Nuclear Regulatory

Legislation

NUREG-0980

Vol. 3, No. 10

112th Congress; 2nd Session

Office of the General Counsel
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Nuclear Regulatory

Legislation

NUREG-0980

Vol. 3, No. 10

112th Congress; 2nd Session

Prepared by:

Office of the General Counsel

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555-0001

Date Published: September 2013

iii

FOREWORD

This compilation of statutes and materials pertaining to nuclear regulatory 

legislation through the 112th Congress, 2nd Session, has been prepared by the 

Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with the 

assistance of staff, for use as an internal resource document. The compilation is 

not to be used as an authoritative citation in lieu of the primary legislative 

sources. Furthermore, while every effort has been made to ensure the 

completeness and accuracy of this material, neither the United States 

Government, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, nor any of their employees 

makes any expressed or implied warranty or assumes liability for the accuracy 

or completeness of the material presented in this compilation.

If you have any questions concerning this compilation, please contact:

Anthony de Jesús

Legislative Specialist

Office of the General Counsel

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555-0001

Anthony.deJesus@nrc.gov

v

Contents ___________

PART II: NONPROLIFERATION AND OTHER 

INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS ...........................................ix

1. Nuclear Nonproliferation and Export Licensing Statutes1067

A. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 1978......................... 1073

B. FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT, FISCAL 

YEARS 1994 AND 1995 ......................................................................... 1107

C. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND ARMS 

EXPORT CONTROL ACT OF 1976.................................................... 1117

D. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT 

COOPERATION ACT OF 1980 ........................................................... 1131

E. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT 

COOPERATION ACT OF 1981 ........................................................... 1132

F. FOREIGN OPERATIONS APPROPRIATIONS (IRAQ 

SANCTIONS).......................................................................................... 1136

G. EMERGENCY WARTIME SUPPLEMENTAL 

APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2003 (IRAQ SANCTIONS)..................... 1144

H. MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE 

SUSPENDING THE IRAQ SANCTIONS ACT .................................. 1145

I. NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL 

YEAR 1993 (IRAN-IRAQ ARMS NON-PROLIFERATION OF 

1992)......................................................................................................... 1146

J. NORTH KOREA THREAT REDUCTION (SUBTITLE B) ............. 1150

K. IRAN NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 2000 .................................. 1152

L. HENRY J. HYDE UNITED STATES-INDIA PEACEFUL 

ATOMIC ENERGY COOPERATION ACT OF 2006 (TITLE 1)..... 1160

M. UNITED STATES-INDIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION 

APPROVAL AND NONPROLIFERATION ENHANCEMENT 

ACT.......................................................................................................... 1175

2. Selected Treaties, Agreements, and Implementing Legislation........................................................................ 1183

A. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY ................................ 1197

Table: Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval, or Accession by 

States or Organization .................................................................................... 1201
vi

B. THE CONVENTION ON THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF 

NUCLEAR MATERIAL........................................................................ 1206

Table: Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material ............... 1215

C. CONVENTION ON THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF 

NUCLEAR MATERIAL IMPLEMENTATION ACT OF 1982........ 1219

D. CONVENTION ON EARLY NOTIFICATION OF A NUCLEAR 

ACCIDENT ............................................................................................. 1223

Table: Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident .................... 1228

E. CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY ......................................... 1232

Table: Signatories and Parties on the Convention on Nuclear Safety............ 1241

F. CONVENTION ON ASSISTANCE IN THE CASE OF A 

NUCLEAR ACCIDENT OR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY .... 1244

Table: Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or 

Radiological Emergency ................................................................................. 1250

G. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I TO THE TREATY FOR THE 

PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA1254

H. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II TO THE TREATY FOR THE 

PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA1258

I. TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 

IN LATIN AMERICA............................................................................ 1261

Table: Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America..... 1271

Table: Additional Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear 

Weapons in Latin America ............................................................................. 1273

Table: Additional Protocol II To The Treaty For The Prohibition Of 

Nuclear Weapons In Latin America .............................................................. 1273

J. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY 

PARTICIPATION ACT OF 1957 ......................................................... 1274

K. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY 

AGENCY ................................................................................................. 1278

L. AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF 

AMERICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY 

AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS IN THE 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA........................................................ 1295

M. U.S. SENATE RESOLUTION CONSENTING TO THE 

RATIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S. 

AND THE IAEA FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS ... 1321

N. PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN 

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE 

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE 
vii

APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS IN THE UNITED STATES 

OF AMERICA ........................................................................................ 1322

O. UNITED STATES ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL 

IMPLEMENTATION ACT................................................................... 1331

P. STATUS WITH REGARD TO CONCLUSION OF 

SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS AND ADDITIONAL 

PROTOCOLS AND SMALL QUANTITIES PROTOCOLS ............. 1343

Q. TABLE: IAEA SUPPLY AGREEMENTS ......................................... 1356

R. TABLE: UNITED STATES AGREEMENTS FOR PEACEFUL 

NUCLEAR COOPERATION................................................................ 1359

S. TABLE: TRILATERALS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, 

THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AND 

OTHER COUNTRIES FOR THE APPLICATION OF 

SAFEGUARDS BY THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY 

AGENCY TO EQUIPMENT CONCERNING CIVIL USES OF 

ATOMIC ENERGY................................................................................ 1361

T. TABLE: TRILATERALS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, 

THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AND 

OTHER COUNTRIES FOR THE APPLICATION OF 

SAFEGUARDS PURSUANT TO THE NONPROLIFERATION 

TREATY.................................................................................................. 1362

U. CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION OF MARINE 

POLLUTION BY DUMPING OF WASTES AND OTHER 

MATTERS............................................................................................... 1363

Table: Parties to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by 

Dumping of Wastes and Other matter, with Annexes.................................. 1371

V. JOINT CONVENTION ON THE SAFETY OF SPENT FUEL 

MANAGEMENT AND ON THE SAFETY OF RADIOACTIVE 

WASTE MANAGEMENT..................................................................... 1374

Table: Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on 

the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.............................................. 1390

W. CODE OF CONDUCT ON THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF 

RADIOACTIVE SOURCES.................................................................. 1394

3. Miscellaneous International Legislation and Executive Orders............................................................................... 1411

A. EXECUTIVE ORDER 10841—PROVIDING FOR THE 

CARRYING OUT OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE 

ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954, AS AMENDED, RELATING 

TO INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION .......................................... 1415
viii

B. EXECUTIVE ORDER 10956—AMENDMENT OF EXECUTIVE 

ORDER 10841 ......................................................................................... 1416

C. EXECUTIVE ORDER 12058—FUNCTIONS RELATING TO 

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION.................................................. 1417

D. EXECUTIVE ORDER 12730—CONTINUATION OF EXPORT 

CONTROL REGULATIONS................................................................ 1418

E. EXECUTIVE ORDER 12114—ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS 

ABROAD OF MAJOR FEDERAL ACTIONS.................................... 1420
PART II: 

NONPROLIFERATION AND 

OTHER INTERNATIONAL 

MATERIALS

Nuclear Nonproliferation and Export Licensing Statutes 1067

1. Nuclear Nonproliferation and Export 

Licensing Statutes

Nuclear Nonproliferation and Export Licensing Statutes 1069

1. Nuclear Nonproliferation and Export Licensing Statutes

Contents

A. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 1978......................... 1073

Sec. 1. Short Title ......................................................................................... 1073

Sec. 2. Statement of Policy........................................................................... 1073

Sec. 3. Statement of Purpose ....................................................................... 1073

Sec. 4. Definitions......................................................................................... 1074

Title I–United States Initiatives to Provide Adequate Nuclear Fuel 

Supply ........................................................................................................... 1074

Sec. 101. Policy ............................................................................................. 1074

Sec. 102. Uranium Enrichment Capacity................................................... 1075

Sec. 103. Report............................................................................................ 1075

Sec. 104. International Undertaking........................................................... 1075

Sec. 105. Reevaluation of Nuclear Fuel Cycle............................................ 1076

Title II–United States Initiatives to Strengthen the International 

Safeguards System....................................................................................... 1076

Sec. 201. Policy ............................................................................................. 1076

Sec. 202. Training Program......................................................................... 1077

Sec. 203. Negotiations................................................................................... 1077

Title III–Export Organization and Criteria.................................................. 1078

Sec. 301. Government-to-Government Transfers ..................................... 1078

Sec. 302. Special Nuclear Material Production ......................................... 1078

Sec. 303. Subsequent Arrangements........................................................... 1079

Sec. 304. Export Licensing Procedures ...................................................... 1084

Sec. 305. Criteria Governing United States Nuclear Exports................... 1088

Sec. 306. Additional Export Criterion and Procedures ............................ 1089

Sec. 307. Conduct Resulting in Termination of Nuclear Exports............ 1090

Sec. 308. Congressional Review Procedures.............................................. 1091

Sec. 309. Component and Other Parts of Facilities................................... 1093

Title IV–Negotiation of Further Export Controls ........................................ 1094

Sec. 401. Cooperation with Other Nations................................................. 1094

Sec. 402. Additional Requirements............................................................. 1098

Sec. 403. Peaceful Nuclear Activities.......................................................... 1098

Sec. 404. Renegotiation of Agreements for Cooperation .......................... 1099

Sec. 405. Authority to Continue Agreements............................................. 1100

Sec. 406. Review ........................................................................................... 1101

Sec. 407. Protection of the Environment.................................................... 1101

Title V–United States Assistance to Developing Countries.......................... 1101

Sec. 501. Policy: Report.............................................................................. 1101

Sec. 502. Programs....................................................................................... 1101

Sec. 503. Report............................................................................................ 1102

Title VI–Executive Reporting......................................................................... 1102

Sec. 601. Reports of the President............................................................... 1102

Sec. 602. Additional Reports....................................................................... 1104

Sec. 603. Savings Clause .............................................................................. 1105

Other Provisions: Provision of Certain Information to Congress.............. 1105
1070 Nuclear Nonproliferation and Export Licensing Statutes

B. FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT, FISCAL 

YEARS 1994 AND 1995 ......................................................................... 1107

Title VIII—Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act........................................ 1107

Part B-Sanctions for Nuclear Proliferation................................................... 1107

Sec. 821. Imposition of Procurement Sanction on Persons Engaging in 

Export Activities that Contribute to Proliferation ................................ 1107

Sec. 822. Eligibility for Assistance .............................................................. 1110

Sec. 823. Role of International Financial Institutions............................... 1110

Sec. 824. Prohibition on Assisting Nuclear Proliferation through the 

Provision of Financing ............................................................................. 1111

Part C-International Atomic Energy Agency ............................................... 1113

Sec. 841. Bilateral and Multilateral Initiatives.......................................... 1113

Sec. 842. IAEA Internal Reforms ............................................................... 1114

Sec. 843. Reporting Requirement ............................................................... 1115

Sec. 844. Definitions..................................................................................... 1115

Part D-Termination......................................................................................... 1116

Sec. 851. Termination upon Enactment of Next Foreign Relations Act.. 1116

C. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND ARMS 

EXPORT CONTROL ACT OF 1976.................................................... 1117

Title II............................................................................................................... 1117

Sec. 38. Control of Arms Exports and Imports......................................... 1117

Sec. 101. Nuclear Enrichment Transfers ................................................... 1126

Sec. 102. Nuclear Reprocessing Transfers, Illegal Exports for Nuclear 

Explosive Devices, Transfers of Nuclear Explosive Devices, and 

Nuclear Detonations................................................................................. 1127

D. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT 

COOPERATION ACT OF 1980 ........................................................... 1131

Sec. 1. Short Title ......................................................................................... 1131

Title I–Military and Related Assistance and Sales Programs ..................... 1131

Sec. 110. Exportation of Uranium Depleted in the Isotope 235................ 1131

E. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT 

COOPERATION ACT OF 1981 ........................................................... 1132

Sec. 1. Short Title ......................................................................................... 1132

Title VII–Miscellaneous Provisions ............................................................... 1132

Sec. 735. Report on Nuclear Activities ....................................................... 1132

Sec. 737. Prohibitions Relating to Nuclear Transfers and Nuclear 

Detonations ............................................................................................... 1132

F. FOREIGN OPERATIONS APPROPRIATIONS (IRAQ 

SANCTIONS).......................................................................................... 1136

Title V- Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990................................................................ 1136

Sec. 586. Short Title ..................................................................................... 1136

Sec. 586A. Declarations Regarding Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait................ 1136

Sec. 586B. Consultations with Congress..................................................... 1136

Sec. 586C. Trade Embargo against Iraq.................................................... 1136

Sec. 586D. Compliance with United Nations Sanctions Against Iraq...... 1137

Sec. 586E. Penalties for Violations of Embargo ........................................ 1138
Nuclear Nonproliferation and Export Licensing Statutes 1071

Sec. 586F. Declarations Regarding Iraq's Long–Standing Violations of 

International Law..................................................................................... 1138

Sec. 586G. Sanctions against Iraq............................................................... 1140

Sec. 586H. Waiver Authority ...................................................................... 1141

Sec. 586I. Denial of Licenses for Certain Exports to Countries 

Assisting Iraq's Rocket or Chemical, Biological, or Nuclear 

Weapons Capability ................................................................................. 1142

Sec. 586J. Reports to Congress. .................................................................. 1142

G. EMERGENCY WARTIME SUPPLEMENTAL 

APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2003 (IRAQ SANCTIONS)..................... 1144

Sec. 1503........................................................................................................ 1144

H. MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE 

SUSPENDING THE IRAQ SANCTIONS ACT .................................. 1145

I. NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL 

YEAR 1993 (IRAN-IRAQ ARMS NON-PROLIFERATION OF 

1992)......................................................................................................... 1146

Title XVI–Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992 ............................ 1146

Sec. 1601. Short Title ................................................................................... 1146

Sec. 1602. United States Policy.................................................................... 1146

Sec. 1603. Application to Iran of Certain Iraq Sanctions......................... 1146

Sec. 1604. Sanctions Against Certain Persons........................................... 1146

Sec. 1605. Sanctions against Certain Foreign Countries .......................... 1147

Sec. 1606. Waiver ......................................................................................... 1148

Sec. 1607. Reporting Requirement ............................................................. 1148

Sec. 1608. Definitions................................................................................... 1148

J. NORTH KOREA THREAT REDUCTION (SUBTITLE B) ............. 1150

Sec. 821. Short Title ..................................................................................... 1150

Sec. 822. Restrictions on Nuclear Cooperation with North Korea .......... 1150

Sec. 823. Definitions..................................................................................... 1151

K. IRAN NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 2000 .................................. 1152

Sec. 1. Short Title ......................................................................................... 1152

Sec. 2. Reports on Proliferation Relating to Iran and Syria..................... 1152

Sec. 3. Application of Measures to Certain Foreign Persons.................... 1153

Sec. 4. Procedures if Measures are Not Applied........................................ 1154

Sec. 5. Determination Exempting Foreign Person from Sections 3 and 

4.................................................................................................................. 1154

Sec. 6. Restriction on Extraordinary Payments in Connection with the 

International Space Station ..................................................................... 1155

Sec. 7. Definitions......................................................................................... 1158

L. HENRY J. HYDE UNITED STATES-INDIA PEACEFUL 

ATOMIC ENERGY COOPERATION ACT OF 2006 (TITLE 1)..... 1160

Title I-- United States and India Nuclear Cooperation ................................ 1160

Sec. 101. Short Title ..................................................................................... 1160

Sec. 102. Sense of Congress......................................................................... 1160

Sec. 103. Statements of Policy. .................................................................... 1161

Sec. 104. Waiver Authority and Congressional Approval........................ 1163
1072 Nuclear Nonproliferation and Export Licensing Statutes

Sec. 105. United States Compliance with Its Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Treaty Obligations.................................................................................... 1171

Sec. 106. Inoperability of Determination and Waivers............................. 1171

Sec. 107. MTCR Adherent Status............................................................... 1171

Sec. 108. Technical Amendment ................................................................. 1171

Sec. 109. United States-India Scientific Cooperative Nuclear 

Nonproliferation Program....................................................................... 1172

Sec. 110. Definitions..................................................................................... 1172

M. UNITED STATES-INDIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION

APPROVAL AND NONPROLIFERATION ENHANCEMENT 

ACT.......................................................................................................... 1175

Sec. 1. Short Title and Table of Contents................................................... 1175

Sec. 2. Definitions......................................................................................... 1175

Title I—Approval of United States-India Agreement for Cooperation on 

Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy................................................................ 1176

Sec. 101. Approval of Agreement................................................................ 1176

Sec. 102. Declarations of Policy; Certification Requirement; Rule of 

Construction ............................................................................................. 1176

Sec. 103. Additional Protocol Between India and the IAEA .................... 1177

Sec. 104. Implementation of Safeguards Agreement Between India and 

the IAEA ................................................................................................... 1177

Sec. 105. Modified Reporting to Congress................................................. 1177

Title II—Strengthening United States Nonproliferation Law Relating to 

Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation .................................................................... 1179

Sec. 201. Procedures Regarding a Subsequent Arrangement on 

Reprocessing ............................................................................................. 1179

Sec. 202. Initiatives and Negotiations Relating to Agreements for 

Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation................................................................. 1179

Sec. 203. Actions Required for Resumption of Peaceful Nuclear 

Cooperation............................................................................................... 1180

Sec. 204. United States Government Policy at the Nuclear Suppliers 

Group to Strengthen the International Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Regime....................................................................................................... 1180

Sec. 205. Conforming Amendments............................................................ 1180
Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95–242) 1073

A. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 1978

Public Law 95–242 92 Stat. 120

March 10, 1978

An Act

To provide for more efficient and effective control over the proliferation 

of nuclear explosive capability.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 

United States of America in Congress assembled,

Sec. 1. Short Title

That this Act may be cited as the “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 

1978.”

Sec. 2. Statement of Policy

The Congress finds and declares that the proliferation of nuclear 

explosive devices or of the direct capability to manufacture or otherwise 

acquire such devices poses a grave threat to the security interests of the 

United States and to continue international progress toward world peace 

and development. Recent events emphasize the urgency of this threat and 

the imperative need to increase the effectiveness of international 

safeguards and controls on peaceful nuclear activities to prevent 

proliferation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the United States to—

(a) actively pursue through international initiatives mechanisms for 

fuel supply assurances and the establishment of more effective 

international controls over the transfer and use of nuclear materials and 

equipment and nuclear technology for peaceful purposes in order to 

prevent proliferation, including the establishment of common 

international sanctions;

(b) take such actions as are required to confirm the reliability of the 

United States in meeting its commitments to supply nuclear reactors and 

fuel to nations which adhere to effective non-proliferation policies by 

establishing procedures to facilitate the timely processing of requests for 

subsequent arrangements and export licenses;

(c) strongly encourage nations which have not ratified the Treaty on 

the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to do so at the earliest 

possible date; and

(d) cooperate with foreign nations in identifying and adapting suitable 

technologies for energy production and, in particular, to identify 

alternative options to nuclear power in aiding such nations to meet their 

energy needs, consistent with the economic and material resources of 

those nations and environmental protection.

Sec. 3. Statement of Purpose

It is the purpose of this Act to promote the policies set forth above 

by–

(a) establishing a more effective framework for international 

cooperation to meet the energy needs of all nations and to ensure that the 

worldwide development of peaceful nuclear activities and the export by 

any nation of nuclear materials and equipment and nuclear technology 

intended for use in peaceful nuclear activities do not contribute to 

proliferation;

22 USC 3201 

note.

22 USC 3201.

22 USC 3202.
1074 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95–242)

(b) authorizing the United States to take such actions as are required 

to ensure that it will act reliably in meeting its commitment to supply 

nuclear reactors and fuel to nations which adhere to effective nonproliferation policies;

(c) providing incentives to the other nations of the world to join in 

such international cooperative efforts and to ratify the Treaty; and

(d) ensuring effective controls by the United States over its exports of 

nuclear materials and equipment and of nuclear technology.

Sec. 4. Definitions

(a) As used in this Act, the term–

(1) “Commission” means the Nuclear Regulatory Commission;

(2) “IAEA” means International Atomic Energy Agency;1

(3) “nuclear materials and equipment” means source material, 

special nuclear material, production facilities, utilization facilities, 

and components, items or substances determined to have significance 

for nuclear explosive purposes pursuant to subsection 109b. of the 

1954 Act; 

(4) “physical security measures” means measures to reasonably 

ensure that source or special nuclear material will only be used for 

authorized purposes and to prevent theft and sabotage;

(5) “sensitive nuclear technology” means any information 

(including information incorporated in a production or utilization 

facility or important component part thereof) which is not available to 

the public and which is important to the design, construction, 

fabrication, operation or maintenance of a uranium enrichment or 

nuclear fuel reprocessing facility or a facility for the production of 

heavy water, but shall not include Restricted Data controlled pursuant 

to Chapter 12 of the 1954 Act;

(6) “1954 Act” means the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 

amended; and

(7) “the Treaty” means the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 

Nuclear Weapons.

(b) All other terms used in this Act not defined in this section shall 

have the meanings ascribed to them by the 1954 Act, the Energy 

Reorganization Act of 1974, and the Treaty.

Title I–United States Initiatives to Provide Adequate Nuclear Fuel 

Supply

Sec. 101. Policy

The United States, as a matter of national policy, shall take such actions 

and institute such measures as may be necessary and feasible to assure 

other nations and groups of nations that may seek to utilize the benefits 

of atomic energy for peaceful purposes that it will provide a reliable 

supply of nuclear fuel to those nations and groups of nations which 

adhere to policies designed to prevent proliferation Such nuclear fuel 

shall be provided under agreements entered into pursuant to section 161 

of the 1954 Act or as otherwise authorized by law. The United States 

shall ensure that it will have available the capacity on a long-term basis 

to enter into new fuel supply commitments consistent with its 

nonproliferation policies and domestic energy needs. The Commission 

––––––––

1 Amended by P.L. 105-277, Div. G, Title XII, § 1225(e)(1), 112 Stat. 2681-775 

(1998).

22 USC 3203.

42 USC 2011 

note.

22 USC 3221.

42 USC 5801 

note.

42 USC 2201.
Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95–242) 1075

shall, on a timely basis, authorize the export of nuclear materials and 

equipment when all the applicable statutory requirements are met.

Sec. 102. Uranium Enrichment Capacity

The Secretary of Energy is directed to initiate construction planning 

and design, construction, and operation activities for expansion of 

uranium enrichment capacity, as elsewhere provided by law. Further the 

Secretary as well as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the 

Secretary of State2 are directed to establish and implement procedures 

which will ensure to the maximum extent feasible, consistent with this 

Act, orderly processing of subsequent arrangements and export licenses 

with minimum time delay.

Sec. 103. Report

The President shall promptly undertake a study to determine the need 

for additional United States enrichment capacity to meet domestic and 

foreign needs and to promote United States non-proliferation objectives 

abroad. The President shall report to the Congress on the results of this 

study within twelve months after the date of enactment of this Act.

Sec. 104. International Undertaking

(a) Consistent with section 105 of this Act, the President shall 

institute prompt discussions with other nations and groups of nations, 

including both supplier and recipient nations, to develop international 

approaches for meeting future worldwide nuclear fuel needs. In 

particular, the President is authorized and urged to seek to negotiate as 

soon as practicable with nations possessing nuclear fuel production 

facilities or material, and such other nations and groups of nations, such 

as the IAEA, as may be deemed appropriate, with a view toward the 

timely establishment of binding international undertakings providing for–

(1) the establishment of an international nuclear fuel authority 

(INFA) with responsibility for providing agreed fuel services and 

allocating agreed upon quantities of fuel resources to ensure fuel 

supply on reasonable terms in accordance with agreements between 

INFA and supplier and recipient nations;

(2) a set of conditions consistent with subsection (d) under which 

international fuel assurances under INFA auspices will be provided to 

recipient nations. including conditions which will ensure that the 

transferred materials will not be used for nuclear explosive devices;

(3) devising, consistent with the policy goals set forth in section 

403 of this Act, feasible and environmentally sound approaches for 

the siting, development, and management under effective 

international auspices and inspection of facilities for the provision of 

nuclear fuel services, including the storage of special nuclear 

material;

(4) the establishment of repositories for the storage of spent 

nuclear reactor fuel under effective international auspices and 

inspection;

(5) the establishment of arrangements under which nations 

placing spent fuel in such repositories would receive appropriate 

compensation for the energy content of such spent fuel if recovery of 

such energy content is deemed necessary or desirable; and

(6) sanctions for violations of the provisions of or for abrogation 

of such binding international undertakings.

––––––––

2 Amended by P.L. 105-277, Div. G, Title XII, § 1225(e)(2), 112 Stat. 2681-775 

(1998).

22 USC 3222.

22 USC 3222 

note.

Study.

Report to 

Congress.

22 USC 3223.

Discussions 

and 

negotiations.
1076 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95–242)

(b) The President shall submit to Congress not later than six months 

after the date of enactment of this Act proposals for initial fuel 

assurances, including creation of an interim stockpile of uranium 

enriched to less than 20 percent in the uranium isotope 235 (low-enriched 

uranium) to be available for transfer pursuant to a sales arrangement to 

nations which adhere to strict policies designed to prevent proliferation 

when and if necessary to ensure continuity of nuclear fuel supply to such 

nations. Such submission shall include proposals for the transfer of lowenriched uranium up to an amount sufficient to produce 100,000 NWe 

years of power from light water nuclear reactors, and shall also include 

proposals for seeking contributions from other supplier nations to such an 

interim stockpile pending the establishment of INFA.

(c) The President shall, in the report required by section 103, also 

address the desirability of and options for foreign participation, including 

investment, in new United States uranium enrichment facilities. This 

report shall also address the arrangements that would be required to 

implement such participation and the commitments that would be 

required as a condition of such participation. This report shall be 

accompanied by any proposed legislation to implement these 

arrangements.

(d) The fuel assurances contemplated by this section shall be for the 

benefit of nations that adhere to policies designed to prevent 

proliferation. In negotiating the binding international undertakings called 

for in this section, the President shall, in particular, seek to ensure that 

the benefits of such undertakings are available to non-nuclear-weapon 

states only if such states accept IAEA safeguards on all their peaceful 

nuclear activities, do not manufacture or otherwise acquire any nuclear 

explosive device; do not establish any new enrichment or reprocessing 

facilities under their de facto or de jure control, and place any such 

existing facilities under effective international auspices and inspection.

(e) The report required by section 601 shall include information on 

the progress made in any negotiations pursuant to this section.

(f)(1) The President may not enter into any binding international 

undertaking negotiated pursuant to subsection (a) which is not a treaty 

until such time as such proposed undertaking has been submitted to the 

Congress and has been approved by concurrent resolution.

(2) The proposals prepared pursuant to subsection (b) shall be 

submitted to the Congress as part of an annual authorization Act for 

the Department of Energy.

Sec. 105. Reevaluation of Nuclear Fuel Cycle

The President shall take immediate initiatives to invite all nuclear 

supplier and recipient nations to reevaluate all aspects of the nuclear fuel 

cycle, with emphasis on alternatives to an economy based on the 

separation of pure plutonium or the presence of high enriched uranium, 

methods to deal with spent fuel storage, and methods to improve the 

safeguards for existing nuclear technology. The President shall, in the 

first report required by section 601, detail the progress of such 

international reevaluation.

Title II–United States Initiatives to Strengthen the International 

Safeguards System

Sec. 201. Policy

The United States is committed to continued strong support for the 

principles of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to 

Proposals, 

submitted to 

Congress.

Proposed 

legislation.

22 USC 3224.

22 USC 3241.
Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95–242) 1077

a strengthened and more effective International Atomic Energy Agency 

and to a comprehensive safeguards system administered by the Agency 

to deter proliferation. Accordingly, the United States shall seek to act 

with other nations to–

(a) continue to strengthen the safeguards program of the IAEA and, in 

order to implement this section, contribute funds, technical resources, 

and other support to assist the IAEA in effectively implementing 

safeguards;

(b) ensure that the IAEA has the resources to carry out the provisions 

of Article XII of the Statute of the IAEA;

(c) improve the IAEA safeguards system (including accountability) to 

ensure–

(1) the timely detection of a possible diversion of source or 

special nuclear materials which could be used for nuclear explosive 

devices;

(2) the timely dissemination of information regarding such 

diversion; and

(3) the timely implementation of internationally agreed 

procedures in the event of such diversion;

(d) ensure that the IAEA receives on a timely basis the data needed 

for it to administer an effective comprehensive international safeguards 

program and that the IAEA provides timely notice to the world 

community of any evidence of a violation of any safeguards agreement to 

which it is a party; and

(e) encourage the IAEA, to the maximum degree consistent with the 

Statute, to provide nations which supply nuclear materials and equipment 

with the data needed to assure such nations of adherence to bilateral 

commitments applicable to such supply.

Sec. 202. Training Program

The Department of Energy, in consultation with the Commission, 

shall establish and operate a safeguards and physical security training 

program to be made available to persons from nations and groups of 

nations which have developed or acquired, or may be expected to 

develop or acquire, nuclear materials and equipment for use for peaceful 

purposes. Any such program shall include training in the most advanced 

safeguards and physical security techniques and technology consistent 

with the national security interests of the United States.

Sec. 203. Negotiations

The United States shall seek to negotiate with other nations and 

groups of nations to–

(1) adopt general principles and procedures, including common 

international sanctions, to be followed in the event that a nation 

violates any material obligation with respect to the peaceful use of 

nuclear materials and equipment or nuclear technology, or in the 

event that any nation violates the principles of the Treaty, including 

the detonation by a non-nuclear-weapon state of a nuclear explosive 

device; and

(2) establish international procedures to be followed in the event 

of diversion, theft, or sabotage of nuclear materials or sabotage of 

nuclear facilities, and for recovering nuclear materials that have been 

lost or stolen, or obtained or used by a nation or by any person or 

group in contravention of the principles of the Treaty.

22 USC 3242.

22 USC 3243.
1078 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95–242)

Title III–Export Organization and Criteria

Sec. 301. Government-to-Government Transfers

(a) Section 54 of the 1954 Act is amended by adding a new 

subsection d. thereof as follows:

d. The authority to distribute special nuclear material under this 

section other than under an export license granted by the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission shall extend only to the following small 

quantities of special nuclear material (in no event more than five hundred 

grams per year of the uranium isotope 233, the uranium isotope 235, or 

plutonium contained in special nuclear material to any recipient):

(1) which are contained in laboratory samples, medical devices, or 

monitoring or other instruments; or

(2) the distribution of which is needed to deal with an emergency 

situation in which time is of the essence.

(b) Section 64 of the 1954 Act is amended by inserting the following 

immediately after the second sentence thereof: “The authority to 

distribute source material under this section other than under an export 

license granted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission shall in no case 

extend to quantities of source material in excess of three metric tons per 

year per recipient.”

(c) Chapter 10 of the 1954 Act is amended by adding a new section 

111 as follows:

Sec. 111.a. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is authorized to 

license the distribution of special nuclear material, source material, and 

byproduct material by the Department of Energy pursuant to section 54, 

64, and 82 of this Act, respectively, in accordance with the same 

procedures established by law for the export licensing of such material by 

any person: Provided, That nothing in this section shall require the 

licensing of the distribution of byproduct material by the Department of 

Energy under section 82 of this Act.

b. The Department of Energy shall not distribute any special nuclear 

material or source material under section 54 or 64 of this Act other than 

under an export license issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

until (1) the Department has obtained the concurrence of the Department 

of State and has consulted with the Arms Control and Disarmament 

Agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Department of 

Defense under mutually agreed procedures which shall be established 

within not more than ninety days after the date of enactment of this 

provision and (2) the Department finds based on a reasonable judgment 

of the assurances provided and the information available to the United 

States Government, that the criteria in section 127 of this Act or their 

equivalent and any applicable criteria in sub section 128 are met, and that 

the proposed distribution would not be inimical to the common defense 

and security.

Sec. 302. Special Nuclear Material Production

Subsection 57b. of the 1954 Act is amended to read as follows:

b. It shall be unlawful for any person to directly or indirectly engage 

in the production of any special nuclear material outside of the United 

States except (1) as specifically authorized under an agreement for 

cooperation made pursuant to section 123, including a specific 

authorization in a subsequent arrangement under section 131 of this Act, 

or (2) upon authorization by the Secretary of Energy after a 

determination that such activity will not be inimical to the interest of the 

United States: Provided. That any such determination by the Secretary of 

42 USC 2074.

42 USC 2094.

42 USC 2141.

42 USC 2112.

Supra.

Special nuclear 

material, 

production.

42 USC 2077. 

Standards and 

criteria. 

Technology 

transfers. 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95–242) 1079

Energy shall be made only with the concurrence of the Department of 

State and after consultation with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

the Department of Commerce, and the Department of Defense. Secretary 

of Energy shall, within ninety days after the enactment of the Nuclear 

Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, establish orderly and expeditious 

procedures, including provision for necessary administrative actions and 

inter-agency memoranda of understanding, which are mutually agreeable 

to the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Commerce, and the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission for the consideration of requests for 

authorization under this subsection. Such procedures shall include, at a 

minimum, explicit direction on the handling of such requests, express 

deadlines for the solicitation and collection of the views of the consulted 

agencies (with identified officials responsible for meeting such 

deadlines), an interagency coordinating authority to monitor the 

processing of such requests, predetermined procedures for the 

expeditious handling of intra-agency and inter-agency disagreements and 

appeals to higher authorities, frequent meetings of interagency 

administrative coordinators to review the status of all pending requests, 

and similar administrative mechanisms. To the extent practicable, an 

applicant should be advised of all the information required of the 

applicant for the entire process for every agency’s needs at the beginning 

of the process. Potentially controversial requests should be identified as 

quickly as possible so that any required policy decisions or diplomatic 

consultations can be initiated in a timely manner. An immediate effort 

should be undertaken to establish quickly any necessary standards and 

criteria, including the nature of any required assurances or evidentiary 

showing, for the decision required under this subsection. The processing 

of any request proposed and filed as of the date of enactment of the 

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 shall not be delayed pending the 

development and establishment of procedures to implement the 

requirements of this subsection. Any trade secrets or proprietary 

information submitted by any person seeking an authorization under this 

subsection shall be afforded the maximum degree of protection allowable 

by law: Provided further, That the export of component parts as defined 

in subsection 11v.(2) or 11cc.(2) shall be governed by sections 109 and 

126 of this Act: Provided further, That notwithstanding subsection 

402(d) of the Department of Energy Organization Act (Public Law 95-

91), the Secretary of Energy and not the Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission shall have sole jurisdiction within the Department of Energy 

over any matter arising from any function of the Secretary of Energy in 

this section, section 54d., section 64, or section 111b.

Sec. 303. Subsequent Arrangements

(a) Chapter 11 of the 1954 Act, as amended by sections 304, 305, 

306, 307, and 308, is further amended by adding at the end 

thereof the following:

Sec. 131. SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENTS.–

a. (1) Prior to entering into any proposed subsequent arrangement 

under an agreement for cooperation (other than an agreement for 

cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91c., 144b., or 144c. of this 

Act), the Secretary of Energy shall obtain the concurrence of the 

Secretary of State and shall consult with the Director, the Commission, 

and the Secretary of Defense: Provided, That the Secretary of State shall have 

the leading role in any negotiations of a policy nature pertaining to any 

proposed subsequent arrangement regarding arrangements for the storage 

or disposition of irradiated fuel elements or approvals for the transfer, for 

Authorization 

requests, 

procedures.

Trade secrets, 

protection.

42 USC 2014.

42 USC 7172.

42 USC 2074.

42 USC 2094.

42 USC 2160.

Consultation.

2 USC 2121.

42 USC 2164.
1080 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95–242)

which prior approval is required under an agreement for cooperation, by 

a recipient of source or special nuclear material, production or utilization 

facilities, or nuclear technology. Notice of any proposed subsequent 

arrangement shall be published in the Federal Register, together with the 

written determination of the Secretary of Energy that such arrangement 

will not be inimical to the common defense and security, and such 

proposed subsequent arrangement shall not take effect before fifteen days 

after publication. Whenever the Director declares that he intends to 

prepare a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement pursuant to 

paragraph (2) of this subsection, notice of the proposed subsequent 

arrangement which is the subject of the Director’s declaration shall not 

be published until after the receipt by the Secretary of Energy of such 

Statement or the expiration of the time authorized by subsection c. for the 

preparation of such Statement, whichever occurs first.

(2) If in the Director’s view a proposed subsequent arrangement 

might significantly contribute to proliferation, he may prepare an 

unclassified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement with regard to 

such proposed subsequent arrangement regarding the adequacy of the 

safeguards and other control mechanisms and the application of the 

peaceful use assurances of the relevant agreement to ensure that 

assistance to be furnished pursuant to the “subsequent arrangement” will 

not be used to further any military or nuclear explosive purpose. For the 

purposes of this section, the term “subsequent arrangements”

means arrangements entered into by any agency or department of the 

United States Government with respect to cooperation with any 

nation or group of nations (but not purely private or domestic 

arrangements) involving–

(A) contracts for the furnishing of nuclear materials and 

equipment;

(B) approvals for the transfer, for which prior approval is 

required under an agreement for cooperation, by a recipient of any 

source or special nuclear material, production or utilization 

facility, or nuclear technology;

(C) authorization for the distribution of nuclear materials and 

equipment pursuant to this Act which is not subject to the 

procedures set forth in section 111b., section 126, or section 09b.;

(D) arrangements for physical security;

(E) arrangements for the storage or disposition of irradiated 

fuel elements;

(F) arrangements for the application of safeguards with respect 

to nuclear materials and equipment; or

(G) any other arrangement which the President finds to be 

important from the standpoint of preventing proliferation.

(3) The United States will give timely consideration to all requests 

for prior approval, when required by this Act, for the reprocessing of 

material proposed to be exported, previously exported and subject to 

the applicable agreement for cooperation, or special nuclear material 

produced through the use of such material or a production or 

utilization facility transferred pursuant to such agreement for 

cooperation, or to the altering of irradiated fuel elements containing 

such material, and additionally, to the maximum extent feasible, will 

attempt to expedite such consideration when the terms and conditions 

for such actions are set forth in such agreement for cooperation or in 

some other international agreement executed by the United States and 

Notice, 

publication in 

the Federal 

Register.

Nuclear 

Proliferation 

Assessment 

Statement.

Subsequent 

arrangements.

Contracts.
Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95–242) 1081

subject to congressional review procedures comparable to those set 

forth in section 123 of this Act.

(4) All other statutory requirements under other sections of this 

Act for the approval or conduct of any arrangement subject to this 

subsection shall continue to apply and other such requirements for 

prior approval or conditions for entering such arrangement shall also 

be satisfied before the arrangements takes effect pursuant to 

subsection a. 

(1).

b. With regard to any special nuclear material exported by the United

States or produced through the use of any nuclear materials and 

equipment or sensitive nuclear technology exported by the United 

States–

(1) the Secretary of Energy may not enter into any subsequent 

arrangements for the retransfer of any such material to a third country 

for reprocessing, for the reprocessing of any such material, or for the 

subsequent retransfer of any plutonium in quantities greater than 500 

grams resulting from the reprocessing of any such material until he has 

provided the Committee on International Relations of the House of 

Representatives and the Committee of Foreign Relations of the Senate 

with a report containing his reasons for entering into such arrangement 

and a period of 15 days of continuous session (as defined in subsection 

130g. of this Act) has elapsed: Provided, however, That if in the view 

of the President an emergency exists due to unforeseen circumstances 

requiring immediate entry into a subsequent arrangement, such period 

shall consist of fifteen calendar days;

(2) the Secretary of Energy may not enter into any subsequent 

arrangement for the reprocessing of any such material in a facility 

which has not processed power reactor fuel assemblies or been the 

subject of a subsequent arrangement therefor prior to the date of 

enactment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 or for 

subsequent retransfer to a non-nuclear-weapon state of any plutonium 

in quantities greater than 500 grams resulting from such reprocessing, 

unless in his judgment, and that of the Secretary of State, such 

reprocessing or retransfer will not result in a significant increase of the 

risk of proliferation beyond that which exists at the time that approval 

is requested. Among all the factors in making this judgment, foremost 

consideration will be given to whether or not the reprocessing or 

retransfer will take place under conditions that will ensure timely 

warning to the United States of any diversion well in advance of the 

time at which the non-nuclear-weapon state could transform the 

diverted material into a nuclear explosive device; and

(3) the Secretary of Energy shall attempt to ensure, in entering 

into any subsequent arrangement for the reprocessing of any such 

material in any facility that has processed power reactor fuel 

assemblies or been the subject of a subsequent arrangement therefor 

prior to the date of enactment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 

1978, or for the subsequent retransfer to any non-nuclear-weapon state 

of any plutonium in quantities greater than 500 grams resulting from 

such reprocessing, that such reprocessing or retransfer shall take place 

under conditions comparable to those which in his view, and that of the 

Secretary of State, satisfy the standards set forth in paragraph (2).

Report to 

congressional 

committees.
1082 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95–242)

c. The Secretary of Energy shall, within ninety days after the 

enactment of this section, establish orderly and expeditious procedures, 

including provisions for necessary administrative actions and interagency 

memoranda of understanding, which are mutually agreeable to the 

Secretaries of State, Defense, and Commerce, the Director of the Arms 

Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission for the consideration of requests for subsequent 

arrangements under this section. Such procedures shall include, at a 

minimum, explicit direction on the handling of such requests, express 

deadlines for the solicitation and collection of the views of the consulted 

agencies (with identified officials responsible for meeting such 

deadlines), an inter-agency coordinating authority to monitor the 

processing of such requests, predetermined procedures for the 

expeditious handling of intra-agency and inter-agency disagreements and 

appeals to higher coordinators to review the status of all pending 

requests, and similar administrative mechanisms. To the extent 

practicable, an applicant should be advised of all the information required 

of the applicant for the entire process for every agency’s needs at the 

beginning of the process. Potentially controversial requests be should 

identified as quickly as possible so that any required policy or decisions 

diplomatic consultations can be initiated in a timely manner. An 

immediate effort should be undertaken to establish quickly as necessary 

standards and criteria, including the nature of any required assurance or 

evidentiary showings, for the decisions required under this section. 

Further, such procedure shall specify that if he intends to prepare a 

Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement, the Director shall so declare 

in his response to the Department of Energy. If the Director declares that 

he intends to prepare such a Statement he shall do so within sixty days of 

his receipt of a copy of the proposed subsequent arrangement (during 

which time the Secretary of Energy may not enter into the subsequent 

arrangement), unless pursuant to the Director’s request the President 

waives the sixty-day requirement and notifies the Committee on 

International Relations of the House of Representatives and the 

Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate of such waiver and the 

justification therefor. The processing of any subsequent arrangement 

proposed and filed as of the date of enactment of this section shall not be 

delayed pending the development and establishment of procedures to 

implement the requirements of this section.

d. Nothing in this section is intended to prohibit, permanently or 

unconditionally, the reprocessing of spent fuel owned by a foreign nation 

which fuel has been supplied by the United States, to preclude the United 

States from full participation in the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle 

Evaluation provided for in section 105 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 

Act of 1978; to in any way limit the presentation or consideration in that 

evaluation of any nuclear fuel cycle by the United States or any other 

participation; nor to prejudice open and objective consideration of the 

results of the evaluation.

e. Notwithstanding subsection 402(d) of the Department of Energy 

Organization Act (Public Law 95-91), the Secretary of Energy, and not 

the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, shall have sole jurisdiction 

within the Department of Energy every any matter arising from any 

function of the Secretary of Energy in this section.

f.(1) With regard to any subsequent arrangement under subsection 

a.(2)(E) (for the storage or disposition of irradiated fuel elements), where 

such arrangement involves a direct or indirect commitment of the United 

Nuclear 

materials, 

reprocessing or 

transfer 

procedures.

Controversial 

requests, 

identification.

Standards and 

criteria.

Nuclear 

Proliferation 

Assessment 

Statement.

Presidential 

waiver.

Notice to 

congressional 

committees.

42 USC 7172.

Presidential 

plan, submittal 

to Congress.
Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95–242) 1083

States for the storage or other disposition, interim or permanent, of any 

foreign spent nuclear fuel in the United States, the Secretary of Energy 

may not enter into any such subsequent arrangement, unless:

(A)(i) Such commitment of the United States has been submitted 

to the Congress for a period of sixty days of continuous session (as 

defined in subsection 130g. of this Act) and has been referred to the 

Committee on International Relations of the House of 

Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 

Senate, but any such commitment shall not become effective if during 

such sixty-day period the Congress adopts a concurrent resolution 

stating in substance that it does not favor the commitment, any such 

commitment to be considered pursuant to the procedures set forth in 

section 130 of this Act for the consideration of Presidential 

submissions; or (ii) if the President has submitted a detailed generic 

plan for such disposition or storage in the United States to the 

Congress for period of sixty days of continuous session (as defined in 

subsection 130g. of this Act), which plan has been referred to the 

Committee on International Relations of the House of 

Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 

Senate and has not been disapproved during such sixty-day period by 

the adoption of a concurrent resolution stating in substance that 

Congress does not favor the plan; and the commitment is subject to 

the terms of an effective plan. Any such plan shall be considered 

pursuant to the procedures set forth in section 130 of this Act for the 

consideration of Presidential submissions;

(B) The Secretary of Energy has complied with subsection a.; and

(C) The Secretary of Energy has complied, or in the arrangement 

will comply with all other statutory requirements of this Act, under 

sections 54 and 55 and any other applicable sections, and any other 

requirements of law.

(2) Subsection (1) shall apply to the storage or other disposition in the 

United States of limited quantities of foreign spent nuclear fuel if the 

President determines that (A) a commitment under section 54 or 55 of 

this Act of the United States for storage or other disposition of such 

limited quantities in the United States is required by an emergency 

situation, (B) it is in the national interest to take such immediate action, 

and (C) he notifies the Committees on International Relations and 

Science and Technology of the House of Representatives and the 

Committees on Foreign Relations and Energy and Natural Resources of 

the Senate of the determination and action, with a detailed explanation 

and justification thereof, as soon as possible.

(3) Any plan submitted by the President under subsection f.(1) shall 

include a detailed discussion, with detailed information, and any 

supporting documentation thereof, relating to policy objectives, technical 

description, geographic information, costs data and justifications, legal 

and regulatory consideration, environmental impact information and any

related international agreements, arrangements or understandings.

(4) For the purposes of this subsection, the term “foreign spent 

nuclear fuel” shall include any nuclear fuel irradiated in any nuclear 

power reactor located outside of the United States and operated by any 

foreign legal entity, government or nongovernment, regardless of the 

legal ownership or other control of the fuel or the reactor and regardless 

of the origin or licensing of the fuel or reactor, but not including fuel 

irradiated in a research reactor.

Notice to 

congressional 

committees.

Plan, contents.

Foreign spent 

nuclear fuel.

42 USC 2075.
1084 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95–242)

(b)(1) Section 54 of the 1954 Act is amended by adding new 

subsection e. as follows,

e. The authority in this section to commit United States funds for 

any activities pursuant to any subsequent arrangement under section 

131a.(2)(E) shall be subject to the requirements of section 131.

(2) Section 55 of the 1954 Act is amended by adding a proviso 

at the end of the section as follows, “Providing, That the authority in 

this section to commit United States funds for any activities pursuant 

to any subsequent arrangement under section 131a.(2)(E) shall be 

subject to the requirements of section 131.”

Sec. 304. Export Licensing Procedures

(a) Chapter 11 of the 1954 Act is amended by adding a new section 

126 as follows:

Sec 126.Export Licensing Procedures.–

a. No license may be issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(the “Commission”) for the export of any production or utilization 

facility

or any source material or special nuclear material, including distributions 

of any material by the Department of Energy under section 54, 64, or 82, 

for which a license is required or requested, and no exemption from any 

requirement for such an export license may be granted by the 

Commission, as the case may be, until –

(1) the Commission has been notified by the Secretary of State that it is 

the judgment of the executive branch that the proposed export or 

exemption will not be inimical to the common defense and security, or 

that any export in the category to which the proposed export belongs 

would not be inimical to the common defense and security because it 

lacks significance for nuclear explosive purposes. The Secretary of State 

shall, within ninety days after the enactment of this section, establish 

orderly and expeditious procedures, including provision for necessary 

administrative actions and inter-agency memoranda of understanding, 

which are mutually agreeable to the Secretaries of Energy, Defense, and 

Commerce, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,3 and the executive 

branch judgment on export applications under this section. Such 

procedures shall include, at a minimum, explicit direction on the 

handling of such applications, express deadlines for the solicitation and 

collection of the views of the consulted agencies (with identified officials 

responsible for meeting such deadlines), an inter-agency coordinating 

authority to monitor the processing of such applications, predetermined 

procedures for the expeditious handling of intra-agency and interagency 

disagreements and appeals to higher authorities, frequent meetings of 

inter-agency administrative coordinators to review the status of all 

pending applications, and similar administrative mechanisms. To the 

extent practicable, an applicant should be advised of all the information 

required of the applicant for the entire process for every agency’s needs 

at the beginning of the process. Potentially controversial applications 

should be identified as quickly as possible so that any required policy 

decisions or diplomatic consultations can be initiated in a timely manner. 

An immediate effort should be undertaken to establish quickly any 

necessary standards and criteria, including the nature of any required 

assurances or evidentiary showing, for the decisions required under this 

section. The processing of any export application proposed and filed as 

––––––––

3 Amended by P.L. 105–277, Division G, Title XII, Chapter 3, § 1225(d)(5), 112 Stat. 

2681-774 (1998).

42 USC 2155.

Exemption.

Supra.

42 USC 2112.

Executive 

branch 

judgment, 

notice to 

Commission.

Procedures.

Contents.

Standards and 

criteria.
Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95–242) 1085

of the date of enactment of this section shall not be delayed pending the 

development and establishment of procedures to implement the 

requirements of this section. The executive branch judgment shall be 

completed in not more than sixty days from receipt of the application or 

request unless the Secretary of State in his discretion specifically 

authorizes additional time for consideration of the application or request 

because it is in the national interest to allow such additional time. The 

Secretary shall notify the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate 

and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives of 

any such authorization. In submitting any such judgment, the Secretary 

of State shall specifically address the extent to which the export criteria 

then in effect are met and the extent to which the cooperating party has 

adhered to the provisions of the applicable agreement for cooperation. In 

the event he considers it warranted, the Secretary may also address the 

following additional factors, among others:

(A) whether issuing the license or granting the exemption will 

materially advance the non-proliferation policy of the United States 

by encouraging the recipient nation to adhere to the Treaty, or to 

participate in the undertakings contemplated by section 403 or 404(a) 

of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978;

(B) whether failure to issue the license or grant the exemption 

would otherwise be seriously prejudicial to the non-proliferation 

objectives of the United States; and

(C) whether the recipient nation or group of nations has agreed 

that conditions substantially identical to the export criteria set forth in 

section 127 of this Act will be applied by another nuclear supplier 

nation or group of nations to the proposed United States export, and 

whether in the Secretary’s judgment those conditions will be 

implemented in a manner acceptable to the United States.

The Secretary of State shall provide appropriate data and 

recommendations, subject to requests for additional data and 

recommendations, as required by the Commission or the Secretary of 

Energy, as the case may be ; and 

(2) the Commission finds, based on a reasonable judgment of the 

assurances provided and other information available to the Federal 

Government, including the Commission, that the criteria in section 127 

of this Act or their equivalent, and any other applicable statutory 

requirements, are met: Provided, That continued cooperation under an 

agreement for cooperation as authorized in accordance with section 124 

of this Act shall not be prevented by failure to meet the provisions of 

paragraph (4) or (5) of section 127 for a period of thirty days after 

enactment of this section, and for a period of twenty-three months 

thereafter if the Secretary of State notifies the Commission that the nation 

or group of nations bound by the relevant agreement has agreed to 

negotiations as called for in section 404(a) of the Nuclear NonProliferation Act of 1978; however, nothing in this subsection shall be 

deemed to relinquish any rights which the United States may have under 

agreements for cooperation in force on the date of enactment of this 

section:

Provided further, That, if upon the expiration of such twenty-four 

month period, the President determines that failure to continue 

cooperation with any group of nations which has been exempted pursuant 

to the above proviso from the provisions of paragraph (4) or (5) of 

section 127 of this Act, but which has not yet agreed to comply with 

those provisions would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of 

Data and 

recommendations.

42 USC 2154.

Extension, 

notice to 

Congress.
1086 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95–242)

United States non-proliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the 

common defense and security, he may, after notifying the Congress of 

his determination, extend by Executive order the duration of the above 

proviso for a period of twelve months, and may further extend the 

duration of such proviso by one year, increments annually thereafter if he 

again makes such determination and so notifies the Congress. In the 

event that the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 

Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate 

reports a joint resolution to take any action with respect to any such 

extension, such joint resolution will be considered in the House or 

Senate, as the case may be, under procedures identical to those provided 

for the consideration of resolutions pursuant to section 130 of this Act: 

And additionally provided, That the Commission is authorized to–

(A) make a single finding under this subsection for more than 

a single application or request, where the applications or requests 

involve exports to the same country, in the same general time frame, 

or similar significance for nuclear explosive purposes and under 

reasonably similar circumstances, and

(B) make a finding under this subsection that there is no 

material changed circumstance associated with a new application or 

request from those existing at the time of the last application or 

request for an export to the same country, where the prior application 

or request was approved by the Commission using all applicable 

procedures of this section, and such finding of no material changed 

circumstance shall be deemed to satisfy the requirement of this 

paragraph for findings of the Commission. The decision not to make 

any such finding in lieu of the findings which would otherwise be 

required to be made under this paragraph shall not be subject to 

judicial review: And provided further, That nothing contained in this 

section is intended to require the Commission independently to 

conduct or prohibit the Commission from independently conducting 

country or site specific visitations in the Commission’s consideration 

of the application of IAEA safeguards.

b. (1) Timely consideration shall be given by the Commission 

to requests for export licenses and exemptions and such requests shall 

be granted upon a determination that all applicable statutory 

requirements have been met. 

(2) If, after receiving the executive branch judgment that the 

issuance of a proposed export license will not be inimical to the 

common defense and security, the Commission does not issue the 

proposed license on a timely basis because it is unable to make the 

statutory determinations required under this Act, the Commission 

shall publicly issue its decision to that effect, and shall submit the 

license application to the President. The Commission’s decision shall 

include application to the President. The Commission’s decision shall 

include an explanation of the basis for the decision and any dissenting 

or separate views. If, after receiving the proposed license application 

and reviewing the Commission’s decision, the President determines 

that withholding the proposed export would be seriously prejudicial to 

the achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives, or 

would otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security, the 

proposed export may be authorized by Executive order Provided, 

That prior to any such export, the President shall submit the Executive 

order, together with his explanation of why in light of the 

Commission’s decision, the export should nonetheless be made, to the 

Findings.

Judicial review, 

exception.

Presidential 

review.

Report to 

Congress and 

congressional 

committees.
Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95–242) 1087

Congress for a period of sixty days of continuous session (as defined

in subsection 130g.) and shall be referred to the Committee on 

Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee 

on Foreign Relations of the Senate, but any such proposed export 

shall not occur if during such sixty-day period the Congress adopts a 

concurrent resolution stating in substance that it does not favor the 

proposed export. Any such Executive order shall be considered 

pursuant to the procedures set forth in section 130 of this Act for the 

consideration of Presidential submissions: And provided further, That 

the procedures established pursuant to subsection (b) of section 304 of 

the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 shall provide that the 

Commission shall immediately initiate review of any application for a 

license under this section and to the maximum extent feasible shall 

expeditiously process the application concurrently with the executive 

branch review, while awaiting the final executive branch judgment. In 

initiating its review, the Commission may identify a set of concerns 

and requests for information associated with the projected issuance of

such license and shall transmit such concerns and requests to the 

executive branch which shall address such concerns and requests in 

its written communications with the Commission. Such procedures 

shall also provide that if the Commission has not completed action on 

the application within sixty days after the receipt of an executive 

branch judgment that the proposed export or exemption is not 

inimical to the common defense and security or that any export in the 

category to which the proposed export belongs would not be inimical 

to the common defense and security because it lacks significance for 

nuclear explosive purposes, the Commission shall inform the 

applicant in writing of the reason for delay and provide follow-up 

reports as appropriate. If the Commission has not completed action by 

the end of an additional sixty days (a total of one hundred and twenty 

days from receipt of the executive branch judgment), the President 

may authorize the proposed export by Executive order, upon a finding 

that further delay would be excessive and upon making the findings 

required for such Presidential authorization under this subsection, and 

subject to the Congressional review procedures set forth herein. 

However, if the Commission has commenced procedures for public 

participation regarding the proposed export under regulations 

promulgated pursuant to subsection (b) of section 304 of the Nuclear 

Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, or–within sixty days after receipt of 

the executive branch judgment on the proposed export–the 

Commission has identified and transmitted to the executive branch a 

set of additional concerns or requests for information, the President 

may not authorize the proposed export until sixty days after public 

proceedings are completed or sixty days after a full executive branch 

response to the Commission’s additional concerns or requests has 

been made consistent with subsection a. (1) of this section: Provided 

further, That nothing in this section shall affect the right of the 

Commission to obtain data and recommendations from the Secretary 

of State at any time as provided in subsection a.(1) of this section.

c. In the event that the House of Representatives or the Senate passes 

a joint resolution which would adopt one or more additional export 

criteria, or would modify any existing export criteria under this Act, any 

such joint resolution shall be referred in the other House to the 

Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate or the Committee on 

Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, and 

Review.

Concerns and 

requests, 

transmittal to 

executive 

branch.

Referral to 

congressional 

committees.
1088 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95–242)

shall be considered by the other House under applicable procedures 

provided for the consideration of resolutions pursuant to section 130 of 

this Act.

(b) Within one hundred and twenty days of the date of enactment of 

this Act, the Commission shall, after consultations with the Secretary of 

State, promulgate regulations establishing procedures (1) for the 

granting, suspending, revoking, or amending of any nuclear export 

license or exemption pursuant to its statutory authority; (2) for public 

participation in nuclear export licensing proceedings when the 

Commission finds that such participation will be in the public interest 

and will assist the Commission in making the statutory determinations 

required by the 1954 Act, including such public hearings and access to 

information as the Commission deems appropriate: Provided, That 

judicial review as to any such finding shall be limited to the 

determination of whether such finding was arbitrary and capricious; (3) 

for a public written Commission opinion accompanied by the dissenting 

or separate views of any Commissioner, in those proceedings where one 

or more Commissioners have dissenting or separate views on the 

issuance of an export license; and (4) for public notice of Commission 

proceedings and decisions, and for recording of minutes and votes of the 

Commission: Provided further, That until the regulations required by this 

subsection have been promulgated, the Commission shall implement the 

provisions of this Act under temporary procedures established by the 

Commission.

(c) The procedures to be established pursuant to subsection (b) shall 

constitute the exclusive basis for hearings in nuclear export licensing 

proceedings before the Commission and, notwithstanding section 189a. 

of the 1954 Act, shall not require the Commission to grant any person an 

on-the-record hearing in such a proceeding.

(d) Within sixty days of the date of enactment of this Act, the 

Commission shall, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the 

Secretary of Energy, and the Secretary of Defense, promulgate (and may 

from time to time amend) regulations establishing the levels of physical 

security which in its judgment are no less strict than those established by 

any international guidelines to which the United States subscribes and 

which in its judgment will provide adequate protection for facilities and 

material referred to in paragraph (3) of section 127 of the 1954 Act

taking into consideration variations in risks to security as appropriate.4

Sec. 305. Criteria Governing United States Nuclear Exports

Chapter 11 of the 1954 Act, as a amended by section 304, is further 

amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

Sec. 127. CRITERIA GOVERNING UNITED STATES NUCLEAR 

EXPORTS–

The United States adopts the following criteria which, in addition to 

other requirements of law, will govern exports for peaceful nuclear uses 

from the United States of source material, special nuclear material, 

production or utilization facilities, and any sensitive nuclear technology:

(1) IAEA safeguards, as required by Article III(2) of the Treaty will 

be applied with respect to any such material or facilities proposed to be 

exported, to any such material or facilities previously exported and 

subject to the applicable agreement for cooperation, and to any special 

nuclear material used in or produced through the use thereof.

––––––––

4 Amended by P.L. 105-277, Div. G, Title XII, Ch. 3, § 1225(e)(3), 112 Stat. 2681-775

(1998).

42 USC 2155a.

Regulations.

42 USC 2155a.

42 USC 2239.

Hearings.

42 USC 2156a.

Regulations.

42 USC 2156.
Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95–242) 1089

(2) No such material, facilities, or sensitive nuclear technology 

proposed to be exported or previously exported and subject to the 

applicable agreement for cooperation, and no special nuclear material 

producer through the use of such materials, facilities or sensitive nuclear 

technology, will be used for any nuclear explosive device or for research 

on or development of any nuclear explosive device.

(3) Adequate physical security measures will be maintained with 

respect to such material or facilities proposed to be exported and to any 

special nuclear material used in or produced through the use thereof. 

Following the effective date of any regulations promulgated by the 

Commission pursuant to section 304(d) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 

Act of 1978, physical security measures shall be deemed adequate if such 

measures provide a level of protection equivalent to that required by the 

applicable regulations.

(4) No such materials, facilities, or sensitive nuclear technology 

proposed to be exported, and no special nuclear material produced 

through the use of such material, will be retransferred to the jurisdiction 

of any other nation or group of nations unless the prior approval of the 

United States is obtained for such retransfer. In addition to other 

requirements of law, the United States may approve such retransfer only 

if the nation or group of nations designated to receive such retransfer 

agrees that it shall be subject to the conditions required by this section.

(5) No such material proposed to be exported and no special nuclear 

material produced through the use of such material will be reprocessed, 

and no irradiated fuel elements containing such material removed from a 

reactor shall be altered in form or content, unless the prior approval of 

the United States is obtained for such reprocessing or alteration.

(6) No such sensitive nuclear technology shall be exported unless the 

foregoing conditions shall be applied to any nuclear material or 

equipment which is produced or constructed under the jurisdiction of the 

recipient nation or group of nations by or through the use of any such 

exported sensitive nuclear technology.

Sec. 306. Additional Export Criterion and Procedures

Chapter 11 of the 1954 Act, as amended by sections 304 and 305, is 

further amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

Sec. 128. ADDITIONAL EXPORT CRITERIA AND 

PROCEDURES–

a. (1) As a condition of continued United States export source 

material, special nuclear material, production or utilization facilities, and 

any sensitive nuclear technology to non-nuclear-weapon states, no such 

export shall be made unless IAEA safeguards are maintained with respect 

to all peaceful nuclear activities in, under the jurisdiction of, or carried 

out under the control of such state at the time of the export.

(2) The President shall seek to achieve adherence to the foregoing 

criterion by recipient non-nuclear-weapon states.

b. The criterion set forth in subsection a. shall be applied as an export 

criterion with respect to any application for the export of materials, 

facilities, or technology specified in subsection a. which is filed after 

eighteen months from the date of enactment of this section, or for any 

such application under which the first export would occur at least twentyfour months after the date of enactment of this section, except as 

provided in the following paragraphs:

42 USC 2157.

Export 

applications, 

criterion 

enforcement.
1090 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95–242)

(1) If the Commission or the Department of Energy, as the case 

may be, is notified that the President has determined that failure to 

approve an export to which this subsection applies because such 

criterion has not yet been met would be seriously prejudicial to the 

achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives or 

otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security, the license or 

authorization may be issued subject to other applicable requirements 

of law Provided, That no such export of any production or utilization 

facility or of any source of special nuclear material (intended for use 

as fuel in any production or utilization facility) which has been 

licensed or authorized pursuant to this subsection shall be made to 

any non-nuclear- weapon state which has failed to meet such criterion 

until the first such license or authorization with respect to such state 

is submitted to the Congress (together with a detailed assessment of 

the reasons underlying the President’s determination, the judgment of

the executive branch required under section 126 of this Act and any

Commission opinion and views) for a period of sixty days of 

continuous session (as defined in subsection 130g. of this Act) and 

referred to the Committee on International Relations of the House of 

Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 

Senate, but such export shall not occur if during such sixty-day period 

the Congress adopts a concurrent resolution stating in substance that 

the Congress does not favor the proposed export. Any such license or 

authorization shall be considered pursuant to the procedures set forth 

in section 130 of this Act for the consideration of Presidential 

submissions.

(2) If the Congress adopts a resolution of disapproval pursuant to 

paragraph (1), no further export of materials, facilities, or technology 

specified in subsection a. shall be permitted for the remainder of that 

Congress, unless such state meets the criterion or the President 

notifies the Congress that he has determined that significant progress 

has been made in achieving adherence to such criterion by such state 

or that United States foreign policy interests dictate reconsideration 

and the Congress, pursuant to the procedure of paragraph (1), does 

not adopt a concurrent resolution stating in substance that it disagrees 

with the President’s determination.

(3) If the Congress does not adopt a resolution of disapproval with 

respect to a license or authorization submitted pursuant to paragraph 

(1), the criterion set forth in subsection a. shall not be applied as an 

export criterion with respect to exports of materials, facilities and 

technology specified in subsection a. to that state: Provided, That the 

first license or authorization with respect to that state which is issued 

pursuant to this paragraph after twelve months from the elapse of the 

sixty-day period specified in paragraph (1), and the first such license 

or authorization which is issued after each twelve-month period 

thereafter, shall be submitted to the Congress for review pursuant to 

the procedures specified in paragraph (1): Provided further, That if 

the Congress adopts a resolution of disapproval during any review 

period provided for this paragraph, the provisions of paragraph (2) 

shall apply with respect to further exports to such state.

Sec. 307. Conduct Resulting in Termination of Nuclear Exports

Chapter 11 of the 1954 Act, as amended by sections 304, 305, and 

306, is further amended by adding at the end thereof:

Sec. 129. Conduct Resulting In Termination Of Nuclear Exports–

Report to 

congressional 

committees.

Congressional 

disapproval, 

resolution.

Export 

authorizations, 

congressional 

review.

Export 

terminations, 

criterion.
Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95–242) 1091

No nuclear materials and equipment or sensitive nuclear technology 

shall be export to–

(1) any non-nuclear-weapon state that is found by the President to 

have, at any time after the effective date of this section,

(A) detonated a nuclear explosive device; or

(B) terminated or abrogated IAEA safeguards; or

(C) materially violated an IAEA safeguards agreement; or

(D) engaged in activities involving source or special nuclear 

material and having direct significance for the manufacture or 

acquisition of nuclear explosive devices, and has failed to take 

steps which, in the President’s judgment, represent sufficient 

progress toward terminating such activities; or

(2) any nation or group of nations that is found by the President to 

have, at any time after the effective date of this section,

(A) materially violated an agreement for cooperation with the 

United States, or, with respect to material or equipment not 

supplied under an agreement for cooperation, materially violated 

the terms under which such material or equipment was supplied or 

the terms of any commitments obtained with respect thereto 

pursuant to section 402(a) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 

1978; or

(B) assisted, encouraged, or inducted any non-nuclear-weapon 

state to engage in activities involving source or special nuclear 

material and having direct significance for the manufacture or 

acquisition of nuclear explosive devices, and has failed to take 

steps which, in the President’s judgment, represent sufficient 

progress toward terminating such assistance, encouragement, or 

inducement; or

(C) entered into an agreement after the date of enactment of 

this section for the transfer of reprocessing equipment, materials, 

or technology to the sovereign control of a non-nuclear-weapon 

state except in connection with an international fuel cycle 

evaluation in which the United States is a participant or pursuant 

to a subsequent international agreement or understanding to which 

the United States subscribes; unless the President determines that 

cessation of such exports would be seriously prejudicial to the 

achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives or 

otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security: Provided, 

That prior to the effective date of any such determination, the 

President’s determination, together with a report containing the 

reasons for his determination, shall be submitted to the Congress 

and referred to the Committee on International Relations of the 

House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign 

Relations of the Senate for a period of sixty days of continuous 

session (as defined in subsection 130g. of this Act), but any such 

determination shall not become effective if during such sixty-day 

period the Congress adopts a concurrent resolution stating in 

substance that it does not favor the determination. Any such 

determination shall be considered pursuant to the procedures set 

forth in section 130 of this Act for the consideration of 

Presidential submissions.

Sec. 308. Congressional Review Procedures

Chapter 11 of the 1954 Act, as amended by sections 304, 305, 306, 

and 307, is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

42 USC 2158.

Report to 

Congress.
1092 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95–242)

Sec. 130. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW PROCEDURES–

a. Not later than forty-five days of continuous session of Congress 

after the date of transmittal to the Congress of any submission of the 

President required by subsection 123d., 126a.(2), 126b.(2), 128b., 129, 

131a.(3), or 131f.(1)(A) of this Act, the Committee on Foreign Relations 

of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations of the House 

of Representatives and in addition, in the case of a proposed agreement 

for cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91c., 144b., or 144c., the 

Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the 

Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, shall each submit a report 

to its respective House on its views and recommendations respecting 

such Presidential submission together with a resolution, as defined in 

subsection f., stating in substance that the Congress approves or 

disapproves such submission, as the case may be: Provided, That if any 

such committee has not reported such a resolution at the end of such 

forty-five day period, such committee shall be deemed to be discharged 

from further consideration of such submission and if, in the case of a 

proposed agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 

91c., 144b., or 144c. of this Act, the other relevant committee of that 

House has reported such a resolution, such committee shall be deemed 

discharged from further consideration of that resolution. If no such 

resolution has been reported at the end of such period, the first resolution, 

as defined in subsection f., which is introduced within five days 

thereafter within such House shall be placed on the appropriate calendar 

of such House.

b. When the relevant committee or committees have reported such a 

resolution (or have been discharged from further consideration of such a 

resolution pursuant to subsection a.) or when a resolution has been 

introduced and placed on the appropriate calendar pursuant to subsection 

a., as the case may be it is at any time thereafter in order (even though a 

previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) for any 

Member of the respective House to move to proceed to the consideration 

of the resolution. The motion is highly privileged and is not debatable. 

The motion shall not be subject to amendment, or to a motion to 

postpone, or to a motion to proceed to the consideration of other 

business. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion of other 

business. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed 

to or disagreed to shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the 

consideration of the resolution is agreed to, the resolution shall remain 

the unfinished business of the respective House until disposed of.

c. Debate on the resolution, and on all debatable motions and appeals 

in connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than ten hours, 

which shall be divided equally between individuals favoring and 

individuals opposing the resolution. A motion further to limit debate is in 

order and not debatable. An amendment to a motion to postpone, or a 

motion to recommit the resolution, or a motion to proceed to the 

consideration of other business is not in order. A motion to reconsider the 

vote by which the resolution is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in 

order. No amendment to any concurrent resolution pursuant to the 

procedures of this section is in order except as provided in subsection d.

d. Immediately following (1) the conclusion of the debate on such 

concurrent resolution, (2) a single quorum call at the conclusion of 

debate if requested in accordance with the rules of the appropriate House, 

and (3) the consideration of an amendment introduced by the Majority 

Leader or his designee to insert the phrase, “does not” in lieu of the word 

42 USC 2159.

Congressional 

committee 

reports.

42 USC 2121.

42 USC 2164.
Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95–242) 1093

“does” if the resolution under consideration is a current resolution of 

approval, the vote on final approval of the resolution shall occur.

e. Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the application 

of the rules of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case 

may be, to the procedure relating to such a resolution shall be decided 

without debate.

f. For the purposes of subsections a. through e. of this section, the 

term “resolution” means a concurrent resolution of the Congress, the 

matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: That the 

Congress (does or does not) favor the _____ transmitted to the Congress 

by the President on, _____, _____, the blank spaces therein to be 

appropriately filled, and the affirmative or negative phrase within the 

parenthetical to be appropriately selected.

g. For the purposes of this section–

(1) continuity of session is broken only by an adjournment of 

Congress sine die; and

(2) the days on which either House is not in session because of an 

adjournment of more than three days to a day certain are excluded in 

the computation of any period of time in which Congress is in 

continuous session.

h. This section is enacted by Congress–

(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and the 

House of Representatives, respectively, and as such they are deemed 

part of the rules of each House, respectively, but applicable only with 

respect to the procedure to be followed in that House in case of 

resolutions described by subsection f. of this section; and they 

supersede other rules only to the extent that they are inconsistent 

therewith; and

(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House 

to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedures of that House) 

at any time, in the same manner and to the same extent as in the case 

of any other rule of that House.

Sec. 309. Component and Other Parts of Facilities

(a) Section 109 of the 1954 Act is amended to read as follows:

Sec. 109. Component And Other Parts Of Facilities–

a. With respect to those utilization and production facilities which 

are so determined by the Commission pursuant to subsection 11v.(2) or 

11cc.(2) the Commission may issue general licenses for domestic 

activities required to be licensed under section 101, if the Commission 

determines in writing that such general licensing will not constitute an 

unreasonable risk to the common defense and security.

b. After consulting with the Secretaries of State, Energy, and 

Commerce, the Commission is authorized and directed to determine 

which component parts as defined in subsection 11v.(2) or 11cc.(2) and 

which other items or substances are especially relevant from the 

standpoint of export control because of their significance for nuclear 

explosive purposes. Except as provided in section 126 b.(2), no such 

component, substance, or item which is so determined by the 

Commission shall be exported unless the Commission issues a general or 

specific license for its export after finding, based on a reasonable 

judgment of the assurances provided and other information available to 

the Federal Government, including the Commission, that the following 

criteria or their equivalent are met: (1) IAEA safeguards as required by 

Article III(2) of the Treaty will be applied with respect to such 

component, substance, or item; (2) no such component, substance, or 

Resolution.

Continuous 

session of 

Congress, 

computation.

42 USC 2139.

Domestic 

activities 

licenses, issuance 

authorization.

42 USC 2139.

Export licenses.
1094 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95–242)

item will be used for any nuclear explosive device or for research on or

development of any nuclear explosive device; and (3) no such 

component, substance, or item will be retransferred to the jurisdiction of 

any other nation or group of nations unless the prior consent of the 

United States is obtained for such retransfer; and after determining in 

writing that the issuance of each such general or specific license or 

category of licenses will not be inimical to the common defense and 

security: Provided, That a specific license shall not be required for an 

export pursuant to this section if the component, item or substance is 

covered by a facility license issued pursuant to section 126 of this Act.5

c. The Commission shall not issue an export license under the 

authority of subsection b. if it is advised by the executive branch, in 

accordance with the procedures established under subsection 126a., that 

the export would be inimical to the common defense and security of the 

United States.

(b) The Commission, not later than one hundred and twenty days 

after the date of the enactment of this Act, shall publish regulations to 

implement the provisions of subsections b. and c. of section 109 of the 

1954 Act. Among other things, these regulations shall provide for the 

prior consultation by the Commission with the Department of State, the 

Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, the Department of 

Commerce, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

(c) The President, within not more than one hundred and twenty days 

after the date of enactment of the Act, shall publish procedures regarding 

the control by the Department of Commerce over all export items, other 

than those licensed by the Commission, which could be, if used for 

purposes other than those for which the export is intended, of 

significance for nuclear explosive purposes. Among other things, these 

procedures shall provide for prior consultations, as required, by the 

Department of Commerce with the Department of State, the Arms 

Control and Disarmament Agency, the Commission, the Department of 

Energy, and the Department of Defense.

(d) The amendments to section 109 of the 1954 Act made by this 

section shall not affect the approval of exports contracted for prior to 

November 1, 1977, which are made within one year of the date of 

enactment of such amendments.

Title IV–Negotiation of Further Export Controls

Sec. 401. Cooperation with Other Nations

Section 123 of the 1954 Act is amended to read as follows:

Sec. 123. Cooperation With Other Nations–

No cooperation with any nation, group of nations or regional defense 

organizations pursuant to section 53, 54a., 57, 64, 82, 91, 103, 104, or 

144 shall be undertaken until-”a. the proposed agreement for cooperation 

has been submitted to the President, which proposed agreement shall 

include the terms, conditions, duration, nature, and scope of the 

cooperation; and shall include the following requirements:

(1) a guaranty by the cooperating party that safeguards as set forth 

in the agreement for cooperation will be maintained with respect to 

all nuclear materials and equipment transferred pursuant thereto, and 

with respect to all special nuclear material used in or produced 

––––––––

5 Amended by P.L. 105-277, Div. G, Title XII, Ch. 3, § 1225(d)(2), 112 Stat. 2681-774

(1998).

42 USC 2139a.

Regulations.

42 USC 2139a.

Export control 

procedures, 

Presidential 

publications.

42 USC 2139 

note.

Savings 

provisions.

42 USC 2153.

42 USC 2073, 

2074, 2077, 

2094, 2112, 

2121, 2133, 

2134, 2164.

Cooperative

agreements , 

submittal to

President.

Contents.
Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95–242) 1095

through the use of such nuclear materials and equipment, so long as 

the material or equipment remains under the jurisdiction or control of 

the cooperating party, irrespective of the duration of other provisions 

in the agreement or whether the agreement is terminated or suspended 

for any reason;

(2) in the case of non-nuclear-weapon states, a requirement, as a 

condition of continued United States nuclear supply under the 

agreement for cooperation, that IAEA safeguards be maintained with 

respect to all nuclear materials in all peaceful nuclear activities within 

the territory of such state, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under 

its control anywhere;

(3) except in the case of those agreements for cooperation 

arranged pursuant to subsection 91c., a guaranty by the cooperating 

party that no nuclear materials and equipment or sensitive nuclear 

technology to be transferred pursuant to such agreement, and no 

special nuclear material produced through the use of any nuclear 

materials and equipment or sensitive nuclear technology transferred 

pursuant to such agreement, will be used for any nuclear explosive 

device, or for research on or development of any nuclear explosive 

device, or for any other military purpose;

(4) except in the case of those agreements for cooperation 

arranged pursuant to subsection 91 c. and agreements for cooperation 

with nuclear-weapon states, a stipulation that the United States shall 

have the right to require the return of any nuclear materials and 

equipment transferred pursuant thereto and any special nuclear 

material produced through the use thereof if the cooperating party 

detonates a nuclear explosive device or terminates or abrogates an 

agreement providing for IAEA safeguards; 

(5) a guaranty by the cooperating party that any material or any 

Restricted Data transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation 

and, except in the case of agreements arranged pursuant to subsection 

91c., 144b., or 144c any production or utilization facility

transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation or any special 

nuclear material produced through the use of any such facility or 

through the use of any material transferred pursuant to the agreement, 

will not be transferred to unauthorized persons or beyond the 

jurisdiction or control of the cooperating party without the consent of 

the United States;

(6) guaranty by the cooperating party that adequate physical 

security will be maintained with respect to any nuclear material 

transferred pursuant to such agreement and with respect to any 

special nuclear material used in or produced through the use of any 

material, production facility, or utilization facility transferred 

pursuant to such agreement;

(7) except in the case of agreements for cooperation arranged 

pursuant to subsection 91c., 144b., or 144c., a guaranty by the 

cooperating party that no material transferred pursuant to the 

agreement for cooperation and no material used in or produced 

through the use of any material, production facility, or utilization 

facility transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation will be 

reprocessed, enriched or (in the case of plutonium, uranium 233, or 

uranium enriched to greater than twenty percent in the isotope 235, or 

other nuclear materials which have been irradiated) otherwise altered 

in form or content without the prior approval of the United States;

42 USC 2121.

42 USC 2164.
1096 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95–242)

(8) except in the case of agreements for cooperation arranged 

pursuant to subsection 91c., 144b., or 144c., a guaranty by the 

cooperating party that no plutonium, no uranium 233, and no uranium 

enriched to greater than twenty percent in the isotope 235, transferred 

pursuant to the agreement for cooperation, or recovered from any 

source or special nuclear material so transferred or from any source or 

special nuclear material used in any production facility or utilization 

facility transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation, will be 

stored in any facility that has not been approved in advance by the 

United States; and

(9) except in the case of agreements for cooperation arranged 

pursuant to subsection 91c., 144b., or 144c., a guaranty by the 

cooperating party that any special nuclear material, production 

facility, or utilization facility produced or constructed under the 

jurisdiction of the cooperating party by or through the use of any 

sensitive nuclear technology transferred pursuant to such agreement 

for cooperation will be subject to all the requirements specified in this 

subsection.

The President may exempt a proposed agreement for cooperation 

(except an agreement arranged pursuant to subsection 91c., 144b., 144c 

or 144d.) from any of the requirements of the foregoing sentence if he 

determines that inclusion of any such requirement would be seriously 

prejudicial to the achievement of United States non-proliferation 

objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security. 

Except in the case of those agreements for cooperation arranged pursuant 

to subsection 91c., 144b., 144c., or 144d., any proposed agreement for 

cooperation shall be negotiated by the Secretary of State, with the 

technical assistance and concurrence of the Secretary of Energy; and 

after consultation with the Commission shall be submitted to the 

President jointly by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Energy 

accompanied by the views and recommendations of the Secretary of 

State, the Secretary of Energy, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

The Secretary of State shall also provide to the President an unclassified 

Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (A) which shall analyze the 

consistency of the text of proposed agreement for cooperation with all the 

requirements of this Act with specific attention to whether the proposed 

agreement is consistent with each of the criteria set forth in this 

subsection, and (B) regarding the adequacy of the safeguards and other 

control mechanisms and the peaceful use assurances contained in the 

agreement for cooperation to ensure that any assistance furnished 

thereunder will not be used to further any military or nuclear explosive 

purpose. Each Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement prepared 

pursuant to this Act shall be accompanied by a classified annex, prepared 

in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, summarizing 

relevant classified information. In the case of those agreements for 

cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91c., 144b., 144c., or 144d., 

any proposed agreement for cooperation shall be submitted to the 

President by the Secretary of Energy or, in the case of those agreements 

for cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91c., 144b., or 144d., 

which are to be implemented by the Department of Defense, by the 

Secretary of Defense;

b. the President has approved and authorized the execution of the 

proposed agreement for cooperation and has made a determination in 

writing that the performance of the proposed agreement will promote, 

42 USC 2121.

42 USC 2164.

Agreement 

requirements, 

Presidential 

exemptions.

Nuclear 

Proliferation 

Assessment 

Statement.

Proposed 

cooperation 

agreements, 

submitted to 

President.
Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95–242) 1097

and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and 

security;

c. the proposed agreement for cooperation (if not an agreement 

subject to subsection d.), together with the approval and determination of 

the President, has been submitted to the Committee on International 

Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign 

Relations of the Senate for a period of thirty days of continuous session 

(as defined in subsection 130g.): Provided, however, That these 

committees, after having received such agreement for cooperation, may 

by resolution in writing waive the conditions of all or any portion of such 

thirty-day period; and

d. the proposed agreement for cooperation (if arranged pursuant to 

subsection 91c., 144b., 144c., or 144d., or if entailing implementation of 

section 53, 54a., 103, or 104 in relation to a reactor that may be capable 

of producing more than five thermal megawatts or special nuclear 

material for use in connection therewith) has been submitted to the 

Congress, together with the approval and determination of the President, 

for a period of sixty days of continuous session (as defined in subsection 

130g. of this Act) and referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 

the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of 

the Senate, and in addition, in the case of a proposed agreement for 

cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91c., 144b., 144c., or 144d., 

the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and 

the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, but such proposed 

agreement for cooperation shall not become effective if during such 

sixty-day period the Congress adopts, and there is enacted, a joint 

resolution stating in substance that the Congress does not favor the 

proposed agreement for cooperation: Provided, That the sixty-day period 

shall not begin until a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement 

prepared by the Secretary of State, and any annexes thereto, when 

required by subsection 123a., has been submitted to the Congress: 

Provided further, That an agreement for cooperation exempted by the 

President pursuant to subsection a. from any requirement contained in 

that subsection shall not become effective unless the Congress adopts, 

and there is enacted, a joint resolution stating that the Congress does 

favor such agreement. During the sixty–day period the Committee on 

Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on 

Foreign Relations of the Senate shall each hold hearings on the proposed 

agreement for cooperation and submit a report to their respective bodies 

recommending whether it should be approved or disapproved. Any such 

proposed agreement for cooperation shall be considered pursuant to the 

procedures set forth in section130i. of this Act.

Following submission of a proposed agreement for cooperation 

(except an agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 

91c., 144b., or 144c.) to the Committee on International Relations of the 

House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 

Senate, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Department of State, 

the Department of Energy, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 

and the Department of Defense shall, upon the request of either of those 

committees, promptly furnish to those committees their views as to 

whether the safeguards and other controls contained therein provide an 

adequate framework to ensure that any exports as contemplated by such 

agreement will not be inimical to or constitute an unreasonable risk to the 

common defense and security.

Submittal to 

congressional 

committees.

42 USC 2073, 

2074, 2133, 

2073, 2074, 

2133, 2134.

42 USC 2121.

42 USC 2164.

Agency views to 

congressional 

committees.
1098 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95–242)

If, after the date of enactment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 

1978, the Congress fails to disapprove a proposed agreement for 

cooperation which exempts the recipient nation from the requirement set 

forth in subsection 123a.(2), such failure to act shall constitute a failure 

to adopt a resolution of disapproval pursuant to subsection 128b.(3) for 

purposes of the Commission’s consideration of applications and requests 

under section 126a.(2) and there shall be no congressional review 

pursuant to section 128 of any subsequent license or authorization with 

respect to that state until the first such license or authorization which is 

issued after twelve months from the elapse of the sixty-day period in 

which the agreement for cooperation in question is reviewed by the 

Congress.

Sec. 402. Additional Requirements

(a) Except as specifically provided in any agreement for cooperation, 

no source or special nuclear material hereafter exported from the United 

States may be enriched after export without the prior approval of the 

United States for such enrichment: Provided, That the procedures 

governing such approvals shall be identical to those set forth for the 

approval of proposed subsequent arrangements under section 131 of the 

1954 Act, and any commitments from the recipient which the Secretary 

of Energy and the Secretary of State deem necessary to ensure that such 

approval will be obtained prior to such enrichment shall be obtained prior 

to the submission of the executive branch judgment regarding the export 

in question and shall be set forth in such submission: And provided 

further, That no source or special nuclear material shall be exported for 

the purpose of enrichment or reactor fueling to any nation or group of 

nations which has, after the date of enactment of this Act, entered into a 

new or amended agreement for cooperation with the United States, 

except pursuant to such agreement.

(b) In addition to other requirements of law, no major critical 

component of any uranium enrichment, nuclear fuel reprocessing, or 

heavy water production facility shall be exported under any agreement 

for cooperation (exempt an agreement for cooperation pursuant to 

subsection 91c., 144b., 144c. of the 1954 Act) unless such agreement for 

cooperation specifically designates such components as items to be 

exported pursuant to the agreement for cooperation. For purposes of this 

subsection, the term “major critical component” means any component 

part or group of component parts which the President determines to be 

essential to the operation of a complete uranium enrichment, nuclear fuel 

reprocessing, or heavy water production facility.

Sec. 403. Peaceful Nuclear Activities

The President shall take immediate and vigorous steps to seek 

agreement from all nations and groups of nations to commit themselves 

to adhere to the following export policies with respect to their peaceful 

nuclear activities and their participation in international nuclear trade:

(a) No nuclear materials and equipment and no sensitive nuclear 

technology within the territory of any nation or group of nations, under 

its jurisdiction, or under its control anywhere will be transferred to the 

jurisdiction of any other nation or group of nations unless the nation or 

group of nations receiving such transfer commits itself to strict 

undertakings including, but not limited to, provisions sufficient to ensure 

that–

(1) no nuclear materials and equipment and no nuclear technology 

in, under the jurisdiction of, or under the control of any non-nuclearweapon state, shall be used for nuclear explosive devices for any 

42 USC 2153a.

Nuclear 

material 

enrichment, 

approval.

42 USC 2121.

42 USC 2164.

Enrichment 

facility 

components, 

export 

prohibition.

Major critical 

component.

42 USC 2153b.

Export policies.
Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95–242) 1099

purpose or for research on or development of nuclear explosive 

devices for any purpose, except as permitted by Article V, the Treaty;

(2) IAEA safeguards will be applied to all peaceful nuclear 

activities in, under the jurisdiction of, or under control of any nonnuclear-weapon state;

(3) adequate physical security measures will be established and 

maintained by any nation or group of nations on all of its nuclearactivities;

(4) no nuclear materials and equipment and no nuclear technology 

intended for peaceful purposes in, under the jurisdiction of, or under 

the control of any nation or group of nations shall be transferred to 

the jurisdiction of any other nation or group of nations which does not 

agree to stringent undertakings meeting the objectives of this section; 

and

(5) no nation or group of nations will assist, encourage, or induce 

any non-nuclear-weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire 

any nuclear explosive device.

(b)(1) No source or special nuclear material within the territory of any 

nation or group of nations, under its jurisdiction, or under its control 

anywhere will be enriched (as described in paragraph AA.(2) of section 

11 of the 1954 Act) or reprocessed, no irradiated fuel elements 

containing such material which are to be removed from a reactor will be 

altered in form or content, and no fabrication or stockpiling involving 

plutonium, uranium 233, or uranium enriched to greater than 20 percent 

in the isotope 235 shall be performed except in a facility under effective 

international auspices and inspection, and any such irradiated fuel 

elements shall be transferred to such a facility as soon as practicable after 

removal from a reactor consistent with safety requirements. Such 

facilities shall be limited in number to the greatest extent feasible and 

shall be carefully sited and managed so as to minimize the proliferation 

and environmental risks associated with such facilities. In addition, there 

shall be conditions to limit the access of non-nuclear-weapon states other 

than the host country to sensitive nuclear technology associated with 

such facilities.

(2) Any facilities within the territory of any nation or group of 

nations, under its jurisdiction, or under its control anywhere for the 

necessary short-term storage of fuel elements containing plutonium, 

uranium 233, or uranium enriched to greater than 20 percent in the 

isotope 235 prior to placement in a reactor or of irradiated fuel 

elements prior to transfer as required in subparagraph (1) shall be 

placed under effective international auspices and inspection.

(c) Adequate physical security measures will be established and 

maintained with respect to all nuclear activities within the territory of 

each nation and group of nations, under its jurisdiction, or under its 

control anywhere, and with respect to any international shipment of 

significant quantities of source or special nuclear material or irradiated 

source or special nuclear material, which shall also be conducted under 

international safeguards.

(d) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to require international 

control or supervision of any United States military activities.

Sec. 404. Renegotiation of Agreements for Cooperation

(a) The President shall initiate a program immediately to renegotiate 

agreements for cooperation in effect on the date of enactment of this Act, 

or otherwise to obtain the agreement of parties to such agreements for 

cooperation to the undertakings that would be required for new 

42 USC 2104.

Enriched 

nuclear 

material and 

sources, 

prohibition.

Proposed 

international 

agreements.

Enriched 

nuclear 

material, 

short-term 

storage.

International 

inspection.

42 USC 2153c.
1100 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95–242)

agreement under the 1954 Act. To the extent that an agreement for 

cooperation in effect on the date of enactment of this Act with a 

cooperating party contains provisions equivalent to any or all of the 

criteria set forth in section 127 of the 1954 Act with respect to materials 

and equipment transferred pursuant thereto or with respect to any special 

nuclear material used in or produced through the use of any such material 

or equipment, any renegotiated agreement with that cooperating party 

shall continue to contain an equivalent provision with respect to such 

transferred materials and equipment and such special nuclear material. 

To the extent that an agreement for cooperation in effect on the date of 

enactment of this Act with a cooperating party does not contain 

provisions with respect to any nuclear materials and equipment which 

have previously been transferred under an agreement for cooperation 

with the United States and which are under the jurisdiction or control of 

the cooperating party and with respect to any special nuclear material 

which is used in or produced through the use thereof and which is under 

the jurisdiction or control of the cooperating party, which are equivalent 

to any or all of those required for new and amended agreements for 

cooperation under section 123a. of the 1954 Act, the President shall 

vigorously seek to obtain the application of such provisions with respect 

to such nuclear materials and equipment and such special nuclear 

material. Nothing in this Act or in the 1954 Act shall be deemed to 

relinquish any rights which the United States may have under any 

agreement for cooperation in force on the date of enactment of this Act.

(b) The President shall annually review each of requirements (1) 

through (9) set forth for inclusion in agreements for cooperation under 

section 123a. of the 1954 Act and the export policy goals set forth in 

section 401 to determine whether it is in the interest of United States 

non-proliferation objectives for any such requirements or export policies 

which are not already being applied as export criteria to be enacted as 

additional export criteria.

(c) If Presidential export criteria proposals, submittal to Congress.

the President proposes enactment of any such requirements or export 

policies as additional export criteria or to take any other action with 

respect to such requirements or export policy goals for the purpose of 

encouraging adherence by nations and groups of nations to such 

requirements and policies, he shall submit such a proposal together with 

an explanation thereof to the Congress.

(d) If the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate or the 

Committee on Foreign Affairs6 of the House of Representatives, after 

reviewing the President’s annual report or any proposed legislation, 

determines that it is in the interest of United States non-proliferation 

objectives to take any action with respect to such requirements or export 

policy goals, it shall report a joint resolution to implement such 

determination. Any joint resolution so reported shall be considered in the 

Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, under applicable 

procedures provided for the consideration of resolutions pursuant to

subsection 130b. through g. of the 1954 Act.

Sec. 405. Authority to Continue Agreements

(a) The amendments to section 123 of the 1954 Act made by this Act 

shall not affect the authority to continue cooperation pursuant to 

agreements for cooperation entered into prior to the date of enactment of 

this Act.

––––––––

6 Amended by P.L. 103-437, 108 Stat. 4581 (1994). 

Export 

agreement 

conditions and 

policy, goals, 

Presidential 

review.

Presidential 

export criteria 

proposals, 

submittal to 

Congress.

42 USC 2153d.

Savings 

provision.
Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95–242) 1101

(b) Nothing in this Act shall affect the authority to include dispute 

settlement provisions, including arbitration, in any agreement made 

pursuant to an Agreement of Cooperation.

Sec. 406. Review

No court or regulatory body shall have any jurisdiction under any law 

to compel the performance of or to review the adequacy of the 

performance of any Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement, or any 

annexes thereto, called for in this Act or in the 1954 Act.7

Sec. 407. Protection of the Environment

The president shall endeavor to provide in any agreement entered into 

pursuant to section 123 of the 1954 Act for cooperation between the 

parties in protecting the international environment from radioactive, 

chemical or thermal contamination arising from peaceful nuclear 

activities.

Title V–United States Assistance to Developing Countries 

Sec. 501. Policy: Report

The United States shall endeavor to cooperate with other nations, 

international institutions, and private organizations in establishing 

programs to assist in the development of non-nuclear energy resources, to 

cooperate with both developing and industrialized nations in protecting 

the international environment from contamination arising from both 

nuclear and non-nuclear energy activities, and shall seek to cooperate 

with and aid developing countries in meeting their energy needs through 

the development of such resources and the application of non-nuclear 

technologies consistent with the economic factors, the material resources 

of those countries, and environmental protection. The United States shall 

additionally seek to encourage other industrialized nations and groups of 

nations to make commitments for similar cooperation and aid to 

developing countries. The President shall report annually to Congress on 

the level of other nations’ and groups of nations’ commitments under 

such program and the relation of any such commitments to United States 

efforts under this Title. In cooperating with and providing such assistance 

to developing countries, the United States shall give priority to parties to 

the Treaty.

Sec. 502. Programs

(a) The United States shall initiate a program, consistent with the 

aims of section 501, to cooperate with developing countries for the 

purpose of–

(1) meeting the energy needs required for the development of 

such countries;

(2) reducing the dependence of such countries on petroleum fuels, 

with emphasis given to utilizing solar and other renewable energy 

resources; and

(3) expanding the energy alternatives available to such countries.

(b) Such program shall include cooperation in evaluating the energy 

alternatives of developing countries, facilitating international trade in 

energy commodities, developing energy resources, and applying suitable 

energy technologies. The program shall include both general and 

country-specific energy assessments and cooperative projects in resource 

exploration and production, training, research and development.

––––––––

7 Amended by P.L. 105-277, Div. G, § 1225(e)(5), 112 Stat. 2681-774 (1998).

42 USC 2160a.

42 USC 2153e.

22 USC 3261.

Nuclear and 

non-nuclear 

energy, 

resource 

development.

22 USC 3262.

Developing 

countries, 

energy 

development 

programs.

Assessment 

and cooperative 

projects.
1102 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95–242)

(c) As an integral part of such program, the Department of Energy, 

under the general policy guidance of the Department of State and in 

cooperation with the Agency for International Development and other 

Federal agencies as appropriate, shall initiate, as soon as practicable, a 

program for the exchange of United States scientists, technicians, and 

energy experts with those of developing countries to implement the 

purposes of this section.

(d) For the purposes of carrying out this section, there is authorized to 

be appropriated such sums as are contained in annual authorization Acts 

for the Department of Energy, including such sums which have been 

authorized for such purposes under previous legislation.

(e) Under the direction of the President, the Secretary of State shall 

ensure the coordination of the activities authorized by this Title with 

other related activities of the United States conducted abroad, including 

the programs authorized by sections 103(c), 106(a)(2), and 119 of the 

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

Sec. 503. Report

Not later than twelve months after the date of enactment of this Act, 

the President shall report to the Congress on the feasibility of expanding 

the cooperative activities established pursuant to section 502(c) into an 

international cooperative effort to include a scientific peace corps 

designed to encourage large numbers of technically trained volunteers to 

live and work in developing countries for varying periods of time for the 

purpose of engaging in projects to aid in meeting the energy needs of 

such countries through the search for and utilization of indigenous energy 

resources and the application of suitable technology, including the 

widespread utilization of renewable and unconventional energy 

technologies. Such report shall also include a discussion of other 

mechanisms to conduct a coordinated international effort to develop, 

demonstrate, and encourage the utilization of such technologies in 

developing countries.

Title VI–Executive Reporting

Sec. 601. Reports of the President

(a) The President shall review all activities of Government 

departments and agencies relating to preventing proliferation and shall 

make a report to Congress in January of 1979 and annually in January of 

each year thereafter on the Government’s efforts to prevent proliferation. 

This report shall include but not be limited to–

(1) a description of the progress made toward–

(A) negotiating the initiatives contemplated in sections 104 

and 105 of this Act;

(B) negotiating the international arrangements or other mutual 

undertakings contemplated in section 403 of this Act;

(C) encouraging non-nuclear-weapons states that are not party 

to the Treaty to adhere to the Treaty or, pending such adherence, 

to enter into comparable agreements with respect to safeguards 

and to forswear the development of any nuclear explosive 

devices, and discouraging nuclear exports to non-nuclear-weapon 

states which have not taken such steps;

(D) strengthening the safeguards of the IAEA as contemplated 

in section 201 of this Act; and

(E) renegotiating agreements for cooperation as contemplated 

in section 404(a) of this Act;

Experts, 

exchange.

Appropriation 

authorization.

22 USC 2151a.

22 USC 2151d.

22 USC 2151q.

22 USC 3262 

note.

Presidential 

report to 

Congress.

22 USC 3281.

Governmental 

nuclear 

nonproliferatio

n activities.
Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95–242) 1103

(2) an assessment of the impact of the progress, described in 

paragraph (1) on the non-proliferation policy of the United States; an 

explanation of the precise reasons why progress has not been made on 

any particular point and recommendations with respect to appropriate 

measures to encourage progress; and a statement of what legislative 

modifications, if any, are necessary in his judgment to achieve the 

non-proliferation policy of the United States;

(3) a determination as to which non-nuclear-weapon states with 

which the United States has an agreement for cooperation in effect or 

under negotiation, if any, have–

(A) detonated a nuclear device; or

(B) refused to accept the safeguards of the IAEA on all of 

their peaceful nuclear activities; or

(C) refused to give specific assurances that they will not 

manufacture or otherwise acquire any nuclear explosive device; or

(D) engaged in activities involving source or special nuclear 

material and having direct significance for the manufacture or 

acquisition of nuclear explosive devices;

(4) an assessment of whether any of the policies set forth in this 

Act have, on balance, been counterproductive from the standpoint of 

preventing proliferation;

(5) a description of the progress made toward establishing 

procedures to facilitate the timely processing of requests for 

subsequent arrangements and export licenses in order to enhance the 

reliability of the Unites States in meeting its commitments to supply 

nuclear reactors and fuel to nations which adhere to effective nonproliferation policies;

(6)8 a description of the implementation of nuclear and nuclearrelated dual-use export controls in the preceding calendar year, 

including a summary by type of commodity and destination of–

(A) all transactions for which–

(i) an export license was issued for any good controlled 

under section 309(c) of this Act;

(ii) an export license was issued under section 109b. of the 

1954 Act;

(iii) approvals were issued under the Export 

Administration Act of 1979, or section 109b.(3) of the 1954 

Act, for the retransfer of any item, technical data, component, 

or substance; or

(iv) authorizations were made as required by section 

57b.(2) of the 1954 Act to engage, directly or indirectly, in the 

production of special nuclear material;

(B) each instance in which–

(i) a sanction has been imposed under section 821(a) or 

section 824 of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 

1994 or section 102(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act;

(ii) sales or leases have been denied under section 3(f) of 

the Arms Export Control Act or transactions prohibited by 

reason of acts relating to proliferation of nuclear explosive 

devices as described in section 40(d) of that Act;

(iii) a sanction has not been imposed by reason of section 

821(c)(2) of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 

––––––––

8 Section 6 was added by P.L. 103-236, 108 Stat. 507-511 (1994).
1104 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95–242)

or the imposition of a sanction has been delayed under section 

102(b)(4) of the Arms Export Control Act; or

(iv) a waiver of a sanction has been made under–

(I) section 821(f) or section 824 of the Nuclear 

Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994,

(II) section 620E(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 

1961, or paragraph (5) or (6)(B) of section 102(b) of the 

Arms Export Control Act,

(III) section 40(g) of the Arms Export Control Act with 

respect to the last sentence of section 40(d) of that Act, or

(IV) section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 

with respect to section 620E of that Act or section 3(f), the 

last sentence of section 40(d), or 102(b)(1) of the Arms 

Export Control Act; and

(C) the progress of those independent states of the former 

Soviet Union that are non-nuclear-weapon states and of the Baltic 

states towards achieving the objective of applying full scope 

safeguards to all their peaceful nuclear activities. Portions of the 

information required by paragraph (6) may be submitted in 

classified form, as necessary. Any such information that may not 

be published or disclosed under section 12(c)(1) of the Export 

Administration Act of 1979 shall be submitted as confidential.

(b) In the first report required by this section, the President shall 

analyze each civil agreement for cooperation negotiated pursuant to 

section 123 of the 1954 Act, and shall discuss the scope and adequacy of 

the requirements and obligations relating to safeguards and other control 

therein.

Sec. 602. Additional Reports

(a) Reports by Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Department of 

Energy. The annual reports to the Congress by the Commission and the 

Department of Energy which are otherwise required by law shall also 

include views and recommendations regarding the policies and actions of 

the United States to prevent proliferation which are the statutory 

responsibility of those agencies. The Department's report shall include a 

detailed analysis of the proliferation implications of advanced enrichment 

and reprocessing techniques, advanced reactors, and alternative nuclear 

fuel cycles. This part of the report shall include a comprehensive version 

which includes any relevant classified information and a summary 

unclassified version.

(b) Additional reporting requirements. The reporting requirements of this 

title are in addition to and not in lieu of any other reporting requirements 

under applicable law.

(c) Congressional notification of nonproliferation activities.

 (1) The Department of State, the Department of Defense, the 

Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, the Commission, 

and, with regard to subparagraph (B), the Director of Central 

Intelligence, shall keep the Committees on Foreign Relations and 

Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on International 

Relations of the House of Representatives fully and currently informed 

with respect to--

 (A) their activities to carry out the purposes and policies of this Act 

and to otherwise prevent proliferation, including the proliferation of 

nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, or their means of delivery; and

 (B) the current activities of foreign nations which are of significance 

from the proliferation standpoint.

Current civil 

agreements, 

analysis.

22 USC 3282.

Governmental 

nuclear 

nonproliferation 

activities.

Reports to 

Congress.
Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95–242) 1105

 (2) For the purposes of this subsection with respect to paragraph (1)(B), 

the phrase “fully and currently informed” means the transmittal of 

credible information not later than 60 days after becoming aware of the 

activity concerned.

(d) Classified portions of reports. Any classified portions of the reports 

required by this Act shall be submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

(e) [Omitted]

(f) Access by Secretary of Defense to information regarding nuclear 

proliferation matters; applicability.

 (1) The Secretary of Defense shall have access, on a timely basis, to all 

information regarding nuclear proliferation matters which the Secretary 

of State or the Secretary of Energy has or is entitled to have. Such access 

shall include access to all communications, materials, documents, and 

records relating to nuclear proliferation matters.

 (2) This subsection does not apply to any intradepartmental document 

of the Department of State or the Department of Energy, or any portion 

of such document, that is solely concerned with internal, confidential 

advice on policy concerning the conduct of interagency deliberations on 

nuclear proliferation matters.9

Sec. 603. Savings Clause

(a) All orders, determinations, rules, regulations, permits, contracts, 

agreements, certificates, licenses, and privileges–

(1) which have been issued, made, granted, or allowed to become 

effective in the exercise of functions which are the subject of this Act, 

by (i) any agency or officer, or part thereof, in exercising the 

functions which are affected by this Act, or (ii) any court of 

competent jurisdiction, and

(2) which are in effect at the time this Act takes effect, shall 

continue in effect according to their terms until modified, terminated, 

superseded, set aside, or repealed as the case may be, by the parties 

thereto or by any court of competent jurisdiction.

(b) Nothing in this Act shall affect the procedures or requirements 

applicable to agreements for cooperation entered into pursuant to section 

91c., 144b., or 144c. of the 1954 Act or arrangements pursuant thereto as 

it was in effect immediately prior to the date of enactment of this Act.

(c) Except where otherwise provided, the provisions of this Act shall 

take effect immediately upon enactment regardless of any requirement 

for the promulgation of regulations to implement such provisions.

* * * *

Other Provisions: Provision of Certain Information to Congress

(a) REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE INFORMATION.–The head of 

each department and agency described in section 602(c) of the Nuclear 

Non–Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 USC 3282(c)) shall promptly provide 

information to the chairman and ranking minority member of the 

Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 

International Relations of the House of Representatives in meeting the 

requirements of subsection (c) or (d) of section 602 of such Act.

––––––––

9 Amended by P.L. 99-661, Div A, Title XIII, Part F, § 1370, 100 Stat. 4004 (1986); 

P.L. 103-437, § 9(a)(8), 108 Stat. 4588 (1994); P.L. 105-277, Div G, Title XII, Ch 3, § 

1225(e)(6), 112 Stat. 2681-775 (1998); P.L. 106-113, Div B, § 1000(a)(7), 113 Stat. 1536

(1999).

42 USC 2153f.

42 USC 2153f.

42 USC 2121.

42 USC 2164.

22 USC 3201 

note.

Effective date.

42 USC 3282 

note.
1106 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95–242)

(b) ISSUANCE OF DIRECTIVES.–Not later than February 1, 2000, 

the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of 

Commerce, the Secretary of Energy, the Director of Central Intelligence, 

and the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission shall issue 

directives, which shall provide access to information, including 

information contained in special access programs, to implement their 

responsibilities under subsections (c) and (d) of section 602 of the 

Nuclear Non–Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 USC 3282(c) and (d)). 

Copies of such directive shall be forwarded promptly to the Committee 

on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International 

Relations of the House of Representatives upon the issuance of the 

directives.10

––––––––

10 Amended by P.L. 106–113, Division B, § 1000(a)(7), 113 Stat. 1536 (1999), enacted

into law section 1134 of Subtitle B of Title XI of Division B of H.R. 3427, 113 Stat. 

1501A–494, as introduced on November 17, 1999).
Foreign Relations Auth. Act, FY 1994 and 1995 (P.L. 103–236) 1107

B. FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT, FISCAL 

YEARS 1994 AND 1995

Public Law 103–236 108 Stat. 382

April 30, 1994

An Act

To provide for more efficient and effective control over the proliferation 

of nuclear explosive capability.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 

United States of America in Congress assembled,

◊◊◊◊

Title VIII—Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act

◊◊◊◊

Part B-Sanctions for Nuclear Proliferation

Sec. 821. Imposition of Procurement Sanction on Persons Engaging 

in Export Activities that Contribute to Proliferation

(a) DETERMINATION BY THE PRESIDENT.–

(1) IN GENERAL.–Except as provided in subsection (b)(2), the 

President shall impose the sanction described in subsection (c) if the 

President determines in writing that, on or after the effective date of 

this part, a foreign person or a United States person has materially 

and with requisite knowledge contributed, through the export from 

the United States or any other country of any goods or technology (as 

defined in section 830(2)), to the efforts by any individual, group, or 

non-nuclear-weapon state to acquire unsafeguarded special nuclear 

material or to use, develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire 

any nuclear explosive device.

(2) PERSONS AGAINST WHICH THE SANCTION IS TO BE 

IMPOSED.–The sanction shall be imposed pursuant to paragraph (1) 

on–

(A) the foreign person or United States person with respect to 

which the President makes the determination described in that 

paragraph;

(B) any successor entity to that foreign person or United States 

person;

(C) any foreign person or United States person that is a parent 

or subsidiary of that person if that parent or subsidiary materially 

and with requisite knowledge assisted in the activities which were 

the basis of that determination; and

(D) any foreign person or United States person that is an 

affiliate of that person if that affiliate materially and with requisite 

knowledge assisted in the activities which were the basis of that 

determination and if that affiliate is controlled in fact by that 

person.

(3) OTHER SANCTIONS AVAILABLE.–The sanction which is 

required to be imposed for activities described in this subsection is in 

Nuclear 

Proliferation 

Prevention Act 

of 1994.

22 USC 3201 

Note.

22 USC 6301.
1108 Foreign Relations Auth. Act, FY 1994 and 1995 (P.L. 103-236)

addition to any other sanction which may be imposed for the same 

activities under any other provision of law.

(4) DEFINITION.–For purposes of this subsection, the term 

“requisite knowledge” means situations in which a person “knows”, 

as “knowing” is defined in section 104 of the Foreign Corrupt 

Practices Act of 1977 (15 USC 78dd-2).

(b) CONSULTATION WITH AND ACTIONS BY FOREIGN 

GOVERNMENT OF JURISDICTION.–

(1) CONSULTATIONS.–If the President makes a determination 

described in subsection (a)(1) with respect to a foreign person, the 

Congress urges the President to initiate consultations immediately 

with the government with primary jurisdiction over that foreign 

person with respect to the imposition of the sanction pursuant to this 

section.

(2) ACTIONS BY GOVERNMENT OF JURISDICTION.–In 

order to pursue such consultations with that government, the 

President may delay imposition of the sanction pursuant to this 

section for up to 90 days. Following these consultations, the President 

shall impose the sanction unless the President determines and certifies 

in writing to the Congress that that government has taken specific and 

effective actions, including appropriate penalties, to terminate the 

involvement of the foreign person in the activities described in 

subsection (a)(1). The President may delay the imposition of the 

sanction for up to an additional 90 days if the President determines 

and certifies in writing to the Congress that that government is in the 

process of taking the actions described in the preceding sentence.

(3) REPORT TO CONGRESS.–Not later than 90 days after 

making a determination under subsection (a)(1), the President shall 

submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 

Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs of the House of Representatives a report on the status of 

consultations with the appropriate government under this subsection, 

and the basis for any determination under paragraph (2) of this 

subsection that such government has taken specific corrective actions.

(c) SANCTION.–

(1) DESCRIPTION OF SANCTION.–The sanction to be imposed 

pursuant to subsection (a)(1) is, except as provided in paragraph (2) of 

this subsection, that the United States Government shall not procure, or 

enter into any contract for the procurement of, any goods or services 

from any person described in subsection (a)(2).

(2) EXCEPTIONS.–The President shall not be required to apply 

or maintain the sanction under this section–

(A) in the case of procurement of defense articles or defense 

services–

(i) under existing contracts or subcontracts, including the 

exercise of options for production quantities to satisfy 

requirements essential to the national security of the United 

States;

(ii) if the President determines in writing that the person or 

other entity to which the sanction would otherwise be applied 

is a sole source supplier of the defense articles or services, that 

the defense articles or services are essential, and that 

alternative sources are not readily or reasonably available; or

President.

President.
Foreign Relations Auth. Act, FY 1994 and 1995 (P.L. 103–236) 1109

(iii) if the President determines in writing that such articles 

or services are essential to the national security under defense 

coproduction agreements;

(B) to products or services provided under contracts entered 

into before the date on which the President publishes his intention 

to impose the sanction;

(C) to–

(i) spare parts which are essential to United States products 

or production;

(ii) component parts, but not finished products, essential to 

United States products or production; or

(iii) routine servicing and maintenance of products, to the 

extent that alternative sources are not readily or reasonably 

available;

(D) to information and technology essential to United States 

products or production; or

(E) to medical or other humanitarian items.

(d) ADVISORY OPINIONS.–Upon the request of any person, the 

Secretary of State may, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, 

issue in writing an advisory opinion to that person as to whether a 

proposed activity by that person would subject that person to the sanction 

under this section. Any person who relies in good faith on such an 

advisory opinion which states that the proposed activity would not 

subject a person to such sanction, and any person who thereafter engages 

in such activity, may not be made subject to such sanction on account of 

such activity.

(e) TERMINATION OF THE SANCTION.–The sanction imposed 

pursuant to this section shall apply for a period of at least 12 months 

following the imposition of the sanction and shall cease to apply 

thereafter only if the President determines and certifies in writing to the 

Congress that–

(1) reliable information indicates that the foreign person or United 

States person with respect to which the determination was made 

under subsection (a)(1) has ceased to aid or abet any individual, 

group, or non-nuclear-weapon state in its efforts to acquire 

unsafeguarded special nuclear material or any nuclear explosive 

device, as described in that subsection; and

(2) the President has received reliable assurances from the foreign 

person or United States person, as the case may be, that such person 

will not, in the future, aid or abet any individual, group, or nonnuclear-weapon state in its efforts to acquire unsafeguarded special 

nuclear material or any nuclear explosive device, as described in 

subsection (a)(1).

(f) WAIVER.–

(1) CRITERION FOR WAIVER.–The President may waive the 

application of the sanction imposed on any person pursuant to this 

section, after the end of the 12-month period beginning on the date on 

which that sanction was imposed on that person, if the President 

determines and certifies in writing to the Congress that the continued 

imposition of the sanction would have a serious adverse effect on vital 

United States interests.

(2) NOTIFICATION OF AND REPORT TO CONGRESS.–If the 

President decides to exercise the waiver authority provided in 

paragraph (1), the President shall so notify the Congress not less than 

20 days before the waiver takes effect. Such notification shall include 
1110 Foreign Relations Auth. Act, FY 1994 and 1995 (P.L. 103-236)

a report fully articulating the rationale and circumstances which led 

the President to exercise the waiver authority.

Sec. 822. Eligibility for Assistance

(a) AMENDMENTS TO THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT.-

(1) PROHIBITION.-Section 3 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 

U.S.C. 2753) is amended by adding at the end the following new 

subsection:

“(f) No sales or leases shall be made to any country that the President 

has determined is in material breach of its binding commitments to the 

United States under international treaties or agreements concerning the 

nonproliferation of nuclear explosive devices (as defined in section 

830(4) of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994) and 

unsafeguarded special nuclear material (as defined in section 830(8) of 

that Act).”.

(2) DEFINITION OF SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL 

TERRORISM.- Section 40 of such Act (22 U.S.C. 2780) is amended-

(A) in subsection (d), by adding at the end the following new 

sentence: “For purposes of this subsection, such acts shall include 

all activities that the Secretary determines willfully aid or abet the 

international proliferation of nuclear explosive devices to 

individuals or groups or willfully aid or abet an individual or 

groups in acquiring unsafeguarded special nuclear material.”; and

(B) in subsection (1)-

(i) in paragraph (2), by striking “and” after the semicolon;

(ii) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at the end and 

inserting a semicolon; and

(iii) by adding at the end the following:

“(4) the term 'nuclear explosive device' has the meaning given that 

term in section 830(4) of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 

1994; and

“(5) the term 'unsafeguarded special nuclear material' has the 

meaning given that term in section 830(8) of the Nuclear Proliferation 

Prevention Act of 1994.”.

(b) FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 196 1.-

(1) PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION 82-7.-Notwithstanding

any other provision of law, Presidential Determination No. 82-7 of 

February 10, 1982, made pursuant to section 670(a)(2) of the Foreign 

Assistance Act of 1961, shall have no force or effect with respect to 

any grounds for the prohibition of assistance under section 102(a)(1) 

of the Arms Export Control Act arising on or after the effective date 

of this part.

(2) AMENDMENT.-Section 620E(d) of the Foreign Assistance

Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2375(d)) is amended to read as follows:

“(d) The President may waive the prohibitions of section 101 of the 

Arms Export Control Act with respect to any grounds for the prohibition 

of assistance under that section arising before the effective date of part B 

of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 to provide assistance 

to Pakistan if he determines that to do so is in the national interest of the 

United States.”.

Sec. 823. Role of International Financial Institutions

(a) IN GENERAL.-The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the 

United States executive director to each of the international financial 

institutions described in section 701(a) of the International Financial 

Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262d(a)) to use the voice and vote of the 

United States to oppose any use of the institution's funds to promote the 

22 USC 6302.
Foreign Relations Auth. Act, FY 1994 and 1995 (P.L. 103–236) 1111

acquisition of unsafeguarded special nuclear material or the development, 

stockpiling, or use of any nuclear explosive device by any non-nuclearweapon state.

(b) DUTIES OF UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS.-

Section 701(b)(3) of the International Financial Institutions Act (22 

U.S.C. 262d(b)(3)) is amended to read as follows:

“(3) whether the recipient country-

“(A) is seeking to acquire unsafeguarded special nuclear 

material (as defined in section 830(8) of the Nuclear Proliferation 

Prevention Act of 1994) or a nuclear explosive device (as defined 

in section 830(4) of that Act);

“(B) is not a State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 

of Nuclear Weapons; or

“(C) has detonated a nuclear explosive device; and”.

Sec. 824. Prohibition on Assisting Nuclear Proliferation through the 

Provision of Financing

(a) PROHIBITED ACTIVITY DEFINED.-For purposes of this 

section, the term “prohibited activity” means the act of knowingly,

materially, and directly contributing or attempting to contribute, through 

the provision of financing, to—

(1) the acquisition of unsafeguarded special nuclear material; or

(2) the use, development, production, stockpiling, or other

acquisition of any nuclear explosive device, by any individual, group, 

or non-nuclear-weapon state.

(b) PROHIBITION.-To the extent that the United States has

jurisdiction to prohibit such activity by such person, no United States 

person and no foreign person may engage in any prohibited activity.

(c) PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION AND ORDER WITH 

RESPECT TO UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN PERSONS.-If the 

President determines, ,that a United States person or a foreign person has 

engaged in a prohibited activity (without regard to whether subsection (b)

applies), the President shall, by order, impose the sanctions described in 

subsection (d) on such person.

(d) SANCTIONS.-The following sanctions shall be imposed pursuant 

to any order issued under subsection (c) with respect to any United States 

person or any foreign person:

(1) BAN ON DEALINGS IN GOVERNMENT FINANCE.-

(A) DESIGNATION AS PRIMARY DEALER.-Neither the

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System nor the Federal 

Reserve Bank of New York may designate, or permit the 

continuation of any prior designation of, the person as a primary 

dealer in United States Government debt instruments.

(B) SERVICE AS DEPOSITARY.-The person may not serve

as a depositary for United States Government funds.

(2) RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONS.-The person may not, 

directly or indirectly-

(A) commence any line of business in the United States in 

which the person was not engaged as of the date of the order; or

(B) conduct business from any location in the United States at 

which the person did not conduct business as of the date of the 

order.

(e) CONSULTATION WITH AND ACTIONS BY FOREIGN 

GOVERNMENT OF JURISDICTION.-

(1) CONSULTATIONS.-If the President makes a determination

under subsection (c) with respect to a foreign person, the Congress 

22 USC 6303.
1112 Foreign Relations Auth. Act, FY 1994 and 1995 (P.L. 103-236)

urges the President to initiate consultations immediately with any 

appropriate foreign government with respect to the imposition of any 

sanction pursuant to this section.

(2) ACTIONS BY GOVERNMENT OF JURISDICTION.-

(A) SUSPENSION OF PERIOD FOR IMPOSING 

SANCTIONS.- In order to pursue consultations described in 

paragraph (1) with any government referred to in such paragraph,

the President may delay, for up to 90 days, the effective date of an 

order under subsection (c) imposing any sanction.

(B) COORDINATION WITH ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGN

GOVERNMENT.-Following consultations described in paragraph

(1), the order issued by the President under subsection (c) 

imposing any sanction on a foreign person shall take effect unless 

the President determines, and certifies in writing to the Congress, 

that the government referred to in paragraph (1) has taken specific 

and effective actions, including the imposition of appropriate 

penalties, to terminate the involvement of the foreign person in 

any prohibited activity.

(C) EXTENSION OF PERIOD.-After the end of the period

described in subparagraph (A), the President may delay, for up to 

an additional 90 days, the effective date of an order issued under 

subsection (b) imposing any sanction on a foreign person if the 

President determines, and certifies in writing to the Congress, that 

the appropriate foreign government is in the process of taking 

actions described in subparagraph (B).

(3) REPORT TO CONGRESS.-Before the end of the 90-day

period beginning on the date on which an order is issued under 

subsection (c), the President shall submit to the Congress a report on-

(A) the status of consultations under this subsection with the 

government referred to in paragraph (1); and (B) the basis for any 

determination under paragraph (2) that such government has taken 

specific corrective actions.

(f) TERMINATION OF THE SANCTIONS.-Any sanction imposed

on any person pursuant to an order issued under subsection (c) shall-

(1) remain in effect for a period of not less than 12 months; and

(2) cease to apply after the end of such 12-month period only if the 

President determines, and certifies in writing to the Congress, that-

(A) the person has ceased to engage in any prohibited activity; 

and

(B) the President has received reliable assurances from such 

person that the person will not, in the future, engage in any 

prohibited activity.

(g) WAIVER.-The President may waive the continued application of 

any sanction imposed on any person pursuant to an order issued under

subsection (c) if the President determines, and certifies in writing to the 

Congress, that the continued imposition of the sanction would have a 

serious adverse effect on the safety and soundness of the domestic or 

international financial system or on domestic or international payments 

systems.

(h) ENFORCEMENT ACTION.-The Attorney General may bring an 

action in an appropriate district court of the United States for injunctive 

and other appropriate relief with respect to-

(1) any violation of subsection (b); or

(2) any order issued pursuant to subsection (c).

(i) KNOWINGLY DEFINED.-
Foreign Relations Auth. Act, FY 1994 and 1995 (P.L. 103–236) 1113

(1) IN GENERAL.-For purposes of this section, the term

“knowingly” means the state of mind of a person with respect to 

conduct, a circumstance, or a result in which-

(A) such person is aware that such person is engaging in such 

conduct, that such circumstance exists, or that such result is 

substantially certain to occur; or

(B) such person has a firm belief that such circumstance exists 

or that such result is substantially certain to occur.

(2) KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF A PARTICULAR

CIRCUMSTANE.-If knowledge of the existence of a particular

circumstance is required for an offense, such knowledge is established 

if a person is aware of a high probability of the existence of such 

circumstance, unless the person actually believes that such 

circumstance does not exist.

(j) SCOPE OF APPLICATION.-This section shall apply with respect 

to prohibited activities which occur on or after the date this part takes 

effect.1

◊◊◊◊

Part C-International Atomic Energy Agency

Sec. 841. Bilateral and Multilateral Initiatives

It is the sense of the Congress that in order to maintain and enhance 

international confidence in the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards and in 

other multilateral undertakings to halt the global proliferation of nuclear 

weapons, the United States should seek to negotiate with other nations 

and groups of nations, including the IAEA Board of Governors and the 

Nuclear Suppliers Group, to-

(1) build international support for the principle that nuclear supply 

relationships must require purchasing nations to agree to full-scope 

international safeguards;

(2) encourage each nuclear-weapon state within the meaning of 

the Treaty to undertake a comprehensive review of its own procedures 

for declassifying information relating to the design or production of 

nuclear explosive devices and to investigate any measures that would 

reduce the risk of such information contributing to nuclear weapons 

proliferation;

(3) encourage the deferral of efforts to produce weapons grade

nuclear material for large-scale commercial uses until such time as 

safeguards are developed that can detect, on a timely and reliable 

basis, the diversion of significant quantities of such material for 

nuclear explosive purposes;

(4) pursue greater financial support for the implementation and 

improvement of safeguards from all IAEA member nations with 

significant nuclear programs, particularly from those nations that are 

currently using or planning to use weapons grade nuclear material for 

commercial purposes;

(5) arrange for the timely payment of annual financial

contributions by all members of the IAEA, including the United

States;

––––––––

1 Amended by P.L. 104-164, Title I, § 157(b), July 21, 1996, 110 Stat. 1440. The double 

commas in subsection (c) are actually in the statute. It also redesignated subsection (f) as (e) 

and struck out former subsection (e) which had provided for judicial review of 

determinations of the President under subsection (c).

22 USC 3201 

note.

22 USC 6321.
1114 Foreign Relations Auth. Act, FY 1994 and 1995 (P.L. 103-236)

(6) pursue the elimination of international commerce in highly 

enriched uranium for use in research reactors while encouraging 

multilateral cooperation to develop and to use low-enriched 

alternative nuclear fuels;

(7) oppose efforts by non-nuclear-weapon states to develop or use 

unsafeguarded nuclear fuels for purposes of naval propulsion;

(8) pursue an international open skies arrangement that would 

authorize the IAEA to operate surveillance aircraft and would 

facilitate IAEA access to satellite information for safeguards

verification purposes;

(9) develop an institutional means for IAEA member nations to 

share intelligence material with the IAEA on possible safeguards 

violations without compromising national security or intelligence 

sources or methods;

(10) require any exporter of a sensitive nuclear facility or sensitive 

nuclear technology to a non-nuclear-weapon state to notify the IAEA 

prior to export and to require safeguards over that facility or 

technology, regardless of its destination; and

(11) seek agreement among the parties to the Treaty to apply

IAEA safeguards in perpetuity and to establish new limits on the right 

to withdraw from the Treaty.

Sec. 842. IAEA Internal Reforms

In order to promote the early adoption of reforms in the

implementation of the safeguards responsibilities of the IAEA, the

Congress urges the President to negotiate with other nations and groups 

of nations, including the IAEA Board of Governors and the Nuclear 

Suppliers Group, to-

(1) improve the access of the IAEA within nuclear facilities that 

are capable of producing, processing, or fabricating special nuclear 

material suitable for use in a nuclear explosive device;

(2)(A) facilitate the IAEA's efforts to meet and to maintain its own 

goals for detecting the diversion of nuclear materials and equipment, 

giving particular attention to facilities in which there are bulk 

quantities of plutonium; and

(B) if it is not technically feasible for the IAEA to meet those 

detection goals in a particular facility, require the IAEA to declare 

publicly that it is unable to do so;

(3) enable the IAEA to issue fines for violations of safeguards

procedures, to pay rewards for information on possible safeguards 

violations, and to establish a “hot line” for the reporting of such 

violations and other illicit uses of weapons grade nuclear material;

(4) establish safeguards at facilities engaged in the manufacture of 

equipment or material that is especially designated or prepared for the 

processing, use, or production of special fissionable material or, in the 

case of non-nuclear-weapon states, of any nuclear explosive device;

(5) establish safeguards over nuclear research and development

activities and facilities;

(6) implement special inspections of undeclared nuclear facilities, 

as provided for under existing safeguards procedures, and seek 

authority for the IAEA to conduct challenge inspections on demand at 

suspected nuclear sites;

(7) expand the scope of safeguards to include tritium, uranium

concentrates, and nuclear waste containing special fissionable

material, and increase the scope of such safeguards on heavy water;

22 USC 6322.
Foreign Relations Auth. Act, FY 1994 and 1995 (P.L. 103–236) 1115

(8) revise downward the IAEA's official minimum amounts of 

nuclear material (“significant quantity”) needed to make a nuclear 

explosive device and establish these amounts as national rather than 

facility standards;

(9) expand the use of full-time resident IAEA inspectors at 

sensitive fuel cycle facilities;

(10) promote the use of near real time material accountancy in the 

conduct of safeguards at facilities that use, produce, or store 

significant quantities of special fissionable material;

(11) develop with other IAEA member nations an agreement on 

procedures to expedite approvals of visa applications by IAEA 

inspectors;

(12) provide the IAEA the additional funds, technical assistance,

and political support necessary to carry out the goals set forth in this 

subsection; and

(13) make public the annual safeguards implementation

information, report of the IAEA, establishing a public registry of 

commodities in international nuclear commerce, including dual-use 

goods, and creating a public repository of current nuclear trade 

control laws, agreements, regulations, and enforcement and judicial

actions by AEA member nations.

Sec. 843. Reporting Requirement

(a) REPORT REQUIRED.-The President shall, in the report required 

by section 601(a) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, describe-

(1) the steps he has taken to implement sections 841 and 842, and

(2) the progress that has been made and the obstacles that have 

been encountered in seeking to meet the objectives set forth in 

sections 841 and 842.

(b) CONTENTS OF REPORT.-Each report under paragraph (1) shall 

describe-

(1) the bilateral and multilateral initiatives that the President has 

taken during the period since the enactment of this Act in pursuit of 

each of the objectives set forth in sections 841 and 842;

(2) any obstacles that have been encountered in the pursuit of 

those initiatives;

(3) any additional initiatives that have been proposed by other 

countries or international organizations to strengthen the 

implementation of IAEA safeguards;

(4) all activities of the Federal Government in support of the 

objectives set forth in sections 841 and 842; (5) any recommendations 

of the President on additional measures to enhance the effectiveness 

of IAEA safeguards; and

(6) any initiatives that the President plans to take in support of 

each of the objectives set forth in sections 841 and 842.

Sec. 844. Definitions

As used in this part-

(1) the term “highly enriched uranium” means uranium enriched to 

20 percent or more in the isotope U-35;

(2) the term “IAEA” means the International Atomic Energy 

Agency;

(3) the term “near real time material accountancy” means a 

method of accounting for the location, quantity, and disposition of 

special fissionable material at facilities that store or process such 

material, in which verification of peaceful use is continuously 

Public 

information.

22 USC 6323.

President.

22 USC 6324.
1116 Foreign Relations Auth. Act, FY 1994 and 1995 (P.L. 103-236)

achieved by means of frequent physical inventories and the use of inprocess instrumentation;

(4) the term “special fissionable material” has the meaning given 

that term by Article XX(1) of the Statute of the International Atomic 

Energy Agency, done at the Headquarters of the United Nations on 

October 26, 1956;

(5) the term “the Treaty” means the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed at Washington, London,

and Moscow on July 1, 1968; and

(6) the terms “IAEA safeguards”, “non-nuclear-weapon state”, 

“nuclear explosive device”, and “special nuclear material” have the 

meanings given those terms in section 830 of this Act.

Part D-Termination

Sec. 851. Termination upon Enactment of Next Foreign Relations 

Act

On the date of enactment of the first Foreign Relations Authorization 

Act that is enacted after the enactment of this Act, the provisions of parts 

A and B of this title shall cease to be effective, the amendments made by 

those parts shall be repealed, and any provision of law repealed by those 

parts shall be reenacted.

22 USC 3201 

note.
Intl. Sec. Assist. and Arms Export Ctrl. Act (P.L. 94–329) 1117

C. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND ARMS 

EXPORT CONTROL ACT OF 1976

Public Law 94–329 90 Stat. 729

June 30, 1976

An Act

To amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Foreign Military 

Sales Act, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 

United States of America in Congress assembled,

That this Act may be cited as the “International Security Assistance 

and Arms Export Control Act of 1976.”

Title II

Sec. 38. Control of Arms Exports and Imports

(a) Presidential control of exports and imports of defense articles and 

services, guidance of policy, etc.; designation of United States Munitions 

List; issuance of export licenses; condition for export; negotiations 

information.

 (1) In furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign policy of 

the United States, the President is authorized to control the import and 

the export of defense articles and defense services and to provide foreign 

policy guidance to persons of the United States involved in the export 

and import of such articles and services. The President is authorized to 

designate those items which shall be considered as defense articles and 

defense services for the purposes of this section and to promulgate 

regulations for the import and export of such articles and services. The 

items so designated shall constitute the United States Munitions List.

 (2) Decisions on issuing export licenses under this section shall take 

into account whether the export of an article would contribute to an arms 

race, aid in the development of weapons of mass destruction, support 

international terrorism, increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation 

of conflict, or prejudice the development of bilateral or multilateral arms 

control or nonproliferation agreements or other arrangements.

 (3) In exercising the authorities conferred by this section, the President 

may require that any defense article or defense service be sold under this 

Act as a condition of its eligibility for export, and may require that 

persons engaged in the negotiation for the export of defense articles and 

services keep the President fully and currently informed of the progress 

and future prospects of such negotiations.

(b) Registration and licensing requirements for manufacturers, exporters, 

or importers of designated defense articles and defense services; 

exceptions.

 (1) (A) (i) As prescribed in regulations issued under this section, every 

person (other than an officer or employee of the United States 

Government acting in an official capacity) who engages in the business 

of manufacturing, exporting, or importing any defense articles or defense 

services designated by the President under subsection (a)(1) shall register 

with the United States Government agency charged with the 

22 USC 2778.
1118 Intl. Sec. Assist. and Arms Export Ctrl. Act (P.L. 94–329)

administration of this section, and shall pay a registration fee which shall 

be prescribed by such regulations. Such regulations shall prohibit the 

return to the United States for sale in the United States (other than for the 

Armed Forces of the United States and its allies or for any State or local 

law enforcement agency) of any military firearms or ammunition of 

United States manufacture furnished to foreign governments by the 

United States under this Act or any other foreign assistance or sales 

program of the United States, whether or not enhanced in value or 

improved in condition in a foreign country. This prohibition shall not 

extend to similar firearms that have been so substantially transformed as 

to become, in effect, articles of foreign manufacture.

 (ii) (I) As prescribed in regulations issued under this section, every 

person (other than an officer or employee of the United States 

Government acting in official capacity) who engages in the business of 

brokering activities with respect to the manufacture, export, import, or 

transfer of any defense article or defense service designated by the 

President under subsection (a)(1), or in the business of brokering 

activities with respect to the manufacture, export, import, or transfer of 

any foreign defense article or defense service (as defined in subclause 

(IV)), shall register with the United States Government agency charged 

with the administration of this section, and shall pay a registration fee 

which shall be prescribed by such regulations.

 (II) Such brokering activities shall include the financing, 

transportation, freight forwarding, or taking of any other action that 

facilitates the manufacture, export, or import of a defense article or 

defense service.

 (III) No person may engage in the business of brokering activities 

described in subclause (I) without a license, issued in accordance with

this Act, except that no license shall be required for such activities 

undertaken by or for an agency of the United States Government--

 (aa) for use by an agency of the United States Government; or

 (bb) for carrying out any foreign assistance or sales program 

authorized by law and subject to the control of the President by other 

means.

 (IV) For purposes of this clause, the term “foreign defense article 

or defense service” includes any non-United States defense article or 

defense service of a nature described on the United States Munitions List 

regardless of whether such article or service is of United States origin or 

whether such article or service contains United States origin components.

 (B) The prohibition under such regulations required by the second 

sentence of subparagraph (A) shall not extend to any military firearms (or 

ammunition, components, parts, accessories, and attachments for such 

firearms) of United States manufacture furnished to any foreign 

government by the United States under this Act or any other foreign 

assistance or sales program of the United States if--

 (i) such firearms are among those firearms that the Secretary of the 

Treasury is, or was at any time, required to authorize the importation of 

by reason of the provisions of section 925(e) of title 18, United States 

Code (including the requirement for the listing of such firearms as curios 

or relics under section 921(a)(13) of that title); and

 (ii) such foreign government certifies to the United States 

Government that such firearms are owned by such foreign government.

 [(C)](B) A copy of each registration made under this paragraph shall 

be transmitted to the Secretary of the Treasury for review regarding law 
Intl. Sec. Assist. and Arms Export Ctrl. Act (P.L. 94–329) 1119

enforcement concerns. The Secretary shall report to the President 

regarding such concerns as necessary.

 (2) Except as otherwise specifically provided in regulations issued 

under subsection (a)(1), no defense articles or defense services 

designated by the President under subsection (a)(1) may be exported or 

imported without a license for such export or import, issued in 

accordance with this Act and regulations issued under this Act, except 

that no license shall be required for exports or imports made by or for an 

agency of the United States Government (A) for official use by a 

department or agency of the United States Government, or (B) for 

carrying out any foreign assistance or sales program authorized by law 

and subject to the control of the President by other means.

 (3) (A) For each of the fiscal years 1988 and 1989, $ 250,000 of 

registration fees collected pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be credited to a 

Department of State account, to be available without fiscal year 

limitation. Fees credited to that account shall be available only for the 

payment of expenses incurred for--

 (i) contract personnel to assist in the evaluation of munitions 

control license applications, reduce processing time for license 

applications, and improve monitoring of compliance with the terms of 

licenses; and

 (ii) the automation of munitions control functions and the 

processing of munitions control license applications, including the 

development, procurement, and utilization of computer equipment and 

related software.

 (B) The authority of this paragraph may be exercised only to such 

extent or in such amounts as are provided in advance in appropriation 

Acts.

(c) Criminal violations; punishment. Any person who willfully violates 

any provision of this section, section 39 [22 USCS § 2779], a treaty 

referred to in subsection (j)(1)(C)(i), or any rule or regulation issued 

under this section or section 39 [22 USCS § 2779], including any rule or 

regulation issued to implement or enforce a treaty referred to in 

subsection (j)(1)(C)(i) or an implementing arrangement pursuant to such 

treaty, or who willfully, in a registration or license application or required 

report, makes any untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a 

material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the 

statements therein not misleading, shall upon conviction be fined for each 

violation not more than $ 1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 20 

years, or both.

(d) [Repealed]

(e) Enforcement powers of President. In carrying out functions under this 

section with respect to the export of defense articles and defense services, 

including defense articles and defense services exported or imported 

pursuant to a treaty referred to in subsection (j)(1)(C)(i), the President is 

authorized to exercise the same powers concerning violations and 

enforcement which are conferred upon departments, agencies and 

officials by subsections (c), (d), (e), and (g) of section 11 of the Export 

Administration Act of 1979 [50 USCS Appx § 2410], and by subsections 

(a) and (c) of section 12 of such Act [50 USCS Appx § 2411(a) and (c)], 

subject to the same terms and conditions as are applicable to such powers 

under such Act, except that section 11(c)(2)(B) of such Act [50 USCS 

Appx. § 2410(c)(2)(B)] shall not apply, and instead, as prescribed in 

regulations issued under this section, the Secretary of State may assess 

civil penalties for violations of this Act and regulations prescribed 
1120 Intl. Sec. Assist. and Arms Export Ctrl. Act (P.L. 94–329)

thereunder and further may commence a civil action to recover such civil 

penalties, and except further that the names of the countries and the types 

and quantities of defense articles for which licenses are issued under this 

section shall not be withheld from public disclosure unless the President 

determines that the release of such information would be contrary to the 

national interest. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed as 

authorizing the withholding of information from the Congress. 

Notwithstanding section 11(c) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 

[50 USCS Appx § 2410(c)], the civil penalty for each violation involving 

controls imposed on the export of defense articles and defense services 

under this section may not exceed $ 500,000.

(f) Periodic review of items on the munitions list; notification regarding 

exemption from licensing requirements for export of defense items.

 (1) The President shall periodically review the items on the United 

States Munitions List to determine what items, if any, no longer warrant 

export controls under this section. The results of such reviews shall be 

reported to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the 

Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, 

Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate. The President may not remove 

any item from the Munitions List until 30 days after the date on which 

the President has provided notice of the proposed removal to the 

Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives 

and to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate in accordance 

with the procedures applicable to reprogramming notifications under 

section 634A(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 [22 USCS § 

2394-1]. Such notice shall describe the nature of any controls to be 

imposed on that item under any other provision of law.

 (2) The President may not authorize an exemption for a foreign country 

from the licensing requirements of this Act for the export of defense 

items under subsection (j) or any other provision of this Act until 30 days 

after the date on which the President has transmitted to the Committee on 

International Relations of the House of Representatives and the 

Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a notification that 

includes--

 (A) a description of the scope of the exemption, including a detailed 

summary of the defense articles, defense services, and related technical 

data covered by the exemption; and

 (B) a determination by the Attorney General that the bilateral 

agreement concluded under subsection (j) requires the compilation and 

maintenance of sufficient documentation relating to the export of United 

States defense articles, defense services, and related technical data to 

facilitate law enforcement efforts to detect, prevent, and prosecute 

criminal violations of any provision of this Act, including the efforts on 

the part of countries and factions engaged in international terrorism to 

illicitly acquire sophisticated United States defense items.

 (3) Paragraph (2) shall not apply with respect to an exemption for 

Canada from the licensing requirements of this Act for the export of 

defense items.

 (4) Paragraph (2) shall not apply with respect to an exemption under 

subsection (j)(1) to give effect to a treaty referred to in subsection 

(j)(1)(C)(i) (and any implementing arrangements to such treaty), 

provided that the President promulgates regulations to implement and 

enforce such treaty under this section and section 39 [22 USCS § 2779].

(g) Identification of persons convicted or subject to indictment for 

violations of certain provisions.
Intl. Sec. Assist. and Arms Export Ctrl. Act (P.L. 94–329) 1121

 (1) The President shall develop appropriate mechanisms to identify, in 

connection with the export licensing process under this section--

 (A) persons who are the subject of an indictment for, or have been 

convicted of, a violation under--

 (i) this section,

 (ii) section 11 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. 

App. 2410),

 (iii) section 793, 794, or 798 of title 18, United States Code 

(relating to espionage involving defense or classified information) or 

section 2339A of such title (relating to providing material support to 

terrorists),

 (iv) section 16 of the Trading with the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C. App. 

16),

 (v) section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers 

Act (relating to foreign assets controls; 50 U.S.C. App. 1705),

 (vi) section 30A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 

78dd-1) or section 104 of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (15 U.S.C. 

78dd-2),

 (vii) chapter 105 of title 18, United States Code [18 USCS §§ 2151 

et seq.] (relating to sabotage),

 (viii) section 4(b) of the Internal Security Act of 1950 (relating to 

communication of classified information; 50 U.S.C. 783(b)),

 (ix) section 57, 92, 101, 104, 222, 224, 225, or 226 of the Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2077, 2122, 2131, 2134, 2272, 2274, 

2275, and 2276),

 (x) section 601 of the National Security Act of 1947 (relating to 

intelligence identities protection; 50 U.S.C. 421),

 (xi) section 603(b) or (c) of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act 

of 1986 (22 U.S.C. 5113 (b) and (c));[,] or

 (xii) section 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the Prevention of Terrorist Access to 

Destructive Weapons Act of 2004, relating to missile systems designed 

to destroy aircraft (18 U.S.C. 2332g), prohibitions governing atomic 

weapons (42 U.S.C. 2122), radiological dispersal devices (18 U.S.C. 

2332h), and variola virus (18 U.S.C. 175b);

 (B) persons who are the subject of an indictment or have been 

convicted under section 371 of title 18, United States Code, for 

conspiracy to violate any of the statutes cited in subparagraph (A); and

 (C) persons who are ineligible--

 (i) to contract with,

 (ii) to receive a license or other form of authorization to export 

from, or

 (iii) to receive a license or other form of authorization to import 

defense articles or defense services from, any agency of the United States 

Government.

 (2) The President shall require that each applicant for a license to 

export an item on the United States Munitions List identify in the 

application all consignees and freight forwarders involved in the 

proposed export.

 (3) If the President determines--

 (A) that an applicant for a license to export under this section is the 

subject of an indictment for a violation of any of the statutes cited in 

paragraph (1),

 (B) that there is reasonable cause to believe that an applicant for a 

license to export under this section has violated any of the statutes cited 

in paragraph (1), or
1122 Intl. Sec. Assist. and Arms Export Ctrl. Act (P.L. 94–329)

 (C) that an applicant for a license to export under this section is 

ineligible to contract with, or to receive a license or other form of 

authorization to import defense articles or defense services from, any 

agency of the United States Government,

 the President may disapprove the application. The President shall 

consider requests by the Secretary of the Treasury to disapprove any 

export license application based on these criteria.

 (4) A license to export an item on the United States Munitions List may 

not be issued to a person--

 (A) if that person, or any party to the export, has been convicted of 

violating a statute cited in paragraph (1), or

 (B) if that person, or any party to the export, is at the time of the 

license review ineligible to receive export licenses (or other forms of 

authorization to export) from any agency of the United States 

Government,

 except as may be determined on a case-by-case basis by the President, 

after consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, after a thorough 

review of the circumstances surrounding the conviction or ineligibility to 

export and a finding by the President that appropriate steps have been 

taken to mitigate any law enforcement concerns.

 (5) A license to export an item on the United States Munitions List may 

not be issued to a foreign person (other than a foreign government).

 (6) The President may require a license (or other form of authorization) 

before any item on the United States Munitions List is sold or otherwise 

transferred to the control or possession of a foreign person or a person 

acting on behalf of a foreign person.

 (7) The President shall, in coordination with law enforcement and 

national security agencies, develop standards for identifying high-risk 

exports for regular end-use verification. These standards shall be 

published in the Federal Register and the initial standards shall be 

published not later than October 1, 1988.

 (8) Upon request of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and 

the Secretary of the Treasury shall detail to the office primarily 

responsible for export licensing functions under this section, on a 

nonreimbursable basis, personnel with appropriate expertise to assist in 

the initial screening of applications for export licenses under this section 

in order to determine the need for further review of those applications for 

foreign policy, national security, and law enforcement concerns.

 (9) For purposes of this subsection--

 (A) the term “foreign corporation” means a corporation that is not 

incorporated in the United States;

 (B) the term “foreign government” includes any agency or 

subdivision of a foreign government, including an official mission of a 

foreign government;

 (C) the term “foreign person” means any person who is not a citizen 

or national of the United States or lawfully admitted to the United States 

for permanent residence under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and 

includes foreign corporations, international organizations, and foreign 

governments;

 (D) the term “party to the export” means--

 (i) the president, the chief executive officer, and other senior 

officers of the license applicant;

 (ii) the freight forwarders or designated exporting agent of the 

license application; and

 (iii) any consignee or end user of any item to be exported; and
Intl. Sec. Assist. and Arms Export Ctrl. Act (P.L. 94–329) 1123

 (E) the term “person” means a natural person as well as a corporation, 

business association, partnership, society, trust, or any other entity, 

organization, or group, including governmental entities.

(h) Judicial review of designation of items as defense articles or services. 

The designation by the President (or by an official to whom the 

President's functions under subsection (a) have been duly delegated), in 

regulations issued under this section, of items as defense articles or 

defense services for purposes of this section shall not be subject to 

judicial review.

(i) Reports relating to exportation of items on the munitions list. As 

prescribed in regulations issued under this section, a United States person 

to whom a license has been granted to export an item on the United 

States Munitions List shall, not later than 15 days after the item is 

exported, submit to the Department of State a report containing all 

shipment information, including a description of the item and the 

quantity, value, port of exit, and end-user and country of destination of 

the item.

(j) Requirements relating to country exemptions for licensing of defense 

items for export to foreign countries.

 (1) Requirement for bilateral agreement.

 (A) In general. The President may utilize the regulatory or other 

authority pursuant to this Act to exempt a foreign country from the 

licensing requirements of this Act with respect to exports of defense 

items only if the United States Government has concluded a binding 

bilateral agreement with the foreign country. Such agreement shall--

 (i) meet the requirements set forth in paragraph (2); and

 (ii) be implemented by the United States and the foreign country in 

a manner that is legally-binding under their domestic laws.

 (B) Exception for Canada. The requirement to conclude a bilateral 

agreement in accordance with subparagraph (A) shall not apply with 

respect to an exemption for Canada from the licensing requirements of 

this Act for the export of defense items.

 (C) Exception for defense trade cooperation treaties.

 (i) In general. The requirement to conclude a bilateral agreement in 

accordance with subparagraph (A) shall not apply with respect to an 

exemption from the licensing requirements of this Act for the export of 

defense items to give effect to any of the following defense trade 

cooperation treaties, provided that the treaty has entered into force 

pursuant to article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United 

States:

 (I) The Treaty Between the Government of the United States of 

America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 

and Northern Ireland Concerning Defense Trade Cooperation, done at 

Washington and London on June 21 and 26, 2007 (and any implementing 

arrangement thereto).

 (II) The Treaty Between the Government of the United States of 

America and the Government of Australia Concerning Defense Trade 

Cooperation, done at Sydney September 5, 2007 (and any implementing 

arrangement thereto).

 (ii) Limitation of scope. The United States shall exempt from the 

scope of a treaty referred to in clause (i)--

 (I) complete rocket systems (including ballistic missile systems, 

space launch vehicles, and sounding rockets) or complete unmanned 

aerial vehicle systems (including cruise missile systems, target drones, 

and reconnaissance drones) capable of delivering at least a 500 kilogram 
1124 Intl. Sec. Assist. and Arms Export Ctrl. Act (P.L. 94–329)

payload to a range of 300 kilometers, and associated production facilities, 

software, or technology for these systems, as defined in the Missile 

Technology Control Regime Annex Category I, Item 1;

 (II) individual rocket stages, re-entry vehicles and equipment, 

solid or liquid propellant motors or engines, guidance sets, thrust vector 

control systems, and associated production facilities, software, and 

technology, as defined in the Missile Technology Control Regime Annex 

Category I, Item 2;

 (III) defense articles and defense services listed in the Missile 

Technology Control Regime Annex Category II that are for use in rocket 

systems, as that term is used in such Annex, including associated 

production facilities, software, or technology;

 (IV) toxicological agents, biological agents, and associated 

equipment, as listed in the United States Munitions List (part 121.1 of 

chapter I of title 22, Code of Federal Regulations), Category XIV, 

subcategories (a), (b), (f)(1), (i), (j) as it pertains to (f)(1), (l) as it pertains 

to (f)(1), and (m) as it pertains to all of the subcategories cited in this 

paragraph;

 (V) defense articles and defense services specific to the design 

and testing of nuclear weapons which are controlled under United States 

Munitions List Category XVI(a) and (b), along with associated defense 

articles in Category XVI(d) and technology in Category XVI(e);

 (VI) with regard to the treaty cited in clause (i)(I), defense articles 

and defense services that the United States controls under the United 

States Munitions List that are not controlled by the United Kingdom, as 

defined in the United Kingdom Military List or Annex 4 to the United 

Kingdom Dual Use List, or any successor lists thereto; and

 (VII) with regard to the treaty cited in clause (i)(II), defense 

articles for which Australian laws, regulations, or other commitments 

would prevent Australia from enforcing the control measures specified in 

such treaty.

 (2) Requirements of bilateral agreement. A bilateral agreement referred 

to paragraph (1)--

 (A) shall, at a minimum, require the foreign country, as necessary, to 

revise its policies and practices, and promulgate or enact necessary 

modifications to its laws and regulations to establish an export control 

regime that is at least comparable to United States law, regulation, and 

policy requiring--

 (i) conditions on the handling of all United States-origin defense 

items exported to the foreign country, including prior written United 

States Government approval for any reexports to third countries;

 (ii) end-use and retransfer control commitments, including securing 

binding end-use and retransfer control commitments from all end-users, 

including such documentation as is needed in order to ensure compliance 

and enforcement, with respect to such United States-origin defense items;

 (iii) establishment of a procedure comparable to a “watchlist” (if 

such a watchlist does not exist) and full cooperation with United States 

Government law enforcement agencies to allow for sharing of export and 

import documentation and background information on foreign businesses 

and individuals employed by or otherwise connected to those businesses; 

and

 (iv) establishment of a list of controlled defense items to ensure 

coverage of those items to be exported under the exemption; and

 (B) should, at a minimum, require the foreign country, as necessary, 

to revise its policies and practices, and promulgate or enact necessary 
Intl. Sec. Assist. and Arms Export Ctrl. Act (P.L. 94–329) 1125

modifications to its laws and regulations to establish an export control 

regime that is at least comparable to United States law, regulation, and 

policy regarding--

 (i) controls on the export of tangible or intangible technology, 

including via fax, phone, and electronic media;

 (ii) appropriate controls on unclassified information relating to 

defense items exported to foreign nationals;

 (iii) controls on international arms trafficking and brokering;

 (iv) cooperation with United States Government agencies, 

including intelligence agencies, to combat efforts by third countries to 

acquire defense items, the export of which to such countries would not be 

authorized pursuant to the export control regimes of the foreign country 

and the United States; and

 (v) violations of export control laws, and penalties for such 

violations.

 (3) Advance certification. Not less than 30 days before authorizing an 

exemption for a foreign country from the licensing requirements of this 

Act for the export of defense items, the President shall transmit to the 

Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives 

and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a certification 

that--

 (A) the United States has entered into a bilateral agreement with that 

foreign country satisfying all requirements set forth in paragraph (2);

 (B) the foreign country has promulgated or enacted all necessary 

modifications to its laws and regulations to comply with its obligations 

under the bilateral agreement with the United States; and

 (C) the appropriate congressional committees will continue to receive 

notifications pursuant to the authorities, procedures, and practices of 

section 36 of this Act [22 USCS § 2776] for defense exports to a foreign 

country to which that section would apply and without regard to any 

form of defense export licensing exemption otherwise available for that 

country.

 (4) Definitions. In this section:

 (A) Defense items. The term “defense items” means defense articles, 

defense services, and related technical data.

 (B) Appropriate congressional committees. The term “appropriate 

congressional committees” means--

 (i) the Committee on International Relations and the Committee on 

Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and

 (ii) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 

Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.1

––––––––

1 Amended by P.L. 90-629, ch 3, § 38, 82 Stat. 320 (1968), as added P.L. 94-329, Title 

II, § 212(a)(1), 90 Stat. 744 (1976); P.L. 95-92, § 20, 91 Stat. 623 (1977); P.L. 96-70, Title 

III, ch 3, § 3303(a)(4), 93 Stat. 499 (1979); P.L. 96-72, § 22(a), 93 Stat. 535 (1979); P.L.

96-92, § 21, 93 Stat. 710 (1979); P.L. 96-533, Title I, § 107(a), (c), 94 Stat. 3136 (1980); 

P.L. 97-113, Title I, §§ 106, 107, 95 Stat. 1522 (1981); P.L. 99-64, Title I, § 123(a), 99 Stat. 

156 (1985); P.L. 99-83, Title I, § 119(a), (b), 99 Stat. 203 (1985); P.L. 100-202, § 101(b) 

[Title VIII, § 8142(a)], 101 Stat. 1329-88 (1987); P.L. 100-204, Title XII, § 1255, 101 Stat. 

1429 (1987); P.L. 101-222, §§ 3(a), 6, 103 Stat. 1896, 1899 (1989); P.L. 103-236, Title VII, 

Part A, § 714(a)(1), 108 Stat. 497 (1994); P.L. 104-164, Title I, Ch 5, §§ 151(a), 156, 110 

Stat. 1437, 1440 (1996); P.L. 105-277, Div G, Title XII, Ch 3, § 1225(a)(2), 112 Stat. 2681- 773 (1998); P.L. 106-113, Div B, § 1000(a)(7), 113 Stat. 1536 (1999); P.L. 106-280, Title I, 

Subtitle A, § 102(a), (b), 114 Stat. 846 (2000); P.L. 107-228, Div B, Title XIV, § 1406, 116 

Stat. 1458 (2002); P.L. 108-458, Title VI, Subtitle J, § 6910, 118 Stat. 3774 (2004); P.L.

111-195, Title I, § 107(a)(2), 124 Stat. 1337 (2010); P.L. 111-266, Title I, §§ 102(b), 

103(a)-(c), 124 Stat. 2797 (2010).
1126 Intl. Sec. Assist. and Arms Export Ctrl. Act (P.L. 94–329)

♦♦♦♦♦

Sec. 101. Nuclear Enrichment Transfers

(a) PROHIBITIONS; SAFEGUARDS AND MANAGEMENT. 

Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no funds made 

available to carry out the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or this Act may 

be used for the purpose of providing economic assistance (including 

assistance under chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 

1961 [22 USCS §§ 2346 et seq.]), providing military assistance or grant 

military education and training, providing assistance under chapter 6 of 

part II of that Act [22 USCS §§ 2348 et seq.], or extending military 

credits or making guarantees, to any country which the President 

determines delivers nuclear enrichment equipment, materials, or 

technology to any other country on or after August 4, 1977, or receives 

such equipment, materials, or technology from any other country on or 

after August 4, 1977, unless before such delivery--

 (1) the supplying country and receiving country have reached 

agreement to place all such equipment, materials, or technology, upon 

delivery, under multilateral auspices and management when available; 

and

 (2) the recipient country has entered into an agreement with the 

International Atomic Energy Agency to place all such equipment, 

materials, technology, and all nuclear fuel and facilities in such country 

under the safeguards system of such Agency.

(b) Certification by President of necessity of continued assistance; 

disapproval by Congress.

 (1) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, the President may 

furnish assistance which would otherwise be prohibited under such 

subsection if he determines and certifies in writing to the Speaker of the 

House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 

Senate that--

 (A) the termination of such assistance would have a serious adverse 

effect on vital United States interests; and

 (B) he has received reliable assurances that the country in question 

will not acquire or develop nuclear weapons or assist other nations in 

doing so.

 Such certification shall set forth the reasons supporting such 

determination in each particular case.

 (2) (A) A certification under paragraph (1) of this subsection shall take 

effect on the date on which the certification is received by the Congress.

However, if, within thirty calendar days after receiving this certification, 

the Congress enacts a joint resolution stating in substance that the 

Congress disapproves the furnishing of assistance pursuant to the 

certification, then upon the enactment of that resolution the certification 

shall cease to be effective and all deliveries of assistance furnished under 

the authority of that certification shall be suspended immediately.

 (B) Any joint resolution under this paragraph shall be considered in 

the Senate in accordance with the provisions of section 601(b) of the 

International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976.

2

––––––––

2 This was previously Sec. 669 (22 USC 2429). It was repealed by P.L. 103-236, Title 

VIII, § 826(b), 108 Stat. 519 (1994). § 826(c) states “Any reference in law as of the date of 

enactment of this Act to section 669 or 670 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 shall, 

after such date, be deemed to be a reference to section 101 or 102, as the case may be, of 

22 USC 2799aa.
Intl. Sec. Assist. and Arms Export Ctrl. Act (P.L. 94–329) 1127

Sec. 102. Nuclear Reprocessing Transfers, Illegal Exports for 

Nuclear Explosive Devices, Transfers of Nuclear Explosive Devices, 

and Nuclear Detonations

(a) Prohibitions on assistance to countries involved in transfer of nuclear 

reprocessing equipment, materials, or technology; exceptions; procedures 

applicable.

 (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, no funds 

made available to carry out the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or this 

Act may be used for the purpose of providing economic assistance 

(including assistance under chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance 

Act of 1961 [22 USCS §§ 2346 et seq.]), providing military assistance or 

grant military education and training, providing assistance under chapter 

6 of part II of that Act [22 USCS §§ 2348 et seq.], or extending military 

credits or making guarantees, to any country which the President 

determines--

 (A) delivers nuclear reprocessing equipment, materials, or technology 

to any other country on or after August 4, 1977, or receives such 

equipment, materials, or technology from any other country on or after 

August 4, 1977 (except for the transfer of reprocessing technology 

associated with the investigation, under international evaluation 

programs in which the United States participates, of technologies which 

are alternatives to pure plutonium reprocessing), or

 (B) is a non-nuclear-weapon state which, on or after August 8, 1985, 

exports illegally (or attempts to export illegally) from the United States 

any material, equipment, or technology which would contribute 

significantly to the ability of such country to manufacture a nuclear 

explosive device, if the President determines that the material, 

equipment, or technology was to be used by such country in the 

manufacture of a nuclear explosive device.

 For purposes of clause (B), an export (or attempted export) by a person 

who is an agent of, or is otherwise acting on behalf of or in the interests 

of, a country shall be considered to be an export (or attempted export) by 

that country.

 (2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1) of this subsection, the President in 

any fiscal year may furnish assistance which would otherwise be 

prohibited under that paragraph if he determines and certifies in writing 

during that fiscal year to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and 

the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that the termination of 

such assistance would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of 

United States nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the 

common defense and security. The President shall transmit with such 

certification a statement setting forth the specific reasons therefor.

 (3) (A) A certification under paragraph (2) of this subsection shall take 

effect on the date on which the certification is received by the Congress. 

However, if, within 30 calendar days after receiving this certification, the 

Congress enacts a joint resolution stating in substance that the Congress 

disapproves the furnishing of assistance pursuant to the certification, then 

upon the enactment of that resolution the certification shall cease to be 

effective and all deliveries of assistance furnished under the authority of 

that certification shall be suspended immediately.

 the Arms Export Control Act.” Sec. 101 was added by P.L. 103-236, Title VIII, Part B, § 

826(a), 108 Stat. 515 (1994).

22 USC 2799aa-1.
1128 Intl. Sec. Assist. and Arms Export Ctrl. Act (P.L. 94–329)

 (B) Any joint resolution under this paragraph shall be considered in 

the Senate in accordance with the provisions of section 601(b) of the 

International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976.

(b) Prohibitions on assistance to countries involved in transfer or use of 

nuclear explosive devices; exceptions; procedures applicable.

 (1) Except as provided in paragraphs (4), (5), and (6), in the event that 

the President determines that any country, after the effective date of part 

B of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994--

 (A) transfers to a non-nuclear-weapon state a nuclear explosive 

device,

 (B) is a non-nuclear-weapon state and either--

 (i) receives a nuclear explosive device, or

 (ii) detonates a nuclear explosive device,

 (C) transfers to a non-nuclear-weapon state any design information or 

component which is determined by the President to be important to, and 

known by the transferring country to be intended by the recipient state 

for use in, the development or manufacture of any nuclear explosive 

device, or

 (D) is a non-nuclear-weapon state and seeks and receives any design 

information or component which is determined by the President to be 

important to, and intended by the recipient state for use in, the 

development or manufacture of any nuclear explosive device,

 then the President shall forthwith report in writing his determination to 

the Congress and shall forthwith impose the sanctions described in 

paragraph (2) against that country.

 (2) The sanctions referred to in paragraph (1) are as follows:

 (A) The United States Government shall terminate assistance to that 

country under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, except for 

humanitarian assistance or food or other agricultural commodities.

 (B) The United States Government shall terminate--

 (i) sales to that country under this Act of any defense articles, 

defense services, or design and construction services, and

 (ii) licenses for the export to that country of any item on the United 

States Munitions List.

 (C) The United States Government shall terminate all foreign military 

financing for that country under this Act.

 (D) The United States Government shall deny to that country any 

credit, credit guarantees, or other financial assistance by any department, 

agency, or instrumentality of the United States Government, except that 

the sanction of this subparagraph shall not apply--

 (i) to any transaction subject to the reporting requirements of title V 

of the National Security Act of 1947 [50 USCS §§ 413 et seq.] (relating 

to congressional oversight of intelligence activities),

 (ii) to medicines, medical equipment, and humanitarian assistance, 

or

 (iii) to any credit, credit guarantee, or financial assistance provided 

by the Department of Agriculture to support the purchase of food or other 

agricultural commodity.

 (E) The United States Government shall oppose, in accordance with 

section 701 of the International Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 

262d), the extension of any loan or financial or technical assistance to 

that country by any international financial institution.

 (F) The United States Government shall prohibit any United States 

bank from making any loan or providing any credit to the government of 
Intl. Sec. Assist. and Arms Export Ctrl. Act (P.L. 94–329) 1129

that country, except for loans or credits for the purpose of purchasing 

food or other agricultural commodities, which includes fertilizer.

 (G) The authorities of section 6 of the Export Administration Act of 

1979 [50 USCS Appx. § 2405] shall be used to prohibit exports to that

country of specific goods and technology (excluding food and other 

agricultural commodities), except that such prohibition shall not apply to 

any transaction subject to the reporting requirements of title V of the 

National Security Act of 1947 [50 USCS §§ 413 et seq.] (relating to 

congressional oversight of intelligence activities).

 (3) As used in this subsection--

 (A) the term “design information” means specific information that 

relates to the design of a nuclear explosive device and that is not 

available to the public; and

 (B) the term “component” means a specific component of a nuclear 

explosive device.

 (4) (A) Notwithstanding paragraph (1) of this subsection, the President 

may, for a period of not more than 30 days of continuous session, delay 

the imposition of sanctions which would otherwise be required under 

paragraph (1)(A) or (1)(B) of this subsection if the President first 

transmits to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and to the 

chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, a 

certification that he has determined that an immediate imposition of 

sanctions on that country would be detrimental to the national security of 

the United States. Not more than one such certification may be 

transmitted for a country with respect to the same detonation, transfer, or 

receipt of a nuclear explosive device.

 (B) If the President transmits a certification to the Congress under 

subparagraph (A), a joint resolution which would permit the President to 

exercise the waiver authority of paragraph (5) of this subsection shall, if 

introduced in either House within thirty days of continuous session after 

the Congress receives this certification, be considered in the Senate in 

accordance with subparagraph (C) of this paragraph.

 (C) Any joint resolution under this paragraph shall be considered in 

the Senate in accordance with the provisions of section 601(b) of the 

International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 

[unclassified].

 (D) For purposes of this paragraph, the term “joint resolution” means 

a joint resolution the matter after the resolving clause of which is as 

follows: “That the Congress having received on ------ a certification by 

the President under section 102(b)(4) of the Arms Export Control Act 

with respect to ------, the Congress hereby authorizes the President to 

exercise the waiver authority contained in section 102(b)(5) of that Act 

[subsec. (b)(5) of this section].”, with the date of receipt of the 

certification inserted in the first blank and the name of the country 

inserted in the second blank.

 (5) Notwithstanding paragraph (1) of this subsection, if the Congress 

enacts a joint resolution under paragraph (4) of this subsection, the 

President may waive any sanction which would otherwise be required 

under paragraph (1)(A) or (1)(B) if he determines and certifies in writing 

to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on 

Foreign Relations of the Senate that the imposition of such sanction 

would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States 

nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense 

and security. The President shall transmit with such certification a 

statement setting forth the specific reasons therefor.
1130 Intl. Sec. Assist. and Arms Export Ctrl. Act (P.L. 94–329)

 (6) (A) In the event the President is required to impose sanctions 

against a country under paragraph (1)(C) or (1)(D), the President shall 

forthwith so inform such country and shall impose the required sanctions 

beginning 30 days after submitting to the Congress the report required by 

paragraph (1) unless, and to the extent that, there is enacted during the 

30-day period a law prohibiting the imposition of such sanctions.

 (B) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the sanctions which 

are required to be imposed against a country under paragraph (1)(C) or 

(1)(D) shall not apply if the President determines and certifies in writing 

to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 

Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs of the House of Representatives that the application of such 

sanctions against such country would have a serious adverse effect on 

vital United States interests. The President shall transmit with such 

certification a statement setting forth the specific reasons therefor.

 (7) For purposes of this subsection, continuity of session is broken only 

by an adjournment of Congress sine die and the days on which either 

House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than three 

days to a day certain are excluded in the computation of any period of 

time in which Congress is in continuous session.

 (8) The President may not delegate or transfer his power, authority, or 

discretion to make or modify determinations under this subsection.

(c) Non-nuclear-weapon state defined. As used in this section, the term 

“non-nuclear-weapon state” means any country which is not a nuclearweapon state, as defined in Article IX(3) of the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons.3

––––––––

3 This was previously Sec. 670 (22 USC 2429a). It was repealed by P.L. 103-236, Title 

VIII, § 826(b), 108 Stat. 519 (1994). § 826(c) states “Any reference in law as of the date of 

enactment of this Act to section 669 or 670 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 shall, 

after such date, be deemed to be a reference to section 101 or 102, as the case may be, of 

the Arms Export Control Act.” Sec. 102 added and amended by P.L. 103-236, Title VIII, 

Part B, § 826(a), 108 Stat. 516 (1994); P.L. 105-194, § 2(a)-(c), 112 Stat. 627 (1998).
Intl. Sec. & Dvlp. Cooperation Act of 1980 (P.L. 96–533) 1131

D. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT 

COOPERATION ACT OF 1980

Public Law 96–533 94 Stat. 3131

December 16, 1980

An Act

To authorize appropriations for the fiscal year 1981 for international 

security and development assistance, the Peace Corps, and refugee 

assistance, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 

United States of America in Congress assembled,

Sec. 1. Short Title

This Act may be cited as the “International Security and 

Development Cooperation Act of 1980.”

Title I–Military and Related Assistance and Sales Programs

Sec. 110. Exportation of Uranium Depleted in the Isotope 235

Upon a finding that an export of uranium depleted in the isotope 235 

is incorporated in defense articles or commodities solely to take 

advantage of high density or pyrophoric characteristics unrelated to its 

radioactivity, such exports shall be exempt from the provisions of the 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 

1978 when such exports are subject to the controls established under the 

arms Export Control Act or the Export Administration Act of 1979.

22 USC 2151 

note.

of 1980.

22 USC 2778a.

22 USC 3201 

note.

42 USC 2011 

note.
1132 Intl. Sec. and Dvlp. Cooperation Act of 1981 (P.L. 97–113)

E. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT 

COOPERATION ACT OF 1981

Public Law 97–113 95 Stat. 1519

December 29, 1981

An Act

To authorize appropriations for the fiscal years 1982 and 1983 for 

international security and development assistance and for the Peace 

Corps, to establish the Peace Corps as an autonomous agency, and for 

other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 

United States of America in Congress assembled,

Sec. 1. Short Title

This Act may be cited as the “International Security and 

Development Cooperation Act of 1981.

Title VII–Miscellaneous Provisions

Sec. 735. Report on Nuclear Activities

Beginning with the fiscal year 1983 and for each fiscal year 

thereafter, the President shall prepare and transmit to the Congress, as 

part of the presentation materials for foreign assistance programs 

proposed for that fiscal year, a classified report describing the nuclear 

programs and related activities of any country for which a waiver of 

section 669 or 6701 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is in effect, 

including an assessment of--

(1) the extent and effectiveness of International Atomic Energy 

Agency safeguards at that country’s nuclear facilities; and

(2) the capability, actions, and intentions of the government of 

that country with respect to the manufacture or acquisition of a 

nuclear explosive device.

Sec. 737. Prohibitions Relating to Nuclear Transfers and Nuclear 

Detonations

(a) The Congress finds that any transfer of a nuclear explosive device 

to a non-nuclear-weapon state or, in the case of a non-nuclear-weapon 

state, any receipt or detonation of a nuclear explosive device would cause 

grave damage to bilateral relations between the United States and that 

country.

(b) Section 669(b)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is 

amended to read as follows:

(2)(A) A certification under paragraph (1) of this subsection shall 

take effect on the date on which the certification is received by the 

Congress. However, if, within thirty calendar days after receiving this 

certification, the Congress adopts a concurrent resolution stating in 

substance that the Congress disapproves the furnishing of assistance 

––––––––

1 22 USC 2429 and 22 USC 2429a were repealed by P.L. 103-236, Title VIII, § 826(b), 

108 Stat. 519 (1994). § 826(c) states “Any reference in law as of the date of enactment of 

this Act to section 669 or 670 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 shall, after such date, 

be deemed to be a reference to section 101 or 102, as the case may be, of the Arms Export 

Control Act.” 

22 USC 2151 

note.

22 USC 2429a-1.

Report to 

Congress.

22 USC 2429.

22 USC 2429a.

22 USC 2429a 

note.

22 USC 2429.
Intl. Sec. and Dvlp. Cooperation Act of 1981 (P.L. 97–113) 1133

pursuant to the certification, then upon the adoption of that resolution 

the certification shall cease to be effective and all deliveries of 

assistance furnished under the authority of that certification shall be 

suspended immediately.

(B) Any concurrent resolution under this paragraph shall be 

considered in the Senate in accordance with the provisions of 

section 601(b) of the International Security Assistance and Arms 

Export Control Act of 1976.

(C) For the purpose of expediting the consideration and 

adoption of concurrent resolutions under this paragraph, a motion 

to proceed to the consideration of any such resolution after it has 

been reported by the appropriate committee shall be treated as 

highly privileged in the House of Representatives.

(c) Section 670 of such Act is amended to read as follows:2

“Sec. 670. Nuclear Reprocessing Transfers, Transfers of Nuclear 

Explosive Devices, and Nuclear Detonations

(a)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, no funds 

authorized to be appropriated by this Act or the Arms Export Control Act 

may be used for the purpose of providing economic assistance (including 

assistance under Chapter 4 of Part II), providing military assistance or 

grant military education and training, providing assistance under of Part 

II, or extending military credits or making guarantees, to any country 

which on or after the date of enactment of the International Security 

Assistance Act of 1977 delivers nuclear reprocessing equipment, 

materials or technology to any other country or receives such equipment, 

materials, or technology from any other country (except for the transfer 

of reprocessing technology associated with the investigation, under 

international evaluation programs in which the United States participates, 

of technologies which are alternatives to pure plutonium reprocessing).

(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1) of this subsection, the 

President may furnish assistance which would otherwise be 

prohibited under that paragraph if he determines and certifies in 

writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the 

Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that the termination of 

such assistance would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of 

United States nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the 

common defense and security. The President shall transmit with such 

certification a statement setting forth the specific reasons therefor.

(3)(A) A certification under paragraph (2) of this subsection shall 

take effect on the date on which the certification is received by the 

Congress. However, if, within 30 calendar days after receiving this 

certification, the Congress adopts a concurrent resolution stating in 

substance that the Congress disapproves the furnishing of assistance 

pursuant to the certification, then upon the adoption of that resolution 

the certification shall cease to be effective and all deliveries of 

assistance furnished under the authority of that certification shall be 

suspended immediately.

(B) Any concurrent resolution under this paragraph shall be 

considered in the Senate in accordance with the provisions of 

––––––––

2 22 USC 2429 and 22 USC 2429a were repealed by P.L. 103-236, Title VIII, § 826(b), 

108 Stat. 519 (1994). § 826(c) states “Any reference in law as of the date of enactment of 

this Act to section 669 or 670 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 shall, after such date, 

be deemed to be a reference to section 101 or 102, as the case may be, of the Arms Export 

Control Act.”

22 USC 2429a.

22 USC 2151 

note.

22 USC 2346.

22 USC 2348.

22 USC 2751 

note.

Transmittal of 

certification to 

Congress.

Congressional 

disapproval.
1134 Intl. Sec. and Dvlp. Cooperation Act of 1981 (P.L. 97–113)

section 601(b) of the International Security Assistance and Arms 

Export Control Act of 1976.

(C) For the purpose of expediting the consideration and 

adoption of concurrent resolutions under this paragraph, a motion 

to proceed to the consideration of any such resolution after it has 

been reported by the appropriate committee shall be treated as 

highly privileged in the House of Representatives.

(b)(1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of this subsection, 

no funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or the Arms Export 

Control Act may be used for the purpose of providing economic 

assistance (including assistance under Chapter 4 of Part II), providing 

military assistance or grant military education and training, providing 

assistance under Chapter 6 of Part II, or extending military credits or 

making guarantees, to any country which on or after the date of 

enactment of the International Security Assistance Act of 1977–

(A) transfers a nuclear explosive device to a non-nuclearweapon state, or

(B) is a non-nuclear-weapon state and either–

(i) receives a nuclear explosive device, or

(ii) detonates a nuclear explosive device.

(2)(A) Notwithstanding paragraph (1) of this subsection, the 

President may, for a period of not more than 30 days of continuous 

session, furnish assistance which would otherwise be prohibited 

under paragraph (1) of this subsection if, before furnishing such 

assistance, the President transmits to the Speaker of the House of 

Representatives, and to the chairman of the Committee on Foreign 

Relations of the Senate, a certification that he has determined that an 

immediate termination of assistance to that country would be 

detrimental to the national security of the United States. Not more 

than one such certification may be transmitted for a country with 

respect to the same detonation, transfer, or receipt of a nuclear 

explosive device.

(B) If the President transmits a certification to the Congress 

under subparagraph (A), a joint resolution which would permit the 

President to exercise the waiver authority of paragraph (3) of this 

subsection shall, if introduced in either House within thirty days 

of continuous session after the Congress receives this 

certification, be considered in the Senate and House of 

Representatives in accordance with subparagraphs (C) and (D) of 

this paragraph.

(C) Any joint resolution under this paragraph shall be 

considered in the Senate in accordance with the provisions of 

section 601(b) of the International Security Assistance and Arms 

Export Control Act of 1976.

(D) For the purpose of expediting the consideration and 

adoption of joint resolutions under this paragraph, a motion to 

proceed to the consideration of such a joint resolution after it has 

been reported by the appropriate committee shall be treated as 

highly privileged in the House of Representatives. 

(E) For purposes of this paragraph, the term “joint resolution” 

means a joint resolution the matter after the resolving clause of 

which is as follows: “That the Congress having received on a 

certification by the President under section 670(b)(2) of the 

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 with respect to _______, the 

Congress hereby authorizes the President to exercise the waiver 

22 USC 2346.

22 USC 2458.

22 USC 2751 

note.

22 USC 2151 

note.

Transmittal of 

certification to 

Congress.

Joint 

resolution.

22 USC 2429a.
Intl. Sec. and Dvlp. Cooperation Act of 1981 (P.L. 97–113) 1135

authority contained in section 670(b)(3) of that Act,” with the date 

of receipt of the certification inserted in the first blank and the 

name of the country inserted in the second blank. 

(3) Notwithstanding paragraph (1) of this subsection, if the 

Congress enacts a joint resolution under paragraph (2) of this 

subsection, the President may furnish assistance which would 

otherwise be prohibited under paragraph (1) if he determines and 

certifies in writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and 

the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that the 

termination of such assistance would be seriously prejudicial to the 

achievement of United States nonproliferation objectives or otherwise 

jeopardize the common defense and security. The President shall 

transmit with such certification a statement setting forth the specific 

reasons therefor.

(4) For purposes of this subsection, continuity of session is broken 

only by an adjournment of Congress sine die and the days on which 

either House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than 

three days to a day certain are excluded in the computation of any 

period of time in which Congress is in continuous session. 

(5) As used in this subsection, the term “non-nuclear-weapon 

state” means any country which is not a nuclear-weapon state, as 

defined in article IX(3) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 

Nuclear Weapons.

Transmittal of 

certification to 

Congress.

Non-nuclear 

weapon State.

See 21 USC 

483.
1136 Foreign Ops. Appropriations (Iraq Sanctions) (P.L. 101–513)

F. FOREIGN OPERATIONS APPROPRIATIONS (IRAQ 

SANCTIONS)

Public Law 101–513 104 Stat. 2047

November 5, 1990

Title V- Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990

* * * *

Sec. 586. Short Title

Sections 586 through 586J of this Act may be cited as the ‛Iraq 

Sanctions Act of 1990’.

Sec. 586A. Declarations Regarding Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait

The Congress–

(1) condemns Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990;

(2) supports the actions that have been taken by the President 

in response to that invasion;

(3) calls for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of 

Iraqi forces from Kuwait;

(4) supports the efforts of the United Nations Security Council 

to end this violation of international law and threat to international 

peace;

(5) supports the imposition and enforcement of multilateral 

sanctions against Iraq;

(6) calls on United States allies and other countries to support 

fully the efforts of the United Nations Security Council, and to 

take other appropriate actions, to bring about an end to Iraq's 

occupation of Kuwait; and

(7) condemns the brutal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq and its 

gross violations of internationally recognized human rights in 

Kuwait, including widespread arrests, torture, summary 

executions, and mass extrajudicial killings.

Sec. 586B. Consultations with Congress

The President shall keep the Congress fully informed, and shall 

consult with the Congress, with respect to current and anticipated events 

regarding the international crisis caused by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, 

including with respect to United States actions.

Sec. 586C. Trade Embargo against Iraq

(a) CONTINUATION OF EMBARGO–Except as otherwise provided 

in this section, the President shall continue to impose the trade embargo 

and other economic sanctions with respect to Iraq and Kuwait that the 

United States is imposing, in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, 

pursuant to Executive Orders Numbered 12724 and 12725 (August 9, 

1990) and, to the extent they are still in effect, Executive Orders 

Numbered 12722 and 12723 (August 2, 1990). Notwithstanding any 

other provision of law, no funds, credits, guarantees, or insurance 

appropriated or otherwise made available by this or any other Act for 

fiscal year 1991 or any fiscal year thereafter shall be used to support or 

administer any financial or commercial operation of any United States 

Government department, agency, or other entity, or of any person subject 

to the jurisdiction of the United States, for the benefit of the Government 

of Iraq, its agencies or instrumentalities, or any person working on behalf 

Iraq 

Sanctions Act 

of 1990.

50 USC 1701 

note. 

President.

President.
Foreign Ops. Appropriations (Iraq Sanctions) (P.L. 101–513) 1137

of the Government of Iraq, contrary to the trade embargo and other 

economic sanctions imposed in accordance with this section.

(b) HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE–To the extent that 

transactions involving foodstuffs or payments for foodstuffs are 

exempted ‛in humanitarian circumstances’ from the prohibitions 

established by the United States pursuant to United Nations Security 

Council Resolution 661 (1990), those exemptions shall be limited to 

foodstuffs that are to be provided consistent with United Nations Security 

Council Resolution 666 (1990) and other relevant Security Council 

resolutions.

(c) NOTICE TO CONGRESS OF EXCEPTIONS TO AND 

TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS–

(1) NOTICE OF REGULATIONS–Any regulations issued after 

the date of enactment of this Act with respect to the economic 

sanctions imposed with respect to Iraq and Kuwait by the United 

States under Executive Orders Numbered 12722 and 12723 (August 

2, 1990) and Executive Orders Numbered 12724 and 12725 (August 

9, 1990) shall be submitted to the Congress before those regulations 

take effect.

(2) NOTICE OF TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS–The 

President shall notify the Congress at least 15 days before the 

termination, in whole or in part, of any sanction imposed with respect 

to Iraq or Kuwait pursuant to those Executive orders.

(d) Relation to Other Laws–

(1) SANCTIONS LEGISLATION–The sanctions that are 

described in subsection (a) are in addition to, and not in lieu of the 

sanctions provided for in section 586G of this Act or any other 

provision of law.

(2) NATIONAL EMERGENCIES AND UNITED NATIONS 

LEGISLATION–Nothing in this section supersedes any provision of 

the National Emergencies Act or any authority of the President under 

the International Emergency Economic Powers Act or section 5(a) of 

the United Nations Participation Act of 1945.

Sec. 586D. Compliance with United Nations Sanctions Against Iraq 

(a) DENIAL OF ASSISTANCE–None of the funds appropriated or 

otherwise made available pursuant to this Act to carry out the Foreign 

Assistance Act of 1961 (including Title IV of Chapter 2 of Part I, relating 

to the Overseas Private Investment Corporation) or the Arms Export 

Control Act may be used to provide assistance to any country that is not 

in compliance with the United Nations Security Council sanctions 

against Iraq unless the President determines and so certifies to the 

Congress that–

(1) such assistance is in the national interest of the United States;

(2) such assistance will directly benefit the needy people in that 

country; or

(3) the assistance to be provided will be humanitarian assistance 

for foreign nationals who have fled Iraq and Kuwait.

(b) IMPORT SANCTIONS–If the President considers that the taking 

of such action would promote the effectiveness of the economic 

sanctions of the United Nations and the United States imposed with 

respect to Iraq, and is consistent with the national interest, the President 

may prohibit, for such a period of time as he considers appropriate, the 

importation into the United States of any or all products of any foreign 

country that has not prohibited–

President.
1138 Foreign Ops. Appropriations (Iraq Sanctions) (P.L. 101–513)

(1) the importation of products of Iraq into its customs territory, 

and

(2) the export of its products to Iraq.

Sec. 586E. Penalties for Violations of Embargo

Notwithstanding section 206 of the International Emergency 

Economic Powers Act (50 USC 1705) and section 5(b) of the United 

Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22 USC 287c(b))–

(1) a civil penalty of not to exceed $250,000 may be imposed on 

any person who, after the date of enactment of this Act, violates or 

evades or attempts to violate or evade Executive Order Numbered 

12722, 12723, 12724, or 12725 or any license, order, or regulation 

issued under any such Executive order; and

(2) whoever, after the date of enactment of this Act, willfully 

violates or evades or attempts to violate or evade Executive Order 

Numbered 12722, 12723, 12724, or 12725 or any license, order, or 

regulation issued under any such Executive order–

(A) shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $1,000,000, 

if a person other than a natural person; or

(B) if a natural person, shall, upon conviction, be fined not 

more than $1,000,000, be imprisoned for not more than 12 years, 

or both.

Any officer, director, or agent of any corporation who knowingly 

participates in a violation, evasion, or attempt described in paragraph (2) 

may be punished by imposition of the fine or imprisonment (or both) 

specified in subparagraph (B) of that paragraph.

Sec. 586F. Declarations Regarding Iraq's Long–Standing Violations 

of International Law

(a) IRAQ'S VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW–The 

Congress determines that–

(1) the Government of Iraq has demonstrated repeated and blatant 

disregard for its obligations under international law by violating the 

Charter of the United Nations, the Protocol for the Prohibition of the 

Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of 

Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (done at Geneva, June 17, 

1925), as well as other international treaties;

(2) the Government of Iraq is a party to the International 

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant 

on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and is obligated under the 

Covenants, as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to 

respect internationally recognized human rights;

(3) the State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights 

Practices for 1989 again characterizes Iraq's human rights record as 

abysmal”;

(4) Amnesty International, Middle East Watch, and other 

independent human rights organizations have documented extensive, 

systematic, and continuing human rights abuses by the Government 

of Iraq, including summary executions, mass political killings, 

disappearances, widespread use of torture, arbitrary arrests and 

prolonged detention without trial of thousands of political opponents, 

forced relocation and deportation, denial of nearly all civil and 

political rights such as freedom of association, assembly, speech, and 

the press, and the imprisonment, torture, and execution of children;

(5) since 1987, the Government of Iraq has intensified its severe 

repression of the Kurdish minority of Iraq, deliberately destroyed 

more than 3,000 villages and towns in the Kurdish regions, and 
Foreign Ops. Appropriations (Iraq Sanctions) (P.L. 101–513) 1139

forcibly expelled more than 500,000 people, thus effectively 

depopulating the rural areas of Iraqi Kurdistan;

(6) Iraq has blatantly violated international law by initiating use of 

chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war;

(7) Iraq has also violated international law by using chemical

weapons against its own Kurdish citizens, resulting in tens of 

thousands of deaths and more than 65,000 refugees;

(8) Iraq continues to expand its chemical weapons capability, and 

President Saddam Hussein has threatened to use chemical weapons 

against other nations;

(9) persuasive evidence exists that Iraq is developing biological 

weapons in violation of international law;

(10) there are strong indications that Iraq has taken steps to 

produce nuclear weapons and has attempted to smuggle from the 

United States, in violation of United States law, components for 

triggering devices used in nuclear warheads whose manufacture 

would contravene the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 

Weapons, to which Iraq is a party; and

(11) Iraqi President Saddam Hussein has threatened to use 

terrorism against other nations in violation of international law and 

has increased Iraq's support for the Palestine Liberation Organization 

and other Palestinian groups that have conducted terrorist acts.

(b) HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS–The Congress determines that 

the Government of Iraq is engaged in a consistent pattern of gross 

violations of internationally recognized human rights. All provisions of 

law that impose sanctions against a country whose government is 

engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally 

recognized human rights shall be fully enforced against Iraq.

(c) SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM–

(1) The Congress determines that Iraq is a country which has 

repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism, a 

country which grants sanctuary from prosecution to individuals or 

groups which have committed an act of international terrorism, 

and a country which otherwise supports international terrorism. 

The provisions of law specified in paragraph (2) and all other 

provisions of law that impose sanctions against a country which 

has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism, 

which grants sanctuary from prosecution to an individual or group 

which has committed an act of international terrorism, or which 

otherwise supports international terrorism shall be fully enforced 

against Iraq.

(2) The provisions of law referred to in paragraph (1) are–

(A) section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act;

(B) section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961;

(C) sections 555 and 556 of this Act (and the 

corresponding sections of predecessor foreign operations 

appropriations Acts); and

(D) section 555 of the International Security and 

Development Cooperation Act of 1985.

(d) MULTILATERAL COOPERATION–The Congress calls on the 

President to seek multilateral cooperation–

(1) to deny dangerous technologies to Iraq;

(2) to induce Iraq to respect internationally recognized human 

rights; and

Saddam 

Hussein.

Saddam 

Hussein.
1140 Foreign Ops. Appropriations (Iraq Sanctions) (P.L. 101–513)

(3) to induce Iraq to allow appropriate international humanitarian 

and human rights organizations to have access to Iraq and Kuwait, 

including the areas in northern Iraq traditionally inhabited by Kurds.

Sec. 586G. Sanctions against Iraq

(a) IMPOSITION–Except as provided in section 586H, the following 

sanctions shall apply with respect to Iraq:

(1) FMS SALES–The United States Government shall not enter 

into any sale with Iraq under the Arms Export Control Act.

(2) COMMERCIAL ARMS SALES- Licenses shall not be issued 

for the export to Iraq of any item on the United States Munitions List.

(3) EXPORTS OF CERTAIN GOODS AND TECHNOLOGY–

The authorities of section 6 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 

(50 USC App. 2405) shall be used to prohibit the export to Iraq of 

any goods or technology listed pursuant to that section or section 

5(c)(1) of that Act (50 USC App. 2404(c)(1)) on the control list 

provided for in section 4(b) of that Act (50 USC App. 2403(b)).

(4) Nuclear equipment, materials, and technology–

(A) NRC LICENSES–The Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

shall not issue any license or other authorization under the Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954 (42 USC 2011 and following) for the export 

to Iraq of any source or special nuclear material, any production 

or utilization facility, any sensitive nuclear technology, any 

component, item, or substance determined to have significance for 

nuclear explosive purposes pursuant to section 109b. of the 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 USC 2139(b)), or any other 

material or technology requiring such a license or authorization.

(B) DISTRIBUTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS–The 

authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 shall not be used to 

distribute any special nuclear material, source material, or 

byproduct material to Iraq.

(C) DOE AUTHORIZATIONS–The Secretary of Energy shall 

not provide a specific authorization under section 57b. (2) of the 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954(42 USC 2077(b)(2)) for any activity 

that would constitute directly or indirectly engaging in Iraq in 

activities that require a specific authorization under that section.

(5) ASSISTANCE FROM INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 

INSTITUTIONS–The United States shall oppose any loan or 

financial or technical assistance to Iraq by international financial 

institutions in accordance with section 701 of the International 

Financial Institutions Act (22 USC 262d).

(6) ASSISTANCE THROUGH THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK–

Credits and credit guarantees through the Export-Import Bank of the 

United States shall be denied to Iraq.

(7) ASSISTANCE THROUGH THE COMMODITY CREDIT 

CORPORATION–Credit, credit guarantees, and other assistance 

through the Commodity Credit Corporation shall be denied to Iraq.

(8) FOREIGN ASSISTANCE–All forms of assistance under the 

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 USC 2151 and following) other 

than emergency assistance for medical supplies and other forms of 

emergency humanitarian assistance, and under the Arms Export 

Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 and following) shall be denied to Iraq.

(b) CONTRACT SANCTITY–For purposes of the export controls 

imposed pursuant to subsection (a)(3), the date described in subsection 

(m)(1) of section 6 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 USC 

App. 2405) shall be deemed to be August 1, 1990.

Credit.
Foreign Ops. Appropriations (Iraq Sanctions) (P.L. 101–513) 1141

Sec. 586H. Waiver Authority

(a) IN GENERAL–The President may waive the requirements of any 

paragraph of section 586G(a) if the President makes a certification under 

subsection (b) or subsection (c).

(b) CERTIFICATION OF FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN IRAQI 

POLICIES AND ACTIONS–The authority of subsection (a) may be 

exercised 60 days after the President certifies to the Congress that–

(1) the Government of Iraq–

(A) has demonstrated, through a pattern of conduct, 

substantial improvement in its respect for internationally 

recognized human rights;

(B) is not acquiring, developing, or manufacturing (i) 

ballistic missiles, (ii) chemical, biological, or nuclear 

weapons, or (iii) components for such weapons; has forsworn 

the first use of such weapons; and is taking substantial and 

verifiable steps to destroy or otherwise dispose of any such 

missiles and weapons it possesses; and

(C) does not provide support for international terrorism;

(2) the Government of Iraq is in substantial compliance with its 

obligations under international law, including–

(A) the Charter of the United Nations;

(B) the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 

(done at New York, December 16, 1966) and the International 

Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (done at New 

York, December 16, 1966);

(C) the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 

Crime of Genocide (done at Paris, December 9, 1948);

(D) the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of 

Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological 

Methods of Warfare (done at Geneva, June 17, 1925);

(E) the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 

(done at Washington, London, and Moscow, July 1, 1968); and

(F) the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 

Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and 

Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (done at Washington, 

London, and Moscow, April 10, 1972); and

(3) the President has determined that it is essential to the national 

interests of the United States to exercise the authority of subsection 

(a).

(c) CERTIFICATION OF FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN IRAQI 

LEADERSHIP AND POLICIES–The authority of subsection (a) may be 

exercised 30 days after the President certifies to the Congress that–

(1) there has been a fundamental change in the leadership of the 

Government of Iraq; and

(2) the new Government of Iraq has provided reliable and credible 

assurance that–

(A) it respects internationally recognized human rights and it 

will demonstrate such respect through its conduct;

(B) it is not acquiring, developing, or manufacturing and it 

will not acquire, develop, or manufacture (i) ballistic missiles, (ii) 

chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, or (iii) components for 

such weapons; has forsworn the first use of such weapons; and is 

taking substantial and verifiable steps to destroy or otherwise 

dispose of any such missiles and weapons it possesses;
1142 Foreign Ops. Appropriations (Iraq Sanctions) (P.L. 101–513)

(C) it is not and will not provide support for international 

terrorism; and(D) it is and will continue to be in substantial 

compliance with its obligations under international law, including 

all the treaties specified in subparagraphs (A) through (F) of 

subsection (b)(2).

(d) INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED IN CERTIFICATIONS–

Any certification under subsection (b) or (c) shall include the justification 

for each determination required by that subsection. The certification shall 

also specify which paragraphs of section 586G(a) the President will 

waive pursuant to that certification.

Sec. 586I. Denial of Licenses for Certain Exports to Countries 

Assisting Iraq's Rocket or Chemical, Biological, or Nuclear Weapons 

Capability

(a) RESTRICTION ON EXPORT LICENSES–None of the funds 

appropriated by this or any other Act may be used to approve the 

licensing for export of any supercomputer to any country whose 

government the President determines is assisting, or whose government 

officials the President determines are assisting, Iraq to improve its rocket 

technology or chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons capability.

(b) NEGOTIATIONS–The President is directed to begin immediate 

negotiations with those governments with which the United States has 

bilateral supercomputer agreements, including the Government of the 

United Kingdom and the Government of Japan, on conditions restricting 

the transfer to Iraq of supercomputer or associated technology.

Sec. 586J. Reports to Congress.

(a) STUDY AND REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL EXPORT 

TO IRAQ OF NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL, AND 

BALLISTIC MISSILE TECHNOLOGY–

(1) The President shall conduct a study on the sale, export, and 

third party transfer or development of nuclear, biological, chemical, 

and ballistic missile technology to or with Iraq including–

(A) an identification of specific countries, as well as 

companies and individuals, both foreign and domestic, engaged in 

such sale or export of, nuclear, biological, chemical, and ballistic 

missile technology;

(B) a detailed description and analysis of the international 

supply, information, support, and coproduction network, 

individual, corporate, and state, responsible for Iraq's current 

capability in the area of nuclear, biological, chemical, and ballistic 

missile technology; and

(C) a recommendation of standards and procedures against 

which to measure and verify a decision of the Government of Iraq 

to terminate the development, production, coproduction, and 

deployment of nuclear, biological, chemical, and offensive 

ballistic missile technology as well as the destruction of all 

existing facilities associated with such technologies.

(2) The President shall include in the study required by paragraph 

(1) specific recommendations on new mechanisms, to include, but not 

be limited to, legal, political, economic and regulatory, whereby the 

United States might contribute, in conjunction with its friends, allies, 

and the international community, to the management, control, or 

elimination of the threat of nuclear, biological, chemical, and ballistic 

missile proliferation.

(3) Not later than March 30, 1991, the President shall submit to 

the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on Foreign 
Foreign Ops. Appropriations (Iraq Sanctions) (P.L. 101–513) 1143

Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Appropriations and the 

Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, a 

report, in both classified and unclassified form, setting forth the

findings of the study required by paragraph (1) of this subsection.

(b) STUDY AND REPORT ON IRAQ'S OFFENSIVE MILITARY 

CAPABILITY–

(1) The President shall conduct a study on Iraq's offensive 

military capability and its effect on the Middle East balance of power 

including an assessment of Iraq's power projection capability, the 

prospects for another sustained conflict with Iran, joint IraqiJordanian military cooperation, the threat Iraq's arms transfer 

activities pose to United States allies in the Middle East, and the 

extension of Iraq's political-military influence into Africa and Latin 

America.

(2) Not later than March 30, 1991, the President shall submit to 

the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on Foreign 

Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Appropriations and the 

Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, a 

report, in both classified and unclassified form, setting forth the 

findings of the study required by paragraph (1).

(c) REPORT ON SANCTIONS TAKEN BY OTHER NATIONS 

AGAINST IRAQ–

(1) The President shall prepare a report on the steps taken by other 

nations, both before and after the August 2, 1990, invasion of Kuwait, 

to curtail the export of goods, services, and technologies to Iraq 

which might contribute to, or enhance, Iraq's nuclear, biological, 

chemical, and ballistic missile capability.

(2) The President shall provide a complete accounting of 

international compliance with each of the sanctions resolutions 

adopted by the United Nations Security Council against Iraq since 

August 2, 1990, and shall list, by name, each country which to his 

knowledge, has provided any assistance to Iraq and the amount and 

type of that assistance in violation of each United Nations resolution.

(3) The President shall make every effort to encourage other 

nations, in whatever forum or context, to adopt sanctions toward Iraq 

similar to those contained in this section.

(4) Not later than every 6 months after the date of enactment of 

this Act, the President shall submit to the Committee on 

Appropriations and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate 

and the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs of the House of Representatives, a report in both classified 

and unclassified form, setting forth the findings of the study required 

by paragraph (1) of this subsection.

* * * *
1144 Emerg. Wartime Supp. Appr. (Iraq Sanctions) (P.L. 108–11)

G. EMERGENCY WARTIME SUPPLEMENTAL 

APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2003 (IRAQ SANCTIONS)

Public Law 108–11 117 Stat. 579

April 16, 2003

An Act

Making emergency wartime supplemental appropriations for the fiscal 

year 2003, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 

States of America in Congress assembled,

Sec. 1503.

The President may suspend the application of any provision of the Iraq 

Sanctions Act of 1990: Provided, That nothing in this section shall affect 

the applicability of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non- Proliferation Act of 1992 

(Public Law 102-484), except that such Act shall not apply to 

humanitarian assistance and supplies: Provided further, That the 

President may make inapplicable with respect to Iraq section 620A of the 

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or any other provision of law that applies 

to countries that have supported terrorism: Provided further, That 

military equipment, as defined by Title XVI, section 1608(1)(A) of 

Public Law 102-484, shall not be exported under the authority of this 

section: Provided further, That section 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act 

of 1961 shall not apply with respect to programs of international 

organizations for Iraq: Provided further, That provisions of law that 

direct the United States Government to vote against or oppose loans or 

other uses of funds, including for financial or technical assistance, in 

international financial institutions for Iraq shall not be construed as 

applying to Iraq: Provided further, That the President shall submit a 

notification 5 days prior to exercising any of the authorities described in 

this section to the Committee on Appropriations of each House of the 

Congress, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the 

Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives: 

Provided further, That not more than 60 days after enactment of this Act 

and every 90 days thereafter the President shall submit a report to the 

Committee on Appropriations of each House of the Congress, the 

Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on 

International Relations of the House of Representatives containing a 

summary of all licenses approved for export to Iraq of any item on the 

Commerce Control List contained in the Export Administration 

Regulations, 15 CFR Part 774, Supplement 1, including identification of 

end users of such items: Provided further, That the authorities contained 

in this section shall expire on September 30, 2004, or on the date of 

enactment of a subsequent Act authorizing assistance for Iraq and that 

specifically amends, repeals or otherwise makes inapplicable the 

authorities of this section, whichever occurs first.

* * * *

President. 

Notification.

Deadlines. 

President. 

Reports.

Expiration

date.
Memo Suspending the Iraq Sanctions Act 1145

H. MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE SUSPENDING THE 

IRAQ SANCTIONS ACT

For Immediate Release

Office of the Press Secretary

May 7, 2003

Memorandum for the Secretary of State 

Presidential Determination

No. 2003-23 

THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 

SUBJECT: Suspending the Iraq Sanctions Act, Making Inapplicable Certain Statutory 

Provisions Related to Iraq, and Delegating Authorities, under the Emergency Wartime 

Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003 

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United 

States, including sections 1503 and 1504 of the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Act, 

2003, Public Law 108-11 (the “Act”), and section 301 of Title 3, United States Code, I 

hereby: 

(1) suspend the application of all of the provisions, other than section 586E, of the Iraq 

Sanctions Act of 1990, Public Law 101-513, and 

(2) make inapplicable with respect to Iraq section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 

1961, Public Law 87-195, as amended (the “FAA”), and any other provision of law that 

applies to countries that have supported terrorism. 

In addition, I delegate the functions and authorities conferred upon the President by: 

(1) section 1503 of the Act to submit reports to the designated committees of the 

Congress to the Secretary of Commerce, or until such time as the principal licensing 

responsibility for the export to Iraq of items on the Commerce Control List has reverted 

to the Department of Commerce, to the Secretary of the Treasury; and, 

(2) section 1504 of the Act to the Secretary of State. 

The functions and authorities delegated herein may be further delegated and redelegated 

to the extent consistent with applicable law. 

The Secretary of State is authorized and directed to publish this determination in the 

Federal Register. 

GEORGE W. BUSH 

# # #
1146 Nat. Def. Auth. Act, 1993 (Iran-Iraq Nonprol) (P.L. 102–484)

I. NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

FOR FISCAL YEAR 1993 (IRAN-IRAQ ARMS NONPROLIFERATION OF 1992)

Public Law 102–484 106 Stat. 2571

October 23, 1992 

Division A – Title XVI

Title XVI–Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992

Sec. 1601. Short Title

This Title may be cited as the “Iran–Iraq Arms Non–Proliferation Act 

of 1992”.

Sec. 1602. United States Policy

(a) IN GENERAL–It shall be the policy of the United States to 

oppose, and urgently to seek the agreement of other nations also to 

oppose, any transfer to Iran or Iraq of any goods or technology, including 

dual-use goods or technology, wherever that transfer could materially 

contribute to either country's acquiring chemical, biological, nuclear, or 

destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons.

(b) SANCTIONS–

(1) In the furtherance of this policy, the President shall apply 

sanctions and controls with respect to Iran, Iraq, and those nations 

and persons who assist them in acquiring weapons of mass 

destruction in accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 

the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, the Chemical and 

Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991, 

Chapter 7 of the Arms Export Control Act, and other relevant 

statutes, regarding the non-proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction and the means of their delivery.

(2) The President should also urgently seek the agreement of other 

nations to adopt and institute, at the earliest practicable date, 

sanctions and controls comparable to those the United States is 

obligated to apply under this subsection.

(c) PUBLIC IDENTIFICATION–The Congress calls on the President 

to identify publicly (in the report required by section 1607) any country 

or person that transfers goods or technology to Iran or Iraq contrary to the 

policy set forth in subsection (a).

Sec. 1603. Application to Iran of Certain Iraq Sanctions

The sanctions against Iraq specified in paragraphs (1) through (4) of 

section 586G(a) of the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 (as contained in Public 

Law 101-513), including denial of export licenses for United States 

persons and prohibitions on United States Government sales, shall be 

applied to the same extent and in the same manner with respect to Iran.

Sec. 1604. Sanctions Against Certain Persons

(a) PROHIBITION–If any person transfers or retransfers goods or 

technology so as to contribute knowingly and materially to the efforts by 

Iran or Iraq (or any agency or instrumentality of either such country) to 

acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or destabilizing 

numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons, then the sanctions 

described in subsection (b) shall be imposed.

(b) MANDATORY SANCTIONS–The sanctions to be imposed 

pursuant to subsection (a) are as follows:

Iran–Iraq Arms 

Nonproliferation 

Act of 1992. 

50 USC 1701 

note.

President.
Nat. Def. Auth. Act, 1993 (Iran-Iraq Nonprol) (P.L. 102–484) 1147

(1) PROCUREMENT SANCTION–For a period of two years, the 

United States Government shall not procure, or enter into any 

contract for the procurement of, any goods or services from the 

sanctioned person.

(2) EXPORT SANCTION- For a period of two years, the United 

States Government shall not issue any license for any export by or to 

the sanctioned person.

Sec. 1605. Sanctions against Certain Foreign Countries

(a) PROHIBITION–If the President determines that the government 

of any foreign country transfers or retransfers goods or technology so as 

to contribute knowingly and materially to the efforts by Iran or Iraq (or 

any agency or instrumentality of either such country) to acquire 

chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or destabilizing numbers and 

types of advanced conventional weapons, then–

(1) the sanctions described in subsection (b) shall be imposed on 

such country; and

(2) in addition, the President may apply, in the discretion of the 

President, the sanction described in subsection (c).

(b) MANDATORY SANCTIONS- Except as provided in paragraph 

(2), the sanctions to be imposed pursuant to subsection (a)(1) are as 

follows:

(1) SUSPENSION OF UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE–The 

United States Government shall suspend, for a period of one year, 

United States assistance to the sanctioned country.

(2) MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANK 

ASSISTANCE–The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the 

United States Executive Director to each appropriate international 

financial institution to oppose, and vote against, for a period of one 

year, the extension by such institution of any loan or financial or 

technical assistance to the sanctioned country.

(3) SUSPENSION OF CODEVELOPMENT OR 

COPRODUCTION AGREEMENTS–The United States shall 

suspend, for a period of one year, compliance with its obligations

under any memorandum of understanding with the sanctioned 

country for the codevelopment or coproduction of any item on the 

United States Munitions List (established under section 38 of the 

Arms Export Control Act), including any obligation for 

implementation of the memorandum of understanding through the 

sale to the sanctioned country of technical data or assistance or the 

licensing for export to the sanctioned country of any component part.

(4) SUSPENSION OF MILITARY AND DUAL-USE 

TECHNICAL EXCHANGE AGREEMENTS–The United States 

shall suspend, for a period of one year, compliance with its 

obligations under any technical exchange agreement involving 

military and dual-use technology between the United States and the 

sanctioned country that does not directly contribute to the security of 

the United States, and no military or dual-use technology may be 

exported from the United States to the sanctioned country pursuant to 

that agreement during that period.

(5) UNITED STATES MUNITIONS LIST–No item on the 

United States Munitions List (established pursuant to section 38 of 

the Arms Export Control Act) may be exported to the sanctioned 

country for a period of one year.

(c) DISCRETIONARY SANCTION–The sanction referred to in 

subsection (a)(2) is as follows:

President.
1148 Nat. Def. Auth. Act, 1993 (Iran-Iraq Nonprol) (P.L. 102–484)

(1) USE OF AUTHORITIES OF INTERNATIONAL 

EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS ACT–Except as provided in 

paragraph (2), the President may exercise, in accordance with the 

provisions of that Act, the authorities of the International Emergency 

Economic Powers Act with respect to the sanctioned country.

(2) EXCEPTION–Paragraph (1) does not apply with respect to 

urgent humanitarian assistance.

Sec. 1606. Waiver

The President may waive the requirement to impose a sanction 

described in section 1603, in the case of Iran, or a sanction described in 

section 1604(b) or 1605(b), in the case of Iraq and Iran, 15 days after the 

President determines and so reports to the Committees on Armed 

Services and Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committees on 

Armed Services and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that 

it is essential to the national interest of the United States to exercise such 

waiver authority. Any such report shall provide a specific and detailed 

rationale for such determination.

Sec. 1607. Reporting Requirement

(a) ANNUAL REPORT–Beginning one year after the date of the 

enactment of this Act, and every 12 months thereafter, the President shall 

submit to the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations of 

the Senate and the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Affairs 

of the House of Representatives a report detailing–

(1) all transfers or retransfers made by any person or foreign 

government during the preceding 12-month period which are subject 

to any sanction under this Title; and

(2) the actions the President intends to undertake or has 

undertaken pursuant to this Title with respect to each such transfer.

(b) REPORT ON INDIVIDUAL TRANSFERS–Whenever the 

President determines that a person or foreign government has made a 

transfer which is subject to any sanction under this Title, the President 

shall, within 30 days after such transfer, submit to the Committees on 

Armed Services and Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committees 

on Armed Services and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a 

report–

(1) identifying the person or government and providing the details 

of the transfer; and

(2) describing the actions the President intends to undertake or has 

undertaken under the provisions of this Title with respect to each such 

transfer.

(c) FORM OF TRANSMITTAL–Reports required by this section 

may be submitted in classified as well as in unclassified form.

Sec. 1608. Definitions

For purposes of this Title:

(1) The term “advanced conventional weapons” includes–

(A) such long-range precision-guided munitions, fuel air 

explosives, cruise missiles, low observability aircraft, other radar 

evading aircraft, advanced military aircraft, military satellites, 

electromagnetic weapons, and laser weapons as the President 

determines destabilize the military balance or enhance offensive 

capabilities in destabilizing ways;

(B) such advanced command, control, and communications 

systems, electronic warfare systems, or intelligence collection 

systems as the President determines destabilize the military 

President.

President.
Nat. Def. Auth. Act, 1993 (Iran-Iraq Nonprol) (P.L. 102–484) 1149

balance or enhance offensive capabilities in destabilizing ways; 

and

(C) such other items or systems as the President may, by 

regulation, determine necessary for purposes of this Title.

(2) The term “cruise missile” means guided missiles that use 

aerodynamic lift to offset gravity and propulsion to counteract drag.

(3) The term “goods or technology” means–

(A) any article, natural or manmade substance, material, 

supply, or manufactured product, including inspection and test 

equipment; and

(B) any information and know-how (whether in tangible form, 

such as models, prototypes, drawings, sketches, diagrams, 

blueprints, or manuals, or in intangible form, such as training or 

technical services) that can be used to design, produce, 

manufacture, utilize, or reconstruct goods, including computer 

software and technical data.

(4) The term “person” means any United States or foreign 

individual, partnership, corporation, or other form of association, or 

any of their successor entities, parents, or subsidiaries.

(5) The term “sanctioned country” means a country against which 

sanctions are required to be imposed pursuant to section 1605.

(6) The term “sanctioned person” means a person that makes a 

transfer described in section 1604(a).

(7) The term “United States assistance” means–

(A) any assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 

other than–

(i) urgent humanitarian assistance or medicine, and

(ii) assistance under Chapter 11 of Part I (as enacted by the 

Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and 

Open Markets Support Act of 1992);

(B) sales and assistance under the Arms Export Control Act;

(C) financing by the Commodity Credit Corporation for export 

sales of agricultural commodities; and

(D) financing under the Export-Import Bank Act.
1150 North Korea Threat Reduction (Subtitle B) (P.L. 106–113)

J. NORTH KOREA THREAT REDUCTION (SUBTITLE B)

Public Law 106–113 113 Stat. 1501–472

November 29, 1999

An Act

Making consolidated appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 

30, 2000, and for other purposes.

* * * *

Sec. 821. Short Title

 This subtitle may be cited as the “North Korea Threat Reduction Act 

of 1999”

Sec. 822. Restrictions on Nuclear Cooperation with North Korea

(a) IN GENERAL.–Notwithstanding any other provision of law or 

any international agreement, no agreement for cooperation (as defined in 

section 11b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 USC 2014 b.)) 

between the United States and North Korea may become effective, no 

license may be issued for export directly or indirectly to North Korea of 

any nuclear material, facilities, components, or other goods, services, or 

technology that would be subject to such agreement, and no approval 

may be given for the transfer or retransfer directly or indirectly to North 

Korea of any nuclear material, facilities, components, or other goods, 

services, or technology that would be subject to such agreement, until the 

President determines and reports to the Committee on International 

Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign 

Relations of the Senate that–

(1) North Korea has come into full compliance with its safeguards 

agreement with the IAEA (INFCIRC/403), and has taken all steps 

that have been deemed necessary by the IAEA in this regard;

(2) North Korea has permitted the IAEA full access to all 

additional sites and all information (including historical records) 

deemed necessary by the IAEA to verify the accuracy and 

completeness of North Korea's initial report of May 4, 1992, to the 

IAEA on all nuclear sites and material in North Korea;

(3) North Korea is in full compliance with its obligations under 

the Agreed Framework;

(4) North Korea has consistently taken steps to implement the 

Joint Declaration on Denuclearization, and is in full compliance with 

its obligations under numbered paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the Joint 

Declaration on Denuclearization (excluding in the case of numbered 

paragraph 3 facilities frozen pursuant to the Agreed Framework);

(5) North Korea does not have uranium enrichment or nuclear 

reprocessing facilities (excluding facilities frozen pursuant to the 

Agreed Framework), and is making no significant progress toward 

acquiring or developing such facilities;

(6) North Korea does not have nuclear weapons and is making no 

significant effort to acquire, develop, test, produce, or deploy such 

weapons; and

(7) the transfer to North Korea of key nuclear components, under 

the proposed agreement for cooperation with North Korea and in 
North Korea Threat Reduction (Subtitle B) (P.L. 106–113) 1151

accordance with the Agreed Framework, is in the national interest of 

the United States.

(b) CONSTRUCTION.–The restrictions contained in subsection (a) 

shall apply in addition to all other applicable procedures, requirements, 

and restrictions contained in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and other 

laws.

Sec. 823. Definitions

In this subtitle:

(1) AGREED FRAMEWORK.–The term “Agreed 

Framework” means the “Agreed Framework Between the United 

States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of 

Korea”, signed in Geneva on October 21, 1994, and the 

Confidential Minute to that Agreement.

(2) IAEA.–The term “IAEA” means the International Atomic 

Energy Agency.

(3) NORTH KOREA.–The term “North Korea” means the 

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

(4) JOINT DECLARATION ON DENUCLEARIZATION.–

The term “Joint Declaration on Denuclearization'' means the Joint 

Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, 

issued by the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s 

Republic of Korea on January 1, 1992.

* * * *
1152 Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (P.L. 106–178)

K. IRAN NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 2000

Public Law 106–178 114 Stat. 38

March 14, 2000

An Act

to provide for the application of measures to foreign persons who transfer 

to Iran certain goods, services, or technology, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 

United States of America in Congress assembled, 

Sec. 1. Short Title

This Act may be cited as the “Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act”.1

Sec. 2. Reports on Proliferation Relating to Iran and Syria

(a) REPORTS.–The President shall, at the times specified in 

subsection (b), submit to the Committee on International Relations of the 

House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 

Senate a report identifying every foreign person with respect to whom 

there is credible information indicating that that person, on or after 

January 1, 1999, transferred to or acquired from Iran, or on or after 

January 1, 2005, transferred to or acquired from Syria–

(1) goods, services, or technology listed on–

(A) the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines for the Export of 

Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology (published by the 

International Atomic Energy Agency as Information Circular 

INFCIRC/254/ Rev.3/ Part 1, and subsequent revisions) and 

Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, 

Material, and Related Technology (published by the International 

Atomic Energy Agency as Information Circular INFCIRC/254/ 

Rev.3/ Part 2, and subsequent revisions);

(B) the Missile Technology Control Regime Equipment and 

Technology Annex of June 11, 1996, and subsequent revisions;

(C) the lists of items and substances relating to biological and 

chemical weapons the export of which is controlled by the 

Australia Group;

(D) the Schedule One or Schedule Two list of toxic chemicals 

and precursors the export of which is controlled pursuant to the 

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 

Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their 

Destruction; or

(E) the Wassenaar Arrangement list of Dual Use Goods and 

Technologies and Munitions list of July 12, 1996, and subsequent 

revisions; or

(2) goods, services, or technology not listed on any list identified 

in paragraph (1) but which nevertheless would be, if they were United 

States goods, services, or technology, prohibited for export to Iran or 

Syria, as the case may be, because of their potential to make a 

material contribution to the development of nuclear, biological, or 

chemical weapons, or of ballistic or cruise missile systems.

––––––––

1 Amended by P.L. 109-112, 119 Stat. 2366 (2005).

Iran 

Nonproliferation 

Act of 2000. 

Arms and 

munitions. 

Weapons.

50 USC 1701 

note.

President
Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (P.L. 106–178) 1153

(b) TIMING OF REPORTS.–The reports under subsection (a) shall 

be submitted not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this 

Act, not later than 6 months after such date of enactment, and not later 

than the end of each 6-month period thereafter.

(c) EXCEPTIONS.–Any foreign person who–

(1) was identified in a previous report submitted under subsection 

(a) on account of a particular transfer; or

(2) has engaged in a transfer on behalf of, or in concert with, the 

Government of the United States, is not required to be identified on 

account of that same transfer in any report submitted thereafter under 

this section, except to the degree that new information has emerged 

indicating that the particular transfer may have continued, or been 

larger, more significant, or different in nature than previously 

reported under this section.

(d) Submission in Classified Form.--When the President considers it 

appropriate, reports submitted under subsection (a), or appropriate parts 

thereof, may be submitted in classified form.

Sec. 3. Application of Measures to Certain Foreign Persons

(a) APPLICATION OF MEASURES.–Subject to sections 4 and 5, 

the President is authorized to apply with respect to each foreign person 

identified in a report submitted pursuant to section 2(a), for such period 

of time as he may determine, any or all of the measures described in 

subsection (b).

(b) DESCRIPTION OF MEASURES.–The measures referred to in 

subsection (a) are the following:

(1) EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 12938 PROHIBITIONS.–The 

measures set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 4 of Executive 

Order No. 12938.

(2) ARMS EXPORT PROHIBITION.–Prohibition on United 

States Government sales to that foreign person of any item on the 

United States Munitions List as in effect on August 8, 1995, and 

termination of sales to that person of any defense articles, defense 

services, or design and construction services under the Arms Export 

Control Act.

(3) DUAL USE EXPORT PROHIBITION.–Denial of licenses 

and suspension of existing licenses for the transfer to that person of 

items the export of which is controlled under the Export 

Administration Act of 1979 or the Export Administration 

Regulations.

(c) EFFECTIVE DATE OF MEASURES.–Measures applied 

pursuant to subsection (a) shall be effective with respect to a foreign 

person no later than–

(1) 90 days after the report identifying the foreign person is 

submitted, if the report is submitted on or before the date required by

section 2(b);

(2) 90 days after the date required by section 2(b) for submitting 

the report, if the report identifying the foreign person is submitted 

within 60 days after that date; or

(3) on the date that the report identifying the foreign person is 

submitted, if that report is submitted more than 60 days after the date 

required by section 2(b).

Deadline.
1154 Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (P.L. 106–178)

(d) PUBLICATION IN FEDERAL REGISTER.–The application of 

measures to a foreign person pursuant to subsection (a) shall be 

announced by notice published in the Federal Register.2

Sec. 4. Procedures if Measures are Not Applied.

(a) REQUIREMENT TO NOTIFY CONGRESS.–Should the 

President not exercise the authority of section 3(a) to apply any or all of 

the measures described in section 3(b) with respect to a foreign person 

identified in a report submitted pursuant to section 2(a), he shall so notify 

the Committee on International Relations of the House of 

Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate 

no later than the effective date under section 3(c) for measures with 

respect to that person.

(b) WRITTEN JUSTIFICATION.–Any notification submitted by the 

President under subsection (a) shall include a written justification 

describing in detail the facts and circumstances relating specifically to 

the foreign person identified in a report submitted pursuant to section 

2(a) that support the President's decision not to exercise the authority of 

section 3(a) with respect to that person.

(c) SUBMISSION IN CLASSIFIED FORM.–When the President 

considers it appropriate, the notification of the President under subsection 

(a), and the written justification under subsection (b), or appropriate parts 

thereof, may be submitted in classified form.

Sec. 5. Determination Exempting Foreign Person from Sections 3 

and 4

(a) IN GENERAL.–Sections 3 and 4 shall not apply to a foreign 

person 15 days after the President reports to the Committee on 

International Relations of the House of Representatives and the 

Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that the President has 

determined, on the basis of information provided by that person, or 

otherwise obtained by the President, that–

(1) the person did not, on or after January 1, 1999, knowingly 

transfer to or acquire from Iran or Syria, as the case may be, the 

goods, services, or technology the apparent transfer of which caused 

that person to be identified in a report submitted pursuant to section 

2(a);

(2) the goods, services, or technology the transfer of which caused 

that person to be identified in a report submitted pursuant to section 

2(a) did not materially contribute to the efforts of Iran or Syria, as the 

case may be, to develop nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or 

ballistic or cruise missile systems;

(3) the person is subject to the primary jurisdiction of a 

government that is an adherent to one or more relevant 

nonproliferation regimes, the person was identified in a report 

submitted pursuant to section 2(a) with respect to a transfer of goods, 

services, or technology described in section 2(a)(1), and such transfer 

was made consistent with the guidelines and parameters of all such 

relevant regimes of which such government is an adherent; or

(4) the government with primary jurisdiction over the person has 

imposed meaningful penalties on that person on account of the 

transfer of the goods, services, or technology which caused that 

person to be identified in a report submitted pursuant to section 2(a).

(b) OPPORTUNITY TO PROVIDE INFORMATION.–Congress 

urges the President–

––––––––

2 Amended by P.L. 109-112, 119 Stat. 2366 (2005).
Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (P.L. 106–178) 1155

(1) in every appropriate case, to contact in a timely fashion each 

foreign person identified in each report submitted pursuant to section 

2(a), or the government with primary jurisdiction over such person, in 

order to afford such person, or governments, the opportunity to 

provide explanatory, exculpatory, or other additional information 

with respect to the transfer that caused such person to be identified in 

a report submitted pursuant to section 2(a); and

(2) to exercise the authority in subsection (a) in all cases where 

information obtained from a foreign person identified in a report 

submitted pursuant to section 2(a), or from the government with 

primary jurisdiction over such person, establishes that the exercise of 

such authority is warranted.

(c) SUBMISSION IN CLASSIFIED FORM.–When the President 

considers it appropriate, the determination and report of the President 

under subsection (a), or appropriate parts thereof, may be submitted in 

classified form.3

Sec. 6. Restriction on Extraordinary Payments in Connection with 

the International Space Station

(a) RESTRICTION ON EXTRAORDINARY PAYMENTS IN 

CONNECTION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION.–

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no agency of the United 

States Government may make extraordinary payments in connection with 

the International Space Station to the Russian Aviation and Space 

Agency, any organization or entity under the jurisdiction or control of the 

Russian Aviation and Space Agency, or any other organization, entity, or

element of the Government of the Russian Federation, unless, during the 

fiscal year in which the extraordinary payments in connection with the 

International Space Station are to be made, the President has made the 

determination described in subsection (b), and reported such 

determination to the Committee on International Relations and the 

Committee on Science of the House of Representatives and the 

Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Commerce, 

Science, and Transportation of the Senate.

(b) DETERMINATION REGARDING RUSSIAN COOPERATION 

IN PREVENTING PROLIFERATION RELATING TO IRAN OR 

SYRIA.–The determination referred to in subsection (a) is a 

determination by the President that–

(1) it is the policy of the Government of the Russian Federation to 

oppose the proliferation to or from Iran and Syria of weapons of mass 

destruction and missile systems capable of delivering such weapons;

(2) the Government of the Russian Federation (including the law 

enforcement, export promotion, export control, and intelligence 

agencies of such government) has demonstrated and continues to 

demonstrate a sustained commitment to seek out and prevent the 

transfer to or from Iran and Syria of goods, services, and technology 

that could make a material contribution to the development of 

nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or of ballistic or cruise 

missile systems; and

(3) neither the Russian Aviation and Space Agency, nor any 

organization or entity under the jurisdiction or control of the Russian 

Aviation and Space Agency, has, during the 1-year period prior to the 

date of the determination pursuant to this subsection, made transfers 

to or from Iran or Syria reportable under section 2(a) of this Act 

––––––––

3 Amended by P.L. 109-112, 119 Stat. 2366 (2005).

Russian 

Federation. 

President.
1156 Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (P.L. 106–178)

(other than transfers with respect to which a determination pursuant 

to section 5 has been or will be made).

(c) PRIOR NOTIFICATION.–Not less than 5 days before making a 

determination under subsection (b), the President shall notify the 

Committee on International Relations and the Committee on Science of 

the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations 

and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the 

Senate of his intention to make such determination.

(d) WRITTEN JUSTIFICATION.–A determination of the President 

under subsection (b) shall include a written justification describing in 

detail the facts and circumstances supporting the President's conclusion.

(e) SUBMISSION IN CLASSIFIED FORM.–When the President 

considers it appropriate, a determination of the President under 

subsection (b), a prior notification under subsection (c), and a written 

justification under subsection (d), or appropriate parts thereof, may be 

submitted in classified form.

(f ) EXCEPTION FOR CREW SAFETY.–

(1) EXCEPTION.–The National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration may make extraordinary payments that would 

otherwise be prohibited under this section to the Russian Aviation 

and Space Agency or any organization or entity under the jurisdiction 

or control of the Russian Aviation and Space Agency if the President 

has notified the Congress in writing that such payments are necessary 

to prevent the imminent loss of life by or grievous injury to 

individuals aboard the International Space Station.

(2) REPORT.–Not later than 30 days after notifying Congress that 

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration will make 

extraordinary payments under paragraph (1), the President shall 

submit to Congress a report describing–

(A) the extent to which the provisions of subsection (b) had 

been met as of the date of notification; and

(B) the measures that the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration is taking to ensure that–

(i) the conditions posing a threat of imminent loss of life 

by or grievous injury to individuals aboard the International 

Space Station necessitating the extraordinary payments are not 

repeated; and

(ii) it is no longer necessary to make extraordinary 

payments in order to prevent imminent loss of life by or 

grievous injury to individuals aboard the International Space 

Station.

(g) SERVICE MODULE EXCEPTION.–

(1) The National Aeronautics and Space Administration may 

make extraordinary payments that would otherwise be prohibited 

under this section to the Russian Aviation and Space Agency, any 

organization or entity under the jurisdiction or control of the Russian 

Aviation and Space Agency, or any subcontractor thereof for the 

construction, testing, preparation, delivery, launch, or maintenance of 

the Service Module, and for the purchase (at a total cost not to exceed 

$14,000,000) of the pressure dome for the Interim Control Module 

and the Androgynous Peripheral Docking Adapter and related 

hardware for the United States propulsion module, if–

(A) the President has notified Congress at least 5 days before 

making such payments;

Deadline.

Deadline.
Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (P.L. 106–178) 1157

(B) no report has been made under section 2 with respect to an 

activity of the entity to receive such payment, and the President 

has no credible information of any activity that would require 

such a report; and

(C) the United States will receive goods or services of value to 

the United States commensurate with the value of the 

extraordinary payments made.

(2) For purposes of this subsection, the term “maintenance”

means activities which cannot be performed by the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration and which must be performed 

in order for the Service Module to provide environmental control, life 

support, and orbital maintenance functions which cannot be 

performed by an alternative means at the time of payment.

(3) This subsection shall cease to be effective 60 days after a 

United States propulsion module is in place at the International Space 

Station.

(h) EXCEPTION.–Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b), no 

agency of the United States Government may make extraordinary 

payments in connection with the International Space Station, or any other 

payments in connection with the International Space Station, to any 

foreign person subject to measures applied pursuant to–

(1) section 3 of this Act; or

(2) section 4 of Executive Order No. 12938 (November 14, 1994), 

as amended by Executive Order No. 13094 (July 28, 1998).

Such payments shall also not be made to any other entity if the agency of 

the United States Government anticipates that such payments will be 

passed on to such a foreign person.

(i) REPORT ON CERTAIN PAYMENTS RELATED TO 

INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall, together with each 

report submitted under section 2(a), submit to the Committee on 

Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 

International Relations of the House of Representatives a report 

that identifies each Russian entity or person to whom the United 

States Government has, since the date of the enactment of the Iran 

Nonproliferation Amendments Act of 2005, made a payment in 

cash or in kind for work to be performed or services to be rendered 

under the Agreement Concerning Cooperation on the Civil 

International Space Station, with annex, signed at Washington 

January 29, 1998, and entered into force March 27, 2001, or any 

protocol, agreement, memorandum of understanding, or contract 

related thereto.

(2) CONTENT.—Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall 

include—

(A) the specific purpose of each payment made to each entity 

or person identified in the report; and 

(B) with respect to each such payment, the assessment of the 

President that the payment was not prejudicial to the 

achievement of the objectives of the United States 

Government to prevent the proliferation of ballistic or cruise 

missile systems in Iran and other countries that have 

repeatedly provided support for acts of international 

terrorism, is determined by the Secretary of State under 

section 620A(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 

U.S.C. 2371(a)), section 6(j) of the Export Administration 

Termination 

date.

President.
1158 Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (P.L. 106–178)

Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)), or section 40(d) of the 

Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780(d)).

Sec. 7. Definitions

For purposes of this Act, the following terms have the following 

meanings:

(1) EXTRAORDINARY PAYMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH 

THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION.–

The term “extraordinary payments in connection with the 

International Space Station” means payments in cash or in kind made 

or to be made by the United States Government–

(A) for work on the International Space Station which the 

Russian Government pledged at any time to provide at its 

expense; or

(B) for work on the International Space Station, or for the 

purchase of goods or services relating to human space flight, that are not 

required to be made under the terms of a contract or other agreement that 

was in effect on January 1, 1999, as those terms were in effect on such 

date, except that such term does not mean payments in cash or in kind 

made or to be made by the United States Government prior to January 1, 

2012, for work to be performed or services to be rendered prior to that 

date necessary to meet United States obligations under the Agreement 

Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space Station, with 

annex, signed at Washington January 29, 1998, and entered into force 

March 27, 2001, or any protocol, agreement, memorandum of 

understanding, or contract related thereto.

(2) FOREIGN PERSON; PERSON.–The terms “foreign person” 

and “person” mean–

(A) a natural person that is an alien;

(B) a corporation, business association, partnership, society, 

trust, or any other nongovernmental entity, organization, or group, 

that is organized under the laws of a foreign country or has its 

principal place of business in a foreign country;

(C) any foreign government, including any foreign

governmental entity; and

(D) any successor, subunit, or subsidiary of any entity described 

in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C), including any entity in which 

any entity described in any such subparagraph owns a controlling 

interest.

(3) EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 12938. The term “Executive 

Order No. 12938” means Executive Order No. 12938 as in effect on 

January 1, 1999.

(4) ADHERENT TO RELEVANT NONPROLIFERATION 

REGIME.–A government is an “adherent” to a “relevant 

nonproliferation regime” if that government–

(A) is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group with respect 

to a transfer of goods, services, or technology described in section 

2(a)(1)(A);

(B) is a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime 

with respect to a transfer of goods, services, or technology 

described in section 2(a)(1)(B), or is a party to a binding 

international agreement with the United States that was in effect 

on January 1, 1999, to control the transfer of such goods, services, 

or technology in accordance with the criteria and standards set 

forth in the Missile Technology Control Regime;
Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (P.L. 106–178) 1159

(C) is a member of the Australia Group with respect to a 

transfer of goods, services, or technology described in section 

2(a)(1)(C);

(D) is a party to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 

Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 

Weapons and on Their Destruction with respect to a transfer of 

goods, services, or technology described in section 2(a)(1)(D); or

(E) is a member of the Wassenaar Arrangement with respect 

to a transfer of goods, services, or technology described in section 

2(a)(1)(E).

(5) ORGANIZATION OR ENTITY UNDER THE 

JURISDICTION OR CONTROL OF THE RUSSIAN AVIATION 

AND SPACE AGENCY.–

(A) The term “organization or entity under the jurisdiction or 

control of the Russian Aviation and Space Agency”' means an 

organization or entity that–

(i) was made part of the Russian Space Agency upon its 

establishment on February 25, 1992;

(ii) was transferred to the Russian Space Agency by decree 

of the Russian Government on July 25, 1994, or May 12, 

1998;

(iii) was or is transferred to the Russian Aviation and 

Space Agency or Russian Space Agency by decree of the 

Russian Government at any other time before, on, or after the 

date of the enactment of this Act; or

(iv) is a joint stock company in which the Russian 

Aviation and Space Agency or Russian Space Agency has at 

any time held controlling interest.

(B) Any organization or entity described in subparagraph (A) 

shall be deemed to be under the jurisdiction or control of the 

Russian Aviation and Space Agency regardless of whether–

(i) such organization or entity, after being part of or 

transferred to the Russian Aviation and Space Agency or 

Russian Space Agency, is removed from or transferred out of 

the Russian Aviation and Space Agency or Russian Space 

Agency; or

(ii) the Russian Aviation and Space Agency or Russian 

Space Agency, after holding a controlling interest in such 

organization or entity, divests its controlling interest.4

––––––––

4 Amended by P.L. 109-112 (119 Stat. 2366) (2005).
1160 US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Coop. Act (P.L. 109–401)

L. HENRY J. HYDE UNITED STATES-INDIA PEACEFUL 

ATOMIC ENERGY COOPERATION ACT OF 2006 (TITLE 1)

Public Law 109–401 120 Stat. 2726

December 18, 2006

An Act

To exempt from certain requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 

a proposed nuclear agreement for cooperation with India.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 

States of America in Congress assembled,

Title I-- United States and India Nuclear Cooperation

Sec. 101. Short Title

This title may be cited as the “Henry J. Hyde United StatesIndia Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006”.

Sec. 102. Sense of Congress

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, other 

weapons of mass destruction, the means to produce them, and the 

means to deliver them are critical objectives for United States foreign 

policy;

(2) sustaining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and 

strengthening its implementation, particularly its verification and 

compliance, is the keystone of United States nonproliferation policy;

(3) the NPT has been a significant success in preventing the 

acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities and maintaining a stable 

international security situation;

(4) countries that have never become a party to the NPT and 

remain outside that treaty's legal regime pose a potential challenge to 

the achievement of the overall goals of global nonproliferation, 

because those countries have not undertaken the NPT obligation to 

prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities;

(5) it is in the interest of the United States to the fullest extent 

possible to ensure that those countries that are not States Party to the 

NPT are responsible in the disposition of any nuclear technology they 

develop;

(6) it is in the interest of the United States to enter into an 

agreement for nuclear cooperation arranged pursuant to section 123 

of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) with a country 

that has never been a State Party to the NPT if--

(A) the country has demonstrated responsible behavior 

with respect to the nonproliferation of technology related to 

nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them;

(B) the country has a functioning and uninterrupted 

democratic system of government, has a foreign policy that is 

congruent to that of the United States, and is working with the 

United States on key foreign policy initiatives related to 

nonproliferation;

(C) such cooperation induces the country to promulgate 

and implement substantially improved protections against the 

22 USC 8001.

22 USC 8001.
US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Coop. Act (P.L. 109–401) 1161

proliferation of technology related to nuclear weapons and the 

means to deliver them, and to refrain from actions that would 

further the development of its nuclear weapons program; and

(D) such cooperation will induce the country to give 

greater political and material support to the achievement of United 

States global and regional nonproliferation objectives, especially 

with respect to dissuading, isolating, and, if necessary, 

sanctioning and containing states that sponsor terrorism and 

terrorist groups that are seeking to acquire a nuclear weapons 

capability or other weapons of mass destruction capability and the 

means to deliver such weapons;

(7) the United States should continue its policy of engagement, 

collaboration, and exchanges with and between India and Pakistan;

(8) strong bilateral relations with India are in the national interest 

of the United States;

(9) the United States and India share common democratic values 

and the potential for increasing and sustained economic engagement;

(10) commerce in civil nuclear energy with India by the United 

States and other countries has the potential to benefit the people of all 

countries;

(11) such commerce also represents a significant change in United 

States policy regarding commerce with countries that are not States 

Party to the NPT, which remains the foundation of the international 

nonproliferation regime;

(12) any commerce in civil nuclear energy with India by the 

United States and other countries must be achieved in a manner that 

minimizes the risk of nuclear proliferation or regional arms races and 

maximizes India's adherence to international nonproliferation 

regimes, including, in particular, the guidelines of the Nuclear 

Suppliers Group (NSG); and

(13) the United States should not seek to facilitate or encourage 

the continuation of nuclear exports to India by any other party if such 

exports are terminated under United States law.

Sec. 103. Statements of Policy.

(a) In General.--The following shall be the policies of the United 

States:

(1) Oppose the development of a capability to produce nuclear 

weapons by any non-nuclear weapon state, within or outside of the 

NPT.

(2) Encourage States Party to the NPT to interpret the right to 

“develop research, production and use of nuclear energyfor peaceful 

purposes”, as set forth in Article IV of the NPT, as being a right that 

applies only to the extent that it is consistent with the object and 

purpose of the NPT to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and 

nuclear weapons capabilities, including by refraining from all nuclear 

cooperation with any State Party that the International Atomic Energy 

Agency (IAEA) determines is not in full compliance with its NPT 

obligations, including its safeguards obligations.

(3) Act in a manner fully consistent with the Guidelines for 

Nuclear Transfers and the Guidelines for Transfers of NuclearRelated Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software and Related 

Technology developed by the NSG, and decisions related to the those 

guidelines, and the rules and practices regarding NSG decision 

making.

22 USC 8002.
1162 US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Coop. Act (P.L. 109–401)

(4) Strengthen the NSG guidelines and decisions concerning 

consultation by members regarding violations of supplier and 

recipient understandings by instituting the practice of a timely and 

coordinated response by NSG members to all such violations, 

including termination of nuclear transfers to an involved recipient, 

that discourages individual NSG members from continuing 

cooperation with such recipient until such time as a consensus 

regarding a coordinated response has been achieved.

(5) Given the special sensitivity of equipment and technologies 

related to the enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing of spent 

nuclear fuel, and the production of heavy water, work with members 

of the NSG, individually and collectively, to further restrict the 

transfers of such equipment and technologies, including to India.

(6) Seek to prevent the transfer to a country of nuclear equipment, 

materials, or technology from other participating governments in the 

NSG or from any other source if nuclear transfers to that country are 

suspended or terminated pursuant to this title, the Atomic Energy Act 

of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), or any other United States law.

(b) With Respect to South Asia.--The following shall be the policies 

of the United States with respect to South Asia:

(1) Achieve, at the earliest possible date, a moratorium on the 

production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes by India, 

Pakistan, and the People's Republic of China.

(2) Achieve, at the earliest possible date, the conclusion and 

implementation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material 

for nuclear weapons to which both the United States and India 

become parties.

(3) Secure India's--

(A) full participation in the Proliferation Security 

Initiative;

(B) formal commitment to the Statement of Interdiction 

Principles of such Initiative;

(C) public announcement of its decision to conform its 

export control laws, regulations, and policies with the Australia 

Group and with the Guidelines, Procedures, Criteria, and Control 

Lists of the Wassenaar Arrangement;

(D) demonstration of satisfactory progress toward 

implementing the decision described in subparagraph (C); and

(E) ratification of or accession to the Convention on 

Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, done at 

Vienna on September 12, 1997.

(4) Secure India's full and active participation in United States 

efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, sanction and contain 

Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including a 

nuclear weapons capability and the capability to enrich uranium or 

reprocess nuclear fuel, and the means to deliver weapons of mass 

destruction.

(5) Seek to halt the increase of nuclear weapon arsenals in South 

Asia and to promote their reduction and eventual elimination.

(6) Ensure that spent fuel generated in India's civilian nuclear 

power reactors is not transferred to the United States except pursuant 

to the Congressional review procedures required under section 131 f. 

of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2160 (f)).

(7) Pending implementation of the multilateral moratorium 

described in paragraph (1) or the treaty described in paragraph (2), 

India. 

Pakistan. 

People’s 

Republic of 

China.
US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Coop. Act (P.L. 109–401) 1163

encourage India not to increase its production of fissile material at 

unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.

(8) Ensure that any safeguards agreement or Additional Protocol 

to which India is a party with the IAEA can reliably safeguard any 

export or reexport to India of any nuclear materials and equipment.

(9) Ensure that the text and implementation of any agreement for 

cooperation with India arranged pursuant to section 123 of the 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) meet the requirements 

set forth in subsections a.(1) and a.(3) through a.(9) of such section.

(10) Any nuclear power reactor fuel reserve provided to the 

Government of India for use in safeguarded civilian nuclear facilities 

should be commensurate with reasonable reactor operating 

requirements.

Sec. 104. Waiver Authority and Congressional Approval

(a) In general. If the President makes the determination described in 

subsection (b), the President may--

 (1) exempt a proposed agreement for cooperation with India arranged 

pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 

2153) from the requirement of subsection a.(2) of such section [42 USCS 

§ 2153(a)(2)];

 (2) waive the application of section 128 of the Atomic Energy Act of 

1954 (42 U.S.C. 2157) with respect to exports to India; and

 (3) waive with respect to India the application of--

 (A) section 129 a.(1)(D) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 

U.S.C. 2158(a)(1)(D)); and

 (B) section 129 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2158) regarding any actions 

that occurred before July 18, 2005.

(b) Determination by the President. The determination referred to in 

subsection (a) is a determination by the President that the following 

actions have occurred:

 (1) India has provided the United States and the IAEA with a credible 

plan to separate civil and military nuclear facilities, materials, and 

programs, and has filed a declaration regarding its civil facilities and 

materials with the IAEA.

 (2) India and the IAEA have concluded all legal steps required prior to 

signature by the parties of an agreement requiring the application of 

IAEA safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with IAEA standards, 

principles, and practices (including IAEA Board of Governors Document 

GOV/1621 (1973)) to India's civil nuclear facilities, materials, and 

programs as declared in the plan described in paragraph (1), including 

materials used in or produced through the use of India's civil nuclear 

facilities.

 (3) India and the IAEA are making substantial progress toward 

concluding an Additional Protocol consistent with IAEA principles, 

practices, and policies that would apply to India's civil nuclear program.

 (4) India is working actively with the United States for the early 

conclusion of a multilateral treaty on the cessation of the production of 

fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 

devices.

 (5) India is working with and supporting United States and 

international efforts to prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing 

technology to any state that does not already possess full-scale, 

functioning enrichment or reprocessing plants.

 (6) India is taking the necessary steps to secure nuclear and other 

sensitive materials and technology, including through--

22 USC 8003.
1164 US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Coop. Act (P.L. 109–401)

 (A) the enactment and effective enforcement of comprehensive 

export control legislation and regulations;

 (B) harmonization of its export control laws, regulations, policies, 

and practices with the guidelines and practices of the Missile Technology 

Control Regime (MTCR) and the NSG; and

 (C) adherence to the MTCR and the NSG in accordance with the 

procedures of those regimes for unilateral adherence.

 (7) The NSG has decided by consensus to permit supply to India of 

nuclear items covered by the guidelines of the NSG.

(c) Submission to Congress.

 (1) In general. The President shall submit to the appropriate 

congressional committees the determination made pursuant to subsection 

(b), together with a report detailing the basis for the determination.

 (2) Information to be included. To the fullest extent available to the 

United States, the report referred to in paragraph (1) shall include the 

following information:

 (A) A summary of the plan provided by India to the United States 

and the IAEA to separate India's civil and military nuclear facilities, 

materials, and programs, and the declaration made by India to the IAEA 

identifying India's civil facilities to be placed under IAEA safeguards, 

including an analysis of the credibility of such plan and declaration, 

together with copies of the plan and declaration.

 (B) A summary of the agreement that has been entered into between 

India and the IAEA requiring the application of safeguards in accordance 

with IAEA practices to India's civil nuclear facilities as declared in the 

plan described in subparagraph (A), together with a copy of the 

agreement, and a description of the progress toward its full 

implementation.

 (C) A summary of the progress made toward conclusion and 

implementation of an Additional Protocol between India and the IAEA, 

including a description of the scope of such Additional Protocol.

 (D) A description of the steps that India is taking to work with the 

United States for the conclusion of a multilateral treaty banning the 

production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, including a 

description of the steps that the United States has taken and will take to 

encourage India to identify and declare a date by which India would be 

willing to stop production of fissile material for nuclear weapons 

unilaterally or pursuant to a multilateral moratorium or treaty.

 (E) A description of the steps India is taking to prevent the spread of 

nuclear-related technology, including enrichment and reprocessing 

technology or materials that can be used to acquire a nuclear weapons 

capability, as well as the support that India is providing to the United 

States to further United States objectives to restrict the spread of such 

technology.

 (F) A description of the steps that India is taking to secure materials 

and technology applicable for the development, acquisition, or 

manufacture of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver 

such weapons through the application of comprehensive export control 

legislation and regulations, and through harmonization with and 

adherence to MTCR, NSG, Australia Group, and Wassenaar 

Arrangement guidelines, compliance with United Nations Security 

Council Resolution 1540, and participation in the Proliferation Security 

Initiative.

 (G) A description and assessment of the specific measures that India 

has taken to fully and actively participate in United States and 
US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Coop. Act (P.L. 109–401) 1165

international efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, sanction and 

contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, 

including a nuclear weapons capability and the capability to enrich 

uranium or reprocess nuclear fuel and the means to deliver weapons of 

mass destruction.

 (H) A description of the decision of the NSG relating to nuclear 

cooperation with India, including whether nuclear cooperation by the 

United States under an agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to 

section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) is 

consistent with the decision, practices, and policies of the NSG.

 (I) A description of the scope of peaceful cooperation envisioned by 

the United States and India that will be implemented under the agreement 

for nuclear cooperation, including whether such cooperation will include 

the provision of enrichment and reprocessing technology.

 (J) A description of the steps taken to ensure that proposed United 

States civil nuclear cooperation with India will not in any way assist 

India's nuclear weapons program.

(d) Restrictions on nuclear transfers.

 (1) In general. Pursuant to the obligations of the United States under 

Article I of the NPT, nothing in this title constitutes authority to carry out 

any civil nuclear cooperation between the United States and a country 

that is not a nuclear-weapon State Party to the NPT that would in any 

way assist, encourage, or induce that country to manufacture or otherwise 

acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.

 (2) NSG transfer guidelines. Notwithstanding the entry into force of an 

agreement for cooperation with India arranged pursuant to section 123 of 

the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) and pursuant to this 

title, no item subject to such agreement or subject to the transfer 

guidelines of the NSG, or to NSG decisions related thereto, may be 

transferred to India if such transfer would be inconsistent with the 

transfer guidelines of the NSG in effect on the date of the transfer.

 (3) Termination of nuclear transfers to India.

 (A) In general. Notwithstanding the entry into force of an agreement 

for cooperation with India arranged pursuant to section 123 of the 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) and pursuant to this title, 

and except as provided under subparagraph (B), exports of nuclear and 

nuclear-related material, equipment, or technology to India shall be 

terminated if there is any materially significant transfer by an Indian 

person of--

 (i) nuclear or nuclear-related material, equipment, or technology 

that is not consistent with NSG guidelines or decisions, or

 (ii) ballistic missiles or missile-related equipment or technology 

that is not consistent with MTCR guidelines,

 unless the President determines that cessation of such exports would 

be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States 

nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense 

and security.

 (B) Exception. The President may choose not to terminate exports of 

nuclear and nuclear-related material, equipment, and technology to India 

under subparagraph (A) if--

 (i) the transfer covered under such subparagraph was made without 

the knowledge of the Government of India;

 (ii) at the time of the transfer, either the Government of India did

not own, control, or direct the Indian person that made the transfer or the 

Indian person that made the transfer is a natural person who acted 
1166 US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Coop. Act (P.L. 109–401)

without the knowledge of any entity described in subparagraph (B) or (C) 

of section 110(5) [22 USCS § 8008(5)]; and

 (iii) the President certifies to the appropriate congressional 

committees that the Government of India has taken or is taking 

appropriate judicial or other enforcement actions against the Indian 

person with respect to such transfer.

 (4) Exports, reexports, transfers, and retransfers to India related to 

enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water production.

 (A) In general.

 (i) Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission may only issue licenses for the export or reexport to India of 

any equipment, components, or materials related to the enrichment of 

uranium, the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, or the production of 

heavy water if the requirements of subparagraph (B) are met.

 (ii) Secretary of Energy. The Secretary of Energy may only issue 

authorizations for the transfer or retransfer to India of any equipment, 

materials, or technology related to the enrichment of uranium, the 

reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, or the production of heavy water 

(including under the terms of a subsequent arrangement under section 

131 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2160)) if the 

requirements of subparagraph (B) are met.

 (B) Requirements for approvals. Exports, reexports, transfers, and 

retransfers referred to in subparagraph (A) may only be approved if--

 (i) the end user--

 (I) is a multinational facility participating in an IAEA-approved 

program to provide alternatives to national fuel cycle capabilities; or

 (II) is a facility participating in, and the export, reexport, transfer, 

or retransfer is associated with, a bilateral or multinational program to 

develop a proliferation-resistant fuel cycle;

 (ii) appropriate measures are in place at any facility referred to in 

clause (i) to ensure that no sensitive nuclear technology, as defined in 

section 4(5) of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 

3203(5)), will be diverted to any person, site, facility, location, or 

program not under IAEA safeguards; and

 (iii) the President determines that the export, reexport, transfer, or 

retransfer will not assist in the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear 

explosive devices or the production of fissile material for military 

purposes.

 (5) Nuclear export accountability program.

 (A) In general. The President shall ensure that all appropriate 

measures are taken to maintain accountability with respect to nuclear 

materials, equipment, and technology sold, leased, exported, or 

reexported to India so as to ensure--

 (i) full implementation of the protections required under section 

123 a.(1) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153 (a)(1)); and

 (ii) United States compliance with Article I of the NPT.

 (B) Measures. The measures taken pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall 

include the following:

 (i) Obtaining and implementing assurances and conditions pursuant 

to the export licensing authorities of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

and the Department of Commerce and the authorizing authorities of the 

Department of Energy, including, as appropriate, conditions regarding 

end-use monitoring.

 (ii) A detailed system of reporting and accounting for technology 

transfers, including any retransfers in India, authorized by the 
US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Coop. Act (P.L. 109–401) 1167

Department of Energy pursuant to section 57 b. of the Atomic Energy 

Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2077(b)). Such system shall be capable of 

providing assurances that--

 (I) the identified recipients of the nuclear technology are 

authorized to receive the nuclear technology;

 (II) the nuclear technology identified for transfer will be used 

only for peaceful safeguarded nuclear activities and will not be used for 

any military or nuclear explosive purpose; and

 (III) the nuclear technology identified for transfer will not be 

retransferred without the prior consent of the United States, and facilities, 

equipment, or materials derived through the use of transferred technology 

will not be transferred without the prior consent of the United States.

 (iii) In the event the IAEA is unable to implement safeguards as 

required by an agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to section 

123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153), appropriate 

assurance that arrangements will be put in place expeditiously that are 

consistent with the requirements of section 123 a.(1) of such Act (42 

U.S.C. 2153(a)(1)) regarding the maintenance of safeguards as set forth 

in the agreement regardless of whether the agreement is terminated or 

suspended for any reason.

 (C) Implementation. The measures described in subparagraph (B) 

shall be implemented to provide reasonable assurances that the recipient 

is complying with the relevant requirements, terms, and conditions of any 

licenses issued by the United States regarding such exports, including 

those relating to the use, retransfer, safe handling, secure transit, and 

storage of such exports.

(e) [Omitted]

(f) Sunset. The authority provided under subsection (a)(1) to exempt an 

agreement shall terminate upon the date of the enactment of the United 

States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation 

Enhancement Act [enacted Oct. 8, 2008].

(g) Reporting to Congress.

 (1) Information on nuclear activities of India. The President shall keep 

the appropriate congressional committees fully and currently informed of 

the facts and implications of any significant nuclear activities of India, 

including--

 (A) any material noncompliance on the part of the Government of 

India with--

 (i) the nonproliferation commitments undertaken in the Joint 

Statement of July 18, 2005, between the President of the United States 

and the Prime Minister of India;

 (ii) the separation plan presented in the national parliament of India 

on March 7, 2006, and in greater detail on May 11, 2006;

 (iii) a safeguards agreement between the Government of India and 

the IAEA;

 (iv) an Additional Protocol between the Government of India and 

the IAEA;

 (v) an agreement for cooperation between the Government of India 

and the United States Government arranged pursuant to section 123 of 

the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) or any subsequent 

arrangement under section 131 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2160);

 (vi) the terms and conditions of any approved licenses regarding the 

export or reexport of nuclear material or dual-use material, equipment, or 

technology; and

 (vii) United States laws and regulations regarding such licenses;
1168 US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Coop. Act (P.L. 109–401)

 (B) any material inconsistencies between the content or timeliness of 

notifications by the Government of India pursuant to paragraph 14(a) of 

the Safeguards Agreement and the facilities and schedule described in 

paragraph (14) of the separation plan presented in the national parliament 

of India on May 11, 2006, taking into account the later initiation of 

safeguards than was anticipated in the separation plan;

 (C) the construction of a nuclear facility in India after the date of the 

enactment of this title [enacted Dec. 18, 2006];

 (D) significant changes in the production by India of nuclear weapons 

or in the types or amounts of fissile material produced; and

 (E) changes in the purpose or operational status of any unsafeguarded 

nuclear fuel cycle activities in India.

 (2) Implementation and compliance report. Not later than 180 days 

after the date on which an agreement for cooperation with India arranged 

pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 

2153) enters into force, and annually thereafter, the President shall 

submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report including--

 (A) a description of any additional nuclear facilities and nuclear 

materials that the Government of India has placed or intends to place 

under IAEA safeguards;

 (B) a comprehensive listing of--

 (i) all licenses that have been approved by the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission and the Secretary of Energy for exports and reexports to 

India under parts 110 and 810 of title 10, Code of Federal Regulations;

 (ii) any licenses approved by the Department of Commerce for the 

export or reexport to India of commodities, related technology, and 

software which are controlled for nuclear nonproliferation reasons on the 

Nuclear Referral List of the Commerce Control List maintained under 

part 774 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulation, or any successor 

regulation;

 (iii) any other United States authorizations for the export or 

reexport to India of nuclear materials and equipment; and

 (iv) with respect to each such license or other form of authorization 

described in clauses (i), (ii), and (iii)--

 (I) the number or other identifying information of each license or 

authorization;

 (II) the name or names of the authorized end user or end users;

 (III) the name of the site, facility, or location in India to which the 

export or reexport was made;

 (IV) the terms and conditions included on such licenses and 

authorizations;

 (V) any post-shipment verification procedures that will be applied 

to such exports or reexports; and

 (VI) the term of validity of each such license or authorization;

 (C) a description of any significant nuclear commerce between India 

and other countries, including any such trade that--

 (i) is not consistent with applicable guidelines or decisions of the 

NSG; or

 (ii) would not meet the standards applied to exports or reexports of 

such material, equipment, or technology of United States origin;

 (D) either--

 (i) an assessment that India is in full compliance with the 

commitments and obligations contained in the agreements and other 

documents referenced in clauses (i) through (vi) of paragraph (1)(A); or
US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Coop. Act (P.L. 109–401) 1169

 (ii) an identification and analysis of all compliance issues arising 

with regard to the adherence by India to its commitments and obligations, 

including--

 (I) the measures the United States Government has taken to 

remedy or otherwise respond to such compliance issues;

 (II) the responses of the Government of India to such measures;

 (III) the measures the United States Government plans to take to 

this end in the coming year; and

 (IV) an assessment of the implications of any continued 

noncompliance, including whether nuclear commerce with India remains 

in the national security interest of the United States;

 (E) (i) an assessment of whether India is fully and actively 

participating in United States and international efforts to dissuade, 

isolate, and, if necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to 

acquire weapons of mass destruction, including a nuclear weapons 

capability (including the capability to enrich uranium or reprocess 

nuclear fuel), and the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction, 

including a description of the specific measures that India has taken in 

this regard; and

 (ii) if India is not assessed to be fully and actively participating in 

such efforts, a description of--

 (I) the measures the United States Government has taken to 

secure India's full and active participation in such efforts;

 (II) the responses of the Government of India to such measures; 

and

 (III) the measures the United States Government plans to take in 

the coming year to secure India's full and active participation;

 (F) an analysis of whether United States civil nuclear cooperation 

with India is in any way assisting India's nuclear weapons program, 

including through--

 (i) the use of any United States equipment, technology, or nuclear 

material by India in an unsafeguarded nuclear facility or nuclear-weapons 

related complex;

 (ii) the replication and subsequent use of any United States 

technology by India in an unsafeguarded nuclear facility or 

unsafeguarded nuclear weapons-related complex, or for any activity 

related to the research, development, testing, or manufacture of nuclear 

explosive devices; and

 (iii) the provision of nuclear fuel in such a manner as to facilitate 

the increased production by India of highly enriched uranium or 

plutonium in unsafeguarded nuclear facilities;

 (G) a detailed description of--

 (i) United States efforts to promote national or regional progress by 

India and Pakistan in disclosing, securing, limiting, and reducing their 

fissile material stockpiles, including stockpiles for military purposes, 

pending creation of a worldwide fissile material cut-off regime, including 

the institution of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty;

 (ii) the responses of India and Pakistan to such efforts; and

 (iii) assistance that the United States is providing, or would be able 

to provide, to India and Pakistan to promote the objectives in clause (i), 

consistent with its obligations under international law and existing 

agreements;

 (H) an estimate of--

 (i) the amount of uranium mined and milled in India during the

previous year;
1170 US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Coop. Act (P.L. 109–401)

 (ii) the amount of such uranium that has likely been used or 

allocated for the production of nuclear explosive devices; and

 (iii) the rate of production in India of--

 (I) fissile material for nuclear explosive devices; and

 (II) nuclear explosive devices;

 (I) an estimate of the amount of electricity India's nuclear reactors 

produced for civil purposes during the previous year and the proportion 

of such production that can be attributed to India's declared civil reactors;

 (J) an analysis as to whether imported uranium has affected the rate 

of production in India of nuclear explosive devices;

 (K) a detailed description of efforts and progress made toward the 

achievement of India's--

 (i) full participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative;

 (ii) formal commitment to the Statement of Interdiction Principles 

of such Initiative;

 (iii) public announcement of its decision to conform its export 

control laws, regulations, and policies with the Australia Group and with 

the Guidelines, Procedures, Criteria, and Controls List of the Wassenaar 

Arrangement; and

 (iv) effective implementation of the decision described in clause 

(iii);

 (L) the disposal during the previous year of spent nuclear fuel from 

India's civilian nuclear program, and any plans or activities relating to 

future disposal of such spent nuclear fuel; and

 (M) with respect to the United States-India Agreement for 

Cooperation on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (hereinafter in this 

subparagraph referred to as the “Agreement”) approved under section 

101(a) of the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and 

Nonproliferation Enhancement Act [22 USCS § 8001 note]--

 (i) a listing of--

 (I) all provision of sensitive nuclear technology to India, and 

other such information as may be so designated by the United States or 

India under Article 1(Q); and

 (II) all facilities in India notified pursuant to Article 7(1) of the 

Agreement;

 (ii) a description of--

 (I) any agreed safeguards or any other form of verification for byproduct material decided by mutual agreement pursuant to the terms of 

Article 1(A) of the Agreement;

 (II) research and development undertaken in such areas as may be 

agreed between the United States and India as detailed in Article 2(2)(a.) 

of the Agreement;

 (III) the civil nuclear cooperation activities undertaken under 

Article 2(2)(d.) of the Agreement;

 (IV) any United States efforts to help India develop a strategic 

reserve of nuclear fuel as called for in Article 2(2)(e.) of the Agreement;

 (V) any United States efforts to fulfill political commitments 

made in Article 5(6) of the Agreement;

 (VI) any negotiations that have occurred or are ongoing under 

Article 6(iii.) of the Agreement; and

 (VII) any transfers beyond the territorial jurisdiction of India 

pursuant to Article 7(2) of the Agreement, including a listing of the 

receiving country of each such transfer;

 (iii) an analysis of--
US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Coop. Act (P.L. 109–401) 1171

 (I) any instances in which the United States or India requested 

consultations arising from concerns over compliance with the provisions 

of Article 7(1) of the Agreement, and the results of such consultations; 

and

 (II) any matters not otherwise identified in this report that have 

become the subject of consultations pursuant to Article 13(2) of the 

Agreement, and a statement as to whether such matters were resolved by 

the end of the reporting period; and

 (iv) a statement as to whether--

 (I) any consultations are expected to occur under Article 16(5) of 

the Agreement; and

 (II) any enrichment is being carried out pursuant to Article 6 of 

the Agreement.

 (3) Submittal with other annual reports.

 (A) Report on proliferation prevention. Each annual report submitted 

under paragraph (2) after the initial report may be submitted together 

with the annual report on proliferation prevention required under section 

601(a) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3281(a)).

 (B) Report on progress toward regional nonproliferation. The 

information required to be submitted under paragraph (2)(F) after the 

initial report may be submitted together with the annual report on 

progress toward regional nonproliferation required under section 620F(c) 

of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2376(c)).

 (4) Form. Each report submitted under this subsection shall 

be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified 

annex.1

Sec. 105. United States Compliance with Its Nuclear 

Nonproliferation Treaty Obligations

Nothing in this title constitutes authority for any action in 

violation of an obligation of the United States under the NPT.

Sec. 106. Inoperability of Determination and Waivers

A determination and any waiver under section 104 shall cease to 

be effective if the President determines that India has detonated a nuclear 

explosive device after the date of the enactment of this title.

Sec. 107. MTCR Adherent Status

Congress finds that India is not an MTCR adherent for the 

purposes of section 73 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 

2797b).

Sec. 108. Technical Amendment

Section 1112(c)(4) of the Arms Control and Nonproliferation 

Act of 1999 (title XI of the Admiral James W. Nance and Meg Donovan 

Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001 (as 

enacted into law by section 1000(a)(7) of Public Law 106-113 and 

contained in appendix G of that Act; 113 Stat. 

1501A-486)) is amended--

(1) in subparagraph (B), by striking “and” after the semicolon at 

the end;

(2) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as subparagraph (D); and

(3) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following new 

subparagraph:

“(C) so much of the reports required under section 104 of the 

Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy 

––––––––

1 Amended by P.L. 110-369, Title I, §§ 101(c), 105, 122 Stat. 4029, 4030 (2008).

22 USC 8004.

22 USC 8005.

President. 

22 USC 8006.

22 USC 2652c.
1172 US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Coop. Act (P.L. 109–401)

Cooperation Act of 2006 as relates to verification or compliance 

matters; and”.

Sec. 109. United States-India Scientific Cooperative Nuclear 

Nonproliferation Program

(a) Establishment.--The Secretary of Energy, acting through the 

Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, is 

authorized to establish a cooperative nuclear nonproliferation program to 

pursue jointly with scientists from the United States and India a program 

to further common nuclear nonproliferation goals, including scientific 

research and development efforts, with an emphasis on nuclear 

safeguards (in this section referred to as “the program”).

(b) Consultation.--The program shall be carried out in 

consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.

(c) National Academies Recommendations.--

(1) In general.--The Secretary of Energy shall enter into an 

agreement with the National Academies to develop recommendations 

for the implementation of the program.

(2) Recommendations.--The agreement entered into under 

paragraph (1) shall provide for the preparation by qualified 

individuals with relevant expertise and knowledge and the 

communication to the Secretary of Energy each fiscal year of--

(A) recommendations for research and related programs 

designed to overcome existing technological barriers to nuclear 

nonproliferation; and

(B) an assessment of whether activities and programs 

funded under this section are achieving the goals of the activities 

and programs.

(3) Public availability.--The recommendations and assessments 

prepared under this subsection shall be made publicly available.

(d) Consistency With Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.--All 

United States activities related to the program shall be consistent with 

United States obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

(e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 

appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this section for 

each of fiscal years 2007 through 2011.

Sec. 110. Definitions

In this title:

(1) The term “Additional Protocol” means a protocol additional to 

a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, as negotiated between a 

country and the IAEA based on a Model Additional Protocol as set 

forth in IAEA information circular 

(INFCIRC) 540.

(2) The term “appropriate congressional committees” means the 

Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 

International Relations of the House of Representatives.

(3) The term “dual-use material, equipment, or technology”

means material, equipment, or technology that may be used in nuclear 

or nonnuclear applications.

(4) The term “IAEA safeguards” has the meaning given the term 

in section 830(3) of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 

(22 U.S.C. 6305(3)).

(5) The term “Indian person” means--

(A) a natural person that is a citizen of India or is subject 

to the jurisdiction of the Government of India;

22 USC 8007.

Contracts.

22 USC 8008.
US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Coop. Act (P.L. 109–401) 1173

(B) a corporation, business association, partnership, 

society, trust, or any other nongovernmental entity, organization, 

or group, that is organized under the laws of India or has its 

principal place of business in India; and

(C) any Indian governmental entity, including any 

governmental entity operating as a business enterprise.

(6) The terms “Missile Technology Control Regime”, 

“MTCR”, and “MTCR adherent” have the meanings given the 

terms in section 74 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 

2797c).

(7) The term “nuclear materials and equipment” means source 

material, special nuclear material, production and utilization facilities 

and any components thereof, and any other items or materials that are 

determined to have significance for nuclear explosive purposes 

pursuant to subsection 109 b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 

U.S.C. 2139(b)).

(8) The terms “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty” and “NPT”

mean the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done 

at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into 

force March 5, 1970 (21 UST 483).

(9) The terms “Nuclear Suppliers Group” and “NSG” refer to a 

group, which met initially in 1975 and has met at least annually since 

1992, of Participating Governments that have promulgated and 

agreed to adhere to Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers (currently IAEA 

INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1) and Guidelines for Transfers of NuclearRelated Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software, and Related 

Technology (currently IAEA INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2).

(10) The terms “nuclear weapon” and “nuclear explosive device”

mean any device designed to produce an instantaneous release of an 

amount of nuclear energy from special nuclear material that is greater 

than the amount of energy that would be released from the detonation 

of one pound of trinitrotoluene (TNT).

(11) The term “process” includes the term “reprocess”.

(12) The terms “reprocessing” and “reprocess” refer to the 

separation of irradiated nuclear materials and fission products from 

spent nuclear fuel.

(13) The term “sensitive nuclear technology” means any 

information, including information incorporated in a production or 

utilization facility or important component part thereof, that is not 

available to the public and which is important to the design, 

construction, fabrication, operation, or maintenance of a uranium 

enrichment or nuclear fuel reprocessing facility or a facility for the 

production of heavy water.

(14) The term “source material” has the meaning given the term in 

section 11 z. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(z)).

(15) The term “special nuclear material” has the meaning given 

the term in section 11 aa. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 

U.S.C. 2014(aa)).

(16) The term “unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity” means 

research on, or development, design, manufacture, construction, 

operation, or maintenance of--

(A) any existing or future reactor, critical facility, 

conversion plant, fabrication plant, reprocessing plant, plant for 

the separation of isotopes of source or special fissionable material, 

or separate storage installation with respect to which there is no 
1174 US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Coop. Act (P.L. 109–401)

obligation to accept IAEA safeguards at the relevant reactor, 

facility, plant, or installation that contains source or special 

fissionable material; or

(B) any existing or future heavy water production plant 

with respect to which there is no obligation to accept IAEA 

safeguards on any nuclear material produced by or used in 

connection with any heavy water produced therefrom.
US-IN Nu. Coop. Appvl. & Nonpro. Enhc. Act (P.L. 110–369) 1175

M. UNITED STATES-INDIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION 

APPROVAL AND NONPROLIFERATION ENHANCEMENT ACT

Public Law 110–369 122 Stat. 4028

October 8, 2008

An Act

To approve the United States-India Agreement for Cooperation on 

Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 

United States of America in Congress assembled,

Sec. 1. Short Title and Table of Contents

(a) SHORT TITLE.--This Act may be cited as the “United 

States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation 

Enhancement Act”.

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.--The table of contents for this Act 

is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.

Sec. 2. Definitions.

Title I—Approval of United States-India Agreement for Cooperation 

on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

Sec. 101. Approval of Agreement.

Sec. 102. Declarations of policy; certification requirement; rule of 

construction.

Sec. 103. Additional Protocol between India and the IAEA.

Sec. 104. Implementation of Safeguards Agreement between India and 

the IAEA.

Sec. 105. Modified reporting to Congress.

Title II—Strengthening United States Nonproliferation Law Relating 

to Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation

Sec. 201. Procedures regarding a subsequent arrangement on 

reprocessing.

Sec. 202. Initiatives and negotiations relating to agreements for peaceful 

nuclear cooperation.

Sec. 203. Actions required for resumption of peaceful nuclear 

cooperation.

Sec. 204. United States Government policy at the Nuclear Suppliers 

Group to strengthen the international nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Sec. 205. Conforming amendments.

Sec. 2. Definitions

In this Act:

(1) AGREEMENT.--The term “United States-India 

Agreement for Cooperation on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy” or 

“Agreement” means the Agreement for Cooperation Between the 

Government of the United States of America and the Government of 

India Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy that was 

transmitted to Congress by the President on September 10, 2008.

22 USC 8001.

Note.
1176 US-IN Nu. Coop. Appvl. & Nonpro. Enhc. Act (P.L. 110–369)

(2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.--

The term “appropriate congressional committees” means the 

Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and 

the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

Title I—Approval of United States-India Agreement for Cooperation 

on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

Sec. 101. Approval of Agreement

(a) IN GENERAL.--Notwithstanding the provisions for 

congressional consideration and approval of a proposed agreement for 

cooperation in section 123 b. and d. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 

(42 U.S.C. 2153 (b) and (d)), Congress hereby approves the United 

States-India Agreement for Cooperation on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear 

Energy, subject to subsection (b).

(b) APPLICABILITY OF ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954, 

HYDE ACT, AND OTHER PROVISIONS OF LAW.--The Agreement 

shall be subject to the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 

U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful 

Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 (22 U.S.C. 8001 et. seq; Public 

Law 109-401), and any other applicable United States law as if the 

Agreement had been approved pursuant to the provisions for 

congressional consideration and approval of a proposed agreement for 

cooperation in section 123 b. and d. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

(c) SUNSET OF EXEMPTION AUTHORITY UNDER HYDE 

ACT.--Section 104(f) of the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful 

Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 (22 U.S.C. 8003(f)) is amended 

by striking “the enactment of” and all that follows through “agreement” 

and inserting “the date of the enactment of the United States-India 

Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act”.

Sec. 102. Declarations of Policy; Certification Requirement; Rule of 

Construction

(a) DECLARATIONS OF POLICY RELATING TO 

MEANING AND LEGAL EFFECT OF AGREEMENT.--Congress 

declares that it is the understanding of the United States that the 

provisions of the United States-India Agreement for Cooperation on 

Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy have the meanings conveyed in the 

authoritative representations provided by the President and his 

representatives to the Congress and its committees prior to September 20, 

2008, regarding the meaning and legal effect of the Agreement.

(b) DECLARATIONS OF POLICY RELATING TO 

TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT, MATERIALS, AND 

TECHNOLOGY TO INDIA.--Congress makes the following 

declarations of policy:

(1) Pursuant to section 103(a)(6) of the Henry J. Hyde United 

States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 (22 

U.S.C. 8002(a)(6)), in the event that nuclear transfers to India are 

suspended or terminated pursuant to title I of such Act (22 U.S.C. 

8001 et seq.), the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et 

seq.), or any other United States law, it is the policy of the United 

States to seek to prevent the transfer to India of nuclear equipment, 

materials, or technology from other participating governments in the 

Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) or from any other source.

(2) Pursuant to section 103(b)(10) of the Henry J. Hyde United 

States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 (22 
US-IN Nu. Coop. Appvl. & Nonpro. Enhc. Act (P.L. 110–369) 1177

U.S.C. 8002(b)(10)), any nuclear power reactor fuel reserve provided 

to the Government of India for use in safeguarded civilian nuclear 

facilities should be commensurate with reasonable reactor operating 

requirements.

(c) CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.--Before exchanging 

diplomatic notes pursuant to Article 16(1) of the Agreement, the 

President shall certify to Congress that entry into force and 

implementation of the Agreement pursuant to its terms is consistent with 

the obligation of the United States under the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and 

Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (commonly 

known as the “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty”), not in any way to 

assist, encourage, or induce India to manufacture or otherwise acquire 

nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

(d) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.--Nothing in the Agreement shall 

be construed to supersede the legal requirements of the Henry J. Hyde

United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 or 

the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

Sec. 103. Additional Protocol Between India and the IAEA

Congress urges the Government of India to sign and adhere to 

an Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA), consistent with IAEA principles, practices, and policies, at the 

earliest possible date.

Sec. 104. Implementation of Safeguards Agreement Between India 

and the IAEA

Licenses may be issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

for transfers pursuant to the Agreement only after the President 

determines and certifies to Congress that--

(1) the Agreement Between the Government of India and the 

International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of 

Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities, as approved by the Board of 

Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency on August 1, 

2008 (the “Safeguards Agreement”), has entered into force; and

(2) the Government of India has filed a declaration of facilities 

pursuant to paragraph 13 of the Safeguards Agreement that is not 

materially inconsistent with the facilities and schedule described in 

paragraph 14 of the separation plan presented in the national 

parliament of India on May 11, 2006, taking into account the later 

initiation of safeguards than was anticipated in the separation plan.

Sec. 105. Modified Reporting to Congress

(a) INFORMATION ON NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES OF 

INDIA.--Subsection (g)(1) of section 104 of the Henry J. Hyde United 

States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 (22 

U.S.C. 8003) is amended--

(1) by redesignating subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D) as 

subparagraphs (C), (D), and (E), respectively; and

(2) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the following new 

subparagraph:

“(B) any material inconsistencies between the content or 

timeliness of notifications by the Government of India 

pursuant to paragraph 14(a) of the Safeguards Agreement and 

the facilities and schedule described in paragraph (14) of the 

separation plan presented in the national parliament of India 

on May 11, 2006, taking into account the later initiation of 

safeguards than was anticipated in the separation plan;”.

President.

President.

Certification.
1178 US-IN Nu. Coop. Appvl. & Nonpro. Enhc. Act (P.L. 110–369)

(b) IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE REPORT.--

Subsection (g)(2) of such section is amended--

(1) in subparagraph (K)(iv), by striking “and” at the end;

(2) in subparagraph (L), by striking the period at the end and 

inserting “; and”; and

(3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

“(M) with respect to the United States-India Agreement 

for Cooperation on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 

(hereinafter in this subparagraph referred to as the 

'Agreement') approved under section 101(a) of the United 

States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and 

Nonproliferation Enhancement Act--

“(i) a listing of--

“(I) all provision of sensitive nuclear 

technology to India, and other such information as 

may be so designated by the United States or India 

under Article 1(Q); and

“(II) all facilities in India notified pursuant to 

Article 7(1) of the Agreement;

“(ii) a description of--

“(I) any agreed safeguards or any other form of 

verification for by-product material decided by 

mutual agreement pursuant to the terms of Article 

1(A) of the Agreement;

“(II) research and development undertaken in 

such areas as may be agreed between the United 

States and India as detailed in Article 2(2)(a.) of the 

Agreement;

“(III) the civil nuclear cooperation activities 

undertaken under Article 2(2)(d.) of the Agreement;

“(IV) any United States efforts to help India 

develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel as called 

for in Article 2(2)(e.) of the Agreement;

“(V) any United States efforts to fulfill political 

commitments made in Article 5(6) of the 

Agreement;

“(VI) any negotiations that have occurred or 

are ongoing under Article 6(iii.) of the Agreement; 

and

“(VII) any transfers beyond the territorial 

jurisdiction of India pursuant to Article 7(2) of the 

Agreement, including a listing of the receiving 

country of each such transfer;

“(iii) an analysis of--

“(I) any instances in which the United States or 

India requested consultations arising from concerns 

over compliance with the provisions of Article 7(1) 

of the Agreement, and the results of such 

consultations; and

“(II) any matters not otherwise identified in this 

report that have become the subject of consultations 

pursuant to Article 13(2) of the Agreement, and a 

statement as to whether such matters were resolved 

by the end of the reporting period; and

“(iv) a statement as to whether--
US-IN Nu. Coop. Appvl. & Nonpro. Enhc. Act (P.L. 110–369) 1179

“(I) any consultations are expected to occur 

under Article 16(5) of the Agreement; and

“(II) any enrichment is being carried out 

pursuant to Article 6 of the Agreement.”.

Title II—Strengthening United States Nonproliferation Law Relating 

to Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation

Sec. 201. Procedures Regarding a Subsequent Arrangement on 

Reprocessing

(a) IN GENERAL.--Notwithstanding section 131 of the Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2160), no proposed subsequent 

arrangement concerning arrangements and procedures regarding 

reprocessing or other alteration in form or content, as provided for in 

Article 6 of the Agreement, shall take effect until the requirements 

specified in subsection (b) are met.

(b) REQUIREMENTS.--The requirements referred to in 

subsection (a) are the following:

(1) The President transmits to the appropriate congressional 

committees a report containing--

(A) the reasons for entering into such proposed 

subsequent arrangement;

(B) a detailed description, including the text, of such 

proposed subsequent arrangement; and

(C) a certification that the United States will pursue 

efforts to ensure that any other nation that permits India to 

reprocess or otherwise alter in form or content nuclear 

material that the nation has transferred to India or nuclear 

material and by-product material used in or produced through 

the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, or 

equipment that it has transferred to India requires India to do 

so under similar arrangements and procedures.

(2) A period of 30 days of continuous session (as defined by 

section 130 g. (2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2159 

(g)(2)) has elapsed after transmittal of the report required under 

paragraph (1).

(c) RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVAL.--Notwithstanding the 

requirements in subsection (b) having been met, a subsequent 

arrangement referred to in subsection (a) shall not become effective if 

during the time specified in subsection (b)(2), Congress adopts, and there 

is enacted, a joint resolution stating in substance that Congress does not 

favor such subsequent arrangement. Any such resolution shall be 

considered pursuant to the procedures set forth in section 130 i. of the 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2159 (i)), as amended by section 

205 of this Act.

Sec. 202. Initiatives and Negotiations Relating to Agreements for 

Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation

Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) 

is amended by adding at the end the following:

“e. The President shall keep the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on 

Foreign Relations of the Senate fully and currently informed 

of any initiative or negotiations relating to a new or amended 

agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation pursuant to this 

section (except an agreement arranged pursuant to section 91 

President.

Reports.

Time period.

President.
1180 US-IN Nu. Coop. Appvl. & Nonpro. Enhc. Act (P.L. 110–369)

c., 144 b., 144 c., or 144 d., or an amendment thereto).”.

Sec. 203. Actions Required for Resumption of Peaceful Nuclear 

Cooperation

Section 129 a. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 

2158 (a)) is amended by striking “Congress adopts a concurrent 

resolution” and inserting “Congress adopts, and there is enacted, a joint 

resolution”.

Sec. 204. United States Government Policy at the Nuclear Suppliers 

Group to Strengthen the International Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Regime

(a) CERTIFICATION.--Before exchanging diplomatic notes 

pursuant to Article 16(1) of the Agreement, the President shall certify to 

the appropriate congressional committees that it is the policy of the 

United States to work with members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group 

(NSG), individually and collectively, to agree to further restrict the 

transfers of equipment and technology related to the enrichment of 

uranium and reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel.

(b) PEACEFUL USE ASSURANCES FOR CERTAIN BYPRODUCT MATERIAL.--The President shall seek to achieve, by the 

earliest possible date, either within the NSG or with relevant NSG 

Participating Governments, the adoption of principles, reporting, and 

exchanges of information as may be appropriate to assure peaceful use 

and accounting of by-product material in a manner that is substantially 

equivalent to the relevant provisions of the Agreement.

(c) REPORT.--

(1) IN GENERAL.--Not later than six months after the date of 

the enactment of this Act, and every six months thereafter, the 

President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a 

report on efforts by the United States pursuant to subsections (a) and 

(b).

(2) TERMINATION.--The requirement to transmit the report 

under paragraph (1) terminates on the date on which the President 

transmits a report pursuant to such paragraph stating that the 

objectives in subsections (a) and (b) have been achieved.

Sec. 205. Conforming Amendments

Section 130 i. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 

2159 (i)) is amended--

(1) in paragraph (1), by striking “means a joint resolution” and 

all that follows through “, with the date” and inserting the following: 

“means--

“(A) for an agreement for cooperation pursuant to 

section 123 of this Act, a joint resolution, the matter after the 

resolving clause of which is as follows: 'That the Congress 

(does or does not) favor the proposed agreement for 

cooperation transmitted to the Congress by the President 

on_____ .',

“(B) for a determination under section 129 of this Act, a 

joint resolution, the matter after the resolving clause of which 

is as follows: 'That the Congress does not favor the 

determination transmitted to the Congress by the President 

on_____ .', or

“(C) for a subsequent arrangement under section 201 of 

the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and 

Nonproliferation Enhancement Act, a joint resolution, the 

matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: 'That 

President.
US-IN Nu. Coop. Appvl. & Nonpro. Enhc. Act (P.L. 110–369) 1181

the Congress does not favor the subsequent arrangement to 

the Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of 

the United States of America and the Government of India 

Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy that was 

transmitted to Congress by the President on September 10, 

2008.', with the date”; and

(2) in paragraph (4)--

(A) by inserting after “45 days after its introduction” the 

following “(or in the case of a joint resolution related to a subsequent 

arrangement under section 201 of the United States-India Nuclear 

Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act, 15 

days after its introduction)”; and

(B) by inserting after “45-day period” the following: ”(or in 

the case of a joint resolution related to a subsequent arrangement 

under section 201 of the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation 

Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act, 15-day period)”.

Selected Treaties, Agreements, and Implementing Legislation 1183

2. Selected Treaties, Agreements, 

and Implementing Legislation

Selected Treaties, Agreements, and Implementing Legislation 1185

2. Selected Treaties, Agreements, and Implementing 

Legislation

Contents

A. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY ................................ 1197

ARTICLE I................................................................................................... 1197

ARTICLE II................................................................................................. 1198

ARTICLE III................................................................................................ 1198

ARTICLE IV................................................................................................ 1198

ARTICLE V ................................................................................................. 1199

ARTICLE VI................................................................................................ 1199

ARTICLE VII .............................................................................................. 1199

ARTICLE VIII............................................................................................. 1199

ARTICLE IX................................................................................................ 1200

ARTICLE X ................................................................................................. 1200

ARTICLE XI................................................................................................ 1200

Table: Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval, or Accession by 

States or Organization .................................................................................... 1201

B. THE CONVENTION ON THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF 

NUCLEAR MATERIAL........................................................................ 1206

Article 1......................................................................................................... 1206

Article 2......................................................................................................... 1206

Article 3......................................................................................................... 1207

Article 4......................................................................................................... 1207

Article 5......................................................................................................... 1207

Article 6......................................................................................................... 1208

Article 7......................................................................................................... 1208

Article 8......................................................................................................... 1208

Article 9......................................................................................................... 1209

Article 10....................................................................................................... 1209

Article 11....................................................................................................... 1209

Article 12....................................................................................................... 1209

Article 13....................................................................................................... 1209

Article 14....................................................................................................... 1210

Article 15....................................................................................................... 1210

Article 16....................................................................................................... 1210

Article 17....................................................................................................... 1210

Article 18....................................................................................................... 1210

Article 19....................................................................................................... 1211

Article 20....................................................................................................... 1211

Article 21....................................................................................................... 1211

Article 22....................................................................................................... 1211

Article 23....................................................................................................... 1212

ANNEX 1 ...................................................................................................... 1213

Table: Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material ............... 1215
1186 Selected Treaties, Agreements, and Implementing Legislation

C. CONVENTION ON THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF 

NUCLEAR MATERIAL IMPLEMENTATION ACT OF 1982........ 1219

Sec. 1. Short Title ......................................................................................... 1219

Sec. 2. Implementation of Convention and Prohibition of Related 

Offenses..................................................................................................... 1219

D. CONVENTION ON EARLY NOTIFICATION OF A NUCLEAR 

ACCIDENT ............................................................................................. 1223

Article 1–Scope of Application.................................................................... 1223

Article 2–Notification and Information...................................................... 1223

Article 3–Other Nuclear Accidents............................................................. 1223

Article 4–Functions of the Agency.............................................................. 1223

Article 5–Information to be Provided ........................................................ 1224

Article 6–Consultations ............................................................................... 1224

Article 7–Competent Authorities and Points of Contact.......................... 1224

Article 8–Assistance to State Parties .......................................................... 1224

Article 9–Bilateral and Multilateral Arrangements.................................. 1225

Article 10–Relationship to Other International Agreements................... 1225

Article 11–Settlement of Disputes............................................................... 1225

Article 12–Entry into Force......................................................................... 1225

Article 13–Provisional Application............................................................. 1226

Article 14–Amendments .............................................................................. 1226

Article 15–Denunciation.............................................................................. 1226

Article 16–Depositary .................................................................................. 1226

Article 17–Authentic Texts and Certified Copies...................................... 1226

Table: Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident .................... 1228

E. CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY ......................................... 1232

Preamble ....................................................................................................... 1232

Chapter 1 Objectives, Definitions, and Scope of Application...................... 1232

Article 1–Objectives..................................................................................... 1232

Article 2–Definitions.................................................................................... 1232

Article 3–Scope of Application.................................................................... 1233

Chapter 2 Obligations..................................................................................... 1233

Article 4–Implementing Measures.............................................................. 1233

Article 5–Reporting...................................................................................... 1233

Article 6–Existing Nuclear Installations .................................................... 1233

Article 7–Legislative And Regulatory Framework ................................... 1233

Article 8–Regulatory Body.......................................................................... 1234

Article 9–Responsibility of the License Holder ......................................... 1234

Article 10–Priority to Safety ....................................................................... 1234

Article 11–Financial and Human Resources.............................................. 1234

Article 12–Human Factors.......................................................................... 1234

Article 13–Quality Assurance ..................................................................... 1234

Article 14–Assessment and Verification of Safety..................................... 1234

Article 15–Radiation Protection ................................................................. 1235

Article 16–Emergency Preparedness.......................................................... 1235

Article 17–Siting........................................................................................... 1235

Article 18–Design and Construction........................................................... 1235

Article 19–Operation ................................................................................... 1236

Chapter 3 Meetings of the Contracting Parties............................................ 1236
Selected Treaties, Agreements, and Implementing Legislation 1187

Article 20–Review Meetings........................................................................ 1236

Article 21–Timetable.................................................................................... 1236

Article 22–Procedural Arrangements ........................................................ 1236

Article 23–Extraordinary Meetings............................................................ 1237

Article 24–Attendance ................................................................................. 1237

Article 25–Summary Reports...................................................................... 1237

Article 26–Languages .................................................................................. 1237

Article 27–Confidentiality ........................................................................... 1237

Article 28–Secretariat.................................................................................. 1238

Chapter 4 Final Clauses and Other Provisions............................................. 1238

Article 29–Resolution of Disagreements .................................................... 1238

Article 30–Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval, Accession .... 1238

Article 31–Entry into Force......................................................................... 1238

Article 32–Amendments to the Convention ............................................... 1239

Article 33–Denunciation.............................................................................. 1239

Article 34–Depositary .................................................................................. 1239

Article 35–Authentic Texts.......................................................................... 1240

Table: Signatories and Parties on the Convention on Nuclear Safety............ 1241

F. CONVENTION ON ASSISTANCE IN THE CASE OF A 

NUCLEAR ACCIDENT OR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY .... 1244

Article 1–General Provisions ...................................................................... 1244

Article 2–Provisions of Assistance .............................................................. 1244

Article 3–Direction and Control of Assistance .......................................... 1245

Article 4–Competent Authorities and Points of Contact.......................... 1245

Article 5–Functions of the Agency.............................................................. 1245

Article 6–Confidentiality and Public Statements ...................................... 1246

Article 7–Reimbursement of Costs............................................................. 1246

Article 8–Privileges, Immunities, and Facilities........................................ 1247

Article 9–Transit of Personnel, Equipment, and Property....................... 1247

Article 10–Claims and Compensation........................................................ 1247

Article 11–Termination of Assistance ........................................................ 1248

Article 12–Relationship to Other International Agreements................... 1248

Article 13–Settlement of Disputes............................................................... 1248

Article 14–Entry into Force......................................................................... 1249

Article 15–Provisional Application............................................................. 1249

Article 16–Amendments .............................................................................. 1249

Article 17–Denunciation.............................................................................. 1250

Article 18–Depositary .................................................................................. 1250

Article 19–Authentic Texts and Certified Copies...................................... 1250

Table: Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or 

Radiological Emergency ................................................................................. 1250

G. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I TO THE TREATY FOR THE 

PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA1254

Understandings and Declarations Attached by the United States to Its 

Ratification of Additional Protocol II..................................................... 1255

Additional Protocol I ................................................................................... 1256

ARTICLE 1. ................................................................................................. 1256

ARTICLE 2. ................................................................................................. 1256

ARTICLE 3. ................................................................................................. 1256
1188 Selected Treaties, Agreements, and Implementing Legislation

H. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II TO THE TREATY FOR THE 

PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA1258

Additional Protocol II.................................................................................. 1258

Article 1. ........................................................................................................ 1258

Article 2. ........................................................................................................ 1258

Article 3. ........................................................................................................ 1258

Article 4. ........................................................................................................ 1258

Article 5. ........................................................................................................ 1258

I. TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 

IN LATIN AMERICA............................................................................ 1261

Preamble ....................................................................................................... 1261

Article 1–Obligations................................................................................... 1262

Article 2–Definition of the Contracting Parties......................................... 1262

Article 3–Definition of Territory ................................................................ 1262

Article 4–Zone of Application..................................................................... 1262

Article 5–Definition of Nuclear Weapons .................................................. 1263

Article 6–Meeting of Signatories................................................................. 1263

Article 7–Organization ................................................................................ 1263

Article 8–Organs.......................................................................................... 1263

Article 9–The General Conference ............................................................. 1263

Article 10–The Council................................................................................ 1264

Article 11–The Secretariat .......................................................................... 1264

Article 12–Control System .......................................................................... 1265

Article 13–IAEA Safeguards....................................................................... 1265

Article 14–Reports of the Parties................................................................ 1265

Article 15–Special Reports Requested by the General Secretary ............ 1266

Article 16–Special Inspections .................................................................... 1266

Article 17–Use of Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes......................... 1266

Article 18–Explosions for Peaceful Purposes............................................. 1266

Article 19–Relations with International Atomic Energy Agency............. 1267

Article 20–Relations with Other International Agencies.......................... 1267

Article 21–Measures in the Event of Violation of the Treaty................... 1267

Article 22–United Nations and Organizations of American States.......... 1267

Article 23–Privileges and Immunities ........................................................ 1268

Article 24–Notification of Other Agreements............................................ 1268

Article 25–Settlement of Disputes............................................................... 1268

Article 26–Signature .................................................................................... 1268

Article 27–Ratification and Deposit............................................................ 1268

Article 28–Reservations............................................................................... 1268

Article 29–Entry into Force......................................................................... 1269

Article 30–Amendments .............................................................................. 1269

Article 31–Duration and Denunciation ...................................................... 1269

Article 32–Authentic Texts and Registration ............................................ 1270

Transitional Article...................................................................................... 1270

Additional Protocol...................................................................................... 1270

Table: Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America..... 1271

Table: Additional Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear 

Weapons in Latin America ............................................................................. 1273
Selected Treaties, Agreements, and Implementing Legislation 1189

Table: Additional Protocol II To The Treaty For The Prohibition Of 

Nuclear Weapons In Latin America .............................................................. 1273

J. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY 

PARTICIPATION ACT OF 1957 ......................................................... 1274

Sec. 1. Short Title ......................................................................................... 1274

Sec. 2. Representatives................................................................................. 1274

Sec. 3. Participation ..................................................................................... 1275

Sec. 4. Voting ................................................................................................ 1275

Sec. 5. Salaries and Expenses...................................................................... 1275

Sec. 6. CSR/FEGLI Status........................................................................... 1276

Sec. 7. Special Nuclear Material Compensation........................................ 1277

Sec. 8. Authority Termination..................................................................... 1277

K. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY 

AGENCY ................................................................................................. 1278

Article I–Establishment of the Agency....................................................... 1278

Article II–Objectives.................................................................................... 1278

Article III–Function..................................................................................... 1278

Article IV–Membership............................................................................... 1279

Article V–General Conference.................................................................... 1280

Article VI–Board Of Governors................................................................. 1281

Article VII–Staff........................................................................................... 1282

Article VIII–Exchange of Information....................................................... 1283

Article IX–Supplying of Materials.............................................................. 1283

Article X–Services, Equipment, and Facilities .......................................... 1284

Article XI–Agency Projects......................................................................... 1284

Article XII–Agency Safeguards.................................................................. 1286

Article XIII–Reimbursement of Members................................................. 1287

Article XIV–Finance .................................................................................... 1287

Article XV–Privileges and Immunities....................................................... 1289

Article XVI–Relationship with Other Organizations ............................... 1289

Article XVII–Settlement of Disputes.......................................................... 1289

Article XVIII–Amendments and Withdrawals ......................................... 1289

Article XIX–Suspension of Privileges......................................................... 1290

Article XX–Definitions ................................................................................ 1290

Article XXI–Signature, Acceptance, and Entry into Force ...................... 1291

Article XXII–Registration with the United Nations.................................. 1291

Article XXIII–Authentic Texts and Certified Copies ............................... 1291

Annex I–Preparatory Commission............................................................. 1292

Summary of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency ........ 1293

L. AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF 

AMERICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY 

AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS IN THE 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA........................................................ 1295

ARTICLE 1 .................................................................................................. 1295

ARTICLE 2 .................................................................................................. 1296

ARTICLE 3 .................................................................................................. 1296

ARTICLE 4 .................................................................................................. 1296

ARTICLE 5 .................................................................................................. 1296
1190 Selected Treaties, Agreements, and Implementing Legislation

ARTICLE 6 .................................................................................................. 1297

ARTICLE 7 .................................................................................................. 1297

ARTICLE 8 .................................................................................................. 1297

ARTICLE 9 .................................................................................................. 1298

ARTICLE 10 ................................................................................................ 1298

ARTICLE 11 ................................................................................................ 1298

ARTICLE 12 ................................................................................................ 1298

ARTICLE 13 ................................................................................................ 1298

ARTICLE 14 ................................................................................................ 1298

ARTICLE 15 ................................................................................................ 1299

ARTICLE 16 ................................................................................................ 1299

ARTICLE 17 ................................................................................................ 1299

ARTICLE 18 ................................................................................................ 1299

ARTICLE 19 ................................................................................................ 1299

ARTICLE 20 ................................................................................................ 1299

ARTICLE 21 ................................................................................................ 1299

ARTICLE 22 ................................................................................................ 1300

ARTICLE 23 ................................................................................................ 1300

ARTICLE 24 ................................................................................................ 1300

ARTICLE 25 ................................................................................................ 1300

ARTICLE 26 ................................................................................................ 1300

ARTICLE 27 ................................................................................................ 1300

ARTICLE 28 ................................................................................................ 1300

ARTICLE 29 ................................................................................................ 1301

ARTICLE 30 ................................................................................................ 1301

ARTICLE 31 ................................................................................................ 1301

ARTICLE 32 ................................................................................................ 1301

ARTICLE 33 ................................................................................................ 1301

ARTICLE 34 ................................................................................................ 1301

ARTICLE 35 ................................................................................................ 1302

ARTICLE 36 ................................................................................................ 1302

ARTICLE 37 ................................................................................................ 1302

ARTICLE 38 ................................................................................................ 1302

ARTICLE 39 ................................................................................................ 1303

ARTICLE 40 ................................................................................................ 1303

ARTICLE 41 ................................................................................................ 1303

ARTICLE 42 ................................................................................................ 1304

ARTICLE 43 ................................................................................................ 1304

ARTICLE 44 ................................................................................................ 1304

ARTICLE 45 ................................................................................................ 1304

ARTICLE 46 ................................................................................................ 1304

ARTICLE 47 ................................................................................................ 1305

ARTICLE 48 ................................................................................................ 1305

ARTICLE 49 ................................................................................................ 1305

ARTICLE 50 ................................................................................................ 1305

ARTICLE 51 ................................................................................................ 1305

ARTICLE 52 ................................................................................................ 1305

ARTICLE 53 ................................................................................................ 1305

ARTICLE 54 ................................................................................................ 1305

ARTICLE 55 ................................................................................................ 1306

ARTICLE 56 ................................................................................................ 1306
Selected Treaties, Agreements, and Implementing Legislation 1191

ARTICLE 57 ................................................................................................ 1306

ARTICLE 58 ................................................................................................ 1306

ARTICLE 59 ................................................................................................ 1306

ARTICLE 60 ................................................................................................ 1306

ARTICLE 61 ................................................................................................ 1306

ARTICLE 62 ................................................................................................ 1307

ARTICLE 63 ................................................................................................ 1307

ARTICLE 64 ................................................................................................ 1307

ARTICLE 65 ................................................................................................ 1307

ARTICLE 66 ................................................................................................ 1307

ARTICLE 67 ................................................................................................ 1308

ARTICLE 68 ................................................................................................ 1308

ARTICLE 69 ................................................................................................ 1308

ARTICLE 70 ................................................................................................ 1308

ARTICLE 71 ................................................................................................ 1308

ARTICLE 72 ................................................................................................ 1308

ARTICLE 73 ................................................................................................ 1309

ARTICLE 74 ................................................................................................ 1309

ARTICLE 75 ................................................................................................ 1309

ARTICLE 76 ................................................................................................ 1310

ARTICLE 77 ................................................................................................ 1310

ARTICLE 78 ................................................................................................ 1310

ARTICLE 79 ................................................................................................ 1310

ARTICLE 80 ................................................................................................ 1311

ARTICLE 81 ................................................................................................ 1311

ARTICLE 82 ................................................................................................ 1311

ARTICLE 83 ................................................................................................ 1311

ARTICLE 84 ................................................................................................ 1312

ARTICLE 85 ................................................................................................ 1312

ARTICLE 86 ................................................................................................ 1312

ARTICLE 87 ................................................................................................ 1312

ARTICLE 88 ................................................................................................ 1312

ARTICLE 89 ................................................................................................ 1312

ARTICLE 90 – DEFINITIONS .................................................................. 1313

ARTICLE 1 – PROTOCOL........................................................................ 1315

ARTICLE 2 .................................................................................................. 1315

ARTICLE 3 .................................................................................................. 1315

ARTICLE 4 .................................................................................................. 1315

ARTICLE 5 .................................................................................................. 1315

ARTICLE 6 .................................................................................................. 1316

ARTICLE 7 .................................................................................................. 1316

ARTICLE 8 .................................................................................................. 1316

ARTICLE 9 .................................................................................................. 1316

ARTICLE 10 ................................................................................................ 1317

ARTICLE 11 ................................................................................................ 1317

ARTICLE 12 ................................................................................................ 1317

ARTICLE 13 ................................................................................................ 1317

ARTICLE 14 ................................................................................................ 1317

ARTICLE 15 ................................................................................................ 1317

ARTICLE 16 ................................................................................................ 1317

ARTICLE 17 ................................................................................................ 1318
1192 Selected Treaties, Agreements, and Implementing Legislation

ARTICLE 18 ................................................................................................ 1318

ARTICLE 19 ................................................................................................ 1318

ARTICLE 20 ................................................................................................ 1318

ARTICLE 21 ................................................................................................ 1318

ARTICLE 22 ................................................................................................ 1318

ARTICLE 23 ................................................................................................ 1319

ARTICLE 24 ................................................................................................ 1319

ARTICLE 25 ................................................................................................ 1319

ARTICLE 26 ................................................................................................ 1319

ARTICLE 27 ................................................................................................ 1319

ARTICLE 28 ................................................................................................ 1320

M. U.S. SENATE RESOLUTION CONSENTING TO THE 

RATIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S. 

AND THE IAEA FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS ... 1321

N. PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN 

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE 

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE 

APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS IN THE UNITED STATES 

OF AMERICA ........................................................................................ 1322

Article I–RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PROTOCOL AND THE 

SAFEGUARDS......................................................................................... 1322

Article 2–PROVISION OF INFORMATION ........................................... 1322

Article 3......................................................................................................... 1325

Article 4–COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS ................................................ 1325

Article 5......................................................................................................... 1326

Article 6......................................................................................................... 1326

Article 7......................................................................................................... 1327

Article 8......................................................................................................... 1327

Article 9......................................................................................................... 1327

Article 10....................................................................................................... 1327

Article 11–DESIGNATlON OF AGENCY INSPECTORS...................... 1327

Article 12–VISAS ......................................................................................... 1328

Article 13–SUBSIDIARY ARRANGEMENTS ......................................... 1328

Article 14–COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS .......................................... 1328

Article 15–PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION ..... 1328

Article 16–ANNEXES.................................................................................. 1329

Article 17–ENTRY INTO FORCE............................................................. 1329

Article 18–DEFINITIONS........................................................................... 1329

O. UNITED STATES ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL 

IMPLEMENTATION ACT................................................................... 1331

Title II—United States Additional Protocol Implementation...................... 1331

Sec. 201. Short Title ..................................................................................... 1331

Sec. 202. Findings......................................................................................... 1331

Sec. 203. Definitions..................................................................................... 1332

Sec. 204. Severability. .................................................................................. 1333

Subtitle A—General Provisions ..................................................................... 1333

Sec. 211. Authority....................................................................................... 1333

Subtitle B—Complementary Access.............................................................. 1333
Selected Treaties, Agreements, and Implementing Legislation 1193

Sec. 221. Requirement for Authority to Conduct Complementary 

Access ........................................................................................................ 1333

Sec. 222. Procedures for Complementary Access...................................... 1334

Sec. 223. Consents, Warrants, and Complementary Access..................... 1335

Sec. 224. Prohibited Acts Relating to Complementary Access................. 1336

Subtitle C—Confidentiality of Information .................................................. 1336

Sec. 231. Protection of Confidentiality of Information ............................. 1336

Subtitle D—Enforcement................................................................................ 1336

Sec. 241. Recordkeeping Violations............................................................ 1336

Sec. 242. Penalties......................................................................................... 1337

Sec. 243. Specific Enforcement ................................................................... 1338

Subtitle E—Environmental Sampling ........................................................... 1339

Sec. 251. Notification to Congress of IAEA Board Approval of 

Wide-Area Environmental Sampling ..................................................... 1339

Sec. 252. Application of National Security Exclusion to Wide-Area 

Environmental Sampling ......................................................................... 1339

Sec. 253. Application of National Security Exclusion to LocationSpecific Environmental Sampling........................................................... 1339

Sec. 254. Rule of Construction .................................................................... 1340

Subtitle F—Protection of National Security Information and Activities.... 1340

Sec. 261. Protection of Certain Information .............................................. 1340

Sec. 262. IAEA Inspections and Visits........................................................ 1341

Subtitle G—Reports........................................................................................ 1341

Sec. 271. Report on Initial United States Declaration............................... 1341

Sec. 272. Report on Revisions to Initial United States Declaration ......... 1341

Sec. 273. Content of Reports on United States Declarations.................... 1341

Sec. 274. Report on Efforts to Promote the Implementation of 

Additional Protocols................................................................................. 1341

Sec. 275. Notice Of IAEA Notifications...................................................... 1342

Subtitle H—Authorization of Appropriations.............................................. 1342

Sec. 281. Authorization of Appropriations ................................................ 1342

P. STATUS WITH REGARD TO CONCLUSION OF 

SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS AND ADDITIONAL 

PROTOCOLS AND SMALL QUANTITIES PROTOCOLS ............. 1343

Q. TABLE: IAEA SUPPLY AGREEMENTS ......................................... 1356

R. TABLE: UNITED STATES AGREEMENTS FOR PEACEFUL 

NUCLEAR COOPERATION................................................................ 1359

S. TABLE: TRILATERALS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, 

THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AND 

OTHER COUNTRIES FOR THE APPLICATION OF 

SAFEGUARDS BY THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY 

AGENCY TO EQUIPMENT CONCERNING CIVIL USES OF 

ATOMIC ENERGY................................................................................ 1361
1194 Selected Treaties, Agreements, and Implementing Legislation

T. TABLE: TRILATERALS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, 

THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AND 

OTHER COUNTRIES FOR THE APPLICATION OF 

SAFEGUARDS PURSUANT TO THE NONPROLIFERATION 

TREATY.................................................................................................. 1362

U. CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION OF MARINE 

POLLUTION BY DUMPING OF WASTES AND OTHER 

MATTERS............................................................................................... 1363

ARTICLE I................................................................................................... 1363

ARTICLE II................................................................................................. 1363

ARTICLE III................................................................................................ 1363

ARTICLE IV................................................................................................ 1364

ARTICLE V ................................................................................................. 1364

ARTICLE VI................................................................................................ 1365

ARTICLE VII .............................................................................................. 1365

ARTICLE VIII............................................................................................. 1366

ARTICLE IX................................................................................................ 1366

ARTICLE X ................................................................................................. 1366

ARTICLE XI................................................................................................ 1366

ARTICLE XII .............................................................................................. 1366

ARTICLE XIII............................................................................................. 1367

ARTICLE XIV ............................................................................................. 1367

ARTICLE XV............................................................................................... 1368

ARTICLE XVI............................................................................................. 1368

ARTICLE XVII ........................................................................................... 1368

ARTICLE XVIII.......................................................................................... 1368

ARTICLE XIX ............................................................................................. 1368

ARTICLE XX............................................................................................... 1369

ARTICLE XXI............................................................................................. 1369

ARTICLE XXII ........................................................................................... 1369

ANNEX I....................................................................................................... 1369

ANNEX II..................................................................................................... 1370

ANNEX III.................................................................................................... 1370

A.–Characteristics and Composition of the Matter...................................... 1370

B.–Characteristics of Dumping Site and Method of Deposit....................... 1370

C.–General Considerations and Conditions................................................. 1371

Table: Parties to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by 

Dumping of Wastes and Other matter, with Annexes.................................. 1371

V. JOINT CONVENTION ON THE SAFETY OF SPENT FUEL 

MANAGEMENT AND ON THE SAFETY OF RADIOACTIVE 

WASTE MANAGEMENT..................................................................... 1374

Preamble ....................................................................................................... 1376

Chapter 1. Objectives Definitions And Scope Of Application..................... 1377

Article 1–Objectives..................................................................................... 1377

Article 2–Definitions.................................................................................... 1377

Article 3–Scope of Application.................................................................... 1378

Chapter 2. Safety of Spent Fuel Management .............................................. 1379

Article 4–General Safety Requirements..................................................... 1379
Selected Treaties, Agreements, and Implementing Legislation 1195

Article 5–Existing Facilities......................................................................... 1379

Article 6–Siting of Proposed Facilities ....................................................... 1379

Article 7–Design and Construction of Facilities........................................ 1379

Article 8–Assessment of Safety of Facilities............................................... 1380

Article 9–Operation of Facilities................................................................. 1380

Article 10–Disposal of Spent Fuel............................................................... 1380

Chapter 3. Safety of Radioactive Waste Management................................. 1380

Article 11–General Safety Requirements................................................... 1380

Article 12–Existing Facilities and Past Practices....................................... 1381

Article 13–Siting of Proposed Facilities ..................................................... 1381

Article 14–Design and Construction of Facilities...................................... 1381

Article 15–Assessment of Safety of Facilities............................................. 1381

Article 16–Operation of Facilities............................................................... 1382

Article 17–Institutional Measures after Closure ....................................... 1382

Chapter 4. General Safety Provisions............................................................ 1382

Article 18–Implementing Measures............................................................ 1382

Article 19–Legislative and Regulatory Framework.................................. 1382

Article 20–Regulatory Body........................................................................ 1383

Article 21–Responsibility of the License Holder ....................................... 1383

Article 22–Human and Financial Resources.............................................. 1383

Article 23–Quality Assurance ..................................................................... 1383

Article 24–Operational Radiation Protection............................................ 1383

Article 25–Emergency Preparedness.......................................................... 1384

Article 26–Decommissioning ....................................................................... 1384

Chapter 5. Miscellaneous Provisions ............................................................. 1384

Article 27–Transboundary Movement....................................................... 1384

Article 28–Disused Sealed Sources ............................................................. 1385

Chapter 6. Meetings of The Contracting Parties.......................................... 1385

Article 29–Preparatory Meeting................................................................. 1385

Article 30–Review Meetings........................................................................ 1385

Article 31–Extraordinary Meetings............................................................ 1386

Article 32–Reporting.................................................................................... 1386

Article 33–Attendance ................................................................................. 1386

Article 34–Summary Reports...................................................................... 1387

Article 35–Languages .................................................................................. 1387

Article 36–Confidentiality ........................................................................... 1387

Article 37–Secretariat.................................................................................. 1387

Chapter 7. Final Clauses and Other Provisions............................................ 1388

Article 38–Resolution of Disagreements .................................................... 1388

Article 39–Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval, Accession .... 1388

Article 40–Entry Into Force ........................................................................ 1388

Article 41–Amendments to the Convention ............................................... 1388

Article 42–Denunciation.............................................................................. 1389

Article 43–Depositary .................................................................................. 1389

Article 44–Authentic Texts.......................................................................... 1389

Table: Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on 

the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.............................................. 1390

Declarations/Reservations on the Joint Convention on the Safety of 

Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste 

Management................................................................................................. 1392
1196 Selected Treaties, Agreements, and Implementing Legislation

W. CODE OF CONDUCT ON THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF 

RADIOACTIVE SOURCES.................................................................. 1394

Measures To Strengthen International Cooperation in Nuclear, 

Radiation and Transport Safety and Waste Management....................... 1395

Revised Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive 

Sources (Annex 1) ........................................................................................ 1397

The IAEA's Member States......................................................................... 1397

I. Definitions ................................................................................................. 1398

II. Scope and Objectives.............................................................................. 1399

III. Basic Principles...................................................................................... 1399

Annex: List of Sources Covered by the Code ............................................ 1405

Table I. Activities Corresponding to Thresholds of Categories............... 1406

Open-Ended Meeting of Technical and Legal Experts to Review a Draft 

Revised Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive 

Sources (Annex 2) ........................................................................................ 1408

Report of the Chairman .............................................................................. 1408
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 1197

A. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the “Parties to the Treaty”,

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war 

and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to 

take measurements to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the 

danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for 

the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear 

weapons,

Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic 

Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities.

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the 

application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency 

safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and 

special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain 

strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear 

technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclearweapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available 

for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or nonnuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled 

to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to 

contribute alone or in cooperation with other States, to the further development of the 

applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the 

nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear 

disarmament,

Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning 

nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere in outer space and under water in its Preamble to 

seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time 

and to continue negotiations to this end,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust 

between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, 

the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals 

of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and 

complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must 

refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 

integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with 

the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of 

international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for 

armaments of the world’s human and economic resources,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any 

recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over 

such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist,

encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire 
1198 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or 

explosive devices.

ARTICLE II

Each non-nuclear weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the 

transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 

devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not 

to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; 

and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other 

nuclear explosive devices.

ARTICLE III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept 

safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the 

International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International 

Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose 

of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view 

to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or 

other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article 

shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is 

being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such 

facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied on all source or special 

fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, 

under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special 

fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the 

processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon 

State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be 

subject to the safeguards required by this article.

3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed 

to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or 

technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of 

peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and 

equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful 

purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of 

safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the 

International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either 

individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of International 

Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 

days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their 

instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such 

agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements 

shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of 

negotiations.

ARTICLE IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all 

the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for 

peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this 

Treaty. 

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to 

participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and 

technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty 

in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 1199

States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of 

nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclearweapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the 

developing areas of the world.

ARTICLE V

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in 

accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through 

appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of 

nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the 

Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive 

devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and 

development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such 

benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an 

appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon 

States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty 

enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also 

obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

ARTICLE VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on 

effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to 

nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and compete disarmament under strict 

and effective international control.

ARTICLE VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional 

treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective 

territories.

ARTICLE VIII

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any 

proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall 

circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or 

more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a 

conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an 

amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all 

the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the 

Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members 

of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment 

shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the 

amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the 

Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the 

Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members 

of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it 

shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification 

of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the 

Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this 

Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of 

the Treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the 

Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary 

Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of 

reviewing the operation of the Treaty.
1200 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

ARTICLE IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign 

the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may 

accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of 

ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the 

United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 

and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary 

Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the 

Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States 

signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the 

purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and 

exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification of accession are deposited subsequent 

to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of 

their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding 

States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification 

or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of 

any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to article 

102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw 

from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of 

this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of 

such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United National Security 

Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the 

extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be 

convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue to force indefinitely, or shall be 

extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a 

majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

ARTICLE XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are

equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. 

Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments 

to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

DONE in triplicate, at the cities of Washington, London and Moscow, this first day 

of July one thousand nine hundred sixty-eight.
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 1201

Table: Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval, or Accession by States or 

Organization

Country

Date of

Signature

Date of

Deposit of

Ratification

Date of

Deposit of

Accession (A) or

Successions (S)

Afghanistan* ................................................. 7/1/68..................2/4/70 ............................

Albania* .................................................................. . .......................... ..........9/12/90(A)

Algeria*................................................................... ............................ ..........1/12/95(A)

Andorra* ................................................................. ............................ ..........6/07/96(A)

Angola*................................................................... ............................ ........10/14/96(A)

Antigua and Barbuda*............................................. ............................ ...........6/17/85(S)

Argentina*............................................................... ............................ ..........2/10/95(A)

Armenia*................................................................. ............................ ..........7/15/93(A)

Australia* .................................................... 2/27/70................1/23/73 ............................

Austria*......................................................... 7/1/68................6/27/69 ............................

Azerbaijan* ............................................................. ............................ ..........9/22/92(A)

Bahamas, The*........................................................ ............................ ...........8/11/76(S)

Bahrain* .................................................................. ............................ ..........11/3/88(A)

Bangladesh* ............................................................ ............................ ..........8/31/79(A)

Barbados*...................................................... 7/1/68................2/21/80 ............................

Belarus* .................................................................. ............................ ..........7/22/93(A)

Belgium*..................................................... 8/20/68..................5/2/75 ............................

Belize* .................................................................... ............................ .............8/9/85(S)

Benin ............................................................. 7/1/68..............10/31/72 ............................

Bhutan* ................................................................... ............................ ..........5/23/85(A)

Bolivia*......................................................... 7/1/68................5/26/70 ............................

Bosnia and Herzegovina*........................................ ............................ ...........8/15/94(S)

Botswana*..................................................... 7/1/68................4/28/69 ............................

Brazil*..................................................................... ............................ ..........9/18/98(A)

Brunei*.................................................................... ............................ ..........3/26/85(A)

Bulgaria*....................................................... 7/1/68..................9/5/69 ............................

Burkina Faso* ........................................... 11/25/68..................3/3/70 ............................

Burundi*.................................................................. ............................ ..........3/19/71(A)

Cambodia* .............................................................. ............................ ............6/2/72(A)

Cameroon* .................................................. 7/17/68..................1/8/69 ............................

Canada*....................................................... 7/23/68..................1/8/69 ............................

Cape Verde.............................................................. ............................ ........10/24/79(A)

Central African Republic* ...................................... ............................ ........10/25/70(A)

Chad* ............................................................ 7/1/68................3/10/71 ............................

Chile*...................................................................... ............................ ..........5/25/95(A)

China* ..................................................................... ............................ ............3/9/92(A)

Colombia*..................................................... 7/1/68..................4/8/86 ............................

Comoros* ................................................................ ............................ ..........10/4/95(A)

Congo ...................................................................... ............................ ........10/23/78(A)

Costa Rica* ................................................... 7/1/68..................3/3/70 ............................

Cote d’Ivoire* ............................................... 7/1/68..................3/6/73 ............................

Croatia*................................................................... ............................ ...........6/29/92(S)

Cuba* ...................................................................... ............................ ..........11/4/02(A)

Cyprus* ......................................................... 7/1/68................2/10/70 ............................

Czech Republic* ..................................................... ............................ .............1/1/93(S)

Democratic People’s Republic of 

Korea (Withdrew from treaty 

1/10/03; Effective 4/10/2003) ................................. ............................ ........12/12/85(A)
1202 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

Country

Date of

Signature

Date of

Deposit of

Ratification

Date of

Deposit of

Accession (A) or

Successions (S)

Democratic Republic of the 

Congo (Formerly Zaire)* ............................ 7/22/68..................8/4/70 ............................

Denmark*...................................................... 7/1/68..................1/3/69 ............................

Djibouti* ................................................................. ............................ ........10/16/96(A)

Dominica*............................................................... ............................ ...........8/10/84(S)

Dominican Republic*.................................... 7/1/68................7/24/71 ............................

Ecuador* ....................................................... 7/9/68..................3/7/69 ............................

Egypt* ........................................................... 7/1/68...............2/26/811 ............................

El Salvador*.................................................. 7/1/68................7/11/72 ............................

Equatorial Guinea.................................................... ............................ ..........11/1/84(A)

Eritrea...................................................................... ............................ ............3/3/95(A)

Estonia*................................................................... ............................ ............1/7/92(A)

Ethiopia* ....................................................... 9/5/68..................2/5/70 ............................

Fiji* ......................................................................... ............................ ...........7/14/72(S)

Finland* ........................................................ 7/1/68..................2/5/69 ............................

France*.................................................................... ............................ ............8/3/92(A)

Gabon*.................................................................... ............................ ..........2/19/74(A)

Gambia* ........................................................ 9/4/68................5/12/75 ............................

Georgia*.................................................................. ............................ ............3/7/94(A)

Germany*, Fed. Republic of ..................... 11/28/69..............5/2/75 1,2 ............................

Ghana* .......................................................... 7/1/68..................5/4/70 ............................

Greece* ......................................................... 7/1/68................3/11/70 ............................

Grenada* ................................................................. ............................ .............9/2/75(S)

Guatemala* ................................................. 7/26/68................9/22/70 ............................

Guinea ..................................................................... ............................ ..........4/29/85(A)

Guinea-Bissau ......................................................... ............................ ...........8/20/76(S)

Guyana* .................................................................. ............................ ........10/19/93(A)

Haiti*............................................................. 7/1/68..................6/2/70 ............................

Holy See*................................................................ ............................ .........2/25/71(A)1

Honduras* ................................... ................. 7/1/68................5/16/73 ............................

Hungary*, Republic of.................................. 7/1/68................5/27/69 ............................

Iceland*......................................................... 7/1/68................7/18/69 ............................

Indonesia* ..................................................... 3/2/70...............7/12/791 ............................

Iran* .............................................................. 7/1/68..................2/2/70 ............................

Iraq* .............................................................. 7/1/68..............10/29/69 ............................

Ireland* ......................................................... 7/1/68..................7/1/68 ............................

Italy* ........................................................... 1/28/69.................5/2/751............................

Jamaica*...................................................... 4/14/69..................3/5/70 ............................

Japan*............................................................ 2/3/70.................6/8/761 ............................

Jordan*........................................................ 7/10/68................2/11/70 ............................

Kazakhstan* ............................................................ ............................ ..........2/14/94(A)

Kenya* .......................................................... 7/1/68................6/11/70 ............................

Kiribati* .................................................................. ............................ ...........4/18/85(S)

Kuwait*....................................................... 8/15/68..............11/17/89 ............................

Kyrgyzstan* ................................ ........................... ............................ ............7/5/94(A)

Laos*............................................................. 7/1/68................2/20/70 ............................

Latvia* .................................................................... ............................ ..........1/31/92(A)

Lebanon*....................................................... 7/1/68................7/15/70 ............................

Lesotho*........................................................ 7/9/68................5/20/70 ............................

Liberia ........................................................... 7/1/68..................3/5/70 ............................

Libya* ......................................................... 7/18/68................5/26/75 ............................
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 1203

Country

Date of

Signature

Date of

Deposit of

Ratification

Date of

Deposit of

Accession (A) or

Successions (S)

Liechtenstein* ......................................................... ............................ .........4/20/78(A)1

Lithuania* ............................................................... ............................ ..........9/23/91(A)

Luxembourg* .............................................. 8/14/68..................5/2/75 ............................

Madagascar* ............................................... 8/22/68................10/8/70 ............................

Malawi* .................................................................. ............................ ...........2/18/86(S)

Malaysia* ...................................................... 7/1/68..................3/5/70 ............................

Maldive Islands* ......................................... 9/11/68..................4/7/70 ............................

Mali* ........................................................... 7/14/69................2/10/70 ............................

Malta* ......................................................... 4/17/69..................2/6/70 ............................

Marshall Islands* .................................................... ............................ ..........1/30/95(A)

Mauritania* ............................................................. ............................ ........10/26/93(A)

Mauritius* ..................................................... 7/1/68..................4/8/69 ............................

Mexico* ...................................................... 7/26/68...............1/21/691 ............................

Micronesia............................................................... ............................ ..........4/14/95(A)

Moldova* ................................................................ ............................ ........10/11/94(A)

Monaco*.................................................................. ............................ ..........3/13/95(A)

Mongolia* ..................................................... 7/1/68................5/14/69 ............................

Montenegro ............................................................. ............................ ............6/3/06(A)

Morocco* ...................................................... 7/1/68..............11/27/70 ............................

Mozambique............................................................ ............................ ............9/4/90(A)

Myanmar (Burma) *................................................ ............................ ..........12/2/92(A)

Namibia*................................................................. ............................ ..........10/2/92(A)

Nauru*..................................................................... ............................ ............6/7/82(A)

Nepal* ........................................................... 7/1/68..................1/5/70 ............................

Netherlands* ............................................... 8/20/68.................5/2/753 ............................

New Zealand* ............................................... 7/1/68................9/10/69 ............................

Nicaragua* .................................................... 7/1/68..................3/6/73 ............................

Niger*...................................................................... ............................ ..........10/9/92(A)

Nigeria*......................................................... 7/1/68................9/27/68 ............................

Norway*........................................................ 7/1/68..................2/5/69 ............................

Oman*..................................................................... ............................ ..........1/23/97(A)

Palau*...................................................................... ............................ ..........4/12/95(A)

Panama* ........................................................ 7/1/68................1/13/77 ............................

Papua New Guinea*................................................ ............................ ..........1/13/82(A)

Paraguay*...................................................... 7/1/68..................2/4/70 ............................

Peru* ............................................................. 7/1/68..................3/3/70 ............................

Philippines*................................................... 7/1/68................10/5/72 ............................

Poland*.......................................................... 7/1/68................6/12/69 ............................

Portugal* ................................................................. ............................ ........12/15/77(A)

Qatar*...................................................................... ............................ ............4/3/89(A)

Republic of Korea* ....................................... 7/1/68................4/23/75 ............................

Romania* ...................................................... 7/1/68..................2/4/70 ............................

Russia*5......................................................... 7/1/68..................3/5/70 ............................

Rwanda*.................................................................. ............................ ..........5/20/75(A)

St. Kitts and Nevis*................................................. ............................ ...........3/22/93(S)

St. Lucia* ................................................................ ............................ .........12/28/79(S)

St. Vincent and the Grenadines* ............................. ............................ ...........11/6/84(S)

Samoa*.................................................................... ............................ ......3/17/1975(A)

San Marino*................................ ................. 7/1/68................8/10/70 ............................

Sao Tome and Principe ........................................... ............................ ..........7/20/83(A)

Saudi Arabia*.......................................................... ............................ ..........10/3/88(A)
1204 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

Country

Date of

Signature

Date of

Deposit of

Ratification

Date of

Deposit of

Accession (A) or

Successions (S)

Senegal* ........................................................ 7/1/68..............12/17/70 ............................

Serbia*8 ................................................................... ............................ ..... 1/1/93; 9/5/01

Seychelles*.............................................................. ............................ ..........3/12/85(A)

Sierra Leone* .......................................................... ............................ ..........2/26/75(A)

Singapore* .................................................... 2/5/70................3/10/76 ............................

Slovakia*................................................................. ............................ .............1/1/93(S)

Slovenia*................................................................. ............................ .............4/7/92(S)

Solomon Islands* .................................................... ............................ ...........6/17/81(S)

Somalia......................................................... 7 /1/68..................3/5/70 ............................

South Africa* .......................................................... ............................ ..........7/10/91(A)

Spain*...................................................................... ............................ ..........11/5/87(A)

Sri Lanka* ..................................................... 7/1/68..................3/5/79 ............................

Sudan*....................................................... 12/24/68..............10/31/73 ............................

Suriname* ............................................................... ............................ ...........6/30/76(S)

Swaziland* .................................................. 6/24/69..............12/11/69 ............................

Sweden* ...................................................... 8/19/68..................1/9/70 ............................

Switzerland*.............................................. 11/27/69.................3/9/771 ............................

Syrian Arab Republic*.................................. 7/1/68................9/24/69 ............................

Taiwan7 ......................................................... 7/1/68................1/27/70 ............................

Tajikistan*............................................................... ............................ ..........1/17/95(A)

Tanzania* ................................................................ ............................ ..........5/31/91(A)

Thailand* ................................................................ ............................ ..........12/2/72(A)

The Former Yugoslav Republic 

of Macedonia*......................................................... ............................ ..........4/12/95(A)

Timor-Leste............................................................. ............................ .......5/5/2003 (A)

Togo .............................................................. 7/1/68................2/26/70 ............................

Tonga* .................................................................... ............................ .............7/7/71(S)

Trinidad and Tobago* ................................. 8/20/68..............10/30/86 ............................

Tunisia*......................................................... 7/1/68................2/26/70 ............................

Turkey* ....................................................... 1/28/69..............4/17/80 1 ............................

Turkmenistan*......................................................... ............................ ..........9/29/94(A)

Tuvalu* ................................................................... ............................ ...........1/19/79(S)

Uganda* .................................................................. ............................ ........10/20/82(A)

Ukraine*.................................................................. ............................ ..........12/5/94(A)

United Arab Emirates*............................................ ............................ ..........9/26/95(A)

United Kingdom of Great Britain 

and Northern Ireland* ................................... 7/1/68.............11/27/684 ............................

United States* ............................................... 7/1/68..................3/5/70 ............................

Uruguay*....................................................... 7/1/68................8/31/70 ............................

Uzbekistan*............................................................. ............................ ............5/2/92(A)

Vanuatu ................................................................... ............................ ..........8/26/95(A)

Venezuela*.................................................... 7/1/68................9/25/75 ............................

Vietnam*................................................................. ............................ ..........6/14/82(A)

Yemen*6.................................................... 11/14/68..................6/1/79 ............................

Zambia* .................................................................. ............................ ..........5/15/91(A)

Zimbabwe*.............................................................. ............................ ..........9/26/91(A)

TOTAL: 190 (Total does not include Taiwan.)
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 1205

* - Entries with asterisk have NPT safeguards agreements that have entered into 

force as of 10/31/92.

** - Non-NPT, full-scope safeguards agreement in force.

a - Dates given are the earliest dates on which a country signed the Treaty or 

deposited its instrument of ratification or accession–whether in Washington, London, or 

Moscow. In the case of a country that was a dependent territory which became a party 

through succession, the date given is the date on which the country gave notice that it 

would continue to be bound by the terms of the Treaty.

b - Effective 11/25/75.

1 With Statement. 2 The former German Democratic Republic, which united with the Federal Republic 

of Germany on 10/3/90, had signed the NPT on 7/1/68 and deposited its instrument of 

ratification on 10/31/69. 3 Extended to Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. 4 Extended to Aguilla and territories under the territorial sovereignty of the United 

Kingdom. 5 Russia has given notice that it would continue to exercise the rights and fulfill the 

obligations of the former Soviet Union arising from the NPT. 6 The Republic of Yemen resulted from the union of the Yemen Arab Republic and 

the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. The table indicates the date of signature 

and ratification by the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen; the first of these two 

states to become a party to the NPT. The Yemen Arab Republic signed the NPT on 

9/23/68 and deposited its instrument of ratification on 5/14/86. 7 On 1/27/70, an instrument of ratification was deposited in the name of the Republic 

of China. Effective 1/1/79, the United States recognized the People's Republic of China 

as the sole legal government of China. The authorities on Taiwan state that they will 

continue to abide by the provisions of the Treaty and the United States regards them as 

bound by the obligations imposed by the Treaty. 8 Effective date of succession to the Treaty by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is 

April 27, 1992; the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia signed the Treaty 

on July 10, 1968 and deposited an instrument of ratification, with a declaration, on 

March 4, 1970 and 5 March 1970. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia changed its 

name to Serbia and Montenegro on February 4, 2003.

August 21, 2012
1206 The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

B. THE CONVENTION ON THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION 

OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL

THE STATES PARTIES TO THIS CONVENTION,

RECOGNIZING the right of all States to develop and apply nuclear energy for peaceful 

purposes and their legitimate interests in the potential benefits to be derived from the 

peaceful application of nuclear energy,

CONVINCED of the need for facilitating international co-operation in the peaceful 

application of nuclear energy,

DESIRING to avert the potential dangers posed by the unlawful taking and use of 

nuclear material,

CONVINCED that offences relating to nuclear material are a matter of grave concern 

and that there is an urgent need to adopt appropriate and effective measures to ensure the 

prevention, detection and punishment of such offences,

AWARE OF THE NEED FOR international co-operation to establish, in conformity 

with the national law of each State Party and with this Convention, effective measures 

for the physical protection of nuclear material,

CONVINCED that this Convention should facilitate the safe transfer of nuclear material,

STRESSING also the importance of the physical protection of nuclear material in 

domestic use, storage and transport,

RECOGNIZING the importance of effective physical protection of nuclear material 

used for military purposes, and understanding that such material is and will continue to 

be accorded stringent physical protection,

HAVE AGREED as follows:

Article 1

For the purposes of this Convention:

(a) “nuclear material” means plutonium except that with isotopic concentration 

exceeding 80% in plutonium-238; uranium-233; uranium enriched in the isotope 235 

or 233; uranium containing the mixture of isotopes as occurring in nature other than 

in the form of ore or ore-residue; any material containing one or more of the 

foregoing;

(b) “uranium enriched in the isotope 235 or 233” means uranium containing the 

isotope 235 or 233 or both in an amount such that the abundance ratio of the sum of 

these isotopes to the isotope 238 is greater than the ratio of the isotope 235 to the 

isotope 238 occurring in nature;

(c) “international nuclear transport” means the carriage of a consignment of 

nuclear material by any means of transportation intended to go beyond the territory 

of the State where the shipment originates beginning with the departure from a 

facility of the shipper in that State and ending with the arrival at a facility of the 

receiver within the State of ultimate destination.

Article 2

1. This Convention shall apply to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes while 

in international nuclear transport.

2. With the exception of articles 3 and 4 and paragraph 3 of article 5, this Convention 

shall also apply to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes while in domestic use, 

storage and transport.

3. Apart from the commitments expressly undertaken by States Parties in the articles 

covered by paragraph 2 with respect to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes 

while in domestic use, storage and transport, nothing in this Convention shall be 

interpreted as affecting the sovereign rights of a State regarding the domestic use, 

storage and transport of such nuclear material.
The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 1207

Article 3

Each State Party shall take appropriate steps within the framework of its national 

law and consistent with international law to ensure as far as practicable that, during 

international nuclear transport, nuclear material within its territory, or on board a ship or 

aircraft under its jurisdiction insofar as such ship or aircraft is engaged in the transport to 

or from that State, is protected at the levels described in Annex I.

Article 4

1. Each State Party shall not export or authorize the export of nuclear material unless 

the State Party has received assurances that such material will be protected during the 

international nuclear transport at the levels described in Annex I.

2. Each State Party shall not import or authorize the import of nuclear material from 

a State not party to this Convention unless the State Party has received assurances that 

such material will during the international nuclear transport be protected at the levels 

described in Annex I.

3. A State Party shall not allow the transit of its territory by land or internal 

waterways or through its airports or seaports of nuclear material between States that are 

not parties to this Convention unless the State Party has received assurances as far as 

practicable that this nuclear material will be protected during international nuclear 

transport at the levels described in Annex I.

4. Each State Party shall apply within the framework of its national law the levels of 

physical protection described in Annex I to nuclear material being transported from a 

part of that State to another part of the same State through international waters or 

airspace.

5. The State Party responsible for receiving assurances that the nuclear material will 

be protected at the levels described in Annex I according to paragraphs 1 to 3 shall 

identify and inform in advance States which the nuclear material is expected to transit by 

land or internal waterways, or whose airports or seaports it is expected to enter.

6. The responsibility for obtaining assurances referred to in paragraph 1 may be 

transferred, by mutual agreement, to the State Party involved in the transport as the 

importing State.

7. Nothing in this article shall be interpreted as in any way affecting the territorial 

sovereignty and jurisdiction of a State, including that over its airspace and territorial sea.

Article 5

1. States Parties shall identify and make known to each other directly or through the 

International Atomic Energy Agency their central authority and point of contact having 

responsibility for physical protection of nuclear material and for co-ordinating recovery 

and response operations in the event of any unauthorized removal, use or alteration of 

nuclear material or in the event of credible threat thereof.

2. In the case of theft, robbery or any other unlawful taking of nuclear material or of 

credible threat thereof, States Parties shall, in accordance with their national law, 

provide co-operation and assistance to the maximum feasible extent in the recovery and 

protection of such material to any State that so requests. In particular:

(a) a State Party shall take appropriate steps to inform as soon as possible other 

States, which appear to it to be concerned, of any theft, robbery or other unlawful 

taking of nuclear material or credible threat thereof and to inform, where appropriate, 

international organizations;

(b) as appropriate, the States Parties concerned shall exchange information with 

each other or international organizations with a view to protecting threatened nuclear 

material, verifying the integrity of the shipping container, or recovering unlawfully 

taken nuclear material and shall:

(i) co-ordinate their efforts through diplomatic and other agreed channels;

(ii) render assistance; if requested;
1208 The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

(iii) ensure the return of nuclear material stolen or missing as a consequence 

of the above-mentioned events.

The means of implementation of this co-operation shall be determined by the States 

Parties concerned.

3. States Parties shall co-operate and consult as appropriate, with each other directly 

or through international organizations, with a view to obtaining guidance on the design, 

maintenance and improvement of systems of physical protection of nuclear material in 

international transport.

Article 6

1. States Parties shall take appropriate measures consistent with their national law to 

protect the confidentiality of any information which they receive in confidence by virtue 

of the provisions of this Convention form another State Party or through participation in 

an activity carried out for the implementation of this Convention. If States Parties 

provide information to international organizations in confidence, steps shall be taken to 

ensure that the confidentiality of such information is protected.

2. States Parties shall not be required by this Convention to provide any information 

which they are not permitted to communicate pursuant to national law or which would 

jeopardize the security of the State concerned or the physical protection of nuclear 

material.

Article 7

1. The intentional commission of:

(a) an act without lawful authority which constitutes the receipt, possession, use, 

transfer, alteration, disposal or dispersal of nuclear material and which causes or is 

likely to cause death or serious injury to any person or substantial damage to 

property;

(b) a theft of robbery of nuclear material;

(c) an embezzlement or fraudulent obtaining of nuclear material;

(d) an act constituting a demand for nuclear material by threat or use of force or 

by any other form of intimidation;

(e) a threat:

(i) to use nuclear material to cause death or serious injury to any person or 

substantial property damage, or

(ii) to commit an offence described in sub-paragraph (b) in order to 

compel a natural or legal person, international organization or State to do or 

to refrain from doing any act;

(f) an attempt to commit any offence described in paragraphs (a), (b) or (c); 

and

(g) an act which constitutes participation in any offence described in paragraphs 

(a) to (f) shall be made a punishable offence by each State Party under its national 

law.

2. Each State Party shall make the offences described in this article punishable by 

appropriate penalties which take into account their grave nature.

Article 8

1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its 

jurisdiction over the offences set forth in article 7 in the following cases;

(a) when the offence is committed in the territory of that State or on board a ship 

or aircraft registered in that State;

(b) when the alleged offender is a national of that State.

2. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to 

establish its jurisdiction over these offences in cases where the alleged offender is 

presented in its territory and it does not extradite him pursuant to article 11 to any of the 

States mentioned in paragraph 1.
The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 1209

3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in 

accordance with national law.

4. In addition to the States Parties mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2, each State Party 

may, consistent with international law, establish its jurisdiction over the offences set 

forth in article 7 when it is involved in international nuclear transport as the exporting or 

importing State.

Article 9

Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, the State Party in whose territory 

the alleged offender is present shall take appropriate measures, including detention, 

under its national law to ensure his presence for the purpose of prosecution or 

extradition. Measures taken according to this article shall be notified without delay to 

the States required to establish jurisdiction pursuant to Article 8 and, where appropriate, 

all other States concerned.

Article 10

The State Party in whose territory the alleged offender is present shall, if it does not 

extradite him, submit, without exception whatsoever and without undue delay, the case 

to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in 

accordance with the laws of that State.

Article 11

1. The offences in article 7 shall be deemed to be included as extraditable offences in 

any extradition treaty existing between States Parties. States Parties undertake to include 

those offences as extraditable offences in every future extradition treaty to be concluded 

between them.

2. If a State Party which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty 

receives a request for extradition from another State Party with which it has no 

extradition treaty, it may at its option consider this Convention as the legal basis for 

extradition in respect of those offences. Extradition shall be subject to the other 

conditions provided by the law of the requested State.

3. States Parties which do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a 

treaty shall recognize those offences as extraditable offences between themselves subject 

to the conditions provided by the law of the requested State.

4. Each of the offences shall be treated, for the purpose of extradition between 

States Parties, as if it had been committed not only in the place in which it occurred but 

also in the territories of the States Parties required to establish their jurisdiction in 

accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 8.

Article 12

Any person regarding whom proceedings are being carried out in connection with any of 

the offences set forth in article 7 shall be guaranteed fair treatment at all stages of the 

proceedings.

Article 13

1. States Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in 

connection with criminal proceedings brought in respect of the offences set forth in 

article 7, including the supply of evidence at their disposal necessary for the 

proceedings. The law of the State requested shall apply in all cases.

2. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not affect obligations under any other treaty, 

bilateral or multilateral, which governs or will govern, in whole or in part, mutual 

assistance in criminal matters.
1210 The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

Article 14

1. Each State Party shall inform the depositary of its laws and regulations which 

give effect to this Convention. The depositary shall communicate such information 

periodically to all States Parties.

2. The State Party where an alleged offender is prosecuted shall, wherever 

practicable, first communicate the final outcome of the proceedings to the States directly 

concerned. The State Party shall also communicate the final outcome to the depositary 

who shall inform all States.

3. Where an offence involves nuclear material used for peaceful purposes in 

domestic use, storage or transport, and both the alleged offender and the nuclear material 

remain in the territory of the State Party in which the offence was committed, nothing in 

this Convention shall be interpreted as requiring that State Party to provide information 

concerning criminal proceedings arising out of such an offence.

Article 15

The Annexes constitute an integral part of this Convention.

Article 16

1. A conference of States Parties shall be convened by the depositary of five years 

after the entry into force of this Convention to review the implementation of the 

Convention and its adequacy as concerns the preamble, the whole of the operative part 

and the annexes in the light of the then prevailing situation.

2. At intervals of not less than five years thereafter, the majority of States Parties 

may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the depositary, the convening of 

further conferences with the same objective.

Article 17

1. In the event of a dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the 

interpretation or application of this Convention, such States Parties shall consult with a 

view to the settlement of the dispute by negotiation, or by any other peaceful means of 

settling disputes acceptable to all parties to the dispute.

2. Any dispute of this character which cannot be settled in the manner prescribed in 

paragraph 1 shall, at the request of any party to such dispute, be submitted to arbitration 

or referred to the International Court of Justice for decision. Where a dispute is 

submitted to arbitration, if, within six months from the date of the request, the parties to 

the dispute are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, a party may request 

the President of the International Court of Justice or the Secretary-General of the United 

Nations to appoint one or more arbitrators. In case of conflicting requests by the parties 

to the dispute, the request to the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall have 

priority. Each State Party may at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance or 

approval of this Convention or accession thereto declare that it does not consider itself 

bound by either or both of the dispute settlement procedures provided for in paragraph 2. 

The other States Parties shall not be bound by a dispute settlement procedure provided 

for in paragraph 2, with respect to a State Party which has made a reservation to that 

procedure.

3. Any State Party which has made a reservation in accordance with paragraph 3 

may at any time withdraw that reservation by notification to the depositary.

Article 18

1. This Convention shall be open for signature by all States at the Headquarters of 

the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna and at the Headquarters of the 

United Nations in New York from 3 March 1980 until its entry into force.

2. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the 

signatory States.

3. After its entry into force, this Convention will be open for accession by all States.
The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 1211

(a) This Convention shall be open for signature or accession by international 

organizations and regional organizations of an integration or other nature, provided 

that any such organization is constituted by sovereign States and has competence in 

respect of the negotiation, conclusion and application of international agreements in 

matters covered by this Convention.

(b) In matters within their competence, such organizations shall, on their own 

behalf, exercise the rights and fulfil the responsibilities which this Convention 

attributes to States Parties.

(c) When becoming party to this Convention such an organization shall 

communicate to the depository a declaration indicating which States are members 

thereof and which articles of this Convention do not apply to it.

(d) Such an organization shall not hold any vote additional to those of its 

Member States.

4. Instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited 

with depositary.

Article 19

1. This Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of 

deposit of the twenty-first instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval with the 

depositary. 

2. For each State ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to the Convention after 

the date of deposit of the twenty-first instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval, 

the Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the deposit by such State 

of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

Article 20

1. Without prejudice to article 16 a State Party may propose amendments to this 

Convention. The proposed amendment shall be submitted to the depositary who shall 

circulate it immediately to all States Parties. If a majority of States Parties request the 

depositary to convene a conference to consider the proposed amendments, the depositary 

shall invite all States Parties to attend such a conference to being not sooner than thirty 

days after the invitations are issued. Any amendment adopted at the conference by a 

two-thirds majority of all States Parties shall be promptly circulated by the depositary to 

all States Parties.

2. The amendment shall enter into force for each State Party that deposits its 

instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval of the amendment on the thirtieth day 

after the date on which two thirds of the States Parties have deposited their instruments 

of ratification, acceptance or approval with the depositary. Thereafter, the amendment 

shall enter into force for nay other State Party on the day on which that State Party 

deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval of the amendment.

Article 21

1. Any State Party any denounce this Convention by written notification to the 

depositary.

2. Denunciation shall take effect one hundred and eighty days following the date on 

which notification is received by the depositary.

Article 22

The depositary shall promptly notify all States of:

(a) each signature of this Convention;

(b) each deposit of an instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or 

accession;

(c) any reservation or withdrawal in accordance with article 17;

(d) any communication made by an organization in accordance with paragraph 

4(c) of article 18;
1212 The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

(e) the entry into force of this Convention;

(f) the entry into force of any amendment to this Convention; and 

(g) any denunciation made under article 21.

Article 23

The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian 

and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Director General of 

the International Atomic Energy Agency who shall send certified copies thereof to all 

States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized, have signed this 

Convention, opened for signature at Vienna and at New York on 3 March 1980.
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident 1213

ANNEX 1

Levels of Physical Protection to be Applied in International Transport of Nuclear 

Materials as Categorized in Annex II

1. Levels of physical protection for nuclear material during storage incidental to 

international nuclear transport include:

(a) For Category III materials, storage within an area to which access is 

controlled;

(b) For Category II materials, storage within an area under constant surveillance 

by guards or electronic devices, surrounded by a physical barrier with a limited 

number of points of entry under appropriate control or any area with an equivalent 

level of physical protection;

(c) For Category I material, storage within a protected area as defined for 

Category II above, to which, in addition, access is restricted to persons whose 

trustworthiness has been determined, and which is under surveillance by guards who 

are in close communication with appropriate responses forces. Specific measures 

taken in this context should have as their object the detection and prevention of any 

assault, unauthorized access or unauthorized removal of material.

2. Levels of physical protection for nuclear material during international transport 

include:

(a) For Category II and III materials, transportation shall take place under special 

precautions including prior arrangements among sender, receiver, and carrier, and 

prior agreement between natural or legal persons subject to the jurisdiction and 

regulation of exporting and importing States, specifying time, place and procedures 

for transferring transport responsibility;

(b) For Category I materials, transportation shall take place under special 

precautions identified above for transportation of Category II and III materials, and 

in addition, under constant surveillance by escorts and under conditions which assure 

close communication with appropriate response forces;

(c) For natural uranium other than in the form of ore or ore-residue; 

transportation protection for quantities exceeding 500 kilograms uranium shall 

include advance notification of shipment specifying mode of transport, expected time 

of arrival and confirmation of receipt of shipment.
1214 The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

ANNEX II

TABLE: CATEGORIZATION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL

Material Form

Category

I II III1

1. Plutonium2 Unirradiated3 2 kg or 

more

Less than 2 kg but 

more than 500 g

500 g or less but more 

than 15 g

2. Uranium-235 Unirradiated3

•uranium enriched to 20% 235U or more5 kg or 

more

Less than 5 kg but 

more than 1 kg 

1 kg or less but more 

than 15 g

•uranium enriched to 10% 235U but less than 20%10 kg or more Less than 10 kg but 

more than 1 kg

•uranium enriched above 

natural, but less than 10% 235U

10 kg or more

3. Uranium-233 Unirradiated3 2 kg or 

more

Less than 2 kg but 

more than 500 g

500 g or less but more 

than 15 g

4. Irradiated fuel Depleted or 

natural uranium, 

thorium or lowenriched fuel (less 

than 10% fossile 

content)4 5

––––––––

1 Quantities not falling in Category III and natural uranium should be protected in accordance with prudent 

management practice.

2 All plutonium except that with isotopic concentration exceeding 80 percent in plutonium-238. 3 Material not irradiated in a reactor or material irradiated in a reactor but with a radiation level equal to or 

less than 100 rads/hour at one meter unshielded. 4 Although this level of protection is recommended, it would be open to states, upon evaluation of the 

specific circumstances, to assign a different category of physical protection.

5 Other fuel which by virtue of its original fissile material content is classified as Category I and II before 

irradiation may be reduced one category level while the radiation level from the fuel exceeds 100 rads/hour at 

1 meter unshielded.
The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 1215

Table: Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval or Accession by States or

Organizations

Country/Organization Date of

Signature

Means/Date of Deposit

of Expression of

Consent to be Bound 

Entry into

Force

Afghanistan acceded 12 Sep 2003 12 Oct 2003

Albania acceded 05 Mar 2002 04 Apr 2002

Algeria acceded 30 Apr 2003 03 May 2003

Andorra acceded 27 Jun 2006 27 Jul 2006

Antigua & Barbuda acceded 04 Aug 1993 03 Sep 1993

Argentina 28 Feb 1986 ratified 06 Apr 1989 06 May 1989

Armenia acceded 24 Aug 1993 23 Sep 1993

Australia 22 Feb 1984 ratified 22 Sep 1987 22 Oct 1987

Austriaa 03 Mar 1980 ratified 22 Dec 1988 21 Jan 1989

Azerbaijan acceded 19 Jan 2004 18 Feb 2004

Bahamas acceded 21 May 2008 20 Jun 2008

Bahrain acceded 10 May 2010 09 Jun 2010

Bangladesh acceded 11 May 2005 10 Jun 2005

Belarus succession 09 Sep 1993 14 Jun 1993

Belgium*,a 13 Jun 1980 ratified 06 Sep 1991 06 Oct 1991

Bolivia acceded 24 Jan 2002 23 Feb 2002

Bosnia and

Herzegovina succession 30 Jun 1998 01 Mar 1992

Botswana acceded 19 Sep 2000 19 Oct 2000

Brazil 15 May ratified 17 Oct 1985 08 Feb 1987

Bulgaria 23 Jun 1981 ratified 10 Apr 1984 08 Feb 1987

Burkina Faso acceded 13 Jan 2004 12 Feb 2004

Cambodia acceded 04 Aug 2006 03 Sep 2006

Cameroon acceded 29 Jun 2004 29 Jul 2004

Canada 23 Sep 1980 ratified 21 Mar 1986 08 Feb 1987

Cape Verde acceded 23 Feb 2007 25 Mar 2007

Central African acceded 20 Feb 2008 21 Mar 2008

Chile acceded 27 Apr 1994 27 May 1994

China acceded 10 Jan 1989 09 Feb 1989

Columbia acceded 28 Mar 2003 27 Apr 2003

Comoros acceded 18 May 2007 17 Jun 2007

Costa Rica acceded 02 May 2003 01 Jun 2003

Croatia succession 29 Sep 1992 08 Oct 1991

Cuba acceded 26 Sep 1997 26 Oct 1997

Cyprus acceded 23 Jul 1998 22 Aug 1998

Czech Republic succession 24 Mar 1993 01 Jan 1993

Democratic Rep. of

the Congo acceded 21 Sep 2004 21 Oct 2004

Denmark* 13 Jun 1980 ratified 06 Sep 1991 06 Oct 1991

Djibouti acceded 22 Jun 2004 22 Jul 2004

Dominica acceded 08 Nov 2004 08 Dec 2004

Dominican Republic 03 Mar 1980

Ecuador 26 Jun 1986 ratified 17 Jan 1996 16 Feb 1996

El Salvador acceded 15 Dec 2006 14 Jun 2007

Equatorial Guinea acceded 24 Nov 2003 24 Dec 
1216 The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

Table: Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval or Accession by States or

Organizations

Country/Organization Date of

Signature

Means/Date of Deposit

of Expression of

Consent to be Bound 

Entry into

Force

Estonia acceded 09 May 1994 08 Jun 1994

Fiji acceded 23 May 2008 22 Jun 2008

Finlanda 25 Jun 1981 accepted 22 Sep 1989 22 Oct 1989

France*,a 13 Jun 1980 approved 06 Sep 1991 06 Oct 1991

Gabon acceded 19 Feb 2008 20 Mar 2008

Georgia acceded 07 Sep 2006 07 Oct 2006

Germany*,a 13 Jun 1980 ratified 06 Sep 1991 06 Oct 1991

Ghana acceded 16 Oct 2002 15 Nov 2002

Greece*,a 03 Mar 1980 ratified 06 Sep 1991 06 Oct 1991

Grenada acceded 09 Jan 2002 08 Feb 2002

Guatemala 12 Mar 1980 ratified 23 Apr 1985 08 Feb 1987

Guinea acceded 29 Nov 2005 29 Dec 2005

Guinea-Bissau acceded 08 Oct 2008 07 Nov 2008

Guyana acceded 13 Sep 2007 13 Oct 2007

Haiti 09 Apr 1980

Honduras acceded 28 Jan 2004 27 Feb 2004

Hungary 17 Jun 1980 ratified 04 May 1984 08 Feb 1987

Iceland acceded 18 Jun 2002 18 Jul 2002

India acceded 12 Mar 2002 11 Apr 2002

Indonesia 03 Jul 1986 ratified 05 Nov 1986 08 Feb 1987

Ireland*,a 13 Jun 1980 ratified 06 Sep 1991 06 Oct 1991

Israel 17 Jun 1983 ratified 22 Jan 2002 21 Feb 2002

Italy*,a 13 Jun 1980 ratified 06 Sep 1991 06 Oct 1991

Jamaica acceded 16 Aug 2005 15 Sep 2005

Japan acceded 28 Oct 1988 27 Nov 1988

Jordan acceded 07 Sep 2009 07 Oct 2009

Kazakhstan acceded 02 Sep 2005 02 Oct 2005

Kenya acceded 11 Feb 2002 13 Mar 2002

Korea, Republic of 29 Dec 1981 ratified 07 Apr 1982 08 Feb 1987

Kuwait acceded 23 Apr 2004 23 May 2004

Lao PDR acceded 29 Sep 2010 29 Oct 2010

Latvia acceded 06 Nov 2002 06 Dec 2002

Lebanon acceded 16 Dec 1997 15 Jan 1998

Lesotho acceded 18 Aug 2010 17 Sep 2010

Libyan Arab

Jamahiriya acceded 18 Oct 2000 17 Nov 2000

Liechtenstein 13 Jan 1986 ratified 25 Nov 1986 08 Feb 1987

Lithuania acceded 07 Dec 1993 06 Jan 1994

Luxembourg*,a 13 Jun 1980 ratified 06 Sep 1991 06 Oct 1991

Madagascar acceded 28 Oct 2003 27 Nov 2003

Mali acceded 07 May 2002 06 Jun 2002

Malta acceded 16 Oct 2003 15 Nov 2003

Marshall Islands acceded 07 Feb 2003 09 Mar 2003

Mauritania acceded 29 Jan 2008 28 Feb 2008

Mexico acceded 04 Apr 1988 04 May 1988
The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 1217

Table: Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval or Accession by States or

Organizations

Country/Organization Date of

Signature

Means/Date of Deposit

of Expression of

Consent to be Bound 

Entry into

Force

Monaco acceded 09 Aug 1996 08 Sep 1996

Mongolia 23 Jan 1986 ratified 28 May 1986 08 Feb 1987

Montenegro succession 21 Mar 2007 03 Jun 2006

Morocco 25 Jul 1980 ratified 23 Aug 2002 22 Sep 2002

Mozambique acceded 03 Mar 2003 02 Apr 2003

Namibia acceded 02 Oct 2002 01 Nov 2002

Nauru acceded 12 Aug 2005 11 Sep 2005

Netherlands*,a 13 Jun 1980 accepted 06 Sep 1991 06 Oct 1991

New Zealand acceded 19 Dec 2003 18 Jan 2004

Nicaragua acceded 10 Dec 2004 09 Jan 2005

Niger 07 Jan 1985 ratified 19 Aug 2004 18 Sep 2004

Nigeria acceded 04 Apr 2007 04 May 2007

Niue acceded 19 Jun 2009 19 Jul 2009

Norwaya 26 Jan 1983 ratified 15 Aug 1985 08 Feb 1987

Oman acceded 11 Jun 2003 11 Jul 2003

Pakistan acceded 12 Sep 2000 12 Oct 2000

Palau acceded 24 Apr 2007 24 May 2007

Panama 18 Mar 1980 ratified 01 Apr 1999 01 May 1999

Paraguay 21 May ratified 06 Feb 1985 08 Feb 1987

Peru acceded 11 Jan 1995 10 Feb 1995

Philippines 19 May ratified 22 Sep 1981 08 Feb 1987

Poland 06 Aug 1980 ratified 05 Oct 1983 08 Feb 1987

Portugal*,a 19 Sep 1984 ratified 06 Sep 1991 06 Oct 1991

Qatar acceded 09 Mar 2004 08 Apr 2004

Republic of Moldova acceded 07 May 1998 06 Jun 1998

Romania 15 Jan 1981 ratified 23 Nov 1993 23 Dec 1993

Russian Federation 22 May ratified 25 May 1983 08 Feb 1987

Rwanda acceded 28 Jun 2002 28 July 2002

Saint Kitts and Nevis acceded 29 Aug 2008 28 Sep 2008

Saudi Arabia acceded 07 Jan 2009 06 Feb 2009

Senegal acceded 03 Nov 2003 03 Dec 2003

Serbia 15 Jul 1980 succession 05 Feb 2002 27 Apr 1992

Seychelles acceded 13 Aug 2003 12 Sep 2003

Slovakia succession 10 Feb 1993 01 Jan 1993

Slovenia succession 07 Jul 1992 25 Jun 1991

South Africa 18 May ratified 17 Sep 2007 17 Oct 2007

Spain*,a 07 Apr 1986 ratified 06 Sep 1991 06 Oct 1991

Sudan acceded 18 May 2000 17 Jun 2000

Swaziland acceded 17 Apr 2003 17 May 2003

Swedena 02 Jul 1980 ratified 01 Aug 1980 08 Feb 1987

Switzerlanda 09 Jan 1987 ratified 09 Jan 1987 08 Feb 1987

Tajikistan acceded 11 Jul 1996 10 Aug 1996

The Frmr. Yug. Rep.

Macedonia succession 20 Sep 1996 17 Nov 1991

Togo acceded 07 Jun 2006 07 Jul 2006 
1218 The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

Table: Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval or Accession by States or

Organizations

Country/Organization Date of

Signature

Means/Date of Deposit

of Expression of

Consent to be Bound 

Entry into

Force

Tonga acceded 24 Jan 2003 23 Feb 2003

Trinidad and

Tobago acceded 25 Apr 2001 25 May 2001

Tunisia acceded 08 Apr 1993 08 May 1993

Turkey 23 Aug 1983 ratified 27 Feb 1985 08 Feb 1987

Turkmenistan acceded 07 Jan 2005 06 Feb 2005

Uganda acceded 10 Dec 2003 10 Jan 2004

Ukraine acceded 06 Jul 1993 05 Aug 1993

United Arab Emirates acceded 16 Oct 2003 15 Nov 2003

United Kingdom*,a 13 Jun 1980 ratified 06 Sep 1991 06 Oct 1991

United Republic of

Tanzania acceded 24 May 2006 23 Jun 2006

United States

of America 03 Mar 1980 ratified 13 Dec 1982 08 Feb 1987

Uruguay acceded 24 Oct 2003 23 Nov 2003

Uzbekistan acceded 09 Feb 1998 11 Mar 1998

Yemen acceded 31 May 2007 30 Jun 2007

EURATOMa 13 Jun 1980 confirmed 06 Sep 1991 06 Oct 1991

*Signed or ratified as a EURATOM member state.

a

Deposited an objection to the declaration of Pakistan.

Notes: The Convention entered into force on 8 February 1987, i.e., on the 

thirtieth day following the deposit of the twenty-first instrument of 

ratification, acceptance or approval with the Director General pursuant to 

Article 19, paragraph 1.

Status: 145 parties

 45 signatories

Last change of status: 29 September 2010
Conv. on the Phys. Prot. of Nucl. Mat. Impl. Act (P.L. 97–351) 1219

C. CONVENTION ON THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION

OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL IMPLEMENTATION

ACT OF 19821

Public Law 97–351 96 Stat. 1663

October 18, 1982

An Act

To amend Title 18 of the United States Code to implement the 

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and for 

other purposes. 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 

United States of America in Congress assembled,

Sec. 1. Short Title

This Act may be cited as the “Convention on the Physical Protection 

of Nuclear Material Implementation Act of 1982.”

Sec. 2. Implementation of Convention and Prohibition of Related 

Offenses

(a) Chapter 39 of Title 18 of the United States Code is amended by 

inserting after the table of sections at the beginning of such Chapter the 

following new section:

Sec. 831. Prohibited transactions involving nuclear materials

(a) Whoever, if one of the circumstances described in subsection 

(c) of this section occurs–

(1) without lawful authority, intentionally receives, possesses, 

uses, transfers, alters, disposes of, or disperses any nuclear 

material for nuclear byproduct material and–

(A) thereby knowingly causes the death of or serious 

bodily injury to any person or substantial damage to property 

or to the environment; or

(B) circumstances exist, or have been represented to the 

defendant to exist, that are likely to cause the death or serious 

bodily injury to any person, or substantial damage to property 

or to the environment;

(2) with intent to deprive another of nuclear material or 

nuclear byproduct material, knowingly–

(A) takes and carries away nuclear material or nuclear 

byproduct material of another without authority;

(B) makes an unauthorized uses, disposition, or transfer, of 

nuclear material or nuclear byproduct material belonging to 

another; or

(C) uses fraud and thereby obtains nuclear material or 

nuclear byproduct material belonging to another;

(3) knowingly–

(A) uses force; or

(B) threatens or places another in fear that any person 

other than the actor will imminently be subject to bodily 

––––––––

1 Added and amended by P.L. 97–351, § 2(a), 96 Stat. 1663 (1982); P.L. 100–690, Title 

VII, Subtitle B, § 7022, 102 Stat. 4397 (1988); P.L. 103–272, § 5(e)(6), 108 Stat. 1374

(1994); P.L. 103–322, Title XXXIII, § 330016(2)(C), 108 Stat. 2148 (1994); P.L. 104–132, 

Title V, Subtitle A, § 502, 110 Stat. 1282 (1996).

18 USC 831 

note.

18 USC 831.
1220 Conv. on the Phys. Prot. of Nucl. Mat. Impl. Act (P.L. 97–351)

injury; and thereby takes nuclear material or nuclear 

byproduct material belonging to another from the person or 

presence of any other;

(4) intentionally intimidates any person and thereby obtains 

nuclear material or nuclear byproduct material belonging to 

another;

(5) with intent to compel any person, international 

organization, or governmental entity to do or refrain from doing 

any act, knowingly threatens to engage in conduct described in 

paragraph 

(2)(A) or (3) of this subsection;

(6) knowingly threatens to use nuclear material or nuclear 

byproduct material to cause death or serious bodily injury to any 

person or substantial damage to property or to the environment 

under circumstances in which the threat may reasonably be 

understood as an expression of serious purposes;

(7) attempts to commit an offense under paragraph (1), (2), 

(3), or (4) of this subsection; or

(8) is a party to a conspiracy of two or more persons to 

commit an offense under paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) of this 

subsection, if any of the parties intentionally engages in any 

conduct in furtherance of such offense; shall be punished as 

provided in subsection (b) of this section.

(b) The punishment for an offense under–

(1) paragraphs (1) through (7) of subsection (a) of this section 

is–

(A) a fine under this Title; and

(B) imprisonment–

(i) for any term of years or for life 

(I) if, while committing the offense, the 

offender knowingly causes the death of any person; 

or

(II) if, while committing an offense under 

paragraph (1) or (3) of subsection (a) of this 

section, the offender, under circumstances 

manifesting extreme indifference to the life of an 

individual, knowingly engages in any conduct and 

thereby recklessly causes the death of or serious 

body injury to any person; and

(ii) for not more than 20 years in any other case; and

(2) paragraph (8) of subsection (a) of this section is–

(A) a fine under this Title; and

(B) imprisonment–

(i) for not more than 20 years if the offense which is 

the object of the conspiracy is punishable under paragraph 

(1)(B)(i); and

(ii) for not more than 10 years in any other case.

(c) The circumstances referred to in subsection (a) of this section 

are that–

(1) the offense is committed in the United States or the special 

maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or the 

special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States (as defined in 

section 46501 of Title 49);

(2) an offender or a victim is–

(A) a national of the United States; or
Conv. on the Phys. Prot. of Nucl. Mat. Impl. Act (P.L. 97–351) 1221

(B) a United States corporation or other legal entity;

(3) after the conduct required for the offense occurs the 

defendant is found in the United States, even if the conduct 

required for the offense occurs outside the United States; or

(4) the conduct required for the offense occurs with respect to 

the carriage of a consignment of nuclear material or nuclear 

byproduct mater by any means of transportation intended to go 

beyond the territory of the state where the shipment originates 

beginning with the departure from a facility of the shipper in that 

state and ending with the arrival at a facility of the receiver within 

the state of ultimate destination and either of such states is the 

United States; or 

(5) either–

(A) the governmental entity under subsection (a)(5) is the 

United States; or

(B) the threat under subsection (a)(6) is directed at the 

United States

(d) The Attorney General may request assistance from the 

Secretary of Defense under Chapter 18 of Title 10 in the enforcement 

of this section and the Secretary of Defense may provide such 

assistance in accordance with Chapter 18 of Title 10, except that the 

Secretary of Defense may provide such assistance through any 

Department of Defense personnel.

(e)(1) The Attorney General may also request assistance from the 

Secretary of Defense under this subsection in the enforcement of this 

section. Notwithstanding section 1385 of this Title, the Secretary of 

Defense may, in accordance with other applicable law, provide such 

assistance to the Attorney General if–

(A) an emergency situation exists (as jointly determined by 

the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense in their 

discretion); and

(B) the provision of such assistance will not adversely 

affect the military preparedness of the United States (as 

determined by the Secretary of Defense in such Secretary’s 

discretion).

(2) As used in this subsection, the term “emergency situation” 

means a circumstance–

(A) that poses a serious threat to the interests of the United 

States; and

(B) in which–

(i) enforcement of the law would be seriously impaired 

if the assistance were not provided; and

(ii) civilian law enforcement personnel are not capable 

of enforcing the law.

(3) Assistance under this section may include–

(A) use of personnel of the Department of Defense to 

arrest persons and conduct searches and seizures with respect 

to violations of this section; and

(B) such other activity as is incidental to the enforcement 

of this section, or to the protection of persons or property from 

conduct that violates this section.

(4) The Secretary of Defense may require reimbursement as a 

condition of assistance under this section.

10 USC 371 et 

seq.

18 USC 1385.

Emergency 

situation.
1222 Conv. on the Phys. Prot. of Nucl. Mat. Impl. Act (P.L. 97–351)

(5) The Attorney General may delegate the Attorney General’s 

function under this subsection only to a Deputy, Associate, or 

Assistant Attorney General.

(f) As used in this section–

(1) the term “nuclear material” means material containing 

any–

(A) plutonium;

(B) uranium not in the form of ore or ore residue that 

contains the mixture of isotopes as occurring in nature;

(C) enriched uranium, defined as uranium that contains the 

isotope 233 or 235 or both in such amount that the abundance 

ratio of the sum of those isotopes to the isotope 238 is greater 

than the ratio of the isotope 235 to the isotope 238 occurring 

in nature; or

(D) uranium 233;

(2) the term “nuclear byproduct material” means any material 

containing any radioactive isotope created through an irradiation 

process in the operation of a nuclear reactor or accelerator;

(3) the term “international organization” means a public 

international organization designated as such pursuant to section 1 

of the International Organizations Immunities Act (22USC288) or 

a public organization created pursuant to treaty or other agreement 

under international law as an instrument through or by which two 

or more foreign governments engage in some aspect of their 

conduct of international affairs;

(4) the term “serious bodily injury” means bodily injury which 

involves–

(A) a substantial risk of death;

(B) extreme physical pain;

(C) protracted and obvious disfigurement; or

(D) protracted loss or impairment of the function of a 

bodily member, organ, or mental faculty;

(5) the term “bodily injury” means–

(A) a cut, abrasion, bruise, burn, or disfigurement;

(B) physical pain;

(C) illness;

(D) impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ, 

or mental faculty; or

(E) any other injury to the body, no matter how temporary. 

(6) the term “national of the United States” has the same 

meaning as in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and 

Nationality Act (8 USC 1101(a)(22)); and

(7) the term “United States corporation or other legal entity” 

means any corporation or other entity organized under the laws of 

the United States or any State, Commonwealth, territory, 

possession, or district of the United States.

Definitions.
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident 1223

D. CONVENTION ON EARLY NOTIFICATION OF A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT

Adopted September 26, 1986, Entered into Force October 27, 1986

THE STATES PARTIES TO THIS CONVENTION,

AWARE that nuclear activities are being carried out in a number of States,

NOTING THAT comprehensive measures have been and are being taken to ensure a 

high level of safety in nuclear activities, aimed at preventing nuclear accidents and 

minimizing the consequences of any such accident, should it occur,

DESIRING to strengthen further international co-operation on the safe development 

and use of nuclear energy,

CONVINCED of the need for States to provide relevant information about nuclear 

accidents as early as possible in order that transboundary radiological consequences can 

be minimized,

NOTING the usefulness of bilateral and multilateral arrangements on information 

exchange in this area,

HAVE AGREED as follows:

Article 1–Scope of Application

1. This Convention shall apply in the event of any accident involving facilities or 

activities of a State Party or of persons or legal entities under its jurisdiction or control, 

referred to in paragraph 2 below, from which a release of radioactive material occurs or 

is likely to occur and which has resulted or may result in an international transboundary 

release that could be of radiological safety significance for another State.

2. The facilities and activities referred to in paragraph 1 are the following:

(a) any nuclear reactor wherever located;

(b) any nuclear fuel cycle facility;

(c) any radioactive waste management facility;

(d) the transport and storage of nuclear fuels or radioactive wastes;

(e) the manufacture, use, storage, disposal and transport of radioisotopes for 

agricultural, industrial, medical and related scientific and research purposes; and

(f) the use of radioisotopes for power generation in space objects.

Article 2–Notification and Information

In the event of an accident specified in article 1 (hereinafter referred to as a “nuclear 

accident”), the State Party referred to in that article shall:

(a) forthwith notify, directly or through the International Atomic Energy Agency 

(hereinafter referred to as the “Agency”), those States which are or may be physically 

affected as specified in article 1 and the Agency of the nuclear accident, its nature, the 

time of its occurrence and its exact location where appropriate; and

(b) promptly provide the States referred to in subparagraph (a), directly or 

through the Agency, and the Agency with such available information relevant to 

minimizing the radiological consequences in those States, as specified in article 5.

Article 3–Other Nuclear Accidents

With a view to minimizing the radiological consequences, States Parties may notify 

in the event of nuclear accidents other than those specified in article 1.

Article 4–Functions of the Agency

The Agency shall:

(a) forthwith inform States Parties, Member States, other States which are or may 

be physically affected as specified in article 1 and relevant international 

intergovernmental organizations (hereinafter referred to as “international organizations”) 

of a notification received pursuant to subparagraph (a) of article 2; and
1224 Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident

(b) promptly provide any State Party, Member State or relevant international 

organization, upon request, with the information received pursuant to sub-paragraph (b) 

of article 2.

Article 5–Information to be Provided

1. The information to be provided pursuant to subparagraph (b) of article 2 shall 

comprise the following data as then available to the notifying State Party:

(a) the time, exact location where appropriate, and the nature of the nuclear 

accident;

(b) the facility or activity involved;

(c) the assumed or established cause and the foreseeable development of the 

nuclear accident relevant to the transboundary release of the radioactive materials;

(d) the general characteristics of the radioactive release, including, as far as is 

practicable and appropriate, the nature, probable physical and chemical form and the 

quantity, composition and effective height of the radioactive release;

(e) information on current and forecast meteorological and hydrological 

conditions, necessary for forecasting the transboundary release of the radioactive 

materials;

(f) the results of environmental monitoring relevant to the transboundary release 

of the radioactive materials;

(g) the off-site protective measures taken or planned;

(h) the predicted behavior over time of the radioactive release.

2. Such information shall be supplemented as appropriate intervals by further 

relevant information on the development of the emergency situation, including its 

foreseeable or actual termination.

3. Information received pursuant to sub-paragraph (b) of article 2 may be used 

without restriction, except when such information is provided in confidence by the

notifying State Party.

Article 6–Consultations

A State Party providing information pursuant to subparagraph (b) of article 2 shall, 

as far as is reasonably practicable, response promptly to a request for further information 

or consultations sought by an affected State Party with a view to minimizing the 

radiological consequences in that State.

Article 7–Competent Authorities and Points of Contact

1. Each State Party shall make known to the Agency and to other States Parties, 

directly or through the Agency, its competent authorities and point of contact 

responsible for issuing and receiving the notification and information referred to in 

article

2. Such points of contact and a focal point within the Agency shall be available 

continuously. 2. Each State Party shall promptly inform the Agency of any changes that 

may occur in the information referred to in paragraph 1.

3. The Agency shall maintain an up-to-date list of such national authorities and 

points of contact as well as points of contact of relevant international organizations and 

shall provide it to States Parties and Member States and to relevant international 

organizations.

Article 8–Assistance to State Parties

The Agency shall, in accordance with its Statute and upon a request of a State Party 

which does not have nuclear activities itself and borders on a State having an active 

nuclear programme but not Party, conduct investigations into the feasibility and 

establishment of an appropriate radiation monitoring system in order to facilitate the 

achievement of the objectives of this Convention.
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident 1225

Article 9–Bilateral and Multilateral Arrangements

In furtherance of their mutual interests, States Parties may consider, where deemed 

appropriate, the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral arrangements relating to the 

subject matter of this Convention.

Article 10–Relationship to Other International Agreements

This Convention shall not affect the reciprocal rights and obligations of States 

Parties under existing international agreements which relate to the matters covered by 

this Convention, or under future international agreements concluded in accordance with 

the object and purpose of this Convention.

Article 11–Settlement of Disputes

1. In the event of a dispute between States Parties, or between a State Party and 

the Agency, concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention, the parties 

to the dispute shall consult with a view to the settlement of the dispute by negotiation or 

by any other peaceful means of settling disputes acceptable to them.

2. If a dispute of this character between States Parties cannot be settled within 

one year from the request for consultation pursuant to paragraph 1, it shall, at the request 

of any party to such dispute, be submitted to arbitration or referred to the International 

Court of Justice for decision. Where a dispute is submitted to arbitration, if, within six 

months from the date of the request, the parties to the dispute are unable to agree on the 

organization of the arbitration, a party may request the President of the International 

Court of Justice or the Secretary-General of the United Nations to appoint one or more 

arbitrators. In cases of conflicting requests by the parties to the dispute, the request to the 

Secretary-General of the United Nations shall have priority.

3. When signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to this Convention, 

a State may declare that it does not consider itself bound by either or both of the dispute 

settlement procedures provided for in paragraph 2. The other States Parties shall not be 

bound by a dispute settlement procedure provided for in paragraph 2 with respect to a 

State Party for which such a declaration is in force.

4. A State Party which made a declaration in accordance with paragraph 3 may at 

any time withdraw it by notification to the depositary.

Article 12–Entry into Force

1. This Convention shall be open for signature by all States and Namibia, 

represented by the United Nations Council for Namibia, at the Headquarters of the 

International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna and at the Headquarters of the United 

Nations in New York, from 26 September 1986 and 6 October 1986 respectively, until 

its entry into force or for twelve months, whichever period is longer.

2. A State and Namibia, represented by the United Nations Council for Namibia, 

may express its consent to be bound by this Convention either by signature, or by 

deposit of an instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval following signature made 

subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, or by deposit of an instrument of 

accession. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be 

deposited with the depositary.

3. This Convention shall enter into force thirty days after consent to be bound has 

been expressed by three States.

4. For each State expressing consent to be bound by this Convention after its 

entry into force, this Convention shall enter into force for that State thirty days after the 

date of expression of consent.

5. (a) This Convention shall be open for accession, as provided for in this article, 

by international organizations and regional integration organizations constituted by 

sovereign States, which have competence in respect of the negotiation, conclusion and 

application of international agreements in matters covered by this Convention.
1226 Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident

(b) In matters within their competence such organizations shall, on their own 

behalf, exercise the rights and fulfill the obligations which this Convention attributes to 

States Parties.

(c) When depositing its instrument of accession, such an organization shall 

communicate to the depositary a declaration indicating the extent of its competence in 

respect of matters covered by this Convention.

(d) Such an organization shall not hold any vote additional to those of its 

Member States.

Article 13–Provisional Application

A State may, upon signature or at any later date before this Convention enters into 

force for it, declare that it will apply this Convention provisionally.

Article 14–Amendments

1. A State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. The proposed 

amendment shall be submitted to the depositary who shall circulate it immediately to all 

other States Parties.

2. If a majority of the States Parties request the depositary to convene a 

conference to consider the proposed amendments, the depositary shall invite all States 

Parties to attend such a conference to begin not sooner than thirty days after the 

invitations are issued. Any amendment adopted at the conference by a two-thirds 

majority of all States Parties shall be laid down in a protocol which is open to signature 

in Vienna and New York by all States Parties.

3. The protocol shall enter into force thirty days after consent to be bound has 

been expressed by three States. For each State expressing consent to be bound by the 

protocol after its entry into force, the protocol shall enter into force for that State thirty 

days after the date of expression of consent.

Article 15–Denunciation

1. A State Party may denounce this Convention by written notification to the 

depositary.

2. Denunciation shall take effect one year following the date on which the 

notification is received by the depositary.

Article 16–Depositary

1. The Director General of the Agency shall be the depositary of this Convention.

2. The Director General of the Agency shall promptly notify States Parties and all 

other States of:

(a) each signature of this Convention or any protocol of amendment;

(b) each deposit of an instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or 

accession concerning this Convention or any protocol of amendment;

(c) any declaration or withdrawal thereof in accordance with article 11;

(d) any declaration of provisional application of this Convention in accordance 

with article 13;

(e) the entry into force of this Convention and of any amendment thereto; and

(f) any denunciation made under article 15.

Article 17–Authentic Texts and Certified Copies

The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, 

Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Director 

General of the International Atomic Energy Agency who shall send certified copies to 

States Parties and all other States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized, have signed 

this Convention, open for signature as provided for in paragraph 1 of article 12.
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident 1227

ADOPTED by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy 

Agency meeting in special session at Vienna on the twenty -sixth day of September one 

thousand nine hundred and eighty-six.
1228 Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident

Table: Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident

Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval, or Accession by States or 

Organizations

Country/

Organization

Date of

Signature

Means/Date of Deposit of 

Expression of Consent to be 

Bound

D / W* Instrument Entry into Force

Date of 

Deposit

Albania accession 30 Sep 2003 30 Oct 2003

Algeria 24 Sep 1987 ratification 15 Jan 2004  15 Feb 2004

Angola accession 22 Dec 2004 22 Jan 2005

Argentina accession 17 Jan 1990  17 Feb 1990

Armenia accession 24 Aug 1993 24 Sep 1993

Australia 26 Sep 1986 ratification 22 Sep 1987  23 Oct 1987

Austria 26 Sep 1986 ratification 18 Feb 1988 20 Mar 1988

Bahamas 26 Sep 1986 

Bahrain accession 05 May 2011  04 Jun 2011

Bangladesh accession 07 Jan 1988 07 Feb 1988

Belarus 26 Sep 1986 ratification 26 Jan 1987  26 Feb 1987

Belgium 26 Sep 1986 ratification 04 Jan 1999 04 Feb 1999

Bolivia accession 22 Aug 2003  21 Sep 2003

Bosnia and 

Herzegovina succession 30 Jun 1988 01 Mar 1992

Botswana accession 11 Nov 2011 11 Dec 2011

Brazil 26 Sep 1986 ratification 04 Dec 1990 04 Jan 1991

Bulgaria 26 Sep 1986 ratification 24 Feb 1988   26 Mar 1988

Cambodia accession 05 Apr 2012 05 May 2012

Cameroon 25 Sep 1987 ratification 17 Jan 2006 16 Feb 2006 

Canada 26 Sep 1986 ratification 18 Jan 1990  18 Feb 1990

Chile 26 Sep 1986 ratification 15 Nov 2005 15 Dec 2005

China 26 Sep 1986 ratification 10 Sep 1987  11 Oct 1987

Colombia accession 28 Mar 2003 28 Apr 2003

Costa Rica 26 Sep 1986 ratification 16 Sep 1991 17 Oct 1991

Côte d’Ivoire 26 Sep 1986 

Croatia succession 29 Sep 1992 08 Oct 1991

Cuba 26 Sep 1986 ratification 08 Jan 1991  08 Feb 1991

Cyprus accession 04 Jan 1989 04 Feb 1989

Czech Republic succession 24 Mar 1993 01 Jan 1993

Dem. P.R. of Korea 29 Sep 1986 

Dem. Republic of

the Congo 30 Sep 1986

Denmark 26 Sep 1986 signature 26 Sep 1986 27 Oct 1986

Dominican Republic accession 29 Apr 2010 29 May 2010

Egypt 26 Sep 1986 ratification 06 Jul 1988  06 Aug 1988

El Salvador accession  26 Feb 2005

Estonia accession 09 May 1994 09 Jun 1994

Finland 26 Sep 1986 approval 11 Dec 1986 11 Jan 1987

France 26 Sep 1986 approval 06 Mar 1989  06 Apr 1989
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident 1229

Table: Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident

Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval, or Accession by States or 

Organizations

Country/

Organization

Date of

Signature

Means/Date of Deposit of 

Expression of Consent to be 

Bound

D / W* Instrument Entry into Force

Date of 

Deposit

Gabon accession 19 Feb 2008 20 Mar 2008

Georgia accession 06 Oct 2010 05 Nov 2010

Germany 26 Sep 1986 ratification 14 Sep 1989  15 Oct 1989

Greece 26 Sep 1986 ratification 06 Jun 1991  07 Jul 1991

Guatemala 26 Sep 1986 ratification 08 Aug 1988 08 Sep 1988

Holy See 26 Sep 1986 

Hungary 26 Sep 1986 ratification 10 Mar 1987   10 Apr 1987

Iceland 26 Sep 1986 ratification 27 Sep 1989 28 Oct 1989

India 29 Sep 1986 ratification 28 Jan 1988  28 Feb 1988

Indonesia 26 Sep 1986 ratification 12 Nov 1993  13 Dec 1993

Iran, Islamic 

Republic of 26 Sep 1986 ratification 09 Oct 2000  09 Nov 2000 

Iraq 12 Aug 1987 ratification 21 Jul 1988  21 Aug 1988

Ireland 26 Sep 1986 ratification 13 Sep 1991 14 Oct 1991

Israel 26 Sep 1986 ratification 25 May 1989  25 Jun 1989

Italy 26 Sep 1986 ratification 08 Feb 1990  11 Mar 1990

Japan 06 Mar 1987 acceptance 09 Jun 1987 10 Jul 1987

Jordan 02 Oct 1986 ratification 11 Dec 1987 11 Jan 1988

Kazakhstan accession 10 Mar 2010 09 Apr 2010

Korea, Republic of accession 08 Jun 1990 09 Jul 1990

Kuwait accession 13 May 2003 13 Jun 2003

Latvia accession 28 Dec 1992 28 Jan 1993

Lebanon 26 Sep 1986 ratification 17 Apr 1997 18 May 1997

Libyan Arab 

Jamahiriya accession 13 Aug 2009 12 Sep 2009

Liechtenstein 26 Sep 1986 ratification 19 Apr 1994 20 May 1994

Lithuania accession 16 Nov 1994 17 Dec 1994

Luxembourg 26 Sep 1986 ratification 26 Sep 2000 27 Oct 2000

Malaysia 01 Sep 1987 signature 01 Sep 1987  02 Oct 1987

Mali 02 Oct 1986 ratification 01 Oct 2007 31 Oct 2007

Mauritania accession 19 Sep 2011 19 Oct 2011

Mauritius accession 17 Aug 1992  17 Sep 1992

Mexico 26 Sep 1986 ratification 10 May 1988 10 Jun 1988

Monaco 26 Sep 1986 approval 19 Jul 1989  19 Aug 1989

Mongolia 08 Jan 1987 ratification 11 Jun 1987   12 Jul 1987

Montenegro succession 21 mar 2007 03 Jun 2006

Morocco 26 Sep 1986 ratification 07 Oct 1993 07 Nov 1993

Mozambique accession 30 Oct 2009 29 Nov 2009

Myanmar accession 18 Dec 1997  18 Jan 1998

Netherlands 26 Sep 1986 acceptance 23 Sep 1991  24 Oct 1991

New Zealand accession 11 Mar 1987 11 Apr 1987

Nicaragua accession 11 Nov 1993  12 Dec 1993
1230 Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident

Table: Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident

Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval, or Accession by States or 

Organizations

Country/

Organization

Date of

Signature

Means/Date of Deposit of 

Expression of Consent to be 

Bound

D / W* Instrument Entry into Force

Date of 

Deposit

Niger 26 Sep 1986

Nigeria 21 Jan 1987 ratification 10 Aug 1990 10 Sep 1990

Norway 26 Sep 1986 signature 26 Sep 1986 27 Oct 1986

Oman accession 09 Jul 2009  08 Aug 2009

Pakistan accession 11 Sep 1989  12 Oct 1989

Panama 26 Sep 1986 ratification 01 Apr 1999 02 May 1999

Paraguay 02 Oct 1986

Peru accession 17 Jul 1995  17 Aug 1995

Philippines accession 05 May 1997 05 Jun 1997

Poland 26 Sep 1986 ratification 24 Mar 1988   24 Apr 1988

Portugal 26 Sep 1986 ratification 30 Apr 1993 31 May 1993

Qatar accession 04 Nov 2005 04 Dec 2005

Republic of Moldova accession 07 May 1998 07 Jun 1998

Romania accession 12 Jun 1990  13 Jul 1990

Russian Federation 26 Sep 1986 ratification 23 Dec 1986  24 Jan 1987

St. Vincent & the 

Grenadines accession 18 Sep 2001 19 Oct 2001

Saudi Arabia accession 03 Nov 1989  04 Dec 1989

Senegal 15 Jun 1987 ratification 24 Dec 2008 23 Jan 2009

Serbia 27 May 1987 succession 05 Feb 2002 27 Apr 1992

Sierra Leone 25 Mar 1987

Singapore accession 15 Dec 1997 15 Jan 1998

Slovakia succession 10 Feb 1993  01 Jan 1993

Slovenia succession 07 Jul 1992  25 Jun 1991

South Africa 10 Aug 1987 ratification 10 Aug 1987  10 Sep 1987

Spain 26 Sep 1986 ratification 13 Sep 1989  14 Oct 1989

Sri Lanka accession 11 Jan 1991  11 Feb 1991

Sudan 26 Sep 1986

Sweden 26 Sep 1986 ratification 27 Feb 1987 30 Mar 1987

Switzerland 26 Sep 1986 ratification 31 May 1988 01 Jul 1988

Syrian Arab

 Republic 02 Jul 1987

Tajikistan accession 02 Sep 2011 01 Oct 2011

Thailand 25 Sep 1987 ratification 21 Mar 1989  21 Apr 1989

The Fmr.Yug. Rep. 

of Macedonia succession 20 Sep 1996 17 Nov 1991

Tunisia 24 Feb 1987 ratification 24 Feb 1989 27 Mar 1989

Turkey 26 Sep 1986 ratification 03 Jan 1991  03 Feb 1991

Ukraine 26 Sep 1986 ratification 26 Jan 1987  26 Feb 1987

United Arab

Emirates accession 02 Oct 1987  02 Nov 1987

United Kingdom 26 Sep 1986 ratification 09 Feb 1990  12 Mar 1990
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident 1231

Table: Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident

Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval, or Accession by States or 

Organizations

Country/

Organization

Date of

Signature

Means/Date of Deposit of 

Expression of Consent to be 

Bound

D / W* Instrument Entry into Force

Date of 

Deposit

United Republic of 

Tanzania accession 27 Jan 2005 26 Feb 2005

United States of

America 26 Sep 1986 ratification 19 Sep 1988  20 Oct 1988

Uruguay accession 21 Dec 1989 21 Jan 1990

Viet Nam accession 29 Sep 1987  30 Oct 1987

Zimbabwe 26 Sep 1986 

EURATOM accession 14 Nov 2006  14 Dec 2006

Food & Agriculture

 Org. (FAO) accession 19 Oct 1990  19 Nov 1990

World Health

 Org. (WHO) accession 10 Aug 1988  10 Sep 1988

World

 Meteorological

 Org. (WMO) accession 17 Apr 1990  18 May 1990

*

”D” denotes Declaration etc. / “W” denotes Withdrawal.

Note: The Convention entered into force on 27 October 1986, i.e. thirty days after the date on 

which the third State expressed their consent to be bound, pursuant to Article 12, para. 3.

Number of Parties: 114

Signatories: 69

Last change of status: 05 April 2012
1232 Convention on Nuclear Safety

E. CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY

Adopted September 20, 1994, Entered into Force October 27, 1986

Preamble

The Contracting Parties,

(i) Aware of the importance to the international community of ensuring that the use 

of nuclear energy is safe, well regulated and environmentally sound;

(ii) Reaffirming the necessity of continuing to promote a high level of nuclear safety 

worldwide;

(iii) Reaffirming that responsibility for nuclear safety rests with the State having 

jurisdiction over a nuclear installation;

(iv) Desiring to promote an effective nuclear safety culture;

(v) Aware that accidents at nuclear installations have the potential for transboundary 

impacts;

(vi) Keeping in mind the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 

(1979), the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (1986), and the 

Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency 

(1986);

(vii) Affirming the importance of international cooperation for the enhancement of 

nuclear safety through existing bilateral and multilateral mechanisms and the 

establishment of this incentive Convention;

(viii) Recognizing that this Convention entails a commitment to the application of 

fundamental safety principles for nuclear installations rather than of detailed safety 

standards and that there are internationally formulated safety guidelines which are 

updated from time to time and so can provide guidance on contemporary means of 

achieving a high level of safety;

(ix) Affirming the need to begin promptly the development of an international 

convention on the safety of radioactive waste management as soon as the ongoing 

process to develop waste management safety fundamentals has resulted in broad 

international agreement;

(x) Recognizing the usefulness of further technical work in connection with the 

safety of other parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, and that this work may, in time, facilitate 

the development of current or future international instruments;

Have agreed as follows:

Chapter 1

Objectives, Definitions, and Scope

of Application

Article 1–Objectives

The objectives of this Convention are:

(i) to achieve and maintain a high level of nuclear safety worldwide through the

enhancement of national measures and international co-operation including, where 

appropriate, safety-related technical co-operation;

(ii) to establish and maintain effective defenses in nuclear installations against 

potential radiological hazards in order to protect individuals, society and the 

environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation from such installations;

(iii) to prevent accidents with radiological consequences and to mitigate such 

consequences should they occur.

Article 2–Definitions

For the purpose of this Convention:

(i) “nuclear installation” means for each Contracting Party any land-based civil 

nuclear power plant under its jurisdiction including such storage, handling and treatment 
Convention on Nuclear Safety 1233

facilities for radioactive materials as are on the same site and are directly related to the 

operation of the nuclear power plant. Such a plant ceases to be a nuclear installation 

when all nuclear fuel elements have been removed permanently from the reactor core 

and have been stored safely in accordance with approved procedures, and a 

decommissioning program has been agreed to by the regulatory body;

(ii) “regulatory body” means for each Contracting Party any body or bodies given 

the legal authority by that Contracting Party to grant licences and to regulate the siting, 

design, construction, commissioning, operation or decommissioning of nuclear 

installations;

(iii) “licence” means any authorization granted by the regulatory body to the 

applicant to have the responsibility for the siting, design, construction, commissioning, 

operation or decommissioning of a nuclear installation.

Article 3–Scope of Application

This Convention shall apply to the safety of nuclear installations.

Chapter 2

Obligations

(a) General Provisions

Article 4–Implementing Measures 

Each Contracting Party shall take, within the framework of its national law, the 

legislative, regulatory and administrative measures and other steps necessary for 

implementing its obligations under this Convention.

Article 5–Reporting 

Each Contracting Party shall submit for review, prior to each meeting referred to in 

Article 20, a report on the measures it has taken to implement each of the obligations of 

this Convention.

Article 6–Existing Nuclear Installations 

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that the safety of 

nuclear installations existing at the time the Convention enters into force for that 

Contracting Party is reviewed as soon as possible. When necessary in the context of this 

Convention, the Contracting Party shall ensure that all reasonably practicable 

improvements are made as a matter of urgency to upgrade the safety of the nuclear 

installation. If such upgrading cannot be achieved, plans should be implemented to shut 

down the nuclear installation as soon as practically possible. The timing of the shutdown 

may take into account the whole energy context and possible alternatives as well as the 

social, environmental and economic impact.

(b) Legislation and Regulation

Article 7–Legislative And Regulatory Framework

1. Each Contracting Party shall establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory 

framework to govern the safety of nuclear installations.

2. The legislative and regulatory framework shall provide for:

(i) the establishment of applicable national safety requirements and 

regulations;

(ii) a system of licensing with regard to nuclear installations and the 

prohibition of the operation of a nuclear installation without a license;

(iii) a system of regulatory inspection and assessment of nuclear installations 

to ascertain compliance with applicable regulations and the terms of licenses;
1234 Convention on Nuclear Safety

(iv) the enforcement of applicable regulations and of the terms of licenses, 

including suspension, modification or revocation.

Article 8–Regulatory Body

1. Each Contracting Party shall establish or designate a regulatory body entrusted 

with the implementation of the legislative and regulatory framework referred to in 

Article 7, and provided with adequate authority, competence and financial and human 

resources to fulfill its assigned responsibilities.

2. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure an effective 

separation between the functions of the regulatory body and those of any other body or 

organization concerned with the promotion or utilization of nuclear energy.

Article 9–Responsibility of the License Holder

Each Contracting Party shall ensure that prime responsibility for the safety of a 

nuclear installation rests with the holder of the relevant license and shall take the 

appropriate steps to ensure that each such license holder meets its responsibility.

(c) General Safety Considerations

Article 10–Priority to Safety 

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that all 

organizations engaged in activities directly related to nuclear installations shall establish 

policies that give due priority to nuclear safety.

Article 11–Financial and Human Resources 

1. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that adequate 

financial resources are available to support the safety of each nuclear installation 

throughout its life.

2. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that sufficient 

numbers of qualified staff with appropriate education, training and retraining are 

available for all safety-related activities in or for each nuclear installation, throughout its 

life.

Article 12–Human Factors

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that the capabilities 

and limitations of human performance are taken into account throughout the life of a 

nuclear installation.

Article 13–Quality Assurance

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that quality 

assurance programs are established and implemented with a view to providing 

confidence that specified requirements for all activities important to nuclear safety are 

satisfied throughout the life of a nuclear installation.

Article 14–Assessment and Verification of Safety

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:

(i) comprehensive and systematic safety assessments are carried out before the 

construction and commissioning of a nuclear installation and throughout its life. 

Such assessments shall be well documented, subsequently updated in the light of 

operating experience and significant new safety information, and reviewed under the 

authority of the regulatory body;

(ii) verification by analysis, surveillance, testing and inspection is carried out to 

ensure that the physical state and the operation of a nuclear installation continue to 

be in accordance with its design, applicable national safety requirements, and 

operational limits and conditions.
Convention on Nuclear Safety 1235

Article 15–Radiation Protection

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that in all 

operational states the radiation exposure to the workers and the public caused by a 

nuclear installation shall be kept as low as reasonably achievable and that no individual 

shall be exposed to radiation doses which exceed prescribed national dose limits.

Article 16–Emergency Preparedness

1. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that there are onsite and off-site emergency plans that are routinely tested for nuclear installations and 

cover the activities to be carried out in the event of an emergency. For any new nuclear 

installation, such plans shall be prepared and tested before it commences operation 

above a low power level agreed by the regulatory body.

2. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that, insofar as 

they are likely to be affected by a radiological emergency, its own population and the 

competent authorities of the States in the vicinity of the nuclear installation are, provided 

with appropriate information for emergency planning and response.

3. Contracting Parties which do not have a nuclear installation on their territory, 

insofar as they are likely to be affected in the event of a radiological emergency at a 

nuclear installation in the vicinity, shall take the appropriate steps for the preparation 

and testing of emergency plans for their territory that cover the activities to be carried 

out in the event of such an emergency.

(d) Safety of Installations

Article 17–Siting

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that appropriate 

procedures are established and implemented:

(i) for evaluating all relevant site-related factors likely to affect the safety of a 

nuclear installation for its projected lifetime;

(ii) for evaluating the likely safety impact of a proposed nuclear installation on 

individuals, society and the environment;

(iii) for re-evaluating as necessary all relevant factors referred to in subparagraphs (i) and (ii) so as to ensure the continued safety acceptability of the 

nuclear installation; (iv) for consulting Contracting Parties in the vicinity of a 

proposed nuclear installation, insofar as they are likely to be affected by that 

installation and, upon request providing the necessary information to such 

Contracting Parties, in order to enable them to evaluate and make their own 

assessment of the likely safety impact on their own territory of the nuclear 

installation.

Article 18–Design and Construction

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:

(i) the design and construction of a nuclear installation provides for several 

reliable levels and methods of protection (defense in depth) against the release of 

radioactive materials, with a view to preventing the occurrence of accidents and to 

mitigating their radiological consequences should they occur;

(ii) the technologies incorporated in the design and construction of a nuclear 

installation are proven by experience or qualified by testing or analysis;

(iii) the design of a nuclear installation allows for reliable, stable and easily 

manageable operation, with specific consideration of human factors and the manmachine interface.
1236 Convention on Nuclear Safety

Article 19–Operation

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:

(i) the initial authorization to operate a nuclear installation is based upon an 

appropriate safety analysis and a commissioning program demonstrating that the 

installation, as constructed, is consistent with design and safety requirements;

(ii) operational limits and conditions derived from the safety analysis, tests and 

operational experience are defined and revised as necessary for identifying safe 

boundaries for operation;

(iii) operation, maintenance, inspection and testing of a nuclear installation are 

conducted in accordance with approved procedures;

(iv) procedures are established for responding to anticipated operational 

occurrences and to accidents;

(v) necessary engineering and technical support in all safety related fields is 

available throughout the lifetime of a nuclear installation;

(vi) incidents significant to safety are reported in a timely manner by the holder 

of the relevant license to the regulatory body;

(vii) programs to collect and analyze operating experience are established, the 

results obtained and the conclusions drawn are acted upon and that existing 

mechanisms are used to share important experience with international bodies and 

with other operating organizations and regulatory bodies;

(viii) the generation of radioactive waste resulting from the operation of nuclear 

installation is kept to the minimum practicable for the process concerned, both in 

activity and in volume, and any necessary treatment and storage of spent fuel and 

waste directly related to the operation and on the same site as that of the nuclear 

installation take into consideration conditioning and disposal.

Chapter 3

Meetings of the Contracting Parties

Article 20–Review Meetings

1. The Contracting Parties shall hold meetings (hereinafter referred to as “review 

meetings”) for the purpose of reviewing the reports submitted pursuant to Article 5 in 

accordance with the procedures adopted under Article 22.

2. Subject to the provisions of Article 24 sub-groups comprised of representatives of 

Contracting Parties may be established and may function during the review meetings as 

deemed necessary for the purpose of reviewing specific subjects contained in the reports.

3. Each Contracting Party shall have a reasonable opportunity to discuss the reports 

submitted by other Contracting Parties and to seek clarification of such reports.

Article 21–Timetable

1. A preparatory meeting of the Contracting Parties shall be held not later than six 

months after the date of entry into force of this Convention.

2. At this preparatory meeting, the Contracting Parties shall determine the date for 

the first review meeting. This review meeting shall be held as soon as possible, but not 

later than thirty months after the date of entry into force of this Convention.

3. At each review meeting, the Contracting Parties shall determine the date for the 

next such meeting. The interval between review meetings shall not exceed three years.

Article 22–Procedural Arrangements

1. At the preparatory meeting held pursuant to Article 21 the Contracting Parties 

shall prepare and adopt by consensus Rules of Procedure and Financial Rules. The 

Contracting Parties shall establish in particular and in accordance with the Rules of 

Procedure:

(i) guidelines regarding the form and structure of the reports to be submitted 

pursuant to Article 5;
Convention on Nuclear Safety 1237

(ii) a date for the submission of such reports;

(iii) the process for reviewing such reports;

2. At review meetings the Contracting Parties may, if necessary, review the 

arrangements established pursuant to subparagraphs (i)-(iii) above, and adopt revisions 

by consensus unless otherwise provided for in the Rules of Procedure. They may also 

amend the Rules of Procedure and the Financial Rules, by consensus. 

Article 23–Extraordinary Meetings

An extraordinary meeting of the Contracting Parties shall be held:

(i) if so agreed by a majority of the Contracting Parties present and voting at a 

meeting, abstentions being considered as voting; or

(ii) at the written request of a Contracting Party, within six months of this request 

having been communicated to the Contracting Parties and notification having been 

received by the secretariat referred to in Article 28, that the request has been 

supported by a majority of the Contracting Parties.

Article 24–Attendance

1. Each Contracting Party shall attend meetings of the Contracting Parties and be 

represented at such meetings by one delegate, and by such alternates, experts and 

advisers as it deems necessary.

2. The Contracting Parties may invite, by consensus, any intergovernmental 

organization which is competent in respect of matters governed by this Convention to 

attend, as an observers, any meeting, or specific sessions thereof. Observers shall be 

required to accept in writing, and in advance, the provisions of Article 27.

Article 25–Summary Reports

The Contracting Parties shall adopt, by consensus, and make available to the public a 

document addressing issues discussed and conclusions reached during a meeting.

Article 26–Languages

1. The languages of meetings of the Contracting Parties shall be Arabic, Chinese, 

English, French, Russian and Spanish unless otherwise provided in the Rules of 

Procedure.

2. Reports submitted pursuant to Article 5 shall be prepared in the national language 

of the submitting Contracting Party or in a single designated language to be agreed in the 

Rules of Procedure. Should the report be submitted in a national language other than the 

designated language, a translation of the report into the designated language shall be 

provided by the Contracting Party.

3. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2, if compensated, the secretariat will 

assume the translation into the designated language of reports submitted in any other 

language of the meeting.

Article 27–Confidentiality

1. The provisions of this Convention shall not affect the rights and obligations of the 

Contracting Parties under their law to protect information from disclosure. For the 

purposes of this Article, “information” includes, inter alia:

(i) personal data;

(ii) information protected by intellectual property rights or by industrial or 

commercial confidentiality; and

(iii) information relating to national security or to the physical protection of 

nuclear materials or nuclear installations.

2. When, in the context of this Convention, a Contracting Party provides information 

identified by it as protected as described in paragraph 1, such information shall be used 

only for the purposes for which it has been provided and its confidentiality shall be 

respected.
1238 Convention on Nuclear Safety

3. The content of the debates during the reviewing of the reports by the Contracting 

Parties at each meeting shall be confidential.

Article 28–Secretariat

1. The International Atomic Energy Agency, (hereinafter referred to as the 

“Agency”) shall provide secretariat for the meetings of the Contracting Parties.

2. The secretariat shall:

(i) convene, prepare and service the meetings of the Contracting Parties;

(ii) transmit to the Contracting Parties information received or prepared in 

accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

The costs incurred by the Agency in carrying out the functions referred to in 

subparagraphs (i) and (ii) above shall be borne by the Agency as part of its regular 

budget.

3. The Contracting Parties may, by consensus, request the Agency to provide other 

services in support of meetings of the Contracting Parties. The Agency may provide 

such services if they can be undertaken within its program and regular budget. Should 

this not be possible, the Agency may provide such services if voluntary funding is 

provided from another source.

Chapter 4

Final Clauses and Other Provisions

Article 29–Resolution of Disagreements

In the event of a disagreement between two or more Contracting Parties concerning 

the interpretation or application of this Convention, the Contracting Parties shall consult 

within the framework of a meeting of the Contracting Parties with a view to resolving 

the disagreement.

Article 30–Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval, Accession

1. This Convention shall be open for signature by all States at the Headquarters of 

the Agency in Vienna from 20 September 1994 until its entry into force.

2. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the signatory 

States.

3. After its entry into force, this Convention shall be open for accession by all States.

4. (i) This Convention shall be open for signature or accession by regional 

organizations of an integration or other nature, provided that any such organization is 

constituted by sovereign States and has competence in respect of the negotiation, 

conclusion and application of international agreements in matters covered by this 

Convention.

(ii) In matters within their competence, such organizations shall, on their own 

behalf, exercise the rights and fulfill the responsibilities which this Convention attributes 

to States Parties.

(iii) When becoming party to this Convention, such an organization shall 

communicate to the Depositary referred to in Article 34, a declaration indicating which 

States are members thereof, which articles of this Convention apply to it, and the extent 

of its competence in the field covered by those articles.

(iv) Such an organization shall not hold any vote additional to those of its 

Member States.

5. Instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited 

with the Depositary.

Article 31–Entry into Force

1. This Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date of deposit 

with the Depositary of the twenty-second instrument of ratification, acceptance or 
Convention on Nuclear Safety 1239

approval, including the instruments of seventeen States, each having at least one nuclear 

installation which has achieved criticality in a reactor core.

2. For each State or regional organization of an integration or other nature which 

ratifies, accepts, approves or accedes to this Convention after the date of deposit of the 

last instrument required to satisfy the conditions set forth paragraph 1, this Convention 

shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date of deposit with the Depositary of 

the appropriate instrument by such a State or organization.

Article 32–Amendments to the Convention

1. Any Contracting Party may propose an amendment to this Convention. Proposed 

amendments shall be considered at a review meeting or an extraordinary meeting.

2. The text of any proposed amendment and the reasons for it shall be provided to the 

Depositary who shall communicate the proposal to the Contracting Parties promptly and 

at least ninety days before the meeting for which it is submitted for consideration. Any 

comments received on such a proposal shall be circulated by the Depositary to the 

Contracting Parties.

3. The Contracting Parties shall decide after consideration of the proposed 

amendment whether to adopt it by consensus, or, in the absence of consensus, to submit 

it to a Diplomatic Conference. A decision to submit a proposed amendment to a 

Diplomatic Conference shall require a two-thirds majority vote of the Contracting 

Parties present and voting at the meeting, provided that at least one half of the 

Contracting Parties are present at the time of voting. Abstentions shall be considered as 

voting.

4. The Diplomatic Conference to consider and adopt amendments to this Convention 

shall be convened by the Depositary and held no later than one year after the appropriate 

decision taken in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article. The Diplomatic 

Conference shall make every effort to ensure amendments are adopted by consensus. 

Should this not be possible, amendments shall be adopted with a two-thirds majority of 

all Contracting Parties.

5. Amendments to this Convention adopted pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 4 above 

shall be subject to ratification, acceptance, approval, or confirmation by the Contracting 

Parties and shall enter into force for those Contracting Parties which have ratified, 

accepted, approved or confirmed them on the ninetieth day after the receipt by the 

Depositary of the relevant instruments by at least three fourths of the Contracting 

Parties. For a Contracting Party which subsequently ratifies, accepts, approves or 

confirms the said amendments, the amendments will enter into force on the ninetieth day 

after that Contracting Party has deposited its relevant instrument.

Article 33–Denunciation

1. Any Contracting Party may denounce this Convention by written notification to 

the Depositary.

2. Denunciation shall take effect one year following the date of the receipt of the 

notification by the Depositary, or on such later date as may be specified in the 

notification.

Article 34–Depositary

1. The Director General of the Agency shall be the Depositary of this Convention.

2. The Depositary shall inform the Contracting Parties of:

(i) the signature of this Convention and of the deposit of instruments of 

ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, in accordance with Article 30;

(ii) the date on which the Convention enters into force, in accordance with 

Article 31;

(iii) the notifications of denunciation of the Convention and the date thereof, 

made in accordance with Article 33;
1240 Convention on Nuclear Safety

(iv) the proposed amendments to this Convention submitted by Contracting 

Parties, the amendments adopted by the relevant Diplomatic Conference or by 

the meeting of the Contracting Parties, and the date of entry into force of the said 

amendments, in accordance with Article 32.

Article 35–Authentic Texts

The original of this Convention of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, 

Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Depositary, 

who shall send certified copies thereof to the Contracting Parties.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized to that effect, have 

signed this Convention. 

DONE AT VIENNA on the 20th day of September 1994.
Convention on Nuclear Safety 1241

Table: Signatories and Parties on the

Convention on Nuclear Safety

Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval, or Accession by States or 

Organizations

State/

Organization

Date of

Signature

Means and Date of

Expression of

Consent to be Bound

Entry into 

Force

Albania acceded 29 Jun 2011 27 Sep 2011

Algeria 20 Sep 1994 

Argentina* 20 Oct 1994 ratified 17 Apr 1997 16 Jul 1997

Armenia* 22 Sep 1994 ratified 21 Sep 1998 20 Dec 1998

Australia 20 Sep 1994 ratified 24 Dec 1996 24 Mar 1997

Austriaa 20 Sep 1994 ratified 26 Aug 1997 24 Nov 1997

Bahrain acceded 11 Nov 2010 09 Feb 2011

Bangladesh 21 Sep 1995 accepted 21 Sep 1995 24 Oct 1996

Belarus acceded 29 Oct 1998 27 Jan 1999

Belgium* 20 Sep 1994 ratified 13 Jan 1997 13 Apr 1997

Bosnia and 

Herzegovina acceded 21 Jul 2010 19 Sep 2010

Brazil* 20 Sep 1994 ratified 04 Mar 1997 02 Jun 1997

Bulgaria* 20 Sep 1994 ratified 08 Nov 1995 24 Oct 1996

Cambodia acceded 05 Apr 2012 04 Jul 2012

Canada* 20 Sep 1994 ratified 12 Dec 1995 24 Oct 1996

Chile 20 Sep 1994 ratified 20 Dec 1996 20 Mar 1997

China* 20 Sep 1994 ratified 09 Apr 1996 24 Oct 1996

Croatia 10 Apr 1995 approved 18 Apr 1996 24 Oct 1996

Cuba 20 Sep 1994

Cyprus acceded 17 Mar 1999 15 Jun 1999

Czech Republic* 20 Sep 1994 approved 18 Sep 1995 24 Oct 1996

Denmark 20 Sep 1994 accepted 13 Nov 1998 11 Feb 1999

Egypt 20 Sep 1994

Estonia acceded 03 Feb 2006 04 May 2006

Finland* 20 Sep 1994 accepted 22 Jan 1996 24 Oct 1996

France* 20 Sep 1994 approved 13 Sep 1995 24 Oct 1996

Germany* 20 Sep 1994 ratified 20 Jan 1997 20 Apr 1997

Ghana 06 Jul 1995

Greece 01 Nov 1994 ratified 20 Jun 1997 18 Sep 1997

Hungary* 20 Sep 1994 ratified 18 Mar 1996 24 Oct 1996

Iceland 21 Sep 1995 ratified 04 Jun 2008 02 Sep 2008

India* 20 Sep 1994 ratified 31 Mar 2005 29 Jun 2005

Indonesia 20 Sep 1994 ratified 12 Apr 2002 11Jul 2002

Ireland 20 Sep 1994 ratified 11 Jul 1996 24 Oct 1996

Israel 22 Sep 1994

Italy 27 Sep 1994 ratified 15 Apr 1998 14 Jul 1998

Japan* 20 Sep 1994 accepted 12 May 1995 24 Oct 1996

Jordan 06 Dec 1994 ratified 12 Jun 2009 10 Sep 2009

Kazakhstan* 20 Sep 1996 ratified 10 Mar 2010 08 Jun 2010

Korea*, Republic of 20 Sep 1994 ratified 19 Sep 1995 24 Oct 1996

Kuwait acceded 11 May 2006 09 Aug 2006

Latvia acceded 25 Oct 1996 23 Jan 1997

Lebanon 07 Mar 1995 ratified 05 Jun 1996 24 Oct 1996

Libyan Arab 

Jamahiriya acceded 13 Aug 2009 11 Nov 2009
1242 Convention on Nuclear Safety

State/

Organization

Date of

Signature

Means and Date of

Expression of

Consent to be Bound

Entry into 

Force

Lithuania* 22 Mar 1995 ratified 12 Jun 1996 24 Oct 1996

Luxembourg 20 Sep 1994 ratified 07 Apr 1997 06 Jul 1997

Mali 22 May 1995 ratified 13 May 1996 24 Oct 1996

Malta acceded 15 Nov 2007 13 Feb 2008

Mexico* 09 Nov 1994 ratified 26 Jul 1996 24 Oct 1996

Monaco 16 Sep 1996

Morocco 01 Dec 1994

Netherlands*,b 20 Sep 1994 accepted 15 Oct 1996 13 Jan 1997

Nicaragua 23 Sep 1994

Nigeria 21 Sep 1994 ratified 04 Apr 2007 03 Jul 2007

Norway 21 Sep 1994 ratified 29 Sep 1994 24 Oct 1996

Pakistan* 20 Sep 1994 ratified 30 Sep 1997 29 Dec 1997

Peru 22 Sep 1994 ratified 01 Jul 1997 29 Sep 1997

Philippines 14 Oct 1994

Poland 20 Sep 1994 ratified 14 Jun 1995 24 Oct 1996

Portugal 03 Oct 1994 ratified 20 May 1998 18 Aug 1998

Republic of Moldova acceded 07 May 1998 05 Aug 1998

Romania* 20 Sep 1994 ratified 01 Jun 1995 24 Oct 1996

Russian Federation* 20 Sep 1994 accepted 12 Jul 1996 24 Oct 1996

Saudi Arabia acceded 18 Mar 2010 16 Jun 2010

Senegal acceded 18 Mar 2010 16 Jun 2010

Singapore acceded 15 Dec 1997 15 Mar 1998

Slovakia* 20 Sep 1994 ratified 07 Mar 1995 24 Oct 1996

Slovenia* 20 Sep 1994 ratified 20 Nov 1996 18 Fed 1997

South Africa* 20 Sep 1994 ratified 24 Dec 1996 24 Mar 1997

Spain* 15 Nov 1994 ratified 04 Jul 1995 24 Oct 1996

Sri Lanka acceded 11 Aug 1999 09 Nov 1999

Sudan 20 Sept 1994

Sweden* 20 Sep 1994 ratified 11 Sep 1995 24 Oct 1996

Switzerland* 31 Oct 1995 ratified 12 Sep 1996 11 Dec 1996

Syrian Arab Repub. 23 Sep 1994

The Frmr. Yug, Rep. 

of Macedonia acceded 15 Mar 2006 13 Jun 2006

Tunisia 20 Sep 1994 ratified 21 Apr 2010 20 Jul 2010

Turkey 20 Sep 1994 ratified 08 Mar 1995 24 Oct 1996

Ukraine* 20 Sep 1994 ratified 08 Apr 1998 07 Jul 1998

United Arab 

Emirates acceded 31 Jul 2009 29 Oct 2009

United Kingdom*,c 20 Sep 1994 ratified 17 Jan 1996 24 Oct 1996

United States* 20 Sep 1994 ratified 11 Apr 1999 10 Jul 1999

Uruguay 28 Feb 1996 ratified 03 Sep 2003 02 Dec 2003

Vietnam acceded 16 Apr 2010 15 Jul 2010

EURATOM acceded 31 Jan 2000 30 Apr 2000

* Indicates that the State has at least one nuclear installation which has achieved 

criticality in a reactor core; sources: Table 1 “Nuclear Power Reactors in Operation and 

Under Construction, 31 Dec 1997”, April 1998 edition of “Nuclear Power Reactors in 

the World”, Reference Data Series No. 2, IAEA, Vienna; Government notification. a On 9 April 1999, Austria deposited an objection to reservation by Ukraine.

b for the Kingdom in Europe.
Convention on Nuclear Safety 1243

c for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Bailiwick of 

Guernsey, the Bailiwick of Jersey and the Isle of Man.

Notes: The Convention, pursuant to Article 31.1, entered into force on the ninetieth day 

after the date of deposit with the Depositary of the twenty-second instrument of 

ratification, acceptance or approval, including the instruments of seventeen States, each 

having at least one nuclear installation which has achieved criticality in a reactor core, 

i.e. 24 October 1996.

Number of Parties: 75

Signatories: 65

Last change of status: 05 April 2012
1244 Conv. on Assistance in the Case of a Nuc. Accident or Radiolog. Emerg

F. CONVENTION ON ASSISTANCE IN THE CASE OF A NUCLEAR 

ACCIDENT OR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY

ADOPTED SEPTEMBER 26, 1986

THE STATES PARTIES TO THIS CONVENTION,

AWARE that nuclear activities are being carried out in a number of States,

NOTING THAT comprehensive measures have been and are being taken to ensure a 

high level of safety in nuclear activities, aimed at preventing nuclear accidents and 

minimizing the consequences of any such accident, should it occur,

DESIRING to strength further international co-operation in the safe development 

and use of nuclear energy,

CONVINCED of the need for an international framework which will facilitate the 

prompt provision of assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological 

emergency to mitigate its consequences,

NOTING the usefulness of bilateral and multilateral arrangements on mutual 

assistance in this area,

NOTING the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency in developing 

guidelines for mutual emergency assistance arrangements in connection with a nuclear 

accident or radiological emergency,

HAVE AGREED as follows:

Article 1–General Provisions

1. The States Parties shall cooperate between themselves and with the 

International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as the “Agency”) in 

accordance with the provisions of this Convention to facilitate prompt assistance in the 

event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency to minimize its consequences and 

to protect life, property and the environment from the effects of radioactive releases.

2. To facilitate such cooperation States Parties may agree on bilateral or 

multilateral arrangements or, where appropriate, a combination of these, for preventing 

or minimizing injury and damage which may result in the event of a nuclear accident or 

radiological emergency.

3. The States Parties request the Agency, acting within the framework of its 

Statute, to use its best endeavours in accordance with the provisions of this Convention 

to promote, facilitate and support the cooperation between States Parties provided for in 

this Convention.

Article 2–Provisions of Assistance

1. If a State Party needs assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or 

radiological emergency, whether or not such accident or emergency originates within its 

territory, jurisdiction or control, it may call for such assistance from any other State 

Party, directly or through the Agency, and from the Agency, or, where appropriate, from 

other international intergovernmental organizations (hereinafter referred to as

“international organizations”).

2. A State Party requesting assistance shall specify the scope and type of 

assistance required and, where practicable, provide the assistance party with such 

information as may be necessary for that party to determine the extent to which it is able 

to meet the request. In the event that it is not practicable for the requesting State Party to 

specify the scope and type of assistance required, the requesting State Party and the 

assisting party shall, in consultation, decide upon the scope and type of assistance 

required.

3. Each State Party to which a request for such assistance is directed shall 

promptly decide and notify the requesting State Party, directly or through the Agency, 

whether it is in a position to render the assistance requested, and the scope and terms of 

the assistance that might be rendered.
Conv. on Assistance in the Case of a Nuc. Accident or Radiolog. Emerg. 1245

4. States Parties shall, within the limits of their capabilities, identify and notify 

the Agency of experts, equipment and materials which could be made available for the 

provision of assistance to other States Parties in the event of a nuclear accident or 

radiological emergency as well as the terms, especially financial, under which such 

assistance could be provided.

5. Any State Party may request assistance relating to medical treatment or 

temporary relocation into the territory of another State Party of people involved in a 

nuclear accident or radiological emergency.

6. The Agency shall respond, in accordance with its Statute and as provided for 

in this Convention, to a requesting State Party’s or a Member State’s request for 

assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency by:

(a) making appropriate resources allocated for this purpose;

(b) transmitting promptly the request to other States and international 

organizations which, according to the Agency’s information, may possess the necessary 

resources; and

(c) if so requested by the requesting State, coordinating the assistance at the 

international level which may thus become available.

Article 3–Direction and Control of Assistance

Unless otherwise agreed:

(a) the overall direction, control, co-ordination and supervision of the assistance 

shall be the responsibility within its territory of the requesting State. The assisting party 

should, where the assistance involves personnel, designate in consultation with the 

requesting State, the person who should be in charge of and retain immediate operational 

supervision over the personnel and the equipment provided by it. The designated person 

should exercise such supervision in cooperation with the appropriate authorities of the 

requesting State;

(b) the requesting State shall provide, to the extent of its capabilities, local 

facilities and services for the proper and effective administration of the assistance. It 

shall also ensure the protection of personnel, equipment and materials brought into its 

territory by or on behalf of the assisting party for such purpose;

(c) ownership of equipment and materials provided by either party during the 

periods of assistance shall be unaffected, and their return shall be ensured;

(d) a State Party providing assistance in response to a request under paragraph 5 

of article 2 shall co-ordinate that assistance within its territory.

Article 4–Competent Authorities and Points of Contact

1. Each State Party shall make known to the Agency and to other States Parties, 

directly or through the Agency, its competent authorities and point of contact authorized 

to make and receive requests for and to accept offers of assistance. Such points of 

contact and a focal point within the Agency shall be available continuously.

2. Each State Party shall promptly inform the Agency of any changes that may 

occur in the information referred to in paragraph 1.

3. The Agency shall regularly and expeditiously provide to States Parties, 

Member States and relevant international organizations the information referred to in 

paragraphs 1 and 2.

Article 5–Functions of the Agency

The States Parties request the Agency, in accordance with paragraph 3 of article 1 

and without prejudice to other provisions of this Convention, to:

(a) collect and disseminate to States Parties and Member States information 

concerning:

(i) experts, equipment and materials which could be made 

available in the event of nuclear accidents or radiological emergencies;
1246 Conv. on Assistance in the Case of a Nuc. Accident or Radiolog. Emerg

(ii) methodologies, techniques and available results of research 

relating to response to nuclear accidents or radiological emergencies;

(b) assist a State Party or a Member State when requested in any of the following 

or other appropriate matters:

(i) preparing both emergency plans in the case of nuclear accidents 

and radiological emergencies and the appropriate legislation;

(ii) developing appropriate training programmes for personnel to 

deal with nuclear accidents and radiological emergencies;

(iii) transmitting requests for assistance and relevant information in 

the event of nuclear accident or radiological emergency;

(iv) developing appropriate radiation monitoring programmes, 

procedures and standards;

(v) conducting investigations into the feasibility of establishing 

appropriate radiation monitoring systems; and public

(c) make available to a State Party or a Member State requesting assistance in the 

event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency appropriate resources allocated for 

the purpose of conducting an initial assessment of the accident or emergency;

(d) offer its good offices to the States Parties and Member States in the event of a 

nuclear accident or radiological emergency;

(e) establish and maintain liaison with relevant international organizations for the 

purposes of obtaining and exchanging relevant information and data, and make a list of 

such organizations available to States Parties, Member States and the aforementioned 

organizations.

Article 6–Confidentiality and Public Statements

1. The requesting State and the assisting party shall protect the confidentiality of 

any confidential information that becomes available to either of them in connection with 

the assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency. Such 

information shall be used exclusively for the purpose of the assistance agreed upon.

2. The assisting party shall make every effort to coordinate with the requesting 

State before releasing information to the public on the assistance provided in connection 

with a nuclear accident or radiological emergency.

Article 7–Reimbursement of Costs

1. An assisting party may offer assistance without costs to the requesting State. 

When considering whether to offer assistance on such a basis, the assisting party shall 

take into account:

(a) the nature of the nuclear accident or radiological emergency;

(b) the place of origin of the nuclear accident or radiological emergency;

(c) the needs of developing countries;

(d) the particular needs of countries without nuclear facilities; and

(e) any other relevant factors.

2. When assistance is provided wholly or partly on a reimbursement basis, the 

requesting State shall reimburse the assisting party for the costs incurred for the services 

rendered by persons or organizations acting on its behalf, and for all expenses in 

connection with the assistance to the extent that such expenses are not directly defrayed 

by the requesting State. Unless otherwise agreed, reimbursement shall be provided 

promptly after the assisting party has presented its request for reimbursement to the 

requesting State, and in respect of costs other than local costs, shall be freely 

transferable.

3. Notwithstanding paragraph 2, the assisting party may at any time waive, or 

agree to the postponement of, the reimbursement in whole or in part. In considering such 

waiver or postponement, assisting parties shall give due consideration to the needs of 

developing countries.
Conv. on Assistance in the Case of a Nuc. Accident or Radiolog. Emerg. 1247

Article 8–Privileges, Immunities, and Facilities

1. The requesting State shall afford to personnel of the assisting party and 

personnel acting on its behalf the necessary privileges, immunities and facilities for the 

performance of their assistance functions.

2. The requesting State shall afford the following privileges and immunities to 

personnel of the assisting party or personnel acting on its behalf who have been duly 

notified to and accepted by the requesting State:

(a) immunity from arrest, detention and legal process, including criminal, civil 

and administrative jurisdiction, of the requesting State, in respect of acts or 

omissions in the performance of their duties; and

(b) exemption from taxation, duties or other charges, except those which are 

normally incorporated in the price of goods or paid for services rendered, in respect 

of the performance of their assistance functions.

3. The requesting State shall:

(a) afford the assisting party exemption from taxation, duties or other charges on 

the equipment and property brought into the territory of the requesting State by the 

assisting party for the purpose of the assistance; and

(b) provide immunity from seizure, attachment, or requisition of such equipment 

and property.

4. The requesting State shall ensure the return of such equipment and property. If 

requested by the assisting party, the requesting State shall arrange, to the extent it is able 

to do so, for the necessary decontamination of recoverable equipment involved in the 

assistance before its return.

5. The requesting State shall facilitate the entry into, stay in and departure from 

its national territory of personnel notified pursuant to paragraph 2 and of equipment and 

property involved in the assistance.

6. Nothing in this article shall require the require the requesting State to provide 

its nationals or permanent residents with the privileges and immunities provided for in 

the foregoing paragraphs.

7. Without prejudice to the privileges and immunities, all beneficiaries enjoying 

such privileges and immunities under this article have a duty to respect the laws and 

regulations of the requesting State. They shall also have the duty not to interfere in the 

domestic affairs of the requesting State.

8. Nothing in this article shall prejudice rights and obligations with respect to 

privileges and immunities afforded pursuant to other international agreements or the 

rules of customary international law.

9. When signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to this Convention, 

a State may declare that it does not consider itself bound in whole or in part by 

paragraphs 2 and 3.

10. A State Party which has made a declaration in accordance with paragraph 9 

may at any time withdraw it by notification to the depositary.

Article 9–Transit of Personnel, Equipment, and Property

Each State Party shall, at the request of the requesting State or the assisting party, 

seek to facilitate the transit through its territory of duly notified personnel, equipment 

and property involved in the assistance to and from the requesting State.

Article 10–Claims and Compensation

1. The States Parties shall closely cooperate in order to facilitate the settlement of 

legal proceedings and claims under this article.

2. Unless otherwise agreed, a requesting State shall in respect of death or injury 

to persons, damage to or loss of property, or damage to the environment caused within 

its territory or other area under its jurisdiction or control in the course of providing the 

assistance requested:
1248 Conv. on Assistance in the Case of a Nuc. Accident or Radiolog. Emerg

(a) not bring any legal proceedings against the assisting party or persons or other 

legal entities acting on its behalf;

(b) assume responsibility for dealing with legal proceedings and claims brought 

by third parties against the assisting party or against persons or other legal entities 

acting on its behalf;

(c) hold the assisting party or persons or other legal entities acting on its behalf 

harmless in respect of legal proceedings and claims referred to in sub-paragraph (b); 

and

(d) compensate the assisting party or persons or other legal entities acting on its 

behalf for:

(i) death of or injury to personnel of the assisting party or persons acting on 

its behalf;

(ii) loss of or damage to non-consumable equipment or materials related to 

the assistance; except in cases of willful misconduct by the individuals who 

caused the death, injury, loss or damage.

3. This article shall not prevent compensation or indemnity available under any 

applicable international agreement or national law of any State.

4. Nothing in this article shall require the requesting State to apply paragraph 2 in 

whole or in part to its nationals or permanent residents.

5. When signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to this Convention, 

a State may declare:

(a) that it does not consider itself bound in whole or in part by paragraph 2;

(b) that it will not apply paragraph 2 in whole or in part in cases of gross 

negligence by the individuals who caused the death, injury, loss or damage.

6. A State Party which has made a declaration in accordance with paragraph 5 

may at any time withdraw it by notification to the depositary.

Article 11–Termination of Assistance

The requesting State or the assisting party may at any time, after appropriate 

consultations and by notification in writing, request the termination of assistance 

received or provided under this Convention. Once such a request has been made, the 

parties involved shall consult with each other to make arrangements for the proper 

conclusion of the assistance.

Article 12–Relationship to Other International Agreements

This Convention shall not affect the reciprocal rights and obligations of States 

Parties under existing international agreements which relate to the matters covered by 

this Convention, or under future international agreements concluded in accordance with 

the object and purpose of this Convention.

Article 13–Settlement of Disputes

1. In the event of a dispute between States Parties, or between a State Party and 

the Agency, concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention, the parties 

to the dispute shall consult with a view to the settlement of the dispute by negotiation or 

by any other peaceful means of settling disputes acceptable to them.

2. If a dispute of this character between States Parties cannot be settled within 

one year from the request for consultation pursuant to paragraph 1, it shall, at the request 

of any party to such dispute, be submitted to arbitration or referred to the International 

Court of Justice for decision. Where a dispute is submitted to arbitration, if, within six 

months from the date of the request, the parties to the dispute are unable to agree on the 

organization of the arbitration, a party may request the President of the International 

Court of Justice or the Secretary-General of the United Nations to appoint one or more 

arbitrators. In cases of conflicting requests by the parties to the dispute, the request to the 

Secretary-General of the United Nations shall have priority.
Conv. on Assistance in the Case of a Nuc. Accident or Radiolog. Emerg. 1249

3. When signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to this Convention, 

a State may declare that it does not consider itself bound by either or both of the dispute 

settlement procedures provided for in paragraph 2. The other States Parties shall not be 

bound by a dispute settlement procedure provided for in paragraph 2 with respect to a 

State Party for which such a declaration is in force.

4. A State Party which has made a declaration in accordance with paragraph 3 

may at any time withdraw it by notification to the depositary.

Article 14–Entry into Force

1. This Convention shall be open for signature by all States and Namibia, 

represented by the United Nations Council for Namibia, at the Headquarters of the 

International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna and at the Headquarters of the United 

Nations in New York, from 26 September 1986 and 6 October 1986 respectively, until 

its entry into force or for twelve months, whichever period is longer.

2. A State and Namibia, represented by the United Nations Council for Namibia, 

may express its consent to be bound by this Convention either by signature, or by 

deposit of an instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval following signature made 

subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, or by deposit of an instrument of 

accession. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be 

deposited with the depositary.

3. This Convention shall enter into force thirty days after consent to be bound has 

been expressed by three States.

4. For each State expressing consent to be bound by this Convention after its 

entry into force, this Convention shall enter into force for that Sate thirty days after the 

date of expression of consent.

5. (a) This Convention shall be open for accession, as provided for in this article, 

by international organizations and regional integration organizations constituted by 

sovereign States, which have competence in respect of the negotiation, conclusion and 

application of international agreements in matters covered by this Convention.

(b) In matters within their competence such organizations shall, on their own 

behalf, exercise the rights and fulfill the obligations which this Convention attributes to 

States Parties.

(c) When depositing its instrument of accession, such an organization shall 

communicate to the depositary a declaration indicating the extent of its competence in 

respect of matters covered by this Convention.

(d) Such an organization shall not hold any vote additional to those of its 

Member States.

Article 15–Provisional Application

A State may, upon signature or at any later date before this Convention enters into 

force for it, declare that it will apply this Convention provisionally.

Article 16–Amendments

1. A State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. The proposed 

amendment shall be submitted to the depositary who shall circulate it immediately to all 

other States Parties.

2. If a majority of the States Parties request the depositary to convene a 

conference to consider the proposed amendments, the depositary shall invite all States 

Parties to attend such a conference to begin not sooner than thirty days after the 

invitations are issued. Any amendment adopted at the conference by a two-thirds 

majority of all States Parties shall be laid down in a protocol which is open to signature 

in Vienna and New York by all States Parties.

3. The protocol shall enter into force thirty days after consent to be bound has 

been expressed by three States. For each State expressing consent to be bound by the 
1250 Conv. on Assistance in the Case of a Nuc. Accident or Radiolog. Emerg

protocol after its entry into force, the protocol shall enter into force for that State thirty 

days after the date of expression of consent.

Article 17–Denunciation

1. A State Party may denounce this Convention by written notification to the 

depositary.

2. Denunciation shall take effect one year following the date on which the 

notification is received by the depositary.

Article 18–Depositary

1. The Director General of the Agency shall be the depositary of this Convention.

2. The Director General of the Agency shall promptly notify States Parties and all 

other States of:

(a) each signature of this Convention or any protocol of amendment;

(b) each deposit of an instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or 

accession concerning this Convention or any protocol of amendment;

(c) any declaration or withdrawal thereof in accordance with articles 8, 10 and 

13;

(d) any declaration of provisional application of this Convention in accordance 

with article 15;

(e) the entry into force of this Convention and of any amendment thereto; and

(f) any denunciation made under article 17.

Article 19–Authentic Texts and Certified Copies

The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, 

Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Director 

General of the International Atomic Energy Agency who shall send certified copies to 

States Parties and all other States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized, have signed this 

Convention, open for signature as provided for in paragraph 1 of article 14.

ADOPTED by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency 

meeting in special session at Vienna on the twenty-sixth day of September one thousand 

nine hundred and eighty-six.

Table: Convention on Assistance in the Case of a 

Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency

Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval or Accession by States or 

Organizations

Country/

Organization

Date of

Signature

Means and Date of

Expression of

Consent to be Bound

Entry into 

Force

Afghanistan 26 Sep 1986 

Albania acceded 30 Apr 2003 31 May 2003 

Algeria 24 Sep 1987 ratified 15 Jan 2004 15 Feb 2004 

Argentina acceded 17 Jan 1990 17 Feb 1990 

Armenia acceded 24 Aug 1993 24 Sep 1993 

Australia 26 Sep 1986 ratified 22 Sep 1987 23 Oct 1987 

Austria 26 Sep 1986 ratified 21 Nov 1989 22 Dec 1989 

Bangladesh acceded 07 Jan 1988 07 Feb 1988 

Belarus 26 Sep 1986 ratified 26 Jan 1987 26 Feb 1987 

Belgium 26 Sep 1986 ratified 04 Jan 1999 04 Feb 1999 

Bolivia acceded 22 Aug 2003 21 Sep 2003 
Conv. on Assistance in the Case of a Nuc. Accident or Radiolog. Emerg. 1251

Country/

Organization

Date of

Signature

Means and Date of

Expression of

Consent to be Bound

Entry into 

Force

Bosnia and 

 Herzegovina succeeded 30 June 1998 01 Mar 1992 

Botswana acceded 11 Nov 2011 11 Dec 2011

Brazil 26 Sep 1986 ratified 04 Dec 1990 04 Jan 1991 

Bulgaria 26 Sep 1986 ratified 24 Feb 1988 26 Mar 1988 

Cameroon 25 Sep 1987 ratified 17 Jan 2006 16 Feb 2006

Canada 26 Sep 1986 ratified 12 Aug 2002 12 Sep 2002 

Chile 26 Sep 1986 ratified 22 Sep 2004 23 Oct 2004 

China 26 Sep 1986 ratified 10 Sep 1987 11 Oct 1987 

Colombia acceded 23 Jun 2005 23 Jul 2005

Costa Rica 26 Sep 1986 ratified 16 Sep 1991 17 Oct 1991 

Cote d’Ivoire 26 Sep 1986 

Croatia succeeded 29 Sep 1992 08 Oct 1991 

Cuba 26 Sep 1986 ratified 08 Jan 1991 08 Feb 1991 

Cyprus acceded 04 Jan 1989 04 Feb 1989 

Czech Republic succeeded 24 Mar 1993 01 Jan 1993 

Dem. P.R. of Korea 29 Sep 1986

Dem. Rep. Of the 30 Sep 1986

 Congo

Denmark 26 Sep 1986 ratified 26 Sep 2008 26 Oct 2008

Egypt 26 Sep 1986 ratified 17 Oct 1988 17 Nov 1988 

El Salvador acceded 28 Jul 2005 27 Aug 2005

Estonia acceded 09 May 1994 09 Jun 1994 

Finland 26 Sep 1986 approved 27 Nov 1990 28 Dec 1990 

France 26 Sep 1986 approved 06 Mar 1989 06 Apr 1989 

Gabon acceded 19 Feb 2008 20 Mar 2008

Germany 26 Sep 1986 ratified 14 Sep 1989 15 Oct 1989 

Greece 26 Sep 1986 ratified 06 Jun 1991 07 Jul 1991 

Guatemala 26 Sep 1986 ratified 08 Aug 1988 08 Sep 1988 

Holy See 26 Sep 1986 

Hungary 26 Sep 1986 ratified 10 Mar 1987 10 Apr 1987 

Iceland 26 Sep 1986 ratified 27 Jan 2006 26 Feb 2006

India 29 Sep 1986 ratified 28 Jan 1988 28 Feb 1988 

Indonesia 26 Sep 1986 ratified 12 Nov 1993 13 Dec 1993 

Iran, Islamic 

 Republic of 26 Sep 1986 ratified 09 Oct 2000 09 Nov 2000 

Iraq 12 Aug 1987 ratified 21 Jul 1988 21 Aug 1988 

Ireland 26 Sep 1986 ratified 13 Sep 1991 14 Oct 1991 

Israel 26 Sep 1986 ratified 25 May 1989 25 Jun 1989 

Italy 26 Sep 1986 ratified 25 Oct 1990 25 Nov 1990 

Japan 06 Mar 1987 accepted 09 Jun 1987 10 Jul 1987 

Jordan 02 Oct 1986 ratified 11 Dec 1987 11 Jan 1988 

Kazakhstan acceded 10 Mar 2010 09 Apr 2010

Korea, Rep. of acceded 08 Jun 1990 09 Jul 1990 

Kuwait acceded 13 May 2003 13 Jun 2003 

Latvia acceded 28 Dec 1992 28 Jan 1993 

Lebanon 26 Sep 1986 ratified 17 Apr 1997 18 May 1997 

Libyan Arab 

 Jamahiriya acceded 27 Jun 1990 28 Jul 1990 

Liechtenstein 26 Sep 1986 ratified 19 Apr 1994 20 May 1994 
1252 Conv. on Assistance in the Case of a Nuc. Accident or Radiolog. Emerg

Country/

Organization

Date of

Signature

Means and Date of

Expression of

Consent to be Bound

Entry into 

Force

Lithuania acceded 21 Sep 2000 22 Oct 2000 

Luxembourg acceded 26 Sep 2000 27 Oct 2000 

Malaysia 01 Sep 1987 signature 01 Sep 1987 02 Oct 1987 

Mali 02 Oct 1986 ratified 01 Oct 2007 31 Oct 2007

Mauritania acceded 19 Sep 2011 19 Oct 2011

Mauritius acceded 17 Aug 1992 17 Sep 1992 

Mexico 26 Sep 1986 ratified 10 May 1988 10 Jun 1988 

Monaco 26 Sep 1986 approval 19 Jul 1989 19 Aug 1989 

Mongolia 08 Jan 1987 ratified 11 Jun 1987 12 Jul 1987 

Montenegro succeeded 21 Mar 2007 03 Jun 2006

Morocco 26 Sep 1986 ratified 07 Oct 1993 07 Nov 1993 

Mozambique acceded 30 Oct 2009 29 Nov 2009

Netherlands 26 Sep 1986 accepted 23 Sep 1991 24 Oct 1991 

New Zealand acceded 11 Mar 1987 11 Apr 1987 

Nicaragua acceded 11 Nov 1993 12 Dec 1993 

Niger 26 Sep 1986 

Nigeria 21 Jan 1987 ratified 10 Aug 1990 10 Sep 1990 

Norway 26 Sep 1986 signature 26 Sep 1986 26 Feb 1987 

Oman acceded 09 Jul 2009 08 Aug 2009

Pakistan acceded 11 Sep 1989 12 Oct 1989 

Panama 26 Sep 1986 ratified 01 Apr 1999 02 May 1999 

Paraguay 02 Oct 1986 

Peru acceded 17 Jul 1995 17 Aug 1995 

Philippines acceded 05 May 1997 05 Jun 1997 

Poland 26 Sep 1986 ratified 24 Mar 1988 24 Apr 1988 

Portugal 26 Sep 1986 ratified 23 Oct 2003 23 Nov 2003 

Qatar acceded 04 Nov 2005 04 Dec 2005

Republic of

 Moldova acceded 07 May 1988 07 Jun 1998 

Romania acceded 12 Jun 1990 13 Jul 1990 

Russian Federation 26 Sep 1986 ratified 23 Dec 1986 26 Feb 1987 

Saint Vincent & the

 Grenadines acceded 18 Sep 2001 19 Oct 2001 

Saudi Arabia acceded 03 Nov 1989 04 Dec 1989 

Senegal 15 Jun 1987 ratified 24 Dec 2008 23 Jan 2009

Serbia succeeded 05 Feb 2002 27 Apr 1992 

Sierra Leone 25 Mar 1987 

Singapore acceded 15 Dec 1997 15 Jan 1998 

Slovakia succeeded 10 Feb 1993 01 Jan 1993 

Slovenia succeeded 07 Jul 1992 25 Jun 1991 

South Africa 10 Aug 1987 ratified 10 Aug 1987 10 Sep 1987 

Spain 26 Sep 1986 ratified 13 Sep 1989 14 Oct 1989 

Sri Lanka acceded 11 Jan 1991 11 Feb 1991 

Sudan 26 Sep 1986 

Sweden 26 Sep 1986 ratified 24 Jun 1992 25 Jul 1992 

Switzerland 26 Sep 1986 ratified 31 May 1988 01 Jul 1988 

Syrian Arab 

Republic

02 Jul 1987

Tajikistan acceded 23 Sep 2011 23 Oct 2011

Thailand 25 Sep 1987 ratified 21 Mar 1989 21 Apr 1989 
Conv. on Assistance in the Case of a Nuc. Accident or Radiolog. Emerg. 1253

Country/

Organization

Date of

Signature

Means and Date of

Expression of

Consent to be Bound

Entry into 

Force

The Frmr.Yug.Rep. 

 of Macedonia succeeded 20 Sep 1996 17 Nov 1991 

Tunisia 24 Feb 1987 ratified 24 Feb 1989 27 Mar 1989 

Turkey 26 Sep 1986 ratified 03 Jan 1991 03 Feb 1991 

Ukraine 26 Sep 1986 ratified 26 Jan 1987 26 Feb 1987 

United Arab 

Emirates acceded 02 Oct 1987 02 Nov 1987 

United Kingdom 26 Sep 1986 ratified 09 Feb 1990 12 Mar 1990 

United Republic of

Tanzania acceded 27 Jan 2005 26 Feb 2005

United States of 

 America 26 Sep 1986 ratified 19 Sep 1988 20 Oct 1988 

Uruguay acceded 21 Dec 1989 21 Jan 1990 

Viet Nam acceded 29 Sep 1987 30 Oct 1987 

Zimbabwe 26 Sep 1986 

EURATOM acceded 14 Nov 2006 14 Dec 2006

Food & Agriculture 

 Org (FAO) acceded 19 Oct 1990 19 Nov 1990 

World Health Org

 Org (WHO) acceded 10 Aug 1988 10 Sep 1988 

World

 Meteorological 

 Org (WMO) acceded 17 Apr 1990 18 May 1990 

Note: The Convention entered into force on 26 February 1987, i.e. thirty days after the 

date on which the third State expressed its consent to be bound, pursuant to Article 14, 

paragraph 3.

Number of Parties: 108

Number of Signatories: 68

11 November 2011
1254 Add’l Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohib. of Nuc. Weapons in Lat. Amer.

G. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I TO THE TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION 

OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA

Done at Mexico February 14, 1967;

Transmitted by the President of the United States of America to the Senate May 24, 

1978 (S. Ex. I, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.);

Reported favorably by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations October 19, 1981 (S. 

Ex. Rep. No. 97-23, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.);

Advice and consent to ratification by the Senate, with understandings, November 13, 

1981;

Ratified by the President, with said understandings, November 19, 1981;

Ratification of the United States of America deposited with Mexico November 23, 1981; 

Proclaimed by the President December 14, 1981;

Entered into force with respect to the United States of America November 23, 1981.

_________

By the President of the United States of America

A Proclamation

Considering that:

Additional Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin 

America was signed on behalf of the United States of America at Mexico City on May 

26, 1977, a certified copy of which is hereto annexed;1

The Senate of the United States of America by its resolution of November 13, 1981, 

two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein, gave its advice and consent to 

ratification of Additional Protocol I, subject to the following understandings:

1) That the provisions of the Treaty made applicable by this Additional Protocol do 

not affect the exclusive power and legal competence under international law of a State 

adhering to this Protocol to grant or deny transit and transport privileges to its own or 

any other vessels or aircraft irrespective of cargo or armaments.

2) That the provisions of the Treaty made applicable by this Additional Protocol do 

not affect rights under the international law of a State adhering to this Protocol regarding 

the exercise of the freedom of the seas, or regarding passage through or over waters 

subject to the sovereignty of a State.

3) That the understandings and declarations attached by the United States to its 

ratification of Additional Protocol II (text attached) apply also to its ratification of 

Additional Protocol I.

The President of the United States of America on November 19, 1981, ratified 

Additional Protocol I, subject to the said understandings, in pursuance of the advice and 

consent of the Senate, and the United States of America deposited its instrument of 

ratification with the Government of the United Mexican States on November 23, 1981;

Pursuant to the provisions of Additional Protocol I, Additional Protocol I, subject to 

the said understandings, entered into force for the United States of America on 

November 23, 1981;

Now, Therefore, I, Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America, proclaim 

and make public Additional Protocol I, subject to the said understandings, to the end that 

it shall be observed and fulfilled with good faith by the United States of America and by 

the citizens of the United States of America and all other persons subject to the 

jurisdiction thereof.

In testimony whereof, I have signed this proclamation and caused the seal of the 

United States of America to be affixed.

––––––––

1 Texts of the English, French, Portuguese, and Spanish languages, as certified by the Department of 

Foreign Relations of Mexico.
Add’l Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohib. of Nuc. Weapons in Lat. Amer. 1255

(seal)

Done at the city of Washington this fourteenth day of December in the year of our Lord 

one thousand nine hundred eighty-one and of the Independence of the United States 

of America the two hundred sixth.

Ronald Reagan

By the President:

Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

Secretary of State

Understandings and Declarations Attached by the United States to Its Ratification 

of Additional Protocol II

I.2 That the United States Government understands the reference in Article 3 of the 

treaty to “its own legislation” to relate only to such legislation as is compatible with the 

rules of international law and as involves an exercise of sovereignty consistent with 

those rules, and accordingly that ratification of Additional Protocol II by the United 

States Government could not be regarded as implying recognition, for the purpose of 

this treaty and its protocols, or for any other purpose, of any legislation which did not, in 

the view of the United States, comply with the relevant rules of international law.

That the United States Government takes note of the Preparatory Commission’s 

interpretation of the treaty, as set forth in the Final Act, that, governed by the principles 

and rules of international law, each of the contracting parties retains exclusive power 

and legal competence, unaffected by the terms of the treaty, to grant or deny noncontracting parties transit and transport privileges.

That as regards the undertaking in Article 3 of Protocol II not to use or threaten to 

use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties, the United States Government 

would have to consider that an armed attack by a Contracting Party, in which it was 

assisted by a nuclear-weapon state, would be incompatible with the Contracting Party’s 

corresponding obligations under Article 1 of the treaty.

II. That the United States Government considers that the technology of making 

nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes is indistinguishable from the technology 

of making nuclear weapons, and that nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices for 

peaceful purposes are both capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled 

manner and have the common group of characteristics of large amounts of energy 

generated instantaneously from a compact source. Therefore the United States 

Government understands the definition contained in Article 5 of the treaty as necessarily 

encompassing all nuclear explosive devices. It also understood that Articles 1 and 5 

restrict accordingly the activities of the contracting parties under paragraph 1 of Article 

18.

That the United States Government understands that paragraph 4 of Article 18 of the 

treaty permits, and that United States adherence to Protocol II will not prevent, 

collaboration by the United States with contracting parties for the purpose of carrying 

out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes in a manner consistent with a 

policy of not contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. In this 

connection, the United States Government notes Article V of the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, under which it joined in an undertaking to take 

appropriate measures to ensure that potential benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear 

explosions would be made available to non-nuclear-weapons states party to that treaty, 

and reaffirms its willingness to extend such undertaking, on the same basis, to states 

precluded by the present treaty from manufacturing or acquiring any nuclear explosive 

device.

––––––––

2 May 8, 1971. TAIS 7137; 22 USED 760.
1256 Add’l Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohib. of Nuc. Weapons in Lat. Amer.

III. That the United States Government also declares that, although not required by 

Protocol II, it will act with respect to such territories of Protocol I adherents as are 

within the geographical area defined in paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the treaty in the same 

manner as Protocol II requires it to act with respect to the territories of contracting 

parties.

Additional Protocol I

The undersigned Plenipotentiaries, furnished with full powers by their respective 

Governments,

Convinced that the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America,3

negotiated and signed in accordance with the recommendations of the General Assembly 

of the United Nations in Resolution 1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, represents an 

important step towards ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Aware that the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not an end in itself but, rather, 

a means of achieving general and complete disarmament at a later stage, and

Desiring to contribute, so far as lies in their power, towards ending the armaments 

race, especially in the field of nuclear weapons, and towards strengthening a world at 

peace, based on mutual respect and sovereign equality of States,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1.

To undertake to apply the status of denuclearization in respect of warlike purposes as 

defined in articles 1, 3, 5 and 13 of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 

Latin America in territories for which, de jure or de facto, they are internationally 

responsible and which lie within the limits of the geographical zone established in that 

Treaty.

ARTICLE 2.

The duration of this protocol shall be the same as that of the Treaty for the Prohibition of 

Nuclear Weapons in Latin America of which this Protocol is an annex, and the 

provisions regarding ratification and denunciation contained in the Treaty shall be 

applicable to it.

ARTICLE 3.

This Protocol shall enter into force, for the States which have ratified it, on the date of 

the deposit of their respective instruments of ratification.

In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, having deposited their full 

powers, found in good and due form, sign this Protocol on behalf of their respective 

Governments.

FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND:

N.J.A. Cheetham

FOR THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS:

S. Van Heemstra

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

Jimmy Carter

NUCLEAR FREE ZONE–LATIN AMERICA4

––––––––

3 Feb. 14, 1967. TAIS 7137; 22 USED 762. 4 The United States is not a party to the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapon in Latin America (the 

Treaty of Tlatelolco). For the English text of the treaty, see 22 USC 762; TIAS 7137; for the text in other 

languages, see 634 UNTS 281.
Add’l Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohib. of Nuc. Weapons in Lat. Amer. 1257

NOTE:

Additional protocol I to the treaty of February 14, 1967 for the prohibition of nuclear 

weapons in Latin America. Done at Mexico February 14, 1967; entered into force 

December 11, 1969; for the United States November 23, 1981. 33 USED 1792; TAIS 

10147; 634 UNTS 362. States which are parties: Netherlands,5 United Kingdom,6

United States7

Additional protocol II to the treaty of February 14, 1967 for the prohibition of nuclear 

weapons in Latin America. Done at Mexico February 14, 1967; entered into force 

December 11, 1969; for the United States May 12, 1971. 22 USED 754; TAIS 7137; 634 

UNTS 364. States which are parties: China,8 France,9 Union of Soviet Socialist Reps.,10

United Kingdom11 12, United States.13

––––––––

5 With statement(s). 6 Applicable to Anguilla, British Virgin Is., Cayman Is., Falkland Is., Montserrat, Turks and Caicos Is. 7 With understanding and declarations. 8 With statement(s). 9 With statement(s). 10 With statement(s). 11 With declaration. 12 Applicable to Anguilla, British Virgin Is., Cayman Is., Falkland Is., Montserrat, Turks and Caicos Is. 13 With understanding and declarations.
1258 Add’l Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohib. of Nuc. Weapons in Lat. Amer.

H. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II TO THE TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION 

OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA

Signed by the United States at Mexico April 1, 1968

Underlying Treaty signed by others at Mexico February 14, 1967

U.S. ratification with understandings and declarations deposited May 12, 1971

Entered into force for the United States May 12, 19711

By the President of the United States of America

A Proclamation

Considering that:

Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin 

America, done at the City of Mexico on February 14, 1967, was signed on behalf of the 

United States of America on April 1, 1968, the text of which Protocol is word for word 

as follows:

Additional Protocol II

The undersigned Plenipotentiaries, furnished with full powers by their respective 

Governments,

Convinced that the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, 

negotiated and signed in accordance with the recommendations of the General Assembly 

of the United Nations in Resolution 1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, represents an 

important step towards ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Aware that the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not an end in itself but, rather, 

a means of achieving general and complete disarmament at a later stage, and

Desiring to contribute, so far as lies in their power, towards ending the armaments 

race, especially in the field of nuclear weapons, and towards promoting and 

strengthening a world at peace, based on mutual respect and sovereign equality of States.

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1.

The statute of denuclearization of Latin America in respect of warlike purposes, as 

defined, delineated and set forth in the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 

Latin American of which this instrument is an annex, shall be fully respected by the 

Parties to this Protocol in all its express aims and provisions.

Article 2.

The Governments represented by the undersigned Plenipotentiaries undertake, therefore, 

not to contribute in any way to the performance of acts involving a violation of the

obligations of article 1 of the Treaty in the territories to which the Treaty applies in 

accordance with article 4 thereof.

Article 3.

The Governments represented by the undersigned Plenipotentiaries also undertake not to 

use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties of the Treaty for 

the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.

Article 4.

The duration of this Protocol shall be the same as that of the Treaty for the Prohibition of 

Nuclear Weapons in Latin American of which this protocol is an annex, and the 

definitions of territory and nuclear weapons set forth in articles 3 and 5 of the Treaty 

shall be applicable to this Protocol, as well as the provisions regarding ratification, 

reservations, denunciation, authentic texts and registration contained in articles 26, 27, 

30 and 31 of the Treaty.

Article 5.

The Protocol shall enter into force, for the States which have ratified it, on the date of 

the deposit of their respective instruments of ratification.

––––––––

1 The United Kingdom, France, and the People’s Republic of China are also parties of Protocol II.
Add’l Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohib. of Nuc. Weapons in Lat. Amer. 1259

In witness whereof the undersigned, Plenipotentiaries, having deposited their full 

powers, found in good and due form, sign this Additional Protocol on behalf of their 

respective Governments.

The Senate of the United States of America by its resolution of April 19, 1971, twothirds of the Senators present concurring, gave it advice and consent to the ratification of 

Additional Protocol II, with the following understandings and declarations:

I

That the United States Government understands the reference in Article 3 of the 

treaty to “its own legislation” to relate only to such legislation as is compatible with the 

rules of international law and as involves an exercise of sovereignty consistent with 

those rules, and accordingly that ratification of Additional Protocol II by the United 

States Government could not be regarded as implying recognition, for the purposes of 

this treaty and its protocols or for any other purpose, of any legislation which did not, in 

the view of the United States, comply with the relevant rules of international law.

That the United States Government takes note of the Preparatory Commission’s 

interpretation of the treaty, as set forth in the Final Act, that, governed by the principles 

and rules of international law, each of the Contracting Parties retains exclusive power 

and legal competence, unaffected by the terms of the treaty, to grant or deny nonContracting Parties transit and transport privileges.

That as regards the undertaking in Article 3 of Protocol II not to use or threaten to 

use nuclear weapons against the Contracting parties, the United States Government 

would have to consider that an armed attack by a Contracting Party, in which it was 

assisted by a nuclear-weapon state, would be incompatible with the Contracting Party’s 

corresponding obligations under Article I of the Treaty.

II

That the United States Government considers that the technology of making nuclear 

explosive devices for peaceful purposes is indistinguishable from the technology of 

making nuclear weapons, and that nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices for 

peaceful purposes are both capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled 

manner and have the common group of characteristics of large amounts of energy 

generated instantaneously from a compact source. Therefore, the United States 

Government understands the definition contained in Article 5 of treaty as necessarily 

encompassing all nuclear explosive devices. It is also understood that Articles 1 and 5 

restrict accordingly the activities of the Contracting Parties under paragraph 1 of Article 

18.

That the United States Government understands that paragraph 4 of Article 18 of the 

treaty permits, and the United States adherence to Protocol II will not prevent, 

collaboration by the United States with Contracting Parties for the purpose of carrying 

out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes in a manner consistent with a 

policy of not contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. In this 

connection, the United States Government notes Article V of the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, under which it joined in an undertaking to take 

appropriate measures to ensure that potential benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear 

explosions would be made available to non-nuclear-weapon states party to that treaty, 

and reaffirms its willingness to extend such undertaking, on the same basis, to states 

precluded by the present treaty from manufacturing or acquiring any nuclear explosive 

device.

III

That the United States Government also declares that, although not required by 

Protocol II, it will act with respect to such territories of Protocol I adherents as are 

within the geographical area defined in paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the treaty in the same 
1260 Add’l Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohib. of Nuc. Weapons in Lat. Amer.

manner as Protocol II requires it to act with respect to the territories of Contracting 

Parties.

The President ratified Additional Protocol II on May 8, 1971, with the above-recited 

understandings and declarations, in pursuance of the advice and consent of the Senate.

It is provided in Article 5 of Additional Protocol II that the Protocol shall enter into 

force, for the States which have ratified it, on the date of the deposit of their respective 

instruments of ratification.

The instrument of ratification of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 

Ireland was deposited on December 11, 1969 with understandings and a declaration, and 

the instrument of ratification of the United States of America was deposited on May 12, 

1971 with the above-recited understandings and declarations.

In accordance with Article 5 of Additional Protocol II, the Protocol entered into 

force for the United States of America on May 12, 1971, subject to the above recited 

understandings and declarations.

Now, therefore, I, Richard Nixon, President of the United States of America, 

proclaim and make public Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of 

Nuclear Weapons in Latin America to the end that it shall be observed and fulfilled with 

good faith, subject to the above-recited understandings and declarations, on and after 

May 12, 1971 by the United States of America and by the citizens of the United States 

of America and all other persons subject to the jurisdictions thereof.

In testimony whereof, I have signed this proclamation and caused the Seal of the 

United States of America to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington this eleventh day of June in the year of our Lord one 

thousand nine hundred seventy-one and of the Independence of the United States of 

America the one-hundred ninety-fifth.

(Seal)
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America 1261

I. TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN 

AMERICA

Preamble

In the name of their peoples and faithfully interpreting their desires and aspirations, 

the Governments of the States which sign the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear 

Weapons in Latin America.

Desiring to contribute, so far as lies in their power, towards ending the armaments 

race, especially in the field of nuclear weapons, and towards strengthening a world at 

peace, based on the sovereign equality of States, mutual respect and good 

neighbourliness,

Recalling that the United Nations General Assembly, in its Resolution 808 (XI), 

adopted unanimously as one of the three points of a coordinated programme of 

disarmament “the total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and 

weapons of mass destruction of every type”,

Recalling that militarily denuclearized zones are not an end in themselves but rather 

a means of achieving general and complete disarmament at a later stage,

Recalling United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1911 (XVIII), which 

established that the measures that should be agreed upon for the denuclearization of 

Latin America should be taken “in the light of the principles of the Charter of the United 

Nations and of regional agreements”,

Recalling United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2028 (XX), which 

established the principle of an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and duties 

for the nuclear non-nuclear powers, and 

Recalling that the Charter of the Organization of American States proclaims that it is 

an essential purpose of the Organization to strengthen the peace and security of the 

hemisphere,

Convinced:

That the incalculable destructive power of nuclear weapons has made it imperative 

that the legal prohibition of war should be strictly observed in practice if the survival of 

civilization and of mankind itself is to be assured,

That nuclear weapons, whose terrible effects are suffered, indiscriminately and 

inexorably, by military forces and civilian population alike, constitute, through the 

persistence of the radioactivity they release, and attack on the integrity of the human 

species and ultimately may even render the whole earth uninhabitable.

That the general and complete disarmament under effective international control is a 

vital matter which all the peoples of the world equally demand,

That the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which seems inevitable unless States, in 

the exercise of their sovereign rights, impose restrictions on themselves in order to 

prevent it, would make an agreement of disarmament enormously difficult and would 

increase the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear conflagration,

That the establishment of militarily denuclearized zones is closely linked with the 

maintenance of peace and security in the respective regions,

That the military denuclearization of vast geographical zones, adopted by the 

sovereign decision of the States comprised therein, will exercise a beneficial influence 

on other regions where similar conditions exist,

That the privileged situation of the signatory States, whose territories are wholly free 

from nuclear weapons, imposes upon them the inescapable duty of preserving that 

situation both in their own interests and for the good of mankind,

That the existence of nuclear weapons in any country of Latin America would make 

it a target for possible nuclear attacks and would inevitable set off, throughout the 

region, a ruinous race in nuclear weapons which would involve the unjustifiable 

diversion, for warlike purposes, of the limited resources required for economic and 

social development,
1262 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

That the foregoing reasons, together with the traditional peace-loving outlook of 

Latin America, give rise to an inescapable necessity that nuclear energy should be used 

in that region exclusively for peaceful purposes, and that the Latin American countries 

should use their right to the greatest and most equitable access to this new source of 

energy in order to expedite the economic and social development of their peoples.

Convinced finally:

That the military denuclearization of Latin America–being understood to mean the 

undertaking entered into internationally in this Treaty to keep their territories forever 

free from nuclear weapons–will constitute a measure which will spare their peoples from 

the squandering of their limited resources on nuclear armaments and will protect them 

against possible nuclear attacks on their territories, and will also constitute a significant 

contribution towards preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and a powerful 

factor of general and complete disarmaments, and

That Latin America, faithful to its tradition of universality, must not only endeavor to 

banish from its homelands the scourge of a nuclear war, but must also strive to promote 

the well-being and advancement of its peoples, at the same time co-operating in the 

fulfillment of the ideals of mankind, that is to say, in the consolidation of a permanent 

peace based on equal rights, economic fairness and social justice for all, in accordance 

with the principles and purposes set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in the 

Charter of the Organization of American States,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1–Obligations

1. The Contracting Parties hereby undertake to use exclusively for peaceful purposes 

the nuclear material and facilities which are under this jurisdiction, and to prohibit and 

prevent in their respective territories:

(a) The testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means 

whatsoever of any nuclear weapons, by the Parties themselves, directly or indirectly, 

on behalf of anyone else or in any other way, and

(b) The receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of 

any nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly, by the Parties themselves, by anyone on 

their behalf or in any other way.

2. The Contracting Parties also undertake to refrain from engaging in, encouraging or 

authorizing, directly or indirectly, or in any way participating in the testing, use, 

manufacture, production, possession or control of any nuclear weapon.

Article 2–Definition of the Contracting Parties

For the purposes of this Treaty, the Contracting Parties are those for whom the 

Treaty is in force.

Article 3–Definition of Territory

For the purposes of this Treaty, the term “territory” shall include the territorial sea, 

air space and any other space over which the State exercises sovereignty in accordance 

with its own legislation.

Article 4–Zone of Application

1. The zone of application of this Treaty is the whole of the territories for which the 

Treaty is in force.

2. Upon fulfillment of the requirements of Article 28, paragraph 1, the zone of 

application of the Treaty shall also be that which is situated in the western hemisphere 

with the following limits (except the continental part of the territory of the United States 

of America and its territorial waters): starting at a point located 35 north latitude, 75 

west longitude; from this point directly southward to a point at 30 north latitude, 75 west 

longitude; from there, directly eastward to a point at 30 north latitude, 50 west longitude; 

from there along a loxodromic line to a point at 5 north latitude, 20 west longitude; from 
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America 1263

there directly southward to a point at 60 south latitude, 20 west longitude; from there 

directly westward to a point at 60 south latitude, 115 west longitude; from there directly 

northward to a point at 0 latitude, 115 west longitude; from there, along a loxodromic 

line to a point at 35 north latitude, 150 west longitude; from there, directly eastward to a 

point at 35 north latitude, 75 west longitude.

Article 5–Definition of Nuclear Weapons

For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear weapon is any device which is capable of 

releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and which has a group of 

characteristics that are appropriate for use for warlike purposes. An instrument that may 

be used for the transport or propulsion of the device is not included in this definition if it 

is separable from the device and not an indivisible part thereof.

Article 6–Meeting of Signatories

At the request of any of the signatory States or if the Agency established by article 7 

should so decide, a meeting of all the signatories may be convoked to consider in 

common questions which may affect the very essence of this instrument, including 

possible amendments to it. In either case, the meeting will be convoked by the General 

Secretary.

Article 7–Organization

1. In order to ensure compliance with the obligations of this Treaty, the Contracting 

Parties hereby establish an international organization to be known as the “Agency for the 

Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean”1 hereinafter 

referred to as “the Agency.” Only the Contracting Parties shall be affected by its 

decisions.

2. The Agency shall be responsible for the holding of periodic or extraordinary 

consultations among Member States on matters relating to the purposes, measures and 

procedures set forth in this Treaty and to the supervision of compliance with the 

obligations arising therefrom.

3. The Contracting Parties agree to extend to the Agency full and prompt cooperation 

in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, of any agreements they may conclude 

with the Agency and of any agreements the Agency may conclude with any other 

international organization or body.

4. The headquarters of the Agency shall be in Mexico City.

Article 8–Organs

1. There are hereby established as principal organs of the Agency a General 

Conference, a Council and a Secretariat.

2. Such subsidiary organs as are considered necessary by the General Conference 

may be established within the purview of this Treaty.

Article 9–The General Conference

1. The General Conference; the supreme organ of the Agency, shall be composed of 

all the Contracting Parties; it shall hold regular sessions every two years and may also 

hold special sessions whenever this Treaty so provides or, in the opinion of the Council, 

the circumstances so require.

2. The General Conference:

(a) May consider and decide on any matters or questions covered by this Treaty, 

within the limits thereof, including those referring to powers and functions of any 

organ provided for in this Treaty.

––––––––

1 Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America [OPANAL], Gen.Conf. Res. 267 (E-V), 

OPANAL Doc. CG/E/Res.267 (E-V) (July 3, 1990), amended treaty to include “and the Caribbean”.
1264 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

(b) Shall establish procedures for the control system to ensure observance of this 

Treaty in accordance with its provisions.

(c) Shall elect the Members of the Council and the General Secretary.

(d) May remove the General Secretary from office if the proper functioning of 

the Agency so requires.

(e) Shall receive and consider the biennial and special reports submitted by the 

Council and the General Secretary.

(f) Shall initiate and consider studies designed to facilitate the optimum 

fulfillment of the aims of this Treaty, without prejudice to the power of the General 

Secretary independently to carry out similar studies for submission to and 

consideration by the Conference.

(g) Shall be the organ competent to authorize the conclusion of agreements with 

Governments and other international organizations and bodies.

3. The General Conference shall adopt the Agency’s budget and fix the scale of 

financial contributions to be paid by Member States, taking into account the systems and 

criteria used for the same purpose by the United Nations.

4. The General Conference shall elect its officers for each session and may establish 

such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

5. Each Member of the Agency shall have one vote. The decisions of the General 

Conference shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of the Members present and voting in 

the case of matters relating to the control system and measures referred to in article 20, 

the admission of new Members, the election or removal of the General Secretary, 

adoption of the budget and matters related thereto. Decisions on other matters, as well as 

procedural questions and also determination of which questions must be decided by a 

two-thirds majority, shall be taken by a simple majority of the Members present and 

voting.

6. The General Conference shall adopt its own rules of procedure.

Article 10–The Council

1. The Council shall be composed of five Members of the Agency elected by the 

General Conference from among the Contracting Parties, due account being taken 

equitable geographic distribution.

2. The Members of the Council shall be elected for a term of four years. However, in 

the first election three will be elected for two years. Outgoing Members may not be reelected for the following period unless the limited number of States for which the Treaty 

is in force so requires.

3. Each Member of the Council shall have one representative.

4. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously.

5. In addition to the functions conferred upon it by this Treaty and to those which 

may be assigned to it by the General Conference, the Council shall, through the General 

Secretary, ensure the proper operation of the control system in accordance with the 

provisions of this Treaty and with the decisions adopted by the General Conference.

6. The Council shall submit an annual report on its work to the General Conference 

as well as such special reports as it deems necessary or which the General Conference 

requests of it.

7. The Council shall elect its officers for each session.

8. The decisions of the Council shall be taken by a simple majority of its Members 

present and voting.

9. The Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure.

Article 11–The Secretariat

1. The Secretariat shall consist of a General Secretary, who shall be the chief 

administrative officer of the Agency, and of such staff as the Agency may require. The 

term of office of the General Secretary shall be four years and he may be re-elected for a 

single additional term. The General Secretary may not be a national of the country in 
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America 1265

which the Agency has its headquarters. In case the office of General Secretary becomes 

vacant, a new election shall be held to fill the office for the remainder of the term.

2. The staff of the Secretariat shall be appointed by the General Secretary, in 

accordance with rules laid down by the General Conference.

3. In addition to the functions conferred upon him by this Treaty and to those which 

may be assigned to him by the General Conference–the General Secretary shall ensure, 

as provided by article 10, paragraph 5, the proper operation of the control system 

established by this Treaty, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and the 

decisions taken by the General Conference.

4. The General Secretary shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the General 

Conference and of the Council and shall make an annual report to both bodies on the 

work of the Agency and any special reports requested by the General Conference or the 

Council or which the General Secretary may deem desirable.

5. The General Secretary shall establish the procedures for distributing to all 

Contracting Parties information received by the Agency from governmental sources and 

such information from non-governmental sources as may be of interest to the Agency.

6. In the performance of their duties the General Secretary and the staff shall not 

seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any other authority external 

to the Agency and shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as 

international officials responsible only to the Agency; subject to their responsibility to 

the Agency, they shall not disclose any industrial secrets or other confidential 

information coming to their knowledge by reason of their official duties in the Agency.

7. Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to respect the exclusively international 

character of the responsibilities of the General Secretary and the staff and not to seek to 

influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

Article 12–Control System

1. For the purpose of verifying compliance with the obligations entered into by the 

Contracting Parties in accordance with article 1, a control system shall be established 

which shall be put into effect in accordance with the provisions of articles 13-18 of this 

Treaty.

2. The control system shall be used in particular for the purpose of verifying:

(a) That devices, services and facilities intended for peaceful uses of nuclear 

energy are not used in the testing or manufacture of nuclear weapons.

(b) That none of the activities prohibited in article 1 of this Treaty are carried out 

in the territory of the Contracting Parties with nuclear materials or weapons 

introduced from abroad, and

(c) That explosions for peaceful purposes are compatible with article 18 of this 

Treaty.

Article 13–IAEA Safeguards

Each Contracting Party shall negotiate multilateral or bilateral agreements with the 

International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of its safeguards to its nuclear 

activities. Each Contracting Party shall initiate negotiations within a period of 180 days 

after the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification of this Treaty. These 

agreements shall enter into force, for each Party, not later than eighteen months after the 

date of the initiation of such negotiations except in case of unforeseen circumstances or 

force majeure.

Article 14–Reports of the Parties

1. The Contracting Parties shall submit to the Agency and to the International 

Atomic Energy Agency, for their information, semi-annual reports stating that no 

activity prohibited under this Treaty has occurred in their respective territories.
1266 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

2. The Contracting Parties to the Treaty shall simultaneously transmit to the Agency 

a copy of the reports submitted to the International Atomic Energy Agency which relate 

to matters subject of this Treaty that are relevant to the work of the Agency.

3. The information furnished by the Contracting Parties shall not be, totally or 

partially, disclosed or transmitted to third parties, by the addresses of the reports, except 

when the Contracting Parties give their express consent.2

Article 15–Special Reports Requested by the General Secretary

1. At the request of any of the Contracting Parties and with the authorization of the 

Council, the General Secretary may request any of the Contracting Parties to provide the 

Agency with complementary or supplementary information regarding any extraordinary 

event or circumstance which affects the compliance with this Treaty, explaining his 

reasons. The Contracting Parties undertake to co-operate promptly and fully with the 

General Secretary.

2. The General Secretary shall inform the Council and the Contracting Parties 

forthwith of such requests and of the respective replies.3

Article 16–Special Inspections

1. The International Atomic Energy Agency has the power of carrying out special 

inspections in accordance with Article 12 and with the agreements referred to in Article 

13 of this Treaty.

2. At the request of any of the Contracting Parties and in accordance with the 

procedures established in Article 15 of this Treaty, the Council may submit for the 

consideration of the International Atomic Energy Agency a request that the necessary 

mechanisms be put into operation to carry out a special inspection.

3. The General Secretary shall request the Director General of the International 

Atomic Energy Agency to transmit to him in a timely manner the information forwarded 

to the Board of Governors of the IAEA relating to the conclusion of the special 

inspection. The General Secretary shall make this information available to the Council 

promptly.

4. The Council, through the General Secretary, shall transmit this information to all 

the Contracting Parties.

Article 17–Use of Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes

Nothing in the provisions of this Treaty shall prejudice the rights of the Contracting 

Parties, in conformity with this Treaty, to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in 

particular for their economic development and social progress.

Article 18–Explosions for Peaceful Purposes

1. Contracting Parties may carry out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful 

purposes–including explosions which involve devices similar to those used in nuclear 

weapons–or collaborate with third parties for the same purpose, provide that they do so 

in accordance with the provisions of this article and the other articles of the Treaty, 

particularly Articles 1 and 5.

2. Contracting Parties intending to carry out, or to cooperate in carrying out, such an 

explosion shall notify the Agency and the International Atomic Energy Agency, as far in 

advance as the circumstances require, of the date of the explosion and shall at the same 

time provide the following information:

(a) The nature of the nuclear device and the source from which it was obtained.

(b) The place and purpose of the planned explosion,

––––––––

2 Paragraph’s two and three were amended by OPANAL, Gen.Conf. Res. 290 (VII), OPANAL Doc. 

CG/E/Res.290 (August 26, 1992).

3 Section amended by OPANAL, Gen.Conf. Res. 290 (VII), OPANAL Doc. CG/E/Res.290 

(August 26, 1992).
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America 1267

(c) The procedures which will be followed in order to comply with paragraph 3 

of this article.

(d) The expected force of the device, and

(e) The fullest possible information on any possible radioactive fall-out that may 

result from the explosion or explosions, and measures which will be taken to avoid 

danger to the population, flora, fauna and territories of any other Party or Parties.

3. The General Secretary and the technical personnel designated by the Council and 

the International Atomic Energy Agency may observe all the preparations, including the 

explosion of the device, and shall have unrestricted access to any area in the vicinity of 

the site of the explosion in order to ascertain whether the device and the procedures 

followed during the explosion are in conformity with the information supplied under 

paragraph 2 of this article and the other provisions of this Treaty.

4. The Contracting Parties may accept the collaboration of third parties for the 

purpose set forth in paragraph 1 of the present article, in accordance with paragraphs 2 

and 3 thereof.

Article 19–Relations with International Atomic Energy Agency

1. The Agency may conclude such agreements with the International Atomic Energy 

Agency, as are authorized by the General Conference and as it considers likely to 

facilitate the efficient operation of the Control System established by this Treaty.4

Article 20–Relations with Other International Agencies

1. The Agency may also enter into relations with any international organization or 

body, especially any which may be established in the future to supervise disarmament or 

measures for the control of armaments in any part of the world. 

2. The Contracting Parties may, if they see fit, request the advice of the InterAmerican Nuclear Energy Commission on all technical matters connected with the 

application of this Treaty with which the Commission is competent to deal under its 

Statute.5

Article 21–Measures in the Event of Violation of the Treaty

1. The General Conference shall take note of all cases in which, in its opinion, any 

Contracting Party is not complying fully with its obligations under this Treaty and shall 

draw the matter to the attention to the Party concerned, making such recommendations 

as it deems appropriate.

2. If, in its opinion, such non-compliance constitutes a violation of this Treaty which 

might endanger peace and security, the General Conference shall report thereon 

simultaneously to the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly 

through the Secretary-General of the United Nations and to the Council of the 

Organization of American States. The General Conference shall likewise report to the 

International Atomic Energy Agency for such purposes as are relevant in accordance 

with its Statute.

Article 22–United Nations and Organizations of American States

None of the provisions of this Treaty shall be construed as impairing the rights and 

obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or, in the case of States 

Members of the Organization of American States, under existing regional treaties.

––––––––

4 Article inserted by OPANAL, Gen.Conf. Res. 290 (VII), OPANAL Doc. CG/E/Res.290 (August 26, 

1992).

5 Article renumbered and amended by OPANAL, Gen.Conf. Res. 290 (VII), OPANAL 

Doc. CG/E/Res.290 (August 26, 1992).
1268 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

Article 23–Privileges and Immunities

1. The Agency shall enjoy in the territory of each of the Contracting Parties such 

legal capacity and such privileges and immunities as may be necessary for the exercise 

of its functions and the fulfillment of its purposes.

2. Representatives of the Contracting Parties accredited to the Agency and officials 

of the Agency shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for 

the performance of their functions.

3. The Agency may conclude agreements with the Contracting Parties with a view to 

determining the details of the application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article.

Article 24–Notification of Other Agreements

Once this Treaty has entered into force, the Secretariat shall be notified immediately 

of any international agreement concluded by any of the Contracting Parties on matters 

with which this Treaty is concerned; the Secretariat shall register it and notify the other 

Contracting Parties.

Article 25–Settlement of Disputes

Unless the Parties concerned agree on another mode of peaceful settlement, any 

question or dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Treaty which is 

not settled shall be referred to the International Court of Justice with the prior consent of 

the Parties to the controversy.

Article 26–Signature

1. This Treaty shall be open indefinitely for signature by:

(a) All the Latin American Republics, and

(b) All other sovereign States situated in their entirety south of latitude 35x north 

in the western hemisphere; and, except as provided in paragraph 2 of this article, all 

such States which become sovereign, when they have admitted by the General 

Conference.

2. The condition of State Party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco shall be restricted to 

Independent States which are situated within the Zone of application of the Treaty in 

accordance with Article 4 of same, and with paragraph I of the present Article, and 

which were Members of the United Nations as of December 10, 1985 as well as to the 

non-autonomous territories mentioned in document OEA/CER.P, AG/doc. 1939/85 of 

November 5, 1985, once they attain their independence.6

Article 27–Ratification and Deposit

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States in accordance with 

their respective constitutional procedures.

2. This Treaty and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the 

Government of the Mexican United States, which is hereby designated the Depositary 

Government.

3. The Depositary Government shall send certified copies of this Treaty to the 

Governments of signatory States and shall notify them of the deposit of each instrument 

of ratification.

Article 28–Reservations

This Treaty shall not be subject to reservations.

––––––––

6 Paragraph 2 was amended by OPANAL, Gen.Conf. Res. 268 (XII), OPANAL Doc. CG/Res.268 

(May 9, 1991).
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America 1269

Article 29–Entry into Force

1. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 of this article, this Treaty shall enter into 

force among the States that have ratified it as soon as the following requirements have 

been met:

(a) Deposit of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty with the Depositary 

Government by the Governments of the States mentioned in article 25 which are in 

existence on the date when this Treaty is opened for signature and which are not 

affected by the provisions of article 25, paragraph 2;

(b) Signature and ratification of Additional Protocol 1 annexed to this Treaty by 

all extra-continental or continental States have de jure or de facto international 

responsibility for territories situated in the zone of application of the Treaty;

(c) Signature and ratification of the Additional Protocol II annexed to this Treaty 

by all powers possessing nuclear weapons;

(d) Conclusion of bilateral or multilateral agreements on the agreements on the 

application of the Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency in 

accordance with article 13 of this Treaty.

2. All signatory States shall have the imprescriptible right to waive, wholly or in part, 

the requirements laid down in the preceding paragraph. They may do so by means of a 

declaration which shall be annexed to their respective instrument of ratification and 

which may be formulated at the time of deposit of the instrument or subsequently. For 

those States which exercise this right, this Treaty shall enter into force upon deposit of 

the declaration, or as soon as those requirements have been met which have not been 

expressly waived.

3. As soon as this Treaty has entered into force in accordance with the provisions of 

paragraph 2 for eleven States, the Depositary Government shall convene a preliminary 

meeting of those States in order that the Agency may be set up and commence its work.

4. After the entry into force of this treaty for all the countries of the zone, the rise of 

a new power possessing nuclear weapons shall have the effect of suspending the 

execution of this Treaty for those countries which have ratified it without waiving 

requirements of paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (c) of this article, and which request such 

suspension; the Treaty shall remain suspended until the new power, on its own initiative 

or upon request by the General Conference ratifies the annexed Additional Protocol II.

Article 30–Amendments

1. Any Contracting Party may propose amendments to this Treaty and shall submit 

its proposals to the Council through the General Secretary, who shall transmit them to all 

the other Contracting Parties and, in addition, to all other signatories in accordance with 

article 6. The Council, through the General Secretary, shall immediately following the 

meeting of signatories convene a special session of the General Conference to examine 

the proposals made, for the adoption of which a two-thirds majority of the Contracting 

Parties present and voting shall be required.

2. Amendments adopted shall enter into force as soon as the requirements set forth in 

article 28 of this Treaty have been complied with.

Article 31–Duration and Denunciation

1. This Treaty shall be of a permanent nature and shall remain in force indefinitely, 

but any Party may denounce it by notifying the General Secretary of the Agency if, in 

the opinion of the denouncing State, there have arisen or may arise circumstances 

connected with the content of this Treaty or of the annexed Additional Protocols I and II 

which affect its supreme interests or the peace and security of one or more Contracting 

Parties.

2. The denunciation shall take effect three months after the delivery to the General 

Secretary of the Agency of the notification by the Government of the signatory State 

concerned. The General Secretary shall immediately communicate such notification to 

the other Contracting Parties and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the 
1270 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

information of the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly. He shall 

also communicate it to the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States.

Article 32–Authentic Texts and Registration

This Treaty, of which the Spanish, Chinese, English, French, Portuguese and Russian 

texts are equally authentic, shall be registered by the Depositary Government in 

accordance with article 102 of the United Nations Charter. The Depositary Government 

shall notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the signatures, ratifications 

and amendments relating to this Treaty and shall communicate them to the SecretaryGeneral of the Organization of American States for its information.

Transitional Article

Denunciation of the declaration referred to in article 28, paragraph 2, shall be subject 

to the same procedures as the denunciation of this Treaty, except that it will take effect 

on the date of delivery of the respective notification.

In Witness Whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, having deposited their full 

powers, found in good and due form, sign this Treaty on behalf of their respective 

Governments.

Done at Mexico, Distrito Federal, on the Fourteenth day of February, one thousand 

nine hundred and sixty-seven.

Additional Protocol

The undersigned Plenipotentiaries, furnished with full powers by their respective 

Governments.7

Convinced that the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, 

negotiated and signed in accordance with the recommendations of the General Assembly 

of the United Nations in Resolution 1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, represents an 

important step towards ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Aware that the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not an end in itself but, rather, 

a means of achieving general and complete disarmament at a later stage, and

Desiring to contribute, so far as lies in their power, towards ending the armaments 

race, especially in the field of nuclear weapons, and towards strengthening a world at 

peace, based on mutual respect and sovereign equality of States.

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1. To undertake to apply the statute of denuclearization in respect of warlike 

purposes as defined in articles 2, 3, 5 and 13 of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear 

Weapons in Latin America in territories for which, de jure or de facto, they are 

internationally responsible and which lie within the limits of the geographical zone 

established in that treaty.

Article 2. The duration of this Protocol shall be the same as that of the Treaty for the 

Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America of which this Protocol is an annex, 

and the provisions regarding ratification and denunciation contained in the Treaty shall 

be applicable to it.

Article 3. This Protocol shall enter into force, for the States which have ratified it, on the 

date of the deposit of their respective instruments of ratification. In Witness Whereof the 

undersigned Plenipotentiaries, having deposited their full powers, found in good and due 

form, sign this Protocol on behalf of their respective Governments.

––––––––

7 The United Kingdom and the Netherlands are parties to this Protocol. The United States has signed. 
Table: Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

Signature and Ratification by States or Organizations

Country Signature Ratification

Amendment to Art. 7

Res. 267 (E-V)

Amendment to Art. 25

Res. 268 (XII)

Amendments 

16, 

Res. 2

Signature Ratification Signature Ratification Signature 

Antigua & Barbuda ......... 10/11/83 10/11/83 1

Argentina ........................ 9/27/67 1/18/94 12/10/90 1/18/94 10/14/91 1/18/94 8/26/92 

Bahamas, The.................. 11/29/76 4/26/77 3/18/92

Barbados......................... 10/18/68 4/25/69 2/14/97 2/14/97 2/14/97 2/14/97 2/14/97 

Belize .............................. 2/14/92 11/9/94 11/23/95 11/23/95 11/23/95 

Bolivia............................. 2/14/67 2/18/69 12/10/90 9/10/91 8/31/92

Brazil............................... 5/9/67 1/29/68 12/5/90 5/30/94 1/23/92 5/30/94 8/26/92 

Chile................................ 2/14/67 10/9/74 1/16/91 1/18/94 9/3/91 1/18/94 8/26/92 

Colombia......................... 2/14/67 8/4/72 12/5/90 1/18/99 8/10/91 1/18/99 12/14/92 

Costa Rica ....................... 2/14/67 8/25/69 12/10/90 1/20/99 9/3/91 1/20/99 8/26/92 

Cuba................................ 3/25/95 10/23/02 12/5/95 10/23/02 12/5/95 10/23/02 12/5/95 

Dominica......................... 5/2/89 6/4/93

Dominican Republic ....... 7/29/67 6/14/68 1/16/91 9/10/91 8/26/92 

Ecuador........................... 2/14/67 2/11/69 12/5/90 10/18/95 9/13/91 8/30/00 8/26/92 

El Salvador...................... 2/14/67 4/22/68 2/21/91 5/22/92 9/10/91 1/14/02 9/8/92 

Grenada........................... 4/29/75 6/20/75 9/17/91 9/17/91 9/17/91

Guatemala ....................... 2/14/67 2/6/70 12/10/90 8/21/98 10/23/97 11/26/03 8/26/92 

Guyana ............................ 1/16/95 1/16/95 1/16/95 1/16/95 1/16/95 1/16/95 1/16/95 

Haiti ................................ 2/14/67 5/23/69 1/16/91 1/21/92 10/22/92

Honduras......................... 2/14/67 9/23/68 1/16/91 3/4/92 8/26/92

Jamaica............................ 10/26/67 6/26/69 2/21/91 3/13/92 9/17/91 5/17/91 6/8/93 

Mexico ............................ 2/14/67 9/20/67 11/5/90 10/24/91 9/2/91 4/10/92 8/26/92 

Nicaragua ........................ 2/15/67 10/24/68 12/10/90 1/28/92 8/26/92 
1 Dates given are the earliest dates on which countries signed the agreements or deposited their ratifications or accessions—whether in Washington, Lond

New York. In the case of a country that was a dependent territory that became a party through succession, the date given is the date on which the country gave 

would continue to be bound by the terms of the agreement.

a The declaration of waiver was deposited June 27, 1975, which is the date of entry into force for Trinidad and Tobago.

Panama............................ 2/14/67 6/11/71 8/8/00 8/8/00 

Paraguay.......................... 4/26/67 3/19/69 2/19/91 10/22/96 1/21/92 10/22/96 8/26/92 

Peru................................. 2/14/67 3/4/69 12/5/90 7/14/95 1/21/92 7/14/95 2/9/93 

St. Lucia .......................... 8/25/92 6/2/95

Saint Kitts and Nevis 2/18/94 4/18/95 2/18/94 2/18/94 2/18/94

St. Vincent/Grenadines... 2/14/92 2/14/92

Suriname ......................... 2/13/76 6/10/77 Accession 

6/13/94

Accession 

6/13/94

Trinidad & Tobago ......... 6/27/67 12/3/70 a

Uruguay .......................... 2/14/67 8/20/68 11/16/90 8/30/94 9/17/91 8/30/94 8/29/92 

Venezuela........................ 2/14/67 3/23/70 2/16/91 2/14/97 9/10/91 2/14/97 8/26/92 

TOTAL 33 33 26 21 24 19 24 
Table: Additional Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

Signature and Ratification by States or Organizations

Country

Date of

Signature

Date of

Deposit of

Ratification

France .................................................... 3/2/79 8/24/92

Netherlands. ........................................... 4/1/68 7/26/71

United Kingdom .................................... 12/20/67 12/11/69

United States.......................................... 5/26/77 11/23/81

Table: Additional Protocol II To The Treaty For The Prohibition Of Nuclear Weapons In Latin Amer

Signature and Ratification by States or Organizations

Country

Date of

Signature

Date of

Deposit of

Ratification

China, Peoples Republic of.................... 8/21/73 6/12/74

France .................................................... 7/18/73 3/22/74

USSR ..................................................... 5/18/78 1/8/79

United Kingdom .................................... 12/20/67 12/11/69

United States.......................................... 4/1/68 5/12/71

Status as of June 10, 2007
1274 Intl. Atomic Energy Agency Participation Act (P.L. 85–177)

J. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY 

PARTICIPATION ACT OF 1957

Public Law 85–177 71 Stat. 453

August 28, 1957

An Act

To provide for the appointment of representatives of the United States of 

the organs of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and to make 

other provisions with respect to the participation of the United States 

in that Agency, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 

United States of America in Congress assembled,

Sec. 1. Short Title

That this Act may be cited as the “International Atomic Energy 

Agency Participation Act of 1957.”

Sec. 2. Representatives

(a) The President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, 

shall appoint a representative and a deputy representative of the United 

States to the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to 

as the “Agency”), who shall hold office at the pleasure of the President. 

Such representative and deputy representative shall represent the United 

States on the Board of Governors of the Agency, may represent the 

United States at the General Conference, and may serve exofficio as 

United States representative on any organ of that Agency, and shall 

perform such other functions in connection with the participation of the 

United States in the Agency as the President may from time to time 

direct.

(b) The President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, 

may appoint or designate from time to time to attend a specified session 

or specified sessions of the General Conference of the Agency a 

representative of the United States and such number of alternates as he 

may determine consistent with the rules of procedure of the General 

Conference.

(c) The President may also appoint or designate from time to time 

such other persons as he may deem necessary to represent the United 

States in the organs of the Agency. The President may designate any 

officer of the United States Government, whose appointment is subject to 

confirmation by the Senate, to act, without additional compensation, for 

temporary periods as the representative of the United States on the Board 

of Governors or to the General Conference of the Agency in the absence 

or disability of the representative and deputy representative appointed 

under section 2(a) or in lieu of such representative in connection with a 

specified subject matter.

(d) All persons appointed or designated in pursuance of authority 

contained in this section shall receive compensation at rates determined 

by the President upon the basis of duties to be performed but not in 

excess of rates authorized by sections 411 and 412 of the Foreign Service 

Act of 1946, as amended (22 USC 866, 867), for Chiefs of Mission and 

Foreign Service officers occupying positions of equivalent importance, 

except that no Member of the Senate or House of Representatives or 
Intl. Atomic Energy Agency Participation Act (P.L. 85–177) 1275

officer of the United States who is designated under subsection (b) or 

subsection (c) of this section as a delegate or representative of the United 

States or as an alternate to attend any specified session or specified 

sessions of the General Conference shall be entitled to receive such 

compensation. Any person who receives compensation pursuant to the 

provisions of this subsection may be granted allowances and benefits not 

the exceed those received by Chiefs of Mission and Foreign Service 

officers occupying positions of equivalent importance.

Sec. 3. Participation

The participation of the United States in the International Atomic 

Energy Agency shall be consistent with and in furtherance of the 

purposes of the Agency set forth in its Statute and the policy concerning 

the development, use, and control of atomic energy set forth in the 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. [The President shall, from time 

to time as occasion may require, but not less that once each year, make 

reports to the Congress on the activities of the International Atomic 

Energy Agency and on the participation of the United States therein.]1

 In 

addition to any other requirements of law the Department of State and the 

Atomic Energy Commission shall keep the Joint Committee on Atomic 

Energy, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Senate 

Committee on Foreign Relations, as appropriate, currently informed with 

respect to the activities of the Agency and the participation of the United 

States therein.

Sec. 4. Voting

The representatives provided for in section 2 hereof, when 

representing the United States in the organs of the Agency, shall, at all 

times, act in accordance with the instructions of the President, and such 

representatives shall, in accordance with such instructions, cast any and 

all votes under the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Sec. 5. Salaries and Expenses

There is hereby authorized to be appropriated annually to the 

Department of State, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise 

appropriated, such sums as may be necessary for the payment by the 

United States of its share of the expenses of the International Atomic 

Energy Agency as apportioned by the Agency in accordance with 

paragraph (D) of article XIV of the Statute of the Agency, and for all 

necessary salaries and expenses of the representatives provided for in 

section 2 hereof and of their appropriate staffs, including personal 

services without regard to the civil service laws and the Classification 

Act of 1949, as amended, travel expenses without regard to the 

Standardized Government Travel Regulations, as amended, the Travel 

Expense Act of 1949, as amended, and section 10 of the Act of March 3, 

1933, as amended; salaries as authorized by the Foreign Service Act of 

1946, as amended, or as authorized by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 

as amended, and expenses and allowances of personnel and dependents 

as authorized by the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended; services 

as authorized by section 15 of the Act of August 2, 1946 (5 USC 55a);2

translating and other services, by contract; hire of passenger motor 

vehicles and other local transportation; printing and binding without 

––––––––

1 Report is required by P.L. 89-348, § (20), 79 Stat. 1310 amended P.L. 85-177 by 

repealing the requirement of a report to the Congress by the President not less than once 

each year on the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency and on the 

participation of the United States therein.

2 P.L. 89-554, 80 Stat. 416 (1966) recodified section 15 of the Act of August 2, 1946, 

as 5 USC 3109.
1276 Intl. Atomic Energy Agency Participation Act (P.L. 85–177)

regard to section II of the Act of March 1, 1919 (44 USC 111); official 

functions and courtesies; such sums as may be necessary to defray the 

expenses of United States participation in the Preparatory Commission 

for the Agency, established pursuant to annex I of the Statute of the 

Agency; and such other expenses as may be authorized by the Secretary 

of State.

Sec. 6. CSR/FEGLI Status

(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, Executive order or 

regulation, a Federal employee who, with the approval of the Federal 

agency or the head of the department by which he is employed, leaves his 

position to enter the employ of the Agency shall not be considered for the 

purposes of the Civil Service Retirement Act, as amended, and the 

Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act of 1954, as amended, as 

separated from his Federal position during such employment with the 

Agency but not to extend beyond the first three consecutive years of his 

entering the employ of the Agency: Provided; (1) That he shall pay to the 

Civil Service Commission within ninety days from the date he is 

separated without prejudice from the Agency all necessary deductions 

and agency contributions for coverage under the Civil Service Retirement 

Act for the period of his employment by the Agency, and (2) That all 

deductions and agency contributions necessary for continued coverage 

under the Federal Employees’ Group life Insurance Act of 1954, as 

amended, shall be made during the term of his employment with the 

International Atomic Energy Agency. If such employee, within three 

years from the date of his employment with the Agency, and within 

ninety days from the date he is separated without prejudice from the 

Agency, applies to be restored to his Federal position, he shall within 

thirty days of such application be restored to such position or to a 

position of like seniority, status and pay.3

(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, Executive order or 

regulation, and Presidential appointee or elected officer who leaves his 

position to enter, or who within ninety days after the termination of his 

position enters, the employ of the Agency, shall be entitled to the 

coverage and benefits of the Civil Service Retirement Act, as amended, 

and the Federal Employees’ Group Life insurance Act of 1954, as 

amended, but not beyond the earlier of either the termination of his 

employment with the Agency or the expiration of three years from the 

date he entered employment with the Agency: Provided, (1) That he shall 

pay to the Civil Service Commission within ninety days from the date he 

is separated without prejudice from the Agency all necessary deductions 

and agency contributions for coverage under the Civil Service Retirement 

Act for the period of his employment by the Agency and (2) That all 

deductions and agency contributions necessary for continued coverage 

under the Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act of 1954, as 

amended, shall be made during the term of his employment with the 

Agency.

(c) The President is authorized to prescribe such regulations as may 

be necessary to carry out the provisions of this section and to protect the 

––––––––

3 Repealed by P.L. 85-795, 72 Stat. 962 (1958). This statute provided that:

Section 6(a) of the International Atomic Energy Agency Participation Act 

of 1957 [22 USC 2025(a)], is repealed except that it shall be considered to 

remain in effect with respect to any employee subject thereto who is serving 

as an employee of the International Atomic Energy Agency on the date of 

enactment of this Act [Aug. 28, 1958] and who does not make the election 

referred to in section 6, and for the purposes of any rights and benefits vested

there under prior to such date.

5 USC 8301.

5 USC 8701.
Intl. Atomic Energy Agency Participation Act (P.L. 85–177) 1277

retirement, insurance and such other civil service rights and privileges as 

the President may find appropriate.

Sec. 7. Special Nuclear Material Compensation

Section 54 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, is 

amended by adding the following new sentences: “Unless hereafter 

otherwise authorized by law the Commission shall be compensated for 

special nuclear material so distributed at not less than the Commission’s 

published charges applicable to the domestic distribution of such 

material, except that the Commission to assist and encourage research on 

peaceful uses or for medical therapy may so distribute without charge 

during any calendar year only a quantity of such material which at the 

time of transfer does not exceed in value $10,000 in the case of one 

nation or $50,000 in the case of any group of nations. The Commission 

may distribute to the International Atomic Energy Agency, or to any 

group of nations, only such amounts of special nuclear materials and for 

such periods of time as are authorized by Congress: Provided, however,

That, notwithstanding this provision, the Commission is hereby 

authorized subject to the provisions of section 123, to distribute to the 

Agency five thousand kilograms of contained uranium 235, together with 

the amounts of special nuclear material which will match in amount the 

sum of all quantities of special nuclear materials made available by all 

other members of the Agency to July 1, 1960.”

Sec. 8. Authority Termination

In the event of an amendment to the Statute of the Agency being 

adopted in accordance with article XVIII-C of the Statute to which the 

Senate by formal vote shall refuse its advice and consent, upon 

notification by the Senate to the President of such refusal to advise and 

consent, all further authority under sections 2, 3, 4, and 5 of this Act, as 

amended, shall terminate: Provided, however, That the Secretary of State, 

under such regulations as the President shall promulgate, shall have the 

necessary authority to complete the prompt and orderly settlement of 

obligations and commitments to the Agency already incurred and pay 

salaries, allowances, travel expenses, and other expenses required for a 

prompt and orderly termination of United States participation in the 

Agency: And provided further, That the representative and the deputy 

representative of the United States to the Agency, and such other officers 

or employees representing the United States in the Agency, under such 

regulations as the President shall promulgate, shall retain their authority 

under this Act for such time as may be necessary to complete the 

settlement of matters arising out of the United States participation in the 

Agency.
1278 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency

K. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY 

AGENCY

Article I–Establishment of the Agency

The Parties hereto establish an International Atomic Energy Agency 

(hereinafter referred to as “the Agency” upon the terms and conditions 

hereinafter set forth.

Article II–Objectives

The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of 

atomic energy to peace, health, and prosperity throughout the world. It 

shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its 

request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to 

further any military purpose.

Article III–Function

A. The Agency is authorized:

1. To encourage and assist research on, and development and 

practical applications of, atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout 

the world; and, if requested to do so, to act as an intermediary for the 

purposes of securing the performance of services or the supplying of 

materials, equipment, or facilities by one member of the Agency for 

another; and to perform any operation or service useful in research 

on, or development or practical application of, atomic energy for 

peaceful purposes.

2. To make provision, in accordance with this Statute, for 

materials. services, equipment, and facilities to meet the needs of 

research on, and development and practical application of, atomic 

energy for peaceful purposes, including the production of electric 

power, with due consideration for the needs of the underdeveloped 

areas of the world.;

3. To foster the exchange of scientific and technical information 

on peaceful use of atomic energy;

4. To encourage the exchange of scientific and training of 

scientists and experts in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy;

5. To establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that 

special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, 

and information made available by the Agency or at its request or 

under its supervision or control are not used in a way as to further any 

military purposes; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the 

parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request 

of a State, to any of that State’s activities in the field of atomic 

energy;

6. To establish or adopt, in consultation and, where appropriate, in 

collaboration with the competent organs of the United Nations and 

with the specialized agencies concerned, standards of safety for 

protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property 

(including such standards for labour conditions), and to provide for 

the applications of these standards to its own operations as well as to 

the operations making use of materials, services, equipment, 

facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at its 

request or under its control or supervision; and to provide for the 

application of these standards, at the request of the parties, to 

operations under any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or, at the 
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency 1279

request of a State, to any of that State’s activities in the field of 

atomic energy;

7. To acquire or establish any facilities, plant and equipment 

useful in carrying out its authorized functions, whenever the facilities, 

plant, and equipment otherwise available to it in the area concerned 

are inadequate or available only on terms it deems unsatisfactory.

B. In carrying out its functions, the Agency shall:

1. Conduct its activities in accordance with the purposes and 

principles of the United Nations to promote peace and international 

cooperation, and in conformity with policies of the United Nations 

furthering the establishment of safeguarded worldwide disarmament 

and in conformity with any international agreements entered into 

pursuant to such policies;

2. Establish control over the use of special fissionable materials 

received by the Agency, in order to ensure that these materials are 

used only for peaceful purposes;

3. Allocate its resources in such a manner as to secure efficient 

utilization and the greatest possible general benefit in all areas of the 

world, bearing in mind the special needs of the underdeveloped areas 

of the world;

4. Submit reports on the activities annually to the General 

Assembly of the United Nations and, when appropriate, to the 

Security Council, if in connection with the activities of the Agency 

there should arise questions that are within the competence of the 

Security Council, the Agency shall notify the Security Council, as the 

organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of 

international peace and security, and may also take the measures open 

to it under this Statute, including those provided in paragraph C of 

Article XII;

5. Submit reports to the Economic and Social Council and other 

organs of the United Nations on matters within the competence of 

these organs.

C. In carrying out its functions, the Agency shall not make assistance 

to members subject to any political, economic, military, or other 

conditions incompatible with the provisions of this Statute.

D. Subject to the provisions of this Statute and to the terms of 

agreement concluded between a State or a group of States and the 

Agency which shall be in accordance with the provisions of the Statute, 

the activities of the Agency shall be carried out with due observance of 

the sovereign rights of States.

Article IV–Membership

A. The initial members of the agency shall be those States Members 

of the United Nations or of any of the specialized agencies which shall 

have signed this Statute within ninety days after it is opened for signature 

and shall have deposited an instrument or ratification.

B. Other members of the Agency shall be those States, whether or not 

Members of the United Nations or of any of the specialized agencies, 

which deposit an instrument of acceptance of this Statute after their 

membership has been approved by the General Conference upon the 

recommendation of the Board of Governors. In recommending and 

approving a State for membership, the Board of Governors and the 

General Conference shall determine that the State is able and willing to 

carry out the obligations of membership in the Agency, giving due 
1280 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency

consideration to its ability and willingness to act in accordance with the 

purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

C. The Agency is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of 

all its members, and all members, in order to ensure to all of them the 

rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith 

the obligations assumed by them in accordance with this Statute.

Article V–General Conference

A. A General Conference consisting of representatives of all 

members shall meet in regular annual session and in such special 

sessions as shall be convened by the District General at the request of the 

Board of Governors or of a majority of members. The sessions shall take 

place at the headquarters of the Agency unless otherwise determined by 

the General Conference.

B. At such sessions, each member shall be represented by one 

delegate who may be accompanied by alternates and by advisers. The 

cost of attendance of any delegation shall be borne by the member 

concerned.

C. The General Conference shall elect a President and such other 

officers as may be required at the beginning of each session. They shall 

hold office for the duration of the session. The General Conference, 

subject to the provisions of this Statute, shall adopt its own rules of 

procedure. Each member shall have one vote. Decisions pursuant to 

paragraph H of Article XIV, paragraph C of article XVIII, and paragraph 

B of Article XIX shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members 

present and voting. Decisions on other questions, including the 

determination of additional questions or categories of questions to be 

decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be made by a majority of the 

members present and voting. A majority of members shall constitute a 

quorum.

D. The General Conference may discuss any questions or any matters 

within the scope of this Statute or relating to the powers and functions of 

any organs provided for in this Statute, and may make recommendations 

to the membership of the Agency or to the Board of Governors or to both 

on any such questions or matters.

E. The General Conference shall:

1. Elect members of the Board of Governors in accordance with 

article VI;

2. Approve States for membership in accordance with article IV;

3. Suspend a member from the privileges and rights of 

membership in accordance with Article XIX;

4. Consider the annual report of the Board;

5. In accordance with Article XIV, approve the budget of the 

Agency recommended by the Board or return it with 

recommendations as to its entirety or parts to the Board, for 

resubmission to the General Conference;

6. Approve reports to be submitted to the United Nations as 

required by the relationship agreement between the Agency and the 

United Nations, except report referred to in paragraph C of Article 

XII, or return them to the Board with its recommendations;

7. Approve any agreement or agreements between the Agency and 

the United Nations and other organizations as provided in Article 

XVI or return such agreements with its recommendations to the 

Board, for resubmission to the General Conference;
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency 1281

8. Approve rules and limitations regarding the exercise of 

borrowing powers by the Board, in accordance with paragraph G of 

Article XIV; approve rules regarding the acceptance of voluntary 

contributions to the Agency; and approve, in accordance with 

paragraph F of Article XIV, the manner in which the general fund 

referred to in that paragraph may be used;

9. Approve amendments to this Statute in accordance with 

paragraph C of Article XVIII.

10. Approve the appointment of the Director General in 

accordance with paragraph A of Article VII.

F. The General Conference shall have the authority:

1. To take decisions on any matter specifically referred to the 

General Conference for this purpose by the Board;

2. To propose matters for consideration by the Board and request 

from the Board reports on any matter relating to the functions of the 

Agency.

Article VI–Board Of Governors

A. The Board of Governors shall be composed as follows:

1. The outgoing Board of Governors shall designate for 

membership on the Board the ten members most advanced in the 

technology of atomic energy including the production of source 

materials, and the member most advanced in the technology of atomic 

energy including the production of source materials in each of the 

following areas in which none of the aforesaid ten is located:

(1) North America

(2) Latin America

(3) Western Europe

(4) Eastern Europe

(5) Africa

(6) Middle East and South Asia

(7) South East Asia and the Pacific

(8) Far East

2. The outgoing Board of Governors (or in the case of the first 

Board, the Preparatory Commission referred to in Annex I) shall 

designate for membership on the Board two members from among 

the following other producers of source materials: Belgium, 

Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Portugal; and shall also designate for 

membership on the Board one other member as a supplier of technical 

assistance. No member in this category in any one year will be 

eligible for redesignation in the same category for the following year.

3. The General Conference shall elect ten members to 

membership on the Board of Governors, with due regard to equitable 

representation on the Board as a whole of the members in the areas 

listed in subparagraph A-1 of this article, so that the Board shall at all 

times include in this category a representative of each of those areas 

except North America. Except for the five members chosen for a term 

of one year in accordance with paragraph D of this article, no member 

in this category in any one term of office will be eligible for 

reelection in this same category for the following term of office.

B. The designations provided for in subparagraphs A-1 and A-2 of 

this article shall take place not less than sixty days before each regular 

annual session of the General Conference. The elections provided for in 

subparagraph A-3 of this article shall take place at regular annual 

sessions of the General Conference.
1282 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency

C. Members represented on the Board of Governors in accordance 

with subparagraph A-1 and A-2 of this article shall hold office from the 

end of the next regular annual session of the General Conference after 

their designation until the end of the following regular annual session for 

the General Conference.

D. Members represented on the Board of Governors in accordance 

with subparagraph A-3 of this Article shall hold office from the end of 

the regular annual session of the General Conference at which they are 

elected until the end of the second regular annual session of the General 

Conference thereafter. In the election of these members for the first 

Board, however, five shall be chosen for a term of one year.

E. Each member of the Board of Governors shall have one vote. 

Decisions on the amount of the Agency’s budget shall be made by a twothirds majority of those present and voting, as provided in paragraph H of 

Article XIV. Decisions on other questions, including the determination of 

additional questions or categories of questions to be decided by a twothirds majority, shall be made by a majority of those present and voting. 

Two-thirds of all members of the Board shall constitute a quorum.

F. The Board of Governors shall have authority to carry out the 

functions of the Agency in accordance with this Statute, subject to its 

responsibilities to the General Conference as provided in the Statute.

G. The Board of Governors shall meet at such times as it may 

determine. The meetings shall take place at the headquarters of the 

Agency unless otherwise determined by the Board.

H. The Board of Governors shall elect a Chairman and other officers 

from among its members and, subject to the provisions of this Statute, 

shall adopt its own rules of procedure.

I. The Board of Governors may establish such committees as it deems 

advisable. The Board may appoint persons to represent it in its relations 

with other organizations.

J. The Board of Governors shall prepare an annual report to the 

General Conference concerning the affairs of the Agency and any 

projects approved by the Agency. The Board shall also prepare for 

submission to the General Conference such reports as the Agency is or 

may be required to make to the United Nations or to any other 

organization the work of which is related to that of the Agency. These 

reports, along with the annual reports, shall be submitted to members of 

the Agency at least one month before the regular annual session of the 

General Conference.

Article VII–Staff

A. The staff of the Agency shall be headed by a Director General. 

The Director General shall be appointed by the Board of Governors with 

the approval of the General Conference for a term of four years. He shall 

be the chief administrative officer of the Agency.

B. The Director General shall be responsible for the appointment, 

organization, and functioning of the staff and shall be under the authority 

of and subject to the control of the Board of Governors. He shall perform 

his duties in accordance with regulations adopted by the Board.

C. The staff shall include such qualified scientific and technical and 

other personnel as may be required to fulfill the objectives and functions 

of the Agency. The Agency shall be guided by the principal that its 

permanent staff shall be kept to a minimum. 

D. The paramount consideration in the recruitment and employment 

of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be 
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency 1283

to secure employees of the highest standards of efficiency, technical 

competence, and integrity. Subject to this consideration, due regard shall 

be paid to the contributions of members of the Agency and to the 

importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as 

possible.

E. The terms and conditions on which the staff shall be appointed, 

renumerated, and dismissed shall be in accordance with regulations made 

by the Board of Governors, subject to provisions of this Statute and to 

general rules approved by the General Conference on the 

recommendation of the Board.

F. In the performance of their duties, the Director General and the 

staff shall not seek or receive instruction from any source external to the 

Agency. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their 

position as officials of the Agency; subject to their responsibilities to the 

Agency, they shall not disclose any industrial secret or other confidential 

information coming to their knowledge by reason of their official duties 

for the Agency. Each member undertakes to respect the international 

character of the responsibilities of the Director General and the staff shall 

not seek to influence them in the discharge of their duties.

G. In this article the term “staff” includes guards.

Article VIII–Exchange of Information

A. Each member should make available such information as would, 

in the judgment of the member, be helpful to the Agency.

B. Each member shall make available to the Agency all scientific 

information developed as a result of assistance extended by the Agency 

pursuant to article XI.

C. The Agency shall assemble and make available in an accessible 

form the information made available to it under paragraphs A and B of 

this article. It shall take positive steps to encourage the exchange among 

its members of information relating to the nature and peaceful uses of 

atomic energy and shall serve as an intermediary among its members for 

this purpose.

Article IX–Supplying of Materials

A. Members may make available to the Agency such quantities of 

special fissionable materials, as they deem advisable and on such terms 

as shall be agreed with the Agency. The materials made available to the 

Agency may, at the discretion of the member making them available, be 

stored either by the member concerned or, with the agreement of the 

Agency, in the Agency’s depots.

B. Members may also make available to the Agency source materials 

as defined in article XX and other materials. The Board of Governors 

shall determine the quantities of such materials which the Agency will 

accept under agreements provided for in article XIII.

C. Each member shall notify the Agency of the quantities, form, and 

composition of special fissionable materials, source materials, and other 

materials which that member is prepared, in conformity with its laws, to 

make available immediately or during a period specified by the Board of 

Governors.

D. On request of the Agency a member shall, from the materials 

which it has made available, without delay deliver to another member or 

group of members such quantities of such materials as the Agency may 

specify, and shall without delay deliver to the Agency itself such 
1284 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency

quantities of such materials as are really necessary for operations and 

scientific research in the facilities of the Agency.

E. The quantities, form and composition of materials made available 

by any member may be changed at any time by the member with the 

approval of the Board of Governors.

F. An initial notification in accordance with paragraph C of this 

article shall be made within three months of the entry into force of this

Statute with respect to the member concerned. In the absence of a 

contrary decision of the Board of Governors, the materials initially made 

available shall be for the period of the calendar year succeeding the year 

when this Statute takes effect with respect to the member concerned. 

Subsequent notifications shall likewise, in the absence of a contrary 

action by the Board, relate to the period of the calendar year following 

the notification and shall be made no later than the first day of November 

of each year.

G. The Agency shall specify the place and method of delivery and, 

where appropriate, the form and composition, of materials which it has 

requested a member to deliver from the amounts which that member has 

notified the Agency it is prepared to make available. The Agency shall 

also verify the quantities of materials delivered and shall report those 

quantities periodically to the members.

The Agency shall be responsible for storing and protecting materials 

in its possession. The Agency shall ensure that these materials shall be 

safeguarded against (1) hazards of the weather, (2) unauthorized removal 

or diversion, (3) damage or destruction, including sabotage, and (4) 

forcible seizure. In storing special fissionable materials in its possession, 

the Agency shall ensure the geographical distribution of these materials 

in any one country or region of the world.

I. The Agency shall as soon as practicable establish or acquire such of 

the following as may be necessary:

1. Plant, equipment, and facilities for the receipt, storage, and 

issue of materials;

2. Physical safeguards;

3. Adequate health and safety measures;

4. Control laboratories for the analysis and verification of 

materials received;

5. Housing and administrative facilities for any staff required for 

the foregoing.

J. The materials made available pursuant to this article shall be used 

as determined by the Board of Governors in accordance with the 

provisions of this Statute. No member shall have the right to require that 

the materials it makes available to the Agency be kept separately by the 

Agency or to designate the specific project in which they must be used.

Article X–Services, Equipment, and Facilities

Members may make available to the Agency services, equipment, and 

facilities which may be of assistance in fulfilling the Agency’s objectives 

and functions.

Article XI–Agency Projects

A. Any member or group of members of the Agency desiring to set 

up any project for research on, or development or practical application of 

atomic energy for peaceful purposes may request the assistance of the 

Agency in securing special fissionable and other materials, services, 

equipment, and facilities necessary for this purpose. Any such request 
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency 1285

shall be accompanied by an explanation of the purpose and extent of the 

project and shall be considered by the Board of Governors.

B. Upon request, the Agency may also assist any member or group of 

members to make arrangements to secure necessary financing from 

outside sources to carry out such projects. In extending this assistance, 

the Agency will not be required to provide any guarantees or to assume 

any financial responsibility for the project.

C. The Agency may arrange for the supplying of any materials, 

services, equipment, and facilities necessary for the project by one or 

more members or may itself undertake to provide any or all of these 

directly, taking into consideration the wishes of the member or members 

making the request.

D. For the purpose of considering the request, the Agency may send 

into the territory of the member or group of members making the request 

a person or persons qualified to examine the project. For this purpose the 

Agency may, with the approval of the member or group of members 

making the request, use members of its own staff or employ suitably 

qualified nationals of any member.

E. Before approving a project under this article, the Board of 

Governors shall give due consideration to:

1. The usefulness of the project, including its scientific and 

technical feasibility;

2. The adequacy of plans, funds, and technical personnel to assure 

the effective execution of the project;

3. The adequacy of proposed health and safety standards for 

handling and storing materials and for operating facilities;

4. The inability of the member or group of members making the 

request to secure the necessary finances, materials, facilities, 

equipment, and services;

5. The equitable distribution of materials and other resources 

available to the Agency;

6. The special needs of the underdeveloped areas of the world;

7. Such other matters as may be relevant.

F. Upon approving a project, the Agency shall enter into an 

agreement with the member or group of members submitting the project, 

which agreement shall:

1. Provide for allocation to the project of any required special 

fissionable or other materials;

2. Provide for transfer of special fissionable materials from their 

then place of custody, whether the materials be in the custody of the 

Agency or of the member making them available for use in Agency 

projects, to the member or group of members submitting the project, 

under conditions which ensure the safety of any shipment required 

and meet applicable health and safety standards;

3. Set forth the terms and conditions, including charges, on which 

any materials, services, equipment, and facilities are to be provided 

by the Agency itself, and, if any such materials, services, equipment, 

and facilities are to be provided by a member, the terms and 

conditions as arranged for by the member or group of members 

submitting the project and the supplying member;

4. Include undertakings by the member or group of members 

submitting the project: (a) that the assistance provided shall not be 

used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and (b) that the 

project shall be subject to the safeguards provided for in article XII, 

the relevant safeguards being specified in the agreement;
1286 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency

5. Make appropriate provisions regarding the rights and interests 

of the Agency and the member or members concerned in any 

inventions or discoveries, or any patents therein, arising from the 

project;

6. Make appropriate provision regarding settlement of disputes;

7. Include such other provisions as may be appropriate.

G. The provisions of this article shall also apply where appropriate to 

a request for materials, services, facilities, or equipment in connection 

with an existing project.

Article XII–Agency Safeguards

A. With respect to any Agency project, or other arrangement where 

the Agency is requested by the parties concerned to apply safeguards, the 

Agency shall have the following rights and responsibilities to the extent 

relevant to the project or arrangement:

1. To examine the design of specialized equipment and facilities, 

including nuclear reactors, and to approve it only from the viewpoint 

of assuring that it will not further any military purpose, that it 

complies with applicable health and safety standards, and that it will 

permit effective application of the safeguards provided for in this 

article;

2. To require the observance of any health and safety measures 

prescribed by the Agency;

3. To require the maintenance and production of operating records 

to assist in ensuring accountability for source and special fissionable 

materials used or produced in the project or arrangement;

4. To call for and receive progress reports;

5. To approve the means to be used for the chemical processing of 

irradiated materials solely to ensure that this chemical processing will 

not lend itself to diversion of materials for military purposes and will 

comply with applicable health and safety standards; to require that 

special fissionable materials recovered or produced as a by-product 

be used for peaceful purposes under, continuing Agency safeguards 

for research or in reactors, existing or under construction, specified 

by the member or members concerned; and to require deposit with the 

Agency of any excess of any special fissionable materials recovered 

or produced as a by-product over what is needed for the above-stated 

uses in order to prevent stockpiling of these materials, provided that 

thereafter at the request of the member or members concerned special 

fissionable materials so deposited with the Agency shall be returned 

promptly to the member or members concerned for use under the 

same provisions as stated as above;

6. To send into the territory of the recipient State or States 

inspectors, designated by the Agency after consultation with the State 

or States concerned, who shall have access at all times to all places 

and data and to any person who by reason of his occupation deals 

with materials, equipment, or facilities which are required by this 

Statute to be safeguarded, as necessary to account for source and 

special fissionable materials supplied and fissionable products and to 

determine whether there is a compliance with the undertaking against 

use in furtherance of any military purpose referred to in subparagraph 

F-4 of article XI, with the health and safety measures referred to in 

subparagraph A-2 of this article, and with any other conditions 

prescribed in the agreement between the Agency and the State or 

States concerned. Inspectors designated by the Agency shall be 
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency 1287

accompanied by representatives of the authorities of the State 

concerned, if that State so requests, provided that the inspectors shall 

not thereby be delayed or otherwise impeded in the exercise of their 

functions.

7. In the event of noncompliance and failure by the recipient State 

or States to take requested corrective steps within a reasonable time, 

to suspend or terminate assistance and withdraw any materials and 

equipment made available by the Agency or a member in furtherance 

of the project.

B. The Agency shall, as necessary, establish a staff of inspectors. The 

staff of inspectors shall have the responsibility of examining all 

operations conducted by the Agency itself to determine whether the 

Agency is complying with the health and safety measures prescribed by it 

for application to projects subject to its approval, supervision or control, 

and whether the Agency is taking adequate measures to prevent the 

source and special fissionable materials in its custody or used or 

produced in its own operations from being used in furtherance of any 

military purpose. The Agency shall take remedial action forthwith to 

correct any noncompliance or failure to take adequate measures.

C. The staff of inspectors shall also have the responsibility of 

obtaining and verifying the accounting referred to in subparagraph A-6 of 

this article and of determining whether there is compliance with the 

undertaking referred to in subparagraph A-2 of this article, and with all 

other conditions of the project prescribed in the agreement between the 

Agency and the State or States concerned. The inspectors shall report any 

noncompliance to the Director General who shall thereupon transmit the 

report to the Board of Governors. The Board shall call upon the recipient 

State or States to remedy forthwith any noncompliance which it finds to 

have occurred. The Board shall report the noncompliance to all members 

and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations. 

In the event of failure of the recipient State or States to take fully 

corrective action within a reasonable time, the Board may take one or 

both of the following measures: direct curtailment or suspension of 

assistance being provided by the Agency or by a member, and call for the 

return of materials and equipment made available to the recipient 

members or groups of members. The Agency may also, in accordance 

with article XIX, suspend any noncomplying member from the exercise 

of the privileges and rights of membership.

Article XIII–Reimbursement of Members

Unless otherwise agreed upon between the Board of Governors and 

the members furnishing to the Agency materials, services, equipment, or 

facilities, the Board shall enter into an agreement with such member 

providing for reimbursement for the items furnished.

Article XIV–Finance

A. The Board of Governors shall submit to the General Conference 

the annual budget estimates for the expenses of the Agency. To facilitate 

the work of the Board in this regard, the Director General shall initially 

prepare the budget estimates. If the General Conference does not approve 

the estimates, it shall return them together with its recommendations to 

the Board. The Board shall then submit further estimates to the General 

Conference for its approval.
1288 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency

B. Expenditures of the Agency shall be classified under the following 

categories:

1. Administrative expenses: These shall include:

(a) Costs of the staff of the Agency other than the staff 

employed in connection with materials, services, equipment, and 

facilities referred to in subparagraph B-2 below; costs of meetings; and 

expenditures required for the preparation of Agency projects and for the 

distribution of information;

(b) Costs of implementing the safeguards referred to in Article 

XII in relation to agency projects or, under subparagraph A-5 of article 

III, in relation to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, together with 

the costs of handling and storage of special fissionable material by the 

Agency other than the storage and handling charges referred to in 

paragraph E below;

2. Expenses, other than those included in subparagraph 1 of this 

paragraph in connection with any materials, facilities, plant, and 

equipment acquired or established by the Agency in carrying out its 

authorized functions, and the costs of materials, services, equipment, and 

facilities provided by it under agreements with one or more members.

C. In fixing the expenditures under subparagraph B-1(b) above, the 

Board of Governors shall deduct such amounts as are recoverable under 

agreements regarding the application of safeguards between the Agency 

and parties to bilateral or multilateral arrangements.

D. The Board of Governors shall apportion the expenses referred to in 

subparagraph B-1 above, among members in accordance with a scale to 

be fixed by the General Conference. In fixing the scale the General 

Conference shall be guided by the principles adopted by the United 

Nations in assessing contributions of Member States to the regular 

budget of the United Nations.

E. The Board of Governors shall establish periodically a scale of 

charges, including reasonable uniform storage and handling charges, for 

materials, services, equipment, and facilities furnished to members by the 

Agency. The scale shall be designed to produce revenues for the Agency 

adequate to meet the expenses and costs referred to in subparagraph B-2 

above, less any voluntary contributions which the Board of Governors 

may, in accordance with paragraph F, apply for this purpose. The 

proceeds of such charges shall be placed in a separate fund which shall 

be used to pay members for any materials, services, equipment, or 

facilities furnished by them and to meet other expenses referred to in 

subparagraph B-2 above, which may be incurred by the Agency itself.

F. Any excess of revenues referred to in paragraph E over the 

expenses and costs there referred to, and any voluntary contributions to 

the Agency, shall be placed in a general fund which may be used as the 

Board of Governors, with the approval of the General Conference, may 

determine.

G. Subject to rules and limitations approved by the General 

Conference, the Board of Governors shall have the authority to exercise 

borrowing powers on behalf of the Agency without, however, imposing 

on members of the Agency any liability in respect of loans entered into 

pursuant to this authority, and to accept voluntary contributions made to 

the Agency.

H. Decisions of the General Conference on financial questions and of 

the Board of Governors on the amount of the Agency’s budget shall 

require a two-thirds majority of those present and voting.
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency 1289

Article XV–Privileges and Immunities

A. The Agency shall enjoy in the territory of each member such legal 

capacity and such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the 

exercise of its functions.

B. Delegates of members together with their alternates and advisers, 

Governors appointed to the Board together with their alternates and 

advisers, and the Director General and the staff of the Agency, shall 

enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary in the independent 

exercise of their functions in connection with the Agency.

C. The legal capacity, privileges and immunities referred to in this 

article shall be defined in a separate agreement or agreements between 

the Agency, represented for this purpose by the Director General acting 

under instructions of the Board of Governors, and the members.

Article XVI–Relationship with Other Organizations

A. The Board of Governors, with the approval of the General 

Conference, is authorized to enter into an agreement or agreements 

establishing an appropriate relationship between the Agency and the 

United Nations and any other organizations the work of which is related 

to that of the Agency.

B. The agreement or agreements establishing the relationship of the 

Agency and the United Nations shall provide for:

1. Submission by the Agency of reports as provided for in 

subparagraphs B-4 and B-5 of Article III;

2. Consideration by the Agency of resolutions relating to it 

adopted by the General Assembly or any of the Councils of the 

United Nations and the submission of reports, when requested, to the 

appropriate organ of the United Nations on the action taken by the 

Agency or by its members in accordance with this Statute as a result 

of such consideration.

Article XVII–Settlement of Disputes

A. Any question or dispute concerning the interpretation or 

application of this Statute which is not settled by negotiation shall be 

referred to the International Court of Justice in conformity with the 

Statute of the Court unless the parties concerned agree on another mode 

of settlement.

B. The General Conference and the Board of Governors are 

separately empowered, subject to authorization from the General 

Assembly of the United Nations, to request the International Court of 

Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question arising within 

the scope of the Agency’s activities.

Article XVIII–Amendments and Withdrawals

A. Amendments to this Statute may be proposed by any member. 

Certified copies of the text of any amendment proposed shall be prepared 

by the Director General and communicated by him to all members at 

least ninety days in advance of its consideration by the General 

Conference.

B. At the fifth annual session of the General Conference following 

the coming into force of this Statute, the question of a general review of 

the provisions of this Statute shall be placed on the agenda of that 

session. On approval by a majority of the members present and voting, 

the review will take place at the following General Conference. 

Thereafter, proposals on the question of a general review of this Statute 
1290 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency

may be submitted for decision by the General Conference under the same 

procedure.

C. Amendments shall come into force for all members when:

(i) Approved by the General Conference by a two-thirds 

majority of those present and voting after consideration of 

observations submitted by the Board of Governors on each 

proposed amendment, and

(ii) Accepted by two-thirds of all the members in 

accordance with their respective constitutional processes. 

Acceptance by a member shall be effected by the deposit of an 

instrument of acceptance with the depository Government 

referred to in paragraph C of Article XXI.

D. At any time after five years from the date when this Statute shall 

take effect in accordance with paragraph E of Article XXI or whenever a 

member is unwilling to accept an amendment to this Statute, it may 

withdraw from the Agency by notice in writing to that effect given to the 

depository Government referred to in paragraph C of Article XXI, which 

shall promptly inform the Board of Governors and all members.

E. Withdrawal by a member from the Agency shall not affect its 

contractual obligations entered into pursuant to Article XI or its 

budgetary obligations for the year in which it withdraws.

Article XIX–Suspension of Privileges

A. A member of the Agency which is in arrears in the payment of its 

financial contributions to the agency shall have no vote in the Agency if 

the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the 

contributions due from it for the preceding two years. The General 

Conference may, nevertheless, permit such a member to vote if it is 

satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of 

the member.

B. A member which has persistently violated the provisions of this 

Statute or of any agreement entered into by it pursuant to this Statute 

may be suspended from the exercise of the privileges and rights of 

membership by the General Conference acting by a two-thirds majority 

of the members present and voting upon recommendation by the Board 

of Governors.

Article XX–Definitions

As used in this Statute:

1. The term “special fissionable materials” means plutonium-239; 

uranium-233; uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233; any material 

containing one or more of the foregoing; and such other fissionable 

material as the Board of Governors shall from time to time determine; 

but the term “special fissionable material” does not include source 

material.

2. The term “uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233” means 

uranium containing the isotopes 235 or 233 or both in an amount such as 

the abundance ratio of the sum of these isotopes to the isotope 238 is 

greater than the ratio of the isotope 235 to the isotope 238 occurring in 

nature.

3. The term “source material” means uranium containing the mixture 

of isotopes occurring in nature; uranium depleted in the isotope 235; 

thorium; any of the foregoing in the form of metal, alloy, chemical 

compound, or concentrate; any other material containing one of more of 

the foregoing in such concentration as the Board of Governors shall from 
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency 1291

time to time determine; and such other materials as the Board of 

Governors shall from time to time determine.

Article XXI–Signature, Acceptance, and Entry into Force

A. This Statute shall be open for signature on 26 October 1956 by all 

States Members of the United Nations or of any of the specialized 

agencies and shall remain open for signature by those States for a period 

of ninety days.

B. The signatory States shall become parties to this Statute by deposit 

of an instrument of ratification.

C. Instruments of ratification by signatory States and instruments of 

acceptance by States whose membership has been approved under 

paragraph B of article IV of this Statute shall be deposited with the 

Government of the United States of America, hereby designated as 

depository Government.

D. Ratification or acceptance of this Statute shall be effected by 

States in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

E. This Statute, apart from the Annex, shall come into force when 

eighteen States have deposited instruments of ratification in accordance 

with paragraph B of this article, provided that such eighteen States shall 

include at least three of the following States: Canada, France, the Union 

of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 

Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. Instruments of 

ratification and instruments of acceptance deposited thereafter shall take

effect on the date of their receipt.

F. The depository Government shall promptly inform all States 

signatory to this Statute of the date of each deposit of ratification and the 

date of entry into force of the Statute. The depository Government shall 

promptly inform all signatories and members of the dates on which 

States subsequently become parties thereto.

G. The Annex to this Statute shall come into force on the first day this 

Statute is open for signature.

Article XXII–Registration with the United Nations

A. This Statute shall be registered by the depository Government 

pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

B. Agreements between the Agency and any member or members,

agreements between the Agency and any organization or other 

organizations, and agreements between members subject to approval of 

the Agency, shall be registered with the Agency. Such agreements shall 

be registered by the Agency with the United Nations if registration is 

required under Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article XXIII–Authentic Texts and Certified Copies

This Statute, done in the Chinese, English, French, Russian and 

Spanish languages, each being equally authentic, shall be deposited in the 

archives of the depository Government. Duly certified copies of this 

Statute shall be transmitted by the depository Government to the 

Governments of the other signatory States and to the Governments of 

States admitted to membership under paragraph B of Article IV.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this 

Statute.

Done at the Headquarters of the United Nations, this twenty-sixth day 

of October, one thousand nine hundred and fifty-six.

5 USC 5101.

5 USC 5701.

5 USC 5731.
1292 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency

Annex I–Preparatory Commission

A. A Preparatory Commission shall come into existence on the first 

day this Statute is open for signature. It shall be composed of one 

representative each of Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, 

Czechoslovakia, France, India, Portugal, Union of South Africa, Union 

of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and 

Northern Ireland, and United States of America, and one representative 

each of six other States to be chosen by the International Conference on 

the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Preparatory 

commission shall remain in existence until this Statute comes into force 

and thereafter until the general Conference has convened and a Board of 

Governors has been selected in accordance with Article VI.

B. The expenses of the Preparatory Commission may be met by a 

loan provided by the United Nations and for this purpose the Preparatory 

Commission shall make the necessary arrangements with the appropriate 

authorities of the United Nations, including arrangements for repayment 

of the loan by the Agency. Should these funds be insufficient, the 

Preparatory Commission may accept advances from Governments. Such 

advances may be set off against the contributions of the Governments 

concerned to the Agency.

C. Preparatory commission shall–

1. Elect its own officers, adopt its own rules of procedure, meet as 

often as necessary, determine its own place of meeting and establish 

such committees as it deems necessary.

2. Appoint an executive secretary and staff as shall be necessary, 

who shall exercise such powers and performs such duties as the 

Commission may determine;

3. Make arrangements for the first session of the General 

Conference, including the preparation of a provisional agenda and 

draft rules of procedure, such session to be held as soon as possible 

after the entry into force of this Statute;

4. Make designations for membership on the first Board of 

Governors in accordance with subparagraph A-1 and A-2 and 

paragraph B of Article VI;

5. Make studies, reports, and recommendations for the first 

session of the General conference and for the first meeting of the 

Board of Governors on subjects of concern to the Agency requiring 

immediate attention, including (a) the financing of the Agency; (b) 

the programs and budget for the first year of the Agency; (c) technical 

problems relevant to advance planning of Agency operations; (d) the 

establishment of a permanent Agency staff; and (e) the location of the 

permanent headquarters of the Agency;

6. Make recommendations for the first meeting of the Board of 

Governors concerning the provisions of a headquarters agreement 

defining the status of the Agency and the rights and obligations which 

will exist in the relationship between the Agency and the host 

Government;

7. (a) Enter into negotiations with the United Nations with a view 

to the preparation of a draft agreement in accordance with Article 

XVI of this Statute, such draft agreement to be submitted to the first 

session of the general Conference and to the first meeting of the 

Board of Governors; and (b) make recommendations to the first 

session of the General Conference and to the first meeting of the 

Board of Governors concerning the relationship of the Agency to 
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency 1293

other international organizations as contemplated in article XVI of 

this Statute.

Summary of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency

ARTICLES I AND II

The statute upon its entry into force will establish the International 

Atomic Energy Agency, the basic objective of which is to seek to 

accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health, 

and prosperity throughout the world without at the same time furthering 

any military purpose.

ARTICLE III

The functions of the Agency set forth in article III of the statute are 

(a) to encourage and assist research on, and development and practical 

application of, atomic energy for peaceful purposes throughout the 

world; (b) to make provisions for materials, services, equipment, and 

facilities needed to carry out the foregoing purposes; (c) to foster the 

exchange of scientific and technical information on, and the exchange 

and training of scientist and experts in, the peaceful uses of atomic 

energy; (d) to establish and administer safeguards to ensure that 

fissionable or other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and 

information with which the Agency deals are not uses to further any 

military purpose; (e) to participate in the establishment, adoption, and 

application of standards of safety for the protection of health and the 

minimization of danger to life and property from activities in the field of 

atomic energy; and (f) to acquire or establish any facilities, plant, and 

equipment useful in carrying out its authorized functions.

In carrying out its functions, the Agency is required by the statute (a) 

to conduct its activities in accordance with the purposes and principals of 

the United Nations and, in particular in conformity with United Nations 

policies furthering the establishment of a safeguarded worldwide 

disarmament; (b) to control the use of such fissionable materials as are 

received by the Agency so as to ensure that they are used only for 

peaceful purposes; (c) to allocate its resources so as to secure efficient 

utilization and wide distribution of their benefits throughout the world, 

bearing in mind the special needs of the underdeveloped areas; (d) to 

submit annual reports on its activities to the General Assembly of the 

United Nations; (e) when appropriate, to submit reports and information 

to the Security Council, Economic and Social Council, and other organs 

of the United Nations; (f) to refuse to give assistance to member 

countries under political economic, military, or other conditions that are 

inconsistent with the statute; and (g) subject to the terms of any 

agreements that may be made between a state or group of states and the 

Agency, to give due observance to the sovereign rights of states.

ARTICLE IV

Initial members of the Agency are to be states members of the United 

Nations or of any of the specialized agencies which signed the statute 

within 90 days after it was opened for signature and which deposit 

instruments of ratification. The following 30 states signed the statute 

during the period it was open for signature: (From Oct. 26, 1956 for a 

period of 90 days.)
1294 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency

NOTE:

While the list of 30 initial member states is not provided here, eighteen 

ratifications were required to bring the IAEA's Statute into force. By 

July 29, 1957, the States in italics–as well as the former Czechoslovakia–

had ratified the Statute. By the end of 1957, the following states had 

signed the Statute: (Names of States are not necessarily their historical 

designations.)

Afghanistan Albania

Argentina Australia

Austria Belarus

Brazil Bulgaria

Canada Cuba

Denmark Dominican Republic

Egypt El Salvador

Ethiopia France

Germany Greece

Guatemala Haiti

Holy See Hungary

Iceland India

Indonesia Israel

Italy Japan

Republic of Korea Monaco

Morocco Myanmar

Netherlands New Zealand

Norway Pakistan

Paraguay Peru

Poland Portugal

Romania Russian Federation

South Africa Spain

Sri Lanka Sweden

Switzerland Thailand

Tunisia Turkey

Ukraine United Kingdom

United States Venezuela

Viet Nam Yugoslavia
Agmt. Btw. the U.S. and IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the U.S. 1295

L. AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE 

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION 

OF SAFEGUARDS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Whereas the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the “United States”) 

is a Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter 

referred to as the “Treaty”) which was opened for signature at London, Moscow and 

Washington on 1 July 1968 and which entered into force on 5 March 1970;

Whereas States Parties to the Treaty undertake to co-operate in facilitating the 

application of International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as the 

“Agency”) safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities;

Whereas non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty undertake to accept 

safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the Agency, 

on all source or special fissionable material in all their peaceful nuclear activities for the 

exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of their obligations under the Treaty 

with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear 

weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

Whereas the United States, a nuclear-weapon State as defined by the Treaty, has 

indicated that at such time as safeguards are being generally applied in accordance with 

paragraph 1 of Article III of the Treaty, the United States will permit the Agency to 

apply its safeguards to all nuclear activities in the United States–excluding only those 

with direct national security significance–by concluding a safeguards agreement with the 

Agency for that purpose;

Whereas the United States has made this offer and has entered into this agreement 

for the purpose of encouraging widespread adherence to the Treaty by demonstrating to 

no-nuclear-weapon States that they would not be placed at a commercial disadvantage 

by reason of the application of safeguards pursuant to the Treaty;

Whereas the purpose of a safeguard agreement giving effect to this offer by the 

United States would thus differ necessarily from the purposes of safeguards agreements 

concluded between the Agency and non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty;

Whereas it is in the interest of Members of the Agency, that, without prejudice to the 

principles and integrity of the Agency’s safeguards system, the expenditure of the 

Agency’s financial and other resources for implementation of such an agreement not 

exceed that necessary to accomplish the purpose of the Agreement;

Whereas the Agency is authorized, pursuant to Article III of the Statute of the 

International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as the “Statute”), to 

conclude such a safeguards agreement;

Now, therefore, the United States and the Agency have agreed as follows:

PART I

ARTICLE 1

(a) The United States undertakes to permit the Agency to apply safeguards, in 

accordance with the terms of this Agreement, on all source or special fissionable 

material in all facilities within the United States, excluding only those facilities 

associated with activities with direct national security significance to the United States, 

which a view to enabling the Agency to verify that such material is not withdrawn, 

except as provided for in this Agreement, from activities in facilities while such material 

is being safeguarded under this Agreement.

(b) The United States shall, upon entry in force of this Agreement, provide the 

Agency with a list of facilities within the United States not associated with activities 

with direct national security significance to the United States and may, in accordance 

with the procedures set forth in Part II of this Agreement, add facilities to or remove 

facilities from that list as it deems appropriate.
1296 Agmt. Btw. the U.S. and IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the U.S.

(c) The United States may, in accordance with the procedures set forth in this 

Agreement, withdraw nuclear material from activities in facilities included in the list 

referred to in Article 1(b).

ARTICLE 2

(a) The Agency shall have the right to apply safeguards in accordance with the terms 

of this Agreement on all source or special fissionable material in all facilities within the 

United States, excluding only those facilities associated with activities with direct 

national security significance to the United States, with a view to enable the Agency to 

verify that such material is not withdrawn, except as provided for in this Agreement, 

from activities in facilities while such material is being safeguarded under this 

Agreement.

(b) The Agency shall, from time to time, identify to the United States those facilities, 

selected from the then current list provided by the United States in accordance with 

Article 1(b) in which the Agency wishes to apply safeguards, in accordance with the 

terms of this Agreement.

(c) In identifying facilities and in applying safeguards thereafter on source or special 

fissionable material in such facilities, the Agency shall proceed in a manner which the

Agency and the United States mutually agrees takes into account the requirement on the 

United States to avoid discriminatory treatment as between United States commercial 

firms similarly situated.

ARTICLE 3

(a) The United States and the Agency shall co-operate to facilitate the 

implementation of the safeguards provided for in this Agreement.

(b) The source or special fissionable material subject to safeguards under this 

Agreement shall be that material in those facilities which shall have been identified by 

the Agency at any given time pursuant to Article 2(b).

(c) The safeguards to be applied by the Agency under this agreement on source or 

special fissionable materials in facilities in the United States shall be implemented by the 

same procedures followed by the Agency in applying its safeguards on similar material 

in similar facilities in non-nuclear-weapon States under agreement pursuant to paragraph 

1 of Article III of the Treaty.

ARTICLE 4

The safeguards provided for in this Agreement shall be implemented in a manner 

designed:

(a) To avoid hampering the economic and technological development of the United 

States or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including 

international exchange of nuclear material;

(b) To avoid undue interference in peaceful nuclear activities of the United States 

and in particular in the operation of the facilities; and

(c) To be consistent with prudent management practices required for the economic 

and safe conduct of nuclear activities.

ARTICLE 5

(a) The Agency shall take every precaution to protect commercial and industrial 

secrets and other confidential information coming to its knowledge in the 

implementation of this Agreement.

(b)(i) The Agency shall not publish or communicate to any State, organization or 

person any information obtained by it in connection with the implementation of this 

Agreement, except that specific information relating to the implementation thereof may 

be given to the Board of Governors of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as “the 

Board”) and to such Agency staff members as require such knowledge by reason of their 
Agmt. Btw. the U.S. and IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the U.S. 1297

official duties in connection with safeguards, but only to the extent necessary for the 

Agency to fulfill its responsibilities in implementing this Agreement.

(ii) Summarized information on nuclear material subject to safeguards under this 

Agreement may be published upon the decision of the Board if the United States 

agrees thereto.

ARTICLE 6

(a) The Agency shall, in implementing safeguards pursuant to this Agreement, take 

full account of technological developments in the field of safeguards, and shall make 

every effort to ensure optimum cost-effectiveness and the application of the principle of 

safeguarding effectively the flow of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this 

Agreement by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points to the 

extent that present or future technology permits.

(b) In order to ensure optimum cost-effectiveness, use shall be made, for example, of 

such means as:

(i) Containment as a means of defining material balance areas for accounting 

purposes;

(ii) Statistical techniques and random sampling in evaluating the flow of nuclear 

material; and

(iii) Concentration of verification procedures on those stages in the nuclear fuel 

cycle involving the production, processing, use or storage of nuclear material from 

which nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices could readily be made, 

and minimization of verification procedures in respect of other nuclear material, on 

condition that this does not hamper the Agency in applying safeguards under this 

Agreement.

ARTICLE 7

(a) The United States shall establish and maintain a system of accounting for and 

control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement.

(b) The Agency shall apply safeguards in accordance with Article 3(c) in such a 

manner as to enable the Agency to verify, in ascertaining that there has been no 

withdrawal of nuclear material, except as provided for in this Agreement, from activities 

in facilities while such material is being safeguarded under this Agreement, findings of 

the accounting and control system of the United States. The Agency’s verification shall 

include, inter alia, independent measurements and observations conducted by the 

Agency in accordance with the procedures specified in Part II. The Agency, in its 

verification, shall take due account of the technical effectiveness of the system of the 

United States.

ARTICLE 8

(a) In order to ensure the effective implementation of safeguards under this 

Agreement, the United States shall, in accordance with the provisions set out in Part II, 

provide the Agency with information concerning nuclear material subject to safeguards 

under this Agreement and the features of facilities relevant to safeguarding such 

material.

(b)(i) The Agency shall require only the minimum amount of information and data 

consistent with carrying out its responsibilities under this Agreement.

(ii) Information pertaining to facilities shall be the minimum necessary for 

safeguarding nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement.

(c) If the United States so requests, the Agency shall be prepared to examine on 

premises of the United States design information which the United States regards as 

being of particular sensitivity. Such information need not be physically transmitted to 

the Agency provided that it remains readily available for further examination by the 

Agency on premises of the United States.
1298 Agmt. Btw. the U.S. and IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the U.S.

ARTICLE 9

(a)(i) The Agency shall secure the consent of the United States to the designation of 

Agency inspectors to the United States.

(ii) If the United States, either upon proposal of a designation or at any other time 

after designation has been made, objects to the designation, the Agency shall propose 

to the United States and alternative designation or designations.

(iii) If, as a result of the repeated refusal of the United States to accept the 

designation of the Agency inspectors, inspections to be conducted under this 

Agreement would be impeded, such refusal shall be considered by the Board, upon 

referral by the Director General of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as “the 

Director General”) with a view to its taking appropriate action.

(b) The United States shall take the necessary steps to ensure that Agency inspectors 

can effectively discharge their functions under this Agreement.

(c) The visits and activities of Agency inspectors shall be so arranged as:

(i) To reduce to a minimum the possible inconvenience and disturbance to the 

United States and to the peaceful nuclear activities inspected; and

(ii) To ensure protection of industrial secrets or any other confidential 

information coming to the inspectors’ knowledge.

ARTICLE 10

The Provisions of the International Organizations Immunities Act of the United 

States of America shall apply to Agency inspectors performing functions in the United 

States under this Agreement and to any property of the Agency used by them.

ARTICLE 11

Safeguards shall terminate on nuclear material upon determination by the Agency 

that the material has been consumed, or has been diluted in such a way that it is no 

longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards, or 

has become practicably irrecoverable.

ARTICLE 12

(a) If the United States intends to exercise its right to withdraw nuclear material from 

activities in facilities identified by the Agency pursuant to Article 2(b) and 39(b) (other 

than those facilities removed, pursuant to Article 34(b)(i) from the list provided for by 

Article 1(b)) and to transfer such material to a destination in the United States other than 

to a facility included in the list established and maintained pursuant to Article 1(b) and 

34, the United States shall notify the Agency in advance of such withdrawal. Nuclear 

material in respect of which such notification has been given shall cease to be subject to 

safeguards under this Agreement as from the time of its withdrawal.

(b) Nothing in this Agreement shall effect the right of the United States to transfer 

material subject to safeguards under this Agreement to destinations not within or under 

the jurisdiction of the United States. The United States shall provide the Agency with 

information with respect to such transfers in accordance with Article 89. The Agency 

shall keep records of each such transfer and, where applicable, of the re-application of 

safeguards to the transferred nuclear material.

ARTICLE 13

Where nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement is to be used in 

non-nuclear activities, such as the production of alloys or ceramics, the United States 

shall agree with the Agency, before the material is so used, on the circumstances under 

which the safeguards on such material may be terminated.

ARTICLE 14

The United States and the Agency will bear the expenses incurred by them in 

implementing their respective responsibilities under this Agreement. However if, the 
Agmt. Btw. the U.S. and IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the U.S. 1299

United States or persons under its jurisdiction incur extraordinary expenses as a result of 

a specific request by the Agency, the Agency shall reimburse such expenses provided 

that it has agreed in advance to do so. In any case the Agency shall bear the cost of any 

additional measuring or sampling which inspectors may request.

ARTICLE 15

In carrying out its functions under this Agreement within the United States, the 

Agency and its personnel shall be covered to the same extent as nationals of the United 

States by any protection against third-party liability provided under the Price-Anderson 

Act, including insurance or other indemnity coverage that may be required by the PriceAnderson Act with respect to nuclear incidents.

ARTICLE 16

Any claim by the United States against the Agency or by the Agency against the 

United States in respect of any damage resulting from the implementation of safeguards 

under this Agreement, other than damage arising out of a nuclear incident, shall be 

settled in accordance with international law.

ARTICLE 17

If the Board, upon report of the Director General, decides that an action by the 

United States is essential and urgent in order to ensure compliance with this Agreement, 

the Board may call upon the United States to take the required action without delay, 

irrespective of whether procedures have been invoked pursuant to Article 21 for the 

settlement of a dispute.

ARTICLE 18

If the Board, upon examination of relevant information reported to it by the Director 

General, determines there has been any non-compliance with this Agreement, the Board 

may call upon the United States to remedy forthwith such non-compliance. In the event 

there is a failure to take fully corrective action within a reasonable time, the Board may 

make the reports provided for in paragraph C of Article XII of the Statute and may also 

take, where applicable, the other measures provided for in that paragraph. In taking such 

action the Board shall take account of the degree of assurance provided by the 

safeguards measures that have been applied and shall afford the United States every 

reasonable opportunity to furnish the Board with any necessary reassurance.

ARTICLE 19

The United States and the Agency shall, at the request of either, consult about any 

question arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement.

ARTICLE 20

The United States shall have the right to request that any question arising out of the 

interpretation or application of this Agreement be considered by the Board. The Board 

shall invite the United States to participate in the discussion of any such question by the 

Board.

ARTICLE 21

Any dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement, except 

a dispute with regard to a determination by the Board under Article 18 or an action taken 

by the Board pursuant to such a determination which is not settled by negotiation or 

another procedure agreed to by the United States and the Agency shall, at the request of 

either, be submitted to an arbitral tribunal composed as follows: The United States and 

the Agency shall each designate one arbitrators, and the two arbitrators so designated 

shall elect a third, who shall be the Chairman. If, within thirty days of the request for 

arbitration, either the United States or the Agency has not designated an arbitrator, either 
1300 Agmt. Btw. the U.S. and IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the U.S.

the United States or the Agency may request the President of the International Court of 

Justice to appoint an arbitrator. The same procedure shall apply if, within thirty days of 

the designation or appointment of the second arbitrator, the third arbitrator has not been 

elected. A majority of the members of the arbitral tribunal shall constitute a quorum, and 

all decisions shall require the concurrence of two arbitrators. The arbitral procedure shall 

be fixed by the tribunal. The decisions of the tribunal shall be binding on the United 

States and the Agency.

ARTICLE 22

The Parties shall institute steps to suspend the applications of Agency safeguards in 

the United States under other safeguards agreements with the Agency while this 

Agreement is in force. However, the United States and the Agency shall ensure that 

nuclear material being safeguarded under this Agreement shall be at all times at least 

equivalent in amount and composition to that which would be subject to safeguards in 

the United States under the agreements in question. The detailed arrangements for the 

implementation of this provision shall be specified in the subsidiary arrangements 

provided for in Article 39, and shall reflect the nature of any undertaking given under 

such other safeguards agreement.

ARTICLE 23

(a) The United States and the Agency shall, at the request of either, consult each 

other on amendments to this Agreement.

(b) All amendments shall require the agreement of the United States and the Agency.

ARTICLE 24

This Agreement or any amendment thereto shall enter into force on the date on 

which the Agency receives from the United States written notification that statutory and 

constitutional requirements of the United States for entry into force have been met.

ARTICLE 25

The Director General shall promptly inform all Member States of the Agency of the 

entry into force of this Agreement, or of any amendments thereto.

ARTICLE 26

The Agreement shall remain in force as long as the United States is a party to the 

Treaty except that the Parties to this Agreement shall, upon the request of either of them, 

consult and, to the extent mutually agreed, modify this Agreement in order to ensure that 

it continues to serve the purpose for which it was originally intended. If the Parties are 

unable after such consultation to agree upon necessary modifications, either Party may, 

upon six months’ notice, terminate this Agreement.

PART II

ARTICLE 27

The purpose of this part of the Agreement is to specify the procedures to be applied 

in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I.

ARTICLE 28

The objective of the safeguards procedures set forth in this part of the Agreement is 

the timely detection of withdrawal, other than in accordance with the terms of this 

Agreement, of significant quantities of nuclear material from activities in facilities while 

such material is being safeguarded under this Agreement.
Agmt. Btw. the U.S. and IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the U.S. 1301

ARTICLE 29

For the purpose of achieving the objective set forth in Article 28, material

accountancy shall be used as a safeguards measure of fundamental importance, with 

containment and surveillance as important complementary measures.

ARTICLE 30

The technical conclusion of the Agency’s verification activities shall be a statement, 

in respect of each material balance area, of the amount of material unaccounted for over 

a specific period, and giving the limits of accuracy of the amounts stated.

ARTICLE 31

Pursuant to Article 7, the Agency, in carrying out its verification activities, shall 

make full use of the United States’ system of accounting for and control of all nuclear 

material subject to safeguards under this Agreement and shall avoid unnecessary 

duplication of the United States’ accounting and control activities.

ARTICLE 32

The United States’ system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material 

subject to safeguards under this Agreement shall be based on a structure of material 

balance areas, and shall make provision, as appropriate and specified in the Subsidiary 

Arrangements, for the establishment of such measures as :

(a) A measurement system for the determination of the quantities of nuclear material 

received, produced, shipped, lost or otherwise removed from inventory, and the 

quantities on inventory;

(b) The evaluation of precision and accuracy of measurements and the estimation of 

measurement uncertainty;

(c) Procedure for identifying, reviewing and evaluating differences in 

shipper/receiver measurements;

(d) Procedure for taking a physical inventory;

(e) Procedures for the evaluation of accumulations of unmeasured inventory and 

unmeasured losses;

(f) A system of records and reports showing, for each material balance area, the 

inventory of nuclear material and the changes in that inventory including receipts into 

and transfers out of the material balance area;

(g) Provisions to ensure that the accounting procedures and arrangements are being 

operated correctly; and

(h) Procedures for the provision of reports to the Agency in accordance with Article 

57 through 63 and 65 through 67.

ARTICLE 33

Safeguards under this Agreement shall not apply to material in mining or ore 

processing activities.

ARTICLE 34

The United States may, at any time, notify the Agency of any facility or facilities to 

be added to or removed from the list provided for in Article 1(b):

(a) In case of addition to the list, the notification shall specify the facility or facilities 

to be added to the list and the date upon which the addition is to take effect;

(b) In the case of removal from the list of a facility or facilities then currently 

identified pursuant to Article 2(b) or 39(b):

(i) The Agency shall be notified in advance and the notification shall specify: the 

facility or facilities being removed, the date of removal, and the quantity and 

composition of the nuclear material contained therein at the time of notification. In 

exceptional circumstances, the United States may remove facilities without giving 

advance notification;
1302 Agmt. Btw. the U.S. and IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the U.S.

(ii) Any facility in respect of which notification has been given in accordance 

with sub-paragraph (i) shall be removed from the list and nuclear material contained 

therein shall cease to be subject to safeguards under this Agreement in accordance 

with and at the time specified in the notification by the United States.

(c) In the case of removal from the list of a facility or facilities not then currently 

identified pursuant to Article 2(b) or 39(b), the notification shall specify the facility or 

facilities being removed and the date of removal. Such facility or facilities shall be 

removed from the list at the time specified in the notification by the United States. 

ARTICLE 35

(a) Safeguards shall terminate on nuclear material subject to safeguards under this 

Agreement, under the conditions set forth in Article 11. Where the conditions of the 

Article are not met, but the United States considers that the recovery of safeguarded 

nuclear material from residues is not for the time being practicable or desirable, the 

United States and the Agency shall consult on the appropriate safeguards measures to be 

applied.

(b) Safeguards shall terminate on nuclear material subject to safeguards under this 

Agreement, under the conditions set forth in Article 13, provided that the United States 

and the Agency agree that such nuclear material is practicably irrecoverable.

ARTICLE 36

At the request of the United States, the Agency shall exempt from the safeguards 

nuclear material, which would otherwise be subject to safeguards under this Agreement, 

as follows:

(a) Special fissionable material, when it is used in gram quantities or less as a 

sensing component in instruments;

(b) Nuclear material, when it is used in non-nuclear activities in accordance with 

Article 13, if such nuclear material is recoverable; and

(c) Plutonium with an isotopic concentration of plutonium-238 exceeding 80%.

ARTICLE 37

At the request of the United States, the Agency shall exempt from safeguards nuclear 

material that would otherwise be subject to safeguards under this Agreement, provided 

that the total quantity of nuclear material which has been exempt in the United States in 

accordance with this Article may not at any time exceed:

(a) One kilogram in total of special fissionable material, which may consist of one or 

more of the following:

(i) Plutonium;

(ii) Uranium with an enrichment of 0.2 (20%) and above, taken account of by 

multiplying its weight by its enrichment; and

(iii) Uranium with an enrichment below 0.2 (20%) and above that of natural 

uranium, taken account of by multiplying its weight by five times the square of its 

enrichment;

(b) Ten metric tons in total of natural uranium and depleted uranium with an 

enrichment above 0.005 (0.5%);

(c) Twenty metric tons of depleted uranium with and enrichment of 0.005 (0.5%) or 

below; and

(d) Twenty metric tons of thorium;

or such greater amounts as may be specified by the Board for uniform application.

ARTICLE 38

If exempted nuclear material is to be processed or stored together with nuclear 

material subject to safeguards under this Agreement, provision shall be made for the reapplication of safeguards thereto.
Agmt. Btw. the U.S. and IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the U.S. 1303

ARTICLE 39

(a) The United States and the Agency shall make Subsidiary Arrangements which 

shall:

(i) contain a current listing of those facilities identified by the Agency pursuant to 

Article 2(b) and thus containing nuclear material subject to safeguards under this 

Agreement; and

(ii) specify in detail, to the extent necessary to permit the Agency to fulfill its 

responsibilities under this Agreement in an effective and efficient manner, how the 

procedures laid down in this Agreement are to be applied.

(b)(i) After entry into force of this Agreement, the Agency shall identify to the 

United States, from the list provided in accordance with Article 1(b), those facilities to 

be included in the initial Subsidiary Arrangements listing;

(ii) The Agency may thereafter identify for inclusion in the Subsidiary 

Arrangements listing additional facilities from the list provided in accordance with 

Article 1(b) as that list may have been modified in accordance with Article 34.

(c) The Agency shall also designate to the United States those facilities to be 

removed from the Subsidiary Arrangements listing which have not otherwise been 

removed pursuant to notification by the by the United States in accordance with Article 

34. Such facility or facilities shall be removed from the Subsidiary Arrangements listing 

upon such designation to the United States.

(d) The Subsidiary Arrangements may be extended or charged by agreement between 

the Agency and the United States without amendment of this Agreement.

ARTICLE 40

(a) With respect to those facilities which shall have been identified by the Agency in 

accordance with Article 39(b)(i), such Subsidiary Arrangement shall enter into force at 

the same time as, or as soon as possible after, entry into force of this Agreement. The 

United States and the Agency shall make every effort to achieve their entry into force 

within 90 days after entry into force of this Agreement; an extension of that period shall 

require agreement between the United States and the Agency.

(b) With respect to facilities which, after the entry into force of this Agreement, have 

been identified by the Agency in accordance with Article 39(b)(ii) for inclusion in the 

Subsidiary Arrangements listing, the United States and the Agency shall make every 

effort to achieve the entry into force of such Subsidiary Arrangements within ninety 

days following such identification to the United States; an extension of that period shall 

require agreement between the Agency and the United States.

(c) Upon identification of a facility by the Agency in accordance with Article 39(b), 

the United States shall provide the Agency promptly with the information required for 

completing the Subsidiary Arrangements, and the Agency shall have the right to apply 

the procedures set forth in this Agreement to the nuclear material listed in the inventory 

provided for in Article 41, even if the Subsidiary Arrangements have not yet entered into 

force.

ARTICLE 41

The Agency shall establish, on the basis of the initial reports referred to in Article 

60(a) below, a unified inventory of all nuclear material in the United States subject to 

safeguards under this Agreement, irrespective of its origin, and shall maintain this 

inventory on the basis of subsequent reports concerning those facilities, of the initial 

reports referred to in Article 60(b), of subsequent reports concerning the facilities listed 

pursuant to Article 39(b)(ii), and of the results of its verification activities. Copies of the 

inventory shall be made available to the United States at intervals to be agreed.
1304 Agmt. Btw. the U.S. and IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the U.S.

ARTICLE 42

Pursuant to Article 8, design information in respect of facilities identified by the 

Agency in accordance with Article 39(b)(i) shall be provided to the Agency during the 

discussion of the Subsidiary Arrangements. The time limits for the provision of design 

information in respect of any facility which is identified by the Agency in accordance 

with Article 39(b)(ii) shall be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements and such 

information shall be provided as early as possible after such identification.

ARTICLE 43

The design information to be provided to the Agency shall include, in respect of each 

facility identified by the Agency in accordance with Article 39(b), when applicable:

(a) The identification of the facility, stating its general character, purpose, nominal 

capacity and geographic location, and the name and address to be used for routine 

business purposes;

(b) A description of the general arrangement of the facility with reference, to the 

extent feasible, to the form, location and flow of nuclear material and to the general 

layout of important items of equipment which use, produce or process nuclear material;

(c) A description of features of the facilities relating to material accountancy, 

containment and surveillance; and

(d) A description of the existing and proposed procedures at the facility for nuclear 

material accountancy and control, with special reference to material balance areas 

established by the operator, measurements of flow and procedures for physical inventory 

taking.

ARTICLE 44

Other information relevant to the application of safeguards shall also be provided to 

the Agency in respect of each facility identified by the Agency in accordance with 

Article 39(b), in particular on organizational responsibility for material accountancy and 

control. The United States shall provide the Agency with supplementary information on 

the health and safety procedures which the Agency shall observe and with which the 

inspectors shall comply at the facility.

ARTICLE 45

The Agency shall be provided with design information in respect of a modification 

relevant for safeguards purposes, for examination, and shall be informed of any change 

in the information provided to it under Article 44, sufficiently in advance for the 

safeguards procedures to be adjusted when necessary.

ARTICLE 46

The design information provided to the Agency shall be used for the following 

purposes:

(a) To identify the features of facilities and nuclear material relevant to the 

application of safeguards to nuclear material in sufficient detail to facilitate verification;

(b) To determine material balance areas to be used for Agency accounting purposes 

and to select those strategic points which are key measurement points and which will be 

used to determine flow and inventory of nuclear material; in determining such material 

balance areas the Agency shall, inter alia, use the following criteria:

(i) The size of the material balance area shall be related to the accuracy with 

which the material balance can be established;

(ii) In determining the material balance area, advantage shall be taken of any 

opportunity to use containment and surveillance to help ensure the completeness of 

flow measurements and thereby to simplify the application of safeguards and to 

concentrate measurement efforts at key measurement points;

(iii) A number if material balance areas in use at a facility or at distinct sites may 

be combined in one material balance area to be used for Agency accounting purposes 
Agmt. Btw. the U.S. and IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the U.S. 1305

when the Agency determines that this is consistent with its verification requirements; 

and

(iv) A special material balance area may be established at the request of the 

United States around a process step involving commercially sensitive information;

(c) To establish the nominal timing and procedure for taking of physical inventory of 

nuclear material for the Agency accounting purposes;

(d) To establish the records and reports requirements and records evaluation 

procedures;

(e) To establish requirements and procedures for verification of the quality and 

location of nuclear material; and

(f) To select appropriate combinations of containment and surveillance methods and 

techniques at the strategic points at which they are to be applied.

The results of the examination of the design information shall be included in the 

Subsidiary Arrangements.

ARTICLE 47

Design information shall be re-examined in the light of changes in operating 

conditions, of developments in safeguards technology or of experience in the application 

of verification procedures, with a view to modifying the action the Agency has taken 

pursuant to Article 46.

ARTICLE 48

The Agency in co-operation with the United States, may send inspectors to facilities 

to verify the design information provided to the Agency pursuant to Article 42 through 

45, for the purposes stated in Article 46.

ARTICLE 49

In establishing a national system of materials control as referred to in Article 7, the 

United States shall arrange that records are kept in respect of each material balance area 

determined in accordance with Article 46(b). The records to be kept shall be described in 

the Subsidiary Arrangements.

ARTICLE 50

The United States shall make arrangements to facilitate the examination of records 

referred to in Article 49 by inspectors.

ARTICLE 51

Records referred to in Article 49 shall be retained for at least five years.

ARTICLE 52

Records referred to in Article 49 shall consist, as appropriate, of

(a) Accounting records of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this 

Agreement; and

(b) Operating records for facilities containing such nuclear material.

ARTICLE 53

The system of measurements on which the record used for the preparation of reports 

are based shall either conform to the latest international standards or be equivalent in 

quality to such standards.

ARTICLE 54

The accounting records referred to in Article 52(a) shall set forth the following in 

respect of each material balance area determined in accordance with Article 46(b):

(a) All inventory changes, so as to permit a determination of the book inventory at 

any time;
1306 Agmt. Btw. the U.S. and IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the U.S.

(b) All measurement results that are used for determination of the physical inventory; 

and

(c) All adjustments and corrections that have been made in respect of inventory 

changes, book inventories and physical inventories.

ARTICLE 55

For all inventory changes and physical inventories the records referred to in Article 

52(a) shall show, in respect of each batch of nuclear material: material identification, 

batch data and source data. The records shall account for uranium, thorium and 

plutonium separately in each batch of nuclear material. For each inventory change, the 

data of the inventory change and, when appropriate, the originating material balance 

area and the receiving material balance area of the recipient shall be indicated.

ARTICLE 56

The operating records referred to in Article 52(b) shall set forth, as appropriate, in 

respect of each material balance area determined in accordance with Article 46(b):

(a) Those operating data which are used to establish changes in the quantities and 

composition of nuclear material;

(b) The data obtained from the calibration of tanks and instruments and from 

sampling and analyses, the procedures to control the quality of measurements and the 

derived estimates of random and systematic error;

(c) A description of the sequence of the actions taken in preparing for, and in taking 

a physical inventory, in order to ensure that it is correct and complete; and

(d) A description of the actions taken in order to ascertain the cause and magnitude 

of any accidental or unmeasured loss that might occur.

ARTICLE 57

The United States shall provide the Agency with reports as detailed in Article 58 

through 67 in respect of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement.

ARTICLE 58

Reports shall be made in English.

ARTICLE 59

Reports shall be based on the records kept in accordance with Article 49 through 56 

and shall consist, as appropriate, of accounting reports and special reports.

ARTICLE 60

The United States shall provide the Agency with an initial report on all nuclear 

material contained in each facility which becomes listed in the Subsidiary Arrangements 

in accordance with Article 39(b):

(a) With respect to those facilities listed pursuant to Article 39(b)(i), such reports 

shall be dispatched to the Agency within thirty days of the last day of the calendar 

month in which this Agreement enters into force, and shall reflect the situations as of the 

last day of that month. 

(b) With respect to each facility listed pursuant to Article 39(b)(ii), an initial report 

shall be dispatched to the Agency within thirty days of the last day of the calendar 

month in which the Agency identifies the facility of the United States and shall reflect 

the situation as of the last day of the month.

ARTICLE 61

The United States shall provide the Agency with the following accounting reports for 

each material balance area determined in accordance with Article 46(b):
Agmt. Btw. the U.S. and IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the U.S. 1307

(a) Inventory change reports showing all charges in the inventory of nuclear material. 

The reports shall be dispatched as soon as possible and in any event within thirty days 

after the end of the month in which the inventory changes occurred or were established; 

and

(b) Material balance reports showing the material balance based on a physical 

inventory of nuclear material actually present in the material balance area. The reports 

shall be dispatched as soon as possible and in any event within thirty days after the 

physical inventory has been taken.

The reports shall be based on data available as of the date of reporting and may be 

corrected at a later date, as required.

ARTICLE 62

Inventory change reports submitted in accordance with Article 61(a) shall specify 

identification and batch data for each batch of nuclear material, the date of the inventory 

change, and, as appropriate, the originating material balance area and the receiving 

material balance area or the recipient. These reports shall be accompanied by concise 

notes:

(a) Explaining the inventory changes, on the basis of the operating data contained in 

the operating records provided for under Article 56(a); and 

(b) Describing, as specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, the anticipated 

operational programme, particularly the taking of a physical inventory.

ARTICLE 63

The United States shall report each inventory change, adjustment and correction, 

either periodically in a consolidated list or individually. Inventory changes shall be 

reported in terms of batches. As specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, small 

changes in inventory of nuclear material, such as transfers of analytical samples, may be 

combined in one batch and reported as one inventory change.

ARTICLE 64

The Agency shall provide the United States with semi-annual statements of book 

inventory of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement, for each 

material balance area, as based on the inventory change reports for the period covered by 

each such statement.

ARTICLE 65

Material balance reports submitted in accordance with Article 61(b) shall include the 

following entries, unless otherwise agreed by the United States and the Agency:

(a) Beginning physical inventory;

(b) Inventory changes(first increases, then decreases);

(c) Ending book inventory;

(d) Shipper/receiver differences;

(e) Adjusted ending book inventory;

(f) Ending physical inventory; and

(g) Material unaccounted for.

A statement of the physical inventory, listing all batches separately and specifying 

material identification and batch data for each batch, shall be attached to each material 

balance report.

ARTICLE 66

The United States shall make special reports without delay:

(a) If any unusual incident or circumstances lead the United States to believe that 

there is or may have been loss of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this 

Agreement that exceeds the limits specified for this purpose in the Subsidiary 

Arrangement; or
1308 Agmt. Btw. the U.S. and IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the U.S.

(b) If the containment has unexpectedly changed from that specified in the 

Subsidiary Arrangement to the extent that unauthorized removal of nuclear material 

subject to safeguards under this Agreement has become possible.

ARTICLE 67

If the Agency so requests, the United States shall provide it with amplifications or 

clarifications of any report submitted in accordance with Article 57 through 63, 65 and 

66, in so far as relevant for the purpose of safeguards.

ARTICLE 68

The Agency shall have the right to make inspections as provided for in Article 69 

through 82.

ARTICLE 69

The Agency may make ad hoc inspections in order to:

(a) Verify the information contained in the initial reports submitted in accordance 

with Article 60;

(b) Identify and verify changes in the situation which have occurred since the date of 

the relevant initial report; and

(c) Identify and if possible verify the quality and composition of the nuclear material 

subject to safeguards under this Agreement in respect of which the information referred 

to in Article 89(a) has been provided to the Agency.

ARTICLE 70

The Agency may make routine inspections in order to:

(a) Verify that reports submitted pursuant to Articles 57 through 63, 65 and 66 are 

consistent with records kept pursuant to Articles 49 through 56;

(b) Verify the location, identify, quantity and composition of all nuclear material 

subject to safeguards under this Agreement; and

(c) Verify information on the possible causes of material unaccounted for, 

shipper/receiver differences and uncertainties in the book inventory.

ARTICLE 71

Subject to the procedures laid down in Article 75, the Agency may make special 

inspections:

(a) In order to verify the information contained in special reports submitted in 

accordance with Article 66; or

(b) If the Agency considers that information made available by the United States, 

including explanations from the United States and information obtained from routine 

inspections, is not adequate for the Agency to fulfill its responsibilities under this 

Agreement.

An inspection shall be deemed to be special when it is either additional to the routine 

inspection effort provided for in Article 76 through 80, or involves access to information 

or locations in addition to the access specified in Article 74 for ad hoc and routine 

inspections, or both.

ARTICLE 72

For the purposes specified in Article 69 through 71, the Agency may:

(a) Examine the records kept pursuant to Articles 49 through 56;

(b) Make independent measurements of all nuclear material subject to safeguards 

under this Agreement;

(c) Verify the functioning and calibration of instruments and other measuring and 

control equipment;

(d) Apply and make use of surveillance and containment measures; and
Agmt. Btw. the U.S. and IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the U.S. 1309

(e) Use other objective methods which have been demonstrated to be technically 

feasible.

ARTICLE 73

Within the scope of Article 72, the Agency shall be enabled:

(a) To observe that samples at key measurement points for material balance 

accountancy are taken in accordance with procedures which produce representative 

samples, to observe the treatment and analysis of the samples and to obtain duplicates of 

such samples;

(b) To observe that the measurements of nuclear material at key measurement points 

for material balance accountancy are representative, and to observe the calibration of the 

instruments and equipment involved;

(c) To make arrangements with the United States that, if necessary:

(i) Additional measurements are made and additional samples taken for the 

Agency’s use;

(ii) The Agency’s standard analytical samples are analyzed;

(iii) Appropriate absolute standards are used in calibrating instruments and other 

equipment; and

(iv) Other calibrations are carried out;

(d) To arrange to use its own equipment for independent measurement and 

surveillance, and if so agreed and specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements to arrange to 

install such equipment;

(e) To apply its seals and other identifying tamper-indicating devices to 

containments, if so agreed and specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements; and

(f) To make arrangements with the United States for the shipping of samples taken 

for the Agency’s use.

ARTICLE 74

(a) For the purposes specified in Article 69(a) and (b) and until such time as the 

strategic points have been specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, Agency inspectors 

shall have access to any location where the initial report or any inspections carried out 

therewith indicate that nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement is 

present.

(b) For the purposes specified in Article 69(c), the inspectors shall have access to any 

facility identified pursuant to Article 2(b) or 39(b) in which nuclear material referred to 

in Article 69(c) is located.

(c) For the purposes specified in Article 70 the inspectors shall have access only to 

the strategic points specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements and to the records 

maintained pursuant to Articles 49 through 56; and

(d) In the event of the United States concluding that any unusual circumstances 

require extended limitations on access by the Agency, the United States and the Agency 

shall promptly make arrangements with a view to enabling the Agency to discharge its 

safeguards responsibilities in the light of these limitations. The Director General shall 

report each such arrangement to the Board.

ARTICLE 75

In circumstances which may lead to special inspections for purposes specified in 

Article 71 the United States and the Agency shall consult forthwith. As a result of such 

consultations the Agency may:

(a) Make inspections in addition to the routine inspection effort provided for in 

Article 76 through 80; and

(b) Obtain access, in agreement with the United States, to information or locations in 

addition to those specified in Article 74. Any disagreement concerning the need for 

additional access shall be resolved in accordance with Articles 20 and 21; in case action 

by the United States is essential and urgent, Article 17 shall apply.
1310 Agmt. Btw. the U.S. and IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the U.S.

ARTICLE 76

The Agency shall keep the number, intensity and duration of routine inspections, 

applying optimum timing, to the minimum consistent with the effective implementation 

of the safeguards procedures set forth in this Agreement, and shall make the optimum 

and most economical use of inspection resources available to it.

ARTICLE 77

The Agency may carry out one routine inspection per year in respect of facilities 

listed in the Subsidiary Arrangements pursuant to Article 39 with a content or annual 

throughput, whichever is greater, of nuclear material not exceeding five effective 

kilograms.

ARTICLE 78

The number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of routine inspections in respect of 

facilities listed in the Subsidiary Arrangements pursuant to Article 39 with a content or 

annual throughput of nuclear material exceeding five effective kilograms shall be 

determined on the basis that in the maximum or limiting case the inspection regime shall 

be no more intensive than is necessary and sufficient to maintain continuity of 

knowledge of the flow and inventory of nuclear material, and the maximum routine 

inspection effort in respect of such facilities shall be determined as follows:

(a) For reactors and sealed storage installations the maximum total of routine 

inspection per year shall be determined by allowing one sixth of a man-year of 

inspection for each such facility.

(b) For facilities, other than reactors or sealed storage installations, involving 

plutonium or uranium enriched to more than 5 percent, the maximum total of routine 

inspection per year shall be determined by allowing for each facility 30 x E mandays of 

inspection per year, where E is the inventory or annual throughput of nuclear material, 

whichever is greater, expressed in effective kilograms. The maximum established for 

any such facility shall not, however, be less than 1.5 man-years of inspection; and

(c) For facilities not covered by paragraphs (a) or (b), the maximum total of routine 

inspection per year shall be determined by allowing for each such facility one third of a 

man-year of inspection plus 0.4 x E man-days of inspection per year, where E is the 

inventory or annual throughput of nuclear material, whichever is greater, expressed in 

effective kilograms.

The United States and the Agency may agree to amend the figures for the maximum 

inspection effort specified in this Article, upon determination by the Board that such 

amendment is reasonable.

ARTICLE 79

Subject to Articles 76 through 78 the criteria to be used for determining the actual 

number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of routine inspections in respect of any 

facility listed in the Subsidiary Arrangements pursuant to Article 39 shall include:

(a) The form of the nuclear material, in particular, whether the nuclear material is in 

bulk form or contained in a number of separate items; its chemical composition and, in 

the case of uranium, whether it is of low or high enrichment; and its accessibility;

(b) The effectiveness of the United States’ accounting and control system, including 

the extent to which the operators of facilities are functionally independent of the United 

States’ accounting and control system; the extent to which the measures specified in 

Article 32 have been implemented by the United States; the promptness of reports 

provided to the Agency; their consistency with the Agency’s independent verification; 

and the amount and accuracy of the material unaccounted for, as verified by the Agency;

(c) Characteristics of that part of the United States fuel cycle in which safeguards are 

applied under this Agreement, in particular, the number and types of facilities containing 

nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement, the characteristics of such 
Agmt. Btw. the U.S. and IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the U.S. 1311

facilities relevant to safeguards, notably the degree of containment; the extent to which 

the design of such facilities facilitates verification of the flow and inventory of nuclear 

material; and the extent to which information from different material balance areas can 

be correlated;

(d) International interdependence; in particular the extent to which nuclear material, 

safeguarded under this Agreement, is received from or sent to other States for use or 

processing; any verification activities by the Agency in connection therewith; and the 

extent to which activities in facilities in which safeguards are applied under this 

Agreement are interrelated with those of other States; and

(e) Technical developments in the field of safeguards, including the use of statistical 

techniques and random sampling in evaluating the flow of nuclear material.

ARTICLE 80

The United States and the Agency shall consult if the United States considers that the 

inspection effort is being deployed with undue concentration on particular facilities.

ARTICLE 81

The Agency shall give advance notice to the United States of the arrival of inspectors 

at facilities listed in the Subsidiary Arrangements pursuant to Article 39, as follows:

(a) For ad hoc inspections pursuant to Article 69(c), at least 24 hours; for those 

pursuant to Article 69 (a) and (b), as well as the activities provided for in Article 48, at 

least one week;

(b) For special inspections pursuant to Article 71, as promptly as possible after the 

United States and the Agency have consulted as provided for in Article 75, it being 

understood that notification of arrival normally will constitute part of the consultations; 

and

(c) For routine inspections pursuant to Article 70 at least twenty-four hours in respect 

of the facilities referred to in Article 78(b) and sealed storage installations containing 

plutonium or uranium enriched to more than 5 percent and one week in all other cases.

Such notice of inspections shall include the names of the inspectors and shall 

indicate the facilities to be visited and the periods during which they will be visited. If 

the inspectors are to arrive from outside the United States the Agency shall also give 

advance notice of the place and time of their arrival in the United States.

ARTICLE 82

Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 81, the Agency may, as a supplementary 

measure, carry out without advance notification a portion of the routine inspections 

pursuant to Article 78 in accordance with the principle of random sampling. In 

performing any unannounced inspections, the Agency shall fully take into account any 

operational programme provided by the United States pursuant to Article 62(b). 

Moreover, whenever practicable, and on the basis of the operational programme, it shall 

advise the United States periodically of its general programme of announced and 

unannounced inspections, specifying the general periods when inspections are foreseen. 

In carrying out any unannounced inspections, the Agency shall make every effort to 

minimize any practical difficulties for the United States and facilities operators bearing 

in mind the relevant provisions of Articles 44 and 87. Similarly the United States shall 

make every effort to facilitate the task of the inspectors.

ARTICLE 83

The following procedures shall apply to the designation of inspectors:

(a) The Director General shall inform the United States in writing of the name, 

qualifications, nationality, grade and such other particulars as may be relevant, of each 

Agency official he proposes for designation as an inspector for the United States;

(b) The United States shall inform the District General within thirty days of the 

receipt of such a proposal whether it accepts the proposal;
1312 Agmt. Btw. the U.S. and IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the U.S.

(c) The Director General may designate each official who has been accepted by the 

United States as one of the inspectors for the United States as one of the inspectors for 

the United States, and shall inform the United States of such designations; and

(d) The Director General, acting in response to a request by the United States or on 

his own initiative, shall immediately inform the United States of the withdrawal of the 

designation of any official as an inspector for the United States.

However, in respect of inspectors needed for the activities provided for in Article 48 

and to carry out ad hoc inspections pursuant to Article 69 (a) and (b) the designation 

procedures shall be completed if possible within thirty days after the entry into force of 

this Agreement. If such designation appears impossible within this time limit, inspectors 

for such purposes shall be designated on a temporary basis.

ARTICLE 84

The United States shall grant or renew a quickly as possible appropriate visas, where 

required, for each inspector designated for the United States.

ARTICLE 85

Inspectors, in exercising their functions under Articles 48 and 69 to 73, shall carry 

out their activities in a manner designed to avoid hampering or delaying the 

construction, commissioning or operation of facilities, or affecting their safety. In 

particular inspectors shall not operate any facility themselves or direct the staff of a 

facility to carry out any operation. If inspectors consider that in pursuance of paragraph 

72 and 73, particular operations in a facility should be carried out by the operator, then 

shall make a request therefor.

ARTICLE 86

When inspectors require services available in the United States, including the use of 

equipment, in connection with the performance of inspections, the United States shall 

facilitate the procurement of such services and the use of such equipment by inspectors.

ARTICLE 87

The United States shall have the right to have inspectors accompanied during their 

inspections by its representatives, provided that inspectors shall not thereby be delayed 

or otherwise impeded in the exercise of their functions.

ARTICLE 88

The Agency shall inform the United States of:

(a) The results of inspections, at intervals to be specified in the Subsidiary 

Arrangements; and

(b) The conclusions it has drawn from its verification activities in the United States, 

in particular by means of statements in respect of each material balance area determined 

in accordance with Article 46(b) which shall be made as soon as possible after a physical 

inventory has been taken and verified by the Agency and a material balance has been 

stuck.

ARTICLE 89

(a) Information concerning nuclear material exported from and imported into the 

United States shall be provided to the Agency in accordance with arrangements made 

with the Agency as, for example, those set forth in INFCIRC/207.

(b) In the case of international transfers to or from facilities identified by the Agency 

pursuant to Articles 2(b) and 39(b) with respect to which information has been provided 

to the Agency in accordance with arrangements referred to in paragraph(a), a special 

report, as envisaged in Article 66, shall be made if any unusual incidents or 

circumstances lead the United States to believe that there is or may have been loss of 

nuclear material, including the occurrence of significant delay, during the transfer.
Agmt. Btw. the U.S. and IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the U.S. 1313

ARTICLE 90 – DEFINITIONS

For the purpose of this Agreement:

A. Adjustment means an entry into and accounting record or a report showing a 

shipper/receiver difference of material unaccounted for. 

B. Annual throughput means, for the purposes of Article 77 and 78, the amount of 

nuclear material transferred annually out of a facility working at nominal capacity.

C. Batch means a portion of nuclear material handled as a unit for accounting 

purposes at a key measurement point and for which the composition and quantity are 

defined by a single set of specifications or measurements. The nuclear material may be 

in bulk form or contained in a number of separate items.

D. Batch data means the total weight of each element of nuclear material and, in the 

case of plutonium and uranium, the isotopic composition when appropriate. The units of 

account shall be as follows:

(a) Grams of contained plutonium;

(b) Grams of total uranium and grams of contained uranium-235 plus uranium-233 

for uranium enriched in these isotopes; and

(c) Kilograms of contained thorium, natural uranium or depleted uranium.

For reporting purposes the weight of individual items in the batch shall be added 

together before rounding to the nearest unit.

E. Book inventory of a material balance area means the algebraic sum of the most 

recent physical inventory of that material balance area and of all inventory changes that 

have occurred since that physical inventory was taken.

F. Correction means an entry into an accounting record or a report to rectify an 

identified mistake or to reflect an improved measurement of a quantity previously 

entered into the record or report. Each corrections must identify the entry to which it 

pertains.

G. Effective kilogram means a special unit used in safeguarding nuclear material. 

The quantity in effective kilograms is obtained by taking :

(a) For plutonium, its weight in kilograms;

(b) For uranium with an enrichment of 0.01 (1 percent) and above, its weight in 

kilograms multiplied by the square of its enrichment; 

(c) For uranium with an enrichment below 0.01 (1 percent) and above 0.005 (0.5 

percent), its weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.0001; and

(d) For depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5 percent) or below, and for 

thorium, its weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.00005.

H. Enrichment means the ratio of the combined weight of the isotopes uranium-233 

and uranium-235 to that of the total uranium in question.

I. Facility means;

(a) A reactor, a critical facility, a conversion plant, a fabrication plant, a reprocessing 

plant, an isotope separation plant or a separate storage installation; or

(b) Any location where nuclear material in amounts greater than one effective 

kilogram is customarily used.

J. Inventory change means an increase or decrease, in terms of batches, of nuclear 

material in a material balance area; such a change shall involve one of the following:

(a) Increases:

(i) Import;

(ii) Domestic receipt: receipts from other material balance areas, receipts from a 

non-safeguarded activity or receipts at the starting point of safeguards;

(iii) Nuclear production: production of special fissionable material in a rector; 

and

(iv) De-exemption: replication of safeguards on nuclear material previously 

exempted therefrom on account of its use or quantity.
1314 Agmt. Btw. the U.S. and IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the U.S.

(b) Decreases:

(i) Export;

(ii) Domestic shipments: shipments to other material balance areas or shipments 

for a non-safeguarded activity;

(iii) Nuclear loss: loss of nuclear material due to its transformation into other 

element(s) or isotope(s) as a result of nuclear reactions;

(iv) Measured discard: nuclear material which has been measured, or estimated 

on the basis of measurement, and disposed of in such a way that it is not suitable for 

further nuclear use;

(v) Retained waste: nuclear material generated from processing or from an 

operational accident, which is deemed to be unrecoverable for the time being but which 

is stored;

(vi) Exemption: exemption of nuclear material from safeguards on account of its use 

or quantity; and

(vii) Other loss: for example, accidental loss (that is, irretrievable and inadvertent 

loss of nuclear material as the result of an operational accident) or theft.

K. Key measurement point means a location where nuclear material appears in such 

a form that it may be measured to determined material flow or inventory. Key 

measurement points thus include, but are not limited to, the inputs and outputs 

(including measured discards) and storages in material balance areas.

L. Man-year of inspection means, for the purposes of Article 78, 300 man-days of 

inspection, a man-day being a day during which a single inspector has access to a 

facility at any time for a total of not more than eight hours.

M. Material balance area means an area in our outside of a facility such that:

(a) The quantity of nuclear material in each transfer into or out of each material 

balance area can be determined; and

(b) The physical inventory of nuclear material in each material balance area can be 

determined when necessary in accordance with specified procedures, in order that the 

material balance for Agency safeguards purposes can be established.

N. Material unaccounted for means the difference between book inventory and 

physical inventory.

O. Nuclear material means any source or any special fissionable material as defined 

in Article XX of the Statute. The term source material shall not be interpreted as 

applying to ore or ore residue. Any determination by the Board under Article XX of the 

Statute after the entry into force of this Agreement which adds to the materials 

considered to be source material or special fissionable material shall have effect under 

this Agreement only upon acceptance by the United States.

P. Physical inventory means the sum of all the measured or derived estimates of 

batch quantities of nuclear material on hand at a given time within a material balance 

area, obtained in accordance with specified procedures.

Q. hipper/receiver difference means the difference between the quantity of nuclear 

material in a batch as stated by the shipping material balance area and as measured at the 

receiving balance area.

R. Source data means those data, recorded during measurement or calibration or used 

to derive empirical relationships, which identify nuclear material and provide batch data. 

Source data may include, for example, weight of compounds, conversion factors to 

determine weight of element, specific gravity, element concentration, isotopic ratios, 

relationship between volume and manometer readings and relationships between 

plutonium produced and power generated.

S. Strategic point means a location selected during examination of design 

information where, under normal conditions and when combined with the information 

from all strategic points taken together, the information necessary and sufficient for the 

implementation of safeguards measures is obtained and verified; a strategic point may 

include any location where key measurements related to material balance accountancy 

are made where containment and surveillance measures are executed.
Agmt. Btw. the U.S. and IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the U.S. 1315

ARTICLE 1 – PROTOCOL

This Protocol specifies the procedures to be followed with respect to facilities 

identified by the Agency pursuant to Article 2 of this Protocol.

ARTICLE 2

(a) The Agency may from time to time identify to the United States those facilities 

included in the list, established and maintained pursuant to Article 1(b) and 34 of the 

Agreement, of facilities not associated with activities having direct national security 

significance to the United States, other than those which are then currently identified by 

the Agency pursuant to Article 2(b) and 39(b) of the Agreement, to which the provisions 

of this Protocol shall apply.

(b) the Agency may also include among the facilities identified to the United States 

pursuant to the foregoing paragraph, any facility which had previously been identified 

by the Agency pursuant to Article 2(b) and 39(b) of the Agreement but which had 

subsequently been designated by the Agency pursuant to Article 39(c) of the Agreement 

for removal from the Subsidiary Arrangements listing.

(c) In identifying facilities pursuant to the forgoing paragraphs and in the preparation 

of Transitional Subsidiary Arrangements pursuant to Article 3 of this Protocol, the 

Agency shall proceed in a manner which the Agency and the United States mutually 

agree takes into account the requirement on the United States to avoid discriminatory 

treatment as between United States commercial firms similarly situated.

ARTICLE 3

The United States and the Agency shall make Transitional Subsidiary Arrangements 

which shall:

(a) contain a current listing of those facilities identified by the Agency pursuant to 

Article 2 of this Protocol;

(b) specify in detail how the procedures set forth in this Protocol are to be applied.

ARTICLE 4

(a) The United States and the Agency shall make every effort to complete the 

Transitional Subsidiary Arrangements with respect to each facility identified by the 

Agency pursuant to Article 2 of this Protocol within ninety days following such 

identification to the United States.

(b) With respect to any facility identified pursuant to Article 2(b) of this Protocol, the 

information previously submitted to the Agency in accordance with Article 42 through 

45 of the Agreement, the results of the examination of the design information and other 

provisions of the Subsidiary Arrangements relative to such facilities, to the extent that 

such information, results and provisions satisfy the provisions of this Protocol relating to 

the submission and examination of information and the preparation of Transitional 

Subsidiary Arrangements, shall constitute the Transitional Subsidiary Arrangements for 

such facility, until and unless the United States and the Agency shall otherwise complete 

Transitional Subsidiary Arrangements for such facility in accordance with the provisions 

of this Protocol.

ARTICLE 5

In the event that a facility currently identified by the Agency pursuant to Article 2(a) 

of this Protocol is identified by the Agency pursuant to Articles 2(b) and 39(b) of the 

Agreement, the Transitional Subsidiary Arrangements relevant to such facility shall, to 

the extent that such Transitional Subsidiary Arrangements satisfy the provisions of the 

Agreement, be deemed to have been made part of the Subsidiary Arrangements to the 

Agreement.
1316 Agmt. Btw. the U.S. and IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the U.S.

ARTICLE 6

Design information in respect of each facility identified by the Agency pursuant to 

Article 2 of this Protocol shall be provided to the Agency during the discussion of the 

relevant Transitional Subsidiary Arrangements. The information shall include, when 

applicable:

(a) The identification of the facility, stating its general character, purpose, nominal 

capacity and geographic location, and the name and address to be used for routine 

business purpose;

(b) A description of the general arrangement of the facility with reference, to the 

extent feasible, to the form, location and flow of nuclear material and to the general 

layout of important items of equipment which use, produce or process nuclear material;

(c) A description of features of the facility relating to material accountancy, 

containment and surveillance; and

(d) A description of the existing and proposed procedures at the facility for nuclear 

material accountancy and control, with special reference to material balance areas 

established by the operator, measurements of flow and procedures for physical inventory 

taking.

ARTICLE 7

Other information relevant to the application of the provisions of this Protocol shall 

also be provided to the Agency in respect of each facility identified by the Agency in 

accordance with Article 2 of this Protocol in particular on organizational responsibility 

for material accountancy and control. The United States shall provide the Agency with 

supplementary information on the health and safety procedures which the Agency shall 

observe and with which inspectors shall comply when visiting the facility in accordance 

with Article II of this Protocol.

ARTICLE 8

The Agency shall be provided with design information in respect of a modification 

relevant to the application of the provisions of this Protocol, for examination, and shall 

be informed of any change in the information provided to it under Article 7 of this 

Protocol, sufficiently in advance for the procedures under this Protocol to be adjusted 

when necessary.

ARTICLE 9

The design information provided to the Agency in accordance with the provisions of 

this Protocol, in anticipation of the application of safeguards under the Agreement, shall 

be used for the following purposes:

(a) To identity the features of facilities and nuclear material relevant to the 

application of safeguards to nuclear material in sufficient detail to facilitate verification;

(b) To determine material balance areas to be used for Agency accounting purposes 

and to select those strategic points which are key measurement points and which will be 

used to determine flow and inventory of nuclear material; in determining such material 

balance areas the Agency shall, inter alia, use the following criteria:

(i) The size of the material balance area shall be related to the accuracy with 

which the material balance can be established;

(ii) In determining the material balance area, advantage shall be taken of any 

opportunity to use containment and surveillance to help ensure the completeness of 

flow measurements and thereby to simplify the application of safeguards and to 

concentrate measurement efforts at key measurement points;

(iii) A number of material balance areas in use at a facility or at distinct sites may 

be combined in one material balance area to be used for Agency accounting purposes 

when the Agency determines that this is consistent with its verification requirements; 

and
Agmt. Btw. the U.S. and IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the U.S. 1317

(iv) A special material balance area may be established at the request of the 

United States around a process step involving commercially sensitive information;

(c) To establish the nominal timing and procedures for taking of physical inventory 

of nuclear material for Agency accounting purposes;

(d) To establish the records and reports requirements and records evaluation 

procedures;

(e) To establish requirements and procedures for verification of the quantity and 

location of nuclear material; and

(f) To select appropriate combinations of containment and surveillance methods and 

techniques and the strategic points at which they are to be applied.

The results of the examination of the design information shall be included in the 

relevant Transitional Subsidiary Arrangements.

ARTICLE 10

Design information provided in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol shall 

be re-examined in the light of changes in operating conditions, of developments in 

safeguards technology or of experience in the application of verification procedures, 

with a view to modifying the action taken pursuant to Article 9 of this Protocol.

ARTICLE 11

(a) The Agency, in co-operation with the United States, may send inspectors to 

facilities identified by the Agency pursuant to Article 2 of this Protocol to verify the 

design information provided to the Agency in accordance with the provisions of this 

Protocol, for the purposes stated in Article 9 of this Protocol or for such other purposes 

as may be agreed between the United States and the Agency.

(b) The Agency shall give notice to the United States with respect to each such visit 

at least one week prior to the arrival of inspectors at the facility to be visited.

ARTICLE 12

In establishing a national system of materials control as referred to in Article 7(a) of 

the Agreement, the United States shall arrange that records are kept in respect of each 

material balance area determined in accordance with Article 9(b) of this Protocol. The 

records to be kept shall be described in the relevant Transitional Subsidiary 

Arrangements.

ARTICLE 13

Records referred to in Article 12 of this Protocol shall be retained for at least five 

years.

ARTICLE 14

Records referred to in Article 12 of this Protocol shall consist, as appropriate, of:

(a) Accounting records of all nuclear material stored, processed, used or produced in 

each facility; and

(b) Operating records for activities within each facility.

ARTICLE 15

The system of measurements on which the records used for the preparation of reports 

are based shall either conform to the latest international standards or be equivalent in 

quality to such standards.

ARTICLE 16

The accounting records referred to in Article 14(a) of this Protocol shall set forth the 

following in respect of each material balance area determined in accordance with Article 

9(b) of this Protocol:

(a) All inventory changes, so as to permit a determination of the book inventory at 

any time;
1318 Agmt. Btw. the U.S. and IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the U.S.

(b) All measurement results that are used for determination of the physical inventory; 

and

(c) All adjustments and corrections that have been made in respect of inventory 

changes, book inventories and physical inventories.

ARTICLE 17

For all inventory changes and physical inventories the records referred to in Article 

14(a) of this Protocol shall show, in respect of each batch of nuclear material: material 

identification, batch data and source data. The records shall account for uranium, 

thorium and plutonium separately in each batch of nuclear material. For each inventory 

change, the date of the inventory change and, when appropriate, the originating material 

balance area and the receiving material balance area or the recipient, shall be indicated.

ARTICLE 18

The operating records referred to in Article 14(b) of this Protocol shall set forth, as 

appropriate, in respect of each material balance area determined in accordance with 

Article 9(b) of this Protocol:

(a) Those operating data which are used to establish changes in the quantities and 

composition of nuclear material;

(b) The data obtained from the calibration of tanks and instruments and from 

sampling and analyses, the procedures to control the quality of measurements and the 

derived estimates of random and systematic error;

(c) A description of the sequence of the actions taken in preparing for, and in taking, 

a physical inventory, in order to ensure that it is correct and complete; and

(d) A description of the actions taken in order to ascertain the cause and magnitude 

of any accidental or unmeasured loss that might occur.

ARTICLE 19

The United States shall provide the Agency with accounting reports as detailed in 

Article 20 through 25 of this Protocol in respect of nuclear material in each facility 

identified by the Agency pursuant to Article 2 of this Protocol.

ARTICLE 20

The accounting reports shall be based on the records kept in accordance with Articles 

12 to 18 to this Protocol. They shall be made in English.

ARTICLE 21

The United States shall provide the Agency with an initial report on all nuclear 

material in each facility identified by the Agency pursuant to Article 2 of this Protocol. 

Such report shall be dispatched to the Agency within thirty days of the last day of the 

Calendar month in which the facility is identified by the Agency and shall reflect the 

situation as of the last day of that month.

ARTICLE 22

The United States shall provide the Agency with the following accounting reports for 

each material balance areas determined in accordance with Article 9(b) of this Protocol:

(a) Inventory change reports showing all changes in the inventory of nuclear 

material. The reports shall be dispatched as soon as possible and in any event within 

thirty days after the end of the month in which the inventory changes occurred or were 

established; and

(b) Material balance reports showing the material balance based on a physical 

inventory of nuclear material actually present in the material balance area. The reports 

shall be dispatched as soon as possible and in any event within thirty days after the 

physical inventory has been taken.
Agmt. Btw. the U.S. and IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the U.S. 1319

The reports shall be based on data available as of the date of reporting and may be 

corrected at a later date, as required.

ARTICLE 23

Inventory change reports submitted in accordance with Article 22(a) of this Protocol 

shall specify identification and batch data for each batch of nuclear material, the date of 

the inventory change, and, as appropriate, the originating material balance area and the 

receiving material balance area or the recipient. These reports shall be accompanied by 

concise notes:

(a) Explaining the inventory changes, on the basis of the operating data contained in 

the operating records provided for in Article 18(a) of this Protocol; and

(b) Describing, as specified in the relevant Transitional Subsidiary Arrangements, 

the anticipated operational programme, particularly the taking of a physical inventory.

ARTICLE 24

The United States shall report each inventory change, adjustment and correction, 

either periodically in a consolidated list or individually. Inventory changes shall be 

reported in terms of batches. As specified in the relevant Transitional Subsidiary 

Arrangements, small changes in inventory of nuclear material, such as transfers of 

analytical samples, may be combined in one batch and reported as one inventory change.

ARTICLE 25

Material balance reports submitted in accordance with Article 22(b) of this Protocol 

shall include the following entries, unless otherwise agreed by the United States and the 

Agency:

(a) Beginning physical inventory;

(b) Inventory changes (first increases, then decreases);

(c) Ending book inventory;

(d) Shipper/receiver differences;

(e) Adjusted ending book inventory;

(f) Ending physical inventory; and

(g) Material unaccounted for.

A statement of the physical inventory, listing all batches separately and specifying 

material identification and batch data for each batch, shall be attached to each material 

balance report.

ARTICLE 26

The Agency shall provide the United States with semi-annual statements of book 

inventory of nuclear material in facilities identified pursuant to Article 2 of this Protocol, 

for each material balance area, as based on the inventory change reports for the period 

covered by each such statement.

ARTICLE 27

(a) If the Agency so requests, the United States shall provide it with amplifications or 

clarifications of any report submitted in accordance with Article 19 of this Protocol, 

insofar as consistent with the purpose of the Protocol.

(b) The Agency shall inform the United States of any significant observations 

resulting from its examination of reports received pursuant to Article 19 of this Protocol 

and from visits of inspectors made pursuant to Article 11 of this Protocol.

(c) The United States and the Agency shall, at the request of either, consult about any 

question arising out of the interpretation or application of this Protocol, including 

corrective action which, in the opinion of the Agency, should be taken by the United 

States to ensure compliance with its terms, as indicated by the Agency in its 

observations pursuant to paragraph (b) of this Article.
1320 Agmt. Btw. the U.S. and IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the U.S.

ARTICLE 28

The definition set forth in Article 90 of the Agreement shall apply, to the extent 

relevant, to this Protocol.

Done in Vienna on the 18th day of November, 1977, in duplicate, in the English 

language.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 

FOR THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY:
Senate Res. Consenting to the U.S.-IAEA Agmt. for Application of 

Safeguards

1321

M. U.S. SENATE RESOLUTION CONSENTING TO THE RATIFICATION OF 

THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE IAEA FOR THE 

APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS

Senate of the United States

IN EXECUTIVE SESSION

July 2, 1980

Resolved, (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein), That the Senate 

advised and consent to the ratification of the Agreement between the United States of 

America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of the 

Safeguards in the United States of America, with attached Protocol, signed at Vienna on 

November 18, 1977 (Ex. B, Ninety-fifth Congress, second session, hereinafter referred 

to as “the Agreement”), subject to the following understandings:

1. That the President shall notify the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate 

and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives of any proposed 

addition to the list, to be provided to the International Atomic Energy Agency pursuant 

to Article 1(b) of the Agreement, of nuclear facilities within the United States eligible 

for International Atomic Energy Agency inspections, together with an explanation of the 

basis upon which the determination was made that any such facility did not have a direct 

national security significance, not less than 60 day prior to such proposed addition being 

provided to the International Atomic Energy Agency, during which period the Congress 

may disapprove such addition by joint resolution by reason of direct national security 

significance, under procedures identical to those provided for the consideration of 

resolutions pursuant to section 130 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended.

2. That the President shall assure that concerned licensees within the United States 

are consulted in advance of, and that their views and interests are considered in, any 

negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency concerning the application to 

a particular facility of Subsidiary Arrangements made pursuant to Article 39 of the 

Agreement.

3. That the President shall establish and maintain an appropriate interagency 

mechanism, comprised of the relevant Executive Branch agencies, and with the 

participation of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, under the chairmanship of the 

Department of State, for the purpose of coordinating policy, and of resolving disputes, 

relating to the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards under 

the Agreement, and, further, that the Congress shall be kept informed of the functions 

and procedures of such interagency mechanism.

4. That in the event of any question of interpretation of the Agreement, the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission shall seek and be bound by guidance from the President. 

Neither this understanding nor any other in this resolution shall in any way alter the 

responsibilities of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under the Agreement or in any 

way limit the existing authority and responsibility of the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission.

5. That the Agreement shall not be constructed to require the communication to the 

International Atomic Energy Agency of “Restricted Data” controlled by the provisions 

of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, including data concerning the design, 

manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons.

Attest: 

Secretary
1322 Protocol Additional to the U.S.-IAEA Agmt. for Application of Safeguards

N. PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC 

ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS IN THE 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

WHEREAS the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as “the United States”) 

and the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as the “Agency”) 

are parties to an Agreement for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of 

America done at Vienna on November 18, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as the 

“Safeguards Agreement”), which entered into force on December 9, 1980;

AWARE OF the desire of the international community to further enhance nuclear 

nonproliferation by strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the 

Agency's safeguards system;

RECALLING that the Agency must take into account in the implementation of 

safeguards the need to: avoid hampering the economic and technological development of 

the United States or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities; 

respect health, safety, physical protection and other security provisions in force and the 

rights of individuals; and take every precaution to protect commercial, technological and 

industrial secrets as well as other confidential information coming to its knowledge; 

WHEREAS the frequency and intensity of activities described in this Protocol shall be 

kept to the minimum consistent with the objective of strengthening the effectiveness and 

improving the efficiency of Agency safeguards;

NOW THEREFORE the United States and the Agency have agreed as follows: 

Article I–RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PROTOCOL AND THE 

SAFEGUARDS

a. The provisions of the Safeguards Agreement shall apply to this Protocol to the extent 

that they are relevant to and compatible with the provisions of this Protocol. In case of 

conflict between the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement and those of this Protocol, 

the provisions of this Protocol shall apply. 

b. The United States shall apply, and permit the Agency to apply, this Protocol, 

excluding only instances where its application would result in access by the Agency to 

activities with direct national security significance to the United States or to locations or 

information associated with such activities.

c. Without prejudice to paragraph b. above, the United States shall have the right to use 

managed access in connection with activities with direct national security significance to 

the United States or in connection with locations or information associated with such 

activities.

Article 2–PROVISION OF INFORMATION

a. The United States shall provide the Agency with a declaration containing. 

(i) A general description of and information specifying the location of 

nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities not 

involving nuclear material carried out anywhere that are funded, 

specifically authorized or controlled by, or carried out on behalf of, the 

United States. 

(ii) Information identified by the Agency on the basis of expected gains in 

effectiveness or efficiency, and agreed to by the United States, on 
Protocol Additional to the U.S.-IAEA Agmt. for Application of Safeguards 1323

operational activities of safeguards relevance at facilities and locations 

outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used. 

(iii) A general description of each building on each site, including its use 

and, if not apparent from that description, its contents. The description 

shall include a map of the site. 

(iv) A description of the scale of operations for each location engaged in 

the activities specified in Annex I to this Protocol. 

(v) Information specifying the location, operational status and the 

estimated annual production capacity of uranium mines and 

concentration plants and thorium concentration plants, and the current 

annual production of such mines and concentration plants for the 

United States as a whole. The United States shall provide, upon 

request by the Agency, the current annual production of an individual 

mine or concentration plant. The provision of this information does 

not require detailed nuclear material accountancy. 

(vi) Information regarding source material which has not reached the 

composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or for being

isotopically enriched, as follows:

(a) The quantities, the chemical composition, the use or intended 

use of such material, whether in nuclear or non-nuclear use, 

for each location in the United States at which the material is 

present in quantities exceeding ten metric tons of uranium 

and/or twenty metric tons of thorium, and for other locations 

with quantities of more than one metric ton, the aggregate for 

the United States as a whole if the aggregate exceeds ten 

metric tons of uranium or twenty metric tons of thorium. The 

provision of this information does not require detailed nuclear 

material accountancy;

(b) The quantities, the chemical composition and the destination 

of each export out of the United States, of such material for 

specifically nonnuclear purposes in quantities exceeding: 

(1) Ten metric tons of uranium, or for successive 

exports of uranium from the United States to the 

same State, each of less than ten metric tons, but 

exceeding a total of ten metric tons for the year;

(2) Twenty metric tons of thorium, or for successive 

exports of thorium from the United States to the 

same State, each of less than twenty metric tons, but 

exceeding a total of twenty metric tons for the year, 

(c) The quantities, chemical composition, current location and 

use or intended use of each import into the United States of 

such material for specifically non-nuclear purposes in 

quantities exceeding; 

(1) Ten metric tons of uranium, or for successive 

imports of uranium into the United States each of 

less than ten metric tons, but exceeding a total of ten 

metric tons for the year;

(2) Twenty metric tons of thorium, or for successive 

imports of thorium into the United States each of 

less than twenty metric tons, but exceeding a total of 

twenty metric tons for the year; 

it being understood that there is no requirement to provide information 

on such material intended for a non-nuclear use once it is in its nonnuclear end-use form.
1324 Protocol Additional to the U.S.-IAEA Agmt. for Application of Safeguards

(vii) (a) Information regarding the quantities, uses and locations of 

nuclear material exempted from safeguards pursuant to 

Article 37 of the Safeguards Agreement; 

(b) Information regarding the quantities (which may be in the 

form of estimates) and uses at each location, of nuclear 

material exempted from safeguards pursuant to Article 36(b) 

of the Safeguards Agreement but not yet in a non-nuclear 

end-use form, in quantities exceeding those set out in Article 

37 of the Safeguards Agreement. The provision of this 

information does not require detailed nuclear material 

accountancy. 

(viii) Information regarding the location or further processing of 

intermediate or high-level waste containing plutonium, high enriched 

uranium or uranium-233 on which safeguards have been terminated 

pursuant to Article 11 of the Safeguards Agreement. For the purpose 

of this paragraph, “further processing” does not include repackaging of 

the waste or its further conditioning not involving the separation of 

elements, for storage or disposal. 

(ix) The following information regarding specified equipment and nonnuclear material listed in Annex II: 

(a) For each export out of the United States of such equipment 

and material: the identity, quantity, location of intended use 

in the receiving State and date or, as appropriate, expected 

date, of export; 

(b) Upon specific request by the Agency, confirmation by the 

United States, as importing State, of information provided to 

the Agency by another State concerning the identity, quantity 

and location of intended use in the United States, and date of 

import or, as appropriate, expected date of the import, of such 

equipment and material into the United States. 

(x) General plans for the succeeding ten-year period relevant to the 

development of the nuclear fuel cycle (including planned nuclear fuel 

cycle-related research and development activities) when approved by 

the appropriate authorities in the United States. 

b. The United States shall make every reasonable effort to provide the Agency with the 

following information: 

(i) A general description of and information specifying the location of 

nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities not 

involving nuclear material which are specifically related to 

enrichment, reprocessing of nuclear fuel or the processing of 

intermediate or high-level waste containing plutonium, high enriched 

uranium or uranium-233 that are carried out anywhere in the United 

States but which are not funded, specifically authorized or controlled 

by, or carried out on behalf of, the United States. For the purpose of 

this paragraph, “processing” of intermediate or high-level waste does 

not include repackaging of the waste or its conditioning not involving 

the separation of elements, for storage or disposal. 

(ii) A general description of activities and the identity of the person or 

entity carrying out such activities, at locations identified by the 

Agency outside a site which the Agency considers might be 

functionally related to the activities of that site. The provision of this 

information is subject to a specific request by the Agency. It shall be 

provided in consultation with the Agency and in a timely fashion. 
Protocol Additional to the U.S.-IAEA Agmt. for Application of Safeguards 1325

c. Upon request by the Agency, the United States shall provide amplifications or 

clarifications of any information it has provided under this Article, in so far as relevant 

for the purpose of safeguards. 

Article 3

a. The United States shall provide to the Agency the information identified in Article 

2.a.(i), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi)(a), (vii) and (x) and Article 2.b.(i) within 180 days of the entry 

into force of this Protocol. 

b. The United States shall provide to the Agency, by 15 May of each year, updates of the 

information referred to in paragraph a. above for the period covering the previous 

calendar year. If there has been no change to the information previously provided, the 

United States shall so indicate.

c. The United States shall provide to the Agency, by 15 May of each year, the 

information identified in Article 2.a.(vi)(b) and (c) for the period covering the previous 

calendar year. 

d. The United States shall provide to the Agency on a quarterly basis the information 

identified in Article 2.a.(ix)(a). This information shall be provided within sixty days of 

the end of each quarter. 

e. The United States shall provide to the Agency the information identified in Article 

2.a.(viii) 180 days before further processing is carried out and, by 15 May of each year, 

information on changes in location for the period covering the previous calendar year. 

f. The United States and the Agency shall agree on the timing and frequency of the 

provision of the information identified in Article 2.a.(ii). 

g. The United States shall provide to the Agency the information in Article 2.a.(ix)(b) 

within sixty days of the Agency's request.

Article 4–COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS

The following shall apply in connection with the implementation of 

complementary access under Article 5 of this Protocol: 

a. The Agency shall not mechanistically or systematically seek to verify the information 

referred to in Article 2; however, the Agency shall have access to: 

(i) Any location referred to in Article 5.a.(i) or (ii) on a selective basis in 

order to assure the absence of undeclared nuclear material and 

activities; 

(ii) Any location referred to in Article 5.b. or c. to resolve a question 

relating to the correctness and completeness of the information 

provided pursuant to Article 2 or to resolve an inconsistency relating 

to that information; 

(iii) Any location referred to in Article 5.a.(iii) to the extent necessary for 

the Agency to confirm, for safeguards purposes, the United States' 

declaration of the decommissioned status of a facility or location 

outside facilities where nuclear material was customarily used. 

b. (i) Except as provided in paragraph (ii) below, the Agency shall give the 

United States advance notice of access of at least 24 hours; 

(ii) For access to any place on a site that is sought in conjunction with 

design information verification visits or ad hoc or routine inspections 

on that site, the period of advance notice shall, if the Agency so 

requests, be at least two hours but, in exceptional circumstances, it 

may be less than two hours.

c. Advance notice shall be in writing and shall specify the reasons for access and the 

activities to be carried out during such access. 

d. In the case of a question or inconsistency, the Agency shall provide the United States 

with an opportunity to clarify and facilitate the resolution of the question or 

inconsistency. Such an opportunity will be provided before a request for access, unless 

the Agency considers that delay in access would prejudice the purpose for which the 
1326 Protocol Additional to the U.S.-IAEA Agmt. for Application of Safeguards

access is sought. In any event, the Agency shall not draw any conclusions about the 

question or inconsistency until the United States has been provided with such an 

opportunity.

e. Unless otherwise agreed to by the United States, access shall only take place during 

regular working hours. 

f. The United States shall have the right to have Agency inspectors accompanied during 

their access by representatives of the United States, provided that the inspectors shall not 

thereby be delayed or otherwise impeded in the exercise of their functions.

Article 5

The United States shall provide the Agency with access to: 

a. (i) Any place on a site; 

(ii) Any location identified by the United States under Article 2.a.(v)-

(viii); 

(iii) Any decommissioned facility or decommissioned location outside 

facilities where nuclear material was customarily used. 

b. Any location identified by the United States under Article 2.a.(i), Article 2.a.(iv), 

Article 2.a.(ix)(b) or Article 2.b., other than those referred to in paragraph a.(i) above, 

provided that if the United States is unable to provide such access, the United States 

shall make every reasonable effort to satisfy Agency requirements, without delay, 

through other means. 

c. Any location specified by the Agency, other than locations referred to in paragraphs a. 

and b. above, to carry out location-specific environmental sampling, provided that if the 

United States is unable to provide such access, the United States shall make every 

reasonable effort to satisfy Agency requirements, without delay, at adjacent locations or 

through other means. 

Article 6

When implementing Article 5, the Agency may carry out the following 

activities: 

a. For access in accordance with Article 5.a.(i) or (iii): visual observation; collection of 

environmental samples; utilization of radiation detection and measurement devices; 

application of seals and other identifying and tamper indicating devices specified in 

Subsidiary Arrangements; and other objective measures which have been demonstrated 

to be technically feasible and the use of which has been agreed by the Board of 

Governors (hereinafter referred to as the “Board”) and following consultations between 

the Agency and the United States. 

b. For access in accordance with Article 5.a.(ii): visual observation; item counting of 

nuclear material; non-destructive measurements and sampling; utilization of radiation 

detection and measurement devices; examination of records relevant to the quantities, 

origin and disposition of the material; collection of environmental samples; and other 

objective measures which have been demonstrated to be technically feasible and the use 

of which has been agreed by the Board and following consultations between the Agency 

and the United States. 

c. For access in accordance with Article 5.b.: visual observation; collection of 

environmental samples; utilization of radiation detection and measurement devices; 

examination of safeguards relevant production and shipping records; and other objective 

measures which have been demonstrated to be technically feasible and the use of which 

has been agreed by the Board and following consultations between the Agency and the 

United States. 

d. For access in accordance with Article 5.c.: collection of environmental samples and, 

in the event the results do not resolve the question or inconsistency at the location 

specified by the Agency pursuant to Article 5.c., utilization at that location of visual 

observation, radiation detection and measurement devices, and, as agreed by the United 

States and the Agency, other objective measures. 
Protocol Additional to the U.S.-IAEA Agmt. for Application of Safeguards 1327

Article 7

a. Upon request by the United States, the Agency and the United States shall make 

arrangements for managed access under this Protocol in order to prevent the 

dissemination of proliferation sensitive information, to meet safety or physical 

protection requirements, or to protect proprietary or commercially sensitive information. 

Such arrangements shall not preclude the Agency from conducting activities necessary 

to provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and 

activities at the location in question, including the resolution of a question relating to the 

correctness and completeness of the information referred to in Article 2 or of an 

inconsistency relating to that information. 

b. The United States may, when providing the information referred to in Article 2, 

inform the Agency of the places at a site or location at which managed access may be 

applicable. 

c. Pending the entry into force of any necessary Subsidiary Arrangements, the United 

States may have recourse to managed access consistent with the provisions of paragraph 

a. above. 

Article 8

Nothing in this Protocol shall preclude the United States from offering the 

Agency access to locations in addition to those referred to in Articles 5 and 9 or from 

requesting the Agency to conduct verification activities at a particular location. The 

Agency shall, without delay, make every reasonable effort to act upon such a request. 

Article 9

The United States shall provide the Agency with access to locations specified 

by the Agency to carry out wide-area environmental sampling, provided that if the 

United States is unable to provide such access it shall make every reasonable effort to 

satisfy Agency requirements at alternative locations. The Agency shall not seek such 

access until the use of wide-area environmental sampling and the procedural 

arrangements therefore have been approved by the Board and following consultations 

between the Agency and the United States.

Article 10

The Agency shall inform the United States of: 

a. The activities carried out under this Protocol, including those in respect of any 

questions or inconsistencies the Agency had brought to the attention of the United 

States, within sixty days of the activities being carried out by the Agency. 

b. The results of activities in respect of any questions or inconsistencies the Agency had 

brought to the attention of the United States, as soon as possible but in any case within 

thirty days of the results being established by the Agency. 

c. The conclusions it has drawn from its activities under this Protocol. The conclusions 

shall be provided annually. 

Article 11–DESIGNATlON OF AGENCY INSPECTORS

a. (i) The Director General shall notify the United States of the 

Board’s approval of any Agency official as a safeguards inspector. 

Unless the United States advises the Director General of its rejection 

of such an official as an inspector for the United States within three 

months of receipt of notification of the Board’s approval, the inspector 

so notified to the United States shall be considered designated to the 

United States. 

(ii) The Director General, acting in response to a request by the United 

States or on his own initiative, shall immediately inform the United 
1328 Protocol Additional to the U.S.-IAEA Agmt. for Application of Safeguards

States of the withdrawal of the designation of any official as an 

inspector for the United States. 

b. A notification referred to in paragraph a. above shall be deemed to be received by the 

United States seven days after the date of the transmission by registered mail of the 

notification by the Agency to the United States. 

Article 12–VISAS

The United States shall, within one month of the receipt of a request therefor, 

provide the designated inspector specified in the request with appropriate multiple 

entry/exit and/or transit visas, where required, to enable the inspector to enter and 

remain on the territory of the United States for the purpose of carrying out his/her 

functions. Any visas required shall be valid for at least one year and shall be renewed, as 

required, to cover the duration of the inspector's designation to the United States.

Article 13–SUBSIDIARY ARRANGEMENTS

a. Where the United States or the Agency indicates that it is necessary to specify in 

Subsidiary Arrangements how measures laid down in this Protocol are to be applied, the 

United States and the Agency shall agree on such Subsidiary Arrangements within 

ninety days of the entry into force of this Protocol or, where the indication of the need 

for such Subsidiary Arrangements is made after the entry into force of this Protocol, 

within ninety days of the date of such indication. 

b. Pending the entry into force of any necessary Subsidiary Arrangements, the Agency 

shall be entitled to apply the measures laid down in this Protocol. 

Article 14–COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

a. The United States shall permit and protect free communications by the Agency for 

official purposes between Agency inspectors in the United States and Agency 

Headquarters and/or Regional Offices, including attended and unattended transmission 

of information generated by Agency containment and/or surveillance or measurement 

devices. The Agency shall have, in consultation with the United States, the right to make 

use of internationally established systems of direct communications, including satellite 

systems and other forms of telecommunication, not in use in the United States. At the 

request of the United States or the Agency, details of the implementation of this 

paragraph with respect to the attended or unattended transmission of information 

generated by Agency containment and/or surveillance or measurement devices shall be 

specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements. 

b. Communication and transmission of information as provided for in paragraph a. 

above shall take due account of the need to protect proprietary or commercially sensitive 

information or design information which the United States regards as being of particular 

sensitivity. 

Article 15–PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

a. The Agency shall maintain a stringent regime to ensure effective protection against 

disclosure of commercial, technological and industrial secrets and other confidential 

information coming to its knowledge, including such information coming to the 

Agency's knowledge in the implementation of this Protocol. 

b. The regime referred to in paragraph a. above shall include, among others, provisions 

relating to:

(i) General principles and associated measures for the handling of confidential 

information; 

(ii) Conditions of staff employment relating to the protection of confidential 

information;

(iii) Procedures in cases of breaches or alleged breaches of confidentiality. 

c. The regime referred to in paragraph a. above shall be approved and periodically 

reviewed by the Board.
Protocol Additional to the U.S.-IAEA Agmt. for Application of Safeguards 1329

Article 16–ANNEXES

a. The Annexes to this Protocol shall be an integral part thereof. Except for the purposes 

of amendment of the Annexes, the term “Protocol” as used in this instrument means the 

Protocol and the Annexes together.1

b. The list of activities specified in Annex I, and the list of equipment and material 

specified in Annex II, may be amended by the Board upon the advice of an open-ended 

working group of experts established by the Board. Any such amendment shall take 

effect four months after its adoption by the Board. 

Article 17–ENTRY INTO FORCE

a. This Protocol shall enter into force on the date on which the Agency receives from the 

United States written notification that the United States' statutory and constitutional 

requirements for entry into force have been met. 

b. The United States may, at any date before this Protocol enters into force, declare that 

it will apply this Protocol provisionally. 

c. The Director General shall promptly inform all Member States of the Agency of any 

declaration of provisional application of, and of the entry into force of, this Protocol. 

Article 18–DEFINITIONS

For the purpose of this Protocol: 

a. Nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities means those activities 

which are specifically related to any process or system development aspect of any of the 

following:

- conversion of nuclear material,

- enrichment of nuclear material, 

- nuclear fuel fabrication, 

- reactors, critical facilities, 

- reprocessing of nuclear fuel, 

- processing (not including repackaging or conditioning not involving the 

separation of elements, for storage or disposal) of intermediate or high level 

waste containing plutonium, high enriched uranium or uranium-233, 

but do not include activities related to theoretical or basic scientific research or to 

research and development on industrial radioisotope applications, medical, 

hydrological and agricultural applications, health and environmental effects and 

improved maintenance. 

b. Site means that area delimited by the United States in the relevant design information 

for a facility, including a closed-down facility, and in the relevant information on a 

location outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used, including a closeddown location outside facilities where nuclear material was customarily used (this is 

limited to locations with hot cells or where activities related to conversion, enrichment, 

fuel fabrication or reprocessing were carried out). It shall also include all installations, 

co-located with the facility or location, for the provision or use of essential services, 

including hot cells for processing irradiated materials not containing nuclear material; 

installations for the treatment, storage and disposal of waste; and buildings associated 

with specified activities identified by the United States under Article 2.a.(iv) above. 

c. Decommissioned facility or decommissioned location outside facilities means an 

installation or location at which residual structures and equipment essential for its use 

have been removed or rendered inoperable so that it is not used to store and can no 

longer be used to handle, process or utilize nuclear material.

––––––––

1 To view the Annexes, see the Model Additional Protocol at the International Atomic Energy Agency 

Web site: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1997/infcirc540c.pdf. The model Additional 

Protocol is the basis of this agreement, with the one exception being the National Security Exclusion.
1330 Protocol Additional to the U.S.-IAEA Agmt. for Application of Safeguards

d. Closed-down facility or closed-down location outside facilities means an installation 

or location where operations have been stopped and the nuclear material removed but 

which has not been decommissioned. 

e. High enriched uranium means uranium containing 20 percent or more of the isotope 

uraniumr-235. 

f. Location-specific environmental sampling means the collection of environmental 

samples (e.g., air, water, vegetation, soil, smears) at, and in the immediate vicinity of, a 

location specified by the Agency for the purpose of assisting the Agency to draw 

conclusions about the absence of undeclared nuclear material or nuclear activities at the 

specified location. 

g. Wide-area environmental sampling, means the collection of environmental samples 

(e.g., air, water, vegetation, soil, smears) at a set of locations specified by the Agency for 

the purpose of assisting the Agency to draw conclusions about the absence of undeclared 

nuclear material or nuclear activities over a wide area. 

h. Nuclear material means any source or any special fissionable material as defined in 

Article XX of the Statute. The term source material shall not be interpreted as applying 

to ore or ore residue. Any determination by the Board under Article XX of the Statute of 

the Agency after the entry into force of this Protocol which adds to the materials 

considered to be source material or special fissionable material shall have effect under 

this Protocol only upon acceptance by the United States. 

i. Facility means: 

(i) A reactor, a critical facility, a conversion plant, a fabrication plant, a 

reprocessing plant, an isotope separation plant or a separate storage 

installation; or 

(ii) Any location where nuclear material in amounts greater than one 

effective kilogram is customarily used.

j. Location outside facilities means any installation or location, which is not a facility, 

where nuclear material is customarily used in amounts of one effective kilogram or less.

DONE at Vienna on the ____ day of 19___ in duplicate in the English language.

FOR THE UNITED STATES 

OF AMERICA

FOR THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC 

ENERGY AGENCY
U.S. Additional Protocol Implementation Act (P.L. 109–401) 1331

O. UNITED STATES ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL 

IMPLEMENTATION ACT

Public Law 109–401 120 Stat. 2741

December 18, 2006

Title II—United States Additional Protocol Implementation

Sec. 201. Short Title

This title may be cited as the “United States Additional Protocol 

Implementation Act”.

Sec. 202. Findings

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear 

explosive devices poses a grave threat to the national security of the 

United States and its vital national interests.

(2) The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has proven critical to 

limiting such proliferation.

(3) For the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to be effective, 

each of the non-nuclear-weapon State Parties must conclude a 

comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and such 

agreements must be honored and enforced.

(4) Recent events emphasize the urgency of strengthening the 

effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system. 

This can best be accomplished by providing IAEA inspectors with 

more information about, and broader access to, nuclear activities 

within the territory of non-nuclear-weapon State Parties.

(5) The proposed scope of such expanded information and 

access has been negotiated by the member states of the IAEA in the 

form of a Model Additional Protocol to its existing safeguards 

agreements, and universal acceptance of Additional Protocols by nonnuclear weapons states is essential to enhancing the effectiveness of 

the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

(6) On June 12, 1998, the United States, as a nuclear-weapon 

State Party, signed an Additional Protocol that is based on the Model 

Additional Protocol, but which also contains measures, consistent 

with its existing safeguards agreements with its members, that protect 

the right of the United States to exclude the application of IAEA 

safeguards to locations and activities with direct national security 

significance or to locations or information associated with such 

activities.

(7) Implementation of the Additional Protocol in the United 

States in a manner consistent with United States obligations under the 

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty may encourage other parties to the 

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, especially non- nuclear-weapon 

State Parties, to conclude Additional Protocols and thereby strengthen 

the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards system and help 

reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation, which is of direct and 

substantial benefit to the United States.

(8) Implementation of the Additional Protocol by the United 

States is not required and is completely voluntary given its status as a 

nuclear-weapon State Party, but the United States has acceded to the 

Additional Protocol to demonstrate its commitment to the nuclear 

nonproliferation regime and to make United States civil nuclear 
1332 U.S. Additional Protocol Implementation Act (P.L. 109–401)

activities available to the same IAEA inspections as are applied in the 

case of non-nuclear- weapon State Parties.

(9) In accordance with the national security exclusion contained 

in Article 1.b of its Additional Protocol, the United States will not 

allow any inspection activities, nor make any declaration of any 

information with respect to, locations, information, and activities of 

direct national security significance to the United States.

(10) Implementation of the Additional Protocol will conform to 

the principles set forth in the letter of April 30, 2002, from the United 

States Permanent Representative to the International Atomic Energy 

Agency and the Vienna Office of the United Nations to the Director 

General of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Sec. 203. Definitions

In this title:

(1) Additional protocol.--The term “Additional Protocol”, when 

used in the singular form, means the Protocol Additional to the 

Agreement between the United States of America and the 

International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of 

Safeguards in the United States of America, with Annexes, signed at 

Vienna June 12, 1998 (T. Doc. 107-7).

(2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 

“appropriate congressional committees” means the Committee 

on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the 

Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee on 

Armed Services, the Committee on International Relations, the 

Committee on Science, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 

House of Representatives.

(3) Complementary access.--The term “complementary access”

means the exercise of the IAEA's access rights as set forth in Articles 

4 to 6 of the Additional Protocol.

(4) Executive agency.--The term “executive agency” has the 

meaning given such term in section 105 of title 5, United States Code.

(5) Facility.--The term “facility” has the meaning set forth in 

Article 18i. of the Additional Protocol.

(6) IAEA.--The term “IAEA” means the International Atomic 

Energy Agency.

(7) Judge of the united states.--The term “judge of the United 

States” means a United States district judge, or a United States 

magistrate judge appointed under the authority of chapter 43 of title 

28, United States Code.

(8) Location.--The term “location” means any geographic point 

or area declared or identified by the United States or specified by the 

International Atomic Energy Agency.

(9) Nuclear non-proliferation treaty.--The term “Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty” means the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of 

Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 

1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (21 UST 483).

(10) Nuclear-weapon state party and non-nuclear-weapon state 

party.--The terms “nuclear-weapon State Party” and “non- nuclearweapon State Party” have the meanings given such terms in the 

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

(11) Person.--The term “person”, except as otherwise provided, 

means any individual, corporation, partnership, firm, association, 

trust, estate, public or private institution, any State or any political 

subdivision thereof, or any political entity within a State, any foreign 
U.S. Additional Protocol Implementation Act (P.L. 109–401) 1333

government or nation or any agency, instrumentality, or political 

subdivision of any such government or nation, or other entity located 

in the United States.

(12) Site.--The term “site” has the meaning set forth in Article 

18b. of the Additional Protocol.

(13) United states.--The term “United States”, when used as a 

geographic reference, means the several States of the United States, 

the District of Columbia, and the commonwealths, territories, and 

possessions of the United States and includes all places under the 

jurisdiction or control of the United States, including--

(A) the territorial sea and the overlying airspace;

(B) any civil aircraft of the United States or public 

aircraft, as such terms are defined in paragraphs (17) and (41), 

respectively, of section 40102(a) of title 49, United States Code; 

and

(C) any vessel of the United States, as such term is 

defined in section 3(b) of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement 

Act (46 U.S.C. App. 1903(b)).

(14) Wide-area environmental sampling.--The term “wide-area 

environmental sampling” has the meaning set forth in Article 18g. of 

the Additional Protocol.

Sec. 204. Severability.

If any provision of this title, or the application of such provision 

to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of this title, 

or the application of such provision to persons or circumstances other 

than those as to which it is held invalid, shall not be affected thereby.

Subtitle A—General Provisions

Sec. 211. Authority

(a) In General.--The President is authorized to implement and 

carry out the provisions of this title and the Additional Protocol and shall 

designate through Executive order which executive agency or agencies of 

the United States, which may include but are not limited to the 

Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Department of 

Justice, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, and the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, shall issue or amend and enforce 

regulations in order to implement this title and the provisions of the 

Additional Protocol.

(b) Included Authority.--For any executive agency designated 

under subsection (a) that does not currently possess the authority to 

conduct site vulnerability assessments and related activities, the authority 

provided in subsection (a) includes such authority.

(c) Exception.--The authority described in subsection (b) does 

not supersede or otherwise modify any existing authority of any Federal 

department or agency already having such authority.

Subtitle B—Complementary Access

Sec. 221. Requirement for Authority to Conduct Complementary 

Access

(a) Prohibition.--No complementary access to any location in 

the United States shall take place pursuant to the Additional Protocol 

without the authorization of the United States Government in accordance 

with the requirements of this title.
1334 U.S. Additional Protocol Implementation Act (P.L. 109–401)

(b) Authority.--

(1) In general.--Complementary access to any location in the 

United States subject to access under the Additional Protocol is 

authorized in accordance with this title.

(2) United states representatives.--

(A) Restrictions.--In the event of complementary access 

to a privately owned or operated location, no employee of the 

Environmental Protection Agency or of the Mine Safety and 

Health Administration or the Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration of the Department of Labor may participate in 

the access.

(B) Number.--The number of designated United States 

representatives accompanying IAEA inspectors shall be kept to 

the minimum necessary.

Sec. 222. Procedures for Complementary Access

(a) In General.--Each instance of complementary access to a 

location in the United States under the Additional Protocol shall be 

conducted in accordance with this subtitle.

(b) Notice.--

(1) In general.--Complementary access referred to in subsection 

(a) may occur only upon the issuance of an actual written notice by 

the United States Government to the owner, operator, occupant, or 

agent in charge of the location to be subject to complementary access.

(2) Time of notification.--The notice under paragraph (1) shall 

be submitted to such owner, operator, occupant, or agent as soon as 

possible after the United States Government has received notification 

that the IAEA seeks complementary access. Notices may be posted 

prominently at the location if the United States Government is unable 

to provide actual written notice to such owner, operator, occupant, or 

agent.

(3) Content of notice.--

(A) In general.--The notice required by paragraph (1) 

shall specify--

(i) the purpose for the complementary access;

(ii) the basis for the selection of the facility, site, or 

other location for the complementary access sought;

(iii) the activities that will be carried out during the 

complementary access;

(iv) the time and date that the complementary 

access is expected to begin, and the anticipated period 

covered by the complementary access; and

(v) the names and titles of the inspectors.

(4) Separate notices required.--A separate notice shall be 

provided each time that complementary access is sought by the IAEA.

(c) Credentials.--The complementary access team of the IAEA 

and representatives or designees of the United States Government shall 

display appropriate identifying credentials to the owner, operator, 

occupant, or agent in charge of the location before gaining entry in 

connection with complementary access.

(d) Scope.--

(1) In general.--Except as provided in a warrant issued under 

section 223, and subject to the rights of the United States Government 

under the Additional Protocol to limit complementary access, 

complementary access to a location pursuant to this title may extend 
U.S. Additional Protocol Implementation Act (P.L. 109–401) 1335

to all activities specifically permitted for such locations under Article 

6 of the Additional Protocol.

(2) Exception.--Unless required by the Additional Protocol, no 

inspection under this title shall extend to--

(A) financial data (other than production data);

(B) sales and marketing data (other than shipment data);

(C) pricing data;

(D) personnel data;

(E) patent data;

(F) data maintained for compliance with environmental 

or occupational health and safety regulations; or

(G) research data.

(e) Environment, Health, Safety, and Security.--In carrying out 

their activities, members of the IAEA complementary access team and 

representatives or designees of the United States Government shall 

observe applicable environmental, health, safety, and security regulations 

established at the location subject to complementary access, including 

those for protection of controlled environments within a facility and for 

personal safety.

Sec. 223. Consents, Warrants, and Complementary Access

(a) In General.--

(1) Procedure.--

(A) Consent.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), an 

appropriate official of the United States Government shall seek 

or have the consent of the owner, operator, occupant, or agent in 

charge of a location prior to entering that location in connection 

with complementary access pursuant to sections 221 and 222. 

The owner, operator, occupant, or agent in charge of the 

location may withhold consent for any reason or no reason.

(B) Administrative search warrant.--In the absence of 

consent, the United States Government may seek an 

administrative search warrant from a judge of the United States 

under subsection (b). Proceedings regarding the issuance of an 

administrative search warrant shall be conducted ex parte, 

unless otherwise requested by the United States Government.

(2) Expedited access.--For purposes of obtaining access to a 

location pursuant to Article 4b.(ii) of the Additional Protocol in order 

to satisfy United States obligations under the Additional Protocol 

when notice of two hours or less is required, the United States 

Government may gain entry to such location in connection with 

complementary access, to the extent such access is consistent with the 

Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, without 

obtaining either a warrant or consent.

(b) Administrative Search Warrants for Complementary 

Access.-

(1) Obtaining administrative search warrants.--For 

complementary access conducted in the United States pursuant to the 

Additional Protocol, and for which the acquisition of a warrant is 

required, the United States Government shall first obtain an 

administrative search warrant from a judge of the United States. The 

United States Government shall provide to such judge all appropriate 

information regarding the basis for the selection of the facility, site, or 

other location to which complementary access is sought.

(2) Content of affidavits for administrative search warrants.--A 

judge of the United States shall promptly issue an administrative 
1336 U.S. Additional Protocol Implementation Act (P.L. 109–401)

search warrant authorizing the requested complementary access upon 

an affidavit submitted by the United States Government--

(A) stating that the Additional Protocol is in force;

(B) stating that the designated facility, site, or other 

location is subject to complementary access under the 

Additional Protocol;

(C) stating that the purpose of the complementary access 

is consistent with Article 4 of the Additional Protocol;

(D) stating that the requested complementary access is in 

accordance with Article 4 of the Additional Protocol;

(E) containing assurances that the scope of the IAEA's 

complementary access, as well as what it may collect, shall be 

limited to the access provided for in Article 6 of the Additional 

Protocol;

(F) listing the items, documents, and areas to be searched 

and seized;

(G) stating the earliest commencement and the 

anticipated duration of the complementary access period, as well 

as the expected times of day during which such complementary 

access will take place; and

(H) stating that the location to which entry in connection 

with complementary access is sought was selected either--

(i) because there is probable cause, on the basis of 

specific evidence, to believe that information required to 

be reported regarding a location pursuant to regulations 

promulgated under this title is incorrect or incomplete, 

and that the location to be accessed contains evidence 

regarding that violation; or

(ii) pursuant to a reasonable general administrative 

plan based upon specific neutral criteria.

(3) Content of warrants.--A warrant issued under paragraph (2) 

shall specify the same matters required of an affidavit under that 

paragraph. In addition, each warrant shall contain the identities of the 

representatives of the IAEA on the complementary access team and 

the identities of the representatives or designees of the United States 

Government required to display identifying credentials under section 

222(c).

Sec. 224. Prohibited Acts Relating to Complementary Access

It shall be unlawful for any person willfully to fail or refuse to 

permit, or to disrupt, delay, or otherwise impede, a complementary 

access authorized by this subtitle or an entry in connection with such 

access.

Subtitle C—Confidentiality of Information

Sec. 231. Protection of Confidentiality of Information

Information reported to, or otherwise acquired by, the United 

States Government under this title or under the Additional Protocol shall 

be exempt from disclosure under section 552 of title 5, United States 

Code.

Subtitle D—Enforcement

Sec. 241. Recordkeeping Violations

It shall be unlawful for any person willfully to fail or refuse--
U.S. Additional Protocol Implementation Act (P.L. 109–401) 1337

(1) to establish or maintain any record required by any 

regulation prescribed under this title;

(2) to submit any report, notice, or other information to the 

United States Government in accordance with any regulation 

prescribed under this title; or

(3) to permit access to or copying of any record by the United 

States Government in accordance with any regulation prescribed 

under this title.

Sec. 242. Penalties

(a) Civil.--

(1) Penalty amounts.--Any person that is determined, in 

accordance with paragraph (2), to have violated section 224 or section 

241 shall be required by order to pay a civil penalty in an amount not 

to exceed $ 25,000 for each violation. For the purposes of this 

paragraph, each day during which a violation of section 224 continues 

shall constitute a separate violation of that section.

(2) Notice and hearing.--

(A) In general.--Before imposing a penalty against a 

person under paragraph (1), the head of an executive agency 

designated under section 211(a) shall provide the person with 

notice of the order. If, within 15 days after receiving the notice, 

the person requests a hearing, the head of the designated 

executive agency shall initiate a hearing on the violation.

(B) Conduct of hearing.--Any hearing so requested shall 

be conducted before an administrative judge. The hearing shall 

be conducted in accordance with the requirements of section 

554 of title 5, United States Code. If no hearing is so requested, 

the order imposed by the head of the designated agency shall 

constitute a final agency action.

(C) Issuance of orders.--If the administrative judge 

determines, upon the preponderance of the evidence received, 

that a person named in the complaint has violated section 224 or 

section 241, the administrative judge shall state the findings of 

fact and conclusions of law, and issue and serve on such person 

an order described in paragraph (1).

(D) Factors for determination of penalty amounts.-- In 

determining the amount of any civil penalty, the administrative 

judge or the head of the designated agency shall take into 

account the nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of the 

violation or violations and, with respect to the violator, the 

ability to pay, effect on ability to continue to do business, any 

history of such violations, the degree of culpability, the 

existence of an internal compliance program, and such other 

matters as justice may require.

(E) Content of notice.--For the purposes of this 

paragraph, notice shall be in writing and shall be verifiably 

served upon the person or persons subject to an order described 

in paragraph (1). In addition, the notice shall--

(i) set forth the time, date, and specific nature of 

the alleged violation or violations; and

(ii) specify the administrative and judicial 

remedies available to the person or persons subject to the 

order, including the availability of a hearing and 

subsequent appeal.
1338 U.S. Additional Protocol Implementation Act (P.L. 109–401)

(3) Administrative appellate review.--The decision and order of 

an administrative judge shall be the recommended decision and order 

and shall be referred to the head of the designated executive agency 

for final decision and order. If, within 60 days, the head of the 

designated executive agency does not modify or vacate the decision 

and order, it shall become a final agency action under this subsection.

(4) Judicial review.-- A person adversely affected by a final 

order may, within 30 days after the date the final order is issued, file a 

petition in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 

or in the Court of Appeals for the district in which the violation 

occurred.

(5) Enforcement of final orders.--

(A) In general.--If a person fails to comply with a final 

order issued against such person under this subsection and--

(i) the person has not filed a petition for judicial 

review of the order in accordance with paragraph (4), or

(ii) a court in an action brought under paragraph 

(4) has entered a final judgment in favor of the designated 

executive agency, the head of the designated executive 

agency shall commence a civil action to seek compliance 

with the final order in any appropriate district court of the 

United States.

(B) No review.--In any such civil action, the validity and 

appropriateness of the final order shall not be subject to review.

(C) Interest.--Payment of penalties assessed in a final 

order under this section shall include interest at currently 

prevailing rates calculated from the date of expiration of the 60-

day period referred to in paragraph 

(3) or the date of such final order, as the case may be.

(b) Criminal.--Any person who violates section 224 or section 

241 may, in addition to or in lieu of any civil penalty which may be 

imposed under subsection (a) for such violation, be fined under title 18, 

United States Code, imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.

Sec. 243. Specific Enforcement

(a) Jurisdiction.--The district courts of the United States shall 

have jurisdiction over civil actions brought by the head of an executive 

agency designated under section 211(a)--

(1) to restrain any conduct in violation of section 224 or section 

241; or

(2) to compel the taking of any action required by or under this 

title or the Additional Protocol.

(b) Civil Actions.--

(1) In general.--A civil action described in subsection (a) may be 

brought--

(A) in the case of a civil action described in paragraph (1) 

of such subsection, in the United States district court for the 

judicial district in which any act, omission, or transaction 

constituting a violation of section 224 or section 241 occurred or 

in which the defendant is found or transacts business; or

(B) in the case of a civil action described in paragraph (2) 

of such subsection, in the United States district court for the 

judicial district in which the defendant is found or transacts 

business.
U.S. Additional Protocol Implementation Act (P.L. 109–401) 1339

(2) Service of process.--In any such civil action, process shall be 

served on a defendant wherever the defendant may reside or may be 

found.

Subtitle E—Environmental Sampling

Sec. 251. Notification to Congress of IAEA Board Approval of 

Wide-Area Environmental Sampling

(a) In General.--Not later than 30 days after the date on which 

the Board of Governors of the IAEA approves wide-area environmental 

sampling for use as a safeguards verification tool, the President shall 

notify the appropriate congressional committees.

(b) Content.--The notification under subsection (a) shall 

contain--

(1) a description of the specific methods and sampling 

techniques approved by the Board of Governors that are to be 

employed for purposes of wide-area sampling;

(2) a statement as to whether or not such sampling may be 

conducted in the United States under the Additional Protocol; and

(3) an assessment of the ability of the approved methods and 

sampling techniques to detect, identify, and determine the conduct, 

type, and nature of nuclear activities.

Sec. 252. Application of National Security Exclusion to Wide-Area 

Environmental Sampling

In accordance with Article 1(b) of the Additional Protocol, the 

United States shall not permit any wide-area environmental sampling 

proposed by the IAEA to be conducted at a specified location in the 

United States under Article 9 of the Additional Protocol unless the 

President has determined and reported to the appropriate congressional 

committees with respect to that proposed use of environmental sampling 

that--

(1) the proposed use of wide-area environmental sampling is 

necessary to increase the capability of the IAEA to detect undeclared 

nuclear activities in the territory of a non-nuclear- weapon State 

Party;

(2) the proposed use of wide-area environmental sampling will 

not result in access by the IAEA to locations, activities, or 

information of direct national security significance; and

(3) the United States--

(A) has been provided sufficient opportunity for 

consultation with the IAEA if the IAEA has requested 

complementary access involving wide-area environmental 

sampling; or

(B) has requested under Article 8 of the Additional 

Protocol that the IAEA engage in complementary access in the 

United States that involves the use of wide-area environmental 

sampling.

Sec. 253. Application of National Security Exclusion to LocationSpecific Environmental Sampling

In accordance with Article 1(b) of the Additional Protocol, the 

United States shall not permit any location-specific environmental 

sampling in the United States under Article 5 of the Additional Protocol 

unless the President has determined and reported to the appropriate 

congressional committees with respect to that proposed use of 

environmental sampling that--
1340 U.S. Additional Protocol Implementation Act (P.L. 109–401)

(1) the proposed use of location-specific environmental 

sampling is necessary to increase the capability of the IAEA to detect 

undeclared nuclear activities in the territory of a non- nuclear-weapon 

State Party;

(2) the proposed use of location-specific environmental 

sampling will not result in access by the IAEA to locations, activities, 

or information of direct national security significance; and

(3) with respect to the proposed use of environmental sampling, 

the United States--

(A) has been provided sufficient opportunity for 

consultation with the IAEA if the IAEA has requested 

complementary access involving location-specific 

environmental sampling; or

(B) has requested under Article 8 of the Additional 

Protocol that the IAEA engage in complementary access in the 

United States that involves the use of location- specific 

environmental sampling.

Sec. 254. Rule of Construction

As used in this subtitle, the term “necessary to increase the 

capability of the IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear activities in the 

territory of a non-nuclear-weapon State Party” shall not be construed to 

encompass proposed uses of environmental sampling that might assist 

the IAEA in detecting undeclared nuclear activities in the territory of a 

non-nuclear-weapon State Party by--

(1) setting a good example of cooperation in the conduct of such 

sampling; or

(2) facilitating the formation of a political consensus or political 

support for such sampling in the territory of a non- nuclear-weapon 

State Party.

Subtitle F—Protection of National Security Information and 

Activities

Sec. 261. Protection of Certain Information

(a) Locations and Facilities of Direct National Security 

Significance.--No current or former Department of Defense or 

Department of Energy location, site, or facility of direct national security 

significance shall be declared or be subject to IAEA inspection under the 

Additional Protocol.

(b) Information of Direct National Security Significance.--No 

information of direct national security significance regarding any 

location, site, or facility associated with activities of the Department of 

Defense or the Department of Energy shall be provided under the 

Additional Protocol.

(c) Restricted Data.--Nothing in this title shall be construed to 

permit the communication or disclosure to the IAEA or IAEA employees 

of restricted data controlled by the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act 

of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), including in particular “Restricted 

Data” as defined under paragraph (1) of section 11 y. of such Act (42 

U.S.C. 2014(y)).

(d) Classified Information.--Nothing in this Act shall be 

construed to permit the communication or disclosure to the IAEA or 

IAEA employees of national security information and other classified 

information.
U.S. Additional Protocol Implementation Act (P.L. 109–401) 1341

Sec. 262. IAEA Inspections and Visits

(a) Certain Individuals Prohibited From Obtaining Access.--No 

national of a country designated by the Secretary of State under section 

620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371) as a 

government supporting acts of international terrorism shall be permitted 

access to the United States to carry out an inspection activity under the 

Additional Protocol or a related safeguards agreement.

(b) Presence of United States Government Personnel.--IAEA 

inspectors shall be accompanied at all times by United States 

Government personnel when inspecting sites, locations, facilities, or 

activities in the United States under the Additional Protocol.

(c) Vulnerability and Related Assessments.--The President shall 

conduct vulnerability, counterintelligence, and related assessments not 

less than every 5 years to ensure that information of direct national 

security significance remains protected at all sites, locations, facilities, 

and activities in the United States that are subject to IAEA inspection 

under the Additional Protocol.

Subtitle G—Reports

Sec. 271. Report on Initial United States Declaration

Not later than 60 days before submitting the initial United States 

declaration to the IAEA under the Additional Protocol, the President 

shall submit to Congress a list of the sites, locations, facilities, and 

activities in the United States that the President intends to declare to the 

IAEA, and a report thereon.

Sec. 272. Report on Revisions to Initial United States Declaration

Not later than 60 days before submitting to the IAEA any 

revisions to the United States declaration submitted under the Additional 

Protocol, the President shall submit to Congress a list of any sites, 

locations, facilities, or activities in the United States that the President 

intends to add to or remove from the declaration, and a report thereon.

Sec. 273. Content of Reports on United States Declarations

The reports required under section 271 and section 272 shall 

present the reasons for each site, location, facility, and activity being 

declared or being removed from the declaration list and shall certify that-

-

(1) each site, location, facility, and activity included in the list 

has been examined by each agency with national security equities 

with respect to such site, location, facility, or activity; and

(2) appropriate measures have been taken to ensure that 

information of direct national security significance will not be 

compromised at any such site, location, facility, or activity in 

connection with an IAEA inspection.

Sec. 274. Report on Efforts to Promote the Implementation of 

Additional Protocols

Not later than 180 days after the entry into force of the 

Additional Protocol, the President shall submit to the appropriate 

congressional committees a report on--

(1) measures that have been or should be taken to achieve the 

adoption of additional protocols to existing safeguards agreements 

signed by non-nuclear-weapon State Parties; and

(2) assistance that has been or should be provided by the United 

States to the IAEA in order to promote the effective implementation 

of additional protocols to existing safeguards agreements signed by 
1342 U.S. Additional Protocol Implementation Act (P.L. 109–401)

non-nuclear-weapon State Parties and the verification of the 

compliance of such parties with IAEA obligations, with a plan for 

providing any needed additional funding.

Sec. 275. Notice Of IAEA Notifications

The President shall notify Congress of any notifications issued 

by the IAEA to the United States under Article 10 of the Additional 

Protocol.

Subtitle H—Authorization of Appropriations

Sec. 281. Authorization of Appropriations

There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be 

necessary to carry out this title.
P. STATUS WITH REGARD TO CONCLUSION OF SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS AND ADDITIONAL PROT

AND SMALL QUANTITIES PROTOCOLS

State/Party SQPa Status of Safeguards Agreement(s) b INFCIRC

Additional P

Statu

Afghanistan X In Force: 20 Feb 1978 257 In Force: 19 J

Albania1 In Force: 25 Mar 1988 359 In Force: 03 N

 Algeria In Force: 07 Jan 1997 531 Approved: 14 

Andorra X In Force: 18 Oct 2010 Signed: 09 Ja

Angola In Force: 28 Apr 2010 In Force: 28 Apr 2010 800 In Force: 28 A

 Antigua and Barbuda2 X In Force: 09 Sep 1996 528

Argentina3 In Force: 04 Mar 1994 435/Mod. 

Armenia In Force: 05 May 1994 455 In Force: 28 J

Australia In Force: 10 Jul 1974 217 In Force: 12 D

Austria4 Accession: 31 Jul 1996 193 In Force: 30 A

Azerbaijan Amended: 20 Nov 2006 In Force: 29 Apr 1999 580 In Force: 29 N

Bahamas2 Amended: 25 Jul 2007 In Force: 12 Sep 1997 544

Bahrain In Force: 10 May 2009 In Force: 10 May 2009 767 Signed: 21 Se

Bangladesh In Force: 11 Jun 1982 301 In Force: 30 M

Barbados2 X In Force: 14 Aug 1996 527

Belarus In Force: 02 Aug 1995 495 Signed: 15 N

Belgium In Force: 21 Feb 1977 193 In Force: 30 A

Belize5 X In Force: 21 Jan 1997 532

Benin Amended: 15 Apr 2008 Signed: 7 Jun 2005 Signed: 7 Ju

Bhutan X In Force: 24 Oct 1989 371

Bolivia2 X In Force: 06 Feb 1995 465

Bosnia and Herzegovina6 In Force: 28 Dec 1973 204

Botswana In Force: 24 Aug 2006 694 In Force: 24 A

Brazil7 In Force: 04 Mar 1994 435

Brunei Darussalam X In Force: 04 Nov 1987 365

Bulgaria8 Accession: 1 May 2009 193 Accession: 1 M
P. STATUS WITH REGARD TO CONCLUSION OF SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS AND ADDITIONAL PROT

AND SMALL QUANTITIES PROTOCOLS

State/Party SQPa Status of Safeguards Agreement(s) b INFCIRC

Additional P

Statu

Burkina Faso Amended: 18 Feb 2008 In Force: 17 Apr 2003 618 In Force: 17 A

Burundi In Force: 27 Sep 2007 In Force: 27 Sep 2007 719 In Force: 27 S

Cambodia X In Force: 17 Dec 1999 586

Cameroon X In Force: 17 Dec 2004 641 Signed: 16 D

Canada In Force: 21 Feb 1972 164 In Force: 08 S

Cape Verde Amended: 27 Mar 2006 Signed: 28 Jun 2005 Signed: 28 Ju

Central African Republic In Force: 7 Sep 2009 In Force: 7 Sep 2009 777 In Force: 7 S

Chad In Force: 13 May 2010 In Force: 13 May 2010 802 In Force: 13 M

Chile9 In Force: 05 Apr 1995 476 In Force: 03 N

China In Force: 18 Sep 1989 369* In Force: 28 M

Colombia9 In Force: 22 Dec 1982 306 In Force: 5 M

Comoros In Force: 20 Jan 2009 In Force: 20 Jan 2009 752 In Force: 20 J

Congo, Republic of the Signed: 13 Apr 2010 Signed: 13 Apr 2010 Signed: 13 A

Costa Rica2 Amended: 12 Jan 2007 In Force: 22 Nov 1979 278 Signed: 12 D

Côte d'Ivoire In Force: 08 Sep 1983 309 Signed: 22 O

Croatia Amended: 26 May 2008 In Force: 19 Jan 1995 463 In Force: 06 J

Cuba2 In Force: 03 Jun 2004 633 In Force: 03 J

Cyprus10 Accession: 1 May 2008 193 Accession: 1 M

 Czech Republic11 In Force: 11 Sep 1997 541 In Force: 01 J

Democratic People’s Rep. of Korea In Force: 10 Apr 1992 403

Democratic Republic of the Congo In Force: 28 Oct 2011 In Force: 09 Nov 1972 183 In Force: 09 A

Denmark12 In Force: 21 Feb 1977 193 In Force: 30 A

Djibouti Signed: 13 April 2010 Signed: 13 April 2010 Signed: 13 Ap

Dominica5 X In Force: 03 May 1996 513

 Dominican Republic2 Amended: 11 Oct 2006 In Force: 11 Oct 1973 201 In Force: 5 M
P. STATUS WITH REGARD TO CONCLUSION OF SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS AND ADDITIONAL PROT

AND SMALL QUANTITIES PROTOCOLS

State/Party SQPa Status of Safeguards Agreement(s) b INFCIRC

Additional P

Statu

Ecuador2 Amended: 7 April 2006 In Force: 10 Mar 1975 231 In Force: 24 O

Egypt In Force: 30 Jun 1982 302

El Salvador2 X In Force: 22 Apr 1975 232 In Force: 24 M

Equatorial Guinea Approved: 13 Jun 1986 Approved: 13 Jun 1986

Eritrea

Estonia13 Accession: 1 Dec 2005 193 Accession: 1 D

Ethiopia X In Force: 02 Dec 1977 261

Fiji X In Force: 22 Mar 1973 192 In Force: 14 J

Finland14 Accession: 01 Oct 1995 193 In Force: 30 A

France In Force: 12 Sep 1981 290* In Force: 30 A

X In Force: 26 Oct 200715

 

718

Gabon X In Force: 25 Mar 2010 792 In Force: 25 M

Gambia Amended: 17 Oct 2011 In Force: 08 Aug 1978 277 Approved: 3 M

Georgia In Force: 03 Jun 2003 617 In Force: 03 J

Germany16 In Force: 21 Feb 1977 193 In Force: 30 A

Ghana In Force: 17 Feb 1975 226 In Force: 11 J

Greece17 Accession: 17 Dec 1981 193 In Force: 30 A

Grenada2 X In Force: 23 Jul 1996 525

Guatemala2 X In Force: 01 Feb 1982 299 In Force: 28 M

Guinea Signed: 13 Dec 2011 Signed: 13 Dec 2011 Signed: 13 D

Guinea–Bissau Approved: 6 Mar 2012 Approved: 6 Mar 2012 Approved: 6 M

Guyana2 X In Force: 23 May 1997 543

Haiti2 X In Force: 9 Mar 2006 681 In Force: 9 M

Holy See Amended: 11 Sep 2006 In Force: 01 Aug 1972 187 In Force: 24 S

Honduras2 Amended: 20 Sep 2007 In Force: 18 Apr 1975 235 Signed: 7 Ju

Hungary18 Accession: 1 Jul 2007 193 Accession: 1 
P. STATUS WITH REGARD TO CONCLUSION OF SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS AND ADDITIONAL PROT

AND SMALL QUANTITIES PROTOCOLS

State/Party SQPa Status of Safeguards Agreement(s) b INFCIRC

Additional P

Statu

Iceland Amended: 15 Mar 2010 In Force: 16 Oct 1974 215 In Force: 12 S

India In Force: 30 Sep 1971 211

In Force: 17 Nov 1977 260

In Force: 27 Sep 1988 360

In Force: 11 Oct 1989 374

In Force: 01 Mar 1994 433

In Force: 11 May 2009 754 Signed: 15 M

Indonesia In Force: 14 Jul 1980 283 In Force: 29 S

Iran, Islamic Republic of In Force: 15 May 1974 214 Signed: 18 D

Iraq In Force: 29 Feb 1972 172 Signed: 9 Oc

Ireland In Force: 21 Feb 1977 193 In Force: 30 A

Israel In Force: 04 Apr 1975 249/Add. 

Italy In Force: 21 Feb 1977 193 In Force: 30 A

Jamaica2 Rescinded: 15 Dec 2006 In Force: 06 Nov 1978 265 In Force: 19 M

Japan In Force: 02 Dec 1977 255 In Force: 16 D

Jordan X In Force: 21 Feb 1978 258 In Force: 28 J

Kazakhstan In Force: 11 Aug 1995 504 In Force: 9 M

Kenya In Force: 18 Sep 2009 In Force: 18 Sep 2009 778 In Force: 18 S

Kiribati X In Force: 19 Dec 1990 390 In Force: 09 N

Korea, Rep. of In Force: 14 Nov 1975 236 In Force: 19 F

Kuwait X In Force: 07 Mar 2002 607 In Force: 02 J

Kyrgyzstan X In Force: 03 Feb 2004 629 In Force: 10 N

Lao Peoples Democratic Republic X In Force: 05 Apr 2001 599

Latvia20 Accession: 1 Oct 2008 193 Accession: 1 O

Lebanon Amended: 5 Sep 2007 In Force: 05 Mar 1973 191

Lesotho Amended: 8 Sep 2009 In Force: 12 Jun 1973 199 I Force: 26 A
P. STATUS WITH REGARD TO CONCLUSION OF SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS AND ADDITIONAL PROT

AND SMALL QUANTITIES PROTOCOLS

State/Party SQPa Status of Safeguards Agreement(s) b INFCIRC

Additional P

Statu

Liberia

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya In Force: 08 Jul 1980 282 In Force: 11 A

Liechtenstein In Force: 04 Oct 1979 275 Signed: 14 Ju

Lithuania21 Accession: 1 Jan 2008 193 Accession: 1 J

Luxembourg In Force: 21 Feb 1977 193 In Force: 30 A

Madagascar Amended: 29 May 2008 In Force: 14 Jun 1973 200 In Force: 18 S

Malawi Amended: 29 Feb 2008 In Force: 03 Aug 1992 409 In Force: 26 J

Malaysia In Force: 29 Feb 1972 182 Signed: 22 N

Maldives X In Force: 02 Oct 1977 253

Mali Amended: 18 Apr 2006 In Force: 12 Sep 2002 615 In Force: 12 S

Malta22 Accession: 1 Jul 2007 193 Accession: 1 

Marshall Islands In Force: 03 May 2005 653 In Force: 03 M

Mauritania X In Force: 10 Dec 2009 788 In Force: 10 D

Mauritius Amended: 26 Sep 2008 In Force: 31 Jan 1973 190 In Force: 17 D

Mexico23 In Force: 14 Sep 1973 197 In Force: 4 M

 Micronesia, Federated States of

Monaco Amended: 27 Nov 2008 In Force: 13 Jun 1996 524 In Force: 30 S

Mongolia X In Force: 05 Sep 1972 188 In Force: 12 M

Montenegro In Force: 4 Mar 2011 In Force: 4 Mar 2011 814 In Force: 4 M

Morocco Rescinded: 15 Nov 2007 In Force: 18 Feb 1975 228 In Force: 21 A

Mozambique In Force: 1 Mar 2011 In Force: 1 Mar 2011 813 In Force: 1 M

Myanmar X In Force: 20 Apr 1995 477

Namibia X In Force: 15 Apr 1998 551 In Force: 20 F

Nauru X In Force: 13 Apr 1984 317

Nepal X In Force: 22 Jun 1972 186

Netherlands X In Force: 05 Jun 197515 229
P. STATUS WITH REGARD TO CONCLUSION OF SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS AND ADDITIONAL PROT

AND SMALL QUANTITIES PROTOCOLS

State/Party SQPa Status of Safeguards Agreement(s) b INFCIRC

Additional P

Statu

In Force: 21 Feb 1977 193 In Force: 30 A

New Zealand24 X In Force: 29 Feb 1972 185 In Force: 24 S

Nicaragua2 Amended: 12 Jun 2009 In Force: 29 Dec 1976 246 In Force: 18 F

Niger In Force: 16 Feb 2005 664 In Force: 2 M

Nigeria In Force: 29 Feb 1988 358 In Force: 4 A

Norway In Force: 01 Mar 1972 177 In Force: 16 M

Oman X In Force: 5 Sep 2006 691

Pakistan In Force: 05 Mar 1962 34

In Force: 17 Jun 1968 116

In Force: 17 Oct 1969 135

In Force: 18 Mar 1976 239

In Force: 02 Mar 1977 248

In Force: 10 Sep 1991 393

In Force: 24 Feb 1993 418

In Force: 22 Feb 2007 705

In Force: 15 Apr 2011 816

Palau Amended: 15 Mar 2006 In Force: 13 May 2005 650 In Force: 13 M

Panama9 Amended: 4 March 2011 In Force: 23 Mar 1984 316 In Force: 11 D

Papua New Guinea X In Force: 13 Oct 1983 312

Paraguay2 X In Force: 20 Mar 1979 279 In Force: 15 S

Peru2 In Force: 01 Aug 1979 273 In Force: 23 J

Philippines In Force: 16 Oct 1974 216 In Force: 26 F

Poland25 Accession: 1 Mar 2007 193 Accession: 1 M

Portugal26 Accession: 01 Jul 1986 193 In Force: 30 A

Qatar In Force: 21 Jan 2009 In Force: 21 Jan 2009 747

 Republic of Moldova Amended: 1 September In Force: 17 May 2006 690 In Force: 1 Ju
P. STATUS WITH REGARD TO CONCLUSION OF SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS AND ADDITIONAL PROT

AND SMALL QUANTITIES PROTOCOLS

State/Party SQPa Status of Safeguards Agreement(s) b INFCIRC

Additional P

Statu

Romania27 Accession: 1 May 2010 193 Accession: 1 M

Russian Federation In Force: 10 Jun 1985 327* In Force: 16 O

Rwanda In Force: 17 May 2010 In Force: 17 May 2010 801 In Force: 17 M

St. Kitts and Nevis5 X In Force: 07 May 1996 514

St. Lucia5 X In Force: 02 Feb 1990 379

St. Vincent and the Grenadines5 X In Force: 08 Jan 1992 400

Samoa X In Force: 22 Jan 1979 268

San Marino Amended: 13 May 2011 In Force: 21 Sep 1998 575

São Tome and Principe

Saudi Arabia In Force: 13 Jan 2009 746

Senegal Amended: 6 Jan 2010 In Force: 14 Jan 1980 276 Signed: 15 D

Serbia28 In Force: 28 Dec 1973 204 Signed: 3 Ju

Seychelles Amended: 31 Oct 2006 In Force: 19 Jul 2004 635 In Force: 13 O

Sierra Leone X In Force: 4 Dec 2009 787

Singapore Amended: 31 Mar 2008 In Force: 18 Oct 1977 259 In Force: 31 M

Slovakia29 Accession: 1 Dec 2005 193 Accession: 1 D

Slovenia30 Accession: 1 Sep 2006 193 Accession: 1 S

Solomon Islands X In Force: 17 Jun 1993 420

Somalia

South Africa In Force: 16 Sep 1991 394 In Force: 13 S

Spain Accession: 05 Apr 1989 193 In Force: 30 A

Sri Lanka In Force: 06 Aug 1984 320

Sudan X In Force: 07 Jan 1977 245

Suriname2 X In Force: 02 Feb 1979 269

Swaziland Amended: 23 July 2010 In Force: 28 Jul 1975 227 In Force: 8 S

Sweden31 Accession: 01 Jun 1995 193 In Force: 30 A
P. STATUS WITH REGARD TO CONCLUSION OF SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS AND ADDITIONAL PROT

AND SMALL QUANTITIES PROTOCOLS

State/Party SQPa Status of Safeguards Agreement(s) b INFCIRC

Additional P

Statu

Switzerland In Force: 06 Sep 1978 264 In Force: 01 F

Syrian Arab Republic In Force: 18 May 1992 407

Tajikistan32 Amended: 6 Mar 2006 In Force: 14 Dec 2004 639 In Force: 14 D

Thailand In Force: 16 May 1974 241 Signed: 22 S

The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Amended: 9 July 2009 In Force: 16 Apr 2002 610 In Force: 11 M

Timor-Leste Signed: 6 Oct 2009 Signed: 6 Oct 2009 Signed: 6 Oc

Togo X In Force: 18 July 2012 In Force: 18 J

Tonga X In Force: 18 Nov 1993 426

Trinidad and Tobago2 X In Force: 04 Nov 1992 414

Tunisia In Force: 13 Mar 1990 381 Signed: 24 M

Turkey In Force: 01 Sep 1981 295 In Force: 17 J

Turkmenistan In Force: 3 Jan 2006 673 In Force: 3 Ja

Tuvalu X In Force: 15 Mar 1991 391

Uganda Amended: 24 Jun 2009 In Force: 14 Feb 2006 674 In Force: 14 F

Ukraine In Force: 22 Jan 1998 550 In Force: 24 J

United Arab Emirates X In Force: 09 Oct 2003 622 In Force: 20 D

United Kingdom of Great Britain In Force: 14 Dec 197233 175

In Force: 14 Aug 1978 263* In Force: 30 A

X Approved: 16 Sep 199215

United Republic of Tanzania Amended: 10 Jun 2009 In Force: 07 Feb 2005 643 In Force: 07 F

United States of America 09 Dec 1980 288* In Force: 06 J

X In Force: 6 Apr 1989 36615

Uruguay2 In Force: 17 Sep 1976 157 In Force: 30 A

Uzbekistan In Force: 08 Oct 1994 508 In Force: 21 D

Vanuatu Approved: 8 Sep 2009 Approved: 8 Sep 2009 Approved: 8 S

Venezuela2 In Force: 11 Mar 1982 300
P. STATUS WITH REGARD TO CONCLUSION OF SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS AND ADDITIONAL PROT

AND SMALL QUANTITIES PROTOCOLS

State/Party SQPa Status of Safeguards Agreement(s) b INFCIRC

Additional P

Statu

Vietnam In Force: 23 Feb 1990 376 Signed: 10 A

Yemen, Rep. of X In Force: 14 Aug 2002 614

Zambia X In Force: 22 Sep 1994 456 Signed: 13 M

Zimbabwe X In Force: 26 Jun 1995 483

Strengthened safeguards system: other parties with additional protocols

(as of 9 October 2008).

Other Partiesb Board Approved Date Signed In force

Euratom 11 Jun 1998 22 Sep 1998 30 Apr 2004

STATUS AS OF 24 Jul 2012

Key
States States not party to the NPT whose safeguards agreements are of INFCIRC/66–type.

States Nonnuclear-weapon States that are party to the NPT but have not yet brought into force comprehensive safeguards agreements 

pursuant to Article III of that Treaty.

 * Voluntary offer safeguards agreement for NPT nuclear–weapon States.

a

Provided that they fulfill certain conditions (including that the quantities of nuclear material do not exceed the limits set out in paragraph 37 of 

States with CSAs have the option to conclude a ‘small quantities protocol’ (SQP) that holds in abeyance the implementation of most of the detailed prov

Part II of the CSA as long as these conditions continue to apply. This column contains countries whose SQP has been approved by the Board and for wh

Secretariat is aware, these conditions continue to apply. For those States that have accepted the revised standard SQP text (approved by the Board 

20 Sept. 2005) the current status is reflected. b 

The IAEA also applies safeguards in Taiwan, China, under two agreements, INFCIRC/133 and INFCIRC/158, which entered 

13 October 1969 and 6 December 1971, respectively.

__________________________________________________________

1 

Sui generis comprehensive safeguards agreement. On 28 November 2002, upon approval by the Board of Governors, an exchange of letters e

confirming that the safeguards agreement satisfies the requirement of Article III of the NPT. 2

Safeguards agreement refers to both the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the NPT. 3 

Date refers to the safeguards agreement concluded between Argentina, Brazil, ABACC and the IAEA. On18 March 1997, upon approval by the Board 

exchange of letters entered into force between Argentina and the IAEA confirming that the safeguards agreement satisfies the requirements of Article 

of Tlatelolco and Article III of the NPT to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. 4 

The application of safeguards in Austria under the NPT bilateral safeguards agreement INFCIRC/156, in force since 23 July 1972, was suspended on 

which date the agreement of 5 April 1973 between the nonnuclear weapon States of EURATOM, EURATOM and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193), to 

had acceded, entered into force for Austria. 5 

Date refers to a safeguards agreement pursuant to Article III of the NPT. Upon approval by the Board of Governors, an exchange of letters entered into 

Lucia on 12 June 1996 and for Belize, Dominica, Saint Kitts & Nevis and Saint Vincent and Grenadines on 18 March 1997) confirming that the safeg

satisfies the requirement of Article 13 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. 6 

The NPT safeguards agreement concluded with the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (INFCIRC/204), which entered into force on 28 Dec. 1973

applied in Bosnia and Herzegovina to the extent relevant to the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
7 

Date refers to the safeguards agreement concluded between Argentina, Brazil, ABACC and the IAEA. On 10 June1997, upon approval by the Board o

exchange of letters entered into force between Brazil and the IAEA confirming that the safeguards agreement satisfies the requirements of Article 13 

Tlatelolco. On 20 Sept.1999, upon approval by the Board of Governors, an exchange of letters entered into force confirming that the safeg

also satisfies the requirements of Article III of the NPT. 8 

The application of safeguards in Bulgaria under the NPT safeguards agreement INFCIRC/178, in force since29 Feb. 1972, was suspended on 1 May 

date the agreement of 5 April 1973 between the nonnuclear weapon States of EURATOM, EURATOM and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193), to which Bulga

entered into force for Bulgaria. 9 

The date refers to a safeguards agreement pursuant to Article 13 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Upon approval by the Board of Governors, 

letters entered into force (for Chile on 9 September 1996; for Colombia on 13 June2001; for Panama on 20 November 2003) confirming that the safeg

satisfies the requirement of Article III of the NPT. 10 

The application of safeguards in Cyprus under the NPT safeguards agreement INFCIRC/189, in force since26 Jan. 1973, was suspended on 1 May 200

the agreement of 5 April 1973 between the nonnuclear weapon States of EURATOM, EURATOM and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193) to which Cyp

entered into force for Cyprus. 11 

The application of safeguards in the Czech Republic under the NPT safeguards agreement INFCIRC/541, in force since 11 Sept. 1997, was 

October 2009, on which date the agreement of 5 April 1973 between the nonnuclear weapon States of EURATOM, EURATOM and the IAEA 

to which the Czech Republic had acceded, entered into force for the Czech Republic. 12 

The application of safeguards in Denmark under the bilateral NPT safeguards agreement INFCIRC/176, in force since 1 March 1972, was suspended 

on which date the agreement of 5 April 1973 (INFCIRC/193) between the nonnuclear weapon States of EURATOM, EURATOM and the IAEA 

to which Denmark had acceded, entered into force for Denmark. Since 1 May 1974, that agreement also applies to the Faroe Islands. Upon Greenland’

EURATOM as of 31 Jan. 1985, the agreement between the IAEA and Denmark (INFCIRC/176) reentered into force for Greenland. 13 

The application of safeguards in Estonia under the NPT safeguards agreement INFCIRC/547, in force since24 Nov. 1997, was suspended on 1 Dec. 200

the agreement of 5 April 1973 between the nonnuclear weapon States of EURATOM, EURATOM and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193), to which Eston

entered into force for Estonia. 14

The application of safeguards in Finland under the bilateral NPT safeguards agreement INFCIRC/155, in force since 9 Feb. 1972, was suspended on 

which date the agreement of 5 April 1973 (INFCIRC/193) between the nonnuclear weapon States of EURATOM, EURATOM and the I

Finland had acceded, entered into force for Finland. 15 

The safeguards agreement referred to is pursuant to Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. 16 

The NPT safeguards agreement of 7 March 1972 concluded with the German Democratic Republic (INFCIRC/181) is no longer in force with effect fr

on which date the German Democratic Republic acceded to the Federal Republic of Germany. 17

The application of safeguards in Greece under the NPT bilateral safeguards agreement INFCIRC/166,provisionally in force since 1 March 1972, w

17 Dec. 1981, on which date the agreement of 5 April 1973between the nonnuclear weapon States of EURATOM, EURATOM and the IAEA (INFCIR

Greece had acceded, entered into force for Greece.
18 

The application of safeguards in Hungary under the bilateral NPT safeguards agreement INFCIRC/174, in force since 30 March 1972, was suspended 

on which date the agreement of 5 April 1973 between the nonnuclear weapon States of EURATOM, EURATOM and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193), to 

had acceded, entered into force for Hungary. 19 

Pending entry into force, the additional protocol is applied provisionally for Iraq as of 17 Feb. 2010. 20 

The application of safeguards in Latvia under the bilateral NPT safeguards agreement INFCIRC/434, in force since 21 Dec. 1993, was suspended on 

which date the agreement of 5 April 1973 between the nonnuclear weapon States of EURATOM, EURATOM and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193), 

had acceded, entered into force for Latvia. 21

The application of safeguards in Lithuania under the bilateral NPT safeguards agreement INFCIRC/413, in force since 15 Oct. 1992, was suspended on 

which date the agreement of 5 April 1973 between the nonnuclear weapon States of EURATOM, EURATOM and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193), to 

had acceded, entered into force for Lithuania. 22 

The application of safeguards in Malta under the bilateral NPT safeguards agreement INFCIRC/387, in force since 13 Nov. 1990, was suspended on 

which date the agreement of 5 April 1973 between the nonnuclear weapon States of EURATOM, EURATOM and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193), 

had acceded, entered into force for Malta. 23 

The safeguards agreement referred to was concluded pursuant to both the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the NPT. The application of safeguards u

safeguards agreement pursuant to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which entered into force on 6 Sept. 1968 (INFCIRC/118), was suspended as of 14 Sept. 1973

24 

Whereas the NPT safeguards agreement and small quantities protocol with New Zealand (INFCIRC/185) also apply to Cook Islands and Niue, the ad

thereto (INFCIRC/185/Add.1) does not apply to those territories. 25

The application of safeguards in Poland under the NPT safeguards agreement INFCIRC/179, in force since11 Oct. 1972, was suspended on 1 March 

date the agreement of 5 April 1973 between the nonnuclear weapon States of EURATOM, EURATOM and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193) to which Pola

entered into force for Poland. 26 

The application of safeguards in Portugal under the bilateral NPT safeguards agreement INFCIRC/272, in force since 14 June 1979, was suspended on 

which date the agreement of 5 April 1973 between the nonnuclear weapon States of EURATOM, EURATOM and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193), to 

had acceded, entered into force for Portugal. 27 

The application of safeguards in Romania under the NPT safeguards agreement INFCIRC/180, in force since27 October 1972, was suspended on 1 May 

date the agreement of 5 April 1973 between the nonnuclear weapon States of EURATOM, EURATOM and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193) to which Roma

entered into force for Romania. 28 

The NPT safeguards agreement concluded with the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (INFCIRC/204),which entered into force on 28 Dec. 1973

applied in Serbia (formerly Serbia and Montenegro) to the extent relevant to the territory of Serbia. 29 

The application of safeguards in Slovakia under the bilateral NPT safeguards agreement with the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (INFCIRC 173

3 March 1972, was suspended on 1 Dec. 2005, on which date the agreement of 5 April 1973 between the nonnuclear weapon States 

EURATOM and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193), to which Slovakia had acceded, entered into force for Slovakia.
30 

The application of safeguards in Slovenia under the NPT safeguards agreement INFCIRC/538, in force since 1 Aug. 1997, was suspended on 1 Sept. 

date the agreement of 5 April 1973 between the nonnuclear weapon States of EURATOM, EURATOM and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193) to which Slove

entered into force for Slovenia. 31 

The application of safeguards in Sweden under the NPT safeguards agreement INFCIRC/234, in force since 14April 1975, was suspended on 1 June 

date the agreement of 5 April 1973 between the nonnuclear weapon States of EURATOM, EURATOM and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193), to which Swed

entered into force for Sweden. 32 

The SQP ceased to be operational upon entry into force of the amendments to the SQP. 33 

Date refers to the INFCIRC/66type safeguards agreement, concluded between the United Kingdom and the IAEA, which remains in force. 
Q. TABLE: IAEA SUPPLY AGREEMENTS

Agreements between the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United States, and other countries for Supply of Nuclear Materi

pursuant to the Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation between the United States and the IAEA.

Agreement Date Signed

IAEA 

Information

Effective Date Circular Number/Citations1

Argentina December 2, 1964 December 2, 1964 INFCIRCS/62

Argentina December 13, 1964 December 30, 1965 INFCIRCS/62/Add. 1

Argentina–Peru May 9, 1978 May 9, 1978 INFCIRCS /266, TIAS No. 9263, 30 UST 1539

Canada–Jamaica January 25, 1984 January 25, 1984 INFCIRCS/ 315, TIAS No. 10933, 35 UST 4309

Chile December 19, 1969 December 19, 1969 INFCIRCS/137

Chile December 31, 1974 December 31, 1974 INFCIRCS/137/Add. 1

Colombia May 30, June 7 & 17, 1994 June 17, 1994 INFCIRCS /460, 1857 UNTS 105

Finland December 30, 1960 December 30, 1960 INFCIRCS/24

Finland July 8, 1966 July 8, 1966 INFCIRCS/24/Add. 2

Finland November 5, 1967 November 5, 1967 INFCIRCS/24/Add. 3

Finland – November 27, 1969 INFCIRCS/24/Add. 4

Greece March 1, 1972 March 1, 1972 INFCIRCS/163

Greece March 1, 1974 March 1, 1974 INFCIRCS/163/Add. 1

Greece December 15, 1977 December 15, 1977 INFCIRCS/163/Add. 2, Part II

India December 9, 1966 December 9, 1966 INFCIRCS/94, Part II

India July 2, 1970 July 2, 1970 INFCIRCS/94/Add. 1, Part I

India November 16, 1970 November 16, 1970 INFCIRCS/94/Add. 1, Part II

India July 1, 1971 July 1, 1971 INFCIRCS/94/Add. 2, Part I

India August 20, 1971 August 20, 1971 INFCIRCS/94/Add. 2, Part II

India October 1, 1971 October 1, 1971 INFCIRCS/94/Add. 2, Part III

Indonesia December 19, 1969 December 19, 1969 INFCIRCS/136

Indonesia April 7, 1975 April 7, 1975 INFCIRCS/135/Add. 1, Mod. 1

Indonesia September 14, 1972 September 14, 1972 INFCIRCS/136/Add. 1

Indonesia December 7, 1979 December 7, 1979 INFCIRCS/136/Add. 2, TIAS No. 9705, 32 UST 361

––––––––

1 Citations refer to IAEA Information Circulars (INFCIRCS), Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS), United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS)

States Treaties and Other International Agreements (UST). 
Agreement Date Signed

IAEA 

Information

Effective Date Circular Number/Citations1

Iran June 7, 1967 June 7, 1967 INFCIRCS/97

Iraq December 28, 1972 December 28, 1972 INFCIRCS/195, Part II

Malaysia September 22, 1980 September 22, 1980 INFCIRCS/287, TIAS No. 9863, 32 UST 2610

Malaysia June 12 & July 22, 1981 July 22, 1981 INFCIRCS/287/Mod. 1, TIAS No. 10202, 33 UST 2785

Mexico December 18, 1963 December 18, 1963 INFCIRCS/52, TIAS No. 9906, 32 UST 3607

Mexico June 20, 1966 June 20, 1966 INFCIRCS/82

Mexico August 23, 1967 August 23, 1967 INFCIRCS/ 102

Mexico October 4, 1972 October 4, 1972 INFCIRCS/52/Add. 1, TIAS No. 9906,32 UST 3618

Mexico December 12, 1972 December 12, 1972 INFCIRCS/194, Part II

Mexico February 12, 1974 February 12, 1974 INFCIRCS/203, TIAS No. 10705

Mexico June 14, 1974 June 14, 1974 INFCIRCS/203/Add. 1, TIAS No. 10705

Mexico March 6, 1980 March 6, 1980 TIAS No. 9906, 32 UST 3628

Morocco December 2, 1983 December 2, 1983 INFCIRCS/313, TIAS No. 10866, 35 UST 3531

Norway April 10, 1961 June 15, 1961 INFCIRCS/29

Norway September 3, 1962 September 3, 1962 INFCIRCS/29/Add. 1

Norway April 8, 1964 April 8, 1964 INFCIRCS/29/Add. 2, Part I & II

Norway April 10, 1967 April 10, 1967 INFCIRCS/29/Add. 3

Pakistan March 5, 1962 March 5, 1962 INFCIRCS/34

Pakistan October 19, 1967 October 19, 1967 INFCIRCS/34/Add. 1

Pakistan June 17, 1968 June 17, 1968 INFCIRCS/116

Pakistan September 30, 1969 September 30, 1969 INFCIRCS/34/Add. 2

Pakistan June 16, 1971 June 16, 1971 INFCIRCS/34/Add. 3

Pakistan June 22, 1971 June 22, 1971 INFCIRCS/116/Add.1

Pakistan November 16, 1971 November 16, 1971 INFCIRCS/150/Add. 1

Philippines September 28, 1966 September 28, 1966 INFCIRCS/88

Philippines August 23, 1968 August 23, 1968 INFCIRCS/88/Add. 1

Romania August 1, 1966 August 1, 1966 INFCIRCS/95, Part II

Romania March 30, 1973 March 30, 1973 INFCIRCS/206

Romania September 26, 1973 September 26, 1973 INFCIRCS/95/Add. 2

Romania July 24, 1975 July 24, 1975 INFCIRCS/206/Mod. 1

Spain June 23, 1967 June 23, 1967 INFCIRCS/99

Thailand September 30, 1986 September 30, 1986 INFCIRCS/342
Agreement Date Signed

IAEA 

Information

Effective Date Circular Number/Citations1

Turkey February 8, 1966 February 8, 1966 INFCIRCS/83, Part II

Turkey May 17, 1974 May 17, 1974 INFCIRCS/212

Venezuela November 7, 1975 November 7, 1975 INFCIRCS/238

Yugoslavia October 4, 1961 October 4, 1961 INFCIRCS/32

Yugoslavia September 28, 1965 September 28, 1965 INFCIRCS/32/Add. 1

Yugoslavia February 20, 1968 February 20, 1968 INFCIRCS/32/Add. 2

Yugoslavia December 30, 1970 December 30, 1970 INFCIRCS/32/Add. 3

Yugoslavia December 29, 1972 December 29, 1972 INFCIRCS/32/Add. 3/Mod. 1

Yugoslavia June 14, 1974 June 14, 1974 INFCIRCS/213, TIAS No. 9728, 32 UST 773

Yugoslavia October 31, 1974 October 31, 1974 INFCIRCS/32Add. 3/Mod. 1

Yugoslavia January 16, 1980 July 14, 1980 INFCIRCS/32/Add. 4, TIAS No. 9767, 32 UST 1128

Yugoslavia December 14, 15 and 20, 1982 December 20, 1982 INFCIRCS/32/Add. 4/Mod. 1, TIAS No. 10621 

Yugoslavia February 23, 1983 February 23, 1983 INFCIRCS/32/Add. 5, TIAS No. 10664

Zaire June 27, 1962 June 27, 1962 INFCIRCS/37, Part II

Zaire February 14, 1968 February 14, 1968 INFCIRCS/37/Add. 2

Zaire December 9, 1970 December 9, 1970 INFCIRCS/37/Add. 3

Zaire April 15, 1971 April 15, 1971 INFCIRCS/37/Add.4

August 21, 2012

Information has been compiled from the International Atomic Energy Agency and the State Department Office of the Legal Advisor, Treaty Affairs
R. TABLE: UNITED STATES AGREEMENTS FOR PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION

List of Agreements

Agreement Date Signed Effective Date Termination Date Citation

Argentina February 29, 1996 October 16, 1997 October 15, 2027 TIAS No. 12730

Australia1 May 5, 2010 December 22, 2010 December 21, 2040 TIAS No. 9893

Bangladesh October 14, 1997 September 15, 1999 June 24, 20122 TIAS No. 10339

Brazil October 14, 1997 September 15, 1999 September 14, 2029 TIAS No. 7439, 23 USC 2477

Canada June 15, 1955 July 21, 1955 January 1, 20303 TIAS No. 3304, 6 USC 2595

China July 23, 1985 December 30, 1985 December 29, 2015 TIAS No. 12027

Colombia January 8, 1981 September 7, 1983 September 6, 2013 TIAS No. 10722

Egypt June 29, 1981 December 29, 1981 December 28, 2021 TIAS No. 10208 

European Atomic Energy 

Community (EURATOM)4

November 7, 1995 & 

March 29, 1996 

April 12, 1996

India October 10, 2008 December 6, 2008 December 5, 20485

Indonesia June 30, 1980 December 30, 1981 December 30, 20316 TIAS No. 10219, – USC –

International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA)

May 11, 1959 August 7, 1959 TIAS No. 4291, 10 USC 1424

amendment February 12, 1974 May 31, 1974 August 6, 2014 TIAS No. 7852, 25 USC 1199

Japan November 4, 1987 July 17, 1988 July 16, 2018 1547 UNTS 287

Kazakhstan November 18, 1997 November 5, 1999 November 4, 2029 TIAS 12900

Korea, Republic of November 24, 1972 March 19, 1973 March 18, 20147 TIAS 7583, 24 UST 775

Morocco May 30, 1980 May 16, 1981 May 16, 2021 TIAS No. 10018, –USC–

––––––––

1 Australia and the United States also signed the “Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Technology for the Separation of Isotopes of Uranium by Laser 

October 28, 1999 and entered into force on May 24, 2000; 2117 UNS 243. 

2 Extended January 5 and February 16, 1993. 3 This agreement has been amended and/or extended five times. It was most recently amended on June 23, 1999. 4 Euratom comprises the following Member States: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 

Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdo

5 This agreement is automatically renewed for 10-year periods unless one of the parties gives 6 months prior notice asking to terminate the agreement. 6 Extended February 20, 2004. 7 Extended May 15, 1974 (TIAS 7842). 
Agreement Date Signed Effective Date Termination Date Citation

Norway January 12, 1984 July 2, 1984 July 1, 2014 TIAS No. 10979, –USC–

Russia May 6, 2008 January 11, 2011 January 10, 2041

South Africa August 25, 1995 December 4, 1997 December 3, 2022 TIAS No. 12685

Switzerland October 31, 1997 June 23, 1998 June 22, 2028 TAS 12894

Taiwan8 April 4, 1972 June 22, 1972 TIAS No. 7364, 23 USC 945

 amendment March 15, 1974 June 14, 1974 June 21, 2014 TIAS No. 7834, 25 USC 913

Thailand May 14, 1974 June 27, 1974 June 26, 2014 TIAS No. 7850, 25 USC 118

Turkey July 26, 2000 June 2, 2008 June 1, 2023

Ukraine May 6, 1998 May 28, 1999 May 27, 2029 TIAS 12950

United Arab Emirates January 15, 2009 December 17, 2009 December 16, 2049

Januar

––––––––

8 Pursuant to section 6 of the Taiwan Relations Act, P.L. 96-8, 93 Stat. 14 (1979), and Executive Order 12143, 44 F.R. 37191, all agreements concluded 

authorities prior to January 1, 1979 are administered on a nongovernmental basis by the American Institute in Taiwan, a nonprofit District of Columbia corpo

constitute neither recognition of Taiwan authorities nor the continuation of any official relationship with Taiwan.
Trilaterals Btw. U.S., IAEA, and Other Countries for Safeguards of Equipment 1361

S. TABLE: TRILATERALS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, THE 

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AND OTHER COUNTRIES 

FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS BY THE INTERNATIONAL 

ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY TO EQUIPMENT CONCERNING CIVIL USES 

OF ATOMIC ENERGY.

Country Effective Date TIAS No.

Argentina................................................... July 25, 1969 6722

Australia.................................................... 1Sep. 26, 1966 6117

Austria...................................................... 2Jan. 24, 1970 6816

Brazil........................................................ Oct. 31, 1968 6583

 Amended................................................ July 27, 1972 7440

China, Republic of (Taiwan)............................. Dec. 6, 1971 7228

Colombia................................................... Dec. 9, 1970 7010

 Extended................................................ Mar. 28, 1977 8556

India......................................................... Jan. 27, 1971 7049

Iran.......................................................... 3Aug. 20, 1969 6741

Israel......................................................... Apr. 4, 1975 8051

Extended................................................ Apr. 7, 1977 8554

Korea........................................................ Jan. 5, 1968 6435

 Amended................................................ Nov. 30, 1972 7584

Philippines................................................. 4July 19, 1968 6524

Portugal..................................................... 5July 19, 1969 6718

South Africa................................................ July 26, 1967 6306

 Amended................................................ June 20, 1974 7848

Spain........................................................ Dec. 9, 1966 6182

 Amended................................................ June 28, 1974 7856

Sweden...................................................... 6Mar. 1, 1972 7295

Switzerland................................................ 7Feb. 28, 1972 7294

Turkey...................................................... 8June 5, 1969 6692

 Extended................................................ June 30, 1981 10201

Venezuela................................................... Mar. 27, 1968 6433

Current as of August 2012

––––––––

1 Suspended by agreement signed July 10, 1974 2 Suspended by agreement signed Sept. 21, 1971. 3 Suspended by agreement signed June 19, 1973. 4 Suspended by agreement signed Feb. 21, 1973. 5 Suspended by agreement signed Sept. 23, 1980. 6 Suspended by agreement signed Apr. 14, 1975. 7 Suspended by agreement signed Sept. 23, 1980. 8 Suspended by agreement signed Jan. 15, 1985.
1362 Trilats. Btw. U.S., IAEA, and Other Countries for Safeguards of Equipmennt

T. TABLE: TRILATERALS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, THE 

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AND OTHER COUNTRIES 

FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS PURSUANT TO THE 

NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

Country Effective Date TIAS No.

Australia July 10, 1974 7865

Austria July 23, 1972 7409

Denmark Mar. 1, 1972 7289

Greece Mar. 1, 1972 7290

Iran May 15, 1974 7829

Norway Sept. 25, 1973 7721

Philippines Oct. 16, 1974 7957

Portugal Sept. 23, 1980 9899

Sweden May 6, 1975 8049

Switzerland Sept. 23, 1980 9900

Thailand June 27, 1974 7849

Turkey Jan. 15, 1985 11932

Venezuela Sep. 27, 1983 10793

Current as of August 2012
Conv. on the Prev. of Marine Pollution by Dump. of Wastes and Other Matters 1363

U. CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION OF MARINE POLLUTION BY 

DUMPING OF WASTES AND OTHER MATTERS

Convention done at London, Mexico City, Moscow and Washington, December 29, 1972

Ratification of the United States of America deposited at Washington, London and 

Mexico City, April 29, 1974 and at Moscow, May 6, 1974

Entered into force, August 30, 1975

The Contracting Parties to this Convention,

Recognizing that the marine environment and the living organisms which it supports 

are of vital importance to humanity, and all people have an interest in assuring that it is 

so managed that its quality and resources are not impaired.

Recognizing that the capacity of the sea to assimilate wastes and render them 

harmless and its ability to regenerate natural resources is not unlimited;

Recognizing that States have in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 

and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources 

pursuant to their own environment policies, and the responsibility to ensure that 

activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of 

other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction;

Recalling Resolution 2749 (XXV) of the General Assembly of the United Nations on 

the principles governing the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, beyond 

the limits of national jurisdiction;

Noting that marine pollution originates in many sources, such as dumping and 

discharges through the atmosphere, rivers, estuaries, outfalls and pipelines, and that it is 

important that States use the best practicable means to prevent such pollution and 

develop products and processes which will reduce the amount of harmful wastes to be 

disposed of;

Being convinced that the international action to control the pollution of the sea by 

dumping can and must be taken without delay but that this action should not preclude 

discussion of measures to control other sources of marine pollution as soon as possible; 

and

Wishing to improve protection of the marine environment by encouraging States with 

a common interest in particular geographical areas to enter into appropriate agreements 

supplementary to this Convention;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Contracting Parties shall individually and collectively promote the effective control 

of all sources of pollution of the marine environment, and pledge themselves especially 

to take all practicable steps to prevent the pollution of the sea by the dumping of waste 

and other matter that is liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living resources 

and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea.

ARTICLE II

Contracting Parties shall, as provided for in the following Articles, take effective 

measures individually, according to their scientific, technical and economic capabilities, 

and collectively, to prevent marine pollution caused by dumping and shall harmonize 

their policies in this regard.

ARTICLE III

For the purposes of this Convention

1. (a) “Dumping” means:

(i) any deliberate disposal at sea of wastes or other matter from vessels, 

aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea;

(ii) any deliberate disposal at sea of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other 

man-made structures at sea.
1364 Conv. on the Prev. of Marine Pollution by Dump. of Wastes and Other Matters

(b) “Dumping” does not include:

(i) the disposal at sea of wastes or other matter incidental to, or derived 

from the normal operations of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made 

structures at sea and their equipment, other than wastes or other matter 

transported by or to vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures 

at sea, operating for the purpose of disposal of such matter or derived from 

the treatment of such wastes or other matter on such vessels, aircraft, 

platforms or structures;

(ii) placement of matter for a purpose other than the mere disposal thereof, 

provided that such placement is not contrary to the aims of this Convention.

(c) The disposal of wastes or other matter directly arising from, or related to the 

exploration, exploitation and associated off-shore processing of sea-bed mineral 

resources will not be covered by the provisions of this Convention.

2. “Vessels and aircraft” means waterborne or airborne craft of any type whatsoever. 

This expression includes air cushioned craft and floating craft, whether self-propelled or 

not.

3. “Sea” means all marine waters other than the internal waters of States.

4. “Wastes or other matter” means material and substance of any kind, form of 

description.

5. “Special permit” means permission granted specifically on application in advance 

and in accordance with Annex II and Annex III.

6. “General permit” means permission granted in advance and in accordance with 

Annex III.

7. “The Organization” means the Organization designated by the Contracting Parties 

in accordance with Article XIV(2).

ARTICLE IV

1. In accordance with the provisions of this Convention Contracting Parties shall 

prohibit the dumping of any wastes or other matter in whatever form or condition except 

as otherwise specified below:

(a) the dumping of wastes or other matter listed in Annex I is prohibited;

(b) the dumping of wastes or other matter listed in Annex II requires a prior 

special permit;

(c) the dumping of all other wastes or matter requires a prior general permit.

2. Any permit shall be issued only after careful consideration of all the factors set 

forth in Annex III, including prior studies of the characteristics of the dumping site, as 

set forth in sections B and C of that Annex.

3. No provision of this Convention is to be interpreted as preventing a Contracting 

Party from prohibiting, insofar as that Party is concerned, the dumping of wastes or 

other matter not mentioned in Annex I. That Party shall notify such measures to the 

Organization.

ARTICLE V

1. The provisions of Article IV shall not apply when it is necessary to secure the 

safety of human life or of vessels aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea 

in cases of force majeure caused by stress of weather, or in any case which constitutes a 

danger to human life or a real threat to vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made 

structures at sea, if dumping appears to be the only way of averting the threat and if 

there is every probability that the damage consequent upon such dumping will be less 

than would otherwise occur. Such dumping shall be so conducted as to minimize the 

likelihood of damage to human or marine life and shall be reported forthwith to the 

organization.

2. A Contracting Party may issue a special permit as an exception to Article IV(1)(a), 

in emergencies, posing unacceptable risk relating to human health and admitting no 

other feasible solution. Before doing so the Party shall consult any other country or 
Conv. on the Prev. of Marine Pollution by Dump. of Wastes and Other Matters 1365

countries that are likely to be affected and the Organization which, after consulting other 

Parties, and international organizations as appropriate, shall, in accordance with Article 

XIV promptly recommend to the Party the most appropriate procedures to adopt. The 

Party shall follow these recommendations to the maximum extent feasible consistent 

with the time within which action must be taken and with the general obligation to avoid 

damage to the marine environment and shall inform the Organization of the action it 

takes. The Parties pledge themselves to assist one another in such situations.

3. Any Contracting Party may waive its right under paragraph (2) at the time of, or 

subsequent to ratification of, or accession to this Convention.

ARTICLE VI

1. Each Contracting Party shall designate an appropriate authority or authorities to:

(a) issue special permits which shall be required prior to, and for, the dumping of 

matter listed in Annex II and in the circumstances provided for in Article V(2);

(b) issue general permits which shall be required prior to, and for, the dumping of 

all other matter;

(c) keep records of the nature and quantities of all matter permitted to be dumped 

and the location, time and method of dumping;

(d) monitor individually, or in collaboration with other Parties and competent 

international organizations, the condition of the seas for the purposes of this 

Convention.

2. The appropriate authority or authorities of a Contracting Party shall issue prior 

special or general permits in accordance with paragraph (1) in respect of matter intended 

for dumping:

(a) loaded in its territory;

(b) loaded by a vessel or aircraft registered in its territory or flying its flag, when 

the loading occurs in the territory of a State not party to this Convention.

3. In issuing permits under sub-paragraphs (1)(a) and (b) above, the appropriate 

authority or authorities shall comply with Annex III, together with such additional 

criteria, measures and requirements as they may consider relevant.

4. Each Contracting Party, directly or through a Secretariat established under a 

regional agreement, shall report to the Organization, and where appropriate to other 

Parties, the information specified in sub-paragraphs (c) and (d) of paragraph (1) above, 

and the criteria, measures and requirements it adopts in accordance with paragraph (3) 

above. The procedure to be followed and the nature of such reports shall be agreed by 

the Parties in consultation.

ARTICLE VII

1. Each Contracting Party shall apply the measures required to implement the present 

Convention to all:

(a) vessels and aircraft registered in its territory or flying its flag;

(b) vessels and aircraft loading in its territory or territorial seas matter which is to 

be dumped;

(c) vessels and aircraft and fixed or floating platforms under its jurisdiction 

believed to be engaged in dumping.

2. Each Party shall take in its territory appropriate measures to prevent and punish 

conduct in contravention of the provisions of this Convention.

3. The Parties agree to co-operate in the development of procedures for the effective 

application of this Convention particularly on the high seas, including procedures for the 

reporting of vessels and aircraft observed dumping is contravention of the Convention.

4. This Convention shall not apply to those vessels and aircraft entitled to sovereign 

immunity under international law. However each Party shall ensure by the adoption of 

appropriate measures that such vessels and aircraft owned or operated by it act in a 

manner consistent with the object and purpose of this Convention, and shall inform the 

Organization accordingly.
1366 Conv. on the Prev. of Marine Pollution by Dump. of Wastes and Other Matters

5. Nothing in this Convention shall affect the right of each Party to adopt other 

measures, in accordance with the principles of international law, to prevent dumping at 

sea.

ARTICLE VIII

In order to further the objectives of this Convention, the Contracting Parties with 

common interests to protect in the marine environment in a given geographical area shall 

endeavor, taking into account characteristic regional features, to enter into regional 

agreements consistent with this Convention for the prevention of pollution, especially by 

dumping. The Contracting Parties to the present Convention shall endeavor to act 

consistently with the objectives and provisions of such regional agreements, which shall 

be notified to them by the Organization. Contracting Parties shall seek to co-operate 

with the Parties to regional agreements in order to develop harmonized procedures to be 

followed by Contracting Parties to the different conventions concerned. Special attention 

shall be given to cooperation in the field of monitoring and scientific research.

ARTICLE IX

The Contracting Parties shall promote, through collaboration within the Organization 

and other international bodies, support for those Parties which request it for:

(a) the training of scientific and technical personnel;

(b) the supply of necessary equipment and facilities for research and monitoring;

(c) the disposal and treatment of waste and other measures to prevent or mitigate 

pollution caused by dumping; preferably within the countries concerned, so 

furthering the aims and purposes of this Convention.

ARTICLE X

In accordance with the principles of international law regarding State responsibility 

for damage to the environment of other States or to any other area of the environment, 

caused by dumping of wastes and other mater of all kinds, the Contracting Parties 

undertake to develop procedures for the assessment of liability and the settlement of 

disputes regarding dumping.

ARTICLE XI

The Contracting Parties shall at their first consultative meeting consider procedures 

for the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation and application of this 

Convention.

ARTICLE XII

The Contracting Parties pledge themselves to promote, within the competent

specialised agencies and other international bodies, measures to protect the marine 

environment against pollution caused by:

(a) hydrocarbons, including oil, and their wastes;

(b) other noxious or hazardous matter transported by vessels for purposes other 

than dumping.;

(c) wastes generated in the course of operation of vessels, aircraft, platforms and 

other man-made structures at sea;

(d) radio-active pollutants from all sources, including vessels;

(e) agents of chemical and biological warfare;

(f) wastes or other matter directly arising from , or related to the exploration, 

exploitation and associated off-shore processing of sea-bed mineral resources.

The Parties will also promote, within the appropriate international organization, the 

codification of signals to be used by vessels engaged in dumping.
Conv. on the Prev. of Marine Pollution by Dump. of Wastes and Other Matters 1367

ARTICLE XIII

Nothing in this Convention shall prejudice the codification and development of the 

law of the sea by the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea convened 

pursuant to Resolution 2750 C (XXV) of the General Assembly of the United Nations 

nor the present or future claims and legal views of any State concerning the law of the 

sea and the nature and extent of coastal and flag State jurisdiction. The Contracting 

Parties agree to consult at a meeting to be convened by the Organization after the Law of 

the Sea Conference, and in any case not later than 1976, with a view to defining the 

nature and extent of the right and the responsibility of a coastal State to apply the 

Convention in a zone adjacent to its coast.

ARTICLE XIV

1. The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as 

a depositary shall call a meeting of the Contracting Parties not later than three months 

after the entry into force of this Convention to decide on organizational matters.

2. The Contracting Parties shall designate a competent Organization existing at the 

time of that meeting to be responsible for Secretariat duties in relation to this 

Convention. Any Party to this Convention not being a member of this Organization shall 

make an appropriate contribution to the expenses incurred by the Organization in 

performing these duties.

3. The Secretariat duties of the Organization shall include:

(a) the convening of consultative meetings of the Contracting Parties not less 

frequently than once every two years and of special meetings of the Parties at any 

time on the request of two-thirds of the Parties;

(b) preparing and assisting, in consultation with the Contracting Parties and

appropriate International Organizations, in the development and implementation of 

procedures referred to in sub-paragraph (4)(e) of this Article;

(c) considering inquiries by, and information from the Contracting Parties, 

consulting with them and with the appropriate International Organizations and 

providing recommendations to the Parties on questions related to, but not specifically 

covered by the Convention;

(d) conveying to the Parties concerned all notifications received by the 

Organization in accordance with Articles IV(3), V(1) and (2), VI(4), XV, XX, and 

XXI.

Prior to the designation of the Organization these functions shall, as necessary, be 

performed by the depositary, who for this purpose shall be the Government of the United 

Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

4. Consultative or special meetings of the Contracting Parties shall keep under 

continuing review the implementation of this Convention and may, inter alia:

(a) review and adopt amendments to this Convention and its Annexes in 

accordance with Article XV;

(b) invite the appropriate scientific body or bodies to collaborate with and to 

advise the Parties or the Organization on any scientific or technical aspect relevant to 

this Convention, including particularly the content of this Annexes;

(c) receive and consider reports made pursuant to article VI(4);

(d) promote co-operation with and between regional organizations concerned 

with the prevention of marine pollution;

(e) develop or adopt, in consultation with appropriate International 

Organizations, procedures referred to in Article V(2), including basic criteria for 

determining exceptional and emergency situations, and procedures for consultative 

advice and the safe disposal of matter in such circumstances, including the 

designation of appropriate dumping areas, and recommend accordingly;

(f) consider any additional action that may be required.
1368 Conv. on the Prev. of Marine Pollution by Dump. of Wastes and Other Matters

5. The Contracting Parties at their first consultative meeting shall establish rules of 

procedure as necessary.

ARTICLE XV

1. (a) At meetings of the Contracting Parties called in accordance with Article XIV 

amendments to this Convention may be adopted by a two-thirds majority of those 

present. An amendment shall enter into force for the Parties which have accepted it on 

the sixtieth day after two-thirds of the Parties shall have deposited an instrument of 

acceptance of the amendment with the Organization. Thereafter the amendment shall 

enter into force for any other Party 30 days after that Party deposits its instrument of 

acceptance of the amendment.

(b) The Organization shall inform all Contracting Parties of any request made for 

a special meeting under Article XIV and of any amendments adopted at meetings of 

the Parties and of the date on which each such amendment enters into force for each 

Party.

2. Amendments to the Annexes will be based on scientific or technical 

considerations. Amendments to the Annexes approved by a two-thirds majority of those 

present at a meeting called in accordance with Article XIV shall enter into force for each 

Contracting Party immediately on notification of its acceptance to the Organization ad 

100 days after approval by the meeting for all other Parties except for those which 

before the end of the 100 days make a declaration that they are not able to accept the 

amendment at that time. Parties should endeavour to signify their acceptance of an 

amendment to the Organization as soon as possible after approval at a meeting. A Party 

may at any time substitute an acceptance for a previous declaration of objection and the 

amendment previously objected to shall thereupon enter into force for that Party.

3. An acceptance or declaration of objection under this Article shall be made by the 

deposit of an instrument with the Organization. The Organization shall notify all 

Contracting Parties of the receipt of such instruments.

4. Prior to the designation of the Organization, the Secretarial functions herein 

attributed to it, shall be performed temporarily by the Government of the United 

Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as one of the depositories of this 

Convention.

ARTICLE XVI

This Convention shall be open for signature by any State at London, Mexico City, 

Moscow and Washington from 29 December 1972 until 31 December 1973.

ARTICLE XVII

This Convention shall be subject to ratification. The instruments of ratification shall 

be deposited with the Governments of Mexico, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 

the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of 

America.

ARTICLE XVIII

After 31 December 1973, this Convention shall be open for accession by any State. 

The instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of Mexico, the 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 

Ireland, and the United States of America.

ARTICLE XIX

1. This Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of 

deposit of the fifteenth instrument of ratification or accession.

2. For each Contracting Party ratifying or acceding to the Convention after the 

deposit of the fifteenth instrument of ratification or accession, the Convention shall enter 
Conv. on the Prev. of Marine Pollution by Dump. of Wastes and Other Matters 1369

into force on the thirtieth day after deposit by such Party of its instrument of ratification 

or accession.

ARTICLE XX

The depositories shall inform Contracting Parties:

(a) of signatures to this Convention and of the deposit of instruments of 

ratification, accession or withdrawal, in accordance with Articles XVI, XVII, XVIII 

and XXI, and

(b) of the date on which this Convention will enter into force, in accordance with 

Article XIX.

ARTICLE XXI

Any Contracting Party may withdraw from this Convention by giving six months’ 

notice in writing to a depositary, which shall promptly inform all Parties of such notice.

ARTICLE XXII

The original of this Convention of which the English, French, Russian and Spanish 

texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Governments of Mexico, the 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 

Ireland and the United States of America who shall send certified copies thereof to all 

States.

In WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, being duly authorized 

thereto by their respective Governments have signed the present Convention.

DONE in quadruplicate at London, Mexico City, Moscow and Washington, this 

twenty-ninth day of December, 1972.

ANNEX I

1. Organohalogen compounds.

2. Mercury and mercury compounds.

3. Cadmium and cadmium compounds.

4. Persistent plastics and other persistent synthetic materials, for example, netting 

and ropes, which may float or may remain in suspension in the sea in such a manner as 

to interfere materially with fishing, navigation or other legitimate uses of the sea.

5. Crude oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil, and lubricating oils, hydraulic fluids, and any 

mixtures containing any of these taken on board for the purpose of dumping.

6. High-level radioactive wastes or other high-level radio-active matter, defined on 

public health, biological or other grounds, by the competent international body in this 

field, at present the International Atomic Energy Agency, as unsuitable for dumping at 

sea.

7. Materials in whatever form (e.g. solids, liquids, semi liquids, gases or in a living 

sates) produced for biological and chemical warfare.

8. The preceding paragraphs of this Annex do not apply to substances which are 

rapidly rendered harmless by physical, chemical or biological processes in the sea 

provided they do not:

(i) make edible marine organisms unpalatable, or

(ii) endanger human health or that of domestic animals.

The consultative procedures provided for under Article XIV should be followed by a 

Party if there is doubt about the harmlessness of the substance.

9. This Annex does not apply to wastes or other materials (e.g. sewage sludges and 

dredged spoils) containing the matters referred to in paragraphs 1-5 above as trace 

contaminants. Such wastes shall be subject to the provisions of Annexes II and III as 

appropriate.
1370 Conv. on the Prev. of Marine Pollution by Dump. of Wastes and Other Matters

ANNEX II

The following substances and materials requiring special care are listed for the 

purposes of Article VI(1)(a).

A. Wastes containing significant amounts of the matters listed below:

arsenic

lead and their compounds

copper

zinc

organosilicon compounds

cyanides

fluorides

pesticides and their by-products not covered in Annex I.

B. In the issue of permits for the dumping of large quantities of acids and alkalis, 

consideration shall be given to the possible presence in such wastes of the substances 

listed in paragraph A and to the following additional substances:

beryllium

chromium and their compounds

nickel

vanadium

C. Containers, scrap metal and other bulky wastes liable to sink to the sea bottom 

may present a serious obstacle to fishing or navigation.

D. Radioactive wastes or other radioactive matter not included in Annex I. In the 

issue of permits for the dumping of this matter, the Contracting Parties should take full 

account of the recommendations of the competent international body in this field, at 

present the International Atomic Energy Agency.

ANNEX III

Provisions be considered in establishing criteria governing the issue of permits for 

the dumping of matter at sea, taking into account Article IV (2), include:

A.–Characteristics and Composition of the Matter

1. Total amount of average composition of matter dumped (e.g. per year).

2. Form, e.g. solid, sludge, liquid, or gaseous.

3. Properties: physical (e.g. solubility and density), chemical and biochemical (e.g. 

oxygen demand, nutrients) and biological (e.g. presence of viruses, bacteria, yeasts, 

parasites).

4. Toxicity.

5. Persistence: physical, chemical and biological.

6. Accumulation and biotransformation in biological materials or sediments.

7. Susceptibility to physical, chemical and biochemical changes and interaction in 

the aquatic environment with other dissolved organic and inorganic materials.

8. Probability of production of taints or other changes reducing marketability of 

resources (fish, shellfish, etc.).

B.–Characteristics of Dumping Site and Method of Deposit

1. Location (e.g. co-ordinates of the dumping area, depth and distance from the 

coast), location in relation to the other areas (e.g., amenity areas, spawning, nursery and 

fishing areas and exploitable resources).

2. Rate of disposal per specific period (e.g. quantity per day, per week, per month).

3. Methods of packaging and containment, if any.

4. Initial dilution achieved by proposed method of release.

5. Dispersal characteristics (e.g. effects of currents, tides and wind on horizontal 

transport and vertical mixing).

6. Water characteristics (e.g. temperature, pH, salinity, stratification, oxygen indices 

of pollution–dissolved oxygen (DO), chemical oxygen demand (COD), biochemical 
Conv. on the Prev. of Marine Pollution by Dump. of Wastes and Other Matters 1371

oxygen demand (BOD)–nitrogen present in organic and mineral form including 

ammonia, suspended matter, other nutrients and productivity).

7. Bottom characteristics (e.g. topography, geochemical and geological 

characteristics and biological productivity).

8. Existence and effects of other dumpings which have been made in the dumping 

area (e.g. heavy metal background reading and organic carbon content).

9. In issuing a permit for dumping, Contracting Parties should consider whether an 

adequate scientific basis exists for assessing the consequences of such dumping, as 

outline in this Annex, taking into account seasonal variations.

C.–General Considerations and Conditions

1. Possible effects on amenities (e.g., presence of floating or stranded material, 

turbidity, objectionable odour, discolouration and foaming).

2. Possible effects on marine life, fish and shellfish culture, fish stocks and fisheries, 

seaweed harvesting and culture.

3. Possible effects on other uses of the sea (e.g. impairment of water quality for 

industrial use, underwater corrosion of structures, interference with ship operations from 

floating materials, interference with fishing or navigation through deposit of waste or 

solid objects on the sea floor and protection of areas of special importance for scientific 

or conservation purposes).

4. The practical availability of alternative land-based methods of treatment, disposal 

or elimination, or of treatment to render the matter less harmful for dumping at sea.

Table: Parties to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by 

Dumping of Wastes and Other matter, with Annexes.

Done at Washington, London, Mexico City, and Moscow

December 29, 1972; entered into force August 30, 1975.

26 USC 2403; TIAS 8165; 1046 UNTS 120.

Parties:

Afghanistan Kenya

Angola Kiribati

Antigua & Barbuda Korea

Argentina1 Libya

Australia1 Luxembourg1

Azerbaijan Malta

Barbados Mexico

Belarus Monaco1

Belgium1 Morocco

Belize2 Nauru

Bolivia Netherlands6

Bosnia-Herzegovina New Zealand7

Brazil Nigeria

Bulgaria Norway

Canada Oman

Cape Verde Pakistan

Chile Panama

China3 Papua New Guinea

Congo, Democratic Republic of the Peru

Costa Rica Philippines

Cote d’Ivoire Poland

Croatia Portugal

Cuba Russian Federation
1372 Conv. on the Prev. of Marine Pollution by Dump. of Wastes and Other Matters

Cyprus Sierra Leone

Denmark4 St. Lucia

Dominican Republic St. Vincent and the Grenadines

Egypt Serbia

Equatorial Guinea Seychelles

Finland Slovenia

France1 5 Solomon Islands

Gabon South Africa

German Democratic Republic1 6 Spain

Germany, Fed. Rep. 1 6 Suriname

Greece5 Sweden

Guatemala Switzerland

Haiti Tanzania

Honduras Tonga

Hungary Tunisia

Iceland Tuvalu12

Iran Ukraine

Ireland Union of Soviet Socialist Reps.8

Italy1 United Arab Emirates

Jamaica United Kingdom1 9

Japan United States

Jordan Vanuatu

Yugoslavia10

Updated as of January 2010

Amendment: November 12, 1993.

NOTES: 1 With statement. 2 On September 21, 1981 Belize became an independent state. In a letter dated September 29, 1982 

to the Secretary General of the United Nations, the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belize 

made a statement reading in part as follows: I have the honour to inform you that the Government of Belize 

has decided to continue to apply provisionally and on the basis of reciprocity, all treaties to which the 

Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland was a party, the application of 

which was extended either expressly or by necessary implication to the then dependent territory of Belize. 

Such provisional application would subsist until Belize otherwise notifies Your Excellency, the depository (in 

the case of a multilateral treaty), or the state party (in the case of a bilateral treaty.) 3 Applicable to Hong Kong and Macao. With declarations. 4 Extended to Faroe Is. 5 With reservation. 6 Applicable to Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. 7 Not applicable to Cook Is., Niue, and Tokalau Is. 8 The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics dissolved December 25, 1991. As stated in the Alma-Ata 

Declaration of December 21, 1991, “... the States participating in the Commonwealth guarantee in accordance 

with their constitutional procedures the discharge of the international obligations deriving from treaties and 

agreements concluded by the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics....”. 9 Extended to Bailiwick of Guernsey, Bermuda, British Indian Ocean Territory, British Virgin Is., 

Cayman Is., Ducie and Osno Is., Falkland Is. and dependencies, Henderson, Hong Kong, Isle of Man, 

Bailiwick of Jersey, Montserrat, Pitcairn, St. Helena and dependencies, Turks and Caicos Is., and United 

Kingdom Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia on the Island of Cyprus. 10 Yugoslavia has dissolved. Where a multilateral treaty action was taken prior to dissolution, 

“Yugoslavia” is retained; where a successor state has taken action it is listed separately. The status of the 

agreements listed below is under review.
Conv. on the Prev. of Marine Pollution by Dump. of Wastes and Other Matters 1373

11 The Federal Republic of Germany provided a note to the Department dated October 15, 1990,which 

reads in pertinent part as follows: 

The Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany presents its compliments to the Department of State 

and has the honor to inform the Department that, with regard to the continued application of treaties of the 

Federal Republic of Germany and the treatment of treaties of the German Democratic Republic following its 

accession to the Federal Republic of Germany with effect from 3 October 1990, the Treaty of 31 August 1990 

between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic on the Establishment of 

German Unity (Unification Treaty) contains the following relevant provisions. 

Treaties of the Federal Republic of Germany 

The Contracting Parties proceed on the understanding that international treaties and agreements to 

which the Federal Republic of Germany is a Contracting Party, including treaties establishing its membership 

of international organizations or institutions, shall retain their validity and that the rights and obligations 

arising therefrom, with the exception of the treaties named in Article I (not included herein), shall also relate 

to the territory specified in Article 3. Where adjustments become necessary in individual cases, the all-German 

Government shall consult with the respective Contracting Parties. 

Treaties of the German Democratic Republic 

(1) The Contracting Parties are agreed that, in connection with the establishment of German unity, 

international treaties of the German Democratic Republic shall be discussed with the Contracting Parties 

concerned with a view to regulating or confirming their continued application, adjustment or expiry, taking 

into account protection of confidence, the interests of the states concerned, the treaty obligations of the 

Federal Republic of Germany as well as the principles of a free, democratic basic order governed by the rule 

of law, and respecting the competence of the European Communities. 

(2) The United Germany shall determine its position with regard to the adoption of international 

treaties of the German Democratic Republic following consultations with the respective Contracting Parties 

and with the European Communities where the latter’s competence is affected. 12 On October 1, 1978, Tuvalu became an independent state. In a note dated December 19, 1978, to the 

Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Prime Minister of Tuvalu made a statement reading in part as 

follows: 

The Government of Tuvalu, conscious of the desirability of maintaining existing international legal 

relationships, and conscious of its obligations under international law to honor its treaty commitments, 

acknowledges that many treaty rights and obligations of the Government of the United Kingdom in respect of 

the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Protectorate, the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony and Tuvalu were succeeded to 

by Tuvalu upon Independence by virtue of customary international law. Since, however, it is likely that by 

virtue of that law certain of such treaties may be said to have lapsed at the date of Tuvalu‘s Independence, it 

seems essential that each treaty purporting or deemed to bind Tuvalu before that date should be subjected to 

legal examination. The Government of Tuvalu proposes after such examination has been completed to indicate 

which, if any, of the treaties which may be said to have lapsed by virtue of customary international law it 

proposes to treat as having lapsed. 

The Government of Tuvalu desires that it should be presumed that each treaty purporting or deemed to 

bind Tuvalu before Independence has been legally succeeded to by Tuvalu and that action should be based on 

such presumption unless and until the Government of Tuvalu decides that any particular treaty should be 

treated as having lapsed. Should the Government of Tuvalu be of opinion that it has legally succeeded to any 

treaty, and wish to terminate the operation of such treaty, it will in due course give notice of termination in the 

terms thereof. 

For the avoidance of doubt, the Government of Tuvalu further declares that it does not regard itself as 

bound by the terms of any convention creating an inter-national organization to the extent that such convention 

requires the payment of any sum by any State, by virtue only of the accession of the Government of the United 

Kingdom to such convention. 
1374 Conv. on the Safety of Spent Fuel Mgmt. and of Radioactive Waste Mgmt.

INFCIRC/546

24 December 1997

International Atomic Energy Agency GENERAL Distr.

INFORMATION CIRCULAR Original: ARABIC, CHINESE

(Unofficial electronic edition) ENGLISH, FRENCH, RUSSIAN 

and

SPANISH

V. JOINT CONVENTION ON THE SAFETY OF SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT 

AND ON THE SAFETY OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT

1. The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety 

of Radioactive Waste Management was adopted on 5 September 1997 by a Diplomatic 

Conference convened by the International Atomic Energy Agency at its headquarters 

from 1 to 5 September 1997. The Joint Convention was opened for signature at Vienna 

on 29 September 1997 during the forty-first session of the General Conference of the 

International Atomic Energy Agency and will remain open for signature until its entry 

into force.

2. Pursuant to article 40, the Joint Convention will enter into force on the ninetieth 

day after the date of deposit with the Depositary of the twenty-fifth instrument of 

ratification, acceptance or approval, including the instruments of fifteen States each 

having an operational nuclear power plant.

3. The text of the Convention, as adopted, is attached hereto for the information of 

Member States.

PREAMBLE

CHAPTER 1 OBJECTIVES, DEFINITIONS AND SCOPE OF APPLICATION

ARTICLE 1 OBJECTIVES

ARTICLE 2 DEFINITIONS

ARTICLE 3 SCOPE OF APPLICATION

CHAPTER 2 SAFETY OF SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT

ARTICLE 4 GENERAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS

ARTICLE 5 EXISTING FACILITIES

ARTICLE 6 SITING OF PROPOSED FACILITIES

ARTICLE 7 DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES

ARTICLE 8 ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY OF FACILITIES

ARTICLE 9 OPERATION OF FACILITIES

ARTICLE 10 DISPOSAL OF SPENT FUEL

CHAPTER 3 SAFETY OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT

ARTICLE 11 GENERAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS

ARTICLE 12 EXISTING FACILITIES AND PAST PRACTICES

ARTICLE 13 SITING OF PROPOSED FACILITIES

ARTICLE 14 DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES

ARTICLE 15 ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY OF FACILITIES

ARTICLE 16 OPERATION OF FACILITIES

ARTICLE 17 INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES AFTER CLOSURE

CHAPTER 4 GENERAL SAFETY PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 18 IMPLEMENTING MEASURES
Conv. on the Safety of Spent Fuel Mgmt. and of Radioactive Waste Mgmt. 1375

ARTICLE 19 LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

ARTICLE 20 REGULATORY BODY

ARTICLE 21 RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LICENCE HOLDER

ARTICLE 22 HUMAN AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES

ARTICLE 23 QUALITY ASSURANCE

ARTICLE 24 OPERATIONAL RADIATION PROTECTION

ARTICLE 25 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

ARTICLE 26 DECOMMISSIONING

CHAPTER 5 MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 27 TRANSBOUNDARY MOVEMENT

ARTICLE 28 DISUSED SEALED SOURCES

CHAPTER 6 MEETINGS OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES

ARTICLE 29 PREPARATORY MEETING

ARTICLE 30 REVIEW MEETINGS

ARTICLE 31 EXTRAORDINARY MEETINGS

ARTICLE 32 REPORTING

ARTICLE 33 ATTENDANCE

ARTICLE 34 SUMMARY REPORTS

ARTICLE 35 LANGUAGES

ARTICLE 36 CONFIDENTIALITY

ARTICLE 37 SECRETARIAT

CHAPTER 7 FINAL CLAUSES AND OTHER PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 38 RESOLUTION OF DISAGREEMENTS

ARTICLE 39 SIGNATURE, RATIFICATION, ACCEPTANCE,

APPROVAL, ACCESSION

ARTICLE 40 ENTRY INTO FORCE

ARTICLE 41 AMENDMENTS TO THE CONVENTION

ARTICLE 42 DENUNCIATION

ARTICLE 43 DEPOSITARY

ARTICLE 44 AUTHENTIC TEXTS
1376 Conv. on the Safety of Spent Fuel Mgmt. and of Radioactive Waste Mgmt.

Preamble

The Contracting Parties

(i) Recognizing that the operation of nuclear reactors generates spent fuel and 

radioactive waste and that other applications of nuclear technologies also generate 

radioactive waste;

(ii) Recognizing that the same safety objectives apply both to spent fuel and 

radioactive waste management;

(iii) Reaffirming the importance to the international community of ensuring that 

sound practices are planned and implemented for the safety of spent fuel and radioactive 

waste management;

(iv) Recognizing the importance of informing the public on issues regarding the 

safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management;

(v) Desiring to promote an effective nuclear safety culture worldwide;

(vi) Reaffirming that the ultimate responsibility for ensuring the safety of spent fuel 

and radioactive waste management rests with the State;

(vii) Recognizing that the definition of a fuel cycle policy rests with the State, some 

States considering spent fuel as a valuable resource that may be reprocessed, others 

electing to dispose of it;

(viii) Recognizing that spent fuel and radioactive waste excluded from the present 

Convention because they are within military or defence programmes should be managed 

in accordance with the objectives stated in this Convention;

(ix) Affirming the importance of international co-operation in enhancing the safety 

of spent fuel and radioactive waste management through bilateral and multilateral 

mechanisms, and through this incentive Convention;

(x) Mindful of the needs of developing countries, and in particular the least 

developed countries, and of States with economies in transition and of the need to 

facilitate existing mechanisms to assist in the fulfillment of their rights and obligations 

set out in this incentive Convention;

(xi) Convinced that radioactive waste should, as far as is compatible with the safety 

of the management of such material, be disposed of in the State in which it was 

generated, whilst recognizing that, in certain circumstances, safe and efficient 

management of spent fuel and radioactive waste might be fostered through agreements 

among Contracting Parties to use facilities in one of them for the benefit of the other 

Parties, particularly where waste

originates from joint projects;

(xii) Recognizing that any State has the right to ban import into its territory of 

foreign spent fuel and radioactive waste;

(xiii) Keeping in mind the Convention on Nuclear Safety (1994), the Convention on 

Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (1986), the Convention on Assistance in the 

Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (1986), the Convention on the 

Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1980), the Convention on the Prevention of 

Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter as amended (1994) and other 

relevant international instruments;

(xiv) Keeping in mind the principles contained in the interagency “International 

Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of 

Radiation Sources” (1996), in the IAEA Safety Fundamentals entitled “The Principles of 

Radioactive Waste Management” (1995), and in the existing international standards 

relating to the safety of the transport of radioactive materials;

(xv) Recalling Chapter 22 of Agenda 21 by the United Nations Conference on 

Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro adopted in 1992, which reaffirms the 

paramount importance of the safe and environmentally sound management of 

radioactive waste;

(xvi) Recognizing the desirability of strengthening the international control system 

applying specifically to radioactive materials as referred to in Article 1(3) of the Basel 
Conv. on the Safety of Spent Fuel Mgmt. and of Radioactive Waste Mgmt. 1377

Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and 

Their Disposal (1989); 

Have agreed as follows:

Chapter 1. Objectives Definitions And Scope Of Application

Article 1–Objectives

The objectives of this Convention are:

(i) to achieve and maintain a high level of safety worldwide in spent fuel and 

radioactive waste management, through the enhancement of national measures and 

international co-operation, including where appropriate, safety-related technical cooperation;

(ii) to ensure that during all stages of spent fuel and radioactive waste management 

there are effective defenses against potential hazards so that individuals, society and the 

environment are protected from harmful effects of ionizing radiation, now and in the 

future, in such a way that the needs and aspirations of the present generation are met 

without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs and 

aspirations;

(iii) to prevent accidents with radiological consequences and to mitigate their 

consequences should they occur during any stage of spent fuel or radioactive waste 

management.

Article 2–Definitions

For the purposes of this Convention:

(a) “closure” means the completion of all operations at some time after the 

emplacement of spent fuel or radioactive waste in a disposal facility. This includes the 

final engineering or other work required to bring the facility to a condition that will be 

safe in the long term;

(b) “decommissioning” means all steps leading to the release of a nuclear facility, 

other than a disposal facility, from regulatory control. These steps include the processes 

of

decontamination and dismantling;

(c) “discharges” means planned and controlled releases into the environment, as a 

legitimate practice, within limits authorized by the regulatory body, of liquid or gaseous 

radioactive materials that originate from regulated nuclear facilities during normal 

operation;

(d) “disposal” means the emplacement of spent fuel or radioactive waste in an 

appropriate facility without the intention of retrieval;

(e) “licence” means any authorization, permission or certification granted by a 

regulatory body to carry out any activity related to management of spent fuel or of 

radioactive waste;

(f) “nuclear facility” means a civilian facility and its associated land, buildings and 

equipment in which radioactive materials are produced, processed, used, handled, stored 

or disposed of on such a scale that consideration of safety is required;

(g) “operating lifetime” means the period during which a spent fuel or a radioactive 

waste management facility is used for its intended purpose. In the case of a disposal 

facility, the period begins when spent fuel or radioactive waste is first emplaced in the 

facility and ends upon closure of the facility;

(h) “radioactive waste” means radioactive material in gaseous, liquid or solid form 

for which no further use is foreseen by the Contracting Party or by a natural or legal 

person whose decision is accepted by the Contracting Party, and which is controlled as 

radioactive waste by a regulatory body under the legislative and regulatory framework 

of the Contracting Party;
1378 Conv. on the Safety of Spent Fuel Mgmt. and of Radioactive Waste Mgmt.

(i) “radioactive waste management” means all activities, including 

decommissioning activities, that relate to the handling, pretreatment, treatment, 

conditioning, storage, or disposal of radioactive waste, excluding off-site transportation. 

It may also involve discharges;

(j) “radioactive waste management facility” means any facility or installation the 

primary purpose of which is radioactive waste management, including a nuclear facility 

in the process of being decommissioned only if it is designated by the Contracting Party 

as a radioactive waste management facility;

(k) “regulatory body” means any body or bodies given the legal authority by the 

Contracting Party to regulate any aspect of the safety of spent fuel or radioactive waste 

management including the granting of licences;

(l) “reprocessing” means a process or operation, the purpose of which is to extract 

radioactive isotopes from spent fuel for further use;

(m) “sealed source” means radioactive material that is permanently sealed in a 

capsule or closely bonded and in a solid form, excluding reactor fuel elements;

(n) “spent fuel” means nuclear fuel that has been irradiated in and permanently 

removed from a reactor core;

(o) “spent fuel management” means all activities that relate to the handling or 

storage of spent fuel, excluding off-site transportation. It may also involve discharges;

(p) “spent fuel management facility” means any facility or installation the primary 

purpose of which is spent fuel management;

(q) “State of destination” means a State to which a transboundary movement is 

planned or takes place;

®) “State of origin” means a State from which a transboundary movement is 

planned to be initiated or is initiated;

(s) “State of transit” means any State, other than a State of origin or a State of 

destination, through whose territory a transboundary movement is planned or takes 

place;

(t) “storage” means the holding of spent fuel or of radioactive waste in a facility that 

provides for its containment, with the intention of retrieval;

(u) “transboundary movement” means any shipment of spent fuel or of radioactive 

waste from a State of origin to a State of destination.

Article 3–Scope of Application

1. This Convention shall apply to the safety of spent fuel management when the 

spent fuel results from the operation of civilian nuclear reactors. Spent fuel held at 

reprocessing facilities as part of a reprocessing activity is not covered in the scope of this 

Convention unless the Contracting Party declares reprocessing to be part of spent fuel 

management.

2. This Convention shall also apply to the safety of radioactive waste management 

when the radioactive waste results from civilian applications. However, this Convention 

shall not apply to waste that contains only naturally occurring radioactive materials and 

that does not originate from the nuclear fuel cycle, unless it constitutes a disused sealed 

source or it is declared as radioactive waste for the purposes of this Convention by the 

Contracting Party.

3. This Convention shall not apply to the safety of management of spent fuel or 

radioactive waste within military or defence programmes, unless declared as spent fuel 

or radioactive waste for the purposes of this Convention by the Contracting Party. 

However, this Convention shall apply to the safety of management of spent fuel and 

radioactive waste from military or defence programmes if and when such materials are 

transferred permanently to and managed within exclusively civilian programmes.

4. This Convention shall also apply to discharges as provided for in Articles 4, 7, 11, 

14, 24 and 26.
Conv. on the Safety of Spent Fuel Mgmt. and of Radioactive Waste Mgmt. 1379

Chapter 2. Safety of Spent Fuel Management

Article 4–General Safety Requirements

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that at all stages of 

spent fuel management, individuals, society and the environment are adequately 

protected against radiological hazards.

In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to:

(i) ensure that criticality and removal of residual heat generated during spent fuel 

management are adequately addressed;

(ii) ensure that the generation of radioactive waste associated with spent fuel 

management is kept to the minimum practicable, consistent with the type of fuel cycle 

policy adopted;

(iii) take into account interdependencies among the different steps in spent fuel 

management;

(iv) provide for effective protection of individuals, society and the environment, by 

applying at the national level suitable protective methods as approved by the regulatory 

body, in the framework of its national legislation which has due regard to internationally 

endorsed criteria and standards;

(v) take into account the biological, chemical and other hazards that may be 

associated with spent fuel management;

(vi) strive to avoid actions that impose reasonably predictable impacts on future 

generations greater than those permitted for the current generation;

(vii) aim to avoid imposing undue burdens on future generations.

Article 5–Existing Facilities

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to review the safety of any spent 

fuel management facility existing at the time the Convention enters into force for that 

Contracting Party and to ensure that, if necessary, all reasonably practicable 

improvements are made to upgrade the safety of such a facility.

Article 6–Siting of Proposed Facilities

1. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that procedures 

are established and implemented for a proposed spent fuel management facility:

(i) to evaluate all relevant site-related factors likely to affect the safety of such a 

facility during its operating lifetime;

(ii) to evaluate the likely safety impact of such a facility on individuals, society 

and the environment;

(iii) to make information on the safety of such a facility available to members of 

the public;

(iv) to consult Contracting Parties in the vicinity of such a facility, insofar as they 

are likely to be affected by that facility, and provide them, upon their request, with 

general data relating to the facility to enable them to evaluate the likely safety impact 

of the facility upon their territory.

2. In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that 

such facilities shall not have unacceptable effects on other Contracting Parties by being 

sited in accordance with the general safety requirements of Article 4.

Article 7–Design and Construction of Facilities

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:

(i) the design and construction of a spent fuel management facility provide for 

suitable measures to limit possible radiological impacts on individuals, society and the 

environment, including those from discharges or uncontrolled releases;

(ii) at the design stage, conceptual plans and, as necessary, technical provisions for 

the decommissioning of a spent fuel management facility are taken into account;

(iii) the technologies incorporated in the design and construction of a spent fuel 

management facility are supported by experience, testing or analysis.
1380 Conv. on the Safety of Spent Fuel Mgmt. and of Radioactive Waste Mgmt.

Article 8–Assessment of Safety of Facilities

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:

(i) before construction of a spent fuel management facility, a systematic safety 

assessment and an environmental assessment appropriate to the hazard presented by the 

facility and covering its operating lifetime shall be carried out;

(ii) before the operation of a spent fuel management facility, updated and detailed 

versions of the safety assessment and of the environmental assessment shall be prepared 

when deemed necessary to complement the assessments referred to in paragraph (i).

Article 9–Operation of Facilities

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:

(i) the licence to operate a spent fuel management facility is based upon appropriate 

assessments as specified in Article 8 and is conditional on the completion of a 

commissioning programme demonstrating that the facility, as constructed, is consistent 

with design and safety requirements;

(ii) operational limits and conditions derived from tests, operational experience and 

the assessments, as specified in Article 8, are defined and revised as necessary;

(iii) operation, maintenance, monitoring, inspection and testing of a spent fuel 

management facility are conducted in accordance with established procedures;

(iv) engineering and technical support in all safety-related fields are available 

throughout the operating lifetime of a spent fuel management facility;

(v) incidents significant to safety are reported in a timely manner by the holder of the 

licence to the regulatory body;

(vi) programmes to collect and analyse relevant operating experience are established 

and that the results are acted upon, where appropriate;

(vii) decommissioning plans for a spent fuel management facility are prepared and 

updated, as necessary, using information obtained during the operating lifetime of that 

facility, and are reviewed by the regulatory body.

Article 10–Disposal of Spent Fuel

If, pursuant to its own legislative and regulatory framework, a Contracting Party has 

designated spent fuel for disposal, the disposal of such spent fuel shall be in accordance 

with the obligations of Chapter 3 relating to the disposal of radioactive waste.

Chapter 3. Safety of Radioactive Waste Management

Article 11–General Safety Requirements

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that at all stages of 

radioactive waste management individuals, society and the environment are adequately 

protected against radiological and other hazards.

In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to:

(i) ensure that criticality and removal of residual heat generated during radioactive 

waste

management are adequately addressed;

(ii) ensure that the generation of radioactive waste is kept to the minimum 

practicable;

(iii) take into account interdependencies among the different steps in radioactive 

waste management;

(iv) provide for effective protection of individuals, society and the environment, by 

applying at the national level suitable protective methods as approved by the regulatory 

body, in the framework of its national legislation which has due regard to internationally 

endorsed criteria and standards;

(v) take into account the biological, chemical and other hazards that may be 

associated with radioactive waste management;
Conv. on the Safety of Spent Fuel Mgmt. and of Radioactive Waste Mgmt. 1381

(vi) strive to avoid actions that impose reasonably predictable impacts on future 

generations greater than those permitted for the current generation;

(vii) aim to avoid imposing undue burdens on future generations.

Article 12–Existing Facilities and Past Practices

Each Contracting Party shall in due course take the appropriate steps to review:

(i) the safety of any radioactive waste management facility existing at the time the 

Convention enters into force for that Contracting Party and to ensure that, if necessary, 

all reasonably practicable improvements are made to upgrade the safety of such a 

facility;

(ii) the results of past practices in order to determine whether any intervention is 

needed for reasons of radiation protection bearing in mind that the reduction in detriment 

resulting from the reduction in dose should be sufficient to justify the harm and the 

costs, including the social costs, of the intervention.

Article 13–Siting of Proposed Facilities

1. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that procedures 

are

established and implemented for a proposed radioactive waste management facility:

(i) to evaluate all relevant site-related factors likely to affect the safety of such a 

facility during its operating lifetime as well as that of a disposal facility after closure;

(ii) to evaluate the likely safety impact of such a facility on individuals, society 

and the environment, taking into account possible evolution of the site conditions of 

disposal facilities after closure;

(iii) to make information on the safety of such a facility available to members of 

the public;

(iv) to consult Contracting Parties in the vicinity of such a facility, insofar as they 

are likely to be affected by that facility, and provide them, upon their request, with 

general data relating to the facility to enable them to evaluate the likely safety impact 

of the facility upon their territory.

2. In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that 

such facilities shall not have unacceptable effects on other Contracting Parties by being 

sited in accordance with the general safety requirements of Article 11.

Article 14–Design and Construction of Facilities

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:

(i) the design and construction of a radioactive waste management facility provide 

for suitable measures to limit possible radiological impacts on individuals, society and 

the environment, including those from discharges or uncontrolled releases;

(ii) at the design stage, conceptual plans and, as necessary, technical provisions for 

the decommissioning of a radioactive waste management facility other than a disposal 

facility are taken into account;

(iii) at the design stage, technical provisions for the closure of a disposal facility are 

prepared;

(iv) the technologies incorporated in the design and construction of a radioactive 

waste management facility are supported by experience, testing or analysis.

Article 15–Assessment of Safety of Facilities

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:

(i) before construction of a radioactive waste management facility, a systematic 

safety assessment and an environmental assessment appropriate to the hazard presented 

by the facility and covering its operating lifetime shall be carried out;

(ii) in addition, before construction of a disposal facility, a systematic safety 

assessment and an environmental assessment for the period following closure shall be 
1382 Conv. on the Safety of Spent Fuel Mgmt. and of Radioactive Waste Mgmt.

carried out and the results evaluated against the criteria established by the regulatory 

body;

(iii) before the operation of a radioactive waste management facility, updated and 

detailed versions of the safety assessment and of the environmental assessment shall be 

prepared when deemed necessary to complement the assessments referred to in 

paragraph (i).

Article 16–Operation of Facilities

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:

(i) the licence to operate a radioactive waste management facility is based upon 

appropriate assessments as specified in Article 15 and is conditional on the completion 

of a commissioning programme demonstrating that the facility, as constructed, is 

consistent with design and safety requirements;

(ii) operational limits and conditions, derived from tests, operational experience and 

the assessments as specified in Article 15 are defined and revised as necessary; 

(iii) operation, maintenance, monitoring, inspection and testing of a radioactive 

waste management facility are conducted in accordance with established procedures. For 

a disposal facility the results thus obtained shall be used to verify and to review the 

validity of assumptions made and to update the assessments as specified in Article 15 for 

the period after closure;

(iv) engineering and technical support in all safety-related fields are available 

throughout the operating lifetime of a radioactive waste management facility;

(v) procedures for characterization and segregation of radioactive waste are applied;

(vi) incidents significant to safety are reported in a timely manner by the holder of 

the licence to the regulatory body;

(vii) programmes to collect and analyse relevant operating experience are established 

and that the results are acted upon, where appropriate;

(viii) decommissioning plans for a radioactive waste management facility other than 

a disposal facility are prepared and updated, as necessary, using information obtained 

during the operating lifetime of that facility, and are reviewed by the regulatory body;

(ix) plans for the closure of a disposal facility are prepared and updated, as 

necessary, using information obtained during the operating lifetime of that facility and 

are reviewed by the regulatory body.

Article 17–Institutional Measures after Closure

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that after closure of a

disposal facility:

(i) records of the location, design and inventory of that facility required by the 

regulatory body are preserved;

(ii) active or passive institutional controls such as monitoring or access restrictions 

are carried out, if required; and

(iii) if, during any period of active institutional control, an unplanned release of 

radioactive materials into the environment is detected, intervention measures are 

implemented, if necessary.

Chapter 4. General Safety Provisions

Article 18–Implementing Measures

Each Contracting Party shall take, within the framework of its national law, the 

legislative, regulatory and administrative measures and other steps necessary for 

implementing its obligations under this Convention.

Article 19–Legislative and Regulatory Framework

1. Each Contracting Party shall establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory 

framework to govern the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management.

2. This legislative and regulatory framework shall provide for:
Conv. on the Safety of Spent Fuel Mgmt. and of Radioactive Waste Mgmt. 1383

(i) the establishment of applicable national safety requirements and regulations 

for radiation safety;

(ii) a system of licensing of spent fuel and radioactive waste management 

activities;

(iii) a system of prohibition of the operation of a spent fuel or radioactive waste 

management facility without a licence;

(iv) a system of appropriate institutional control, regulatory inspection and 

documentation and reporting;

(v) the enforcement of applicable regulations and of the terms of the licences;

(vi) a clear allocation of responsibilities of the bodies involved in the different 

steps of spent fuel and of radioactive waste management.

3. When considering whether to regulate radioactive materials as radioactive waste, 

Contracting Parties shall take due account of the objectives of this Convention.

Article 20–Regulatory Body

1. Each Contracting Party shall establish or designate a regulatory body entrusted 

with the implementation of the legislative and regulatory framework referred to in 

Article 19, and provided with adequate authority, competence and financial and human 

resources to fulfill its assigned responsibilities.

2. Each Contracting Party, in accordance with its legislative and regulatory 

framework, shall take the appropriate steps to ensure the effective independence of the 

regulatory functions from other functions where organizations are involved in both spent 

fuel or radioactive waste management and in their regulation.

Article 21–Responsibility of the License Holder

1. Each Contracting Party shall ensure that prime responsibility for the safety of 

spent fuel or radioactive waste management rests with the holder of the relevant licence 

and shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that each such licence holder meets its 

responsibility.

2. If there is no such licence holder or other responsible party, the responsibility rests 

with the Contracting Party which has jurisdiction over the spent fuel or over the 

radioactive waste.

Article 22–Human and Financial Resources

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:

(i) qualified staff are available as needed for safety-related activities during the 

operating lifetime of a spent fuel and a radioactive waste management facility;

(ii) adequate financial resources are available to support the safety of facilities for 

spent fuel and radioactive waste management during their operating lifetime and for 

decommissioning;

(iii) financial provision is made which will enable the appropriate institutional 

controls and monitoring arrangements to be continued for the period deemed necessary 

following the closure of a disposal facility.

Article 23–Quality Assurance

Each Contracting Party shall take the necessary steps to ensure that appropriate quality 

assurance programmes concerning the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste 

management are established and implemented.

Article 24–Operational Radiation Protection

1. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that during the 

operating lifetime of a spent fuel or radioactive waste management facility:

(i) the radiation exposure of the workers and the public caused by the facility 

shall be kept as low as reasonably achievable, economic and social factors being 

taken into account;
1384 Conv. on the Safety of Spent Fuel Mgmt. and of Radioactive Waste Mgmt.

(ii) no individual shall be exposed, in normal situations, to radiation doses which 

exceed national prescriptions for dose limitation which have due regard to 

internationally endorsed standards on radiation protection; and

(iii) measures are taken to prevent unplanned and uncontrolled releases of 

radioactive materials into the environment.

2. Each Contracting Party shall take appropriate steps to ensure that discharges shall 

be limited:

(i) to keep exposure to radiation as low as reasonably achievable, economic and 

social factors being taken into account; and

(ii) so that no individual shall be exposed, in normal situations, to radiation doses 

which exceed national prescriptions for dose limitation which have due regard to 

internationally endorsed standards on radiation protection.

3. Each Contracting Party shall take appropriate steps to ensure that during the 

operating lifetime of a regulated nuclear facility, in the event that an unplanned or 

uncontrolled release of radioactive materials into the environment occurs, appropriate 

corrective measures are implemented to control the release and mitigate its effects.

Article 25–Emergency Preparedness

1. Each Contracting Party shall ensure that before and during operation of a spent 

fuel or radioactive waste management facility there are appropriate on-site and, if 

necessary, off-site emergency plans. Such emergency plans should be tested at an 

appropriate frequency.

2. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps for the preparation and 

testing of emergency plans for its territory insofar as it is likely to be affected in the 

event of a radiological emergency at a spent fuel or radioactive waste management 

facility in the vicinity of its territory.

Article 26–Decommissioning

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure the safety of 

decommissioning of a nuclear facility. Such steps shall ensure that:

(i) qualified staff and adequate financial resources are available;

(ii) the provisions of Article 24 with respect to operational radiation protection, 

discharges and unplanned and uncontrolled releases are applied;

(iii) the provisions of Article 25 with respect to emergency preparedness are applied;

and

(iv) records of information important to decommissioning are kept.

Chapter 5. Miscellaneous Provisions

Article 27–Transboundary Movement

1. Each Contracting Party involved in transboundary movement shall take the 

appropriate steps to ensure that such movement is undertaken in a manner consistent 

with the provisions of this Convention and relevant binding international instruments.

In so doing:

(i) a Contracting Party which is a State of origin shall take the appropriate steps 

to ensure that transboundary movement is authorized and takes place only with the 

prior notification and consent of the State of destination;

(ii) transboundary movement through States of transit shall be subject to those 

international obligations which are relevant to the particular modes of transport 

utilized;

(iii) a Contracting Party which is a State of destination shall consent to a 

transboundary movement only if it has the administrative and technical capacity, as 

well as the regulatory structure, needed to manage the spent fuel or the radioactive 

waste in a manner consistent with this Convention;
Conv. on the Safety of Spent Fuel Mgmt. and of Radioactive Waste Mgmt. 1385

(iv) a Contracting Party which is a State of origin shall authorize a transboundary 

movement only if it can satisfy itself in accordance with the consent of the State of 

destination that the requirements of subparagraph (iii) are met prior to transboundary 

movement;

(v) a Contracting Party which is a State of origin shall take the appropriate steps 

to permit re-entry into its territory, if a transboundary movement is not or cannot be 

completed in conformity with this Article, unless an alternative safe arrangement can 

be made.

2. A Contracting Party shall not licence the shipment of its spent fuel or radioactive 

waste to a destination south of latitude 60 degrees South for storage or disposal.

3. Nothing in this Convention prejudices or affects:

(i) the exercise, by ships and aircraft of all States, of maritime, river and air 

navigation rights and freedoms, as provided for in international law;

(ii) rights of a Contracting Party to which radioactive waste is exported for 

processing to return, or provide for the return of, the radioactive waste and other 

products after treatment to the State of origin;

(iii) the right of a Contracting Party to export its spent fuel for reprocessing; 

(iv) rights of a Contracting Party to which spent fuel is exported for reprocessing 

to return, or provide for the return of, radioactive waste and other products resulting 

from reprocessing operations to the State of origin.

Article 28–Disused Sealed Sources

1. Each Contracting Party shall, in the framework of its national law, take the 

appropriate steps to ensure that the possession, remanufacturing or disposal of disused 

sealed sources takes place in a safe manner.

2. A Contracting Party shall allow for reentry into its territory of disused sealed 

sources if, in the framework of its national law, it has accepted that they be returned to a 

manufacturer qualified to receive and possess the disused sealed sources.

Chapter 6. Meetings of The Contracting Parties

Article 29–Preparatory Meeting

1. A preparatory meeting of the Contracting Parties shall be held not later than six 

months after the date of entry into force of this Convention.

2. At this meeting, the Contracting Parties shall:

(i) determine the date for the first review meeting as referred to in Article 30. 

This review meeting shall be held as soon as possible, but not later than thirty 

months after the date of entry into force of this Convention;

(ii) prepare and adopt by consensus Rules of Procedure and Financial Rules;

(iii) establish in particular and in accordance with the Rules of Procedure:

(a) guidelines regarding the form and structure of the national reports to be 

submitted pursuant to Article 32;

(b) a date for the submission of such reports;

(c) the process for reviewing such reports.

3. Any State or regional organization of an integration or other nature which ratifies, 

accepts, approves, accedes to or confirms this Convention and for which the Convention 

is not yet in force, may attend the preparatory meeting as if it were a Party to this 

Convention.

Article 30–Review Meetings

1. The Contracting Parties shall hold meetings for the purpose of reviewing the 

reports submitted pursuant to Article 32.

2. At each review meeting the Contracting Parties:

(i) shall determine the date for the next such meeting, the interval between review 

meetings not exceeding three years;
1386 Conv. on the Safety of Spent Fuel Mgmt. and of Radioactive Waste Mgmt.

(ii) may review the arrangements established pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 

29, and adopt revisions by consensus unless otherwise provided for in the Rules of 

Procedure. They may also amend the Rules of Procedure and Financial Rules by 

consensus.

3. At each review meeting each Contracting Party shall have a reasonable 

opportunity to discuss the reports submitted by other Contracting Parties and to seek 

clarification of such reports.

Article 31–Extraordinary Meetings

An extraordinary meeting of the Contracting Parties shall be held:

(i) if so agreed by a majority of the Contracting Parties present and voting at a 

meeting; or

(ii) at the written request of a Contracting Party, within six months of this request 

having been communicated to the Contracting Parties and notification having been 

received by the secretariat referred to in Article 37 that the request has been supported 

by a majority of the Contracting Parties.

Article 32–Reporting

1. In accordance with the provisions of Article 30, each Contracting Party shall 

submit a national report to each review meeting of Contracting Parties. This report shall 

address the measures taken to implement each of the obligations of the Convention. For 

each Contracting Party the report shall also address its:

(i) spent fuel management policy;

(ii) spent fuel management practices;

(iii) radioactive waste management policy;

(iv) radioactive waste management practices;

(v) criteria used to define and categorize radioactive waste.

2. This report shall also include:

(i) a list of the spent fuel management facilities subject to this Convention, their 

location, main purpose and essential features;

(ii) an inventory of spent fuel that is subject to this Convention and that is being 

held in storage and of that which has been disposed of. This inventory shall contain a 

description of the material and, if available, give information on its mass and its total 

activity;

(iii) a list of the radioactive waste management facilities subject to this 

Convention, their location, main purpose and essential features;

(iv) an inventory of radioactive waste that is subject to this Convention that:

(a) is being held in storage at radioactive waste management and nuclear fuel 

cycle facilities;

(b) has been disposed of; or

(c) has resulted from past practices.

This inventory shall contain a description of the material and other appropriate 

information available, such as volume or mass, activity and specific radionuclides;

(v) a list of nuclear facilities in the process of being decommissioned and the 

status of decommissioning activities at those facilities.

Article 33–Attendance

1. Each Contracting Party shall attend meetings of the Contracting Parties and be 

represented at such meetings by one delegate, and by such alternates, experts and 

advisers as it deems necessary.

2. The Contracting Parties may invite, by consensus, any intergovernmental 

organization which is competent in respect of matters governed by this Convention to 

attend, as an observer, any meeting, or specific sessions thereof. Observers shall be 

required to accept in writing, and in advance, the provisions of Article 36.
Conv. on the Safety of Spent Fuel Mgmt. and of Radioactive Waste Mgmt. 1387

Article 34–Summary Reports

The Contracting Parties shall adopt, by consensus, and make available to the public a 

document addressing issues discussed and conclusions reached during meetings of the 

Contracting Parties.

Article 35–Languages

1. The languages of meetings of the Contracting Parties shall be Arabic, Chinese, 

English, French, Russian and Spanish unless otherwise provided in the Rules of 

Procedure.

2. Reports submitted pursuant to Article 32 shall be prepared in the national 

language of the submitting Contracting Party or in a single designated language to be 

agreed in the Rules of Procedure. Should the report be submitted in a national language 

other than the designated language, a translation of the report into the designated 

language shall be provided by the Contracting Party.

3. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2, the secretariat, if compensated, 

will assume the translation of reports submitted in any other language of the meeting 

into the designated language.

Article 36–Confidentiality

1. The provisions of this Convention shall not affect the rights and obligations of the 

Contracting Parties under their laws to protect information from disclosure. For the 

purposes of this article, “information” includes, inter alia, information relating to 

national security or to the physical protection of nuclear materials, information protected 

by intellectual property rights or by industrial or commercial confidentiality, and 

personal data.

2. When, in the context of this Convention, a Contracting Party provides information 

identified by it as protected as described in paragraph 1, such information shall be used 

only for the purposes for which it has been provided and its confidentiality shall be 

respected.

3. With respect to information relating to spent fuel or radioactive waste falling 

within the scope of this Convention by virtue of paragraph 3 of Article 3, the provisions 

of this Convention shall not affect the exclusive discretion of the Contracting Party 

concerned to decide:

(i) whether such information is classified or otherwise controlled to preclude 

release;

(ii) whether to provide information referred to in sub-paragraph (i) above in the 

context of the Convention; and

(iii) what conditions of confidentiality are attached to such information if it is 

provided in the context of this Convention.

4. The content of the debates during the reviewing of the national reports at each 

review meeting held pursuant to Article 30 shall be confidential.

Article 37–Secretariat

1. The International Atomic Energy Agency, (hereinafter referred to as “the 

Agency”) shall provide the secretariat for the meetings of the Contracting Parties.

2. The secretariat shall:

(i) convene, prepare and service the meetings of the Contracting Parties referred 

to in Articles 29, 30 and 31;

(ii) transmit to the Contracting Parties information received or prepared in 

accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

The costs incurred by the Agency in carrying out the functions referred to in subparagraphs

(i) and (ii) above shall be borne by the Agency as part of its regular budget.

3. The Contracting Parties may, by consensus, request the Agency to provide other 

services in support of meetings of the Contracting Parties. The Agency may provide 
1388 Conv. on the Safety of Spent Fuel Mgmt. and of Radioactive Waste Mgmt.

such services if they can be undertaken within its programme and regular budget. Should 

this not be possible, the Agency may provide such services if voluntary funding is 

provided from another source.

Chapter 7. Final Clauses and Other Provisions

Article 38–Resolution of Disagreements

In the event of a disagreement between two or more Contracting Parties concerning the 

interpretation or application of this Convention, the Contracting Parties shall consult 

within the framework of a meeting of the Contracting Parties with a view to resolving 

the disagreement. In the event that the consultations prove unproductive, recourse can be 

made to the mediation, conciliation and arbitration mechanisms provided for in 

international law, including the rules and practices prevailing within the IAEA.

Article 39–Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval, Accession

1. This Convention shall be open for signature by all States at the Headquarters of 

the Agency in Vienna from 29 September 1997 until its entry into force.

2. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the signatory 

States.

3. After its entry into force, this Convention shall be open for accession by all States.

4. (i) This Convention shall be open for signature subject to confirmation, or 

accession by regional organizations of an integration or other nature, provided that any 

such organization is constituted by sovereign States and has competence in respect of the 

negotiation, conclusion and application of international agreements in matters covered 

by this Convention. 

 (ii) In matters within their competence, such organizations shall, on their own 

behalf, exercise the rights and fulfil the responsibilities which this Convention attributes 

to States Parties.

 (iii) When becoming party to this Convention, such an organization shall 

communicate to the Depositary referred to in Article 43, a declaration indicating which 

States are members thereof, which Articles of this Convention apply to it, and the extent 

of its competence in the field covered by those articles.

 (iv) Such an organization shall not hold any vote additional to those of its Member 

States.

5. Instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval, accession or confirmation shall 

be deposited with the Depositary.

Article 40–Entry Into Force

1. This Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date of deposit 

with the Depositary of the twenty-fifth instrument of ratification, acceptance or 

approval, including the instruments of fifteen States each having an operational nuclear 

power plant.

2. For each State or regional organization of an integration or other nature which 

ratifies, accepts, approves, accedes to or confirms this Convention after the date of 

deposit of the last instrument required to satisfy the conditions set forth in paragraph 1, 

this Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date of deposit with 

the Depositary of the appropriate instrument by such a State or organization.

Article 41–Amendments to the Convention

1. Any Contracting Party may propose an amendment to this Convention. Proposed 

amendments shall be considered at a review meeting or at an extraordinary meeting.

2. The text of any proposed amendment and the reasons for it shall be provided to the 

Depositary who shall communicate the proposal to the Contracting Parties at least ninety 

days before the meeting for which it is submitted for consideration. Any comments 

received on such a proposal shall be circulated by the Depositary to the Contracting 

Parties.
Conv. on the Safety of Spent Fuel Mgmt. and of Radioactive Waste Mgmt. 1389

3. The Contracting Parties shall decide after consideration of the proposed 

amendment whether to adopt it by consensus, or, in the absence of consensus, to submit 

it to a Diplomatic Conference. A decision to submit a proposed amendment to a 

Diplomatic Conference shall require a two-thirds majority vote of the Contracting 

Parties present and voting at the meeting, provided that at least one half of the 

Contracting Parties are present at the time of voting.

4. The Diplomatic Conference to consider and adopt amendments to this Convention 

shall be convened by the Depositary and held no later than one year after the appropriate 

decision taken in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article. The Diplomatic 

Conference shall make every effort to ensure amendments are adopted by consensus. 

Should this not be possible, amendments shall be adopted with a two-thirds majority of 

all Contracting Parties.

5. Amendments to this Convention adopted pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 4 above 

shall be subject to ratification, acceptance, approval, or confirmation by the Contracting 

Parties and shall enter into force for those Contracting Parties which have ratified, 

accepted, approved or confirmed them on the ninetieth day after the receipt by the 

Depositary of the relevant instruments of at least two thirds of the Contracting Parties. 

For a Contracting Party which subsequently ratifies, accepts, approves or confirms the 

said amendments, the amendments will enter into force on the ninetieth day after that 

Contracting Party has deposited its relevant instrument.

Article 42–Denunciation

1. Any Contracting Party may denounce this Convention by written notification to 

the Depositary. 

2. Denunciation shall take effect one year following the date of the receipt of the 

notification by the Depositary, or on such later date as may be specified in the 

notification.

Article 43–Depositary

1. The Director General of the Agency shall be the Depositary of this Convention.

2. The Depositary shall inform the Contracting Parties of:

(i) the signature of this Convention and of the deposit of instruments of 

ratification, acceptance, approval, accession or confirmation in accordance with 

Article 39;

(ii) the date on which the Convention enters into force, in accordance with 

Article 40;

(iii) the notifications of denunciation of the Convention and the date thereof, 

made in accordance with Article 42;

(iv) the proposed amendments to this Convention submitted by Contracting 

Parties, the amendments adopted by the relevant Diplomatic Conference or by the 

meeting of the Contracting Parties, and the date of entry into force of the said 

amendments, in accordance with Article 41.

Article 44–Authentic Texts

The original of this Convention of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian 

and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Depositary, who 

shall send certified copies thereof to the Contracting Parties.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF THE UNDERSIGNED, BEING DULY AUTHORIZED TO 

THAT EFFECT, HAVE SIGNED THIS CONVENTION.

Done at Vienna on the fifth day of September, one thousand nine hundred and ninetyseven.
1390 Conv. on the Safety of Spent Fuel Mgmt. and of Radioactive Waste Mgmt.

Table: Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of 

Radioactive Waste Management

Notes: The Convention, pursuant to Article 40.1 entered into force on 18 June 2001, 

i.e. on the ninetieth day after the day of deposit with the Depositary of the 25th 

instrument of ratification, acceptance, or approval, including the instruments of 15 

States each having an operational nuclear power plant.

Country/

Organization Signature Instrument

Date of 

Deposit

DeclarationWithdrawEntry into 

Force

Albania Accession 29 Jun 2011 27 Sep 2011

Argentina1 19 Dec 1997 Ratification 14 Nov 2000 18 Jun 2001

Australia 13 Nov 1998 Ratification 05 Aug 2003 03 Nov 2003

Austria 17 Sep 1998 Ratification 13 Jun 2001 11 Sep 2001

Belarus 13 Oct 1999 Ratification 26 Nov 2002 24 Feb 2003

Belgium1 08 Dec 1997 Ratification 05 Sep 2002 04 Dec 2002

Brazil1 31 Oct 1997 Ratification 17 Feb 2006 18 May 2006

Bulgaria1 22 Sep 1998 Ratification 21 Jun 2000 18 Jun 2001

Canada1 07 May 1998 Ratification 07 May 1998 18 Jun 2001

Chile Accession 26 Sep 2011 25 Dec 2011

China1 Accession 13 Sep 2006  12 Dec 2006

Croatia 09 Apr 1998 Ratification 10 May 1999 18 Jun 2001

Cyprus Accession 21 Oct 2009 19 Jan 2010

Czech

 Republic1 30 Sep 1997 Approval 25 Mar 1999 18 Jun 2001

Denmark 09 Feb 1998 Acceptance 03 Sep 1999 18 Jun 2001

Estonia 05 Jan 2001 Ratification 03 Feb 2006 04 May 2006

Finland1 02 Oct 1997 Acceptance 10 Feb 2000 18 Jun 2001

France1 29 Sep 1997 Approval 27 Apr 2000 18 Jun 2001

Gabon Accession 29 Apr 2010 28 Jul 2010

Georgia Accession 22 Jul 2009 20 Oct 2009

Germany1 01 Oct 1997 Ratification 13 Oct 1998 18 Jun 2001

Ghana Accession 01 Jun 2011 30 Aug 2011

Greece 09 Feb 1998 Ratification 18 Jul 2000 18 Jun 2001

Hungary1 29 Sep 1997 Ratification 02 Jun 1998 18 Jun 2001

Iceland Accession 27 Jan 2006 27 Apr 2006

Indonesia 06 Oct 1997

Ireland 01 Oct 1997 Ratification 20 Mar 2001 18 Jun 2001

Italy 26 Jan 1998 Ratification 08 Feb 2006 09 May 2006

Japan1 Accession 26 Aug 2003 24 Nov 2003

Kazakhstan1 29 Sep 1997 Ratification 10 Mar 2010 08 Jun 2010

Korea, 

 Republic 29 Sep 1997 Ratification 16 Sep 2002 15 Dec 2002

Kyrgyzstan Accession 18 Dec 2006 18 Mar 2007

Latvia 27 Mar 2000 Acceptance 27 Mar 2000 18 Jun 2001

Lebanon 30 Sep 1997

Lithuania1 30 Sep 1997 Ratification 16 Mar 2004 14 Jun 2004

Luxembourg 01 Oct 1997 Ratification 21 Aug 2001 19 Nov 2001

Macedonia3 Accession 31 Dec 2009 31 Mar 2010

Mauritania Accession 19 Sep 2011 18 Dec 2011

Montenegro Accession 09 Aug2010 7 Nov 2010

Morocco 29 Sep 1997 Ratification 23 Jul 1999 18 Jun 2001

Netherlands1,2 10 Mar 1999 Acceptance 26 Apr 2000 18 Jun 2001

Nigeria Accession 04 Apr 2007 03 Jul 2007

Norway 29 Sep 1997 Ratification 12 Jan 1998 18 Jun 2001
Conv. on the Safety of Spent Fuel Mgmt. and of Radioactive Waste Mgmt. 1391

Table: Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of 

Radioactive Waste Management

Notes: The Convention, pursuant to Article 40.1 entered into force on 18 June 2001, 

i.e. on the ninetieth day after the day of deposit with the Depositary of the 25th 

instrument of ratification, acceptance, or approval, including the instruments of 15 

States each having an operational nuclear power plant.

Country/

Organization Signature Instrument

Date of 

Deposit

DeclarationWithdrawEntry into 

Force

Peru 04 Jun 1998

Philippines 10 Mar 1998

Poland 03 Oct 1997 Ratification 05 May 2000 18 Jun 2001

Portugal Accession 15 May 2009 13 Aug 2009

Republic of 

Moldova Accession 23 Feb 2010 X 24 May 2010

Romania1 30 Sep 1997 Ratification 06 Sep 1999 18 Jun 2001

Russian 

Federation1 27 Jan 1999 Ratification 19 Jan 2006 19 Apr 2006

Saudi Arabia Accession 19 Sep 2011 18 Dec 2011

Senegal Accession 24 Dec 2008 24 Mar 2009

Slovakia1 30 Sep 1997 Ratification 06 Oct 1998 18 Jun 2001

Slovenia1 29 Sep 1997 Ratification 25 Feb 1999 18 Jun 2001

South Africa Accession 15 Nov 2006 13 Feb 2007

Spain1 30 Jun 1998 Ratification 11 May 1999 18 Jun 2001

Sweden1 29 Sep 1997 Ratification 29 Jul 1999 18 Jun 2001

Switzerland1 29 Sep 1997 Ratification 05 Apr 2000 18 Jun 2001

Tajikistan Accession 12 Dec 2007 11 Mar 2008

Ukraine1 29 Sep 1997 Ratification 24 Jul 2000 18 Jun 2001

United Arab 

Emirates Accession 31 Jul 2009 29 Oct 2009

United

 Kingdom1 29 Sep 1997 Ratification 12 Mar 2001 18 Jun 2001

United States

 of America1 29 Sep 1997 Ratification 15 Apr 2003 14 Jul 2003

Uruguay Accession 28 Dec 2005 28 Mar 2006

Uzbekistan Accession 19 Jan 2009 19 Apr 2009

EURATOM Accession 04 Oct 2005 02 Jan 2006

 

1 Indicates that the State has at least one operational nuclear power plant. 2 For the Kingdom in Europe. 3 Sometimes listed as “the frmr. Yug. Rep. of Macedonia.”

Last change of status: 26 Sept 2011 Parties: 63 Signatories: 42 
1392 Conv. on the Safety of Spent Fuel Mgmt. and of Radioactive Waste Mgmt.

Declarations/Reservations on the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel 

Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management

Declarations and reservations made upon expressing consent to be bound and objections 

thereto

China, Peoples Republic of acceded 13 Sep 2006

“1.The interpretation of the Government of the People’s Republic of China of ‘transboundary 

movement’, as referred to in Article 2 subparagraph (u) and in Article 27, is as follows: before 

consenting to a transboundary movement originating from another Contracting Party’s domestic 

entity, any Contracting Party to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and 

on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management which is a State of destination shall confirm the 

said transboundary movement with the State of origin of the said transboundary movement, and 

obtain authorization from the said State of origin. 2.Unless the Government of the People’s 

Republic of China issues a separate notice, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel 

Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management shall not apply to the Macao 

Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China.”

[Additional statement relating to the above declaration - received on 3 July 2007] 

“In accordance with the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the 

People's Republic of China and the Basic Law of the Macao Special Administrative Region of the 

People's Republic of China, the Government of the People's Republic of China decides that the 

Convention applies to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and unless otherwise 

notified, shall not apply to the Macao Special Administrative Region. The declaration made by the 

People's Republic of China to Subparagraph (u), Article 2 and Article 27 of the Convention also 

applies to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.”

Denmark, Kingdom of accepted 03 Sep 1999

“Until further notice the Convention shall not apply to Greenland and the Faroe Islands.”

EURATOM acceded 04 Oct 2005

“The following States are presently members of the European Atomic Energy Community: the 

Kingdom of Belgium, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of 

Germany, the Republic of Estonia, the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the French 

Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Lativa, the 

Republic of Lithuania, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic 

of Malta, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Poland, the 

Portuguese Republic, the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, the Republic of Finland, the 

Kingdom of Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The Community 

declares that Articles 1 to 16, 18, 19 to 21 and 24 to 44 of the Joint Convention apply to it. The 

Community possesses competences, shared with the abovementioned Member States, in the fields 

covered by Articles 4, 6 to 11, 13 to 16, 19 and 24 to 28 of the Joint Convention as provided by 

the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community in Article 2(b) and the relevant 

Articles of Title II, Chapter 3, entitled 'Health and Safety'.” “When acceding to this Convention, 

the European Atomic Energy Community also wishes to put forward a reservation with regard to 

the non-compliance of Article 12(1) of the Directive 92/3/Euratom on the supervision and control 

of shipments of radioactive waste between Member States and into and out of the Community 

with the specific requirement in Article 27(1)(i) of the Joint Convention which requires the 

consent of the state of destination in the framework of transboundary movements. A revision of 
Conv. on the Safety of Spent Fuel Mgmt. and of Radioactive Waste Mgmt. 1393

this Directive, which will bring the relevant Community law in conformity with this Convention, 

is currently in the process of adoption.”

Japan accepted 26 Aug 2003

“The Government of Japan, in accedding to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel 

Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, adopted at Vienna on 

September 5, 1997, declares reprocessing to be part of spent fuel management pursuant to Article 

3, paragraph 1 of the Convention.”

Declarations/reservations made upon signature

Denmark, Kingdom of 09 Feb 1998

“. . . for the time being, the signature on behalf of Denmark does not commit the Faroe Islands and

Greenland.”
1394 Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources

International Atomic Energy Agency 

Agence internationale de I'energie atomique

2005/Note 8

W. CODE OF CONDUCT ON THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF 

RADIOACTIVE SOURCES

On 8 September 2003, the Board of Governors approved the Code of Conduct on the 

Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources that was contained in document 

GOV/2003/49-GC(47)/9. The approved text was subsequently, in January 2004, 

published with the symbol IAEA/CODEOC/2004. 

The Secretariat has recently noticed a typographical error in Table I (Activities 

Corresponding to Thresholds of Categories) annexed to the Code of Conduct: for Po210, the entry '6.E+02' under Category 1 should read '6.E+01'. 

The Secretariat is issuing a correction slip in all official languages for insertion into 

publication IAEA/CODEOC/2004. 

7 February 2005
Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources 1395

International Atomic Energy Agency 

Board of Governors GO V /2003/49-GC( 47)/9 

General Conference Date: 29 July 2003

General Distribution

Original: English 

For official use only

Item 3 of the Board's provisional agenda (GOY /2003/44)

Item 14 of the Conference's provisional agenda (GC/47)/1) 

Measures To Strengthen International Cooperation

in Nuclear, Radiation

and Transport Safety and Waste Management

Revision of the Code of Conduct

on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources

Report by the Director General

Summary

● The purpose of this document is to seek adoption by the Board of Governors of the 

revised Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources that is 

contained in Annex 1 to this document. 

Background 

● In September 1999, the Board approved an Action Plan for the Safety of Radiation 

Sources and Security of Radioactive Materials (see document GOV/1999/46-GC(43)/IO 

and Corr.l) and requested the Secretariat to implement it. The Action Plan included the 

following action: “to initiate a meeting of technical and legal experts for exploratory 

discussions relating to an international undertaking in the area of the safety of radiation 

sources and the security of radioactive materials.” Statements made in the Board at that 

time suggested that the development of a code of conduct would be the most generally 

acceptable way of proceeding. 

● Early in 2000, the Secretariat convened an open-ended group of technical and legal 

experts to undertake exploratory discussions on a possible Code of Conduct on the 

Safety of Radiation Sources and the Security of Radioactive Materials. The group met in 

March and July 2000 and produced a Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of 

Radioactive Sources (see document GOV/2000/34- GC(44/7) which was taken note of 

by the Board in September 2000.1

 In taking note of the Code of Conduct, the Board also 

took note of an accompanying report by the Chairman of the open-ended group - Mr. S. 

––––––––

1 The Agency published the code of conduct (in Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish) 

in 2001 under the symbol IAEA/CODE0C/2001.
1396 Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources

McIntosh (Australia) - and requested the Director General “to organize consultations on 

decisions which the Agency's policy-making organs may wish to take, in the light of the 

report of the Chairman of the Open-ended Meeting, regarding - inter alia - the 

application and implementation of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of 

Radioactive Sources and to make recommendations thereon to the Board.” 

● In May 2002, the Secretariat requested from Member States information about how 

they were implementing the Code of Conduct and in August 2002, it convened an openended group of technical and legal experts to consider how the Code of Conduct might 

be strengthened, particularly in response to security concerns and to questions arising 

from the responses to the Secretariat's May 2002 request for information, and to examine 

previously unresolved issues. The group met, under the chairmanship of Mr. S. 

McIntosh (Australia), again in March and July 2003, and agreed on the revised Code of 

Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources that is contained in Annex 1 

to this document. Annex 2 contains the report on the last meeting by the Chairman of the 

open-ended group. 

Recommended Action by the Board

● It is recommended that the Board approve the revised Code of Conduct on the Safety 

and Security of Radioactive Sources and transmit it to the General Conference with a 

recommendation that the Conference adopt it and encourage its wide implementation.
Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources 1397

Annex 1

Revised Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources 

(Annex 1)

International Atomic Energy Agency

The IAEA's Member States

Noting that radioactive sources are used throughout the world for a wide variety of 

beneficial purposes, e.g. in industry, medicine, research, agriculture and education, 

Aware that the use of these radioactive sources involves risks due to potential 

radiation exposure, 

Recognizing the need to protect individuals, society and the environment from the 

harmful effects of possible accidents and malicious acts involving radioactive sources, 

Noting that ineffective, interrupted or sporadic regulatory or management control of 

radioactive sources has led to serious accidents, or malicious acts, or to the existence of 

orphan sources, 

Aware that the risks arising from such incidents must be minimized and protected 

against through the application of appropriate radiation safety and security standards, 

Recognizing the importance of fostering a safety and security culture in all 

organizations and among all individuals engaged in the regulatory control or the 

management of radioactive sources, 

Recognizing the need for effective and continuous regulatory control, in particular to 

reduce the vulnerability of radioactive sources during transfers, within and between 

States2,

Recognizing that States should take due care in authorizing exports, particularly 

because a number of States may lack appropriate infrastructure for the safe management 

and secure protection of radioactive sources, and that States should make efforts to 

harmonize their systems of export control of radioactive sources, 

Recognizing the need for technical facilities, including appropriate equipment and 

qualified staff, to ensure the safe management and secure protection of radioactive 

sources, 

Noting that the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing 

Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources contain recommendations for 

protection against exposure to ionizing radiation and for the safety and security of 

radioactive sources, 

Recalling the IAEA's Safety Requirements document on Legal and Governmental 

Infrastructure for Nuclear, Radiation, Radioactive Waste and Transport Safety, 

Taking account of the provisions of the Convention on Early Notification of a 

Nuclear Accident (1986) and of the provisions of the Convention on Assistance in the 

Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (1986), 

Taking account of the provisions of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel 

Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (1997), in particular 

those provisions which relate to the transboundary movement of radioactive waste and 

to the possession, remanufacturing or disposal of disused sealed sources, 

Recognizing that, while unsealed radioactive material is excluded from this Code, 

there may be circumstances where it should be managed in accordance with the 

objectives of this Code, 

Recognizing the global role of the IAEA in the area of the safety and security of 

radioactive sources, 

Taking account of the IAEA's categorization of radioactive sources, currently found 

in IAEA- TECDOC-1344 entitled “Categorization of radioactive sources”, while 

recognizing that TECDOC-1344 is based on deterministic health effects and does not 

fully take into account the range of impacts that could result from accidents or malicious 

acts involving radioactive sources, and 
1398 Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources

Taking account of the approval by the Board of Governors of the activities regarding 

protection against nuclear terrorism proposed to it in March 2002, including activities 

relating to the security of radioactive material other than nuclear material, 

DECIDE that the following Code of Conduct should serve as guidance to States for -

inter alia - the development and harmonization of policies, laws and regulations on the 

safety and security of radioactive sources. 

I. Definitions

 1. For the purposes of this Code: 

“authorization” means a permission granted in a document by a 

regulatory body to a natural or legal person who has submitted an application 

to manage a radioactive source. The authorization can take the form of a 

registration, a licence or alternative effective legal control measures which 

achieve the objectives of the Code. 

“disposal” means the emplacement of radioactive sources in an 

appropriate facility without the intention of retrieval. 

“disused source” means a radioactive source which is no longer 

used, and is not intended to be used, for the practice for which an 

authorization has been granted. 

“management” means the administrative and operational activities 

that are involved in the manufacture, supply, receipt, possession, storage, use, 

transfer, import, export, transport, maintenance, recycling or disposal of 

radioactive sources. 

“orphan source” means a radioactive source which is not under 

regulatory control, either because it has never been under regulatory control, 

or because it has been abandoned, lost, misplaced, stolen or transferred 

without proper authorization. 

“radioactive source” means radioactive material that is 

permanently sealed in a capsule or closely bonded, in a solid form and which 

is not exempt from regulatory control. It also means any radioactive material 

released if the radioactive source is leaking or broken, but does not mean 

material encapsulated for disposal, or nuclear material within the nuclear fuel 

cycles of research and power reactors. 

“regulatory body” means an entity or organization or a system of 

entities or organizations designated by the government of a State as having 

legal authority for exercising regulatory control with respect to radioactive 

sources, including issuing authorizations, and thereby regulating one or more 

aspects of the safety or security of radioactive sources. 

“regulatory control” means any form of control or regulation 

applied to facilities or activities by a regulatory body for reasons related to 

radiation protection or to the safety or security of radioactive sources. 

“safety” means measures intended to minimize the likelihood of 

accidents involving radioactive sources and, should such an accident occur, to 

mitigate its consequences. 

“safety culture” means the assembly of characteristics and attitudes 

in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding 

priority, protection and safety issues receive the attention warranted by their 

significance. 

“security” means measures to prevent unauthorized access or 

damage to, and loss, theft or unauthorized transfer of, radioactive sources. 

“security culture” means characteristics and attitudes in 

organizations and of individuals which establish that security issues receive 

the attention warranted by their significance. 

“storage” means the holding of radioactive sources in a facility that 

provides for their containment with the intention of retrieval. 
Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources 1399

II. Scope and Objectives

2. This Code applies to all radioactive sources that may pose a significant risk to 

individuals, society and the environment, that is the sources referred to in the Annex 

to this Code. States should also devote appropriate attention to the regulation of other 

potentially harmful radioactive sources. 

3. This Code does not apply to nuclear material as defined in the Convention on 

the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, except for sources incorporating 

plutonium-239.

4. This Code does not apply to radioactive sources within military or defence 

programmes. 

5. (a) The objectives of this Code are, through the development, hamlonization 

and implementation of national policies, laws and regulations, and through the 

fostering of international co-operation, to: 

(i) achieve and maintain a high level of safety and security of radioactive 

sources; 

(ii) prevent unauthorized access or damage to, and loss, theft or 

unauthorized transfer of, radioactive sources, so as to reduce the likelihood of 

accidental harmful exposure to such sources or the malicious use of such 

sources to cause harm to individuals, society or the environment; and 

(iii) mitigate or minimize the radiological consequences of any accident or 

malicious act involving a radioactive source. 

(b) These objectives should be achieved through the establishment of an 

adequate system of regulatory control of radioactive sources, applicable from the 

stage of initial production to their final disposal, and a system for the restoration 

of such control if it has been lost. 

6. This Code relies on existing international standards relating to nuclear, 

radiation, radioactive waste and transport safety and to the control of radioactive 

sources. It is intended to complement existing international standards in these areas. 

III. Basic Principles

 GENERAL

7. Every State should, in order to protect individuals, society and the 

environment, take the appropriate measures necessary to ensure: 

(a) that the radioactive sources within its territory, or under its jurisdiction or 

control, are safely managed and securely protected during their useful lives and at 

the end of their useful lives; and 

(b) the promotion of safety culture and of security culture with respect to 

radioactive sources. 

8. Every State should have in place an effective national legislative and 

regulatory system of control over the management and protection of radioactive 

sources. Such a system should: 

(a) place the prime responsibility for the safe management of, and the security 

of, radioactive sources on the persons being granted the relevant authorizations; 

(b) minimize the likelihood of a loss of control; 

(c) include national strategies for gaining or regaining control over orphan 

sources; 

(d) provide for rapid response for the purpose of regaining control over 

orphan sources; 

(e) foster ongoing communication between the regulatory body and users; 

(f) provide for measures to reduce the likelihood of malicious acts, including 

sabotage, consistent with the threat defined by the State; 

(g) mitigate or minimize the radiological consequences of accidents or 

malicious acts involving radioactive sources; and. 

(h) provide for its own continuous improvement.
1400 Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources

9. Every State should ensure that appropriate facilities and services for radiation 

protection, safety and security are available to, and used by, the persons who are 

authorized to manage radioactive sources. Such facilities and services should 

include, but are not limited to, those needed for: 

(a) searching for missing sources and securing found sources; 

(b) intervention in the event of an accident or malicious act involving a 

radioactive source; 

(c) personal dosimetry and environmental monitoring; and 

(d) the calibration of radiation monitoring equipment. 

10. Every State should ensure that adequate arrangements are in place for the 

appropriate training of the staff of its regulatory body, its law enforcement agencies 

and its emergency services organizations.

11. Every State should establish a national register of radioactive sources. This 

register should, as a minimum, include Category I and 2 radioactive sources as 

described in the Annex to this Code. The information contained in that register 

should be appropriately protected. For the purpose of introducing efficiency in the 

exchange of radioactive source information between States, States should endeavour 

to harmonize the formats of their registers. 

12. Every State should ensure that information concerning any loss of control 

over radioactive sources, or any incidents, with potential transboundary effects 

involving radioactive sources, is provided promptly to potentially affected States 

through established IAEA or other mechanisms. 

13. Every State should:

(a) promote awareness among industry, health professionals, the public, and 

government bodies of the safety and security hazards associated with orphan 

sources; and 

(b) encourage bodies and persons likely to encounter orphan sources during 

the course of their operations (such as scrap metal recyclers and customs posts) to 

implement appropriate monitoring programmes to detect such sources. 

14. Every State should encourage the reuse or recycling of radioactive sources, 

when practicable and consistent with considerations of safety and security. 

15. Every State should, in implementing this Code, emphasize to designers, 

manufacturers (both manufacturers of radioactive sources and manufacturers of 

devices in which radioactive sources are incorporated), suppliers and users and those 

managing disused sources their responsibilities for the safety and security of 

radioactive sources. 

16. Every State should define its domestic threat, and assess its vulnerability with 

respect to this threat for the variety of sources used within its territory, based on the 

potential for loss of control and malicious acts involving one or more radioactive 

sources. 

17. Each State should take appropriate measures consistent with its national law 

to protect the confidentiality of any information that it receives in confidence under 

this Code of Conduct from another State or through participation in an activity 

carried out for the implementation of this Code of Conduct. If any State provides 

information to international organizations in confidence, steps should be taken to 

ensure that the confidentiality of such information is protected. A State that has 

received information in confidence from another State should only provide this 

information to third parties with the consent of that other State. A State is not 

expected to provide any information that it is not permitted to communicate pursuant 

to its national law or which would jeopardize the security of that State. 

LEGISLATION AND REGULATIONS 

18. Every State should have in place legislation and regulations that. 

(a) prescribe and assign governmental responsibilities to assure the safety and 

security of radioactive sources; 

(b) provide for the effective control of radioactive sources; 
Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources 1401

(c) specify the requirements for protection against exposure to ionizing 

radiation; and 

(d) specify the requirements for the safety and security of radioactive sources 

and of the devices in which sources are incorporated. 

19. Such legislation and/or regulations should provide for, in particular: 

(a) the establishment of a regulatory body whose regulatory functions are 

effectively independent of other functions with respect to radioactive sources, 

such as the management of radioactive sources or the promotion of the use of 

radioactive sources. This body should have the powers and characteristics listed 

in paragraphs 20 to 22; 

(b) measures to protect individuals, society and the environment from the 

deleterious effects of ionizing radiation from radioactive sources; 

(c) administrative requirements relating to the authorization of the 

management of radioactive sources; 

(d) provisions for exemption, as appropriate, from the administrative 

requirements referred to in paragraph (c) above; 

(e) administrative requirements relating to notifications to the regulatory body 

of actions involved in the management of radioactive sources that may engender 

a significant risk to individuals, society or the environment; 

(f) managerial requirements relating in particular to the establishment of 

adequate policies, procedures and measures for the control of radioactive sources; 

(g) requirements for security measures to deter, detect and delay the 

unauthorized access to, or the theft, loss or unauthorized use or removal of 

radioactive sources during all stages of management; 

(h) requirements relating to the verification of the safety and security of 

radioactive sources, through safety and security assessments, monitoring and 

verification of compliance, and the maintenance of appropriate records; and 

(i) the capacity to take appropriate enforcement actions 

REGULATORY BODY 

20. Every State should ensure that the regulatory body established by its 

legislation has the authority to: 

(a) establish regulations and issue guidance relating to the safety and security 

of radioactive sources; 

(b) require those who intend to manage radioactive sources to seek an 

authorization and to submit: 

(i) a safety assessment; and 

(ii) a security plan or assessment as appropriate 

for the source and/or the facility in which the source is to be managed, if deemed 

necessary in the light of the risks posed and, in the case of security, the current 

national threat assessment; 

(c) obtain all relevant information from an applicant for an authorization; 

(d) issue, amend, suspend or revoke, as necessary, authorizations for the 

management of radioactive sources. 

(e) attach clear and unambiguous conditions to the authorizations issued by it, 

including conditions relating to: 

(i) responsibilities; 

(ii) minimum operator competencies; 

(iii) minimum design and performance criteria, and maintenance 

requirements for radioactive sources and the devices in which they are 

incorporated; 

(iv) minimum performance criteria and maintenance requirements for 

equipment and systems used to ensure the safety and security of radioactive 

sources; 

(v) requirements for emergency procedures and communication links; 
1402 Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources

(vi) work procedures to be followed; 

(vii) the safe and secure management of disused sources, including, where 

applicable, agreements regarding the return of disused sources to a supplier; 

(viii) measures to determine, as appropriate, the trustworthiness of 

individuals involved in the management of radioactive sources; and 

(ix) the confidentiality of information relating to the security of sources; 

(f) obtain any relevant and necessary information from a person with an 

authorization, in particular if that is warranted by revised safety or security 

assessments; 

(g) require those supplying or transferring radioactive sources or devices 

incorporating radioactive sources to provide the recipient with all relevant 

technical information to permit their safe and secure management. 

(h) enter premises in order to undertake inspections for the verification of 

compliance with regulatory requirements; 

(i) enforce regulatory requirements;

(j) monitor, or request other authorized bodies to monitor, at appropriate 

checkpoints for the purpose of detecting orphan sources; 

(k) ensure that corrective actions are taken when a radioactive source is in an 

unsafe or non-secure condition; 

(l) provide, on a case-by-case basis, to a person with an authorization and the 

public any information that is deemed necessary in order to protect individuals, 

society and the environment; 

(m) liaise and co-ordinate with other governmental bodies and with relevant 

non- governmental bodies in all areas relating to the safety and security of 

radioactive sources; 

(n) liaise with regulatory bodies of other countries and with international 

organizations to promote co-operation and the exchange of regulatory 

information; 

(o) establish criteria for intervention in emergency situations; 

(p) ensure that radioactive sources are stored in facilities appropriate for the 

purpose of such storage; and 

(q) ensure that, where disused sources are stored for extended periods of time, 

the facilities in which they are stored are fit for that purpose. 

21. Every State should ensure that its regulatory body 

(a) is staffed by qualified personnel; 

(b) has the financial resources and the facilities and equipment necessary to 

undertake its functions in an effective manner; and 

(c) is able to draw upon specialist resources and expertise from other relevant 

governmental agencies. 

22. Every State should ensure that its regulatory body 

(a) establishes procedures for dealing with applications for authorization; 

(b) ensures that arrangements are made for the safe management and secure 

protection of radioactive sources, including financial provisions where 

appropriate, once they have become disused; 

(c) maintains appropriate records of persons with authorizations in respect of 

radioactive sources, with a clear indication of the type(s) of radioactive sources 

that they are authorized to use, and appropriate records of the transfer and 

disposal of the radioactive sources on termination of the authorizations. These 

records should be properly secured against unauthorized access or alteration, and 

back-up copies should be made; 

(d) promotes the establishment of a safety culture and of a security culture 

among all individuals and in all bodies involved in the management of 

radioactive sources; 
Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources 1403

(e) establishes systems for ensuring that, where practicable, both radioactive 

sources and their containers, are marked by users with an appropriate sign to 

warn members of the public of the radiation hazard, but where this is not 

practicable, at least the container is so marked; 

(f) establishes systems for ensuring that the areas where radioactive sources 

are managed are marked by users with appropriate signs to warn workers or 

members of the public, as applicable, of the radiation hazard; 

(g) establishes systems for ensuring that, where practicable, radioactive 

sources are identifiable and traceable, or where this is not practicable, ensures 

that alternative processes for identifying and tracing those sources are in place; 

(h) ensures that inventory controls are conducted on a regular basis by 

persons with authorizations; 

(i) carries out both announced and unannounced inspections at an appropriate 

frequency taking into account past performance and the risks presented by the 

radioactive source; 

(j) takes enforcement actions, as appropriate, to ensure compliance with 

regulatory requirements; 

(k) ensures that the regulatory principles and criteria remain adequate and 

valid and take into account, as applicable, operating experience and 

internationally endorsed standards and recommendations; 

(l) requires the prompt reporting by authorized persons of loss of control over, 

and of incidents in connection with, radioactive sources; 

(m) provides guidance on appropriate levels of information, instruction and 

training on the safety and security of radioactive sources and the devices or 

facilities in which they are housed, to manufacturers, suppliers and users of 

radioactive sources; 

(n) requires authorized persons to prepare emergency plans, as appropriate; 

(o) is prepared, or has established provisions, to recover and restore 

appropriate control over orphan sources, and to deal with radiological 

emergencies and has established appropriate response plans and measures; 

(p) is prepared in respect of orphan sources that may have originated within 

the State to assist in obtaining technical information relating to their safe and 

secure management. 

IMPORT AND EXPORT OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES 

23. Every State involved in the import or export of radioactive sources should 

take appropriate steps to ensure that transfers are undertaken in a manner consistent 

with the provisions of the Code and that transfers of radioactive sources in 

Categories 1 and 2 of the Annex to this Code take place only with the prior 

notification by the exporting State and, as appropriate, consent by the importing 

State in accordance with their respective laws and regulations. 

24. Every State intending to authorize the import of radioactive sources in 

Categories 1 and 2 of the Annex to this Code should consent to their import only if 

the recipient is authorized to receive and possess the source under its national law 

and the State has the appropriate technical and administrative capability, resources 

and regulatory structure needed to ensure that the source will be managed in a 

manner consistent with the provisions of this Code. 

25. Every State intending to authorize the export of radioactive sources in 

Categories 1 and 2 of the Annex to this Code should consent to its export only if it 

can satisfy itself, insofar as practicable, that the receiving State has authorized the 

recipient to receive and possess the source and has the appropriate technical and 

administrative capability, resources and regulatory structure needed to ensure that the 

source will be managed in a manner consistent with the provisions of this Code. 

26. If the conditions in paragraphs 24 and 25 with respect to a particular import 

or export cannot be satisfied, that import or export may be authorized in exceptional 
1404 Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources

circumstances with the consent of the importing State if an alternative arrangement 

has been made to ensure the source will be managed in a safe and secure manner. 

27. Every State should allow for re-entry into its territory of disused radioactive 

sources if, in the framework of its national law, it has accepted that they be returned 

to a manufacturer authorized to manage the disused sources. 

28. Every State which authorizes the import or export of a radioactive source 

should take appropriate steps to ensure that such import or export is conducted in a 

manner consistent with existing relevant international standards relating to the 

transport of radioactive materials. 

29. Although not subject to the authorization procedures outlined in paragraphs 

24 and 25 above, the transport of radioactive sources through the territory of a transit 

or transshipment state should be conducted in a manner consistent with existing 

relevant international standards relating to the transport of radioactive materials, in 

particular paying careful attention to maintaining continuity of control during 

international transport. 

ROLE OF THE IAEA

30. The IAEA should:

(a) continue to collect and disseminate information on laws, regulations and 

technical standards relating to the safe management and secure protection of 

radioactive sources, develop and establish relevant technical standards and 

provide for the application of these standards at the request of any State, inter alia 

by advising and assisting on all aspects of the safe management and secure 

protection of radioactive sources; 

(b) disseminate this Code and related information widely; and 

(c) in particular, implement the measures approved by its policy-making 

organs. 

DISSEMINATION OF THE CODE 

31. Every State should, as appropriate, inform persons involved in the 

management of radioactive sources, such as industry, health professionals, and 

government bodies, and the public, of the measures it has taken to implement this 

Code, and should take steps to disseminate that information. 
Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources 1405

Annex: List of Sources Covered by the Code

Category I sources, if not safely managed or securely protected would be likely to 

cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with 

them, for more than a few minutes. It would probably be fatal to be close to this amount 

of unshielded material for a period of a few minutes to an hour. These sources are 

typically used in practices such as radiothermal generators, irradiators and radiation 

teletherapy. 

Category 2 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause 

permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, 

for a short time (minutes to hours). It could possibly be fatal to be close to this amount 

of unshielded radioactive material for a period of hours to days. These sources are 

typically used in practices such as industrial gamma radiography, high dose rate 

brachytherapy and medium dose rate brachytherapy. 

Category 3 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause 

permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, 

for some hours. It could possibly - although it is unlikely - be fatal to be close to this 

amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of days to weeks. These sources 

are typically used in practices such as fixed industrial gauges involving high activity 

sources (for example, level gauges, dredger gauges, conveyor gauges and spinning pipe 

gauges) and well logging. 

Table I provides a categorization by activity levels for radionuclides that are 

commonly used. These are based on D-values which define a dangerous source i.e.: a 

source that could, if not under control, give rise to exposure sufficient to cause severe 

deterministic effects. A more complete listing of radionuclides and associated activity 

levels corresponding to each category, and a fuller explanation of the derivation of the 

D-values, may be found in TECDOC-l344, which also provides the underlying 

methodology that could be applied to radionuclides not listed. Typical source uses are 

noted above for illustrative purposes only. 

In addition to these categories, States should give appropriate attention to radioactive 

sources considered by them to have the potential to cause unacceptable consequences if 

employed for malicious purposes, and to aggregations of lower activity sources (as 

defined by TECDOC 1344) which require management under the principles of this 

Code. 
1406 Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources

Table I. Activities Corresponding to Thresholds of Categories

Radionuclides

Category 1 Category 2 Category 1

1000 x D 10 x D D

(TBq) (Ci)a (TBq) (Ci)a (TBq) (Ci)a

Am-241 6.E+01 2.E+03 6.E-01 2.E+01 6.E-02 2.E+00

Am-241/Be 6.E+01 2.E+03 6.E-01 2.E+01 6.E-02 2.E+00

Cf-252 2.E+01 5.E+02 2.E-01 5.E-00 2.E-02 5.E-01

Cm-244 5.E+01 1.E+03 5.E-01 1.E+01 5.E-02 1.E+00

Co-60 3.E+01 8.E+02 3.E-01 8.E+00 3.E-02 8.E-01

Cs-137 1.E+02 3.E+03 1.E+00 3.E+01 1.E-01 3.E+00

Gd-153 1.E+03 3.E+04 1.E+01 3.E+02 1.E+00 3.E+01

Ir-192 8.E+01 2.E+03 8.E-01 2.E+01 8.E-02 2.E+00

Pm-147 4.E+04 1.E+06 4.E+02 1.E+04 4.E+01 1.E+03

Pu-238 6.E+01 2.E+03 6.E-01 2.E+01 6.E-02 2.E+00

Pu-239b/Be 6.E+01 2.E+03 6.E-01 2.E+01 6.E-02 2.E+00

Ra-226 4.E+01 1.E+03 4.E-01 1.E+01 4.E-02 1.E+00

Se-75 2.E+02 5.E+03 2.E+00 5.E+01 2.E-01 5.E+00

Sr-90 (Y-90) 1.E+03 3.E+04 1.E+01 3.E+02 1.E+00 3.E+01

Tm-170 2.E+04 5.E+05 2.E+02 5.E+03 2.E+01 5.E+02

Yb-169 3.E+02 8.E+03 3.E+00 8.E+01 3.E-01 8.E+00

Au-198* 2.E+02 5.E+03 2.E+00 5.E+01 2.E-01 5.E+00

Cd-109* 2.E+04 5.E+05 2.E+02 5.E+03 2.E+01 5.E+02

Co-57* 7.E+02 2.E+04 7.E+00 2.E+02 7.E-01 2.E+01

Fe-55* 8.E+05 2.E+07 8.E+03 2.E+05 8.E+02 2.E+04

Ge-68* 7.E+02 2.E+04 7.E+00 2.E+02 7.E-01 2.E+01

Ni-63* 6.E+04 2.E+06 6.E+02 2.E+04 6.E+01 2.E+03

Pd-103* 9.E+04 2.E+06 9.E+02 2.E+04 9.E+01 2.E+03

Po-210* 6.E+02 2.E+03 6.E-01 2.E+01 6.E-02 2.E+00

Ru-106 (Rh-106)* 3.E+02 8.E+03 3.E+00 8.E+01 3.E-01 8.E+00
Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources 1407

Radionuclides

Category 1 Category 2 Category 1

1000 x D 10 x D D

(TBq) (Ci)a (TBq) (Ci)a (TBq) (Ci)a

Tl-204* 2.E+04 5.E+05 2.E+02 5.E+03 2.E+01 5.E+02

These radionuclides are very unlikely to be used in individual radioactive sources with activity levels that 

would place them within Categories 1, 2, or 3 and would therefore not be subject to the paragraph relating to 

national registries (11) or the paragraphs relating to import and export control (23 to 26).

a The primary values to be used are given in TBq. Curie values are provided for practical usefulness and are 

rounded after conversion.

b Criticality and safeguard issues will need to be considered for multiples of D.
1408 Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources

Annex 2

Open-Ended Meeting of Technical and Legal Experts

to Review a Draft Revised Code of Conduct on

the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (Annex 2)

Vienna, 14-18 July 2003

Report of the Chairman

1. An open-ended meeting of technical and legal experts to review and finalize a 

draft revised Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources1 met 

from 14 to 18 July 2003 at the IAEA Headquarters in Vienna under the chairmanship of 

Mr. S. McIntosh (Australia). The meeting was attended by representatives from 21 

Member States (Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, the Czech Republic, 

Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Germany, India, Israel, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, the Russian 

Federation, the Slovak Republic, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United 

States of America) and an observer from the NEA/OECD. The meeting was opened by 

Mr T. Taniguchi, DDG-NS, followed by introductory remarks by Mr A. Gonzalez, 

NSRW . 

2. At the outset, the Chairman recalled the discussions undertaken and decisions 

made at the Group's previous meetings of 19-23 August 2002 and 3-7 March 2003. 

Building on those discussions and decisions, the Group made a number of amendments 

to the draft revised Code. These included, inter alia, changes to some of the definitions 

in the Code and the addition of language concerning the establishment of systems for 

mitigating or minimizing the radiological consequences of accidents or malicious acts 

involving radioactive sources. 

3. As foreshadowed in the report of the meeting of 3-7 March 2003, the Group gave 

priority to consideration of the scope of the Code. That consideration was carried out in 

the light of the recent finalization of the revisions to the IAEA's Categorization of 

Radioactive Sources, published as IAEA-TECDOC-1344. The Group confirmed that the 

Code – with the exception of paragraphs relating to national registers and export/import 

control – should apply, with some modification, to sources in Categories I to 3 of the 

categorization developed in TECDOC-1344. This approach is now reflected in the 

Annex to the Code. Sources containing radionuclides which, although included in 

TECDOC-1344, do not meet the definition of “radioactive source” in the Code - for 

example because they are not in a solid form, or are unsealed sources – are outside the 

scope of the Code, and are therefore excluded from Table I in the Annex. Additionally, 

radionuclides that are unlikely to be used in radioactive sources with activity levels that 

would place them within Categories 1, 2 or 3 were marked with an asterisk, in order to 

indicate that the Code is not currently applicable to individual sources of these types. 

4. At the same time, the Group agreed that States should also devote appropriate 

attention to the regulation, in accordance with the Code, of other potentially harmful 

radioactive sources. Such sources include those considered by them to have the potential 

to cause unacceptable consequences if employed for malicious purposes, and 

aggregations of lower activity sources. 

5. The Group recalled that the scope of the Code excluded unsealed radioactive 

sources. The Group agreed that, although the content of the Code could not be precisely 

applied to unsealed radioactive sources, States should be encouraged to regulate them 

under similar principles in some circumstances. A paragraph to that effect was inserted 

in the preamble to the Code. 

––––––––

1 The IAEA Board of Governors took note of an earlier version of the Code of Conduct on 11 

September 2000, published as IAEA/CODEOC/200 1. 
Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources 1409

6. The Group agreed that the Code did not apply to radioactive sources within 

military or defence programmes, although some states expressed the opinion that such 

sources should be managed in accordance with the objectives of the Code and that the 

Code's principles should apply to such sources during and after transfer to civilian 

programmes. The vulnerability of sources during any form of transfer was highlighted in 

the preamble. 

7. The Group agreed on further enhancements to the paragraphs concerning the 

export and import of radioactive sources. In particular, it was agreed that the scope of 

these paragraphs should be restricted to sources within Categories I and 2 of the 

classification structure contained in the Annex to the Code. The Group considered that 

the implementation of these paragraphs would be assisted if the Secretariat could take 

responsibility for the compilation, maintenance and publication of a list of contact 

details of competent national regulatory bodies, and for the development of a 

standardised format for importing States to use in indicating that prospective users were 

properly authorized. Some experts considered that the Secretariat should also take 

responsibility for providing information concerning the degree of implementation by 

importing States of the Code, with the consent of the States involved. The Group noted 

the importance of developing further guidance on the full implementation of the 

paragraphs dealing with export and import control. In particular, the guidance should 

include understandings on how an exporting State would assess the degree to which an 

importing State has implemented the Code. As in the draft developed in March 2003, the 

revised draft Code includes language permitting the export of a source other than in 

accordance with these paragraphs only “in exceptional circumstances”. The Group noted 

that the guidance referred to above should include a common understanding as to the 

scope of the term “exceptional circumstances”. The Group encouraged supplier states to 

consult on the harmonization of their export control systems. 

8. The Group gave further consideration to the issue of security of sources, and 

inserted additional language concerning assessment of domestic threats and 

vulnerability, sabotage, mitigation and minimisation of consequences, and 

confidentiality. The Group noted that interim guidance on the security of radioactive 

sources had recently been published as TECDOC-1355, and that further guidance on this 

issue will be published by the Agency. The Group also noted that a TECDOC regarding 

security during transport was currently under development elsewhere in the Agency, and 

that there was therefore no need to include detailed language in this regard in the Code. 

Some states expressed concern that the strict application of the Code should not impede 

international initiatives directed at securing or recovering sources in an unsafe or 

insecure condition. 

9. The Group noted that the Agency's revised draft Action Plan for Safety and 

Security of Radioactive Sources, to be submitted to the September meeting of the IAEA' 

s Board of Governors, would contain a number of actions relevant to the implementation 

of the Code. The Group looked forward to the Board's consideration of this issue. The 

Chairman also noted the importance of the implementation of the Code by developing 

states, and the role which the Agency's technical co-operation programme might play in 

assisting that process. 

10. The Group agreed that the finalized draft Code should be submitted to the 

September meeting of the IAEA's Board of Governors and to the subsequent General 

Conference for their adoption. 

11. The Group further considered whether, and if so by what means, the commitment 

of States to the Code could be reinforced. That consideration was assisted by the 

circulation of a Chairman's paper on the subject prior to the meeting. The Group agreed 

that decisions and guidance on this issue were properly matters for the Agency's policymaking organs. However, some States expressed a preference for a political 

commitment. Further, several experts considered that, in addition to endorsement by the 

General Conference, States should be encouraged to make individual political 
1410 Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources

commitments concerning their implementation of the Code. Options for the wording of 

such a commitment that were proposed were: 

● “[State] declares that it will fully implement the terms of the Code of Conduct 

on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. Consistent with the non-legally 

binding status of the Code, this declaration does not create any legal obligations.” 

● “[State] fully supports and endorses the IAEA's efforts to create international 

standards for the safety and security of radioactive sources. [State] is working toward 

full implementation of the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of 

Radioactive Sources and encourages other countries to do the same.” 

● “[State] affirms its determination to uphold the principles of safe and secure 

management of radioactive sources, as are stated in the Code of Conduct on the 

Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. Consistent with the non-legally binding 

status of the Code, this declaration does not create any legal obligations or any 

specific reporting system.”

● “[State] affirms its support for the IAEA's work on the safety and security of 

radioactive sources, including the completion of the recently revised IAEA Code of 

Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, which is non- legally 

binding in nature. [State] will implement the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety 

and Security of Radioactive Sources and urges other countries to do the same. This 

declaration does not create any legal obligations or any specific reporting systems.” 

12. The experts agreed that the Code as revised by the Group provides the basis for 

significant enhancements of the control of radioactive sources. Such control would be a 

significant step towards enhancing both the safety and the security of radioactive 

sources. 

Steven McIntosh

Chairman 

18 July 2003 
Miscellaneous International Legislation and Executive Orders 1411

3. Miscellaneous International 

Legislation and Executive Orders

Miscellaneous International Legislation and Executive Orders 1413

3. Miscellaneous International Legislation and Executive 

Orders

Contents

A. EXECUTIVE ORDER 10841—PROVIDING FOR THE 

CARRYING OUT OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE 

ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954, AS AMENDED, RELATING 

TO INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION .......................................... 1415

Section 1 ........................................................................................................ 1415

Section 2 ........................................................................................................ 1415

Section 3 ........................................................................................................ 1415

Section 4 ........................................................................................................ 1415

B. EXECUTIVE ORDER 10956—AMENDMENT OF EXECUTIVE 

ORDER 10841 ......................................................................................... 1416

C. EXECUTIVE ORDER 12058—FUNCTIONS RELATING TO 

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION.................................................. 1417

Section 1. Department of Energy................................................................ 1417

Section 2. Department of State.................................................................... 1417

Section 3. Department of Commerce.......................................................... 1417

Section 4. Coordination ............................................................................... 1417

Section 5. General Provisions...................................................................... 1417

D. EXECUTIVE ORDER 12730—CONTINUATION OF EXPORT 

CONTROL REGULATIONS................................................................ 1418

Section 1 ........................................................................................................ 1418

Section 2 ........................................................................................................ 1418

Section 3 ........................................................................................................ 1418

Section 4 ........................................................................................................ 1419

E. EXECUTIVE ORDER 12114—ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS 

ABROAD OF MAJOR FEDERAL ACTIONS.................................... 1420

Section 1 ........................................................................................................ 1420

Section 2 ........................................................................................................ 1420

Section 3 ........................................................................................................ 1422

E.O. 10841—Carrying Out Certain Prov. of the AEA Relating to Int’l Coop. 1415

A. EXECUTIVE ORDER 10841—PROVIDING FOR THE CARRYING OUT OF 

CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954, AS 

AMENDED, RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 

amended (42 USC 201 et seq.), hereinafter referred to as the Act, and section 301 of 

Title 3 of the United States Code, and as President of the United States, it is ordered as 

follows:

Section 1

Whenever the President, pursuant to section 123 of the Act, has approved and authorized 

the execution of a proposed agreement providing for cooperation pursuant to section 

91c, 144a, 144b, or 144c of the Act (42 USC 2121(c), 2164(a), 2164(b), 2164(c), such 

approval and authorization by the President shall constitute his authorization to 

cooperate to the extent provided for in the agreement and in the manner provided for in 

section 91c, 144a, 144b, or 144c, as pertinent. In respect of sections 91c, 144b, and 

144c, authorizations by the President to cooperate shall be subject to the requirements of 

section 123d of the Act and shall also be subject to appropriate determinations made 

pursuant to section 2 of this order.

Section 2

 (a) The Secretary of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission are hereby 

designated and empowered to exercise jointly, after consultation with executive agencies 

as may be appropriate, the following-described authority without the approval, 

ratification, or other action of the President:

(1) The authority vested in the President by section 91c of the Act to determine 

that the proposed cooperation and each proposed transfer arrangement referred to in 

that section will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common 

defense and security.

(2) The authority vested in the President by section 144b of the Act to determine 

that the proposed cooperation and the proposed communication of Restricted Data 

referred to in that section will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to 

the common defense and security.

(3) The authority vested in the President by section 144c of the Act to determine 

that the proposed cooperation and the communication of the proposed Restricted 

Data referred to in that section will promote and not constitute an unreasonable risk 

to the common defense and security.

(b) Whenever the Secretary of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission are 

unable to agree upon a joint determination under the provisions of subsection (a) of this 

section, the recommendations of each of them, together with the recommendations of 

other agencies concerned, shall be referred to the President, and the determination shall 

be made by the President.

Section 3

This order shall not be construed as delegating the function vested in the President by 

section 91c of the Act of approving programs proposed under that section.

Section 4

 (a) The functions of negotiating and entering into international agreements under the 

Act shall be performed by or under the authority of the Secretary of State.

(b) International cooperation under the Act shall be subject to the responsibilities of 

the Secretary of State with respect to the foreign policy of the United States pertinent 

thereto.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

THE WHITE HOUSE.

September 30, 1959
1416 E.O. 10956—Amending E.O. 10841

B. EXECUTIVE ORDER 10956—AMENDMENT OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 

10841

Amendment of Executive Order No 10841, Relating to International Cooperation 

Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as Amended

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 

amended (42 U.S. C. 201 et seq.), and section 301 of Title 3 of the United States Code, 

and as President of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

Executive Order No. 10841 of September 30, 1959, entitled “providing for the 

Carrying Out of Certain Provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as Amended, 

Relating to International cooperation,” is hereby amended by changing the period at the 

end of paragraph 92) of section 2(a) thereof to a colon and adding to such paragraph the 

following: “Provided, that each determination made under this paragraph shall be 

referred to the President and, unless disapproved by him, shall become effective fifteen 

days after such referral or at such later time as may be specified in the determination.”

JOHN F. KENNEDY.

THE WHITE HOUSE.

August 10, 1961
E.O. 12058—Functions Relating to Nuclear Non-Proliferation 1417

C. EXECUTIVE ORDER 12058—FUNCTIONS RELATING TO NUCLEAR 

NON-PROLIFERATION

May 11, 1978, 43 F.R. 20947

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 

(Public Law 95-242, 92 Stat. 120, 22 U.S.C. 3201) and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 

as amended (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), and section 301 of Title 3 of the United States 

Code, and as President of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Department of Energy

The following functions vested in the President by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act 

of 1978 (92 Stat. 120, 22 U.S.C. 3201), hereinafter referred to as the Act, and by the 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), hereinafter referred to 

as the 1954 Act, are delegated or assigned to the Secretary of Energy:

(a) That function vested in section 402(b) of the Act (92 Stat. 145, 42 U.S.C. 2153a).

(b) Those functions vested by sections 131a(2)(G), 131b(1), and 131f(2) of the 1954 

Act (92 Stat. 127, 42 U.S.C. 2160).

(c) That function vested by section 131f(1)(A)(ii) of the 1954 Act to the extent it 

relates to the preparation of a detailed generic plan.

Section 2. Department of State

The Secretary of State shall be responsible for performing the following functions 

vested in the President:

(a) Those functions vested by sections 104(a), 104(d), 105, 403, 404, 407, and 501 of 

the Act (92 Stat. 122, 123, 146, 147, and 22 U.S.C. 3223(a), 3223(d), 3224, and 42 

U.S.C. 2153b, 2153b, 2153c, 2153e, and 22 U.S.C. 3261).

(b) That function vested by section 128a(2) of the 1954 Act (92 Stat. 137, 42 U.S.C. 

2157(a)(2)).

(c) That function vested by section 601 of the Act to the extent it relates to the 

preparation of an annual report.

(d) The preparation of timely information and recommendations related to the 

President’s functions vested by sections 126, 128b, and 129 of the 1954 Act (92 Stat. 

131, 137, and 138, 42 U.S.C. 2155, 2157, and 2158).

(e) That function vested by section 131c of the 1954 Act (92 Stat. 129, 42 U.S.C. 

2160(c); except that, the Secretary shall not waive the 60-day requirement for the 

preparation of a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Assessment Statement for more than 60 days 

without the approval of the President.

Section 3. Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce shall be responsible for performing the function vested 

in the President by section 309(c) of the Act (92 Stat. 141, 42 U.S.C. 2139a).

Section 4. Coordination

In performing the functions assigned to them by this Order, the Secretary of Energy 

and the Secretary of State shall consult and coordinate their actions with each other and 

with the heads of other concerned agencies.

Section 5. General Provisions

(a) Executive Order No. 11902 of February 2, 19761 entitled “Procedures for an 

Export Licensing Policy as to Nuclear Materials and Equipment,” is revoked.

(b) The performance of functions under either the Act or the 1954 Act shall not be 

delayed pending the development of procedures, even though as many as 120 days are 

allowed for establishing them. Except where it would be inconsistent to do so, such 

functions shall be carried out in accordance with procedures similar to those in effect 

immediately prior to the effective date of the Act.

Jimmy Carter

The White House,

May 11, 1978

––––––––

1 1978 U.S. Code Cong, and Adm. News Pamph. No. 4, p. 1159. 
1418 E.O. 12730—Continuation of Export Control Regulations

D. EXECUTIVE ORDER 12730—CONTINUATION OF EXPORT CONTROL 

REGULATIONS

Executive Order 12730 of September 30, 1990

Continuation of Export Control Regulations

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United 

States of America, including but not limited to section 203 of the International 

Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702) (hereafter referred to as “the Act”),

I, GEORGE BUSH, president of the United States of America, find that the unrestricted 

access of foreign parties to U.S. goods, technology, and technical data and the existence 

of certain boycott practices of foreign nations, in light of the expiration of the Export 

Administration Act of 1979, constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the 

national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States and hereby declare a 

national emergency with respect to that threat.

Accordingly, in order (a) to exercise the necessary vigilance over exports from the 

standpoint of their significance to the national security of the United States; (b) to 

further significantly the foreign policy of the United States, including it policy with 

respect to cooperation by U.S. persons with certain foreign boycott activities, and to 

fulfill its international responsibilities; and (c) to protect the domestic economy from the 

excessive drain of scarce materials and reduce the serious economic impact of foreign 

demand, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1

Notwithstanding the expiration of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended 

(50 U.S.C. App. 2401 et seq.), the provisions of that Act, the provisions for 

administration of that Act, and the delegations of authority set forth in Executive Order 

12002 of July 7, 1977, Executive Order 122141 of May 2, 1980, and Executive Order 

No. 121312 of May 4, 1979, as amended by Executive Order No. 12551 of February 21, 

1986, shall, to the extent permitted by law, be incorporated in this order and shall 

continue in full force and effect.

Section 2

All rules and regulations issued or continued in effect by the Secretary of Commerce 

under the authority of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended, including 

those published in Title 15, Chapter III, Subchapter C, of the Code of Federal 

Regulations, Parts 768 to 799 inclusive, and all orders, regulations, licenses, and other 

forms of administrative action issued, taken, or continued in effect pursuant thereto, 

shall, until amended or revoked by the Secretary of Commerce, remain in full force and 

effect, the same as if issued or taken pursuant to this order, except that the provisions of 

sections 203(b)(2) and 206 of the Act (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(2) and 1705) shall control over 

any inconsistent provisions in the regulations. Nothing in this section shall affect the 

continued applicability of administrative sanctions provided for by the regulations 

described above.

Section 3

Provisions for administration of section 38(e) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 

U.S.C. 2778(e)) may be made and shall continue in full force and effect until amended 

or revoked under the authority of section 203 of the Act (50 U.S.C. 1702). To the extent 

permitted by law, this order also shall constitute authority for the issuance and 

continuation in full force and effect all rules and regulations by the President or his 

––––––––

1 50 App. U.S.C.A. section 2403 nt. 2 50 App. U.S.C.A. section 2401 nt.
E.O. 12730—Continuation of Export Control Regulations 1419

delegate, and all orders, licenses, and other forms of administrative action issued, taken, 

or continued in effect pursuant thereto, relating to the administration of section 38(e).

Section 4

This order shall be effective as of midnight between September 30, 1990, and October 1, 

1990, and shall remain in effect until terminated. It is my intention to terminate this 

order upon the enactment into law of a bill reauthorizing the authorities contained in the 

Export Administration Act.

George Bush

THE WHITE HOUSE

September 30, 1990
1420 E.O. 12114—Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions

E. EXECUTIVE ORDER 12114—ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS ABROAD OF 

MAJOR FEDERAL ACTIONS

Source: The provisions of Executive Order 12114 of Jan. 4, 1979, appear at 44 FR 

1957, 3 CFR, 1979 Comp., p. 356, unless otherwise noted.

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United 

states, and as President of the United States, in order to further environmental objectives 

consistent with the foreign policy and national security policy of the United States, it is 

ordered as follows:

Section 1

1-1. Purpose and Scope. The purpose of this Executive Order is to enable responsible 

officials of Federal agencies having ultimate responsibility for authorizing and 

approving actions encompassed by this Order to be informed of pertinent environmental 

considerations and to take such considerations into account, with other pertinent 

considerations of national policy, in making decisions regarding such actions. While 

based on independent authority, this Order furthers the purpose of the National 

Environmental Policy Act and the Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act and 

the Deepwater Port Act consistent with the foreign policy and national security policy of 

the United States, and represents the United States government's exclusive and complete 

determination of the procedural and other actions to be taken by Federal agencies to 

further the purpose of the National Environmental Policy Act, with respect to the 

environment outside the United States, its territories and possessions.

Section 2

2-1. Agency Procedures. Every Federal agency taking major Federal actions 

encompassed hereby and not exempted herefrom having significant effects on the 

environment outside the geographical borders of the United States and its territories and 

possessions shall within eight months after the effective date of this Order have in effect 

procedures to implement this Order. Agencies shall consult with the Department of State 

and the Council on Environmental Quality concerning such procedures prior to placing 

them in effect.

2-2. Information Exchange. To assist in effectuating the foregoing purpose, the 

Department of State and the Council on Environmental Quality in collaboration with 

other interested Federal agencies and other nations shall conduct a program for exchange 

on a continuing basis of information concerning the environment. The objectives of this 

program shall be to provide information for use by decisionmakers, to heighten 

awareness of and interest in environmental concerns and, as appropriate, to facilitate 

environmental cooperation with foreign nations.

2-3. Actions Included. Agencies in their procedures under Section 2-1 shall establish 

procedures by which their officers having ultimate responsibility for authority and 

approving actions in one of the following categories encompassed by this Order, take 

into consideration in making decisions concerning such actions, a document described in 

Section 2-4(a): 

(a) major Federal actions significantly affecting the environment of the global commons 

outside the jurisdiction of any nation (e.g., the oceans or Antarctica); 

(b) major Federal actions significantly affecting the environment of a foreign nation not 

participating with the United States and not otherwise involved in the action; 

(c) major Federal actions significantly affecting the environment of a foreign nation 

which provide to that nation: 

(1) a product, or physical project producing a principal product or an emission 

or effluent, which is prohibited or strictly regulated by Federal law in the 

United States because its toxic effects on the environment create a serious 

public health risk; or 
E.O. 12114—Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions 1421

(2) a physical project which in the United States is prohibited or strictly 

regulated by Federal law to protect the environment against radioactive 

substances. 

(d) major Federal actions outside the United States, its territories and possessions which 

significantly affect natural or ecological resources of global importance designated for 

protection under this subsection by the President, or, in the case of such a resource 

protected by international agreement binding on the United States, by the Secretary of 

State. Recommendations to the President under this subsection shall be accompanied by 

the views of the Council on Environmental Quality and the Secretary of State. 

2-4. Applicable Procedures. (a) There are the following types of documents to be used 

in connection with actions described in Section 2-3: 

(i) environmental impact statements (including generic, program and specific 

statements); 

(ii) bilateral or multilateral environmental studies, relevant or related to the 

proposed action, by the United States and one or more foreign nations, or by an 

international body or organization in which the United States is a member or 

participant; or 

(iii) concise reviews of the environmental issues involved, including 

environmental assessments, summary environmental analyses or other 

appropriate documents. 

(b) Agencies shall in their procedures provide for preparation of documents described in 

Section 2-4(a), with respect to actions described in Section 2-3, as follows: 

(i) for effects described in Section 2-3(a), an environmental impact statement 

described in Section 2-4(a)(i); 

(ii) for effects described in Section 2-3(b), a document described in Section 2-

4(a)(ii) or (iii), as determined by the agency; 

(iii) for effects described in Section 2-3(c), a document described in Section 2-

4(a)(ii) or (iii), as determined by the agency; 

(iv) for effects described in Section 2-3(d), a document described in Section 2-

4(a)(i), (ii) or (iii), as determined by the agency. 

Such procedures may provide that an agency need not prepare a new document 

when a document described in Section 2-4(a) already exists. 

(c) Nothing in this Order shall serve to invalidate any existing regulations of any agency 

which have been adopted pursuant to court order or pursuant to judicial settlement of 

any case or to prevent any agency from providing in its procedures for measures in 

addition to those provided for herein to further the purpose of the National 

Environmental Policy Act and other environmental laws, including the Marine 

Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act and the Deepwater Port Act, consistent with the 

foreign and national security policies of the United States. 

(d) Except as provided in Section 2-5(b), agencies taking action encompassed by this 

Order shall, as soon as feasible, inform other Federal agencies with relevant expertise of 

the availability of environmental documents prepared under this Order. 

Agencies in their procedures under Section 2-1 shall make appropriate provision for 

determining when an affected nation shall be informed in accordance with Section 3-2 of 

this Order of the availability of environmental documents prepared pursuant to those

procedures. 

In order to avoid duplication of resources, agencies in their procedures shall provide for 

appropriate utilization of the resources of other Federal agencies with relevant 

environmental jurisdiction or expertise. 

2-5. Exemptions and Considerations. (a) Notwithstanding Section 2-3, the following 

actions are exempt from this Order: 

(i) actions not having a significant effect on the environment outside the United 

States as determined by the agency; 

(ii) actions taken by the President; 
1422 E.O. 12114—Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions

(iii) actions taken by or pursuant to the direction of the President or Cabinet 

officer when the national security or interest is involved or when the action 

occurs in the course of an armed conflict; 

(iv) intelligence activities and arms transfers; 

(v) export licenses or permits or export approvals, and actions relating to 

nuclear activities except actions providing to a foreign nation a nuclear 

production or utilization facility as defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 

as amended, or a nuclear waste management facility; 

(vi) votes and other actions in international conferences and organizations; 

(vii) disaster and emergency relief action. 

(b) Agency procedures under Section 2-1 implementing Section 2-4 may provide for 

appropriate modifications in the contents, timing and availability of documents to other 

affected Federal agencies and affected nations, where necessary to: 

(i) enable the agency to decide and act promptly as and when required; 

(ii) avoid adverse impacts on foreign relations or infringement in fact or 

appearance of other nations' sovereign responsibilities, or 

(iii) ensure appropriate reflection of: 

(1) diplomatic factors; 

(2) international commercial, competitive and export promotion factors; 

(3) needs for governmental or commercial confidentiality; 

(4) national security considerations; 

(5) difficulties of obtaining information and agency ability to analyze 

meaningfully environmental effects of a proposed action; and 

(6) the degree to which the agency is involved in or able to affect a decision to 

be made.

(c) Agency procedure under Section 2-1 may provide for categorical exclusions and for 

such exemptions in addition to those specified in subsection (a) of this Section as may be 

necessary to meet emergency circumstances, situations involving exceptional foreign 

policy and national security sensitivities and other such special circumstances. In 

utilizing such additional exemptions agencies shall, as soon as feasible, consult with the 

Department of State and the Council on Environmental Quality. 

(d) The provisions of Section 2-5 do not apply to actions described in Section 2-3(a) 

unless permitted by law. 

Section 3

3-1. Rights of Action. This Order is solely for the purpose of establishing internal 

procedures for Federal agencies to consider the significant effects of their actions on the 

environment outside the United States, its territories and possessions, and nothing in this 

Order shall be construed to create a cause of action.

3-2. Foreign Relations. The Department of State shall coordinate all communications by 

agencies with foreign governments concerning environmental agreements and other 

arrangements in implementation of this Order.

3-3. Multi-Agency Actions. Where more than one Federal agency is involved in an action 

or program, a lead agency, as determined by the agencies involved, shall have 

responsibility for implementation of this Order.

3-4. Certain Terms. For purposes of this Order, “environment” means the natural and 

physical environment and excludes social, economic and other environments; and an 

action significantly affects the environment if it does significant harm to the 

environment even though on balance the agency believes the action to be beneficial to 

the environment. The term “export approvals” in Section 2-5(a)(v) does not mean or 

include direct loans to finance exports.

3-5. Multiple Impacts. If a major Federal action having effects on the environment of the 

United States or the global commons requires preparation of an environmental impact 

statement, and if the action also has effects on the environment of a foreign nation, an 

environmental impact statement need not be prepared with respect to the effects on the 

environment of the foreign nation.


NUREG

-0980

Vol. 3, No. 10

Nuclear Regulatory Legislation 112thCongress; 2ndSession