RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 9, 2022; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2021-CA-0130-MR

ROBERT EUGENE ALLEY APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM HENDERSON CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE SHEILA N. FARRIS, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 17-CI-00197

JULIA MADELLE ALLEY APPELLEE 

AND

NO. 2021-CA-0226-MR

JULIA MADELLE ALLEY CROSS-APPELLANT 

v. 

CROSS-APPEAL FROM HENDERSON CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE SHEILA N. FARRIS, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 17-CI-00197

ROBERT EUGENE ALLEY CROSS-APPELLEE 
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OPINION

VACATING

**   **  **

BEFORE: CALDWELL, GOODWINE, AND JONES, JUDGES.

GOODWINE, JUDGE: Robert Eugene Alley (“Robert”) appeals from the findings 

of fact, conclusions of law, and decree of dissolution of the Henderson Family

Court awarding Julia Madelle Alley (“Madelle”) permanent maintenance and 

requiring Robert to maintain a life insurance policy with Madelle as a 50% 

beneficiary. After careful review, we vacate those portions of the family court’s 

decree. 

Robert and Madelle were married on August 12, 1984, in Missouri. 

On April 5, 2017, Robert filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in the 

Henderson Family Court. Robert was 61 years old and worked as a psychiatrist. 

Madelle was 53 years old and never worked outside of the home after the first 

child was born. On August 29, 2018, the family court held an evidentiary hearing 

and took the matter under advisement. Approximately twenty-two months later, 

the family court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree of 

dissolution. The lengthy delay resulted from Robert’s inquest into whether the 

parties’ marriage was valid, which involved a declaratory action in Missouri. 

During the pendency of the Missouri case, the family court declined to rule on any 

of the parties’ motions. 
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After the Missouri court declared the parties’ marriage valid, the 

family court requested updated verified financial disclosures. On June 11, 2020, 

the family court entered the decree. Relevant to this appeal, the court awarded 

Madelle permanent maintenance and required Robert to maintain a life insurance 

policy with Madelle as 50% beneficiary. 

Madelle then filed motions to alter, amend, or vacate the decree. On 

January 11, 2021, the family court entered an order granting in part and denying in 

part her motions. None of the issues addressed in that order are pertinent to this 

appeal. This appeal and cross-appeal followed. 

On appeal, Robert argues the family court abused its discretion in: (1) 

awarding Madelle maintenance; (2) alternatively, making the maintenance award 

permanent; and (3) ordering Robert to continue a life insurance policy with 

Madelle as 50% beneficiary. 

First, Robert argues the family court abused its discretion in awarding 

Madelle maintenance. We review an award of spousal maintenance for abuse of 

discretion. Naramore v. Naramore, 611 S.W.3d 281, 286 (Ky. App. 2020).

“Abuse of discretion occurs when the circuit court’s decision is ‘arbitrary, 

unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.’” Id. (quoting 

Artrip v. Noe, 311 S.W.3d 229, 232 (Ky. 2010).
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Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 403.200(1) governs when a family 

court may award a spouse maintenance: 

(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal 

separation, or a proceeding for maintenance following 

dissolution of a marriage by a court which lacked 

personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse, the court 

may grant a maintenance order for either spouse only if it 

finds that the spouse seeking maintenance: 

(a) Lacks sufficient property, including marital 

property apportioned to [her], to provide for [her]

reasonable needs; and

(b) Is unable to support [herself] through 

appropriate employment or is the custodian of a 

child whose condition or circumstances make it 

appropriate that the custodian not be required to 

seek employment outside the home.

(Emphasis added.) If the spouse requesting maintenance meets both requirements, 

then the family court must consider the relevant factors in KRS 403.200(2) in 

setting the amount and duration of the maintenance award. 

The family court applied KRS 403.200(1) and found, “[w]ith the 

exception of her lack of effort to reeducate herself and gain employment she has 

been provided marital property to support her reasonable needs.” Record (“R.”) at

975. The court stated Madelle would receive approximately $594,000. Madelle 

“had 3 years to seek training or education to improve her employability.” Id. 

Thus, the court found Madelle received “substantial marital property but is not yet 

employed for which she bears the responsibility.” Id. 
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Despite making findings that Madelle had been apportioned 

substantial marital property to meet her reasonable needs and that she bore 

responsibility for her lack of employment, the family court awarded Madelle “a 

small amount of rehabilitative maintenance” because she was not yet employed. 

Id. The family court then applied the factors in KRS 403.200(2) in awarding 

Madelle permanent “maintenance in the amount of $3,000.00 per month until 

death, remarriage or cohabitation or as otherwise modifiable under Kentucky 

Revised Statutes.” Id. at 976. 

The family court abused its discretion because its analysis under KRS 

403.200(1) does not support its decision to award Madelle maintenance. The 

statute requires the requesting spouse both lack sufficient property to provide for 

her reasonable needs and is unable to support herself through appropriate 

employment. The family court found Madelle had “been awarded a substantial 

amount [of marital property] to provide for her needs.” R. at 975 (emphasis 

added). Thus, Madelle clearly does not meet the first requirement of KRS 

403.200(1)(a). We need not address the employment prong of KRS 403.200(1) 

because the statute requires the requesting spouse meet both prongs for an award of 

maintenance. As such, the family court clearly abused its discretion in awarding 

Madelle maintenance as its findings under the statute do not support the award.
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Second, Robert argues the family court abused its discretion in 

ordering him to continue to maintain a $500,000.00 term life insurance policy on 

himself with Madelle as a 50% beneficiary. Citing Weldon v. Weldon, 957 S.W.2d 

283 (Ky. App. 1997), Robert argues his obligation to continue the life insurance 

policy on behalf of Madelle must be for the purpose of securing his maintenance 

obligation to her should he predecease her. The facts of this case are 

distinguishable. 

Although we disagree with Robert’s reasoning, we agree the family 

court abused its discretion in obligating him to maintain a life insurance policy for 

Madelle’s benefit. “[A] term policy with no cash or present value . . . is not

property and not subject to division under KRS 403.190(2) and (3).” Davis v. 

Davis, 775 S.W.2d 942, 944 (Ky. App. 1989). Insurance proceeds are not realized 

as property until “after death, and therefore [are] not acquired during the 

marriage.” Id. In Davis, this Court held: 

Even if [husband] had disclosed the policies to the trial 

court during the pendency of the litigation, the trial court 

could not, we believe, have required that he maintain 

[wife] as a beneficiary of a portion of the proceeds under 

the facts of this case. A named beneficiary acquires no 

right other than a defeasible vested interest, a mere 

expectancy.

775 S.W.2d at 944. 
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Under Davis, Robert’s term life insurance policy was not property 

subject to division. As Madelle only has a mere expectancy in the payout of the 

policy, the family court lacked the authority to require Robert to maintain Madelle

as a beneficiary of 50% of the proceeds. Thus, we vacate this portion of the family 

court’s decree. 

On cross-appeal, Madelle argues the following findings of the family 

court were not supported by substantial evidence: (1) it was unclear whether she 

applied for employment; (2) she provided no testimony that she was unable to 

work; (3) she had three years to seek training or education to improve her 

employability; and (4) it was her fault she had no income. Additionally, Madelle 

argues the family court improperly considered credit card statements Robert filed 

after the final hearing in finding Madelle’s lifestyle had not changed in three years. 

First, we address Madelle’s arguments that certain findings in the 

decree were unsupported by substantial evidence. “We may not disturb the trial 

court’s factual findings unless they are manifestly against the weight of the 

evidence or not supported by substantial evidence. ‘Substantial evidence’ is 

evidence of substance and relevant consequence sufficient to induce conviction in 

the minds of reasonable people.” McGregor v. McGregor, 334 S.W.3d 113, 116 

(Ky. App. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
-8-

Additionally, the family court as fact finder has great latitude in 

weighing evidence: 

Regardless of conflicting evidence, the weight of the 

evidence, or the fact that the reviewing court would have 

reached a contrary finding, due regard shall be given to 

the opportunity of the [family] court to judge the

credibility of the witnesses because judging the

credibility of witnesses and weighing evidence are tasks 

within the exclusive province of the [family] court.

Jones v. Jones, 617 S.W.3d 418, 424-25 (Ky. App. 2021) (quoting Moore v. 

Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003)). 

Madelle takes issue with the family court’s findings that (1) it was 

unclear whether she applied for employment; (2) she provided no testimony that 

she was unable to work; (3) she had three years to seek training or education to 

improve her employability; and (4) it was her fault she had no income. Based on 

our review, the only evidence Madelle presented regarding the reasons for her lack 

of employment was her own testimony. She did not provide any documentation of 

her job applications, her health conditions, or that she was unable to work. 

Madelle did not provide any expert testimony or testimony from her treating 

physician to support her claims that she was unable to work due to health-related 

issues. The family court weighed the credibility of Madelle’s testimony and did 

not find it credible. Thus, it was reasonable for the family court to reach these 

findings and conclude that Madelle bore responsibility for her lack of employment.
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Furthermore, it seems Madelle contests these factual findings in an 

attempt to prove she is unable to support herself through appropriate employment 

as required by KRS 403.200 for an award of maintenance. As we held that 

Madelle is not entitled to maintenance because the family court found she had 

sufficient property to provide for her reasonable needs, the family court’s findings 

regarding her lack of employment do not affect the result.

Finally, Madelle takes issue with the family court’s finding that her 

lifestyle had not changed during the three years this action was pending. She 

argues the family court improperly considered credit card statements attached to 

Robert’s motion for contempt, which he filed after the evidentiary hearing. 

Madelle asserts there was no hearing or opportunity for her to respond to the 

motion. Madelle cites no law in support of her argument. 

Madelle does not assert this factual finding would change any of the 

family court’s legal conclusions. The family court previously warned Madelle that 

her spending habits met the standard for dissipation of marital assets. Even if the 

family court erred in relying on the credit card statements, the family court’s 

statement that Madelle spent much of Robert’s income on the parties’ joint credit 

card did not appear to affect any portion of the division of marital assets. Thus, 

even if the family court erred in making this finding, it was harmless. 
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For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the portions of the Henderson 

Circuit Court’s decree obligating Robert to pay Madelle maintenance and maintain 

life insurance with her as a 50% beneficiary. 

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:

Austin P. Vowels

M. Alexander Russell

Henderson, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Allison B. Rust

Henderson, Kentucky