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87–388 PDF 2003

HOMELAND SECURITY: SECURING STRATEGIC

PORTS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,

VETERANS AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 23, 2002

Serial No. 107–216

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

STEPHEN HORN, California

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

BOB BARR, Georgia

DAN MILLER, Florida

DOUG OSE, California

RON LEWIS, Kentucky

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

DAVE WELDON, Florida

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida

C.L. ‘‘BUTCH’’ OTTER, Idaho

EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,

DC

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

JIM TURNER, Texas

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

KEVIN BINGER, Staff Director

DANIEL R. MOLL, Deputy Staff Director

JAMES C. WILSON, Chief Counsel

ROBERT A. BRIGGS, Chief Clerk

PHIL SCHILIRO, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, VETERANS AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman

ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

RON LEWIS, Kentucky

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

DAVE WELDON, Florida

C.L. ‘‘BUTCH’’ OTTER, Idaho

EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine

TOM LANTOS, California

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

EX OFFICIO

DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

LAWRENCE J. HALLORAN, Staff Director and Counsel

R. NICHOLAS PALARINO, Senior Policy Advisor

JASON CHUNG, Clerk

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Counsel

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on July 23, 2002 ............................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Decker, Raymond, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management Team,

U.S. General Accounting Office, accompanied by Joe Kirschbaum, Senior Analyst; and Kenneth Goulden, vice president, Maersk Sealand ....... 54

Privratsky, Major General Kenneth L., Commander, Military Traffic

Management Command, Department of Defense; Captain William G.

Schubert, Maritime Administrator, Department of Transportation; and

Rear Admiral Paul J. Pluta, Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety

and Environmental Protection, U.S. Coast Guard, Department of

Transportation .............................................................................................. 5

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Decker, Raymond, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management Team,

U.S. General Accounting Office, prepared statement of ............................ 57

Goulden, Kenneth, vice president, Maersk Sealand, prepared statement

of ..................................................................................................................... 73

Pluta, Rear Admiral Paul J., Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety

and Environmental Protection, U.S. Coast Guard, Department of

Transportation, prepared statement of ....................................................... 34

Privratsky, Major General Kenneth L., Commander, Military Traffic

Management Command, Department of Defense, prepared statement

of ..................................................................................................................... 7

Schubert, Captain William G., Maritime Administrator, Department of

Transportation, prepared statement of ....................................................... 24

(1)

HOMELAND SECURITY: SECURING STRATEGIC

PORTS

TUESDAY, JULY 23, 2002

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, VETERANS

AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Shays

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Shays, Putnam, Gilman, Schrock,

Tierney, Allen, Watson, and Lynch.

Staff present: Lawrence J. Halloran, staff director and counsel;

R. Nicholas Palarino, senior policy advisor; Thomas Costa, professional staff member; Jason M. Chung, clerk; and David Rapallo,

minority counsel.

Mr. SHAYS. A quorum being present, this hearing of the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International

Relations entitled, ‘‘Homeland Security: Protecting Strategic Ports,’’

is called to order. I welcome our witnesses and I also welcome our

guests.

This is the first of two hearings the subcommittee will convene

on port security. Today we examine force protection measures and

other precautions at the strategic seaports through which the bulk

of U.S. military personnel and material pass in the event of a

major mobilization. In 2 weeks, at Congressman Putnam’s request,

the subcommittee will hear testimony in Tampa, Florida, on security enhancements at critical commercial ports.

The deadly attacks on the U.S.S. Cole forced the Department of

Defense to confront vulnerabilities of harbor operations abroad and

at home. Even before that, the Inter-Agency Commission on Crime

and Security in U.S. Seaports reported widespread, systemic weaknesses in procedures and policies to protect military property and

personnel at the dock.

The Commission found security standards lacked consistency.

Readiness is seldom tested in portwide exercises. Complex, unclear

lines of authority between multiple Federal agencies, State regulators, local governments and private entities all but guarantee a

fragmented, uncoordinated response to a portside attack.

More recently, the General Accounting Office surveyed a number

of strategic seaports to assess security, management, and coordination. They found weaknesses in threat communication, risk mitigation, and resource allocation. Lack of end-to-end security planning

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means some military equipment is completely outside DOD control

during transit.

In this war, the front line is here at home. Last century’s approaches to maritime security will not win the modern battle to secure strategic ports.

Our witnesses today will describe efforts to strengthen security

planning and force protection at strategic seaports. We appreciate

their time and the expertise they bring to our discussion of these

important issues.

At this time I would recognize Mr. Schrock if he has any comment he would like to make.

Mr. SCHROCK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen, for being here today.

I represent the Second Congressional District of Virginia, which

includes Norfolk and Virginia Beach and will eventually include

Virginia’s eastern shore and a portion of Hampton. The District I

represent boasts 384 military commands, eight major bases, including four four-star commands, and the giant Norfolk Naval Base.

Hampton Roads has the best natural deep-water harbor on the

east coast of the United States. Fifty-foot deep unobstructed channels provide easy access and maneuvering room for the largest of

today’s container ships. The port is located just 18 miles from open

sea on a year-round ice-free harbor.

The strategic location of the Port of Hampton Roads and its

transportation infrastructure offer steamship lines and shippers access to two-thirds of the U.S. population. The Port of Hampton

Roads transports more intermodal containers to more cities than

any other port in the United States.

I have just described one of the most attractive terrorist targets

in the United States. A ship sailing through Hampton Roads

steams within a few hundred yards of the Norfolk Naval Base,

home of the Atlantic Fleet, and Fort Monroe, home of the U.S.

Army Training and Doctrine Command. Fort Eustis, home of the

U.S. Transportation Command, is a short distance, a few miles up

the James River.

The detonation of a ship-based weapon of mass destruction would

have disastrous effects on our military and our economy. This is a

nightmare we cannot allow. How are we going to prevent this scenario? Specifically, how are we going to keep these very lethal

threats from endangering our ports of embarkation and military

bases? That’s what I’m hoping we can discuss today.

Every time I cross over the Hampton Roads Bridge Tunnel, as

I did yesterday coming here, I think ‘‘what if,’’ and the what-ifs

scare me to death. Fortunately, I am starting to see signs of detectors on the bridge now, and that made me feel better than I have

felt in a long time, but I know a lot more needs to be done, and

I’m one who is willing to do anything I can to help solve this problem and prevent a disaster. That is my No. 1 issue in Congress

right now—port security. We’ll do anything to make sure our ports

are secure.

Again, I thank you for being here. I thank you for what you’re

doing. I look forward to hearing your testimony.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman.

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At this time the Chair would recognize the vice chairman of the

committee, Mr. Putnam.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for your

leadership on this issue and your allowing the subcommittee to

come down to Florida to focus in a second phase of this hearing on

port security in our area.

As we focus today on the strategic seaports, these are those

which offer the most attractive target to terrorists, as Mr. Schrock

has pointed out, but they also offer what should be the most welldefended, well-guarded opportunities for terrorists to hit our seaports. I believe that there has been a pattern established where

terrorists go after our more soft targets.

But it is disconcerting to note, as the GAO did, that even at

these strategic seaports, which should be the best-defended, which

should be the most well-guarded, there is no comprehensive process

to mitigate vulnerabilities or prioritize resource distribution, no

comprehensive mechanism for developing and communicating

threat information, no mechanism in place to assess and communicate comprehensive threat information across agencies.

This is a recurring theme in our entire homeland defense and

our entire national security strategy. Nobody is talking to anyone.

There is no communication at any level. That, to me, is the most

disturbing part of this entire GAO report and its entire discussion

about homeland security.

While I, along with a lot of others, have pinned our hopes that

the creation of a new department is going to improve communication and improve coordination, the bottom line is nobody is talking

to each other now and we can only hope that they will begin to talk

to each other in the future.

As we evaluate those threats of bio-terror release in one of the

ports that would make incoming ships impossible to disembark in

these ports and make the outgoing ships from the ports impossible

to leave through quarantine or some other purpose; as we evaluate

the threats of destroying a ship and clogging up the shipping panels; as we evaluate the patchwork of agencies—local, State, and

Federal, Coast Guard and DOD—that share responsibility for these

seaways, it becomes more and more clear that we have not adequately analyzed the threats that face our borders.

I look forward to the testimony today, and I thank the chairman

for his leadership on this issue.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

At this time the Chair recognizes Mr. Gilman, welcomes him. We

welcome him and will hear his statement now if he would like to

make one.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. You always come prepared, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. I thank you for holding this important and timely

hearing. Due to events of September 11th and the attack on our

U.S.S. Cole in Yemen, it has become increasingly clear that port security is an integral component within the broader context of our

Nation’s security and deserves much more attention than it has received in prior years as we work toward the consolidation of our

homeland security responsibilities under a single Federal department.

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It is imperative that we address this issue of port security. According to the GAO report, which is a focus of today’s hearing, no

single entity presently coordinates threat information among the

myriad local, State, and Federal agencies with jurisdiction over our

Nation’s strategic seaports. Moreover, the GAO report asserts that

the Department of Defense current system of protecting our Nation’s military forces and equipment as they are deployed throughout our seaports is inadequately structured to today’s security realities.

As the war on terrorism evolves, the likelihood that our Nation

will deploy greater number of troops and equipment by way of

these seaports is extremely high. Ensuring that our troops and

equipment are not subject to sabotage, to theft, or attack on our

own soil is essential. Accordingly, we welcome the testimony of today’s distinguished panelists and hope that these participants can

address the most critical issues regarding port security and the deployment of our Nation’s military personnel and equipment

through these vital seaports.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman.

Before I recognize our witnesses, I will take care of some housekeeping here and ask unanimous consent that all members of the

subcommittee be permitted to place an opening statement in the

record and that the record remain open for 3 days for that purpose.

Without objection, so ordered.

I ask further unanimous consent that all witnesses be permitted

to include their written statements in the record. Without objection, so ordered.

At this time I will recognize our first panel. We have General

Kenneth Privratsky, Commander, Military Traffic Management

Command, Department of Defense; Captain William G. Schubert,

Maritime Administrator, Department of Transportation; and we

have Admiral Paul J. Pluta, Assistant Commandant for Marine

Safety and Environmental Protection, U.S. Coast Guard, Department of Defense [sic], hopefully soon to be the Department of

Homeland Security.

I would invite the witnesses to stand so I can swear you in, and

then we will begin to hear your testimony.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. We note for the record all three of our witnesses responded in the affirmative.

We will begin with you, General, and do welcome you here.

Thank you for coming.

STATEMENTS OF MAJOR GENERAL KENNETH L. PRIVRATSKY,

COMMANDER, MILITARY TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT COMMAND,

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; CAPTAIN WILLIAM G. SCHUBERT, MARITIME ADMINISTRATOR, DEPARTMENT OF

TRANSPORTATION; AND REAR ADMIRAL PAUL J. PLUTA, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT FOR MARINE SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, U.S. COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

General PRIVRATSKY. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak today on the issue of

5

security as it relates to the movement of military cargo through

strategic seaports. We have been blessed over the years with patriotic commercial port owners and operators, a robust strategic port

infrastructure, excellent civil and military cooperation at all levels,

and, until the events of September 11th, a relatively risk-free

homeland. Like others appearing today, we in the Military Traffic

Management Command have been reassessing requirements since

that day.

I have submitted written comments for the record. In this opening statement, I would like to give you a sense of our ongoing efforts to keep deployments safe.

There are a significant number of players involved in the process

of deploying units by sea. Considerable advanced planning and coordination is essential. One method used with success has been the

National Port Readiness Committees. They create forums for everyone to understand clearly their roles and responsibilities and to

surface potential issues or threats.

We in the Military Traffic Management Command also conduct

extensive planning with deploying units, which includes identifying

sensitive or hazardous cargos that may present special security

concerns.

Because of GAO’s assistance a year ago, we have made significant progress in safeguarding ammunition shipments to the Department of Defense’s three ammunition ports. During deployments, events follow carefully scripted plans. They do not commingle with other commercial port activities. We have had lots of opportunity to practice. In the last 18 months, we have conducted 62

exercises or deployments, all without incident.

Following September 11th we added much emphasis. We asked

for and received external assistance in assessing threats both at

DOD-owned and commercial strategic ports, and we are implementing recommendations.

We in the Military Traffic Management Command are instituting

a new port terminal risk analysis for use on each deployment operation. We also centralized command and control of operations at a

single location at Ft. Eustis, Virginia, under the direction of a onestar general. That was something planned to be accomplished by

June 2003. After September 11th, we accelerated our timeline. We

now have a robust 24/7 operation managing surface transportation

worldwide.

Prior to September 11th we had no significant intelligence capability within my command. Now we are adding that and have Reservists in our Operation Center in the interim developing intelligence. We routinely receive intelligence information from the

Army military intelligence community and the U.S. Transportation

Command. We have secure communications with some commercial

carriers and associations to share information. As a result, we are

much better prepared to see and communicate threats than we

were last fall. All of us, however, remain on a journey at this point.

We have made much progress, but there is certainly more that can

and should be done. Toward that end, I look forward to seeing the

results of GAO’s examination on security measures. We will work

hard to make our processes better.

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I see positive developments in the legislation currently being

worked by congressional conferees. Provisions directing Department of Transportation to assess the safety of all U.S. ports and

to prepare anti-terrorism plans are critical. We agree with the need

to have background checks and security identification issued by a

central agency. We also are interested keenly in those measures

that improve cargo identification and screening.

In closing, I would like to commend Congress for taking a national approach to port security. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today and I look forward to your questions.

Mr. PUTNAM [assuming Chair]. Thank you, General.

[The prepared statement of General Privratsky follows:]

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Mr. PUTNAM. Captain Schubert, welcome to the committee.

Captain SCHUBERT. Good morning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman

and members of the subcommittee. It is a pleasure to be here with

you today to discuss the role of strategic commercial ports in homeland security.

The Maritime Administration plays an integral part in the deployment of U.S.-flagged vessels carrying military personnel and

supplies to the theater. During a deployment, the Maritime Administration, also known as MARAD, serves to ensure that our commercial port facilities are available to the Department of Defense

for military load-outs. In peacetime, MARAD acts as an advocate

for our Nation’s port community, which is a critical component of

our economy.

The emergency operating arm of MARAD, the National Shipping

Authority, is responsible for the acquisition and operation of ships

for the defense service and for the coordination of shipping and

U.S. commerce and the administration of the U.S. Government’s

war risk insurance program. Also, in the event of a national emergency, the National Shipping Authority administers a program to

assure the priority use and allocation of commercial port facilities.

If this authority is invoked, my responsibility is to serve as the director of the National Shipping Authority.

Coordinating port security during mobilization is not new to

MARAD. It is an issue that we have been addressing for many

years through the port readiness programs and the National Port

Readiness Network.

The National Port Readiness Network has established Port Readiness Committees at each of our designated 13 strategic commercial

ports. The local captain of the U.S. Coast Guard, Captain of the

Port, are the chairpersons of those committees. MARAD chairs both

the National Port Readiness Steering and Working Groups. These

organizations provide coordination and cooperation to ensure readiness of commercial ports to support force deployment during contingencies and other defense emergencies.

To maintain heightened readiness and performance at strategic

ports, MARAD assists its National Port Readiness Network partners in conducting port readiness assessments, monthly readiness

status reports, mobilization planning, vulnerability assessments,

and improving the deployment process. We have also partnered

with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and other groups in the

development of risk assessments at our strategic ports.

MARAD is also concerned with port security because of its role

in providing strategic sealift to the Department of Defense.

Through the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement, also known

as VISA, and the maritime security program, known as MSP,

MARAD administers an emergency preparedness program that utilizes civilian transportation resources in a defense emergency.

MSP and VISA stem from DOT’s authority under the Defense

Production Act to prioritize sealift capacity for national defense

purposes.

Since September 11th, a number of changes have occurred to improve port security. Obviously, port security is a major concern

today, both in Congress and within the administration. Secretary

Mineta has stated, ‘‘Protecting seaports and port facilities against

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the threat of terrorism is imperative.’’ The terrorist attacks have

resulted in a renewed focus of security of our transportation systems, and we at the Department of Transportation are aggressively

meeting these challenges on several fronts.

Congress is to be commended for its swift action in passing the

Department of Defense Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2002,

which included port security grant funding. From this supplemental appropriation, DOT was able to award 77 port security

grants, totaling $92.3 million, including $38.1 million for our 13

strategic ports. That’s roughly 41 percent of the total. These funds

will be used to enhance facilities and operational security, provide

for security assessments, and explore the use of new technology to

improve maritime security.

As you know, port security legislation currently awaits action by

the congressional conferees. Although neither bill has specifically

addressed port security during a period of mobilization, the security measures that will flow from the passage of this legislation will

certainly enhance security throughout the port system.

Since September 11th, MARAD has also focused on providing

port security training and implementation of technology to improve

security. In August of this year the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy’s Global Maritime and Transportation School, which is administered by MARAD, will conduct security training for the State of

Florida law enforcement officials.

On the international level, DOT and MARAD are working with

the International Labor Organization, or ILO, to implement smart

card technology to provide a reliable, secure mariner identification

system in order to track employment records, minimize fraudulent

documentation, and facilitate access to secure areas. A uniform and

verifiable transportation worker identification card could facilitate

the smooth flow of commerce and also promote security. Other

technological innovations include cargo and container tracking systems and electronic container seals.

In conclusion, I have every confidence that the Port Readiness

Network—this is due to my personal experience during Desert

Storm/Desert Shield. In 1991, when I was based in Houston working for MARAD I was involved with the Port of Houston’s day-today deployment activities. I can tell you we all pulled together.

There was excellent cooperation between the Military Traffic Management Command, the Coast Guard and MARAD and State and

local governments. We all knew our jobs and we did them well.

I would like to make a special mention that the Coast Guard performed an outstanding job in providing both shoreside and waterbased force protection. We were able to secure our work area, credential dock workers, and load ships bound for the war zone without any serious disruption in commercial service. We were determined then and we are determined now.

I want to thank the chairman and members of this committee for

the opportunity to address you here today, and I look forward to

working with you on this vitally important issue in the future.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you, Captain.

[The prepared statement of Captain Schubert follows:]

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Mr. PUTNAM. At this time the Chair recognizes Admiral Pluta.

Welcome to the subcommittee.

Admiral PLUTA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Mr.

Chairman and distinguished members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss the Coast Guard’s

efforts in protecting our Nation’s strategic seaports. The Coast

Guard, with primary authority from the Espionage Act of 1917,

and the Magnuson Act of 1950, is the lead Federal agency for reducing, preempting, deterring, and defending against security

threats targeting ports, waterways, and the coastal areas of the

United States and its territories.

As a unique instrument of national security, the Coast Guard is

the only military service with civil law enforcement authority, regulatory and safety responsibilities, and Captain of the Port authorities. These authorities prompted a memorandum of agreement

signed in 1995 by the Secretaries of Transportation and Defense,

the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the U.S.

Coast Guard to provide interdepartmental recognition of Coast

Guard capabilities in support of the national military strategy. The

memorandum of agreement establishes port operations, security,

and defense as a mission of the Coast Guard, including the use of

Coast Guard forces to help provide anti-terrorism force protection

from military forces in the United States and overseas.

It is through a well-defined command and control structure at

the local level and strong partnerships with key public and private

port stakeholders that the Coast Guard is able to accomplish these

missions. Guided by the National Port Readiness Network, the

Captain of the Port is the lead agency responsible for coordinating

Federal, State, and local resources, as well as private entities in

the port region, in executing port security responsibilities during

any mobilization or national defense contingency operation. This is

accomplished primarily through port readiness, harbor safety, and

port security committees at the local level.

As a former Captain of the Port for the strategic ports of Wilmington, North Carolina; Morehead City, North Carolina; and

Southport, North Carolina, I can’t emphasize enough the importance of a coordinated approach by all maritime players in carrying

out this critical function of port security, especially as the United

States continues its overseas military operations.

Additionally, the Captain of the Port could receive significant assistance through the passage of pending comprehensive port security legislation currently being reviewed in conference. Through a

well-developed hierarchy of port security plans, Federal, State, and

local security activities and resources will be more effectively

aligned in addressing our collective homeland security responsibilities.

The Coast Guard has been working closely with the Transportation Command, the Military Sealift Command, the Military Traffic Management Command, Department of Navy, and the Maritime

Administration to identify gaps, validate security requirements,

and establish a scheduling process for coordinating Coast Guard

waterside security during priority outlooks.

Another key initiative in closing security gaps has been the increased emphasis on vulnerability assessments for U.S. seaports.

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Even before the events of September 11th, the Coast Guard was actively working with DOD on their methodology for identifying port

vulnerabilities in strategic seaports.

Although the principles of port security for strategic seaports are

built around the prevention of a terrorist event, safeguarding our

strategic seaports against a broad spectrum of threats requires a

comprehensive maritime domain awareness. A robust maritime domain awareness will provide all leaders with the knowledge base

needed to frame the optimum policies, decisions, and operations to

protect our strategic seaports.

The importance of protecting and supporting the movement of

military forces and supplies through U.S. seaports is never more

critical than it is today. Protecting military load-outs in the continental United States and its territories is a longstanding mission

of the Coast Guard that requires a well-coordinated effort with our

Government and industry partners. It is incumbent upon our Government agencies and military services to balance the resources

and meet the challenge of protecting our critical military assets

and infrastructure.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I will

be happy to answer any questions that you might have.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PUTNAM. You’re very welcome, Admiral.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Pluta follows:]

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Mr. PUTNAM. We appreciate the entire panel being here and we

thank you for your thoughtful opening statements.

We have a journal vote pending, so the subcommittee will stand

in recess for a few moments. We will be back as soon as possible.

Subcommittee stands in recess.

[Recess.]

Mr. PUTNAM. The subcommittee will reconvene. My apologies to

the panel. Our logistics command here in Congress also has some

systemic problems.

At this time I would like to recognize Mr. Schrock for any questions that he may have.

Mr. SCHROCK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I’m going to emphasize again how important this issue is to me.

I’m sorry there aren’t more Members here because the bad guys got

us one way before, and I think the next way they are going to do

it is by sea. I don’t like to scream ‘‘fire’’ in a crowded theater and

I’m not Chicken Little with ‘‘the sky is falling,’’ but, by golly, if we

don’t address this thing we’re going to have another September

11th and it is going to be in the waters of America. We just have

to prevent that.

This is a broad question, General, but you talked about cargo

and identification screening. I’m just trying to figure out how we

solve that. I hear a lot of people say, ‘‘We need to make sure when

the container ships come to our shores, when they are off-loaded

they are checked.’’ I’m here to tell you that’s too late. If a ship

leaves Alexandria, Egypt, with a little weapon on it and it gets behind our carrier piers in Norfolk, for instance, and GPS system sets

it off, it is too late. But how do we do that? I know that’s a terrible

question to ask, but I try to think of that all the time and don’t

know how to do it unless you get all these other countries to agree

to do something like that. But how do we do that?

General PRIVRATSKY. Sir, I don’t think there is a single answer

to how you do that. I don’t think that you can check containers adequately at either end of the supply chain and make it effective. I

think, as we work toward the best solutions, we are going to find

ourselves leveraging our robust technology capabilities, analyzing

patterns, analyzing shippers, analyzing cargo, analyzing discrepancies related to all of that, to use technology to try to identify

what we then see as being particularly risky, and then applying

our cargo screening toward that.

I do not see a future where we will ever be able to screen all

cargo at either end, or we’re going to bring supply chains to their

knees.

Mr. SCHROCK. It would certainly impact commerce. Admiral.

Admiral PLUTA. Thank you, sir. I thought it would be worth mentioning, the concepts behind the approach we are taking in concert

with all the agencies involved with this challenge, and I think it

is the biggest challenge that we face in the security realm, the

cargo security part, particularly containerized cargo.

The solution set that we are focusing on is end-to-end cargo integrity from the point that the box is loaded to the point that it

arrives at its destination, and that includes having a trusted agent

at the loading, having a higher, sophisticated kind of locking system and better containers that can be interrogated electronically,

38

and have a chain of custody as it moves along all the way from its

point of loading to the point of destination—a lot of information

sharing that needs to be done, manifesting, proper manifesting of

the cargo.

What helps that is that we are putting into place security requirements, both domestically and internationally, for people to do

cargo security, in particular, better so that we can recognize those

companies that do security well, have solid security plans in place,

and do vet them and audit them properly, and those people can—

we don’t need to waste our time looking at people who do security

well. We can focus on those that we know less about. And so it is

an incentive program that will help us get that job done because

of the millions of containers that come into our ports. It is a very

difficult problem.

Mr. SCHROCK. I think I heard there were 16,000 containers offloaded in America every single day. That’s a lot.

Admiral, let me followup with you. First of all, let me tell you

how wonderful I think the Coast Guard is. I mean, their mission

has not been fully appreciated over the years, and I think now we

certainly understand how important the future role of the Coast

Guard is going to be—and that’s from a guy who wore the Navy

uniform for 24 years. You’re part of our sea services, and I’m really

proud of what you do. And I want to make sure, if Congress isn’t

giving you what you need, keep coming back and screaming. Jim

Loy, Admiral Loy, former commandant, was the first head of the

services who had the courage to stand up and say, ‘‘Congress,

enough is enough. Unless you give us the funding to do what we

need, we can’t do any more.’’ I thought that took a lot of courage,

and the others fell in line behind him.

You talk about a coordinated approach. I had a working group

over in Anacostia, I believe it was—over in Suitland several

months ago, and had 15 Government agencies there. What I found

was, you know, I think interoperability, keeping agencies being

able to talk to one another is very important in sharing information, but what I found was that a lot of the agencies would love

to share some of that information but by law they can’t, which just

makes absolutely no sense to me. Are you finding that the case?

How do we break that down? I guess it’s going to have to come

from here, most of it, to pass laws to get rid of laws so you all can

talk to one another. Has that been a problem for you all?

Admiral PLUTA. Yes, sir, it has been a big challenge. Ever since

the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection,

we recognized that there would be difficulty sharing classified

threat information with the people who actually own the infrastructure—in large measure, the private sector. So the concept that

the Presidential decision directors put in place was ISACs, they

call them—Information Sharing and Analysis Centers—so that the

FBI, when they get credible threat information, can share them

through the ISAC right directly to the people who need it.

As we speak, Coast Guard people, FBI people, people from the

maritime community are putting together an Information Sharing

and Analysis Center for the maritime mode to get that threat information and be able to share it widely. The challenge will be to get

39

the security clearances to the people who ultimately need that classified information.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. SCHROCK. All right. That’s good news.

Let me just ask one more question, Mr. Chairman, and then I

will keep quiet.

Captain, you talked about security assessments, you all were

doing security assessments. I guess that’s a follow-on to what I

asked the admiral. Are you able to do those in conjunction with

other agencies, or are there stumbling blocks, roadblocks in the

way that prevent you from doing that?

Captain SCHUBERT. The security assessments—there’s really on

two fronts that’s being done. The Coast Guard is—and Admiral

Pluta could address this I more detail—is developing a standard to

do what we call ‘‘port security assessments.’’ These are very comprehensive assessments, and there have been some that have been

done. At least two of the thirteen commercial strategic ports have

been completed, and there are plans ahead to do the rest of them.

The other security assessments when we talk about it was

through the port grants that we just—that I just mentioned earlier

in my opening statement. We have funded out—of the $92.3 million, approximately $5 million of that went to help ports do their

own security assessments, and approximately $633,000 of that

were security assessments to help fund the ports in the 13 strategic

ports that had requested money to do that. So that’s really where

we are.

Admiral, did you want to add anything?

Admiral PLUTA. Sir, the port vulnerability or port security assessments, we’re planning on hitting all 55 of the strategic and economical ports in the United States over the next 3 years. It is resource-constrained evolution. We hope to get eight accomplished

this year, and we will have all the strategic ports front loaded in

that because we weighed heavily in that direction.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. SCHROCK. Well, thank you to all. Just know that if there is

any way I can carry your water and help you with this, I’m here

all the time to help you with that, and I’m not kidding. It is a huge

issue for me, and I want to help you in any way I can.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you, Mr. Schrock.

We’ll note for the record that Mr. Allen and Ms. Watson have arrived. At this time, the Chair recognizes Mr. Allen for 7 minutes.

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I may not need all of

that.

I apologize for not being here for your testimony.

The port in my District, Portland, Maine, is probably not going

to have a lot of troops moving through it, but I do want to ask you,

Admiral Pluta, about the Coast Guard’s general role with respect

to ports—port security. I’m thinking, of course, of my own. In particular, to what extent is the Coast Guard working to develop affiliations with others who are using the ports in the ports available

to keep their eyes and ear open?

By way of background, just to give you sort of the setting for my

question, I was touring. I went out in the harbor, the Portland Harbor, the other day with the waterfront director and a variety of

40

other people. It is clear that what we’re trying to do there is, from

the local fire fighters on the fire boat, to the Coast Guard, to the

fishermen, to all the others who are out there using the port, there

is a sense that we need to use all of the people who are using the

port for other reasons and tie them together somehow to be the

eyes and ears in order to protect the area. That’s separate from the

whole issue of commercial transportation and containers and so on.

But I wondered at your level whether you’re giving some thought

to that issue and how you are approaching it.

Admiral PLUTA. Thank you, sir.

The answer to your question is yes, absolutely. We have been

working that issue since September 11th. In particular, up in your

area the First District commander, Admiral Cray, is working with

the fisheries community. I can’t remember the specific name of the

program, but it is—Coast Watch is the name of the program. In

particular, working with the fishermen, telling them specifically

what sorts of suspicious things we might be interested in hearing

and who to contact—‘‘Here’s the telephone number, here’s the contact point.’’

We have worked not only that up in your area but around the

country. On the national level, we’ve entered into memorandum of

agreement with the American Pilots Association. In large measure,

the pilots are the first Americans that set foot on a foreign-flagged

vessel when they come into the United States. Also, the National

Cargo Bureau, which is the first view of cargo that comes into our

country. And we published an 800 number, our own 7-by–24 national response center for people to call in for any suspicious activity. We have Port Readiness Committees at every port around the

country, including Portland, where all of the port stakeholders

come together to discuss security issues.

So we have tried to—we know that we don’t have enough resources to do this job ourselves, sir, and so we have reached out

in large measure to try to help expand our forces.

Mr. ALLEN. One more question. Again, it is not the precise subject of this hearing, but I have been told that the resources of the

Coast Guard after September 11th have been diverted really to

protecting the homeland, and, of course, up and down the Maine

coast the search and rescue function, the sort of watching out for

fishing vessels and just being available for all of those other tasks

has been a real concern. How are you now trying to balance your

different roles and functions, the ones you were focused on before

September 11th and the new significance of homeland security?

How are you sort of not giving up the old to take on the new?

Admiral PLUTA. Thank you for that question, sir. It is very important to us because we consider that everything we do plays a

role in national security one way or the other. The security of our

citizens is equally as important in their day-to-day safety, life at

sea, as it in the anti-terrorism context. So, in simple answer to

your question, right after September 11th, because no one in the

country knew what to expect next, we diverted all of our assets to

defending our ports, and we spent up to—about 58 percent of our

operating expenses of our budget were directed at maritime security.

41

We recognized we couldn’t sustain that. We needed to get back

to fisheries patrol, search and rescue, drug enforcement, migrant

interdiction, and so over time we migrated those larger assets back

to those missions, and what the Commandant of the Coast Guard

established is a multi-year strategy to get us sufficient resources to

do all of those things.

We’re starting to commission maritime safety and security

teams—there will be six of them scattered around the country initially—so that they could be our domestic surge capability should

another terrorist event occur so that we wouldn’t have to divert

search and rescue and law enforcement assets to do that job.

But we haven’t degraded our capability. We are back to not full

capacity but near full capacity in those missions, and we are working over the multi-year strategy with your help, sir, to get back to

the point where we can do both for the country.

Mr. ALLEN. Admiral, thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.

Chairman.

Mr. PUTNAM. You’re very welcome. And we’ll note for the record

that Mr. Tierney from Massachusetts has joined us, and the Chair

recognizes the chairman of the subcommittee, Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Pluta, I was not being facetious when I was saying

hopefully you will find yourself under not the Department of Transportation but the Department of Homeland Security. I am intrigued by the sense that I get from your testimony that you all

feel that coordination is pretty good. Is that an accurate statement

among all three?

Admiral PLUTA. Not perfect, Mr. Chairman, but certainly better

than it ever has been.

Mr. SHAYS. And, Captain, you nodded your heard, so that’s a

yes?

Captain SCHUBERT. Yes, I agree with that. Not perfect, but we

do work well together. And I think what is most important is when

the balloon went up for the Gulf War, that should be one of the

best examples of how we can really work together, and we did work

together very well.

Mr. SHAYS. General.

General PRIVRATSKY. Sir, I am cautiously optimistic. There is no

question that since September 11th that our focus has shifted more

to security than readiness in port operations, and our Port Readiness Committees by name are becoming more and more Port Security Committees because of that shift in emphasis. In September

we just did not view the threats to our homeland as we view them

today, and so there has definitely been a migration of focus toward

more security.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me make reference to the GAO, who will testify

later today. They said, ‘‘Uncertainties regarding the seaport security environment exist because comprehensive assessments of

threat, vulnerability, and critical port infrastructure functions have

not been completed and there’s no effective mechanism to coordinate and disseminate threat information at the seaports.’’

Should I read it again, or did you all hear it? I’d like you to respond to that. Why don’t we start with you, General?

42

General PRIVRATSKY. In terms of risk assessments, we have had

a very systematic number of assessments for ports underway over

the past several years. Specifically, if we looked at one of the ports

that garners a lot of my attention, our ammunition port at Sunny

Point, we had two——

Mr. SHAYS. I’m sorry. Sunny Point is which State?

General PRIVRATSKY. North Carolina.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

General PRIVRATSKY. It’s our high-volume ammunition port. We

had two threat assessments at that port pre-September 11th and

after September 11th we had another one conducted by Department of Army, and we have implemented recommendations from

those.

U.S. Transportation Command has requested the Defense Threat

Reduction Agency assessment of strategic ports. Four have been

conducted to date. Others will follow.

And so I think that there is a thorough assessment. I know at

that ammunition port I mentioned that we have taken very deliberate action after those assessments and we’re a lot different now

than we were in September and we’ll be different in the future.

Mr. SHAYS. Before I leave you, General, let me ask you, you responded to the threat assessment. The second part of that comment

was that critical port infrastructure functions have not been completed and there’s no effective method to coordinate and disseminate threat information at the seaport. Take that point about infrastructure not being completed.

General PRIVRATSKY. Well, we have an integrated priority list of

projects that is managed by the U.S. Transportation Command to

resource fixes toward strategic ports. I can provide a more-detailed

answer for the record for you on that.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just stick with you again, General, to say in

the report from GAO they say, ‘‘We identified two significant weaknesses associated with DOD’s force protection process for deployments through domestic seaports. First, DOD lacks a central authority responsible for overseeing, coordinating, and executing force

protection measures while military forces deploy from domestic installations through U.S. seaports.’’ Can you respond to that?

General PRIVRATSKY. There is no centralized DOD authority for

controlling that, but port security falls underneath the Coast

Guard, and that at a local level comes together at the Port Readiness Committees, of which my command plays routinely.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just jump then to the Coast Guard. I’ve always gotten the feeling that the Department of Transportation considers the Coast Guard somewhat of a step-child, with no disrespect to step-children, but, frankly, it hasn’t been funded properly by Congress. I think we all know that and we’ve known it for

a number of years.

I’ll leave with that negative note and I’ll come back for a second

round, Mr. Chairman. My time is up.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair recognizes Mr. Watson from California. Mr. Watson,

do you have questions?

Ms. WATSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen, for being here.

43

I have a District that once included the coastline of Southern

California. However, most of our military transportation and so on,

our military transferrals, are out of the, I think, Stockton Harbor.

Maybe some of you are aware.

My question to anyone who can respond is: how far out does the

line go? Is there a possibility that the enemy could be within, say,

a 20-mile radius, a 30-mile radius, and still do damage to us? Do

we scout out beyond that line for any kind of craft that might have

mal-intent? Can you just respond in general, please?

Admiral PLUTA. Thank you, Ms. Watson. Yes, we have jurisdiction. The Coast Guard has jurisdiction out to the 200-mile exclusive

economic zone of our country.

Ms. WATSON. 200 miles.

Admiral PLUTA. We’re working on, with Congress’ help, enabling

legislation for us to require automatic identification systems for

vessels. They will all be required to carry transponders which

transmit information about their name, their flag, last port of call,

things such as that.

We also, because the bad guys will turn it off, we also are working with the Department of Defense on surveillance systems so

that we can cross-check the responder information and be able to

tell the legitimate traffic from those that may not be. And so we

do have the jurisdiction, we exercise the jurisdiction. We identify

96 hours before a vessel is scheduled to arrive at the United States.

We will identify whether or not they have any suspicious crew

members or any problems with their cargo, and we will keep them

out of port and board them with a multi-agency boarding off-shore

before we’ll ever let them in port if we suspect that there might be

something amiss.

So it’s not just a port-related focus, although that’s very important. We’re also concerned about the maritime domain awareness

of knowing which vessels, which cargo, which people are coming in

the direction of the United States.

Ms. WATSON. Let me go back to a little history. We were all

stunned by the ‘‘U.S.S. Cole’’ incident. As I understand, that was

supposed to be a craft bringing food to the ship?

Admiral PLUTA. I’m not familiar specifically. I thought it might

have been an anchor-handling vessel or an anchor-handling crew

that they thought it was or could have been bringing food. In any

case, we are concerned about a Cole-type event, and particularly

working with the U.S. Navy. That’s why we identify vessels of high

interest, and if we suspect that there might be a crew member who

has a suspect background, we will put Coast Guard people on

board as that vessel transits in, and we’ll put Coast Guard vessels

alongside to escort it if it is a high-consequence vessel like a Navy

vessel or a cruise ship or something like that, so that our escort

vessel will be able to shoulder away any small boat that may want

to come by.

In the case of Naval vessels, we’ll establish a Naval vessel protection zone around their assets, and by law people that enter that

zone will be violating the law and we can enforce that against

them.

So yes, we factor in Cole-type incidents. We don’t have enough

assets currently, but with our multi-year budget strategy and with

44

what is coming into the Coast Guard and what’s coming into the

Department of Defense, we will be able to deal with that threat,

as well.

Ms. WATSON. Being a late arrival—and I apologize for that—you

might have mentioned this, but have you graded and rated the

ports as to their vulnerability, as to those who are at higher risk?

And, if so, is there a list available?

Admiral PLUTA. Yes, ma’am. There is a list of strategically and

economically important ports to the United States that the Department of Transportation has focused on in cooperation with the Department of Defense, and so we are focusing our attention on those

55 of the 361 ports in the United States first.

Ms. WATSON. Are they ranked?

Admiral PLUTA. Yes, ma’am. It’s a classified document and we

can provide that to you in a separate forum.

Ms. WATSON. Yes. I just want to know how many are on the west

coast, California, if somebody could get that to me.

Admiral PLUTA. Could we get back to you off-line on that,

ma’am?

Ms. WATSON. Yes. I just want to add that right after September

11th we did hold a forum out in California in Los Angeles about

preparedness and readiness across the board, and our big concern

was about our Port of Los Angeles, but troop movement usually is

out of, as I said, the Stockton area, the North Bay area.

I must commend them for, you know, the constant vigilance. I

would just like to know are we up to par, have we done all that

we can do, and what kind of risks or vulnerability do we face. So

if you could get that information to me I can join with my colleagues from California to be sure that we see that our various

military units and those people responsible are keeping at this in

securing. I’d appreciate that information.

Admiral PLUTA. Thank you, Ms. Watson. We will provide you

with that list, and with your help over time I think we’ll get to

where we need to be to provide all the protection your ports deserve.

Ms. WATSON. We’re there.

Admiral PLUTA. Thank you.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you, Ms. Watson.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you.

Mr. PUTNAM. Captain Schubert, as the maritime administrator,

you are also director of the National Shipping Authority, and that

position is only mobilized in times of emergency; is that correct?

Captain SCHUBERT. That’s correct. The President needs to invoke

a national emergency or war.

Mr. PUTNAM. And when was the last time that was mobilized,

that occurred?

Captain SCHUBERT. It is kind of interesting. During Desert

Storm—the last time it was evoked was probably—I’d have to get

back to you on exact answer, but I want to reflect back to Desert

Storm/Desert Shield. During that mobilization we acted under the

National Port Readiness Network as if it was invoked, and we actually did issue one priority order to a ship yard under that authority. So I would say that was probably the last time it was invoked,

45

because we did invoke or issue a priority order to utilize commercial facilities, and it was done once during that engagement.

Mr. PUTNAM. So it is—but even in that situation it wasn’t really

fully engaged. It was used in that instance; is that a fair characterization?

Captain SCHUBERT. Yes, and there’s an interesting reason why it

wasn’t fully engaged. Again, I’ll relate to the Port of Houston,

which was the second-largest load-out port. In that instance, the

MTMC and MARAD worked very closely together as to what the

requirements are.

Our role is to make sure that, when we go in and prioritize and

allocate public resources, that it does not disrupt commerce to—has

the least impact on the disruption of normal flow of commerce.

In this case, in Houston we were able to negotiate with the Port

of Houston to use one berth, basically one berth that they had as

a primary load-out without disrupting the commercial flow, so we

were able to do that without actually issuing what we call a ‘‘port

planning order.’’ That was modeled pretty much throughout the

United States.

Mr. PUTNAM. Does it concern you that in time of war the plans

that are in place for a war or for a national emergency were not

fully engaged, which begs the question of whether we have the

right plans in place? And, second, that we were essentially responding to the war effort in a logistics capacity by doing what was

most convenient for commercial shippers?

Captain SCHUBERT. No, that didn’t concern me on either count.

We weren’t just doing—first of all, to answer the last part of your

question, we weren’t just concerned about commercial shippers, but

that is the reason why, under the Defense Production Act, that civilian agencies have those roles of prioritizing and allocating resources. It is so that we don’t disrupt.

But in this case we had, I think, a very effective load-out scenario. We moved more cargo during that 6-month period than we

did during the entire Korean War. It worked very well, very efficiently. The Government agencies that were involved in the Port

Readiness Network worked very well together. We established communications. We did, during that engagement, establish secure

communications with all the ports. We had a credentialling system

that we stood up almost overnight. It worked very well, and I think

we learned a lot of good lessons from that.

Mr. PUTNAM. Let me come back to that. General, you mentioned

that your committees, your Readiness Committees, have essentially

shifted from being Readiness Committees to being Security Committees. Could you elaborate on the consequences of that shift?

General PRIVRATSKY. I didn’t mean to imply that we have shifted, but we are shifting. On September 11th the risks to our homeland were different than they are today, and when Port Readiness

Committees met routinely, quarterly in most cases, at the 13 commercial strategic ports, they met to discuss the readiness of the

port to deploy the forces. Less time was spent then discussing security implications because we were perceiving the environment differently than we do today.

Now, when those Port Readiness Committees meet there is an

open discussion of intelligence information. All those committees

46

have met at those 13 commercial ports since February. The ones

in California have met just this month. There is an open dialog

sharing of intelligence information.

Our ability to provide information to those committees is much

better today than it was in September. As I mentioned in my written and oral testimony, we have a more robust intelligence capability in my command, and our links to other commands are better.

That information throughout the Military Traffic Management

Command is disseminated down to the level where they enter that

Port Readiness Committee.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you. My time has expired.

The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Tierney.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony.

Admiral Pluta, before September 11th or immediately following

September 11th the Coast Guard was very involved in protective

activities, am I right?

Admiral PLUTA. Yes, sir.

Mr. TIERNEY. When you undertook those activities, did you do so

under some existing memorandum of agreement with various other

agencies, or just a plan that the Coast Guard had designed on its

own to spring into action?

Admiral PLUTA. I don’t think I could point to a memorandum of

understanding that caused us to do what we did on September

11th, we just did what we always do—we respond. We are a response organization. We saw a need and we didn’t know where the

next threat was coming from, so we put everything we had to work

guarding the ports of the United States of America, sir.

Mr. TIERNEY. And since that day have you changed that posture

at all? Are you still performing under that sort of independent

mandate, or have you since then worked out memorandum of

agreement or other arrangements with other people to divide up

the responsibilities and address them?

Admiral PLUTA. There has been a lot more networking, sir, with

regard to everything that we do in the ports, obviously. We have

gone back to the traditional missions with the assets that we

pulled out of service to go and defend the ports, and so that we

could get back to the important drug interdiction, migrant interdiction, safety of life at sea, fisheries enforcement, those missions. But

in the ports, themselves, we recognize that we couldn’t do this job

alone and we shouldn’t do this job alone. It shouldn’t be just borne

by the Federal Government. It should be borne by all the agencies,

as well as State and local, as well as the private sector. So we’ve

outreached a lot, we’ve had a lot of public meetings, we’ve sent out

guidance. We are working internationally to get a global solution

to our problems. And, yes, sir, we are a networking organization

because of how small we are, and we exercise that to the max.

Mr. TIERNEY. Has there been any conversation with the Coast

Guard and the Department of Defense with respect to plans announced by the Department of Defense to do a Northern American

Command?

Admiral PLUTA. Yes, sir. We have been in at the ground floor on

the development of NORTHCOM all along the way, and we intend

to ensure that Coast Guard is strongly represented as a member

47

of that staff, with your approval, with a flag officer as well as a

robust staff to support that flag officer and the northern commander.

Mr. TIERNEY. What do you know so far about the plans of how

the Coast Guard’s responsibilities and the Navy’s responsibilities

will play off one another as that develops?

Admiral PLUTA. If anything, the September 11th event has

caused our relationship to even strengthen. We had a NAVGUARD

Board to coordinate our issues before, and resources largely flowed

from the Coast Guard to the Navy. But, due to the fact that we

are the lead Federal agency for maritime security, the Navy has

chopped vessels for our use to protect the ports of the United

States and have worked ever more closely with us on sharing intelligence, doing analysis, and our day-to-day operational readiness.

Mr. TIERNEY. And as far as you can tell, is that the direction that

this NORTHCOM is heading in—that it will continue to be a cooperative relationship and that the Navy will share resources——

Admiral PLUTA. Yes, sir.

Mr. TIERNEY [continuing]. As opposed to having any sort of disturbance as to who is going to control what?

Admiral PLUTA. Yes, sir. It has been a very cooperative effort and

I think the NORTHCOM is going to be focused on the maritime defense as opposed to maritime security, the preventive part of it.

But the Coast Guard is integral to both of those issues, so we have

been welcomed. One of my capstone classmates is putting that together for the Department of Defense. Very close relationship, sir.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you, Mr. Tierney.

We’re going to finish out the first round with the other gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Lynch, and then have a second

round for those who have additional questions.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, Commander, Captain, thank you very much for your

courtesy in appearing before this committee and informing us.

I want to say that I represent the Port of Boston, especially a significant portion of the maritime port. I share that honor with Congressman Capuano and also Mr. Tierney.

I just wonder if, in speaking of these 14 ‘‘strategic ports’’ through

which we move military personnel and material, are there any lessons that can be learned for the other? I’m hoping, by the way, that

the Port of Boston is on this larger list of 55 ports. I don’t know.

I don’t have that classified list yet, but I will have it soon. Are

there lessons that we can learn, structurally or in terms of preparation, to address the concerns that you see in these ‘‘strategic

ports’’ that would be useful in the larger grouping of 55 ports? Anyone?

Admiral PLUTA. Thank you, Mr. Lynch. I think the rest of the

ports can learn very from those ports. Having been a chairman of

a Port Readiness Committee and having had that history since the

1980’s, where the Port Readiness Network matured, it helped us

prosecute the Gulf War in all our ports because the MTMC commander, the Coast Guard Captain of the Port, the State Port of

North Carolina in that case, we all knew each other, our people

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knew each other, we knew each other’s facilities, and it was natural for us to flow into an accelerated mode.

In the other ports there were no Port Readiness Committees, and

so I think part of the pending legislation that the conferees are

working on and maritime security is to have a legal requirement

that there be Port Security Committees in those other ports to perform largely the same function with also some additional members,

like from the intelligence community and the Federal and State

and local law enforcement community—FBI, State police, those

kind of folks—to make sure that threat information is fresh and

new.

So the lessons learned for me, sir, are that the Port Readiness

Committee concept works and we ought to export that success to

the other ports of the United States.

Mr. LYNCH. The other question I had is regarding containerized

cargo. I know that a very small percentage of that is being inspected right now, and I know you spoke earlier of the efforts to

move our borders out, so to speak, so that there is some type of

screening process that might occur if we have some indication that

there might be questionable persons or cargo on a particular ship.

But are there any, I guess, systematized processes that you see

being implemented in the near term that might address the problem that we have, for example, in the Port of Boston where we

have, you know, shipping lines from China and from the Middle

East and from Europe—well, the Mediterranean, let’s say—coming

on a weekly basis into the port of Boston?

Captain SCHUBERT. I would like to address this first, and if you

want to add, Admiral—first of all, I wanted to mention it earlier

with regards to the container movement of container cargo, that in

this area there has been very good cooperation amongst all the

Federal agencies to address this issue. In fact, as we speak right

now there is what we refer to as the ‘‘inter-agency container working group’’ working on it up at the Merchant Marine Academy up

at King’s Point from Monday to Wednesday to try to consolidate

and come up with some additional action items to address this

issue.

Our main concern I think is, as you say, pushing the borders out

is that we want to know—we want to have some form of pre-inspection of cargo and screening cargo before it is actually loaded on

a ship that’s coming to the United States. But, again, there is some

specific recommendations from this container working group. The

first report was last February, in that timeframe. Some of those

initiatives have been implemented, and it is an example of very

close cooperation amongst all the Federal agencies.

Admiral PLUTA. Mr. Lynch, just to inform the committee, there

are several pilot projects going on under the umbrella of Operation

Safe Commerce. One that has already been completed followed a

containerized shipment of lights from a manufacturer in Slovakia

through Germany to Canada and then down to New England. We

are learning our lessons there.

There are other pilot projects on the west coast. I know the Port

of Seattle is forming some bilateral partnerships and pilot projects

with Singapore and with China, several ports in China, and so we

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are learning how to do that, how to maintain the integrity of those

pieces of cargo.

Also, a lot of this has to do with information sharing—the required proper manifesting of information and getting it to the people who need it in a timely fashion, protecting the commercial interests but allowing the Government agencies to draw from it. So

we put out a notice of proposed rulemaking on our 96-hour advanced notice of arrival requirements to require that electronic

cargo manifest information be forwarded directly to U.S. Customs

at least 96 hours before a vessel arrives here.

So the coordination, the providing of that sort of an electronic

data base and information sharing capability I think is key to our

getting this, and supporting through R&D or Federal funds the

kind of pilot projects where we can learn to do this properly.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you. Admiral, just on that last point—and

this is my last question—what type of penalty befalls a company—

let’s just say on your very point where the bill of lading has to say,

you know, exactly what is in the container that is coming into the

port. Let’s just say that is not—that the bill of lading is not correct,

that a shipper is actually putting things in a container that he has

not declared on the invoice, and that there is potentially a breach

of security. What happens to that shipper who is in violation?

Admiral PLUTA. Mr. Lynch, sir, we’re working with the Department of Justice on how to best structure the legal framework for

penalties, but at the very minimum if somebody fails to comply

with the 96-hour advanced notice of arrival requirement they won’t

be permitted in port, and that’s going to interrupt their supply

chain, and that’s going to slow down their business, and they’re not

going to put themselves in that position if they are a competent operator. So that’s one measure, and, as I said, the Department of

Justice is helping us to deal with that.

If I might, may I transfer the floor to——

Mr. LYNCH. Sure.

Captain SCHUBERT. If we’re talking about an issue of cargo description as manifested, it would refer to as a ‘‘misdescription of

cargo,’’ and that really falls within the realm of the Federal Maritime Commission.

Now, if we’re talking about misdeclaring cargo at customers,

then I’m sure there are penalties there, but the—for a

misdescription of cargo, the Federal Maritime Commission does

have pretty steep penalties for that.

Mr. LYNCH. It just seems to me that we are going to need the

cooperation of foreign shippers to police their own cargo or their

own containers before they come into this country in an effort to

move the borders out.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you, Mr. Lynch.

Let me just ask a quick question to followup from Mr. Lynch before we yield to the chairman.

In 1998, according to testimony that this subcommittee received

last week, 1998 a private weapons collector imported not one but

two scud missiles from Czechoslovakia into the Port of Long Beach.

What was the penalty to the shipper for mis-identifying, or how did

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we correctly identify that scud missiles were coming in and no one

caught it?

Admiral PLUTA. I can’t answer your question, Mr. Chairman. I

was unaware of that event. It’s a Customs declaration kind of an

issue. I can’t speak for them. I’m sorry, sir, but I can’t answer.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, you are recognized.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I almost would be overwhelmed if I had to figure out how to protect our ports, in part because almost every military part, it strikes

me, is a domestic port—I mean, has a non-military function, as

well. Is that fairly accurate, Captain?

Captain SCHUBERT. Yes. I’d say that, from a percentage basis of

cargo that’s moving through our ports on a regular basis, it’s a very

small percentage. A very small percentage of our cargo would be

DOD cargos, if that’s what you’re asking.

Mr. SHAYS. When I was asking earlier about the whole issue of

vulnerability and threat assessment, I’m unclear as to what agency

is responsible for conducting seaport-specific terrorism vulnerability and threat assessment.

Captain SCHUBERT. I would view that—as I mentioned earlier,

the Coast Guard has gone out to develop a very detailed, comprehensive port—we don’t call it port vulnerability assessments—

port security assessment on a way to do that on the 55 ports, and

I believe Admiral Pluta could address that, but I believe the Coast

Guard, as our primary agency for homeland security, is responsible

for that.

Admiral PLUTA. Mr. Chairman, if I might add?

Mr. SHAYS. Yes. Sure.

Admiral PLUTA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I mentioned earlier, we have sought funds and received some to conduct vulnerability of port security assessments here at the—at first the most

important ports in the United States, and eventually all of them.

This would be a comprehensive assessment by a contractor with

Coast Guard oversight to look at all aspects of vulnerability of the

entire port, not just a single facility.

I think, to contrast with what General Privratsky was talking

about, he is mainly concerned, I believe, with the facility, itself,

under MTMC and worrying about it from both the shore side and

the water side. Our concern is the entire port. One facility may be

very well protected and the one right next door not well protected.

We want to uncover those kind of vulnerabilities and look at such

things as where do they get their power from, how well is their information protected, and then how is access control provided, lighting, fencing, the whole nine yards.

Mr. SHAYS. And I make an assumption that you have not had the

resources to do it so we do not at this time really have an assessment of vulnerability and threat. I mean, we are doing it but we

don’t have it.

Admiral PLUTA. Yes, sir. We have five completed. We hope to do

eight at least this year with the funds available to us.

Mr. SHAYS. And how many are we talking about?

Admiral PLUTA. I’m sorry, sir?

Mr. SHAYS. How many would we be talking about totally?

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Admiral PLUTA. Fifty-five, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. And so, General, would you kind of, based on what

the admiral told me, put it in context with what you were telling

me about?

General PRIVRATSKY. The fifty-five, seventeen of those ports are

strategic ports, and of those thirteen are commercial, and of those

thirteen there have been risk assessments conducted on four of the

commercial ports. Of the DOD facilities, there have been extensive

risk assessments done on two, those at Sunny Point, North Carolina, and Concord, California.

Mr. SHAYS. And are those ports—sorry for my ignorance—are

those ports exclusive military, or are they ports that folks sail out

of for pleasure and commercial ships come in?

General PRIVRATSKY. Our port at Sunny Point, North Carolina,

is a DOD installation. It is our primary port for shipping ammunition. We do have——

Mr. SHAYS. These are weapons ports. I’m sorry, but what I’m

asking is—the ports are fairly large, so do you have a part of a

major harbor or——

General PRIVRATSKY. These are exclusive use Department of Defense facilities. At Sunny Point I do have the capability and the approval authority to move commercial shipments through there, and

I have executed that a half dozen times in the past year-and-a-half

through an extensive coordination process.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just conclude by asking each of you to do a

proper threat—to do the things that were mentioned by GAO, the

comprehensive assessment of threat, vulnerability, and critical port

infrastructure and functions, to do the proper overseeing, coordination, executing force protection, what type of dollars are we talking

about?

Admiral PLUTA. Mr. Chairman, the assessments—average cost of

a comprehensive assessment of an entire port area like I have been

talking about is about $500,000, a half million dollars apiece to do

that.

Mr. SHAYS. And if you had all the money necessary, would you

have the personnel to do it, or is there a time issue, as well? I

mean, in other words, is there a limit to how quickly we can do

this?

Admiral PLUTA. Mr. Chairman, I think there is—we could do it

quicker than we have planned right now. We are using a contractor, and we are going to—the Coast Guard role and our other agencies that are helping us do oversight are going to just be overseeing

the contractor’s work. So it is a matter of how many people the contractor can get geared up to do the job. They have been working

on first a model port assessment template that we can apply to

every port, not that one size fits all, but we need to look at the

same elements as we look at every port. So that work is nearly

complete, and then they will be ready to roll it out and try it out

on ports.

We have learned what we’ve learned today through working with

DTRA on threat reduction to defense ports, but it is—I think it is

more resource constrained than time constrained, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much.

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Mr. PUTNAM. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

At this time we recognize the distinguished chairman emeritus

of the International Relations Committee, Mr. Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I address this to the entire panel. I regret I had to go to another

meeting and was detained from coming back on time. What is the

role of the Merchant Marine in port security or security in high

seas? Can I address that to the whole panel?

Captain SCHUBERT. Well, first of all, in my opinion, the safest

way to move cargo is under—is on a U.S.-flagged vessel with U.S.-

owned and U.S.-crewed crew on board the ship. That is the basis

for the Cargo Preference Act of 1904 which mandates that all military cargo move on U.S.-flagged ships.

But the bit for security, it is—I certainly feel better, you know—

I gave some testimony a couple of weeks ago about some of the

issues around what we call ‘‘open registries, flag inconvenience.’’ So

we are quite concerned that some of these ships that are coming

in and out of our ports, that we need to increase the knowledge and

standardized way of credentialling worldwide so we know who is on

those ships.

Outside of that, we have the IMO efforts that the Coast Guard

is engaged in, which I believe will designate a security officer

aboard our ships.

Did you want to add to that, Admiral?

Admiral PLUTA. If I may, Mr. Chairman Emeritus, thank you,

sir. What the administrator said is true. We are depending upon

the mariner to be our eyes and ears, as well as making sure that

the vessel security plans that we will require both domestically and

internationally for all flagged vessels, there be a vessel security officer on board designated to make sure that the security measures

are implemented on that ship, and that could be things like making sure you know all of the crew members and passengers on

board and whether or not they are clean, making sure that any of

the cargo—all the cargo on board has been properly vetted, and

those sorts of things. We also will require a company security officer to oversee their whole fleet of ships, likely to be a former Merchant Mariner.

Mr. GILMAN. Admiral Pluta, is there some special training for

these security officers on each ship?

Admiral PLUTA. Yes, sir, there will be a list of required competencies that they have to have and required training that they

have to have, and then they have to train the rest of the crew in

what their responsibilities will be.

Mr. GILMAN. Who will be doing that training initially?

Admiral PLUTA. You want to answer that?

Captain SCHUBERT. We’re still waiting for the pending legislation

to port security to pass, and it will address that to some degree,

but from the viewpoint of the Department, we believe that we have

resources out there like the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy at

King’s Point and Global Maritime Transportation School at King’s

Point that can be used for that.

Mr. GILMAN. But they’re not using them at the present time; is

that correct?

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Captain SCHUBERT. I could say not only the Merchant Marine

Academy, but the State schools are implementing security courses

at their schools as we speak, but, as I mentioned in my opening

statement, the Global Maritime Transportation School at King’s

Point is currently training—actually, in August will be training

from the State of Florida law enforcement officers from the State

of Florida, and this will be, I think, the first real class dedicated

exclusively to do that.

Mr. GILMAN. So right now there is no overall training in place;

is that right?

Captain SCHUBERT. It’s not—correct, sir. It’s not in place yet because we were waiting for the final legislation to come out of conference to see how it will define those responsibilities.

Mr. GILMAN. I hope you are going to be able to expedite that.

How do we currently monitor private boat owners from international ports like yachts, fishing vessels? How do we monitor all

of that?

Admiral PLUTA. Mr. Chairman Emeritus, I don’t think that we

monitor. We monitor the vessels that do come into the United

States, but, as far as the private vessels, I don’t think there is—

they’re below the cutoff for our 96-hour advanced notice of arrival

requirements. We hope to get all vessels under that same requirement so that we can see all foreign yachts and foreign fishing vessels and foreign other vessels coming into the United States, but

currently we have no requirement for that, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. So right now, Admiral, they are under the radar

screen, right? They’re not up on the screen?

Admiral PLUTA. Yes, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We appreciate the distinguished panel’s comments. There may be

additional comments submitted for you to answer for the record. At

this time we will excuse the first panel and seat the second panel.

The subcommittee is pleased to welcome Mr. Raymond Decker,

the director of Defense Capabilities and Management Team with

the U.S. General Accounting Office, and Mr. Kenneth Goulden,

Vice President of Maersk Sealand. Welcome to the subcommittee,

gentlemen.

As you know, this is a subcommittee that does swear in witnesses, so I would ask that you please stand and raise your right

hand.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. PUTNAM. Note for the record that the witnesses responded in

the affirmative.

It is a pleasure to have you with us, and we will begin with Mr.

Decker. You are recognized.

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STATEMENTS OF RAYMOND DECKER, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT TEAM, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY JOE KIRSCHBAUM,

SENIOR ANALYST; AND KENNETH GOULDEN, VICE PRESIDENT, MAERSK SEALAND

Mr. DECKER. Thank you very much, Mr. Putnam, Chairman

Shays, distinguished members of the subcommittee. I am pleased

to be here today to participate in a hearing on homeland security,

securing strategic ports with an emphasis on the security coordination measures through our military movements through these vital

portals.

As requested, my testimony will focus on the security environment at domestic strategic seaports used by the Department of Defense for military deployments and the Department’s process for securing these military deployments through those ports. My comments are based on preliminary results of the work we are currently conducting on this issue for the subcommittee. We plan to

provide the subcommittee with a report this fall.

I have asked my senior analyst in charge responsible for this

area, Mr. Joe Kirschbaum, to join me at the witness table.

The October 12, 2000, attack on the U.S. destroyer ‘‘U.S.S. Cole’’

in the Port of Aden illustrated the danger of non-traditional threats

to U.S. ships in seaports. The September 11th attacks heightened

the need for a significant change in conventional anti-terrorism

thinking. The new security environment assumes that all U.S. military assets here and abroad are vulnerable to attack and a domestic physical infrastructure such as our commercial seaports is recognized as highly vulnerable to potential terrorist attack. These

seaports are vital to our national security, and during a major conflict 95 percent of the Department of Defense’s equipment and material needed for overseas military operations would pass through

them.

Uncertainties regarding the seaport security environment exist

for several reasons. First, comprehensive assessments of threat,

vulnerability, and critical port infrastructure and functions which

we would call ‘‘criticality’’ have not been completed. These assessments underpin the risk management approach that I have previously described in past hearings before this subcommittee and

the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs.

As you are aware, risk management is a balanced, systematic,

and analytical approach to determine the likelihood that a threat

could adversely affect individuals, physical assets, or functions, and

then identify actions to reduce the risk, mitigate the severity of the

consequence of the event, and reasonably manage uncertainty.

Second, no effective process exists to receive, analyze, evaluate,

and disseminate the spectrum of threat information at seaports.

Most threat information at the ports is received informally through

personal contacts with law enforcement individuals. No formal

mechanism exists to ensure that all threats are factored into the

risk-based decisionmaking process with actionable information

transmitted in a timely manner to all relevant organizations.

Recent efforts by the Coast Guard and other agencies at the

ports are attempting to address many of these weaknesses, and you

heard many of the witnesses in the previous panel discuss this.

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The Coast Guard has initiated vulnerability assessments of the

port’s infrastructure and is deploying additional teams dedicated to

seaport authority functions. The first Marine safety and security

team was deployed 3 weeks ago to Seattle and will provide SWATteam-like support to investigate suspicious vessels before they

enter U.S. ports.

In 1999, the Coast Guard discussed in a strategic plan the concept of maritime domain awareness, which links information fusion, risk management principles, and decisionmaking process.

With the support of the National Security Council, this concept is

being validated at the Coast Guard’s Intelligence Coordination

Center in Suitland through real-world application.

On the congressional front, proposed legislation, Senate Resolution 1214, the Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001, should assist those officials and organizations responsible for the safe and

secure operation of our seaports to better focus resources and actions against future threats. Several key provisions of the legislation include: the establishment of a national level and port and

local port security bodies to plan and oversee security measures,

the conduct of port vulnerability assessments, and background

checks for port workers and development of access controls to sensitive areas. There is much more in that resolution that will be

very beneficial.

The implementation of these provisions and others will help create an effective framework to better understand the threat environment and the importance of the continuous assessment of threat to

support daily operations, as well as short-and long-term planning.

We believe the current enhanced security-related activities discussed earlier, coupled with the measures of S.R. 1214, should continue to improve the security posture of our seaports.

Now I would like to comment on Department of Defense’s force

protection process for deployments through domestic seaports. During the conduct of our work, we identified two significant weaknesses in the process. First, there is no Department of Defense

focal point tasked to provide overall oversight, coordination, and

execution of domestic force protection measures from fort-to-port

military movements. Since a military movement of equipment or

material normally involves the parent military unit, the Military

Transportation Management Command, Port Readiness Committee, Military Sealift Command, and with each of these elements responsible for a different portion of the journey, there are varying

degrees of force protection planning, execution, and risk management application.

Complicating this issue further is the fact that non-Government

parties may be contracted to provide transport by road and rail. As

a result, potential force protection gaps and weaknesses requiring

attention and action outside the purview or awareness of any one

element may exist.

In contrast, once a military shipment reaches its overseas debarkation point, a military element at the Unified Command level is

responsible for the overall force protection planning and execution

for the safe off-load and transport to its final destination. This capability provides oversight of all phases of the movement, especially when non-U.S. entities are involved.

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Second, during the movement of military equipment or material

by ship, the Department sometimes relinquishes control of these

items to non-Department-of-Defense entities to include foreignflagged ships crewed by non-U.S. citizens. Although this practice is

consistent with current Department policies and procedures, it limits the Department’s ability to provide security oversight while the

equipment is in transit and potentially increases the risk involving

these vital cargos.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, the events of September 11th

heightened the vulnerability of the U.S. homeland to non-traditional attack, and the resulting new environment warrants that

more attention be focused on vital military deployments through

strategic commercial seaports.

A risk management approach will wisely guide both military and

civilian leaders and managers as they make important decisions affecting planning and actions to better prepare against potential attacks and mitigate the consequences of adverse events. However,

the current uncertainties in the security environment at our domestic ports and weaknesses in the Department of Defense’s force

protection approach increase the potential risk to military deployments that could adversely affect U.S. overseas operations.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. We would be

pleased to respond to any questions you, the committee, may have.

Mr. SHAYS [resuming Chair]. Thank you, Mr. Decker. I appreciate all the work you do before this committee.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Decker follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Goulden at Maersk Sealand.

Mr. GOULDEN. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, it

is a pleasure for me to appear here before you today to speak about

security coordination measures at strategic seaports during mobilization of military cargo. Maersk shares your commitment to ensuring that security measures are in place to protect military personnel and cargo during mobilizations.

By way of background, Maersk is one of the largest providers of

global intermodal transportation services in the world. We have

built and operate an integrated transportation network covering

100 countries. Our network includes more than 250 ocean-going

vessels, numerous terminals on five different continents, including

12 ocean terminals here in the United States, over 800,000 shipping containers, business relationships with trucking companies

and railroads around the world, and sophisticated information

management systems to track each shipment from initial order to

final delivery.

One of Maersk’s most important customers is the U.S. Government and the Department of Defense, in particular. Two of our

main business areas with the Department of Defense are, one, ship

ownership and management services, and, two, global intermodal

transportation services.

With respect to ship ownership management services, Maersk

owns and/or operates a sizable fleet of ships exclusively for the U.S.

military. The fleet includes two ammunition ships, eight large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ships known as LMSRs, five maritime

prepositioning ships, and twelve surveillance ships. These ships

typically call at seaports controlled by the U.S. military.

Maersk also provides the military with global intermodal transportation services using our commercial intermodal network. Currently Maersk transports approximately 30,000 40-foot equivalent

containers each year for the Department of Defense.

In addition to providing peacetime support, Maersk supports the

military mobilization requirements through its participation in the

maritime security program and the voluntary intermodal sealift administration known as VISA. Under these programs, Maersk has

committed to provide the U.S. military with more intermodal and

vessel capacity capabilities during a mobilization than any other

carrier in the world. This commitment is memorialized in pre-negotiated contracts to facilitate a quick and seamless transition from

peacetime to contingency operations.

Earlier, General Privratsky provided the subcommittee with testimony that focused primarily on security of military organic transportation networks. The military also relies on commercial intermodal networks and assets. The focus of my testimony is the security of commercial intermodal networks during both peacetime and

military mobilizations.

Mobilizations and major deployments will be accomplished under

the VISA program. One important component of the VISA program

is the Joint Planning and Advisory Group known as JPAG. The

JPAG provides a forum for the military and VISA carriers to exchange information, both classified and unclassified, and coordinate

actions to develop concepts of operations. Through pre-negotiated

contracts, the JPAG will have a number of tools at its disposal and

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can incorporate these into CONOPS to protect military cargo. The

security measures included in the CONOPS will be in addition to

the many security measures that Maersk has in place to protect its

commercial intermodal network and the cargo that moves through

it.

Since September 11th, Maersk has hardened its existing security

systems and procedures. Maersk also was one of the first carriers

to participate in the voluntary U.S. Customs trade partnership

against terrorism initiative known as C-TPAT. As part of that initiative, Maersk is conducting global security assessment and gap

analysis, which should be completed within the next 30 days.

Maersk will followup that assessment by implementing appropriate

measures to address any identified security gap or weakness.

We have made good progress in improving security, but still have

a big job in front of us. Without a doubt, it is a complex and multifaceted endeavor that requires the leadership and coordination of

the Federal Government.

The Federal Government must establish and enforce standardized security requirements for each participant and each node in

the intermodal transportation process. Without mandatory security

standards, the competitive environment makes it commercially impossible for an individual company on its own initiative to impose

additional security requirements on customers and suppliers. When

establishing security requirements, the Federal Government must

be mindful of the impact that such requirements could have on the

network performance and strike an appropriate balance. We must

be careful that security measures do not cause bottlenecks that reduce network velocity and ultimately disrupt military mobilizations

and international commerce.

In closing, Maersk believes that the proposed legislation, if enacted and properly implemented, would result in better management and coordination of security efforts. In particular, Maersk

supports standardized cargo documentation requirements; national

systems for identification cards and personnel credentialling; uniform standards for container security; coordinated security assistance, plans, and response teams. Improving the security of the

intermodal transportation will inevitably have a positive impact on

the military cargo moving through commercial networks during a

mobilization; therefore, Maersk believes that the proposed legislation is an important step in the right direction.

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for

the opportunity to testify before you today.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Goulden follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Let me ask what may appear to be somewhat of a

facetious question, but it is not intended that way. I’d like to just

see where it leads us.

Tell me something hopeful. Tell me something encouraging about

our ability to protect our strategic resources at our seaports. I’ll

throw it open to you first, Mr. Decker, and then to Mr. Goulden.

Mr. DECKER. Mr. Chairman, could I ask for a rephrasing of the

question, please?

Mr. SHAYS. Yes.

Mr. DECKER. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. I’ll preface it by saying as I listened to the testimony

I feel like—and as I think of what I’ve seen in my work chairing

this committee, I don’t know a lot that I can feel encouraged about

in our capabilities to protect vital resources in our ports. Given, in

particular, that a lot of the ports have dual use—they really have

three. They have military—our harbors do. They have military,

they have commercial, and they have recreational uses. I don’t feel

that we have an infrastructure in place that is particularly good at

protecting our facilities. I don’t feel we have the manpower. I don’t

feel we have the coordination yet. I don’t think we’ve done our risk

assessment. I don’t think that we’ve developed a strategy. So I

started to get a little depressed about it.

Tell me some hopeful things that I can say, ‘‘Oh, gosh, this is better than I think.’’

Mr. DECKER. Sir, I think one of the most hopeful aspects, besides

the good work that I think people are trying to do at the different

executive agencies at different levels, are the provisions in the Senate Resolution 1214. Really, that legislation, with its counterpart

House resolution, which is an amendment to that resolution, really

provides for the first time a tremendously top-down-to-the-bottomlevel framework that is going to help the national leadership as

well as the local officers that are responsible for working port security issues with tools that will allow them to move forward. This

will take some time, though, for this to evolve.

If you look at a couple of the major points that were brought up

earlier, some of the issues that are being worked on, port vulnerability assessments, this legislation prescribes that there has to be

some standards applied and there has to be some consistency with

how they are done across the board. Right now that’s not the case.

Department of Defense has had a very long program of force protection in which they have come up with a good process for vulnerability assessments, and I was encouraged to hear that DTRA is

going to be involved working with the Coast Guard, with the Maritime Administration, and others—MTMC—to work on that. So legislation is part one.

Part two is I think that there are a lot of response-type actions

that are positive. The one I mentioned about the Coast Guard with

their SWAT-like teams that go out and look at suspicious vessels

before they get into a port, that’s positive, the studies that are ongoing looking at sea container security issues. But there is a lot a

question about are we better today than we were a year ago, you

know, independent of September 11th, and I’m not really sure I can

answer that, with the work that we’ve done. I just sort of share

your concerns.

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Mr. GOULDEN. Your concerns are well placed, but, having said

that—and I think everyone recognizes that—the amount of focus

today as opposed to prior to September 11th is incredible. You can’t

go anywhere in our business and not have security be a mainstay

portion of it. There are pilots in place, the Customs C-TPAT

partnering agreement that I talked about, security.

Mr. SHAYS. You mean pilot programs?

Mr. GOULDEN. Pilot programs in place like the C-TPAT.

Mr. SHAYS. Because you do have pilots at your harbors.

Mr. GOULDEN. At the ports we have pilots. Yes, we do. You got

it. Pilot programs. You got it. Security seals, our other pilot programs that are in place. There have been a few more mentioned

here.

The industry is thirsty for answers on how to improve the system

and how do they participate in the system. There is a growing recognition that cargo plays an important part, and it is the whole

intermodal network, not just one node.

Granted, the port is where everything comes in and out of, but

knowledge of things away from there which are much more difficult

to assess are now being looked at as the long-term solution to offer

some protection to the ports.

So I think there is a lot to be hopeful for. We certainly aren’t

there yet.

Mr. SHAYS. Your company has contracts, as you pointed out, obviously, with the military to ship. Are all your ships dedicated to

military transportation, or is it—do you sometimes—do you have

some ships just totally dedicated and other ships that are used

where needed?

Mr. GOULDEN. Correct. We have a group of vessels where we either own those vessels and charter them and manage them for the

U.S. Government or we manage U.S. Government vessels for them,

and those are totally dedicated to the Department of Defense and

the work that the Department of Defense does.

Mr. SHAYS. So any transportation of military hardware is on a

dedicated ship?

Mr. GOULDEN. There is a set that’s done that way. We also have

23 vessels that we operate in our commercial fleet, so of 250 worldwide vessels, 23 of those would be in commercial operation off of

U.S. shores integrated into that commercial fleet. By and large, the

majority of the cargo on those ships is commercial cargo moving in

and out of foreign commerce of the United States through U.S.

ports.

We also move about 30,000 40-foot equivalents for the U.S. military in peacetime in foreign commerce on those same U.S.-flagged

vessels, which are U.S. flagged, crewed by U.S. crew members and

U.S. citizens, and operated by us in our fleets. They are also documented U.S.-flagged vessels.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Mr. Decker, General Privratsky’s testimony stated that the Military Traffic Management Command coordinates with other organizations and shares information. Your study and testimony implies

there is need for significant improvement, so I’d like to ask how

should the MTMC improve coordination of force protection measures.

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Mr. DECKER. Mr. Chairman, if you will allow me, I’d like to have

my colleague, Mr. Kirschbaum——

Mr. SHAYS. I’d be delighted to have him respond.

Mr. DECKER [continuing]. Provide a comment on that, if you will.

Mr. SHAYS. The question is, is he delighted to respond? [Laughter.]

Do you want me to repeat the question?

Mr. KIRSCHBAUM. No, sir, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. By and

large, at the ports we visited—the point the general made about

the coordination mechanisms at the Port Readiness Committees

and the role that his command plays, from our view is fairly systematic. They do have processes in place and they follow them fairly closely and they are most assuredly dedicated individuals.

Where the variance comes in is in the stages of the deployment

process from the fort to the port, as Mr. Decker alluded to earlier,

where there are several phases at which force protection concerns

are critical, but the actual transport is changed. It is changed

hands from the military installation, from road or rail movement,

and then at some point at the port when the military equipment

changes over. At the port, itself, that Port Readiness Committee

structure is in place where you have MTMC coordinating with the

Coast Guard, with local military commanders. That same level of

planning, of assessments, and of coordinated force protection measures cannot be traced to the same level at all stages of that deployment. It’s when you step back to that overall view you see that

there’s a potential that the same level of planning has not been

done throughout the entire process. That’s the difference.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Mr. Goulden, when military hardware, equipment, is loaded on

non-DOD ships—in other words, on one of your ships—what kind

of security arrangements are made? Do you carry any military flag?

Do you have military personnel on board? Are you treated like a

commercial ship or like a military ship?

Mr. GOULDEN. We’re treated as a commercial ship. The cargo

that comes on into the port and loaded for DOD onto our vessels

would be treated as the same unless the U.S. military asks for special treatment. Our contracts enable them to say that they could

have a super cargo, that they would want someone to watch that

cargo all the way through from loading to destination and then

hand it off at the other end. That assessment of their cargo and

how they want it handled is done by theirs, and our contractual relationship enables us to implement the terms that they would like.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Is there any question that any of the

three of you feel that we need to put on the record and want to

ask yourself the question and answer it? Is there a question that

you think we need to put on the record?

Mr. GOULDEN. Not from me.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Decker.

Mr. DECKER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to just pursue that

question you asked.

Mr. SHAYS. Sure.

Mr. DECKER. And with the help of our distinguished colleague,

perhaps illuminate more on the issue.

Mr. SHAYS. Sure.

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Mr. DECKER. A concern that we raised had to do with the military equipment being transported on ships of foreign flag with

crews from other countries.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me be clear. So these are—your ships would not

necessarily be U.S.-flagged ships?

Mr. GOULDEN. We would move military cargo that was booked

with us on our U.S.-flagged vessels. In the event no U.S.-flagged

vessel was available, a determination of non-availability would be

made, then the military has the right to authorize the cargo to be

booked on one of our foreign-flagged vessels.

Mr. SHAYS. Sorry, Mr. Decker. I just wanted to ask him.

Mr. DECKER. No. In fact, that’s exactly where I was headed with

the question. When we did some of our site work, we looked at the

ship manifests, the cargo on nine ships of different flags, and also

the crew manifest, the crew list. And what we noted—and these

were in support of military operations overseas, not a mobilization

but ongoing operations—the ships, by and large, except for one,

was of a foreign—all foreign flagged. Now, some is I think flag of

convenience for other reasons, but several were owned by foreign

countries and therefore—and then flagged in different countries.

Crews were totally from other countries. Yet, on these ships during

the missions we looked at you had Bradley fighting vehicles, 155

millimeter howitzers, Black Hawk helicopters, machine guns, night

vision goggles, nuclear biological chemical defense equipment, and

it just goes on—communications equipment.

Mr. SHAYS. So you would draw from that what?

Mr. DECKER. Well, a concern that perhaps—and maybe the risk

is acceptable, but do we know everything we need to about the

ships and the crews that are not under U.S. flag or U.S. control,

that the risk is acceptable when we move high-value, very sensitive, important equipment.

I thought my colleague would be able to, from his perspective,

knowing the business, might be able to share some insight on that.

Mr. SHAYS. Would you care to respond to that?

Mr. GOULDEN. I’m not familiar with the statistics, so I don’t

know if these were spot charters or liner operations or whatever,

but I do know that the Military Sealift Command routinely charters vessels that are foreign flagged once they’ve made a determination that there are no U.S.-flagged vessels available.

Mr. SHAYS. And do they do that through you or do they do it

independently?

Mr. GOULDEN. No, they do it independently. They do a request

for bid and people put in proposals.

Mr. SHAYS. And how much of the non-military-transported goods

do you think your company does? Do you do 10 percent of it, 50

percent of it?

Mr. GOULDEN. In what we would call ‘‘liner traffic,’’ cargo that

moves within a specific contract called the ‘‘universal service contract 03,’’ which is managed by the Military Traffic Management

Command, on a global basis in foreign commerce we probably handle somewhere between 45 and 50 percent of the cargo.

Mr. SHAYS. You had a lot of explanation before you got to that

number.

Mr. GOULDEN. Well, you don’t want to confuse it——

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Mr. SHAYS. Yes, I understand.

Mr. GOULDEN [continuing]. With domestic cargo and other cargos.

Mr. SHAYS. So you do almost half?

Mr. GOULDEN. Yes, approximately half. Correct.

Mr. SHAYS. So can I infer that the other half is going on nonU.S.-flagged ships?

Mr. GOULDEN. No, you cannot.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Mr. GOULDEN. The other half would go on competitors that are

U.S. flag operators with U.S. citizen crews, similar companies just

like my own—American President Lines, Lykes Lines, Farrell, Central Gulf Waterman—make sure I get them all in there, because

they won’t be happy with me if I don’t. But they all participate in

the same contract and would handle the rest of the cargo.

Mr. SHAYS. Gentlemen, is there anything else we need to put on

the record?

[No response.]

Mr. SHAYS. Then I’d like to thank you. I appreciate your testimony. I appreciate your putting this on the record. I think this is

clearly a work in process and a new area for this committee, so we

will be getting into it in a lot more depth.

Thank you.

This hearing is adjourned.

Mr. DECKER. Thank you.

Mr. GOULDEN. Thank you, sir.

[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, to

reconvene at the call of the Chair.]

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