Testimony 

Before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. 

Senate 

United States General Accounting Office

GAO 

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 9:30 a.m. 

Friday, June 28, 2002 HOMELAND SECURITY 

New Department Could 

Improve Coordination but 

May Complicate Priority 

Setting 

Statement of Janet Heinrich 

Director, Health Care—Public Health Issues 

GAO-02-893T 
Page 1 GAO-02-893T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss the proposed 

creation of the Department of Homeland Security. Since the terrorist 

attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent anthrax incidents, there 

has been concern about the ability of the federal government to prepare 

for and coordinate an effective public health response to such events, 

given the broad distribution of responsibility for that task at the federal 

level. Our earlier work found, for example, that more than 20 federal 

departments and agencies carry some responsibility for bioterrorism 

preparedness and response and that these efforts are fragmented.1

Emergency response is further complicated by the need to coordinate 

actions with agencies at the state and local level, where much of the 

response activity would occur. 

The President’s proposed Homeland Security Act of 20022

 would bring 

many of these federal entities with homeland security responsibilities—

including public health preparedness and response—into one department, 

in an effort to mobilize and focus assets and resources at all levels of 

government. The aspects of the proposal concerned with public health 

preparedness and response would involve two primary changes to the 

current system, which are found in Title V of the proposed legislation. 

First, the proposal would transfer certain emergency preparedness and 

response programs from multiple agencies to the new department. 

Second, it would transfer the control over, but not the operation of, other 

public health preparedness assistance programs, such as providing 

emergency preparedness planning assistance to state and local 

governments, from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 

to the new department.3

 Title III of the proposed legislation would also 

transfer responsibility for certain chemical, biological, radiological, and 

nuclear research and development programs and activities to the new 

department.4

 1

U.S. General Accounting Office, Bioterrorism: Federal Research and Preparedness 

Activities, GAO-01-915 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28, 2001). 

2

H.R. 5005, 107th Cong. (2002). 

3

These changes are primarily covered by Sections 502 and 505, respectively, in Title V of 

the President’s proposed legislation. 

4

These changes are primarily covered by Sections 301, 302, and 303 of the President’s 

proposed legislation. 
Page 2 GAO-02-893T 

In order to assist the Committee in its consideration of this extensive 

reorganization of our government, my remarks today will focus on Titles 

III and V of the President’s proposal and the implications of (1) the 

proposed transfer of specific public health preparedness and response 

programs currently housed in HHS into the new department, (2) the 

proposed transfer of control over certain other public health preparedness 

assistance programs from HHS to the new department, and (3) the 

proposed transfer of responsibility for research and development on 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats to the new 

department. My testimony today is based largely on our previous and 

ongoing work on homeland security,5

 as well as a review of the proposed 

legislation. 

In summary, we believe that the proposed reorganization has the potential 

to repair the fragmentation we have noted in the coordination of public 

health preparedness and response programs at the federal, state, and local 

levels. As we have recommended, the proposal would institutionalize the 

responsibility for homeland security in federal statute. We expect that, in 

addition to improving overall coordination, the transfer of programs from 

multiple agencies to the new department could reduce overlap among 

programs and facilitate response in times of disaster. However, we have 

concerns about the proposed transfer of control of public health 

assistance programs that have both basic public health and homeland 

security functions from HHS to the new department. These dual-purpose 

programs have important synergies that we believe should be maintained. 

We are concerned that transferring control over these programs, including 

priority setting, to the new department has the potential to disrupt some 

programs that are critical to basic public health responsibilities. We do not 

believe that the President’s proposal is sufficiently clear on how both the 

homeland security and the public health objectives would be 

accomplished. The proposed Department of Homeland Security would 

also be tasked with developing national policy for and coordination of the 

federal government’s civilian research and development efforts to counter 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats. However, we are 

concerned that the proposed transfer of control and priority setting for 

research from the organizations where the research would be conducted 

could also be disruptive to dual-purpose programs. 

 5

See “Related GAO Products” at the end of this testimony. 
Page 3 GAO-02-893T 

Federal, state, and local government agencies have differing roles with 

regard to public health emergency preparedness and response. The federal 

government conducts a variety of activities, including developing 

interagency response plans, increasing state and local response 

capabilities, developing and deploying federal response teams, increasing 

the availability of medical treatments, participating in and sponsoring 

exercises, planning for victim aid, and providing support in times of 

disaster and during special events such as the Olympic games. One of its 

main functions is to provide support for the primary responders at the 

state and local level, including emergency medical service personnel, 

public health officials, doctors, and nurses. This support is critical because 

the burden of response falls initially on state and local emergency 

response agencies. 

The President’s proposal transfers control over many of the programs that 

provide preparedness and response support for the state and local 

governments to a new Department of Homeland Security. Among other 

changes, the proposed legislation transfers HHS’s Office of the Assistant 

Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness to the new 

department. Included in this transfer is the Office of Emergency 

Preparedness (OEP), which currently leads the National Disaster Medical 

System (NDMS)6

 in conjunction with several other agencies and the 

Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS).7

 The Strategic National 

Stockpile,8

 currently administered by the Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention (CDC), would also be transferred, although the Secretary of 

HHS would still manage the stockpile and continue to determine its 

contents. The President’s proposal would also transfer the select agent 

registration enforcement program from HHS to the new department. 

Currently administered by CDC, the program’s mission is the security of 

 6

In the event of an emergency, the NDMS has response teams that can provide support at 

the site of a disaster. These include specialized teams for burn victims, mental health 

teams, teams for incidents involving weapons of mass destruction, and mortuary teams 

that can be deployed as needed. About 2,000 civilian hospitals have pledged resources that 

could be marshaled in any domestic emergency under the system. 

7

The MMRS is a program that provides support for local community planning and response 

capabilities for mass casualty and terrorist incidents in metropolitan areas. 

8

The stockpile, previously called the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile, consists of two 

major components. The first component is the 12-Hour Push Packages, which contain 

pharmaceuticals, antidotes, and medical supplies and can be delivered to any site in the 

United States within 12 hours of a federal decision to deploy assets. The second component 

is the Vendor Managed Inventory. 

Background 
Page 4 GAO-02-893T 

those biologic agents that have the potential for use by terrorists. The 

proposal provides for the new department to consult with appropriate 

agencies, which would include HHS, in maintaining the select agent list. 

Under the President’s proposal, the new department would also be 

responsible for all current HHS public health emergency preparedness 

activities carried out to assist state and local governments or private 

organizations to plan, prepare for, prevent, identify, and respond to 

biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear events and public health 

emergencies. Although not specifically named in the proposal, this would 

include CDC’s Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response program and the 

Health Resources and Services Administration’s (HRSA) Bioterrorism 

Hospital Preparedness Program. These programs provide grants to states 

and cities to develop plans and build capacity for communication, disease 

surveillance, epidemiology, hospital planning, laboratory analysis, and 

other basic public health functions. Except as otherwise directed by the 

President, the Secretary of Homeland Security would carry out these 

activities through HHS under agreements to be negotiated with the 

Secretary of HHS. Further, the Secretary of Homeland Security would be 

authorized to set the priorities for these preparedness and response 

activities. 

The new Department of Homeland Security would also be responsible for 

conducting a national scientific research and development program, 

including developing national policy and coordinating the federal 

government’s civilian efforts to counter chemical, biological, radiological, 

and nuclear weapons or other emerging threats. This would include 

establishing priorities and directing and supporting national research and 

development and procurement of technology and systems for detecting, 

preventing, protecting against, and responding to terrorist acts using 

chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. Portions of the 

Departments of Agriculture, Defense, and Energy that conduct research 

would be transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security. For 

example, the Department of Energy’s (DOE) chemical and biological 

national security research and some of its nuclear smuggling and 

homeland security activities would be transferred to the new homeland 

security department. The Department of Homeland Security would carry 

out civilian health-related biological, biomedical, and infectious disease 

defense research and development through agreements with HHS, unless 

otherwise directed by the President. As part of this responsibility, the new 

department would establish priorities and direction for a program of basic 

and applied research on the detection, treatment, and prevention of 
Page 5 GAO-02-893T 

infectious diseases to be conducted by the National Institutes of Health 

(NIH). 

The transfer of federal assets and resources in the President’s proposed 

legislation has the potential to improve coordination of public health 

preparedness and response activities at the federal, state, and local levels. 

Our past work has detailed a lack of coordination in the programs that 

house these activities, which are currently dispersed across numerous 

federal agencies. In addition, we have discussed the need for an 

institutionalized responsibility for homeland security in federal statute.9

We have also testified that one key consideration in evaluating whether 

individual agencies or programs should be included or excluded from the 

proposed department is the extent to which homeland security is a major 

part of the agency or program mission.10

The President’s proposal provides the potential to consolidate programs, 

thereby reducing the number of points of contact with which state and 

local officials have to contend. However, coordination would still be 

required with multiple agencies across departments. Many of the agencies 

involved in these programs have differing perspectives and priorities, and 

the proposal does not sufficiently clarify the lines of authority of different 

parties in the event of an emergency, such as between the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation (FBI) and public health officials investigating a suspected 

bioterrorist incident. Let me provide you with more details. 

We have reported that many state and local officials have expressed 

concerns about the coordination of federal public health preparedness and 

response efforts.11 Officials from state public health agencies and state 

emergency management agencies have told us that federal programs for 

improving state and local preparedness are not carefully coordinated or 

well organized. For example, federal programs managed by the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Department of Justice (DOJ), 

 9

U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Responsibility and Accountability 

for Achieving National Goals, GAO-02-627T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 11, 2002). 

10U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Proposal for Cabinet Agency Has 

Merit, but Implementation Will be Pivotal to Success, GAO-02-886T (Washington, D.C.: 

June 25, 2002). 

11U.S. General Accounting Office, Bioterrorism: Federal Research and Preparedness 

Activities, GAO-01-915 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28, 2001). 

Transfer of Certain 

Public Health 

Programs Has 

Potential to Improve 

Coordination 
Page 6 GAO-02-893T 

OEP, and CDC all currently provide funds to assist state and local 

governments. Each program conditions the receipt of funds on the 

completion of a plan, but officials have told us that the preparation of 

multiple, generally overlapping plans can be an inefficient process.12 In 

addition, state and local officials told us that having so many federal 

entities involved in preparedness and response has led to confusion, 

making it difficult for them to identify available federal preparedness 

resources and effectively partner with the federal government. 

The proposed transfer of numerous federal response teams and assets to 

the new department would enhance efficiency and accountability for these 

activities. This would involve a number of separate federal programs for 

emergency preparedness and response, whose missions are closely 

aligned with homeland security, including FEMA; certain units of DOJ; and 

HHS’s Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency 

Preparedness, including OEP and its NDMS and MMRS programs, along 

with the Strategic National Stockpile and the select agent program. In our 

previous work, we found that in spite of numerous efforts to improve 

coordination of the separate federal programs, problems remained, and we 

recommended consolidating the FEMA and DOJ programs to improve the 

coordination.13 The proposal places these programs under the control of 

the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response, who 

could potentially reduce overlap and improve coordination. This change 

would make one individual accountable for these programs and would 

provide a central source for federal assistance. 

The proposed transfer of MMRS, a collection of local response systems 

funded by HHS in metropolitan areas, has the potential to enhance its 

communication and coordination. Officials from one state told us that 

their state has MMRSs in multiple cities but there is no mechanism in 

place to allow communication and coordination among them. Although 

the proposed department has the potential to facilitate the coordination of 

this program, this example highlights the need for greater regional 

coordination, an issue on which the proposal is silent. 

 12U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Partnership 

in a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness, GAO-02-547T

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22, 2002). 

13U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related 

Recommendations, GAO-01-822 (Washington, D.C., Sept. 20, 2001). 
Page 7 GAO-02-893T 

Because the new department would not include all agencies with public 

health responsibilities related to homeland security, coordination across 

departments would still be required for some programs. For example, 

NDMS functions as a partnership among HHS, the Department of Defense 

(DOD), the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), FEMA, state and local 

governments, and the private sector. However, as the DOD and VA 

programs are not included in the proposal, only some of these federal 

organizations would be brought under the umbrella of the Department of 

Homeland Security. Similarly, the Strategic National Stockpile currently 

involves multiple agencies. It is administered by CDC, which contracts 

with VA to purchase and store pharmaceutical and medical supplies that 

could be used in the event of a terrorist incident. Recently expanded and 

reorganized, the program will now include management of the nation’s 

inventory of smallpox vaccine. Under the President’s proposal, CDC’s 

responsibilities for the stockpile would be transferred to the new 

department, but VA and HHS involvement would be retained, including 

continuing review by experts of the contents of the stockpile to ensure 

that emerging threats, advanced technologies, and new countermeasures 

are adequately considered. 

Although the proposed department has the potential to improve 

emergency response functions, its success depends on several factors. In 

addition to facilitating coordination and maintaining key relationships 

with other departments, these factors include merging the perspectives of 

the various programs that would be integrated under the proposal and 

clarifying the lines of authority of different parties in the event of an 

emergency. As an example, in the recent anthrax events, local officials 

complained about differing priorities between the FBI and the public 

health officials in handling suspicious specimens. According to the public 

health officials, FBI officials insisted on first informing FBI managers of 

any test results, which delayed getting test results to treating physicians. 

The public health officials viewed contacting physicians as the first 

priority in order to ensure that effective treatment could begin as quickly 

as possible. 
Page 8 GAO-02-893T 

The President’s proposal to shift the responsibility for all programs 

assisting state and local agencies in public health emergency preparedness 

and response from HHS to the new department raises concern because of 

the dual-purpose nature of these activities. These programs include 

essential public health functions that, while important for homeland 

security, are critical to basic public health core capacities.14 Therefore, we 

are concerned about the transfer of control over the programs, including 

priority setting, that the proposal would give to the new department. We 

recognize the need for coordination of these activities with other 

homeland security functions, but the President’s proposal is not clear on 

how the public health and homeland security objectives would be 

balanced. 

Under the President’s proposal, responsibility for programs with dual 

homeland security and public health purposes would be transferred to the 

new department. These include such current HHS assistance programs as 

CDC’s Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response program and HRSA’s 

Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness Program. Functions funded through 

these programs are central to investigations of naturally occurring 

infectious disease outbreaks and to regular public health communications, 

as well as to identifying and responding to a bioterrorist event. For 

example, CDC has used funds from these programs to help state and local 

health agencies build an electronic infrastructure for public health 

communications to improve the collection and transmission of 

information related to both bioterrorist incidents and other public health 

events.15 Just as with the West Nile virus outbreak in New York City, which 

initially was feared to be the result of bioterrorism,16 when an unusual case 

 14The recently enacted Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and 

Response Act of 2002 mandated development of a preparedness plan for state and local 

governments building on core public health capacities, to include effective public health 

surveillance and reporting mechanisms, appropriate laboratory capacity, properly trained 

and equipped public health and medical personnel, and communications networks that can 

effectively disseminate relevant information in a timely and secure manner. Pub. L. No. 107-

188, §101, 115 Stat. ____, ____ (adding section 2801 to the Public Health Service Act). 

15These include the Health Alert Network (HAN), a nationwide system that facilitates the 

distribution of health alerts, dissemination of prevention guidelines and other information, 

distance learning, national disease surveillance, and electronic laboratory reporting, and 

Epi-X, a secure Web-based disease surveillance network for federal, state, and local 

epidemiologists that provides tools for searching, tracking, discussing, and reporting on 

diseases and is therefore a key element in any disease investigation. 

16U.S. General Accounting Office, West Nile Virus Outbreak: Lessons for Public Health 

Preparedness, GAO/HEHS-00-180 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 11, 2000). 

New Department’s 

Control of Essential 

Public Health 

Capacities Raises 

Concern 
Page 9 GAO-02-893T 

of disease occurs public health officials must investigate to determine 

whether it is naturally occurring or intentionally caused. Although the 

origin of the disease may not be clear at the outset, the same public health 

resources are needed to investigate, regardless of the source. 

States are planning to use funds from these assistance programs to build 

the dual-purpose public health infrastructure and core capacities that the 

recently enacted Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness 

and Response Act of 2002 stated are needed. States plan to expand 

laboratory capacity, enhance their ability to conduct infectious disease 

surveillance and epidemiological investigations, improve communication 

among public health agencies, and develop plans for communicating with 

the public. States also plan to use these funds to hire and train additional 

staff in many of these areas, including epidemiology. 

Our concern regarding these dual-purpose programs relates to the 

structure provided for in the President’s proposal. The Secretary of 

Homeland Security would be given control over programs to be carried 

out by HHS. The proposal also authorizes the President to direct that these 

programs no longer be carried out through agreements with HHS, without 

addressing the circumstances under which such authority would be 

exercised. We are concerned that this approach may disrupt the synergy 

that exists in these dual-purpose programs. We are also concerned that the 

separation of control over the programs from their operations could lead 

to difficulty in balancing priorities. Although the HHS programs are 

important for homeland security, they are just as important to the day-today needs of public health agencies and hospitals, such as reporting on 

disease outbreaks and providing alerts to the medical community. The 

current proposal does not clearly provide a structure that ensures that the 

goals of both homeland security and public health will be met. 

The proposed Department of Homeland Security would be tasked with 

developing national policy for and coordinating the federal government’s 

civilian research and development efforts to counter chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear threats. In addition to coordination, we believe 

the role of the new department should include forging collaborative 

relationships with programs at all levels of government and developing a 

strategic plan for research and development. However, we have many of 

the same concerns regarding the transfer of responsibility for the research 

and development programs that we have regarding the transfer of the 

public health preparedness programs. We are concerned about the 

implications of the proposed transfer of control and priority setting for 

Transfer of Control 

and Priority Setting 

over Dual-Purpose 

Research and 

Development Raises 

Concern 
Page 10 GAO-02-893T 

dual-purpose research. For example, some research programs have broad 

missions that are not easily separated into homeland security research and 

research for other purposes. We are concerned that such dual-purpose 

research activities may lose the synergy of their current placement in 

programs. In addition, we see a potential for duplication of capacity that 

already exists in the federal laboratories. 

We have previously reported that while federal research and development 

programs are coordinated in a variety of ways, coordination is limited, 

raising the potential for duplication of efforts among federal agencies.17

Coordination is limited by the extent of compartmentalization of efforts 

because of the sensitivity of the research and development programs, 

security classification of research, and the absence of a single 

coordinating entity to ensure against duplication. For example, DOD’s 

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency was unaware of U.S. Coast 

Guard plans to develop methods to detect biological agents on infected 

cruise ships and, therefore, was unable to share information on its 

research to develop biological detection devices for buildings that could 

have applicability in this area. 

The new department will need to develop mechanisms to coordinate and 

integrate information on research and development being performed 

across the government related to chemical, biological, radiological, and 

nuclear terrorism, as well as user needs. We reported in 1999 and again in 

2001 that the current formal and informal research and development 

coordination mechanisms may not ensure that potential overlaps, gaps, 

and opportunities for collaboration are addressed.18 It should be noted, 

however, that the legislation tasks the new department with coordinating 

the federal government’s “civilian efforts” only. We believe the new 

department will also need to coordinate with DOD and the intelligence 

agencies that conduct research and development efforts designed to 

detect and respond to weapons of mass destruction. In addition, the first 

responders and local governments possess practical knowledge about 

their technological needs and relevant design limitations that should be 

taken into account in federal efforts to provide new equipment, such as 

protective gear and sensor systems, and help set standards for 

 17GAO-01-822. 

18U.S. General Accounting Office, Chemical and Biological Defense: Coordination of 

Nonmedical Chemical and Biological R&D Programs, GAO/NSIAD-99-160 (Washington, 

D.C.: Aug. 16, 1999), and GAO-01-822. 
Page 11 GAO-02-893T 

performance and interoperability. Therefore, the new department will 

have to develop collaborative relationships with these organizations to 

facilitate technological improvements and encourage cooperative 

behavior. 

The President’s proposal could help improve coordination of federal 

research and development by giving one person the responsibility for 

creating a single national research and development strategy that could 

address coordination, reduce potential duplication, and ensure that 

important issues are addressed. In 2001, we recommended the creation of 

a unified strategy to reduce duplication and leverage resources, and 

suggested that the plan be coordinated with federal agencies performing 

research as well as state and local authorities.19 The development of such a 

plan would help to ensure that research gaps are filled, unproductive 

duplication is minimized, and that individual agency plans are consistent 

with the overall goals. 

The proposal would transfer parts of DOE’s nonproliferation and 

verification research and development program to the new department, 

including research on systems to improve the nation’s capability to 

prepare for and respond to chemical and biological attacks. However, the 

legislation is not clear whether the programmatic management and dollars 

only would move or the scientists carrying out the research would also 

move to the new department. Because the research is carried out by 

multiprogram laboratories that employ scientists skilled in many 

disciplines who serve many different missions and whose research 

benefits from their interactions with colleagues within the laboratory, it 

may not be prudent to move the scientists who are doing the research. One 

option would be rather than moving the scientists, the new department 

could contract with DOE’s national laboratories to conduct the research. 

The President’s proposal would also transfer the responsibility for civilian 

health-related biological defense research and development programs to 

the new department, but the programs would continue to be carried out 

through HHS. These programs, now primarily sponsored by NIH, include a 

variety of efforts to understand basic biological mechanisms of infection 

and to develop and test rapid diagnostic tools, vaccines, and antibacterial 

and antiviral drugs. These efforts have dual-purpose applicability. The 

scientific research on biologic agents that could be used by terrorists 

 19GAO-01-822. 
Page 12 GAO-02-893T 

cannot be readily separated from research on emerging infectious 

diseases. For example, NIH-funded research on a drug to treat 

cytomegalovirus complications in patients with HIV is now being 

investigated as a prototype for developing antiviral drugs against 

smallpox. Conversely, research being carried out on antiviral drugs in the 

NIH biodefense research program is expected to be useful in the 

development of treatments for hepatitis C. 

The proposal to transfer responsibility to the new department for research 

and development programs that would continue to be carried out by HHS 

raises many of the same concerns we have with the structure the proposal 

creates for public health preparedness programs. Although there is a clear 

need for the new department to have responsibility for setting policy, 

developing a strategy, providing leadership, and overall coordinating of 

research and development efforts in these areas, we are concerned that 

control and priority-setting responsibility will not be vested in those 

programs best positioned to understand the potential of basic research 

efforts or the relevance of research being carried out in other, nonbiodefense programs. 

In addition, the proposal would allow the new department to direct, fund, 

and conduct research related to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, 

and other emerging threats on its own. This raises the potential for 

duplication of efforts, lack of efficiency, and an increased need for 

coordination with other departments that would continue to carry out 

relevant research. We are concerned that the proposal could result in a 

duplication of capacity that already exists in the current federal 

laboratories. 

Many aspects of the proposed consolidation of response activities are in 

line with our previous recommendations to consolidate programs, 

coordinate functions, and provide a statutory basis for leadership of 

homeland security. The transfer of the HHS medical response programs 

has the potential to reduce overlap among programs and facilitate 

response in times of disaster. However, we are concerned that the 

proposal does not provide the clear delineation of roles and 

responsibilities that is needed. We are also concerned about the broad 

control the proposal grants to the new department for research and 

development and public health preparedness programs. Although there is 

a need to coordinate these activities with the other homeland security 

preparedness and response programs that would be brought into the new 

department, there is also a need to maintain the priorities for basic public 

Concluding 

Observations 
Page 13 GAO-02-893T 

health capacities that are currently funded through these dual-purpose 

programs. We do not believe that the President’s proposal adequately 

addresses how to accomplish both objectives. We are also concerned that 

the proposal would transfer the control and priority setting over dualpurpose research and has the potential to create an unnecessary 

duplication of federal research capacity. 

Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to 

respond to any questions you or other Members of the Committee may 

have at this time. 

For further information about this testimony, please contact Janet 

Heinrich at (202) 512-7118. Gene Aloise, Robert Copeland, Marcia Crosse, 

Greg Ferrante, Gary Jones, Deborah Miller, Roseanne Price, and Keith 

Rhodes also made key contributions to this statement. 

Contact and 

Acknowledgments 
Page 14 GAO-02-893T 

Homeland Security: Proposal for Cabinet Agency Has Merit, but 

Implementation Will Be Pivotal to Success. GAO-02-886T. 

Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2002. 

Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but 

May Complicate Public Health Priority Setting. GAO-02-883T. 

Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2002. 

Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts Are Underway but 

Uncertainty Remains. GAO-02-610. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002. 

Homeland Security: Responsibility and Accountability for Achieving 

National Goals. GAO-02-627T. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002. 

Homeland Security: Progress Made; More Direction and Partnership 

Sought. GAO-02-490T. Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2002. 

Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short- and 

Long-Term National Needs. GAO-02-160T. Washington, D.C.: 

November 7, 2001. 

Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide 

Preparedness Efforts. GAO-02-208T. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2001. 

Homeland Security: Need to Consider VA’s Role in Strengthening Federal 

Preparedness. GAO-02-145T. Washington, D.C.: October 15, 2001. 

Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach. 

GAO-02-150T. Washington, D.C.: October 12, 2001. 

Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation’s Efforts. 

GAO-01-1158T. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001. 

Bioterrorism: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Role in 

Public Health Protection. GAO-02-235T. Washington, D.C.: 

November 15, 2001. 

Bioterrorism: Review of Public Health Preparedness Programs. GAO-02-

149T. Washington, D.C.: October 10, 2001. 

Bioterrorism: Public Health and Medical Preparedness. GAO-02-141T. 

Washington, D.C.: October 9, 2001. 

Related GAO Products 

Homeland Security 

Public Health 
Page 15 GAO-02-893T 

Bioterrorism: Coordination and Preparedness. GAO-02-129T. 

Washington, D.C.: October 5, 2001. 

Bioterrorism: Federal Research and Preparedness Activities. GAO-01-

915. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2001. 

Chemical and Biological Defense: Improved Risk Assessment and 

Inventory Management Are Needed. GAO-01-667. 

Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2001. 

West Nile Virus Outbreak: Lessons for Public Health Preparedness. 

GAO/HEHS-00-180. Washington, D.C.: September 11, 2000. 

Chemical and Biological Defense: Program Planning and Evaluation 

Should Follow Results Act Framework. GAO/NSIAD-99-159. 

Washington, D.C.: August 16, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public 

Health Initiatives. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112. Washington, D.C.: 

March 16, 1999. 

National Preparedness: Technologies to Secure Federal Buildings. GAO02-687T. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2002. 

National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and Private 

Sector Efforts Is Critical to an Effective National Strategy for Homeland 

Security. GAO-02-621T. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002. 

Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Cooperation in the 

Development of a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local 

Preparedness. GAO-02-550T. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2002. 

Combating Terrorism: Enhancing Partnerships Through a National 

Preparedness Strategy. GAO-02-549T. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2002. 

Combating Terrorism: Critical Components of a National Strategy to 

Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-548T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 25, 2002. 

Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Partnership in a National 

Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-547T. 

Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2002. 

Combating Terrorism 
Page 16 GAO-02-893T 

Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy to Enhance 

State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-473T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 1, 2002. 

Chemical and Biological Defense: DOD Should Clarify Expectations for 

Medical Readiness. GAO-02-219T. Washington, D.C.: November 7, 2001. 

Anthrax Vaccine: Changes to the Manufacturing Process. GAO-02-181T. 

Washington, D.C.: October 23, 2001. 

Chemical and Biological Defense: DOD Needs to Clarify Expectations for 

Medical Readiness. GAO-02-38. Washington, D.C.: October 19, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Considerations for Investing Resources in 

Chemical and Biological Preparedness. GAO-02-162T. 

Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related 

Recommendations. GAO-01-822. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve DOD Antiterrorism 

Program Implementation and Management. GAO-01-909. 

Washington, D.C.: September 19, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Comments on H.R. 525 to Create a President’s 

Council on Domestic Terrorism Preparedness. GAO-01-555T. 

Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Accountability Over Medical Supplies Needs 

Further Improvement. GAO-01-666T. Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Options to Improve the Federal 

Response. GAO-01-660T. Washington, DC: April 24, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Accountability Over Medical Supplies Needs 

Further Improvement. GAO-01-463. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and 

National Strategy. GAO-01-556T. Washington, D.C.: March 27, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: FEMA Continues to Make Progress in 

Coordinating Preparedness and Response. GAO-01-15. 

Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2001. 
Page 17 GAO-02-893T 

Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied 

Capabilities; Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination. GAO-01-

14. Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2000. 

Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of 

Mass Destruction Training. GAO/NSIAD-00-64. Washington, D.C.: 

March 21, 2000. 

Combating Terrorism: Chemical and Biological Medical Supplies Are 

Poorly Managed. GAO/T-HEHS/AIMD-00-59. Washington, D.C.: 

March 8, 2000. 

Combating Terrorism: Chemical and Biological Medical Supplies Are 

Poorly Managed. GAO/HEHS/AIMD-00-36. Washington, D.C.: 

October 29, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Threat of Chemical and 

Biological Terrorism. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-50. Washington, D.C.: 

October 20, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk 

Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks. GAO/NSIAD-99-163. 

Washington, D.C.: September 14, 1999. 

Chemical and Biological Defense: Coordination of Nonmedical Chemical 

and Biological R&D Programs. GAO/NSIAD-99-160. Washington, D.C.: 

August 16, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is 

Unclear. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-184. Washington, D.C.: June 23, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Growth in Federal Programs. 

GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181. Washington, D.C.: June 9, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency Response 

Equipment and Sustainment Costs. GAO/NSIAD-99-151. 

Washington, D.C.: June 9, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is 

Unclear. GAO/NSIAD-99-110. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat 

Terrorism. GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 1999. 
Page 18 GAO-02-893T 

Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness 

Program Focus and Efficiency. GAO/NSIAD-99-3. Washington, D.C.: 

November 12, 1998. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici 

Domestic Preparedness Program. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16. Washington, D.C.: 

October 2, 1998. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues. GAO/TNSIAD-98-164. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 1998. 

Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize 

and Target Program Investments. GAO/NSIAD-98-74. Washington, D.C.: 

April 9, 1998. 

Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs 

Requires Better Management and Coordination. GAO/NSIAD-98-39. 

Washington, D.C.: December 1, 1997. 

Disaster Assistance: Improvement Needed in Disaster Declaration 

Criteria and Eligibility Assurance Procedures. GAO-01-837. 

Washington, D.C.: August 31, 2001. 

Chemical Weapons: FEMA and Army Must Be Proactive in Preparing 

States for Emergencies. GAO-01-850. Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2001. 

Federal Emergency Management Agency: Status of Achieving Key 

Outcomes and Addressing Major Management Challenges. GAO-01-832. 

Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2001. 

Budget Issues: Long-Term Fiscal Challenges. GAO-02-467T. 

Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2002. 

Results-Oriented Budget Practices in Federal Agencies. GAO-01-1084SP. 

Washington, D.C.: August 2001. 

Managing for Results: Federal Managers’ Views on Key Management 

Issues Vary Widely Across Agencies. GAO-01-592. Washington, D.C.: 

May 25, 2001. 

Disaster Assistance 

Budget and Management 
Page 19 GAO-02-893T 

Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and High 

Risks. GAO-01-159SP. Washington, D.C.: November 2000. 

Managing for Results: Using the Results Act to Address Mission 

Fragmentation and Program Overlap. GAO-AIMD-97-146. 

Washington, D.C.: August 29, 1997. 

Government Restructuring: Identifying Potential Duplication in Federal 

Missions and Approaches. GAO/T-AIMD-95-161. Washington, D.C.: 

June 7, 1995. 

Government Reorganization: Issues and Principles. GAO/T-GGD/AIMD95-166. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 1995. 

Grant Programs: Design Features Shape Flexibility, Accountability, and 

Performance Information. GAO/GGD-98-137. Washington, D.C.: 

June 22, 1998. 

Federal Grants: Design Improvements Could Help Federal Resources Go 

Further. GAO/AIMD-97-7. Washington, D.C.: December 18, 1996. 

Block Grants: Issues in Designing Accountability Provisions. 

GAO/AIMD-95-226. Washington, D.C.: September 1, 1995. 

Grant Design 

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