J-S68001-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: R.W.P., III,

A MINOR

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: L.H., MOTHER No. 1823 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Decree Entered May 19, 2015, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Family 

Court, at No(s): CP-51-AP-00000434-2014, 

FID: 51-FN-384630-2009

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DONOHUE, and MUNDY, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED DECEMBER 07, 2015

L.H. (Mother) appeals from the decree entered May 19, 2015, in the 

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which involuntary terminated 

her parental rights to her minor son, R.W.P. (Child), born in March of 2012.1 

We affirm.

Child was removed from Mother’s care due to Mother’s history of 

seizures, and alleged prostitution.2 N.T., 5/19/2015, at 6. Since that time, 

 

1 The parental rights of Child’s father, R.P., were terminated by a separate 

decree entered July 14, 2015. Father is not a party to the instant appeal. 

2 The record is not consistent as to the date Child was removed from 

Mother’s care. During the termination hearing, Community Umbrella Agency 

case manager, Jose De Jesus, testified that on “the 21st of this month 

[C]hild will be in care three years,” meaning that Child was placed on May 

21, 2012. N.T., 5/19/2015, at 6. However, the trial court states in its 

opinion that Child entered placement on “October 12, 2012[,] when he was 

three days old.” Trial Court Opinion, 7/24/2015, at 1. Confusingly, as noted 

supra, Child was born in March of 2012. The statement of facts attached to 

the petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights indicates that Child was 

placed in the care of his paternal grandmother shortly after his birth in 

March of 2012, but that the paternal grandmother later requested kinship 
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Child has resided with his paternal grandmother. Id. On August 20, 2014, 

the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (DHS) filed a petition to 

terminate Mother’s parental rights to Child involuntarily. A termination 

hearing was held on May 19, 2015, during which the trial court heard the 

testimony of Community Umbrella Agency case manager, Jose De Jesus, and 

Mother. Following the hearing, the court entered its decree terminating 

Mother’s parental rights. Mother timely filed a notice of appeal, along with a 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.

Mother now raises the following issues for our review. 

1. Did the [t]rial judge rule in error that the Philadelphia City 

Solicitor’s Office meant [sic] its burden of proof that [Mother]’s 

parental rights to her children [sic] should be terminated[?]

2. Did the trial judge rule in error that the termination of 

[Mother]’s parental rights would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the children [sic] [?]

Mother’s brief at 3. 

Mother argues that DHS failed to present sufficient evidence to 

terminate her parental rights. Id. at 4-5, 9. Mother emphasizes that she 

completed parenting and anger management classes, and that she was 

receiving mental health treatment and visiting with Child. Id. at 4-6. 

Mother further contends that DHS failed to prove that she is continuing to 

engage in prostitution. Id. at 4, 6-7, 9. Finally, Mother asserts that the trial 

 

care assistance in September of 2012, and that an order of protective 

custody was granted on October 12, 2012. 
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court failed to consider the bond between Mother and Child, and that 

severing that bond will have a “severe impact.” Id. at 7-8. 

We consider Mother’s claims mindful of our well-settled standard of 

review.

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely

because the record would support a different result. We have 

previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often 

have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple 

hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if 

the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention 
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paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). 

In this case, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). We need only agree 

with the trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as 

Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. 

Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). Here, 

we analyze the court’s decision to terminate under Sections 2511(a)(8) and 

(b), which provide as follows.

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

***

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement 

with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed 

from the date of removal or placement, the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement of 

the child continue to exist and termination of 

parental rights would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the child. 

***

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 
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consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8), (b).

We first address whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8).

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511(a)(8), the following factors must be demonstrated: (1) 

[t]he child has been removed from parental care for 12 months 

or more from the date of removal; (2) the conditions which led 

to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist; and 

(3) termination of parental rights would best serve the needs 

and welfare of the child.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275-76 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

“Notably, termination under Section 2511(a)(8), does not require an 

evaluation of [a parent’s] willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that 

led to placement of her children.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 

511 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted).

Instantly, the trial court concluded that DHS presented clear and 

convincing evidence that the parental rights of Mother should be terminated. 

Trial Court Opinion, 7/24/2015, at 8. The court reasoned that Child has 

been in care for almost his entire life, and that Mother has failed to remedy 

the conditions that resulted in Child’s removal. Id. at 8-9. Specifically, the 

court found that Mother has failed to properly address her seizures, and that 

Mother has continued to post suggestive advertisements on social media 

websites. Id. at 9, 11. The court further found that Mother is not able to 
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provide for Child financially, that Mother has failed to improve her parenting 

skills, and that Mother does not properly interact with Child during visits. 

Id. at 10. 

After a thorough review of the record in this matter, we conclude that 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion. During the termination hearing, 

Community Umbrella Agency case manager, Jose De Jesus, testified that he 

was assigned to this matter on April 20, 2015. N.T., 5/19/2015, at 9. Mr. 

De Jesus explained that Mother was required to complete several Family 

Service Plan objectives. Specifically, Mother was asked to complete 

parenting and anger management classes, and to provide evidence that she 

completed the classes. Id. at 8, 11. Mother also was asked to continue 

receiving treatment for her seizures, and to continue receiving mental health 

treatment through Hispanic Community Counseling Services. Id. at 10. Mr. 

De Jesus stated that Mother successfully completed three parenting 

programs, and that Mother provided him with documentation indicating that 

she is receiving mental health treatment.3 Id. at 8, 11. However, Mother’s 

documentation did not indicate how frequently Mother had been receiving 

treatment, or what the nature of that treatment was. Id. at 11. Mother 

 

3 When counsel for Mother asked Mr. De Jesus whether Mother had 

completed anger management classes, counsel for Father objected on the 

basis that the question had been asked and answered. N.T., 5/19/2015, at 

21. The objection was sustained. Id. However, the record reveals that Mr. 

De Jesus had not previously been asked about anger management. Thus, 

Mr. De Jesus was never able to state whether Mother had complied with this 

objective. 
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failed to provide documentation indicating that she is receiving regular 

treatment for her seizures. Id. at 10. As explained by Mr. De Jesus, “She’s 

only provided me with an emergency documentation for Jefferson Hospital 

that she had to miss a visit because she had a seizure and was going on her 

way to the hospital, that’s the only documentation I have on record.” Id. 

Mother provided Mr. De Jesus with this documentation on May 8, 2015. Id. 

Mr. De Jesus later added that, “[t]here is documentation in the record but 

not to me. It’s in the file that she is certified to have seizures.” Id. at 17. 

Mother has not asked Mr. De Jesus to provide services with respect to her 

seizures, although Mother did inform Mr. De Jesus that she intends on 

having a family member act as her nurse. Id. at 20-21. 

Mr. De Jesus further testified concerning Mother’s visitation with Child. 

Mother receives weekly supervised visits with Child. Id. at 8. Mother was 

never offered unsupervised visits, because “she’s almost [sic] on the phone, 

or isn’t interacting properly with the child.” Id. Mr. De Jesus testified 

inconsistently with respect to Mother’s attendance at visits. Mr. De Jesus 

initially noted that he reviewed the file in this matter prior to testifying, and 

that the file indicated that Mother attended her visits consistently prior to his 

involvement in the case. Id. at 9-10. Mr. De Jesus later stated that 

Mother’s visits “weren’t consistent for like three workers before me . . . .” 

Id. at 16. Mr. De Jesus then stated again that his review of the file showed 

that Mother “was consistent on visit[s] . . . .” Id. at 22. Mr. De Jesus 
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noted that Child is doing well with his paternal grandmother, and calls his 

paternal grandmother “mother” or “mom.” Id. at 15. He opined that Child 

would not be harmed if Mother’s parental rights are terminated. Id.

Finally, Mr. De Jesus testified concerning possible prostitution by 

Mother. Id. at 11-15, 21. Mr. De Jesus was presented with several 

exhibits, which are included in the certified record on appeal. Specifically, 

Mr. De Jesus was presented with a printout of Mother’s Facebook page from 

October 17, 2012. See Child Advocate Exhibit 1. The printout includes 

numerous suggestive photographs of Mother. The printout further includes 

several suggestive messages posted by Mother. For example, Mother posted 

one message stating, “I[’]M DOING LAP DANCES AT MY HOUSE AND SO 

MUCH MORE CALL ME . . . FOR MORE INFO.” Mother later posted another 

message stating, “I[’]M LIVE IN WEST PHILLY. IF YOU GOT 120 CALL ME 

. . . RITE [sic] NOW. I[’]M LOOKING TO BE SEEN RITE [sic] NOW NO 

GAMES.” Mr. De Jesus also testified concerning an online classified ad 

posted by Mother on November 16, 2013. See DHS Exhibit 3. The ad 

includes a picture of Mother, and states, “[]âTM¥Speical [sic] $65 for 20 

minsâTM¥ [sic].” Finally, Mr. De Jesus identified Mother as the subject of 

several suggestive photos, which were printed from the internet on February 

18, 2015. See DHS Exhibits 1 and 2. There is no date indicating when the 

pictures were posted, nor is there any text with the pictures. It is not clear 

what type of website on which the pictures were posted.
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Mother testified that she completed two parenting classes. N.T., 

5/19/2015, at 23-24. Mother also completed “a class for the foster parent 

and the mother to get along to interact with the child.” Id. at 24-25. 

Mother stated that she completed an anger management program, and is 

receiving therapy at Hispanic Community Counseling Services. Id. at 25. 

Mother did not specify how often she attends therapy, but stated that she 

goes “basically when I want to go . . . .” Id. With respect to her seizures, 

Mother acknowledged that her condition is “not gonna go away.” Id. at 26. 

However, Mother emphasized that her illness “does not make me a bad 

mother,” and that she is able to clean her home, cook for herself, and pay 

her bills with Supplemental Security Income. Id. Mother noted that she is 

applying for her cousin to act as her nurse. Id. Mother claimed that she is 

bonded with Child, and that Child calls her “mother.” Id. at 27.

Thus, the record supports the conclusion of the trial court that Child 

has been removed from Mother’s care for over twelve months, and that 

Mother has failed to remedy the conditions that led to Child’s removal. At 

the time of the termination hearing, Child had been out of Mother’s care for 

at least two and a half years, and probably longer. During that time, Mother 

failed to demonstrate that she is receiving appropriate medical treatment for 

her seizures, that her seizures are under control, and that she is capable of 

ensuring Child’s safety while he is in her care. Mother also has continued to 
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display inadequate parenting skills, in that she does not interact properly 

with Child during visits. 

The record further confirms that it would best serve the needs and 

welfare of Child to terminate the parental rights of Mother. Given Mother’s 

disinterest in parenting Child during visits, and given her apparent failure 

over the course of years to obtain appropriate medical care, there is no 

realistic hope that Mother ever will be able to provide for Child. Moreover, 

Child has spent the majority of his life residing with his paternal 

grandmother, and Child considers his paternal grandmother to be his 

mother. Removing Child from his paternal grandmother at this point would 

be devastating to Child, as he would be ripped away from the only family he 

has ever known. As our Supreme Court has explained, this Court must 

accept the findings of the trial court if they are supported by the record, and 

we may not reverse merely because the record could support a different 

result. T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. Because the trial court’s decision in the 

instant matter is supported by competent evidence, we must affirm the 

termination of parental rights.4

 

4 We agree with Mother that the record does not support the trial court’s 

finding that Mother has continued to post suggestive advertisements on 

social media websites. Child Advocate Exhibit 1 is a printout of Mother’s 

Facebook page from October of 2012, while DHS Exhibit 3 is an online 

classified ad from November of 2013. At the time of the termination 

hearing, these postings were over two and a half years old, and one and a 

half years old, respectively. DHS Exhibits 1 and 2 are pictures against a 

white background with no accompanying text. While there is a date on the 

exhibits indicating that they were printed from the internet on February 18, 
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We next consider whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). We have 

discussed our analysis under Section 2511(b) as follows.

Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental 

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has 

explained, Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding 

analysis and the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. 

Case law, however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, 

if any, between parent and child is a factor to be considered as 

part of our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or 

her child is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) bestinterest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be 

considered by the court when determining what is in the best

interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court 

can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, 

and should also consider the intangibles, such as the 

love, comfort, security, and stability the child might 

have with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court 

stated that the trial court should consider the 

importance of continuity of relationships and whether 

any existing parent-child bond can be severed 

without detrimental effects on the child.

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting 

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011)) (quotation marks and 

citations omitted).

 

2015, there is no indication as to when the pictures were actually posted. It 

is not clear what type of website on which the pictures were posted, nor is 

there anything about the pictures which would confirm that Mother was the 

one who posted them. Nonetheless, as detailed supra, the other evidence 

presented during the termination hearing was more than sufficient to affirm 

the termination of Mother’s parental rights.
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Here, the trial court found that Mother and Child do not have a 

parent/child bond, and that Child is bonded with his paternal grandmother. 

Trial Court Opinion, 7/24/2015, at 11. The court reasoned that it would best 

serve the needs and welfare of Child to terminate Mother’s parental rights, 

so that Child can be adopted by paternal grandmother. Id. at 12. The court 

explained that terminating Mother’s parental rights would not cause 

irreparable harm to Child, but that Child would be irreparably harmed if he 

were removed from his paternal grandmother. Id.

We again conclude that the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion. 

While Mother asserted that she shares a bond with Child, the trial court was 

free to reject this testimony. Child has been out of Mother care since he was 

about seven months old, at the latest, and, at the time of the termination 

hearing, Child was over three years old. It is unlikely that Child has a strong 

attachment or bond with Mother. See In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 764 (Pa. 

Super. 2008) (observing that the relationship between K.Z.S. and his 

mother “must be fairly attenuated,” given that K.Z.S. had been in foster care 

for most of his young life, and given that he had only limited contact with 

the mother during this time). Moreover, it is clear that any possible bond 

between Child and Mother is outweighed by Mother’s inability to care for 

Child, and by Child’s need for permanence and stability. See C.D.R., 111 

A.3d at 1220 (concluding that the appellant mother’s bond with C.D.R was 

outweighed by the mother’s “repeated failure to remedy her parental 
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incapacity,” and by C.D.R.’s need for permanence and stability). Mother is 

not entitled to relief.

Accordingly, because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child, we 

affirm the decree of the trial court.

Decree affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/7/2015
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