Opinion issued November 30, 2023

In The 

## Court of Appeals

For The 

## First District of Texas

———————————— NO. 01

- 23

- 00485

- CV

——————————— BEACHSIDERS, LLC, D/B/A BEACHSIDERS BAR & GRILL, Ap pe l lant V. ERIC VAUGHAN AND DENISE VAUGH A N , Appellees

On Appeal from th e 405 th District Court Galveston County, Texas Trial Court Ca se No. 23

- CV

- 0819

MEMORANDU M OPINION

This appeal involves a dispute between Appellees Eri c a nd Denise Vaughan ,

two Gal veston , Texas homeowner s , and Appell a nt Beachsiders , LLC concerning a

ba r B eachs iders ope rates near the Vaug hans ’ home

. A lleg ing the bar interfer es

with the use and en

joyment of their home, the Vaughan s filed suit against2

Bea chsiders f

or p rivate nu isance . They secured an ex pa rte temporary restrai n ing
order and, subsequently , a temporar y injunction prevent i ng Beachsiders fr om,

among o ther things, playing music outside and ordering the bar to take affirmative
action, including erecti n g a w ooden privacy along its property

.
Bea chsiders filed a n interlocutory appea l challenging t h e trial court ’ s temporary injunction , 1 and later an o pposed m otion to s t ay th e portion of the
temporary i njunction ordering it to erect a f enc e along its property. We granted the
motion to stay on August 10, 2023

.
In six i ssues, Beachsi ders argues (1) th e trial court abused its discretion in
granti ng the temporary injunction , (2) the temporary injunction violates Texas R u le

of Civ il Procedur e 683 , (3) the trial court abused its di scretion in granting
injunctive relief not sought by the Vaughan s , (4) th e t rial court abused its

discretion by issuing injunctive relief that destroy s the status quo , (5) the trial cour t

violated Beachsiders ’ consti tutional righ ts , and (6) the trial court abuse d its
discretion in setting the temporary injunction bond at $2,500

.
B ecause the tem porary injunct ion violates Texas Rule of Civil Procedure

683 , the in

junction is void. We dissolve the injunction and remand t he case to the

trial court.

1 Sectio n 51.014 (c) of t he Tex as Civil Pr act ice and Remedies Co d e p ermits an interloc u tory appeal of an order grant i ng a temporary injunction. T EX

. C IV

. P RAC

. & R EM

. C ODE § 51.014 (4).3 B ackground Claire and Christopher Downings 2 deeded the i r property at 4229 13 Mile

Roa d i n Galveston, T exas to Appellant Beach s iders, L LC d/b/a Beachsiders Bar

and Grill in 2010

. The property is in a commercially zoned area on the west end of

Gal veston , Texas

. Adjacent to the pro perty i s a vacant strip of land owned by

Texas Parks and Wil d li fe. And a djacent to the Texas Parks and Wildlife property

is a house ow ned and occupied by Appellees Eric Vaughan a n d h i s wife, Denise
Vaughan

. The Vaughan s have owned the house since July 2015, having moved

the re full

- time in 2016. 3

A fter the Down i ng s dee ded the property to Beachsiders in 2010 , t h e Downings operated the property as a short

- term rental home

. Eric Vaughan

testified that in July 2022 , he learned the Downings planned to start operating a bar

on the Beachs iders property

. He learn ed th e D owni ngs were seeking a n alco h olic
beverage permit from th e T ex a s Alcoholic Beverage Commission and that the y had

obtained a loudspeaker permit from the C i ty of Gal v eston. T h e loudspeaker permit
was issued to Chris Downing/Beachsiders Bar at 4229 13 Mil e R oad and appr oved

2 The Do wnings own Beachs iders, LLC . While they are name d a s de fend ants in the underlying litigation, they a re not parties to the p r es ent appeal.

3 T he Pirates Beach West plann ed community, where the Vaughans ’ home is located , is zoned residentia l , while t he Beach siders property is zoned commercial

. Prior to thei r pur chase of th e ir Galveston home in 2015 , the V aug hans rented the pro p e rt y on occasional weekend s and holidays as a vacation home for their family

.4

the use of a lo udsp eaker outside the Beachsiders bar from 12 p.m. to 10 p.m. , starting on A p ril 18 and through J une 3 0, 20 23

. 4

Beach siders Bar & Grill opened on May 6, 20 23

. The Vaughans
complained t o the City of Galveston Police Dep a rt ment that the bar was playing
music in violation of the loudspeaker permit, but to their knowledge, no official

action was taken “ to enforce the permit. ”
Shortly a fter, o n May 23, 2023, the V aughan s f i led an Original Petition,
Application for Tem porary Re str aining O rder, and Temporary Injunction again st

Beach siders and the Downing s assertin g a claim for private nuis ance

. Stating the
Downings and Beachsiders “ opened [the] bar after obtaining the requis i te state and
municipal permits, ” the Vau gh a ns alleg e d tha t “ the ongoing and off ensive mann er

in w hich the bar ha [d ] been operate d ha [d] become an intolerabl e nuisanc e ” that

“ substantially interfere[]d with the use and enjoyment of their home. ” The
Vaughan s alleged Beachsiders had “ vio lated the City of Gal v es ton ’ s sound
ordinances on multiple occasions ” and that “ lou dspeakers mounted on a cabana in

an outsid e e ntertainment area ” were direct ed at the Vaughan s ’ home subjecting

4 The loudspeak er permit required the permit holder to comply with “ the decibel level or hou rs rest rictions of Galveston Munici pal Code 24. ” The per m it i s f or no ise between the ho urs of 12 p.m. and 1 0 p.m. The loudspeaker permit includes the not ation that it can be revoked for v iolation of the city ’ s decibel le vel o r hours req uirements, if the per mit holder causes “ imminent breach o f the peace , ” if the ho ld e r use s “ f

ig hting words ” or obs cene language, or if the holder directs amplified speech at someone “ in a manner likely to harass, abuse or torment that person

. ” The per mit i s not dated but indicates it is a “2023 Quarter Two Per m i t. ”5

them to loud no i se

. T he y also alleged bar patro n s ha d been “ o bser ved c ons uming

alc oh o l o ff

- premi ses ” in v iolation of S ection 28.10 of the T e xas A lcoholic
Beverage Code and congregating “ outside in a loud and boister ous ” and often

“ drunken manner , ” that Beachsiders h a d not screened its dum p s ters as requi r ed by

law , that congestion ha d re sul ted from “ inad equate parking , ” and that “ cri minal
activity ” w as “ li kely [to] increase. ” They alleged that Beach siders ’ patrons,

“ o b vi o usly advised by employees of Defendan t s, have acted in a tau n t ing and
threatening manner ” toward the m

. The Vaughan s a lleg ed these activities were

ca using “ unreasonable di scomfort and interruption to their normal use ” of their

home result ing in “ l oss of use and enjoyment o f their property, pr o bab le
diminution in value, as well as t heir pri v acy

. ”

The Vaughan s sou g ht a te mporary re stra ini ng order , temporary i njunctive

r elief , and recovery of damages from $2 00 ,000 to $ 1 ,000 , 000

. In addition to
monetary d amages, t he Vaugh a n s s o u ght to enjoin

Defendants , their officers, agents, representatives, succes sors, assign s,
em ploy ee s , trustee s, and an y person acting in co ncert with them, from taking fur ther action to play loud mus ic beyond reasonable levels and time periods as r e quired u n d er the Cit y of Galveston ’s ordi n anc es on sound, al lowing or employ ing bands or other music ians t o cause mu sic to be amplified outside of the [Beachsiders] Property

.6

The Vaughans did not request a perma ne nt in j unction. The trial court granted a n

e x parte t emporary restraining order against Beachsiders and the Downings on May 23, 2023, and it set a temporary i njunction hearing for Ma y 31, 2023

. 5

The Temporary Injunct ion Hearing

T he trial co urt conducted a te mporary injunction hearing on May 3 1 , 2023.
During the hearing, Eric Vaughan testified that he and his wife live fulltime at the ir

home in Gal v e ston

. Before purchasing the property , the y r ented the house every
July 4 fr om 2001 to 20 15

. 6 The back of the house has an e l evated d eck w ith a pool
and a barbecue grill and an un obstruct e d view of the ocean. Vaughan testified th at
at times, the y ca n h ear the oc ean fr om the deck. He estimated the house is about

400 to 500 feet from the beach.
Vaughan te s t ified that “ as of the day that the bar opened, every single day,
seven days a week, there was loud sp eak er mus ic playing aud ibly that we could

hear in our yar d, in our p roperty, on our back por ch. ” H e testified he was “ very

bothered ” by the m u s ic

. According to Vaughan , a sp eaker mounted on the bar ’ s

cabana i s “ literally pointed directly ” at his house

. He testified he kn o w s the music

5 Among other thin gs, the temporary restra in ing order e njoined Beachsiders from violat ing the City of Galveston ’ s noise ordinance s ; playing music outside the bar ; allowing bands or other musicia ns to play or cause mus ic to be played “ at any time

o r a n y day ” on Beachsiders ’ pro p erty, allowing patro ns to congregate outside Beachsider s in a “ l oud and boisterous manner , ” and allowing pa trons to violate section 28.10 of the Texas Alcoh olic Beverage Co de by lea ving Beachsid e rs while p ossessi n g alcohol.

6 The original petition i ndi cates the Vaughans firs t began to rent the house in 2002.7

is “ com i ng fro m [ Beachsiders bec ause] there ’ s nothing e lse aro und except the state
park and the o c ean. ” He testified he is “ reasonably certain ” the music he heard
was coming from Beachsiders.

Va ughan explained he recorded video s to do cum ent times when he could

he ar B ea c hsiders play ing mus ic after 10 p.m. The vide o s Vaughan recorded from

his house o n May 15, 2023 at 10:28 p.m. , on May 17, 2 023 at 6 :01 a.m. , on Ma y 18, 2023 at 10:09 p.m

. , and on May 23, 2023 at 10:05 p.m

. were played d uring the
hearing. Vaugha n te stif

ie d that even though i t i s hard to hear music on some of the
videos, there is no doubt the music w a s pl aying , prompting him to make the

recordi ngs

. Vaughan testified the recordings , which he re corded with his iPhone,
do not accurately refl ect the v olu m e o f t he music , and t h a t t h e m u s i c sounds “ much
lighter on the video tha n it wa s in real ity. ” 7
Vaughan testified he w a s not simply comp laining that the music w as played

a fter 10 p.m. Rather, he do es not want the music to be played a t all. He stat ed ,

“ H avi ng music playing seven da ys a week whether we like it or not, whether it
interferes with our enjoyment of our house is not something t hat we want to ad apt

to. That ’ s not what we expect. It ’ s not what we bought the house for. It ’ s n ot h ow

we enjoy it. ”

7 A review o f the recordings refle cts mus ic that, w hen audib le , is not loud

. Al l but one of the videos were taken fro m the deck of Vaughan ’s house.8

Additional videos , which Vaughan recorded after the temporary restraining

order i ssued on May 23, 2023, were also played during the hearing. On May 29,
2023, V aughan recorded three video s that purported to show bar p a t rons standing

outside the bar

— som e o n the Texas Parks and W ildlife l and next to the bar

— with
alcoholic beverages

. No music was audible. On May 30, 2023 , Vau ghan also

recorded a video at 8:46 p.m. of musi c purportedly playing from t he loudspeakers

at th e B ea c hs iders cabana. He testi fied he had no doubt that the music was coming

from Beachsiders , given that he shot the v ideo from his own property this time

c lose r to the bar tha n w hen he shot th e other videos

. 8
Vaughan testified that because of the activity at Beachsiders, he now s et s his

hom e a larm at night and he had to buy w i ndow coverings for his h ouse ’ s back

windows “ so there ’ s no exposure o f people at any time w alking around in [his]

house to bar patrons out in the back yard. ” He stated,
The music playing every si ngle day whet her you like it or not, the music playing beyond hours, in the morning, certainly the enga g ement with p eople. . . . We ’ re o n ly 25 days since the bar open ed. There ’ s advertisements of bands being put outside. I mean, the audacity of that advertisin g alon e ju st shocks me. Hey neighbors, we ’ re going to be putti ng a band out in the yard, you know.

8 Vaughan t estified that the property behind an d to the left of his ho use is operate d as a short

- term renta l property. I n addition, t h e property behind and to the right of his hou se was , at least recently , a short

- term rental

. He conceded tha t “ Airbnbers ” can be lou d and rambunctious when they vis it Gal veston.9

Vaughan stated h e believes t he bar affects his home ’ s value, 9 his security, 10 and it

“ certainly affects the enjo yment of [ the ] home. ” H e expl ained he is not tr ying to

shut down Beac hsiders

. He simply want s Beachsiders to keep i ts patrons in side

the b ar and n o t subject th e Vaughan s to music seven days a week. Vaughan

test ified that while he never complained when the Beachsiders pr operty was a

short

- te r m rental , his co mplaint now stems from the fac t that the no ise is “ seven days a week and o ngoing w i t h th e pot ential for increas e d interfe rence in the way of

ban ds. ”
Vaughan testi fied he and hi s w ife can hear the music with the house ’ s

external doo rs closed. He a nd h is wife hear it lying in bed. According to
Vaughan, t hey can “ hea r th e ba s s reverberating in the p il l ow [

. ] ” He acknowledged

t hey do n ot have vi deo or audio that re f lects the music is audible while they a r e in

bed with the doors and windows clos ed

.
Vau gha n testified he has no evidence the music f rom Beachsiders exc e e d ed
the legal decibel limit and, i n fact, he does not know whe ther it did

. According to
Vaughan, Beachsiders plans to p rovide live amplified music outdoors on F riday

and Saturd ay night s , wh ich he test ified will subs tantially interf ere wi t h the use and

9 Vaugh an te stified that his house was on the marke t at the t ime of the hearing

. 10 Vaughan t estified about a myriad of security measures a t his house , such as alarms , lights, came ras, and motion detectors, and s tated no one co nnecte d wit h Beachsiders has “ trip ped ” the security measures.10

enjoyment of his property. Vaughan stated he does not want a ban d to play
outside, even if it complies with the decibel li mit. “ We ’ re not o kay with on an outgoing regular bas is having a bar o per ate in our backyard w i t h drinks outs ide,
patrons drinking till 2:00 o ’ clock in t he morning, bands playing every Friday . . . or
Saturday regardless of our plans, music that ’ s running sev en days a week. This is
the essence of why we ’ re here. ”
Vaugh an s t ate d h is property is not b eing harmed beyond r epair , but his quiet
enjoyment of the proper ty is

. H e has seen bar patrons consume alcohol on the

Texas Parks and W ildlife l and next to his property

. He t estified that taunting by a bar patron who gestu r ed at hi m i s the “ most egr egious offense ” he witnessed.
Vaughan believes he has been harassed and ar guably , abused, by the activity at

Bea chsiders

. Vaughan concedes that Beachsiders has a right to operate as a bar , but he

doe s not want it b r o ught into h is ba cky ard

. H e testified th at even though n o patrons have stepped on his property , Beachsider s is “ aud ibly and visibly ” in his
backyard

. H e stated th at even though he made complain ts to the City of Galveston

P o lice Department ab o u t Beachsiders violat ing the lou dspeaker hour re striction s on11

the louds peaker permit and th e temporary restrai n ing order , the City too k no

action

. 11

At the conclusion of the h ea ring, Vaughan ’ s co unsel argued that

Bea chsi ders ’ conduct “ sh ows a p a t tern of violations that would be of fensi ve to

anyo ne, particularly someone who ’ s invested significantly in their home, to live a

life near the beach, a quiet enjoyment to enjoy

— to s it out on t heir deck. ” He

ar g u ed :
[A] nyone of any ordinary s e n sibilities would find that offensive and fin d t hat d etr imental to their home

-- d etrimental to the use and enjoyment of their home. That's all he ’ s doing. He ’ s trying to zealously g uard h i s right to the use and enjoyment of his home in the
mann er to whic h he ’ s been accustomed, to the manner which ex ist ed pr ior , which is what an injunct ion is about. It ’ s about preserving the status quo until we get to the end.

Beachsiders responded that Vaughan had not established there was no i s e emanating fro m the bar beyond the allowed decib el level. Be achsiders ’ co unsel

ar gued Va ughan ack nowledged “ Yes, there ’ s beach noise. You can park on the

beach. He concedes to that. Music could be c oming from anywhere in any

direct ion, and we have to take his word f o r i t [?] ” “ He has no e vidence of an y

11 John Drew ry, Jr. also testifi ed d uring the tem porary injunction hearing. He is an attor n e y employed by the Vaughan s ’ counsel ’s firm. Drewry used to live in Galveston near a bar ca lled Beachsiders , bu t not the one at the l ocation near the Vaughan s ’ home

. Drewr y testified the bar was downstairs and the Downing s liv e d upstairs. Behind Beachsiders was a lot the Downings fenced in , wh ich was close to Drewr y ’s home

. Dr ewry te stified that sometim es Bea chs iders played music af t er 10 p.m. a nd on one occas ion it played throughout the nigh t a nd into the next mo r n i n g. Drewry did not complain about the music.12

decibel leve l , nor doe s he hav e any evidence that the decibel level is exceeding the
waves crashing. ” Nor was the re evidence th at a nyone ha d tampered with the
Vaughan s ’ home.

Bea chsiders ’ counsel also argue d t he Vaughan s had not show n a probabl e right of recov e ry “ because the stand ard is the ordinary sensibilities of a person.
Noises go on ou tside. S o metimes in these videos, there are b irds, crickets, waves,
and wind; and sometimes its lightly playing music

. And that is w it hin the bounds

of the law. ” H e argu e d that what the Vaug han s were requesting in essence would

hinder “ the business ” of the bar and disallow Be achsiders “ from a revenue stream

. ”

T o the e xtent the court granted the tempora r y injunction, Be achsiders requested

that the Vaughan s be ordered to post a bond of $2 50,00 0 o r more.

At the conclusion of the h earing, the trial court indicated it would take the
matter under advisement, and asked th e Vaughan s to submit a proposed order

.
T he Temporary Injunction
On June 13, 2023, the trial court issued a T em por ary I nju ncti on

. T he

follo wing day, on June 14, 2023, it issued a n Amended Temp orary Inju nction. 12

In its entire t y , t he Amended Temporary Injunction pro v i d es:

CAME TO BE CONSIDERED, the R e quest for I njuncti o n Relief filed by Pla intiff Vaughan ( “ Plaint iff ” ), and the Court

12 The Amended Temporar y In junction corrected a numbering error in sec ti on (F) and provided a diffe ren t trial date.13

con sidered the Request and the arguments of counsel, and finds that it should be GRANTED

. In sup port of its decision, and based on P l a i n tiff ’ s testimony and other ev idence presented, the Court hereby finds that:

Defendant Beachside rs , LLC d/b /a Beachsiders Bar and Grill has conducted bu siness o peration s wh ich have interfered with Plainti ff ’s private use and en joyment of his residence.

I t is acco rdingly hereby ORDERED that Defend ant Beachsiders, LLC d /b/a Beachsiders Bar and Grill , or any and all of its ’ [sic] agent s who re ceived actual notice of this Order, are also hereby ordered and re strained , from the dat e of th is Order until the da t e of trial as follows:
(A) Defendant is to remove all lou dspeakers from th e elevated areas of the “c aba na ” or “ ou tside ” portion of the premises;
(B) Defendant shall n ot aim any loudsp e akers i n the direct io n of the “neighborhood ” ; (C) Defendant shall erect a wooden p rivacy/security fence along the entire length of the property line whi ch boarders [sic] the Texa s S tate Par k property/non

commercially zoned properties (i. e . the property line clos es t to the “neighb o r

hood ”). The privacy fence shall be erected within 90 d a ys of the date of this order [;]
(D) Defendant shall not allow patrons to leave the property located 42 29 13 Mi le Road, Galveston, Texas 77554 , whi le posses si ng alcohol i n violation of T e x. Alc [o] . Bev. Co de § 28.10 (b); 13

13 Sec t ion 28.10 of the Texas Alcoholic Bevera ge Code for bids a mi xed beverage permittee from allowing a patron to “ take a n y alcoholic beverage purchased on the lice nsed premis es from the premises where sold ” with limited exceptions. T E X

. A LCO

. B EV

. C ODE § 28.1 0

.14 (E) Defendant sh a ll not allow or emplo y bands or other musicians to play or cause music to be played outside at any time o n any giv en da y o n Defend ants ’ property located at 4229 13 Mile Road, Ga lvesto n, Texas 77 554; and
(F) Def

endant shall contin ue to strictly adhere to, and refrain from violatin g , any and all ordinances and/or permits issued by the City of Galveston, Texas.

It is further OR DER ED that t he trial on the meri ts of this matter is set for trial on the 2 nd day o f November , 2023, at 9:00 am with the Pretrial date 10

- 2

- 23 at 9 am.

The O rder shall become effective when Plaintiff s deposit with the Clerk a bond in the amount of $2500 .00 in co nf ormity with the law.

The Clerk shall fo r th w ith, on the fil ing by the Plai ntif fs of the bond, and on approving the bond according to the law , issu e a Temporary I n

junction in conformity with the law and the t erms of this Order.
(Footnote added. ) Beachsid ers filed a Motion for R e consideration an d D i ssolution,

Clarification and/or Modification of Temporary Injunction ; Alternatively for

Fi n dings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

. The clerk ’ s record does not re flect a
ruling on the motion or any issu ed findings

.
B eachsiders filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the Temporary

I njunction and later, a Motion to S t ay En forc ement of Section C o f the Temporar y

I njunction , which this Court gr anted on August 10, 2023.15 S tandard of Rev iew and Applicable L aw The purp ose of a te mporar y injunction “ is to pres erve the status quo of the
litigation ’ s subject matter pending a trial on the merits. ” Butnaru v. Ford Motor

Co. , 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002 )

. Temporary injunctions are an extraordinar y remedy and do no t issue as a matter or right. Id. To obtain a temporary injunction , an applicant need not establis h that it will prevail upon a final tria l o n the merits,

b u t it must plead and prove that it (1) has a cause of action agai nst the opposing

party , (2) ha s a probabl e right on fi nal trial to the relief sought , and (3) faces
probable, imminent, and irrepa rable injury in the interim. Id. ; Clar k v. Hastings
Equity Partners, LLC , 651 S. W.3d 359, 366 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Di st.] 20 22 , no pet.)

. To establish i rr eparable injury, the applicant must show it cannot be
“adequately compensated in damages or [] the damages c annot be measure d by any

certai n pecuniary standard.” Butnaru , 84 S.W.3d at 204. In o ther words, the
appl icant must establish it has no adequat e r e m edy at law. McGlothlin v. Kliebert , 672 S.W.2d 231, 232 (Tex. 1984)

. Although the decision whether to grant or deny a request for a temporary injunction is committed to the sound discreti o n of the trial court, once the court

decides to grant injunc tiv e relief , it mu st comp ly with Texas Rule of Civil

Proc edure 6 8 3 , which governs the form and scope of injunction s and temporary restraining ord ers

. Se e T EX

. R. C IV . P. 683 ; Clark , 651 S.W.3d at 366 (discussing16

Rul e 683 requ i rements); Conlin v. Haun , 419 S.W.3d 68 2, 685

– 86 (Tex. App.

—
Houston [ 1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (same)

. Rule 683 provides that a temporary injunction orde r m ust state the spe cific reasons for its issuance and se t the cause

for trial on the merits. Se e T EX

. R. C I V

. P. 683

. Under Rule 6 83 , a te mporary inju n ction order must specifically set forth the r easons the tria l c ourt believes
irreparable injury will result absent an injunction preserving the status quo pending

a trial on the merits and it must “ describe i n reasonable detail and not by r efe rence

to the complaint or othe r document, the act or acts sought to be re str ained .” 14 15

T EX

. R. C IV

. P. 683 ; Clark , 651 S.W.3d at 366

. These requirements are mandatory

and an order that violates Rule 683 “ is subje ct to being declared void and

14 Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 683 states:

Eve ry or d e r granting an injunction and every restraining order shall set forth the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail and not by re ference to the complai n t or other document, the act or acts sought to be restr a i ne d; and is binding only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or partic ipatio n w ith the m who receive

a c tual notice of the order by personal service or ot herwi s e

. Every order granting a temporary injunction shall include an order setting the cause for trial on the merits with resp ect to the ultimate relief sought. The appeal o f a te mpo rary in junction shall c onst itute no cause for delay of the trial.
T EX

. R. C IV

. P

. 683.

15 “[T]he obvious purpose of [ r ule 683] is to adequately inform a party of what he is enjoined from doing and the reason why he is so enjoined.” El Tacaso, Inc. v

. J ireh St ar, Inc. , 356 S. W.3d 740, 74 4 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2011, no pet.) (citing S c hu lz v. Schulz , 478 S.W.2d 239, 244

– 45 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 1972, no writ) ).17

dissolved .” Qwes t Commc ’ ns Corp. v. AT & T Corp. , 24 S.W.3d 334, 337 (Tex.
2000); se e a lso Clark , 651 S.W.3d at 366; Conlin , 41 9 S.W.3d at 6 86

. Analysis In its second point of error , Beac hsiders argues th e t emporary i njunctio n

should be de clared void and dissolved fo r fail ure to satisfy the req uirem ents of

Texas Rule of C ivil Procedure 68 3

. Beachsiders argues the temporary injunction
does not comply with Rule 683 because it does not state the reason s for its issuance
or why the trial court believes irreparable in jury will resul t absent the gra nting of

the injunction

. Rule 683 m andates t hat an order granting a t emporary injunction “ shall s et

forth the reasons for its is suance ” and “ shall be specific in terms. ” T EX

. R. C IV

. P.

683

. “ The trial court must s et fort h sp ecific reas o ns, not merely conclusory
statements, in the or der granting t emp orary in junctive relief. ” Kot

z v. Imperial
Cap

. Bank , 319 S.W.3d 54, 56 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 2010, no pet.)

. 16 T he

r easons the cour t believes the applicant will suffer in jury wi thout th e injunction

“ must be specific and legally sufficient, and not me re conclusory statements. ”
Indep. Cap

. Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Collins , 261 S.W.3d 792, 795 (Tex. App.

— Dallas
2008, no pet.) ( noting an injunction that “ does not specify the facts the trial cour t

16 See A rkoma B asin Exploration Co.
, Inc. v. FMF Associates 1990

– A Ltd. , 249 S.W.3d 380, 389 n. 32 (Te x. 2008 ) ( defining “co n cl us or y ” as “ expressing a factual inference without sta t i ng the underlying facts on which the inference is based”) (citing Black ’ s Law Dictionary 308 (8th ed. 2004))

.18

relied on [] mak e [ s ] the trial court ’ s findings conclusory ”) . Mere re citations of

harm are insufficient. Stone r v. Thompson , 553 S.W.2d 150, 151 (Tex. App.

—
Houston [1 st Dist .] 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.) ( “ The conclusion that the situation i s

harmful is no t a reason why injury will be suffered if the interlocutory r elief i s n ot

ordered

. T he failure to include in the order a reason why the court deems issuance
of the writ proper for preventing injury to the applicant is reversible error. ”)

.
T he t empo rary i njunctio n here s tates that “ based on Plaintiff ’ s test imony

and othe r e vidence prese nted, the Court find s that [ Beachsiders ] has conducted

business o peration s wh ic h have interfered with Plainti ff ’s private use and
enjoyment of his re sidence. ” Bea c hsi ders arg ues th is “ no n

- specific and factually
unsupported recitation[] ” do es not satisfy Rule 683. We agree

.
The temporary i njunction does not state wit h s pecific ity the reasons for its

issuance , nor does it me ntion anywhere t he reasons why the trial cou rt conclude d
irreparable injury w ould result absent the granting of the i nju nction. These
deficiencies render the order fatally defective

. S ee City of Corpus Christi v.

Friends of the Col iseum , 311 S.W .3d 706, 708 ( T e x. App.

— Corpus Christi

– Edinburg 2010, no pet.) (“ When a temporary injunction is based in part on a showing that the app lic ant would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not
issued, Rule 683 requires the order to state precisely why the appli cant would

suf f e r irreparable harm.”) (empha sis in origi nal) ; Smart Auto. Serv s

. Inc. v. Muir ,19

No. 13

- 20

- 00338

- CV, 2021 WL 156 750 3, at *4 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi

– Edinburg Apr. 22, 20 21, no pet.) (mem. op.) ( holding temporary i njunction ’s

state ment that “[ Appe llant ’ s ] actions have deprived [ Appel le e ] of his right to use
his GMC Pickup .

. . f

or both personal and business reasons ” d id not “sufficiently
state the reasons why [ Appellee ] wo uld suf fer irreparable harm if the temporar y injunction was not granted ”)

. 17 , 18

17 See also Kotz v. Imperial Capital Bank , 319 S.W.3d 54, 5 6

– 5 7 ( Tex. Ap p.

— San Antonio 2 010, no pet.) (holding tempor ary injunction did not satisfy Rule 683 in stating that applicants “ will suffer irrep a r able injury in their possession and use of the Subject Property in the event t hat the requested inj unctive relief is not granted, th at they have no adequate remedy at la w, and that the requested injunctive relief is necessar y to preserve the status quo p e n ding final trial ” because “ [a] t most, this language characterizes by what mea ns har m will occur unless Kotz is enj oin ed fr om taking posses si on and use of the subject property

— but does not state or explain the reasons why irreparable i n j ury will result absent an injunction. ” ) (emphasis in or iginal) ; see also Int ’ l Broth. of Elec. Wo rkers Local Union 479 v. Becon C onst. Co
., Inc. , 104 S .W.3d 239 , 244 ( Tex. App.

— Beaumo nt 2003, no pet.) (holding that injun ction that stated “ t he C o u rt finds that the Defendants have and continue to violate the provisions of Texas Labor Code § 101.152 causing irreparable harm to Becon Co nstru cti on Company ” do es not re flect a reason why inju ry will be su stained or identify the p robable injury that wil l occur un less injunction issues ) ; El Tacaso, Inc. v. Jireh Star, Inc. , 356 S.W.3d 740, 746

– 47 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2011, no pet.) (holding stateme nt in injunction that unless appell ant is “ restrained and enjoined from taking direct or in direct action to promote i ts desire, intention, and purpose to ruin [ appellee ’s ] business in o rder to regain its leasehold and [ a ppellee ’s ] restaurant, including but n ot limited to demand ing pa yment, tak ing actions to c ollect, or exercising any default rig hts in relations [sic] t o the subject

- Promissory Note and subject

- License Agreement, and to continue such prejudicial acts, [ appellee ] will suffer irreparable harm f or wh ich there is no a dequat e monetary compensation” does not satisfy Rul e 683 ’ s requ irement that a temporary injunction “ specify the reasons why the applicant will s uffer irrep a r able harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law. ” )

.20

R ely ing on Intercontinental Termina ls Co., LLC v. Vopak N. Am., In c. , the
Vaughans argue the t emporary i njunctio n sat i sf ie s Rule 683, because it states that

th e reason for it s issuance is t h e i nterference by Beachsiders ’ “ business operations ”

with Vaughan ’ s “priv ate use and enjoyment of his residence

. ” 354 S. W.3d 887
(Tex. App.

— Houston [ 1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.)

. Inter con tinental Ter minals was an appeal from a t emporary injunct ion that allowed two V o pak entities certain use of

a ra ilro a d track belonging to ITC , a competitor, during the pen dency of litigation

over the track use

. Id. at 890

. 19 IT C argued on appeal that t he temporary

18 C ompare with IAC, Lt d. v. Bell Heli copter T extron, Inc. , 160 S.W.3d 19 1, 20 1 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) ( holding that when injunction stated that appellee show ed appell ants had po s s ess ion of appellee ’ s data , which was entitled to trade

- s ecr et protection , and were ac tively using data to co mpete with appellee ,
“ the trial court ’ s findings about appellants ’ possession and use of [appellee ’ s] helicopter blade information cons titute a re a s on that [appellee] would be harmed without injunctive re lief. ” ); Khaledi v. H.K. G lob al Trading, Ltd. , 126 S .W.3d 273, 280 (Tex. App

. — San Antonio 2003, no pet.) ( holding i njunction sufficient when it stated former busines s partner ’ s cond uct pr evented plaintiffs “from realizin g the significant loan v alues in [] u niqu e properties” and sig nif icantly impaired their ability to assist in paying amount owed under promi ssory note and to tender money into court ’ s registry, and that plaintiffs ’ business plan and abi lity to obt a i n f

inancing on cert ai n properties were “adv ersely affect ed in a way th at cannot be effectively m easured in dollars”) ; McGuire

- Sobrino v. TX Cannalliance LLC , No. 05

- 19

- 01261

- CV, 2020 WL 4581649, at *4 (Tex. App.

— Dallas Au g. 10, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) ( h old ing injunction g ave specific reasons for issuance by s tating appell ant wrongly exercised cont rol over appellee ’s m ailing list , used appellee ’s confidential client lists for his own benefit , used appellee ’s

name for his own promo tional purposes , and us e d ap pellee ’s digital assets for unauthorize d promotion of content )

. 19 Vop ak and ITC are stora ge and transport businesses. Intercont inental Terminal s Co
., LLC v. Vo

p a k N. Am., In c. , 354 S. W.3 d 887 , 890 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.)

.21

inj unction “ impermissibly alter [ ed] the status q u o ” and wa s not supported by

evidence of “ probabl e , imm i nent , and irreparable harm and a probabl e r ight to

recove r

. ” Id

. Th e trial court ’ s injunction in Intercontinental Terminal s concluded

tha t t he harm to V o pak “ was imminent ‘ be cause [ITC ’ s] c a r restrictions are
continuing and an emba rgo, one of wh i ch has already been entered providing
Vopak ’ s customers from ship ping cars to Vopak , will likely occur again. ’ ” Id. at

894

. T h e tr ial court furth er concluded that “ITC ’ s restrictions threaten to ca u se

and will probably cause at least the f ollowing harm t o Vopak: business disruption,
loss of goodwill, loss of reputatio n in the marketplace, customer uncertainty,
delays in servicing doc k/sea customers , b acklog costs, [and] d emurrage fees [.]” Id.

at 8 9 5

. T his ex planation provides significant ly m ore detail than the t emporary

i njunction issued against Beachsiders , w hich d oes not state the reasons for its

issuance , other than stating in conclu sory fashi on and without more that

Beachsiders “ has conducted bu si ness operations which have inter fered with

P laintiff ’ s priv ate use and e njoyment of his residenc e. ” We thus find

Int ercontinental Terminals inappos ite.

The Vaughan s also argue the t emporary i njuncti o n c omplies with Rule 683

b ecause it states the trial court reached its conclusion “ bas ed on Appellee Eric
Vaughan ’ s testimony an d other evidence presented at th e temporary i njuncti on hearing

. ” But “[p] leadings and testimony do not satisfy the requirement th at the22

t emporary injunction order must state the rea sons f or its iss uance. ” Courtlandt

Place Historical Found. v. Doerner , 76 8 S.W.2d 924, 925 (Tex. App.

— Houston
[1st Dis t.] 1989, no writ ) ( ordering dissolution of temporary injunction that lacked

reaso ns for its issuance even though applicant contended he ple d and introduced
evidence supporting issuance ) ; see also Moreno v. Baker Tools, Inc. , 808 S.W.2d
208, 211 (Tex. App.

— Hous ton [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ) (same); Groun ds v. First

Grou ndRock Royalties, LL C , 629 S.W.3d 674, 677 ( Tex. App.

— S a n Antonio
2021, no pet.) (same). Thus, a ny testimon y elicited and exh ibits a dmitted at the

temporary injunction hearing cannot make up for the t e mporary i n j unction ’s failure

to include speci fic re ason s for its issuanc e

. See H ome Asset, Inc. v. MPT of Vic t ory

Lakes F cer, LLC , No. 01

- 22

- 00441

- CV, 2023 W L 3183322 at *2 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1 st Dist.] 20 23 , no pet.) (mem. op.) ( “ [ W ] e cannot affirm a temporary

injunction order that doe s not comply with Rule 683 on the ground th at th e trial

court nonetheless ma de a reasonable decision based on the underlying facts of the

case

. ” )

.
Because the t emporary i njunctio n fails to comply with the require ments of

Rule 683 , we concl u de t he order is void and must be dissolved

. 20

20 Because of our disposition , it is not necessary to address Beachsiders ’ re mai ning issues

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 47.1

.23 Conclusion

We declare the t emporary i njunctio n or der void, dissolve the injun ction, and

remand the case to the trial court fo r further procee dings. 21 We dir ect the clerk of

this C our t to is s ue the mandate immediately. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 18.6

.

V eronic a R iv as

- M oll oy J u s tice

P anel co nsi sts of C h ief J ustice Adams and Just ices Landau an d R i v as

- Moll oy

.

21 This dissoluti on is without pr ejud ice as to fu t u re relief the parties may s eek.