IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 

LOVANCE WHITTLE, 

Defendant Below, 

Appellant, 

v. 

STATE OF DELAWARE, 

Plaintiff Below, 

Appellee. 

§ 

§ 

§ No. 306, 2020 

§ 

§ Court Below—Superior Court 

§ of the State of Delaware 

§ 

§ Cr. ID No. 1311004679 (N) 

§ 

§ 

§ 

 Submitted: June 11, 2021 

 Decided: August 12, 2021 

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and MONTGOMERY-REEVES,

Justices. 

ORDER 

 Upon consideration of the briefs and the record on appeal, it appears to the 

Court that: 

(1) The defendant below-appellant, Lovance Whittle, filed this appeal from 

a Superior Court order sentencing him for a violation of probation (“VOP”). We 

find no merit to the appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. 

(2) The record reflects that, in December 2013, a grand jury indicted 

Whittle for three counts of second-degree rape and one count of sex offender 

unlawful sexual conduct with a child. On September 5, 2014, Whittle pleaded guilty 

to the lesser-included offenses of third-degree rape and second-degree unlawful 
2 

sexual contact in exchange for dismissal of the other charges. The Superior Court 

sentenced Whittle as follows: (i) for third-degree rape, effective November 22, 2013, 

twenty-five years of Level V incarceration, suspended after seven years for 

decreasing levels of supervision; and (ii) for second-degree unlawful sexual contact, 

one year of Level V incarceration, suspended for one year of Level III probation. 

Whittle subsequently filed four motions for sentence reduction. The Superior Court 

denied all of those motions. 

(3) On March 12, 2020, an administrative warrant was filed for Whittle’s 

VOP. The VOP report alleged that Whittle had admitted, during a polygraph exam 

and later to his probation officer, to violating the sex offender special conditions of 

his probation by using a phone and laptop to access the internet and to contact 

prostitutes. The report also alleged that Whittle had admitted to engaging in sexual 

activity with unconscious women. The report recommended that Whittle be 

sentenced to nineteen years and five months of Level V incarceration suspended 

after his successful completion of a program within the Department of Correction’s 

(“DOC”) discretion. 

(4) At the VOP hearing, Whittle’s counsel admitted that Whittle had 

violated his probation by using electronic devices to access the internet, but disputed 

the other allegations and requested a sentence of Level III with GPS supervision or 

Level IV home confinement. According to Whittle, he used a friend’s smartphone 
3 

to contact a female friend because his own phone lacked internet access, but he did 

not use the internet to look for anyone. He also described his interactions with 

several unconscious women. 

(5) At the conclusion of the hearing, the Superior Court sentenced Whittle 

as follows: (i) for third-degree rape, nineteen years and five months of Level V 

incarceration, suspended after successful completion of a treatment program within 

DOC’s discretion for two years of Level III probation; and (ii) for second-degree 

unlawful sexual contact, one year of Level V incarceration, suspended for one year 

of Level III probation. The Superior Court’s written sentencing order provided: (i) 

for third-degree rape, nineteen years of Level V incarceration, suspended after 

successful completion of a sex offender treatment program within DOC discretion 

for two years of Level III probation; and (ii) for second-degree unlawful sexual 

contact, one year of Level V incarceration, suspended for one year of Level III 

probation. This appeal followed. 

(6) On appeal, Whittle does not dispute that he violated his probation by 

accessing the internet. He argues primarily that the Superior Court should have 

sentenced him to Level IV or Level III supervision because he would not have 

contracted COVID-19 as he did at Level V and could have engaged in sex offender 

treatment in person or by phone instead of by correspondence in prison. He also 

argues that what he said during the polygraph exam did not match exactly what he 
4 

was charged with, and that the polygraph exam was not introduced during the VOP. 

As requested by the Court, the State addressed the discrepancy in the sentences 

imposed and whether the time imposed exceeded the time remaining on Whittle’s 

sentence. 

(7) After careful consideration, we find no merit to Whittle’s appeal. 

Probation is an “act of grace,” and the Superior Court has broad discretion in 

deciding whether to revoke a defendant’s probation.1 Whittle’s admission to 

accessing the internet in violation of the sex offender terms of his probation 

constitutes sufficient evidence to sustain the Superior Court’s finding of a VOP.2 

Given Whittle’s admission that he violated the terms of his probation by accessing 

the internet, it is unnecessary to address his contentions regarding the polygraph 

exam. 

(8) As to Whittle’s claims concerning his sentence, “appellate review of 

sentences is extremely limited.”3 When the sentence falls within the statutory limits, 

“we consider only whether it is based on factual predicates which are false, 

impermissible, or lack minimal reliability, judicial vindictiveness or bias, or a closed 

mind.”4 Once Whittle committed a VOP, the Superior Court could impose any 

1 Brown v. State, 249 A.2d 269, 272 (Del. 1968). 

2 Davis v. State, 2021 WL 223526, at *1 (Del. Jan. 21, 2021); Thompson v. State, 2016 WL 

4427177, at *2 (Del. Aug. 19, 2016). 

3 Kurzmann v. State, 903 A.2d 702, 716 (Del. 2006). 

4 Weston v. State, 832 A.2d 742, 746 (Del.2003). 
5 

period of incarceration up to and including the balance of Level V time remaining 

on his sentence.5 

(9) The State concedes that the Level V time imposed at the VOP hearing 

for Whittle’s third-degree rape conviction (nineteen years and five months) exceeded 

the amount of Level V time remaining on that conviction by nineteen days, but 

argues that the Level V time imposed in the VOP sentencing order for Whittle’s 

third-degree rape conviction (nineteen years) did not exceed the time remaining on 

Whittle’s rape conviction. As the State points out, the Superior Court may correct a 

clerical mistake or error arising from oversight or omission in an order at any time.6

(10) Finally, Whittle has not shown that the sentence was based on false 

factual predicates or the result of judicial vindictiveness, bias, or a closed mind. At 

the conclusion of the VOP hearing, the Superior Court judge concluded that home 

confinement or GPS monitoring would not suffice under the circumstances, and that 

he would follow the recommendation of Probation & Parole based on the record and 

the testimony at the VOP hearing. Based on Whittle’s admission that he violated his 

probation and his statements at the VOP hearing concerning his interactions with 

unconscious women, we cannot find that the Superior Court abused its discretion. 

5

 11 Del. C. § 4334(c); Pavulak v. State, 880 A.2d 1044, 1046 (Del. 2005). 

6

 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 36. 
6 

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 

Court is AFFIRMED. 

 BY THE COURT: 

 /s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. 

 Chief Justice