FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

MARCH 30, 2011

JOHN LEY

CLERK

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

 ________________________

 No. 10-14373 

Non-Argument Calendar

 ________________________

 D.C. Docket No. 0:10-cr-60119-WPD-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JONATHAN KEITH CORY, 

llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

 Appeal from the United States District Court

 for the Southern District of Florida

 ________________________

(March 30, 2011)

Before TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:
Jonathan Cory pled guilty of possession with the intent to distribute cocaine,

in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and was sentenced to prison term of 18

months. He appeals his sentence, presenting one issue: whether his sentence is

substantively unreasonable. See under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261,

125 S.Ct. 738, 765-66, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (the question on appeal of a

sentence is whether the sentence is “unreasonable.”) We find that it is not

unreasonable and therefore affirm.

Cory’s sentence is at the bottom of the sentence range, 18 to 24 months,

prescribed by the Sentencing Guidelines. He argues that his sentence is

nonetheless substantively unreasonable because the nature and circumstances of

the offense and his personal history—a traumatic home life—and mental

impairment warranted a downward variance. Moreover, since his criminal history

does not indicate a need for his incarceration to protect the public, the sentence he

received is greater than necessary to achieve the sentencing purposes of 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a).

Whether a sentence is reasonable is guided by the sentencing factors set out

in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 188-89. Those

factors include: 

2
1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and

characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness

of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just

punishment for the offense; (3) the need for deterrence; (4) the need to

protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed

educational or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of

sentences available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent

policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to avoid

unwanted sentencing disparities; and (10)the need to provide restitution

to victims. 

United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 786 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing to 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a). “[T]he weight given to any § 3553(a) factor is within the sound

discretion of the district court and we will not substitute our judgment in weighing

the relevant factors.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1248 (11th Cir.) (en

banc). A sentence is substantively reasonable if, under the totality of the

circumstances, it achieves the sentencing purposes of § 3553(a). Pugh, 515 F.3d

at 1191. 

Cory has not shown that the sentence he received is substantively

unreasonable. It is at the low-end of the Guidelines sentence range, and well

below the statutory maximum sentence for the crime he committed, 20 years’

imprisonment. The district court explained its rationale in sentencing Cory to

18 months’ imprisonment, expressly stating that it had considered all of the

aggravating and mitigating factors, including the quantity and value of the cocaine

3
smuggled in on his person, as well as his lack of equity interest in the cocaine. 

The court also stated that it had considered the testimony presented by the expert

psychologist who testified on Cory’s behalf and taken into account Cory’s mental

impairment. 

AFFIRMED.

4