### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE Jul y 21, 200 4 S es sio n
DOR IAN SOR IAN O BA UTIS TA v. ST ATE OF TEN NES SEE

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Bedf ord County No. 9077 Lee R ussell, Ju dge

No. M2002- 01707-CCA -R3-P C - F iled Septem ber 21, 2004

The pe titioner, Dorian Soriano Bautista, appea ls from the Be dford Count y Circuit Court’s dismi ssal of his petition for post-conviction re lief fr o m his conviction for theft ove r one thousand dollar s, a Cla ss D fe lon y . H e c on te nd s th a t he re c e ive d th e ine ff e c tiv e a ssi st anc e of

c ou ns e l be c a us e his
a tto rn e y s f

a ile d to e xpla in t o h im the a dv e rs e c on se qu e nc e s that his g uil ty ple a a nd c on vic tio n c ou ld ha ve on his re sid e nt a lie n s ta tus , w hic h le d to his de po rt a tio n. We a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ou rt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

J O S EP H M. T I PTON , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which N OR MA M C G EE O G LE and R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J J ., joined.

S. J ason Whatley , Columbi a, Te nnessee , for the a ppellant, Doria n Soriano Ba utista.

Paul G. S u m mers, Attorne y Gene ral a nd Reporter ; Eliz abeth T. Ry an, Senior Counsel; Wil liam Michae l McCown, District Attorney Gene ral; and Mic hael Da vid Randles, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

This case arises f

rom the petitioner’ s theft of a car whee l and tires. On June 14, 2001, the pe tit ion e r p le d g uil ty

a ndthe state su mma

ri zedthe e vid e nc e a g a ins t th e pe tit ion e r a s f oll ow s:

Your Honor , the State’s proof would show that on Marc h the 3rd of this y ear a civilian or c itiz en witness basic ally saw the de fenda nt stealing wheel s o ff a car at the Clare nce L amb Car L ot. And appar ently when the defe ndant sort of re alized he was be ing w atche d, he took o f

f, w e n t a c r o s s to Kr o g e r ’ s a c r o s s th e s tr e e t th r o u g h the parking lot there. Kind of ke pt up with him [ s i c] . The police wer e contac ted, and stopped him just a short distance near by . And he wa s-2- in a truck. A nd the stolen whee l and tires we re i n t h e b ac k . So, ba sic a lly c a ug ht i n th e a c t.

The trial c ourt, afte r re ceiving the state’s pr offe r, informe d the petitioner of his c onstitut ional ri g ht ( 1) to a

jury tr ia l, ( 2) to fo rc e the state to p ro ve e ve ry e le me nt o f the c ri me be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t, ( 3) to c on fr on t a ndc ro ss- e xami ne wi tn ess es cal le d a g a ins t hi m, ( 4) to r e ma in s ile nt o r t o testify at trial, (5) to have the a ssistance of counsel, (6) to call witnesses on his own beha lf, and (7) to have the c ourt issue subpoenas c ompelling the attendance of witnesses. The trial court then informed the pe titioner that if he we re convicted by a jury , he would have the rig ht to a sentenc ing hearing and to appea l his convicti o n

. The trial c ourt explained to the petitioner that the crime for which he ha d been c harg ed car ried with it a pote ntial sentence of two to twelve y ear s. The trial c ourt asked the petitioner whe ther he was unde r the influenc e of any intox icant, and when the pe titioner replied that he was not, the f ollowing e x chang e occ urre d:
THE COURT: Okay . Mr. B autista . . . [di d] anybody promise y ou a nythi ng to g e t y ou to t ake the de a l? [THE PETI TI ONER]: No, sir. THE COUR T : An y b ody

threaten y ou in any

way to ge t y ou to take the de a l? [THE PETI TI ONER]: No, sir. THE C O U RT : O k a y

. A s f ar a s y o u ar e c o n c e r n e d , w a s th e plea b ar g a i n arr a n g e m e n tf

r e e a n d v o l u n t ar y? [THE PETI TI ONER]: Yes, sir.

Th e tr ia l c ou rt

fo un d th a t th e peti ti on er’ s g uil ty ple a wa s k no wi ng a ndvo lun tary , a ndit
acc epted the pe titioner’s plea. At the sentenc ing he aring , the trial court imposed a sentenc e of two y ear s and one month, which it suspende d, placing the petit ioner on probation. As the petitioner wa s le a vin g the c ou rtho us e , a n a g e nt o f the I mmi g ratio n an d N a tur a lizatio n Se rv ic e (I NS) arr e ste d h im and cha rg ed him with being subject to removal fr om the United States pursuant to fe dera l law for ha vin g be e n c on vic te d of “a n ag g ra vate d fe lon y ” a s def ine d in the I mmi g ratio n an d N a tio na lit y Ac t. The INS therea fter tr ansported the petitioner to the Oakdale Feder al Detention Center in L ouisiana to a wa it d e po rt a tio n p ro c e e din g s. The pe titioner sought post-c onviction relief, c laiming that he rec eived the ine ffe ctive assistance of counse l which pre vented him from e ntering a knowin g an d voluntary g uiltyplea. Spe c if ic a lly , th e pe tit ion e r al le g e d his co urt app oin te d co un se l fa ile d to in fo rm him of the e ff e c t hi s g uiltyplea would ha ve on his resident alien status. The petiti oner alleg ed that had he known of such
a dv e rs e c on se qu e nc e s, he wo uldha ve pr oc e e de d to tr ia l.
The pe titioner was unable to attend the post-conviction hea ring in this m atter be cause he wa s detained in L ouisiana aw aiting d eportation, but the petitioner’s post-conviction counse l and an assistant district attorney

g ener al took his deposition by telephone. The deposition was introduce d as evide nce at the petit ioner’s post-conviction hearing. A transcript of the deposition was included-3-

in the rec ord, but a t ra n s cr i p t o f t h e re mainder of the hea ring is absent. We note that the court
re po rt e r f a ile d to pr od uc e the po st- c on vic tio n h e ari ng tr a ns c ri pt andwa s su bs e qu e nt lyfo un d in contempt of c ourt and inca rc er ated. However , the petitioner’s post-c onviction counsel and the district attorney

g ener al’s off

ice f iled an ag ree d “stateme nt of the evide nce.” See T.R.A.P. 24(c)

. The pe titioner testified that he is a pe rmanen t resident alien r esiding in the United States since 1993, that he g raduated from Shelby ville Central Hig h School w here he learned to spe ak flue nt Eng lish, and that he wa s intending upon a pply ing f or U n i t ed S tates citizenship. Rega rding the char g es ag ainst him in Bedfor d County , he said that in re turn for his g uiltyplea to thef t over one thousand dollars, the state h a d dr o pped misdemea nor cha rg es ag ainst him for wea

pon possession and criminal trespa ss.
Th e pe tit ion e r t e sti fi e d th a t hi s p ub lic de fe nd e rs , w ho he c ha ra c te ri zed a s a

“ blo nd e ma n w ith g lasses” a nd a woman, never told him that he could be deporte d to Mex ico base d upon his guilty plea to the ft ov e r o ne tho us a nddo lla

rs . H e sa id that he wa s u na wa re wheth e r the c ha

rg e s a g a ins t hi m wer e misdemea nors or fe lonies but he knew that some wer e more serious than others. He said that
on the da y of the g uil ty ple a , he wa s tak e n into c us tod y fo r fa ilu re to co mpl y wi th a co urt or de r t o pa y fe e s to his c ou rt -a

pp oin te d la wy e rs . H e sa id that w hil e he wa s in de te nti on , a ma le pu bli c defe nder told him his only options wer e to plead guilty and get probation or t o g o to trial and ser ve two y ear s and one month in the Department of Corr ection. He said neither of his court-a

ppointed attorney s discussed the possibilityof pre trial or judicial diversion with him prior to his guilty plea. He sa id that had he known ple ading g uilty to the t heft charg e would have resulted in hi s deportation, he would neve r have ag ree d to the plea ba rg ain. He sa id he would have instead proc eede d to trial in order to c ontest the state’s pr oof re g arding the value of the stolen property

. An Assistant Publi c De fende r met with him on two occa sions: at the petitioner’s ar raig nment
a nda t th e pu bli c de fe nd e r’ s o ff ic e . H e sa id he dis c us se d w ith the pe tit ion e r the state ’s re sp on se to the pe tit ion e r’ s dis c ov e ry re qu e st, a ndhe sa id the y dis c us se d th e pe tit ion e r’ s v e rs ion of the e ve nts

. He said that he also discussed with the petitioner the nature of the char g es ag ainst hi m an d t he punishment he coul d re ce i ve. Hesaid that during the discussion of punishment, the petitioner
a dmi tte d h is g uil t a nd tol d him he wa s on ly c on c e rn e d w ith a vo idi ng inc arc e ratio n. Th e a tto rn e y sa id that althoug h he was not phy sically prese nt on the date of the plea hearing, he had conduc ted the plea
ne g oti a tio ns wi th the state

. He sa id the a g re e me nt with the state pr ov ide d tha t the pe tit ion e r w ou ld be placed on probation i f the pre sentenc e re port was f avora ble. He a cknowledg ed he w as aw are of the pe tit ion e r’ s st a tus a s a re sid e nt a lie n d uring the ple a ne g oti a tio n p ro c e ss.
The District Public Def

ender testified that she re prese nted the petitioner at his plea hea ring
on June 14 , 2 00 1. She sa id sh e ha d famil iari zed he rs e lf wi th the pe tit ion e r’ s c a se by dis c us sin g it with c o-counse l be fore the hearing. She said he told her of the plea a g ree ment rea ched w ith the state. She said she met with the petitioner bef ore the hearing and revie wed the ple a ag ree ment paper work wi th him

. She sa id that at tha t time , s he a sk e d th e pe tit ion e r i f h e ha d a ny qu e sti on s a ndthat hi s o nly
conce rn wa s avoiding incar cer ation. She said the petitioner d id not ask her a bout potential-4-

deportation issues. S he testified that she was a lso awar e of the petitioner’s immigr ation status before the entry of his g uiltyplea.

After rea ding the petitioner’s de position and list ening to the testimonyof the witnesses at the po st- c on vic tio n h e ari ng , th e tr ia l c ou rt dis mis se d the pe tit ion fo r p os t- c on vic tio n r e lie f b e c a us e it found that th ep e ti ti o n e r

p e r ju r e d himself and bec ause the petitioner’s c laims of ineffe ctive assistanc e of counse l were based only upon a fa ilure of a

ppointed counsel to inform him of a collate ral conseque nce of

his guilty plea. The trial court he ld that the failuredid not violate the petitioner’s rig ht to the effe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel under the S i x t h Am endment to the United States Constit ution.
The pe titioner contends that the tria l c ourt err ed in de ny ing his pe tition for post-conviction relief beca use of the f

ailure of counsel to inform him that his g uilty plea to theft over one thousand do lla rs c ou ld r e su lt i n h is d e po rt a tio n to Me xico . T he iss ue on app e a l is wh e the r s uc h a failu re is a violation of t he right t o the ef fec tive assistance of counse l under the Six th Amendment. I n support of his arg ument, which he a lleg es constitutes oneof first impression in Tenne ssee, the pe titioner cites as persua s iv e a u th o r ity

n u me r o u s c a s e s f

r o m o th e r

ju r is d ic ti o n s h o ld in g th a t s u c h a f a il ure constitutes the ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel bec ause of the dra sti c and punitive nature of deportation. The state claims that an attorney ’s failure t o inform a c lient of potential issues involving deportation is a collatera l issue, and as s uch, it does not constitute the ineff ective a ssistance of counsel. I n support of this arg ument, the state’s brief is re plete with quotes, cites, and analy sis from what it claims i s a 1 9 9 5 Tenne ssee Supre me Court case but is in fact a 1994 Te nnessee Court of C ri m i n al Ap p ea l s ca s e. S ee Ad k i n s v

. S t at e, 9 1 1 S

. W

. 2 d 3 3 4 (T en n

. C ri m

. Ap p

. 1 9 9 4 ). Al t h o u gh the state c on c lud e s its ar g ume nt by po int ing ou t tha t “th is co urt is simply no t auth orize d to fi ndin petitioner’s fa vor,” w e note that the Adkins lang uag e relied on by the state wa s dicta. See id. a t 350- 51. Howeve r, fo r re as o ns which we addre ss below, we a g ree with the state and a ffirm the tria l court’s dismissal of the pe tition for post-conviction relief

. The burde n in a post-conviction proc eeding is on the petitioner to prove his gr ounds for re lief by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. T.C.A. § 40-30-110( f) (2003). On appea l, w e are bound by the tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s o f fa c t un le ss w e c on c lud e tha t th e e vid e nc e in the re c or d p re po nd e rate s a g a ins t those finding s. Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 456 (Tenn

. 2001). B eca use they relate to mix ed questions of law a nd fac t, we re v i ew t h e t ri al court’s conclusions as to whe ther c ounsel’s perf ormanc e wa s deficie nt and whethe r that d e f ic iency was pre judicial under a

de no vo sta nd ardwi th no presumption of cor

rec tness. I d. at 457.

Under the Six th Amendment, when a claim of i neff ective assistance of counsel is m ade, the burden is on the pe titioner to show (1) that counse l’s perf ormanc e wa s deficie nt and (2) that the defic iency was prejudicia l. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S

. C t

. 2 0 5 2 , 2064 (1984); see L ockhart v. Fre twell, 506 U.S

. 3 6 4 , 3 6 8 -7 2 , 113 S. Ct . 838, 842-44 (1993) . I n other words, a show ing that counsel’s pe rformance falls below a rea sonable standard is not enoug h; rather , the petitioner must also show that but for the substanda rd per formanc e, “the result of the pr ocee ding
wo uldha ve be e n d if

fe re nt. ” Str ic kland , 4 66 U. S. at 69 1. Whe n a pe tit ion e r ple a ds g uil ty , he mus t-5-

s h o w a r e a s o n ab l e p r o b ab i l i t y t h a t , b u tf o r t h e e rr o r s o f

h i s c o u n s e l , h e w o u l d n o th a v e p l e d g u i l t y. See Hill v. L ockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S. C t. 366, 370 (1985); Adkins, 911 S.W .2d at 349.
When the petitioner’s c laim is one of inadequate advice , courts g ene r a ll y d is ti ng uish betwee n failure to inform of direc t and i ndirec t conseque nces of a guilty plea. Fa ilure by counsel to inform of direc t conseque nces of

a g uiltyplea may

constitute ineffe ctive assistanc e of counsel. On the other hand, fa ilure to inform of indire ct conse quence s of a g uiltypl ea n o rmally does not. Adkins, 911 S.W .2d at 350. This distinction “turns on whether the result re p re s en ts a definite, immediate a nd larg ely automatic ef

fec t on the rang e of the defe ndant’s punishment.” I d. (quoting Torre y v. Estelle, 842 F.2d 234, 236 ( 9th Cir. 1988)).

I n Adkins, this court stated,
Any failure of counsel to a dvise as to any collater al conse quence s of a plea does not, under the se authorities, fa ll below the ra ng e of competenc e dema nded of attorne y s in criminal case s. Misadvice on the issue might have war rante d relief ; and, while a fine di stinction, sil e nc e by c ou ns e l do e s no t. I n sh ort, a sin of c omm iss ion mig ht m e ri t relief while the sin of omission does not.

911 S.W .2d at 350. One of the authorities the court cited as an example of a collater al conse quence was United States v. De l Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 59 (D .C. Cir. 1990). The Del Rosario court he ld that

“ tr ia l c ou ns e l’ s f

a ilu re to a dv ise a

de fe nd a nt o f the col lat eral c on se qu e nc e of a ple a of g uil ty aff ecting the possibilit y

of the de portation of the de fenda nt[ ] does n ot fall short of the ‘ objective standard of

rea sonablene ss,’ . . . under Strickla nd.” 902 F .2d at 59.
The pe ti ti o n e r

u r g e s th is c o u r t t o h o ldth a t f a il u r e to in f

o r m a d e f e n d a n t o f th e p o te ntial
c on se qu e nc e s o f d e po rt a tio n c on sti tut e s in e ff e c tiv e a s s i s t an c eo f

c o u n s e l andc ite s c a se s f

ro m I lli no is
a ndPe nn sy lvania

a s r e pr e se ntativ e of

a mod e rn tr e nd

. Se e Pe op le v. Cor re a , 485 N. E. 2d30 7 ( I ll. App. Ct. 1985); Comm onwea lth v. W ellington, 451 A.2d 223 (Pa. S uper. Ct. 1982). I n Correa , the
c ou rt he ld the de fe nd a nt r e c e ive d in e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta nc e of

c ou ns e l be c a us e he sp e c if ic a lly a sk e d h is
c ou ns e l a bo ut p ote nti a l de po rt a tio n c on se qu e nc e s a ndre c e ive d e rr on e ou s a dv ice. How e ve r, in People v. Huante , 571 N.E.2d 736 (I ll. 1991) , the I llinois Supreme Court disti ng uished the Corre a decision and he ld that “the passive c onduct of co u n s el i n fa i l ing to discuss with a de fenda nt the collater al conse quence s of a g uiltyplea” did not constitute the i neff ective assistance of

counsel. 571 N.E.2d at 739.

I n Wellington, the court held the fa ilure to advise a defe ndant that a c onviction could rende r her subjec t to deportation constituted ineffe ctive assistance of counse l. 451 A.2d at 225. Howe ver, the Pennsy lvania Supreme Court disapproved of t h i s h o l d ing in Commonwea lth v. Frometa , 555 A. 2d92 , 9 4 n .2 (P a . 1 98 9) . In s o d oin g , th e c ou rt no te d th a t it s d e c isi on wa s-6- in l i n e wi th a majority

of state a nd fede ral c ourts. See , Tafoy a v. Sta te , 5 00 P.2 d 2 47 (A la sk a 19 72 ) ce rt . de n. 41 0 U.S. 94 5, 93 S. Ct

. 1389 (fa ilure to in fo rm an a lien defe ndant of the possibilityof deportation does not constitute ineffec tive assistance ); State v. Malik, 37 Wash.App. 414, 680 P.2d 770 (1984 ) (it is not incumbant upon defe nse counse l to explain the collater al conse quence of deportation to criminal defe ndant); State v. Chung, 210 N .J .Super. 427, 510 A.2d 72 (1986) (def

ense counsel need only advise a criminal defe ndant of the direc t conseque nces of pleading g uilty ); State v. Ginebra , 511 So.2d 960 (Fla.1987) (fa ilure of c o u nsel to inform of the c ollatera l
c on se qu e nc e s o f d e po rt a tio n d oe s n ot u nd e rm ine g uil ty ple a ); Mo tt
v. Sta te , 407 N.W.2d 581 (Iow a 1 9 87) (f ailure to a dvise a c riminal defe ndant of

the collater al conse quence s, even “ serious ones” like deportation can not be the ba sis of an ineffe ctiveness c laim); State v. Santos , 136 Wis .2d 528, 401 N.W.2d 856 ( 1987) (knowledg e of the collater al consequence s is not a prere quisite to a knowing and int e lli g e nt ple a ). Se e a lso , United States v. Santelises , 476 F.2d 787 (2 d Cir.1973); United States v. Romero-Vilca , 8 5 0 F

. 2 d 1 77 (3d Cir .1 98 8) ; Un ite d Sta te s v. Ca mpb e ll , 778 F.2d 764 ( 11th Cir.1985); L aPorta v. United States , 651 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. Pa.1986). See g e ne ra lly , 65 A.L .R. 4th 719 (1988).

We ag ree with the decisions of t he I llinois and P ennsy lvania S upreme Courts and hold that failure to inform a def

endant of potential conseque nces of deportation does not constitute ineffec tive
a ssi sta nc e of

c ou ns e l un de r S tr ic klandbe c a us e it ha s no de fi nit e , im me diate , a ndlarg e ly a uto ma tic eff ect on the r ang e of the defe ndant’s punishment. We decline at this ti me to addre ss the question po se d to the c ou rt

in C or re a c on c e rn ing e rr on e ou s a dv ic e in the de po rt a tio n co nte xt, e xce pt t o n ote that this court has distinguished be tween e rrone ous advice and failure to i nform. See A dkins, 911 S.W .2d at 350.

I n th e pr e se nt c a se , th e re c or d re fl e c ts that ne ith e r o f the pe tit ion e r’ s a tto rn e y s a dv ise d h im
co n ce rn i n g p o t en t i al d ep o rt at i o n i s s u es , an d i t al s o i n d i ca t es t h ey d i d n o tm i s i n fo rm h i m

. Al t h o u gh the y we re bo th a wa

re of the fact tha t th e pe tit ion e r w a s a re sid e nt a lie n, the y

faile d to dis c us s potential deporta tion issues with hi m. Ba sed upon the for eg oing a uthorities, we hold that the fa ilure to discuss with the petitioner potential deportation ramifications from his conviction did not render the ir pe rf orma nc e a s th e pe tit ion e r’ s c ou ns e l de fi c ie nt. We a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt

.

____________________________________ J OSEPH M. TI PTON, J UDGE