Issue Date: 05/17/12 1 OpESS 2012/02 Rev. 1

NRC INSPECTION MANUAL IOEB

OPERATING EXPERIENCE SMART SAMPLE (OpESS) 2012/02, Revision 1

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION INTERPRETATION AND OPERABILITY DETERMINATION

CORNERSTONE: BARRIER INTEGRITY

MITIGATING SYSTEMS

OpESS 2012/02-01 APPLICABILITY

01.01 This OpESS applies to all licensed operating commercial nuclear reactors.

01.02 Supports informing sample selection for Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.15, 

“Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments.”

01.03 Performance of this OpESS is voluntary.

OpESS 2012/02-02 OBJECTIVES

02.01 Provide support to baseline inspection activities in the area of Technical Specification 

(TS) interpretation.

02.02 Provide examples of licensee non-conservative decision-making and improper 

application of TS Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) and Action requirements identified 

during inspections, reviews of operating experience and licensing actions.

OpESS 2012/02-03 BACKGROUND

03.01 Technical Specification Interpretation.

Since 2007, there has been an increase in the number of inspection findings involving the 

human performance cross cutting aspects of ‘a systematic process for decision making’ 

(H.1(a)), and ‘use of conservative assumptions in decision making’ (H.1(b)). These are the only 

two cross-cutting aspects that have shown any kind of upward trend.

A recent review of inspection findings, operating experience, and license amendment requests 

(LARs) identified numerous instances where licensees have improperly applied their TS. 

Collectively, this experience along with increased NRR support, suggests that an increasing 

number of licensees may be taking a non-conservative approach to interpreting their TS 

requirements or when evaluating degraded or non-conforming conditions. NOTE: Inspectors 

should not approve a licensee’s interpretation of their Technical Specifications.
Issue Date: 05/17/12 2 OpESS 2012/02 Rev. 1

03.02 Operability Determinations.

NRC Inspection Manual Part 9900: Technical Guidance, (TG) “Operability Determinations & 

Functionality Assessments for Resolution of Degraded or Nonconforming Conditions Adverse to 

Quality or Safety (ODP)” sets forth NRC staff expectations for licensee operability 

determinations and functionality assessments. 

The Standard Technical Specifications (STS) definition of Operable/Operability is an integral 

concept to TS compliance and therefore plant-specific immediate operability determinations and 

prompt operability determinations. The TG references the STS definition of 

Operable/Operability:

A system, subsystem, train, component, or device shall be OPERABLE or have 

OPERABILITY when it is capable of performing its specified safety functions, and when 

all necessary attendant instrumentation, controls, normal or emergency electrical 

power, cooling and seal water, lubrication and other auxiliary equipment that are 

required for the system, subsystem, train, component, or device to perform its 

function(s) are also capable of performing their related support function(s).

Upon discovery of failure to meet an LCO, the SSC is declared inoperable and licensees must 

meet the associated Conditions of the Required Actions per LCO 3.0.2.”

It has become apparent that some licensees have taken a non-conservative approach to 

interpreting their TS requirements when it comes to meeting the Required Actions of associated 

Conditions required by TSs. For example: 

• A licensee may decide to implement compensatory measures as an interim action until 

final corrective action to resolve an emergent condition is completed; however, they 

must meet all LCO applicable Required Actions of the associated Conditions.

• A licensee may not intentionally declare a required SSC inoperable when it is capable 

of performing its specified safety function unless the inoperability declaration is for 

preventative maintenance, corrective maintenance, or other activities consistent with, 

but limited to, those identified in LCO 3.0.2. Intentional entry into any action statement 

shall not be made for operational convenience.

• Whether stated as a Required Action or not, licensees always have the option to restore 

inoperable equipment to operable status and exit the TS Condition.

Section .5.03, “Examples of Previous Inspection Findings,” of this guidance provides specific 

inspection experience examples regarding non-conservative decision making. 

OpESS 2012/02-04 INSPECTION GUIDANCE

The following inspection guidance may be applied as appropriate to support baseline inspection 

activities. Inspector judgment should be used when determining the extent to which this OpESS 

should be used to inform inspection activities under the applicable baseline IPs.

04.01 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments. The recommended 

inspection activities described below support IP 71111.15, “Operability Determinations and 

Functionality Assessments.”
Issue Date: 05/17/12 3 OpESS 2012/02 Rev. 1

a. Review an instance where a change to plant operations was justified by a 

corresponding change to the TS Bases or an interpretation of an existing TS Bases 

statement.

[Supports IP 71111.15, Section 02.01b]

1. Compare the changes against any licensee procedures or written guidance 

associated with the decision making process.

2. Evaluate the adequacy of any 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation associated with the 

change to the TS Bases.

3. Examples of previous issues are provided below in Section 05.03d and 05.03e.

b. Review an operability determination where a licensee credit compensatory measures, 

which substitute manual operator action for automatic action to perform a specified 

safety function, to consider/declare equipment operable.

[Supports IP 71111.15, Sections 02.01c, 02.01d]

1. Part 9900: Technical Guidance, Appendix C.5 contains guidance on the temporary 

use of manual actions to support operability determinations. Operability 

determinations are generally not expected to be successful in cases where credit is 

taken for manual action in place of automatic action(s). 

2. Some manual compensatory actions could constitute a temporary facility or 

procedure change under 10 CFR 50.59 and inadvertently result in the plant 

operating outside its design basis.

3. Examples of previous issues are provided below in Section 05.03b and 05.03f. 

c. Review an instance where the licensee failed to meet or did not perform a surveillance 

test within its specified frequency.

[Supports IP 71111.15, Section 02.01e]

1. Per Part 9900: Technical Guidance, if an SSC is clearly inoperable (e.g., loss of 

motive power or failed TS surveillance), it must be declared inoperable and the 

operability determination process need not be entered. Licensees shall enter all 

applicable conditions immediately, per LCO 3.0.2. Time of discovery for a failed 

surveillance should be determined from the surveillance test unless there is clear 

evidence showing otherwise. 

2. Review any applicable licensee procedure requirements for a surveillance not 

performed within its specified Frequency to ensure that they are properly 

implemented and that all applicable TS requirements are identified and 

implemented within the time allowed by TS . Per SR 3.0.3, compliance with the 

requirement to declare the LCO not met may be delayed, from the time of 

discovery, up to 24 hours or up to the limit of the specified Frequency, whichever is 

greater. This delay period is permitted to allow performance of the Surveillance.

3. Examples of previous issues are provided below in Section 05.03a, 05.03c, and

05.03d.
Issue Date: 05/17/12 4 OpESS 2012/02 Rev. 1

OpESS 2012/02-05 REFERENCES

These references may include pre-decisional information contained on NRC internal websites. 

Once the agency has formally evaluated an OpE issue and has determined that it meets the 

criteria for agency action, the NRC communicates the issue to the public and the industry 

through one or more appropriate methods (e.g. generic communication, rulemaking public 

comment periods, etc.).

05.01 NRC Inspection Manual

a. 71111.15, “Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments”

b. Part 9900: Technical Guidance, “Operability Determinations & Functionality 

Assessments for Resolution of Degraded or Nonconforming Conditions Adverse to 

Quality or Safety.” (Included as the attachment to RIS 2005-20, Revision 1)

05.02 NRC Generic Communications

a. NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2005-20, Revision 1, Revision To NRC Inspection 

Manual Part 9900 Technical Guidance, “Operability Determinations & Functionality 

Assessments For Resolution Of Degraded Or Nonconforming Conditions Adverse To 

Quality Or Safety”

b. Information Notice 97-78, “Crediting of Operator Actions in Place of Automatic Actions 

and Modification of Operator Actions, including Response Times”

05.03 Examples of previous inspection findings.

a. River Bend – The licensee experienced a reactor system flow mismatch due to a 

reactor recirculation flow control valve malfunction and properly entered the TS Action 

for failing to meet the TS LCO (3.4.1). However, rather than reduce reactor power (to 

less than 77.6%) within 1-hour and shutdown the affected loop within two hours as 

required by TS (Action Conditions A and B respectively), the licensee chose to only 

enter the Condition (TS LCO 3.4.1.D.1) requiring a plant shutdown with an AOT of 12 

hours. The recirculation flow control valve was returned to service about 4.5 hours after 

the licensee entered the TS LCO Action Statement and reactor power was maintained 

steady at 100% throughout this period. The licensee’s failure to comply with Condition 

“A” of TS 3.4.1 constituted a violation of their TS.

b. Perry – Due to past experience and concerns of causing a loss of shutdown cooling 

(SDC) during testing and other maintenance, the licensee voluntarily entered Condition 

“A” of the primary containment isolation valve TS LCO (3.6.1.3) nine times in a 6-day 

period. To prevent the potential closure of the SDC primary containment isolation 

valves, the licensee removed electrical power from the valve actuator with the valve in 

the open position. This action prevented the SDC isolation valve from remote operation 

including automatic closure signal from reactor vessel water level – low instrumentation. 

The “authorization” allowing the voluntary Condition “A” of TS 3.6.1.3 entry was 

communicated to the operators via the station night orders. 
Issue Date: 05/17/12 5 OpESS 2012/02 Rev. 1

c. SONGS – While performing a TS surveillance to verify that the reactor control element 

assembles (CEAs) are capable of inserting upon a reactor trip (trippable), one of the 

CEAs failed to move as required by the surveillance test. The licensee “suspended” the 

surveillance test and initiated action to determine the cause of the CEA malfunction. 

After about 5-hours the licensee verified that the cause of the CEA failure was due to a 

CEA control system failure and was not due to a “stuck” CEA condition (indication on 

the installed CEA instrumentation does not provide positive determination). Based on 

prior problems with the CEA control system and never having experienced a stuck 

CEA, the licensee did not enter the applicable TS LCO 3.1.5 Condition for the 

surveillance test that was being conducted. TS LCO 3.1.5 Condition “D”, Untrippable 

CEA, has a 6-hour completion time. Operators used non-conservative decision making 

to determine Operability in lieu of following surveillance procedures that clearly 

identified a condition indicating a failed surveillance test.

d. Pilgrim - After just completing a surveillance test of the control rods, the control rod 

position indication system failed, and the locations of the control rods were 

indeterminate. TS 3.3.8.1 states that all control rods without position indication are 

required to be declared inoperable and fully inserted into the core within 3 hours. 

However, the licensee did not enter any Condition within TS 3.3.8.1 at the time of 

discovery. The licensee erroneously believed that TS 3.3.8.1 entry was not required 

until the 24 hour periodicity of surveillance 4.3.B.1.5, “Control Rod Operability,” expired. 

The licensee did not enter TS 3.3.8.1 when faced with a degraded condition affecting 

control rod position indication. The licensee’s improper interpretation resulted in a TS 

violation.

e. Limerick - The licensee racked out one of the two offsite power supply feeder breakers 

to a 4kV Class 1E emergency electrical bus for maintenance. Although one of the two 

offsite power sources was not available to emergency bus, the licensee did not declare 

the associated offsite power circuit inoperable and enter into the associated technical 

specification Action per TS LCO 3.8.1.1, “AC Sources – Operating.” With an offsite 

power supply feeder breaker to a 4kV bus racked out, manual and automatic transfer 

between the normal and alternate offsite power circuits to the bus was not possible. The 

licensee had made a prior change to the TS Bases to allow the breaker configuration 

without submitting a license amendment request (LAR) to make the necessary TS 

change. The licensee’s non-conservative decision was caused by an inadequate TS 

Bases change evaluation (10 CFR 50.59) to identify a Bases change requiring a license 

amendment to change the applicable TS.

f. A common practice for a number of plants (e.g., McGuire, Harris, SONGS, Robinson, 

North Anna) has been to connect the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) to the 

non-safety/non-seismic spent fuel pool purification system (FPPS), while at power, for 

filtration and purification of the safety injection system water source contained in the 

RWST. In these circumstances, these licensees had not evaluated the potential effects 

of cross-tying the safety and non-safety systems (i.e., potential failures modes of nonsafety system). Inspectors should question the licensees whether such similar 

configurations are within their licensing basis, review any supporting analysis, and 

make determinations on the adequacy of such analysis. If the configurations cannot be 

supported by analysis, the inspector should question the licensee whether the affected 

systems can still meet their design function and the basis for operability. In the 

examples above, these licensees did not declare the RWST inoperable and did not 

enter the applicable LCO statement while in this configuration. Some licensees may 
Issue Date: 05/17/12 6 OpESS 2012/02 Rev. 1

have relied on manual operator actions to close the system interface valve between the 

RWST and the FPPS in the event of a seismic event. Others make procedural changes 

under 10 CFR 50.59 and conduct independent reviews. Normally, plant operation 

cannot be sustained indefinitely with the use of manual actions and without any impact 

on the plant’s TS.

OpESS 2012/02-06 REPORTING RESULTS/TIME CHARGES/ADDITIONAL ISSUES

If information from this OpESS is used to inform the sample selection for a baseline IP, include 

the OpESS number and title in the ‘List of Documents Reviewed’ section of the relevant 

inspection report. 

In addition, if any findings or violations are identified in conjunction with this OpESS, include a 

statement similar to the following in the description section of the finding write-up:

This [finding or violation] was identified in connection with a review of Operating 

Experience Smart Sample [number and title].

Inspection time for this OpESS is to be charged to the normal baseline procedure under which it 

is being documented.

OpESS 2012/02-07 CONTACTS

For technical support regarding the performance of this OpESS and emergent issues, contact 

Gerald Waig (NRR/ADRO/DSS/STSB) at 301-415-2260 or Gerald.Waig@nrc.gov, or Shaun 

Anderson (NRR/ADRO/DSS/STSB) at 301-415-2039 or Shaun.Anderson@nrc.gov, or John 

Thompson (NRR/ DIRS/IOEB) at 301-415-1011 or John.Thompson@nrc.gov. 

For administrative, reporting, or documentation questions, contact Jeremy Bowen at 301-415-

3471 or Jeremy.Bowen@nrc.gov.
Issue Date: 05/17/12 Att 1 - 1 OpESS 2012/02 Rev. 1

Revision History for OpESS 2012/02

Commitment 

Tracking Number

Issue Date Description of Change Training 

Needed

Training 

Completion Date

Comment Resolution 

Accession Number

N/A ML11321A229

01/06/12

Initial issuance. N/A N/A ML12003A074

N/A ML12139A242

05/17/12

Provided additional clarity and 

references.

N/A N/A N/A