_____________

POLICY ISSUE

(Notation Vote) 

December 17, 2014 SECY-14-0144

FOR: The Commissioners 

FROM: Mark A. Satorius

Executive Director for Operations 

SUBJECT: REQUEST BY SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON FOR EXEMPTIONS 

FROM CERTAIN EMERGENCY PLANNING REQUIREMENTS 

PURPOSE: 

The purpose of this paper is to seek Commission approval for the staff to grant Southern 

California Edison’s (SCE’s) request for exemptions from certain emergency planning (EP) 

requirements of Part 50, “Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities,” of Title 10, 

“Energy,” of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR). SCE’s proposed exemptions would 

result in elimination of the requirements placed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC) on the licensee for formal offsite radiological emergency plans at the San Onofre Nuclear 

Generating Station (SONGS) site, but would require the maintenance of certain onsite 

capabilities to communicate and coordinate with offsite response authorities. This paper does 

not address any new commitments or resource implications. 

SUMMARY: 

The EP requirements of 10 CFR 50.47, “Emergency Plans,” and Appendix E, “Emergency 

Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities,” to 10 CFR Part 50 

continue to apply to a nuclear power reactor after permanent cessation of operations and 

removal of fuel from the reactor vessel. There are no explicit regulatory provisions 

distinguishing EP requirements for a power reactor that has been shut down from those for an 

operating power reactor. 

CONTACTS: Michael Norris, NSIR/DPR 

 301-287-3754 
The Commissioners - 2 -

To modify their emergency plans to reflect the risk commensurate with power reactors that have 

been permanently shut down, power reactor licensees transitioning to decommissioning must 

seek exemptions from certain EP regulatory requirements before amending these plans. 

The staff has reviewed the technical basis for SCE’s requested exemptions and is 

recommending that the Commission approve the staff’s proposal to grant the requested 

EP exemptions, as detailed in the enclosure. 

BACKGROUND: 

The regulations in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) provide that the NRC may, on application by a 

licensee or on its own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of the regulations in 

circumstances in which application of the regulation would not serve the underlying purpose of 

the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule.1

 The risk of an offsite 

radiological release is significantly lower and the types of possible accidents are significantly 

fewer, at a nuclear power reactor that has permanently ceased operations and removed fuel 

from the reactor vessel than at an operating power reactor. On this basis, the NRC has 

previously granted similar exemptions from EP requirements for permanently shut down and 

defueled power reactor licensees. The staff provided an evaluation of an exemption request for 

the Kewaunee Power Station to the Commission in SECY-14-0066 (Agencywide Documents 

Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML14072A257), which the 

Commission approved in the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) to SECY-14-0066 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML14219A366). 

Before the Kewaunee Power Station, the last approved exemption that eliminated the 

requirements for formal offsite radiological EP was for the Zion facility in 1999 (ADAMS Legacy 

Accession No. 9908260192). The underlying technical basis for the approval of the Zion 

facility’s exemption was based on demonstrating that the radiological consequences of designbasis-accidents (DBAs) would not exceed the limits of the U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency’s (EPA’s) Protective Action Guides (PAGs) at the exclusion area boundary and that the 

spent fuel stored in the spent fuel pool (SFP) would not reach the zirconium ignition temperature 

in fewer than 10 hours based on analysis that assumes no water or air cooling of the fuel. The 

staff concluded that if 10 hours were available to initiate mitigative actions or, if needed, to 

implement offsite protective actions using a comprehensive emergency management plan 

(CEMP),2

 formal offsite radiological emergency plans are not necessary for permanently 

defueled nuclear power reactor licensees. In addition to SONGS, Crystal River Unit 3 and 

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station have also applied for exemptions from certain 

 

1 Notwithstanding the special circumstances of the exemption request, 10 CFR 50.12(a)(1) requires that the 

exemption must be authorized by law, not present an undue risk to the public health and safety, and be consistent 

with the common defense and security. 

2

 A CEMP in this context, also referred to as an emergency operations plan (EOP), is addressed in the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA’s) Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101, “Developing and 

Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans.” CPG 101 is the foundation for State, territorial, Tribal, and local EP in the 

United States. It promotes a common understanding of the fundamentals of risk-informed planning and 

decisionmaking and helps planners at all levels of government in their efforts to develop and maintain viable, allhazards, all-threats emergency plans. An EOP is flexible enough for use in all emergencies. It describes how people 

and property will be protected; details who is responsible for carrying out specific actions; identifies the personnel, 

equipment, facilities, supplies and other resources available; and outlines how all actions will be coordinated. A 

CEMP is often referred to as a synonym for “all hazards planning.” 
The Commissioners - 3 - 

EP requirements. The exemption requests by SONGS, as described in this paper, are 

consistent with those approved by the Commission for the Kewaunee Power Station in the SRM 

to SECY-14-0066. 

The NRC requires a level of licensee EP commensurate with the potential consequences to 

public health and safety and common defense and security at the licensee’s site. Under the 

current safety analysis in NUREG-1738, “Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at 

Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants” (ADAMS Accession No. ML010430066), the event 

sequences important to risk at a decommissioning power reactor are limited to a large 

earthquake and cask-drop events. This is an important difference from an operating power 

reactor where typically a large number of different initiating events make significant contributions 

to risk. Additionally, physical security for special nuclear material at fixed sites, including 

decommissioning power reactors, is required by 10 CFR Part 73, “Physical Protection of Plants 

and Materials.” Decommissioning power reactor licensees are required by 10 CFR 73.55(f) to 

develop target sets for use in the development and implementation of security strategies that 

protect against spent fuel sabotage. While both operating and decommissioning power reactors 

are required to develop target sets, the number of target sets at a decommissioning reactor is 

significantly reduced. Implementation of the protective strategy at a decommissioning reactor 

takes into account this reduction in target sets. With the significant reduction in radiological risk 

for a power reactor undergoing decommissioning, the NRC has historically approved 

exemptions from EP and security requirements based on site-specific evaluations and the 

objectives of the regulations. 

The NRC prepared NUREG-1738 to provide a technical basis for SECY-00-0145, “Integrated 

Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power Plant Decommissioning” (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML003721626). The proposed rulemaking was later deferred in light of higher priority work after 

the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Nonetheless, NUREG-1738 provides insights that 

the staff continues to find helpful for the evaluation of exemption requests regarding EP 

requirements. Specifically, NUREG-1738 identified a zirconium fire resulting from a substantial 

loss-of-water inventory in the SFP as the only postulated scenario at a decommissioning power 

reactor that, while highly unlikely, might result in a significant offsite release. 

Previously granted exemptions from EP regulations reduced EP requirements for 

decommissioning power reactors to those consistent with these standards: (1) 

10 CFR 50.47(d), which states the requirements for a license authorizing fuel loading and low 

power testing only; and (2) 10 CFR 72.32(a), which establishes the information required in an 

emergency plan for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI). Examples of 

previously granted exemptions from EP regulations for decommissioning power reactors 

include: setting the highest emergency plan classification as an “Alert”; extending the timing 

requirements for notification of offsite authorities; requiring only onsite exercises with the 

opportunity for offsite response organization participation; and only maintaining arrangements 

for offsite response organizations (i.e., law enforcement, fire and medical services) that might 

respond to onsite emergencies. The existence of formal offsite radiological emergency plans is 

no longer a binding requirement on the licensee. 

While the staff considers the exemptions from certain EP requirements, as requested by SCE 

and described above, to be reasonable for a power reactor that has been permanently shut 

down and defueled, the resulting set of EP requirements could be viewed as a reduction in 

effectiveness when compared to the operating reactor emergency plan currently in effect at 
The Commissioners - 4 - 

SONGS. In the SRM to SECY-08-0024, “Delegation of Commission Authority to Staff to 

Approve or Deny Emergency Plan Changes That Represent a Decrease in Effectiveness,” 

dated May 19, 2008 (ADAMS Accession No. ML081400510), the Commission directed that the 

staff should request Commission approval for any reduction in effectiveness of a licensee’s 

emergency plan that requires an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 

Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. In a manner consistent with the SRM’s direction, this paper 

seeks Commission approval for the staff to process and grant, as appropriate, SCE’s requested 

exemptions from the EP requirements as detailed in the enclosure, which provides a summary 

of SCE’s exemption request and a brief description of the staff’s basis for recommending 

approval. 

DISCUSSION: 

SCE is the holder of Renewed Facility Operating Licenses No. NFP-10 (for SONGS Unit 2) and 

NFP-15 (for SONGS Unit 3), issued under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and 

10 CFR Part 50, which authorizes the licensee to possess and store spent nuclear fuel and 

greater-than-Class C radioactive waste at the SONGS facility. SONGS Unit 1 was permanently 

shut down on November 30, 1992, all fuel assemblies were removed from the reactor on 

March 6, 1993, and the unit is in the decommissioning phase. SONGS Units 2 and 3 have been 

permanently shut down since January 2012. After the reactors were shut down, all fuel 

assemblies were removed from the reactor vessels and placed in the SFP (on 

October 15, 2012, at Unit 3 and on July 18, 2013, at Unit 2). Spent fuel is currently stored on 

site in an SFP and in an ISFSI dry-cask storage facility. 

By letter dated June 12, 2013, “Certification of Permanent Cessation of Power Operations, San 

Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Units 2 and 3” (ADAMS Accession No. ML131640201), SCE 

submitted a certification to the NRC indicating its intention to permanently cease power 

operations at SONGS under 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i). By letter dated June 28, 2013, “Permanent 

Removal of Fuel from the Reactor Vessel, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 3” 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML13183A391), SCE submitted a certification of permanent removal of 

fuel from the reactor vessel for SONGS Unit 3. By letter dated July 22, 2013, “Permanent 

Removal of Fuel from the Reactor Vessel, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2” 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML13204A304), SCE submitted a certification of permanent removal of 

fuel from the reactor vessel for SONGS Unit 2, under 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(ii). Upon the 

docketing of these certifications, the 10 CFR Part 50 licenses for SONGS no longer authorized 

operation of the reactors, or emplacement or retention of fuel into the reactor vessels, as 

specified in 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). 

By letter dated March 31, 2014, “Emergency Planning Exemption Request” (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML14092A332), SCE requested exemptions from specific EP requirements of 

10 CFR Part 50 for SONGS. The staff issued a request for additional information (RAI) in a 

letter dated August 27, 2014, “San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 – 

Request for Additional Information Re: Emergency Planning Exemption Request” (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML14209A005). In a letter dated September 9, 2014, “Response to Request for 

Additional Information Regarding Emergency Planning Exemption Request San Onofre Nuclear 

Generating Station, Units 1, 2, 3 and ISFSI” (ADAMS Accession No. ML14258A003), SCE 

provided responses to the RAI. 
The Commissioners - 5 - 

The staff issued a supplemental RAI to the licensee in an e-mail dated September 10, 2014, 

“Draft RAI RE: Emergency Planning Exemption Request (TAC Nos. MF 3835, MF 3836, and 

MF 3837)” (ADAMS Accession No. ML14274A210). In a letter dated October 2, 2014, 

“Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Emergency Planning Exemption 

Request” (ADAMS Accession No. ML14280A265), SCE provided responses to the RAI, which 

contained information applicable to the radiological dose consequences of potential DBAs and 

beyond DBAs. 

The staff also transmitted a supplemental RAI to the licensee in an e-mail dated 

September 22, 2014, “San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3, Draft Request for 

Additional Information” (ADAMS Accession No. ML14274A213). In a letter dated 

October 6, 2014, “Response to Request for Additional Information Proposed Exemptions from 

Certain Portions of 10 CFR 50.47 and Appendix E” (ADAMS Accession No. ML14282A021), 

SCE provided responses to the RAI, which contained information applicable to the SFP 

inventory makeup strategies for mitigating the loss-of-water inventory. The information provided 

by SCE included justifications for each requested exemption. Note that this document is 

withheld from public release as it contains security-related information. 

By letter dated October 7, 2014, “Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding 

Emergency Planning Exemption Request” (ADAMS Accession No. ML14287A228), the licensee 

corrected a factual error in its October 2, 2014, RAI response. The licensee stated that the error 

did not change the conclusions stated in the relevant paragraph of the October 2, 2014, RAI 

response. 

In an e-mail dated October 8, 2014, “Request for Clarification of October 6, 2014 RAI Response 

Concerning Proposed Exemption from Certain EP Requirements (TAC Nos. MF 3835, MF 3836, 

and MF 3837)” (ADAMS Accession No. ML14296A469), the staff requested a clarification of the 

two items in the licensee’s October 6, 2014, RAI response. By letter dated October 27, 2014, 

“Response to Request for Clarification of October 6, 2014 RAI Responses Concerning 

Emergency Planning Exemption Request San Onofre Generating Station, Units 1, 2, 3 and 

ISFSI” (ADAMS Accession No. ML14303A257), SCE provided a response, which contained 

additional information applicable to their SFP makeup and spray strategies. 

In Enclosure 1 to the March 31, 2014, letter, SCE provided the accident analyses associated 

with DBAs and beyond DBAs as a basis for justifying the request for approval of the SONGS 

Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan. SCE’s exemption request included radiological 

analyses to show that the radiological consequences of DBAs will not exceed the limits of the 

EPA PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. Additionally, SCE performed analyses for loss of 

SFP inventory events, including an event that has uncovered spent fuel with no cooling. In the 

unlikely event that no cooling of the spent fuel is possible, the analysis showed that more than 

10 hours would be available from the time the fuel is uncovered until it reaches a temperature of 

900 degrees Celsius (C) to initiate mitigative actions consistent with plant conditions and, if 

necessary, for offsite authorities to employ their CEMP to take protective actions.
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The staff requested further clarification for the adiabatic heatup time in its September 22, 2014, 

RAI request, specifically for SCE to provide the actual time to heat up to 900 degrees C relative 

to a specific date after the reactors were shut down. In its October 6, 2014, RAI response, SCE 

provided the following further analysis of uncovered spent fuel with no cooling through 2016: 

DATE Decay Time 

(months)

 Heat-up Time to 

565°C (hours)

Heat-up Time to 

900°C (hours)

October 12, 2014 33 10.7 17.8

February 12, 2015 37 12.0 20.0

June 12, 2015 41 13.4 22.3

December 12, 2015 47 15.4 25.6

June 12, 2016 53 17.3 28.7

December 12, 2016 59 19.0 31.6

These results show the time to reach 565 degrees C, which is the lowest temperature at which 

incipient cladding failure may occur and is below the temperature at which exothermic cladding 

oxidation may begin adding significant heat, is already also greater than 10 hours. Therefore, 

the results also demonstrate that, in the event ample air is available for cladding oxidation, the 

extra heat produced by cladding oxidation could not result in heat up times to 900 degrees C of 

less than 10 hours. 

In addition, the significant decay of short-lived radionuclides that has occurred since the 

January 2012 shutdown provides assurance in other ways. As indicated by the results of 

research conducted for NUREG-1738 and more recently, for NUREG-2161, “Consequence 

Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I 

Boiling Water Reactor” (ADAMS Accession No. ML14255A365), while other consequences can 

be extensive, accidents from SFPs with significant decay time have little potential to cause 

offsite early fatalities, even if the formal offsite radiological EP requirements were relaxed. 

As noted above, SCE furnished information concerning its SFP inventory makeup strategies to 

supplement its exemption request. The multiple strategies for providing makeup to the SFP 

include: using existing plant systems for inventory makeup; an internal strategy that relies on 

installed fire water pumps (two motor-driven and one diesel-driven) and service and firewater 

storage tanks; or an external strategy that uses portable pumps to initiate makeup flow into the 

SFPs through a seismic standpipe and standard fire hoses routed either over the SFP’s edge or 

to a spray nozzle. The portable pumps consist of a skid-mounted pump that is capable of 

delivering 500 gallons per minute (GPM) and a trailer-mounted pump capable of delivering 

2,500 GPM. SCE further provides that designated on-shift personnel are trained to implement 

such strategies and that they have plans in place to mitigate the consequences of an event 

involving a catastrophic loss-of-water inventory concurrently from the SFPs of both Units 2 

and 3. SCE estimates that it would take approximately 55 minutes to deliver flow to one pool, 

with an additional 35 minutes to provide water to the second pool without relocation of the 

trailer-mounted pump. Relocation of the trailer-mounted pump, if required, would take 

approximately 30 additional minutes. 

In a letter dated October 1, 2014, “Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362 Supplement I to Amendment 

Applications 266 and 251 Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications San Onofre Nuclear 

Generating Station, Units 2 and 3” (ADAMS Accession No. ML14280A264), SCE withdrew the 

proposed changes to the Mitigating Strategies License Condition for Units 2 and 3 (2.C(26) for 
The Commissioners - 7 - 

Unit 2 and 2.C(27) for Unit 3). This license condition requires SONGS to maintain its SFP 

inventory-makeup strategies as discussed above. SCE states that these diverse strategies 

provide for defense-in-depth and can be used to provide sufficient makeup or spray to the SFPs 

before the onset of zirconium cladding ignition. In the unlikely situation that a radiological 

release is expected, elements of the revised emergency plan would make it easier for offsite 

authorities to take protective actions under a CEMP. The licensee must still maintain an ability 

to determine whether a radiological release is occurring and if a release is occurring or expected 

to occur, promptly communicate that information to offsite authorities. SONGS uses commercial 

telephone lines or mobile communications devices, including cell and satellite phones, to notify 

the State and County agencies of a declared emergency. Section E, “Notification Methods and 

Procedures,” of the proposed SONGS Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML14354A338) states that SONGS, in cooperation with State and local 

authorities, has established mutually agreeable methods and procedures for notification of 

offsite response organizations. These procedures include the specific content and format of the 

initial notification message to be transmitted during an emergency, along with methods of 

transmission. The following offsite agencies, at a minimum, will receive the initial notification 

messages: 

• the State of California, 

• Orange County, 

• San Diego County, and 

• Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton. 

The staff found the exemption application complete and found that the licensee’s associated 

technical justification provides a basis for the Commission’s consideration of the requested 

exemption. Chapter 15 of the SONGS Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML13182A288), revised May 2013, described the DBAs that were applicable to 

SONGS during power operation. Many of the UFSAR accident scenarios involved failures or 

malfunctions of systems that could affect the reactor core. By letter dated September 17, 2014 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML14265A144), SCE submitted the revised UFSAR Chapter 15 

analysis, which summarizes the evaluation of the current DBAs that remain applicable to the 

permanently shutdown and defueled condition of SONGS. 

The staff reviewed SCE’s exemption request against the requirements in 10 CFR 50.47, 

Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 72.32, “Emergency Plan.” The review considered 

the status of the facility, which is permanently shut down and defueled, and the low likelihood of 

any credible accident resulting in radiological releases requiring offsite protective measures. 

The staff based its evaluation of the SCE request for exemptions from EP requirements on the 

site-specific analyses provided by SCE. The staff verified SCE’s analyses and its calculations. 

The analysis provides reasonable assurance that in granting the requested exemption to SCE: 

(1) an offsite radiological release will not exceed the EPA PAGs at the site boundary for a DBA; 

and; (2) in the unlikely event of a beyond DBA resulting in a loss of all SFP cooling, there is 

sufficient time to initiate appropriate mitigating actions and, if a release is projected to occur, 

there is sufficient time for offsite agencies to take protective actions using a CEMP to protect the 

health and safety of the public. 

Consistent with the June 17, 1993, memorandum of understanding between the NRC and the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), contained in Appendix A, “Memorandum of 
The Commissioners - 8 - 

Understanding Between Federal Emergency Management Agency and Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission,” to 44 CFR Part 353, “Fee for Services in Support, Review and Approval of State 

and Local Government or Licensee Radiological Emergency Plans and Preparedness,” the staff 

has discussed and coordinated its review of requests for exemptions from EP regulations with 

FEMA. As part of the staff’s evaluation of the recent EP exemption request for the Kewaunee 

Power Station, the staff provided FEMA with a copy of SECY-14-0066 and the opportunity to 

ask questions, obtain clarification, and comment on the paper before the Commission received 

it for review. FEMA provided the following comments in response to the EP exemption 

proposed in SECY-14-0066: 

FEMA is not taking a position on the technical arguments presented by the licensee or 

the NRC’s assessments. FEMA recognizes the NRC’s role to analyze the possibility of 

incidents that could result in offsite dose impacts. FEMA acknowledges that individual 

states and local governments have the primary authority and responsibility to protect 

their citizens and respond to disasters and emergencies. The exemption, if issued, 

could create a transitional environment for off-site emergency planners in how they 

consider radiological hazards. FEMA will continue to support offsite organizations as 

they adjust their plans, capabilities, and resources to the changing radiological threat. 

Among the resources available to support FEMA stakeholders during the transition 

process include, but are not limited to, the National Preparedness System guidance 

materials, the Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee, and 

assistance from FEMA Headquarters and Regional Staff. 

The NRC staff considered FEMA’s comments as part of SECY-14-0066 and believes that the 

technical and safety basis for the exemption demonstrates reasonable assurance in the two 

areas mentioned above. 

FEMA was offered the opportunity to comment on this draft SONGS SECY paper. In response, 

FEMA indicated that it had no further comments other than the inclusion of the statement above 

from SECY-14-0066. 

The SONGS decommissioning facility, at the time the exemption is granted, would pose 

significantly less of a radiological risk to public health and safety than an operating power 

reactor, which should result in a straightforward transition to a more streamlined CEMP. 

Aspects of existing offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans may remain in place, at 

the State’s discretion, before completion of any adjustments to State and local CEMPs that are 

appropriate for the reduced radiological risk and can be adopted to minimize burden on the 

State and local governments. SCE will still be required to maintain an onsite emergency plan, 

which would provide for the notification of, and coordination with, offsite organizations, to an 

extent commensurate with the approved exemptions. 

The staff’s exemption recommendation, if approved by the Commission, would not affect the 

authority that FEMA has under its regulations in 44 CFR Chapter I, “Federal Emergency 

Management Agency,” for overall emergency management and assistance to State and local 

response organizations, nor would it affect the responsibilities of State and local governments to 

establish and maintain CEMPs. The NRC would base its finding of reasonable assurance on its 

review of licensee onsite emergency preparedness and would not require a finding from FEMA 

on the adequacy of State and local CEMPs. Under its role as described in the National 

Response Framework, the NRC remains ready to support FEMA by providing it and State and 
The Commissioners - 9 - 

local governments with technical advice related to the safety and security of operations at the 

plant. 

Though not considered as part of the staff’s reasonable assurance determination, the staff is 

informing the Commission of ongoing efforts between SCE and the SONGS Interjurisdictional 

Planning Committee (IPC)3

: 

• In a letter dated June 3, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14282A021), SCE stated that 

it intended to fully comply with the nuclear power plant funding provisions of California 

Government Code Section 8610.5, that it would continue to provide funding for EP, until 

that section expires in July 2019, and that it will not seek changes to funding levels 

without prior consultation with the IPC. 

• In accordance with an email dated October 22, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML14297A489), the members of the SONGS IPC have committed to maintaining 

emergency response capabilities related to nuclear preparedness throughout the 

SONGS decommissioning process and to continuing a multi-agency partnership to 

accomplish this goal. As a part of ongoing EP efforts, the IPC will retain the ability to 

receive information, independently monitor and assess conditions, and take actions to 

protect residents, visitors, and emergency workers. Although plans will vary by agency, 

these public safety capabilities include law enforcement, fire and medical services, 

radiological monitoring, multi-agency coordination, and public information. While most of 

these capabilities are applicable to a variety of hazards, the IPC will preserve a specific 

focus on nuclear power plants as a part of their continuing preparedness efforts for as 

long as necessary. 

In separate letters dated March 31, 2014, “Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan, San Onofre 

Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, Respectively, and Independent Spent Fuel 

Storage Installation” (ADAMS Accession No. ML14092A314) and “Permanently Defueled 

Emergency Action Level Scheme, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, 

Respectively, and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation” (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML14029A249), SCE also requested license amendments to approve its emergency plan, 

implementing changes that reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled status of SONGS. 

The revised emergency plan also includes changes consistent with the proposed exemptions 

discussed in this paper. The staff is awaiting a decision on this paper before issuing a decision 

on the amendment requests. 

CONCLUSION: 

The NRC staff concludes that granting the exemption request, as provided in the enclosure, 

would provide: (1) an adequate basis for an acceptable state of emergency preparedness; and 

(2) in conjunction with arrangements made with offsite response agencies, reasonable 

 

3

 The IPC was formed in 1982 to address the EP requirements within the emergency planning zone for SONGS. The 

IPC is composed of representatives from: City of San Clemente, City of Dana Point, City of San Juan Capistrano, 

Orange County, San Diego County, Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, California State Parks, and Southern 

California Edison. The mission of this group is to integrate emergency plans, coordinate decisionmaking for SONGSrelated activities and educate the public. (Source: http://www.songscommunity.com/partnerships.asp, accessed 

November 3, 2014.) 
The Commissioners - 10 - 

assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a 

radiological emergency at SONGS. 

The NRC staff has determined that pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, “Specific Exemptions”, the 

exemptions described in the enclosure are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to 

the public health and safety, and will be consistent with the common defense and security, and 

special circumstances are present. 

RECOMMENDATION: 

The exemption request is consistent with previously granted exemptions and SECY-14-0066 for 

the Kewaunee Power Station, and is commensurate with the risk associated with the facility. 

The changes in regulatory requirements are appropriate because the traditional accident 

sequences that dominate operating reactor risk are no longer applicable. Continued application 

of the regulations to the licensee, to maintain its current level of EP, is not necessary to achieve 

the underlying purpose of the regulation. Therefore, the staff recommends that the 

Commission: 

Approve: The staff’s proposal to grant SCE’s requested EP exemptions from 

certain requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 

consistent with the discussion above. 

COORDINATION: 

The Office of the General Counsel reviewed this paper and has no legal objection. 

 /RA/ 

Mark A. Satorius 

Executive Director 

 for Operations 

Enclosure: 

Exemptions to Rule Language
The Commissioners - 10 - 

assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a 

radiological emergency at SONGS. 

The NRC staff has determined that pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, “Specific Exemptions”, the 

exemptions described in the enclosure are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to 

the public health and safety, and will be consistent with the common defense and security, and 

special circumstances are present. 

RECOMMENDATION: 

The exemption request is consistent with previously granted exemptions and SECY-14-0066 for 

the Kewaunee Power Station, and is commensurate with the risk associated with the facility. 

The changes in regulatory requirements are appropriate because the traditional accident 

sequences that dominate operating reactor risk are no longer applicable. Continued application 

of the regulations to the licensee, to maintain its current level of EP, is not necessary to achieve 

the underlying purpose of the regulation. Therefore, the staff recommends that the 

Commission: 

Approve: The staff’s proposal to grant SCE’s requested EP exemptions from 

certain requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 

consistent with the discussion above. 

COORDINATION: 

The Office of the General Counsel reviewed this paper and has no legal objection. 

 /RA/

Mark A. Satorius 

Executive Director 

 for Operations 

Enclosure: 

Exemptions to Rule Language 

ADAMS ACCESSION No.: ML14251A554 * via email l 

OFFICE: NSIR/DPR BC:NSIR/DPR DD/NSIR/DPR NRR 

NAME: MNorris JAnderson RLewis JUhle* 

DATE: 10/09/2014 10/09/2014 10/14/2014 11/7/2014 

OFFICE: RES NMSS RIV Tech Editor 

NAME: SCoffin* KJones* MDapas* CHsu* 

DATE: 10/25/2014 10/23/2014 10/30/2014 11/6/2014 

OFFICE: OGC NSIR FO EDO 

NAME: HBenowitz* JWiggins MSatorius 

DATE: 11/25/2014 12/3/14 12/17/14 

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
Exemptions to Rule Language 

Strikethrough text indicates requested exemptions to rule language.

Enclosure 

10 CFR 50.47 Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

(b) The onsite and, except as provided in 

paragraph (d) of this section, offsite

emergency response plans for nuclear 

power reactors must meet the following 

standards: 

In the Statement of Considerations (SOC) for the 

final rule for emergency planning (EP) 

requirements for independent spent fuel storage 

installations (ISFSIs) and for monitor retrievable 

storage (MRS) facilities (60 FR [Federal Register] 

32430; June 22, 1995), the Commission 

responded to comments concerning offsite EP for 

ISFSIs or an MRS and concluded that, “the offsite 

consequences of potential accidents at an ISFSI 

or an MRS would not warrant establishing 

Emergency Planning Zones.” 

In a nuclear power reactor’s permanently defueled 

state, the accident risks are more similar to an 

ISFSI or an MRS than an operating nuclear power 

plant. The EP program would be similar to that 

required for an ISFSI under Section 72.32(a) of 

Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations

(10 CFR) when fuel stored in the spent fuel pool 

(SFP) has more than 5 years of decay time and 

would not change substantially when all the fuel is 

transferred from the SFP to an onsite ISFSI. 

Exemptions from offsite EP requirements have 

previously been approved when the site-specific 

analyses show that at least 10 hours is available 

from a partial drain-down event where cooling of 

the spent fuel is not effective until the hottest fuel 

assembly reaches 900°C. The technical basis 

that underlied the approval of the exemption 

request is based partly on the analysis of a time 

period that spent fuel stored in the SFP is unlikely 

to reach the zirconium ignition temperature in less 

than 10 hours. This time period is based on a 

heat-up calculation which uses several simplifying 

assumptions. Some of these assumptions are 

conservative (adiabatic conditions), while others 

are non-conservative (no oxidation below 900°C). 

Weighing the conservatisms and nonconservatisms, the staff judges that this 

calculation reasonably represents conditions that 

may occur in the event of an SFP accident. 
2 

10 CFR 50.47 Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

 The staff concluded that if 10 hours were 

available to initiate mitigative actions, or if 

needed, offsite protective actions using a 

comprehensive emergency management plan 

(CEMP), formal offsite radiological emergency 

plans are not necessary for these permanently 

defueled nuclear power reactor licensees. 

As supported by the licensee’s SFP analysis, the 

staff believes an exemption to the requirements 

for formal offsite radiological emergency plans is 

justified for a zirconium fire scenario considering 

the low likelihood of this event together with time 

available to take mitigative or protective actions 

between the initiating event and before the onset 

of a postulated fire. 

The Southern California Edison (SCE) analysis 

has demonstrated that the radiological 

consequences of design-basis-accidents (DBAs) 

will not exceed the limits of the U.S. 

Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) 

Protective Action Guides (PAGs) at the exclusion 

area boundary. These analyses also show that 

as of October 12, 2014, in the unlikely event of a 

beyond DBA where the hottest fuel assembly 

adiabatic heat up occurs, 17.8 hours is available 

to take mitigative or, if needed, offsite protective 

actions using a CEMP from the time the fuel is 

uncovered until it reaches the auto-ignition 

temperature of 900°C. 

SCE furnished information to supplement its 

exemption request concerning its SFP inventory 

makeup strategies. The multiple strategies for 

providing makeup to the SFP include: using 

existing plant systems for inventory makeup; an 

internal strategy that relies on installed fire water 

pumps (two motor-driven and one diesel-driven) 

and service and firewater storage tanks; or an 

external strategy that uses portable pumps to 

initiate make-up flow into the pools through a 

seismic standpipe and standard fire water hoses 

routed either over the pools’ edges or to spray 

nozzles. SCE further provides that designated 

on-shift staff is trained to implement such 
3 

10 CFR 50.47 Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

strategies and they have plans in-place to 

mitigate the consequences of an event involving 

a catastrophic loss-of-water inventory 

concurrently from both Units 2 and 3 SFPs. It is 

estimated that it would take approximately 55 

minutes to deliver flow to one pool, with an 

additional 35 minutes to provide water to the 

second pool without having to relocate the trailermounted pump. Relocation of the trailermounted pump, if required, would take 

approximately 30 additional minutes. In a letter 

dated October 1, 2014, “Docket Nos. 50-361 and 

50-362 Supplement 1 to Amendment 

Applications 266 and 251 Permanently Defueled 

Technical Specifications San Onofre Nuclear 

Generating Station, Units 2 and 3” (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML14280A264), SCE withdrew its 

proposed changes to the Mitigating Strategies 

License Condition for Units 2 and 3 (2.C(26) for 

Unit 2 and 2.C(27) for Unit 3). These license 

conditions require the San Onofre Nuclear 

Generating Station (SONGS) to maintain its SFP 

inventory makeup strategies as discussed above.
4 

10 CFR 50.47 Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

(1) Primary responsibilities for emergency 

response by the nuclear facility licensee 

and by State and local organizations 

within the Emergency Planning Zones

have been assigned, the emergency 

responsibilities of the various supporting 

organizations have been specifically 

established, and each principal response 

organization has staff to respond and to 

augment its initial response on a 

continuous basis. 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 

(3) Arrangements for requesting and 

effectively using assistance resources 

have been made, arrangements to 

accommodate State and local staff at the 

licensee’s Emergency Operations Facility 

have been made, and other organizations 

capable of augmenting the planned 

response have been identified. 

Decommissioning power reactors present a low 

likelihood of any credible accident resulting in a 

radiological release together with the time available 

to take mitigative or, if needed, offsite protective 

actions using a CEMP between the initiating event 

and before the onset of a postulated fire. As such, 

an emergency operations facility would not be 

required. The “nuclear island,” control room, or 

other onsite location can provide for the 

communication and coordination with offsite 

organizations for the level of support required. 

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 

(4) A standard emergency classification 

and action level scheme, the basis of 

which include facility system and effluent 

parameters, is in use by the nuclear 

facility licensee, and State and local 

response plans call for reliance on 

information provided by facility licensees 

for determinations of minimum initial 

offsite response measures. 

Decommissioning power reactors present a low 

likelihood of any credible accident resulting in a 

radiological release together with the time available 

to take mitigative or, if needed, offsite protective 

actions using a CEMP between the initiating event 

and before the onset of a postulated fire. As such, 

formal offsite radiological emergency response 

plans are not required. 

The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) document 

NEI 99-01, “Development of Emergency Action 

Levels for Non-Passive Reactors” (Revision 6), was 

found to be an acceptable method for development 

of emergency action levels (EALs) and was 

endorsed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) in a letter dated March 28, 2013 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML12346A463). NEI 99-01 

provides EALs for non-passive operating nuclear 

power reactors, permanently defueled reactors and 

ISFSIs. 

SCE requested a license amendment to revise its 

EAL scheme to NEI 99-01, Revision 6 in a letter 
5 

10 CFR 50.47 Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

dated March 31, 2014, “Permanently Defueled 

Emergency Action Level Scheme, San Onofre 

Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, 

Respectively, and Independent Spent Fuel Storage 

Installation” (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML14029A249). 

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 

(5) Procedures have been established for 

notification, by the licensee, of State and 

local response organizations and for 

notification of emergency personnel by all 

organizations; the content of initial and 

follow up messages to response 

organizations and the public has been 

established; and means to provide early 

notification and clear instruction to the 

populace within the plume exposure 

pathway Emergency Planning Zone have 

been established. 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 

(6) Provisions exist for prompt 

communications among principal 

response organizations to emergency 

personnel and to the public. 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 

(7) Information is made available to the

public on a periodic basis on how they will 

be notified and what their initial actions 

should be in an emergency (e.g., listening 

to a local broadcast station and remaining 

indoors), [T]he principal points of contact 

with the news media for dissemination of 

information during an emergency 

(including the physical location or 

locations) are established in advance, and 

procedures for coordinated dissemination 

of information to the public are 

established. 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 

(9) Adequate methods, systems, and 

equipment for assessing and monitoring 

actual or potential offsite consequences of 

a radiological emergency condition are in 

use. 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 
6 

10 CFR 50.47 Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

(10) A range of protective actions has 

been developed for the plume exposure 

pathway EPZ for emergency workers and 

the public. In developing this range of 

actions, consideration has been given to 

evacuation, sheltering, and, as a 

supplement to these, the prophylactic use 

of potassium iodide (KI), as appropriate. 

Evacuation time estimates have been 

developed by applicants and licensees. 

Licensees shall update the evacuation 

time estimates on a periodic basis. 

Guidelines for the choice of protective 

actions during an emergency, consistent 

with Federal guidance, are developed and

in place, and protective actions for the 

ingestion exposure pathway EPZ 

appropriate to the locale have been 

developed.

In the unlikely event of an SFP accident, the iodine 

isotopes, which contribute to an off-site dose from 

an operating reactor accident, are not present, so 

potassium iodide distribution would no longer serve 

as an effective or necessary supplemental 

protective action. 

The Commission responded to comments in its 

SOC for the final rule for EP requirements for 

ISFSIs and MRS facilities (60 FR 32435), and 

concluded that, “the offsite consequences of 

potential accidents at an ISFSI or an MRS would 

not warrant establishing Emergency Planning 

Zones.” Additionally, in the SOC for the final rule for 

EP requirements for ISFSIs and for MRS facilities 

(60 FR 32430), the Commission responded to 

comments concerning site-specific EP that includes 

evacuation of surrounding population for an ISFSI 

not at a reactor site, and concluded that, “The 

Commission does not agree that as a general 

matter emergency plans for an ISFSI must include 

evacuation planning.” 

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 

(c)(2) Generally, the plume exposure 

pathway EPZ for nuclear power plants 

shall consist of an area about 10 miles 

(16 km) in radius and the ingestion 

pathway EPZ shall consist of an area 

about 50 miles (80 km) in radius. The 

exact size and configuration of the EPZs 

surrounding a particular nuclear power 

reactor shall be determined in relation to 

local emergency response needs and 

capabilities as they are affected by such 

conditions as demography, topography, 

land characteristics, access routes, and 

jurisdictional boundaries. The size of the 

EPZs also may be determined on a caseby-case basis for gas-cooled nuclear 

reactors and for reactors with an 

authorized power level less than 250 MW 

thermal. The plans for the ingestion 

pathway shall focus on such actions as 

are appropriate to protect the food 

ingestion pathway.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). 
7 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

1. The applicant's emergency plans shall 

contain, but not necessarily be limited to, 

information needed to demonstrate 

compliance with the elements set forth 

below, i.e., organization for coping with 

radiological emergencies, assessment 

actions, activation of emergency 

organization, notification procedures, 

emergency facilities and equipment, 

training, maintaining emergency 

preparedness, and recovery, and onsite 

protective actions during hostile action. In 

addition, the emergency response plans 

submitted by an applicant for a nuclear 

power reactor operating license under this 

Part, or for an early site permit (as 

applicable) or combined license under 

10 CFR Part 52, shall contain information 

needed to demonstrate compliance with 

the standards described in § 50.47(b), 

and they will be evaluated against those 

standards. 

The EP rule published in the Federal Register 

(76 FR 72560; November 23, 2011) amended 

certain requirements in 10 CFR Part 50. Among 

the changes, the definition of “hostile action” was 

added as an act directed toward a nuclear power 

plant or its personnel. This definition is based on 

the definition of “hostile action” provided in NRC 

Bulletin 2005-02, “Emergency Preparedness and 

Response Actions for Security-Based Events.” 

NRC Bulletin 2005-02 is not applicable to nuclear 

power reactors that have permanently ceased 

operations and have certified that fuel has been 

removed from the reactor vessel. 

The NRC excluded non-power reactors from the 

definition of "hostile action" at the time of the 

rulemaking because, as defined in 10 CFR 50.2, a 

non-power reactor is not considered a nuclear 

power reactor and a regulatory basis had not been 

developed to support the inclusion of non-power 

reactors in the definition of “hostile action.” 

Similarly, a decommissioning power reactor or 

ISFSI is not a “nuclear reactor” as defined in the 

NRC’s regulations. A decommissioning power 

reactor also has a low likelihood of a credible 

accident resulting in radiological releases requiring 

offsite protective measures. For all of these 

reasons, the staff concludes that a 

decommissioning power reactor is not a facility that 

falls within the definition of “hostile action.” 

Similarly, for security, risk insights can be used to 

determine which targets are important to protect 

against sabotage. A level of security 

commensurate with the consequences of a 

sabotage event is required and is evaluated on a 

site-specific basis. The severity of the 

consequences declines as fuel ages and, thereby, 

removes over time the underlying concern that a 

sabotage attack could cause offsite radiological 

consequences. 

Although this analysis provides a justification for 

exempting SONGS from “hostile action” related 

requirements, some EP requirements for securitybased events are maintained. The classification of 
8 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

security-based events, notification of offsite 

authorities and coordination with offsite agencies 

under a CEMP concept are still required. 

2. This nuclear power reactor license 

applicant shall also provide an analysis of 

the time required to evacuate various 

sectors and distances within the plume 

exposure pathway EPZ for transient and 

permanent populations, using the most 

recent U.S. Census Bureau data as of the 

date the applicant submits its application 

to the NRC.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). 

 

3. Nuclear power reactor licensees shall 

use NRC approved evacuation time 

estimates (ETEs) and updates to the 

ETEs in the formulation of protective 

action recommendations and shall provide 

the ETEs and ETE updates to State and 

local governmental authorities for use in 

developing offsite protective action 

strategies.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.2. 

4. Within 365 days of the later of the date 

of the availability of the most recent 

decennial census data from the U.S. 

Census Bureau or December 23, 2011, 

nuclear power reactor licensees shall 

develop an ETE analysis using this 

decennial data and submit it under § 50.4 

to the NRC. These licensees shall submit 

this ETE analysis to the NRC at least 

180 days before using it to form protective 

action recommendations and providing it 

to State and local governmental 

authorities for use in developing offsite 

protective action strategies

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.2. 

5. During the years between decennial 

censuses, nuclear power reactor 

licensees shall estimate EPZ permanent 

resident population changes once a year, 

but no later than 365 days from the date 

of the previous estimate, using the most 

recent U.S. Census Bureau annual 

resident population estimate and 

State/local government population data, if 

available. These licensees shall maintain 

these estimates so that they are available 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.2. 
9 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

for NRC inspection during the period 

between decennial censuses and shall 

submit these estimates to the NRC with 

any updated ETE analysis.

6. If at any time during the decennial 

period, the EPZ permanent resident 

population increases such that it causes 

the longest ETE value for the 2-mile zone 

or 5-mile zone, including all affected 

Emergency Response Planning Areas, or 

for the entire 10-mile EPZ to increase by 

25 percent or 30 minutes, whichever is 

less, from the nuclear power reactor 

licensee's currently NRC approved or 

updated ETE, the licensee shall update 

the ETE analysis to reflect the impact of 

that population increase. The licensee 

shall submit the updated ETE analysis to 

the NRC under § 50.4 no later than 365 

days after the licensee's determination 

that the criteria for updating the ETE have 

been met and at least 180 days before 

using it to form protective action 

recommendations and providing it to State 

and local governmental authorities for use 

in developing offsite protective action 

strategies. 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.2. 

A.1. A description of the normal plant 

operating organization. 

 

Based on the permanently shut down and defueled 

status of the reactor, a decommissioning reactor is 

not authorized to operate under 10 CFR 50.82(a). 

Because the licensee cannot operate the reactors, 

the licensee does not have a “plant operating 

organization.” 

A.3. A description, by position and 

function to be performed, of the licensee's 

headquarters personnel who will be sent 

to the plant site to augment the onsite 

emergency organization.

The number of staff at decommissioning sites is 

generally small but is commensurate with the need 

to safely store spent fuel at the facility in a manner 

that is protective of public health and safety. 

Decommissioning sites typically have a level of 

emergency response that does not require 

response by the licensee’s headquarters 

personnel. 

A.4. Identification, by position and function 

to be performed, of persons within the 

licensee organization who will be 

responsible for making offsite dose 

projections, and a description of how 

Although the likelihood of events that would result 

in doses in excess of the EPA PAGs to the public 

beyond the owner controlled area boundary based 

on the permanently shut down and defueled status 

of the reactor is extremely low, the licensee still 
10 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

these projections will be made and the 

results transmitted to State and local 

authorities, NRC, and other appropriate 

governmental entities. 

must be able to determine if a radiological release 

is occurring. If a release is occurring, then the 

licensee staff should promptly communicate that 

information to offsite authorities for their 

consideration. The offsite organizations are 

responsible for deciding what, if any, protective 

actions should be taken based on a CEMP. 

A.5. Identification, by position and function 

to be performed, of other employees of 

the licensee with special qualifications for 

coping with emergency conditions that 

may arise. Other persons with special 

qualifications, such as consultants, who 

are not employees of the licensee and 

who may be called upon for assistance for 

emergencies shall also be identified. The 

special qualifications of these persons 

shall be described.

SONGS has performed an on-shift staffing 

analysis, addressing SFP mitigating strategies, 

including review of collateral duties. The specific 

event scenario utilized for the staffing analysis 

involves a catastrophic loss-of-water inventory in 

one SFP. 

In addition to the scenario described above, 

SONGS performed a separate case study to 

validate that the minimum on-shift staff can perform 

mitigation efforts in the event that the second SFP 

is also affected by a catastrophic loss-of-water 

inventory. 

A.7. By June 23, 2014, identification of, 

and a description of the assistance 

expected from, appropriate State, local, 

and Federal agencies with responsibilities 

for coping with emergencies, including 

hostile action at the site. For purposes of 

this appendix, “hostile action” is defined 

as an act directed toward a nuclear power 

plant or its personnel that include the use 

of violent force to destroy equipment, take 

hostages, and/or intimidate the licensee to 

achieve an end. This includes attack by 

air, land, or water using guns, explosives, 

projectiles, vehicles, or other devices 

used to deliver destructive force. 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.1. 

A.8. Identification of the State and/or local 

officials responsible for planning for, 

ordering and controlling appropriate 

protective actions, including evacuations 

when necessary.

Offsite emergency measures are limited to support 

provided by local police, fire departments, and 

ambulance and hospital services, as appropriate. 

Due to the low probability of DBAs or other credible 

events to exceed the EPA PAGs, protective actions 

such as evacuation should not be required, but 

could be implemented at the discretion of offsite 

authorities using a CEMP. 

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). 
11 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

A.9. By December 24, 2012, for nuclear 

power reactor licensees, a detailed 

analysis demonstrating that on-shift 

personnel assigned emergency plan 

implementation functions are not assigned 

responsibilities that would prevent the 

timely performance of their assigned 

functions as specified in the emergency 

plan.

Responsibilities should be well defined in the 

emergency plan and procedures, regularly tested 

through drills and exercises audited and inspected 

by the licensee and the NRC. The duties of the onshift personnel at a decommissioning reactor 

facility are not as complicated and diverse as those 

for an operating power reactor. 

The staff considered the similarity between the 

staffing levels at a permanently shut down and 

defueled reactor and staffing levels at an operating 

power reactor site. The minimal systems and 

equipment needed to maintain the spent nuclear 

fuel in the SFP or in a dry cask storage system in a 

safe condition requires minimal personnel and is 

governed by Technical Specifications. In the EP 

final rule published in the Federal Register 

(76 FR 72560; November 23, 2011), the NRC 

concluded that the staffing analysis requirement 

was not necessary for non-power reactor licensees 

due to the small staffing levels required to operate 

the facility. 

The staff also examined the actions required to 

mitigate the very low probability beyond designbasis events for the SFP. In a letter dated 

October 1, 2014, “Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362 

Supplement 1 to Amendment Applications 266 and 

251 Permanently Defueled Technical 

Specifications San Onofre Nuclear Generating 

Station, Units 2 and 3” (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML14280A264), SCE withdrew the proposed 

changes to the Mitigating Strategies License 

Condition for Units 2 and 3 (2.C(26) for Unit 2 

and 2.C(27) for Unit 3). This license condition 

requires SONGS to maintain its SFP inventory 

makeup strategies as discussed above. 

SONGS has performed an on-shift staffing 

analysis, addressing SFP mitigating strategies, 

including review of collateral duties. The specific 

event scenario utilized for the staffing analysis 

involves a catastrophic loss-of-water inventory in 

one SFP. 
12 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

In addition to the scenario described above, 

SONGS performed a separate case study to 

validate that the minimum on-shift staff can perform 

mitigation efforts in the event that the second SFP 

is also affected by a catastrophic loss-of-water 

inventory. 

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, 

Appendix E, Section IV.1. 

B.1. The means to be used for 

determining the magnitude of, and for 

continually assessing the impact of, the 

release of radioactive materials shall be 

described, including emergency action 

levels that are to be used as criteria for 

determining the need for notification and 

participation of local and State agencies, 

the Commission, and other Federal 

agencies, and the emergency action 

levels that are to be used for determining 

when and what type of protective 

measures should be considered within 

and outside the site boundary to protect 

health and safety. The emergency action 

levels shall be based on in-plant 

conditions and instrumentation in addition 

to onsite and offsite monitoring. By June 

20, 2012, for nuclear power reactor 

licensees, these action levels must 

include hostile action that may adversely 

affect the nuclear power plant. The initial 

emergency action levels shall be 

discussed and agreed on by the applicant 

or licensee and State and local 

governmental authorities, and approved 

by the NRC. Thereafter, emergency 

action levels shall be reviewed with the 

State and local governmental authorities 

on an annual basis. 

NEI 99-01 was found to be an acceptable method 

for development of EALs. No offsite protective 

actions are anticipated to be necessary, so 

classification above the alert level is no longer 

required, which is consistent with ISFSI facilities. 

As discussed previously, SCE requested a license 

amendment to revise its EAL scheme to NEI 99-01, 

Revision 6 in a letter dated March 31, 2014, 

“Permanently Defueled Emergency Action Level 

Scheme, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, 

Units 1, 2, and 3, respectively, and Independent 

Spent Fuel Storage Installation” (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML14029A249). 

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, 

Appendix E, Section IV.1. 

C.1. The entire spectrum of emergency 

conditions that involve the alerting or 

activating of progressively larger 

segments of the total emergency 

organization shall be described. The 

communication steps to be taken to alert 

or activate emergency personnel under 

Containment parameters do not provide an 

indication of the conditions at a defueled facility 

and emergency core cooling systems are no longer 

required. Other indications, such as SFP level or 

temperature, can be used at sites where there is 

spent fuel in the SFPs. 
13 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

each class of emergency shall be 

described. Emergency action levels 

(based not only on onsite and offsite

radiation monitoring information but also 

on readings from a number of sensors 

that indicate a potential emergency, such 

as the pressure in containment and the 

response of the Emergency Core Cooling 

System) for notification of offsite agencies 

shall be described. The existence, but not 

the details, of a message authentication 

scheme shall be noted for such agencies. 

The emergency classes defined shall 

include: (1) notification of unusual events, 

(2) alert, (3) site area emergency, and 

(4) general emergency. These classes are 

further discussed in NUREG-0654/FEMAREP-1. 

In the SOC for the final rule for EP requirements for 

ISFSIs and for MRS facilities (60 FR 32430), the 

Commission responded to comments concerning a 

general emergency at an ISFSI and MRS, and 

concluded that, “...an essential element of a 

General Emergency is that a release can be 

reasonably expected to exceed EPA PAGs 

exposure levels off site for more than the 

immediate site area.” 

The probability of a condition reaching the level 

above an emergency classification of alert is very 

low. In the event of an accident at a defueled 

facility that meets the conditions for exemption 

from formal EP requirements, there will be 

available time for event mitigation and, if 

necessary, implementation of offsite protective 

actions using a CEMP. 

NEI 99-01 was found to be an acceptable method 

for development of EALs. No offsite protective 

actions are anticipated to be necessary, so 

classification above the alert level is no longer 

required. 
14 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

C.2. By June 20, 2012, nuclear power 

reactor licensees shall establish and 

maintain the capability to assess, classify, 

and declare an emergency condition 

within 15 minutes after the availability of 

indications to plant operators that an 

emergency action level has been 

exceeded and shall promptly declare the 

emergency condition as soon as possible 

following identification of the appropriate 

emergency classification level. Licensees 

shall not construe these criteria as a 

grace period to attempt to restore plant 

conditions to avoid declaring an 

emergency action due to an emergency 

action level that has been exceeded. 

Licensees shall not construe these criteria 

as preventing implementation of response 

actions deemed by the licensee to be 

necessary to protect public health and 

safety provided that any delay in 

declaration does not deny the State and 

local authorities the opportunity to 

implement measures necessary to protect 

the public health and safety. 

In the EP rule published in the Federal Register 

(76 FR 72560), non-power reactor licensees were 

not required to assess, classify and declare an 

emergency condition within 15 minutes. An SFP 

and an ISFSI are also not nuclear power reactors as 

defined in the NRC’s regulations. A 

decommissioning power reactor has a low likelihood 

of a credible accident resulting in radiological 

releases requiring offsite protective measures. For 

these reasons, the staff concludes that a 

decommissioning power reactor should not be 

required to assess, classify and declare an 

emergency condition within 15 minutes. 

D.1. Administrative and physical means 

for notifying local, State, and Federal 

officials and agencies and agreements 

reached with these officials and agencies 

for the prompt notification of the public 

and for public evacuation or other 

protective measures, should they become 

necessary, shall be described. This 

description shall include identification of 

the appropriate officials, by title and 

agency, of the State and local government 

agencies within the EPZs.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 

10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). 
15 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

D.2. Provisions shall be described for 

yearly dissemination to the public within 

the plume exposure pathway EPZ of basic 

emergency planning information, such as 

the methods and times required for public 

notification and the protective actions 

planned if an accident occurs, general 

information as to the nature and effects of 

radiation, and a listing of local broadcast 

stations that will be used for dissemination 

of information during an emergency. 

Signs or other measures shall also be 

used to disseminate to any transient 

population within the plume exposure 

pathway EPZ appropriate information that 

would be helpful if an accident occurs.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.D.1. 

D.3. A licensee shall have the capability to 

notify responsible State and local 

governmental agencies within 15 minutes 

after declaring an emergency. The 

licensee shall demonstrate that the 

appropriate governmental authorities have 

the capability to make a public alerting 

and notification decision promptly on 

being informed by the licensee of an 

emergency condition. Prior to initial 

operation greater than 5 percent of rated 

thermal power of the first reactor at the 

site, each nuclear power reactor licensee 

shall demonstrate that administrative and 

physical means have been established for 

alerting and providing prompt instructions 

to the public with the plume exposure 

pathway EPZ. The design objective of the 

prompt public alert and notification system 

shall be to have the capability to 

essentially complete the initial alerting and 

notification of the public within the plume 

exposure pathway EPZ within about 

15 minutes. The use of this alerting and 

notification capability will range from 

immediate alerting and notification of the 

public (within 15 minutes of the time that 

State and local officials are notified that a 

situation exists requiring urgent action) to 

the more likely events where there is 

While the capability needs to exist for the 

notification of offsite government agencies within a 

specified time period, previous exemptions have 

allowed for extending the State and local 

government agencies’ notification time up to 

60 minutes based on the site-specific justification 

provided. 

SCE’s exemption request provides that the 

SONGS will make notifications to the State of 

California, the local counties (Orange and San 

Diego), and Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton 

within 60 minutes of declaration of an event. In the 

permanently defueled condition of the reactor, the 

rapidly developing scenarios associated with 

events initiated during reactor power operation are 

no longer credible. 

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 

10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). 
16 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

substantial time available for the 

appropriate governmental authorities to 

make a judgment whether or not to 

activate the public alert and notification 

system. The alerting and notification 

capability shall additionally include 

administrative and physical means for a 

backup method of public alerting and 

notification capable of being used in the 

event the primary method of alerting and 

notification is unavailable during an 

emergency to alert or notify all or portions 

of the plume exposure pathway EPZ 

population. The backup method shall 

have the capability to alert and notify the 

public within the plume exposure pathway 

EPZ, but does not need to meet the 

15 minute design objective for the primary 

prompt public alert and notification 

system. When there is a decision to 

activate the alert and notification system, 

the appropriate governmental authorities 

will determine whether to activate the 

entire alert and notification system 

simultaneously or in a graduated or 

staged manner. The responsibility for 

activating such a public alert and 

notification system shall remain with the 

appropriate governmental authorities.

D.4. If FEMA has approved a nuclear 

power reactor site's alert and notification 

design report, including the backup alert 

and notification capability, as of 

December 23, 2011, then the backup alert 

and notification capability requirements in 

Section IV.D.3 must be implemented by 

December 24, 2012. If the alert and 

notification design report does not include 

a backup alert and notification capability 

or needs revision to ensure adequate 

backup alert and notification capability, 

then a revision of the alert and notification 

design report must be submitted to FEMA 

for review by June 24, 2013, and the 

FEMA-approved backup alert and 

notification means must be implemented 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.D.3 regarding the alert and notification 

system requirements. 
17 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

within 365 days after FEMA approval. 

However, the total time period to 

implement a FEMA-approved backup alert 

and notification means must not exceed 

June 22, 2015.

E.8.a.(i) A licensee onsite technical 

support center and an emergency 

operations facility from which effective 

direction can be given and effective 

control can be exercised during an 

emergency; 

Due to the low probability of DBAs or other credible 

events to exceed the EPA PAGs at the site 

boundary, the available time for event mitigation at 

a decommissioning power reactor and, if needed, 

to implement offsite protective actions using a 

CEMP, an emergency operations facility (EOF) 

would not be required to support offsite agency 

response. Onsite actions may be directed from the 

control room or other location, without the 

requirements imposed on a technical support 

center (TSC). 

E.8.a. (ii) For nuclear power reactor 

licensees, a licensee onsite operational 

support center;

NUREG-0696, “Functional Criteria for Emergency 

Response Facilities,” provides that the operational 

support center (OSC) is an onsite area separate 

from the control room and the TSC where licensee 

operations support personnel will assemble in an 

emergency. For a decommissioning power 

reactor, an OSC is no longer required to meet its 

original purpose of an assembly area for plant 

logistical support during an emergency. The OSC 

function can be incorporated into another facility. 

E.8.b. For a nuclear power reactor 

licensee's emergency operations facility 

required by paragraph 8.a of this section, 

either a facility located between 10 miles 

and 25 miles of the nuclear power reactor 

site(s), or a primary facility located less 

than 10 miles from the nuclear power 

reactor site(s) and a backup facility 

located between 10 miles and 25 miles of 

the nuclear power reactor site(s). An 

emergency operations facility may serve 

more than one nuclear power reactor site. 

A licensee desiring to locate an 

emergency operations facility more than 

25 miles from a nuclear power reactor site 

shall request prior Commission approval 

by submitting an application for an 

amendment to its license. For an 

emergency operations facility located 

more than 25 miles from a nuclear power

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3). 
18 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

reactor site, provisions must be made for 

locating NRC and offsite responders 

closer to the nuclear power reactor site so 

that NRC and offsite responders can 

interact face-to-face with emergency 

response personnel entering and leaving 

the nuclear power reactor site. Provisions 

for locating NRC and offsite responders 

closer to a nuclear power reactor site that 

is more than 25 miles from the emergency 

operations facility must include the 

following:

(1) Space for members of an NRC site 

team and Federal, State, and local 

responders;

(2) Additional space for conducting 

briefings with emergency response 

personnel;

(3) Communication with other licensee 

and offsite emergency response facilities;

(4) Access to plant data and radiological 

information; and

(5) Access to copying equipment and 

office supplies;

E.8.c. By June 20, 2012, for a nuclear 

power reactor licensee's emergency 

operations facility required by paragraph 

8.a of this section, a facility having the 

following capabilities:

(1) The capability for obtaining and 

displaying plant data and radiological 

information for each reactor at a nuclear 

power reactor site and for each nuclear 

power reactor site that the facility serves;

(2) The capability to analyze plant 

technical information and provide 

technical briefings on event conditions 

and prognosis to licensee and offsite 

response organizations for each reactor at 

a nuclear power reactor site and for each 

nuclear power reactor site that the facility 

serves; and

(3) The capability to support response to 

events occurring simultaneously at more 

than one nuclear power reactor site if the 

emergency operations facility serves more 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3). 
19 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

than one site; and

E.8.d. For nuclear power reactor 

licensees, an alternative facility (or 

facilities) that would be accessible even if 

the site is under threat of or experiencing 

hostile action, to function as a staging 

area for augmentation of emergency 

response staff and collectively having the 

following characteristics: the capability for 

communication with the emergency 

operations facility, control room, and plant 

security; the capability to perform offsite 

notifications; and the capability for 

engineering assessment activities, 

including damage control team planning 

and preparation, for use when onsite 

emergency facilities cannot be safely 

accessed during hostile action. The 

requirements in this paragraph 8.d must 

be implemented no later than December 

23, 2014, with the exception of the 

capability for staging emergency response 

organization personnel at the alternative 

facility (or facilities) and the capability for 

communications with the emergency 

operations facility, control room, and plant 

security, which must be implemented no 

later than June 20, 2012.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.1 regarding hostile action. 

E.8.e. A licensee shall not be subject to 

the requirements of paragraph 8.b of this 

section for an existing emergency 

operations facility approved as of 

December 23, 2011;

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3). 

E.9.a. Provisions for communications with 

contiguous State/local governments within 

the plume exposure pathway EPZ. Such 

communication shall be tested monthly. 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 

10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). 

The State and the local governments in which the 

nuclear facility is located need to be informed of 

events and emergencies, so lines of 

communication must be maintained. 
20 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

E.9.c. Provision for communications 

among the nuclear power reactor control 

room, the onsite technical support center, 

and the emergency operations facility; 

and among the nuclear facility, the 

principal State and local emergency 

operations centers, and the field 

assessment teams. Such 

communications systems shall be tested 

annually.

Because of the low probability of DBAs or other 

credible events that would be expected to exceed 

the EPA PAGs and the available time for event 

mitigation and, if needed, implementation of offsite 

protective actions using a CEMP, there is no need 

for the TSC, EOF, or offsite field assessment 

teams. 

Also refer to justification for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3). 

Communication with State and local emergency 

operations centers is maintained to coordinate 

assistance on site if required. 

E.9.d. Provisions for communications by 

the licensee with NRC Headquarters and 

the appropriate NRC Regional Office 

Operations Center from the nuclear power 

reactor control room, the onsite technical 

support center, and the emergency 

operations facility. Such communications 

shall be tested monthly. 

The functions of the control room, EOF, TSC, and 

OSC may be combined into one or more locations 

due to the smaller facility staff and the greatly 

reduced required interaction with State and local 

emergency response facilities. 

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 
21 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

F.1. The program to provide for: (a) The 

training of employees and exercising, by 

periodic drills, of radiation emergency 

plans to ensure that employees of the 

licensee are familiar with their specific 

emergency response duties, and (b) The 

participation in the training and drills by 

other persons whose assistance may be 

needed in the event of a radiation 

emergency shall be described. This shall 

include a description of specialized initial 

training and periodic retraining programs 

to be provided to each of the following 

categories of emergency personnel: 

i. Directors and/or coordinators of the 

plant emergency organization; 

ii. Personnel responsible for accident 

assessment, including control room shift 

personnel; 

iii. Radiological monitoring teams; 

iv. Fire control teams (fire brigades); 

v. Repair and damage control teams; 

vi. First aid and rescue teams; 

vii. Medical support personnel; 

viii. Licensee’s headquarters support 

personnel;

ix. Security personnel. 

In addition, a radiological orientation 

training program shall be made available 

to local services personnel; e.g., local 

emergency services/Civil Defense, local 

law enforcement personnel, local news 

media persons. 

Decommissioning power reactor sites typically 

have a level of emergency response that does not 

require additional response by the licensee’s 

headquarters personnel. Therefore, the staff 

considers exempting licensee’s headquarters 

personnel from training requirements to be 

reasonable. 

Due to the low probability of DBAs or other credible 

events to exceed the EPA PAGs, offsite 

emergency measures are limited to support 

provided by local police, fire departments, and 

ambulance and hospital services, as appropriate. 

Local news media personnel no longer need 

radiological orientation training since they will not 

be called upon to support the formal Joint 

Information Center. The term “Civil Defense” is no 

longer commonly used; references to this term in 

the examples provided in the regulation are, 

therefore, not needed 
22 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

F.2. The plan shall describe provisions for 

the conduct of emergency preparedness 

exercises as follows: Exercises shall test 

the adequacy of timing and content of 

implementing procedures and methods, 

test emergency equipment and 

communications networks, test the public 

alert and notification system, and ensure 

that emergency organization personnel 

are familiar with their duties. 

Because of the low probability of DBAs or other 

credible events that would be expected to exceed 

the limits of EPA PAGs and the available time for 

event mitigation and, if necessary, offsite protective 

actions from a CEMP, the public alert and 

notification system will not be used and, therefore, 

requires no testing. 

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 

F.2.a. A full participation exercise which 

tests as much of the licensee, State, and 

local emergency plans as is reasonably 

achievable without mandatory public 

participation shall be conducted for each 

site at which a power reactor is located. 

Nuclear power reactor licensees shall 

submit exercise scenarios under § 50.4 at 

least 60 days before use in a full 

participation exercise required by this 

paragraph 2.a.

F.2.a.(i), (ii), and (iii) are not applicable. 

Due to the low probability of DBAs or other credible 

events that would be expected to exceed the limits 

of EPA PAGs, the available time for event 

mitigation and, if necessary, implementation of 

offsite protective actions using a CEMP, no formal 

offsite radiological emergency plans are required. 

The intent of submitting exercise scenarios at an 

operating power reactor site is to check that 

licensees utilize different scenarios in order to 

prevent the preconditioning of responders at power 

reactors. For decommissioning power reactor 

sites, there are limited events that could occur and, 

as such, the previously routine progression to 

general emergency in an operating power reactor 

site scenario is not applicable. 

The licensee would be exempt from 10 CFR 

Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.a.(i)-(iii) 

because the licensee would be exempt from the 

umbrella provision of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.F.2.a. 

F.2.b. Each licensee at each site shall 

conduct a subsequent exercise of its 

onsite emergency plan every 2 years. 

Nuclear power reactor licensees shall 

submit exercise scenarios under § 50.4 at 

least 60 days before use in an exercise 

required by this paragraph 2.b. The 

exercise may be included in the full 

participation biennial exercise required by 

paragraph 2.c. of this section. In addition, 

the licensee shall take actions necessary 

to ensure that adequate emergency 

response capabilities are maintained 

during the interval between biennial 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.F.2.a. 

The low probability of DBAs or other credible 

events that would exceed the EPA PAGs, the 

available time for event mitigation and, if 

necessary, implementation of offsite protective 

actions using a CEMP, render a TSC, OSC and 

EOF unnecessary. The principal functions 

required by regulation can be performed at an 

onsite location that does not meet the requirements 

of the TSC, OSC or EOF. 
23 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

exercises by conducting drills, including at 

least one drill involving a combination of 

some of the principal functional areas of 

the licensee's onsite emergency response 

capabilities. The principal functional 

areas of emergency response include 

activities such as management and 

coordination of emergency response, 

accident assessment, event classification, 

notification of offsite authorities, and 

assessment of the onsite and offsite

impact of radiological releases, protective 

action recommendation development, 

protective action decision making, plant 

system repair and mitigative action 

implementation. During these drills, 

activation of all of the licensee's 

emergency response facilities (Technical 

Support Center (TSC), Operations 

Support Center (OSC), and the 

Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)) 

would not be necessary, licensees would 

have the opportunity to consider accident 

management strategies, supervised 

instruction would be permitted, operating 

staff in all participating facilities would 

have the opportunity to resolve problems 

(success paths) rather than have 

controllers intervene, and the drills may 

focus on the onsite exercise training 

objectives. 

F.2.c. Offsite plans for each site shall be 

exercised biennially with full participation 

by each offsite authority having a role 

under the radiological response plan. 

Where the offsite authority has a role 

under a radiological response plan for 

more than one site, it shall fully participate 

in one exercise every two years and shall, 

at least, partially participate in other offsite 

plan exercises in this period. If two 

different licensees each have licensed 

facilities located either on the same site or 

on adjacent, contiguous sites, and share 

most of the elements defining co-located 

licensees, then each licensee shall:

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.F.2.a. 
24 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

(1) Conduct an exercise biennially of its 

onsite emergency plan;

 (2) Participate quadrennially in an offsite 

biennial full or partial participation 

exercise;

(3) Conduct emergency preparedness 

activities and interactions in the years 

between its participation in the offsite full 

or partial participation exercise with offsite 

authorities, to test and maintain interface 

among the affected State and local 

authorities and the licensee. Co-located 

licensees shall also participate in 

emergency preparedness activities and 

interaction with offsite authorities for the 

period between exercises;

(4) Conduct a hostile action exercise of its 

onsite emergency plan in each exercise 

cycle; and

(5) Participate in an offsite biennial full or 

partial participation hostile action exercise 

in alternating exercise cycles.

F.2.d. Each State with responsibility for 

nuclear power reactor emergency 

preparedness should fully participate in 

the ingestion pathway portion of exercises 

at least once every exercise cycle. In 

States with more than one nuclear power 

reactor plume exposure pathway EPZ, the 

State should rotate this participation from 

site to site. Each State with responsibility 

for nuclear power reactor emergency 

preparedness should fully participate in a 

hostile action exercise at least once every 

cycle and should fully participate in one 

hostile action exercise by 

December 31, 2015. States with more 

than one nuclear power reactor plume 

exposure pathway EPZ should rotate this 

participation from site to site.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.2. 

F.2.e. Licensees shall enable any State or 

local Government located within the 

plume exposure pathway EPZ to 

participate in the licensee’s drills when 

requested by such State or local 

government. 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.2. 
25 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

F.2.f. Remedial exercises will be required 

if the emergency plan is not satisfactorily 

tested during the biennial exercise, such 

that NRC, in consultation with FEMA,

cannot (1) find reasonable assurance that 

adequate protective measures can and 

will be taken in the event of a radiological 

emergency or (2) determine that the 

Emergency Response Organization 

(ERO) has maintained key skills specific 

to emergency response. The extent of 

State and local participation in remedial 

exercises must be sufficient to show that 

appropriate corrective measures have 

been taken regarding the elements of the 

plan not properly tested in the previous 

exercises.

The U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency 

is responsible for evaluating the adequacy of offsite 

response during an exercise. No action is 

expected from State or local government 

organizations in response to an event at a 

decommissioning power reactor site other than 

firefighting, law enforcement and 

ambulance/medical services support. A 

memorandum of understanding should be in place 

for those services. Offsite response organizations 

will continue to take actions on a comprehensive 

EP basis to protect the health and safety of the 

public as they would at any other industrial site. 

F.2.i. Licensees shall use drill and 

exercise scenarios that provide 

reasonable assurance that anticipatory 

responses will not result from 

preconditioning of participants. Such 

scenarios for nuclear power reactor 

licensees must include a wide spectrum of 

radiological releases and events, 

including hostile action. Exercise and drill 

scenarios as appropriate must emphasize 

coordination among onsite and offsite 

response organizations. 

Due to the low probability of DBAs or other credible 

events to exceed the EPA PAGs, the available time 

for event mitigation and, if needed, implementation 

of offsite protective actions using a CEMP, the 

previously routine progression to general 

emergency in power reactor site scenarios is not 

applicable to a decommissioning site. Therefore, 

the licensee is not expected to demonstrate 

response to a wide spectrum of events. 

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.1 regarding hostile action. 

F.2.j. The exercises conducted under 

paragraph 2 of this section by nuclear 

power reactor licensees must provide the 

opportunity for the ERO to demonstrate 

proficiency in the key skills necessary to 

implement the principal functional areas of 

emergency response identified in 

paragraph 2.b of this section. Each 

exercise must provide the opportunity for 

the ERO to demonstrate key skills specific 

to emergency response duties in the 

control room, TSC, OSC, EOF, and joint 

information center. Additionally, in each 

eight calendar year exercise cycle, 

nuclear power reactor licensees shall vary 

the content of scenarios during exercises 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.F.2. 
26 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

conducted under paragraph 2 of this 

section to provide the opportunity for the 

ERO to demonstrate proficiency in the key 

skills necessary to respond to the

following scenario elements: hostile action 

directed at the plant site, no radiological 

release or an unplanned minimal 

radiological release that does not require 

public protective actions, an initial 

classification of or rapid escalation to a 

Site Area Emergency or General 

Emergency, implementation of strategies, 

procedures, and guidance developed 

under § 50.54(hh)(2), and integration of 

offsite resources with onsite justification. 

The licensee shall maintain a record of 

exercises conducted during each eight 

year exercise cycle that documents the 

content of scenarios used to comply with 

the requirements of this paragraph. Each 

licensee shall conduct a hostile action 

exercise for each of its sites no later than 

December 31, 2015. The first eight-year 

exercise cycle for a site will begin in the 

calendar year in which the first hostile 

action exercise is conducted. For a site 

licensed under Part 52, the first eight-year 

exercise cycle begins in the calendar year 

of the initial exercise required by Section 

IV.F.2.a.

I. By June 20, 2012, for nuclear power 

reactor licensees, a range of protective 

actions to protect onsite personnel during 

hostile action must be developed to 

ensure the continued ability of the 

licensee to safely shut down the reactor 

and perform the functions of the 

licensee’s emergency plan.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.E.8.d.