J-S27012-17

_____________________________

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

MYLES RAMZEE

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 3224 EDA 2016

Appeal from the PCRA Order September 15, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Carbon County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-13-CR-0000047-1998

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., OTT, J., and PLATT, J.*

JUDGMENT ORDER BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED MAY 02, 2017

Appellant, Myles Ramzee, appeals from the order of the Carbon County 

Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed as untimely his serial petition filed 

under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), at 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-

9546. On March 19, 1999, a jury convicted Appellant of first-degree 

murder, robbery, aggravated assault, and conspiracy. The court sentenced 

Appellant on May 17, 1999, to life imprisonment without the possibility of 

parole for the murder conviction plus a consecutive term of 121⁄2 to 25 years’ 

imprisonment. This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on April 19, 

2000, and our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal on November 14, 

2000. See Commonwealth v. Ramzee, 758 A.2d 724 (Pa.Super. 2000), 

appeal denied, 568 Pa. 659, 795 A.2d 974 (2000). Appellant sought no 
J-S27012-17

- 2 -

further review. From 2001 to 2012, Appellant filed numerous unsuccessful 

petitions for collateral relief. 

Appellant filed the current pro se PCRA petition on March 23, 2016, 

seeking relief under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 

L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) and Montgomery v. Louisiana, ___ U.S. ___, 136 

S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016). The court appointed counsel, who filed 

a motion to withdraw and Turner/Finley1 no-merit letter on July 18, 2016. 

The court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice on July 27, 2016. Appellant 

responded pro se on August 3, 2016, and for the first time, raised Alleyne 

v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013). 

On September 15, 2016, the court denied PCRA relief and allowed counsel to 

withdraw. Appellant timely filed a pro se notice of appeal on October 5, 

2016. On October 17, 2016, the court ordered Appellant to file a concise 

statement per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b); Appellant did not comply.2 

The timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional requisite. 

Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 148 A.3d 849 (Pa.Super. 2016). A PCRA 

petition, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one 

____________________________________________

1 Commonwealth v. Turner, 518 Pa. 491, 544 A.2d 927 (1988) and 

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc). 

2 We observe Appellant is proceeding pro se on appeal but failed to file a 

court-ordered Rule 1925(b) statement. See Commonwealth v. Castillo, 

585 Pa. 395, 403, 888 A.2d 775, 780 (2005) (deeming issues waived per 

Rule 1925(b)). 
J-S27012-17

- 3 -

year of the date the underlying judgment of sentence becomes final. 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence is deemed final “at the 

conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme 

Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the 

expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). The 

statutory exceptions to the PCRA time-bar allow for very limited 

circumstances which excuse the late filing of a petition; a petitioner 

asserting a timeliness exception must file a petition within 60 days of when 

the claim could have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1-2). 

Instantly, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on or about 

February 12, 2001, following the 90-days for filing a petition for certiorari

with the United States Supreme Court. See U.S.Sup.Ct. Rule 13. Appellant 

filed the current pro se PCRA petition on March 23, 2016, more than 15 

years after his judgment of sentence became final, which is patently 

untimely. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Appellant attempts to invoke the 

“new constitutional right” exception per Section 9545(b)(1)(iii), insisting 

Miller/Montgomery afford him relief. Nevertheless, Appellant admits he 

was 23 years old at the time of his offenses. Thus, Miller/Montgomery

relief does not apply to Appellant. Moreover, this Court has rejected 

Appellant’s argument that Miller/Montgomery relief should be extended to 

those under 25 years old because the brain is not developed fully until that 

age. See Commonwealth v. Furgess, 149 A.3d 90 (Pa.Super. 2016) 
J-S27012-17

- 4 -

(holding 19-year-old appellant was not entitled to relief under 

Miller/Montgomery on collateral review; rejecting argument that he 

should be considered “technical juvenile”). Likewise, Alleyne law affords 

Appellant no relief. See Commonwealth v. Washington, ___ Pa. ___, 

142 A.3d 810 (2016) (holding new constitutional rule announced in Alleyne

is not substantive or watershed procedural rule that warrants retroactive 

application to collateral attacks on mandatory minimum sentences where 

judgment of sentence became final before Alleyne was decided).3 Thus, 

Appellant’s current petition remains untimely. Accordingly, we affirm.

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/2/2017

____________________________________________

3 Appellant also did not satisfy the 60-day rule regarding his Alleyne issue. 

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).