NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

JAMES P., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, J.M., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 16-0420

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD29733

The Honorable Lisa Daniel Flores, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

David W. Bell Attorney at Law, Higley

By David W. Bell

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Amber E. Pershon

Counsel for Appellee
JAMES P. v. DCS, J.M.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Donn Kessler delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding 

Judge Peter B. Swann and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

K E S S L E R, Judge:

¶1 James P. (“Father”) challenges the juvenile court’s order 

severing his parental rights to his child, JM. For the following reasons, we 

affirm the juvenile court’s order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Father is the biological father of JM, born March 21, 2015. 

When JM was born, the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) took JM into 

custody because she tested positive for opiates at birth and JM’s mother

(“Mother”)1 was facing allegations of abusing substances and being unable 

to care for JM due to domestic violence. At the time, Father’s paternity had 

not been established and his whereabouts were unknown.

¶3 Father failed to appear at the dependency hearing without 

good cause in September 2015, and the juvenile court found JM dependent.

Father established his paternity to JM approximately five months later. 

During the next five months, he failed to contact DCS, and although he 

attended one hearing, he did so only after the court added a concurrent case 

plan of severance and adoption, arriving at the hearing four minutes before 

it ended. 

¶4 In July 2016, JM’s guardian ad litem moved to terminate 

Father’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment and JM’s being in 

an out-of-home placement for fifteen months. Father failed to appear at the 

initial severance hearing two months later. The court found Father had 

failed to attend the hearing without good cause and that Father had waived 

his right to contest the evidence supporting the grounds for termination. 

See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 8-535(D) (2016) (allowing court to find 

parent has waived parent’s legal rights and admitted the allegations of the 

 

1 Mother consented to adoption of JM and is not a party to this appeal.
JAMES P. v. DCS, J.M.

Decision of the Court

3

petition by failing to appear at the initial severance hearing).

2 Father 

appeared at the one-day severance trial in September 2016 and explained 

he had missed the initial termination hearing because he had 

misunderstood the date of the trial. However, the juvenile court affirmed 

its prior finding that Father failed to appear without good cause and 

proceeded with the severance trial. 

¶5 At trial, the DCS case manager testified JM was adoptable, she 

had been residing in an approved foster care home that was committed to 

adopting her, and that even if that placement were to disrupt, she would 

still be adoptable going forward. The case manager also stated Father had 

never met JM and that severance was in JM’s best interests because it would 

provide her with permanency, stability, and care for her special needs. 

Father admitted he had never met JM and that based on his 

communications with the foster placement, the foster placement was 

meeting JM’s needs and was willing to adopt her. 

¶6 The juvenile court found DCS had established a prima facie 

case, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father abandoned JM by failing 

to provide reasonable support and failing to maintain regular contact with 

JM for more than six months. See A.R.S. § 8-531(1) (2016) (stating “failure to 

maintain a normal parental relationship with the child without just cause 

for a period of six months constitutes prima facie evidence of 

abandonment”). It concluded Father had failed to rebut the presumption 

of abandonment because he did not demonstrate just cause for his failure 

to maintain a normal parental relationship with JM for more than six 

months. See Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. State Auto. & Cas. Underwriters, 

108 Ariz. 113, 115 (1972) (clarifying “whenever evidence contradicting [a]

presumption is introduced, the presumption vanishes”). Finally, the court 

concluded severance was in JM’s best interests because severance would 

protect JM from Father’s abandonment and provide her with an 

opportunity to be adopted by a placement who could meet her needs and 

provide her with love, stability, and permanency. It noted JM’s “significant 

special medical needs that make her especially vulnerable,” and found her 

current placement could meet her needs and wished to adopt her. 

¶7 Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A) (2016), 12-120.21(A)(1) (2016), and 12-2101(A)(1) (2016).

 

2 We cite the current version of the applicable statutes unless revisions 

material to this decision have since occurred.
JAMES P. v. DCS, J.M.

Decision of the Court

4

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

¶8 To terminate parental rights, the juvenile court must find, by 

clear and convincing evidence, at least one of the statutory grounds set out 

in A.R.S. § 8-533(B). See A.R.S. § 8-533(B) (2016); Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of 

Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249, ¶ 12 (2000). It must also find DCS has shown 

by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the best interests 

of the child. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284, ¶ 22 (2005). On review, 

“we will accept the juvenile court’s findings of fact unless no reasonable 

evidence supports those findings, and we will affirm a severance order 

unless it is clearly erroneous.” Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 

278, 280, ¶ 4 (App. 2002) (citations omitted). 

II. Best Interests Findings

¶9 Father challenges the juvenile court’s best interests findings, 

arguing: (1) DCS failed to prove severance was in JM’s best interest by a 

preponderance of the evidence; (2) the court did not find Father was unable 

to parent JM or meet her special needs; and (3) the court failed to consider 

the factors in Lawrence R. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 217 Ariz. 585 (App. 2008) 

before severing his parental rights. 

¶10 To establish that severance of a parent’s rights would be in a 

child’s best interests, the court must find either that the child will benefit 

from termination of the relationship or that the child would be harmed by 

continuation of the parental relationship. Id. at 587, ¶ 8 (citation and 

quotation omitted). In making this determination, the juvenile court may 

consider evidence that the child is adoptable or that an existing placement 

is meeting the needs of the child. Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 

Ariz. 43, 50, ¶ 19 (App. 2004) (citations omitted).

¶11 As an initial matter, Father’s argument that the court erred by 

severing his rights without finding he was unable to parent JM or meet her 

special needs fails. The statute does not require such a finding to justify 

termination. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1). Similarly, Father’s argument that the 

court failed to consider the factors in Lawrence R. fails. Lawrence R. does not 

provide mandatory factors for consideration. Instead, it clarifies that 

although “a determination that the child is adoptable alone does not require

the fact finder to conclude that severance is in the child’s best interests,” 

DCS “may satisfy the best interest requirement if it presents credible 

evidence that the child is adoptable.” Lawrence R., 217 Ariz. at 587, ¶ 8

(emphasis added) (citation omitted).
JAMES P. v. DCS, J.M.

Decision of the Court

5

¶12 Here, DCS presented credible evidence JM was adoptable. 

The DCS case manager testified that JM was adoptable, had been residing 

in an approved foster care home that was committed to adopting her, and 

that even if that placement were to disrupt, JM would still be adoptable 

going forward. Furthermore, the case manager testified severance was in 

JM’s best interests because it would provide JM with permanency, stability, 

and care for her special needs. See Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 

180 Ariz. 348, 352 (App. 1994) (upholding severance when case manager 

testified child “would benefit psychologically from the stability an 

adoption would provide” even though child did not have an adoptive 

placement). This evidence is sufficient to show JM was adoptable, 

satisfying the best interests requirement. Because DCS presented credible 

evidence JM was adoptable, the juvenile court did not err in severing 

Father’s parental rights. 

CONCLUSION

¶13 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s order 

severing Father’s parental rights to JM.