The

formation of a second facility in New

Orleans three days later improved the flow

of accurate information back to the Baton Rouge JIC. These JICs helped to stem the spread of rumors and

unsubstantiated reports that had plagued public information efforts during the first week after landfall.

Federal and State officials struggled to locate, recover, and identify the hundreds of deceased victims. While

mortuary affairs is generally a State and local responsibility, the NRP is unclear about the appropriate Federal role,

leading to substantial confusion.213 FEMA established body collection points at Gulfport, Mississippi, and St.

Gabriel, Louisiana, in the days following Hurricane Katrina’s landfall.214 From August 31 to September 4, FEMA

also deployed ten Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams (DMORTs) and both of its Disaster Portable

Morgue Units (DPMU) to help State and local personnel identify and process bodies at those collection points.215

On September 1, FEMA reached a verbal agreement with Kenyon International Emergency Services, a disaster

management contractor, to retrieve and transport bodies.216 However, difficulties finalizing the agreement with

Kenyon hindered body recovery efforts on the ground.217 Frustrated Kenyon executives withdrew from their

agreement with FEMA; this led FEMA to request that DOD take over the body recovery effort until another

contractor could be found.218

Disagreement between Federal and State officials over body recovery responsibilities continued for weeks after

landfall. Federal officials maintained that body recovery was ultimately a State responsibility with the Federal

government providing support only.219 In a September 13 press conference, Governor Blanco expressed her dismay

and blamed FEMA for failing to “break through the bureaucracy” to finalize a contact with Kenyon International.

On September 13, Governor Blanco directed the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals to sign its own

written contract with Kenyon, even though the Governor believed that “recovery of bodies is a FEMA

responsibility.”220 The deployed DMORTs performed well in extraordinarily difficult circumstances. Though they

found themselves in the midst of a catastrophic disaster and caught in a public political dispute, they carried out their

mission with great professionalism and compassion.

Meeting Victims’ Needs

The national effort to meet the needs of Hurricane Katrina victims expanded in the weeks after landfall.

Government, private sector, faith-based, non-profit, and other volunteer personnel collaborated in innovative ways

to provide medical, financial, and housing assistance. For example, former Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill

Clinton are distributing over $90 million they raised following Hurricane Katrina to Gulf Coast higher education

institutions, local and regional faith-based organizations, and the States of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama.221

At the National Book Festival in September attendees collected donated books to help Gulf Coast schools and

libraries replace the books that were destroyed by the hurricane.222

Federal responders overcame many of the initial public health challenges as increasing numbers of medical

personnel and supplies flowed into the region. The continuing efforts of medical personnel to vaccinate Hurricane

Katrina evacuees prevented most communicable diseases from spreading in the densely populated shelters. 223 By

mid-September, the HHS’s public health response transitioned focus from acute public health issues to include less

imminent concerns, such as child care support, mental health services, and treatment services for substance abuse.224

On September 7, FEMA announced that it had instituted the Expedited Assistance Program to speed the delivery of

assistance to Hurricane Katrina victims.225 This enabled registrations to grow from 261,946 on September 5 to over

LESSON LEARNED: The Department of Homeland Security

should develop an integrated public communications plan to

better inform, guide, and reassure the American public before,

during, and after a catastrophe. The Department of Homeland

Security should enable this plan with operational capabilities to

deploy coordinated public affairs teams during a crisis.
CHAPTER FOUR: A WEEK OF CRISIS — AUGUST 29 – SEPTEMBER 5

THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED

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one million ten days later.226 FEMA delivered over $1 billion in assistance to evacuees in all fifty States and the

District of Columbia by September 17—less than three weeks after landfall.227 However, this extraordinary and

unprecedented effort was frequently overshadowed by problems encountered by evacuees in their attempts to

register for or receive assistance. For example, FEMA established Disaster Recovery Centers (DRCs) in the Gulf

Coast region that were not structured to process disaster assistance registrations.228 The DRCs also were not set up

to assist victims in obtaining the other Federal assistance that they were already receiving before Katrina, such as

Social Security and Veteran’s Benefits. Staff at the DRCs directed victims to register by telephone or via the

Internet.229 Since many households in Hurricane Katrina-affected areas were without power or telephone service,

such instructions left many without the means to file their registrations.230 In addition, FEMA had not determined

the capacity of existing Federal agency call centers and telephone banks to handle increased call volumes.

Consequently, victims registering for assistance via telephone repeatedly encountered long delays and disconnected

calls.231

At times, FEMA public statements

regarding the provision of assistance were

confusing or incomplete. For example,

FEMA announced that it was making

$2,000 cash payments to qualified/registered

disaster victims and that these funds would

be provided through various means,

including by debit card.232 However, it

made this announcement before the debit

cards were widely available and did not

provide detailed guidance on distribution

procedures. 233 This led to widespread

confusion and frustration. Security personnel had to lock down the Houston Astrodome during the distribution of

debit cards due to unrest among evacuees.234

Faith-based, non-profit, and other non-government and volunteer organizations continued to provide essential

support to Hurricane Katrina victims. For example, in Harris County, Texas, the Citizen Corps Council—a

volunteer organization under the auspices of DHS—coordinated private sector contributions and the mobilization of

60,000 volunteers.235 The Citizen Corps volunteers created an evacuee “city,” which at its peak sheltered more than

27,000 people at the Reliant Center, Reliant Arena, and the Astrodome.236 The Southern Baptist Convention of the

North American Mission Board and other faith-based organizations provided food and shelter to many evacuees and

helped them find temporary and permanent housing.237

However, faith-based and non-governmental

groups were not adequately integrated into the

response effort.238 These groups often encountered

difficulties coordinating their efforts with Federal,

State and local governments, due to a failure to

adequately address their role in the NRP.239 Major

Todd Hawks of the Salvation Army testified to

Congress that the Salvation Army, “wasn't

permitted to have a liaison officer in the State's

Emergency Operations Center (EOC). As a result,

we had to obtain critical information second-hand through Voluntary Organizations Active in a Disaster (VOAD)—

if we received the information at all.” Hawks stated this situation further complicated the Salvation Army’s relief

effort.240 Reverend Larry Snyder, President of Catholic Charities USA, remarked, “In spite of Catholic Charities

having available FEMA trained and certified disaster response staff, we were not always allowed admittance to

FEMA operations and the local EOCs. This significantly impaired a more coordinated response by all of us.” These

groups succeeded in their missions, mitigated suffering and helped victims survive mostly in spite of, not because

of, the government. These groups deserve better next time. Jim Towey, Director of the White House Office of

Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, said these folks were the foot soldiers and armies of compassion that

victims of Katrina so desperately needed.

LESSON LEARNED: The Department of Health and Human

Services should coordinate with other departments of the

Executive Branch, as well as State governments and nongovernmental organizations, to develop a robust, comprehensive,

and integrated system to deliver human services during disasters

so that victims are able to receive Federal and State assistance in

a simple and seamless manner. In particular, this system should

be designed to provide victims a consumer oriented, simple,

effective and single encounter from which they can receive

assistance.

LESSON LEARNED: The Federal response should better

integrate the contributions of volunteers and nongovernmental organizations into the broader national

effort. This integration would be best achieved at the State

and local levels, prior to future incidents. In particular,

State and local governments must engage NGOs in the

planning process, credential their personnel, and provide

them the necessary resource support for their involvement

in a joint response.
CHAPTER FOUR: A WEEK OF CRISIS — AUGUST 29 – SEPTEMBER 5

THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED

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Locating temporary or long-term housing

for Hurricane Katrina evacuees presented

significant challenges for Federal

officials. The supply of temporary

housing in the disaster area, such as hotels

and apartments, was quickly depleted,

while FEMA’s effort to provide trailers to

evacuees foundered due to inadequate

planning and poor coordination.241

Moving evacuees into trailers was delayed

because of FEMA’s failure to plan for the provision of delivery transportation and infrastructure support such as

water and electrical hook-up.242 The shelter population plummeted from nearly 273,000 on September 5 to about

135,000 on September 10 as evacuees found temporary or other housing opportunities.243 Although FEMA had

planned to place all evacuees into temporary housing by October 1,244 nearly 16,000 victims of Hurricane Katrina

and Hurricane Rita, which made landfall near the Texas-Louisiana border on September 24, still remained in

shelters in mid-October.245 FEMA also did not provide expedited direct rental assistance to individuals until late

September.246 Those out of shelters were mostly placed in hotels, which only delayed the permanent housing

problem. Further, the uncertainty of relocation fostered constant anxiety in the already traumatized victims of

Katrina.

Housing and other assistance issues persisted even as response operations gave way to recovery and rebuilding

efforts. They are critical for determining whether the region will retain its people and their unique culture. These

remain central issues for Donald Powell, appointed by President Bush on November 1, 2005, to serve as the

Coordinator of Federal Support for the Gulf Coast's Recovery and Rebuilding.247

CONCLUSION

Hurricane Katrina necessitated a national response that Federal, State, and local officials were unprepared to

provide. The methods that had been employed successfully for the 243 previous major disaster declarations since

January 2001 proved inadequate for Hurricane Katrina’s magnitude.248 The Federal response suffered from

significant organization and coordination problems during this week of crisis. The lack of communications and

situational awareness had a debilitating effect on the Federal response. Even after coordinating elements were in

place, Federal departments and agencies continued to have difficulty adapting their standard procedures to this

catastrophic incident. The Federal government’s problems responding to Hurricane Katrina illustrate greater

systemic weaknesses inherent in our current national preparedness system: the lack of expertise in the areas of

response, recovery, and reconstruction. Insufficient planning, training, and interagency coordination are not

problems that began and ended with Hurricane Katrina. The storm demonstrated the need for greater integration and

synchronization of preparedness efforts, not only throughout the Federal government, but also with the State and

local governments and the private and non-profit sectors as well.

LESSON LEARNED: Using established Federal core

competencies and all available resources, the Department of

Housing and Urban Development, in coordination with other

departments of the Executive Branch with housing stock, should

develop integrated plans and bolstered capabilities for the

temporary and long-term housing of evacuees. The American Red

Cross and the Department of Homeland Security should retain

responsibility and improve the process of mass care and sheltering

during disasters.
THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED

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Hurricane Katrina Critical Challenges

1. National Preparedness

2. Integrated Use of Military Capabilities

3. Communications

4. Logistics and Evacuations

5. Search and Rescue

6. Public Safety and Security

7. Public Health and Medical Support

8. Human Services

9. Mass Care and Housing

10. Public Communications

11. Critical Infrastructure and Impact Assessment

12. Environmental Hazards and Debris Removal

13. Foreign Assistance

14. Non-Governmental Aid

15. Training, Exercises, and Lessons Learned

16. Homeland Security Professional Development

and Education

17. Citizen and Community Preparedness

CHAPTER FIVE: LESSONS LEARNED

This government will learn the lessons of Hurricane Katrina. We are going to review every action and make

necessary changes so that we are better prepared for any challenge of nature, or act of evil men, that could

threaten our people.

—President George W. Bush, September 15, 20051

The preceding chapters described the dynamics of the response to Hurricane Katrina. While there were numerous

stories of great professionalism, courage, and compassion by Americans from all walks of life, our task here is to

identify the critical challenges that undermined and prevented a more efficient and effective Federal response. In

short, what were the key failures during the Federal response to Hurricane Katrina?

We ask this question not to affix blame. Rather, we

endeavor to find the answers in order to identify

systemic gaps and improve our preparedness for the

next disaster – natural or man-made. We must move

promptly to understand precisely what went wrong and

determine how we are going to fix it.

After reviewing and analyzing the response to

Hurricane Katrina, we identified seventeen specific

lessons the Federal government has learned. These

lessons, which flow from the critical challenges we

encountered, are depicted in the accompanying text box.

Fourteen of these critical challenges were highlighted in

the preceding Week of Crisis section and range from

high-level policy and planning issues (e.g., the

Integrated Use of Military Capabilities) to operational

matters (e.g., Search and Rescue).2 Three other

challenges – Training, Exercises, and Lessons Learned;

Homeland Security Professional Development and

Education; and Citizen and Community Preparedness –

are interconnected to the others but reflect measures and institutions that improve our preparedness more broadly.

These three will be discussed in the Report’s last chapter, Transforming National Preparedness.

Some of these seventeen critical challenges affected all aspects of the Federal response. Others had an impact on a

specific, discrete operational capability. Yet each, particularly when taken in aggregate, directly affected the overall

efficiency and effectiveness of our efforts. This chapter summarizes the challenges that ultimately led to the lessons

we have learned. Over one hundred recommendations for corrective action flow from these lessons and are outlined

in detail in Appendix A of the Report.
CHAPTER FIVE: LESSONS LEARNED

THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 

-52- 

Critical Challenge: National Preparedness 

Our current system for homeland security does not provide the necessary framework to manage the challenges posed 

by 21st Century catastrophic threats. But to be clear, it is unrealistic to think that even the strongest framework can 

perfectly anticipate and overcome all challenges in a crisis. While we have built a response system that ably handles 

the demands of a typical hurricane season, wildfires, and other limited natural and man-made disasters, the system 

clearly has structural flaws for addressing catastrophic events. During the Federal response to Katrina3

, four critical 

flaws in our national preparedness became evident: Our processes for unified management of the national response; 

command and control structures within the Federal government; knowledge of our preparedness plans; and regional 

planning and coordination. A discussion of each follows below. 

Unified Management of the National Response 

Effective incident management of catastrophic events requires coordination of a wide range of organizations and 

activities, public and private. Under the current response framework, the Federal government merely “coordinates” 

resources to meet the needs of local and State governments based upon their requests for assistance. Pursuant to the 

National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the National Response Plan (NRP), Federal and State agencies 

build their command and coordination structures to support the local command and coordination structures during an 

emergency. Yet this framework does not address the conditions of a catastrophic event with large scale competing 

needs, insufficient resources, and the absence of functioning local governments. These limitations proved to be 

major inhibitors to the effective marshalling of Federal, State, and local resources to respond to Katrina. 

Soon after Katrina made landfall, State and local authorities understood the devastation was serious but, due to the 

destruction of infrastructure and response capabilities, lacked the ability to communicate with each other and 

coordinate a response. Federal officials struggled to perform responsibilities generally conducted by State and local 

authorities, such as the rescue of citizens stranded by the rising floodwaters, provision of law enforcement, and 

evacuation of the remaining population of New Orleans, all without the benefit of prior planning or a functioning 

State/local incident command structure to guide their efforts. 

The Federal government cannot and should not be the Nation’s first responder. State and local governments are best 

positioned to address incidents in their jurisdictions and will always play a large role in disaster response. But 

Americans have the right to expect that the Federal government will effectively respond to a catastrophic incident. 

When local and State governments are overwhelmed or incapacitated by an event that has reached catastrophic 

proportions, only the Federal government has the resources and capabilities to respond. The Federal government 

must therefore plan, train, and equip to meet the requirements for responding to a catastrophic event. 

Command and Control Within the Federal Government 

In terms of the management of the Federal response, our architecture of command and control mechanisms as well 

as our existing structure of plans did not serve us well. Command centers in the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) and elsewhere in the Federal government had unclear, and often overlapping, roles and responsibilities that 

were exposed as flawed during this disaster. The Secretary of Homeland Security, is the President’s principal 

Federal official for domestic incident management, but he had difficulty coordinating the disparate activities of 

Federal departments and agencies. The Secretary lacked real-time, accurate situational awareness of both the facts 

from the disaster area as well as the on-going response activities of the Federal, State, and local players. 

The National Response Plan’s Mission Assignment process proved to be far too bureaucratic to support the response 

to a catastrophe. Melvin Holden, Mayor-President of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, noted that, “requirements for paper 

work and form completions hindered immediate action and deployment of people and materials to assist in rescue 

and recovery efforts.”4

 Far too often, the process required numerous time consuming approval signatures and data 

processing steps prior to any action, delaying the response. As a result, many agencies took action under their own 

independent authorities while also responding to mission assignments from the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA), creating further process confusion and potential duplication of efforts. 
CHAPTER FIVE: LESSONS LEARNED

THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 

-53- 

This lack of coordination at the Federal headquarters-level reflected confusing organizational structures in the field. 

As noted in the Week of Crisis chapter, because the Principal Federal Official (PFO) has coordination authority but 

lacks statutory authority over the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), inefficiencies resulted when the second PFO 

was appointed. The first PFO appointed for Katrina did not have this problem because, as the Director of FEMA, he 

was able to directly oversee the FCOs because they fell under his supervisory authority.5

 Future plans should ensure 

that the PFO has the authority required to execute these responsibilities. 

Moreover, DHS did not establish its NRP-specified disaster site multi-agency coordination center—the Joint Field 

Office (JFO)—until after the height of the crisis.6

 Further, without subordinate JFO structures to coordinate Federal 

response actions near the major incident sites, Federal response efforts in New Orleans were not initially wellcoordinated.7

 

Lastly, the Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) did not function as envisioned in the NRP. First, since the ESFs do 

not easily integrate into the NIMS Incident Command System (ICS) structure, competing systems were implemented 

in the field – one based on the ESF structure and a second based on the ICS. Compounding the coordination 

problem, the agencies assigned ESF responsibilities did not respect the role of the PFO. As VADM Thad Allen 

stated, “The ESF structure currently prevents us from coordinating effectively because if agencies responsible for 

their respective ESFs do not like the instructions they are receiving from the PFO at the field level, they go to their 

headquarters in Washington to get decisions reversed. This is convoluted, inefficient, and inappropriate during 

emergency conditions. Time equals lives saved.” 

Knowledge and Practice in the Plans 

At the most fundamental level, part of the explanation for why the response to Katrina did not go as planned is that 

key decision-makers at all levels simply were not familiar with the plans. The NRP was relatively new to many at 

the Federal, State, and local levels before the events of Hurricane Katrina.8

 This lack of understanding of the 

“National” plan not surprisingly resulted in ineffective coordination of the Federal, State, and local response. 

Additionally, the NRP itself provides only the ‘base plan’ outlining the overall elements of a response: Federal 

departments and agencies were required to develop supporting operational plans and standard operating procedures 

(SOPs) to integrate their activities into the national response.9

 In almost all cases, the integrating SOPs were either 

non-existent or still under development when Hurricane Katrina hit. Consequently, some of the specific procedures 

and processes of the NRP were not properly implemented, and Federal partners had to operate without any 

prescribed guidelines or chains of command. 

Furthermore, the JFO staff and other deployed Federal personnel often lacked a working knowledge of NIMS or 

even a basic understanding of ICS principles. As a result, valuable time and resources were diverted to provide onthe-job ICS training to Federal personnel assigned to the JFO. This inability to place trained personnel in the JFO 

had a detrimental effect on operations, as there were not enough qualified persons to staff all of the required 

positions. We must require all incident management personnel to have a working knowledge of NIMS and ICS 

principles. 

Insufficient Regional Planning and Coordination 

The final structural flaw in our current system for national preparedness is the weakness of our regional planning 

and coordination structures. Guidance to governments at all levels is essential to ensure adequate preparedness for 

major disasters across the Nation. To this end, the Interim National Preparedness Goal (NPG) and Target 

Capabilities List (TCL) can assist Federal, State, and local governments to: identify and define required capabilities 

and what levels of those capabilities are needed; establish priorities within a resource-constrained environment; 

clarify and understand roles and responsibilities in the national network of homeland security capabilities; and 

develop mutual aid agreements. 

Since incorporating FEMA in March 2003, DHS has spread FEMA’s planning and coordination capabilities and 

responsibilities among DHS’s other offices and bureaus. DHS also did not maintain the personnel and resources of 

FEMA’s regional offices.10 FEMA’s ten regional offices are responsible for assisting multiple States and planning 

for disasters, developing mitigation programs, and meeting their needs when major disasters occur. During Katrina, 
CHAPTER FIVE: LESSONS LEARNED

THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED

-54-

eight out of the ten FEMA Regional Directors were serving in an acting capacity and four of the six FEMA

headquarters operational division directors were serving in an acting capacity. While qualified acting directors filled

in, it placed extra burdens on a staff that was already stretched to meet the needs left by the vacancies.

Additionally, many FEMA programs that were operated out of the FEMA regions, such as the State and local liaison

program and all grant programs, have moved to DHS headquarters in Washington. When programs operate out of

regional offices, closer relationships are developed among all levels of government, providing for stronger

relationships at all levels. By the same token, regional personnel must remember that they represent the interests of

the Federal government and must be cautioned against losing objectivity or becoming mere advocates of State and

local interests. However, these relationships are critical when a crisis situation develops, because individuals who

have worked and trained together daily will work together more effectively during a crisis.

Critical Challenge: Integrated Use of Military Capabilities

The Federal response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrates that the Department of Defense (DOD) has the capability to

play a critical role in the Nation’s response to catastrophic events. During the Katrina response, DOD – both

National Guard and active duty forces – demonstrated that along with the Coast Guard it was one of the only Federal

departments that possessed real operational capabilities to translate Presidential decisions into prompt, effective

action on the ground. In addition to possessing operational personnel in large numbers that have been trained and

equipped for their missions, DOD brought robust communications infrastructure, logistics, and planning capabilities.

Since DOD, first and foremost, has its critical overseas mission, the solution to improving the Federal response to

future catastrophes cannot simply be “let the Department of Defense do it.” Yet DOD capabilities must be better

identified and integrated into the Nation’s response plans.

The Federal response to Hurricane Katrina highlighted various challenges in the use of military capabilities during

domestic incidents. For instance, limitations under Federal law and DOD policy caused the active duty military to be

dependent on requests for assistance. These limitations resulted in a slowed application of DOD resources during the

initial response. Further, active duty military and National Guard operations were not coordinated and served two

different bosses, one the President and the other the Governor.

Limitations to Department of Defense Response Authority

For Federal domestic disaster relief operations, DOD currently uses a “pull” system that provides support to civil

authorities based upon specific requests from local, State, or Federal authorities.11 This process can be slow and

bureaucratic. Assigning active duty military forces or capabilities to support disaster relief efforts usually requires a

request from FEMA,12 an assessment by DOD on whether the request can be supported, approval by the Secretary of

Defense or his designated representative, and a mission assignment for the military forces or capabilities to provide

the requested support. From the time a request is initiated until the military force or capability is delivered to the

disaster site requires a 21-step process.13 While this overly bureaucratic approach has been adequate for most

disasters, in a catastrophic event like Hurricane Katrina the delays inherent in this “pull” system of responding to

requests resulted in critical needs not being met.14 One could imagine a situation in which a catastrophic event is of

such a magnitude that it would require an even greater role for the Department of Defense. For these reasons, we

should both expedite the mission assignment request and the approval process, but also define the circumstances

under which we will push resources to State and local governments absent a request.

LESSON LEARNED: The Federal government should work with its homeland security partners in revising

existing plans, ensuring a functional operational structure—including within regions—and establishing a clear,

accountable process for all National preparedness efforts. In doing so, the Federal government must:

 Ensure that Executive Branch agencies are organized, trained, and equipped to perform their

response roles.

 Finalize and implement the National Preparedness Goal.
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Unity of Effort among Active Duty Forces and the National Guard

In the overall response to Hurricane Katrina, separate command structures for active duty military and the National

Guard hindered their unity of effort. U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) commanded active duty forces,

while each State government commanded its National Guard forces. For the first two days of Katrina response

operations, USNORTHCOM did not have situational awareness of what forces the National Guard had on the

ground. Joint Task Force Katrina (JTF-Katrina) simply could not operate at full efficiency when it lacked visibility

of over half the military forces in the disaster area.15 Neither the Louisiana National Guard nor JTF-Katrina had a

good sense for where each other’s forces were located or what they were doing. For example, the JTF-Katrina

Engineering Directorate had not been able to coordinate with National Guard forces in the New Orleans area. As a

result, some units were not immediately assigned missions matched to on-the-ground requirements. Further, FEMA

requested assistance from DOD without knowing what State National Guard forces had already deployed to fill the

same needs.16

Also, the Commanding General of JTF-Katrina and the Adjutant Generals (TAGs) of Louisiana and Mississippi had

only a coordinating relationship, with no formal command relationship established. This resulted in confusion over

roles and responsibilities between National Guard and Federal forces and highlights the need for a more unified

command structure.17

Structure and Resources of the National Guard

As demonstrated during the Hurricane Katrina response, the National Guard Bureau (NGB) is a significant joint

force provider for homeland security missions. Throughout the response, the NGB provided continuous and

integrated reporting of all National Guard assets deployed in both a Federal and non-Federal status to

USNORTHCOM, Joint Forces Command, Pacific Command, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland

Defense. This is an important step toward achieving unity of effort. However, NGB’s role in homeland security is

not yet clearly defined. The Chief of the NGB has made a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense that NGB be

chartered as a joint activity of the DOD.18 Achieving these efforts will serve as the foundation for National Guard

transformation and provide a total joint force capability for homeland security missions.19

Critical Challenge: Communications

Hurricane Katrina destroyed an unprecedented portion of the core communications infrastructure throughout the

Gulf Coast region. As described earlier in the Report, the storm debilitated 911 emergency call centers, disrupting

local emergency services. 20 Nearly three million customers lost telephone service. Broadcast communications,

including 50 percent of area radio stations and 44 percent of area television stations, similarly were affected.21 More

than 50,000 utility poles were toppled in Mississippi alone, meaning that even if telephone call centers and

electricity generation capabilities were functioning, the connections to the customers were broken.22 Accordingly,

the communications challenges across the Gulf Coast region in Hurricane Katrina’s wake were more a problem of

basic operability,23 than one of equipment or system interoperability.

 24 The complete devastation of the

communications infrastructure left emergency responders and citizens without a reliable network across which they

could coordinate.25

Although Federal, State, and local agencies had communications plans and assets in place, these plans and assets

were neither sufficient nor adequately integrated to respond effectively to the disaster.26 Many available

communications assets were not utilized fully because there was no national, State-wide, or regional

communications plan to incorporate them. For example, despite their contributions to the response effort, the U.S.

Department of Agriculture (USDA) Forest Service’s radio cache—the largest civilian cache of radios in the United

States—had additional radios available that were not utilized.27

LESSON LEARNED: The Departments of Homeland Security and Defense should jointly plan for the

Department of Defense’s support of Federal response activities as well as those extraordinary circumstances

when it is appropriate for the Department of Defense to lead the Federal response. In addition, the Department of

Defense should ensure the transformation of the National Guard is focused on increased integration with active

duty forces for homeland security plans and activities.
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Federal, State, and local governments have not yet completed a comprehensive strategy to improve operability and

interoperability to meet the needs of emergency responders.28 This inability to connect multiple communications

plans and architectures clearly impeded coordination and communication at the Federal, State, and local levels. A

comprehensive, national emergency communications strategy is needed to confront the challenges of incorporating

existing equipment and practices into a constantly changing technological and cultural environment.29

Critical Challenge: Logistics and Evacuation

The scope of Hurricane Katrina’s devastation, the effects on critical infrastructure in the region, and the debilitation

of State and local response capabilities combined to produce a massive requirement for Federal resources. The

existing planning and operational structure for delivering critical resources and humanitarian aid clearly proved to be

inadequate to the task. The highly bureaucratic supply processes of the Federal government were not sufficiently

flexible and efficient, and failed to leverage the private sector and 21st Century advances in supply chain

management.

Throughout the response, Federal resource managers had great difficulty determining what resources were needed,

what resources were available, and where those resources were at any given point in time. Even when Federal

resource managers had a clear understanding of what was needed, they often could not readily determine whether

the Federal government had that asset, or what alternative sources might be able to provide it. As discussed in the

Week of Crisis chapter, even when an agency came directly to FEMA with a list of available resources that would be

useful during the response, there was no effective mechanism for efficiently integrating and deploying these

resources. Nor was there an easy way to find out whether an alternative source, such as the private sector or a

charity, might be able to better fill the need. Finally, FEMA’s lack of a real-time asset-tracking system – a necessity

for successful 21st Century businesses – left Federal managers in the dark regarding the status of resources once they

were shipped.30

Our logistics system for the 21st Century should be a fully transparent, four-tiered system. First, we must encourage

and ultimately require State and local governments to pre-contract for resources and commodities that will be

critical for responding to all hazards. Second, if these arrangements fail, affected State governments should ask for

additional resources from other States through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) process.

Third, if such interstate mutual aid proves insufficient, the Federal government, having the benefit of full

transparency, must be able to assist State and local governments to move commodities regionally. But in the end,

FEMA must be able to supplement and, in catastrophic incidents, supplant State and local systems with a fully

modern approach to commodity management.

With respect to evacuation—fundamentally a State and local responsibility—the Hurricane Katrina experience

demonstrates that the Federal government must be prepared to fulfill the mission if State and local efforts fail.

Unfortunately, a lack of prior planning combined with poor operational coordination generated a weak Federal

performance in supporting the evacuation of those most vulnerable in New Orleans and throughout the Gulf Coast

following Katrina’s landfall. The Federal effort lacked critical elements of prior planning, such as evacuation

routes, communications, transportation assets, evacuee processing, and coordination with State, local, and nongovernmental officials receiving and sheltering the evacuees. Because of poor situational awareness and

LESSON LEARNED: The Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with State and local governments

and the private sector, should develop a modern, flexible, and transparent logistics system. This system should

be based on established contracts for stockpiling commodities at the local level for emergencies and the

provision of goods and services during emergencies. The Federal government must develop the capacity to

conduct large-scale logistical operations that supplement and, if necessary, replace State and local logistical

systems by leveraging resources within both the public sector and the private sector.

LESSON LEARNED: The Department of Homeland Security should review our current laws, policies, plans,

and strategies relevant to communications. Upon the conclusion of this review, the Homeland Security Council,

with support from the Office of Science and Technology Policy, should develop a National Emergency

Communications Strategy that supports communications operability and interoperability.
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communications throughout the evacuation operation, FEMA had difficulty providing buses through ESF-1,

Transportation, (with the Department of Transportation as the coordinating agency).31 FEMA also had difficulty

delivering food, water, and other critical commodities to people waiting to be evacuated, most significantly at the

Superdome.32

Critical Challenge: Search and Rescue

After Hurricane Katrina made landfall, rising floodwaters stranded thousands in New Orleans on rooftops, requiring

a massive civil search and rescue operation. The Coast Guard, FEMA Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Task

Forces,33 and DOD forces,34 in concert with State and local emergency responders from across the country,

courageously combined to rescue tens of thousands of people. With extraordinary ingenuity and tenacity, Federal,

State, and local emergency responders plucked people from rooftops while avoiding urban hazards not normally

encountered during waterborne rescue.35

Yet many of these courageous lifesavers were put at unnecessary risk by a structure that failed to support them

effectively. The overall search and rescue effort demonstrated the need for greater coordination between US&R, the

Coast Guard, and military responders who, because of their very different missions, train and operate in very

different ways. For example, Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) teams had a particularly challenging situation since

they are neither trained nor equipped to perform water rescue. Thus they could not immediately rescue people

trapped by the flood waters.36

Furthermore, lacking an integrated search and rescue incident command, the various agencies were unable to

effectively coordinate their operations.37 This meant that multiple rescue teams were sent to the same areas, while

leaving others uncovered.38 When successful rescues were made, there was no formal direction on where to take

those rescued.39 Too often rescuers had to leave victims at drop-off points and landing zones that had insufficient

logistics, medical, and communications resources, such as atop the I-10 cloverleaf near the Superdome.40

Critical Challenge: Public Safety and Security

State and local governments have a fundamental responsibility to provide for the public safety and security of their

residents. During disasters, the Federal government provides law enforcement assistance only when those resources

are overwhelmed or depleted.41 Almost immediately following Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, law and order began to

deteriorate in New Orleans. The city’s overwhelmed police force–70 percent of which were themselves victims of

the disaster—did not have the capacity to arrest every person witnessed committing a crime, and many more crimes

were undoubtedly neither observed by police nor reported. The resulting lawlessness in New Orleans significantly

impeded—and in some cases temporarily halted—relief efforts and delayed restoration of essential private sector

services such as power, water, and telecommunications.42

The Federal law enforcement response to Hurricane Katrina was a crucial enabler to the reconstitution of the New

Orleans Police Department’s command structure as well as the larger criminal justice system. Joint leadership from

the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security integrated the available Federal assets into the

remaining local police structure and divided the Federal law enforcement agencies into corresponding New Orleans

Police Department districts.

While the deployment of Federal law enforcement capability to New Orleans in a dangerous and chaotic

environment significantly contributed to the restoration of law and order, pre-event collaborative planning between

LESSON LEARNED: The Department of Transportation, in coordination with other appropriate departments of

the Executive Branch, must also be prepared to conduct mass evacuation operations when disasters overwhelm

or incapacitate State and local governments.

LESSON LEARNED: The Department of Homeland Security should lead an interagency review of current

policies and procedures to ensure effective integration of all Federal search and rescue assets during disaster

response.
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Federal, State, and local officials would have improved the response. Indeed, Federal, State, and local law

enforcement officials performed admirably in spite of a system that should have better supported them. Local, State,

and Federal law enforcement were ill-prepared and ill-positioned to respond efficiently and effectively to the crisis.

In the end, it was clear that Federal law enforcement support to State and local officials required greater

coordination, unity of command, collaborative planning and training with State and local law enforcement, as well

as detailed implementation guidance. For example, the Federal law enforcement response effort did not take

advantage of all law enforcement assets embedded across Federal departments and agencies. Several departments

promptly offered their assistance, but their law enforcement assets were incorporated only after weeks had passed,

or not at all.43

Coordination challenges arose even after Federal law enforcement personnel arrived in New Orleans. For example,

several departments and agencies reported that the procedures for becoming deputized to enforce State law were

cumbersome and inefficient. In Louisiana, a State Police attorney had to physically be present to swear in Federal

agents. Many Federal law enforcement agencies also had to complete a cumbersome Federal deputization process.44

New Orleans was then confronted with a rapid influx of law enforcement officers from a multitude of States and

jurisdictions—each with their own policies and procedures, uniforms, and rules on the use of force—which created

the need for a command structure to coordinate their efforts.45

Hurricane Katrina also crippled the region’s criminal justice system. Problems such as a significant loss of

accountability of many persons under law enforcement supervision,46 closure of the court systems in the disaster,47

and hasty evacuation of prisoners48 were largely attributable to the absence of contingency plans at all levels of

government.

Critical Challenge: Public Health and Medical Support

Hurricane Katrina created enormous public health and medical challenges, especially in Louisiana and

Mississippi—States with public health infrastructures that ranked 49th and 50th in the Nation, respectively.49 But it

was the subsequent flooding of New Orleans that imposed catastrophic public health conditions on the people of

southern Louisiana and forced an unprecedented mobilization of Federal public health and medical assets. Tens of

thousands of people required medical care. Over 200,000 people with chronic medical conditions, displaced by the

storm and isolated by the flooding, found themselves without access to their usual medications and sources of

medical care. Several large hospitals were totally destroyed and many others were rendered inoperable. Nearly all

smaller health care facilities were shut down. Although public health and medical support efforts restored the

capabilities of many of these facilities, the region’s health care infrastructure sustained extraordinary damage.50

Most local and State public health and medical assets were overwhelmed by these conditions, placing even greater

responsibility on federally deployed personnel. Immediate challenges included the identification, triage and

treatment of acutely sick and injured patients; the management of chronic medical conditions in large numbers of

evacuees with special health care needs; the assessment, communication and mitigation of public health risk; and the

provision of assistance to State and local health officials to quickly reestablish health care delivery systems and

public health infrastructures.51

Despite the success of Federal, State, and local personnel in meeting this enormous challenge, obstacles at all levels

reduced the reach and efficiency of public health and medical support efforts. In addition, the coordination of

Federal assets within and across agencies was poor. The cumbersome process for the authorization of

reimbursement for medical and public health services provided by Federal agencies created substantial delays and

frustration among health care providers, patients and the general public.52 In some cases, significant delays slowed

the arrival of Federal assets to critical locations.53 In other cases, large numbers of Federal assets were deployed,

only to be grossly underutilized.54 Thousands of medical volunteers were sought by the Department of Health and

LESSON LEARNED: The Department of Justice, in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security,

should examine Federal responsibilities for support to State and local law enforcement and criminal justice

systems during emergencies and then build operational plans, procedures, and policies to ensure an effective

Federal law enforcement response.
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Human Services (HHS), and though they were informed that they would likely not be needed unless notified

otherwise, many volunteers reported that they received no message to that effect.55 These inefficiencies were the

products of a fragmented command structure for medical response; inadequate evacuation of patients; weak State

and local public health infrastructures;56 insufficient pre-storm risk communication to the public;57 and the absence

of a uniform electronic health record system.

Critical Challenge: Human Services

Disasters—especially those of catastrophic proportions—produce many victims whose needs exceed the capacity of

State and local resources. These victims who depend on the Federal government for assistance fit into one of two

categories: (1) those who need Federal disaster-related assistance, and (2) those who need continuation of

government assistance they were receiving before the disaster, plus additional disaster-related assistance. Hurricane

Katrina produced many thousands of both categories of victims.58

The Federal government maintains a wide array of human service programs to provide assistance to special-needs

populations, including disaster victims.59 Collectively, these programs provide a safety net to particularly vulnerable

populations.

The Emergency Support Function 6 (ESF-6) Annex to the NRP assigns responsibility for the emergency delivery of

human services to FEMA. While FEMA is the coordinator of ESF-6, it shares primary agency responsibility with

the American Red Cross.60 The Red Cross focuses on mass care (e.g. care for people in shelters), and FEMA

continues the human services components for ESF-6 as the mass care effort transitions from the response to the

recovery phase.61 The human services provided under ESF-6 include: counseling; special-needs population support;

immediate and short-term assistance for individuals, households, and groups dealing with the aftermath of a disaster;

and expedited processing of applications for Federal benefits.62 The NRP calls for “reducing duplication of effort

and benefits, to the extent possible,” to include “streamlining assistance as appropriate.”63

Prior to Katrina’s landfall along the Gulf Coast and during the subsequent several weeks, Federal preparation for

distributing individual assistance proved frustrating and inadequate. Because the NRP did not mandate a single

Federal point of contact for all assistance and required FEMA to merely coordinate assistance delivery, disaster

victims confronted an enormously bureaucratic, inefficient, and frustrating process that failed to effectively meet

their needs. The Federal government’s system for distribution of human services was not sufficiently responsive to

the circumstances of a large number of victims—many of whom were particularly vulnerable—who were forced to

navigate a series of complex processes to obtain critical services in a time of extreme duress. As mentioned in the

preceding chapter, the Disaster Recovery Centers (DRCs) did not provide victims single-point access to apply for

the wide array of Federal assistance programs.

Critical Challenge: Mass Care and Housing

Hurricane Katrina resulted in the largest national housing crisis since the Dust Bowl of the 1930s. The impact of

this massive displacement was felt throughout the country, with Gulf residents relocating to all fifty States and the

LESSON LEARNED: In coordination with the Department of Homeland Security and other homeland security

partners, the Department of Health and Human Services should strengthen the Federal government’s capability

to provide public health and medical support during a crisis. This will require the improvement of command and

control of public health resources, the development of deliberate plans, an additional investment in deployable

operational resources, and an acceleration of the initiative to foster the widespread use of interoperable

electronic health records systems.

LESSON LEARNED: The Department of Health and Human Services should coordinate with other

departments of the Executive Branch, as well as State governments and non-governmental organizations, to

develop a robust, comprehensive, and integrated system to deliver human services during disasters so that

victims are able to receive Federal and State assistance in a simple and seamless manner. In particular, this

system should be designed to provide victims a consumer oriented, simple, effective, and single encounter from

which they can receive assistance.
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District of Columbia.64 Prior to the storm’s landfall, an exodus of people fled its projected path, creating an urgent

need for suitable shelters. Those with the willingness and ability to evacuate generally found temporary shelter or

housing. However, the thousands of people in New Orleans who were either unable to move due to health reasons or

lack of transportation, or who simply did not choose to comply with the mandatory evacuation order, had significant

difficulty finding suitable shelter after the hurricane had devastated the city.65

Overall, Federal, State, and local plans were inadequate for a catastrophe that had been anticipated for years.

Despite the vast shortcomings of the Superdome and other shelters, State and local officials had no choice but to

direct thousands of individuals to such sites immediately after the hurricane struck. Furthermore, the Federal

government’s capability to provide housing solutions to the displaced Gulf Coast population has proved to be far too

slow, bureaucratic, and inefficient.

The Federal shortfall resulted from a lack of interagency coordination to relocate and house people. FEMA’s

actions often were inconsistent with evacuees’ needs and preferences. Despite offers from the Departments of

Veterans Affairs (VA), Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and Agriculture (USDA) as well as the private

sector to provide thousands of housing units nationwide, FEMA focused its housing efforts on cruise ships and

trailers, which were expensive and perceived by some to be a means to force evacuees to return to New Orleans.66

HUD, with extensive expertise and perspective on large-scale housing challenges and its nation-wide relationships

with State public housing authorities, was not substantially engaged by FEMA in the housing process until late in

the effort. 67 FEMA’s temporary and long-term housing efforts also suffered from the failure to pre-identify

workable sites and available land and the inability to take advantage of housing units available with other Federal

agencies.

Critical Challenge: Public Communications

The Federal government’s dissemination of essential public information prior to Hurricane Katrina’s Gulf landfall is

one of the positive lessons learned. The many professionals at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration (NOAA) and the National Hurricane Center worked with diligence and determination in

disseminating weather reports and hurricane track predictions as described in the Pre-landfall chapter. This includes

disseminating warnings and forecasts via NOAA Radio and the internet, which operates in conjunction with the

Emergency Alert System (EAS).68 We can be certain that their efforts saved lives.

However, more could have been done by officials at all levels of government. For example, the EAS—a mechanism

for Federal, State and local officials to communicate disaster information and instructions—was not utilized by State

and local officials in Louisiana, Mississippi or Alabama prior to Katrina’s landfall.69

Further, without timely, accurate information or the ability to communicate, public affairs officers at all levels could

not provide updates to the media and to the public. It took several weeks before public affairs structures, such as the

Joint Information Centers, were adequately resourced and operating at full capacity. In the meantime, Federal,

State, and local officials gave contradictory messages to the public, creating confusion and feeding the perception

that government sources lacked credibility. On September 1, conflicting views of New Orleans emerged with

positive statements by some Federal officials that contradicted a more desperate picture painted by reporters in the

streets. 70 The media, operating 24/7, gathered and aired uncorroborated information which interfered with ongoing

emergency response efforts.71 The Federal public communications and public affairs response proved inadequate

and ineffective.

LESSON LEARNED: Using established Federal core competencies and all available resources, the Department

of Housing and Urban Development, in coordination with other departments of the Executive Branch with

housing stock, should develop integrated plans and bolstered capabilities for the temporary and long-term

housing of evacuees. The American Red Cross and the Department of Homeland Security should retain

responsibility and improve the process of mass care and sheltering during disasters.

LESSON LEARNED: The Department of Homeland Security should develop an integrated public

communications plan to better inform, guide, and reassure the American public before, during, and after a

catastrophe. The Department of Homeland Security should enable this plan with operational capabilities to

deploy coordinated public affairs teams during a crisis.
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Critical Challenge: Critical Infrastructure and Impact Assessment

Hurricane Katrina had a significant impact on many sectors of the region’s “critical infrastructure,” especially the

energy sector.72 The Hurricane temporarily caused the shutdown of most crude oil and natural gas production in the

Gulf of Mexico as well as much of the refining capacity in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. “[M]ore than ten

percent of the Nation’s imported crude oil enters through the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port”73 adding to the impact on

the energy sector. Additionally, eleven petroleum refineries, or one-sixth of the Nation’s refining capacity, were

shut down.74 Across the region more than 2.5 million customers suffered power outages across Louisiana,

Mississippi, and Alabama.75

While there were successes, the Federal government’s ability to protect and restore the operation of priority national

critical infrastructure was hindered by four interconnected problems. First, the NRP-guided response did not account

for the need to coordinate critical infrastructure protection and restoration efforts across the Emergency Support

Functions (ESFs). The NRP designates the protection and restoration of critical infrastructure as essential objectives

of five ESFs: Transportation; Communications; Public Works and Engineering; Agriculture; and Energy.76

Although these critical infrastructures are necessary to assist in all other response and restoration efforts, there are

seventeen critical infrastructure and key resource sectors whose needs must be coordinated across virtually every

ESF during response and recovery.77 Second, the Federal government did not adequately coordinate its actions with

State and local protection and restoration efforts. In fact, the Federal government created confusion by responding

to individualized requests in an inconsistent manner.78 Third, Federal, State, and local officials responded to

Hurricane Katrina without a comprehensive understanding of the interdependencies of the critical infrastructure

sectors in each geographic area and the potential national impact of their decisions. For example, an energy

company arranged to have generators shipped to facilities where they were needed to restore the flow of oil to the

entire mid-Atlantic United States. However, FEMA regional representatives diverted these generators to hospitals.

While lifesaving efforts are always the first priority, there was no overall awareness of the competing important

needs of the two requests. Fourth, the Federal government lacked the timely, accurate, and relevant ground-truth

information necessary to evaluate which critical infrastructures were damaged, inoperative, or both. The FEMA

teams that were deployed to assess damage to the regions did not focus on critical infrastructure and did not have the

expertise necessary to evaluate protection and restoration needs.79

The Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) provides strategic-level guidance for all Federal, State,

and local entities to use in prioritizing infrastructure for protection.80 However, there is no supporting

implementation plan to execute these actions during a natural disaster. Federal, State, and local officials need an

implementation plan for critical infrastructure protection and restoration that can be shared across the Federal

government, State and local governments, and with the private sector, to provide them with the necessary

background to make informed preparedness decisions with limited resources.

Critical Challenge: Environmental Hazards and Debris Removal

The Federal clean-up effort for Hurricane Katrina was an immense undertaking. The storm impact caused the spill

of over seven million gallons of oil into Gulf Coast waterways. Additionally, it flooded three Superfund81 sites in

the New Orleans area, and destroyed or compromised numerous drinking water facilities and wastewater treatment

plants along the Gulf Coast.82 The storm’s collective environmental damage, while not creating the “toxic soup”

portrayed in the media, nonetheless did create a potentially hazardous environment for emergency responders and

the general public.83 In response, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Coast Guard jointly led an

interagency environmental assessment and recovery effort, cleaning up the seven million gallons of oil and resolving

over 2,300 reported cases of pollution.84

LESSON LEARNED: The Department of Homeland Security, working collaboratively with the private sector,

should revise the National Response Plan and finalize the Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan to be

able to rapidly assess the impact of a disaster on critical infrastructure. We must use this knowledge to inform

Federal response and prioritization decisions and to support infrastructure restoration in order to save lives and

mitigate the impact of the disaster on the Nation.
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While this response effort was commendable, Federal officials could have improved the identification of

environmental hazards and communication of appropriate warnings to emergency responders and the public. For

example, the relatively small number of personnel available during the critical week after landfall were unable to

conduct a rapid and comprehensive environmental assessment of the approximately 80 square miles flooded in New

Orleans, let alone the nearly 93,000 square miles affected by the hurricane.85

Competing priorities hampered efforts to assess the environment. Moreover, although the process used to identify

environmental hazards provides accurate results, these results are not prompt enough to provide meaningful

information to responders. Furthermore, there must be a comprehensive plan to accurately and quickly

communicate this critical information to the emergency responders and area residents who need it. 86 Had such a

plan existed, the mixed messages from Federal, State, and local officials on the reentry into New Orleans could have

been avoided.

Debris Removal

State and local governments are normally responsible for debris removal. However, in the event of a disaster in

which State and local governments are overwhelmed and request assistance, the Federal government can provide

two forms of assistance: debris removal by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) or other Federal agencies,

or reimbursement for locally contracted debris removal.87

Hurricane Katrina created an estimated 118 million cubic yards of debris. In just five months, 71 million cubic yards

of debris have been removed from Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. In comparison, it took six months to

remove the estimated 20 million cubic yards of debris created by Hurricane Andrew.88

However, the unnecessarily complicated rules for removing debris from private property hampered the response.89

In addition, greater collaboration among Federal, State, and local officials as well as an enhanced public

communication program could have improved the effectiveness of the Federal response.

Critical Challenge: Managing Offers of Foreign Assistance and Inquiries Regarding Affected Foreign

Nationals

Our experience with the tragedies of September 11th and Hurricane Katrina underscored that our domestic crises

have international implications. Soon after the extent of Hurricane Katrina’s damage became known, the United

States became the beneficiary of an incredible international outpouring of assistance. One hundred fifty-one (151)

nations and international organizations offered financial or material assistance to support relief efforts.90 Also, we

found that among the victims were foreign nationals who were in the country on business, vacation, or as residents.

Not surprisingly, foreign governments sought information regarding the safety of their citizens.

We were not prepared to make the best use of foreign support. Some foreign governments sought to contribute aid

that the United States could not accept or did not require. In other cases, needed resources were tied up by

bureaucratic red tape.91 But more broadly, we lacked the capability to prioritize and integrate such a large quantity

of foreign assistance into the ongoing response. Absent an implementation plan for the prioritization and integration

of foreign material assistance, valuable resources went unused, and many donor countries became frustrated.92

While we ultimately overcame these obstacles amidst the crisis, our experience underscores the need for pre-crisis

planning.

LESSON LEARNED: The Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Environmental

Protection Agency, should oversee efforts to improve the Federal government’s capability to quickly gather

environmental data and to provide the public and emergency responders the most accurate information available,

to determine whether it is safe to operate in a disaster environment or to return after evacuation. In addition, the

Department of Homeland Security should work with its State and local homeland security partners to plan and to

coordinate an integrated approach to debris removal during and after a disaster.
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Nor did we have the mechanisms in place to provide foreign governments with whatever knowledge we had

regarding the status of their nationals. Despite the fact that many victims of the September 11, 2001, tragedy were

foreign nationals, the NRP does not take into account foreign populations (e.g. long-term residents, students,

businessmen, tourists, and foreign government officials) affected by a domestic catastrophe. In addition, Federal,

State, and local emergency response officials have not included assistance to foreign nationals in their response

planning.

Many foreign governments, as well as the family and friends of foreign nationals, looked to the Department of State

for information regarding the safety and location of their citizens after Hurricane Katrina. The absence of a central

system to manage and promptly respond to inquires about affected foreign nationals led to confusion.93

Critical Challenge: Non-governmental Aid

Over the course of the Hurricane Katrina response, a significant capability for response resided in organizations

outside of the government. Non-governmental and faith-based organizations, as well as the private sector all made

substantial contributions. Unfortunately, the Nation did not always make effective use of these contributions

because we had not effectively planned for integrating them into the overall response effort.

Even in the best of circumstances, government alone cannot deliver all disaster relief. Often, non-governmental

organizations (NGOs) are the quickest means of providing local relief, but perhaps most importantly, they provide a

compassionate, human face to relief efforts. We must recognize that NGOs play a fundamental role in response and

recovery efforts and will contribute in ways that are, in many cases, more efficient and effective than the Federal

government’s response. We must plan for their participation and treat them as valued and necessary partners.

The number of volunteer, non-profit, faith-based, and private sector entities that aided in the Hurricane Katrina relief

effort was truly extraordinary. Nearly every national, regional, and local charitable organization in the United

States, and many from abroad, contributed aid to the victims of the storm. Trained volunteers from member

organizations of the National Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster (NVOAD), the American Red Cross,

Medical Reserve Corps (MRC), Community Emergency Response Team (CERT), as well as untrained

volunteers from across the United States, deployed to Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama.

Government sponsored volunteer organizations also played a critical role in providing relief and assistance. For

example, the USA Freedom Corps persuaded numerous non-profit organizations and the Governor’s State Service

Commissions to list their hurricane relief volunteer opportunities in the USA Freedom Corps volunteer search

engine. The USA Freedom Corps also worked with the Corporation for National and Community Service, which

helped to create a new, people-driven “Katrina Resource Center” to help volunteers connect their resources with

needs on the ground.94 In addition, 14,000 Citizen Corps volunteers supported response and recovery efforts around

the country.95 This achievement demonstrates that seamless coordination among government agencies and

volunteer organizations is possible when they build cooperative relationships and conduct joint planning and

exercises before an incident occurs.96

Faith-based organizations also provided extraordinary services. For example, more than 9,000 Southern Baptist

Convention of the North American Mission Board volunteers from forty-one states served in Texas, Louisiana,

Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia. These volunteers ran mobile kitchens and recovery sites.97 Many smaller,

faith-based organizations, such as the Set Free Indeed Ministry in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, brought comfort and

offered shelter to the survivors. They used their facilities and volunteers to distribute donated supplies to displaced

persons and to meet their immediate needs.98 Local churches independently established hundreds of “pop-up”

shelters to house storm victims.99

LESSON LEARNED: The Department of State, in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security,

should review and revise policies, plans, and procedures for the management of foreign disaster assistance. In

addition, this review should clarify responsibilities and procedures for handling inquiries regarding affected

foreign nationals.
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More often than not, NGOs successfully contributed to the relief effort in spite of government obstacles and with

almost no government support or direction. Time and again, government agencies did not effectively coordinate

relief operations with NGOs. Often, government agencies failed to match relief needs with NGO and private sector

capabilities. Even when agencies matched non-governmental aid with an identified need, there were problems

moving goods, equipment, and people into the disaster area. For example, the government relief effort was

unprepared to meet the fundamental food, housing, and operational needs of the surge volunteer force.

LESSON LEARNED: The Federal response should better integrate the contributions of volunteers and nongovernmental organizations into the broader national effort. This integration would be best achieved at the State

and local levels, prior to future incidents. In particular, State and local governments must engage NGOs in the

planning process, credential their personnel, and provide them the necessary resource support for their

involvement in a joint response.
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CHAPTER SIX: TRANSFORMING NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS

Hurricane Katrina was an extraordinary storm that caused destruction on a scale never before seen from a natural 

disaster in the United States. The continuing Federal response—the largest disaster relief and recovery effort in our 

Nation’s history—likewise has been unprecedented and extraordinary. But what we owe the people of the Gulf 

Coast, and all Americans, is the best possible response. 

We must expect more catastrophes like Hurricane Katrina—and possibly even worse. In fact, we will have 

compounded the tragedy if we fail to learn the lessons—good and bad—it has taught us and strengthen our system 

of preparedness and response. We cannot undo the mistakes of the past, but there is much we can do to learn from 

them and to be better prepared for the future. This is our duty. 

The preceding chapter outlined in detail fourteen of the seventeen specific lessons the Federal government has 

learned from our response to Hurricane Katrina; the remaining three will be discussed more fully here. These 

seventeen lessons, and the 125 recommendations that flow from them, represent specific challenges for corrective 

action. But we also recognize that to overcome these challenges and fully accomplish the intent of the attendant 

recommendations, we require a transformation of our homeland security architecture. 

In the aftermath of another American catastrophe—the terrorist attacks of September 11—we transformed our 

government architecture, policies, and strategies in a comprehensive effort to defeat terrorism and better protect and 

defend the homeland. With the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the post of Director of National 

Intelligence, the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, and the codification of both the National Counterterrorism 

Center and the National Counterproliferation Center, we have undertaken the most extensive reorganization of the 

Federal government since 1947.1

 We have created top-level policy guidance through the National Security Strategy, 

the National Strategy for Homeland Security and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, all of which 

identify strategic objectives to secure the United States, its citizens and interests from terrorist attacks.2

 Most 

important, we have pursued our policies and objectives through concrete action. In concert with our coalition 

partners, we have been on the offense, waging an unremitting campaign of direct and continuous action against our 

terrorist enemies and the deadly scourge of terror and intimidation more broadly. These actions, combined with an 

array of defensive measures at home and abroad, have enhanced the safety and security of the American people. 

Preparedness is inextricably intertwined with our national security, counterterrorism, and homeland security 

strategies. As discussed throughout this report, we have taken essential steps over the past five years—through 

plans, policies, and guidelines such as the National Response Plan, the National Incident Management System, the 

Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan, and the Interim National Preparedness Goal—to strengthen our 

ability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, and recover from the natural and man-made disasters that will 

occur.3

 

But we must go further. We must continue to build upon the foundation of national and homeland security we have 

established since 9/11 to improve our preparedness capabilities. Our response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrated 

the imperative to integrate and synchronize our policies, strategies, and plans—among all Federal, State, local, 

private sector, and community efforts and across all partners in the professions of prevention, protection, response, 
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and recovery—into a unified system for homeland security. This unifying system will ensure National

Preparedness.

National Preparedness involves a continuous cycle of activity to develop the elements (e.g., plans, procedures,

policies, training, and equipment) necessary to maximize the capability to prevent, protect against, respond to,

and recover from domestic incidents, especially major events that require coordination among an appropriate

combination of Federal, State, local, tribal, private sector, and non-governmental entities, in order to minimize

the impact on lives, property, and the economy.

—Interim National Preparedness Goal, March 20054

Today there is a national consensus that we must be better prepared to respond to events like Hurricane Katrina.

While we have constructed a system that effectively handles the demands of routine, limited natural and man-made

disasters, our system clearly has structural flaws for addressing catastrophic incidents. But we as a Nation—Federal,

State, and local governments; the private sector; as well as communities and individual citizens—have not

developed a shared vision of or commitment to preparedness: what we must do to prevent (when possible), protect

against, respond to, and recover from the next catastrophe. Without a shared vision that is acted upon by all levels

of our Nation and encompasses the full range of our preparedness and response capabilities, we will not achieve a

truly transformational national state of preparedness.

There are two immediate priorities for this transformation:

1. Define and implement a comprehensive National Preparedness System; and

2. Foster a new, robust Culture of Preparedness.

A NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS SYSTEM

Shortfalls in the Federal response to Hurricane Katrina highlight that our current homeland security architecture—to

include policies, authorities, plans, doctrine, operational concepts, and resources at the Federal, State, local, private

sector, and community levels—must be strengthened and transformed. At the most fundamental level, the current

system fails to define Federal responsibility for national preparedness in catastrophic events. Nor does it establish

clear, comprehensive goals along with an integrated means to measure their progress and achievement. Instead, the

United States currently has guidelines and individual plans, across multiple agencies and levels of government that

do not yet constitute an integrated national system that ensures unity of effort.5

In addition, as described in the narrative section of this report, the response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that

our current system is too reactive in orientation. Our decades-old system, built on the precepts of federalism, has

been based on a model whereby local and State governments wait to reach their limits and exhaust their resources

before requesting Federal assistance. Federal agencies could and did take steps to prepare to extend support and

assistance, but tended to provide little without a prior and specific request. In other words, the system was biased

toward requests and the concept of “pull” rather than toward anticipatory actions and the proactive “push” of Federal

resources.

While this approach has worked well in the majority of disasters and emergencies, catastrophic events like

Hurricane Katrina are a different matter. The current homeland security environment—with the continuing threat of

mass casualty terrorism and the constant risk of natural disasters—now demands that the Federal government

actively prepare and encourage the Nation as a whole to plan, equip, train, and cooperate for all types of future

emergencies, including the most catastrophic.

A useful model for our approach to homeland security is the Nation’s approach to national security. Over the past

six decades, we have created a highly successful national security system. This system is built on deliberate

planning that assesses threats and risks, develops policies and strategies to manage them, identifies specific missions
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and supporting tasks, and matches the forces or capabilities to execute them. Operationally organized, it stresses the 

importance of unity of command from the President down to the commander in the field. 

Perhaps most important, the national security system emphasizes feedback and periodic reassessment. Programs 

and forces are assessed for readiness and the degree to which they support their assigned missions and strategies on 

a continuing basis. Top level decision-makers periodically revisit their assessments of threats and risks, review their 

strategies and guidance, and revise their missions, plans, and budgets accordingly.6

This national security system was not created overnight. It has taken almost sixty years to build and refine. 

Beginning with the National Security Act of 1947-mandated creation of the Department of Defense, the Central 

Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Council (NSC), this system has evolved substantially through the 

years.7

 It has taken time to create a strong NSC that has integrated interagency policies and efforts. Similarly, it 

took decades to build first the Office of the Secretary of Defense and then the Joint Staff as the central management 

elements for the Department of Defense. We did not accomplish the complete intent of the 1947 reforms for 

national security system until Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols defense reorganization legislation in 1986, 

and the Federal government put those reforms in place in following years.8

 

The lessons of the national security system’s evolution will help us to transform our five-year old homeland security 

system. Of course, homeland security demands are complex. While responsibility for national security rests with 

the Federal government working with its international partners, the precepts of federalism make every level of 

government and region of the country both a contributor to, and responsible for, homeland security. 

There are significant institutional and intergovernmental challenges to information and resource sharing as well as 

operational cooperation. These barriers stem from a multitude of factors—different cultures, lack of communication 

between departments and agencies, and varying procedures and working patterns among departments and agencies. 

Equally problematic, there is uneven coordination in pre-incident planning among State and local governments. For 

example, our States and territories developed fifty-six unique homeland security strategies, as have fifty high-threat, 

high-density urban areas.9

 Although each State and territory certainly confronts unique challenges, without 

coordination this planning approach makes the identification of common or national solutions difficult. 

Furthermore, our current approach to response planning does not sufficiently acknowledge how adjoining 

communities and regions can and do support each other. For example, there is wide disparity in emergency 

response capabilities across the country’s many local jurisdictions. Yet we currently lack the means to assess and 

track what these disparities are and, consequently, how we must plan to account for them in a crisis. 

The remainder of this section describes the key elements of the National Preparedness System. These include the 

guiding vision for preparedness as well as clarification of the Federal government’s central role in organizing the 

national efforts of our homeland security partners. The section also explains the essential importance of building 

operational capabilities in the Federal government by: a) Strengthening the operational management capacity of the 

Department of Homeland Security and strengthening its field elements; b) Reinforcing the DHS role as incident 

manager for the Federal response; and c) Strengthening the response capabilities of other departments and agencies 

in the Federal government. This section also highlights the essential roles for training, education, and exercises as 

well as the importance of feedback—through readiness assessment and lessons learned—and processes for 

undertaking corrective actions. The section concludes with a discussion of the essential role of Congress in 

supporting the National Preparedness System and related transformation. 

A Preparedness Vision 

A National Preparedness System must begin with a common vision for preparedness—what end-state are we 

seeking to achieve and how do we plan to get there? In Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8), the 

President called for the creation of a comprehensive national preparedness system, starting with a “national domestic 

all-hazards preparedness goal.” 10 This Goal was to outline key preparedness priorities, objectives, targets, and 

desired outcomes. In response to HSPD-8, DHS has developed an Interim National Preparedness Goal that reflects 

the Department’s progress to date to develop each of those elements in coordination with other entities.11 It will 

remain in effect until superseded by the final National Preparedness Goal, which awaits completion. 
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We must now translate this Goal into a robust preparedness system that includes integrated plans, procedures, 

policies, training, and capabilities at all levels of government. The System must also incorporate the private sector, 

non-governmental organizations, faith-based groups, and communities, including individual citizens. The desired 

end-state of our National Preparedness System must be to achieve and sustain risk-based target levels of capability 

to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from major events in order to minimize the impact on lives, 

property, and the economy. 

The Homeland Security Strategy and HSPD-8 provide the framework for the National Preparedness System. From 

this guidance comes the requirement for risk-based capabilities at the Federal, State and local levels that must enable 

the Nation to respond to a range of disasters—both man-made and natural. The required capabilities determine 

readiness targets for organizations at all levels. A unified effort from all homeland security stakeholders to commit 

the requisite resources, training, and exercising must support these targets and asset requirements. 

Our National Preparedness System must also have appropriate feedback and assessment mechanisms to ensure that 

progress is made and that our goals are being realized. As called for in the Interim National Preparedness Goal, we 

must establish a readiness baseline for capabilities at the Federal, State, and local levels. This baseline should 

include an inventory of our preparedness assets as well as a metrics-based assessment of current capabilities. 

Thereafter, we must assess the gap between our present and target levels of capability. Over time, we must track our 

progress in closing these gaps. 

Finally, the National Preparedness System must emphasize preparedness for all hazards. Most of the capabilities 

necessary for responding to natural disasters are also vital for responding to terrorist incidents. Yet for a variety of 

reasons, much of the Federal government, Congress, and the Nation at large have continued to think about terrorism 

and natural disasters as if they are competing priorities rather than two elements of the larger homeland security 

challenge. The lessons of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina are that we cannot choose one or the other type of disaster. 

We must be prepared for all hazards. 

The Federal Government’s Role in the “National” System

Building upon the President’s Homeland Security Strategy, Homeland Security Presidential Directives, and the 

Interim National Preparedness Goal, the Federal government must clearly articulate national preparedness goals 

and objectives; it must create the infrastructure—through the definition of common strategies and interoperable 

capabilities—for ensuring unity of effort; and it must manage the system for measuring effectiveness and assessing 

preparedness at all levels of government. Put another way, the Federal government must develop common doctrine 

and ensure alignment of preparedness plans, budgets, grants, training, exercises, and equipment. 

While each State will have its own strategy and a multitude of local capabilities to meet the needs of its citizens, the 

Federal government—through the Department of Homeland Security—must work with State, local, and regional 

entities to develop strategies and plans that define how each State manages disasters within their borders as well as 

regionally, beginning at the local level. DHS must also identify how State, local, regional, and private-sector 

preparedness activities support the national strategy. 

Transformation Within the Federal Government: Building Operational Capability

The creation of an effective National Preparedness System will require the Federal government to transform the way 

it does business. The most important objective of this Federal transformation must be to build and integrate 

operational capability. Each Federal department or agency with homeland security responsibilities needs 

operational capability—or the capacity to get things done—to translate executive management direction promptly 

into results on the ground. It includes the personnel to make and communicate decisions; organizational structures 

that are assigned, trained, and exercised for their missions; sufficient physical resources; and the command, control, 

and communication channels to make, monitor, and communicate decisions. 

As described in the preceding narrative, the response to Hurricane Katrina required that the Federal government both 

support State and local efforts while conducting response operations in the field, in addition to making policy or 

implementing programs. With the exceptions of the Department of Defense and the Coast Guard—two 
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organizations with considerable operational capabilities—the Federal government was at times slow and ineffective 

in responding to the massive operational demands of the catastrophe. 

These shortfalls were not due to the absence of top level plans such as the National Response Plan and the National 

Incident Management System. Rather, the problem is that these plans lack clarity on key aspects and have 

operational gaps, as discussed in previous chapters, and have not been effectively integrated and translated into 

action. Prior training, exercising, and equipping proved inadequate to the task of effectively responding to 

Hurricane Katrina. There is a difference between a plan (saying “this is what we need to do”) and a trained, 

resourced set of defined missions (saying “this is what we are going to do, and this is how we are going to organize, 

train, exercise, and equip to do it”). For any plan to work, it must first be broken down into its component parts. 

Next, the plan’s requirements should be matched to the human and physical assets of each responsible department, 

agency, or organization. 

The imperative, therefore, is to organize coherent, proactive management of responses to catastrophic events. 

Virtually all elements of the Federal government must be operational—to respond to catastrophic events with 

unified effort. There are three principal requirements to achieve this transformational goal: 

1. Strengthening DHS institutions to manage the Federal response as well as enhancing DHS regional and 

field elements. 

2. Reinforcing the Secretary of Homeland Security’s position as the President’s manager of the Federal 

response; and 

3. Strengthening the response capabilities—management and field resources—of other Federal departments 

and agencies. 

The Department of Homeland Security

Since the Department was created in January 2003, the management and personnel of the Department of Homeland 

Security have undertaken their responsibilities with energy and professionalism. Their courage and commitment to 

their mission have improved the security of all Americans. 

But the Federal response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that the energy and professionalism of DHS personnel 

was not enough to support the Department’s role as the manager of the Federal response. In particular, DHS lacked 

both the requisite headquarters management institutions and sufficient field capabilities to organize a fully 

successful Federal response effort. Within the Department, therefore, it is essential to strengthen the DHS 

headquarters elements to direct the Federal response while also providing appropriate resources to DHS field 

elements so that they can make an impact on the ground. 

In order to strengthen DHS’s operational management capabilities, we must structure the Department’s headquarters 

elements to support the Secretary’s incident management responsibilities. First and most important, Federal 

government response organizations must be co-located and strengthened to manage catastrophes in a new National 

Operations Center (NOC). The mission of the NOC must be to coordinate and integrate the national response and 

provide a common operating picture for the entire Federal government. This interagency center should ensure 

National-level coordination of Federal, State, and local response to major domestic incidents. It must combine and 

co-locate the situational awareness mission of the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC), the operational 

mission of the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC), and the strategic role currently assigned to the 

Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG). During an incident, all department and agency command centers, 

as well as the Joint Field Office (JFO) at the disaster site, must provide information to the NOC, which develops a 

National common operating picture capable of being exported in real time to other Federal operations centers. 

The NOC must be staffed by an experienced, well-trained, and resourced cadre of personnel who are prepared to 

provide expert strategic and operational management of Federal responses to catastrophic incidents. For example, 

these personnel must include logistical experts with the management tools to track moving resources anywhere 

across the Nation and ensure timely delivery of aid to affected areas. This staff must also include operations experts 

who understand how to combine existing resources into effective response packages for any scenario. In addition to 
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Advantages of Using Unified Command13

 A single set of objectives is developed for the entire

incident.

 A collective approach is used to develop strategies to

achieve incident objectives.

 Information flow and coordination is improved between

all jurisdictions and agencies involved in the incident

 All agencies with responsibility for the incident have an

understanding of joint priorities and restrictions.

 No agency’s legal authorities will be compromised or

neglected.

 The combined efforts of all agencies are optimized as

they perform their respective assignments under a single

Incident Action Plan.

a robust permanent staff, the NOC must include a “battle roster” of personnel who will surge to expand and sustain

the NOC’s capacity during a crisis.

The DHS headquarters must also possess a robust capability for deliberate operational planning. Rather than

waiting for the next disaster, DHS planners must apply lessons learned as well as develop detailed operational plans

that anticipate the requirements of future responses and what capabilities can be matched to them in what timeframe.

Using these operational plans and capability inventories as baseline data, the Headquarters planning staff can

conduct national readiness assessments, highlighting priorities for subsequent preparedness investments, training,

and exercising.

Below the headquarters level within DHS, we must build up the Department’s regional structures. As noted above,

the integration of State and local strategies and capabilities on a regional basis is a homeland security priority.

Homeland security regional offices should be the means to foster State, local and private sector integration.

Furthermore, DHS regional structures are ideally positioned to pre-identify, organize, train, and exercise future

Principal Federal Officials and Joint Field Office staffs. Each DHS regional organization should possess the

capacity to establish a self-sufficient, initial JFO on short notice anywhere in its region.

More broadly, the Department of Homeland Security must possess field personnel with the necessary resources,

training, and national support. As a start, we must improve and emphasize plans that stress a proactive DHS role—

in particular, the Catastrophic Incident Annex and Catastrophic Incident Supplement of the NRP. But DHS must

also have available operational funds so that it can “lean forward” in future crises, to take anticipatory actions

without budgetary concern or risk of subsequent criticism for a false alarm. In the event of a surprise contingency,

battlefield commanders should not have to wait for the release of funds to execute their pre-assigned missions. The

same flexibility should be afforded to our Federal homeland security responders.12

Managing the Interagency Process in Homeland Security Response

In order to create robust homeland security response capabilities, we must also transform our Federal interagency

processes. Most important, we must eliminate the extraordinary red tape and resulting delays in the process of

requests for assistance in response efforts. Too often during the Hurricane Katrina response we found that the

Federal government did not effectively use assets at the ready because the necessary requests were being

“coordinated” somewhere in the bureaucracy. The solution is to enshrine in the Federal government one of the

central tenets of the National Incident Management System—Unified Command. We must transform our approach

for catastrophic incidents from one of bureaucratic coordination to proactive unified command that creates true

unity of effort. As set forth in NIMS, “In a

[Unified Command] structure, the individuals

designated by their jurisdictional authorities . . .

must jointly determine objectives, strategies,

plans, and priorities and work together to execute

integrated incident operations and maximize the

use of assigned resources.”13

At the Federal level, the most urgent step in

creating unity of effort will be to reinforce the

Secretary of Homeland Security as the Federal

government’s preparedness and incident

manager. In order to create unity of effort at the

Federal level, the Department should manage and

orchestrate the specialized efforts of other

Federal departments and agencies within their

core competencies. Although DHS by

Presidential directive has this mission,14 its

internal structures and relationships across the
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Federal government do not position it to fully succeed. The current arrangements are an awkward mix of the

traditional, FEMA-led, approach to interagency coordination and the Homeland Security Act’s creation of a

powerful Department of Homeland Security.

One model for the command and control structure for the Federal response in the new National Preparedness System

is our successful defense and national security statutory framework. In that framework, there is a clear line of

authority that stretches from the President, through the Secretary of Defense, to the Combatant Commander in the

field. When a contingency arises, the Combatant Commander in that region executes the missions assigned by the

Secretary of Defense and the President. Although the Combatant Commander might not “own” or control forces on

a day-to-day basis, during a military operation he controls all military forces in his theater: he exercises the

command authority and has access to resources needed to affect outcomes on the ground.

Figure 6.1 portrays the structure for command and control of defense operations. Unity of command is established

in a chain of command from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the Combatant Commander. The

Combatant Commander possesses operational control over forces and resources provided by the armed services.

The Intelligence Community additionally provides essential information—warning and situational awareness—to

the commander in the field. The system makes a clear distinction between operations—in which the Combatant

Commander is the center of activity—and the provision of operational resources. In the latter case, the Armed

Services are responsible for the training and equipping of forces.

Figure 6.1: Command and Control of Defense Operations

The model somewhat parallels the original conception of the Federal homeland security response. In particular, the

President directs the Secretary of Homeland Security, who coordinates interagency actions at the senior level while

supervising the field commander for the Federal response—the Principal Federal Official (PFO). The PFO, in turn,

is supported with resources provided by DHS and other interagency departments and agencies.

As described in HSPD-5, Cabinet members are to support the Secretary of Homeland Security as the President’s

incident manager directing and coordinating the Federal response.15 At the PFO level, this can be accomplished by

Combatant

Commander

Combatant

Commander

President President

Secretary of

Defense

Secretary of

Defense

Armed Armed Services Services Intelligence

Community

Intelligence

Community

Supporting

Forces

Supporting

Forces

Unity of Command Unity of Command

Intelligence

Intelligence Situational Awareness Situational Awareness
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ensuring that the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO)—who possesses authority over resources—works for the 

PFO.16 

However, the comparison between the homeland security and defense operations models breaks down in two 

significant ways. First, the Federal commander only manages Federal resources in homeland security. In almost 

every circumstance, State and local governments maintain operational control over their own resources. Second, the 

Secretary of Homeland Security and the PFO must request Federal assets from other departments and agencies; they 

do not command the resources of other departments and agencies. HSPD-5 makes clear that one Cabinet member 

cannot alter or impede the ability to carry out the authorities of Federal departments and agencies to perform their 

responsibilities under law.17 Rather, HSPD-5 anticipates that future events will necessarily involve a joint approach 

given that several departments and agencies have distinct statutory authorities (e.g., the Attorney General for 

criminal investigation of terrorist acts, the Secretary of Defense for command over our military forces, and so forth). 

In this vein, we must similarly transform the existing system of Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). A vestige of 

the 1992 Federal Response Plan,

18 the precursor to the NRP, these capability-specific coordination mechanisms, at a 

minimum, must be reconciled to the NIMS as well as responsive to the orders of the Principal Federal Official. 

More fundamentally, we must examine whether we should reorganize and, in some cases, redefine the ESF 

structures, while building DHS command and control mechanisms.19

These interagency management changes recognize that Federal response to catastrophic events—potential or 

actual—must be both efficient and effective in meeting the needs of the victims. Without infringing upon the 

statutory responsibilities of the Cabinet departments and agencies, we must ensure that the President’s incident 

manager is able to call upon the full range of the Federal government’s response assets, and to aggressively 

orchestrate, lead, and coordinate their use in response operations. 

Operational Capabilities in Other Federal Departments/Agencies

Beyond changes to DHS and the structure of Federal response, there is still a compelling need to strengthen 

operational capabilities across the Federal government. Those departments and agencies that have a responsibility 

to participate in a catastrophic response must build up their crisis deployable capabilities as well as their effective 

operational management. 

To start, all Federal departments and agencies should have operational command and control structures that comply 

with the National Incident Management System. Secretaries and directors throughout the government must operate 

jointly, using the same systems, doctrine, and terminology. Similarly, in support of crisis operational capability, 

each department and agency must develop a deliberate planning capability. Planning should include not only the 

response plans themselves but also, both personnel and funding to train professional planners. 

With these new operational planning functions, Federal departments and agencies must build the detailed supporting 

plans, concepts, and staffing to execute their NRP and emergency response missions. During Hurricane Katrina, it 

became clear that most Federal departments and agencies had not developed—much less exercised—standard 

operating procedures for their response. 

An additional imperative is for all Federal departments and agencies to develop “battle rosters” of trained personnel 

who should deploy when their organization is called upon to support a Federal response to a catastrophic event. The 

development of these rosters must coincide with the implementation of training certification programs that ensure 

that personnel are trained and skilled to a high, uniform standard. 

Homeland Security Training, Education, and Exercising

An effective National Preparedness System requires that management and response personnel, especially those in 

the field, are well versed in their missions. At all levels of government, we must build a leadership corps that is 

fully educated, trained, and exercised in our plans and doctrine. Training is not nearly as costly as the mistakes 

made in a crisis. Equally important, this corps must be populated by leaders who are prepared to exhibit innovation 

and take the initiative during extremely trying circumstances. 
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As discussed in the narrative, the response to Hurricane Katrina revealed a lack of familiarity with incident

management, the planning discipline, legal authorities, capabilities, and field-level crisis leadership. Many Federal,

State, and local officials lacked a fundamental understanding of the National Response Plan, the NIMS, and State

and local response plans. The first priority for training is to ensure that our emergency managers fully understand

our preparedness and response plans and doctrine. To that end, we must train all emergency managers with

responsibility for the Federal response in the National Response Plan and the National Incident Management

System. At the same time, the Department of Homeland Security must continue to condition its State assistance

grants on all relevant State and local emergency response personnel being NIMS and NRP trained and capable.20

DHS and its Federal partners should develop and deploy mobile training teams to support this effort.

Beyond current plans and doctrine, we require a more systematic and institutional program for homeland security

professional development and education. While such a program will center on the Department of Homeland

Security, it should extend to personnel throughout all levels of government having responsibility for preventing,

preparing for, responding to, and recovering from natural and man-made disasters. For example, DHS should

establish a National Homeland Security University (NHSU)—analogous to the National Defense University—for

senior homeland security personnel as the capstone for homeland security training and education opportunities. 21

The NHSU, in turn, should integrate homeland security personnel from State and local jurisdictions as well as other

Federal departments and agencies.

Over the long term, our professional

development and education programs must

break down interagency barriers to build a

unified team across the Federal government.

Just as the Department of Defense

succeeded in building a joint leadership

cadre, so the rest of the Federal government

must make familiarity with other

departments and agencies a requirement for

career advancement.22 Where practicable, interagency and intergovernmental assignments for Federal personnel

must build trust and familiarity among diverse homeland security professionals. These assignments will break down

organizational stovepipes, advancing the exchange of ideas and practices. At a minimum, we should build joint

training and educational institutions for our senior managers in homeland security-related departments and agencies.

These Federal professional development and education programs must integrate participants from other homeland

security partners—namely, State and local governments as well as the private sector, non-governmental

organizations, and faith-based organizations. As in every homeland crisis, it is inevitable that Federal, State, and

local homeland security officials will come together to respond, and so it is important that we recognize the value in

the old military adage that we must “train as you fight; fight as you train.”

Pursuant to HSPD-8, the National Preparedness System should include a robust program of homeland security

exercises at all levels of government and across all disciplines.23 The Department of Homeland Security should

serve as the President’s executive agent in developing and managing a National Exercise and Evaluation Program

(NEEP). The NEEP should consolidate all existing interagency homeland security-related exercise programs at the

Federal level with existing DHS National Exercise Program and Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation

Program (HSEEP) through common doctrine, objectives, and management.24 The NEEP should sponsor an

aggressive program of joint exercises that involve all levels of government, as well as problem-specific exercises at

particular levels of government. NEEP planning, moreover, must be integrated with a robust national homeland

security training program. Moreover, the Program must emphasize intelligence-driven, threat-based scenarios that

stress the system. In particular, we should not shy away from exercising worst case scenarios that “break” our

homeland security system. Arguably, those scenarios will provide us the most meaningful, if sobering, lessons.

Assessments, Lessons Learned, and Corrective Actions

The success of the National Preparedness System over time will depend upon the quality of its metrics-based

assessment and feedback mechanisms. In particular, the System must possess the means to measure progress

LESSON LEARNED: The Department of Homeland Security

should develop a comprehensive program for the professional

development and education of the Nation’s homeland security

personnel, including Federal, State and local employees as well

as emergency management persons within the private sector,

non-governmental organizations, as well as faith-based and

community groups. This program should foster a “joint” Federal

Interagency, State, local, and civilian team.
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towards strategic goals and capability objectives. It must systematically identify best practices and lessons learned

in order to share them with our homeland security partners throughout the Nation. It must also have an effective

process for conducting corrective or remedial actions when a system challenge is identified.

With common goals and performance

metrics, the new National Preparedness

System must first provide us with the

capacity to create a national preparedness

baseline that, at a minimum, serves as an

inventory of our capabilities. More

importantly, the baseline will tell us how

prepared we are today in each of our

jurisdictions and nationally. Reviewed at the

Federal level and compared against the

National Preparedness Goal, the System

must also identify gaps in our national

capabilities. These gaps can then serve as

the priority targets for the homeland security grant process. In turn, the grant process must be tied to performance

metrics that assess progress toward meeting national objectives. The President’s Management Agenda has proven

an effective tool applied to Federal department and agency performance that has recently, as a result of this review,

been extended to include State and local homeland security programs that are federally funded.25

Furthermore, this National Preparedness System must be dynamic. Like the national security system described

above, we must routinely revisit our plans and reassess our capabilities in order to account for evolving risks,

improvements in technological capabilities, and preparedness innovations.

An integrated National Preparedness System must identify and share lessons learned and best practices both within

departments and agencies and across jurisdictions. We understand that for many aspects of homeland security there

is no single, best way of doing business. Our National Preparedness organization should systematically investigate

and seek out innovative approaches being applied in the various localities, States, departments, agencies, and the

private sector. The system should circulate the most promising of these practices, as well as any lessons—positive

and negative—on a continuous basis, so that we never stop improving our security.

Finally, we must ensure that problems identified in our training, exercises, and lessons learned programs are

corrected. Too often, after-action reports for exercises and real-world incidents highlight the same problems that do

not get fixed—the need for interoperable communications, for example. Thus, the circle of the National

Preparedness System must be closed by a Remedial Action Management Program (RAMP) that is led by DHS and

coordinated by the Homeland Security Council but is resident in and executed by individual departments and

agencies. Department and agency RAMPs must translate findings of homeland security gaps and vulnerabilities into

concrete programs for corrective action. Then the RAMPs must track that the appropriate corrective actions are

fully implemented in a timely fashion.

The Role of Congress

The challenges of transformation are not limited to the Executive Branch of government. Despite previous calls for

transformation from national commissions, the U.S. Congress has not fully transformed itself for homeland

security.26 The numerous congressional committees in both houses that authorize and appropriate funds for

homeland security inevitably produce competing initiatives and requirements. For example, the Secretary of

Homeland Security and his leadership team were required to testify at 166 hearings before 61 full committees and

subcommittees in the Senate and House of Representatives and provided over 2,000 briefings during 2005 as of

October 14, 2005.27 At best, the many priorities distract us from the true, top priorities. At worst, the many

priorities and requirements can contradict each other.

Moreover, Congress has not yet embraced a purely risk-based funding approach to homeland security priorities.

Although the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate have passed several forms of grant reform legislation

LESSON LEARNED: The Department of Homeland Security

should establish specific requirements for training, exercise, and

lessons learned programs linked through a comprehensive

system and common supporting methodology throughout the

Federal, State and local governments. Furthermore, assessments

of training and exercises should be based on clear and consistent

performance measures. DHS should require all Federal and

State entities with operational homeland security responsibilities

to have a lessons learned capability, and DHS should ensure all

entities are accountable for the timely implementation of

remedial actions in response to lessons learned.
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that would permit DHS to increase the prioritization of homeland security spending on the basis of risk, the two

bodies have failed to reconcile their differences.28 Until we as a Nation agree to a solely risk-based approach, we are

in danger of allocating our limited resources in ways that do not prioritize funding to meet national homeland

security goals and objectives.

Finally, our experience in building an effective national security system demonstrates that Congress will be an

essential partner as we continue to transform our homeland security system. Implementing the Goldwater-Nichols

defense reform, for example, required legislation, and the durability of our homeland security reforms and the new

National Preparedness System will require comparable support and participation from our Congressional partners.

How Much is Enough?

An age-old question for national security and, now, homeland security planning is how much is enough? In

particular, at what level of preparedness do we feel confident that we have adequately accounted for the threats we

face, our vulnerabilities, and the means we have to manage them? Recognizing that the future is uncertain and that

we cannot anticipate every threat, we as a Nation must rely on a capabilities-based planning approach29 to answering

these questions: we must set levels of capabilities—at Federal, State, and local levels as among our other homeland

security partners—that we conclude are appropriate to meet the range of risks that we may confront in the future.

In order to help identify the range of future plausible risks, the Department of Homeland Security has produced a set

of fifteen National Planning Scenarios (see Figure 6.2). The Scenarios were designed to illustrate a myriad of tasks

and capabilities that are required to prepare for and respond to a range of potential terrorist attacks and natural

disasters that our Nation may confront. They identify the potential scale, scope, and complexity of fifteen incidents

that would severely harm our Nation’s citizens, infrastructure, economy, and threaten our way of life. Examples

include an outbreak of pandemic influenza on U.S. soil, a major earthquake in a U.S. city, and the detonation of a

ten-kiloton nuclear device in a large U.S. metropolitan area. The Scenarios also include a Category 5 hurricane

hitting a major metropolitan area.30

Figure 6.2. U.S. Natural Disasters that Caused the Most Death and Damage to Property

in Each Decade, 1900-2005, with 2004 Major Hurricanes,

September 11th Terrorist Attacks, and Selected National Planning Scenarios31

Damage in Third Quarter 2005 dollars

.

SELECTED NATIONAL

PLANNING SCENARIOS

13 9

Nuclear

Device

Pandemic

Influenza

Major

Earthquake

9/11 Terrorist

Attacks

1900 1906 1919 1927 1928 1938 1944 1955 1957 1965 1969 1972 1989 1992 1993 2001 2004 2005

Atlantic-Gulf

Hurricane Mississippi

Floods

Hurricane San

Felipe and

Okeechobee Flood

New England

Hurricane Northeast

Hurricane

Hurricane

Diane Hurricane

Audrey

Hurricane

Betsy Hurricane

Cam ille

Hurricane

Agnes

Hurricane

Hugo

Hurricane

Andrew

East Coast

Blizzard

2004 Major

Hurricanes (Charley,

Frances, Ivan,

Jeanne)

Hurricane

Katrina

San Francisco

Earthquake and

Fire

Galveston

Hurricane

Deaths Damage

$100 B

$90 B

$80 B

$70 B

$60 B

$50 B

$40 B

$30 B

$20 B

$10 B

10,000

9,000

8,000

7,000

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000
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The Scenarios, which were meant to be illustrative of a wide variety of hazards, generally do not specify a 

geographic location, and the impacts are meant to be scalable for a variety of population considerations. Ultimately, 

they give homeland security planners a tool that allows for the flexible and adaptive development of capabilities as 

well as the identification of needed capability levels to meet the National Preparedness Goal. 

While the National Planning Scenarios have been effective tools for generating dialogue on response capabilities, 

they do not fully anticipate some of the worst disaster scenarios. Scenario 10, for example, depicts the effects of a 

Category 5 hurricane hitting a major metropolitan area in the United States. However, in the Scenario, the Category 

5 hurricane actually causes fewer deaths and less destruction than did Hurricane Katrina, a Category 3, because the 

Scenario only characterizes the destruction caused to a metropolitan area, while a storm like Hurricane Katrina may 

span three or more States. Further, although the Scenario acknowledges potential delays and difficulties in 

evacuation, realistic circumstances such as Katrina may be worse, where more than 100,000 residents did not 

evacuate.32

Scenario 1, the detonation of a ten-kiloton nuclear device in an American city by a terrorist group, suffers from 

similar limitations and fails to fully challenge our plans and preparation skills. Although devastating in terms of 

both death and destruction, a ten-kiloton bomb is a relatively small nuclear device. Moreover, the Scenario does not 

anticipate one of the most demanding characteristics of past al-Qaida operations: multiple, simultaneous attacks. 

How much more taxing would it be to respond to multiple and simultaneous nuclear, chemical, or biological 

incidents? If the purpose of the National Planning Scenarios is to provide a foundation for identifying the 

capabilities required to meet all hazards, the Scenarios must press us to confront the most destructive challenges. 

Hurricane Katrina severely stressed our current national response capabilities. However, as depicted in Figure 6.2, 

three other National Planning Scenarios—an act of nuclear terrorism (Scenario 1), an outbreak of pandemic 

influenza (Scenario 3), and a 7.5 magnitude earthquake striking a major city (Scenario 9)—are more daunting still. 

Compared with the deaths and economic chaos a nuclear detonation or influenza outbreak could unleash, Hurricane 

Katrina was small. But even these scenarios do not go far enough to challenge us to improve our level of 

preparedness. Until we can meet the standard set by the most demanding scenarios, we should not consider 

ourselves adequately prepared. 

The most recent Top Officials (“TOPOFF”) exercise in April 2005 revealed the Federal government’s lack of 

progress in addressing a number of preparedness deficiencies, many of which had been identified in previous 

exercises. This lack of progress reflects, in part, the absence of a remedial action program to systematically address 

lessons learned from exercises. To ensure appropriate priority and accountability are being applied to address these 

continuing deficiencies, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism now annually 

conducts four Cabinet-level exercises with catastrophic scenarios. To date, a catastrophic exercise with a pandemic 

scenario was conducted in December 2005; the next exercise is scheduled for this March. 

While the National Planning Scenarios represent a good start for our national process of capabilities-based planning 

for homeland security, we must orient the National Preparedness System towards still greater challenges. We must 

not shy away from creating planning scenarios that stress the current system of response to the breaking point and 

challenge our Nation in ways that we wish we did not have to imagine. To that end, we must revise the planning 

scenarios to make them more challenging. Among other characteristics, they must reflect both what we know and 

what we can imagine about the ways our enemies think—that they will not hit us hard just once, but that they will 

seek to cause us damage on significant scale in multiple locations simultaneously. We must not again find ourselves 

vulnerable to the charge that we suffered a “‘failure of imagination’ and a mind-set that dismissed possibilities.”33

Envisioning a National Preparedness System

Figure 6.3 provides an illustration of how our existing homeland security strategy, doctrine, and capabilities can be 

unified into a single National Preparedness System. The graphic ties together the priorities described throughout 

this section into a new transformational construct. The strengths of this System include first and foremost 

integration of strategy, doctrine, capabilities, response activities, and exercises, as well as assessment and 

evaluation. The graphic also highlights the feedback mechanisms that must be built into the System. In particular, 

as described above, the System must include routine reporting and assessment of program performance metrics, the 
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readiness of particular capabilities, as well as best practices and lessons learned from exercises and activities. These 

assessments and findings must be reported back, as appropriate, to inform key components throughout the System. 

The National Preparedness System graphic additionally highlights the constituent elements of operational 

capabilities: deliberate planning, resources, logistics, training, and education. Moreover, the graphic notes the 

importance of unity of effort in exercises and the conduct of response activities in incidents. 

As described above, the National Preparedness System must be dynamic, flexible, and responsive to new 

developments. Like our national security system, the strategy, doctrine, and capabilities of the System should be 

reviewed periodically to determine their continued relevance to current challenges. Similarly, periodic reviews must 

assess the continued internal consistency of the System—e.g., do the doctrine and capabilities support the strategy? 

Key inputs to the System include the current national vision for preparedness, laws, and policies and the use of 

capability-based planning that prioritizes investments to fill gaps identified by needs assessments. An equally 

important input is the current assessment of risks—what threats does the Nation currently confront, what are our 

current vulnerabilities, and what are the consequences? Against the current assessment of risks, we must continually 

evaluate our capability to respond effectively. 

Finally, our planning and operational documents should define the critical roles played by all of our homeland 

security partners in the Preparedness System. Federal, State, and local governments play prominent roles 

throughout the System—from strategy development to assessment and lessons learned. Additionally, the private 

sector, NGOs, faith-based groups, communities, and individuals play important roles in operational capabilities as 

well as response activities. 
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Figure 6.3: A Shared Vision of Preparedness 

National Security Strategy

National Strategy for Combating Terrorism

National Strategy for Homeland Security

National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction

National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza

Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan

STRATEGY 

National Preparedness Goal

National Response Plan

National Infrastructure Protection Plan 

DOCTRINE 

Universal Task List

Target Capabilities List

CAPABILITIES 

National Planning 

Scenarios 

Federal Plans 

State Plans

Local Plans

Community Plans

Family Plans

PLANS 

People

Equipment & Technology

RESOURCES 

Mission-specific

Multi-disciplinary

TRAINING 

Prof. Development

Continuing Education

EDUCATION 

INCIDENTS EXERCISES 

LESSONS LEARNED BEST PRACTICES 

REMEDIAL ACTION 

MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

ANALYSIS & INFORMATION 

SHARING 

UNITY OF EFFORT 

ASSESSMENT AND EVALUATION 

Supply Chain

Intermodal Delivery

LOGISTICS 

All Hazards National Exercise and Evaluation 

Program

LESSONS LEARNED

LESSONS LEARNED

LESSONS LEARNED
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CREATING A CULTURE OF PREPAREDNESS 

The second element of our continuing transformation for homeland security perhaps will be the most profound and 

enduring—the creation of a Culture of Preparedness. A new preparedness culture must emphasize that the entire 

Nation—Federal, State, and local governments; the private sector; communities; and individual citizens—shares 

common goals and responsibilities for homeland security. In other words, our homeland security is built upon a 

foundation of partnerships. And these partnerships must include shared understanding of at least four concepts: 

 The certainty of future catastrophes; 

 The importance of initiative; 

 The roles of citizens and other homeland security stakeholders in preparedness; and 

 The roles of each level of government and the private sector in creating a prepared Nation. 

Future Challenges 

The first principle for a Culture of Preparedness must be a shared acknowledgement that creating a prepared Nation 

will be a continuing challenge. Optimism is fundamental to the American character. While it always energizes us, 

it also grounds us in times of tragedy and loss. We must guard against our optimism leading us to a dangerous sense 

of complacency. Complacency of our citizens presents a great challenge. We are fortunate that, because of the 

courage and self-sacrifice of public servants across all levels of government, we have not suffered another terrorist 

attack on our homeland since 2001. But we are a Nation at war, and we have a responsibility to be prepared. We 

must temper our optimism with sober recognition of the certainty of future catastrophes. We cannot prevent natural 

disasters. And though we work tirelessly against them, we cannot anticipate nor prevent every type of terrorist 

attack against the homeland. As the Irish Republican Army once warned British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 

after narrowly missing her in an assassination attempt: terrorists only need to be successful once; but we, their 

targets, must be successful everyday.34 We know that our enemies plot further attacks against us. We must continue 

to prevent them and, if necessary, respond. Regrettably, lives will be lost, citizens displaced, and property 

destroyed. 

The certainty of future challenges should inform our national expectations. As a Nation, we will prepare ourselves 

in the most effective ways we know. Our Culture of Preparedness, therefore, must emphasize the importance of 

flexibility and readiness to cope with an uncertain future. While we cannot predict the future to our satisfaction, we 

can build capabilities that prepare us for a broad range of challenges. Perhaps equally important, we can ensure that 

our preparedness plans, thinking, and “imagination” do not become so rigid that we cannot rapidly adapt to 

unforeseen challenges.35

Initiative 

Despite reforms that encourage a proactive, anticipatory approach to the management of incidents, the culture of our 

response community has a fundamental bias towards reaction rather than initiative. As a result, our national efforts 

too often emphasize response and clean-up efforts at the expense of potentially more cost-effective anticipatory 

actions that might prevent or mitigate damage. 

The need for anticipatory response is a pillar of the National Response Plan. A list of Key Concepts in the National 

Response Plan places it second only to “systematic and coordinated incident management.” Specifically, the NRP

calls for: 

Proactive notification and deployment of Federal resources in anticipation of or in response to 

catastrophic events in coordination and collaboration with State, local, and tribal governments and 

private entities when possible.36

Similarly, our Culture of Preparedness must stress initiative at all levels. Fundamentally, our Preparedness System 

and Culture must encourage and reward innovation. To do so, we must build a system and approach that better 
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aligns authority and responsibility—those who are responsible for a mission or task must have the authority to act.

In the same vein, an alignment of authority and responsibility provides us the ability to assess our performance—

collectively and individually. Performance assessment and accountability, however, must not be blame.37 Our

current culture of blame threatens both individual and institutional initiative, resourcefulness, and enterprise across

the homeland security, law enforcement, and intelligence fields. It is time that Congress, the Executive Branch, and

all of our homeland security partners develop a consensus regarding a reasonable balance of accountability,

responsibility, and authority at all levels. Otherwise, the culture of blame and its related acrimony will debilitate us.

Citizen Preparedness

Our preparedness culture must also emphasize the importance of citizen and community preparedness. Citizen and

community preparedness are among the most effective means of preventing terrorist attacks as well as protecting

against, mitigating, responding to, and recovering from all hazards.38 For example, the Citizen Corps in Harris

County, Texas, brought together over 50,000 volunteers to support American Red Cross efforts and staff evacuation

centers throughout Houston. As a joint team, they created an actual working city (with its own zip code) for

Hurricane Katrina victims sheltering in the Astrodome.39

Thus, citizens and communities can help themselves by becoming more prepared. If every family maintained the

resources to live in their homes without electricity and running water for three days, we could allocate more Federal,

State, and local response resources to saving lives. Similarly, if every family developed their own emergency

preparedness plan, they almost certainly would reduce the demand for outside emergency resources. As the 9/11

Commission Report states, “One clear lesson of September 11 is that individual civilians need to take responsibility

for maximizing the probability that they will survive, should disaster strike.”40

Leadership at all levels will be essential in

helping to transform citizen preparedness.

First, responsible public officials at the

Federal, State, and local levels as well as

prominent national figures should begin a

public dialogue that emphasizes common

themes regarding the importance of citizen

preparedness. DHS should continue to build

upon those programs and institutions that

already work, such as Department of

Education elementary and secondary school

programs; Citizen Corps; State and local

government training programs; and Federal

cooperation with the National Governors

Association. Nongovernmental organizations

can also play a key role in this area. DHS has made some important progress in this area with its Ready.gov

initiative and its public service announcements program with the Ad Council.41 But more needs to be done.

Encouraging preparedness awareness and activity is a shared responsibility across all levels of government that we

must make a priority. Preparedness today will save lives tomorrow.

In addition, DHS and other Federal agencies should identify both the individual skills and capabilities that would

help citizens in a disaster as well as the types of messages from trusted leaders that would encourage citizens to be

better prepared. Public awareness messaging must shift to include more substantive information, as opposed to just

telling our citizens that they need to “do something.” For example, the “Stop, Drop, and Roll” campaign used so

successfully in fire safety as part of the “Learn Not to Burn”42 program provided citizens with specific steps to take.

Other successful campaigns include the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s “Buckle Up America”

campaign,43 which prescribes proper use of seat belt and child safety seats. As with so many of these successful

campaigns, the Nation’s children can help lead the way.44

LESSON LEARNED: The Federal government, working with

State, local, NGO, and private sector partners, should combine

the various disparate citizen preparedness programs into a

single national campaign to promote and strengthen citizen and

community preparedness. This campaign should be developed

in a manner that appeals to the American people, incorporates

the endorsement and support of prominent national figures,

focuses on the importance of individual and community

responsibility for all-hazard disaster preparedness, provides

meaningful and comprehensive education, training and

exercise opportunities applicable to all facets of the American

population, and establishes specialized preparedness programs

for those less able to provide for themselves during disasters

such as children, the ill, the disabled, and the elderly.
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Other Homeland Security Stakeholders and Preparedness 

We must build upon our initial successful efforts to partner with other homeland security stakeholders—namely the 

private sector, non-governmental organizations, and faith-based groups.45 Each of these groups plays a critical role 

in preparedness. To the extent that we can incorporate them into the National effort, we will be reducing the burden 

on other response resources so that Federal, State, and local responders can concentrate our energies on those with 

the greatest need. 

Private sector companies own and operate 85 percent of our Nation’s critical infrastructure.46 Transportation, 

electricity, banking, telecommunications, food supply, and clean water are examples of services relying on 

infrastructure that have become basic aspects of our daily lives. Yet, these services are often only noticed when they 

are disrupted and when the American public expects speedy restoration. In fact, the Nation relies on “critical 

infrastructure” to maintain its defense, continuity of government, economic prosperity, and quality of life. The 

services provided by these interconnected systems are so vital that their disruption will have a debilitating impact on 

national security, the economy, or public health and safety. 

Companies are responsible for protecting their systems, which comprise the majority of critical infrastructure. 

Because of this, private sector preparation and response is vital to mitigating the national impact of disasters. 

Government actions in response to a disaster can help or hamper private sector efforts. However, governments 

cannot plan to adequately respond unless the private sector helps them understand what infrastructure truly is 

critical. Likewise, businesses cannot develop contingency plans without understanding how governments will 

respond. To maximize the Nation’s preparedness, Federal, State, and local governments must join with the private 

sector to collaboratively develop plans to respond to major disasters. There are important initiatives in this area 

already underway by the Business Round Table (BRT) and Business Executives for National Security (BENS) 

project.47 We must encourage and build upon these efforts. The private sector must be an explicit partner in and 

fully integrated across all levels of response—Federal, State, and local. 

Non-governmental organizations play essential roles in preparedness by complementing and supporting 

preparedness efforts. In times of crisis, NGOs—especially community groups, faith-based organizations, places of 

worship, and relief organizations—provide essential human faces, helping hands, compassion, and comfort to all 

American people, whether or not they are victims of an incident. As such, they fill an essential need in the response 

system in ways far beyond the capacity of the Government. Thus, their contributions must be fully integrated at all 

levels—Federal, State, and local. 

The Role of Each Level of Government in a Culture of Preparedness 

Today, we operate under two guiding principles: a) that incident management should begin at the lowest 

jurisdictional level possible, and b) that, for most incidents, the Federal government will generally play a supporting 

role to State and local efforts.48 While these principles suffice for the vast majority of incidents, they impede the 

Federal response to severe catastrophes. In a catastrophic scenario that overwhelms or incapacitates local and State 

incident command structures, the Federal government must be prepared to assume incident command and get 

assistance directly to those in need until State and local authorities are reconstituted. 

The National Preparedness System must also recognize the role of the Federal government for monitoring and 

guiding national preparedness efforts. In particular, the system must ensure that the Federal government assesses 

the preparedness of localities across the country with an eye towards identifying the Federal response requirement 

for each. In addition, Federal, State, local, and private sector partners must agree on a system in which the Federal 

government responds more actively and effectively while respecting the role of State and local governments. 

The new culture of preparedness must stress partnership among all levels of government. Local governments will 

continue to have responsibility for providing the immediate response capabilities for the vast majority of incidents 

while State governors will continue to have sovereign responsibilities to protect their residents. Yet preparedness 

must emphasize the shared nature of these responsibilities in a catastrophic event. State governments must work 

with their local jurisdictions to ensure that they have developed plans and capabilities that are appropriate for the 
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homeland security challenges confronting them. Both State and local governments must also reach out to their 

citizens, private sector, and community groups to promote their preparedness efforts. 

Furthermore, in the new culture of preparedness, State and local governments must continually seek to work with 

their neighboring jurisdictions. Building upon the successes of interstate cooperation programs such as the 

Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC),49 the Federal government must take an active role in 

encouraging and facilitating these partnerships. Regional collaboration at the State and local levels will help the 

Nation to reduce overlapping or redundant capabilities as well as to minimize capability gaps. Moreover, active 

regional collaboration will likewise be a means for identifying and sharing homeland security lessons learned and 

best practices. 

Finally, in our new Culture of Preparedness, all required response assets and resources of the Federal government 

must integrate and synchronize to ensure an effective national response to a crisis. In practical terms, this entails 

stepping away from the bureaucratic view of a particular department or agency’s institutional interests. Instead, we 

must continually build preparedness partnerships across the Federal government as well as with State and local 

governments. 

FOSTERING TRANSFORMATION 

Our continuing transformation is not a choice but an absolute necessity. We must begin a national dialogue on 

shared responsibilities and expectations for preparedness. As highlighted throughout this report, the American 

concept of federalism requires that any transformation must involve and accommodate all levels of government and 

communities across the Nation. 

The objectives of this dialogue must be first to establish reasonable expectations of what government can and cannot 

do in response to catastrophes. Our citizens need to know what to expect from their government, in order to make 

sure they do everything possible at their level to protect themselves and their loved ones. 

Second, this dialogue must develop a shared understanding of the need for active Federal management of the 

National Preparedness System, to include: 

 Setting metrics for State, local, community, and individual preparedness; 

 Developing and implementing a system to assess that preparedness as well as to establish clear 

responsibilities and accountability; and 

 Identifying the circumstances under which the Federal government will push capabilities independent of 

request. 

Finally, this dialogue must result in a shared understanding of roles and responsibilities in preparedness for 

catastrophic events, to include those of: 

 The Federal government; 

 State governments; 

 Local governments; 

 The private sector (including non-governmental organizations and faith-based organizations); and 

 Communities and individual citizens. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: EPILOGUE

Each morning as the sun rises over the Gulf Coast, determined residents of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama 

begin another day in the long trial of reviving their communities and rebuilding their lives. They continue to grieve 

for those who were lost. For all of them, Katrina and its aftermath remain a painful, challenging, and ever-present 

reality. 

These human dimensions and their indelible images of despair and destruction must remain sharply in focus as we 

address the lessons we have learned from our Federal response to Hurricane Katrina. The seventeen specific lessons 

we have identified resulted in 125 recommendations, which have been reviewed by all relevant Federal departments 

and agencies. They soon will enter a review process, which will help to refine the recommendations, as necessary, 

as well as develop implementation plans and attendant timelines. 

These recommendations for corrective action are substantial, and the task to implement them will be a weighty one. 

Arriving at sound policy decisions is difficult enough, but the path to effectuating significant, transformational 

change within bureaucracies can be a lengthy process. But if the lessons of Katrina really are to be learned, this 

change is imperative. 

The 2006 hurricane season is just over three months away. Even while the homeland security policy community 

undertakes the deliberative process to implement the lessons we have learned from Katrina, there are specific actions 

we can and should undertake now – in parallel with the policy process – to be better prepared for future 

emergencies. We propose to undertake the following activities before June 1: 

 Ensure that, in the event of another disaster, we are able to co-locate relevant Federal, State, and local 

decision-makers, including leaders of State National Guards, to enhance unity of effort 

 For events preceded by warning, ensure we are prepared to pre-position a fully resourced and integrated 

interagency Federal Joint Field Office (JFO) to coordinate and, if necessary, direct Federal support to the 

disaster 

 Ensure situational awareness by establishing rapid deployable communications as well as instituting a 

structure for consolidated Federal operational reporting to the Department of Homeland Security 

 In order to enhance coordination of military resources supporting the response, co-locate a single 

Department of Defense point of contact at the JFO and current FEMA regional offices 

 To ensure the most effective employment of Federal disaster relief personnel and assets, designate locations 

throughout the country for receiving, staging, moving, and integrating them 

 Identify and develop rosters of Federal, State, and local government personnel who are prepared to assist in 

disaster relief 

 Employ all available 21st Century technologies both to update and utilize the national Emergency Alert 

System in order to provide the general public with advanced notification of and instruction for disasters and 

emergencies 
CHAPTER SEVEN: EPILOGUE

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 Encourage States to pre-contract with service providers for key disaster relief efforts, such as debris 

removal and the provision of critical commodities 

 Enhance the mechanism for providing Federal funds to States for preparations upon warning of an 

imminent emergency 

 Improve delivery of assistance to disaster victims by streamlining registration, expediting eligibility 

decisions, tracking movements of displaced victims, and incorporating safeguards against fraud 

 Enhance on-going review of State evacuation plans and incorporate planning for Continuity of Government 

to ensure continuation of essential and emergency services 

We have already begun collaborating with the Department of Homeland Security to implement many of these steps. 

The completion of the tasks above will better position the Federal government to respond to natural and man-made 

disasters more effectively and efficiently in the near-term. And as the Federal government works to implement 

these steps and the full 125 recommendations contained in this Report, we encourage State and local governments, 

all facets of the private sector as well as the media to undertake a review of their own respective roles and 

responsibilities in both preparing for and responding to catastrophic events. In the end, what we require for a fully 

successful national response to all 21st Century hazards is to build upon the national and homeland security 

foundations we have established since 9/11 and implement a unified system of National Preparedness. 

We are confident that the lessons we have learned from Hurricane Katrina and the accompanying recommendations 

we propose will yield preparedness dividends that transcend Federal, State, and local boundaries. Their full 

implementation will help the Nation – all levels of government, the private sector, and communities and individual 

citizens – achieve a shared commitment to preparedness. Together, we will strengthen our ability to prepare for, 

protect against, respond to, and recover from a wide range of catastrophic possibilities that are as varied as the mind 

of a terrorist and as random as the weather. There is no greater mission, and no greater tribute to the victims of 

Hurricane Katrina. 
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APPENDICES

Appendix A – Recommendations 

Appendix B – What Went Right 

Appendix C – List of Acronyms 

Appendix D – Staff Page 

Appendix E – Endnotes

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APPENDIX A – RECOMMENDATIONS

1. National Preparedness (Recommendations 1 – 21)

2. Integrated Use of Military Capabilities (Recommendations 22 – 32)

3. Communications (Recommendations 33 – 37)

4. Logistics and Evacuation (Recommendations 38 – 43)

5. Search and Rescue (Recommendations 44 – 48) 

6. Public Safety and Security (Recommendations 49 – 56) 

7. Public Health and Medical Support (Recommendations 57 – 62)

8. Human Services (Recommendations 63 – 67)

9. Mass Care and Housing (Recommendations 68 – 72) 

10. Public Communications (Recommendations 73 – 77) 

11. Critical Infrastructure and Impact Assessment (Recommendations 78 – 85)

12. Environmental Hazards and Debris Removal (Recommendations 86 – 88)

13. Foreign Assistance (Recommendations 89 – 97)

14. Non-Governmental Aid (Recommendations 98 – 103)

15. Training, Exercises, and Lessons Learned (Recommendations 104 – 111)

16. Homeland Security Professional Development and Education (Recommendations 112 – 118)

17. Citizen and Community Preparedness (Recommendations 119 – 125)
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Critical Challenge: National Preparedness 

Lesson Learned: The Federal government should work with its homeland security partners in revising 

existing plans, ensuring a functional operational structure—including within regions—and establishing a 

clear, accountable process for all National preparedness efforts. In doing so, the Federal government must: 

• Ensure that Executive Branch agencies are organized, trained, and equipped to perform their 

response roles. 

• Finalize and implement the National Preparedness Goal.

Recommendations: 

National Response Plan and the National Incident Management System 

1. DHS should establish an interagency team of senior planners with appropriate emergency management 

experience to conduct a comprehensive, 90-day review of the NRP and the NIMS. One of the main goals 

of this review will be to provide a cross-walk between the NIMS and the NRP to ensure that the two plans are 

properly integrated and clearly explained. Using feedback and lessons learned from the Hurricane Katrina 

response, including addressing relevant recommendations from the Katrina Lessons Learned Review Group, 

the interagency group led by DHS and overseen by HSC will develop findings and recommendations for 

changes to the NRP and request detailed comments and feedback from all agencies. Before changes are 

finalized, the group will test the recommended changes through tabletop exercises to ensure the suggested 

changes are clear and improve the NRP. Revisions should include the development and promulgation of 

guidance on the purpose and procedures for declaring Incidents of National Significance and the development 

of a streamlined, standardized mission assignment process and clearly delineate the consequences of an INS 

declaration. A second, independent group of subject-matter experts from across the State and local 

emergency response and homeland security community and the private sector should then review and validate 

the group’s recommendations. Following the completion of the 90 day review, the recommended 

modifications to the NRP will be expeditiously reviewed through the HSC interagency policy process. 

a. Revise the NRP to address situations that render State and local governments incapable of an 

effective response. The NRP does not adequately anticipate that the Federal government may need to 

temporarily assume some inherently State and local responsibilities and augment State and local incident 

command staff during a catastrophic incident. The Federal government should develop plans to build 

and temporarily command the ICS until the local or State authorities are able to recover from the initial 

impact of the catastrophic incident and perform their roles under ICS. These plans should utilize any 

available State or local assets that may remain operational and necessarily require collaborative planning 

between Federal, State, and local authorities. These revisions should also be incorporated into the NRPCIA and CIS. This effort should be part of the 90 day interagency review effort. 

b. Realign ESFs to NIMS structure. Although the NRP base plan was predicated on the NIMS incident 

command system, the Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) were taken from the old Federal Response 

Plan and were not adequately realigned to fit within the NIMS structure. The ESFs should be realigned 

to fit within the NIMS structure to ensure coordination and efficiency. Rather than having each ESF 

function independently undertaking common functions (i.e., operations, planning, logistics, 

finance/administration), the ESF structure should be realigned to separate operational elements from 

common support requirements. 

c. Require agencies to develop integrated operational plans, procedures and capabilities for their 

support to the base NRP and all ESFs and Support Annexes. The NRP required each ESF primary 

agency to “develop standard operating procedures (SOPs) and notification protocols.” Each primary 

department or agency for each ESF and support annex should develop a detailed operations plan on how 

they will become operational and coordinate with other annexes and ESFs during a major incident. 

These operational plans should conform to NIMS and be consistent with the recommended 

reconfiguration of the ESF structure. These plans should be exercised yearly through either National, 
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departmental, or agency exercises. It should be recognized that these plans will take time to create and 

will need to be developed in collaboration with State and local officials. 

d. All Federal departments and agencies should align their response structures to NIMS. In 

accordance with this alignment, the entire Federal response structure should be NIMS based, reporting 

through one unified command using the same terminology and basic organizational structure. Although 

ICS is a field command structure, developing an understanding of the ICS at all levels will eliminate 

confusion, standardize operations throughout the government, and limit unnecessary interference with 

field command. DHS should lead a review of all Federal department and agency response operations 

plans to guarantee conformance with NIMS and the NRP, from response teams to command post 

operations. 

1) DHS should establish performance measures and metrics to allow an objective assessment of NRP 

and NIMS implementation status for all departments and agencies, and state and local governments. 

2) After the establishment of the performance metrics, all departments and agencies will report to the 

President through the Homeland Security Council (HSC) within 60 days on all NRP/NIMS 

implementation efforts to date and on whether they have met the guidance goals established in 

HSPD-5. The HSC will assess the progress of NIMS implementation for each department and 

agency. 

3) To ensure that State and local governments fully implement NIMS requirements to be eligible for 

Homeland Security Grant Program funding in fiscal year 2007 and thereafter, DHS should formally 

review all NIMS compliance certifications through a peer review process, in addition to a selfcertification process. The peer review process should: (1) verify the satisfaction of training, 

planning, exercising, and other NIMS metrics; and (2) promote the sharing of lessons learned and 

best practices for institutionalizing the NIMS. 

2. DHS should institute a formal training program on the NIMS and NRP for all department and agency 

personnel with incident management responsibilities. The key to the implementation of ICS is training. 

All departments and agencies should undertake an aggressive ICS training program for all personnel who 

may deploy during a disaster. It is essential that personnel have a working knowledge of ICS before a 

disaster occurs. Adequate training will be a component of the NRP/NIMS assessment. In order to 

effectively implement the NRP and NIMS, senior officials at departments and agencies must also be familiar 

with the requirements for their ESF roles, increased participation for specific scenarios, how to request and 

assign assets, how to work within a JFO structure, and the level of representation and participation 

coordinating entities require. DHS should therefore develop and deliver detailed briefings and instructions on 

the NIMS and NRP to all relevant Federal decision-makers including each Cabinet Secretary and their 

emergency response staff. Additionally, DHS should develop and deliver similar briefings and instructions 

tailored to relevant state and local decision makers, the private sector and Non-Governmental Organizations. 

3. DHS should lead an interagency effort to develop and resource a deliberative, integrated and Federal 

planning and execution system to meet the requirements of the revised NRP. Departments and agencies 

should have both personnel and funds to be able to train, exercise, plan and detail staff to disaster response 

activities to enable better execution of their roles and responsibilities. Specific contingency plans must be 

integrated so that capabilities and gaps are identified and addressed. 

Departments and agencies should develop and resource “Force Packages” of rapidly deployable operational 

capabilities that meet the re-organized ESF requirements within 90 days of completing the revised NRP. 

The Department of Homeland Security: A Regional Structure for Preparedness 

4. DHS should develop and implement Homeland Security Regions that are fully staffed, trained, and 

equipped to manage and coordinate all preparedness activities and any emergency that may require a 

substantial Federal response. Homeland Security Regions should be created and each region should be 
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staffed with a preparedness group populated by subject matter experts from across the Federal government. 

Special consideration should be given to developing a separate National Capital Region due to the unique 

requirements associated with enduring constitutional government. The group’s goal within each region 

should be to prepare for disasters, conduct training, coordinate and integrate planning, measure capability and 

preparedness, and respond to a disaster if one occurs. The group should also help to ensure that Federal 

spending in the region is spent to bolster capabilities as outlined in the National Preparedness Goal. The size 

of the preparedness group should be determined by the size of the region, propensity of the region to 

experience a natural disaster or terrorist attack, risks within the region and general State and local 

preparedness measured against the National Preparedness Goal. 

5. Each Regional Director should have significant expertise and experience, core competency in 

emergency preparedness and incident management, and demonstrated leadership ability. The Regional 

Director should have full situational awareness of all events, risks, and response capabilities within the 

region. When an event occurs in the region, the Regional Director should be ready to become the PFO and 

should coordinate or direct as appropriate the Federal response assets deployed within the operational area. 

The Regional Director as PFO should establish and direct the Regional Response Coordination Center 

(RRCC). These Regional Directors will comprise the professional PFO cadre and receive initial and ongoing PFO training. 

6. The PFO should have the authority to execute responsibilities and coordinate Federal response assets. 

The PFO should have the same authority as an FCO to manage and coordinate the Federal response to a 

disaster. The PFO should have the authority to make any operational decisions necessary, within the law, 

without having to obtain approval from headquarters. Giving the PFO this authority could be accomplished 

without a change to the Stafford Act by simply designating the PFO as an FCO. Alternatively, the Secretary 

of Homeland Security or the FEMA Director could delegate their authority to oversee FCO to the PFO. This 

action does not require demoting FCO’s within a particular region to Deputy FCOs. The FCO will retain all 

current authorities under the Stafford Act and will report through the PFO. An incident covering multiple 

states will require multiple FCOs operating concurrently under the command of the PFO. 

7. Each Homeland Security Region must be able to establish a self-sufficient, initial JFO anywhere within 

the region. The rapid establishment of a JFO is the keystone to effective Federal emergency response. It is 

critical that each Region have the resources, equipment, and personnel to establish a JFO after a major 

disaster. This JFO should be built using available State, local, and/or National Guard infrastructure. It should 

also be built in such a way that Federal officials can collaborate with their State and local counterparts and 

thereby better complement their response operations. The JFO must also be completely self-sufficient, with 

food, water, power, communications equipment, and housing for personnel, to enable deployment to areas 

where critical infrastructure are damaged or destroyed. To the extent possible for an anticipated event, the 

organization of the JFO should begin before the event. For a no-notice event, each region should have the 

ability to establish an initial JFO within 12 hours. To assist in this effort, each region should pre-identify JFO 

locations in areas with large populations. The ability to establish a JFO after a major disaster directly 

enhances the Federal government’s ability to maintain continuity of operations (COOP). Each regional JFO 

should also identify and conduct exercises at their respective COOP sites. 

8. Each region must be able to establish and resource rapidly deployable, self-sustaining incident 

management teams (IMT) to execute the functions of the JFO and subordinate area commands that are 

specified in the NRP and NIMS. The regional headquarters should create IMT’s that can rapidly respond to 

a disaster with robust, deployable communication packages and assist in establishing the command and 

control structures required in NIMS and the NRP. IMTs should be composed of experts in ICS who can 

establish a command for the Federal response to connect with State and local response structures during 

disasters and large scale events. IMTs should maintain certification in all levels of ICS for each ICS 

command element. 

9. DHS should establish several strategic-level, standby, rapidly deployable interagency task forces 

capable of managing the national response for catastrophic incidents that span more than one 

Homeland Security Region. These Joint Interagency Headquarters should be led by a senior official from a 
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pre-designated pool of individuals with significant emergency management experience and assessed as 

capable of serving as the PFO for a catastrophic incident. Standard operating procedures, requisite billet 

structure, and training requirements for the coordination of Federal support to multiple Joint Field Offices 

should be developed. When stood up to support the National response to a catastrophic incident, the Joint 

Interagency Headquarters should be manned by an experienced incident management staff drawn from a pool 

of pre-designated and trained interagency personnel, and supported with dedicated communications and 

transportation assets capable of self-deploying in any environment. 

Incident Management Organization and Capabilities at the Federal Level 

10. Integrate and synchronize the preparedness functions within the Department of Homeland Security. 

The recently established DHS Preparedness Directorate resulting from Secretary Chertoff’s review of the 

Department’s core policies, operations and structure should be fully implemented. To expand upon this 

initiative, DHS should integrate and synchronize the preparedness functions with the response, recovery and 

operational support activities currently located elsewhere in the department. Specifically, DHS should 

consider adding an Assistant Secretary for Preparedness Programs and an Assistant Secretary for Operational 

Plans, Training and Exercises, and an Executive Director for Public and Citizen Preparedness to the 

Undersecretary of Preparedness’ senior staff, which currently includes Assistant Secretaries for Grants and 

Training, Infrastructure Protection and Cyber & Telecommunications, plus the Chief Medical Officer, Fire 

Administrator, the Office of State and Local Coordination and the National Capital Region Director. This 

adjustment to the DHS headquarters will integrate all the preparedness functions of the Department and 

preserves FEMA as an independent operating agency to perform their response and recovery mission. There 

should be no artificial, functional, or geographic divide between the components of the Preparedness 

Directorate. The Undersecretary for Preparedness along with the FEMA Director should serve as the senior 

advisers to the Secretary on all matters related to the Federal response during an incident. 

11. DHS should establish a permanent standing planning/operations staff housed within the National 

Operations Center (see recommendation #15). This body would evaluate the integration of Federal 

department and agency plans to ensure they align with resource availability. This group would replace the 

IIMG and be charged with coordinating national-level support to a region or multiple regions during a 

catastrophe, and staff interagency operational and policy decisions raised to the Disaster Response Group (see 

recommendation #19). The permanent group would be staffed by the interagency at the GS-15/0-6 level and 

comprise individuals with significant planning, preparedness, and response experience. 

12. All departments and agencies should develop emergency response plans and a response capability. 

Many departments and agencies that traditionally do not have emergency response missions or roles assisted 

in the Hurricane Katrina response. To perform more effectively in future disasters, all Federal departments 

and agencies should develop emergency plans and possess the ability to operate in an emergency situation. 

Departments and agencies should coordinate and integrate their response planning efforts with those of other 

Federal agencies. DHS should be responsible for providing logistical support to these agency response teams 

in the field to avoid unnecessary duplication and expense of every Federal agency purchasing emergency 

response equipment for catastrophic incidents. Many Federal agencies will not have to respond to an 

emergency unless it is a catastrophic event. 

13. A unified departmental external affairs office should be created within DHS that combines legislative 

affairs, intergovernmental affairs, and public affairs as a critical component of the preparedness and 

response cycle. DHS should create an Under Secretary for External Affairs fully staffed and capable of 

performing the roles of legislative, intergovernmental, and public affairs. DHS already has an Assistant 

Secretary for Public Affairs and an Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs. Therefore, an Assistant 

Secretary for Intergovernmental Affairs should be created. The DHS Regions should mirror this 

organizational structure and staff an external affairs function including intergovernmental affairs staff to 

better communicate with State and local officials before, during, and after disaster response. DHS should 

revise the NRP to include a deployable intergovernmental affairs surge capacity under ESF-15. The ESF-15 

should be lead by the DHS Assistant Secretary of External Affairs. 
APPENDIX A – RECOMMENDATIONS

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14. HSC should lead an interagency review to update or modify as necessary Executive Order 12656, 

dealing with updated national security emergency preparedness policies and strategies to ensure that 

continuity planning is expanded to include all hazards. This order directs the head of each Federal 

department and agency to “assist State, local, and private sector entities in developing plans for mitigating the 

effects of National security emergencies and for providing services that are essential to a National response” 

(Sec. 201 (9)). DHS should implement the order through an aggressive program designed to assist State and 

local governments in developing continuity of operations (COOP) plans. The order states that the Secretary 

of Homeland Security is responsible to “guide and assist State and local governments and private sector 

organizations in achieving preparedness for National security emergencies, including development of plans 

and procedures for assuring continuity of government, and support planning for prompt and coordinated 

Federal assistance to States and localities in responding to National security emergencies.” Investments in 

planning may be funded through Federal homeland security grants in conformance with the National 

Preparedness Goal. All Federal Agencies must have COOP plans at the headquarters, regional, and local 

level and should follow the guidance set forth in Federal Preparedness Circular 65 (FPC65) Federal 

Executive Branch Continuity of Operations (COOP), June 15, 2004. 

15. Establish a National Operations Center to coordinate the National response and provide situational 

awareness and a common operating picture for the entire Federal government. This interagency center 

will allow for National-level coordination of Federal/State/local response to major domestic incidents. This 

center will combine, co-locate, and replace the situational awareness mission of the Homeland Security 

Operations Center (HSOC), the operational mission of the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) 

and the role of the IIMG, and be staffed with full time detailed employees assigned to a planning cell from 

relevant departments and agencies. Staffed and managed by interagency officials, it will also provide 

situational awareness and a common operating picture on a real-time basis during a domestic emergency for 

the White House and all agencies. All department and agency command centers will provide information to 

the National Operations Center (NOC), which will develop a National common operating picture capable of 

being exported to the White House Situation Room and other Federal operations centers as necessary. The 

National Operations Center should be located and designed to meet the requirements of Enduring 

Constitutional Government. DHS will serve as the Executive Agent for the NOC and it will function as a true 

interagency command center. 

 

16. Establish a National Information and Knowledge Management System. Departments and agencies, 

working with the NOC and the Program Manager for Information Sharing, should develop a national system 

of information management to provide a common operating picture which allows for the processing and 

timely provisioning of interagency information sources (e.g. DOD National Military Command System, 

National Counterterrorism Center, FBI Strategic Information Operations Center). These information sources 

should be viewable at all Federal operation centers utilizing compatible geo-spatial information systems, and 

should operate on both classified (SIPRNET) and unclassified systems to allow State and local emergency 

management interface and integration. 

17. Establish a National Reporting System. Departments and agencies, through the NOC, should establish a 

single reporting system to establish a uniform information flow to senior decision makers. A single reporting 

system should be used to provision relevant information for the right decision maker, at the right time, and in 

a usable format. This reporting system should incorporate the existing uniform reports utilized in the ICS.

18. Establish National Information Requirements and a National Information Reporting Chain. 

Departments and agencies, through the NOC, should develop information requirements at each level of the 

incident command structure to ensure that valuable, accurate information is reported in a timely manner. A 

national reporting chain should be established to ensure a standard information flow through all levels of the 

incident command structure.

19. Establish the Disaster Response Group (DRG). The HSC should establish the DRG to create a forum 

where strategic policy and interagency coordination and deconfliction can take place. These decisions would 

then be implemented through the NOC. This HSC-chaired group would address issues that cannot be resolved 

at lower levels, and either resolve them or develop decision recommendations for Deputies and Principals. 
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The group would function in a manner analogous to the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG). As such it 

would meet on a regular basis on preparedness and response policy and implementation issues and then more 

frequently as required during a crisis.

National Preparedness System

20. Future preparedness of the Federal, State, and local authorities should be based on the risk, 

capabilities and needs structure of the National Preparedness Goal (NPG). Before an effective response 

plan can be created and an effective response implemented, gaps or shortfalls in required capability must be 

identified. Pursuant to HSPD-8, DHS should develop a system to assess the level of national preparedness by 

assessing the levels of capability identified in the NPG through performance metrics outlined in the Target 

Capabilities List (TCL). DHS should assess the Nation’s preparedness yearly and should, in conjunction with 

the interagency, recommend appropriate adjustments to the NPG, TCL and yearly priorities for Homeland 

Security Grants. This will enable organizations across the Nation to identify capabilities that need 

improvement and develop and maintain capabilities at levels needed to manage major events using the NRP 

and NIMS. The deficiencies in Federal, State, and local response to Hurricane Katrina highlight the need for 

a more efficient National preparedness system. For example, States should utilize their licensing authorities 

to require providers of essential services and commodities, such as gas stations, pharmacies, and cell tower 

operators to equip their facilities with generators to enable them to operate in an emergency where central 

power is lost. Federal, State and local departments and agencies all share the responsibility for protecting and 

responding to their citizens and should use the NPG and TCL as a planning tool to: 

a. Define required capabilities and what levels of those capabilities are needed. DHS should also lead a 

process to determine what capabilities articulated in the NPG are within the purview of the Federal 

government, what levels of those capabilities are required, and finally which Departments and Agencies 

should develop and maintain those levels of capability. The information should be included in the NPG; 

b. Revise the NPG as appropriate to define appropriate support roles for Federal and State employees to 

perform as emergency staff when an emergency prevents them from performing their regular duties. 

c. Strategies for meeting the NPG required levels of capability should be developed that prioritize 

investments on the basis of risk, need and National priorities in HSPD-8; 

d. Establish priorities within a resource-constrained environment; 

e. Clarify and understand roles and responsibilities in the National network of homeland security 

capabilities and revise the NPG as appropriate; 

f. Develop mutual aid agreements and Emergency Management Assistance Compacts that are informed by 

the requirements in the NPG and are synchronized in a manner to deliver the right capability at the right 

time to the right place to meet the right need; and 

g. Establish a program to measure and assess the effectiveness of preparedness capabilities across the 

Nation using the President’s Management Agenda Score Card tool, and tie performance results to 

Homeland Security Grant Program funding. 

21. DHS should develop and maintain a National inventory of Federal capabilities. Effective response plans 

cannot be developed absent a consideration of resources and capabilities. The Federal capabilities and 

corresponding assets and resources should be inventoried and placed into a database, per HSPD-8, by DHS. 

Key to this real-time inventory will be awareness of which assets are available during a disaster and of their 

deployment timeline from notification. Furthermore, DHS was required to establish a National inventory of 

Federal assets by Section 7406 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. 
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a. DHS should coordinate with other Federal agencies and States to identify physical locations 

around the country that could be used as crisis support centers or bases for receiving, staging and 

integrating emergency management resources during disasters. 

Critical Challenge: Integrated Use of Military Capabilities 

Lesson Learned: The Departments of Homeland Security and Defense should jointly plan for the 

Department of Defense’s support of Federal response activities as well as those extraordinary circumstances 

when it is appropriate for the Department of Defense to lead the Federal response. In addition, the 

Department of Defense should ensure the transformation of the National Guard is focused on increased 

integration with active duty forces for homeland security plans and activities. 

Recommendations: 

22. DOD and DHS should develop recommendations for revision of the NRP to delineate the 

circumstances, objectives, and limitations of when DOD might temporarily assume the lead for the 

Federal response to a catastrophic incident. Katrina demonstrated the importance of prior planning for 

rapid and complex response efforts. DOD should develop plans to lead the Federal response for events of 

extraordinary scope and nature (e.g., nuclear incident or multiple simultaneous terrorist attacks causing a 

breakdown in civil society). 

23. DOD should revise its Immediate Response Authority (IRA) policy to allow commanders, in 

appropriate circumstances, to exercise IRA even without a request from local authorities. DOD should 

work with DHS and State officials to improve integration of military response capabilities. 

24. DOD and DHS should plan and prepare for a significant DOD supporting role during a catastrophic 

event. DOD’s joint operational response doctrine is an integral part of the national effort and must be fully 

integrated into the national response at all levels of government. DOD should have a contingency role and a 

requirement to assist DHS with expertise in logistics, planning, and total asset visibility. DOD should 

coordinate with DHS and DOT to identify DOD’s contingency role in airport operations and evacuations, and 

the planning and use of Ready Reserve Fleet vessels for housing, evacuation, communications, command, 

control, and logistics. The NRP and Catastrophic Incident Supplement (CIS) should specify the specific 

requirements for DOD resources based on the magnitude and type of a catastrophic event.

25. DOD should provide support from the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) and the 

National Security Agency (NSA) as part of overall DOD support to DHS under the NRP to provide 

technical skills, situational awareness, imagery support, analysis and assessment for responding to 

catastrophic events. Requests for situational awareness capabilities should follow DOD processes for 

asset allocation. DOD will ensure requests for assistance are identified and satisfied for access to NGA, 

NSA and other Combat Support Agency’s capabilities. NGA and NSA have significant technical 

capabilities that should be integrated into the Nation’s preparation and response efforts. NGA and NSA have 

the capability to rapidly provide situational awareness and analysis. The response to Hurricane Katrina 

highlighted that NGA and NSA possess unique capabilities that can be utilized in homeland missions, to 

include severe weather events. The NSA was instrumental in matching up missing family members, and the 

NGA provided valuable overhead imagery of the disaster site. Defined roles in homeland security missions 

will allow for these capabilities to be better budgeted, developed, and ultimately leveraged. In support of 

missions in the homeland where DHS is the Primary Federal Agency, DHS should levy tasking requirements. 

These agencies have established relationships with governmental and private/commercial entities, which can 

be integrated as part of a larger national response effort. NGA and NSA roles and support to the homeland 

security mission should be added into the agencies’ core mission statements. NGA and NSA support should 

be coordinated with civil agencies providing geospatial support and analysis, including the U.S. Geological 

Survey. These agencies need resources to perform homeland security functions. In order to meet these new 

mission requirements these agencies need to expand from a legacy focus of being a producer to a broader role 

as a service provider. 
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26. Set standards for “pushing” the pre-positioning of Federal assets to States and locals, in the case of an 

imminent catastrophe. DHS should create a civil operational planning capability to push assets that is 

robust, agile, and deployable; otherwise, the response will rely heavily on DOD capabilities. Factors slowing 

delivery of commodities require review and solutions adapted prior to future disasters. DHS should include 

much better planning efforts between State and Federal emergency management logisticians and operations 

personnel, the assistance and advice of DOD strategic logistics planners, and more robust private sector 

partnerships. DHS should mandate the use of pre-competed private sector contracts for capabilities ranging 

from airlift to advanced communications and life support and have available a rapid response capability 

similar to DOD. Federal funding should be predicated on States entering into their own contractual 

agreements, pre-crisis, with the private sector for procurement and delivery of commodities. 

27. In addition to the National Guard, the other Reserve Components of the military services should 

modify their organization and training to include a priority mission to prepare and deploy in support 

of homeland security missions. Reserve components historically have focused on military and war fighting 

missions, which will continue; however, we should recognize that the Reserve components are too valuable a 

skilled and available resource at home not to be ready to incorporate them in any Federal response planning 

and effort. Additionally, efforts should be made to leverage Reserve civilian skills in disaster relief efforts. 

28. DOD should consider fully resourcing the JTF State Headquarters to address capabilities gaps and to 

enhance readiness. Enhance National Guard capabilities by resourcing and fully implementing Joint Force 

Headquarters (JFHQ) State. JFHQ-State transformation is key to rapid deployment of National Guard forces 

in response to a catastrophe. 

The transformation of JFHQ-State and other National Guard capabilities for homeland security missions will 

ensure response forces are available in each DHS region. These capabilities should support NRP 

requirements including: security, maintenance, aviation, engineer, medical, communications, transportation, 

and logistics. The National Guard should develop rapid reaction forces capable of responding to an incident 

within 24 hours. This is vital to future rapid deployment of National Guard forces in response to a 

catastrophe. This transformation, as it nears completion, must continue to take root within DOD. 

JFHQ State will provide the command structure in which to lead and direct arriving Federal response 

capabilities, forming the backbone of State Incident Command System (ICS) and, as a result, the Federal 

Joint Field Office (JFO). It will facilitate unity of effort and provide the situational awareness needed for an 

effective response. To that end, the Command, Control, Communications, and Information (C3I) structure 

must be interoperable and satisfy a common set of mission essential tasks. 

29. Develop the capability to rapidly activate a JTF-State for contingencies. JTF-State is a forward deployed 

command group that can stage assets (by conducting reception, staging, onward movement, and integration); 

provide situational awareness and initial command and control for both State governors (for National Guard 

troops) and USNORTHCOM (for Federal active duty troops); and provide State level components to a 

Federal active duty JTF, should one be required. JTF-State coordinates with USNORTHCOM and State 

authorities to ensure the application of the full capability of the Joint Force for domestic response missions. 

A key component of the JTF-State should be the State’s WMD CSTs. The option to expanding the role of the 

CSTs to an all-hazards response team should be explored. This may require additional resources, but would 

improve situational awareness and command and control capabilities at the State level. 

A JTF-State model streamlines the command structure exercising command and control over all assigned 

forces supporting civil authorities. The JTF command and control architecture should provide a wide 

network to build a single common operating picture that increases situational awareness and redundancy. The 

JTF should assume command and control of Federal active duty forces and National Guard forces from other 

States. As part of the JFHQ State, the JTF maintains and provides trained and equipped forces and 

capabilities. If and when necessary, this JTF model enables a National Guard Commander familiar with State 

and local area of operations to serve both in a Federal and State status providing both unity of effort and unity 

of command for Federal and State forces. 
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30. DOD should consider assigning additional personnel (to include General officers) from the National 

Guard and the reserves of the military services to USNORTHCOM to achieve enhanced integration of 

Active and reserve component forces for homeland security missions. 

31. DOD should support DHS development of an analysis and operational planning capability to enable 

DHS to predict detailed requirements and plan for specific actions needed to respond to future 

disasters. This DOD/DHS element should assess past catastrophic disasters and the successes and failures of 

the overall responses to those events. This information should inform detailed planning for future disaster 

response, and allow determination of specific decision points to aid rapid decision making. Ultimately a 

fully mature DHS planning capability should have additional utility by deploying during future catastrophic 

events and translating initial damage assessments into accurate needs assessments for local, State and Federal 

authorities. 

32. DOD should consider chartering the NGB as a joint activity of the DOD. Responsibilities should 

include: 

a. Serve as the focal point in developing, managing, and integrating employment of joint National Guard 

capabilities for the Joint Staff and the Departments of the Army and Air Force in support of the 

Combatant Commands. 

b. Act as the DOD channel of communication to and from the National Guard of the States and Territories. 

c. Support all Combatant Commanders in developing joint operational requirements for contingency and 

response plans. Specifically support U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), USNORTHCOM, U.S. 

Pacific Command (USPACOM), U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), U.S. Strategic Command 

(USSTRATCOM) and the States and Territories in developing strategy and contingency plans for 

homeland defense missions. 

d. Administer Army and Air Force programs; acquire, distribute, and manage resources; plan, coordinate, 

and provide situational awareness and other support to the Combatant Commanders. 

Critical Challenge: Communications 

Lesson Learned: The Department of Homeland Security should review our current laws, policies, plans, and 

strategies relevant to communications. Upon the conclusion of this review, the Homeland Security Council, 

with support from the Office of Science and Technology Policy, should develop a National Emergency 

Communications Strategy that supports communications operability and interoperability. 

Recommendations: 

33. DHS should complete the review of National Security and Emergency Preparedness (NS/EP) 

communications policy by April 30, 2006. As requested by the Homeland Security Council and the 

National Security Council, DHS should conduct this review to provide a preliminary strategic “plan for 

integrating communications for all levels of crisis in light of evolving threats and new and converging 

technologies, and for organizational and policy changes.” This review and resulting strategic plan will 

advance communications capability planning for the Nation’s response posture. 

34. HSC and OSTP should lead an interagency review of all current policies, laws, plans, and strategies 

that address communications and integrate them into a National Emergency Communications 

Strategy. The review should include: 

a. The development of an overarching National Emergency Communications Strategy should address a full 

range of hazards; 
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b. A national emergency communications strategy should consider the direction of the telecommunications 

industry and supporting recommendations of the President’s National Security Telecommunications 

Advisory Council; 

c. State and local emergency prevention, preparedness, and response personnel must maximize the 

resources provided by, and implement the procedures contained in, the Homeland Security Grant 

Program; 

d. Federal, State, and local entities should use the Target Capabilities List (TCL) as a reference to develop 

emergency communications strategies. The resulting strategies will enhance operability and support 

future interoperable emergency communications capabilities. State and local standards and performance 

measures for achieving for interoperability should be tied to Homeland Security Grant Program funding 

criteria; 

e. By March 1, 2006, HSC and OSTP should organize an interagency group to begin the development of a 

national emergency communications strategy. An interim strategy, to be completed May 31, 2006, 

should provide sufficient guidance and direction to address the deficiencies identified in the Hurricane 

Katrina response. 

35. DHS should revise the NRP to conform to the new National Emergency Communications Strategy. The 

NRP should include sufficient guidance on communications operations when responding to a disaster. This 

guidance should address the full spectrum of possible effects to the Nation’s communications system from 

disasters and detail the required responses. It should also ensure that response operations employ all available 

communications assets to support operability and interoperability. The following areas should be addressed 

as part of the revision of the NRP: 

a. Communications procedures and guidelines need to be defined, implemented, and practiced through 

simulations and exercises. Measurement of progress to increase overall crisis communications capability 

will be graded against the President’s Management Agenda criteria; 

b. Updated communications guidance must also emphasize the ability of emergency responders and private 

security officials to share information and use available communication systems to connect with 

authorities at all levels of government. Planning needs to cover not only system connectivity, but also 

operating practices, business processes, and initial data sets to make the system work; 

c. The NRP’s ESF-2 must direct the integration of all available Federal, State, local, and private 

communications assets. The full integration of communications capability requires an assessment of 

Federal assets and an inventory of available capability. During emergencies, ESF-2 must have the 

authority to implement, resource, and restore communications; 

d. State and local first responders must satisfy the requirements of the Target Capabilities List, in order to 

receive Federal funding. 

36. DHS should develop and maintain a national crisis communication system to support information 

exchange from the President, across the Federal government, and down to the State level. 

37. DHS should establish and maintain a deployable communications capability, to quickly gain and retain 

situational awareness when responding to catastrophic incidents. To restore operability and achieve 

interoperability, there is a strong need for rapidly deployable, interoperable, commercial, off-the-shelf 

equipment that can provide a framework for connectivity among Federal, State, and local authorities. A 

deployable capability to “reach-back” to “large headquarters units capable of providing superior support to 

deployed elements from their home stations where they have better facilities, resources and access to 

information,” can achieve initial operability. This transformational capability should ensure decision makers 

at all levels of government have accurate and complete data to assess courses of action. Inadequate 

situational awareness during the response to Hurricane Katrina resulted in decision makers relying on 
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incorrect and incomplete information. DHS progress in this regard is essential to ensure adequate situational 

awareness. It must therefore set measurable goals and use the President’s Management Agenda initiatives to 

encourage progress and accountability toward achieving them. Available technologies can provide short-term 

operability and support long-term interoperability for emergency responders. However, to keep pace with 

technology changes, DHS should consider commercial, off-the-shelf solutions.

Critical Challenge: Logistics and Evacuation 

Lesson Learned: The Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with State and local governments 

and the private sector, should develop a modern, flexible and transparent logistics system. This system 

should be based on established contracts for stockpiling commodities at the local level for emergencies and 

the provision of goods and services during emergencies. The Federal government must develop the capacity 

to conduct large-scale logistical operations that supplement and, if necessary, replace State and local logistical 

systems by leveraging resources within both the public sector and the private sector. The Department of 

Transportation, in coordination with other appropriate departments of the Executive Branch, must also be 

prepared to conduct mass evacuation operations when disasters overwhelm or incapacitate State and local 

governments. 

Recommendations: 

38. DHS should partner with State and local governments, other Federal agencies and the private sector to 

develop an efficient, transparent and flexible logistics system for the procurement and delivery of goods 

and services during emergencies. DHS should develop a logistics system, utilizing an integrated supply 

chain management approach, capable of supporting large-scale disaster operations by leveraging 

resources within both the public sector and the private sector.

a. DHS should identify private sector resources that can be leveraged to supplement and provide 

surge capacity to the Federal support to disaster operations, execute direct vendor delivery 

contingency contracts with these sources prior to disasters, and encourage State and local 

governments to do the same. Such contracting practices would eliminate time-consuming and 

inefficient negotiations during emergencies. By utilizing direct vendor delivery contracts, shipments are 

sent directly to the customer from the supplier, bypassing unnecessary storage points. Participating State 

governments would identify their anticipated requirements and coordinate with DHS to ensure that 

contingency contracts are executed to meet those needs. 

b. DHS should require that local and State governments establish contracts with private sector 

vendors for disaster relief supplies in advance of an emergency with the assurance of 

reimbursement should these contracts be activated in a post disaster declaration environment.

c. Federal government should allocate strategic goods and services or conduct re-supply operations 

during a catastrophic disaster when shortfalls occur in local and State resources. The new logistics 

system developed in concert with State and local governments, and the private sector should be 

transparent to all managers within the system (Federal, State and local governments and the private 

sector). The system should be comprehensive so that the full range of logistical requirements and the 

flow of goods and services can be tracked from provider to receiver. The system should take into 

account all the sources of logistical provisions such as mutual aid agreements within States, EMAC 

agreements between States, contracts between the private sector and Federal and State governments, and 

agreements between non-governmental, community, faith-based and volunteer organizations and Federal 

and State governments. The system should be designed to allow all Federal, State and local logistics 

managers to monitor the execution of mutual aid agreements between Federal homeland security regions, 

and to allow Federal prioritization of strategic logistics resources in circumstances where State and/or 

regional resources are depleted. 
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d. DHS should improve planning and coordination with State and local partners, non-governmental 

organizations, and the private sector. DHS should ensure that its logistics system leverages the 

capabilities within local and State governments and all other potential reliable and credible resources. 

DHS should work with the National Emergency Management Association to ensure the full coordination 

of Federal logistical support, provided under the Stafford Act, with State logistical support provided 

under EMAC. The use of commercial logistics best practices in supply chain management should be 

used to minimize the need for the Federal government to stockpile materials. Charities and faith based 

organizations should be fully integrated into resource planning and be incorporated into the supply chain 

in their local areas. Federal, State, and local logistical planners should use the best practices from 

successful large private sector companies as well as from DOD as the standard to develop improved 

operational capabilities and coordination procedures in the new logistics system.

e. DHS, in cooperation with other departments and agencies, should develop the capability to identify 

sources of assets within the Federal government, and to track the movement of supplies during a 

disaster. This information would be extremely useful to resource managers at all levels of government 

during disasters. 

f. DHS should establish a Chief Logistics Officer to oversee all logistics operations across multiple 

support functions. The Chief Logistics Officer (CLO) would be responsible for developing and 

maintaining an integrated supply chain management system. This system should be structured in ways 

that are compatible with the structure of the National Incident Management System. The CLO would 

guide and assist those Federal, State and local organizations that manage emergency response assets and 

commodities, enabling them to procure and deliver supplies for emergency operations. The CLO would 

be responsible for logistics technology and software solutions that allow emergency managers to have 

visibility of all assets in the supply chain and to be able to access those supplies. A CLO should also be 

established in each homeland security regional office. 

g. DOD should detail logistics planners to DHS to assist in developing this logistics system. DOD and 

DHS should review and consider supply chain management best practices in developing the DHS 

logistics system. DOD should assist DHS in developing its logistics system; train DHS personnel in 

logistics management; exercise the DHS logistics system; and assist operating DHS’ logistics 

management system until a fully mature capability exists.

39. DHS should streamline its procedures for issuing mission assignments to other departments and 

agencies. These mission assignments will be identified in advance of an emergency so that logisticians 

can operationalize assets and provide resource support rapidly. In addition, other departments and 

agencies should establish procedures for promptly executing mission assignments. The goal of these 

efforts is to minimize the delays observed during Hurricane Katrina when departments or agencies were slow 

to act because they either had not received a FEMA mission assignment, or did not have an effective system 

for executing the mission assignment once received. 

40. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) should consider the efficacy of the Executive Branch 

and departments and agencies having the flexibility to transfer funds across accounts in advance of 

supplemental funding for immediate use during catastrophes in order to execute the departments’ and 

agencies’ respective missions under the National Response Plan. Transferred funds would not supplant 

the Disaster Relief Fund that is controlled and dispersed by DHS through the mission assignment process. 

Rather, it would provide the flexibility to use all sources of funds to fund emergency response actions in the 

aftermath of a catastrophic event in circumstances where the DHS mission assignment process is insufficient 

or inappropriate to handle the requirements of responding to the disaster. 

41. Designate DOT as the primary federal agency responsible for developing the Federal government’s 

capability to conduct mass evacuations when disasters overwhelm State and local governments. DOT 

should, in coordination with HHS, DOD, VA, DHS and the American Red Cross (ARC) plan, train and 

conduct exercises for the timely evacuation of patients and transportation of medical supplies and 

personnel. DOT, which is the primary agency for ESF-1, is best positioned to develop the capability to 
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conduct and coordinate mass evacuation and associated critical tasks. DOT should identify, prioritize, and 

approve plans to: transport patients to and from all Federal medical treatment facilities, and; assemble and 

pre-deploy caches of medical supplies to strategic locations. Such proactive efforts should improve the 

ability of Federal agencies to conduct patient evacuations when State and local agencies are unable to do so in 

a timely or effective manner. DOT should coordinate directly with HHS, DOD, VA, USDA, DHS and ARC, 

as well as State and local agencies, to plan, train and exercise for mass evacuations. In addition to assisting 

States in planning and preparing for mass evacuations, ESF-1 would conduct evacuation operations when 

State and local governments are unable to do so. ESF-8 would retain primary responsibility for coordinating 

the evacuation of seriously ill or injured persons. In addition, USDA (one of the primary agencies for ESF-11: 

Agriculture and Natural Resources) would plan and manage the evacuation of animals. It should be 

understood that the development of these capabilities will take time and in most cases will be grown to full 

capacity incrementally. 

42. DHS should require State and local governments, as a condition for receiving Homeland Security 

grants, to develop, implement, and exercise emergency evacuation plans and to cooperate fully with all 

Federal evacuation activities. DHS has commendably incorporated a similar requirement in its FY 2006 

Homeland Security Grant Program. State and local governments should use the National Preparedness Goal’s 

Target Capabilities List (TCL) as a standard for the development of these evacuation plans. In addition to 

those TCL capabilities, State and local evacuation plans should specify procedures to address the prepositioning of food, medical and fuel supplies. These plans should address establishing first-aid stations, 

tracking and coordinating movements of evacuees, evacuating pets, unaccompanied minors, the elderly, and 

evacuating people who lack the means to leave voluntarily. Each State, starting in FY 07, should receive an 

annual evacuation readiness status report. This report will be in the form of an evacuation readiness “report 

card” that will grade the ability of the State to conduct evacuation operations. The report card will be based 

on exercises, training, effective use of Federal grant monies, and other relevant criteria as a condition of 

further grant funding. Much like the President’s Management Agenda, States will be given the expected 

results which they need to accomplish with their grant funding. This assessment would not only classify each 

State on its level of evacuation readiness, but also track how well homeland security grant funds are spent for 

evacuation planning. States that do not use their grant funds effectively would have their grant funds reduced 

or terminated. 

43. DHS should, in coordination with DOT, evaluate all State evacuation plans as well as the evacuation 

plans of the 75 largest urban areas. As the President declared when he addressed the Nation from Jackson 

Square in New Orleans, “Our cities must have clear and up-to-date plans for . . . evacuating large numbers of 

people in an emergency.” DHS reviewed State catastrophic planning, including evacuation planning, and 

submitted a Congressionally mandated report to Congress on February 10, 2006. In addition, DHS and DOT 

are jointly reviewing evacuation plans for the Gulf Region, their findings due to Congress on June 1, 2006. 

These two departments should report their findings to the President through the Assistant to the President for 

Homeland Security and Counterterrorism concurrently with their submission to Congress. These reviews 

should specifically address special needs populations, people who lack the means to evacuate voluntarily, and 

the evacuation of animals, as well as other aspects of evacuation planning mentioned in Recommendation 5 

above. 

a. Consideration should be given to revising the Stafford Act to restrict reimbursement eligibility to 

only those States that have met basic performance requirements for critical functions such as mass 

evacuation.
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Critical Challenge: Search and Rescue

Lesson Learned: The Department of Homeland Security should lead an interagency review of current 

policies and procedures to ensure effective integration of all Federal search and rescue assets during disaster 

response. 

Recommendations: 

44. DHS should lead an interagency team to review and revise the NRP to ensure the integration of all 

Federal search and rescue assets. This review should: 

a. Expand ESF-9 to ensure the coordination of all Federal search and rescue operations, not just 

urban search and rescue. Under this new construct, both the urban and civil search and rescue 

coordinators would report to the Operations Section Chief under the Incident Commander. This structure 

is consistent with the National Search and Rescue Plan (NSP) requirement for the civil search and rescue 

coordinator to serve as the search and rescue representative to the Incident Commander, as well as with 

NIMS and ICS principles that place both urban search and rescue and civil search and rescue under the 

Operations Section. It would allow both coordinators to support each other and share resources, 

depending on the nature of the incident. Ideally, the ESF-9 coordinator in the Joint Field Office (JFO) 

should have extensive training and education in both urban search and rescue and civil search and rescue.

b. Require coordination throughout Incident Command to ensure continuity of care for those 

rescued. The ESF-9 coordinator should work with the logistics section under ESF-5: Emergency 

Management and the other ESF’s grouped under the Emergency Services Branch (including ESF-8: 

Public Health and Medical Services) to ensure victims receive medical care and are transported to an 

adequate housing shelter. 

c. ESF-9 must include the United States Forest Service’s (USFS), DOI and EPA capabilities to 

perform search and rescue operations. USFS is given the role as primary agency under ESF-4: 

Firefighting and as supporting agency under ESF-9. DOI is a principal partner with USFS in carrying 

out ESF-4 functions. As firefighters make up a large percentage of FEMA Urban Search and Rescue 

teams, their expertise and capabilities should also contribute to search and rescue operations. Under 

ESF-9, the mission statements of USFS and DOI should include the availability of firefighting personnel, 

not just equipment and supplies, for use in search and rescue operations. ESF-9 must include the 

capabilities of all participants in the National Search and Rescue Committee.

45. The National Search and Rescue Committee should revise the National Search and Rescue Plan (NSP) 

to include disaster response operations. The NRP references the NSP as a supporting operational 

document. However, the NSP is confusing because it specifically states that it does not cover overall 

response to disaster operations, as called for in the NRP. The NSP should therefore be revised to clarify its 

role in disaster response operations. The revision should specifically address air traffic control and 

coordination. 

46. Each State and major city should incorporate Search and Rescue and US&R annexes into their overall 

disaster response plans. Federal grant assistance should require each State, under the State Homeland 

Security Grant Program, and urban area under the Urban Areas Security Initiative, develop a search and 

rescue annex within its specific disaster response plan, as part of its concept of operations. This search and 

rescue annex should be scalable, modular, organized along ICS principles, and be all-hazards in scope. It 

should also specifically delineate which agencies have primary responsibility for each aspect of search and 

rescue. The plan should specify in what order Federal assistance assets or State-to-State mutual aid assets 

(through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact) will be requested and detail how search and 

rescue coordination will be integrated into incident command. These search and rescue annexes should 

identify where victims are to be taken in the event Federal, State, and local logistical support to the victims is 

required. Representatives of National Search and Rescue committee organizations should assist the 

development of State and local search and rescue plans. 
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47. DHS should expand the National Preparedness Goal’s Target Capabilities List (TCL) Capability: 

Urban Search and Rescue to require Federal Urban Search and Rescue teams and State and local 

entities to train, equip, and exercise for civil search and rescue missions. Currently, this capability only 

focuses on urban search and rescue and does not include any of the types of civil search and rescue, such as 

maritime rescue. An expanded capability should use the NSP as the guide for including civil search and 

rescue performance standards. State and local entities not currently in the national civil search and rescue 

community could then use the expanded search and rescue capability as a reference to plan, train, and 

exercise for both urban search and rescue and civil search and rescue missions. Funding for urban search and 

rescue teams should reserve a portion of their funding allocated to train and equip FEMA Urban Search and 

Rescue Task Force members for civil search and rescue operations. 

48. DHS should create a national search and rescue volunteer certification program. This national 

certification should be used to verify the identity and the level of skills and training of search and rescue 

volunteers. Volunteers could report to “reception centers,” which should be established along the perimeter 

of any impacted area to receive spontaneous volunteers. A national certification program would speed the 

incorporation of these individuals into the unified search and rescue command structure and greatly increase 

the effectiveness of the response. Voluntary organizations such as the National Association of Search and 

Rescue (NASAR) should be requested to assist with such a certification program. 

Critical Challenge: Public Safety and Security 

Lesson Learned: The Department of Justice, in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security, 

should examine Federal responsibilities for support to State and local law enforcement and criminal justice 

systems during emergencies and then build operational plans, procedures, and policies to ensure an effective 

Federal law enforcement response. 

Recommendations: 

Law Enforcement 

49. DHS should, in coordination with DOJ, revise the National Response Plan to provide more effective 

coordination of the law enforcement response to a disaster by clarifying and expanding the role and 

mission of the Public Safety and Security support function and the Senior Federal Law Enforcement 

Officer. The revised NRP should: 

a. Designate DOJ as the primary agency responsible for the ESF-13 Public Safety and Security 

function. The NRP designates DHS and DOJ to serve jointly as primary agencies for the ESF-13 

function. This diffusion of responsibility creates unnecessary confusion at the scene of the crisis and 

violates the principle of unity of command. We recognize that DHS has significant law enforcement 

assets, both in Washington DC and in field offices throughout the country. However, the Attorney 

General is, by law, the President’s primary law enforcement officer. DOJ’s long experience and 

recognized public law enforcement responsibility for prosecuting Federal crimes, in addition to its 

existing ties with the State and local law enforcement communities, make it best positioned to assume the 

lead role, though it still must continue to work in partnership with DHS. Through its United States 

Attorneys Offices in all 50 states and through the FBI’s 100 Joint Terrorism Task Forces, DOJ has the 

capability to leverage these important relationships with State and local law enforcement. We also 

consider DOJ to have greater traditional law enforcement experience, whereas DHS’s law enforcement 

programs are more specialized, focusing on areas such as border control, aviation security, and protective 

services. In addition, giving DOJ responsibility for leading the Public Safety and Security support 

function will let DHS focus on its overall coordination of emergency response mission. 

b. Finalize the drafting of Public Safety and Security policies and procedures. The Public Safety and 

Security (ESF-13) Annex of the NRP required primary and support agencies to define their functions and 

develop policies and procedures by April 2005, four months after the NRP was issued. While drafts 
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exist, this effort needs immediate completion to provide clarity to the organization and functions of the 

Public Safety and Security support function. 

c. Specify that the Attorney General will, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, 

designate the SFLEO. When the Secretary of Homeland Security declares an Incident of National 

Significance (INS), the Attorney General should promptly designate the SFLEO; during a non-INS event, 

the Attorney General may appoint an SFLEO if needed. Also, the NRP should give the Attorney General 

the authority to designate a Deputy SFLEO from a department other than that of the SFLEO. In 

recognition of the Secretary of Homeland Security’s role in coordinating the Federal response under 

HSPD-5, the Attorney General should consult with the Secretary prior to designating the SFLEO. 

d. Include a new position designated as the “Senior Civilian Representative of the Attorney General” 

(SCRAG). As with the SFLEO, the Attorney General should immediately appoint the SCRAG to serve 

as the Attorney General’s representative for issues requiring senior-level involvement of a DOJ official. 

Whereas the SFLEO is responsible for managing the operational aspects of the Federal law enforcement 

response, the SCRAG will assist as needed in resolving any significant law enforcement policy issues 

that might arise with State or local officials, or between Federal official. 

e. Require the establishment of a law enforcement coordination center within the Joint Field Office 

(JFO) to coordinate the Federal, State, and local law enforcement response during all types of 

emergencies. While the NRP includes such an entity for a terrorist-related incident or a National Special 

Security Event, it does not clearly set forth how Federal law enforcement coordinates with its State and 

local counterparts during other incidents.

50. DOJ should lead the development of the capability to surge Federal law enforcement resources in the 

immediate aftermath of a disaster. As outlined by the NRP, law enforcement personnel should be drawn 

from the following sources, in this order: 1) Civilian law enforcement and National Guard from affected 

State; 2) Civilian law enforcement and National Guard from other States; and 3) Civilian law enforcement 

from Federal agencies. To maximize the availability of law enforcement assets from each of these categories, 

the following should be done: 

a. DOJ should establish a program to review State and local plans for continuity of operations for law 

enforcement and the criminal justice system during a crisis. 

b. DOJ should develop a program to increase States’ awareness of the procedures for requesting 

Federal law enforcement assistance under the Emergency Federal Law Enforcement Assistance 

Act. 

c. DOJ should lead an interagency effort to catalogue the Federal law enforcement assets within the 

Executive Branch. This effort will serve as the basis for developing a database of assets available for 

use during an INS, in order to ensure appropriate use of all available Federal law enforcement assets.

d. DOJ and DHS should each develop, in coordination with the other, the capability to rapidly deploy 

a contingent of Federal law enforcement officers to prevent and respond to civil disorder. 

Consistent with the principle that law enforcement is the responsibility of local and State governments, 

this force should deploy only in the event that State authorities request Federal assistance pursuant to the 

Emergency Federal Law Enforcement Assistance Act, or as otherwise directed by the President. 

However, the NRP should make clear that where, as in this case, the need for additional law enforcement 

resources is manifest and obvious, it should be the Attorney General’s responsibility, after notifying the 

Secretary of Homeland Security, to make an offer of Federal law enforcement support to the affected 

Governor. 

51. DOJ should develop procedures for streamlined deputization of qualified Federal law enforcement 

officers. This effort should address circumstances where Federal law enforcement personnel require Federal

deputization to enforce Federal laws outside their jurisdiction, or State deputization to enforce State laws. 
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DOJ should work together with the States’ Attorneys General to develop agreements whereby a State 

requesting Federal law enforcement assistance agrees in advance to grant limited State law enforcement 

authority to Federal agents for the duration of the emergency. 

52. DOJ should, in coordination with DHS, further incorporate force protection into Federal response 

planning, to prevent disruption of Federal agencies' operations and to protect Federal personnel and 

property. While the Public Safety and Security annex of the NRP designates force protection as an ESF-13 

responsibility, further response planning is required on this issue in light of the problems encountered during 

Hurricane Katrina.

Criminal Justice 

53. DOJ should, in coordination with the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, develop a program to 

ensure the continuity of the Federal criminal justice system and to provide assistance to States in 

developing complementary plans. While the operation and continuity of the court system falls under the 

purview of the Judicial Branch, the Department of Justice should ensure that adequate plans exist to ensure 

the continuity of its critical prosecutorial functions. Components of DOJ such as the U.S. Marshals Service 

and the Bureau of Prisons are critical to the operations of the Federal court system and must be incorporated 

into the contingency planning. 

54. DOJ should develop plans to improve the accountability for persons under supervision by the Federal 

criminal justice system, and to provide assistance to States in developing complementary plans. 

55. DOJ, in coordination with DHS, should establish a program to provide oversight and technical 

assistance for States’ emergency plans for evacuating prisoners in the event of a disaster. Although 

evacuation of State and local prisoners is primarily a State and local responsibility, prisoners are protected by 

Federal civil rights laws and thus the Federal government has an interest in ensuring that such evacuations are 

appropriately planned and implemented. 

56. DHS and DOJ should coordinate their respective grant and assistance funding programs to States and 

local governments to establish uniform standards and conditions of awards in furtherance of the above 

recommendations. If both departments should determine a need for legislation to remedy the disparate 

standards or criteria for different grant sources, OMB should consult with the departments to draft proposed 

legislation. 

Critical Challenge: Public Health and Medical Support

Lesson Learned: In coordination with the Department of Homeland Security and other homeland security 

partners, the Department of Health and Human Services should strengthen the Federal government’s 

capability to provide public health and medical support during a crisis. This will require the improvement of 

command and control of public health resources, the development of deliberate plans, an additional 

investment in deployable operational resources, and an acceleration of the initiative to foster the widespread 

use of interoperable electronic health records systems. 

Recommendations: 

57. HHS should lead a unified and strengthened public health and medical command for Federal disaster 

response. 

a. HHS should develop a comprehensive plan to identify, deploy and track Federal public health and 

medical assets (human, fixed and materiel) for use during a catastrophic event. HHS should assume 

primary control of the public health and medical support effort, coordinating the activities of supporting 

agencies from a central location. The Secretary of HHS should be aware of, and in charge of 

coordinating, all Federal medical and public health assets available for use. All Federal departments 
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must support and facilitate HHS in the execution of its responsibilities to coordinate all Federal public 

health and medical assets. Medical operations are highly dependent on efficient inter-agency cooperation 

and the successful completion of tasks is dependent on a fully integrated Federal effort. 

b. HHS in coordination with OMB and DHS should draft proposed legislation for submission to 

Congress, to transfer NDMS from DHS to HHS. As the agency charged in HSPD-5 with the overall 

coordination of disaster response in America, DHS should clearly articulate the operational requirements 

for disaster medical assistance. HHS should then be responsible for building and maintaining the 

appropriate operational capability: it should guide, direct, and develop the NDMS and integrate it into 

other HHS operational elements. NDMS is a critical component to the success of any Federal disaster 

response requiring medical support. As such, public health professionals and emergency medical 

responses should be managed and overseen by HHS which has the greatest health experience and 

expertise. Thus, NDMS should be returned to the direct command of HHS. It should be understood that 

the development of these capabilities will take time and in most cases will be grown to full capacity 

incrementally. 

c. HHS should organize, train, equip, and roster medical and public health professionals in preconfigured and deployable teams. These personnel should be comprised of officers of the 

Commissioned Corps of the U.S. Public Health Service, the Medical Reserve Corps (MRC), the NDMS, 

health care providers within DOD and the VA, and volunteer health professionals from the private sector. 

This is consistent with the HHS efforts to enhance the medical and public health response to meet future 

challenges by transforming the United States Public Health Service Commissioned Corps. This will 

enable a critical emergency response resource to address public health challenges more quickly and 

efficiently. The Commissioned Corps will increase its ranks, streamline its assignment and deployment 

process, and increase its ability to recruit the best and the brightest to defend the Nation’s public health. 

HHS announced administrative steps toward this end. HHS has also drafted legislation in this area and 

forwarded it to OMB for Administration review and clearance. HHS should be given appropriate 

authorities to carry out this responsibility and should establish and test a system to quickly and efficiently 

identify, credential and assign personnel to missions.

58. HHS should ensure coordination and oversight of emergency, bioterrorism, and ongoing public health 

preparedness needs. In a public health emergency, the Secretary of HHS should have the integrated support 

of the public health and public health emergency preparedness programs. Within HHS, two Staff Division 

and seven Operating Division Assistant Secretary level positions oversee some aspect of public health 

programs, many of which have overlapping functions in an emergency response. The Secretary of HHS 

should review this issue and determine how best to ensure the integration of all relevant HHS information and 

functions during a public health emergency. 

59. The Surgeon General should routinely communicate public health, as well as individual and 

community preparedness guidance to the general population. While there are other prominent and 

capable Federal health officials, the Surgeon General’s stature and credibility should be used to repeatedly 

and proactively deliver a consistent public health preparedness message to the public. This will not only help 

to increase personal, community and national disaster preparedness, it will also make the Surgeon General a 

more effective and credible source of guidance during public health emergencies. 

60. Create and maintain a dedicated, full time, and equipped response team composed of Commissioned 

Corps officers of the U.S. Public Health Service. The size of this team would be determined by the Corps’ 

senior leadership, and be sufficient to meet the response needs as set forth by the Secretary. This team, 

overseen by the Surgeon General, could rapidly and effectively deploy to any event requiring medical and 

public health expertise and remain on station as long as needed. Other Corps officers, NDMS, the MRC, and 

the private sector could augment the team under the Surgeon General’s command as required.

 

61. DHS and HHS should look for the means to increase the capacities and capabilities of local and State 

health infrastructures. Local and State health departments are the foundation upon which the National 

public health preparedness rests. HHS and DHS provide Federal grants to local and State health departments, 
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but additional funding is needed in view of the threats to the Nation from: weapons of mass destruction; 

biological agents; pandemic influenza and natural disasters. Grant funds from HHS and DHS should be 

synchronized to maximize the benefit to local and State health departments. Furthermore, all grant funding 

must be targeted toward increasing needed capabilities and then be reviewed to grade State and local 

performance according to the Presidential Management Agenda. 

62. Accelerate the HHS initiative to foster widespread use of interoperable electronic health (EHR) records 

systems, to achieve development and certification of systems for emergency responders within the next 

12 months. The adoption of interoperable EHR systems will support first responders and health providers 

and dramatically improve the quality and efficacy of care to displaced patients across a population. The 

President signed an Executive Order, Incentives for the Use of Health Information Technology and 

Establishing the Position of the National Health Information Technology Coordinator, on April 27, 2004, that 

provides guidance for the development of a nationwide interoperable health information technology. 

Critical Challenge: Human Services 

Lesson Learned: The Department of Health and Human Services should coordinate with other departments 

of the Executive Branch, as well as State governments and non-governmental organizations, to develop a 

robust, comprehensive, and integrated system to deliver human services during disasters so that victims are 

able to receive Federal and State assistance in a simple and seamless manner. In particular, this system 

should be designed to provide victims a consumer oriented, simple, effective, and single encounter from which 

they can receive assistance. 

Recommendations: 

63. Assign HHS the responsibility for coordinating the provision of human services during disasters. HHS 

should serve as the single Federal coordinating agency, with full situational awareness across agencies, and 

manage the delivery of services by other Federal departments. HHS working with DHS should review and, 

as appropriate, amend the NRP to ensure a single point of contact for victims to access all applicable Federal 

human services in an emergency and a capable deployment plan to enable this effort.

a. Federal agencies with an ongoing role in delivering human services should be prepared to do so in 

a disaster environment. In addition to HHS, other Federal agencies have responsibility for providing 

human services. All Federal agencies responsible for the administration of human service programs 

should plan and prepare for the delivery of services in a disaster environment, with HHS coordinating 

and authorizing reimbursement for their respective disaster-related expenditures. Federal agencies that 

routinely deliver human services should build on established relationships with State and local agencies 

and private sector organizations, but also create contingency plans to assure the independent delivery of 

Federal assistance when necessary. 

64. HHS should inventory all Federal human services. As part of this effort HHS should: 

a. Inventory the range of human services programs of the Federal government. There are thousands of 

human service programs across the interagency, many of which are jointly administered by State and 

local agencies. A catalogue of available programs will facilitate the prioritization and delivery of 

services, especially during emergency situations.

b. Identify current statutory authorities that permit the waiver of impediments to the delivery of 

services during an emergency. Knowing which regulations can be waived will help responding 

agencies to more efficiently deliver services in emergency settings when speed is a high priority. 

Agencies should identify current waiver authority and impediments to service delivery and should 

provide HHS with suggested threshold criteria for triggering waiver authority. Agencies should also 

identify current authority for reimbursing disaster-related administrative costs and related impediments to 

reimbursing service providers for legitimate costs.
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65. HHS should develop a simple, comprehensive, and efficient means for disaster victims to enroll for all 

available human services at a single encounter. Many important human service programs have wide 

variation in eligibility requirements. HHS’ coordination and integration role is vital in helping to simplify 

access to complex and varied human service programs. Upon completion of the inventory of programs and 

available Federal facilities, HHS should prioritize the delivery of human service programs and develop plans 

to establish “one-stop” centers where disaster victims would enroll in Federal, State, local, and nongovernmental human assistance programs. These “one stop” centers should complement the continued and 

expanded use of simplified telephone and internet-based registration modalities. The goal should be for the 

victim to go to one physical location, encounter one person who gathers all the necessary data and inputs it 

into a database that is shared and transparent among all human service providers at the Federal, State and 

local level as required. This will likely increase efficiency, reduce frustration of evacuees and expedite the 

delivery of services for eligible recipients. 

a. Task the appropriate Federal agencies to develop processes to assess disaster victims’ needs and 

process their applications for assistance within consolidated “one-stop” centers. These processes 

should avoid duplication of effort, employ streamlined in-take and case management strategies and foster 

the interagency administration of human services in a disaster area. 

b. HHS working with DHS should work to include faith-based, community, and non-profit 

organizations in the emergency planning, preparedness, and delivery of human services. These 

private sector organizations contributed greatly to the Hurricane Katrina response. They should actively 

participate in all phases of a Federal disaster response and HHS should specifically facilitate access to 

their services in all “one-stop” centers.

c. HHS in coordination with DHS should oversee the development of deployable interagency teams to 

assess human service needs and deliver assistance. Created before the disaster, these teams can be 

deployed immediately to the disaster area to begin coordinating access to human services. These teams 

should be composed of knowledgeable and experienced Federal employees as well as personnel from 

State and local agencies and the private sector, as appropriate. They should serve in the “one stop” 

centers and also visit shelters and other locations necessary to facilitate the deliver of human services. 

d. HHS working with DHS and the Department of Labor should inventory existing Federal 

infrastructure and resources which could be utilized for provisions of consolidated services to 

affected areas. Contingency plans should be developed for the utilization of Federal facilities, 

equipment such as phones, computers, and personnel on short-notice to provide consolidated services in 

response to a crisis. These plans should be exercised and evaluated on a routine basis.

66. HHS and DHS should jointly work with the private sector to encourage the development of a capacity 

to voluntarily store and retrieve personal identifying information. Encourage the private sector 

development of a capability for individuals to voluntarily submit their personal identifying information for 

virtual storage that citizens and their families could access during emergencies. The capability is best thought 

of as a 21st century version of a bank vault, with virtual safe deposit boxes for information. Disaster victims 

could access the virtually stored data to apply for Federal assistance, medical treatment, or insurance benefits. 

Because of the sensitivity of the personal data stored, strict privacy limitations and protections would be 

required. HHS should consider how their experience with Electronic Health Records (EHR) might inform 

such an effort. 

67. Existing Federal sources of information should be identified which might assist Federal authorities 

upon an emergency or disaster declaration by the President. While numerous current Federal information 

sources exist (such as those maintained by SSA, DHS, VA, Treasury and the Department of Defense), they 

are not designed to identify or track individuals. Limited emergency access to existing Federal information 

sources should be considered and evaluated for their potential value in improving the Federal response. The 

development and deployment process must account for privacy, security, scalability, and compatibility 
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Critical Challenge: Mass Care and Housing 

Lesson Learned: Using established Federal core competencies and all available resources, the Department of 

Housing and Urban Development, in coordination with other departments of the Executive Branch with 

housing stock, should develop integrated plans and bolstered capabilities for the temporary and long-term 

housing of evacuees. The American Red Cross and the Department of Homeland Security should retain 

responsibility and improve the process of mass care and sheltering during disasters. 

Recommendations: 

68. ARC and DHS should retain the mass care and sheltering responsibility during disasters. With longstanding experience providing mass care and shelters during disasters, ARC is a highly valued national asset: 

it must be a primary agency, along with DHS. ARC has extensive experience with mass care and sheltering 

during disasters, however, their status as a non-government organization limits their access to Federal 

planning meetings. DHS and ARC should strengthen their planning and operational relationships with HUD. 

HUD’s expertise lies in the provision of mid- and long-term housing. To assure the appropriate expertise is 

brought to bear in all phases of a disaster (preparation, response, recovery and rebuilding) and a seamless 

integration of care for disaster victims, HUD, DHS and ARC must develop a close working relationship, not 

just during crises. During non-emergency times, they must jointly plan for mass care and housing during 

disasters. In conjunction with other Federal agencies, they must train for disasters and conduct exercises to 

evaluate the response readiness of the Federal government. 

69. Designate HUD as the lead Federal agency for the provision of temporary housing. HUD, with 

extensive experience providing housing resources for those in need, must use its extensive network of 

regional offices and State and local housing agencies, to prepare for potential relocation emergencies. While 

there will always be a need for some victims to remain on their property while rebuilding their homes, the 

provision of trailers should not be the default means of temporary housing offered to all evacuees leaving 

shelters. HUD, rather than DHS, should be the lead Federal agency for housing and HUD should devote 

resources to gain this competency with support from ARC, and other Federal agencies. HUD must create a 

professional staff to augment its current housing capacity in order to create the ability to arrange housing for 

disaster victims and adequately train, exercise and resource this capability. But, DHS should retain its vital 

coordinating function for the entire disaster response. It should be understood that the development of these 

capabilities will take time and in most cases will be grown to full capacity incrementally. 

70. Assist States and municipalities in developing mass relocation plans for each major metropolitan area 

and inventories of existing shelters and shelter sites. Such plans must match mass evacuation plans 

developed for metropolitan areas and should include the pre-identification of sites suitable for the 

establishment of shelters. Plans should also include appropriate guidelines regarding suitable shelters and 

thorough inventories of shelters already in existence. HUD should receive the lead role in relocation planning 

and inventorying shelters, with DOT, DOI and USDA assuming supporting roles. HUD can combine data 

from Federal, State, and local sources to compile inventories and establish the frequency of inventory 

updates. Federal grant money should be predicated on States and municipalities periodically updating their 

relocation plans and shelter inventories. 

71. DHS should develop a system to maintain awareness of the movement of shelter and temporary 

housing residents. Local, State, and Federal officials in charge of sheltering evacuees must know the 

number and type (e.g., number of disabled, number of minors) of evacuees in addition to their names and 

personal identifying data as they move between shelters and from shelters to temporary housing. This will 

improve allocation of resources to shelters (such as food and water), as well as the reunion of separated 

family members. Such a system must complement other systems to register evacuees for available social 

services. 

72. DHS should review and revise the Federal regulations under the Stafford Act to emphasize “locationindependent” housing assistance. Current regulations allow payment of rental subsidies to disaster victims, 

but not the routine payment of security deposits or utility fees. Reimbursement for repairs to existing 
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available housing units are also not authorized, effectively precluding the use of a large supply of federally 

controlled units that may only need minor repairs in order to be occupied. These restrictions effectively push 

many people to trailers and other manufactured housing units, while leaving other available housing vacant. 

Revising these housing regulations would allow greater flexibility in meeting urgent housing needs in the 

aftermath of a disaster. 

Critical Challenge: Public Communications 

Lesson Learned: The Department of Homeland Security should develop an integrated public 

communications plan to better inform, guide, and reassure the American public before, during, and after a 

catastrophe. The Department of Homeland Security should enable this plan with operational capabilities to 

deploy coordinated public affairs teams during a crisis. 

Recommendations: 

73. DHS should revise the NRP to improve the Public Affairs Support and External Affairs annexes to 

ensure a better coordinated, more effective response. 

a. DHS should revise standing operating procedures, command relationships, training, organizational 

structure, and communications between Federal Public Affairs Offices (PAOs) and their State and local 

counterparts. 

b. DHS should revise the NRP to delineate clearly when National and Incident JICs should be required to 

activate and deactivate. This guidance should also determine the proper location and number of JICs to 

be established in response to catastrophes. 

c. DHS should revise the NRP to delineate a clear structure for a fully coordinated, integrated, and 

synchronized public communications strategy, across the Federal government and with State and 

locals. 

74. DHS should establish rapidly deployable Public Affairs teams, able to operate self-sufficiently, in 

austere conditions. These deployable Public Affairs teams should be established across all Federal 

departments and agencies with key Homeland Security responsibilities. These teams should be capable 

of providing Public Affairs assistance within hours to incident locations. These teams could be used to form 

the Incident JIC. All Federal departments and agencies with domestic operational responsibilities should 

establish programs to use embedded media where appropriate. 

75. DHS should expand Federal partnership programs with State and local Public Affairs Officials (PAO). 

a. DHS should strengthen its relationship with groups such as the National Governors Association to 

provide joint incident communications training programs for State governments. 

b. DHS should also strengthen relationships with the Defense Information School, Navy Post Graduate 

School, National Defense University, and other academic institutions. These Federal partners can assist 

in providing training and certification to State and local emergency management and the PAOs of key 

DHS organizations (e.g., DHS, FEMA, U.S. Coast Guard) and personnel such as PFO and Federal 

Coordinating Officer candidates. Such training would help to improve incident communications efforts. 

76. Develop a Public Communications Coordination capability for crisis communications at the White 

House. Designate a senior White House Communications official to be responsible for the Homeland 

Security Council and crisis communications portfolio. In close collaboration with DHS’ Office of Public 

Affairs, this official would be responsible for: 
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a. Coordination of public communications and public affairs within the homeland across all relevant 

Federal departments and agencies; 

b. Establishing a permanent strategic communications capability, to facilitate messages to the public, the 

media, and all departments and agencies; 

c. Developing a national public communications and public affairs strategic plan; 

d. Develop “Risk Communications” to communicate pre-incident expectations to private citizens. This may 

be carried out by identifying credible spokespersons who can frequently update the public on 

preparedness, current threats and crisis communications. 

77. DHS should establish an integrated public alert and warning system in coordination 

with all relevant departments and agencies.

a. The system, building on the Emergency Alert System (EAS), must leverage advanced communication 

 technologies and existing Federal, State, and local systems. 

b. Federal, State and local levels of government must have the means to communicate essential and 

accurate emergency information to the public prior to, during and after a catastrophe. 

c. Use the National Preparedness Goal’s Target Capabilities List as a reference to build and sustain the 

system. 

Critical Challenge: Critical Infrastructure and Impact Assessment 

Lesson Learned: The Department of Homeland Security, working collaboratively with the private sector, 

should revise the National Response Plan and finalize the Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan to 

be able to rapidly assess the impact of a disaster on critical infrastructure. We must use this knowledge to 

inform Federal response and prioritization decisions and to support infrastructure restoration in order to 

save lives and mitigate the impact of the disaster on the Nation. 

Recommendations: 

78. DHS should revise the National Response Plan to: 

a. Provide for a stronger Infrastructure Support Branch in the National Operations Center. The 

Infrastructure Support Branch will coordinate among the appropriate ESF’s to ensure that the guidance 

developed by the Critical Infrastructure Policy Coordinating Committee is followed for infrastructure 

protection and restoration after an event. In addition, this branch will coordinate with critical 

infrastructure sectors, provide senior leaders with a summary of reports and modeling, and develop 

recommended preemptive and responsive actions to remediate or mitigate the impact of the loss of 

critical infrastructure. These optional actions will be based on reports from the Impact Assessment 

Working Group, the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC), Sector 

Coordinating Councils, and consultation with DHS/IP. 

b. Strengthen the role and responsibility of the Infrastructure Liaison. Currently, the Infrastructure 

Liaison is designated by DHS/IP, to serve as the principal advisor to the JFO Coordination Group 

regarding all national and regional level critical infrastructure and key resource incident-related issues. 

This role should be more clearly defined, and have greater responsibility which should include a 

designated group of trained critical infrastructure staff from Federal departments and agencies including 

DHS staff versed in infrastructure protection that are available for immediate deployment to the JFO to 

fill the role of the expanded Infrastructure Liaison group. The liaison should: (1) Gather and fuse relevant 

data about private infrastructure operational status; (2) Coordinate overall Federal response efforts for 
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infrastructure restoration and recovery; and (3) Strengthen direct communications with private 

infrastructure owners and operators. This expanded Infrastructure Liaison will incorporate the Private 

Sector Liaisons to ensure unity of effort. 

Policy and Planning 

79. DHS should revise the National Preparedness Goal to require the collaborative development of 

regional disaster plans (such as those required by the DHS Urban Area Security Initiative) with the 

private sector. This activity will not only prepare the Federal government to respond, but will set private 

sector expectations of specific actions the government will take in response to a disaster. 

 

80. Set basic criteria for private sector preparedness against which these regional plans can be measured. 

There is a lack of a clear and agreed upon prioritized implementation plan to address the coordinated 

restoration and protection of critical infrastructure during times of limited resources and competing demands. 

Basic levels of private sector preparation similar to those outlined in the National Preparedness Goal should 

be set and used to measure progress in restoration planning. 

81. DHS should review, revise, and finalize the Interim NIPP within 90 days to: 

a. Standardize Federal government policy to link the prioritization of both protection and 

restoration. Linking prioritization for protection to prioritization for restoration will motivate private 

sector participation in the effort to prioritize critical infrastructure and to develop disaster response plans.

b. Require the use of a systems and resiliency approach to determine the global consequence of the 

loss of each asset. Using a systems approach will clearly identify the assets in each region whose loss 

has the greatest potential to cause a national impact.

c. Address cross sector dependencies in the systems approach. As outlined in the National Strategy for 

the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, critical infrastructure restoration and 

protection efforts should take into account the five cross-sector security priorities.

d. Add an annex to the interim NIPP to describe how those policy considerations that are learned in 

the prioritization for protection will be used to develop restoration priorities. The Federal 

government can develop priorities for restoring critical infrastructure using much of the same information 

used to prioritize protecting it. Having restoration priorities will allow the Federal government to make 

crisis decisions informed by clearly established restoration priorities. 

Information 

82. DHS should expand the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center’s (NISAC) Modeling 

and Analysis capability to allow more robust and accurate systems modeling. Sector specific agencies

should provide the NISAC with any modeling available to their department for their assigned sector, and all 

NISAC analyses should in turn be shared with sector specific agencies. In addition, as directed in HSPD-7 

the Department of Homeland Security will work with other appropriate Federal departments and agencies to 

geospatially map, image and analyze critical infrastructure. 

83. The National Economic Council should form an Impact Assessment Working Group to provide an 

overall economic impact assessment of major disasters, including the Departments of Homeland 

Security, Treasury, Commerce, Energy (Energy Information Administration) and Labor as well as the 

President’s Council of Economic Advisers. Since Hurricane Katrina, NISAC has significantly improved 

their capability to provide reports detailing the cascading impact of major disasters on the Nation’s 

infrastructure but it does not include a robust assessment of the economic impacts. The various economic 

modeling expertise of the members of the Impact Assessment Working Group should be incorporated into the 

NISAC models.
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84. The Department of Commerce should lead, in cooperation with the Department of Treasury, 

Homeland Security, and other sector specific agencies as appropriate, the development of a proposal to 

the Department of Homeland Security for incentives and other mechanisms to motivate private sector 

cooperation and participation in efforts to prioritize infrastructure protection. This group should 

review the Defense Production Act, the Protected Critical Infrastructure Information Act, as well as financial 

incentives. These incentives should then be incorporated into the articulation of a business case for private 

sector participation in infrastructure protection. This business case should discuss protection and prioritized 

restoration as well as encourage private sector infrastructure resiliency and redundancy. In addition, States 

are encouraged to share best practices regarding financial incentives to motivate private sector cooperation 

and participation in infrastructure protection and restoration efforts. 

85. DHS should share the plans and policy for Federal response and delineated roles and responsibilities 

with the private sector. The National Response Plan urges businesses to develop disaster contingency plans. 

Businesses have been unable to develop completely effective contingency plans without understanding the 

actions Federal, State, and local governments will take in response to a disaster. Furthermore, the Federal 

government has been unable to develop agreed upon response plans for prioritized restoration. The first step 

to establishing a collaborative planning and exercise program with the private sector is to, with appropriate 

protections, share relevant sections of the NRP with key private sector partners. 

Critical Challenge: Environmental Hazards and Debris Removal 

Lesson Learned: The Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Environmental Protection 

Agency, should oversee efforts to improve the Federal government’s capability to quickly gather 

environmental data and to provide the public and emergency responders the most accurate information 

available, to determine whether it is safe to operate in a disaster environment or to return after evacuation. 

In addition, the Department of Homeland Security should work with its State and local homeland security 

partners to plan and to coordinate an integrated approach to debris removal during and after a disaster. 

Recommendations: 

86. DHS, in coordination with EPA, DOL/OSHA, HHS, DOC/NOAA, and DOD/USACE, should: 

a. DHS should enhance the Emergency Response Team (ERT) capability to conduct initial 

environmental assessments and communicate warnings to the general public and emergency 

responders by adding HHS and DOL/OSHA members. DHS should lead the collaborative 

development of detailed plans to guide initial environmental assessment operations under the NRP. 

b. DOL/OSHA should lead the development of operational procedures for Worker Health and Safety. 

Planning must include pre-disaster identification of potential hazards to inform out-of-area responders. 

87. DHS, in coordination with EPA, HHS, OSHA, and DOE should develop an integrated plan to quickly 

gather environmental data and provide the public and emergency responders the most accurate 

information available to decide whether it is safe to operate in a disaster environment or return after 

evacuation. This plan should address how to best communicate risk, as well as determine who is accountable 

for making the determination that an area is safe. It should also address the need for adequate laboratory 

capacity to support response to all hazards. The plan should be completed in 180 days. 

88. DHS should jointly lead DOD/USACE, DOI, USDA, and EPA to address and coordinate debris 

removal issues as part of ESF operational procedures. The procedures should include an integrated 

public communication approach for debris removal, especially as it applies to private property.
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Critical Challenge: Managing Offers of Foreign Assistance and Inquiries Regarding Affected Foreign 

Nationals 

Lesson Learned: The Department of State, in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security, 

should review and revise policies, plans, and procedures for the management of foreign disaster assistance. 

In addition, this review should clarify responsibilities and procedures for handling inquiries regarding 

affected foreign nationals. 

Recommendations: 

89. DOS should lead the revision of the International Coordination Support Annex to the NRP, clarifying 

responsibilities of DOS, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), DOD, and other supporting 

agencies in response to domestic incidents. This revision should begin immediately. 

90. Prior to June 1, 2006, DOS and DHS should lead an interagency effort that will quickly develop 

procedures to review, accept or reject any offers of international assistance for a domestic catastrophic 

incident. This should include an appropriate mechanism, led by DHS and supported by DOS and 

Treasury, to receive, disburse, and audit any cash assistance received in support of victim needs. These 

operating procedures should include: 

a. A coordination process among Federal agencies and non-governmental partners to solicit, accept, 

receive, integrate and distribute foreign assistance; 

b. An expedited review process for international aid that addresses both critical needs and legitimate foreign 

policy objectives; 

c. The inclusion of a USAID representative to the Joint Field Office (JFO); 

d. The inclusion of a representative from USAID/OFDA on the State Department Task Force and a DOS 

representative on USAID/OFDA’s Response Management Team to improve interagency coordination; 

also the addition of a DHS representative to both task forces to provide more efficient information 

sharing about assistance needs on the ground. 

91. DHS should lead an interagency effort to create and routinely update a prioritized list of anticipated 

disaster needs for foreign assistance and a list of items that cannot be accepted. These lists should be 

completed before June 1, 2006. These lists would be based upon notional planning scenarios, State/local 

emergency managers’ anticipated requirements, and current legal impediments on prohibited forms of aid. 

Once complete, DHS should distribute these lists to all appropriate agencies, to include regulatory agencies, 

in order to address regulatory barriers in advance. 

92. DOS should establish, before June 1, 2006, an interagency process to: determine appropriate uses of 

international cash donations; to ensure timely use of these funds in a transparent and accountable 

manner; to meet internal Federal government accounting requirements; and to communicate to donors 

how their funds were used. 

93. Public and Diplomatic Communications during domestic emergencies should both encourage cash 

donations -- preferably to recognized nonprofit voluntary organizations with relevant experience -- 

and emphasize that donations of equipment or personnel should address disaster needs. Financial 

contributions provide emergency managers maximum flexibility to meet requirements in crises and avoid 

regulatory challenges. In a catastrophe, rapid, proactive communication of requirements reduces the potential 

for the refusal of assistance. The Department of State should have domestic crisis communications 

procedures in place before June 1, 2006. 
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94. The Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security should, before June 1, 2006, 

jointly develop procedures to ensure that the needs of foreign missions are included in domestic plans 

for tracking inquires regarding persons who are unaccounted for in a disaster zone. 

a. During a crisis, DOS and USAID should provide DHS with personnel who have technical expertise in 

humanitarian and disaster management issues, to include population displacement.

b. In improving their strategies for providing faster information and assistance to American citizens, 

Federal, State, and local emergency management officials should include provisions covering the needs 

of affected foreign nationals. To ensure these provisions meet U.S. legal obligations under the Vienna 

Convention on Consular Relations, these officials should work with DOS. DOS in turn should inform 

foreign missions about these provisions. This should be accomplished through changes to the NRP, and 

through refinement of agencies’ NRP implementation plans. 

95. DHS and DOS should revise the NRP to include DOD and USDA-Food Safety Inspection Service as 

cooperating agencies to the International Coordination Support Annex. Including DOD more directly in 

foreign assistance management would leverage existing relationships with partner military establishments and 

help to ensure that staging areas for the acceptance of foreign aid are preplanned and quickly available.

96. DHS should include DOS and foreign assistance management in domestic interagency training and 

exercise events. Inclusion in the new National Exercise Program (NEP) should occur before the end of 

FY06. 

97. DHS should provide daily disaster response situational updates through the Secretary of State to all 

Chiefs of Mission or Chargés d’Affaires. These updates should improve situational awareness and provide 

information to address host government concerns or questions. 

Critical Challenge: Non-governmental Aid 

Lesson Learned: The Federal response should better integrate the contributions of volunteers and nongovernmental organizations into the broader national effort. This integration would be best achieved at the 

State and local levels, prior to future incidents. In particular, State and local governments must engage 

NGOs in the planning process, credential their personnel, and provide them the necessary resource support 

for their involvement in a joint response. 

Recommendations: 

98. DHS should revise the NRP to designate responsibility for coordinating non-governmental assistance, 

including faith-based organizations, during emergencies. These responsibilities should fully address the 

following: 

a. Improve communication of requirements from the incident site; 

b. Pre-identify and catalogue non-governmental goods and build a process to deploy these goods to specific 

regions for catastrophic events; 

c. Develop a statewide support function for volunteers (both pre-trained and spontaneous) in each State to 

assist local emergency managers and NGOs to prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters; 

d. Recruit, train and identify National Incident Management System (NIMS) trained volunteers; 

e. Incorporate NGOs into the planning, training, and exercising process; and 

f. Ensure there is a mechanism to coordinate spontaneous, unaffiliated volunteers. 
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99. DHS should establish an office with responsibility for integrating non-governmental and other 

volunteer resources into Federal, State, and local emergency response plans and mutual aid 

agreements. Further, DHS should establish a distinct organizational element to assist faith-based 

organizations. There is no single office within DHS that is responsible for integrating non-governmental and 

faith-based assistance into emergency response planning. By establishing such an office, DHS can foster an 

integrated planning process through which government at all levels can identify and communicate their 

requirements to NGOs during response and recovery operations. This office should also study and 

recommend improvements to the process to deploy resources and personnel to specific regions for 

catastrophic events, through emergency assistance compacts or other mechanisms. 

The responsibilities of the office should include, but not be limited to the following: 

a. Increasing relationship-building to include conducting a national conference for NGOs and the private 

sector on emergency preparedness and response where they can share best practices; 

b. Identifying potential donation sources; and 

c. Identifying and eliminating difficulties pre-incident that NGOs encounter with the Federal government 

when delivering services. 

d. Inventory, develop partnerships with and promote the best practices of successful Faith-Based disaster 

relief programs such as the United States Emergency Chaplains Corps. 

100. DHS should condition State and local grants, under the Homeland Security Grant program, on 

incorporating NGOs and the private sector into their emergency planning, training, exercises, and 

disaster relief efforts. These revised plans should include the following: 

a. Participation of NGOs, including small regional and local groups, in planning for disaster response and 

recovery efforts; and 

b. Pre-determined roles and responsibilities for volunteer organizations, which identify their mission, 

capabilities, training, and certification. 

An improved plan to incorporate and connect volunteers and private sector assets with emergency 

management officials would have enabled the better use of NGO contributions. Some states have improved 

how NGOs respond to incidents by creating a volunteer and social service infrastructure. In Florida and 

North Carolina, NGOs and emergency managers have formalized their relationships at the State and local 

level by including a volunteer coordinator in the State EOC. As a result, their State and local emergency 

managers better understand what non-governmental assistance is available before, during, and after a disaster. 

Federal, State, and local officials should use the National Preparedness Goal’s Target Capabilities List: 

Volunteer Management and Donations as the standard to improve capabilities. The next version of the Target 

Capabilities List should expand the explanation of the roles and responsibilities of volunteer organizations 

and include establishing their role in staffing State emergency operations centers. 

101. DHS should improve access to, and awareness of, private sector and non-governmental resources 

available for use during emergency response operations. This process should include the following: 

a. Pre-arranged and contingency contracting; 

b. Provision of requirements estimates to NGOs and private sector organizations that are willing to provide 

resources during catastrophic events; 

c. Consistent, accurate, and timely messaging of resource needs to NGOs; 
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d. Providing NGOs and private sector organizations with information on reimbursement and access to 

Federal aid; 

e. Development of robust donations and volunteer management software system standards; 

f. Completing the development of a credentialing system, already being created by FEMA’s NIMS 

Integration Center, to allow authorized volunteers and workers restoring critical infrastructure access to 

relief sites; and 

g. Identification of what Federal, State, or local support NGOs will need to sustain operations (sanitation, 

electricity, food, and water). 

The Federal government cannot comprehensively plan and coordinate how NGOs and private sector entities 

will respond locally or regionally in a catastrophic disaster. State and local officials must take the lead in 

planning the best use of non-governmental resources at the local level. All States should consider existing 

models to coordinate and integrate non-governmental resources in disaster planning and response, 

recognizing that business-government partnerships require a level of trust and agility most easily built at the 

regional level. One such model which has proven successful is the Business Executives for National Security 

(BENS) Business Force project. Business Force partnerships of regional, State, and local officials, together 

with businesses and NGOs, have been successful in emergency response planning and using private sector 

resources and volunteers to fill gaps in preparedness and response capabilities. The BENS model also 

includes a web-based catalogue of private sector resources. The Federal government should recognize that 

the private/non-government sectors often perform certain functions more efficiently and effectively than 

government because of their expertise and experience in applying successful business models. These publicprivate partnerships should be facilitated, recognized, and funded. 

Additionally, integrating regional partnerships and resource databases (like the ones created by BENS) with 

national databases and response capabilities gives incident commanders full visibility of supply and volunteer 

sources. The capability to draw on these resources should inform and be part of Federal, State, and local 

logistics systems and response plans. 

 

102. Legal and liability impediments to the use and coordination of non-governmental and private sector 

resources during a catastrophic event should be removed. Measures that should be implemented include: 

a. DHS should lead an interagency effort to remove Federal legal and liability impediments to the use and 

coordination of non-governmental and private sector resources during a catastrophic event. Encourage 

the passage and enactment of S.1747, currently pending in the 109th Congress, a Bill to limit liability for 

volunteers and those providing goods and services for disaster relief. 

b. Recommending uniform provisions for State law similar to the Non-Liability of Federal Government 

provision in the Stafford Act, to ease State and local government fear of legal liability; 

c. Recommending uniform State “good Samaritan” laws to protect organizations donating goods and 

services from legal liability; 

d. Revision of the two-year maximum service rule for national service programs, such as AmeriCorps, to 

allow experienced volunteers to continue serving after two years; and 

e. Simplification and clarification of Federal auditing and oversight procedures during a disaster. We 

should allow trusted organizations (those with established Federal relationships) to respond quickly 

during a disaster and wait to review their activities post-disaster. 
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103. DHS should encourage NGOs and the private sector to plan their giving streams at the local level in 

order to provide comprehensive support to affected local areas during an emergency and prevent 

duplication of relief efforts. By improving the integration of planning among voluntary organizations at the 

local level, these organizations will be better positioned to serve citizens during an emergency. FEMA should 

authorize local voluntary organizations to accept gifts and donations of cash, goods, and services pledged to 

FEMA at the local level. 

Critical Challenge: Training, Exercises, and Lessons Learned 

Lesson Learned: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should establish specific requirements for 

training, exercise, and lessons learned programs linked through a comprehensive system and common 

supporting methodology throughout the Federal, State and local governments. Furthermore, assessments of 

training and exercises should be based on clear and consistent performance measures. DHS should require 

all Federal and State entities with operational Homeland Security responsibilities to have a lessons learned 

capability, and DHS should ensure all entities are accountable for the timely implementation of remedial 

actions in response to lessons learned. 

Recommendations: 

104. DHS should finalize the Target Capabilities List (TCL). DHS should finalize the TCL by the end of 

Second Quarter, FY06 with input from Federal, State, local and professional entities in order to evaluate 

preparedness. The TCL should define performance-based standards and outcomes grounded in capabilities 

which can be used to assess a State’s ability to properly execute a desired mission. Without the TCL, 

training and exercises have no goal against which to measure their performance. Consequently, lessons are 

not learned or incorporated into the capabilities-based planning process. 

 

105. Strengthen Homeland Security Council (HSC) coordination of Federal emergency training, exercises 

and lessons learned. Homeland Security Council should designate a Senior Director of Education, Training, 

Exercises, and Lessons Learned. The most recent Top Officials (“TOPOFF”) exercise in April 2005 revealed 

the Federal government’s lack of progress in addressing a number of preparedness deficiencies, many of 

which had been identified in previous exercises. This lack of progress reflects, in part, the absence of a 

remedial action program to systematically address lessons learned from exercises. To ensure appropriate 

priority and accountability are being applied to address these continuing deficiencies, the Assistant to the 

President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism now annually conducts four Cabinet-level exercises 

with catastrophic scenarios. The HSC, weighing a variety of factors, should: 

a. Establish the National goals of what should be trained and exercised for the coming year and make 

recommendations for follow-on goals; 

b. Ensure the establishment of a Remedial Action Management Program (RAMP) to ensure agencies are 

enacting lessons learned to improve response capabilities. The RAMP would provide the basis for 

systematically identifying, analyzing, and monitoring the implementation of initiatives aimed at 

resolving deficiencies uncovered in exercises, training events, real-world events, and policy discussions. 

Equally important, the RAMP would conduct remedial action tracking and long-term trend analysis, 

ensuring that remedial actions are completed and inform the cycle of preparedness activities. This 

program will provide the Federal Interagency with the means of overcoming the perennial problem of 

observing the same issues repeatedly characterized as “lessons learned” in reports compiled following 

major events; 

c. Review Senior Official exercise priorities to ensure more challenging scenarios based on the most 

catastrophic threats (natural and man-made) that exercise the National Goals and the use of Federal 

resources; and 
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d. Ensure all Cabinet Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Under Secretary and other appropriate personnel, 

especially those who are identified as primary or supporting agencies of Essential Support Functions, 

train and exercise on their respective roles for catastrophic events. This will help to meet the Interim 

National Preparedness Goal Overarching Priorities to “Implement the National Incident Management 

System and National Response Plan” through the use of Senior Official Exercises (SOEs). 

106. All agencies with operational components should establish and fund Remedial Action Management 

Programs (RAMPs). All agencies with operational components should establish and fund RAMPs to 

identify and incorporate lessons learned by the end of FY06. This program will enable Federal agencies to 

overcome the perennial problem of observing recurring problems in AARs. To assist in this effort, DOD 

should work closely with DHS to establish the overall program, using the current DOD model as a basis. 

107. DHS should conduct State and local officials training and exercises. Key State and local officials should 

participate in training and exercises to ensure Governors and their cabinets attend a training course on their 

roles and responsibilities during a disaster and be exercised annually. The same will hold true for mayors of 

UASI cities and their Urban Area Working Group. These steps will help the Nation meet the Interim 

National Preparedness Goal, Overarching Priorities to “Implement the National Incident Management System 

and National Response Plan” and “Expand Regional Collaboration.” Lack of coordination should be taken 

into consideration for future grant funding. 

108. DHS should restructure the TOPOFF Exercise Series. DHS should restructure the scope and scale of the 

TOPOFF exercise series to provide maximum effectiveness for its participants before execution of the FY07 

Full-Scale Exercise. Though the intention of TOPOFF was to utilize terrorist based scenarios, further 

scenarios should encompass all-hazards and be HSC-vetted. Scenarios for future exercises should include 

recovery issues that explore the role of the private sector and non-governmental agencies, including faith 

based organizations. 

These restructured TOPOFF exercises should use a variety of exercise types, as outlined in the NEEP. Rather 

than simply conducting full-scale exercises every two years, the TOPOFF structure should execute a series of 

exercises every year identify lessons learned from those exercises in a timelier manner and issue an AAR that 

identifies the remedial actions to be taken with a deadline for implementation. 

109. DHS should develop an Exercise Series to Evaluate Nationwide Preparedness Utilizing the Final TCL. 

DHS should provide a series of exercises to all Urban Area Security Initiative cities and State capitals. The 

purpose of these exercises should be to evaluate and provide a baseline for the Nation’s overall preparedness. 

These exercises should be provided through G&T’s Direct Support program. Once a current baseline of 

preparedness measures at the State level has been identified, each State, starting in FY 07, should get an 

annual level of preparedness status report. This report will be in the form of a comprehensive preparedness 

“report card” that will grade capabilities, exercises, training, effective use of federal grant monies, and other 

relevant criteria as a condition of further grant funding. Much like the President’s Management Agenda, 

States will be given the expected results which they need to accomplish with their grant funding. This “report 

card” would not only classify each State on their level of preparedness, but also track how well homeland 

security grant dollars are spent. States that do not use their grant dollars effectively would have their grant 

dollars reduced or terminated. 

110. DHS should consolidate the DHS Training and Exercise Structure. DHS should consolidate homeland 

security related training and exercise assets in a new Office of Training, Exercises and Lessons Learned 

(TELL) during FY06. This office should reside under the Preparedness Directorate and reflect the continuing 

transformation within DHS. DHS should separate training and exercise components currently within the G&T 

and place those assets within the new TELL. Key components should include, but not be limited to: Noble 

Training Center, Center for Domestic Preparedness, National Emergency Training Center, National Exercise 

and Evaluation Program. 

111. DHS should establish a National Exercise and Evaluation Program (NEEP). Building on the existing 

NEP, DHS should coordinate the establishment of a NEEP for homeland security related exercises by the end 
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of FY06. As currently constructed the NEP does not include and coordinate the full range of National 

homeland security exercise programs. DHS should provide a “National Exercise Strategy” as prescribed by 

HSPD-8. The NEEP should designate HSEEP as the common exercise methodology across all levels of 

government, so all exercises are using the same doctrine. The NEEP should also include domestic and 

international exercises that enable Federal, State and local governments to improve interagency coordination 

across all types of crises. DHS should provide, on a periodic basis, consolidated Federal homeland security 

training and exercise schedule and a status report on lessons learned and appropriate follow-up from 

completed exercises to the HSC’s Director of Training, Exercises, and Lessons Learned. DOD’s Chairman’s 

Exercise Program and the joint Exercise Program) should not fall under DHS domain, but appropriate 

exercises should be coordinated with DHS and incorporated in the NEP/NEEP. 

To assist Federal, State and local collaboration, DHS should develop and fund a National Exercise Simulation 

Center (SIMCEN), similar to the Department of Defense’s Joint Warfighting Center. The SIMCEN would 

act as a tool to simulate the Federal role in emergency response and be capable of working with State and 

local exercises. This SIMCEN should be designed to mirror the National operations center and provide a 

learning environment for Federal agencies. Agencies should be appropriately resourced, so that they are able 

to provide personnel to attend training and operate at the SIMCEN. DHS should support the use of 

simulation and modeling to assist in the development of operational procedures and exercises (particularly 

those based on catastrophic incidents) and as a resource to assist in responding to catastrophic incidents. 

Simulations of this type should be run out of the SIMCEN. 

Critical Challenge: Homeland Security Professional Development and Education 

Lesson Learned: The Department of Homeland Security should develop a comprehensive program for the 

professional development and education of the Nation’s homeland security personnel including Federal, State 

and local employees as well as emergency management persons within the private sector, non-governmental 

organizations, as well as faith-based and community groups. This program should foster a “joint” Federal 

Interagency, State, local, and civilian team. 

Recommendations: 

112. Each Federal department and agency assigned specific homeland security roles should establish a 

homeland security professional development program that encompasses career assignments, education, 

exercises, and training. All departments and agencies assigned specific homeland security roles should 

establish professional development programs to insure they have the skilled personnel necessary to execute 

these responsibilities. These personnel must have the requisite professional credentials and experiences, 

knowledge of their organization’s emergency responsibilities, and understanding of other organizations’ 

related emergency responsibilities. Homeland security professional development programs should include 

interagency and intergovernmental (i.e., Federal, State, and local governments) perspectives. Further, the 

scope of homeland security requires that these programs focus on all hazards: terrorism, natural disasters, 

accidents, and other disasters. Departments and agencies must determine which offices are assigned 

homeland security roles and responsibilities, and should also determine the education, training, and technical 

expertise required for homeland security senior leaders and crisis managers. Each should establish education, 

exercise, and training requirements for personnel assigned to offices with homeland security responsibilities 

throughout all levels of government. 

113. OPM should establish, and Federal Departments and agencies should implement a career development 

process that mandates interagency and intergovernmental assignments as well as professional 

education. These career development processes must require and reward interagency and intergovernmental 

homeland security assignments. Such assignments will enable homeland security professionals to understand 

the roles, responsibilities, and cultures of other organizations and disciplines. Interagency and 

intergovernmental assignments will build trust and familiarity among homeland security professionals from 

differing perspectives. These assignments will also break down barriers between organizations, thus 
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enhancing the exchange of ideas and practices. The need for intergovernmental assignments should be 

determined on a case-by-case basis. 

a. Each career development program should require that homeland security personnel complete 

interagency or intergovernmental assignments, and professional education, prior to assignment to 

senior managerial positions, including the Senior Executive Service (SES). Interagency and 

intergovernmental assignments should be designed to build a cadre of homeland security professionals 

across all levels of government who possess common knowledge of operational roles and 

responsibilities. Career development programs must reward strong academic performance in 

professional education programs. 

b. Departments and agencies should establish fellowships that allow State and local homeland 

security professionals to serve in a related Federal department or agency for a limited period of 

time. This can promote the development of a common planning culture and foster collaboration among 

Federal, State, and local governments. Further, these fellowships can enhance partnerships that result in 

more effective and efficient emergency responses.

c. The White House should consider if legislative or regulatory changes are required to facilitate 

interagency and intergovernmental assignments. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 transformed the 

Department of Defense (DOD) into a truly integrated department by requiring an assignment in another 

branch of the Armed Forces as a prerequisite for promotion to flag or general officer. Similar legislation 

should be considered for the Federal government to achieve the same sort of integration across Executive 

Branch departments and agencies. 

114. The Department of Homeland Security should establish an interagency working group to establish 

specific goals with objective standards against which Department and Agency progress toward full 

implementation of effective professional development programs can be measured. The interagency 

working group should ensure consistency and uniformity among Federal homeland security professional 

development programs. The interagency working group should provide quarterly reports to the Secretary of 

Homeland Security and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism on the 

status of Federal homeland security professional development programs. 

115. DHS should provide training, technical, and other assistance in support of other departments’ and 

agencies’ homeland security professional development programs. DHS should expand its use of 

innovative techniques and technologies to enhance the quality and dissemination of homeland security 

education and training. This may include the use of distance learning programs and interactive computer 

methodologies. DHS must expand its efforts to promote awareness and implementation of the NIMS and the 

NRP throughout Federal, State, and local governments, and private sector. 

116. DHS should establish a National Homeland Security University (NHSU) for senior officials that serves 

as a capstone to other educational and training opportunities. An NHSU should be established to provide 

a strategic perspective of homeland security and counterterrorism that transcends organizations, levels of 

government, response disciplines, and the private sector. This requires that the NHSU faculty and student 

body include interagency, intergovernmental, and private sector representatives. NHSU programs should 

prepare officials for senior homeland security and counterterrorism assignments in Federal, State, and local 

governments. To achieve this, the NHSU curriculum should focus on all hazards and all phases of emergency 

preparedness and response. It should expand students’ understanding of the strategic aspects of homeland 

security and counterterrorism planning, policy development, incident management, and support functions, 

among other topics. NHSU educational programs must be scalable and portable in order to reach the widest 

audiences. NHSU should offer traditional in-residence courses in Washington, DC. It should also offer 

regional and virtual educational programs, and utilize innovative educational methodologies, such as 

simulation centers, for use by faculty, students, and government officials. The NHSU should serve as a 

center of homeland security and counterterrorism strategic thought and expertise for the nation. DHS should 

consider leveraging the infrastructure and expertise at the National Defense University by partnering with 
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DOD to have the NHSU be a joint DHS/DOD initiative that focuses on both Homeland Security and 

Homeland Defense. 

117. Federal departments and agencies should strengthen their existing homeland security educational and 

training programs. The Emergency Management Institute, the Naval Postgraduate School, the National 

Defense University, and other university programs are critical national resources for developing skilled and 

knowledgeable homeland security professionals. Departments and agencies should ensure that these and 

other similar homeland security educational programs have the greatest impact. This should include requiring 

State and local participation in such programs through Federal fellowships. This will provide the Nation with 

a cadre of trained homeland security professionals. DHS should support these educational and training 

programs by providing them with curricula and other technical assistance. DHS should pursue opportunities 

to replicate innovative educational programs, such as the joint New York City Fire Department-U.S. Military 

Academy’s Counterterrorism Leadership Program. 

118. The White House should consider establishing a Presidential Board to review the national security, 

homeland security, and counterterrorism professional development programs of Federal departments 

and agencies to identify opportunities for further integration. The Nation can no longer view national 

security, homeland security, and counterterrorism independently. Federal professional development 

programs must recognize the interdependencies among all three and adjust their respective career 

assignments, education, exercises, and training accordingly. The Board should provide a roadmap for uniting 

the efforts of DHS, DOD, and other departments and agencies in educating, training and preparing our leaders 

for their crucial roles in safeguarding the Nation. Further, this review should promote the establishment of a 

common security paradigm that integrates national security, homeland security, and counterterrorism. This 

review should also identify opportunities for greater collaboration and integration. Importantly, this vision is 

not to eliminate the departments’ own professional development programs, each of which serves an important 

role and is tailored to meet the needs of their respective organizations. 

Critical Challenge: Citizen and Community Preparedness 

Lesson Learned: The Federal government, working with State, local, NGO, and private sector partners, 

should combine the various disparate citizen preparedness programs into a single national campaign to 

promote and strengthen citizen and community preparedness. This campaign should be developed in a 

manner that appeals to the American people, incorporates the endorsement and support of prominent 

national figures, focuses on the importance of individual and community responsibility for all-hazard disaster 

preparedness, provides meaningful and comprehensive education, training and exercise opportunities 

applicable to all facets of the American population, and establishes specialized preparedness programs for 

those less able to provide for themselves during disasters such as children, the ill, the disabled, and the 

elderly. 

Recommendations: 

119. DHS should make citizen and community preparedness a National priority. To facilitate this 

initiative, Cabinet Secretaries and other prominent National public figures (e.g. the Surgeon General) 

should serve as spokespersons to promote citizen and community preparedness. The Secretary of 

Homeland Security, Secretary of Education, United States Surgeon General, and other National public 

figures, should publicize the importance of the community and individual preparedness. The goal of this 

effort should be to have citizens better understand the role and limitations of government and to encourage 

individual preparedness. 

a. In addition, DHS should continue to research means to lower the barriers to personal preparedness and 

adapt outreach and instructional materials to address the findings. Public awareness messaging should 

shift to include more substantive information within the message, as opposed to telling citizens they need 

to “do” something. For example, the “Stop, Drop, and Roll” campaign used so successfully in fire safety 

as part of the “Learn Not to Burn” program embedded the message and provided citizens with an action. 
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Other successful campaigns include the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s “Click It or 

Ticket” program which fines drivers for not wearing their seatbelt, and the “Buckle Up America” 

campaign which prescribes proper use of seat belt and child safety seats. 

b. DHS should leverage the success of public education conducted by fire departments nationwide which 

has reduced the loss of lives and property by fire. The Citizen Corps public education effort should be 

integrated with the DHS’s United States Fire Administration so that preparedness efforts of local fire 

departments can be expanded to include citizen and community preparedness. Additionally, DHS should 

leverage the success of the USAonwatch program to form a National Network of Community Watches 

comprised of citizen volunteers to develop best practices, a common doctrine and metrics for all-hazards 

community preparedness. 

c. The newly created Office of Public and Community Preparedness should continue to assist with 

implementing National strategies for citizen preparedness and communities. However, this office should 

be removed from the Office of Grants and Training, so as to focus solely on homeland security policies, 

plans, strategies, and guidance at the Federal, State, and local levels which highlight citizen and 

community preparedness. 

120. DHS should consider increasing grant funding for citizen and community preparedness programs and 

where program metrics demonstrate effectiveness, DHS should consider allowing greater use of 

Federal funds for Citizen Corps Council staff positions at the State and local level within the FY07 

grant program. State and local governments generally do not have full time staff assigned to support this 

critical component of community preparedness. The availability of full-time positions at the State and local 

level for the Citizen Corps to coordinate the government and community planning is critical. Locations with 

full-time staff assigned to this tend to have developed robust plans. While Citizen Corps has existed since 

2002, funding for the program has not been consistent. 

121. DHS should build baseline skills and capabilities needed by all citizens and communities. DHS needs to 

establish a comprehensive list of skills and capabilities to assess how well citizens are prepared utilizing 

resources such as the Rand Corporations “Individual Preparedness and Response to Chemical, Radiological, 

Nuclear, and Biological Terrorist Attacks.” These baseline skills include assembling preparedness kits, 

developing communications plans, training in basic first aid, and learning how to react to a variety of hazards 

and disasters. Additionally, the DHS should develop a process to evaluate national progress toward improved 

citizen preparedness capabilities through the use of the Target Capabilities List and established metrics, 

evaluated annually as a condition of receiving Homeland Security grant funding. 

122. DHS should develop tools for State and local governments to use in order to prepare, train, exercise, 

and engage citizens and communities in all areas of preparedness in FY06. Special consideration should 

be given to persons with disabilities, health problems, language barriers, income barriers, and unaccompanied 

minors. Planning also needs to contemplate household pets and other animals. Developing these tools at the 

National level, in partnership with non-governmental organizations, private sector, emergency responders, 

and experts on vulnerable populations, will achieve economies of scale. Providing tools, such as instructor 

guides and participant handbooks for classroom based instruction, identified standardized skills and 

capabilities, and strategic planning guidance, will elevate National preparedness without depleting scarce 

resources at the local level. 

 Although DHS and other organizations already have established websites to assist with community 

preparedness (e.g.,www.ready.gov, www.prepare.org), there is no measure to evaluate if they have increased 

overall citizen preparedness. 

123. The Department of Education (DOEd), working with DHS, should include individual and community 

preparedness into current elementary and secondary educational programs. The DOEd should 

recommend funding to better student preparedness initiatives and disseminate teaching materials. Schools 

should use materials and curricula developed by DHS and the American Red Cross to prepare students. 
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Students should be required to take courses in first aid, disaster preparedness or other related topics as a part 

of their curriculum starting in FY07. 

School programs on littering, recycling, anti-smoking and seat belt safety have demonstrated their 

effectiveness at helping to achieve National community goals beyond just students. We should build on these 

successful initiatives to educate and prepare our children and their families for the threats of the 21st Century. 

124. DHS should immediately highlight preparedness best practices through the DHS Lessons Learned and 

Information Sharing website (www.llis.gov)and the Citizen Corps Council’s National conference. By 

identifying best practices during exercises and audits, Citizen Corps Councils will be able to keep abreast of 

the emerging trends in citizen preparedness. 

125. Working with the National Governors Association, DHS should encourage the establishment of State 

tax relief holidays throughout the year to allow citizens to purchase disaster preparedness supplies. 

Providing periodic tax breaks throughout the year would encourage people to purchase emergency supplies. 

These tax holidays should consider the State of Florida’s model in defining what types of supplies would 

qualify. The government should also work closely with the private sector to build “preparedness packs” in 

various sizes (individual through family size) for sale at low cost, much as the American Red Cross has done. 

THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 

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APPENDIX B – WHAT WENT RIGHT

But there are lessons learned that we don’t need to change: the lesson of courage...the determination of our 

citizens...the compassion of our fellow citizens...the decency of men and women. 

 —President George W. Bush, January 12, 20061

The devastation of Hurricane Katrina will forever be seared into our country’s memory. Visions of our citizens 

stranded on highway overpasses, of debris-filled plots where grand houses once stood, and of babies being hoisted 

onto roofs to avoid the surging water, continue to haunt us to this day. But there are other stories from Katrina, 

stories that may only be known by a few, but that are appreciated deeply by those involved. These are the stories of 

the men and women of our military, our law enforcement and fire departments, our private citizens, non-government 

organizations and our faith based groups. These are the stories of the human side of Katrina. It is important that we 

do not let the horror of the storm overshadow the true courage, determination, compassion and decency of the 

American people. Although many efforts are described below, what follows is at best only a partial representation of 

the enormity of the American spirit. 

Preparation and Response to Katrina 

We have identified numerous areas in which the Federal, State and local governments could have better prepared 

for, responded to, and recovered from the storm, but it is also important to acknowledge that we pre-staged more 

assets and pre-deployed more personnel than we have for any other storm in American history. And we have tried 

to include throughout the review some examples of the many good lessons of courage, compassion, and initiative 

that saved lives and reduced suffering. 

In 1992, Hurricane Andrew struck densely populated urban areas in southeastern Florida as a Category 5 storm and 

provides the closest comparison to Hurricane Katrina. They were two of the most destructive storms ever to strike 

the United States, but Katrina affected an area three times as large, caused two to six times the economic damage, 

and killed up to twenty times as many people—this was partially due to Katrina’s large wind field and the high 

storm surge, which proved far more damaging than the more compact Andrew. 

Prior to both hurricanes, the National Weather Service provided repeated and accurate warnings, but local 

populations did not fully evacuate—greatly magnifying human suffering in the wake of the storm. Andrew and 

Katrina both overwhelmed State and local responders, but the Federal response to Katrina was greatly improved due 

to better preparations prior to landfall. 

Non-governmental Organizations 

The number of volunteer and non-profit organizations providing support to the Hurricane Katrina relief effort was 

truly extraordinary. Virtually every national, regional and local charitable organization in the U.S., and many from 

abroad, contributed aid to the victims of Hurricane Katrina. To assist in the coordination of these offers of 

assistance, the USA Freedom Corps (Freedom Corps) and the Governor’s State Service Commissions rallied non-
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profit organizations to list volunteer opportunities in the Freedom Corps volunteer search engine. The Freedom 

Corps also worked with the Corporation for National and Community Service to create a Katrina Resource Center 

that helped groups of volunteers connect their resources with needs on the ground.2

The Citizen Corps coordinated volunteer efforts throughout the country, with more than 14,000 Citizen Corps 

volunteers from all 50 states and the District of Columbia actively involved in response and recovery efforts across 

America. The Harris County, Texas, Citizen Corps Council brought together an enormous number of volunteers to 

support the American Red Cross and staffed evacuation centers throughout Houston. They processed over 8,000 

volunteers in one day, and an average of 3,500 per day overall. These volunteers allowed for the creation of an 

actual city (with its own zip code) for nearly 25,000 Louisiana evacuees sheltering in the Houston Reliant 

Astrodome. They were successful because they had coordinated ahead of time with local businesses and volunteer 

groups, and because they were familiar with and implemented elements of the Incident Command System.3

 

Faith-based organizations supported the relief effort as well. For example, 6,000 Southern Baptist Relief volunteers 

from 36 state conventions served in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and Texas following the hurricane 

and flood. These volunteers ran mobile kitchens, and recovery sites.4

 They also established hundreds of “pop-up” 

shelters created by churches or other agencies.5

 Operation Blessing, comprised of a network of faith-based partners 

and resources, provided food and shelter to help those in need and transported food and other supplies with their 

own fleet of trucks.6

 They also made over $4 million in Fast Cash Grants available to church and smaller relief 

groups throughout the affected region.7

 Members of the Salvation Army came from across the nation and served 

over one million meals, sheltered more than 31,000 people in seven states, and provided aid to displaced citizens in 

thirty states.8

 The Salvation Army not only strengthened the social service infrastructure in those states directly 

impacted by the hurricane and flood—they did so nationwide. The Salvation Army’s network alone fielded more 

than 60,000 health and welfare inquiries and helped to locate 25,508 people to date.9

 These and many other faithbased organizations filled the gaps that other private and public sector organizations could not. Christ in Action, an 

inter-denominational non-profit organization from Manassas, Virginia deployed volunteers and mobile kitchens to 

Gulfport, MS and began feeding people on September 1. After 115 days of operations, Christ in Action served over 

420,000 meals and repaired over 500 houses in time for families to reoccupy their homes by Christmas. Based upon 

lessons learned from this experience, Dr. Denny Nissley, the Director of Christ in Action, is organizing a Coalition 

of Faith-Based First Responders from around the Nation to be prepared for the next major disaster. This Coalition 

will perform disaster relief training for volunteers and will maintain a current roster of thousands of volunteers who 

can be quickly called upon to provide support during the next major disaster. 

Private citizens also provided assistance and resources in the aftermath of the storm. Dr. Carrie Oliver from Texas, 

operating independently, arrived with three RVs pulling 16-foot trailers driven by herself, her husband and friends to 

Baton Rouge shortly after the storm hit. The RVs were full of medical supplies, food, and water. Back in Texas, 

Dr. Oliver runs a large clinic, and she had brought all available medical supplies and had purchased the vehicles, 

trailers, and other supplies with her own money. 

Dr. Oliver initially planned on heading directly to New Orleans, but officials in Livingston Parish did not think it 

was safe. Instead Dr. Oliver was incorporated into responding to other parishes. The supplies and personnel were 

divided into three teams, and with the assistance of a helicopter procured from the Louisiana Office of Homeland 

Security and Emergency Preparedness, Dr. Oliver flew ahead to different parish localities, and had the three teams 

follow by ground. Besides initially helping in Livingston Parish shelters, the teams visited different areas in 

Washington, St. Tammany, Tangipahoa, and Jefferson Parishes, and set up walk-in clinics operating out of the RVs. 

Later, the RVs were used to set up a mobile hospital unit and decontamination clinic at the Children’s Hospital in 

the City of New Orleans 2nd Precinct to take care of injured soldiers, police, and other responders who could not 

otherwise get medical care. 

After three days, Dr. Oliver returned to Texas, but left everything she had brought with her. She signed over the 

titles to the vehicles, trailers and supplies. Livingston Parish officials continued to use the RVs and supplies for 

relief missions to surrounding parishes and New Orleans, as well as for longer trips, such as one to distribute 

equipment to police officers in Mississippi.10
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Other organizations worked tirelessly to assist emergency responders that, due to the storm, did not have the 

equipment and means to effectively carry out their duties. Amateur Radio Operators from both the Amateur Radio 

Emergency Service and the American Radio Relay League, monitored distress calls and rerouted emergency 

requests for assistance throughout the U.S. until messages were received by emergency response personnel. A 

distress call made from a cell phone on a rooftop in New Orleans to Baton Rouge was relayed, via ham radio, from 

Louisiana to Oregon, then Utah, and finally back to emergency personnel in Louisiana, who rescued the 15 stranded 

victims.11 Ham radio operators voluntarily manned the amateur radio stations at sites such as the National Hurricane 

Center, Hurricane Watch Net, Waterway Net, Skywarn and the Salvation Army Team Emergency Radio Network.12 

State Governments Support Other Critical Services 

Other State Governments volunteered to provide non-response related critical services that the States of Louisiana 

and Mississippi could no longer provide. Multiple State Public Health Laboratories volunteered to assist the 

devastated Louisiana and Mississippi State Public Health Laboratories. Florida sent a mobile drinking water lab and 

personnel to Mississippi, helping to prevent people from getting sick from contaminated water. Iowa personnel 

performed 12,000 newborn screening tests, critical to the health of our youngest citizens, as they must be performed 

quickly in order to provide immediate treatment. The efforts to shoulder some of the burden were and continue to 

be coordinated through the non-profit organization representing these laboratories, the Association of Public Health 

Laboratories, and the State laboratories themselves.13

Local Officials 

Many of those called upon to do the toughest work were those that had lost the most. Members of local fire 

departments, police departments, and emergency service units worked tirelessly despite being victims themselves. 

Many lost their homes, cars, and possessions. Others lost their families and loved ones. Yet these very people 

returned to work to protect and serve the people to whom they had made a commitment. They often worked their 

shifts without knowledge of where there family was, or where they would sleep that night. Despite these obstacles, 

they continued to perform their duties. 

Some members of the Waveland, MS Police Department stayed at their police station during the storm. There came 

a point when the flooding from the storm surge became so great that they clung desperately to a bush located in the 

front yard of the station for five hours. When the surge subsided, the men returned to their duties, rescuing and 

saving those that remained in the 7,000 person town. 

When the officers of the Waveland Police Department wanted to return to their duty, a few problems arose. Cars, 

equipment, radios, they had lost it all. The State of Florida, which was leaning forward with their State Emergency 

Response Team (SERT), immediately responded following the storm. The State of Florida deployed personnel, 

equipment and commodities to Mississippi to aid response and recovery from the devastating impact of Hurricane 

Katrina. In the hours and days after the catastrophic storm, Governor Jeb Bush pledged the support of Florida to 

Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour. Resources from Florida were mobilized through the Emergency Management 

Assistance Compact. These efforts represent Florida's largest state-to-state assistance in history. Law Enforcement 

officers who are an integral part of the Florida SERT assisted the Waveland, MS Police Department by providing 

relief so police officers could return to their homes and account for their families. 

Other cities and states sent their police and fire departments to help their fellow departments that were crippled by 

the storm. The Fire Department of New York City (FDNY) and the New York City Police Department (NYPD),

two organizations that themselves suffered a devastating loss four years prior, deployed staff and equipment to assist 

in the recovery effort. FDNY sent over 660 fire department staff, including firefighters, fire officers, emergency 

medical technicians, paramedics, counselors, physicians, and communications personnel to assist the crippled New 

Orleans Fire Department.14 NYPD sent more than 300 officers to support the effort to restore order. Additionally, 

the State of New York sent more than 100 officers and the Department of Corrections sent more than 250 officers. 

The City's Urban Search and Rescue Team (New York Task Force One - NYTF-1), which is made up of NYPD, 

FDNY, and Office of Emergency Management personnel, was deployed to Mississippi at FEMA's request to support 

rescue efforts along the Gulf Coast. Fire trucks, police cruisers, school buses, transit buses, and other equipment and 

goods, bearing the seal of the State or City of New York were abundant during the response. 
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In Louisiana, the Livingston Parish Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness conducted search 

and rescue missions in the City of New Orleans, for 16 days after the storm with the Arizona National Guard 855th

Military Police, at great personal expense and risk. To Livingston’s credit, they augmented the New Orleans 2nd

District Police Department (NO 2nd PD), at their request, to perform these missions. At one point the NO 2nd PD 

ammunition was down to “the rounds on their belts” and their uniforms were starting to rot off their bodies. 

Livingston Parish provided supplies and medical care, and provided means of communication to the NO 2nd PD via 

the Parishes radios and satellite phones as the NO 2nd PD had no communications devices that worked. 

The Parish also provided a critically important security function, escorting medical assets to and from hospitals 

trying to care for injured and sick, and providing cover for New Orleans Police personnel during their operations. 

The primary resource that responded to this request was the Sheriff’s Department Special Response Team (SRT) 

who ran missions and provided security escorts. The SRT was specifically requested because of their outstanding 

skill, having won several State SRT competitions. 

The Parish exceeded its duty by responding into the State of Mississippi, surrounding Parishes, and the City of New 

Orleans. The Parish procured large amounts of supplies, out of their own operating budget, without knowing 

whether they would be reimbursed, and ultimately became a critical component in the flow of goods to help the 

devastated region. As this aid was not forthcoming from other sources, Livingston Parish personnel saved many 

lives during this disaster. 

Private Sector Organizations 

Private sector organizations provided commodities, services, expert advice, financial donations and volunteer groups 

to assist in the relief efforts. FedEx facilitated equipment and supply distribution, particularly for the American Red 

Cross.15 Dell, Home Depot, IBM, Lenovo, Pfizer, Wal-Mart, and other corporations gave millions of dollars in 

cash and in-kind donations to support immediate relief and recovery efforts as well as long-term rebuilding.16 

Vanguard Technologies, Inc., “showed up the day after the storm and provided communications when we had 

none,” said St. Bernard’s Parish officials. Vanguard Technologies, a small Louisiana business, provided Saint 

Bernard and Plaquemines parishes with innovative internet protocol (IP) network solutions and utilized a Point of 

Presence (POP) internet connectivity, that remained fully operational during Katrina, when no other company, big or 

small, was able to restore crucial communications in this devastated area. Vanguard also deployed a fully 

operational, redundant, broadband, wireless IP network, covering more than 100 square miles, within five days of 

Katrina's Gulf Coast landfall. The networks supported: Voice-over-Internet Protocol (VoIP) telephony; Video 

surveillance over IP; mobile video surveillance; high speed World Wide Web internet access; email communications 

via simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP); and web mail services. Vanguard, to date, continues servicing the 

parishes with critical communications access linking key government services and facilities. 

Private companies also worked hard to mitigate the economic damage that Hurricane Katrina was sure to bring. 

Norfolk Southern Railroad recognized the potential impact of the loss of certain key bridges, and pre-staged repair 

barges just outside the hurricane impact area. After the Hurricane passed, the barges moved in and quickly repaired 

the bridges to minimize the impact on the flow of commerce. By pre-positioning freighters offshore and swiftly 

returning their grain transport facilities to operational status, the Cargill Corporation started shipping grain 

internationally almost immediately after landfall. With over half of all U.S. grain exports flowing through ports 

affected by Hurricane Katrina from 17 different states17 this single action had a significantly positive national 

economic impact. 

Academic institutions across the country accepted students who had been displaced from their universities and 

provided them with financial assistance. For example, the Office of Student Aid and Scholarships at Louisiana 

State University (LSU) administered a Hurricane Katrina/Rita Student Relief Fund to assist students who had lost 

financial support or were displaced by the hurricane and flood. In addition, the LSU campus hosted one of the 

largest peacetime triage operations in the history of the United States. 

While State and local governments, non-governmental organizations, private companies and even individual citizens 

were pulling together to provide services for the victims of the storm and assistance for the public services that were 
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overwhelmed or incapacitated, the departments and agencies of the U.S. Federal government pulled its resources 

and personnel to mitigate the devastation that Katrina would bring. 

The Department of Homeland Security 

Almost 6,000 U.S. Coast Guard personnel (active duty, Reserve, Auxiliary, and civilian members) from throughout 

the country conducted one of the largest search and rescue missions in its history as part of an even larger multiagency, multi-level search and rescue effort. They retrieved more than 33,000 people along the Gulf Coast, 

including more than 12,000 by air, and 11,000 by surface, plus 9,403 evacuated from hospitals. Almost one-third of 

the Coast Guard’s entire fleet was dedicated to rescue efforts. Coast Guard personnel also worked tirelessly in 

multi-agency teams to reconstitute waterways and conduct environmental assessments. They restored hundreds of 

buoys and channel markers that were missing or destroyed in the hurricane. Their efforts to restore these and other 

navigational aids and waterways, allowed maritime industry in the area to return to normal faster. 

Having evacuated with boats on trailers prior to the storm, Petty Officer Jessica Guidroz, a coxswain at the 

Coast Guard Station New Orleans, could not return to the station by road after the hurricane passed. She 

and her crew launched their boat and headed toward the station. Finding the station occupied by rescued 

victims already, she established order at the station and then piloted a twenty-five foot boat through 

Metairie and Lakeview, banging on roofs and yelling, scanning for open attic windows, and convincing 

reluctant evacuees to leave. Learning of a large number of trapped residents, she proceeded to lead a 

squadron of eight boats and crews in the evacuation of approximately 2,000 people from the campus of the 

University of New Orleans. Like most of the station crew, she lived nearby and lost all her personal 

possessions to the storm, yet put her duty first. After several days piloting a boat into devastated 

neighborhoods, ferrying thousands of people to safety, and seeing destruction on a scale so vast that it 

seemed surreal, Guidroz was moved when she saw an image on television. She had been haunted by the 

memory of a young mother who had almost been trampled during the evacuation. She remembered how 

“the baby was wearing this diaper that you know hadn’t been changed in days.” That night, a news channel 

showed images from the Houston Astrodome, and there she was – the lady with the baby. “She was in 

Houston now, and she looked like she’d showered and her kid had on clean clothes. That moment is when 

it clicked,” Guidroz said. “Here was someone we had actually helped, and it fell into place that we were 

doing something that really mattered, something really good.” 

Petty Officer Moises Rivera-Carrion of the Coast Guard served as a rescue swimmer aboard Coast Guard 

HH-60J helicopters responding to the devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina. During almost three days 

of operations in an urban setting with hazards including unlit towers, downed power lines, and 

contaminated floodwaters, Petty Officer Rivera-Carrion tested the limits of his skill and endurance while 

rescuing 269 survivors trapped on rooftops and balconies throughout New Orleans and southwest 

Louisiana. 

With 50 plus knot winds blowing debris, Petty Officer Rodney L. Gordon landed in the first aircraft to 

return to New Orleans and immediately began a series of complex electrical and mechanical repairs vital to 

sustaining what quickly grew into the largest air rescue operation in Coast Guard history. Scrambling to 

locate and cannibalize broken and non-essential equipment until supply lines could be restored, he repaired 

failed and failing emergency generators, power lines, and dozens of destroyed components. He restored 

power to vital operations and communications facilities, including the Naval Air Station control tower, 

enabling the successful control and dispatch of thousands of military and Coast Guard aircraft sorties on 

rescue and evacuation missions. Most critically, the viability of the entire joint service air rescue operation 

was jeopardized by the electrical failure of the base’s enormous aviation fuel distribution plant. He took 

charge and single-handedly performed a complex rewiring of its emergency generators, enabling hundreds 

of aircraft to continue lifesaving missions. 

The heroics of Petty Officer Guidroz, Petty Officer Rivera-Carrion and Petty Officer Rodney L. Gordon are only a 

few of the multiple USCG stories from Katrina. However, their stories, and many more are the reason that the Coast 

Guard was soon given the moniker, in a New Orleans Newspaper, of the “New Orleans Saints.” 
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Responsible for more than 180,000 employees, the Department of Homeland Security was duly praised for the 

efforts of the United States Coast Guard. However, additional DHS units brought many other life-saving and orderrestoring employees and talents to the preparation, response and recovery operations. 

DHS Customs and Border Protection and DHS Immigration and Customs Enforcement leaders sought to match 

their resources with the needs of the affected populations in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. They took 

clothing, toys, linens and other useful items seized and forfeited at U.S. ports of entry for violations of federal law—

more than 100,000 pieces as of this writing—and delivered them directly to the victims of the hurricane and flood.18 

They filled the needs of people who had lost these basic items at minimal cost to the government, using goods that 

they had seized during the course of everyday operations. Their practical and innovative thinking and actions 

helped these victims directly, returning to them some possessions, as well as the sense of security such possessions 

convey. 

On September 5, 2005 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) / Federal Protection Service 

(FPS) Sergeant Matthew Pinardi was securing the FEMA morgue detail near Interstates 10 and 610 in New 

Orleans. He observed a young male riding a bike across the overpass and witnessed the man hit 

the retaining wall. The young man flipped over the railing and landed some fifty feet below in water over 

his head. Sergeant Pinardi called for additional assistance, traversed the embankment and at great personal 

peril entered flood waters to rescue the young man. The man was pulled to safety and transported by 

emergency medical services to a FEMA National Disaster Medical System medical clinic. 

Staff within the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) worked hard to deliver aid and services to those 

affected by the hurricane and flood. Drawing upon their previous experiences with natural and manmade disasters, 

FEMA staff distributed more than $5 billion in federal aid to more than 1.7 million households in the affected region 

by February 1, 2006.19 FEMA also mobilized elements of the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), such as 

Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs), deploying them to the Gulf States to assist with emergency health 

care delivery. For example, a DMAT stationed in Florida was deployed to Mississippi, where it set up operations in 

an abandoned medical center that had been put out of service by the flood. Over a two week period, this DMAT 

treated more than 3,000 patients that were able to make it to the medical center, and treated another 2,000 by 

sending teams of their own personnel out into the surrounding area.20 

Also part of the National Disaster Medical System, the Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams (DMORTs) 

created a large, temporary morgue in St. Gabriel, Louisiana, to support the entire state,21 and supplemented and 

otherwise provided mortuary services in Louisiana and Mississippi. DMORT members deployed from throughout 

the Nation to assist. These specialists worked with local medical, mortuary, and forensic professionals, and 

provided needed mortuary services, equipment, and personnel. Especially important were the services that trained 

personnel provided in identifying the dead. They worked with x-rays and DNA samples and communicated 

information with compassion to families waiting to hear news of their loved ones. Despite some primitive 

conditions (e.g., with only a roof and intermittent power), team members helped to identify not only those killed by 

the hurricane and flood, but also those bodies that were unearthed from cemeteries and mausoleums. Their duties 

were made even more challenging by the destruction of medical, dental and other records, and the inability of many 

people to accurately determine whether those people they sought were dead or missing. They drew upon both 

technical expertise and personal empathy to address the needs of both the dead and the living. 22

Department of Defense 

Well before Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast, the Department of Defense (DOD) prepared for the 2005 

hurricane season. Based on prior assistance for hurricane recovery operations, on August 19th the Secretary of 

Defense approved a standing order to prepare and organize for severe weather disaster operations. This order 

expedited the pre-positioning of senior military representatives known as Defense Coordinating Officers, to act as 

liaisons with other governmental organizations in the projected disaster area prior to an event. The order also 

authorized the use of DOD installations as logistical staging areas for FEMA. U.S. Northern Command directed a 

number of emergency deployment readiness exercises prior to FEMA requests, spending training funds to preposition response capability. Once officially activated and deployed, DOD provided logistics support to FEMA, 

helping the Agency to track items in motion.23 
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The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers led the removal of 224 billion gallons of water from New Orleans in 43 days, 

enabling recovery and repair operations. By improving their pumping capacity and efficiency, adding pumps, 

creating intentional breaches, and developing other on-the-spot workarounds, they were able to reduce the estimated 

time to clear New Orleans of water by approximately 50 percent.24

U.S. Army soldiers provided a number of services in support of Local, State, Federal, and private-sector activities, 

including medical treatment (e.g., thousands of immunizations), debris clearing, evacuation, planning, and 

performance of search and rescue missions.25 The U.S. Marine Corps helped local governments reinvigorate their 

infrastructures26 and augmented search and rescue operations. In one particularly noteworthy case, two Marines 

using a borrowed boat rescued 150 people in 36 hours.27 The Mississippi National Guard, supported with Guard 

members from many other States, performed superbly throughout the response, carrying out a number of duties, 

including clearing key roads, search and rescue, and getting supplies into the hands of victims as quickly as 

possible.28 The U.S. Navy mobilized more than 10,000 naval personnel to the affected Gulf coast region, as well as 

68 aircraft, and 16 ships,29 including amphibious construction equipment and mobile diving salvage units, 

particularly useful in flood conditions.30 

Prior to Katrina’s landfall, twenty-one Seabees from Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 133 and Naval 

Mobile Construction Battalion 7, led by a Navy Chief Warrant Officer answered the call to vigilantly 

support the staff and residents of the Armed Forces Retirement Home in Gulfport, Mississippi. Located 

about two hundred yards from the Gulf of Mexico, the home had evacuated all but fifty patients in 

anticipation of Hurricane Katrina. Seabees postured themselves on the ground floor of the building, and 

began bracing the structure against a thirty foot tidal surge and winds recorded in excess of 120 miles per 

hour. When the storm surge forced its way into the building, generator power was lost, and in the darkness, 

amidst rushing water, tidal pull and life-threatening debris, these Seabees as young as 18 years old and 

hailing from every area of the country, evacuated fifty bed-ridden and wheel-chair bound retirees and 

numerous staff members, as well as all medical oxygen tanks, to the upper floors of the building. Their 

actions saved lives and helped prevent the home from succumbing to total physical devastation. 

The 53rd Weather Reconnaissance Squadron (also known as the Hurricane Hunters), of the 403rd Wing, is composed 

of U.S. Air Force Reservists. Flying out of Keesler Air Force Base in Biloxi, Mississippi, it is the only military unit 

flying into hurricanes and tropical storms.31 The unit followed Hurricane Katrina from inception to landfall, and 

provided critical reconnaissance information to the National Hurricane Center throughout the event.32 They 

maintained daily hurricane vigilance. Other Air Force personnel supported recovery and relief operations, including 

transportation of more than 13,000 people, air traffic control, and aerial lift, refueling, photography, search and 

rescue, and medical evacuation.33

The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) started collecting key infrastructure-related information (i.e. 

on airports, hospitals, police stations, emergency operations centers, highways, schools, etc.) well in advance of 

landfall and got this information into the hands of Federal, State, and local first responders in the affected region. 

As the storm was tracked, NGA pre-deployed analysts and mobile systems to the affected areas that provided 

expertise and information on the ground and facilitated the delivery of additional information from NGA offices 

elsewhere. Because they had assets in place and focused on the region, NGA provided the first comprehensive 

overview of the damage resulting from the hurricane and flood. NGA merged imagery with other information, 

creating hundreds of intelligence products per day that could be used and applied by response professionals to aid in 

decision-making. NGA assessments were multi-dimensional, timely, relevant, and continuous. They addressed 

many issues, including but not limited to: recovery planning and operations, transportation infrastructure, critical 

and catastrophic damage, dike stability and breaches, industry damage, and hazard spills. The NGA World Wide 

Navigational Warning Service also provided navigation information to the U.S. Navy, Merchant Marine, and Coast 

Guard, and relayed messages from the National Weather Service to people at sea. NGA also aided in the location 

and recovery of oil platforms. The imagery activities of NGA were essential to the restoration of critical 

infrastructure. 34 
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Department of Justice 

The Bureau of Prisons provided extensive support to the Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. Some of those 

accomplishments included transporting 4,000 Louisiana Department of Corrections inmates out of New Orleans 

jails. Busses staffed by Bureau personnel from both within and outside of the region were dispatched to assist with 

this operation. The agency also transported fifty-five inmates from the St. Charles Parish Jail to the Federal 

Detention Center in Houston, Texas at the request of the U.S. Marshals Service, as well as seventy inmates from 

Harrison and Pearl River Counties, Mississippi to the northern part of that state. In addition to moving inmates, 

Bureau of Prisons staff provided supplies to the storm ravaged region. Specifically, staff from the U.S. Penitentiary 

in Atlanta, Georgia and the Federal Prison Camp in Montgomery, Alabama delivered to New Orleans toothpaste, 

toothbrushes, soap, shampoo, mouthwash, disposable personal sanitation packs, 600 Meals Ready to Eat (MRE), 

600 hot trays of potato dinners, 600 cans of orange juice, eighty cases of water bottles, sheets, linen and pillows. 

The Federal Bureau of Investigation recognized that there was a lack of unified law enforcement leadership, and 

no central coordination for law enforcement in New Orleans, and created a Law Enforcement Coordination Center 

(LECC).35 Once the LECC was established, all law enforcement personnel and agencies (including those provided 

by the National Guard) had a unified command structure. This allowed every law enforcement agency operating in 

the New Orleans area to coordinate with other agencies.36 Additionally, senior federal law enforcement officials 

from the FBI and DHS not only coordinated the response of the Federal law enforcement agencies, they also brought 

the New Orleans Police Department command element together for the first time since the hurricane struck. Further, 

they integrated Federal law enforcement assets and personnel into the remaining local police structure. 

FBI Special Agent in Charge Michael Wolf and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 

Assistant Director Michael Vanacore, were appointed to serve as the Co-Senior Federal Law Enforcement 

Officials (SFLEO) under the NRP. Within a day of their appointment and for the first time since Katrina 

made landfall, the SFLEOs brought together all the Federal law enforcement agencies operating in the New 

Orleans area with the State police to coordinate efforts. The SFLEOs established a Law Enforcement 

Coordination Center (LECC) first in Baton Rouge and subsequently in New Orleans modeled after the 

FBI’s Joint Operations Center. The LECC coordinated all law enforcement activities in the New Orleans 

area, bringing together Federal, State, and local law enforcement to including National Guard and DOD 

military police to provide assistance and support to the New Orleans Police Department. The rapid 

establishment of the LECC led to the rapid coordination of law enforcement activities and the restoration of 

law and order in New Orleans. 

The United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Louisiana supported law enforcement operations 

during the first week following Hurricane Katrina’s impact. They were required to quickly set up two completely 

new offices in Baton Rouge and Houma, Louisiana. A large portion of their employees worked hard to accomplish 

this. However, certain members of their staff particularly distinguished themselves during the initial period when 

their operations were being conducted out of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Middle District of Louisiana. 

Despite being dislocated from their homes and having the option of administrative leave, many of these employees 

went to Baton Rouge on their own to become involved in operations. Other essential employees came in to perform 

necessary tasks without any assurance that they would have a place to stay. 

Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) Michael Magner evacuated to Baton Rouge, Louisiana where he 

arranged for his own lodging. He was one of the first AUSAs to report for duty and coordinated the 

manning of the regional jail facility established at the New Orleans bus station, personally performing 

several twenty-four hour shifts. He also supervised the handling of complaints and judicial appearances in 

cases involving persons arrested on criminal charges during that initial period. AUSA Stephen Higginson 

moved in with a friend in Baton Rouge while his family evacuated to Boston, Massachusetts. He 

immediately began handling a number of thorny legal issues that had arisen while at the same time 

performing twenty-four hour shifts at the bus station. AUSA Brian Marcelle, while providing for his wife 

and two infant children, voluntarily performed twenty-four hour shifts at the bus station, handled 

complaints, and made judicial appearances in cases involving persons arrested on criminal charges during 

that initial period. 
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On September 4, 2005, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) received a tip 

from a resident regarding gunfire in a New Orleans neighborhood. ATF Special Response Team (SRT) 

members responded, equipped with night vision goggles, and witnessed two individuals shooting at a 

helicopter as it flew overhead. The two men fled to a residence, and the SRT personnel entered the location 

and seized two handguns. One of the subjects, a convicted felon, gave a statement regarding the incident 

and was the first person federally arrested by any agency in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. 

ATF agents also provided critical supplies on numerous occasions (including food, water, clothing, 

protective equipment, and ammunition) to the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD). On September 1, 

an ATF agent responded to New Orleans to provide assistance and emergency provisions to an NOPD Task 

Force Officer conducting post-storm operations. On September 2, upon arriving in New Orleans and 

setting up camp at a post office in the Algiers neighborhood, ATF SRT agents offered assistance to the 

NOPD SWAT team and 4th district officers. The police officers advised they had not seen or heard from 

any federal agency and were glad to see the ATF personnel, as they were running low on ammunition, food 

and water. The ATF SRT provided the NOPD with these supplies and immediately began assisting with 

law enforcement missions. 

On September 3, ATF New Orleans Field Division agents provided security at a Mandeville, Louisiana 

hospital to which a large number of evacuees were being airlifted. Due to aircraft coming under fire, the 

hospital requested that ATF provide armed support for a rescue mission into the city to evacuate patients 

and personnel from Tulane University Hospital. Two agents assisted on this mission resulting in the 

rescue/evacuation of fourteen people. Agents also provided an armed escort for a transport shipment of 

emergency medical supplies from the New Orleans Airport to the Mandeville hospital. 

Beginning on September 8, ATF SRT responded on several occasions with NOPD to clear the Fisher 

Housing Development after receiving reports of sniper fire. Several firearms were recovered, but the 

reports of sniper fire continued. On September 10, ATF SRT, acting on a tip, deployed to the Fisher 

Housing Development and found an AK-47 assault weapon with a 100 round magazine. It is believed that 

this was the weapon used during the reported sniper shootings in the area. After seizing the weapon, no 

more sniper reports were made. 

ATF SRT personnel also established a medical facility to provide medicine and prescription drugs (e.g., 

insulin) to individuals in need and living in the area of the SRT base at the Algiers post office. ATF SRT 

personnel went to residences and nursing homes to provide food, water, and much-needed medical 

attention to people who could not or would not leave their homes. On September 4, with the assistance of 

the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, ATF personnel rescued at least twenty-three people, 

including one ATF employee, who were trapped in their homes. 

Throughout the response to Hurricane Katrina, ATF continued to reach out to the sick and elderly citizens 

in the New Orleans area. On September 13, as Hurricane Rita was headed toward the Gulf Coast, SRT 

personnel went to all of the sick and elderly people known to them in the New Orleans area and attempted 

to convince them to evacuate. The many people that chose to remain in their homes were provided with 

food and water. Additionally, ATF agents rescued scores of domesticated animals throughout the response 

to the hurricane. 

In response to the housing shortage, New Orleans ATF Field Division agents opened their residences to 

provide lodging to coworkers who were displaced from their homes and to other ATF agents on detail from 

other parts of the country. Agents assisted in the cutting and clearing of fallen trees at the residences of a 

number of field division personnel, and assisted many division personnel in returning to their residences in 

severely damaged areas to conduct damage assessments and retrieve personal effects. New Orleans Field 

Division agents provided personal security for Assistant United States Attorneys for the Eastern District of 

Louisiana returning to their offices and residences to retrieve important case information. 

Deputy United States Marshal (DUSM) Justin Vickers of the New Orleans U.S. Marshals Service office 

found out there was a stranded elderly lady (in her 80s) in an apartment complex. Although she was able to 
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call out by telephone; she was confused and unable to provide her apartment number and street address. 

DUSM Vickers was able to locate the complex and find her. He not only rescued her from the abandoned 

complex but also found her suitable care in a family's home located in Baton Rouge. 

Department of Health and Human Services 

The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), part of the Department of Health and Human Services 

(HHS) quickly identified the need for specific guidance on how to get hospitals in the region affected by the 

hurricane and flood reopened and running again. The Agency developed easy to read information, and checklists 

regarding supplies, medications, staffing, patient transport, reopening evaluation, and management.37 AHRQ 

developed this information and got it into the hands of the State and Local leaders responsible for making hospitals 

function again. 

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) deployed approximately 200 personnel to the affected 

region, including the following specialties: public health nursing, occupational, laboratory, medical, epidemiology, 

sanitation, environmental health, disease surveillance, public information and health risk communication. CDC led 

and/or assisted with a variety of emergency public health programs.38 CDC immunization experts helped to provide 

vaccines and vaccinate children displaced by Hurricane Katrina, especially those staying in evacuation centers. 

Most importantly, they determined which diseases would result from the hurricane and flood, and not only 

monitored the region for them, they also communicated information on these diseases and others the public might be 

worried about, helping to allay public fears.39 They helped to fill gaps in the public health infrastructure, prevented 

disease from gaining a foothold in the already devastated region, and communicated health-related information to 

the public. 

Many victims of the hurricane and flood took charge of their own medical care to the extent that they could. In 

response to their demands for more information, for two weeks immediately after the hurricane and flood, the 

National Institutes of Health (NIH) expanded their program for medical consultation to not only help health care 

providers throughout the Nation, but also specifically assist patients and the worried well in the affected region. 

Working with their partners in academic medical centers and professional medical societies, NIH opened and 

manned phone lines all day every day to answer questions about a variety of diseases and cases involving 

complicated medical treatment. NIH immediately recognized that they were in the best position to match medical 

experts with health care providers and patients in need of answers – providing both groups with the information they 

needed to better manage health care concerns in the midst of the crisis. 40 

The U.S. Public Health Service staff from the Bureau of Prisons Federal Medical Center in Carswell, 

Texas provided support in response to Hurricane Katrina in a number of ways. For example, Lieutenant 

Commander Christopher L. McGee, Social Worker, was deployed for two weeks serving in a special needs 

shelter for elderly, wounded, and cognitively-impaired persons. While on a mission to locate a missing 

shelter resident, he and two National Guards members found a man lying on the ground surrounded by 

several other men that were hitting and kicking him. Specialists Christopher L. Horne and Mark D. Miller 

from the 528th Engineering unit, and Lieutenant Commander McGee intervened and stopped the assault, 

and then provided emergency care to the victim. While awaiting emergency medical response, the victim 

became combative and had to be restrained until paramedics arrived. After treatment, the man was safely 

returned to his family in Arizona the next day. During his tour, Lieutenant Commander McGee and his 

team, were able to locate and reunite approximately 296 shelter residents with family or community 

support systems. Additionally, Commander William Resto-Rivera and his medical team provided 

treatment and services to more than 130 elderly nursing home residents who had been displaced, and then 

prepared them for immediate movement. Captain Barbara J. Jenkins, Nurse Manager of Carswell's Mental 

Health Inpatient Unit, also performed brief mental health assessments for over 250 soldiers and civilians, 

both responders and victims. 

Department of Energy 

Colonial and Plantation Pipelines, major suppliers of fuel for the eastern US, were not operating due to lack of 

power at their pumping stations in Mississippi and Louisiana due to effects of Hurricane Katrina. The Department 
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of Energy (DOE) persuaded Entergy and Mississippi Power to elevate the electrical restoration of these pumping 

stations to near the top of the priority list. Mississippi Power elevated restoration of Collins, Mississippi to their 

number one priority. Unfortunately, the assessments of the electrical grid revealed damage to multiple transmission 

lines. Entergy also had responsibility for restoring power to several of the pump stations. Entergy raised the pump 

stations in their priority list and were able to restore power to some of the lesser damaged facilities quickly. As a 

result of the lengthy restoration time, Colonial contracted for some generators. After these initial contracts were 

superseded by FEMA for use on lifesaving activities, The Department of Transportation, as the lead for Emergency 

Support Function 1 (ESF-1) under the NRP, coordinated transport and delivery of large emergency generators to 

petroleum and natural gas industry sites that lacked power following the hurricanes. At FEMA's request, ESF-1 

also obtained the needed waivers so that these generators could be moved by road and rail. Colonial worked with 

DOE to request that FEMA recognize Colonial Pipeline as critical infrastructure and part of the necessary 

emergency response, providing critical fuel to the recovery effort. DOE worked with FEMA to get emergency 

responder identification for Colonial contractors and staff to expedite their travel through the police barricades and 

into the disaster area. DOE worked with Mississippi Highway Patrol to provide the company the information they 

needed to get into the disaster areas and checked road availability at the pumping stations. As Colonial attempted to 

restore power and deliver generators to these sites, their crews reported criminal activity and gunshots. Colonial 

stated they needed protection or would have to cease work and depart. DOE arranged with the Mississippi Highway 

Patrol to provide police protection to three of the Colonial pumping stations.

DOE provided a situation brief and recommendations regarding getting electricity back on at the water pumps at 

Lake Livingston Pumping Station. This pumping station supplies Houston with water. After speaking to all parties, 

it was determined that four different groups were preparing four different solutions involving portable generation. 

DOE, as the lead for ESF-12, pulled CenterPoint Energy, Entergy, Army Corps of Engineers, City of Houston, and 

the Coastal Water Authority (who ran the pumping station) together on a conference call to discuss the situation 

(note there was not a lot of communication between CenterPoint Energy and Entergy up to this point). CenterPoint 

Energy suggested energizing an open link between CenterPoint Energy and Entergy and letting CenterPoint Energy 

repair three lines between Entergy substations and to serve the pump station load from CenterPoint. ESF-12 

strongly recommended to the PFO that this become the number one solution since this would provide a more stable 

source of power for the pumping stations. Late night on Sunday September 25, CenterPoint Energy contacted the 

DOE Emergency Operations Center to ask for permission to make the connection. Within minutes of that call, ESF12 at the Austin JFO gave the verbal go-ahead to CenterPoint to proceed with its work on getting the pump station 

up. The work was completed two days later and the pump station came back on line just as the water supply was 

down to about a one day supply. 

ESF-12 in Alabama was asked to contact an Alabama pole-making company (Cahaba) and attempt to get them fuel 

so they could continue their pole-making/treating (they make 4000 poles per day). The Governor of Alabama was 

made aware of the plight of Cahaba which was producing poles for Entergy and Mississippi Power (ESF-12 at the 

Mississippi EOC confirmed with Entergy and Mississippi Power that this pole supply was critical) and ESF-12 was 

tasked with getting them fuel. ESF-12 spoke with all parties with involved (Hunt Oil, Stephens Oil Distributor, and 

Cahaba) and got Hunt Oil to release the needed fuel beginning the following day, the day that Cahaba was going to 

have to shutdown their pole-making due to lack of fuel. ESF-12 personnel drafted a letter to Hunt Oil that was 

signed by the FCO and sent out a half hour later. Six pole-making companies in MS had shut down and the utilities 

were using the poles as fast as they were produced. Cahaba made 4000 poles per day and is the largest pole making 

company in the world. Without these poles, restoration would have severely been affected. 

The Louisiana Offshore Oil Port was also partially damaged and initially shut down by Hurricane Katrina. This 

facility is the only US facility capable of offloading ultra large tankers and pumps about 1 million barrels of oil a 

day. DOE facilitated their access to emergency communications; worked with the local utilities to prioritize their 

restoration of commercial power; assisted in getting delivery of food and water to the on-site crew; and facilitated 

their communication with the U.S. Coast Guard to get their shipping lanes surveyed, which resulted in a U.S. Navy 

minesweeper being deployed to the area. 
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Department of Transportation 

The Department of Transportation (DOT) successfully coordinated one of the largest airlifts in its history to support 

the emergency evacuation of more than 66,000 citizens from New Orleans. This large and complex operation 

involved three federal Departments and a fleet of private sector and military aircraft.41 Additionally, the DOT 

Federal Aviation Administration quickly restored air traffic control and runway operations at the Louis Armstrong 

International Airport in New Orleans. This not only facilitated the delivery of relief supplies into the area, but also 

enabled federal authorities to execute a massive airlift of New Orleans evacuees. The Air Transport Association also 

coordinated forty domestic flights with continual DOD and civilian flights to evacuate a total of 24,000 people. 

As a member of the DOT Region Ten Emergency ESF-1 response cadre, John Calvin was deployed for a period of 

over five weeks to the Louisiana State EOC and to the JFO in Baton Rouge. Working more than eighteen hours 

each day as part of the FEMA Emergency Response Team-Advance (ERT-A) he played a crucial role in postlandfall evacuation operations. Using ESF-1 controlled helicopters, he personally coordinated and led the evacuation 

of over 200 patients and staff, many of whom were non-ambulatory, from the rooftop of the flooded Louisiana State 

University hospital in downtown New Orleans. This dangerous but urgent lifesaving mission was undertaken 

voluntarily on John Calvin’s part and at considerable risk, despite the fact that helicopter evacuations are not part of 

the traditional ESF-1 function. Additionally, John Calvin worked almost constantly, often on less than three hours 

sleep, coordinating military and ESF-1 buses and aircraft during the early phases of the evacuation. His personal 

efforts were instrumental in moving 210,000 people from New Orleans to shelters 

Department of Housing and Urban Development 

Working with the U.S. Conference of Mayors and the National Association of Counties, the Department of Housing 

and Urban Development (HUD) coordinated the identification of housing opportunities for hurricane victims. As a 

result, numerous cities, counties, and Indian Tribes offered housing and transportation to displaced persons. For 

example, the cities of Detroit and Philadelphia offered housing for over 1,000 displaced individuals. Allegheny 

County, Pennsylvania also offered to house 1,000 persons. HUD then worked with FEMA to match displaced 

individuals with vacant housing. HUD also sent personnel to Disaster Recovery Centers in states that were directly 

affected by the hurricane and flood, as well as in Arkansas, Florida, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas to meet 

with people displaced from their homes, and personally help them find temporary and permanent housing in host 

cities.42 HUD used key interpersonal skills and relationships it had developed over the years, successfully matching 

the newly homeless with homes. 

Department of Agriculture 

Prior to Katrina making landfall, the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) had proactively pre-positioned food in 

warehouses in Louisiana and Texas, making the food readily available for disaster meal service programs. FNS 

continued its efforts to ensure adequate supplies of food were on hand or nearby by airlifting initial supplies of 

infant formula and baby food products to Louisiana, Texas, Alabama and Mississippi and then following up with 

additional baby food supplies for delivery via land transportation (this amounted to approximately two million 

pounds). Additional commodities (approximately twenty million pounds), that included fruits, juices, vegetables, 

meats and grains, were also procured and/or diverted from existing USDA and other state sources to assist with 

congregate meal service and provide families with food packages until the Disaster Food Stamp Program could 

provide food relief (certain locations in the hardest hit areas could not operate the Disaster Food Stamp Program 

because there were no retail outlets available). Additionally, schools outside the devastated areas were granted 

waivers which permitted the service of free meals to children who had fled the devastated areas and began attending 

school elsewhere. FNS also promptly implemented the Food Stamp Program’s first National Evacuee Policies that 

enabled State agencies that were not affected by the hurricane or that were not administering a disaster program to 

immediately issue disaster benefits to individuals and families who evacuated to their States. FNS approved over 

seventy waivers to affected States to issue benefits under the disaster authority. FNS also expanded the range of 

foods that could be purchased with food stamps in Louisiana, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, and Texas, and 

approved alternate procedures for use and replacement of food stamp benefit cards to improve a household’s ability 

to purchase food. 
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About 3,000 members of the Forest Service also deployed to the region to support response efforts. Arriving in 

Mississippi, Louisiana, Florida, and Alabama, Forest Service personnel established support camps, provided 

aviation assistance, and transported desperately needed supplies to relief workers. The base camps they established 

were capable of supporting 1,000 emergency responders at each site. They bolstered the destroyed aircraft 

infrastructure in the region with their own fixed wing planes and helicopters. They also helped navigate the Federal 

procurement system and successfully obtained needed emergency response supplies. These activities allowed local 

and state emergency response personnel to focus on response rather than worrying about the supplies and other 

support they needed.43 

Many organizations and agencies that responded to Hurricane Katrina and the ensuing flood arrived in the 

region without much experience with or knowledge of the affected States and their geography. National 

Guard member Ronnie Davis – also of the USDA National Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) – 

utilized the organization’s digital data (ordinarily used to produce conservation plans and generated in 

Texas) and its Digital Topographic Support System to create the much needed maps of the affected regions 

of Mississippi. Davis and his team set up the system on an airport runway, and using a National Guard 

generator, managed to produce over 800 maps to support sector operations. In addition to hand-delivering 

these maps to National Guard units, the team also delivered maps to local police, law enforcement officers 

arriving from other States, and FEMA. According to Davis, his “...work for NCRCS just transitioned into 

what was needed to help with Hurricane Katrina relief in Mississippi and to support the local 

governments.”44 

The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) sent fifty veterinarians and wildlife experts to the region 

to rescue animals – pets, zoo animals, and livestock. They augmented and provided veterinary services in Louisiana 

and Mississippi, saving more than 10,000 animals from the flooding of New Orleans. They delivered fresh water 

and bales of hay to starving cattle. They also successfully rescued mice that were part of Tulane University’s cancer 

research program. APHIS helped many animals survive until they could be reunited with their owners, reduce the 

economic impact of further agricultural losses, and maintain research continuity.45 

Through its Emergency Conservation Program, the Farm Service Agency (FSA) provided funding to help farmers 

and ranchers rehabilitate farmland damaged by the hurricane and flood. Administered by FSA state and county 

committees, this program provided the additional resources needed to remove debris from farmland, and restore 

farm-related infrastructure (e.g., fencing). FSA also decided to change its policy for those affected by the disaster, 

allowing eligible producers to receive 100% cost-share assistance in implementing an approved practice (instead of 

the usual 75%).46

The USDA program for Rural Development did not wait to be asked and instead, reached out to those displaced by 

the hurricane and flood. It offered direct loan borrowers a “no-questions-asked” moratorium on their mortgage 

payments, while simultaneously working with guaranteed lenders to prevent any liquidation actions and offer 

payment forbearance. The program also actively looked to fill the housing gaps that could not be addressed by 

FEMA and the Small Business Administration by finding alternative lodging for those that had been displaced, and 

making these victims a higher priority for Rural Development housing. For example, the program arranged to let 

tenants use vacant seasonal labor housing units while repairs were being made to their own homes. Rural 

Development looked for ways to make its own activities bend to meet the housing needs generated by this 

catastrophe, while continuing to meet their ongoing commitments to rural communities throughout the Nation.47 

Many scientific federal organizations worked with scientists in the affected region to continue their research. For 

example, the Agricultural Research Service (ARS), the in-house research arm of the U.S. Department of 

Agriculture (USDA), did not allow the hurricane to derail important ongoing agricultural research throughout the 

Nation. When the USDA Southern Regional Research Center in New Orleans was severely damaged by Hurricane 

Katrina, ARS quickly relocated some of the scientists, support staff, and their families to the U.S. Plant, Soil and 

Nutrition Laboratory in New York. ARS provided support to these families, facilitated the continuation of their 

research, and gave them the opportunity to collaborate with other scientists from the Cornell University Departments 

of Plant Pathology and Animal Science.48 ARS and other federal agencies, such as the Department of Commerce 

National Institute of Standards and Technology and the Department of Energy Office of Science provided 

scientists with the resources and support they needed to continue their research in spite of the hurricane and flood.49
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Department of Commerce 

Clearly understanding the impact of the hurricane and flood on businesses in the region, the Minority Business 

Development Agency of the Department of Commerce (DOC) sent business development specialists to the region to 

provide on-the-ground assistance to the owners of the more than 59,000 minority firms in Louisiana, Mississippi, 

and Alabama, as well those that temporarily relocated to Texas. MBDA established a minority business 

development center in Houston to assist with loan applications, business plans, insurance claims, reconstruction of 

business records, and business administration. Instead of letting these businesses slide, MBDA helped get owners 

back on their feet quickly.50 

Elements of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) were proactive and vigilant. The 

National Hurricane Center (part of the NOAA National Weather Service) accurately predicted and tracked the size, 

scale, and path of Hurricane Katrina. Further, Max Mayfield, Director of the National Hurricane Center, personally 

made phone calls to local, State and Federal leaders to apprise them of the situation, aggressively contacting officials 

in the affected areas to warn them.51 Members of the National Weather Service knew that the time would come to 

issue warnings, and they developed them ahead of time, evaluating data and basing the warning language on various 

scenarios, so that when certain criteria were met (as with Hurricane Katrina), they did not have to waste time 

creating statements—they could issue them immediately. 

The National Weather Service also correctly realized that the levees were breaching and issued a flash flood warning 

at 8:14 AM Monday, August 29, saying, “A levee breach occurred along the industrial canal at Tennessee Street. 

Three to eight feet of water is expected due to the breach.”52 These organizations correctly characterized the 

situation, identified the danger, and got the word out clearly and promptly. 

During the response to Hurricane Katrina, the DOC National Telecommunications and Information 

Administration (NTIA) correctly and immediately identified the need for additional communications bandwidth, 

and allocated more than 1,100 frequencies to nine Federal agencies which allowed them to operate their land mobile, 

aeronautical, maritime, and satellite communications. NTIA also coordinated with the Federal Communications 

Commission to temporarily authorize the use of private sector satellite, ultrawideband, and microwave 

communication services. In addition to these response efforts, NTIA also provided financial support to reestablish 

the communications infrastructure in Louisiana, helping the state to take an initial and important step toward 

recovery.53 

Department of the Interior 

The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) of the Department of the Interior (DOI) focused their efforts on assisting tribes 

in the Gulf region to address their public safety, emergency access, and emergency services needs.54 They 

maintained communications before hurricane landfall and coordinated directly with Tribal governments, such as the 

Mississippi Choctaw Tribal government.55 BIA waited until Tribal governments made requests before sending 

assistance, but started preparing and moving assets ahead of time, so that when the requests for assistance did come, 

they were already responding. 

BIA had responded to seven hurricanes previously and knew exactly what to do when the time and requests came. 

The Bureau arranged for fresh water to be delivered from other States, replaced spoiled food, cleared debris from 

roadways, brought in necessary supplies, ensured continuity of education for children attending BIA-funded schools, 

and improved public safety infrastructure by assigning Bureau law enforcement personnel to the area. The Bureau 

also correctly assumed that those Tribes near the affected regions would take in other members that were victims of 

the hurricane and flood, and worked to provide financial and other assistance, helping the Tribes take care of each 

other.56

Federal land-managing agencies, such as the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), as well as their state 

counterparts sent hundreds of employees to help restore public health and safety in the devastated region. They also 

deployed to the Mississippi-Louisiana border to clear roadways and power lines of damaged and fallen trees that had 

cut off those in the coastal communities, so that first responders could gain access to the victims and help restore 
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power. BLM personnel also skillfully applied their experience with planning, logistical support and tracking (gained 

from years of managing wildland fires) to the situation in the Gulf region. 57 

Coordinating with FEMA, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and their sister organizations within the DOI, the 

Bureau of Reclamation mobilized equipment and staff in response to the hurricane and flood. Recognizing the 

need to purify drinking water, the Bureau of Reclamation sent an expeditionary water purification unit to 

Mississippi, purifying both contaminated and salt water to levels that not only met, but exceeded, EPA drinking 

water standards. The unit produced 100,000 to 200,000 gallons of purified water per day. The Bureau also 

deployed employees to assist with debris removal and install temporary roofing. They had equipment and trained 

personnel who were well acquainted with the rigors and requirements of water purification and other missions in 

contaminated and disaster-driven conditions.58

Scientists from the Geological Survey worked with the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality to monitor 

water quality in the state following the hurricane and flood. Using a mobile laboratory, they collected and analyzed 

water samples from 22 sites in and around Lake Pontchartrain, a major recreational area and fishery, for three weeks 

to determine levels of contamination, and whether this contamination extended into the Mississippi Sound.59 They 

applied sound scientific research practices and attention to detail to the problem of contaminated water in the region. 

Volunteers from the DOI Office of Surface Mining (OSM) deployed to Texas and worked at 13 different debrisdisposal sites, dealing with more than one million cubic yards of debris. Additionally, OSM personnel conducted 

safety training, handled equipment inventory, purchasing and other administrative requirements. They applied their 

vast experience with clearing large amounts of debris to the situation, moving debris out as efficiently and 

effectively after the disaster as they do for surface mining.60

Department of Labor 

Recognizing that getting back to work and starting new jobs would be critical for those affected, whether they 

returned to their home states or chose to live elsewhere in the U.S., the Department of Labor established a 

“Pathways to Employment” initiative. Using the Department’s network of over 3,500 career centers nationwide, the 

initiative helps evacuees and survivors find jobs. The Department sent numerous personnel directly to the affected 

region to provide job counseling to evacuees (including tailored assistance to the disabled looking for employment), 

and help all in need of jobs use the expanded resources provided by this initiative. Additionally, the Department 

expedited and increased its Job Corps offerings, providing over 4,000 scholarships to economically disadvantaged 

young adults (aged 16-24).61 

Department of Education 

The Department of Education established an innovative website to help provide assistance to those schools that had 

accepted students displaced by Hurricane Katrina and the flood. At this site schools list the needs of these students 

(e.g. books, clothes, school supplies, computers – even counseling) and donors list what they can provide. Schools 

and donors have access to one another’s information, and are then encouraged to contact each other directly, and 

hundreds of matches have been made.62 The Department of Education also worked with the Defense Logistics 

Agency, the General Services Administration, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency to pool federal 

resources and quickly provide thousands of pieces of furniture, computers and other equipment from the federal 

surplus to schools in need.63

Department of State 

Using the recently developed Employee Profile Plus database, managers in the State Department rapidly located 

current and former employees with skills in about 300 specific areas. The web-based system was deployed during 

the Department's tsunami relief efforts in late 2004 and again following the hurricane and flood. They quickly 

found employees with required language, area and disaster relief expertise in a matter of minutes, rather than days or 

weeks.64 These skilled personnel were critical in communicating information to those that primarily or solely spoke 

foreign languages. 
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Department of the Treasury 

The Bureau of Public Debt immediately realized that there would be a great need for money in the devastated 

region, but that ordinary access to cash would be limited at the banks. The Bureau expedited both the replacement 

of savings bonds that had been destroyed, as well as the redemption of Series EE and I savings bonds that were less 

than one year old.65 Other organizations in the Department of the Treasury, such as the Financial Management 

Service (FMS), immediately issued guidance to financial institutions to help them confirm the identify of people 

trying to redeem Treasury checks – to help the institutions prevent fraud and help the victims obtain needed funds.66 

The Internal Revenue Service also took action to advise taxpayers in the affected region of recent changes in tax 

law that under certain conditions would allow them to withdraw funds early from retirement plans, without the usual 

penalties.67 Although Treasury checks, savings bonds, and of course, retirement plans, are often considered longterm investments, the Department of the Treasury allowed investors to turn them into sources of cash in this 

emergency, understanding that without the cash to address immediate needs, there would be no long-term future for 

these victims. 

The Administrative Resource Center within Treasury’s Bureau of the Public Debt, provides administrative 

services to many Federal agencies. The Armed Forces Retirement Home, with residences for elderly 

veterans in Gulfport, MS and Washington, DC, is one of its customers. As soon as the Administrative 

Resource Center procurement staff was informed, late on August 29, 2005, of the decision to evacuate 

approximately 400 residents and essential staff from the flooded Gulfport home to the Washington, DC 

facility, they set about applying their procurement skills to orchestrate a safe and rapid evacuation and 

relocation. This included arranging for the rental of buses along with procuring necessary nursing services, 

lodging, and meals for the several-day journey. The frailest of residents were either redirected to Maxwell 

Air Force Base, for faster and less stressful transport to Washington, DC, or, in extreme cases, were found 

places in a nearby nursing home. While the Gulfport residents were in transit to Washington, the Center 

also quickly procured a host of goods and services to prepare the facilities at the Washington, DC campus 

for the huge and sudden influx of new residents. This included procuring beds, linens, furniture, air 

conditioners, and extra support services, such as medical, food, transportation and custodial services. 

Within eight days of Katrina making landfall, the last busload of Gulfport residents arrived safely at the 

Washington, DC campus. 

While working on the phones for FEMA, Dionne Lewis, a four-year IRS employee for Atlanta Accounts 

Management, received a call from a distressed person in Texas who was living in the Houston Astrodome. 

This person had been displaced by Hurricane Katrina and was in desperate need of help. Thrilled to have 

reached someone with such compassion, the person wanted to know if Ms. Lewis could also help the next 

person in line there at the Astrodome. She agreed, but little did she know that the call would last 

throughout her entire shift as one person after another came to the phone to find what help the IRS could 

offer. There was little time for breaks. Ms. Lewis did not let the magnitude of the calls or the prospect of 

being on the phone for nearly eight hours keep her from being professional, assuring that each person was 

informed of their Privacy Act rights, and then affording them an opportunity to tell their story and receive 

what assistance the IRS could offer. These and other all day long marathon calls occurred 

quite frequently and became known as the Delta calls. IRS employees answered well over 760,000 

registration calls for FEMA and more than 30,000 calls on the special IRS toll-free line for affected 

taxpayers. 

Internal Revenue Service, Portland call site assistor Jon Fredericks, received a call from an eighty-one yearold woman outside of a New Orleans home needing urgent help. She was sitting in the sweltering heat, 

without power, waiting for someone to evacuate her. She had tried to call several help lines, but had not 

reached anyone so far except the IRS. Mr. Fredericks told her to stay on the line and with the help of 

coworker Jim McMahan, contacted city emergency services and alerted them to her situation and location. 

Within a short time, the rescue team arrived at her home. 
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The Department of Veterans Affairs 

The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) took a hard look at their resources, missions, assets and personnel, and 

redirected them to fill the needs of the victims of the hurricane and flood, while maintaining service to America’s 

veterans. The VA not only provided medical services, hospital beds, and medications in accordance with its 

standing emergency health care mission,68 it also removed VA properties for sale from the market in eleven states to 

use them instead to fill housing needs for those displaced,69 and worked with veterans to replace their benefit 

checks.70 The VA cared for many victims of the hurricane and flood, while also continuing to care for the soldiers 

who have borne the battle, and for their families. 

Jack Myers, Maintenance and Repair Foreman, Wayne Brown, Air Conditioning Shop Foreman, and James 

Ware, Plumbing Shop Foreman, had taken shelter from Hurricane Katrina in a building on the north side of 

the Gulfport Veterans Affairs campus leaving their vehicles and their office on the more dangerous south 

side. That afternoon, the three men went to check on their vehicles. They found a five-year-old boy alone 

under a four-foot tall pile of debris that minutes before had been part of an apartment complex. The men 

took him back to their shelter. There, they dried him off, fed him and clothed him with an oversized 

uniform crudely tailored to fit his small frame. Fortunately, he suffered only minor cuts and scratches. 

“He’s a very smart boy,” said Brown. “He knew his name and his school and his teacher’s name. He told 

us his momma had given him a Pop Tart and told him to go upstairs.” The boy just continued to clutch that 

wet Pop Tart, remembered Brown, and was eventually reunited with his mother and brother. 

By Friday, Sept. 2, all patients, employees, and family members had been safely evacuated from the VA in 

New Orleans using boats, military trucks, and military transport planes. Nine veterans, however, remained 

in the hospital morgue. Lynn Ryan, chief financial officer with the South Central VA Health Care Network, 

was determined to make sure everyone was evacuated. He searched and found a local company that had a 

refrigerated tractor-trailer and a willing driver. The following day, the truck driver, Ryan, co-worker 

Ceagus Reed, a human resources coordinator, and VA Police Officers Charlie Donelson and Reginald 

Finch, both with the G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery VA Medical Center in Jackson, Mississippi, made it 

through all the roadblocks and to the outskirts of downtown New Orleans. Four feet high floodwaters and 

the approaching evening hours forced them to take shelter for the night, sleeping in their vehicles at a toll 

plaza where law enforcement officers had set up a temporary station. On Sunday, two additional 

colleagues arrived to help—Steve Jones, an engineer, and Steve Morris, occupational safety and health 

manager. The team made it to downtown New Orleans but the refrigerated tractor-trailer couldn’t make it 

through the flooded streets to the hospital’s loading dock. Ryan flagged down a five-ton military transport 

truck that helped ferry the bodies from the hospital to the refrigerated trailer. At the loading dock, Ryan, 

Reed, Morris, and Jones donned biohazard gear and climbed the three flights of stairs to the hospital 

morgue. One at a time, they carried the bodies out. They returned to Jackson and notified the next of kin 

and made burial arrangements, including some at the VA’s national cemetery in Natchez. 

Phil Boogaerts, chief engineer at the New Orleans VA Medical Center, single-handedly kept the hospital 

supplied with necessary power and utilities to ensure adequate care for patents, employees and their 

families for four days prior to their evacuation. As a direct result of his actions, VA staff was able to 

provide adequate care to patients and successfully evacuate all patients, families, and employees, including 

nine ventilator-dependent patients. In addition, Mr. Boogaerts videotaped the facility before, during, and 

after the storm providing valuable documentation that assisted with the assessment of damages to the 

physical plant as a result of the storm. Finally, Boogaerts voluntarily remained at the hospital after it was 

evacuated to continue maintenance of the facility. For several days, Boogaerts lived at the hospital in 

isolation, without air conditioning, running water, or prepared meals. 

After evacuating the VA Medical Center, employees donated all of their food, 300 cases of water, all their 

medical supplies, and needed medication to Charity Hospital, a neighboring hospital that was still operating 

and had yet to completely evacuate. Employees delivered the provisions by boat, making their way through 

the murky waters of flooded downtown New Orleans. Among the medicines Charity needed and donated 

by the VA, were medicines for ant bites and snake bites. 
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Environmental Protection Agency 

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) worked with their partners in the Louisiana Department of 

Environmental Quality and other local officials to help remove hazardous household and other materials. They 

created a “curbside pickup” program to collect the materials from the houses, instead of making already 

overwhelmed victims deliver hazardous materials to another location.71 They also identified the potential hazards 

returning victims would face, and distributed information to people in affected areas regarding a range of hazards, 

from asbestos to septic systems.72 They collected and removed many hazardous materials, including electronics, 

batteries, computer hardware, paint, solvents, lawn and garden products. They enabled people to reestablish clean 

and safe environments in their houses and for their families. Without EPA assistance, this would not have occurred. 

Additionally, the EPA also waived national sulfur emissions standards for diesel fuel for a short period so that fuel 

produced for non-road uses could be legally used in highway vehicles.73

The success of the Incident Command System (ICS) was clearly demonstrated in Hancock County, 

considered to be the most devastated area within Mississippi. Carter Williamson led a team during the early 

stages of EPA’s response effort to protect the citizens of Hancock County from releases of hazardous 

materials. Under adverse conditions, working sixteen-hour days every day, Mr. Williamson motivated the 

team members who were living under severe conditions, where basic support services such as electricity, 

shelter, running water, and telephones were, if available, very limited. In a demonstration of leadership, 

Carter remained in a variety of primitive shelters throughout the entire hurricane response, embedded with 

the team in the impacted community. His efforts resulted in the team’s ability to provide more effective 

service and helped his team to empathize with the plight of the community. Whereas most other EPA 

employees rotated in and out of the work area on a two week basis, Mr. Williamson chose to remain in the 

community, despite having a wife and children back home, because he believed the consistency of 

leadership would be beneficial to the response effort. Although the magnitude of the task was 

overwhelming and the working conditions were poor, the quality of the response effort lead by Mr. 

Williamson was outstanding. 

With Hurricane Katrina approaching, Nancy Jones was preparing to implement a Hurricane Debris 

Management Plan, like the one she had drafted for the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) while 

participating in the “Hurricane Pam” planning workshops. Because of this experience, the USACE 

specifically requested that Ms. Jones be deployed to assist the USACE in handling the debris collection and 

segregation of the hazardous materials resulting from Hurricane Katrina. She was instrumental in setting up 

the collection and debris management plan in many of the eastern Parishes including the City of New 

Orleans. Her coordination with the USACE made the response to the hurricane more efficient and 

effective. The Parish Officials and the City of New Orleans have developed trust and respect for the EPA 

because of her efforts. Ms. Veronica White with the City of New Orleans sums up Nancy’s efforts well. 

“She is excellent and thorough. She has answered every question we (the City of New Orleans) have had. 

If she didn’t know the answer right off, she got back to us with a response very quickly.” Ms. White asked 

that the EPA keep Ms. Jones on the project through completion. She stated that they did not want to lose 

her. 

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 

In another effort to get needed resources in the region freed up for use by the victims and responders there, as well 

by citizens throughout the Nation, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission took immediate steps to reconstruct 

the natural gas infrastructure of the region, and reduce the disruption in the natural gas supply. 74 Because the 

Commission approved temporary waivers and expanded eligibility standards they were able to help natural gas 

companies restore service and deliver additional gas to the market. 

Federal Communications Commission 

The Commission acted quickly to facilitate the resumption of communications services in the affected areas and to 

authorize the use of temporary communications services for use by emergency personnel and evacuees in shelters. 

First, the Commission operated twenty-four hours a day every day of the week to assist industry efforts to restore 
APPENDIX B – WHAT WENT RIGHT

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communications. The Commission streamlined procedures to approve requests for special temporary authority 

(STA), which would in turn expedite industry recovery efforts. The Commission quickly granted more than ninety 

STA requests and 100 temporary frequency authorizations that telecommunications companies and broadcasters 

needed to get service restored. The Commission also contacted each segment of the communications industry to 

help match their needs with resources (such as such as emergency generators and fuel) around the nation. 

Additionally, the Commission used its High Frequency Direction Finding Capability Center to remotely assess the 

damage done to radio stations in the areas struck by Hurricane Katrina and to monitor the progress of restoration 

activity. Further, the Commission assisted telecommunication carriers by helping their repair crews to secure the 

transportation and credentials recognized by local authorities to gain access to damaged sites. 

Office of Management and Budget 

Recognizing that recipients of federal grants in those areas affected by Hurricane Katrina and its ensuing flood either 

would have to stop grant-related activities or be unable to perform as well as usual, the Office of Management and 

Budget (OMB) worked with the Federal agencies and the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) to assist 

these grantees in resuming operations. OMB directed federal agencies and OSTP to: (1) provide greater flexibility 

with grant application deadlines, (2) approve no-cost extensions on expiring awards for up to 12 months, (3) accept 

short written requests for project continuation, (4) allow grantees to continue to charge salaries and benefits to 

current grants, as well as costs to resume project activities, (5) waive some requirements for prior federal approval 

for re-budgeting and automatic carryover of unspent funds, (6) extend deadlines for reports, (7) continue already 

approved indirect cost rates for up to a year, (8) delay submitting financial and other reports to close out projects, 

and (9) help grantees reconstruct their records by allowing them to substitute copies for original records and 

providing copies of what had already been submitted.75 OMB relieved short-term administrative and financial 

management requirements without compromising accountability. 

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APPENDIX C – LIST OF ACRONYMS

AAR After Action Review

ABA American Bus Association

AHRQ Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality

APHIS Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

ARC American Red Cross 

ARS Agricultural Research Service 

ASD (HD) Assistant Secretary of Defense, Homeland Defense 

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 

ATF SRT Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives Special Response Team 

AUSA Assistant United States Attorney 

BENS Business Executives for National Security

BIA Bureau of Indian Affairs

BLM Bureau of Land Management 

BRT Business Round Table

C3I Command, Control, Communications, Information

CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 

CERT Community Emergency Response Team 

CIS Catastrophic Incident Supplement

CLO Chief Logistics Officer

CNGB Chief of the National Guard Bureau

CONOPS Concept of Operations

COOP Continuity of Operations 

CRWG Hurricane Katrina Comprehensive Review Working Group 

CSG Counterterrorism Security Group 

CST Civil Support Team

BEA Bureau of Economic Analysis 

DART Disaster Assistance Response Team 

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DMAT Disaster Medical Assistance Team

DMORT Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team

DoD Department of Defense

DOE Department of Energy 

DOEd Department of Education 

DOI Department of the Interior

DOJ Department of Justice 

DOL Department of Labor

DOL/OSHA Department of Labor Occupational Safety and Health Administration

DOS Department of State 

DOT Department of Transportation 

DPMU Disaster Portable Morgue Unit 

DRC Disaster Recovery Center
APPENDIX C – LIST OF ACRONYMS

THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 

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DRG Disaster Response Group

DUSM Deputy United States Marshal

EAS Emergency Alert System

EBS Emergency Broadcast System 

EHR Electronic Health Records 

EOC Emergency Operations Center

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

EMAC Emergency Management Assistance Compact 

EMS Emergency Medical Services 

ERT Emergency Response Team 

ERT-A Emergency Response Team-Advanced 

ERT-N Emergency Response Team-National 

ESF Emergency Support Function 

FAA Federal Aviation Administration 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

FCO Federal Coordinating Officer 

FNS Food and Nutrition Service

FPS Federal Protection Service 

FRP Federal Response Plan 

FSA Farm Service Agency 

HHS Department of Health and Human Services 

HHS SERT Health and Human Services Secretary’s Emergency Response Teams 

HLT Hurricane Liaison Team 

HSC Homeland Security Council 

HSOC Homeland Security Operations Center

HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive 

HUD Department of Housing and Urban Development 

ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

ICS Incident Command System 

IIMG Interagency Incident Management Group 

IMT Incident Management Team 

INS Incident of National Significance 

IRA Immediate Response Authority 

IRS Internal Revenue Services 

JFHQ-State Joint Force Headquarters-State 

JFO Joint Field Office

JIC Joint Information Center 

JTF-Katrina Joint Task Force-Katrina 

JTF-State Joint Task Force-State 

LECC Law Enforcement Coordination Center 

LSU Louisiana State University 

LTG Lieutenant General 

MERS Mobile Emergency Response System 

MOB center Mobilization center 

MRC Medical Reserve Corps 

MRE Meals-Ready-To-Eat 

NASAR National Association of Search and Rescue 

NCC National Coordinating Center 

NCS National Communications System 

NDMS National Disaster Medical System 

NEEP National Exercise and Evaluation Program 

NEMA National Emergency Management Association 

NEP National Exercise Program 

NGA National Geospatial Intelligence Agency 
APPENDIX C – LIST OF ACRONYMS

THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 

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NGB National Guard Bureau 

NGO Non-Governmental Organization 

NHC National Hurricane Center 

NHSU National Homeland Security University

NICCL National Incident Communications Conference Line 

NIFC National Interagency Fire Center

NIH National Institutes of Health

NIMS National Incident Management System 

NIPP National Infrastructure Protection Plan

NISAC National Infrastructure Simulation & Analysis Center

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

NOC National Operations Center

NOFD New Orleans Fire Department 

NOPD New Orleans Police Department 

NPG National Preparedness Goal 

NPS National Park Service 

NRCC National Response Coordination Center 

NRP National Response Plan 

NRP-CIS National Response Plan Catastrophic Incident Supplement 

NSA National Security Agency

NSC National Security Council

NS/EP National Security and Emergency Preparedness

NTIA National Telecommunications and Information Administration

NVOAD National Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster

NWR NOAA Weather Radio 

NWS National Weather Services 

OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

OSD-HD Office of the Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense

OSM Office of Surface Mining

OSTP Office of Science and Technology Policy

PAO Public Affairs Office

PAO Public Affairs Official

PFO Principal Federal Officer

PHS Public Health Service

RAMP Remedial Action Management Program 

RRCC Regional Response Coordination Center 

RSOI Reception, Staging, Onward movement, and Integration

SAR Search and Rescue

SCRAG Senior Civilian Representative of the Attorney General

SES Senior Executive Service 

SFLEO Senior Federal Law Enforcement Official

SIMCEN National Exercise Simulation Center

SLO State Liaison Officer

SNS Strategic National Stockpile

SOE Senior Official Exercise

SOP Standard Operational Procedures

SSA Social Security Administration

STA Special Temporary Authority

SWAT Special Weapons and Training

TAG Adjutant General

TCC Traffic Control Center

TCL Target Capabilities List

TELL Office of Training, Exercises, and Lessons Learned

TPC Tropical Prediction Center
APPENDIX C – LIST OF ACRONYMS

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TSA Transportation Security Administration 

USACE United States Army Corps of Engineers 

USAID United States Agency for International Development 

USCG United States Coast Guard 

USDA United States Department of Agriculture 

USFS United States Forest Service 

USJFCOM United States Joint Forces Command

USMS Unites States Marshals Service 

USNORTHCOM United States Northern Command

USPACOM United States Pacific Command

USSOUTHCOM United States Southern Command 

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command 

USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command

US&R Urban Search and Rescue 

VOAD Volunteer Organizations Active in a Disaster 

VA Department of Veteran Affairs

VADM Vice Admiral
THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 

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APPENDIX D – STAFF PAGE

Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned Staff 

Special thanks go to the dedicated team of tireless professionals—working with colleagues across the country at all 

levels of government—who have contributed to this Report. For the past four months, they have reviewed the 

Federal government’s role and performance in preparing for, responding to, and recovering from Hurricane Katrina. 

White House Staff

Frances Fragos Townsend, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security 

 and Counterterrorism 

Kenneth P. Rapuano, Deputy Assistant to the President for Homeland Security 

Joel B. Bagnal, Special Assistant to the President for Homeland Security 

Michele L. Malvesti, Senior Director, National Security Council 

Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Special Assistant to the President for Homeland Security 

Thomas P. Bossert, Policy Director, Homeland Security Council 

Daniel J. Kaniewski, Policy Director, Homeland Security Council 

Marie O’Neill Sciarrone, Policy Director, Homeland Security Council 

Joshua C. Dozor, Policy Director, Homeland Security Council 

Michael J. Taylor, Executive Assistant, Homeland Security Council 

Katrina Lessons Learned Review Group

Stuart G. Baker, Department of Homeland Security 

Richard W. Brancato, Department of Transportation 

Donovan E. Bryan, Department of Defense 

Christopher Combs, Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Theodore M. Cooperstein, Department of Justice 

William T. Dolan, Colonel, United States Army 

Michael O. Forgy, Department of Homeland Security 

Douglas J. Morrison, Colonel, United States Army 

Richard L. Mourey, Commander, United States Coast Guard 

David C. Rutstein, Captain, United States Public Health Service

THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 

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APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

FOREWORD

1

 President George W. Bush, Jackson Square, New Orleans, September 15, 2005. 

2

 President George W. Bush, Jackson Square, New Orleans, September 15, 2005. 

3

 The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5: Management of Domestic Incidents

(Washington, D.C., February 28, 2003); see also, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan

(Washington, D.C., December 2004), Preface. 

CHAPTER ONE: KATRINA IN PERSPECTIVE

1

 The White House, “Proclamation by the President: National Day of Prayer and Remembrance for the Victims of 

Hurricane Katrina,” news release, September 8, 2005, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 

2005/09/print/20050908-12.html. 2

 As measured by damage to property. Measuring destructiveness in terms of damage to property rather than loss 

of life is a useful way to compare disasters. Loss of life reflects both the magnitude of the disaster, as well as the 

quality of the response, while property destruction correlates more directly to the magnitude of the disaster alone. 3

 In 1871, Chicago was the fifth largest city in the United States, with a population of almost 300,000. The fire 

killed 300 people, made one-third of the city homeless, and destroyed a third of the city’s property. For Chicago 

Fire deaths and population displacement, see Lawrence J. Vale and Thomas J. Campanella, eds., The Resilient City: 

How Modern Cities Recover from Disaster [“Resilient City”] (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 28; U.S. 

Census Bureau, “Table 10. Population of the 100 Largest Urban Places: 1870,” June 15, 1998, 

http://www.census.gov/population/ documentation/twps0027/tab10.txt. For all other Chicago Fire statistics, see 

Chicago Historical Society, “The Great Chicago Fire,” http://www.chicagohs.org/fire/intro/gcf-index.html; The 

Chicago Fire and the Fire Insurance Companies (New York: J.H. and C.M. Goodsell, 1871); and Insurance Year 

Book (1874). (Note that statistics for disasters can vary significantly depending on the source consulted, both due to 

variances in how terms are defined and the lack of consistent historical records.) 

For statistics on the San Francisco Earthquake/Fire and Hurricane Andrew, see Figure 1.1 and accompanying notes. 4

 Rebecca Watson, Assistant Secretary for Land and Minerals Management, U.S. Department of the Interior, 

written statement for a hearing on Global Oil Demand/Gasoline Prices, on September 6, 2005, submitted to the 

Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, 109th Congress, 1st session. 5

 U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, “Hurricane Katrina Situation 

Report #6,” August 28, 2005. 6

 Evidence suggests that Hurricane Katrina reached Category 3 intensity as it made second landfall, but that only 

winds to the east of the eye sustained Category 3 speeds. New Orleans probably experienced Category 2 wind 

speeds at most. See Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane 

Katrina, August 23-30, 2005 [“Katrina Tropical Cyclone Report”], prepared for the National Hurricane Center 

(Miami, Florida, December 20, 2005), 8. Under the Saffir-Simpson scale, Category 3 hurricanes are characterized 

by winds of 111—130 miles per hour. For an explanation of the Saffir-Simpson scale, see U.S. Department of 

Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, “The Saffir-Simpson 
APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

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 Hurricane Scale,” [“NHC Saffir-Simpson Scale”] http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/aboutsshs.shtml. During the same period 

(1851—2005), eighteen Category 4 and three Category 5 hurricanes hit the United States. For hurricane statistics 

through 2004, see Eric S. Blake et al., The Deadliest, Costliest, and Most Intense United States Tropical Cyclones 

from 1851 to 2004 (And Other Frequently Requested Hurricane Facts) [“United States Tropical Cyclones”], NOAA 

Technical Memorandum NWS TPC-4 (Miami, Florida, August 2005), 12, 

http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/Deadliest_Costliest.shtml. For 2005 hurricane data, see U.S. Department of Commerce, 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, “2005 Atlantic Hurricane Season 

Tropical Cyclone Reports,” http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/2005atlan.shtml; U.S. Department of Commerce, National 

Climatic Data Center and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Satellite Information Service, “Climate 

of 2005 Atlantic Hurricane Season,” http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/research/2005/hurricanes05.html. 7

 Hurricane Camille is a useful point of comparison—until the 2005 hurricane season, it was the second most 

intense hurricane of record ever to strike the United States. U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, “Hurricane History—Hurricane Camille, 1969,” 

[“Hurricane History—Hurricane Camille”], http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/HAW2/english/history.shtml#camille. Under 

the Saffir-Simpson scale, Category 5 hurricanes are characterized by winds greater than 155 miles per hour. See 

NHC Saffir-Simpson Scale. 8

 Axel Graumann et al., Hurricane Katrina: A Climatological Perspective: Preliminary Report [“Climatological 

Perspective”], Technical Report 2005-01, prepared for the National Climatic Data Center, (Asheville, NC, January 

2006), 21, http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/reports/tech-report-200501z.pdf. For Hurricane Camille’s strength on 

landfall, see Hurricane History—Hurricane Camille. 9 Climatological Perspective, 21. Hurricane force winds are defined as those 64 knots (74 miles per hour) or 

above lasting for one minute at ten meters above ground with unobstructed exposure. For Hurricane Katrina, the 

radius was 103.5 miles in the northeast and southeast quadrants, and 69 miles in the northwest and southwest 

quadrants. Northern moving systems like Katrina typically have stronger winds to the east, as the storm’s clockwise 

rotation results in greater centrifugal force, and therefore force, in that direction. Katrina Tropical Cyclone Report, 3. 10 Katrina Tropical Cyclone Report, 9. The report states: “Even though Hurricane Camille (1969) was more 

intense than Katrina at landfall while following a similar track, Camille was far more compact and produced 

comparably high storm surge values along a much narrower swath.” See U.S. Department of Commerce, National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, “Preliminary Report on Hurricane Camille: 

August 14-22, 1969,” ftp://ftp.nhc.noaa.gov/pub/storm_archives/atlantic/prelimat/atl1969/camille/prelim06.gif. See 

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service, 

“Preliminary Storm Report: Hurricane Katrina,” September 6, 2005, http://www.srh.noaa.gov/tlh/tropical/PSHTAE_Katrina.txt. 11 Estimates on the total affected area vary according to the criteria selected. The estimate of 93,000 square miles 

was derived by adding the areas of the 138 parishes and counties first declared Major Disaster areas and made 

eligible for Individual Assistance or Public Assistance, Categories C – G (31 in Louisiana, 74 in Mississippi, 22 in 

Alabama, and 11 in Florida). The exact sum is 92,930 square miles. See also U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security, “United States Government Response to the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina,” news release, September 1, 

2005, http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=4777. 12 Katrina Tropical Cyclone Report, 8-9. 13 Katrina Tropical Cyclone Report, 8-9. 14 Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, “DOTD’s ‘Louisiana Team’ to Collect Data on 

Levee Failures,” news release, October 10, 2005, http://www.dotd.louisiana.gov/press/pressrelease 

.asp?nRelease=545. See also Dr. Ivor van Heerden, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: 

Performance of the Flood Control System, on November 2, 2005, submitted to the Senate Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 1st session. 15 See Katrina Tropical Cyclone Report, 9. 16 U.S. Census Bureau, “Annual Estimates of the Population for Incorporated Places over 100,000, Ranked by 

July 1, 2004 Population: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2004,” Cities & Towns: Places over 1,000: 2000 to 2004, 

http://www.census.gov/popest/cities/SUB-EST2004.html. The estimate of the population of New Orleans on July 1, 

2004 was 462,269. 17 The Galveston Hurricane was a tremendous human tragedy. At least 8,000 people lost their lives in this storm. 

See United States Tropical Cyclones, 12, http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/Deadliest_Costliest.shtml (estimating 8,000—

12,000 deaths); U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National 

Hurricane Center, “Hurricane History—Galveston Hurricane, 1900,” 
APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

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-153- 

 http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/HAW2/english/history.shtml#galveston (estimating 6,000—12,000 deaths); Erik Larson, 

Isaac’s Storm: A Man, a Time, and the Deadliest Hurricane in History (New York: Random House, 1999), 264-265 

(estimating 6,000—10,000 deaths); and Galveston Historical Foundation, “Galveston History,” 

http://www.galvestonhistory.org/history.htm (estimating over 6,000 deaths and stating that Galveston was the fourth 

largest city in Texas at the time). 18 Haley Barbour, Governor of Mississippi, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Recovering from 

Hurricane Katrina, on September 7, 2005, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 109th Congress, 1st session; 

Haley Barbour as quoted on the Public Broadcasting Service, “Storm-Ravaged Mississippi,” NewsHour with Jim 

Lehrer, September 7, 2005, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/weather/july-dec05/miss_9-7.html. 19 See Dr. Robert C. Sheets, former Director of the National Hurricane Center, testimony before a hearing on

Rebuilding FEMA: Preparing for the Next Disaster, on May 18, 1993, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 

103rd Congress, 1st session. 20 Unless otherwise specified, all damage estimates in this chapter are in third-quarter 2005 dollars. 

21 Figure 1.1 includes both the most deadly and the most destructive natural disaster from each decade in the 

period 1900 to 2005. Often, these are the same disaster. The four major Atlantic hurricanes of 2004, while neither 

the most deadly nor most destructive of the decade, are also included to provide context on recent hurricane activity. They are grouped because they struck overlapping areas, in rapid succession, and together constituted the most 

damaging U.S. hurricane season on record until Hurricane Katrina struck in August 2005. The disasters included in 

the chart are discrete, violent natural disasters in the United States. They do not include terrorist events, 

technological failures (e.g., dams breaking or ferries sinking), or protracted, non-destructive natural events such as 

deadly heat waves or epidemics, which are difficult to compare to discrete, violent events. Where multiple death 

estimates are available, the highest credible estimate is shown, capturing deaths caused both directly and indirectly 

by the event. Where multiple damage estimates are available, the lowest credible estimate is shown, excluding local 

post-disaster inflation effects and effects on the national economy. 

The chart does not reflect the enormous loss of life due to the pandemic influenza—sometimes known as the 

“Spanish Flu”—outbreak of 1918—1919, which claimed the lives of approximately 500,000 Americans and over 20 

million people worldwide. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Vaccine Program Office, 

“Pandemics and Pandemic Scares in the 20th Century,” last revised February 12, 2004, 

http://www.hhs.gov/nvpo/pandemics/flu3.htm. See generally Alfred W. Crosby, America’s Forgotten Pandemic: 

The Influenza of 1918 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 

Table 1.2, below, contains the data used in Figure 1.1 

Table 1.2 Worst Natural Disasters in the United States, 1900-200521

Damage in Third Quarter 2005 dollars

Top Disasters Estimated deaths Estimated damage 

Galveston Hurricane (1900) 8,000 < $1 billion 

San Francisco Earthquake and Fire (1906) 5,000 $6 billion 

Atlantic-Gulf Hurricane (1919) 600 < $1 billion 

Mississippi Floods (1927) 246 $2 billion 

Hurricane San Felipe and the Okeechobee Flood (1928) 2,750 < $1 billion 

New England Hurricane (1938) 600 $4 billion 

Northeast Hurricane (1944) 390 < $1 billion 

Hurricane Diane (1955) 184 $5 billion 

Hurricane Audrey (1957) 390 < $1 billion 

Hurricane Betsy (1965) 75 $7 billion 

Hurricane Camille (1969) 335 $6 billion 

Hurricane Agnes (1972) 122 $8 billion 

Hurricane Hugo (1989) 86 $11 billion 

Hurricane Andrew (1992) 61 $33 billion 

East Coast Blizzard (1993) 270 $4 billion 

Major 2004 Hurricanes (Charley, Frances, Ivan, Jeanne) 167 $46 billion 

Hurricane Katrina (2005) 1,330 $96 billion 
APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

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-154- 

 Note that statistics for disasters can vary significantly depending on the source consulted, both due to variances in 

how terms are defined and the lack of consistent historical records. 

 For statistics on those hurricanes not listed separately below, see United States Tropical Cyclones; U.S. 

Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center,

“Hurricane History,” http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/HAW2/english/history.shtml; U.S. Department of Commerce, 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service, “Memorial Web Page for the 1928 

Okeechobee Hurricane,” http://www.srh.noaa.gov/mfl/newpage/Okeechobee.html; Russell L. Pfost, “Reassessing 

the Impact of Two Historical Florida Hurricanes” (American Meteorological Society, Boston 2003), 1367; and U.S. 

Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, 

“NHC/TPC Archive of Past Hurricane Seasons,” http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pastall.shtml. 

For the Galveston Hurricane, see note 17. 

For the 1906 San Francisco Earthquake and Fire, see Resilient City, 28 (estimating 5,000 deaths); Harry Chase 

Brearley, Fifty Years of a Civilizing Force: An Historical and Critical Study of the Work of the National Board of 

Fire Underwriters (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1916), 98-100 (estimating $6 billion in property 

damage); U.S. Geological Survey, “Casualties and damage after the 1906 Earthquake,” 

http://quake.wr.usgs.gov/info/1906/casualties.html (estimating more than 3,000 deaths and $7 billion in property 

damage). See generally Rutherford H. Platt, “The Bay Area: One Disaster After Another,” in Rutherford H. Platt, 

ed., Disasters and Democracy: The Politics of Extreme Natural Events (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1999), 245-

247; Virtual Museum of the City of San Francisco, “The Great 1906 Earthquake And Fire,” 

http://www.sfmuseum.org/1906/06.html. 

For the 1927 Mississippi floods, see Paul S. Trotter et al., “Floods on the Lower Mississippi: An Historical 

Economic Overview,” technical attachment prepared for the National Weather Service, 

http://www.srh.noaa.gov/topics/attach/html/ssd98-9.htm (estimating 246 deaths and $2 billion in property damage); 

Miriam Gradie Anderson and Rutherford H. Platt, “St. Charles County, Missouri: Federal Dollars and the 1993 

Flood,” in Platt, Disasters and Democracy: The Politics of Extreme Natural Events (Washington, DC: Island Press, 

1999), 215-216 (estimating 245-500 deaths). 

For Hurricane Camille, see Ernest Zebrowski and Judith A. Howard, Category 5: The Story of Camille [“The 

Story of Camille”] (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2005), 266 (reporting 335 deaths); Roger A. 

Pielke, Jr., Chantal Simonpietri, and Jennifer Oxelson, Thirty Years After Hurricane Camille: Lessons Learned, 

Lessons Lost (Boulder, Colorado, July 1999) (estimating more than 200 deaths); Hurricane History—Hurricane 

Camille (reporting 256 deaths and $6 billion in damage). 

For Hurricanes Hugo and Andrew, the East Coast Blizzard, and the major 2004 hurricanes, see U.S. 

Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Satellite and Information Service 

and National Climatic Data Center, “1980-2003 Billion Dollar U.S. Disasters,” in A Climatology of 1980-2003 

Extreme Weather and Climate Events, Technical Report 2003-01 [“Billion Dollar U.S. Disasters”] (Asheville, 

NC, December 2003), http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/reports/billionz.html; Ed Rappaport, “Preliminary Report: 

Hurricane Andrew, 16 - 28 August, 1992, prepared for the National Hurricane Center” [“Preliminary Report: 

Hurricane Andrew”](Miami, Florida, December 1993), http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/1992andrew.html; U.S. 

Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center,

“Hurricane History,” http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/HAW2/english/history.shtml. 

For Hurricane Katrina deaths, see Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, “Reports of Missing and 

Deceased” [“Louisiana Missing and Deceased”], February 17, 2006, 

http://www.dhh.louisiana.gov/offices/page.asp?ID=192&Detail=5248; Katrina Tropical Cyclone Report. For 

property damage, see U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Damages and Insurance 

Settlements from the Third-quarter Hurricanes,” http://www.bea.gov/bea/faq/national/2005q3hurricanes.pdf 

(estimates reflect data as of December 21, 2005); U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, 

“Estimated Damage and Insurance Settlements Effects from Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma on Monthly 

Personal Income,” [“Estimated Damage and Insurance Settlements Effects from Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and 

Wilma”] http://www.bea.gov/bea/faq/national/oct2005hurricane.pdf (accessed on January 20, 2006). 

For GDP deflation, see U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Gross Domestic 

Product and Corporate Profits: Third Quarter 2005 ‘final’ estimates,” news release, December 21, 2005, 

http://www.bea.gov/bea/newsrelarchive/2005/gdp305f.htm; and Louis D. Johnston and Samuel H. Williamson, 

“The Annual Real and Nominal GDP for the United States, 1790—Present,” Economic History Services, October 

2005, http://www.eh.net/hmit/gdp. 
APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

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 22 The three next most costly natural disasters are Hurricane Andrew, which hit south Florida in 1992 ($33 

billion), the Midwest Floods of 1993 ($27 billion), and the Northridge Earthquake, which hit southern California in 

1994 ($25 billion). By comparison, the direct damages caused by the 9/11 terrorist attacks totaled $18 billion. See 

Robert Looney, “Economic Costs to the United States Stemming From the 9/11 Attacks,” Strategic Insights 1, no. 6 

(Monterey, CA, August 2002), http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/aug02/homeland.asp. Damages are in 2005 dollars. 

For Hurricane Andrew, see note 21, above. For the Midwest Floods, see Billion Dollar U.S. Disasters. For the 

Northridge Earthquake, see U.S. Geological Survey, USGS Response to an Urban Earthquake – Northridge ’94 

(n.d., ca. 1996), http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/1996/ofr-96-0263/introduc.htm#impacts. 

 23 Numbers do not equal sum due to rounding. Estimate derived from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau 

of Economic Analysis, “Damages and Insurance Settlements from the Third-quarter Hurricanes,” 

http://www.bea.gov/bea/faq/national/2005q3hurricanes.pdf (estimates reflect data as of December 21, 2005); 

Estimated Damage and Insurance Settlements Effects from Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. 24 Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, prepared written statement for a hearing 

on Hurricane Katrina: The Homeland Security Department’s Preparation and Response, on February 15, 2006, 

submitted to the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 109th Congress, 2nd session. 

Depending on the definition of “damaged and destroyed homes,” this number could be considerably higher or lower 

than the figure cited. 25 Damage to homes includes major but not minor damage. Stanley K. Smith and Christopher McCarty, 

Demographic Effects of Natural Disasters: A Case Study of Hurricane Andrew [“Demographic Effects of Natural 

Disasters”], Demography, Vol. 33, No. 2 (May, 1996), 266 (repeating results of American Red Cross survey). Note 

that the authors of the case study provide a higher estimate of 144,100 houses destroyed or suffering major damage. 26 American Red Cross, “Hurricane Season 2004,” http://www.redcross.org/sponsors/drf/h2004-

stewardreport.html. 27 Damage to homes includes major but not minor damage. For statistics on Hurricane Camille, see The Story of 

Camille, 226 (reporting 335 deaths); Roger A. Pielke, Jr., Chantal Simonpietri, and Jennifer Oxelson, Thirty Years 

After Hurricane Camille: Lessons Learned, Lessons Lost (Boulder, Colorado, July 1999) (estimating more than 200 

deaths and 22,008 homes destroyed or damaged); Hurricane History—Hurricane Camille (reporting 256 deaths and 

$6 billion in damage). For statistics on Hurricane Andrew, see Preliminary Report: Hurricane Andrew (reporting 

61 deaths and $25 billion in damage); Demographic Effects of Natural Disasters (reporting 15 deaths and $22 

billion in damage). For statistics on Hurricane Ivan, see Billion Dollar U.S. Disasters, Technical Report 2003-01 

(Asheville, NC, December 2003), http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/reports/billionz.html (reporting 57 deaths); 

American Red Cross, “Hurricane Season 2004,” http://www.redcross.org/sponsors/drf/h2004-stewardreport.html 

(reporting 63 deaths). For statistics on Hurricane Katrina, see note 21. 28 Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, written statement submitted for a hearing 

on Hurricane Katrina: The Homeland Security Department’s Preparation and Response, on February 15, 2006, to the 

Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 109th Congress, 2nd session. 29 Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, written statement for a hearing on 

“Hurricane Katrina: The Homeland Security Department’s Preparation and Response,” on February 15, 2006, 

submitted to the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 109th Congress, 2nd session. 30 A football field is 120 yards long by 53 yards wide. End-zones are included in this calculation. National 

Football League, “Beginner’s Guide to Football,” http://www.nfl.com/fans/rules/basics. Based upon this, the height 

of debris is calculated by finding the volume of the debris stacked on the football field. This is done by dividing 

118,000,000 by the product of 120 and 53: 118,000,000 / 6360 = 18,553 yards. There are 1760 yards in a mile, so 

the number of miles high is then calculated by dividing 18,553 by 1760: 18,553 / 1760 = 10.5. So the debris, if 

stacked onto the space of a football field, would reach ten and a half miles high. 31 The methodology and time period examined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in developing these statistics for 

“most affected areas” differ from those used to develop the estimate of areas “impacted” by Hurricane Katrina 

included in note 11. First, the Bureau of Labor Statistics defines “most affected areas” as the thirty-four parishes in 

Louisiana and forty-seven counties in Mississippi that FEMA designated for both individual and public disaster 

assistance. This Report defines areas “impacted” by Hurricane Katrina as those parishes and counties designated for 

individual assistance and/or public assistance, categories C-G (reimbursement for rebuilding and/or replacing 

disaster-damaged public facilities such as roads, bridges, and public buildings). Second, the Bureau of Labor 

Statistics includes all counties designated for assistance as of September 30, 2005, thereby including the areas 

affected by Hurricane Rita in addition to those affected by Katrina. By contrast, this Report’s methodology on this 
APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 

-156- 

 point only includes those counties and parishes designated for assistance as of August 29, 2005, thereby counting 

only those counties that were affected by Katrina. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Labor 

Market Statistics for Areas Affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: September and October 2005,” 

http://www.bls.gov/katrina/data_after.htm; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Labor Market 

Statistics Prior to Disaster for Areas Affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,” 

http://www.bls.gov/katrina/data.htm#2. 32 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, “State Personal Income: Third Quarter 2005,” 

news release, December 20, 2005, 4, http://www.bea.gov/bea/newsrelarchive/2005/spi1205.pdf. 33 Nationwide all grade conventional retail prices increased from $2.28 per gallon on August 1 and $2.62 on 

August 29, to peak at $3.08 on September 5. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, 

“Retail Gasoline Historical Prices, Worksheet for U.S. All Grades Conventional Retail Gas Prices (Cent Per 

Gallon),” All Grades spreadsheet, http://www.eia.doe.gov/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/ 

wrgp/mogas_history.html. While gas prices had risen steadily throughout 2005 due to increasing global demand for 

crude oil, the temporary shutdown of major oil refineries and pipelines in the Gulf region as a direct result of 

Hurricane Katrina spurred a sharp and sudden drop in domestic supply that further exacerbated this price incline. 

See U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “A Primer on Gasoline Prices,” 

http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/analysis_publications/primer_on_gasoline_prices/html/petbro.html 

(accessed February 6, 2006). 34 U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, “Hurricane Katrina/Hurricane Rita Evacuation 

and Production Shut-in Statistics Report,” news release, January 11, 2006, http://www.mms.gov/ooc/press/ 

2006/press0111.htm. 35 U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, “Hurricane Katrina Situation 

Report #10,” August 30, 2005. 36 Stacy R. Stewart, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Ivan, 2-24 September 2004, prepared for the National 

Hurricane Center (Miami, Florida, May 2005), http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/2004ivan.shtml. 37 Kenneth Moran, Director of the Office of Homeland Security, Enforcement Bureau, Federal Communications 

Commission, testimony before a hearing on Ensuring Operability During Catastrophic Events, House Committee on 

Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science, and Technology, October 26, 2005, 109th 

Congress, 1st session. 38 Kenneth Moran, Director of the Office of Homeland Security, Enforcement Bureau, Federal Communications 

Commission, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina and Communications Interoperability, on 

September 29, 2005, submitted to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 109th Congress, 

1st session. 

39 Kevin J. Martin, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, written statement provided for a hearing on 

Public Safety Communications from 9/11 to Katrina: Critical Public Policy Lessons, submitted to Subcommittee on 

Telecommunications and the Internet, Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives 

September 29, 2005. 40 Louisiana Hurricane Recovery Resources, “Energy, Oil, and Gas,” http://www.laseagrant.org/hurricane/oil.htm 

(accessed January 11, 2006); U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, 

“Gulf Coast Hurricanes Situation Report #31,” October 31, 2005. 41 The ten major to medium spills caused by Katrina accounted for 7,359,990 gallons. Given that 134 spills of less 

than 10,000 gallons have not been assessed in detail, the actual oil spill figure for Hurricane Katrina is likely higher 

than 7.4 million gallons. Louisiana Hurricane Recovery Resource, “Energy, Oil, and Gas,” 

http://www.laseagrant.org/hurricane/oil.htm (accessed January 11, 2006). The Exxon Valdez spilled about 10.8 

million gallons into the waters off of Alaska. See Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, “Excerpt from the 

Official Report on the 1989 Exxon Valdez Oil Spill,” http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/History/excerpt.htm (accessed 

January 11, 2006). 42 Gulf Coast Hurricane Emergency Environmental Protection Act of 2005, H. Res. 4139, 109th Congress, 1st

session (October 25, 2005). 43 As of the time of writing, Louisiana has recovered 1,103 bodies, 23 of which were not storm related, for 1,080 

storm related deaths. See Louisiana Missing and Deceased. There were 231 deaths in Mississippi, fifteen in 

Florida, two in Alabama, and two in Georgia. See Katrina Tropical Cyclone Report, 10. Since there are still at least 

2,096 people from the Gulf Coast area missing, it is likely that the death toll numbers will increase. 
APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

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44 For the number of dead in other states, see Katrina Tropical Cyclone Report, 10. For the definition of the New

Orleans metropolitan area, see The White House, Office of Management and Budget, “Updates of Statistical Area

Definitions and Guidance on Their Uses,” OMB Bulletin 06 – 01, December 5, 2005, 42,

http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/bulletins/fy2006/b06-01.pdf. 45 These numbers were extrapolated from data on 754 released bodies of known age, of which 183 were between

the ages of sixty-one and seventy-five and 355 were over the age of seventy-five. Louisiana Department of Health

and Hospitals, “Vital Statistics of All Bodies at St. Gabriel Morgue,” January 18, 2006, www.dhh.state.la.us/offices/

publications/pubs-192/5796.pdf. 46 Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, “Deceased Katrina Victims Released to Families 11-4-2005,”

news release, November 4, 2005, http://www.dhh.louisiana.gov/news.asp?ID=145&Detail=728&Arch=2005. 47 As of February 17, 2006, 191 victims were unclaimed. Louisiana Missing and Deceased. 48 Louisiana Missing and Deceased. In the immediate wake of the hurricane, the Department of Justice requested

that the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) establish a hotline to accept reports of

missing children and adults related to both Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. As of February 13, 2006, 97 percent of the

5,071 missing children cases reported to the NCMEC for Hurricane Katrina had been resolved, with the majority of

the unresolved cases in Louisiana. The NCMEC received 12,514 reports of missing adults, all of which were

referred to the National Center for Missing Adults (NCMA). National Center for Missing and Exploited Children,

“Katrina/Rita Missing Persons Hotline: Update on calls/cases,” report through February 13, 2006,

http://www.missingkids.com/en_US/documents/KatrinaHotlineUpdate.pdf. 49 Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane

Katrina: The Homeland Security Department’s Preparation and Response, on February 15, 2006, Senate Homeland

Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 109th Congress, 2nd session. In the first half of the 1930s, almost

one million people left the plains, and after 1935, 2.5 million left. Not all of this migration, however, was due to the

Dust Bowl, as drought and changing economic conditions played a factor as well. Donald Worster, Dust Bowl: The

Southern Plains in the 1930s (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 49. 50 By January 13, only 82 individuals still resided in transient shelters in Louisiana, representing those few who

were ineligible for housing programs or had refused other housing options. Scott Wells, Deputy Federal

Coordinating Officer for Louisiana, testimony before a hearing on Housing Needs after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,

on January 13, 2006, House Financial Services Committee, Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity,

109th Congress, 2nd session. 51 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Secretary Leavitt To Gulf Region: Announces Streamlines

Access to Benefits for Hurricane Katrina Victims,” news release, September 13, 2005. See also Arizona

Department of Health Services, “Hurricane Evacuees Find Lost Records-And More-Through Arizona’s Office of

Vital Records,” news release, September 23, 2005, http://www.azdhs.gov/news/2005all/katrina

_vrecords.htm; District of Columbia Office of the Mayor, “Mayor Williams Introduces Legislation to Aid Katrina

Victims,” September 20, 2005, http://dc.gov/mayor/news/release.asp?id=763&mon=200509. 52 HHS Secretary Mike Leavitt said that most of those displaced by Katrina did not have access to their medical

records. Sarah A. Lister, Hurricane Katrina: The Public Health and Medical Response, Congressional Research

Service Report for Congress RL33096 (Washington, DC, September 21, 2005). 53 Bruce Katz, Matt Fellowes, and Mia Mabanta, Katrina Index: Tracking Variables of Post-Katrina

Reconstruction (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, February 2006,), 24, 38, 40, 44. 54 U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration, “Addendum: Revisions/Updates to

the Dec. 15 Katrina Economic Impact Report,” December 2005. In total, Katrina, combined with Hurricanes Rita

and Wilma, forced about 600,000 into unemployment. This is measured by the number of jobless claims benefits

with the hurricanes listed as the primary reason. 55 U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Labor Market Statistics Prior to Disaster for Areas

Affected by Hurricane Katrina,” September and October 2005, http://www.bls.gov/katrina/data_archived.htm.

CHAPTER TWO: NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS — A PRIMER

1

 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, Domestic Incident Management, states “[t]he Federal Government

recognizes the roles and responsibilities of State and local authorities in domestic incident management. Initial
APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 

-158- 

 responsibility for managing domestic incidents generally falls on State and local authorities. The Federal 

Government will assist State and local authorities when their resources are overwhelmed, or when Federal interests 

are involved. The Secretary will coordinate with State and local governments to ensure adequate planning, 

equipment, training, and exercise activities. The Secretary will also provide assistance to State and local 

governments to develop all-hazards plans and capabilities, including those of greatest importance to the security of 

the United States, and will ensure that State, local, and Federal plans are compatible.” The White House, Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive-5 [“HSPD-5”] (Washington, DC, February 2003), § 6. 2

 “The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government, are few and defined. Those 

which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.” The Federalist No. 45. 3

 U.S. Constitution art. 1, sec. 10; U.S. Constitution art. 4, sec. 2; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) 

(“The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers”); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 

(1819); The Federalist No. 45. “It must never be forgotten that the Federal government is one of enumerated powers 

and that it does not possess a general police power,” Ronald D. Rotunda and John E. Novak, Treatise on 

Constitutional Law, 3rd ed. (Minnesota: West Group Publishing, 1999), 346. 4

 U.S. Constitution, amend. 10. 

5

 U.S. Constitution, art. 1, sec. 8; art. 2, sec. 2. 

6

 U.S. Constitution, art. 4, sec. 4. 

7

 10 U.S.C. § 331 (2005). The other two sections of the Insurrection Act permit Presidential action independent of 

State requests. The President may send in Federal military forces or federalize a State’s National Guard troops 

without a request from the Governor in those situations where the President finds it necessary to enforce Federal 

laws, judicial decisions, or protect Federal rights. 10 U.S.C. §§ 332, 333 (2005). 8

 See generally, Thomas E. Drabek and Gerard J. Hoetmer [“Drabek & Hoetmer”], Emergency Management: 

Principles and Practice for Local Government (Washington, DC: International City Management Association, 

1991), 3-29. 9

 National Academy of Public Administration, Coping With Catastrophe: Building an Emergency Management 

System to Meet People’s Needs in Natural and Manmade Disasters [“NAPA Report”] (Washington, DC: National 

Academy of Public Administration, 1993), 10. 10 NAPA Report, 10. 11 See Drabek & Hoetmer, 6-7; NAPA Report, 10-11. 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency—a former independent agency that became part of the new 

Department of Homeland Security in March 2003—is tasked with responding to, planning for, recovering from and 

mitigating against disasters. FEMA can trace its beginnings to the Congressional Act of 1803, generally considered 

the first piece of disaster legislation. In the century that followed, ad hoc legislation was passed more than 100 times 

in response to hurricanes, earthquakes, floods and other natural disasters. 

By the 1930s, when the Federal approach to problems became popular, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation 

was given authority to make disaster loans for repair and reconstruction of certain public facilities following an 

earthquake, and later, other types of disasters. In 1934, the Bureau of Public Roads was given authority to provide 

funding for highways and bridges damaged by natural disasters. The Flood Control Act, which gave the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers greater authority to implement flood control projects, was also passed. This piecemeal approach 

to disaster assistance was problematic and it prompted legislation that required greater cooperation between Federal 

agencies and authorized the President to coordinate these activities. 

The 1960s and early 1970s brought massive disasters requiring major Federal response and recovery operations 

by the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, established within the Department of Housing and Urban 

Development (HUD). Hurricane Carla struck in 1962, Hurricane Betsy in 1965, Hurricane Camille in 1969 and 

Hurricane Agnes in 1972. The Alaskan Earthquake hit in 1964 and the San Fernando Earthquake rocked Southern 

California in 1971. These events served to focus attention on the issue of natural disasters and brought about 

increased legislation. In 1968, the National Flood Insurance Act offered new flood protection to homeowners, and 

in 1974 the Disaster Relief Act firmly established the process of Presidential disaster declarations. 

However, emergency and disaster activities were still fragmented. When hazards associated with nuclear power 

plants and the transportation of hazardous substances were added to natural disasters, more than 100 Federal 

agencies were involved in some aspect of disasters, hazards and emergencies. Many parallel programs and policies 

existed at the State and local level, compounding the complexity of Federal disaster relief efforts. The National 

Governor's Association sought to decrease the many agencies with whom State and local governments were forced 

to work. They asked President Jimmy Carter to centralize Federal emergency functions. 
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 President Carter's 1979 executive order merged many of the separate disaster-related responsibilities into a new 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Among other agencies, FEMA absorbed: the Federal Insurance 

Administration, the National Fire Prevention and Control Administration, the National Weather Service Community 

Preparedness Program, the Federal Preparedness Agency of the General Services Administration and the Federal 

Disaster Assistance Administration activities from HUD. Civil defense responsibilities were also transferred to the 

new agency from the Defense Department's Defense Civil Preparedness Agency. See U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA History,” 

http://www.fema.gov/about/history. 12 The Red Cross had originally been chartered in 1900, but its re-chartering in 1905 significantly expanded its 

role in responding to disasters. See Brien R. Williams, “The Federal Charter of the American Red Cross,” American 

Red Cross Museum, April 2005, http://www.redcross.org/museum/history/charter.asp; and American Red Cross, “A 

Brief History of the American Red Cross 2001,” http://www.redcross.org/museum/briefarc.html. In response to the 

San Francisco earthquake and fire of 1906, President Theodore Roosevelt announced that all Federal aid was to be 

channeled through the American Red Cross. Federal troops were sent to the city in order to provide security and the 

Federal government established tent camps where those affected by the disaster were provided with shelter and food. 

NAPA Report, 10. 13 NAPA Report, 11. 14 NAPA Report, 11; Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended, Public Law 920, 81st Congress, 2nd session 

(January 12, 1951). 15 The order stated, “Federal disaster relief provided under the [Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950] shall be 

deemed to be supplementary to relief afforded by state, local, or private agencies and not in substitution therefor. . .” 

Executive Order no. 10427, 18 Fed. Reg. 407 (1953). 16 NAPA Report, 11 (citing Message from the President of the United States transmitting a report on “New 

Approaches to Federal Disaster Preparedness and Assistance,” May 14, 1973). 17 The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-707, § 5170, 102 Stat. 

4689 (1988) (amended 2000) [“Stafford Act”]. 18 Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5170 and § 5191 (2005) require the Governor’s request as a condition for Presidential 

declaration of a major disaster. Robert Theodore Stafford served in Congress as a Representative and a Senator 

from Vermont. Prior to his Congressional career, Stafford served in the United States Navy during both World War 

II and during the Korean conflict. He was the Governor of Vermont from 1959-1961. While in the Senate, he led 

the passage of the Stafford Act, which was the amended version of the 1974 Disaster Relief Act (Disaster Relief Act 

of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-288, § 401, 88 Stat. 143). For additional information, “Stafford, Robert Theodore,” 

Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/ 

biodisplay.pl?index=S000776. 19 This figure represents an average since the Disaster Relief Act was enacted in 1974. U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Annual Major Disaster Declaration Totals,” 

http://www.fema.gov/news/disaster_totals_annual.fema. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, “2004 Federal Disaster Declarations,” 

http://www.fema.gov/news/disasters.fema?year=2004. 20 “Discipline” refers to the various emergency response fields (e.g., police, medical, firefighters). 

21 The White House, Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, DC, 

July 2002), 42. 22 6 U.S.C. § 312 (2005) (requiring the Secretary to execute these responsibilities through the Under Secretary for 

Emergency Preparedness and Response). 23 The White House, “President Bush signs Homeland Security Act,” news release, November 25, 2002, 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/20021125-6.html. 24 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Department of Homeland Security Facts for March 1, 2003,” 

February 28, 2003, http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=817. See also The White House, “Ridge Sworn 

In as Secretary of Homeland Security,” news release, January 24, 2003, 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/print/20030124-5.html. Before becoming Secretary of 

Homeland Security, Thomas Joseph Ridge was the first Homeland Security Advisor to the President of the United 

States and Director of the White House Office of Homeland Security, the precursor to the current Homeland 

Security Council. Prior to his service to the President, Secretary Ridge was the governor of Pennsylvania. The 

White House, “Biography of Secretary Tom Ridge,” http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/ridgebio.html. 
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 25 HSPD-5, § 4. 26 HSPD-5, § 18. 27 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System [“National Incident 

Management System”] (Washington, DC, 2004), ix. 28 National Incident Management System, 2. 29 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “NIMS and the Incident 

Command System,” http://www.fema.gov/txt/nims/nims_ics_position_paper.txt. The 9/11 Commission found that 

the September 11, 2001, attacks demonstrated the need for nationwide adoption of the ICS. See National 

Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: WW Norton 

and Company), 397. After President Bush issued HSPD-5 on February 28, 2003, the Department of Homeland 

Security worked with State and local governments, the emergency management community, the private sector and 

other key stakeholders to develop the National Incident Management System. 30 National Incident Management System, 7. 31 National Incident Management System, 138. 32 National Incident Management System, 11. 33 National Incident Management System, 7. 34 National Incident Management System, 14-16. 35 The President directed the development of a National Response Plan to align Federal coordination structures, 

capabilities, and resources into a unified, all-discipline, and all-hazards approach to domestic incident management. 

See HSPD-5. The development of the NRP included extensive vetting and coordination with Federal, State, local, 

and tribal agencies, nongovernmental organizations, private-sector entities, and the first-responder and emergency 

management communities. For a list of the signatories of the NRP, see U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 

National Response Plan [“National Response Plan”] (Washington, DC, December 2004), iii-viii. 36 National Response Plan, 15. 37 States and locals, using mutual aid agreements, are frequently able to respond without Federal assistance. In 

addition, many requests by Governors for Federal assistance are made that do not result in a disaster declaration but 

are nevertheless significant. 38 See generally, National Response Plan. 39 The Catastrophic Incident Annex is an integral part of the National Response Plan. It lays out the “context and 

overarching strategy” for response to catastrophic incidents. It also presages the publication of the Catastrophic 

Incident Supplement—“a more detailed and operationally specific” plan for catastrophic incident response. U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security, “Catastrophic Incident Annex,” in National Response Plan, pg. “CAT-1.” As of 

February 2006, the Catastrophic Incident Supplement exists in draft form only, and has not been officially released. 

A catastrophic incident is defined as “Any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in 

extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, 

environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions. . . .” National Response Plan, 63. Although 

the National Response Plan by virtue of the Catastrophic Incident Annex did anticipate the need for a more robust 

Federal response to a catastrophic incident, that is all it did. Without the Catastrophic Incident Supplement, that 

acknowledgement was not made operational and thus had no practical effect. 40 National Response Plan, 3. 41 National Response Plan, 3. 42 National Response Plan, 1. 43 HSPD-5, § 4. 44 National Response Plan, 4. 45 Governor Blanco’s letter to the President requesting Federal assistance in the form of an emergency declaration 

seems to have satisfied the second criterion, while the substantial involvement of multiple Federal departments and 

agencies seems to have satisfied the third. On August 27, 2005, Governor Kathleen Blanco sent a letter to President 

Bush requesting an emergency declaration for the State of Louisiana. The letter stated, “I have determined that this 

incident is of such severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State and affected 

local governments, and that supplementary Federal assistance is necessary to save lives, protect property, public 

health, and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a disaster.” Kathleen Blanco, Governor of Louisiana, “Letter to 

President Bush requesting that he declare an emergency for the State of Louisiana due to Hurricane Katrina” (Baton 

Rouge, August 27, 2005). That same day President Bush declared a state of emergency in Louisiana, stating, “I 

have determined that the emergency conditions in certain areas of the State of Louisiana, resulting from Hurricane 
APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

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 Katrina beginning on August 26, 2005, and continuing is of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant an 

emergency declaration...” For complete text of declaration, see 70 Fed. Reg. 53238 (Sept. 7, 2005). 46 National Response Plan, 4. 47 National Response Plan, 7. 48 Prior to Katrina’s landfall on the Gulf Coast, all of the lead agencies responsible for various support activities 

had already deployed liaisons to FEMA headquarters or field locations, and the Federal and State coordinating 

officers had co-located in Baton Rouge to begin establishing a unified command. Upon declaring an INS, the 

Secretary designated a PFO. NRP actions that had not yet been taken at this time included standup of the 

Interagency Incident Management Group and establishment of a fully functional Joint Field Office. U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #4,” August 27, 2005, 11-15, indicates all 

ESFs have been activated. Former Federal Coordinating Officer of Louisiana, William Lokey, states, “On Saturday 

morning, August 27, 2005, I was assigned to respond with the ERT-N to Louisiana as FCO for Katrina Operations. 

I arrived in Baton Rouge late in the afternoon. After checking in with FEMA staff who had been working in New 

Orleans on a previously declared disaster and who had evacuated to Baton Rouge, I went to the Louisiana State 

Emergency Operations Center. There, I met with FEMA staff from Region VI that had responded as the Advance 

Emergency Response Team (ERT-A), other members of the ERT-N who were arriving, and Colonel Jeff Smith 

(State Coordinating Officer), my primary counterpart for State of Louisiana operations. My first priority was to 

work with Jeff Smith to identify the State’s priorities, then to organize my staff to start planning and working with 

our State counterparts to identify tasks and objectives to meet those priorities. The State was heavily involved in the 

ongoing evacuation efforts but did begin working with us on such issues as search and rescue, commodity 

distribution, and medical needs. We worked late into the night and began again early on Sunday morning . . . Other 

ERT members from the Emergency Support Functions (ESF) had arrived and began discussions with their 

counterparts. These included but were not limited to people from ESF-1 Transportation, ESF-8 Health and Medical, 

and the Defense Coordinating Officer. We worked on identifying distribution sites; sending food and water to the 

Superdome; coordinating with health officials in New Orleans and the State; and planning with State and Federal 

agencies on potential search and rescue efforts.” William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Officer for Louisiana, 

testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, on 

December 14, 2005, House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to 

Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session. 49 FEMA has used the NRP during all major disasters since the NRP was adopted. National Response Plan, 

Appendix 5. http://www.fema.gov/news/disasters.fema?year=2005. 50 Operationally, the Federal government was utilizing the NRP before landfall and prior to the declaration of an 

INS. 51 The Joint Field Office (JFO) structure and Principal Federal Official (PFO) position can be implemented 

without an INS declaration by the Secretary of Homeland Security. National Response Plan, 28-33. The NRP 

states, “During actual or potential Incidents of National Significance, the overall coordination of Federal incident 

management activities is executed through the Secretary of Homeland Security” (emphasis added). National 

Response Plan, 15. This suggests that the Secretary can create the structures found in the NRP, such as JFO and 

PFO, even if there is only the potential for an INS, and an INS has not yet been declared. 52 National Response Plan, 28-33. 53 HSPD-5, § 5. 54 National Response Plan, 71. 55 42 U.S.C. § 5143 (2005) ; National Response Plan, 65. The delineation of roles and responsibilities between 

the statutorily empowered FCO and the policy constructed PFO are unclear. Section 5143 of the Stafford Act 

expressly requires the President, immediately upon his declaration of a major disaster or emergency, to appoint a 

FCO to conduct response and recovery operations in the affected area. The President has also formally delegated his 

response and recovery powers granted him in the Stafford Act to the Secretary of Homeland Security. The Stafford 

Act of 1974 gave this authority (to direct other departments) to the President; Executive Order 12148 delegated this 

authority in 1979 to the FEMA Director; and Executive Order 13286 subsequently transferred the authority in 2003 

to the Secretary of Homeland Security. See Executive Order no. 12148, 44 Fed. Reg. 43239 (1979); Executive 

Order no. 13286, 68 Fed. Reg. 10619 (2003). This delegation of authority is consistent with the Secretary’s 

designation as PFO for incident management in HSPD-5. However, the Secretary has delegated his Stafford Act 

authority to the FEMA Director and according to the NRP can name a third and separate individual PFO for an 

Incident of National Significance. 
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 56 National Response Plan, 16. See also note 65. 57 National Response Plan, 15, 25. 58 National Response Plan, 15. 59 See “Emergency Support Function Annexes” in National Response Plan, pgs. “ESF-i” et seq. 60 Reorganization Plan no. 3 of 1978, 43 Fed.. Reg. 41943 (June 19, 1978). The organization of FEMA was 

further defined in Executive Order no. 12,127, 44 Fed. Reg. 19367 (March 31,1979) and Executive Order no. 12148, 

44 Fed. Reg. 43239 (July 20, 1979). 61 Homeland Security Act of 2002 [“Homeland Security Act”], Public Law 296, 107th Congress, 2nd session 

(November 25, 2002) § 501, codified at 6 U.S.C. § 312 (2005). 62 National Response Plan, pg. “ESF 5-1.” See also Homeland Security Act, § 507, codified at 6 U.S.C. § 317 

(2005). 63 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Regional and Area 

Offices,” http://www.fema.gov/regions. 64 FEMA Disaster Assistance Employees (DAEs) are on-call personnel, not carried on the permanent payroll, 

activated to augment the full time employee pool when a surge capacity is required to respond to a disaster. Many 

have years of experience, while others may have little to no prior disaster or emergency response experience. These 

employees are only used to assist in the aftermath of specific disasters and emergencies. The reservists are trained 

to fulfill specific disaster response staffing needs, including key program, technical, and administrative functions. 65 The RRCC is a standing facility operated by FEMA that is activated to coordinate regional response efforts, 

establish Federal priorities, and implement local Federal support until a JFO is established in the field and/or the 

PFO, FCO, or Federal Resource Coordinator (FRC) can assume their NRP coordination responsibilities. The RRCC 

establishes communications with the affected State emergency management agency and the National Response 

Coordination Center (NRCC) coordinates deployment of the Emergency Response Team–Advance Element (ERTA) to field locations, assesses damage information, develops situation reports, and issues initial mission 

assignments. National Response Plan, 27. 66 These regions have two of the largest regional staffs within FEMA: Region VI has 100 employees and over 300 

reservists, and Region VI has 115 employees and over 550 reservists. See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 

Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA: Region VI – About Region VI,” 

http://www.fema.gov/regions/vi/about.shtm (last updated March 3, 2005); U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 

Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA: Region IV,” http://www.fema.gov/regions/iv/index.shtm (last 

updated October 22, 2004). The NRCC and the RRCC in Region IV began monitoring Hurricane Katrina as early as 

Tuesday, August 23. On Thursday, August 25, the NRCC activated to Level 2—partial activation—at 7:00 am, and 

the Region IV RRCC activated to Level 2 at 12:30 pm. On Saturday, August 27, the NRCC went to Level 1—full 

activation—at 7:00 am, and Region IV and Region VI RRCCs went to Level 1 activation at 12:00 pm. U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Hurricane Katrina Response 

Timeline,” September 10, 2005. FEMA employs more than 2,600 full-time staff, about 1,000 of them in its ten 

regional offices, and nearly 4,000 disaster reservists. FEMA disaster reservists, officially known as Disaster 

Assistance Employees, serve as a surge force for rapidly increasing the pool of Federal response personnel during a 

major disaster. The program recruits and trains citizen volunteers to become full Federal employees when a major 

disaster exceeds the capacity of FEMA’s permanent staff. The agency has access to this collective pool of human 

resources, but does not have its own critical response assets, such as buses, trucks, and ambulances. 67 Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5170 (2005). 68 Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5191 (2005). 69 Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5170 (2005). 70 Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, Emergency Operations Plan (Baton 

Rouge, April 5, 2005), 3. 71 The Constitution requires that “[n]o State shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement 

or Compact with another State . . . .” U.S. Constitution, art.1, sec.10. 72 EMAC was developed in the 1990s and officially ratified by Congress as an organization with thirteen member 

States in 1996. Emergency Management Assistance Compact, Public Law 104-321, 104th Congress, 2nd session, 

(October 19, 1996). As of October 2005, 49 States, the District of Columbia, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Puerto 

Rico had enacted EMAC legislation. National Emergency Management Association, “EMAC Overview,” 

December 2005, http://www.emacweb.org/?323. EMAC is administered by the National Emergency Management 
APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

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 Association (NEMA). During an emergency, NEMA’s staff works with EMAC member states to coordinate the 

EMAC system. 73 Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, Emergency Operations Plan (Baton 

Rouge, April 5, 2005), 3. 74 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Catastrophic Incident Annex [“Catastrophic Incident Annex”], in 

National Response Plan, pg. “CAT-1.” 75 National Response Plan, 63. 76 Catastrophic Incident Annex, pg. “CAT-1.” 77 National Response Plan, 44. 78 Given its draft status, the Catastrophic Incident Supplement has never been part of incident planning or 

exercises nor had it been widely disseminated, and as a result is not a part of current operational plans for incident 

management. Furthermore, our experience in Hurricane Katrina suggests it must now be reconsidered to make it 

more robust in ensuring that Federal assistance arrives as soon as possible. 79 The White House, “President Discusses Hurricane Relief in Address to the Nation,” news release, September 

15, 2005, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050915-8.html. 

CHAPTER THREE: HURRICANE KATRINA — PRE-LANDFALL

1

 The White House, “President Discusses Hurricane Katrina, Congratulates Iraqis on Draft Constitution,” news 

release, August 28, 2005. 2

 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Atlantic Oceanographic and 

Meteorological Laboratory, Hurricane Research Division, “Frequently Asked Questions,” 

http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/tcfaq/A3.html. The National Hurricane Center defines “major hurricanes” as 

hurricanes that reach maximum sustained 1-minute surface winds of at least 111 mph. 3

 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “NOAA: 2005 Atlantic 

Hurricane Season Outlook,” May 16, 2005. In 2004, the hurricane season had been particularly devastating. 

Twenty seven disasters were declared in fifteen States and two U.S. Territories. The season was especially difficult 

for Florida, which took a direct hit from four hurricanes and one tropical storm in six weeks. Together, Hurricanes 

Charlie, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne, directly or indirectly resulted in over 150 U.S. deaths and approximately fortysix billion dollars in damage. Richard J. Pasch, Daniel P. Brown, and Eric S. Blake, Tropical Cyclone Report: 

Hurricane Charlie, prepared for the National Hurricane Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

(Miami, Florida, October 18, 2004), (updated January 5, 2005); Jack Beven II, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane 

Frances, prepared for National Hurricane Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Miami, 

Florida, December 17, 2004); Stacy R. Stewart, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Ivan, prepared for the National 

Hurricane Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Miami, Florida, December 16, 2004), 

(updated May 27, 2005); Miles B. Lawrence and Hugh D. Cobb, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Jeanne, 

prepared for the National Hurricane Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Miami, Florida, 

November 22, 2004), (updated January 7, 2005). 4

 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “NOAA Issues 2005 

Atlantic Hurricane Season Outlook: Another Above Normal Season Expected,” news release, May 16, 2005. 5

 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service, 

“New Weather Forecast Office in Key West Hoists Hurricane Flags for Wilma,” news release, October 24, 2005: 

“Hurricane Wilma is part of a hurricane season replete with “firsts”: . . . a record of seven named storms had formed 

by the end of July.” 6

 Jack Beven II, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Dennis, prepared for the National Hurricane Center, 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Miami, Florida, November 22, 2005) (updated December 16, 

2005). 7

 Monroe County, Key West Florida, “Emergency News Hurricane Dennis,” July 8, 2005, 

http://www.monroecounty-fl.gov/Pages/MonroeCoFL_EmerNews/EmergencyArchives/S00633CB7. Evacuations 

were ordered in the Florida Keys for “all non-residents” and “all residents west of the Seven Mile Bridge.” For 

information on major disaster declarations, see Federal Register. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 

“Alabama; Major Disaster and Related Determinations,” July 10, 2005, 
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 http://www.fema.gov/news/dfrn.fema?id=4284; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Mississippi; Major 

Disaster and Related Determinations,” July 10, 2005, http://www.fema.gov/news/dfrn.fema?id=4285; U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security, “Florida; Major Disaster and Related Determinations,” July 10, 2005, 

http://www.fema.gov/news/dfrn.fema?id=4286. In preparation for Hurricane Dennis, FEMA activated its Regional 

Response Coordination Center (RRCC) in Atlanta at the highest operational level. FEMA conducted coordination 

calls between Federal, State and local officials, positioned liaison officers at State Emergency Operations Centers, 

pre-staged emergency supplies and response teams at various locations, and requested the activation of the First U.S. 

Army’s crisis action team. See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 

“FEMA Regional Center at Highest Level in Preparation for Hurricane Dennis,” news release, July 9, 2005; 

Department of Defense, First U.S. Army, “First U.S. Army Stands up Crisis Action Team for Hurricane Dennis,” 

news release, July 9, 2005. Other military preparations for Hurricane Dennis included the alert of National 

Guardsmen in Florida, Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana and Georgia. See U.S. Department of Defense, “Military 

Taking Precautions as Hurricane Dennis Approaches,” news release, July 8, 2005. 8

 State of Louisiana, Office of the Governor, “Governor Blanco Declares State of Emergency Regarding 

Hurricane Dennis,” news release, July 8, 2005, 

http://gov.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=newsroom&tmp=detail&articleID=717. 9

 Jack Beven II, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Dennis, prepared for the National Hurricane Center, 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Miami, Florida, November 22, 2005), (updated December 16, 

2005). 10 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, August 2005 Update to 

Atlantic Hurricane Season Outlook: Bulk of This Season’s Storms Still to Come (Washington, D.C, August 2, 2005). 11 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “NOAA Raises the 2005 

Atlantic Hurricane Season Outlook,” August 2, 2005, http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2005/s2484.htm. 12 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina, August 

23-30, 2005, prepared for the National Hurricane Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

(Miami, Florida, December 2005), 1. Excerpt from this text: “The complex genesis of Katrina involved the 

interaction of a tropical wave, the middle tropospheric remnants of Tropical Depression Ten, and an upper 

tropospheric trough. This trough, located over the western Atlantic and the Bahamas, produced strong westerly 

shear across Tropical Depression Ten, causing it to degenerate on 14 August approximately 825 n. mi. east of 

Barbados. The low-level circulation gradually weakened while continuing westward, and it eventually dissipated 

on 21 August in the vicinity of Cuba. Meanwhile, a middle tropospheric circulation originating from Tropical 

Depression Ten lagged behind and passed north of the Leeward Islands on 18-19 August. A tropical wave moved 

through the Leeward Islands and merged with the middle tropospheric remnants of Tropical Depression Ten on 19 

August, forming a large area of showers and thunderstorms north of Puerto Rico. This activity continued to move 

slowly northwestward, passing north of Hispaniola and then consolidating just east of the Turks and Caicos during 

the afternoon of 22 August. Dvorak satellite classifications from the Tropical Analysis and Forecast Branch (TAFB) 

of the Tropical Prediction Center (TPC) began at 1800 UTC that day. The upper tropospheric trough weakened as it 

moved westward toward Florida, and the shear relaxed enough to allow the system to develop into a tropical 

depression by 1800 UTC 23 August over the southeastern Bahamas about 175 n. mi. southeast of Nassau. The 

depression was designated Tropical Depression Twelve rather than “Ten” because a separate tropical wave appeared 

to be partially responsible for the cyclogenesis, and, more importantly, the low-level circulation of Tropical 

Depression Ten was clearly not involved.” 13 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, 

Hurricane Katrina Advisory #1 (Miami, Florida, August 23, 2005). National Hurricane Center Katrina Advisories 

were released every several hours beginning at 5:00 PM EDT on August 23 and ending at 10:00 AM CDT on August 

30. Advisories were typically issued at 5:00 AM, 11:00 AM, 5:00 PM, and 11:00 PM EDT each day. The advisories 

are numbered sequentially from 1 to 31. Most of the advisories were updated with supplemental advisories—for 

example, Hurricane Katrina Advisory 1 was released at 5:00 PM EDT and Advisory 1a was released at 8:00 PM EDT. 

Advisory 2 was released at 11:00 PM EDT. The official publication time zone switched from Eastern Daylight Time 

to Central Daylight Time with Advisory #17, released at 10:00 AM CDT, August 27, 2005. All Hurricane Katrina 

Advisories are available from the National Hurricane Center. See U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic 

and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, “Hurricane Katrina Advisory Archive,” 

http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2005/KATRINA.shtml?. 
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 14 Admiral Timothy J. Keating, Commander North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern 

Command, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the Department of 

Defense, the Coast Guard, and the National Guard of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, on October 27, 2005, 

submitted to the House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane 

Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session. 15 “Based on aircraft reconnaissance flight-level wind data, the cyclone became Katrina, the 11th tropical storm of 

the 2005 Atlantic hurricane season, at 1200 UTC 24 August when it was centered over the central Bahamas about 65 

n. mi. east-southeast of Nassau.” Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: 

Hurricane Katrina, August 23-30, 2005, prepared for the National Hurricane Center, National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration (Miami, Florida, December 20, 2005), 1. 16 FEMA’s Hurricane Liaison Team became operational at 7:00 AM EDT on August 24, 2005. The HLT had begun 

monitoring the storm the previous evening. FEMA Tropical Storm Katrina Briefing, August 25, 2005. 17 U.S. Department of Defense, OASD HD, Hurricane Katrina/Rita/Ophelia Interim Timeline (Aug. – Sept. 2005), 

November 2, 2005, 2. 18 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, 

Tropical Storm Katrina Advisory 4 (Washington, D.C., August 24, 2005). 19 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service 

Tropical Prediction Center and National Hurricane Center, “Hurricane Katrina Discussion Number 9,” August 25, 

2005; U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service 

Tropical Prediction Center and National Hurricane Center, “Tropical Storm Katrina Discussion Number 8,” August 

25, 2005. 20 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service, 

Miami-South Florida Forecast Office, “Hurricane Katrina Storm Report,” September 1, 2005, 

http://www.srh.noaa.gov/mfl/events/?id=katrina. 21 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina, 23-30 

August 2005, prepared for the National Hurricane Center (Miami, Florida, August 2005), 10. 22 Florida Power & Light, Company, “FPL begins assessment process following Hurricane Katrina,” news release, 

August 26, 2005, http://www.fpl.com/news/2005/contents/05101.shtml. 23 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Remote Sensing Tutorial, “Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and 

Wilma,” http://rst.gsfc.nasa.gov/Sect14/Sect14_10a.html. 24 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service, 

Miami-South Florida Forecast Office, “Hurricane Katrina Storm Report,” September 1, 2005, 

http://www.srh.noaa.gov/mfl/events/?id=katrina; and Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, 

“Bronson to Assess Hurricane Katrina Damage to South Florida Agriculture,” news release, August 29, 2005, 

http://www.doacs.state.fl.us/press/2005/08292005.html. 25 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP # 1,” August 25, 2005. The 

Emergency Operations Center is the physical location at which the coordination of information and resources to 

support domestic incident management activities normally takes place. An EOC may be a temporary facility or may 

be located in a more central or permanently established facility. See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 

National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), 64. 26 Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #1, August 25, 2005. 

27 “Despite all of our efforts and despite the fact that we pre-positioned more commodities and staged more rescue 

and medical teams than ever before in our agency's history, our initial response was overwhelmed.” William Lokey, 

Federal Coordinating Officer, Baton Rouge, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina Response in 

Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, submitted to the House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 

Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session. 28 On August 25, FEMA began to identify ERT-A teams for deployment to Florida and Alabama. FEMA Tropical 

Storm Katrina Briefing, August 25, 2005. For definition of ERT-A, see U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 

Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Glossary,” http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is14/glossary.htm#E. 29 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “National Situation 

Update,” August 26, 2005, http://www.fema.gov/emanagers/2005/nat082605.shtm. Throughout this Report, note 

that events were occurring in different time zones. Times referenced as Central Daylight Time (CDT) reflect the 

local time events took place in Louisiana. All Noon FEMA video teleconferences took place at 12:00 PM Eastern 
APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

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 Daylight Time (EDT), which was 11:00 AM in Louisiana and Mississippi. Throughout the report, times are 

referenced in accordance with the source material supporting the text. 30 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, 

Hurricane Katrina Advisory #11 (Washington, D.C., August 26, 2005). 31 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina (23-30 

August 2005), prepared for the National Hurricane Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

(Miami, Florida, December 2005), 2-3. 32 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, 

Hurricane Katrina Intermediate Advisory # 14 (Miami, Florida, August 26, 2005); U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “National Situation Update,” August 26, 2005. 33 See National Weather Service Tropical Prediction Center and National Hurricane Center Hurricane Katrina 

Advisories 15 through 26, covering a period from August 26, 2005, 11:00 PM EDT to August 29, 2005, 6:00 AM CDT. 

These advisories are available at the U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration, National Weather Service Tropical Prediction Center and National Hurricane Center, “Hurricane 

Katrina Advisory Archive,” http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2005/KATRINA.shtml?. 34 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, 

“Hurricane Katrina Forecast Timeline,” n.d., ca. 2005. 35 Brigadier General David L. Johnson (USAF, Ret.), Director of the National Weather Service, National Oceanic 

and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, written statement for a hearing on NOAA 

Hurricane Forecasting, on October 7, 2005, submitted to the House Committee on Science, 109th Congress, 1st

session, 2. 36 The last National Hurricane Center Advisory on August 26 was issued at 11:00 PM EDT. Katrina made landfall 

at 6:10 AM CDT on August 29, fifty-six hours later. U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Advisory # 15 (Miami, Florida, August 

26, 2005). 37 State of Louisiana, Executive Department, Proclamation No. 48 KBB 2005: State of Emergency—Hurricane 

Katrina (Baton Rouge, August 26, 2005); State of Alabama, Office of the Governor, State of Emergency 

Proclamation (Jackson, August 26, 2005). 38 Brent Warr, Mayor of Gulfport, Mississippi, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness 

and Response by the State of Mississippi, on December 7, 2005, submitted to the Select Bipartisan Committee to 

Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session. 39 Department of Homeland Security SITREP #4, August 27, 2005. See generally, Robert R. Latham Jr., 

Executive Director of the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, written statement for a hearing on 

Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi, on December 7, 2005, submitted to the 

House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th

Congress, 1st session. 40 Louisiana State Police, “LSP Timeline of Events,” n.d., ca. 2005, 2. 

41 Louisiana National Guard, Task Force Pelican, “Hurricane Katrina Overview of Significant Events,” November 

28, 2005, 4. 42 State of Alabama, Office of the Governor, Executive Order No. 939 (Jackson, August 26, 2005). 43 U.S. Department of Defense, “Mississippi Guard Provide Relief to State,” Armed Forces Press Service, 

September 8, 2005, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2005/20050908_2648.html. 44 “More than 8,000 people perished September 8, 1900 when the category 4 hurricane barreled into 

Galveston...,” U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “The Galveston 

Storm of 1900 − The Deadliest Disaster in History,” http://www.noaa.gov/galveston1900/. See also Erik Larson, 

Isaac’s Storm: A Man, a Time, and the Deadliest Hurricane in History (New York: Random House, 1999), 264-265. 

Note that statistics for disasters can vary significantly depending on the source consulted, due to both variances in 

how terms are defined and the difficulty of confirming specific data in the aftermath of a devastating event. 45 The Saffir-Simpson scale for measuring hurricane strength had not been developed until 1969—four years after 

Hurricane Betsy made landfall on the Louisiana coast. The classification of Hurricane Betsy as a Category 3 storm 

was made retroactively based on wind speed readings. For general information on Hurricane Betsy, see U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers, “Historical Records of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Response to Recent Hurricanes,” 

http://www.hq.usace.army.mil/history/Hurricane_files/ Hurricane.htm. For deaths, see Eric S. Blake et al., The 

Deadliest, Costliest, and Most Intense United States Tropical Cyclones from 1851 to 2004 (And Other Frequently 
APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

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 Requested Hurricane Facts), NOAA Technical Memorandum NWS TPC-4 (Miami, Florida, August 2005), 7, 

http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/Deadliest_Costliest.shtml; compare to U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “How Safe is New 

Orleans from Flooding?” September 11, 2003, http://www.usace.army.mil/inet/functions/cw/ 

hot_topics/11sep_msy.htm (reporting 81 deaths). For extent of flooding by parish see, Joseph A. Towers, former 

Attorney for the Army Corps of Engineers, testimony before the Task Force on Updating the National 

Environmental Policy Act, Congressional Resources Committee, 109th Congress, 1st session, 2005, 

http://resourcescommittee.house.gov/nepataskforce/archives/josephtowers.htm. 46 “Damaged homes” include those with major damage, but not those with minor damage. For deaths, see Ernest 

Zebrowski and Judith A. Howard, Category 5: The Story of Camille (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 

2005); For homes damaged or destroyed, see Roger A. Pielke, Jr., Chantal Simonpietri, and Jennifer Oxelson, Thirty 

Years After Hurricane Camille: Lessons Learned, Lessons Lost (Boulder, Colorado, July 1999). For other 

information, see U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National 

Hurricane Center, “Hurricane History – Hurricane Camille, 1969,” 

http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/HAW2/english/history.shtml#camille. 47 See Greg Brouwer “The Creeping Storm,” Civil Engineering Magazine, June, 2003, 

http://www.pubs.asce.org/ceonline/ceonline03/0603feat.html. See also U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “Morganza 

to the Gulf of Mexico Hurricane Protection Project,” http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/prj/mtog/. It is important to 

note that the levees protecting New Orleans were designed in advance of the Saffir-Simpson model. Although it is 

often reported that New Orleans levees were constructed to protect against a Category 3 storm, the levee system was 

actually designed to withstand a Standard Project Hurricane (SPH)—a theoretical hybrid of many different storms. 

The central pressure for an SPH is in the Category 4 range, the highest wind speed is that of a high strength 

Category 2, and the surge is similar to that of a Category 3. Al Naomi (Senior Project Manager, U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers), “Talkback,” Riverside (a publication of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers), January, 2005, 8, 

http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/pao/Riverside/ Jan_05_Riv.pdf. 48 In 1999, the Senate of the State of Louisiana issued a resolution “to authorize and to urge the governor of ... 

Louisiana to support the development of the ‘Comprehensive Hurricane Protection Plan for Coastal Louisiana’ by 

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to provide continuous hurricane protection from Morgan City to the Mississippi 

border.” Senate of the State of Louisiana, House Concurrent Resolution No. 142 (Baton Rouge, June 18, 1999). 

The Comprehensive Hurricane Protection Plan for Coastal Louisiana by the New Orleans District U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers was released in June 2000. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Comprehensive Hurricane Protection Plan 

for Coastal Louisiana (New Orleans, June 2000). 49 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Comprehensive Hurricane Protection Plan for Coastal Louisiana (New 

Orleans, June 2000). 50 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service, 

Southern Region headquarters, “Tropical Cyclone Hazards: Inland Flooding,” July 27, 2004, 

http://www.srh.noaa.gov/srh/tropicalwx/awareness/flooding.htm: “It is common to think the stronger the storm the 

greater the potential for flooding. However, this is not always the case. A weak, slow moving tropical storm can 

cause more damage due to flooding than a more powerful fast moving hurricane.” See also, U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, Comprehensive Hurricane Protection Plan for Coastal Louisiana ( New Orleans, June 2000). 51 Statement of Vice Admiral Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr (Undersecretary of Commerce for Oceans and 

Atmosphere.), before 31st AMS Broadcasters Conference 200-300 Broadcast Meteorologists/Private Sector and 

Industry, June 26, 2002, http://www.noaa.gov/lautenbacher/ams-broadcasters.htm 52 The origins of the Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Planning Project can be traced back to 1998 

when, in the wake of Hurricane Georges, the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness 

recognized the need for more comprehensive hurricane planning. After an initial period of development, the State of 

Louisiana submitted planning proposals to FEMA for approval. FEMA granted the State funding in 2001, but was 

forced to withdraw those funds a year later, due to budgetary constraints. Despite this setback, the need for 

catastrophic hurricane planning in Louisiana continued to be recognized at both the Federal and State level. On 

March 17, 2004, FEMA awarded funding to the State of Louisiana for what would become the Southeast Louisiana 

Catastrophic Hurricane Planning Project. See Sean E. Fontenot, Former Chief, Planning Division, Louisiana Office 

of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, written statement submitted for a hearing on Preparing for 

Catastrophe: The Hurricane Pam Exercise, on January 24, 2006, before the Senate Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 2nd session, 10. 
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 53 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Hurricane PAM Exercise 

Concludes,” July 23, 2004. The Hurricane PAM exercise included participants from thirteen southeast Louisiana 

Parishes: Ascension, Assumption, Jefferson, Lafourche, Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. Charles, St. James, 

St. John, St. Tammany, Tangipahoa, and Terrebonne. See also Senator Susan Collins (R-Maine), statement at a 

hearing on Preparing for a Catastrophe: The Hurricane Pam Exercise, on January 24, 2006, to the Senate Committee 

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 2nd session. 54 Wayne Fairley, Chief, Response Operation Branch, Response and Recovery Division, FEMA Region IV, 

written statement submitted for a hearing on Preparing for Catastrophe: The Hurricane Pam Exercise, on January 24, 

2006, before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 2nd session, 9. 55 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Response 

Coordination Center, video teleconference, August 27, 2005. 56 Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, 

Hurricane Katrina Advisory # 15A (Washington, D.C., August 27, 2005); Department of Commerce, National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Advisory # 19

(Washington, D.C., August 27, 2005). As noted previously, times are referenced in accordance with the time 

zone—Eastern Daylight Time or Central Daylight Time—listed on the source material supporting the text. 57 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service 

Tropical Prediction Center and National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Advisory # 19 (Miami, Florida, 

August 27, 2005). 58 NHC’s Bill Reeve warned that the storm was headed toward “the worst possible locations for storm surge” and 

would produce a surge typical of a Category 4 or Category 5 hurricane. See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 

Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Response Coordination Center, video teleconference, August 27, 

2005. 59 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina: August 

23-30, 2005, prepared for the National Hurricane Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

(Miami, Florida, December 2005). See also U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration, National Weather Service Tropical Prediction Center and National Hurricane Center, Hurricane 

Katrina Intermediate Advisory # 18A, (Miami, Florida, August 27, 2005). 60 Louisiana Office of the Governor, Response to U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs and Information Request Dated October 7, 2005 (Baton Rouge, December 2005), 4. State 

Representative Cedric Richmond called Governor Blanco on Saturday afternoon after visiting a ballpark where 

hundreds were in attendance. Representative Richmond “learned that some people had not paid attention to the 

weekend news and did not realize the severity of the hurricane aiming at New Orleans. He worries that many may 

have thought that the hurricane was still targeting the Florida panhandle....” 61 Louisiana Office of the Governor, Response to U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs and Information Request Dated October 7, 2005 (Baton Rouge, December 2005), 4. 62 Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, “Timeline for Hurricane Katrina,” n.d., ca. 2005, 2. 63 In Phase I or the Precautionary Phase, “The Plan prescribes that during the Precautionary phase, the location of 

staging areas for people who need transportation will be announced and that public transportation will concentrate 

on moving people from the staging areas to safety in host parishes with priority given to people with special needs. 

Furthermore, during the Precautionary stage the Plan directs that nursing homes and other custodial care 

organizations in the risk areas should be contacted to ensure that they are prepared to evacuate their residents.” 

Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, “Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Evacuation 

and Sheltering Plan,” in State of Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan Supplement 1A (Baton Rouge, January 

2000); Louisiana State Police, “LSP Timeline of Events,” n.d., ca. 2005, 2. On Saturday August 27, 2005, 

representatives of the Louisiana Nursing Home Association (LNHA), sitting at the Louisiana State EOC, started 

calling and emailing all the at-risk nursing homes in Louisiana, checking on their preparedness for the storm and 

determining if they were planning to evacuate or shelter-in-place. They were able to reach most of the nursing 

homes. They learned that the State EOP was also calling nursing homes, as were the local parish sheriffs. By 

Sunday morning, some nursing homes that intended to shelter-in-place had decided to evacuate. They had 

previously been told that buses were available but, by the time they decided to evacuate, drivers were not available. 

At that point the LNHA made formal requests for bus drivers, but none materialized prior to landfall. In all, prior to 

the storm, twenty-one nursing homes evacuated and sixty-eight sheltered-in-place. See generally, Joseph A. 

Donchess, Executive Director of the Louisiana Nursing Home Association, written statement for a hearing on 
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 Challenges in a Catastrophe: Evacuating New Orleans in Advance of Hurricane Katrina, on January 31, 2006, 

submitted to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 2nd session. 64 Mississippi State officials estimated that approximately 400,000 people used U.S. 49 and Interstates 55 and 59 

to evacuate during the 2004 hurricane season. 65 The TCC received traffic reports from Louisiana State Police troops, LA DOTD traffic counters, and other 

sources. Louisiana State Police, “LSP Timeline of Events,” n.d., ca. 2005, 2-4. 66 Louisiana State Police, “LSP Timeline of Events,” n.d., ca. 2005, 4; State of Mississippi, Mississippi 

Emergency Management Agency, “Highway Evacuation Advisory,” news release, August 27, 2005. 67 According to Robert Latham Jr., Executive Director of MEMA, “During the 2004 hurricane season, culminating 

with Hurricane Ivan on September 13, 2004, the contra-flow plan was never executed, but major congestion in and 

around Hattiesburg, Mississippi resulted in a comprehensive review of our evacuation plan . . . As a result of these 

problems, Governor Barbour asked Mississippi Public Safety Commissioner George Phillips to develop a plan that 

would provide additional law enforcement officers to support evacuations, especially in the Hattiesburg area. This 

plan was completed prior to this year’s hurricane season and executed flawlessly for the evacuation, including 

execution of contra-flowing both Interstates 55 and 59 from Louisiana to Mississippi.” Robert R. Latham Jr., 

Executive Director of the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, written statement for a hearing on 

Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi, on December 7, 2005, submitted to the 

House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th

Congress, 1st session; Louisiana Office of the Governor, Response to U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs and Information Request Dated October 7, 2005 (Baton Rouge, December 2005). 68 City of New Orleans, Office of Emergency Preparedness, Hurricanes Annex--Part Three: Sheltering (New 

Orleans, n.d.). 69 Erin Fowler of the Department of Health and Human Services Regional Emergency Coordination Program 

Office spoke with Dr. Roseanne Pratts, Director of Emergency Preparedness for the Louisiana Department of 

Health, on August 27, “and inquired if federal HHS assistance was needed for patient movement or evacuation, or 

anything else. [Dr. Pratts] responded no, that they do not require anything at this time, and they would be in touch if 

and when they needed assistance.” Senators Susan Collins and Joseph Lieberman, statements during a hearing on 

Challenges in a Catastrophe: Evacuating New Orleans in Advance of Hurricane Katrina, on January 31, 2006, 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 2nd session. HHS also offered 

assistance to New Orleans health officials on August 27, 2005. See generally, Joseph A. Donchess, Executive 

Director of the Louisiana Nursing Home Association, written statement for a hearing on Challenges in a 

Catastrophe: Evacuating New Orleans in Advance of Hurricane Katrina, on January 31, 2006, submitted to the 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 2nd session. 70 Louisiana Office of the Governor, Response to U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs and Information Request Dated October 7, 2005 (Baton Rouge, December 2005). 71 Liability concerns may have constrained the development of this program. Nicholas Riccardi and James 

Rainey, “Katrina’s Aftermath,” Los Angeles Times, September 13, 2005 ; Bruce Nolan, “In Storm, N.O. Wants No 

One Left Behind,” The Times-Picayune, July 24, 2005. 72 Louisiana Office of the Governor, Response to U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs and Information Request Dated October 7, 2005 (Baton Rouge, December 2005). 73 For the notice on recommended evacuations of Algiers, the Lower Ninth Ward, and low-lying areas, see City of 

New Orleans, “Mayor Nagin Urges Citizens to Prepare for Hurricane Katrina,” news release, August 27, 2005. The 

Louisiana evacuation plan called for New Orleans to begin evacuations thirty hours prior to projected landfall. This 

delay was designed to enable residents of coastal areas to evacuate, see Mayor’s Office of Communications, City of 

New Orleans, “Mayor Nagin Urges Citizens to Prepare for Hurricane Katrina,” news release, August 27, 2005; 

“Mayor Urges Storm Preparations,” NOLA.com: Times Picayune Breaking News Weblog, August 27, 2005 74 Bruce Nolan, “Katrina Takes Aim,” The New Orleans Times-Picayune, August 28, 2005: “New Orleans Mayor 

Ray Nagin followed at 5:00 PM, issuing a voluntary evacuation.” 75 City of New Orleans, Mayor’s Office of Communications, “Mayor Nagin Urges Citizens to Prepare for 

Hurricane Katrina,” news release, August 27, 2005. 76 State of Mississippi, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, “Evacuation Traffic Expected to Increase on 

Interstates,” news release, August 27, 2005; U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration, National Hurricane Center, “Hurricane Katrina Forecast Timeline,” n.d., ca. 2005. See also U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Response Coordination 
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 Center, video teleconference, August 27, 2005, (Mississippi EOC reporting voluntary evacuations being encouraged 

along coastal counties). 77 In an interview with Frontline, New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin described the difficulty completing a mandatory 

evacuation: “But keep in mind the last time a hurricane event happened is 1965. Most people ride out these 

storms—they’re Category 2s or whatever, and it’s no big deal. The storm before Katrina a couple of weeks 

earlier—another Parish official made this huge declaration to mandatorily evacuate in spite of what everyone else 

was saying. So public confidence was a little low at the time . . . I think regardless of what we do in this town, some 

people will stay.” Ray Nagin, Mayor of New Orleans, interview by Public Broadcasting Service, Frontline, 

November 22, 2005. 78 Louisiana Office of the Governor, Response to U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs and Information Request Dated October 7, 2005 (Baton Rouge, December 2005). 79 American Red Cross, “Gulf Coast States Prepare for Hurricane Katrina,” news release, August 27, 2005, 

http://www.redcross.org/article/ 0,1072,0_332_4467,00.html 80 State of Mississippi, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, “Evacuation Traffic Expected to Increase on 

Interstates,” news release, August 27, 2005. 81 Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness, “Situation Report Executive Summary: Hurricane Katrina,”

August 27, 2005. 82 The declaration of the Superdome as a “special needs shelter” was an element of the State’s Emergency 

Operations Plan. According to the plan, the Superdome serves as the Category II special needs shelter for Jefferson, 

Plaquemines, Orleans, and St. Bernard parishes. “Category II” facilities are for patients whose conditions are “less 

serious and less likely to undergo a severe deterioration.” State of Louisiana, Emergency Operations Plan, 

Supplement 1C: Louisiana Shelter Operations Plan (Baton Rouge, April 2005), Annex X “Special Needs Plan,” 5, 

10, Appendix 2. The Superdome had also been used as “a shelter of last resort” in previous hurricanes. The 

Superdome was first used in this capacity in 1998 when people sought refuge from Hurricane Georges. U.S. 

Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service Forecast 

Office, “Top Weather Events of the 20th Century within the NWSFO New Orleans/Baton Rouge Service Area,” 

December 8, 2005, http://www.srh.noaa.gov/lix/html/top10.htm. The State of Louisiana Emergency Operations 

Plan defines a shelter of last resort as “a place for persons to be protected from the high winds and heavy rains from 

the storm. Unlike a shelter, there may be little or no water or food and possibly no utilities. A Last Resort Refuge is 

intended to provide best available survival protection for the duration of the hurricane only.” Louisiana Office of 

Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, State of Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan: Supplement 1A 

(Baton Rouge, January 2000), 29. 83 City of New Orleans, “Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan: Special Needs Shelter Plan,” 

http://www.cityofno.com/portal.aspx?portal=46&tabid=28. The Plan states: “[I]t is not appropriate to admit 

individuals to this shelter who require constant care or who require constant electricity to support machines 

necessary to maintain their life. Dialysis will not be available. Persons who are acutely ill will be evaluated and 

referred to local hospitals for definitive care. On a daily basis, every person with a chronic medical problem should 

have a viable plan that has been discussed with their primary physician so that when a disaster occurs, they will have 

an action plan established which can be put into effect.” 84 State of Texas, Texas State Operations Center, “Situation Report #8,” August 27, 2005. 

85 State of Mississippi, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, “Mississippi to Reverse Lane Interstates 55 

and 59,” news release, August 27, 2005. 86 Robert R. Latham Jr., Executive Director of the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, written statement 

for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi, on December 7, 2005, 

submitted to the House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane 

Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session. 87 Louisiana National Guard, Task Force Pelican, “Hurricane Katrina Overview of Significant Events,” November 

28, 2005, 5. 88 State of Alabama, Office of the Governor, “Governor Riley Says Supplies Ready to Assist Hurricane Victims,” 

news release, August 28, 2005: “Alabama has pre-positioned supplies . . . Governor Riley said the state already has 

290,000 bags of ice, more than 250,000 gallons of water, 652,000 MREs (meals ready to eat), and 110,000 tarps 

measuring 20 feet by 25 feet.” 
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 89 Office of the Governor of Alabama, “Governor Riley Briefed on State’s Hurricane Preparations,” news release, 

August 27, 2005; State of Alabama, Office of the Governor, “Governor Riley Says Supplies Ready to Assist 

Hurricane Victims,” news release, August 28, 2005. 90 State of Texas, State Operations Center, “Situation Report #8,” August 27, 2005. 

91 Level 1 operations began at 7:00 AM EDT. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS 

SITREP # 4,” August 27, 2005, 11. 92 Hurricane Katrina DHS Situation Report #4, 27 Aug 05, 1800 hrs. 

93 See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Response 

Coordination Center, video teleconference, August 27, 2005, 16. 94 See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Response 

Coordination Center, video teleconference, August 27, 2005, 16 – 17. 95 See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Response 

Coordination Center, video teleconference, August 27, 2005, 16-18. The figures for liters of water, pounds of ice, 

and number of MREs and tarps were converted using FEMA conversion factors of 18,000 liters of water, 40,000 

pounds of ice, 2,520 tarps, and 21,888 MREs per truckload. FEMA Office of Legislative Affairs, Hurricane Katrina 

Response Fact Sheet. 96 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP # 4,” August 27, 2005. 97 See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Response 

Coordination Center, video teleconference, August 27, 2005, 22. 98 Colonel Jeff Smith, Acting Deputy Director, Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency 

Preparedness, testimony at hearing on the Hurricane Katrina Response in Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, before 

the House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 2nd

session. See also transcript of August 27, 2005, NRCC Video Teleconference. The Emergency Response TeamNational is a national “on-call” team that is ready to deploy to large disasters such as Category 3 or 4 hurricanes. 

See also, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP # 4,” August 27, 2005. For 

definition of ERT-N, see U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency. See 

also FEMA National Situation Update, August 28, 2005, http://www.fema.gov/emanagers/2005/nat082805.shtm. 

“Glossary,” http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is14/glossary.htm#E. 99 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, DC, December 2004), 40. 

See also Dan Bement, “FEMA Operations,” prepared for the U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal 

Highway Administration, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/modiv/fema.htm. 100 U.S. Department of Defense, “Hurricane Katrina Timeline,” August 29, 2005.. 101 U.S. Department of Defense, “Hurricane Katrina Timeline,” August 29, 2005. 102 See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #4,” August 27, 2005. 103 The emergency declaration for Mississippi was requested by Governor Barbour on Saturday, August, 27, 2005; 

the emergency declaration for Alabama was requested by Governor Riley on Sunday, August 28, 2005. Presidential 

states of emergency were declared for both States on August 28. 70 Fed. Reg. 53239 (Aug. 28, 2005) (Mississippi); 

70 Fed. Reg. 54061-62 (Aug. 28, 2005) (Alabama). 104 President Bush authorized FEMA “. . . to identify, mobilize, and provide at its discretion, equipment and 

resources necessary to alleviate the impacts of the emergency” for the parishes of Allen, Avoyelles, Beauregard, 

Bienville, Bossier, Caddo, Caldwell, Claiborne, Catahoula, Concordia, De Soto, East Baton Rouge, East Carroll, 

East Feliciana, Evangeline, Franklin, Grant, Jackson, LaSalle, Lincoln, Livingston, Madison, Morehouse, 

Natchitoches, Pointe Coupee, Ouachita, Rapides, Red River, Richland, Sabine, St. Helena, St. Landry, Tensas, 

Union, Vernon, Webster, West Carroll, West Feliciana, and Winn. The White House, “Statement on Emergency 

Assistance for Louisiana,” news release, August 27, 2005. See also, Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 

Emergency Assistance Act, Public Law 93-288, as amended [“Stafford Act”], § 502(a)(b). 105 Data on pre-landfall disaster declarations compiled from: Department of Homeland Security, Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, “Federally Declared Disasters by Calendar Year,” Library, 

http://www.fema.gov/library/drcys.shtm. Hurricane Floyd did not make landfall until 6:30 AM on September 16, 

1999, but the storm caused significant coastal damage as it passed offshore Florida, Georgia, and the Carolinas; as a 

result, President Clinton issued emergency declarations for Florida and Georgia on September 14. He did the same 

for the Carolinas the following day. For more information, see: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, “Emergency Aid Ordered For Florida Hurricane Response,” news release, 

September 14, 1999, http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=8554; U.S. Department of Homeland 
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 Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Emergency Aid Ordered For Georgia Hurricane Response,” 

news release, September 14, 1999, http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=8553; U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Emergency Aid Ordered For South Carolina 

Hurricane Response,” news release, September 15, 1999, http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=8552 

and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Emergency Aid Ordered 

For North Carolina Hurricane Response,” news release, September 15, 1999, 

http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=8551. 106 On August 27, 2005, Governor Kathleen Blanco sent a letter to President Bush requesting an emergency 

declaration for the State of Louisiana. The letter stated, “I have determined that this incident is of such severity and 

magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State and affected local governments, and that 

supplementary Federal assistance is necessary to save lives, protect property, public health, and safety, or to lessen 

or avert the threat of a disaster.” The letter contained a list of “State and local resources that have been or will be 

used to alleviate the conditions of this emergency.” It also certified that “the State and local governments will 

assume all applicable non-Federal share of costs required by the Stafford Act.” Governor Blanco specifically 

requested “emergency protective measures, direct Federal Assistance, Individual and Household Program (IHP) 

assistance, Special Needs Program assistance, and debris removal” for all affected areas. She defined the affected 

areas as “all the southeastern parishes including the New Orleans Metropolitan area and the mid-state Interstate I-49 

corridor and northern parishes along the I-20 corridor that are accepting the thousands of citizens evacuating . . . . ,” 

Kathleen Blanco, Governor of Louisiana, Letter to President Bush requesting that he declare an emergency for the 

State of Louisiana due to Hurricane Katrina (Baton Rouge, August 27, 2005). That same day President Bush 

declared a state of emergency in Louisiana. 70 Fed. Reg. 53238 (August 27, 2005). 107 William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Officer for Baton Rouge, written statement for a hearing on Louisiana 

Hurricane Katrina Response and Recovery, on December 14, 2005, submitted to the House Select Committee to 

Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session. 108 Louisiana Office of the Governor, Response to U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs and Information Request Dated October 7, 2005 (Baton Rouge, December 2005); U.S. 

Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, 

“Hurricane Katrina Forecast Timeline,” n.d., ca. 2005. 109 Max Mayfield, testimony before a hearing on “The Lifesaving Role of Accurate Hurricane Prediction,” 

Disaster Prevention and Prediction Hearing, U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 

on September 20, 2005, 109th Congress, 1st session, 11. Mayfield said: “Yes Sir, I called. I don’t do that very 

often. But I—in fact, I have only done that only one other time for Hurricane Lili in the— when it was a 

Category 4 Hurricane in the Gulf of Mexico. I called the former Governor of Louisiana in 2002. And this was 

Saturday night around 8:30 or 9 o’clock eastern time and I called the—I got hold of the Governor of Louisiana, 

the Governor of Mississippi and Governor Blanco in Louisiana suggested I call Mayor Nagin in New Orleans. I 

called him and left a message and he called me right back and I have—a lot of people have asked me what I said 

and I, you know, with the hundreds of briefings that we did, I don’t remember exactly. But the whole purpose of 

that was just to be absolutely sure that they understood the severity of the situation and I do remember telling all 

three of them that I want to leave the National Hurricane Center that night and be able to go home and sleep 

knowing that I had done everything that I could do.” 110 Max Mayfield, testimony before a hearing on “The Lifesaving Role of Accurate Hurricane Prediction,”

Disaster Prevention and Prediction , U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, on 

September 20, 2005, 109th Congress, 1st session, 11. 111 See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Response 

Coordination Center, video teleconference, August 27, 2005. 112 Brigadier General David L. Johnson, Director, National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, 

National Weather Service, testimony before a hearing on “Predicting Hurricanes: What We Knew About Katrina,” 

U.S. House Select Committee on Hurricane Katrina, on September 22, 2005, 109th Congress, 1st session, 43 

(testifying that Hurricane Katrina became a Category 4 storm at 12:40 AM on Sunday, August 28, and became a 

Category 5 storm at 6:15 AM that same day). 113 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina: August 

23-30, 2005, National Hurricane Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Miami, Florida, 

December 2005), 3. 
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 114 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service, 

New Orleans/Baton Rouge Forecast Office, Slidell, Louisiana, “Urgent Weather Message,” August 28, 2005. 115 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane 

Center, Hurricane Katrina Advisory # 25, (Miami, Florida, August 28, 2005). 116 U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration, National Weather Service, New Orleans/Baton Rouge Forecast Office, Slidell, LA, “Urgent 

Weather Message,” August 28, 2005. 117 The Emergency Alert System (EAS) is a mechanism for public officials—Federal, State, and local—to 

communicate disaster information and instructions rapidly and widely. The system aims to reach the broadest 

possible audience by disseminating emergency updates on existing radio and television stations, including via digital 

and satellite networks. Federal Communications Commission, FCC Consumer Facts: The Emergency Alert System 

(Washington, DC, 2005), 1. See also State of California, “What Is EAS?,” 

http://eas.oes.ca.gov/Pages/whatseas.htm. The new EAS system is the direct descendent of the Emergency 

Broadcast System (EBS), the Nation’s alert system from 1963 until the advent of EAS. EAS was officially launched 

on January 1, 1997 (for radio stations) and December 31, 1998 (for television). Federal Emergency Management 

Agency, “Background on the Emergency Alert System,” October 23, 2004, 

http://www.fema.gov/rrr/rep/easrep.shtm. While EAS fulfills the same function as EBS, it differs in that it takes 

advantage of digital technology to permit automation of transmission. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 

“Background on the Emergency Alert System,” October 23, 2004, http://www.fema.gov/rrr/rep/easrep.shtm. The 

Emergency Broadcast System and its EAS successor were originally designed for the President to speak to the 

Nation during an emergency, particularly following catastrophic nuclear attacks. But the system was made available 

to State and local officials in 1963, and since then has been used primarily for weather emergencies. “There are two 

contexts in which the EAS will be used—Presidentially-initiated alerts and messages and those initiated by State and 

local governments in concert with the broadcast industry.” Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Background 

on the Emergency Alert System,” October 23, 2004, http://www.fema.gov/rrr/rep/easrep.shtm. See also, Federal 

Communications Commission, FCC Consumer Facts: The Emergency Alert System (Washington, DC, 2005), 2. 

The document states: “a state emergency manager may use the system to send out a public warning by broadcasting 

that warning from one or more major radio stations in a particular state.” EAS was not activated prior to landfall 

aside from NOAA hurricane warnings and advisories. “The Emergency Alert System was never activated by the 

White House or by State or local governments during Katrina.” Ken Kerschbaumer, “Broadcasters Seek Better 

Emergency Alert System,” Broadcasting and Cable, September 12, 2005. 118 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service, “NOAA Weather Radio All 

Hazards,” January 31, 2006, http://www.weather.gov/nwr/. The Federal Communication Commission’s EAS 

Primary Entry Point (PEP) station in New Orleans (station WWL) was one of the few radio stations in the area to 

provide continuous service to the New Orleans area. The NOAA Weather Radio (NWR) is a national network of 

radio stations that continuously broadcast weather and hazard information from local Weather Service offices. 

Operating in close conjunction with EAS, NOAA Weather Radio comprises an “all hazards” radio network that acts 

as a “single source for comprehensive weather and emergency information.” National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration, National Weather Service, “NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards,” January 31, 2006, 

http://www.weather.gov/nwr. 119Transcript of August 27, 2005, NRCC Video Teleconference. 120 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Coast Guard, Hurricane Katrina: The U.S. Coast Guard at its Best

(Washington, D.C., 2005), 15. 121 “New Orleans Mayor, Louisiana Governor Hold Press Conference,” CNN, August 28, 2005, 

http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0508/28/bn.04.html. 122 “New Orleans Mayor, Louisiana Governor Hold Press Conference,” CNN, August 28, 2005, 

http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0508/28/bn.04.html . Louisiana law provides the parish presidents with 

the authority to issue mandatory evacuation orders. The law allows the Parish President to “Direct and compel the 

evacuation of all or part of the population from any stricken or threatened area within the boundaries of the parish if 

he deems this action necessary for mitigation, response, or recovery measures.” The law declares the penalty for 

violating such an order to be a fine not more than five hundred dollars, or confinement in the parish jail for not more 

than six months, or both. Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act, La. Rev. Stat. 

29-727. Although a State responsibility, it is unclear how the State or Parish law enforcement authorities intended 

to enforce this order. The Mayor ordered a mandatory evacuation for the entire Parish of Orleans, with the 
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 exceptions of essential personnel of the Federal government, State of Louisiana and City of New Orleans, as well as 

essential personnel of regulated utilities and mass transportation services, hospitals and their patients, essential 

media, Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriff's office and its inmates, and the essential personnel of operating hotels and 

their patrons. The Mayor ordered every person not exempt to immediately evacuate the City of New Orleans, or if 

no other alternative was available, to immediately move to one of the facilities within the City that would be 

designated a refuge of last resort. 123 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Coordination Center, video teleconference, August 

28, 2005. 

124 Frances Fragos Townsend, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, remarks to 

the National Emergency Management Association’s 2006 mid-year conference, February 13, 2006. 125 See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Coordination Center, video teleconference, 

August 28, 2005. 126 See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Coordination Center, video teleconference, 

August 28, 2005. 127 Secretary Chertoff asked, “...are there any DOD assets that might be available. Have we reached out to them, 

and have we I guess made any kind of arrangement in case we need some additional help from them?” Director 

Brown responded, “We have DOD assets over here at the EOC. They are fully engaged, and we are having those 

discussions with them now.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 

National Response Coordination Center, video teleconference, August 28, 2005. 128 Michael Chertoff, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, testimony on the Department of Homeland 

Security Relief Response, on October 19, 2005, before the House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 

Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress 1st session, 48. Secretary Chertoff testified, “it is 

correct that under the declaration there's an FCO appointed. It was Lokey in Louisiana and Carwile in Mississippi. 

But Brown went down as their supervisor with direct authority over them to be on the ground in charge of the entire 

Gulf Coast response. In other words, he went down on Sunday. He was—on Saturday he was in FEMA in 

Washington running the operation with each of the support function representatives, including DOD literally sitting 

at the table with him at FEMA headquarters. He then moved himself—after the Sunday VTC, down to Baton Rouge 

and operated using his authority over the FCOs as the head of the whole agency. He was in charge of this thing on 

the ground from his arrival on Sunday through the end. The designation as a PFO, I guess, was a kind of formal 

recognition of that.” 129 Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, written statement for a hearing on the 

Department of Homeland Security’s Hurricane Relief Response, on October 19, 2005, submitted to the House Select 

Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st

session, 14. 130 The White House, “President Discusses Hurricane Katrina, Congratulates Iraqis on Draft Constitution,” news 

release, August 28, 2005. 131 By Sunday afternoon, Mississippi ordered mandatory or voluntary evacuation orders for six counties. Alabama 

Governor Bob Riley issued evacuation orders for Mobile and Baldwin counties. State of Mississippi, Mississippi 

Emergency Management Agency, “Mississippians Urged to Take Precautions for Hurricane Katrina,” news release, 

August 28, 2005; State of Alabama, Office of the Governor, “Governor Riley Orders Evacuation of Parts of Mobile 

and Baldwin Counties,” news release, August 28, 2005; Leigh Ann Ryals, Director of the Baldwin County 

Emergency Management Agency, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by 

the State of Alabama, on November 9, 2005, House Committee on Government Reform on the State of Alabama’s 

Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina,109th Congress, 1st session. 132 “Before Katrina came, I developed a new evacuation plan that includes contra-flow, where both sides of the 

interstates are used for outbound traffic. I am proud that we rapidly moved over 1.2 million people - some 92% of 

the population - to safety without gridlock or undue delay prior to Katrina.” Governor Kathleen Blanco, written 

statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, on December 

14, 2005, submitted to the U.S. House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to 

Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session. See also, Johnny Bradberry, Secretary of the Louisiana Department 

of Transportation and Development, testimony before a hearing on the Evacuation of New Orleans, Senate 

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, January 31, 2006, 109th Congress, 2nd session. 
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133 U.S. Department of Transportation, “Hurricane Katrina - Situation Report Five,” August 29, 2005; Louis

Armstrong New Orleans International Airport, “Hurricane Katrina from the Airport’s Point of View,”

http://www.flymsy.com/. 134 Governor Kathleen Blanco, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response

by the State of Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, submitted to the U.S. House Select Committee to Investigate the

Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session. The Louisiana DOTD estimated that

500,000 vehicles evacuated during Phase 3 operations, see Louisiana State Police, “LSP Timeline of Events,” n.d.,

ca. 2005, 5. 135 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #6,” August 29, 2005, 12. 136 State of Texas, State Operations Center, “Situation Report #9,” August 28, 2005. 137 Ray Nagin, Mayor of New Orleans, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and

Response by the State of Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, U.S. House Select Committee to Investigate the

Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session, “After a Sunday morning statewide

conference call, I announced the first ever in our almost 300-year history a citywide mandatory evacuation order,

which followed the evacuation orders, I might add, of some of the other low-lying parishes that also were

encouraging their citizens to evacuate post haste. We opened the Superdome as our refuge of last resort, and we

staged buses throughout the city to transport people to the Superdome, and set a curfew for dusk. The city also

evacuated 400 special needs residents to the state shelter and then opened the Superdome at 8 a.m. that morning for

the remaining special needs populations. There were thousands of residents that did not leave, including those with

means who would choose to ride out the storm like their parents had done during Hurricane Betsy. When reality set

in for many of them on Sunday, they made their way to the refuge of last resort, the Superdome.”

Louisiana National Guard personnel on-scene reported no evacuees at the Superdome until after noon. Louisiana

National Guard, Task Force Pelican, “Hurricane Katrina Overview of Significant Events,” November 28, 2005, 5-6. 138 Major General Bennett Landreneau, Louisiana National Guard, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane

Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, and the National Guard of

Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, on October 27, 2005, House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the

Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session. A shelter of last resort is intended to

serve only as a location to ride out the winds of a storm. Under the State of Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan,

it could “be located either inside or outside of the Hurricane Risk” and did not have to meet American Red Cross

shelter standards. It is required to be “wind resistant” and “located outside of the flood zone or [provide the] ability

to locate on floors.” Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness, State of Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan

Supplement 1C: Louisiana Shelter Operations Plan (Baton Rouge, as revised July 2000), Annex M. 139 Marty Bahamonde, Regional Director for External Affairs, Region One, FEMA, written statement for a hearing

on Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, A Flooded City, A Chaotic Response, on October 20, 2005, submitted to the

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong., 1st session, 2, stating, “Later that

night after most of the 12,000 evacuees entered the Superdome, I returned to the EOC around midnight to ride out

the storm.” Although estimates put the Superdome population at between 20,000 and 40,000 by Friday, September

2, when evacuations of the Superdome began, Louisiana officials have stated that this increase took place after

landfall on the Gulf Coast. Colonel Jeff Smith, Acting Deputy Director, Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and

Emergency Preparedness, testimony before a hearing on the Hurricane Katrina Response in Louisiana, on December

14, 2005, House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th

Congress, 2nd session. Jeff Smith had recently taken the job of Acting Deputy Director of the Louisiana Office of

Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness. On November 29, 2004, a Federal grand jury had indicted

Michael L. Brown, the former Deputy Director of the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency

Preparedness (LOHSEP) and the State official responsible for overall management of Louisiana's Hazardous

Mitigation Grants from FEMA, on charges of obstructing a Federal audit. This grant program funds mitigation

projects to prevent flood loses or flood claims made upon the National Flood Insurance Program. Two other

LOHSEP officials were indicted with him. U.S. Department of Justice, Three State Officials Indicted for

Obstructing Federal Audit, press release, November 29, 2004,

http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/law/news/wdl20041129.html; Ken Silverstein and Josh Meyer, "Katrina's Aftermath:

Louisiana Officials Indicted Before Katrina Hit," Los Angeles Times, September 17, 2005, 17. 140 For example, the State of Alabama made a request on August 28 for shuttle trucks and tarps to be delivered to

Maxwell Air Force Base. Alabama also requested the transport and delivery of two 50-man Joint Field Office kits
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 to Montgomery. Mississippi requested the pre-positioning of 30 trucks of water with tractors at Meridian NAS and 

two helicopters to transport response personnel. 141 FEMA Office of Legislative Affairs, Hurricane Katrina Response Fact Sheet. 142 Speaking before the House Ways and Means Committee, Joseph C. Becke, Senior Vice President, 

American Red Cross, stated “It has been the policy of the Red Cross that there are no safe areas south of the I-10/I12 corridor for a large-scale hurricane . . . We do not establish shelters in facilities that do not meet our criteria for 

safety during landfall.” In saying this, Mr. Becke clearly implies that the Superdome is considered by the Red Cross 

to be an “unsafe” shelter. See Joseph C. Becke, Senior Vice President of Preparedness and Response, American 

Red Cross, written statement for a hearing on the Response of Charities to Hurricane Katrina, on December 13, 

2005, before the House Ways and Means Committee, 109th Congress 1st session. However, the Red Cross was not 

against the use of the Superdome as a shelter of last resort. In a “frequently asked questions” portion of the official 

Red Cross website the organization states, “the original plan was to evacuate all the residents of New Orleans to safe 

places outside the city. With the hurricane bearing down, the city government decided to open a shelter of last resort 

in the Superdome downtown. We applaud this decision and believe it saved a significant number of lives.” See 

American Red Cross, “Frequently Asked Questions,” http://www.redcross.org/faq/ 0,1096,0_682_4524,00.html 

(emphasis added). Thus, the Superdome, while it did not meet the Red Cross’ safety requirements, served a valuable 

purpose as a shelter of last resort. Although the Red Cross’s own policies prevented it from directly staffing the 

Superdome, the organization claims that it was willing to supply the shelter with essential commodities after Katrina 

made landfall. According to the “Frequently Asked Questions” statement on its website, the organization was 

prevented from carrying out this mission by the National Guard and local authorities. 143 “New Orleans Mayor, Louisiana Governor Hold Press Conference,” CNN Breaking News, August 28, 2005, 

http://transcripts.cnn.com/transcripts/0508/28/bn.04.html. 144 Major General Bennett Landreneau, Adjutant General, State of Louisiana, testimony before a hearing on 

Military Disaster Relief, on October 27, 2005, House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for 

and response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session. 145 Louisiana National Guard, Task Force Pelican, “Hurricane Katrina Overview of Significant Events,” 

November 28, 2005, 3, 5. 146 Louisiana National Guard, Task Force Pelican, “Hurricane Katrina Overview of Significant Events,” 

November 28, 2005, 6. 147 Louisiana National Guard, Task Force Pelican, “Hurricane Katrina Overview of Significant Events,” 

November 28, 2005, 6. 148 Louisiana National Guard, Task Force Pelican, “Hurricane Katrina Overview of Significant Events,” 

November 28, 2005, 7. 149 Louisiana National Guard, Task Force Pelican, “Hurricane Katrina Overview of Significant Events,” 

November 28, 2005, 7. 150 Louisiana National Guard, Task Force Pelican, “Hurricane Katrina Overview of Significant Events,” 

November 28, 2005, 7-8. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) contacted the Director of 

Emergency Preparedness for the Louisiana Health Department. The State declined assistance. 151 “New Orleans Mayor, Louisiana Governor Hold Press Conference,” CNN, August 28, 2005, 

http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0508/28/bn.04.html. 152Louisiana State Police, “LSP Timeline of Events,” n.d., ca. 2005. 5. The storm forced Troop B of the Louisiana 

State Police to relocate from their barracks to the Kenner Police Department’s headquarters. 153 Parish officials declared mandatory evacuations for Lafourche, Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. Charles 

and St. John the Baptist parishes. Officials declared mandatory evacuations for limited geographical or flood-prone 

areas of the following parishes: Jefferson, St. James, Livingston, Tangipahoa, St. Tammany and Terrebone. Parish 

officials recommended evacuations in Ascension, Assumption and Washington parishes. See Louisiana State 

Police, “Southeast Louisiana Evacuations Continue,” news release, August 28, 2005; Louisiana State Police, 

“Hurricane Evacuations: Livingston Parish,” news release, August 28, 2005; Louisiana State Police, “Hurricane 

Evacuations: St. Tammany Parish,” news release, August 28, 2005; Louisiana State Police, “Hurricane Evacuations: 

Washington Parish,” news release, August 28, 2005. 154 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Tropical Storm Katrina 

Briefing, August 25, 2005. 155 Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS) detachments consist of trained personnel and mobile 

response assets. FEMA has five MERS detachments strategically placed across the country. MERS detachments 
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 are designed to provide communications capabilities and operational and logistical support to first responders. 

Each MERS detachment has a suite of vehicle assets to provide support. Because its diverse asserts are housed 

on a number of different trucks, a single MERS detachment “can concurrently support a large Disaster Field 

Office and multiple field operating sites within the disaster area.” Thus, the deployment of one MERS unit is not 

married to a single location. The communications component of MERS capabilities consists of Ku-band satellite, 

International Maritime Satellite (INMARSAT) and American Mobile Satellite Corporation (AMSC) satellite 

terminals, line of sight microwave transmission, and high frequency, very high frequency, and ultra high 

frequency radio. MERS logistics support includes power, heating, ventilation, and cooling (HVAC), fuel, and 

[potable] water.” A MERS detachment can provide “generators to supply the power generation requirements of 

one or more facilities or locations within the disaster area,” and “heating, ventilation, and cooling requirements 

for a large office building.” A MERS detachment also provides personnel experienced in facility management, 

acquisition support, warehouse operation, transportation management, and property accountability.” Further, 

“the MERS Detachments have resources that can provide temporary office or operational space.” The Denton, 

Texas MERS team operates FEMA’s Emergency Operations Vehicle (EOV), an “82 foot long expandable trailer 

providing office workstations and conference space for 20-25 people.” The EOV also has kitchen, power 

generation, and communications facilities. MERS detachments also have rapid response teams to provide initial 

support immediately following a disaster. The Quick Reaction System (QRS) consists of “13 people with 4-

wheel drive vehicles and support equipment for 72 hours that provide the initial damage assessment.” This unit 

also has “an INMARSAT and AMSC satellite terminal, cellular telephones and laptop computers, VHF and HF 

radios, life support (water, food, batteries, etc.), and generators.” Finally, ERTA and ERTS units are “preloaded 

trucks with food, water, clothing, first aid items, safety equipment, sleeping bags, hygiene items, office 

equipment, tools, and lumber.” These trucks can support “100 people for 10 days.” For a detailed assessment of 

MERS capabilities, see U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 

Response and Recovery: Mobile Operations Capability Guide for Emergency Managers and Planners, October 

23, 2004, http://www.fema.gov/rrr/mers01.shtm. 156 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA National Situation 

Update,” August 29, 2005, 3. 157 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Office of Legislative 

Affairs, Hurricane Katrina Response Fact Sheet. 158 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Goddard Space Flight Center, “Hurricane Katrina from 

TRMM: August 28, 2005,” http://svs.gsfc.nasa.gov/vis/a000000/a003200/a003218/ (data from NASA spacecraft). 159 “New Orleans Mayor, Louisiana Governor Hold Press Conference,” CNN, August 28, 2005, 

http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0508/28/bn.04.html. 

CHAPTER FOUR: A WEEK OF CRISIS — AUGUST 29 – SEPTEMBER 5 

1

 The White House, “President Discusses Hurricane Relief in Address to the Nation,” news release, September 15, 

2005, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050915-8.html. 2

 These wind gusts were reported in Poplarville, Mississippi, at the Pearl River County Emergency Operations 

Center. See Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane 

Katrina, 23-30 August 2005, prepared for the National Hurricane Center (Miami, Florida, December 20, 2005), 3, 8. 3

 Hurricane Katrina was downgraded to Category 1 on the Saffir-Simpson scale at 6:00 PM UTC on August 29. 

Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina, 23-30 

August 2005, prepared for the National Hurricane Center (Miami, Florida, December 20, 2005), 4. 4

 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina, 23-30 

August 2005, prepared for the National Hurricane Center (Miami, Florida, December 20, 2005), 4. 5

 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina, 23-30 

August 2005, prepared for the National Hurricane Center (Miami, Florida, December 20, 2005). A National Data 

Buoy Center (NDBC) buoy located 64 nautical miles south of Dauphin Island, Alabama, measured a peak 

significant wave height of 55 feet on August 28, matching the record for “the largest significant wave height ever 

measured by a NDBC buoy.” 
APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

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 6

 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina, 23-30 

August 2005, prepared for the National Hurricane Center (Miami, Florida, December 20, 2005), 8-9. 7

 As of the time of this writing, Louisiana had counted 1,103 deaths, twenty-three of which were not storm related, 

for 1,080 storm related deaths. See Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, “Reports of Missing and 

Deceased,” February 17, 2006, http://www.dhh.louisiana.gov/offices/page.asp?ID=192&Detail=5248 (accessed 

February 17, 2006). There were 231 deaths in Mississippi, fifteen in Florida, two in Alabama, and two in Georgia. 

See Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina, 23-30 

August 2005, prepared for the National Hurricane Center (Miami, Florida, December 20, 2005), 10. Since there are 

still 2,096 people from the Gulf Coast area missing, it is likely that the death toll numbers will increase. See also 

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Satellite and Information 

Service and National Climatic Data Center, 2005 Annual Climate Review: U.S. Summary (Asheville, NC, January 

2006), http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/research/2005/ann/us-summary.html; and Ray Nagin, Mayor of New 

Orleans, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Managing the Crisis and Evacuating New Orleans, on 

February 1, 2006, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 2nd session. 8

 The White House, “President Outlines Hurricane Katrina Relief Efforts,” news release, August 31, 2005. 9

 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina, 23-30 

August 2005, prepared for the National Hurricane Center (Miami, Florida, December 20, 2005), 11. 10 Brett Martel, “'What Hiroshima looked like' - Katrina's full wrath still being felt, death toll soars past 100,” 

Associated Press, August 31, 2005. 11 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #8,” August 30, 2005. See also 

American Red Cross, “Hurricane Katrina Damage Assessments,” http://www.msema.org/redcrossassessments.htm 

(accessed February 13, 2006). 12 Guy Gugliotta and Peter Whoriskey, “Floods Ravage New Orleans; Two Levees Give Way; in Mississippi, 

Death Toll Estimated at 110,” Washington Post, August 31, 2005. 13 “The eastbound lanes of Interstate 10 between Gulfport and Biloxi were impassable because of storm debris.”

“Katrina kills 50 in one Mississippi county,” CNN.com, August 30, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/WEATHER/ 

08/29/hurricane.katrina. 14 “Katrina kills 50 in one Mississippi county,” CNN.com, August 30, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/ 

WEATHER/08/29/hurricane.katrina. See also U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS 

SITREP #8,” August 30, 2005, 3 (“Widespread flooding has also been reported across coastal Mississippi and 

Alabama”). 15 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Satellite and Information 

Service and National Climatic Data Center, “Hazards/Climate Extremes,” http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/ 

research/2005/aug/hazards.html; and Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, Tropical Cyclone 

Report: Hurricane Katrina, 23-30 August 2005, prepared for the National Hurricane Center (Miami, Florida, 

December 20, 2005), 8-9, 10. 16 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #14,” September 2, 2005. 17 Norman Mineta, Secretary of the Department of Transportation, written statement for a hearing on the 

Department of Transportation (Hurricane Katrina), on October 6, 2005, submitted to the House Committee on 

Appropriations, Subcommittee on Transportation, Treasury, Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, 

District of Columbia, and Independent Agencies, 109th Congress, 1st session. 18 Tommy Longo, Mayor of Waveland, Mississippi, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: 

Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi, on December 7, 2005, House Select Bipartisan Committee 

to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session, 51. 19 Tommy Longo, Mayor of Waveland, Mississippi, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: 

Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi, on December 7, 2005, House Select Bipartisan Committee 

to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session. See also U.S. 

Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, Coastal & Marine Geology Program, “Before and After Photo 

Comparisons: Mainland Mississippi,” Hurricane Katrina Impact Studies, August 31, 2005, 

http://coastal.er.usgs.gov/hurricanes/katrina/photo-comparisons/mainmississippi.html. 20 Haley Barbour, Governor of Mississippi, testimony via video teleconference before a hearing on Hurricane 

Katrina: Recovering from Hurricane Katrina, on September 7, 2005, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 

109th Congress, 1st session. 
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 21 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Operations Center, “Hurricane Katrina Update,” 

August 30, 2005, 12. 22 U.S. Department of Energy, “Department of Energy's Hurricane Response Chronology, as Referred to by 

Secretary Bodman at Today's Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee Hearing,” news release, October 27, 

2005, http://energy.gov/news/2404.htm. 23 U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, “Hurricane Katrina Situation 

Report #10,” August 30, 2005, 1; and U.S. Department of Energy, “Department of Energy's Hurricane Response 

Chronology, as Referred to by Secretary Bodman at Today's Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee 

Hearing,” news release, October 27, 2005, http://energy.gov/news/2404.htm. 24 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #36,” September 13, 2005, 7. “The 

wireline telecommunications network sustained enormous damage both to the switching centers that route calls and 

to the lines used to connect buildings and customers to the network.” Kenneth Moran, Director of the Office of 

Homeland Security, Enforcement Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, written statement for a hearing on 

Hurricane Katrina and Communications Interoperability, on September 29, 2005, submitted to the Senate 

Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 109th Congress, 1st session. 25 Nearly one hundred radio and television stations remained off the air a month after Hurricane Katrina’s landfall. 

Kenneth Moran, Director of the Office of Homeland Security, Enforcement Bureau, Federal Communications 

Commission, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina and Communications Interoperability, on 

September 29, 2005, submitted to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 109th

Congress, 1st session. 26 Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane 

Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, and the National Guard of 

Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, on October 27, 2005, House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 

Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session, 74. 27 “The public health and health care delivery infrastructures have been either completely destroyed or have 

sustained significant damage across the affected Gulf Coast. Existing facilities that are operational are under 

extreme stress as they assume even greater responsibilities to fill the gaps created by the loss of so many facilities. 

Physician offices, cancer, imaging, dialysis and rehabilitation centers, hospitals, clinics, long-term care facilities, 

pharmacies, laboratories, etc., need to be rebuilt or repaired, not to mention re-supplied, with information technology 

systems, equipment and inventory.” Ardis D. Hoven, Member of the American Medical Association Board of 

Trustees, written statement for a hearing on Assessing Public Health and the Delivery of Care in the Wake of 

Hurricane Katrina, on September 22, 2005, submitted to the House Energy and Commerce Committee, 

Subcommittees on Health and Oversight and Investigations, 109th Congress, 1st session. 28 “Nursing homes and hospitals were not a priority during the rescue process. For the first two days, [the 

Louisiana Nursing Home Association] was on its own to improvise and find ways to rescue the elderly in nursing 

homes.” Joseph A. Donchess, Executive Director of the Louisiana Nursing Home Association, written statement for 

a hearing on Challenges in a Catastrophe: Evacuating New Orleans in Advance of Hurricane Katrina, on January 

31, 2006, submitted to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 2nd

session. “Only a third of nursing homes in the New Orleans area evacuated before Katrina, according to state and 

industry officials. In hard-hit Orleans and Jefferson parishes, eight of forty-one nursing homes removed residents 

before the storm.” Roma Khanna, “Katrina’s toll on the sick, elderly emerges,” Houston Chronicle, November 28, 

2005. Fatality statistics illustrate Hurricane Katrina’s heavy toll on older Louisiana residents. For example, 71% of 

the dead at St. Gabriel Morgue whose age could be determined were more than sixty years old. See Louisiana 

Department of Health and Hospitals, “Vital Statistics of All Bodies at St. Gabriel Morgue,” January 4, 2006, 

http://www.dhh.louisiana.gov/publications 

.asp?ID=192&Detail=878. 29 For example, Dr. Mark Peters of East Jefferson General Hospital in Metairie, Louisiana, stated that, “A day or 

two after the storm, we ran low on food. We always were able to feed our patients, and there were only two days 

when the staff had to eat once a day, and in small amounts. After that, we were able to contact various businesses 

and vendors to replenish our supplies and food.” Dr. Mark Peters, President and Chief Executive Officer of East 

Jefferson General Hospital, written statement for a hearing on Assessing Public Health and Delivery of Care in the 

Wake of Hurricane Katrina, on September 22, 2005, submitted to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 

Subcommittee on Health and Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 109th Congress, 1st session. Also see 

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Secretary's Operations Center Flash Report #8--Hurricane 
APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

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 Katrina,” August 31, 2005, 1-2; and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Secretary's Operations Center 

Flash Report #9--Hurricane Katrina,” August 31, 2005, 1. 30 For example, six or seven patients at the Bethany Home, a nursing facility in New Orleans, succumbed to the 

conditions as they awaited evacuation. See Joseph A. Donchess, Executive Director of the Louisiana Nursing Home 

Association, testimony before a hearing on Challenges in a Catastrophe: Evacuating New Orleans in Advance of 

Hurricane Katrina, on January 31, 2006, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th

Congress, 2nd session. See also Roma Khanna, “Katrina’s Aftermath,” Houston Chronicle, November 27, 2005. 31 The Louisiana State Attorney General subsequently charged the nursing home’s owners with thirty-four counts 

of negligent homicide. Louisiana Office of the Attorney General, “Nursing Home Owners Surrender to Medicaid 

Fraud Control Unit Investigators,” news release, September 14, 2005, http://www.ag.state.la.us/ViewPressRel.aspx 

?RelID=420. 32 Ray Nagin, Mayor of New Orleans, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and 

Response by the State of Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation 

for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session, 3. 33 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina, 23-30 

August 2005, prepared for the National Hurricane Center (Miami, Florida, December 20, 2005), 9. 34 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina SITREP #6,” August 29, 2005. 35 R.B. Seed, P.G. Nicholson, R.A. Dalrymple, et al., Preliminary Report on the Performance of the New Orleans 

Levee Systems in Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005, November 17, 2005. 36 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Urban Search and Rescue 

Operations Completed: Hurricane Katrina Urban Search and Rescue Teams Are Due to Return Home,” news 

release, September 30, 2005, http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=19320.html 37 Governor Kathleen Blanco, Michael Brown, Senator Mary Landrieu, Bill Lokey, and Senator David Vitter, 

“Governor Kathleen Blanco (D-LA) Hold a News Conference Regarding Hurricane Katrina,” Congressional 

Quarterly Transcription, August 30, 2005. 38 FEMA Urban Search and Rescue teams “helped 6,582 people reach safety in the hours and days immediately 

following Hurricane Katrina. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 

“Urban Search and Rescue Operations Completed: Hurricane Katrina Urban Search and Rescue Teams Are Due to 

Return Home,” September 30, 2005, http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=19320.html. National Guard 

forces were engaged in search and rescue operations within four hours after landfall. Lieutenant General H. Steven 

Blum, written statement for a hearing on Responding to Catastrophic Events: The Role of the Military and National 

Guard in Disaster Response, on October 20, 2005, submitted to the House Committee on Government Reform, 

109th Congress, 1st session. Early search and rescue actions of local first responders: Ray Nagin, Mayor of New 

Orleans, written statement submitted for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of 

Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, to the House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to 

Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session, 1. 39 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service, 

Flash Flood Warning for Louisiana, August 29, 2005 (New Orleans, LA, August 2005). 40 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #7,” August 29, 2005. 41 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Operations Center, “FEMA National Sitrep 2005 

Aug 29,” August 29, 2005. 42 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Operations Center, “HSOC#4317-05: HC Katrina 

Update- 11:30hrs,” August 29, 2005. 43 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Operations Center, “HSOC#4317-05: VTC 

NOTES 29 AUG 05.” 44 It was not until 7:30 PM that the HSOC developed a spot report that described the USACE report, but it is 

unclear if this spot report was distributed outside of the HSOC. 45 Marty Bahamonde, Regional Director for External Affairs, Region One, Federal Emergency Management 

Agency, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, A Flooded City, A Chaotic Response, on 

October 20, 2005, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 1st session. 46 Marty Bahamonde, Regional Director for External Affairs, Region One, Federal Emergency Management 

Agency, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, A Flooded City, A Chaotic Response, on 

October 20, 2005, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 1st session. 
APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

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 47 Michael Brown, former Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, testimony before a hearing on 

Hurricane Katrina: Hurricane Preparedness, on February 10, 2006, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 2nd session. 48 Marty Bahamonde, Regional Director for External Affairs, Region One, Federal Emergency Management 

Agency, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, A Flooded City, A Chaotic Response, on 

October 20, 2005, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 1st session. 49 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Operations Center, “HSOC Spot Rep #13,” August 

29, 2005). 50 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS Sit Rep #8,” August 30, 2005. 51 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Operations Center, “HSOC #4217-05: HC 

Katrina—NO 200 Ft Breached Levee Update,” August 30, 2005; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland 

Security Operations Center, “HSOC #4317-05: HC Katrina – NO 200 Ft of Levee Breached,” August 30, 2005; and 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Operations Center, “HSOC Spot Rep FW: US Army 

Corps of Engineers Spot Rep,” August 30, 2005. 52 Governor Kathleen Blanco, Michael Brown, Senator Mary Landrieu, Bill Lokey, and Senator David Vitter, 

“Governor Kathleen Blanco (D-LA) Hold a News Conference Regarding Hurricane Katrina,” Congressional 

Quarterly Transcription, August 30, 2005. 53 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina, 23-30 

August 2005, prepared for the National Hurricane Center (Miami, Florida, December 20, 2005); and Ray Nagin, 

Mayor of New Orleans, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State 

of Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to 

Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session. In contrast, Raymond B. Seed, prepared statement for a hearing on 

Hurricane Katrina: Performance of the Flood Control System, on November 2, 2005, submitted to the Senate 

Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, 109th Congress, 1st session, 2, 

http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/110205Seed.pdf. Both sources report that eighty percent of New Orleans experienced 

some amount of flooding. 54 Michael Brown, former Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, testimony before a hearing 

on Hurricane Katrina: Hurricane Preparedness, on February 10, 2006, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 2nd session. 55 International Association of Firefighters, “Reports from the Hurricane Frontlines: Katrina (August 29-

September 6),” August 30, 2005, http://daily.iaff.org/Katrina/Katrina.htm?c=report1. 56 International Association of Firefighters, “Reports from the Hurricane Frontlines: Katrina (September 7-

September 13),” September 10, 2005, http://daily.iaff.org/Katrina/Katrina.htm?c=report2. 57 Warren J. Riley, Superintendent of the New Orleans Police Department, written statement for a hearing on 

Hurricane Katrina: Managing Law Enforcement and Communications in a Catastrophe, on February 6, 2006, 

submitted to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 2nd session. 

In contrast, see Ray Nagin, Mayor of New Orleans, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: 

Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, House Select Committee to 

Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session (“Pre-Katrina, we had 

1,668 officers. Post-Katrina, we're at 1,506 -- so we're down 162 officers. We've had about 133 officers that have 

either been terminated, resigned, you know, are under investigation or resigned for personal reasons.”). 58 Louisiana State Police, “Hurricane Katrina Timeline of Events,” n.d.,ca. 2005. 59 Christopher Rhoads, “Cut Off: At Center of Crisis, City Officials faced struggle to keep in touch,” Wall Street 

Journal, September 9, 2005. 60 Willis Carter, Chief of Communications, Shreveport, Louisiana Fire Department, written statement for a 

hearing on Communications Interoperability, on September 29, 2005, submitted to the Senate Committee on 

Commerce, Science and Transportation, 109th Congress, 1st session. 61 Louisiana State Police, “Hurricane Katrina Timeline of Events,” n.d., ca. 2005. 62 Senator Robert Barham, quoted in Joby Warrick, “Crisis Communications Remain Flawed,” Washington Post, 

December 10, 2005. 63 Nick Felton, New Orleans Local 632 President, quoted in International Association of Firefighters, “Reports 

from the Hurricane Frontlines: Katrina (September 7-September 13),” September 13, 2005, 

http://daily.iaff.org/Katrina/Katrina.htm?c=report2. 
APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

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 64 Lieutenant Colonel Keith LaCaze, Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, Enforcement Division, 

Activity Report on Hurricane Katrina (Baton Rouge, 2005), 2; Massachusetts Urban Search and Rescue Task Force 

One, Hurricane Katrina: National Urban Search and Rescue Response System Issue Statements and 

Recommendations (Beverly, MA, 2005), 7; and Ceci Connolly, ‘“I Don’t Think I’ve Ever Had a More Surreal 

Experience’; Veteran Rescue Workers Surprised by Challenges in Louisiana,” Washington Post, September 12, 

2005. 65 Juliet Eilperin, “Flooded Toxic Waste Sites Are Potential Health Threat,” Washington Post, September 10, 

2005. “A Superfund site is any land in the United States that has been contaminated by hazardous waste and 

identified by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as a candidate for cleanup because it poses a risk to 

human health and/or the environment.” See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “About Superfund,” 

http://www.epa.gov/superfund/about.htm (accessed January 28, 2005). 66 Gulf Coast Hurricane Emergency Environmental Protection Act of 2005, HR Res. 4139, section 102 (c), 109th

Congress, 1st session (October 25, 2005). See also U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina: 

What Government is Doing,” http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/katrina.htm (accessed February 10, 2006). 67 For first-hand accounts of these conditions, see Lieutenant Colonel Keith LaCaze, Louisiana Department of 

Wildlife and Fisheries, Enforcement Division, Activity Report on Hurricane Katrina (Baton Rouge, 2005), 2; 

Massachusetts Urban Search and Rescue Task Force One, Hurricane Katrina: National Urban Search and Rescue 

Response System Issue Statements and Recommendations (Beverly, MA, 2005), 7; and Ceci Connolly, ‘“I Don’t 

Think I’ve Ever Had a More Surreal Experience’; Veteran Rescue Workers Surprised by Challenges in Louisiana,” 

Washington Post, September 12, 2005. For details on the contaminants found in tested floodwaters, see U.S. 

Environmental Protection Agency, “Environmental Assessment Summary for Areas of Jefferson, Orleans, St. 

Bernard, and Plaquemines Parishes Flooded as a Result of Hurricane Katrina,” December 6, 2005, 

http://www.epa.gov/katrina/testresults/katrina_env_assessment_summary.htm. 68 For example, see Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, letter to Governor Bill Owens, entitled “Calling 

Certain Elements of the Colorado National Guard to Active Duty to Assist with Emergency Response Efforts 

Related to Hurricane Katrina,” September 1, 2005. Governor Blanco signed similar memoranda with fifteen other 

States on the same date. 

EMAC was established to provide form and structure to interstate mutual aid. Approved by Congress in 1996 

(Public Law 104-321), the EMAC membership has since grown to include 49 States, the District of 

Columbia, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. Through EMAC, a disaster-struck member State may request and 

receive assistance from other member States quickly and efficiently, facilitated by the Compact's legal foundation. 

Once the conditions for providing assistance to a requesting State have been set, the terms constitute a legally 

binding contractual agreement that obligates States for reimbursement. See Emergency Management Assistance 

Compact, “About EMAC,” http://www.emacweb.org. 69 U.S. Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau, After Action Review: Hurricane Response September 

2005, December 21, 2005, 57. 70 Ray Nagin, Mayor of New Orleans, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and 

Response by the State of Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, submitted to the House Select Committee to Investigate 

the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session, 1. 71 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Urban Search and Rescue 

Operations Completed: Hurricane Katrina Urban Search and Rescue Teams Are Due to Return Home,” news 

release, September 30, 2005, http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=19320.html. FEMA pre-positioned 

US&R teams to the region and eventually deployed all twenty-eight National US&R teams within the first week 

after Hurricane Katrina’s second landfall. FEMA US&R Task Forces, in conjunction with USCG, DOD, other 

Federal agencies, and State and local first responders, rescued over 6,500 people. 72 Donna Miles, “Military Support to Katrina Relief Effort Continues to Grow,” American Forces Information 

Service, August 31, 2005, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2005/20050831_2576.html. 73 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Coast Guard, Hurricane Katrina: The U.S. Coast Guard at its Best

(Washington, D.C., 2005), 7, 47. See also U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Coast Guard, “Coast Guard 

Response to Hurricane Katrina,” Coast Guard Fact File, http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/comrel/factfile/index.htm 

(accessed February 10, 2006); and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina: What Government 

is Doing,” http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/katrina.htm (accessed February 10, 2006). 74 John Sherffius, cartoon, reproduced by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Coast Guard Aviation 

Association, September 2005, http://www.aoptero.org/images/nola%20st.gif (accessed February 7, 2006). 
APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 

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 75 Haley Barbour, Governor of Mississippi, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness 

and Response by the State of Mississippi, on December 7, 2005, submitted to the House Select Bipartisan 

Committee to Investigate the Preparation and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session, 2-3. 76 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Urban Search and Rescue 

Operations Completed: Hurricane Katrina Urban Search and Rescue Teams Are Due to Return Home,” September 

30, 2005, http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=19320.html. 77 Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, written statement for a hearing on Responding to Catastrophic Events: The 

Role of the Military and National Guard in Disaster Response, on October 20, 2005, submitted to the House 

Committee on Government Reform, 109th Congress, 1st session. 78 “US&R activities include locating, extricating, and providing onsite medical treatment to victims trapped in 

collapsed structures.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., 

December 2004), ESF #9-1. 79 National Search and Rescue Committee, National Search and Rescue Plan (Washington, D.C., 1999), 8-9. 80 East Baton Rouge Parish, Draft After-Action Report for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (Baton Rouge, 2005), 37-38. 81 Louisiana Office of the Governor, Response to U.S Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 

Affairs Document and Information Request Dated October 7, 2005 and to the U.S House of Representatives Select 

Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina (Baton Rouge, December 2, 

2005), 11; and Lieutenant Colonel Keith LaCaze, Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, Enforcement 

Division, Activity Report on Hurricane Katrina (Baton Rouge, 2005). 82 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), ESF #9-1. 83 Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness, Emergency Operations Plan Supplement 1A: Southeast 

Louisiana Hurricane Evacuation and Sheltering Plan (Baton Rouge, January 2000), Parts I, II, VI. The City of New 

Orleans had drafted a hurricane annex to its emergency management plan that outlined the responsibilities of 

municipal organizations for executing the City’s evacuation. See New Orleans Office of Emergency Preparedness, 

City of New Orleans Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan: Hurricanes Annex (New Orleans, n.d.). 84 William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Officer for Louisiana, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane 

Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, submitted to the House 

Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session, 

93 ; Brigadier General Mark Graham, Deputy Commanding General, Fifth U.S. Army, written statement for a 

hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Managing the Crisis and Evacuating New Orleans, on February 1, 2006, submitted to 

the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 109th Congress, 2nd session; and Vince Pearce, 

National Response Program Manager, Department of Transportation, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane 

Katrina: Managing the Crisis and Evacuating New Orleans, on February 1, 2006, submitted to the Senate Committee 

on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, 109th Congress, 2nd session, 1-2. 85 On August 29, the population of evacuees at the facility was estimated to be between 10,000 and 12,000. Marty 

J. Bahamonde, Office of Public Affairs, Federal Emergency Management Agency, testimony before the Senate 

Homeland Security Committee and Governmental Affairs, October 20, 2005, 2; Louisiana Office of the Governor, 

Response to U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Information Request 

Dated October 7, 2005 and to the U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for 

and Response to Hurricane Katrina, (Baton Rouge, December 2, 2005), 7; and Louisiana National Guard, Task 

Force Pelican, “Hurricane Katrina: Overview of Significant Events,” November 28, 2005, 14. An inaccurate 

estimate of 25,000 general population evacuees at the Superdome was reported by DHS on August 29. U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security, "Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #6," August 29, 2005, 13. 

 FEMA estimated the Superdome population at 20,000 people on August 29. The Louisiana National Guard 

estimates that the crowd grew to 35,000 over the course of the next three days. See Louisiana National Guard, Task 

Force Pelican, “Hurricane Katrina: Overview of Significant Events,” November 28, 2005, 13, 15-17. 86 Louisiana National Guard, Task Force Pelican, “Hurricane Katrina: Overview of Significant Events,” 

November 28, 2005, 16, 17. 87 Major General Bennett Landreneau, Adjutant General for the State of Louisiana, testimony before a hearing on 

Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the Department of Defense, on October 27, 2005, House Select 

Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st

session. 88 Louisiana National Guard, Task Force Pelican, “Hurricane Katrina: Overview of Significant Events,” 

November 28, 2005, 17. 
APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

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 89 Louisiana National Guard, Task Force Pelican, “Hurricane Katrina: Overview of Significant Events,” 

November 28, 2005, 15-17; Marty Bahamonde, Regional Director for External Affairs, Region One, Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans: A Flooded 

City, a Chaotic Response, on October 20, 2005, submitted to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 1st session. 90 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Secretary’s Operations Center Flash Report #6,”August 30, 

2005. 91 Louisiana Office of the Governor, Response to U.S Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 

Affairs Document and Information Request Dated October 7, 2005 and to the U.S House of Representatives Select 

Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina (Baton Rouge, December 2, 

2005), 9. 92 FEMA requested of the Governors of a number of States that their States accept and temporarily house 

evacuees. See, e.g., Arizona Department of Housing, “Arizona to Accept Evacuees from Gulf Coast,” news release, 

n.d., ca. 2005, http://www.housingaz.com/evacuees.asp.; Oregon Office of the Governor, “Questions and Answers 

on Relief Efforts,” http://governor.oregon.gov/Gov/hurricane_qa.shtml. The Governor of Louisiana and her staff 

also made direct requests to States. See Louisiana Office of the Governor, Response to U.S Senate Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Document and Information Request Dated October 7, 2005 and to the 

U.S House of Representatives Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane 

Katrina (Baton Rouge, December 2, 2005), 9-10. 93 Louisiana Office of the Governor, Response to U.S Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 

Affairs Document and Information Request Dated October 7, 2005 and to the U.S House of Representatives Select 

Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina (Baton Rouge, December 2, 

2005), 10. 94 The provision of buses occurred through ESF-1, which is led by the Department of Transportation. Vincent 

Pearce, National Response Program Manager for the Department of Transportation, written statement submitted for 

a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Managing the Crisis and Evacuating New Orleans, on February 1, 2006, to the 

Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee; and U.S. Department of Transportation, “Actions 

for Hurricane Katrina: Annotated Chronology of Significant Events,” October 6, 2005, 4. 95 FEMA directly requested that several States receive and house evacuees. For examples, see Arizona 

Department of Housing, “Arizona to Accept Evacuees from Gulf Coast,” news release, n.d., ca. 2005, 

http://www.housingaz.com/evacuees.asp.; and Oregon Office of the Governor, “Questions and Answers on Relief 

Efforts,” http://governor.oregon.gov/Gov/hurricane_qa.shtml. In other cases, such requests were made by one 

State's governor to another. For example, see District of Columbia Office of the Mayor, “Mayor Williams 

Announces Airlift of Several Hundred Hurricane Evacuees to DC Armory,” news release, September 5, 2005, 

http://dc.gov/mayor/news/release.asp?id=758&mon=200509; and New York Office of the Governor, “Governor: 

NY Stands Ready to Welcome Hurricane Katrina Evacuees, news release, September 7, 2005, 

http://www.ny.gov/governor/press/05/sep7_05.htm. 96 I-10 is a major interstate cutting east-west through New Orleans. Near the Superdome, I-10 features an elevated 

four-way interchange, called a cloverleaf due to its distinctive shape. Evacuees gathered atop this interchange to 

escape Hurricane Katrina’s floodwaters. Brigadier General Mark A. Graham, Deputy Commanding General, Fifth 

U.S. Army, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Managing the Crisis and Evacuating New Orleans, 

on February 1, 2006, submitted to the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee, 109th

Congress, 2nd session, 2, 3-4; and William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Officer for Louisiana, written statement for 

a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, 

submitted to the House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 

109th Congress, 1st session, 5, 7, 92. 97 Louisiana Office of the Governor, Response to U.S Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 

Affairs Document and Information Request Dated October 7, 2005 and to the U.S House of Representatives Select 

Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina (Baton Rouge, December 2, 

2005), 10. 98 Louisiana National Guard, Task Force Pelican, “Hurricane Katrina: Overview of Significant Events,” 

November 28, 2005, 23, 24. Ray Nagin, Mayor of New Orleans, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane 

Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, submitted to the House 

Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session. 
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 99 Louisiana National Guard, Task Force Pelican, “Hurricane Katrina: Overview of Significant Events,” 

November 28, 2005, 23. 100 Louisiana National Guard, Task Force Pelican, “Hurricane Katrina: Overview of Significant Events,” 

November 28, 2005, 23; Ray Nagin, Mayor of New Orleans, written statement for a hearing on Managing the Crisis: 

Evacuating New Orleans, on February 1, 2006, submitted to the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental 

Affairs Committee, 109th Congress, 2nd session; and Louisiana Office of the Governor, Response to U.S Senate 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Document and Information Request Dated October 7, 

2005 and to the U.S House of Representatives Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to 

Hurricane Katrina (Baton Rouge, December 2, 2005), 10. 101 Louisiana Office of the Governor, Response to U.S Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs Document and Information Request Dated October 7, 2005 and to the U.S House of 

Representatives Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina (Baton 

Rouge, December 2, 2005), 11. Also see Kathleen Blanco, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: 

Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, submitted to the House Select 

Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session, 68. 102 “The buses that the city of New Orleans controls are basically Regional Transit Authority. And those buses 

were always staged, or has been staged in an area that has been high and dry throughout every storm that has ever hit 

the city of New Orleans. And we expected the same for this event. Unfortunately, those buses flooded also because 

80 percent of the city went underwater.” Ray Nagin, Mayor of New Orleans, written statement for a hearing on 

Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, submitted to the 

House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st

session, 99. 103 Louisiana Office of the Governor, Response to U.S Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs Document and Information Request Dated October 7, 2005 and to the U.S House of 

Representatives Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina (Baton 

Rouge, December 2, 2005), 11. 104 “About 20,000 people were in the dome when efforts began, and that number swelled as people poured in to 

get a ride out of town, Capt. John Pollard said.” The Associated Press, “Superdome Evacuation Completed,” 

September 3, 2005. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9175611/ 105 Medical evacuations from the Convention Center began on September 2, as well. U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #14,” September 2, 2005, 1; and Louisiana National Guard, 

Task Force Pelican, “Hurricane Katrina: Overview of Significant Events,” November 28, 2005, 23-24. Louisiana 

National Guard, Task Force Pelican, “Hurricane Katrina: Overview of Significant Events,” November 28, 2005, 23-

24. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #16,” September 3, 2005, 1. 106 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #17,” September 3, 2005, 1. 107 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #16,” September 3, 2005, 1. 108 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #18,” September 4, 2005, 1. 109 The next three largest U.S. domestic airlifts were: Hurricane Andrew in 1992 (13,500 people), the Mariel 

Boatlift (12,000 people by helicopter), and Hurricane Rita (9,000 people). U.S. Department of Transportation, 

“Largest Airlift in U.S. History to Get Over 10,000 People Out of New Orleans by End of Today,” news release, 

September 3, 2005, http://www.dot.gov/affairs/dot12005.htm; National Museum of the U.S. Air Force, “Year by 

Year Events: 1990-1997,” http://www.pafb.af.mil/museum/50th/event90.htm. 110 In addition, the U.S. Army provided ground support at the airport, including physically assisting in loading 

passengers up airplane stairs and into aircraft. See also U.S. Department of Transportation, “Hurricane Katrina – 

Situation Report Fifteen,” September 3, 2005, 2; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS 

SITREP #14,” September 2, 2005 (“Coordinated major airlift of evacuees to begin 8:00 AM CDT, September 2, 2005. 

Evacuees will depart New Orleans Superdome by bus, and be flown at a rate of 4-5 planes per hour from New 

Orleans Airport to Lackland Air Force Base, TX for reception and housing at Kelly AFB”); U.S. Department of 

Transportation, In re: Foreign Air Carriers: Facilitation of Air Services in Support of Hurricane Katrina Relief 

Efforts, Docket OST-2005-22395 (September 2, 2005), 3; and James C. May, President and Chief Executive Officer 

of Air Transport Association of America, testimony before a hearing on Review of the Impact of Hurricane Katrina 

on the Aviation Industry, on September 14, 2005, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 

Subcommittee on Aviation, 109th Congress, 1st session, 8. 
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 111 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA VIP Briefing,” 

slide presentation, September 2, 2005. 112 U.S. Department of Defense, “Hurricane Katrina Update,” September 8, 2005, 4; U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region VI Regional Response Coordinating Center, 

“SITREP #10,” September 4, 2005, 1; and Bryon Okada, “Screeners kept flights moving,” Dallas Fort-Worth Star 

Telegram, September 12, 2005, as reprinted by the Transportation Security Administration, What Others Are Saying 

About TSA, http://www.tsa.gov/public/display?theme=204&content=090005198016ab96. 113 The Department of Transportation had arranged for Amtrak to transport evacuees from New Orleans to 

Lafayette on a twice-daily run. The trains had enough food and water to sustain the passengers during the two to 

four hour ride. The first Amtrak train arrived at Avondale Station in New Orleans at 4:30 AM on September 3. The 

train could have accommodated 600 passengers, but only ninety-six were at the station because of a bus problem in 

New Orleans. See U.S. Department of Transportation, “Hurricane Katrina – Situation Report Fifteen,” September 3, 

2005, 10. In contrast, however, see Ray Nagin, Mayor of New Orleans, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane 

Katrina: Managing the Crisis and Evacuating New Orleans, on February 1, 2006, Senate Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs Committee, 109th Congress, 2nd session. 114 CNN, “Rita Now a Monster Category-Five Storm,” transcript, September 22, 2005. 

http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0509/22/lad.04.html 115 For examples, see Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, “Hurricane Katrina Situation Report 24,” 

September 1, 2005, 11; For examples of media reports on the looting, see Walt Philbin, “Widespread looting hits 

abandoned businesses; Lack of police after storm leaves stores vulnerable,” New Orleans Times-Picayune, August 

30, 2005; “Katrina kills 50 in one Mississippi county,” CNN.com, August 30, 2005, 

http://www.cnn.com/2005/WEATHER/08/29/hurricane.katrina. 116 In one notable example, on August 30, a New Orleans Police officer was shot in the head by looters. See 

Louisiana State Police, “Hurricane Katrina Timeline of Events,” n.d., ca. 2005, 8. Also in New Orleans, a man was 

arrested by Federal agents for firing at a U.S. military helicopter on a search and rescue mission. U.S. Attorney’s 

Office for the Eastern District of Louisiana, news release, October 8, 2005. The reported target of the gunfire was a 

U.S. military helicopter on a search and rescue mission. While the gunfire did not hit the helicopter, the incident 

was widely reported and contributed to the perception of lawlessness in New Orleans. See, e.g., “ATF Makes First 

Federal Arrest in New Orleans,” US Fed News, September 6, 2005; “US authorities arrest New Orleans man accused 

of firing on helicopter,” Agence France Presse, September 7, 2005; “Federal agents start post-storm arrests; Algiers 

man accused of shooting at copter,” New Orleans Times-Picayune, September 7, 2005. 117 For examples, see U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #7,” August 29, 

2005, 5; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #11,” August 31, 2005, 4. 

Additionally, without functioning jails in New Orleans, law enforcement officers initially had no choice but to 

release those that they arrested for minor crimes. 118 Reports on general lawlessness in New Orleans, were later found to be embellished or completely false. Brian 

Thevenot and Gordon Russel, “Rape. Murder. Gunfights,” New Orleans Times-Picayune, September 26, 2005; 

Robert E. Pierre and Ann Gerhart, “News of Pandemonium May Have Slowed Aid,” Washington Post, October 5, 

2005; and Michelle Roberts, “Reports of rape, murder at Katrina shelters were probably exaggerated, officials now 

say,” Associated Press, September 27, 2005. 119 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Hurricane Katrina 

Response Brief,” September 1, 2005. The brief reported that security and lawlessness were becoming a “very 

critical concern” and were hindering relief efforts. See also U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, “VIP Katrina Briefing,” slide presentation, September 1, 2005. 120 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Coast Guard District Eight, internal message from August 31, 2005; 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Operations Center, “HSOC SPOT REP #53,” 

September 1, 2005; and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #13,” September 

1, 2005. 121 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region VI Regional 

Response Coordination Center, “1603-DR-LA SitRep #7,” September 1, 2005; U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #13,” September 13, 2005; and U.S. Department of Defense, “CJCS 

Katrina Update,” draft, September 6, 2005. 
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122 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Secretary’s Operations Center Flash Report #10 – Hurricane

Katrina,” September 1, 2005; and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Secretary’s Operations Center

Flash Report #12 – Hurricane Katrina,” September 2, 2005. 123 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #15,” September 2, 2005; U.S.

Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #19,” September 4, 2005; U.S. Department of

Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #18,” September 4, 2005; U.S. Department of Homeland

Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #29,” September 9, 2005. 124 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #13,” September 1, 2005, 4, 10, 12;

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #15,” September 2, 2005, 5, 13, 14; U.S.

Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #16,” September 3, 2005, 10; U.S.

Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #18,” September 4, 2005, 1; U.S. Department

of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #19,” September 4, 2005, 11; U.S. Department of

Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #21,” September 5, 2005, 11; U.S. Department of Homeland

Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #22,” September 6, 2005, 9. 125 The Department of Homeland Security’s law enforcement response began on August 29, when Immigration

and Customs Enforcement (ICE) deployed officers from the Federal Protective Service to protect critical Federal

facilities and to assist FEMA where needed. From August 30 to September 1, DHS deployed additional ICE

personnel to the region to perform public safety and security missions. The U.S. Coast Guard also deployed

personnel to conduct security and law enforcement missions. By August 30, Customs & Border Protection (CBP)

deployed a site survey team and Special Operations Division agents to the hurricane area; CBP air and maritime

assets also joined in conducting law enforcement operations. On August 31, the Secret Service deployed personnel

to implement its Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) and Restoration of Operations, Personnel and Equipment

(ROPE) mission assignments.

 On September 1, the Office of the Attorney General directed ATF, DEA, FBI, and the U.S. Marshals Service to

identify personnel, assets, and other resource for immediate deployment to areas impacted by Hurricane Katrina. On

September 2, having received the inventory of assets and personnel available for deployment, the Attorney General

issued a memorandum to the same agencies directing the Federal Bureau of Investigation to continue to deploy

agents (including SWAT agents) and tactical assets (including helicopters, boats, and technical/communications

assets) to the affected area; the Drug Enforcement Administration to prepare to deploy Mobile Enforcement Teams,

special agents, and tactical assets (including helicopters and other aircraft) to the affected area; the Bureau of

Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives to establish a Violent Crime Impact Team (VCIT) in Baton Rouge,

Louisiana, with related VCIT personnel and assets, to address any rise in criminal activity in that city; and the

United States Marshals Service to continue to deploy Deputy U.S. Marshals and Court Security Officers to conduct

prisoner transport operations and provide additional court security and to prepare to utilize the Justice Prisoner and

Alien Transportation (JPATS) to deploy law enforcement personnel to airports around the country as needed. 126 In the first week following Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, DHS and DOJ deployed the following numbers of law

enforcement personnel to New Orleans to assist in restoring order. Other departments contributed significant

numbers of law enforcement personnel as well.

Date DHS DOJ

Aug 29 66 268

Aug 30 74 292

Aug 31 196 326

Sep 1 162 443

Sep 2 381 547

Sep 3 1033 645

Sep 4 1230 690

127 42 U.S.C. § 10501 et seq. See also letter from Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco to Attorney General

Alberto Gonzales, dated September 3, 2005 [letter is dated September 3, 2005, but was received via facsimile on the

following day]; letter from Attorney General Gonzales to Governor Blanco, dated September 4, 2005 (approving

request); letter from Governor Blanco to Attorney General Gonzales and Secretary Chertoff, dated September 6,

2005 (requesting additional support); letter from Attorney General Gonzales to Governor Blanco, dated September

7, 2005 (approving request); letter from Secretary Chertoff to Governor Blanco, dated September 7, 2005
APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

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 (approving request). Governor Barbour of Mississippi made a similar request on September 3, which was granted 

pursuant to an order by the Attorney General on that date. 128 DHS deployed law enforcement officers from Customs and Border Protection, the Federal Air Marshals 

Service, the Federal Protective Service, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement. DOJ deployed officers from 

the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, and the U.S. Marshals Service. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS 

SITREP #21,” September 5, 2005. 129 By September 8, the Department of Interior deployed 175 law enforcement officers from the U.S. Fish and 

Wildlife Service, the National Park Service, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Tribal Police. The Department of 

the Treasury and the Department of Veteran Affairs deployed thirty-four and thirty-three law enforcement officers, 

respectively. The Environmental Protection Agency sent seventeen officers to the region, and the U.S. Postal 

Inspection Service deployed a total of 117 law enforcement personnel. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 

“Federal Law Enforcement Deployed to Region,” September 8, 2005. In addition, USDA’s Forest Service deployed 

approximately 300-350 law enforcement officers to the affected area as members of ESF-4 Incident Management 

Teams. Eventually, over 3,500 Federal law enforcement officers were deployed to the region. 130 In Louisiana, for example, a State Police attorney had to physically be present to swear in Federal agents. 

Additionally, law enforcement personnel from the Department of the Interior (DOI) had to be sworn in as Deputy 

U.S. Marshals to give them Federal law enforcement authority beyond their statutory DOI jurisdiction. 131 For additional information on the disarray of the New Orleans criminal justice system in Hurricane Katrina’s 

aftermath, see Melinda Deslatte, “Prisons in New Orleans empty as temporary booking facility up and running,” 

Associated Press, September 3, 2005; Ann Woolner, “A Legal System in Chaos: New Orleans Struggles,” Fulton 

County Daily Report, October 4, 2005; and Chuck Crumbo, “Evacuation leaves Louisiana prison system in chaos,” 

The State (Columbia, SC), October 5, 2005. 132 On September 3, the Associated Press reported that “computer logs still hadn’t been retrieved from the 

criminal district court in New Orleans...[and] tracking down witnesses, finding court records and trial transcripts 

and organizing a temporary court” would remain challenges to the reestablishment of the city’s criminal justice 

system. Melinda Deslatte, “Prisons in New Orleans empty as temporary booking facility up and running,” 

Associated Press, September 3, 2005; Ann Woolner, “A Legal System in Chaos: New Orleans Struggles,” Fulton 

County Daily Report, October 4, 2005; and Chuck Crumbo, “Evacuation leaves Louisiana prison system in chaos,” 

The State (Columbia, SC), October 5, 2005. Both State and Federal courts closed their doors. Supreme Court of 

Louisiana, Order by Justice Catherine D. Kimball, September 2, 2005, Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Supreme Court of 

Mississippi, Order by Justice James W. Smith, Jr., September 7, 2005; U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 

Louisiana, Order by Chief Judge Helen G. Berrigan, September 4, 2005, accessed from 

http://katrinalaw.org/dokuphp?id=louisiana_eastern_district_court on February 17, 2006; U.S. Bankruptcy Court for 

the Eastern District of Louisiana, September 2, 2005, accessed from 

http://katrinalaw.org/dokuphp?id=louisiana_eastern_bankruptcy_court on February 17, 2006; Fourth Circuit Court 

of Appeal, State of Louisiana, Order by Justice Max N. Tobias, Jr., September 2, 2005, accessed from 

http://katrinalaw.org/dokuphp?id=fourth_circuit_court_of_appeal on February 17, 2006; Fifth Circuit Court of 

Appeal, State of Louisiana, Order by Justice Walter J. Rothschild, September 2, 2005, accessed from: 

http://katrinalaw.org/dokuphp?id= fifth_circuit_court_of_appeal, accessed on February 17, 2006; Civil District 

Court, Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana, Order by Chief Justice Robin M. Giarrusso, September 2, 2005, 

accessed from http://katrinalaw.org/dokuphp?id= orleans_parish_civil_district_court, accessed on February 17, 

2006. 133 The DOJ’s Bureau of Prisons moved or facilitated movement of a large number of prisoners incarcerated in 

Louisiana facilities during the first week of the disaster. The Bureau noted that no major difficulties or issues were 

encountered during the actual transport of the prisoners, though both the Bureau and the U.S. Marshals Service 

noted flaws in the decision making process and a general failure on the part of State and local prison authorities to 

be proactive in evacuating their incarcerated populations. 134 Scott Wells, Deputy Federal Coordinating Officer for Louisiana, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane 

Katrina: Perspectives of FEMA’s Operations Professionals, on December 8, 2005, submitted to the Senate 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 1st session. 135 Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, memorandum for distribution entitled 

“Designation of Principal Federal Official for Hurricane Katrina,” August 30, 2005, 1. 
APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

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 An INS was arguably in effect since President Bush earlier issued his Emergency Declarations and Major Disaster 

Declarations. See the National Preparedness—A Primer chapter for a detailed discussion of this issue, as well as 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, Preliminary Observations on Hurricane Response (Washington, DC, 

February 2006, 4). 136 Though Secretary Chertoff subsequently testified that Director Brown had the authority to manage the incident 

even prior to his formal designation as PFO, “...when he went down on Sunday it was with the understanding that 

he was going to manage this thing as the battlefield commander, you know, with the authority he had as the director 

of FEMA, which put him in supervisory authority over the federal coordinating officers.” Secretary Chertoff added, 

“When I actually formally designated him the PFO, it was essentially formalizing something that had occurred in 

practice.” Michael Chertoff, testimony before a hearing on “Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the Department of 

Homeland Security,” on October 19, 2005, House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response 

to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session. 137 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), 33. 138 According to the NRP, the FCO is “The Federal officer who is appointed to manage Federal resource support 

activities related to Stafford Act disasters and emergencies. The FCO is responsible for coordinating the timely 

delivery of Federal disaster assistance resources and programs to the affected State and local governments, 

individual victims, and the private sector.” National Response Plan, p. 65. 139 “[Director Brown] was going to manage this thing as the battlefield commander, you know, with the authority 

he had as the director of FEMA, which put him in supervisory authority over the federal coordinating officers.” 

Michael Chertoff, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the Department of Homeland 

Security, on October 19, 2005, House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to 

Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session. See also Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 

Assistance Act [“Stafford Act”], as amended by Public Law 106-390 (October 30, 2000). 140 Colonel Jeff Smith, Deputy Director of the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency 

Preparedness, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of 

Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, submitted to the House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation and 

Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session. 141 A virtual National JIC “links all participants through technological means (secure or nonsecure) when 

geographical restrictions, incident management requirements, and other limitations preclude physical attendance by 

public affairs leadership at a central location.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan

(Washington, D.C., December 2004), PUB-3. 142 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), 28. 143 Some of this lack of planning can be attributed to the failure to finalize the JFO Standing Operating Procedures 

prior to Katrina, as required by the National Response Plan. 144 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS Sitrep #20,” September 5, 2005, 1; U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS Sitrep #23,” September 6, 2005, 1; U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Daily Conference Call on Hurricane Katrina, 

September 7, 2005, 1; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS Sitrep #27,” September 8, 

2005, 1; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Region VI Regional 

Response Coordinating Center Sitrep #15,” September 9, 2005, 1; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 

“Hurricane Katrina DHS Sitrep #20,” September 5, 2005, 1; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 

“Secretary’s Operations Center Flash Report #32—Hurricane Katrina,” September 12, 2005, 2, 3; U.S. Department 

of Health and Human Services, “Secretary’s Operations Center Flash Report #32—Hurricane Katrina,” September 

12, 2005, 2; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Emergency Response Issues,” September 11, 2005, 10; 

Robert B. Stephan, Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 

prepared statement for a hearing on “Hurricane Katrina: The Roles of DHS and FEMA Leadership,” on February 10, 

2006, submitted to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, 109th Congress, 

2nd session, pgs. 7-8. 

145 Federal officials recognized the need for a presence in New Orleans to effectively coordinate the efforts to 

stabilize the City, so a “forward PFO” in New Orleans was eventually established. The JFO remained in Baton 

Rouge. 146 Although the JFO in Baton Rouge was located in close proximity to the Louisiana State Emergency Operations 

Center, the vast majority of the response operations in the early stages of the incident occurred in the greater New 

Orleans area. It quickly became apparent that the JFO was too far away to coordinate operational activities in New 
APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

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 Orleans. For this reason, the Law Enforcement Coordination Center (LECC) was initially established in Baton 

Rouge and then moved to New Orleans to coordinate law enforcement activities. The Department of Defense 

(DOD) set up its Katrina Task Force HQ in Mississippi. New Orleans officials established the New Orleans 

Emergency Operations Center downtown, with no connectivity to the JFO. 147 U.S. Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau, Office of Legislative Liaison, “National Guard Status 

Comparison Chart,” n.d., http://www.ngb.army.mil/ll/statuscomparison.asp. State active duty and Title 32 forces are 

not subject to posse comitatus restrictions, see 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (Military forces generally may not perform 

domestic law enforcement), which bar Federal military forces from enforcing civil law. Thus, while serving in State 

active duty status or Title 32 status (which allows for Federal pay while under state command and control), the 

Army National Guard and the Air National Guard can directly assist civil authorities in maintaining peace and order. 

Lieutenant General Steven H. Blum, “A Vision for the National Guard,” Joint Force Quarterly, December 2004, 36. 148 U.S. Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Manual 3025.1-M, Manual for Civil 

Emergencies (Washington, D.C., June 1994), para. C2.2. Active duty forces are authorized to perform critical 

functions such as rescue, evacuation, and emergency treatment of casualties; emergency restoration of power; debris 

removal; food distribution; roadway control, and emergency communications. 149 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Execution Order, August 30, 2005. 150 JTF-Katrina was established at Camp Shelby on August 28 and activated three days later on August 31. It 

served as U.S. Northern Command’s forward joint command element for integrating the military component of the 

Federal response. 151 Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of the Department of Defense, and General Richard Myers, Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Defense Department Operational Update Briefing,” Tuesday, September 6, 2005. 

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2005/d20050906slide.pdf 152 Department of Defense, DOD Support to Hurricane Katrina, Executive Summary OASD(HD), September 5, 

2005. 153 “DOD aircraft have flown mosquito abatement aerial spraying missions covering more than two million acres.” 

Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, written statement for a hearing on Responding 

to Catastrophic Events: The Role of the Military and National Guard in Disaster Response, on November 9, 2005, 

submitted to the House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and 

Capabilities jointly with the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, 

Science, and Technology, 109th Congress, 1st session. 154 U.S. Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau, “After Action Review: Hurricane Response September 

2005,” December 21, 2005, 6. 155 U.S. Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau, “After Action Review: Hurricane Response September 

2005,” December 21, 2005, 14. 156 U.S. Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau, “After Action Review: Hurricane Response September 

2005,” December 21, 2005. 157 U.S. Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau, “After Action Review: Hurricane Response September 

2005,” December 21, 2005, 57. 158 President George W. Bush, “President Discusses Progress in War on Terror to National Guard,” February 9, 

2006. 159 U.S. Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau, “After Action Review: Hurricane Response September 

2005,” December 21, 2005, 57. 160 U.S. Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau, “After Action Review: Hurricane Response September 

2005,” December 21, 2005, 20; Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, written 

statement submitted for a hearing on Responding to Catastrophic Events: The Role of the Military and National 

Guard in Disaster Response, on October 20, 2005, for the House Committee on Government Reform, 109th

Congress, 1st session. 161 16,599 National Guard forces were deployed in 1989-90 following the San Francisco Loma Prieta earthquake. 

U.S. Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau, “After Action Review: Hurricane Response September 2005,” 

December 21, 2005. 162 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, “DoD 

Support to Hurricane Katrina, OASD(HD) Executive Summary,” September 5, 2005; U.S. Department of Defense, 

National Guard Bureau, “After Action Review: Hurricane Response September 2005,” NGB J7, December 21, 2005; 

Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, testimony on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the 
APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

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 Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, and the National Guard of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, before 

the House Bipartisan Select Committee on Hurricane Katrina, United States House of Representatives, 109th

Congress,1st Session, October 27, 2005. 163 U.S. Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau, “After Action Review: Hurricane Response September 

2005,” NGB J7, December 21, 2005, 146. 164 U.S. Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau, “After Action Review: Hurricane Response September 

2005,” NGB J7, December 21, 2005, 6. 165 Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, testimony before a hearing on 

Responding to Catastrophic Events: The Role of the Military and National Guard in Disaster Response, on 

November 9, 2005, Emergency Preparedness, Science, and Technology Subcommittee, House Homeland Security 

Committee, 109th Congress, 1st session, 14. According to Assistant Secretary McHale, a police officer is likely to be 

carrying a handheld Motorola while an active duty military officer is likely to use a secure SINCGARS radio; these 

two radios cannot easily talk to one another. 166 The two deployed MERS detachments were the Region IV detachment from Thomasville, Georgia and the 

Region VI detachment from Denton, Texas. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency 

Management Agency, “FEMA National Situation Report,” August 29, 2005, 3; and Michael Brown, former Director 

of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency, on September 27, 2005, House Select Bipartisan Committee to 

Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session. 

Each MERS detachment has a suite of assets that were also deployed to Florida, Georgia, and Texas. U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA National Situation Report,” 

August 29, 2005, 3. 167 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), ESF 

#15-5. 168 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Response and Recovery: 

Available Support,” October 23, 2004, http://www.fema.gov/rrr/mers02.shtm. 169 Rear Admiral Joe Kilkenny, Joint Force Maritime Component Commander and Commander of Carrier Strike 

Group Ten, U.S. Fleet Forces, Joint Task Force Katrina, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Providing Rescue and Civil 

Support Relief from the Sea, Air, and Land, (November 1, 2005). The DJC2 is a standardized, integrated, rapidly 

deployable, modular, scaleable, command and control (C2) capability that provides a military commander with a 

planning, operating, and collaborating capability. Lt. Col. Roarke Anderson, JS J6, Deployable Joint Command and 

Control (DJC2): DJC2 Program Overview, (n.d.), 2. 170 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, “Defense Department Briefing on 

DoD Response to Hurricane Katrina,” news release on briefing by Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, August 31, 

2005. 171 The National Coordinating Center (NCC) for Telecommunications is defined in the NRP as “A joint 

telecommunications industry–Federal Government operation established to assist in the initiation, coordination, 

restoration, and reconstitution of [National Security/Emergency Preparedness] telecommunications services and 

facilities.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), 

69. For a discussion on NCC, see Dr. Peter M. Fonash, Deputy Manager of the National Communications System, 

Preparedness Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, written statement for a hearing on Ensuring 

Operability during Catastrophic Events, on October 26, 2005, submitted to the House Committee on Homeland 

Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology, 109th Congress, 1st session, 2. 172 Dr. Peter M. Fonash, Deputy Manager of the National Communications System, Preparedness Directorate, 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, written statement for a hearing on Ensuring Operability during Catastrophic 

Events, on October 26, 2005, submitted to the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on 

Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology, 109th Congress, 1st session. 173 Dr. Peter M. Fonash, Deputy Manager of the National Communications System, Preparedness Directorate, 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, written statement for a hearing on Ensuring Operability during Catastrophic 

Events, on October 26, 2005, submitted to the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on 

Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology, 109th Congress, 1st session; and Chad Hart, A Research Note 

On: Land Mobile Radio and Public Safety Communications, prepared for the Venture Development Corporation, 

Datacom and Telecom Practice (Natick, MA, November 2005), http://www.vdccorp.com/telecom/research/05_lmr_rn.pdf. 
APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

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 174 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #13,” September 1, 2005. 175 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #21,” September 5, 2005. 176 For examples, see Ardis D. Hoven, Member of the American Medical Association Board of Trustees, 

testimony before a hearing on Assessing Public Health and the Delivery of Care in the Wake of Katrina, on 

September 22, 2005, House Energy and Commerce Committee, Subcommittees on Health and Oversight and 

Investigations, 109th Congress, 1st session, 3; and Robert Latham, Director, Mississippi Emergency Management 

Agency, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi, 

on December 7, 2005, House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to 

Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session. 177 William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Officer for Louisiana, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane 

Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, submitted to the House 

Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session, 51. 178 In an interview with CNN, FEMA Director Michael Brown stated “we’ve got enough people and commodities 

in place right now for a three to five day surge capacity. But what I’ve ordered my folks to do is to jam that supply 

line as far back as Fort Worth and as far back as Atlanta so as those supplies begin to run out, we can continue to 

feed those in here as long as it takes.” “Hurricane Katrina,” CNN Breaking News, August 29, 2005. 179 Michael Brown, former Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, testimony before a hearing 

on Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, on September 27, 2005, House 

Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session, 

49-50. 180 Congressman Tom Davis (R-VA), written opening statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness 

and Response by the State of Mississippi, on December 7, 2005, House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate 

the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session; and William Carwile, Federal 

Coordinating Officer for Mississippi, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response 

by the State of Mississippi, on December 7, 2005, House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation 

for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session. 181 William Carwile, Federal Coordinating Officer for Mississippi, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane 

Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi, on December 7, 2005, House Select Committee to 

Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session, 45. 182 Tommy Longo, Mayor of Waveland, Mississippi, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: 

Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi, on December 7, 2005, House Select Bipartisan Committee 

to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session, 51; and Ray Nagin, 

Mayor of New Orleans, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Managing the Crisis and Evacuating 

New Orleans, on February 1, 2006, submitted to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security, 109th Congress, 2nd

session, 3-5. 183 Congressman William Jefferson (D-LA), during a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, on September 27, 2005, House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation 

for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session, 93. 184 U.S. Department of Commerce, “Gutierrez Announces Hurricane Contracting Information Center: One-Stop 

Shop to Help U.S. Businesses Participate in Hurricane Rebuilding Efforts,” news release, October 11, 2005. Also 

see U.S. Department of Commerce, “Hurricane Contracting Information Center,” 

http://www.rebuildingthegulfcoast.gov. 185 “Under Title I of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended (DPA), the President is authorized to 

require preferential acceptance and performance of contracts or orders supporting certain approved national defense 

and energy programs, and to allocate materials, services, and facilities in such a manner as to promote these 

approved programs. Additional priorities authority is found in Section 18 of the Selective Service Act of 1948, in 10 

U.S.C. § 2538, and in 50 U.S.C. § 82. The DPA priorities and allocations authority has also been extended to 

support emergency preparedness activities under Title VI of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 

Assistance Act (Stafford Act).” [...] “The Department of Commerce is delegated authority to implement these 

priorities and allocations provisions for industrial resources. The Bureau of Industry and Security’s Office of 

Strategic Industries and Economic Security (SIES) administers this authority through the Defense Priorities and 

Allocations System (DPAS) regulation (15 CFR Part 700). The purpose of the DPAS is to (1) assure the timely 

availability of industrial resources to meet current national defense and emergency preparedness program 

requirements; and (2) provide an operating system to support rapid industrial response in a national emergency.” 
APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

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 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “Defense Priorities and Allocations System 

Program (DPAS),” https://www.bis.doc.gov/defenseindustrialbaseprograms/OSIES/DPAS/Default.htm. 

As an example of how this authority was used in the response to Hurricane Katrina, Norfolk Southern Railway used 

a DPAS rated contract to procure switch equipment and generators so that it could repair railway automated signals. 186 FEMA issued a mission assignment on the morning of September 3 that stated “FEMA requests that DOD 

provide planning and execution for transportation and distribution of ice, water, food and medical supplies in 

support of the Katrina disaster in Louisiana and Mississippi.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, “1604DR-MS-DOD-19, Amendment 1,” September 3, 2005. 187 Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane 

Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, and the National Guard of 

Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, on October 27, 2005, House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 

Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session, 70-71. 188 In developing the NRP, it was envisioned that additional and specific planning would be needed for logistics, 

international coordination, private sector coordination and donations management. In fact, each issue has its own 

support annex in the NRP. The annexes, however, provide little detail or operational direction and do not provide 

clear responsibility for the various roles and tasks referred to in the annexes. 189 The Swiss offer was received September 5, 2005 and not fully vetted by FEMA until September 14. As 

another example, a C-130 aircraft traveling from Sweden with a water purification system and a cellular network 

waited four days for flight clearance from the U.S. 190 An estimated $854.5 million in donations have been pledged to the U.S. 191 USAID Liaisons were sent throughout the region: FEMA RRCCs – Atlanta, GA, Denton, TX, Tucker, AL; 

JFOs – Baton Rouge, LA, Montgomery, AL, Jackson, MS, New Orleans, LA; JTF – Shreveport, LA, JTF Camp 

Shelby – Hattiesburg, MS; JTF Forward – USS Iwo Jima, National Guard Forward Deployment – New Orleans, 

LA, Dobbins AFB – GA; FEMA Disaster Recovery Center – Mobile, AL; NORTHCOM – Colorado Springs, CO; 

Dobbins AFB – Little Rock, AK. The first four were deployed on September 2 – two went to FEMA HQ and two 

went to the State Task Force. On September 3, the State Department started sending people to the FEMA callcenter, and on September 4 to the RRCC in Atlanta, the JTF at Camp Shelby, and Dobbins AFB in Georgia. On 

September 5, personnel were deployed to Shreveport, Little Rock, and Denton. 192 U.S Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #21,” September 5, 2005; and 

United States Agency for International Development, "Agency Channels Foreign Aid for Hurricane Katrina 

Victims," Front Lines, October 2005. 193 It applied to Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi since August 29 and to Florida since August 24—after 

Hurricane Katrina’s first landfall. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “HHS Designates First Medical 

Shelters and Provides Vital Medical Supplies and Medical Assistance,” news release, September 2, 2005, 

http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2005pres/20050902.html. 194 Sarah A. Lister, Hurricane Katrina: The Public Health and Medical Response, Congressional Research 

Service Report for Congress RL33096 (Washington, D.C., September 2005), summary and CRS-11. 195 “19 NDMS DMATs and other NDMS teams were pre-staged for Katrina, and as the storm passed, they along 

with the US&R Task Forces, began moving, into the impact areas. By the day after the storm, teams were providing 

medical care and continue to do so today. The mission is still ongoing, with personnel staffing hospitals and clinics 

destroyed or rendered inoperable by the storms as we speak.” Dr. Roy L. Alson, Associate Professor of Emergency 

Medicine at Wake Forest University School of Medicine and Commander of Disaster Medical Assistance Team NC1, written statement for a hearing on Mitigating Catastrophic Events Through Effective Medical Response, on 

October 20, 2005, submitted to the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Prevention of 

Nuclear and Biological Attack, 109th Congress, 1st session. According to an attachment Dr. Alson provided with his 

testimony, 16,477 patients were treated by NDMS personnel in FEMA region IV through 13 October 2005, and 

40,995 patients were treated and 59,917 individuals immunized by NDMS personnel in FEMA region VI through 13 

October 2005. 196 Hilarie H. Cranmer, “Hurricane Katrina: Volunteer Work – Logistics First,” New England Journal of Medicine

353(15), no. 13, October, 2005. Dr. Cranmer was a member of the American Red Cross team that had been 

deployed “to perform the critical-needs assessments that would help define the public health response to Hurricane 

Katrina.” Dr. Thomas Kirsch, Medical Director for Disaster Health Services for the American Red Cross, written 

statement for a hearing on Assessing Public Health and the Delivery of Care in the Wake of Katrina, on September 

22, 2005, submitted to the House Energy and Commerce Committee, Subcommittees on Health and Oversight and 
APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

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 Investigations, 109th Congress, 1st session. See Ardis D. Hoven, Member of the American Medical Association 

Board of Trustees, written statement for a hearing on Assessing Public Health and the Delivery of Care in the Wake 

of Katrina, on September 22, 2005, submitted to the House Energy and Commerce Committee, Subcommittees on 

Health and Oversight and Investigations, 109th Congress, 1st session. Dr. Kirsch said he took a team to Louisiana to 

assess nineteen Red Cross shelters and three very large state shelters: “Every shelter had good access to medical care 

either through local physicians providing care in the shelter, visiting medical teams, DMAT teams or relationships 

with local hospitals.” Moreover, “[w]ith flooding widespread across the region and power and communications 

networks out, physicians and other health care professionals in hospitals desperately tried to keep patients alive, and 

appear to have mostly succeeded, even when their back-up generators failed.” 197 Louisiana Nursing Home Association staff lacked means to communicate with key decision makers early in the 

crisis. The Association “set up our own rescue missions.” Joseph A. Donchess, Executive Director of the Louisiana 

Nursing Home Association, written statement for a hearing on Challenges in a Catastrophe: Evacuating New 

Orleans in Advance of Hurricane Katrina, on January 31, 2006, submitted to the Senate Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 2nd session. Dr. Clyde Martin told Government Executive 

magazine that he joined a private relief effort in Louisiana after waiting for several days for Federal or 

State agencies to deploy him in their medical response. Justin Rood, “Medical Catastrophe,” GOVEXEC.com, 

November 1, 2005, http://www.govexec.com/features/1105-01/1105-01s1.htm (accessed February 6, 2006). 198 Louisiana State University, Office of University Relations, “LSU is Site of Largest Acute-Care Field Hospital 

in U.S. History,” news release, September 6, 2005; and Elizabeth M. Duke, Health Resources Services 

Administrator, Department of Health and Human Services, "Remarks to the National Association of Community 

Health Centers' 2005 Annual Convention and Community Health Institute," September 19, 2005, 

http://newsroom.hrsa.gov/speeches/2005/NACHC-Sept.htm (accessed February 10, 2006). 199 Separate JFOs were set up and became fully operational in: Mobile, Alabama on September 1; Denver, 

Colorado on September 6; Montgomery, Alabama (supplanting the Mobile facility) and Oklahoma (State) on 

September 10; Austin, Texas on September 11; Baton Rouge and New Orleans, Louisiana on September 12; Little 

Rock, Arkansas on September 13; and Jackson, Mississippi on September 16. U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Federal Concept of Operations Matrix,” September 18, 2005; 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IV Regional Response 

Coordinating Center, “Situation Report 9,” September 11, 2005; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 

“Secretary’s Operations Center Flash Report #32 – Hurricane Katrina,” September 12, 2005; U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency/Arkansas Joint Field Office, “Situation Report 11,” 

September 13, 2005; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Executive 

Briefing,” slide presentation, September 17, 2005. 200 Preliminary steps were taken toward establishing the JTF-Forward on September 6, but the facility was not 

fully established until later on the 7th. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Homeland Defense, “Hurricane Katrina Timeline,” October 16, 2005, 13; and U.S. Department of Health and 

Human Services, “Secretary’s Operations Center Flash Report #23—Hurricane Katrina,” September 7, 2005. This 

temporary site was supplanted by the physical facility established on September 12, as referenced above. 201 Regarding the timing of the appointment of VADM Allen, Secretary Chertoff testified that on “Saturday 

[September 3] I identified Admiral Allen as a person that I wanted to consider putting into place. I spoke to the 

Commandant over the weekend, made sure that Admiral Allen was free to come down, had him come down with the 

intention of having him take over at least the Louisiana piece of this in order to make sure we had that under control. 

And then ultimately on Friday [September 9] I made the determination that I would put Admiral Allen in control of 

the entire operation.” Michael Chertoff, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the 

Department of Homeland Security, on October 19, 2005, House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for 

and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session. 202 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Statement by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff,” news 

release, September 9, 2005. 203 The FCO “is appointed to manage Federal resource support activities ... [and] is responsible for coordinating 

the timely delivery of Federal disaster assistance resources and programs to the affected State and local 

governments, individual victims, and the private sector.” Whereas the PFO is an invention of HSPD-5 and the NRP, 

the FCO position was created by the Stafford Act, and empowered with statutory authority to perform assigned 

responsibilities. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 
APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

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-195- 

 2004), 65. VADM Allen’s appointments: 70 Fed. Reg. 56929 (Sep. 29, 2005) (Louisiana); 70 Fed. Reg. 57308 

(Sep. 30, 2005) (Alabama); 70 Fed. Reg. 57309 (Sep. 30, 2005) (Mississippi). 204 When Secretary Chertoff designated VADM Allen as the FCO (in addition to his earlier appointment as PFO), 

Allen gained statutory authority that enabled him to more efficiently coordinate Federal disaster assistance. 205 “The SFLEO is the senior law enforcement official from the agency with primary jurisdictional responsibility 

as directed by statute, Presidential directive, existing Federal policies, and/or the Attorney General. The SFLEO 

directs intelligence/investigative law enforcement operations related to the incident and supports the law 

enforcement component of the Unified Command on-scene. In the event of a terrorist incident, this official will 

normally be the FBI SAC.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., 

December 2004), 35. 206 U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, “FBI Hurricane Timeline,” October 21, 2005, 3. 

The LECC is a construct familiar to law enforcement personnel, integrating the Federal, State, and local law 

enforcement communities, but is not a term currently incorporated into the NRP. 207 The LECC was built on a modified FBI Joint Operations Center construct. It coordinated a plan to answer 

thousands of 911 calls in New Orleans that had gone unresolved and provided the conduit for coordination between 

civilian law enforcement and the National Guard and Title 10 U.S. Army forces operating in New Orleans. The 

LECC not only provided a facility for all Federal law enforcement, but built a separate headquarters for the New 

Orleans Police adjacent to it since the NOPD’s headquarters had been destroyed. 208 U.S. Department of Defense, “CJCS Hurricane Katrina Update,” September 12, 2005. 209 New Orleans Mayor’s Office of Communications, “Updated Situation Report for New Orleans,” September 13, 

2005. 210 Search and rescue teams in New Orleans carried out primary and secondary searches. Primary searches were 

visual, with hailing calls as searchers moved through a certain area. Forced entry into a building was not conducted 

without probable cause. Secondary searches were conducted door to door in areas where flooding had occurred 

higher than 5.5 feet above the floor. Damage incurred by access into a building was kept to a minimum and the 

building was re-secured after the search. New Orleans Police Department officers were on site for all the searches 

conducted. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Urban Search and 

Rescue Operations Completed: Hurricane Katrina Urban Search and Rescue Teams are due to Return Home,” news 

release, September 30, 2005. 211 Mike Tamillow, Section Chief, Federal Emergency Management Agency Urban Search and Rescue, to Ed 

Buikema, Director, Region V, Federal Emergency Management Agency, memorandum on “US&R Section – 

Hurricane Katrina Update,” September 10, 2005. Also see U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, “Urban Search and Rescue Operations Completed: Hurricane Katrina Urban 

Search and Rescue Teams Are Due to Return Home,” news release, September 30, 2005, 

http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=19320. 212 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #23,” September 6, 2005; and U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #29,” September 9, 2005. 213 HHS serves as the coordinator of NRP Emergency Support Function #8 (“Public Health and Medical 

Services”), which includes mortuary affairs. However, FEMA’s NDMS has responsibilities for victim identification 

and mortuary services through its DMORTs. Consequently, HHS must request assistance from FEMA NDMS to 

deploy Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams to an incident site. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 

National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), ESF #8-6. 214 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #18,” September 4, 2005; and U.S. 

Department of Defense, “Hurricane Katrina Update,” September 8, 2005, 20. 215 Louisiana requested DMORT and DPMU support on August 29. Mississippi requested a DMORT assessment 

team on August 30. The first DMORT team was reported as engaged in Louisiana on August 31. By September 4, 

DMORT 1, DMORT 2, DMORT 4, DMORT 5, and DMORT Family Assistance Center (east), along with one 

DPMU, were deployed to Gulfport-Biloxi Municipal Airport. DMORT 6, DMORT 7, DMORT 8, DMORT WMD, 

and DMORT Family Assistance Center (west), along with one DPMU, were deployed to St. Gabriel, Louisiana. 

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Secretary’s Operations Center Flash Report #5—Hurricane 

Katrina,” August 29, 2005, 2; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Secretary’s Operations Center: 

Flash Report # 6—Hurricane Katrina,” August 30, 2005, 2; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 

“Secretary’s Operations Center: Flash Report #8—Hurricane Katrina,” August 31, 2005, 5-7; U.S. Department of 
APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

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 Health and Human Services, “Secretary’s Operations Center Flash Report #17—Hurricane Katrina,” September 4, 

2005, 7-9. 216 Kenyon International Management Services, “Hurricane Katrina Update: Kenyon International Activates 

Emergency Team for Hurricane Katrina Response,” news release, http://www.kenyoninternational.com; Thomas 

Fitzgerald and Joyce Tsai, “Louisiana Governor Blasts FEMA Over Recovery of Bodies,” Knight Ridder News 

Service, September 14, 2005; and Mark Hosenball and Keith Naughton, “Cash and ‘Cat 5’ Chaos,” Newsweek, 

September 26, 2005. 217 As Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco described it, “While Kenyon International of Houston has been and 

still is on the ground, working each day along with DMORT teams, they have not added enough personnel to do the 

work because of the lack of proper support or a contract.” Louisiana Office of the Governor, “Statement by 

Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco on Body Removal Process in Southeast Louisiana,” news release, September 

13, 2005, http://www.gov.state.la.us/index.cfm?md=newsroom&tmp=detail&articleID=832. 218 On September 9, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services reported: “It is unclear as to the future 

resources for this mission as we heard the contractor Kenyon International may be in default of their verbal 

contract.” U.S. Department of Defense, “Hurricane Katrina Update,” slide presentation, September 8, 2005, 20; and 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #37,” September 13, 2005, 18. 219 On September 9, White House spokesman Scott McClellan stated: “Mortuary affairs efforts on the ground – 

the State has the responsibility for overseeing the plan, implementing the plan and the federal government through 

the military and other ways, we’re supporting those efforts with teams in the region, as well.” The White House, 

“Press Briefing by Scott McClellan,” news release, September 9, 2005, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 

2005/09/print/20050909-3.html. FEMA spokeswoman Nicol Andrews made the same point in October, arguing that 

“Body retrieval is a state responsibility.” Renae Merle and Griff Witte, “Lack of Contracts Hampered FEMA: 

Dealing With Disaster on the Fly Proved Costly,” Washington Post, October 10, 2005. 220 Louisiana Office of the Governor, “Statement by Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco on Body Removal 

Process in Southeast Louisiana” news release, September 13, 2005, http://www.gov.state.la.us/ 

index.cfm?md=newsroom&tmp=detail&articleID=832. 221 Bush-Clinton Katrina Fund, “Bush-Clinton Katrina Fund Announces Allocations for Louisiana, Mississippi 

and Alabama,” news release, January 19, 2006, http://www.bushclintonkatrinafund.org/index.php?src=news 

&submenu=Media&prid=20&category=Press%20Releases. 222 The National Book Festival is an annual event organized and sponsored by the Library of Congress and hosted 

by First Lady Laura Bush. White House website, “Mrs. Bush’s Remarks at the National Book Festival Author’s 

Breakfast,” September 24, 2005, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050924-2.html. 223 “Despite the massive migration of evacuees and their subsequent placement in evacuation centers, only one 

known outbreak of communicable disease (norovirus) requiring unusual mobilization of public health resources had 

been reported as of September 23.” U.S. Centers for Disease Control, “Infectious Disease and Dermatologic 

Conditions in Evacuees and Rescue Workers After Hurricane Katrina – Multiple States, August-September, 2005,” 

as reprinted in the Journal of the American Medical Association 294, no. 17, November 2, 2005, 2159. 224 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Estimates Show More Than 40% of Hurricane Evacuees 

Now Receiving HHS Benefits or Services,” news release, September 29, 2005. 225 Expedited Assistance is FEMA’s program to provide $2,000 in “an initial emergency first installment” of 

assistance, prior to a completed inspection of a victim’s home, to help pay for food, shelter, clothing, personal 

necessities and medical needs. Eligible evacuees could also get additional FEMA assistance for a total up to 

$26,500 per household. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 

“Emergency Assistance Flowing to Gulf Coast,” news release, September 9, 2005; and U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Disaster Assistance Frequently Asked Questions,” 

http://www.fema.gov/rrr/dafaq.shtm (accessed February 3, 2006). 226 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #21,” September 5, 2005; and U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #41,” September 15, 2005. 227 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA VIP Briefing,” 

slide presentation, September 12, 2005, 6:00 PM; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS 

SITREP #44,” September 17, 2005; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management 

Agency, “Nearly $690 Million in Assistance Helping More Than 330,000 Families Displaced by Katrina,” news 

release, September 10, 2005. 
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228 However, the NRP inconsistently describes the role and purpose of DRCs. The NRP states a DRC “is a central

facility where individuals affected by a disaster can obtain information on disaster recovery assistance programs

from various Federal, State, local, tribal, private-sector, and voluntary organizations.” However, the NRP also

states the DRC is “[a] facility established in a centralized location within or near the disaster area at which disaster

victims (individuals, families, or businesses) apply for disaster aid.” NRP, p.64. (Emphasis added). 229 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Disaster Assistance

Frequently Asked Questions,” news release, September 13, 2005. FEMA’s “Disaster Assistance Frequently Asked

Questions” stated, “You cannot register for assistance at a DRC, you must register by calling 1-800-621-FEMA ...

or apply on line at www.FEMA.gov.” 230 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #34,” September 12, 2005, 3.

Approximately one-third of Louisiana households were without power or telephone service as of September 12. 231 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency/State of Alabama Joint

Field Office, “FEMA-1605-DR-AL-SITREP #08,” September 4, 2005. On September 4, the FEMA/State of

Alabama JFO reported, “The Helpline number is currently unavailable. Due to the large number of teleregistration

calls, all lines are being made available for registration.” This is an indication that the FEMA phone system lacked

the capacity to sustain the demand for service on both the teleregistration line and Helpline, at least at that time for

some customers. 232 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA Getting Assistance

to Individuals,” news release, September 7, 2005; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency

Management Agency, “FEMA VIP Briefing,” slide presentation, September 7, 2005, 6:00 PM, 7; U.S. Department of

Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA VIP Briefing,” slide presentation, September

9, 2005, 6:00 PM, 2; and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA

VIP Briefing,” slide presentation, September 10, 2005, 6:00 AM, 3. “Currently, the amount of money being

distributed through the expedited assistance program is $2,000 per household. ... This emergency assistance is

provided to help with disaster needs such as transportation, clothing, rental housing, other housing accommodations,

and food, and is included in the calculation of total benefits for which victims are eligible.” 233 Government Accountability Office, Expedited Assistance for Victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: FEMA's

Control Weaknesses Exposed the Government to Significant Fraud and Abuse, GAO-06-403T, February 13, 2006,

18-19, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06403t.pdf. 234 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA VIP Briefing,”

slide presentation, September 8, 2005; and Lisa Rein and Christopher Lee, “Debit Card Giveaway Goes Awry in

Houston,” Washington Post, September 9, 2005. FEMA individual assistance programs suffered from other

problems. Accounting and verification problems prompted an investigation by the DHS Office of the Inspector

General. “In a November 1, 2005, report on expedited assistance overpayment, DHS OIG attempted to identify the

events that resulted in a married couple receiving duplicate payments for expedited assistance and determine why

internal controls did not prevent the duplicate payment from being issued and why the applicants were not provided

adequate information to return the excess funds. It was found that for a short time, the National Emergency

Management Information System was not configured with system controls to prevent more than one payment per

household. FEMA officials ... have identified more than 5,000 potentially duplicated payments.” Executive Council

on Integrity and Efficiency, Oversight of Gulf Coast Hurricane Recovery: A 90-Day Progress Report to Congress

(Washington, D.C., December 2005), 33. 235 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Good Story: Harris County, Texas Citizen Corps’ Response to

Hurricane Katrina,” Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS.gov) database, November 17, 2005,

http://www.llis.gov; Harris County Joint Information Center, “Mission Fulfilled, Command stands Down,” news

release, September 20, 2005, http://www.hcjic.org/news_release.asp?p=62&intRelease_ID=2078&intAcc_ID=62. 236 Harris County Joint Information Center, “Mission Fulfilled, Command stands Down,” news release, September

20, 2005, http://www.hcjic.org/news_release.asp?p=62&intRelease_ID=2078&intAcc_ID=62. 237 T. Yarbrough, “’Baptists’ 10.5 Million Meals shatters Prior Disaster Relief Record,” North American Mission

Board, http://www.namb.net/site/apps/nl/content2.asp?c=9qKILUOzEpH&b=227361&ct=1568907 (accessed

January 13, 2006). For other examples, see Liz Szabo, “Grass-roots groups pitch in to find shelter for evacuees,”

USA Today, September 8, 2005. 238 This despite the NRP Volunteer and Donations Management Support Annex, which describes this process.
APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

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 239 The NRP Volunteer and Donations Management Support Annex focuses on managing unaffiliated volunteers 

and unsolicited donated goods. It does not provide guidelines for coordinating private sector and NGO relief efforts. 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), VOL-1. 240 Major Todd Hawks, Public Affairs Secretary for the Salvation Army of America, testimony before a hearing 

on the Response of Charities to Hurricane Katrina, on December 13, 2005, House Committee on Ways and Means, 

Subcommittee on Oversight, 109th Congress, 1st session. 241 David Roberson, President and CEO of Cavalier Homes, Inc., testimony before a hearing on Emergency 

Housing Needs in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, on September 15, 2005, House Committee on Financial 

Services, Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity, 109th Congress, 1st session. Also see Laura 

Maggi, “Hotel Rooms Sought For Shelter Occupants; Other Housing Options Appear Slow To Arrive,” New 

Orleans Times-Picayune, September 21, 2005; and Shankar Vedantam and Dean Starkman, “Lack of Cohesion 

Bedevils Recovery,” Washington Post, September 18, 2005. 242 James N. Russo, Federal Coordinating Officer for Mississippi Recovery Operations, Federal Emergency 

Management Agency, testimony before a hearing on Housing Options in the Aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and 

Rita, on January 14, 2006, House Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Housing and Community 

Opportunity, 109th Congress, 2nd session; David Roberson, representing the Manufactured Housing Institute and the 

Manufactured Housing Association for Regulatory Reform, testimony before a hearing on Emergency Housing 

Needs Following Hurricane Katrina, on September 15, 2005, House Committee on Financial Services, 

Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity, 109th Congress, 1st session. 243 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #20,” September 5, 2005; and U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #31,” September 10, 2005. 244 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA Executive 

Briefing,” slide presentation, September 14, 2005, 6:00 AM. 245 A complicating factor was that as Hurricane Rita approached the Gulf Coast, individuals in shelters from 

Hurricane Katrina had to be evacuated from their original shelter sites and moved to new ones. U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security, “Gulf Coast Hurricane Katrina (85) and Rita (37) Response and Recovery DHS SITREP,” 

October 14, 2005. 246 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “U.S. Government Announces a Comprehensive Transitional Housing 

Assistance Program for Katrina Evacuees,” news release, September 23, 2005; U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security, “Fact Sheet: Transitional Housing Assistance for Hurricane Katrina Evacuees,” September 23, 2005; and 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Press Briefing by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff and 

Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Alphonso Jackson,” news release, September 24, 2005. 247 Mr. Powell serves as the primary Federal contact for Congress, State, local and private leaders in supporting 

“mid and long term recovery and rebuilding plans.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Coordinator Named 

to Lead Federal Recovery and Rebuilding Activities in the Gulf Coast Region,” news release, November 1, 2005. 248 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Federally Declared 

Disasters By Calendar Year,” http://www.fema.gov/library/drcys.shtm. Forty emergency declarations were issued 

in the period from January 20, 2001 to Hurricane Katrina. 

CHAPTER FIVE: LESSONS LEARNED

1

 The White House, “President Discusses Hurricane Relief in Address to the Nation,” news release, September 15, 

2005, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050915-8.html. 2

 The critical challenges described here include and go beyond those identified in other evaluations of the national 

response to Hurricane Katrina. See, for example, David M. Walker, Comptroller General, Statement by Comptroller 

General David M. Walker on GAO’s Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, prepared for the U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-06-365R, 

(Washington, D.C., February 1, 2006). 3

 Though State and local preparedness is critical to the success of overall National preparedness and response 

efforts, this Report is not intended to assess State and local efforts. 
APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

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 4

 Melvin “Kip” Holden, Mayor-President of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, written statement for a hearing on 

Recovering from Hurricane Katrina: Responding to the Immediate Needs of Its Victims, on September 28, 2005, 

submitted to the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 109th Congress, 1st session. 5

 The DHS Secretary designates a Principal Federal Official (PFO). See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 

National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), 71. The Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) “is 

appointed to manage Federal resource support activities ... [and] is responsible for coordinating the timely delivery 

of Federal disaster assistance resources and programs to the affected State and local governments, individual 

victims, and the private sector.” Whereas the PFO derives from HSPD-5 and the NRP, the FCO position was 

created by the Stafford Act (Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act [“Stafford Act”], as 

amended by Public Law 106-390, October 30, 2000). U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response 

Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), 65. 6

 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #20,” September 5, 2005, 1; U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #23,” September 6, 2005, 1; U.S. Department 

of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA Daily Conference Call on Hurricane 

Katrina,” September 7, 2005, 1; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #27,” 

September 8, 2005, 1; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Region 

VI Regional Response Coordinating Center SitRep #15,” September 9, 2005, 1; U.S. Department of Health and 

Human Services, “Secretary’s Operations Center Flash Report #32—Hurricane Katrina,” September 12, 2005, 2, 3; 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Emergency Response Issues,” September 11, 2005, 10; Robert B. Stephan, 

Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, prepared statement for a 

hearing on “Hurricane Katrina: The Roles of DHS and FEMA Leadership,” on February 10, 2006, submitted to the 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 2nd session, 7-8. 7

 Federal officials recognized the need for a presence in New Orleans to effectively coordinate the efforts to 

stabilize the City, so a “forward PFO” in New Orleans was eventually established. The JFO remained in Baton 

Rouge. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Secretary’s Operations Center Flash Report #23,” 

September 7, 2005; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA 

Executive Briefing,” slide presentation, September 17, 2005, 6 AM. 8

 Only eight months had elapsed between the unveiling of the NRP and its implementation for the worst natural 

disaster in U.S. history. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, DC: 

December 2004). 9

 The NRP requires all of the supporting Federal Departments and Agencies to modify existing interagency 

incident management and emergency response plans and protocols to incorporate linkages to and be consistent with 

NIMS, the NRP and its coordinating mechanisms. The NRP also requires that detailed standard operational 

procedures be developed for the HSOC, NRCC, IIMG, the JFO and each ESF Annex. These plans are meant to 

clearly define the functions of each organization and describe how the organization interfaces with the rest of the 

emergency response effort. See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, 

D.C., December 2004), Letter of Instruction, ix. 10 Starting after the 2002 Salt Lake City Olympics, money and resources that were once dedicated to training and 

exercising the National Emergency Response Teams (ERT-N) have been diverted from the ERT program to other 

programs. See William Carwile, Federal Coordinating Officer for Mississippi, Federal Emergency Management 

Agency, testimony before a hearing on the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, on December 8, 

2005, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. ERT-N deploys for large-scale, high 

impact events, to coordinate the plans with other Federal agencies within FEMA regions. See U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), 40. ERT-Ns also provide 

assistance to the smaller ERT deployed by the FEMA regions. The loss of funding has resulted in ERT-N teams that 

are not fully equipped nor train or exercise together. William Carwile, Federal Coordinating Officer for Mississippi, 

Federal Emergency Management Agency, testimony before a hearing on the Preparation for and Response to 

Hurricane Katrina, on December 8, 2005, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. 

Scott Wells, the Deputy Federal Coordinating Officer for Louisiana, stated that FEMA lacked “the people, we did 

not have the expertise; we did not have the operational training folks that we needed to do our missions.” He also 

stated generally that the staff level in the regional office is “woefully inadequate” to set up a Regional Response 

Coordination Center (RRCC) required for a disaster, and staff an ERT to go to the scene of a disaster. Wells 

describes FEMA staffing in disasters as robbing “Peter to pay Paul.” Scott Wells, Deputy Federal Coordinating 

Officer for Louisiana, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Perspectives of FEMA’s Operation 
APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

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 Professionals, on December 8, 2005, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th

Congress, 1st session. 11 A DHS request to DOD on September 2 that “DOD provide the support, planning, and execution of the full 

logistical support to the Katrina disaster in all declared states in coordination with FEMA” was initially denied 

because the request did not come from the Secretary of DHS to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of DHS 

immediately resubmitted the request to the Secretary of Defense which was then granted. Ultimately, DOD (OSD & 

Joint Staff) worked with the FEMA Response Division to meet this requirement. The Joint Staff and the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense (OSD) worked throughout the weekend of September 3-5 to meet this Mission Assignment. 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Mission Assignment, Program 

Code/Event #: 1604DR-MS: HURRICANE KATRINA, Action Request #:1509-32760,” September 3, 2005; U.S. 

Department of Defense, “Hurricane Katrina/Rita/Ophelia Interim Timeline (August – September 2005),” November 

2, 2005, 1, 8, 10-11; and “Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the Department of Defense, the Coast 

Guard, and the National Guard of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama, October 27, 2005, hearing before the Select 

Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st

session (Congressman Tom Davis, quoting from Ken Burris, email to Mathew Broderick et al., Subject: request, 

September 2, 2005.) 12 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), p. 41. 

According to the NRP, the Local Chief Executive Officer “Requests State and, if necessary, Federal assistance 

through the Governor of the State when the jurisdiction’s capabilities have been exceeded or exhausted” and the 

Governor “Requests Federal assistance when it becomes clear that State or tribal capabilities will be insufficient or 

have been exceeded or exhausted.” According to the Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, “The initial actions . . . 

are conducted by local government. Local authorities will exhaust their resources, and then use mutual aid 

agreements with volunteer groups, the private sector and/or neighboring parishes.” The plan also states that “State 

assistance will supplement local efforts and Federal assistance will supplement State and local efforts when it is 

clearly demonstrated that it is beyond local and State capability to cope with the emergency/disaster.” Louisiana 

Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, Emergency Operations Plan (Baton Rouge, April 

2005). 13 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Center for Operational Analysis, “Incident Command Request Briefing,” 

November 1, 2005. However, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld verbally approved some requests. See also 

Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane 

Katrina: The Defense Department’s Role in the Response, on February 9, 2006, Senate Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs Committee, 109th Congress, 2nd session. 14 Melvin “Kip” Holden, Mayor-President of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, noted that requirements for paperwork and 

form completions hindered immediate action and deployment of people and material to assist in rescue and recovery 

efforts. Melvin “Kip” Holden, written statement submitted for a hearing on Recovering from Hurricane Katrina: 

Responding to the Immediate Needs of Its Victims, on September 28, 2005, Senate Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs Committee, 109th Congress, 1st session. 15 As noted in U.S. Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau (NGB J7), After Action Review: Hurricane 

Response September 2005 (December 21, 2005), 146, 168. 16 U.S. Department of Defense, Hurricane Katrina Initial Observations and Lessons Learned (n.d., ca. 2005). 

These deployments occurred under the EMAC system. 17 U.S. Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau (NGB J7), After Action Review: Hurricane Katrina 

Response September 2005 (December 21, 2005). 18 If chartered as a joint DOD activity, the NGB would become a member of the Joint Staff, rather than only 

having a reporting relationship with the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Air Force. Lieutenant 

General H. Steven Blum, “A Vision for the National Guard,” Joint Forces Quarterly, issue 36 (December 2004), 24-29. 19 U.S. Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau (NGB J5), Draft Baseline Capabilities for Joint Task 

Force-State (JTF-State), n.d., ca. 2005. The National Guard Bureau can provide overarching situational awareness 

and an integrated common, relevant operating picture regarding the employment of Army and Air Guard troops in 

each of the 54 States, Territories and the District of Columbia. This demonstrates the essential role of the National 

Guard Bureau as the channel of communications between the several States and the combatant commanders, the 

Joint Staff and the Departments of Defense, Army and Air Force. Given the current national security environment, 

the necessity to continue providing this kind of data will continue to grow. Capabilities include Joint Force Joint 

Operations Centers (JF JOC). This is a network composed of the NGB Joint Operations Center and a Joint 
APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

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 Operations Center in each of the States, Territories, and the District of Columbia. Each JF JOC has redundant 

communications connectivity to include: DOD unclassified (NIPR) and classified (SIPR) computer networks; a 

High Frequency network with high and low-side voice and data information; and commercial systems. The network 

provides DOD and interagency connectivity and situational awareness to deliberate planning and to emerging and 

on-going contingency operations in any State or Territory. The National Guard has successfully established a Joint 

CONUS Communications Support Environment (JCCSE) nationwide. Each JFHQ has established Homeland 

Security Information Network (HSIN) linkages. The HSIN is an unsecured collection of Department of Homeland 

Security systems designed to facilitate information sharing and collaboration. 20 Colonel F. G. Dowden, Regional Liaison, New Orleans Department of Homeland Security and Public Safety, 

written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Managing Law Enforcement and Communications in a 

Catastrophe, on February 6, 2006, submitted to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 

Affairs, 109th Congress, 2nd session. 21 Kevin J. Martin, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, written statement for a hearing on Public 

Safety Communications from 9/11 to Katrina: Critical Public Policy Lessons, submitted to Subcommittee on 

Telecommunications and the Internet, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, on September 29, 2005, 109th

Congress, 1st session. 22 U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, “Hurricane Katrina Situation 

Report #20,” September 4, 2005. 23 Communications “operability” refers to whether a basic communications network is functioning at all. 

Operability will fail when the underlying infrastructure is destroyed or otherwise fails (e.g. through loss of power). 24 Communications “interoperability” refers to the ability to communicate across different, operable 

communication systems. 25 Congressman Bill Pascrell, Jr., hearing on Government Operability during Catastrophic Events, on October 26, 

2005, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science and 

Technology, 109th Congress, 1st session. 26 For example, FEMA had pre-positioned two of their five Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS) 

detachments in the Gulf and quickly moved them to the affected areas in Louisiana and Mississippi soon after 

landfall, but additional MERS support should have been deployed to the Gulf when it became apparent that those 

pre-positioned were insufficient for an incident of Katrina’s magnitude. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 

Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA National Situation Report,” August 29, 2005, 3; and Michael 

Brown, former Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane 

Katrina: The Role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, on September 27, 2005, to House Select 

Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session. 27 Mark Rey, Under Secretary for Natural Resources and Environment, U.S Department of Agriculture, testimony 

before a hearing on Ensuring Operability during Catastrophic Events, on October 26, 2005, House Committee on 

Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology, 109th Congress, 1st session. 28 Dr. David G. Boyd, Director of the Office for Interoperability and Compatibility, Department of Homeland 

Security, written statement for a hearing on Ensuring Operability during Catastrophic Events, on October 26, 2005, 

House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology, 

109th Congress, 1st session. As a first step, as required by the Fiscal Year 2005 and 2006 homeland security grant 

guidance, States and urban areas are to develop Tactical Interoperable Communication Plans to address means of 

improving communications operability and interoperability. See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Fiscal 

Year 2006 Homeland Security Grant Program Guidance: Program Guidance and Application Kit (Washington, 

D.C., December 2005). Although not an issue during Hurricane Katrina, first responders still require more radio 

spectrum to effectively communicate during their missions. Public Law 109-171, enacted recently, provides first 

responders with more radio spectrum in the 700 megahertz band, starting April 7, 2009. The bill calls for auctioning 

off some of the radio spectrum relinquished by broadcasters. Some of that revenue would pay for upgrades to first 

responders’ equipment. This transition for the 700 megahertz radio spectrum is considered a critical component in 

improving communications between police, fire, and other emergency agencies. 29 Dr. David G. Boyd, Director of the Office for Interoperability and Compatibility, Department of Homeland 

Security, written statement for a hearing on Ensuring Operability during Catastrophic Events, on October 26, 2005, 

to House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology, 

House Homeland Security Committee, 109th Congress, 1st session. 
APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

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 30 Private sector companies manage sophisticated supply and delivery chains using the most efficient means 

available to handle goods as few times as possible between the supplier and the customer. 31 Vincent Pearce, National Response Program Manager for the Department of Transportation, testimony before a 

hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Managing the Crisis and Evacuating New Orleans, on February 1, 2006, Senate 

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 109th Congress, 2nd session. 32 For example, a contractor arrived at an evacuation staging site at Zephyr Field stadium in New Orleans with 

37,500 meals, as requested, only to discover that the evacuees had already left. 33 FEMA US&R Task Forces, in conjunction with USCG, DOD, other federal agencies, and State and local first 

responders, rescued over 6,500 people. See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency 

Management Agency, “Urban Search and Rescue Operations Completed: Hurricane Katrina Urban Search and 

Rescue Teams Are Due to Return Home,” news release, September 30, 2005, http://www.fema.gov/news/ 

newsrelease.fema?id=19320.html. 34 Donna Miles, “Military Providing Full-Scale Response to Hurricane Relief Effort,” American Forces Press 

Service, August 31, 2005, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2005/20050831_2576.html. 35 “Some of the problems we encountered were low visibility at night, a lot of downed power lines, a lot of 

underwater obstructions, vehicles that were underwater, debris that was everywhere, and large numbers of people 

shouting for help from the house.” Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, “Department Timelines 

Chronology 3,” Activity Report on Hurricane Katrina (Baton Rouge, 2005), 2. 36 East Baton Rouge Parish, Draft After-Action Report for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (Baton Rouge, 2005), 38. 37 Scott Wells, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Perspectives of FEMA’s Operations 

Professionals, on December 8, 2005, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th

Congress, 1st session. 38 Massachusetts Urban Search and Rescue Task Force-1, Hurricane Katrina After-Action Report: August 30, 

2005 through September 8, 2005 (Beverly, MA, 2005), 6. 39 East Baton Rouge Parish, Draft After-Action Report for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (Baton Rouge, 2005), 38. 40 Louisiana Office of the Governor, Response to U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs (Baton Rouge, December 2005), 11. See also Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, testimony before a 

hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, to the 

House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st

session, 68. Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, “Department Timelines Chronology 3,” Activity Report 

on Hurricane Katrina (Baton Rouge, 2005), 7. http://www.nola.com/katrina/view.ssf.html; Newsweek, “The Lost 

City”, September 12, 2005. 41 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), 8, 43; 

and National Response Plan ESF #13 Annex, pg. 13-1. 42 On August 31, most of the New Orleans police force was redirected from search and rescue missions to respond 

to the looting, detracting from the priority mission of saving lives. Homeland Security Operations Center Spot 

Report #33, 31 Aug 05, 1123 hrs. (recording that “on August 31, CEO Akerman of Bell South contacted [a DHS 

official] and requests immediate security assistance, relating that the Bell South Main Central Office was being 

overrun by mob during attempted evacuation of site and that its employees may be in physical danger”); U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #15,” September 2, 2005 (reporting that 

security concerns were prohibiting all operations in many grain industry facilities); U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #18,” September 4, 2005 (reporting that fuel and security for deliveries 

are a concern); U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #19,” September 4, 2005 

(reporting that security remained a major concern for agriculture, food processing, distribution, services, and retail; 

access to service and retail facilities for re-stocking remains restricted in many areas; security for all infrastructures 

remained a major concern, with employers reluctant to restart businesses; safety of their employees is a priority); 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #29,” September 9, 2005 (reporting that 

security remained the top priority for the industry; contract security and other security sources were being 

coordinated with other Emergency Support Functions). 43 Both the Department of the Interior and the Department of Commerce reported that their organic law 

enforcement assets were available for use in the Gulf Coast region and attempted to lend their assistance by 

contacting the Interagency Incident Management Group in Washington, D.C., but received no response. The 

Department of the Interior has 4,400 law enforcement officers—including hundreds of officers immediately 

deployable in the Gulf Coast area—trained to work in harsh environments, conduct search and rescue, emergency 
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 medical services, and evacuation, yet these assets were not called upon to assist under the NRP until late September, 

when DOI contacted the LECC in New Orleans. The Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Office of Law Enforcement (OLE) also attempted to lend its law enforcement 

assistance to the Federal response effort, but received no response through the ESF-13 process. 44 For example, the Department of Interior law enforcement personnel had to be sworn in as Deputy U.S. Marshals 

to give them Federal law enforcement authority beyond their statutory DOI jurisdiction. 45 While some law enforcement officers provided by States under the EMAC readily accepted direction from 

Louisiana and Federal law enforcement officials, others operated in New Orleans with little coordination or 

supervision. 46 According to the U.S. Marshals Service, this was “a critical issue” in both New Orleans and Southern 

Mississippi. The Marshals Service and the DOJ Office of Legal Policy have offered recommendations for more 

comprehensive monitoring of persons under law enforcement supervision. For additional information on the 

disarray of the New Orleans criminal justice system in Hurricane Katrina’s aftermath, see Melinda Deslatte, 

“Prisons in New Orleans empty as temporary booking facility up and running,” Associated Press, September 3, 

2005; Ann Woolner, “A Legal System in Chaos: New Orleans Struggles,” Fulton County Daily Report, October 4, 

2005; and Chuck Crumbo, “Evacuation leaves Louisiana prison system in chaos,” The State (Columbia, SC), 

October 5, 2005. 47 On September 3, the Associated Press reported that “computer logs still hadn’t been retrieved from the criminal 

district court in New Orleans...[and] tracking down witnesses, finding court records and trial transcripts and 

organizing a temporary court” would remain challenges to the reestablishment of the city’s criminal justice system. 

Melinda Deslatte, “Prisons in New Orleans empty as temporary booking facility up and running,” Associated Press,

September 3, 2005; Ann Woolner, “A Legal System in Chaos: New Orleans Struggles,” Fulton County Daily 

Report, October 4, 2005; and Chuck Crumbo, “Evacuation leaves Louisiana prison system in chaos,” The State 

(Columbia, SC), October 5, 2005. 

Both State and Federal courts closed their doors. Supreme Court of Louisiana, Order by Justice Catherine D. 

Kimball, September 2, 2005, Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Supreme Court of Mississippi, Order by Justice James W. 

Smith, Jr., September 7, 2005; U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, Order by Chief Judge Helen 

G. Berrigan, September 4, 2005, accessed from http://katrinalaw.org/dokuphp?id=louisiana_eastern_district_court 

on February 17, 2006; U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, September 2, 2005, accessed 

from http://katrinalaw.org/dokuphp?id=louisiana_eastern_bankruptcy_court on February 17, 2006; Fourth Circuit 

Court of Appeal, State of Louisiana, Order by Justice Max N. Tobias, Jr., September 2, 2005, accessed from 

http://katrinalaw.org/dokuphp?id=fourth_circuit_court_of_appeal on February 17, 2006; Fifth Circuit Court of 

Appeal, State of Louisiana, Order by Justice Walter J. Rothschild, September 2, 2005, accessed from: 

http://katrinalaw.org/dokuphp?id= fifth_circuit_court_of_appeal, accessed on February 17, 2006; Civil District 

Court, Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana, Order by Chief Justice Robin M. Giarrusso, September 2, 2005, 

accessed from http://katrinalaw.org/dokuphp?id= orleans_parish_civil_district_court, accessed on February 17, 

2006. 48 The DOJ’s Bureau of Prisons moved, or facilitated movement of, a large number of prisoners incarcerated in 

Louisiana facilities during the first week of the disaster. Though there were no major difficulties or issues 

encountered during the actual transport of the prisoners, there were flaws in the decision making process and a 

general failure on the part of State and local prison authorities to be proactive in evacuating their incarcerated 

populations. 49 United Health Foundation, America's Health Rankings--2005 Edition (St. Paul, MN: Arundel Street Consulting, 

Inc., 2005), http://www.unitedhealthfoundation.org/shr2005/survey.asp (accessed January 25, 2006), 13. 50 “The public health and health care delivery infrastructures have been either completely destroyed or have 

sustained significant damage across the affected Gulf Coast. Existing facilities that are operational are under 

extreme stress as they assume even greater responsibilities to fill the gaps created by the loss of so many facilities. 

Physician offices, cancer, imaging, dialysis and rehabilitation centers, hospitals, clinics, long-term care facilities, 

pharmacies, laboratories, etc., need to be rebuilt or repaired, not to mention re-supplied, with information technology 

systems, equipment and inventory.” Dr. Ardis D. Hoven, Member of the American Medical Association Board of 

Trustees, written statement for a hearing on Assessing Public Health and the Delivery of Care in the Wake of 

Hurricane Katrina, on September 22, 2005, submitted to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 

Subcommittees on Health and Oversight and Investigations, 109th Congress, 1st session. 
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 51 Sarah A. Lister, Hurricane Katrina: The Public Health and Medical Response, Congressional Research Service 

Report for Congress RL33096, (Washington, D.C., September 21, 2005), Summary, CRS 1, CRS 6-7, CRS 11. 52 “Our situations are urgent. Unless we find financial relief within the next seven to ten days, we will be forced 

to make some very tough decisions. We are committed to our patients, our hospital staff and our community. 

However, we can’t continue to care for our patients and community – many of whom hopefully will return soon 

from the evacuation – unless we have immediate financial assistance. ... The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 

Services already has eased some of its regulations governing Medicare and Medicaid. There are, however, 

additional measures that can be taken. The AHA suggests immediate federal coverage for the uninsured people 

affected by the hurricane. So that access can be granted as quickly as possible, additional relief from Medicare and 

Medicaid red tape is needed. ... The AHA also asks that [FEMA] funds be available for all types of community 

hospitals affected by the storm.” Dr. Mark Peters, President & CEO, East Jefferson Memorial Hospital, Metairie, 

Louisiana, on behalf of the American Hospital Association, written statement for a hearing on Assessing Public 

Health and the Delivery of Care in the Wake of Katrina, on September 22, 2005, submitted to the House Committee 

on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittees on Health and Oversight and Investigations, 109th Congress, 1st session. 53 In several instances, HHS had pre-positioned medical, public health and pharmaceutical assets in Louisiana and 

had them ready to deploy where needed as soon as they received a go-ahead from State decision-makers. In some 

cases, security and logistics may have been issues, but delays in ‘on the ground’ decision-making by local and State 

officials resulted in delays in the delivery of assets and services when and where they were needed. 54 One key example: “Dr. Laurence Grummer-Strawn, a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention researcher 

and an HHS Public Health Service member, was deployed to central Louisiana with a team of 125 medical 

personnel to construct a temporary 1,000-bed hospital. The plan, Grummer-Strawn understood, was for that facility 

to treat ‘overflow patients’ transferred from hospitals in the southern part of the state. Arriving Saturday, Sept. 3, 

six days after Katrina hit, his team spent two days setting up the hospital before they were told they weren't needed 

there. The team left Alexandria, La., Wednesday - it took a day to pack up the beds and equipment - and fanned out 

to conduct needs assessments at shelters across the state.” Justin Rood, “Medical Catastrophe,” Government 

Executive Magazine, November 1, 2005, http://www.govexec.com/features/1105-01/1105-01s1.htm. 55 “Almost 34,000 volunteer health professionals registered through HHS’s toll-free telephone number or through 

the website established for this purpose. Of these, only 1,400 were deployed, based on the tasking requirements 

from FEMA. By the end of the first week following Katrina’s landfall, it became clear that the majority of the 

volunteers would not be urgently needed in the Gulf Coast. Though HHS announced this fact, this message did not 

reach many volunteers, who expressed frustration that their services were not being accepted or efficiently utilized. 

[M]any well-intentioned clinicians and health care organizations simply self-deployed and traveled to Louisiana, 

where their arrival compounded the overall disorganization of the effort to provide health care ... Lacking an 

assigned role within a properly planned framework, many found themselves sitting on their hands, doing nothing for 

which they had been trained.” Hilarie H. Cranmer, “Hurricane Katrina: Volunteer Work – Logistics First,” New 

England Journal of Medicine 353(15), no. (October 13, 2005). 56 Irwin Redlener, Dennis Johnson, David A. Berman and Roy Grant, “Follow-Up 2005: Where the American 

Public Stands on Terrorism and Preparedness after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,” 

http://www.ncdp.mailman.columbia.edu/research.htm (accessed January 25, 2006). 57 Sarah A. Lister, Hurricane Katrina: The Public Health and Medical Response, Congressional Research Service 

for Congress RL33096, (Washington, D.C., September 21, 2005), 22. 58 As of September 11, 2005, 14 days after Katrina made landfall, FEMA had received 699,207 Louisiana, 

Alabama and Mississippi household registrations for assistance under the Individuals and Households Program 

(IHP); 393,294 had been approved for assistance; 366,370 households had been funded; and $818,939,600 in 

assistance had been released. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #35,” 

September 12, 2005, 11. By late September, “an estimated more than 20 percent of all those affected by the storms 

and who have filed for FEMA assistance are now receiving HHS benefits and services. Furthermore, 41 percent of 

the 857,000 evacuees living in a different zip code from the damaged areas are receiving help from HHS.” U.S. 

Department of Health and Human Services, “Estimates Show More Than 40 Percent of Hurricane Evacuees Now 

Receiving HHS Benefits or Services,” news release, September 29, 2005. 59 Examples include: health insurance for elderly and disabled Americans (Medicare) and health insurance for 

low-income people (Medicaid); financial assistance for low-income families; pre-school education and services 

(Head Start); Social Security benefits; veterans benefits; and unemployment benefits. 60 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), ESF #6-1. 
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 61 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), ESF #6-5. 

“Mass care” includes overall coordination of the shelter, feeding and other activities to support the emergency needs of 

victims. 62 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), ESF #6-3. 

“Human services” refer to the provision of resources, the processing of new Federal benefit claims, compensation 

claims and other supportive services. 63 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), ESF #6-2. 64 Based on the locations reported by those who applied for FEMA assistance as a result of the impact of 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 

“Reported Locations of Katrina/Rita Applicants,” January 20, 2006, 

http://www.fema.gov/pdf/press/katrina_after/metro_stats.pdf (accessed January 25, 2006). 65 Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, written statement for a hearing on 

Hurricane Katrina: The Homeland Security Department’s Preparation and Response, on February 15, 2006, 

submitted to the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 109th Congress, 2nd session. 

Governor Kathleen Blanco estimates that 8 percent of the New Orleans population stayed behind. Governor 

Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by 

the State of Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, submitted to the U.S. House Select Committee to Investigate the 

Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session. 

Mayor Nagin testified to Congress that “thousands of residents” did not leave, even after he issued the mandatory 

evacuation order. Ray Nagin, Mayor of New Orleans, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: 

Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, submitted to the House Select 

Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st

session. 66 Ronald D. Utt, “After Weeks of Confusion, the Right Course for Evacuee Housing Assistance,” WebMemo 

#866, prepared for The Heritage Foundation, September 28, 2005. 67 “Had HUD staff been more closely involved in FEMA planning, the cost and delay of relearning 50 years of 

lessons could have been avoided.” Ronald D. Utt, “After Weeks of Confusion, the Right Course for Evacuee 

Housing Assistance,” WebMemo #866, prepared for The Heritage Foundation, September 28, 2005. HUD played a 

key role facilitating the identification of available housing resources and placement of Katrina evacuees in housing. 68 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service, “NOAA Weather Radio All 

Hazards,” January 31, 2006, http://www.weather.gov/nwr/. The Federal Communication Commission’s EAS 

Primary Entry Point (PEP) station in New Orleans (station WWL) was one of the few radio stations in the area to 

provide continuous service to the New Orleans area. The NOAA Weather Radio (NWR) is a national network of 

radio stations that continuously broadcast weather and hazard information from local Weather Service offices. 

Operating in close conjunction with EAS, NOAA Weather Radio comprises an “all hazards” radio network that acts 

as a “single source for comprehensive weather and emergency information.” National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration, National Weather Service, “NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards,” January 31, 2006, 

http://www.weather.gov/nwr/. 69 The Emergency Alert System (EAS) is a mechanism for public officials—Federal, State, and local—to 

communicate disaster information and instructions rapidly and widely. The system aims to reach the broadest 

possible audience by disseminating emergency updates on existing radio and television stations, including via digital 

and satellite networks. Federal Communications Commission, FCC Consumer Facts: The Emergency Alert System

(Washington, DC, 2005), 1. See also State of California, “What Is EAS?,” 

http://eas.oes.ca.gov/Pages/whatseas.htm. The new EAS system is the direct descendant of the Emergency 

Broadcast System (EBS), the Nation’s alert system from 1963 until the advent of EAS. EAS was officially launched 

on January 1, 1997 (for radio stations) and December 31, 1998 (for television). Federal Emergency Management 

Agency, “Background on the Emergency Alert System,” October 23, 2004, 

http://www.fema.gov/rrr/rep/easrep.shtm. While EAS fulfills the same function as EBS, it differs in that it takes 

advantage of digital technology to permit automation of transmission. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 

“Background on the Emergency Alert System,” October 23, 2004, http://www.fema.gov/rrr/rep/easrep.shtm. The 

Emergency Broadcast System and its EAS successor were originally designed for the President to speak to the 

Nation during an emergency, particularly following catastrophic nuclear attacks. But the system was made available 

to State and local officials in 1963, and since then has been used primarily for weather emergencies. “There are two 

contexts in which the EAS will be used—Presidentially-initiated alerts and messages and those initiated by State and 
APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

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 local governments in concert with the broadcast industry.” Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Background 

on the Emergency Alert System,” October 23, 2004, http://www.fema.gov/rrr/rep/easrep.shtm. See also, Federal 

Communications Commission, FCC Consumer Facts: The Emergency Alert System (Washington, DC, 2005), 2. 

The document states: “a state emergency manager may use the system to send out a public warning by broadcasting 

that warning from one or more major radio stations in a particular state.” EAS was not activated prior to landfall 

aside from NOAA hurricane warnings and advisories. “The Emergency Alert System was never activated by the 

White House or by State or local governments during Katrina.” Ken Kerschbaumer, “Broadcasters Seek Better 

Emergency Alert System,” Broadcasting and Cable, September 12, 2005. 70 “The Big Disconnect on New Orleans,” CNN.com, September 2, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/09/02/ 

katrina.response. 71 In testimony before the House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation and Response to 

Hurricane Katrina, Mr. Phil Parr, Deputy Federal Coordinating Officer, FEMA, and Mr. Terry Ebert, Director of the 

Louisiana Office of Homeland Security, of the City of New Orleans, both testified that exaggerated media reports 

impeded rescue efforts (December 14, 2005). 72 The Nation relies on interdependent systems known as “critical infrastructure” to maintain its defense, 

continuity of government, economic prosperity, and quality of life. The term critical infrastructure means “systems 

and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems 

and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, 

or any combination of those matters.” See, e.g., USA Patriot Act of 2001, Section 1016(e), Public Law 107-56, 

107th Congress, 1st session (October 26, 2001), 115 Stat. 401; Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2001, 42 

U.S.C. § 5195c(e). 

Transportation, electricity, banking, telecommunications, food supply, and clean water are examples of critical 

infrastructure services that have become basic aspects of our daily lives. These services are often only noticed when 

they are disrupted, and the American public expects speedy restoration of them. Private sector companies own and 

operate 85 percent of our Nation’s critical infrastructure and are responsible for protecting their facilities and 

restoring operations following an incident. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Interim National Infrastructure 

Protection Plan (Washington, DC). Response planning must also recognize the unique Federal responsibility to 

support private sector efforts and assist in the restoration of critical infrastructures imperative to the National 

economy or integral to larger cascading systems or supply chains. 73 U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Hurricane Katrina’s Impact on the U.S. Oil 

and Natural Gas Markets, September 6, 2005. 74 Samuel Bodman, Secretary of the Department of Energy, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane 

Recovery Efforts, on October 27, 2005, submitted to the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, 109th

Congress, 1st session. 75 U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, “Hurricane Katrina Situation 

Report #10,” August 30, 2005. 76 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), 12. 77 Sectors include: Agriculture and Food, Banking and Finance, Chemical, Commercial Facilities, Dams, Defense 

Industrial Base, Emergency Services, Energy, Government Facilities, Information Technology, National Monuments 

and Icons, Nuclear Reactors, Material and Waste, Postal and Shipping, Public Health and Healthcare, 

Telecommunications, Transportation, Water. The White House, The National Strategy for the Physical Protection 

of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets (Washington, D.C., February 2003), 9. 78 Industries with critical infrastructure contacted various Federal departments and agencies and requested 

assistance to protect or to restore their facilities. These requests were inconsistently coordinated across sectors and 

responded to in an ad hoc fashion. 79 “The Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) initially deploys a DHS/Emergency Preparedness & 

Response (EPR)/FEMA-led Emergency Response Team Advance (ERT-A), including rapid needs assessment 

personnel and appropriate ESF representatives, to State operating facilities and incident sites to assess the impact of 

the situation, collect damage information, gauge immediate Federal support requirements, and make preliminary 

arrangements to set up Federal field facilities.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan

(Washington, D.C. December 2004), 51. “Infrastructure Specialist (representing ESF #3)-assesses the status of 

transportation.” In addition, they did not have expertise in the critical infrastructure in the region. U.S. Department 

of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA Rapid Needs Assessment Form,” April 
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 2001, http://www.fema.gov/preparednesss/resources/em_mgt/rapid_needs_assessment_team.htm (accessed on 

January 17, 2005).79

80 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan (Washington, D.C.). 81 A Superfund site is a hazardous waste site that is part of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) 

Superfund Program. Years ago, before people became aware of the public health and environmental dangers of 

dumping chemical wastes, thousands of properties became uncontrolled or abandoned hazardous waste sites. 

Examples include abandoned warehouses or landfills. Concern about this problem led Congress to establish in 1980 

the Superfund Program to locate, investigate and clean up the worst sites nationwide. The EPA administers the 

Superfund Program in cooperation with individual states and tribal governments. EPA, “About Superfund,” 

http://www.epa.gov/superfund/about.htm, accessed February 15, 2006. 82 Gulf Coast Hurricane Emergency Environmental Protection Act of 2005, HR 4139, 109th Congress, 1st session, 

(October 25, 2005), 3. 83 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Environmental Assessment Summary,” December 6, 2005, 

http://www.epa.gov/katrina/testresults/katrina_env 

_assessment_summary.htm, (accessed January 18, 2006). 84 “As of Oct. 4, 22 multi-agency environmental assessment and recovery teams had: conducted shoreline and 

waterway assessments throughout Mississippi and Alabama; resolved 2,315 of 2,380 cases reported to the Coast 

Guard and EPA; assessed a total of 504 vessels grounded or deposited inland along coastal areas for potential oil 

discharges; collected more than 10,000 hazardous materials such as drums, tanks, cylinders, containers and batteries 

throughout the Mississippi counties of Hancock, Harrison and Jackson as well as the Alabama counties of Baldwin 

and Mobile; recovered about 43,000 gallons of fuel; and assessed more than 200 facilities.” U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security, Coast Guard, “Coast Guard Response to Hurricane Katrina,” U.S. Coast Guard Fact File, 

September 11, 2005, http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/comrel/factfile/Factcards/Hurricane_Katrina.htm. 85 The graph shown on the referenced website displays the estimated volume and surface area of the flood waters 

at one foot increments. Note that the volume and area estimates are only for the areas shown as inundated on the 

above graphic. The depths are relative to the water surface as of the afternoon of Friday, September 2, 2005. U.S. 

Geological Survey, “Hurricane Katrina: Science,” http://eros.usgs.gov/katrina/science.html (accessed January 23, 

2006). “The affected area was home to 2.3 million people, (0.8 percent of the U.S. population), and covers 90,000 

square miles, (2.5 percent of the U.S. surface area). At the time Katrina hit, New Orleans was the 35th largest U.S. 

city by population.” See House Committee on Ways and Means, “Economic Update: Hurricane Katrina,” news 

release, September 8, 2005, http://waysandmeans.house 

.gov/media/pdf/taxdocs/090805katrina.pdf. 86 Even after assessments were conducted, a number of Federal agencies reported that their personnel did not 

receive information or warnings concerning environmental hazards. 87 Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5173. 88 Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, written statement for a hearing on 

“Hurricane Katrina: The Homeland Security Department’s Preparation and Response,” on February 15, 2006, 

submitted to the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 109th Congress, 2nd session. 89 Debris on private property can only be removed with the owner’s consent or with a State or local government 

request to the Federal government that must meet several conditions. This was a difficult process because many 

owners had evacuated the area and could not be located. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal 

Emergency Management Agency; and Eric Cramer, “Waveland: A Case Study in Community Restoration,” 

Mississippi Valley Division News, http://www.mvd.usace.army.mil/hurricane/mvk/news/waveland.pdf. 90 The Department of State lists 151 countries, political entities and international organizations that offered 

assistance. Two additional countries offered assistance but wished no public recognition, for a total of 153. Of 

those, 139 were countries and the balance (14) was either political entities or international organizations. Note that 

of the fourteen, five different United Nations organizations are included. Pledges totaled $854 million. Of the $854 

million pledged, $400 million was in commodity for cash assistance (oil to be sold and then cash value considered). 

Of the remaining $454 million, $126.4 million has been received so far. The other $328 million plus the $400 

million in oil, has not been received, for a total of $728 million. (As of October 12, the foreign countries had 

pledged $854 million in financial contributions, and of this amount the USG had received $118.9 million (the latter 

figure had increased to $126.4 million by January 9). On October 20, 2005, after interagency consensus, $66 

million of the foreign funds received by the U.S. was transferred to FEMA for a case management program. The 
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 Federal government expects the balance of the foreign funds received to be allocated shortly. This accounts for all 

$854 million pledged. 91 A German company offering a $3 million integrated satellite and cellular telephone system capable of handling 

5,000 calls at once waited five days for a written deployment order from USNORTHCOM. 92 Joel Brinkley and Craig S. Smith, “Score of nations offer their help,” International Herald Tribune, September 

8, 2005; and Sean McCormack, “Daily Press Briefing,” US Department of State, September 7, 2005. 93 The State Department made contact with all New Orleans-based consulates, facilitated visits by various 

consular officials, as well as monitored the arrival and distribution of in-kind assistance and held regular press 

briefings. There is no tracking of Green Card holders or tourists. 94 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Emergencies and Disasters,” http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/ 

assetlibrary/katrina.html (accessed January 13, 2006). 95 U.S. Citizen Corps, “Citizen Corps Support for Hurricane Katrina Response & Recovery Efforts,” 

http://www.citizencorps.gov/doc/cc_Support_Katrina_1005.doc (accessed January 13, 2006). 96 Long before Hurricane Katrina ever made landfall, the Harris County Citizen Corps laid the groundwork for 

success with its pre-incident organization and its partnerships with local volunteer groups and area businesses. 

These two factors allowed the Harris County Citizen Corps to mobilize and organize its resources quickly and 

efficiently to serve the thousands of evacuees sheltered in Houston-area sites. According to emergency responders 

on the scene, Citizen Corps members previously trained in the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and 

the Incident Command System (ICS) were of great value to the hurricane response. Due to their pre-incident 

training, many Citizen Corps volunteers were already familiar with NIMS/ICS terminology (e.g., Joint Information 

Center, Joint Operations Center, IC, etc.) and understood the responsibilities of emergency responders at the incident 

site. Information available at U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Lessons Learned Information Sharing

(LLIS.gov) website, https://www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/detail.cfm?content_id=14990. 97 Tim Yarbrough, “Baptists’ 10.5 Million Meals shatters Prior Disaster Relief Record,” North American Mission 

Board, http://www.namb.net/site/apps/nl/content2.asp?c=9qKILUOzEpH&b=227361&ct=1568907 (accessed 

January 13, 2006). 98 The White House, Office of National Drug Control Policy, “Director Walters visits Baton Rouge, LA,” 

September 30, 2005, http://www.pushingback.com/archives/05sep.html (accessed January 13, 2006). See also, Set 

Free Indeed Ministry, “Hurricane Katrina: Set Free Indeed Offering Recovery & Relief,” 

http://www.setfreeindeedministry.com/katrina.html (accessed February 15, 2005). 99 Melvin “Kip” Holden, Mayor of Baton Rouge, interview by Wolf Blitzer, CNN Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer, 

September 11, 2005, http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0509/11/le.01.html. 

CHAPTER SIX: TRANSFORMING NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS

1

 The National Security Act of 1947 mandated a major reorganization of the foreign policy and military 

establishments of the U.S. Government. The act created many of the institutions that Presidents found useful when 

formulating and implementing foreign policy, including the National Security Council (NSC). The Council itself 

included the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and other members (such as the 

Director of Central Intelligence), who met at the White House to discuss both long-term problems and more 

immediate national security crises. A small NSC staff was hired to coordinate foreign policy materials from other 

agencies for the President. Beginning in 1953, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs directed this staff. 

The act also established the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which grew out of World War II era Office of 

Strategic Services and small post-war intelligence organizations. The CIA served as the primary civilian 

intelligence-gathering organization in the government. Later, the Defense Intelligence Agency became the main 

military intelligence body. The 1947 law also caused far-reaching changes in the military establishment. The War 

Department and Navy Department merged into a single Department of Defense under the Secretary of Defense, who 

also directed the newly created Department of the Air Force. However, each of the three branches maintained their 

own service secretaries. In 1949 the act was amended to give the Secretary of Defense more power over the 

individual services and their secretaries. 

See generally National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495, codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 401—403-3 (2005). 
APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

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 2

 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC, September 

2002); The White House, Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, DC, 

July 2002); and The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Washington, DC, February 2003). 3

 See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, DC, December 2004); U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System (Washington, DC, March 1, 2004); U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security, Interim National Preparedness Goal (Washington, DC, March 31, 2005); and 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan (Washington, DC, 

February 2005). 4 Interim National Preparedness Goal, 3. 5

 Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 (HSPD-8) establishes policy that all Federal departments and 

agencies will cooperate to issue relevant State and local financial assistance, program announcements, solicitations, 

application instructions, and other guidance documents in a manner that is consistent with the National Preparedness 

Goal. The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8: National Preparedness [“HSPD-8”] 

(Washington, DC, December 17, 2003). 6

 Congress requires the Secretary of Defense to conduct a comprehensive examination every four years (known as 

the “Quadrennial Defense Review”) of the national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, 

infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program and policies of the United States with a view 

toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a defense program for 

the next twenty years. See 10 U.S.C. § 118 (2005). 7

 See note 2. 

8

 Among other reforms, the Goldwater-Nichols legislation clarified the chain of command from the President to 

the Secretary of Defense to the Combatant Commander. It also elevated the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to 

be the President’s principal military adviser and strengthened the Joint Staff as a truly “Joint” organization that 

works for the Chairman, not the armed services. Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, Public Law 99-433, 99th Congress, 

2nd session, 101 Stat. 992 (October 1, 1986). 

9

 Eligibility to receive State Homeland Security Grant Program funding is dependent upon DHS approval of 

statewide, territory, or regional homeland security strategies that adopt capability-based planning and a prioritization 

of assets based on risks and need in conformance with the National Preparedness Goal. The Urban Area Security 

Initiative is a subset of the State Homeland Security Grant Program, providing funds to address the unique planning, 

equipment, training, and exercise needs of high threat, high-density urban areas, and assist them in building an 

enhanced and sustainable capacity to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism. U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security, FY 2006 Homeland Security Grant Program (Washington, DC, December 2005). 10 HSPD-8, § 1. 11 See generally Interim National Preparedness Goal. 12 In particular, DHS would benefit from sufficient funds to permit the Department to deploy additional assets and 

resources upon warning of a catastrophic event. Furthermore, we as a Nation must not penalize DHS and other 

Federal responders when they undertake anticipatory actions for false alarms. To use medical terms, a false negative

is unacceptable while we should be willing to accept some false positives. 13 As described in the National Incident Management System, the command function may be exercised in two 

general ways: 1) through a “Single Command” structure led by an Incident Commander (IC), or through a “Unified 

Command.” In a Single Command structure, the IC is solely responsible for establishing incident management 

objectives and strategies and for ensuring that all functional area activities are directed toward accomplishment of 

the strategy. In a Unified Command structure, the individuals designated by their jurisdictional authorities jointly 

determine objectives, strategies, plans, and priorities and work together to execute integrated incident operations and 

maximize the use of assigned resources. National Incident Management System, 12-16. 14 The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5: Management of Domestic Incidents 

(Washington, DC, February 28, 2003). See also Homeland Security Act of 2002 [“Homeland Security Act”], Public 

Law 296, 107th Congress, 2nd session (November 22, 2005), § 101, codified at 6 U.S.C. § 111 (2002). 15 HSPD-5, § 14. 16 There is no reason to eliminate the FCO role in the Stafford Act as there is a wide-range of incidents that are not 

nationally significant—such as most wildfires—where an FCO is essential to coordinate the Federal response, but a 

PFO is not necessary. 17 HSPD-5, § 5. 
APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 

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 18 First issued in 1992, the Federal Response Plan (FRP) outlined how the Federal Government implemented the 

Stafford Act to assist State and local governments when a major disaster or emergency overwhelmed their ability to 

respond effectively to save lives; protect public health, safety, and property; and restore communities. The FRP 

outlined policies, planning assumptions, concept of operations, response and recovery actions, and responsibilities of 

twenty-five Federal departments and agencies and the American Red Cross, that guided Federal operations 

following a Presidential declaration of a major disaster or emergency. An interim edition of the FRP was released in 

2003 to reflect the passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the establishment of DHS. Federal Response 

Plan (Interim), January 2003. 19 See generally National Response Plan, pg. ESF-i et seq. Under current arrangements, the NRP Emergency 

Support Functions (ESF) do not cleanly connect to the ICS structure required by NIMS, thus causing at time dueling 

systems or organizations to be created—one based on the ESF structure and one based on the ICS system. The 

Incident Command System (ICS) adopted by NIMS has five major sections (Command, Operations, Planning, 

Logistics, and Finance/Administration), each with their own subordinate groups that are modular and scalable to 

account for situations of various size and nature. See National Incident Management System, 7. 20 An eligibility requirement for States, territories, and regions to receive State Homeland Security Grant Program 

and Urban Areas Security Initiative grant funds is compliance with the phased implementation of NIMS. U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security, FY 2006 Homeland Security Grant Program [“FY 2006 Homeland Security 

Grant Program”] (Washington, DC, December 2005). The implementation of the National Incident Management 

System is also one of seven priorities for spending Federal homeland security assistance as outlined in the NPG. 

Interim National Preparedness Goal, 10. 21 The National Defense University, located at Fort McNair in Washington, DC, prepares military and civilian 

leaders from the United States and other countries to address national and international security challenges, through 

multi-disciplinary educational programs, research, professional exchanges, and outreach. For additional 

information, see www.ndu.edu. 22 See Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, Public Law 99-433, 99th Congress, 2nd session (October 1, 1986), § 401-406. 23 HSPD-8 directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish a national program and a multi-year planning 

system to conduct homeland security preparedness-related exercises in coordination with other appropriate Federal 

departments and agencies. See generally HSPD-8. 

 24 The National Strategy for Homeland Security directed the establishment of a National Exercise Strategy. 

HSPD-8 directed Secretary Tom Ridge to establish a “National Exercise Program” (NEP). Secretary Ridge charged 

the DHS Office of Domestic Preparedness to develop a program that identifies and integrates national level exercise 

activities to ensure those activities serve the broadest community of learning. In addition to full scale, integrated 

National level exercises—the NEP provides for tailored exercise activities that serve as the Department's primary 

vehicle for training national leaders and staff. The NEP enhances the collaboration among partners at all levels of 

government for assigned homeland security missions. National-level exercises provide the means to conduct "fullscale, full system tests" of collective preparedness, interoperability, and collaboration across all levels of 

government and the private sector. The program also incorporates elements to allow us to identify the implications 

of changes to homeland security strategies, plans, technologies, policies, and procedures. The cornerstone of 

national performance-based exercises is the Top Officials (TOPOFF), biennial exercise series. TOPOFF included a 

functional exercise in 2000 (TOPOFF I) and a full-scale exercise in 2003 (TOPOFF II). For additional information, 

see http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp. The “Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program” (HSEEP) is both 

doctrine and policy for designing, developing, conducting and evaluating exercises. HSEEP is a threat- and 

performance-based exercise program that includes a cycle, mix and range of exercise activities of varying degrees of 

complexity and interaction. 

HSEEP includes a series of four reference manuals to help states and local jurisdictions establish exercise programs 

and design, develop, conduct, and evaluate exercises. For additional information, see 

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/hseep.htm.http://www.hseep.dhs.gov 25 Office of Management and Budget, The President’s Management Agenda (Washington, DC, 2001). See also 

FY 2006 Homeland Security Grant Program. 26 U.S. Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, 

Report to the President of the United States [“WMD Report”](Washington, DC, March 31, 2005), 337-341; National 

Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the 

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States [“9/11 Report”] (New York: WW Norton and 

Company, July 22, 2004), 420-421. 
APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 

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 27 Prior to the 109th Congress, the Department was subject to the oversight of eighty-eight different Congressional 

committees and sub-committees. See 9/11 Public Discourse project, “Fact Sheet on Congressional Reform” 

(Washington, DC, July 11, 2005), http://www.9-11pdp.org/ua/2005-07-11_factsheet.pdf. Subsequently, the 

committee structure has been changed to attempt a consolidation of homeland security oversight through the 

formation of a Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs and a House Committee on 

Homeland Security. 28 For example, using a risk-based formula, the Urban Area Security Initiative is funded for FY06 at $765 million. 

This compares to the $950 million of FY06 funding allocated in both equal distributions and risk-based justifications 

across the States and territories through the State Homeland Security Grant Program and the Law Enforcement 

Terrorism Prevention Program. Moreover, when other “all-hazards” grant programs (e.g., Firefighter Assistance 

Grants and Emergency Management Performance Grants) are added to the equation, risk-based grants account for 

less than 30 percent of homeland security grants for preparedness and other responder needs. Department of 

Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2006, Public Law 90, 109th Congress, 1st session (October 18, 2005). See 

also Shawn Reese, “Risk-Based Funding in Homeland Security Grant Legislation: Analysis of Issues for the 109th

Congress,” CRS Report # 33050, August 29, 2005. 29 The Interim National Preparedness Goal defines capabilities-based planning as “planning, under uncertainty, to 

provide capabilities suitable for a wide range of threats and hazards while working within an economic framework 

that necessitates prioritization and choice.” Interim National Preparedness Goal, 4. 30 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Planning Scenarios, Draft Version 20.1 [“National Planning 

Scenarios”] (Washington, DC, April 2005). 31 Figure 2 duplicates Figure 1.1 in the previous “Katrina in Perspective” chapter, with the addition of the 

September 11th terrorist attacks and National Planning Scenarios 1, 3, and 9. For sources for these additions, see 

9/11 Report, Executive Summary, 1-2; Robert Looney, “Economic Costs to the United States Stemming From the 

9/11 Attacks,” Strategic Insights 1, no. 6 (Monterey, CA, August 2002), 

http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/aug02/homeland.asp; and National Planning Scenarios. Table 4, below, contains 

the data used in Figure 2. 

Table 1. Worst Natural Disasters in the United States, 1900-2005, with 

September 11th Terrorist Attacks and Selected National Planning Scenarios 

Damage in Third Quarter 2005 dollars 

Top Disasters Estimated deaths Estimated damage 

Galveston Hurricane (1900) 8,000 < $1 billion 

San Francisco Earthquake and Fire (1906) 5,000 $6 billion 

Atlantic-Gulf Hurricane (1919) 600 < $1 billion 

Mississippi Floods (1927) 246 $2 billion 

Hurricane San Felipe and the Okeechobee Flood (1928) 2,750 < $1 billion 

New England Hurricane (1938) 600 $4 billion 

Northeast Hurricane (1944) 390 < $1 billion 

Hurricane Diane (1955) 184 $5 billion 

Hurricane Audrey (1957) 390 < $1 billion 

Hurricane Betsy (1965) 75 $7 billion 

Hurricane Camille (1969) 335 $6 billion 

Hurricane Agnes (1972) 122 $8 billion 

Hurricane Hugo (1989) 86 $11 billion 

Hurricane Andrew (1992) 61 $33 billion 

East Coast Blizzard (1993) 270 $4 billion 

September 11, 2001 2981 $18 billion 

Major 2004 Hurricanes (Charley, Frances, Ivan, 

Jeanne) 167 $46 billion 

Hurricane Katrina (2005) 1,330 $96 billion 

National Planning Scenarios
APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 

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#1. 10-kt Improvised Nuclear Device Hundreds of 

thousands 

Hundreds of billions of 

dollars 

#3. Pandemic Influenza 87,000 $87 billion (low estimate) 

#9. Major Earthquake 1,400 Hundreds of billions of 

dollars 

32 Governor Kathleen Blanco estimates that 8 percent of the New Orleans population stayed behind: “Hurricane 

Ivan threatened us last year. Our evacuation looked like Houston’s—not very pretty. Before Katrina came, I 

developed a new evacuation plan that includes contra-flow, where both sides of the interstates are used for outbound 

traffic. I am proud that we rapidly moved over 1.2 million people—some 92% of the population—to safety without 

gridlock or undue delay prior to Katrina.” Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, written statement for a hearing on 

Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, submitted to the 

U.S. House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 

1st session. 

33 9/11 Report, 336 (quoting then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz). 34 “1984: Tory Cabinet in Brighton bomb blast,” BBC.co.uk, October 12, 1984, 

http://newssearch.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/october/12/newsid_2531000/2531583.stm. 35 The 9/11 Commission report describes the 9/11 attacks resulting partly from a failure in imagination. In 

particular, the Commission report highlights the importance of institutionalizing imagination in our methods for 

detecting and warning of surprise attacks. See 9/11 Report, 336, 339-348. 36 National Response Plan, 5. 37 See also Frances Fragos Townsend, Remarks at the National Emergency Management Association’s 2006 MidYear Conference, February 13, 2006, available at www.lexis.com. 38 Current programs aimed at increasing the preparedness of individual citizens and communities include Citizen 

Corps, the Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) program, the Fire Corps, the Neighborhood Watch 

Program, the Medical Reserve Corps Program, as well as Volunteers in Police Service. For summaries of these 

programs, see U.S. Citizen Corps, “Partners and Programs,” http://www.citizencorps.gov/programs/. 39 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Good Story: Harris County, Texas Citizen Corps’ Response to 

Hurricane Katrina,” Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS.gov) database, November 17, 2005, 

http://www.llis.gov. 40 9/11 Report, 318. 41 “The Ad Council has declared Ready one of the most successful campaigns in its more than 60-year history. 

 Since its launch the Ready campaign has generated more than $466 million in donated media support and its 

website has received more than 1.9 billion hits and 22 million unique visitors. The U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security promotes individual emergency preparedness through the Ready campaign and Citizen Corps as part of a 

broader national effort conducted by the Department’s Preparedness Directorate. Ready is a national public service 

advertising campaign produced by The Advertising Council in partnership with Homeland Security. The Ready

campaign is designed to educate and empower Americans to prepare for and respond to emergencies, including 

natural disasters and potential terrorist attacks.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Homeland Security and 

the Advertising Council Provide Parents and Teachers with Resources to Educate Children about Emergency 

Preparedness,” news release, February 2, 2006, http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/press_release/ 

press_release_0848.xml. See also www.ready.gov. 42 The “Learn Not to Burn” curriculum, first released in 1979, teaches twenty-two key fire safety behaviors and is 

organized in three learning levels. The curriculum is intended for use by teachers in planning classroom activities 

and can be re-used from year to year. “Learn Not to Burn” incorporates fire safety behaviors into regular school 

subjects, so children absorb life-saving information while developing skills in reading, math, art, history, and 

science. National Fire Protection Association, “Learn Not to Burn,” http://www.nfpa.org 43 A 2004 study by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration reported a record 80 percent of 

Americans wear their safety belts while driving or riding in their vehicles. Transportation Secretary Norman Y. 

Mineta said the 80 percent safety belt usage will save 15,200 lives and $50 billion in economic costs associated with 

traffic related crashes, injuries, and deaths every year. Donna Glassbrenner, “Safety Belt Use in 2004—Overall 

Results, Traffic Safety Facts,” prepared for the National Center for Statistics and Analysis (September 2004). See 
APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 

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 also U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, “Safety belt use jumps to 

record 80%,” news release, September 16, 2004. 44 Additional advertising campaigns that were successful in helping to change citizen behavior include efforts to 

stop the use of drugs through the ‘Just Say No’ message created by First Lady Nancy Reagan and ‘Drug Abuse 

Resistance Education’ (D.A.R.E.); prevent drunk driving originating with Mothers Against Drunk Driving 

(MADD); help quit smoking through the Surgeon General’s campaign to educate people on health risks and the 

American Cancer Society’s Great ‘American Smoke Out’; and stop littering through the ‘Keep America Beautiful’ 

message promoted by First Lady Claudia ‘Lady Bird’ Johnson. 45 For example, the development of the Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan has developed upon a 

close partnership between governments at all levels and the private sector owners of the Nation’s Critical 

Infrastructure and Key Resources. Our national efforts to improve air transportation security, furthermore, have 

depended upon unprecedented partnership between DHS’s Transportation Security Administration and the airline 

industry. See generally, Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan (Washington, DC, February 2005). 46 National Strategy for Homeland Security, viii. 47 For information on BRT, see Business Round Table letter to President George W. Bush, January 31, 2006, and 

http://www.businessroundtable.org/. For information on BENS, see www.bens.org. The BENS “Business Force”

project partnerships of regional, State, and local officials, together with businesses and NGOs, have been successful 

in emergency response planning and using private sector resources and volunteers to fill gaps in preparedness and 

response capabilities. 48 “A basic premise of the NRP is that incidents are generally handled at the lowest jurisdictional level possible. 

Police, fire, public health and medical, emergency management, and other personnel are responsible for incident 

management at the local level . . . In the vast majority of incidents, State and local resources and interstate mutual 

aid normally provide the first line of emergency response and incident management support. When an incident or 

potential incident is of such severity, magnitude, and/or complexity that it is considered an Incident of National 

Significance according to the criteria established in this plan, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination 

with other Federal departments and agencies, initiates actions to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from 

the incident.” National Response Plan, 15. 49 EMAC was developed in the 1990s and officially ratified by Congress as an organization with thirteen member 

States in 1996. Emergency Management Assistance Compact, Public Law 104-321, 104th Congress, 2nd session, 

(October 19, 1996). As of October 2005, 49 States, the District of Columbia, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Puerto 

Rico had enacted EMAC legislation. National Emergency Management Association, “EMAC Overview,” 

December 2005, http://www.emacweb.org/?323. EMAC is administered by the National Emergency Management 

Association (NEMA). During an emergency, NEMA staff works with EMAC member states to coordinate ensure 

information passes easily through the EMAC system. 

APPENDIX B – WHAT WENT RIGHT

1

 The White House, “President Visits Mississippi, Discusses Gulf Coast Reconstruction,” January 12, 2006, 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/01/20060112-3.html. 2

 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina: What Government is Doing,” http://www.dhs.gov/ 

katrina.htm. 3

 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Good Story: Harris County, Texas Citizen Corps’ Response to 

Hurricane Katrina,” Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS.gov) database, November 17, 2005, 

http://www.LLIS.gov. 4

 North American Mission Board, Southern Baptist Convention, “Disaster Relief: Generosity Fatigue Nowhere in 

Sight,” news release, September 23, 2005. 5

 Kip Holden, Mayor of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, interview by Wolf Blitzer, CNN Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer, 

September 11, 2005, http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0509/11/le.01.html; Set Free Indeed Ministry, 

“Hurricane Katrina Set Free Indeed Offering Recovery and Relief,” http://setfreeindeedministry.com/katrina.html 

(accessed February 8, 2006); and Bethany World Prayer Center website, “Hurricane Relief. Hurricane Katrina 

(Timeline),” http://www.bethany.com/katrina_relief.php (accessed February 8, 2006). 6

 Operation Blessing, “Hurricane Relief: Hurricane Relief by State,” http://www.ob.org/projects/hurricane_relief/ 
APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 

-214- 

 index.asp. 7

 Operation Blessing, “Hurricane Relief Activities in the Gulf Coast,” http://www.ob.org/projects/hurricane_relief/ 

relief_log.asp?NP_ID=1772. 8

 The Salvation Army, “Across the Nation the Salvation Army is Providing Aid to Survivors of Hurricane 

Katrina,” news release, September 13, 2005. 9

 The Salvation Army, “Katrina Update 1-20-06,” January 20, 2006, http://www.satern.org/response.html. 10 Livingston Parish, “After Action Report,” February 2006. 

11 Gary Krakow, “Ham Radio Operators to the Rescue after Katrina: Amateur Radio Networks Help Victims of 

the Hurricane,” MSNBC, September 6, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9228945/; American Radio Relay 

League (ARRL), “Amateur Radio Volunteers Involved in Katrina Recovery,” news release, August 31, 2005, 

http://www.arrl.org/news/stories/2005/08/30/1/?nc=1; Ben Joplin, interview by National Public Radio, All Things 

Considered, August 30, 2005, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4824598. 12 American Radio Relay League (ARRL), “President Urges Orderly Amateur Radio Response in Katrina 

Recovery,” news release, September 1, 2005, http://www.arrl.org/news/stories/2005/09/01/2/; American Radio 

Relay League (ARRL), “Amateur Radio Volunteers Involved in Katrina Recovery,” news release, August 31, 2005, 

http://www.arrl.org/news/stories/2005/08/30/1/. 13 Association of State Public Health Laboratories, “APHL Response to Hurricane Katrina 2005,” 

http://www.aphl.org/article.cfm?ArticleID=98; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 4, “Response to 

Hurricane Katrina,” September 5, 2005, http://epa.gov/region4/Katrina/response_20050905.htm; University of Iowa, 

“UI Hurricane Katrina Relief Includes Expertise, Enrollment, Supplies, Space,” news release, September 2, 2005, 

http://www.uiowa.edu/~ournews/2005/september/090205katrina-relief.html; Iowa Office of the Governor, “Iowans 

continue to aid survivors of Hurricane Katrina: State agencies stand ready to aid victims of Hurricane Rita,” news 

release, September 22, 2005, http://www.iowahomelandsecurity.org/asp/hurricane_katrina/IA 

_efforts_update.doc; and email from Association of State Public Health Laboratories. 14 New York City Fire Department, “Update on FDNY Hurricane Katrina Relief Efforts,” news release, 

September 26, 2005, http://www.nyc.gov/html/fdny/html/pr/2005/092605_alert_01.shtml. 15 Federal Express, “FedEx Support of Relief Efforts in Areas Affected by Hurricane Katrina,” news release, 

September 7, 2005, http://www.fedex.com/us/about/responsibility/katrina.html?link=4. 16 Rich Karlgaard, “Wonderful Wealth,” Forbes 176, no. 7 (October 10, 2005), 43; Dell USA, “Helping Those in 

Need,” http://www1.us.dell.com/content/topics/segtopic.aspx/brand/katrina_relief?c=us&cs=19&l=en&s=gen 

(accessed February 8, 2006); Home Depot, “Hurricane Katrina: Relief and Rebuilding Efforts,” 

http://www.homedepot.com (accessed February 8, 2006); IBM, “IBM Response Gains Ground in Aftermath of 

Katrina,” http://www.ibm.com/news/us/en/2005/09/ 

2005_09_06.html (accessed February 8, 2006); Lenovo, “Lenovo Responds to Hurricane Katrina Tragedy,” 

September 2, 2006, http://www.pc.ibm.com/us/lenovo/about/hurricane.html (accessed February 8, 2006); Pfizer, 

“Pfizer Expands Hurricane Katrina Relief Effort,” September 21, 2006, http://www.pfizer.com/pfizer/are/ 

news_releases/2005pr/mn_2005_0921a.jsp (accessed February 8, 2006); and Wal-Mart, “Wal-Mart Commits 

Additional $15 Million to Katrina Relief,” September 1, 2006, http://walmartstores.com/GlobalWMStoresWeb/ 

navigate.do?catg=26&contId=4856 (accessed February 8, 2006). 17 Gary P. LaGrange, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Port of New Orleans, testimony before a 

hearing on Revitalizing the Economy of South Louisiana, on November 7, 2005, to the Senate Committee on 

Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 109th Congress, 1st session. 18 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection, “U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

Donates More Than 100,000 Pieces of Seized Goods for Hurricane Katrina Evacuees in Mississippi,” news release, 

September 12, 2005. 19 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Hurricane Katrina 

Information,” news release, February 1, 2006, http://www.fema.gov/press/2005/resources_katrina. 20 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Disaster Medical 

System Section, FloridaOne Disaster Medical Assistance Team, “Hurricane Katrina Deployment,” 

http://dev.floridaonedmat.com/index.cfm/m/1/m/88. 21 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #18,” September 4, 2005, 2. 22 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Executive Briefing,” 

(September 17, 2005), 9. 
APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

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 23 Paul McHale, Assistant Defense Secretary for Homeland Defense, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane 

Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, and the National Guard of 

Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, on October 27, 2005, House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 

Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session; Lieutenant Colonel Richard Chavez, 

Chief of the Homeland Security Readiness Branch, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness 

and Response by the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, and the National Guard of Louisiana, Mississippi, 

and Alabama, on October 27, 2005, to the House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and 

Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session. 24 U.S. Department of Defense, Army Corps of Engineers, Mississippi Valley Division, Louisiana Recovery Field 

Office, “New Orleans: Unwatered,” news release, October 11, 2005. 25 Donna Miles, “Military Hurricane Relief Focuses on Saving Lives, Reducing Suffering,” American Forces 

Press Service, September 1, 2005, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2005/20050901_2590.html. 26 U.S. Marine Corps, “Beirut Battalion Concludes Contribution to Hurricane Relief,” Marine Corps News, 

October 1, 2005. 27 U.S. Marine Corps, “Marine Recruiters Save 150 Lives after Hurricane Katrina,” Marine Corps News, 

September 28, 2005. 28 William Carwile, Federal Coordinating Officer for Mississippi, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 

written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Perspectives on FEMA’s Operations Professionals, on 

December 8, 2005, submitted to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th

Congress, 1st session. 29 Katy Glassborow, “US Navy joins disaster-relief effort in wake of Hurricane Katrina,” Jane’s Navy 

International, September 9, 2005. See also Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, 

testimony before a hearing on the Role of the Military and National Guard in Disaster Response, on November 9, 

2005, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science, and 

Technology, 109th Congress, 1st session. 30 U.S. Department of Defense, Navy, Commander of the 2nd Fleet Public Affairs, “Norfolk Ships Deploy to 

Support Hurricane Katrina Relief Efforts,” Navy Newsstand, August 31, 2005. 31 U.S. Department of Defense, Air Force Reserve, 53rd Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, “The Hurricane 

Hunters,” http://www.hurricanehunters.com/welcome.htm (accessed February 2, 2006) ; U.S. Department of 

Defense, Air Force Reserve, 53rd Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, “Eye to Eye with Hurricane Katrina,” 

http://www.hurricanehunters.com/katrina.htm (accessed January 25, 2006). 32 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, 

“NHC/TPC Hurricane Reconnaissance Data Archive,” ftp://ftp.nhc.noaa.gov/pub/products/nhc/recon; and U.S. 

Department of Defense, Air Force Reserve, 53rd Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, ”Eye to Eye with Hurricane 

Katrina,” http://www.hurricanehunters.com/katrina.htm (accessed January 25, 2006). 33 U.S. Department of Defense, Air Force, “Air Force Support of Hurricane Katrina Continues,” Air Force Link, 

September 4, 2005. 34 U.S. National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, “Geospatial Intelligence Aids Hurricane Recovery Efforts,” 

news release, September 7, 2005. 35 The LECC is DOJ construct integrating the Federal, State, and local law enforcement communities, but is not a 

term currently incorporated into the NRP. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Justice, United States Attorney’s Office, 

Northern District of Georgia, “LECC,” http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/gan/lecc.html (accessed January 31, 2006). 36 The LECC was built on a modified FBI Joint Operations Center construct. The LECC coordinated a plan to 

answer thousands of 911 calls in New Orleans that had gone unresolved. The LECC provided the conduit for 

coordination between civilian law enforcement and the National Guard and Title 10 U.S. Army forces operating in 

New Orleans. The LECC not only provided a facility for all Federal law enforcement, but built a separate 

headquarters for the New Orleans Police adjacent to the LECC, since their headquarters had been destroyed. 37 Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Use of Former(“Shuttered”) Hospitals to Expand Surge Capacity

(Gaithersburg, MD, August 2005). 38 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Update on 

CDC’s Response to Hurricane Katrina,” September 16, 2005, http://www.cdc.gov/od/katrina/09-16-05.htm. 39 Jennifer Thew and Phyllis Class, “Shelter from the Storm,” Nursing Spectrum, October 1, 2005, 

http://www.nursingspectrum.com/Katrina/ShelterFromTheStorm.cfm; and U.S. Department of Health and Human 
APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

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-216-

Services, Centers for Disease Control, “Update on CDC’s Response to Hurricane Katrina,” September 6, 2005,

http://www.cdc.gov/od/katrina/09-06-05.htm. 40 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health, “NIH Opens Up Medical

Consultation Line to Patients Affected by Hurricane Katrina,” news release, September 14, 2005. 41 U.S. Department of Transportation, “DOT Activities in Support of Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina,”

news release, September 5, 2005. 42 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, “HUD’s Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.”

http://www.hud.gov/news/katrina05response.cfm (accessed December 14, 2005). 43 Ann Westling, “Tahoe National Forest Service Employees – Some Back from Hurricane Katrina,” YubaNet,

October 15, 2005, http://yubanet.com/artman/publish/article_26436.shtml; U.S. Department of Agriculture, “USDA

Assists with Hurricane Katrina Relief Efforts,” news release, September 5, 2005. 44 U.S. Department of Agriculture, National Resources Conservation Service, Emergency Watershed Program,

“Digital Data Provides Maps for Hurricane Relief,” news release, September 23, 2005. 45 U.S. Department of Agriculture, “USDA Prepares for Hurricane Rita: USDA Highlights Assistance to Regions

Affected by Hurricane Katrina,” news release, September 22, 2005, http://www.usda.gov/wps. 46 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Farm Service Agency, “100% Cost Share Assistance Available to Farmers in

FSA’s Emergency Conservation Program,” news release, FSA Online, September 15, 2005,

http://www.fsa.usda.gov/ms/news0101.htm. 47 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Rural Development, “Hurricane Katrina Recovery Resources from Rural

Development,” http://www.rurdev.usda.gov/rd/disasters/katrina.html. 48 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, “Plant Protection Research Unit News and

Events,” news release, November 14, 2005. 49 U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Science, “DOE’s Office of Science Responds to Hurricane Katrina,”

news release, September 8, 2005, http://www.sc.doe.gov/Sub/Newsroom/News_Releases/DOESC/2005/Hurricane/Hurricane.htm. 50 U.S. Department of Commerce, Minority Business Development Agency, “MBDA to Assist with Rebuilding

Minority Business Enterprises Hit by Hurricane Katrina,” news release, September 9, 2005. 51 Max Mayfield, Director of the National Hurricane Center, written statement for a hearing on the Lifesaving

Role of Accurate Hurricane Prediction, on September 20, 2005, submitted to the U.S. Senate Committee on

Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Disaster Prevention and Prediction, 109th Congress, 1st

session. 52 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service,

Flash Flood Warning, (New Orleans, LA, August 29, 2005, 8:14 AM). 53 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information Administration, “Commerce

Department Awards $283,320 to Louisiana Educational Television Authority,” news release, September 27, 2005. 54 U.S. Department of the Interior, “Cason Announces Initial BIA Response to Aid Tribal Victims of Hurricane

Katrina,” news release, September 1, 2005. 55 U.S. Department of the Interior, “Ragsdale Tours Mississippi Choctaw Reservation Impacted by Hurricane

Katrina,” news release, September 9, 2005. 56 U.S. Department of the Interior, “Ragsdale Tours Mississippi Choctaw reservation Impacted by Hurricane

Katrina,” news release, September 9, 2005. 57 U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, “BLM, Other Federal Agencies Send Employees

to Help with Katrina Relief Effort,” news release, September 2, 2005. 58 U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, “Reclamation Continues to Mobilize Response for

Hurricane Katrina Disaster,” news release, September 2, 2005. 59 Donald M. Stoeckel et al., Bacteriological Water Quality in the Lake Pontchartrain Basin, Louisiana,

Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, data series 143, prepared for the U.S. Department of the Interior and U.S.

Geological Survey (September 2005). 60 U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of Surface Mining, “OSM Volunteers Aid Hurricane Recovery,” news

release, December 19, 2005. 61 U.S. Department of Labor, “U.S. Department of Labor Launches ‘Pathways to Employment’ Initiative,

Expanding Employment Services for Hurricane Survivors,” news release, September 30, 2005. 62 U.S. Department of Education, “Hurricane Help for Schools,” http://hurricanehelpforschools.gov/

thanksto.html (accessed February 10, 2006).
APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 

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 63 U.S. Department of Education, “Hurricane-Affected Schools Receive Federal Surplus Property,” news release, 

November 1, 2005. 64 Jenny Mandel, “Three Agencies Honored with Top Management Awards,” Government Executive Magazine, 

December 14, 2005, http://govexec.com/dailyfed/1205/121405m1.htm; and Ambassador W. Robert Pearson, 

“Accomplishments and Challenges,” State Magazine, January 2006, 2. 65 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Bureau of the Public Debt, “Bureau of the Public Debt Aids Savings Bonds 

Owners Battered by Hurricane Katrina,” news release, August 29, 2005. 66 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Financial Management Service, Special Notice for Depository Institutions: 

Update to U.S. Treasury Guidance on Cashing FEMA Disaster Assistance Checks and Government Benefit Checks 

Issued by the U.S. Treasury (Washington, D.C., September 14, 2005). 67 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, “Tax Favored Treatment for Early Distributions 

from IRAs and other Retirement Plans for Victims of Hurricane Katrina,” news release, October 17, 2005. 68 U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, Veterans Integrated Service Network, “Hurricanes: VA/VISN 4 Update 

#2,” September 27, 2005. 69 U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, “web site bulletin,” http://www.vba.va.gov/ro/central/stpau/Pages/ 

Katrina.html. 70 U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, “VA Creates Procedures for Benefits in Wake of Hurricane Katrina,” 

news release, September 14, 2005. 71 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Curbside Pickup of Household Hazardous Waste Planned in 

Plaquemines Parish,” news release, September 25, 2005. 72 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Hurricane Response 2005: Public Outreach Materials,” 

http://www.epa.gov/katrina/outreach; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “EPA and Federal Partners Warn of 

Potential Environmental Health Hazards When Returning to Homes and Businesses after Hurricane Katrina,” news 

release, September 14, 2004. 73 Lawrence Kumins and Robert Bamberger, Oil and Gas Disruption from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, 

Congressional Research Service Report for Congress RL33124 (Washington, D.C., October 21, 2005), 7-8. 74 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Commission Temporarily Eases Natural Gas Construction Rules to 

Speed Recovery from Hurricanes,” news release, November 17, 2005. 75 White House Office of Management and Budget to the Chief Financial Officers and Grant Policy Officials, 

memorandum entitled “Administrative Relief for Grantees Impacted by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,” September 

30, 2005.