OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

ANA Garrison at Gamberi Appears Well Built Overall but

Some Construction Issues Need to Be Addressed  

April 30, 2010

SIGAR Audit‐10‐10  Contract Performance and Oversight
SIGAR Audit‐10‐10 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page i 

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

April 30, 2010

General David Petraeus, USA  

Commander, U.S. Central Command  

General Stanley A. McChrystal  

Commander, U.S. Forces‐Afghanistan, and  

  Commander, International Security Assistance Force  

Lieutenant General Robert L. Van Antwerp

U.S. Army Chief of Engineers and  

  Commanding General of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers  

Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV

Commanding General, NATO Training Mission‐Afghanistan/

  Combined Security Transition Command‐Afghanistan

This report discusses the results of a performance audit of four firm fixed‐price contracts currently

valued at $129.8 million for the construction of the Afghanistan National Army garrison at Gamberi in

Laghman Province.  It includes four recommendations for the U.S. Commanding General of U.S. Army

Corps of Engineers to address construction issues observed at the site.  

A summary of this report is on page ii.  This performance audit was conducted by the Office of the

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction under the authority of Public Law No. 110‐181

and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended.  When preparing the final report, we considered

comments from the U.S. army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and the NATO Training Mission‐

Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command‐Afghanistan (NTM‐A/CSTC‐A).  In their comments,

USACE concurred with the recommendations and NTM‐A/CSTC‐A concurred with the findings of the

report.  Copies of the comments are included in appendices II and III of this report.   

John Brummet

Assistant Inspector General for Audits

Office of the Special Inspector General  

      for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SIGAR Audit‐10‐10 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page ii 

                                                                    Special inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction  

i

.

`

  

What SIGAR Reviewed  

One objective of coalition efforts in Afghanistan is to build the country’s capacity to provide for its own security by training and

equipping the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Current requirements call for the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) to grow

from 103,475, as of June 2009, to almost 172,000 by October 2011. As a result, additional facilities will be needed to train, base,

and house the Afghan forces. The NATO Training Mission‐Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command‐Afghanistan (NTM‐

A/CSTC‐A), through the Afghanistan National Security Forces Fund, is providing $129.8 million for four firm fixed‐price contracts to

establish an ANA garrison in Gamberi, Laghman Province, in eastern Afghanistan. Large enough to house 4,000 personnel, the

garrison is being built in four phases and with a training range.  Contracts for Phases I and II were awarded to DynCorp LLC, Inc.,

Phase III was awarded to BYA Inc, and the weapons training range was awarded to Lakeshore Engineering. Phase IV has not been

awarded at this time.  The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Afghanistan Engineer District‐North (AED‐North) provides

program management and oversight of construction. This report addresses the contracts’ cost, schedule, and outcome; oversight;

and the sustainment of the Gamberi garrison. To accomplish these objectives, we reviewed all contracts, statements of work,

modifications, and contract files for the garrison. We examined criteria and guidance in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)

and the AED District Level Quality Assurance Plan for Construction, dated December 15, 2008.  We interviewed officials from NTM‐

A/CSTC‐A and AED‐North, as well as the prime contractors. We performed a site inspection of the garrison from February 1‐4,

2010. We conducted our work in Kabul, Afghanistan, and Washington, D.C., from November 2009 to April 2010 in accordance with

generally accepted government auditing standards.   

                          SIGAR    Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

What SIGAR Found  

Phases I, II, and the training range of the Gamberi garrison are behind schedule while Phase III is ahead of schedule.  All phases of

the garrison are scheduled to be completed by September 2010, with some increases in cost because AED‐North exercised certain

contract options. Our inspection of the garrison indicated that it appeared to be well constructed; however, poor flood control

measures, including a drainage channel that may fill with silt, and inadequate site grading may not provide significant protection

against future flooding. Additionally, the structural integrity of a bridge near the garrison entrance needs to be addressed, and the

training range needs to be secured.

Before September 2009, AED‐North provided limited oversight for the garrison due to security issues; however, AED personnel have

since provided management and oversight, as required by the FAR and USACE requirements. AED‐North issued DynCorp two

interim unsatisfactory ratings for Phases I and II due to delays, primarily because DynCorp was slow to recognize problems with

subcontractors and take action to address them.

NTM‐A/CSTC‐A officials stated that they were unaware of any planning documents or justification for the garrison that addressed

the strategic deployment of troops, garrisons, locations, or operations. Planning reports we reviewed did not address these

matters. Without an updated strategy that reflects current ANSF requirements, NTM‐A/CSTC‐A runs the risk of building facilities

that do not meet ANA needs. NTM‐A/CSTC‐A is developing a process to determine if the requirements for a garrison or other

infrastructure are the same or have changed. NTM‐A/CSTC‐A officials stated that the government of Afghanistan does not have the

financial or technical capacity to sustain ANSF facilities once they are completed. Current plans call for all ANSF facilities to be

turned over to the Afghanistan government by 2013 for operations and maintenance.  

SIGAR Audit‐10‐10               April 2010

ANA Garrison at Gamberi Appears Well Built

Overall but Some Construction Issues Need

to Be Addressed

What SIGAR Recommends  

To ensure the quality of the construction at the Gamberi garrison, we recommend that the U.S.

Commanding General, USACE, direct AED‐North to (1) mitigate silt accumulation in the anti‐

vehicle and flood control trench, (2) ensure that the site is properly graded, (3) repair the

bridge near the main entrance of the garrison, and (4) secure the weapons training range.   

In response to a draft of this report, USACE concurred with SIGAR’s recommendations.

Photo: Anti‐Vehicle and Flood

Control Trench, Feb. 2010

For more information contact: SIGAR Public affairs at (703) 602‐8742 or PublicAffairs@sigar.mil
SIGAR Audit‐10‐10 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page iii 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background                     2 

Phases I, II, and Training Range Are Not Within the Original Schedule; Phase III  

          Is Ahead of Schedule                                                                                                                      5

Contract Management and Oversight Meet U.S. and Contract Requirements                        13     

NTM‐A/CSTC‐A Lacks Overall Planning for ANSF Facilities but Is Developing a Process to

         Meet Changing Requirements and Provide for Sustainment                                                  16

Conclusions 18

Recommendations 18

Comments 18

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 20

Appendix II:  Comments from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 22

Appendix III: Comments from NATO Training Mission‐Afghanistan/Combined Security  

         Transition Command‐Afghanistan                                                                                                  26

TABLES

Table 1: Completion Dates and Award Amounts for the Gamberi ANA Garrison 5

Table 2: Modifications to Contract W917PM‐08‐C‐0009, Phase I                                                          6

Table 3: Modifications to Contract W917PM‐08‐C‐0076, Phase II                                                         7

Table 4: Modifications to Contract W917PM‐09‐C‐0052, Phase III 8

Table 5: Modifications to Contract W917PM‐09‐C‐0047, Training Range   8

FIGURES AND PHOTOS

Figure 1: Map of Provinces in Afghanistan                                                                                                             3

Figure 2: Master Plan of Gamberi ANA Garrison                                                                                                   4

Photo 1: Proper Concrete Curing Technique at the Gamberi ANA Garrison                 9

Photo 2: K‐span Building Properly Installed at the Gamberi ANA Garrison                10

Photo 3: Anti‐Vehicle and Flood Control Trench at the Gamberi ANA Garrison               11

Photo 4: Grading at the Gamberi ANA Garrison that May Result in Poor Drainage                         11

Photo 5: Bridge Near Entrance of the Gamberi ANA Garrison                   12

Photo 6: Exposed Reinforcement Bars on Underside of Culvert Deck over Drainage Ditch                    12

Photo 7: Terrain of the Gamberi ANA Training Range                      13
SIGAR Audit‐10‐10 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page iv 

ACRONYMS

AED‐North    Afghanistan Engineer District‐North

ANA     Afghanistan National Army

ANSF     Afghanistan National Security Forces

COR     Contracting Officer Representative

FAR     Federal Acquisition Regulation

MOD     Ministry of Defense

NTM‐A/CSTC‐A    NATO Training Mission‐Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition    

                                                 Command‐ Afghanistan

RE     Resident Engineer

SIGAR     Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

USACE     U. S. Army Corps of Engineers
SIGAR Audit‐10‐10 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 1 

ANA Garrison at Gamberi Appears Well Built Overall but Some Construction

Issues Need to Be Addressed

One objective of coalition efforts in Afghanistan is to build the country’s capacity to provide for its own

security by training and equipping the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). 1

  In 2001, the Bonn

Agreement initially set troop levels for the Afghan National Army (ANA) at 50,000.  New requirements

called for the ANA to grow from 103,475, as of June 2009, to 171,600 by October 2011.  As a result of

these increases, additional facilities will be needed to train, base, and house the Afghan forces.  Through

fiscal year 2009, $29.2 billion has been appropriated for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, which

provides the funding to train, equip, and sustain the ANSF.  

The ANA garrison at Gamberi will house 4,000 personnel, the largest ANA presence in Laghman

Province.  The NATO Training Mission‐Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command‐Afghanistan

(NTM‐A/CSTC‐A)2 is providing $129.8 million to construct the first three of four phases, as well as a

training range.  The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Afghanistan Engineer District‐North (AED‐

North)3 awarded two firm fixed‐price contracts for program management and oversight of Phases I and

II to DynCorp International LLC, a third firm fixed‐price contract for Phase III to BYA Inc., and a fourth

firm fixed‐price contract for the training range to Lakeshore Engineering Services. As of April 23, 2010,

NTM‐A/CSTC‐A had not awarded a contract for Phase IV.  This report addresses (1) whether the Gamberi

garrison was constructed within the terms of the contracts, including schedule and cost; 4 (2) whether

USACE oversight of the Gamberi garrison construction was conducted in accordance with the Federal

Acquisition Regulation (FAR), USACE requirements, and oversight provisions of the contract; and (3)

what NTM‐A/CSTC‐A’s overall justification for the garrison was and what plans it has for sustainment of

ANSF facilities.   

                                                           

1 ANSF includes the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police.

  

2 NTM‐A/CSTC‐A operates with a single commander for both the U.S.‐led CSTC‐A and NATO. The mission provides

training for the ANA, including defense colleges and academies, develops doctrine, and trains and mentors the

Afghan police.

3 AED officially divided into two sections on August 3, 2009. AED‐South handles construction in Regional

Commands South and West, and AED‐North handles construction in Capital Region and Regional Commands North

and East.

4

Firm fixed‐price contracts provide for a price that is not subject to any adjustment on the basis of the contractor’s

cost experience in performing the contract. This contract type places upon the contractor maximum risk and full

responsibility for all costs and resulting profit or loss. Firm fixed‐price contracts require the contractor to deliver

services within an agreed‐upon schedule and cost to the United States. Throughout this report, we refer to “cost”

as the cost to NTM‐A/CSTC‐A to provide this garrison.  
SIGAR Audit‐10‐10 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 2 

To accomplish these objectives, we reviewed all contracts, statements of work, modifications, and the

contract files for the Gamberi garrison.5

  We examined criteria and guidance in the FAR and the AED

District‐Level Quality Assurance Plan for Construction, dated December 15, 2008.  We interviewed

officials from NTM‐A/CSTC‐A, AED‐North, DynCorp International LLC, BYA Inc., and Lakeshore

Engineering Services, and conducted a site inspection of the Gamberi garrison during February 1‐4,

2010.  We conducted our work in Afghanistan and Washington, D.C., from November 2009 to April 2010

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Appendix I presents a more

detailed discussion of our scope and methodology.  This report is one in a series of Special Inspector

General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) performance audits that examines contract cost,

schedule, and outcome; oversight; and sustainment of reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan.   

BACKGROUND  

NTM‐A/CTSC‐A, in partnership with the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the

international community, plans and implements reforms of the ANSF to develop a stable Afghanistan,

strengthen rule of law, and defeat terrorism within its borders. NTM‐A/CSTC‐A provides advisors,

mentors, and trainers to the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior.  NTM‐A/CSTC‐A is

providing $129.8 million for the construction contracts awarded to date for the Gamberi ANA garrison in

Laghman Province in eastern Afghanistan.   See figure 1 for a map of the provinces in Afghanistan.   

                                                           

5 A contract modification as defined by the FAR is a minor change in the details of a provision or clause that is

specifically authorized by the FAR and does not alter the substance of the provision or clause.  
SIGAR Audit‐10‐10 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 3 

Figure 1: Map of Provinces in Afghanistan  

Source: SIGAR, April 23, 2010.  

The Gamberi ANA garrison will be home to 3 infantry battalions, or about 4,000 ANA soldiers and 250

U.S. soldiers who will be embedded at the garrison.  Construction of the 1 kilometer by 1 kilometer base

has been broken into four phases, along with a weapons training range.  As shown in figure 2, the

master plan details the four phases, which include:  

 Phase I – barracks, storage facilities, dining facility, and embedded training team compound6

constructed for both the ANA soldiers and the embedded U.S. training team.

 Phase II – barracks and battalion headquarters building, and communication and electrical

distribution system, were constructed for both the ANA soldiers and the embedded U.S. training

team.

                                                           

6 The embedded training team compound will house U.S. soldiers who work with the ANA battalions. According to

USACE, the construction of this compound is not supposed to be funded through ASFF, as the use of those funds is

restricted for the training, equipping, and sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces. During the course of

this review, SIGAR requested clarification from NTM‐A/CSTC‐A on the source of funds used to pay for the

construction of the compound.   
SIGAR Audit‐10‐10 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 4 

 Phase III – three bachelor officers barracks, six enlisted open‐bay barracks, battalion headquarters,

arms storage, general warehouse storage, and a motor pool for a Corps Support Battalion.

 Phase IV – facilities for the 201st Corps headquarters (to be awarded).

Figure 2: Master Plan of Gamberi ANA Garrison  

Source: USACE, February 2, 2010.   

The ANA training range, which is not depicted in figure 2, will consist of eight ranges, related roads, and

support facilities.
SIGAR Audit‐10‐10 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 5 

PHASES I, II, AND THE TRAINING RANGE ARE NOT WITHIN THE ORIGINAL SCHEDULE; PHASE III

IS AHEAD OF SCHEDULE 

The first three phases of the Gamberi ANA garrison and the training range are currently scheduled to be

completed by September 2010 with an increase of $3.3 million in cost because AED‐North exercised

certain options7 in the contracts.  The garrison appears to be well‐constructed but we found some issues

with construction quality, including poor flood control measures and potential problems with water

drainage, inadequate grading, a deteriorating bridge, and potential difficulties securing the weapons

training range.  Table 1 shows the status of the cost and schedule for the garrison’s three phases and the

training range.  

Table 1: Completion Dates and Award Amounts for the Gamberi ANA Garrison

Phase

Original

Completion

Date

Current

Completion

Date

Original

Award

Amount

Current

Award

Amount

Percentage

Completea

I Sept. 27, 2008 Sept. 1, 2010 $49.2 million $50.5 millionb

99

II June 17, 2009 July 1, 2010 $40.0 million $41.1 millionc

66

III Sept. 5, 2010 Sept. 5, 2010 $26.8 million $26.8 million 30

Training

Range

July 4, 2010 Aug. 17, 2010 $10.5 million $11.4 milliond

22

Source: SIGAR analysis of contract, modifications, notices to proceed, and Resident Management System reports.

Notes:   a

Percentages are as of April 8, 2010. b Original award amount increased $1.3 million because AED‐North exercised options to pave the entrance road

and upgrade the wastewater treatment plant. c Original award amount increased $1.1 million because AED‐North exercised options and made changes in the

scope of work.   d

Original award amount increased $900,000 because AED‐North exercised an option to demine the training range.

                                                           

7 Options are line items identified in the original contract as additions that may be included in the contract at the

request of the contracting authority.  Options are exercised by means of a contract modification.
SIGAR Audit‐10‐10 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 6 

Phase I Is Behind Schedule and Costs Have Increased Due to Additions to the Contract  

The completion date of Phase I of the Gamberi garrison was originally September 27, 2008; was

extended until November 5, 2008; and is now August 27, 2010, according to an AED‐North official.  AED‐

North awarded Phase I to DynCorp International LLC on November 24, 2007, for $49.2 million.  AED‐

North issued seven modifications to the contract resulting in cost increases of almost $1.3 million,

including options to pave the entrance road to the garrison and upgrade the wastewater treatment

plant.  Table 2 summarizes the modifications to the contract.  

Table 2: Modifications to Contract W917PM‐08‐C‐0009, Phase I

Modification Date Signed Purpose Cost/Schedule

Change

P00001 Dec. 5, 2007 Exercised option to pave

entrance road

Cost increased by

more than $797,000

P00002 Jan. 6, 2008 Changed description of

contract line item  

No change

P00003 Apr. 19, 2008 Upgraded electrical system No change

P00004 July 25, 2008 Included FAR Clause 52.246‐

12, inspection of construction

to the contract

No change

A00001 Jan. 19, 2009 Exchanged evaporative

coolers  

No change  

A00002 Aug. 23, 2009 Extended contract   Completion date

extended to Nov. 5,

2008  

A00003 Oct. 29, 2009 Upgraded wastewater

treatment plant

Cost increased by

about $495,000

Source: SIGAR analysis of contract, modifications, notices to proceed, and Resident Management System reports.

According to an AED document as of April 8, 2010, Phase I was 99 percent complete.  Additionally, AED‐

North had made payments of more than $50 million toward the total contract cost of Phase I.  Because

DynCorp did not meet the terms of the contract’s schedule, however, certain monetary damages8 may

be assessed at the completion of Phase I.  At that point, AED‐North and DynCorp will determine the final

amount of damages that DynCorp may have to provide to AED‐North. As of April 8, 2010, the amount

set aside for potential damages was more than $1.6 million.  

                                                           

8 These damages are called liquidated damages and are the amount the contracting officer designates during the

formation of a contract for the government to collect as compensation upon a specific breach (e.g., late

performance).
SIGAR Audit‐10‐10 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 7 

Phase II Is Behind Schedule, with Increased Costs Due to Changes in Scope of Work

AED‐North awarded the Phase II contract to DynCorp International LLC on August 7, 2008, for

$40 million.  The notice to proceed gave an initial completion date of June 17, 2009, and the contract

was extended to January 21, 2010; however, according to an AED document, the anticipated completion

date for Phase II is now July 1, 2010.  AED‐North issued five modifications to Phase II resulting in

increased costs of more than $1.1 million.  AED‐North provided one modification that was not

numbered and changed the location of several buildings.  The initial completion date for Phase II was

extended until January 21, 2010; however, Phase II was not complete as of this date.  Table 3

summarizes the contract modifications.

Table 3: Modifications to Contract W917PM‐08‐C‐0076, Phase II

Modification Date Signed Purpose Cost/Schedule

Change

Modification, not assigned

number

Aug. 26, 2009 Changed location of several

buildings and the motor pool  

Modified existing and new

utility construction

Contract increased

by almost $79,000

Completion date

extended to Aug. 19,

2009   

A00001 Jul. 22, 2009 Extended contract due to

delays in May 2009

Completion date

extended to Jun. 18,

2009  

P00001 Jul. 30, 2009 Changed scope of work to

provide asphalt on gravel

roads

Completion date extended

Contract increased

by more than

$624,000   

Completion date

extended to Jul. 20,

2009

A00003 Sept. 30, 2009 Changed scope of work to

expand the medical clinic at

the garrison  

Completion date extended

Contract increased

by about $400,000

Completion date

extended to Jan. 21,

2010

A00002 Oct. 21, 2009 Extended contract due to

USACE delay during

modification process

Completion date

extended to Sept.

23, 2009  

Source: SIGAR analysis of contract, modifications, notices to proceed, and Resident Management System reports.
SIGAR Audit‐10‐10 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 8 

According to AED‐North, as of April 8, 2010, Phase II was 66 percent complete.  Additionally, AED has

made payments of more than $27 million toward the total contract cost of Phase II.  Because DynCorp

did not meet the schedule, it may be assessed damages at the end of Phase II.  

Phase III Is Ahead of Schedule with No Cost Increases

Phase III is currently ahead of schedule.  AED‐North awarded Phase III to BYA Inc. on June 9, 2009, for

over $26.8 million; the notice to proceed required a completion date for certain work items by May 8,

2010.  The entire project is to be completed by September 5, 2010.  AED‐North issued one modification

for Phase III with no increase to costs or schedule.  Table 4 summarizes the contract modification.  

Table 4: Modification to Contract W917PM‐09‐C‐0052, Phase III

Modification Date Purpose Cost/Schedule

Change

P00001 Jun. 16, 2009 Modified the technical

requirements under the contract  

No change

Source: SIGAR analysis of contract, modifications, notices to proceed, and Resident Management System reports.

As of April 8, 2010, Phase III was 30 percent complete, with more than $8 million in payments made

toward the total cost of the contract.  

Training Range Is Behind Schedule with Some Cost Increases  

The training range is currently behind schedule.  AED‐North awarded the construction of the training

range to Lakeshore Engineering Services, Inc., on June 9, 2009, for $10.5 million.  The notice to proceed

required the project to be completed by July 4, 2010.  AED‐North issued two modifications for the

training range that resulted in increased costs of almost $900,000 to demine the range.  Additionally,

the completion date for the range was extended until August 17, 2010. Table 5 provides information on

the contract modifications.  

Table 5: Modifications to Contract W917PM‐09‐C‐0047, Training Range  

Modification Date Purpose Cost/Schedule

Change

A00001 Sept.. 20, 2009 AED‐North required

contractor to include quality

control requirements and

specifications to the contract  

No change

P00001 Dec. 14, 2009 Required contractor to

demine the range  

Cost increased by

$859,014, and

extended until Aug.

17, 2010

Source: SIGAR analysis of contract, modifications, notices to proceed, and Resident Management System reports.
SIGAR Audit‐10‐10 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 9 

As of April 8, 2010, the training range was 22 percent complete.   AED has made payments of more than

$2.2 million toward the total cost of the contract.  

The Garrison Appears Well Built although It Has Some Quality Assurance Issues

We conducted a site inspection of the Gamberi garrison during February 1‐4, 2010, and found that it

appeared to be well constructed.  The concrete for the foundations of buildings and the K‐span

prefabricated buildings was installed according to standards.9

  Additionally, we observed proper quality

control methods used by the subcontractors at the garrison.  However, we found some issues with

construction quality, including poor flood control measures, inadequate grading, and a deteriorating

bridge, as well as potential difficulties securing the weapons training range.  

Proper Quality Control Methods Were Used at the Garrison

Overall, we found the site was well maintained and had no obvious constuction issues.  We observed

that proper quality control methods were used at the garrison, specifically with regard to the installation

of concrete and K‐span structures.  For example, for concrete to be installed properly and structurally

sound, it must be “cured” or hydrated and then covered with burlap and visqueen to solidify, according

to contract requirements.  The proper hydration of concrete is key to achieving maximum compressive

strength, particularly in an arid environment such as Afghanistan.  

We observed the contractor using proper concrete curing techniques, as shown in photo 1.  It is not

unusual to observe these curing techniques on building slabs or exposed finish grade concrete, but they

are rarely used for concrete drainages or foundations.

Photo 1: Proper Concrete Curing Techniques at the Gamberi ANA Garrison

Source: SIGAR, February 2, 2010.

Additionally, we observed that the K‐span structures for Phases I and II were constructed with no visible

imperfections.  The K‐span buildings we examined had the roofs and walls attached.  We examined the

                                                           

9 K‐spans are pre‐engineered structures that are designed to be erected in the shortest time possible.   
SIGAR Audit‐10‐10 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 10 

ceilings and did not observe any visible defects such as buckling or inferior welds.  Photo 2 shows a K‐

span building.

Photo 2: K‐span Building Properly Installed at the Gamberi ANA Garrison

Source: SIGAR, February 2, 2010.  

Further, during the course of the site inspection, we observed the contractor performing numerous

quality control tests for Phase III.  For example, in the areas where fill material was placed, we observed

subcontractors performing sand cone density tests, which are required for determining the density of

soil and gravel.  We observed that the tests were performed at more than adequate intervals of

approximately 50 feet along the road under construction.  In addition, we observed the excavation and

preparation of the foundation for an enlisted barracks.  Onsite survey crews were monitoring the

foundation excavations, which appeared precisely laid out and excavated.  We also observed that the

bottom of the excavation had been swept clean.  In addition, we observed a cone density test

performed on the footing to ensure that the soil was capable of bearing the pressure placed upon it.   

Some Construction Quality Issues at the Garrison Need to Be Addressed

We observed some issues with the quality of construction, concerning water drainage, site grading, and

securing the training range at the garrison.  Regarding drainage, AED‐North rejected DynCorp’s intial

flood control design for Phases I and II because the plan called for water to drain to a dry river bed

(wadi) that ran through the the garrison and under the walls securing the base, which presented a

security risk.  In August 2009, the garrison experienced major flooding, and AED‐North and DynCorp are

currently attempting to implement flood control measures by digging an anti‐vehicle and flood control  

trench on the outside of the garrison walls that will divert storm water runoff around the project (see

photo 3).  The channel will also serve as a barrier to vehicles approaching the garrison.  We observed

that, due to the size of the channel, silt will build up over time, limiting the amount of water that can be

diverted.  Thus, unless the ditch is maintained, this measure may not provide significant protection

against future flooding.  
SIGAR Audit‐10‐10 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 11 

Photo 3: Anti‐Vehicle and Flood Control Trench at the Gamberi ANA Garrison  

Source: SIGAR, February 2, 2010.

Further, poor grading at the construction site may result in drainage problems around some buildings.

Sound construction practices dictate that soil grading should begin on the low end of a construction site

and progress to the higher elevations to allow interim storm water runoff to drain completely off the

project.  We observed that the finished grade of the streets in the project are significantly higher than

adjacent building slabs at several locations throughout the site, as shown in photo 4. The poor grading

design will likely result in the accumulation of water around the structure.  If not addressed, a significant

rainfall could cause flooding.    

Photo 4: Grading at the Gamberi ANA Garrison that May Result in Poor Drainage

Source: SIGAR, February 2, 2010.

AED‐North personnel expressed concern about the structural integrity of a bridge located on the access

road to the garrison’s main gate.  The bridge consists of a reinforced concrete deck, approximately 8 to

10 inches thick, supported by stone masonry walls on each side of a drainage ditch (see photo 5).  AED‐
SIGAR Audit‐10‐10 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 12 

North personnel were concerned that the deck of the culvert could collapse under the weight of heavily

armored vehicles and construction traffic.   

Photo 5: Bridge Near Entrance of the Gamberi ANA Garrison

Source: SIGAR, February 3, 2010.

Although the stone masonry walls appeared to be in good condition, the deck of the culvert is poorly

constructed reinforced concrete.  Due to improper concrete placement, the reinforcement bars on the

underside of the concrete deck have inadequate contact with the concrete for proper strength and are

exposed to the elements.  The reinforcement bars showed signs of corrosion, as shown in photo 6.  

Because of these problems, the strength of the deck is severely degraded and may collapse under heavy

traffic.   

Photo 6: Exposed Reinforcement Bars on Underside of Culvert Deck over Drainage Ditch

Source: SIGAR, February 3, 2010.

According to the Lakeshore Engineering Services Inc. project manager, the weapons training range,

which is 2.2 kilometers by 1.75 kilometers, will be fenced in to provide security for the training range by

keeping local people from entering, including nomads who graze their animals in the area.  We observed

that the construction of a continuous fence around the area, as planned, will be a challenge due to the

rugged terrain.  The project manager noted that the nomads had already removed the survey markers
SIGAR Audit‐10‐10 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 13 

from the site, which may delay installation of the fence.  Photo 7 illustrates the terrain on which the

range is located.  

Photo 7: Terrain of the Gamberi ANA Garrison Training Range  

Source: SIGAR, February 4, 2010.  

CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT MEET U.S. AND CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS

Since September 2009, AED personnel have provided management and oversight for Phases I, II, and III,

and the training range, as required by the FAR and USACE internal requirements.  Prior to that time,

AED‐North was unable to provide daily oversight for the project because of the difficulty of getting to

the site due to security issues.  AED‐North hired local nationals to conduct oversight, but due to their

lack of training, they were unable to provide the oversight needed.  During Phases I and II, DynCorp was

issued two interim unsatisfactory ratings and but since taken correction actions, according to AED‐

North.  

AED‐North Had Some Difficulty Providing Daily Oversight before September 2009 but Has Met

Other Quality Assurance Requirements

The Gamberi resident engineer (RE), who was also the Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) for

Phase I, was located offsite and was unable to provide daily oversight over the project until September

2009, when the RE moved to the construction site.  AED‐North met other quality assurance

requirements such as completing quality assurance and quality control reports, organizing contract files

according to the AED quality assurance plan, and documenting progress payments made to contractors.
SIGAR Audit‐10‐10 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 14 

The RE began providing daily oversight of the project in September 2009. USACE guidance10 states that

the RE, who often serves as the COR or the designated authorized representative of the contracting

officer,11 is required to manage the USACE area office, provide guidance on implementing an effective

quality assurance program, train resident office staff, and execute the mission successfully.  Before

September 2009, due to security issues, the RE had to commute from Forward Operating Base Hughie,

about an hour away, to the garrison to conduct site visits.  To provide the daily oversight needed, the RE

employed local national quality assurance representatives to ensure that the contractor’s work

complied with the terms of the contract.  However, according to the RE, the local national

representatives had limited quality assurance experience and were not well versed in building

standards.  Because the RE was not onsite and the local nationals were inexperienced, some quality

assurance issues were not addressed.  Now that the RE and the COR assigned to Phases II, III, and the

training range are on site, they hold biweekly quality assurance training programs with their local

national representatives to train them to conduct proper quality assurance.  The RE and COR may meet

more than once a week with the contractor if issues arise.  The COR for Phases II, III, and the training

range stated that he addresses issues with the contractors as they arise and holds weekly meetings with

the prime contractors. We reviewed the training certificates of the AED‐North personnel assigned as

CORs and resident engineer and found that they had received the required training.   

According to USACE guidance, contract files must be organized to provide the history of the contract to

in‐coming personnel; this contributes to continuity of oversight of contractor performance.  At the AED‐

North offices in Gamberi, we reviewed the contract files for Phases I, II, III, and the training range and

found they contained the documents that the AED quality assurance plan deem essential for proper

oversight.  The files also were organized in the manner required by the the AED quality assurance  plan.  

Finally, SIGAR found that progress payments made to the contractors for the four contracts were

documented properly.  According to the FAR, the COR is responsible for reviewing payment vouchers

submitted by the contractor and for approving the payments.  We found that AED‐North personnel

meet monthly with the contractor to mutually agree upon the percentage of completed work that

would be acceptable by the contractor and the COR for that month.  The contractor then submits the

request for payment to the COR for processing.  The alternate contracting officer reviews and approves

the payment request.  The Contracting Officer authorizes the final payment.  

DynCorp Was Issued Two Unsatisfactory Ratings Due to Delays on Phases I and II, but

Corrective Actions Have Been Taken

AED‐North issued DynCorp two unsatisfactory ratings for Phases I and II due to delays.  The

unsatisfactory rating for Phase I, dated February, 6, 2009, stated that DynCorp had replaced one

program and two project managers since the start of construction, which caused the project to slip

further behind.  Further, DynCorp did not manage key personnel changes to ensure continuity.  

                                                           

10 The USACE AED District‐Level Quality Assurance Plan for Construction, dated December 15, 2008, and the FAR

were the primary reference documents we reviewed to assess quality assurance requirements.  

11 The COR has the authority to take all actions related to contract administration with the exception of obligating

the payment of money by the government or authorizing a change in contract performance or completion time.
SIGAR Audit‐10‐10 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 15 

Additionally, DynCorp failed to properly manage, control, and coordinate with subcontractors.12   

DynCorp also failed to replace subcontractors before they were released and terminated, which delayed

the project.  DynCorp responded to the interim unsatisfactory rating for Phase I acknowledging a lack of

effective management during Phase I’s initial performance period.  DynCorp initiated several remedial

actions before the rating was issued that included replacing the program manager.  

The unsatisfactory rating for Phase II, dated May 3, 2009, stated that DynCorp was unable to commit

sufficient resources and personnel to the project.  Further, DynCorp failed to adequately locate and

manage a sufficient number of subcontractors to commence work.  AED‐North considered terminating

Phase II for default, but after a meeting between AED‐North and DynCorp, they agreed to continue the

project.  In responding to the interim unsatisfactory rating for Phase II, DynCorp stated that it had begun

several corrective actions to address the assertions AED‐North had made.  For example, DynCorp stated

that it had changed its project management staff, created open communications with project officials,

and implemented a new subcontracting plan and new process to ensure that subcontractors were

qualified to perform the work required.  

The DynCorp program manager stated that there were a number of reasons DynCorp fell behind

schedule.  During the past year, DynCorp’s workforce was reduced when Pakistani workers employed as

subcontractors returned to Pakistan, and Afghanistan authorities did not allow them to re‐enter the

country. DynCorp also experienced problems obtaining materials.  For example, according to the

DynCorp program manager, the Afghanistan National Police wanted illegal payments to allow materials

to come through on the roads.  The Afghanistan customs office and police prevented the movement of

materials such as pre‐engineered metal buildings, insulation, and windows through the Pakistan border,

which caused delays.  Furthermore, according to the DynCorp program manager, DynCorp has had

difficulties accelerating work to make up for lost time.  After DynCorp fired one of the subcontractors,

the garrison was attacked in January 2010.  For safety reasons, the garrison now keeps its lights out

from dusk to dawn, and DynCorp cannot work multiple shifts to increase the pace of construction.   

According to the RE and COR, the quality of DynCorp’s management has improved.  The RE stated that,

once DynCorp’s initial program manager and other senior personnel were replaced in December 2008,

the project began to make progress.  The current DynCorp program manager stated that he meets with

the RE or the COR, usually more than once a week, and with all of the subcontractors weekly.   

According to the COR, BYA Inc. and Lakeshore Engineering Services are properly managing their

subcontractors and meet with AED regularly.  In addition, BYA meets regularly with other prime

contractors to discuss any issues that may arise with the subcontractors, according to a BYA official.

                                                           

12 We identified 17 Afghanistan subcontractors that performed work on Phases I and II.
SIGAR Audit‐10‐10 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 16 

NTM‐A/CSTC‐A LACKS OVERALL PLANNING FOR ANSF FACILITIES BUT IS DEVELOPING A

PROCESS TO MEET CHANGING REQUIREMENTS AND PROVIDE FOR SUSTAINMENT  

NTM‐A/CSTC‐A was not aware of any planning documents or justification for the garrison that provided

information on the strategic deployment of ANA troops, garrison locations, or operations.  As of

February 2010, NTM‐A/CSTC‐A officials stated that they are developing a process to capture changing

ANSF facility requirements.  In addition, because the government of Afghanistan does not have the

capacity to sustain the facilities, AED is in the process of awarding two new contracts to provide for their

operations and maintenance.  

Lack of Overall Planning for ANSF Facilities, but Process Is Being Developed to Capture

Changing Requirements  

In February 2010, NTM‐A/CSTC‐A officials stated that they were unaware of any planning documents or

justification for the garrison that provided information on the strategic deployment of ANA troops,

garrison locations, or operations.  In response to our questions, NTM‐A/CSTC‐A provided us with the

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Fiscal Year 2008, Security Forces Fund Justification for Iraq Security

Forces Fund (ISFF) and ASFF.  This funding document cited an ANA Master Plan for Facilities

Development, October 2005.   However, NTM‐A/CSTC‐A officials were not aware of this document nor

could they provide us with any other planning document that addressed this issue.13  

In addition, other planning documents we reviewed did not provide information on overall planning. For

example, the June 2008 United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces

provides details on how NTM‐A/CSTC‐A would work with MOD and Ministry of Interior to increase

management and assessment procedures for the ANSF.  Additionally, NTM‐A/CSTC‐A, in close

coordination with the government of Afghanistan, developed the Campaign Plan for the Development of

Afghan National Security Forces in September 2008.  The goals of the plan are to build and develop

ministerial institutional capability and to generate and develop the fielded forces.  However, neither of

these plans provides information on the strategic deployment of ANA troops, garrison locations, or

operations.  When we asked NTM‐A/CSTC‐A officials for overall planning or justification documents used

for the construction of the Gamberi garrison, they informed us they were not aware of any overall plans

or justification documents.  An overall planning document or justification for the Gamberi garrison and

the ANSF facilities in general is important for NTM‐A/CSTC‐A and the MOD to ensure that, as

requirements change, the initial scope can be adapted as needed and resources can be prioritized and

used effectively to achieve strategic goals.   

Without an updated strategy that reflects current ANSF requirements, NTM‐A/CSTC‐A runs the risk of

building facilities that do not meet ANA needs.  For example, a senior NTM‐A/CSTC‐A official stated that

                                                           

13 In April 2010, NTM‐A/CSTC‐A provided us a document referred to as a “Conceptual Master Plan for the ANA”

that was developed in the spring and summer of 2006.  The document addresses the mission and facility

requirements for a number of ANA command level organizations—including the Kabul Military Training Center, a

Ministry of Defense Compound, a Medical Command, an Acquisition Agency, and an Afghan National Army

Training Command.  The planning and analysis of these ANA facilities appears detailed and comprehensive.  

However, the plan provided to us does not address ANA garrisons, is not signed or dated, and is missing numerous

pages.   
SIGAR Audit‐10‐10 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 17 

it may be possible that a garrison built based on 2005 plans and perceived needs would likely have

different needs 5 years later.  He stated that NTM‐A/CSTC‐A, to address these concerns, is creating a

process to capture changing requirements of the garrisons as they move forward to help ensure that

adjustments can be made if requirements change from those originally envisioned.   

Government of Afghanistan Does Not Have the Capacity to Sustain ANSF Facilities, but the

Goal of New Contracts Is to Provide for Sustainment of Facilities and Training of Afghans  

A NTM‐A/CSTC‐A official stated that the government of Afghanistan does not have the financial or

technical capacity to sustain Gamberi or other ANSF facilities once they are completed.  Since 2002, the

United States and the international community have provided funding for sustainment of ANA facilities.  

According to the NTM‐A/CSTC‐A 2008 campaign plan, future costs of sustainment may continue through

2025.  In September 2006, AED awarded an operations and maintenance contract for $200 million to

Contrack International Inc. to provide for the sustainment of ANSF facilities.  When this current contract

expired October 15, 2009, AED exercised an option to extend the ANA contract with Contrack

International Inc. for 6 months.  Currently, Contrack International Inc. is conducting operations and

maintenance at the power plant located at the Gamberi garrison.  Cost of operations and maintenance

at Gamberi is more than $1 million.  Expenses to date have been more than $377,000.

According to the AED program manager for operations and maintenance, two new contracts for

operations and maintenance for ANSF facilities will be awarded by May 21, 2010.  These contracts will

cover ANA and ANP facilities in northern and southern Afghanistan for up to $450 million and $350

million, respectively. According to the program manager, these contracts will be for 1 base year plus 4

optional years.  These contracts will be indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contracts14 with task

orders for operations and maintenance activities written against the contracts at specific locations.  

According to the program mangager for operations and maintenance, a total of 663 sites will be covered

over the life of these contracts.  However, not all sites are completed and will be added with task orders

as warranted.  

According to the AED official program manager for operations and maintenance, the new contracts will

require a training program for Afghan workers in all aspects of operations and maintenance.  The

program will be expanded with each additional year to include all regions in Afghanistan. According to

the program manager, NTM‐A/CSTC‐A plans to transfer responsibility for all operations and

maintenance for the ANSF facilites to the government of Afghanistan by 2013.  The contractor will train

Afghans  to support these functions. The MOD will begin taking responsibility in selected locations

beginning in 2010 with all locations phased in over time.  The additional option years for the contracts

are included if the all of the ANSF facilities are not turned over by 2013.   

                                                           

14 Indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contracts may be used to acquire supplies and/or services when the exact

times and/or exact quantities of future deliveries are not known at the time of contract award. 
SIGAR Audit‐10‐10 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 18 

CONCLUSIONS

Scheduled for completion by early September 2010, the Gamberi ANA garrison and training range

appear to be well constructed.  However, we found several issues with the quality of construction at the

garrison.  A large anti‐vehicle and flood control trench on the outside of the garrison walls will divert

water around the garrison. However, as silt builds up in the channel over time, the amount of water

diverted will be limited and the channel may not protect against flooding.  Inadequate onsite grading

may result in flooding or standing water around some buildings.  In addition, a bridge near the garrison

entrance could collapse under heavy traffic as the strength of the deck has been compromised.  Finally,

the weapons training range will need to be fenced, which will be difficult due to the rugged terrain.  The

United States has paid more than $87 million out of the current contracts’ value of $129.8 million to

build this garrison in support of ANA operations in Laghman Province.  To protect U.S. investment in the

garrison and provide a functioning facility for ANA troops, the construction issues we observed at the

garrison need to be addressed.  

RECOMMENDATIONS  

To ensure the quality of the construction at the Gamberi garrison, we recommend that the U.S.

Commanding General, USACE, direct AED‐North to address the following construction issues:

1. Mitigate silt accumulation in the anti‐vehicle and flood control trench,

2. Ensure that the site is properly graded,    

3. Repair bridge near the main entrance of the garrison, and  

4. Secure the weapons training range.

COMMENTS

USACE and NTM‐A/CSTC‐A provided written comments on a draft of this report.  The comments are

reproduced in appendices II and III, respectively.  We also met with DynCorp International officials and

discussed the draft with them.

In its response, USACE stated that it concurred with the report’s recommendations.  USACE provided

some additional comments that we have incorporated into this report, as appropriate.  

NTM‐A/CSTC‐A stated that it concurred with the draft report.  It did not specifically comment on the

recommendations nor take issue with our description of current plans to provide for the operations and

maintenance of the facilities.  However, NTM‐A/CSTC‐A commented on our observation that it could not

locate any planning documents or justification for the garrison that provided information on the

strategic deployment of ANA troops, garrison locations, or operations.  NTM‐A/CSTC‐A stated that we

did not reflect the true state of NTM‐A/CSTC‐A’s operational planning.  We understand and appreciate

NTM‐A/CSTC‐A’s position, namely, that the rapid operational pace and changing ANA requirements over

the last few years cannot be understated.  We also did not question the strategic positioning of the

Gamberi garrison or whether the garrison requirements were given proper scrutiny.  Rather, we
SIGAR Audit‐10‐10 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 19 

questioned why the strategic and tactical requirements for Gamberi and other ANA garrisons had not

been more formally documented.  NTM‐A/CSTC‐A also provided a number of technical comments and

suggestions that we incorporated throughout the report, as appropriate.    

Finally, in meeting with DynCorp officials, they basically concurred with the factual information we

presented.  They noted that flood control and potential drainage issues at the construction site have

been a concern since before construction started, and they have designed a system of ditches and

culverts to mitigate the problem.  These officials also noted that DynCorp is working with AED‐North to

address the structural integrity to the bridge near the entrance to the garrison.   
SIGAR Audit‐10‐10 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 20 

APPENDIX I:  SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

This report provides the results of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan

Reconstruction’s review of the NTM‐A/CSTC‐A’s project to construct a garrison in Gamberi.  This report

addresses (1) whether the Gamberi garrison was constructed within the terms of the contract, including

schedule and cost; (2) whether USACE oversight of the Gamberi garrison construction was conducted in

accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), United States Corps of Engineers (USACE)

requirements, and oversight provisions of the contract; and (3) what NTM‐A/CSTC‐A’s overall

justification for the garrison was and what plans it has for sustainment of ANSF facilities.       

To examine contract outcomes, including schedule and cost, we met with officials from NTM‐A/CSTC‐A,

AED‐North, DynCorp international LLC, BYA Inc., Lakeshore Engineering Services and USACE. We

reviewed the contracts, statements of work, notices to proceed, and modifications for Phases I, II, III,

and the training range. We conducted a site inspection of the Gamberi ANA garrison during February 1‐

4, 2010, to observe the project and identify any quality assurance issues that AED‐North would need to

address. We used computer processed data from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Resident

Management System to determine the progress and payments made to date for each contract we

reviewed.  In addition, the Resident Management System provided information on issues and challenges

for each contract.  We verified information in the system with hard‐copy contract files.  Though the

Resident Management System had some minor errors, we determined that these data were sufficient

for the purposes of our review.

To examine the contracting process and oversight, we met with officials from NTM‐A/CSTC‐A, AED‐

North, DynCorp international LLC, BYA Inc., and Lakeshore Engineering Services.  We reviewed criteria

and guidance in the FAR and the AED District Level Quality Assurance Plan for Construction, dated

December 15, 2008, to determine if the contracting process and oversight of the contract met

requirements.  Additionally, we reviewed AED guidance to determine the roles and responsibilities for

AED personnel.  We reviewed contracts, statements of work, notices to proceed, and modifications for

the Gamberi garrison to determine if the contracting process met criteria established in USACE

guidance.  We reviewed the contract files for Gamberi to determine if the contract files were maintained

according to USACE guidance.  We reviewed and analyzed a judgmental sample of the quality assurance

reports for each contract to determine if the COR’s oversight met USACE guidance.  We reviewed

training certificates and resumes of the former and current CORs to determine if these personnel had

received required USACE training. We reviewed the progress payments obtained from AED‐North to

determine if payments made to the contract were done so in accordance with the FAR and USACE

guidance.  We reviewed the unsatisfactory ratings DynCorp received to determine the reasons for the

delays for Phases I and II.  We also identified the Afghanistan subcontractors that performed work at the

garrison.  In conducting the audit, we assessed certain internal controls pertinent to the audit objectives

regarding the administration and oversight of the contracts.  Specifically, we identified and reviewed

internal and management control procedures required by the FAR and the AED District Level Quality

Assurance Plan for Construction, dated December 15, 2008. We relied on available documents in the

contract files and analyzed these documents to determine if the internal controls for this project were

adequate.  The specific results of our review are contained in the findings sections of the report.
SIGAR Audit‐10‐10 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 21 

To examine U.S. government efforts to transfer the garrison to the government of Afghanistan and

provide for its sustainment, we met with officials from NTM‐A/CSTC‐A and AED‐North to determine

what sustainment plans the Afghanistan government has in place.  We reviewed the current operations

and maintenance contract to determine the total cost to sustain the ANSF facilities.  We also reviewed

CSTC‐A’s Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National Security Forces and the June 2008

United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces.

This report is one in a series of Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction performance

audits that examines contract cost, schedule, and outcome; oversight; and sustainment.  We conducted

work in Afghanistan, and Washington, D.C., from November 2009 to April 2010 in accordance with

generally accepted government auditing standards.  These standards require that we plan and perform

the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and

conclusions based on our audit objectives.  We believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.  The audit was conducted by the

Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction under the authority of Public Law

No. 110‐181, and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended.
SIGAR Audit‐10‐10 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 22 

APPENDIX II:  COMMENTS FROM U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS
SIGAR Audit‐10‐10 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 23 
SIGAR Audit‐10‐10 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 24 

See SIGAR

comment 1.

See SIGAR

comment 2.

See SIGAR

comment 3.

See SIGAR

comment 4.
SIGAR Audit‐10‐10 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 25 

The following are SIGAR’s comments on AED‐North’s letter dated April 23, 2010:

1. This was not discussed to the extent that AED‐North asserts.  We added language to the report to

indicate that the channel is an anti‐vehicle diversion trench.

2. This was not discussed to the extent that AED‐North asserts.

3. This was not discussed to the extent that AED‐North asserts.  Nevertheless, the bridge still needs to

be repaired even though AED‐North was in negotiations with the contractor to repair the bridge at

the time of our site inspection.  

4. This was not discussed to the extent that AED‐North asserts.  Our concern was not about installing

the fence.  Rather, we are concerned that securing the training range will be difficult due to the

rugged terrain and that the fencing could be easily breached.
SIGAR Audit‐10‐10 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 26 

APPENDIX II:  COMMENTS FROM NATO TRAINING MISSION‐AFGHANISTAN/COMBINED

SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND‐AFGHANISTAN
SIGAR Audit‐10‐10 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 27 

See SIGAR

comment 1.

See SIGAR

comment 2.

See SIGAR

comment 2.

See SIGAR

comment 3.
SIGAR Audit‐10‐10 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 28 

See SIGAR

comment 4.

See SIGAR

comment 2.
SIGAR Audit‐10‐10 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 29 

See SIGAR

comment 6.

See SIGAR

comment 2.

See SIGAR

comment 5.

See SIGAR

comment 4.
SIGAR Audit‐10‐10 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 30 

See SIGAR

comment 3.
SIGAR Audit‐10‐10 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 31 
SIGAR Audit‐10‐10 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 32 

The following are SIGAR’s comments on CSTC‐A’s letter dated April 23, 2010:

1. Correction made.  

2. We changed footnote 4, page 1, to better define a firm fixed‐price contract and define cost.  

Throughout the report, we use the term “cost” to refer to the eventual cost of the garrison to the

United States.  We understand that under the terms of a firm fixed‐price contract, a contractor’s

costs are normally not negotiable, and we are not referring to the contractor’s costs.  Rather, we are

referring to the costs to construct the garrison as part of the U.S. efforts to train and equip the ANA.   

3. As we noted in the report, the ANA Master Facilities Plan dated October 2005 was referred to in a

budget justification document for fiscal year 2008 provided to us by NTM‐A/CSTC‐A.  We asked

NTM‐A/CSTC‐A officials for a copy of this 2005 Master Plan and any updates to it.  NTM‐A/CSTC‐A

could not locate such a document, nor did they refer us to CJ7.  Additionally, we asked U.S. Central

Command (CENTCOM) to help locate a copy.  After we submitted a copy of this draft report for

comment, NTM‐A/CSTC‐A provided us a document referred to as a “Conceptual Master Plan for the

ANA” that was developed in the spring and summer of 2006.  CENTCOM also provided some

information about this document, including some additional pages.  The document addresses the

mission and facility requirements for a number of ANA command level organizations—including the

Kabul Military Training Center, a Ministry of Defense Compound, a Medical Command, an

Acquisition Agency, and an Afghan National Army Training Command.  The planning and analysis of

these ANA facilities appears detailed and comprehensive.  However, the plan provided to us does

not address ANA garrisons, is not signed or dated, and is missing numerous pages.

4. According to USACE’s Resource Management System and other AED‐North documentation and

officials from AED‐North and DynCorp International, Phases I and II and the training range are

behind schedule.   We did not mean to imply that exercising contract options was an unexpected

cost to the United States and have made this clear throughout the report.    

5. Correction made.

6. The tables corresponding to Phases I, II, III, and the training range were intended to summarize the

contract modifications.  We explain each in more detail in the text that follows each table.

(This report was completed under the audit project code SIGAR‐016A).
SIGAR Audit‐10‐10 Contract Performance and Oversight  Page 33 

_________________________________________________________________________________

SIGAR’s Mission    The mission of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan

Reconstruction is to enhance oversight of programs for the

reconstruction of Afghanistan by conducting independent and

objective audits, inspections, and investigations on the use of

taxpayer dollars and related funds.  SIGAR works to provide

accurate and balanced information, evaluations, analysis, and

recommendations to help the U.S. Congress, U.S. agencies, and

other decision‐makers to make informed oversight, policy, and

funding decisions to:

 improve effectiveness of the overall reconstruction strategy

and its component programs;

 improve management and accountability over funds

administered by U.S. and Afghan agencies and their

contractors;

 improve contracting and contract management processes;

 prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; and

 advance U.S. interests in reconstructing Afghanistan.

   

Obtaining Copies of SIGAR     To obtain copies of SIGAR documents at no cost, go to  

Reports and Testimonies    SIGAR’s Web site (www.sigar.mil).  SIGAR posts all released  

                                                                         reports, testimonies, and correspondence on its Web site.

To Report Fraud, Waste, and     To help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting  

Abuse in Afghanistan       allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement, and

Reconstruction Programs    reprisal contact SIGAR’s hotline:          

 Web: www.sigar.mil/fraud

 Email: hotline@sigar.mil

 Phone Afghanistan: +93 (0) 700‐10‐7300

 Phone DSN Afghanistan 318‐237‐2575

 Phone International: +1‐866‐329‐8893

 Phone DSN International: 312‐664‐0378

 U.S. fax: +1‐703‐604‐0983

Public Affairs Public Affairs Officer

 Phone: 703‐602‐8742  

 Email: PublicAffairs@sigar.mil  

 Mail: SIGAR Public Affairs

400 Army Navy Drive

Arlington, VA 22202