UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

2100 RENAISSANCE BOULEVARD, SUITE 100

KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406-2713

January 30, 2014

Mr. Kevin Walsh 

Site Vice President 

Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant 

NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC 

c/o Mr. Michael Ossing 

P.O. Box 300 

Seabrook, NH 03874 

SUBJECT: SEABROOK STATION, UNIT NO. 1 - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION 

REPORT 05000443/2013005 

Dear Mr. Walsh: 

On December 31, 2013, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an 

inspection at Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1. The enclosed inspection report documents the 

inspection results, which were discussed on January 17, 2014, with you and other members of 

your staff. 

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and 

compliance with the Commission’s rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. 

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed 

personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection no findings of significance were identified. However, a 

licensee-identified violation, which was determined to be of very low safety significance, is listed 

in Section 40A7 of this report. If you contest this non-cited violation, you should provide a 

response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to 

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-

0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator Region I, the Director, Office of Enforcement, 

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC 

Resident Inspector at Seabrook Station.

As a result of the Safety Culture Common Language Initiative, the terminology and coding of 

cross-cutting aspects were revised beginning in calendar year (CY) 2014. New cross-cutting 

aspects identified in CY 2014 will be coded under the latest revision to IMC 0310. Cross-cutting 

aspects identified in the last six months of 2013 using the previous terminology will be converted 

to the latest revision in accordance with the cross-reference in IMC 0310. The revised crosscutting aspects will be evaluated for cross-cutting themes and potential substantive crosscutting issues in accordance with IMC 0305 starting with the CY 2014 mid-cycle assessment 

review. 
K. Walsh 2

In accordance with 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 2.390, “Public Inspections, 

Exemptions, Requests for Withholding,” of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, 

its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection 

in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS)

component of NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). 

ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html

(the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Glenn T. Dentel, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 3 

Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No. 50-443 

License No: NPF-86 

Enclosure: Inspection Report No. 05000443/2013005

w/ Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ
K. Walsh 2

In accordance with 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 2.390, “Public Inspections, 

Exemptions, Requests for Withholding,” of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, 

its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection 

in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS) 

component of NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). 

ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html

(the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

 /RA/

Glenn T. Dentel, Chief 

Reactor Projects Branch 3 

Division of Reactor Projects 

Docket No. 50-443 

License No: NPF-86 

Enclosure: Inspection Report No. 05000443/2013005 

w/ Attachment: Supplemental Information 

cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ 

Distribution w/encl: (via e-mail)

W. Dean, RA 

D. Lew, DRA 

M. Scott, DRP 

E. Benner, DRP 

R. Lorson, DRS 

J. Trapp, DRS 

G. Dentel, DRP 

R. Barkley, DRP

M. Draxton, DRP

B. Reyes, DRP

P. Cataldo, DRP, SRI

C. Newport, DRP, RI 

A. Cass, DRP, Resident AA

E. Quinones, RI, OEDO

RidsNrrPMSeabrook Resource

RidsNrrDorlLpl1-2 Resource

ROPreports Resource

 DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRP\BRANCH3\Inspection\Reports\Issued\2013 (ROP 14)\SB IR 2013005 final.docx

 ADAMS Accession No.: ML14030A509

 SUNSI Review

 Non-Sensitive

 Sensitive

 Publicly Available

 Non-Publicly Available

OFFICE RI/DRP RI/DRP

NAME mmt PCataldo/PC GDentel/ GTD

DATE 01/29/14 01/ 30/ 14

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
1

Enclosure

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Docket No.: 50-443

License No.: NPF-86

Report No.: 05000443/2013005

Licensee: NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC 

Facility: Seabrook Station, Unit No.1

Location: Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874

Dates: October 1, 2013 through December 31, 2013

Inspectors: P. Cataldo, Senior Resident Inspector

C. Newport, Resident Inspector

W. Cook, Senior Reactor Analyst

B. Dionne, Senior Health Physicist

J. Gilliam, Acting Resident Inspector 

D. Silk, Senior Operations Engineer

Approved by: Glenn T. Dentel, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 3

Division of Reactor Projects
2

Enclosure

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................ 3

REPORT DETAILS.................................................................................................................... 4

1. REACTOR SAFETY ........................................................................................................... 4

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection .................................................................................... 4

1R04 Equipment Alignment ............................................................................................... 5

1R05 Fire Protection.......................................................................................................... 6

1R06 Flood Protection Measures ...................................................................................... 6

1R07 Heat Sink Performance ........................................................................................... 6

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program ............................................................ 7

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness ...................................................................................... 9

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control .................................10

1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments ....................................10

1R18 Plant Modifications .................................................................................................11

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing ......................................................................................12

1R22 Surveillance Testing ...............................................................................................12

1EP6 Drill Evaluation .......................................................................................................13

2. RADIATION SAFETY.........................................................................................................13

2RS6 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment ...............................................13

2RS7 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program .....................................................14

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES..........................................................................................................15

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification ..........................................................................15

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution .....................................................................17

4OA5 Other Activities ........................................................................................................20

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit...........................................................................................21

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violation....................................................................................21

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION...............................................................22

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION.......................................................................................A-1

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT ..................................................................................................A-1

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED ....................................A-1

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED.......................................................................................A-1

LIST OF ACRONYMS.............................................................................................................A-9
3

Enclosure

SUMMARY

IR 05000443/2013005; 10/01/2013-12/31/2013; Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1, Routine 

Integrated Inspection Report. 

This report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced 

inspections performed by regional inspectors. The NRC’s program for overseeing the safe 

operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, “Reactor 

Oversight Process,” Revision 4.

No findings were identified.

Other Findings

A violation of very low safety significance that was identified by NextEra was reviewed by the 

inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by NextEra have been entered into NextEra’s 

corrective action program (CAP). This violation and corrective action tracking number are listed 

in Section 4OA7 of this report.
4

Enclosure

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Seabrook operated at full power for the entire assessment period, with the exception of minor 

down powers to perform scheduled turbine valve testing. Documents reviewed for each section 

of this inspection report are listed in the Attachment.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01 – 3 samples)

.1 Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a review of NextEra’s readiness for the onset of seasonal cold 

temperatures on November 18, 2013. The review focused on the emergency feedwater 

pump house, turbine building, and the service water (SW) cooling tower. The inspectors 

reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), technical specifications 

(TSs), the seasonal readiness memorandum, and the corrective action program (CAP) 

to determine specific temperatures or other seasonal weather that could challenge these 

systems, and to ensure NextEra personnel had adequately prepared for these 

challenges. The inspectors reviewed station procedures, including NextEra’s seasonal 

weather preparation procedure and applicable operating procedures. The inspectors 

performed walkdowns of the selected systems to ensure station personnel identified 

issues that could challenge the operability of the systems during cold weather 

conditions.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 External Flooding

a. Inspection Scope

During the week of December 16, 2013, the inspectors performed an inspection of 

selected external flood protection measures for Seabrook Station. The inspectors 

reviewed TSs, procedures, design documents, and the UFSAR, which depicted the 

design flood levels and protection areas containing safety-related equipment to identify 

areas that may be affected by external flooding. The inspectors conducted a general 

site walkdown of external areas of the plant, including the diesel generator building, 

turbine building, and primary auxiliary building, to ensure that NextEra’s flood protection 

measures were in accordance with design specifications. The inspectors also reviewed 

operating procedures for mitigating external flooding during severe weather to determine 

if NextEra had established adequate measures to protect against external flooding 

events.
5

Enclosure

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Readiness for Impending Adverse Weather Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed NextEra’s preparations for the onset of cold weather and high 

winds on November 26, 2013. The inspectors reviewed the implementation of adverse 

weather preparation procedures before the onset of and during this adverse weather 

condition. The inspectors walked down the emergency feedwater pump house and the 

SW cooling tower to ensure system availability. The inspectors verified that operator 

actions defined in NextEra’s adverse weather procedure maintained the readiness of 

essential systems. The inspectors discussed readiness and staff availability for adverse 

weather response with operations and work control personnel.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

.1 Partial System Walkdowns (71111.04Q – 4 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems:

 Equipment alignment of Vital Bus 11A while 11B was cross-tied to battery ‘D’ and 

battery ‘B’ was out of service on October 2, 2013

 ‘B’ residual heat removal (RHR) return to service (RTS) on November 27, 2013

 ‘A’ emergency diesel generator (EDG) jacket water heat exchanger SW outlet valve 

RTS on December 11, 2013

 ‘A’ SW during replacement of the ‘C’ SW pump motor on December 13, 2013

The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the 

reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed 

applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the UFSAR, TSs, work orders 

(WOs), condition reports (CRs), and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant 

trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have impacted system 

performance of their intended safety functions. The inspectors also performed field 

walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and 

support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable. The inspectors examined 

the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of 

equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. The inspectors also reviewed 

whether NextEra staff had properly identified equipment issues and entered them into 

the corrective action program for resolution with the appropriate significance 

characterization. 
6

Enclosure

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

Resident Inspector Quarterly Walkdowns (71111.05Q – 2 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted tours of the areas listed below to assess the material 

condition and operational status of fire protection features. The inspectors verified that 

NextEra controlled combustible materials and ignition sources in accordance with 

administrative procedures. The inspectors verified that fire protection and suppression 

equipment was available for use as specified in the area pre-fire plan, and passive fire 

barriers were maintained in good material condition. The inspectors also verified that 

station personnel implemented compensatory measures for out of service, degraded, or 

inoperable fire protection equipment, as applicable, in accordance with procedures. 

 'A' EDG DG-F-1A-A, DG-F-2A-A, DG-F-3E-A, DG-F-3C-A, DG-F-3A-Z on 

November 14, 2013

 Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB) F-1A-Z 7'/-6'/-26' on November 20, 2013

1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06 – 1 sample)

Internal Flooding Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR, the site flooding analysis, and plant procedures to 

assess susceptibilities involving internal flooding. The inspectors also reviewed the CAP 

to determine if NextEra identified and corrected flooding problems and whether operator 

actions for coping with flooding were adequate. The inspectors focused on the internal 

tank farm area of the PAB to verify the adequacy of equipment seals located below the 

flood line, floor and water penetration seals, common drain lines and sumps, sump 

pumps, level alarms, control circuits, and temporary or removable flood barriers.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink Performance (71111.07A – 1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the ‘A’ EDG jacket water heat exchanger to determine its 

readiness and availability to perform its safety functions. The inspectors reviewed the 

design basis for the component and verified NextEra’s commitments to NRC Generic 

Letter 89-13. The inspectors observed actual performance tests for the heat exchangers 

and/or reviewed the results of previous inspections of the ‘A’ EDG jacket water and 

similar heat exchangers. The inspectors discussed the results of the most recent 
7

Enclosure

inspection with engineering staff and reviewed pictures of the as-found and as-left

conditions. The inspectors verified that NextEra initiated appropriate corrective actions 

for identified deficiencies. The inspectors also verified that the number of tubes plugged 

within the heat exchanger did not exceed the maximum amount allowed.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11 – 3 samples)

.1 Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification Testing and Training

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed licensed operator simulator training on October 23, 2013, 

which included simulated degraded equipment and subsequent equipment failures that 

resulted in escalating degraded plant conditions that ensured implementation of 

emergency operating procedures by the operating crew, as well as implementation of 

the emergency plan. This emergency plan implementation included classification of 

specific events that warranted an Alert Event Declaration. The inspectors evaluated 

operator performance during the simulated event and verified completion of risk 

significant operator actions, including the use of abnormal and emergency operating 

procedures. The inspectors assessed the clarity and effectiveness of communications, 

implementation of actions in response to alarms and degrading plant conditions, and the 

oversight and direction provided by the control room supervisor. The inspectors verified 

the accuracy and timeliness of the emergency classification made by the shift manager 

and the technical specification action statements entered by the control room supervisor. 

Additionally, the inspectors assessed the ability of the crew and training staff to identify 

and document crew performance problems. 

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Performance in the Main Control Room

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed general control room activities, including alarm response and 

control room shift turnovers, conducted on November 9, 2013 and December 23, 2013. 

Additionally, the inspectors observed monthly surveillance testing of the ‘B’ EDG 

conducted on November 12, 2013 and December 23, 2013. The inspectors observed 

test performance to verify that procedure use, crew communications, and coordination of

activities between work groups similarly met established expectations and standards.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.
8

Enclosure

.3 Licensed Operator Requalification Biennial Review

a. Inspection Scope

The following inspection activities were performed using NUREG-1021, “Operator 

Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors,” Revision 9, Supplement 1, and 

Inspection Procedure Attachment 71111.11B, “Licensed Operator Requalification 

Program.” 

Examination Results

The operating tests for the weeks of October 21, 2013 and October 28, 2013 were 

reviewed for quality and performance.

On December 6, 2013 the results of the annual operating tests were reviewed to 

determine if pass fail rates were consistent with the guidance of NUREG-1021, 

"Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors," Revision 9, 

Supplement 1, and NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix I, “Operator Requalification 

Human Performance Significance Determination Process.” The review verified that 

the failure rate (individual or crew) did not exceed 20%.

 1 out of 53 operators failed at least one section of the Annual Examination. The 

overall individual failure rate was 1.9%.

 0 out of 9 crews failed the simulator test. The crew failure rate was 0.0%.

Written Examination Quality

The inspectors reviewed two written examinations that were administered during the 

weeks of October 21 and 28, 2013, for qualitative and quantitative attributes as specified 

in Appendix B of Attachment 71111.11B, Licensed Operator Requalification.

Operating Test Quality

Twenty-two job performance measures (JPMs) and six scenarios were reviewed for 

qualitative and quantitative attributes as specified in Appendix C of 71111.11B, 

“Licensed Operator Requalification Program.”

Licensee Administration of Operating Tests

The dynamic simulator examinations and JPMs administered during the week of October 

28, 2013, were observed. These observations included facility evaluations of Shift Crew 

A and Staff Crew 1 during three dynamic simulator examinations and individual 

performance of five JPMs.

Examination Security

The inspector assessed whether facility staff properly safeguarded examination material. 

JPMs, scenarios, and written examinations were checked for excessive overlap of test 

items.
9

Enclosure

Remedial Training and Re-Examinations

The remediation plans for one crew failure and one individual JPM failure from the 2011 

requalification examination were reviewed to assess the effectiveness of the remedial 

training. 

Conformance with Operator License Conditions

Medical records for ten license holders were reviewed to assess conformance with 

license conditions. 

Proficiency watch standing records were reviewed for the third quarter of 2013. 

The reactivation plans for five senior reactor operator license holders and three reactor 

operator license holders were reviewed to assess the effectiveness of the reactivation 

process. 

Simulator Performance

Simulator performance and fidelity was reviewed for conformance to the reference plant 

control room. A simulator deficiency report was also reviewed to ensure facility staff 

addressed identified modeling problems. Simulator test documentation was also 

reviewed. 

Problem Identification and Resolution

A review was conducted of recent operating history documentation found in inspection 

reports, NextEra’s CAP, and the most recent NRC plant issues matrix. The inspectors 

also reviewed specific events from the CAP which indicated possible training 

deficiencies, to verify that they had been appropriately addressed. The senior resident 

inspector was consulted for insights regarding licensed operators’ performance. 

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12 – 3 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the samples listed below to assess the effectiveness of 

maintenance activities on structure, system, or component (SSC) performance and 

reliability. The inspectors reviewed system health reports, CAP documents, 

maintenance WOs, and maintenance rule (MR) basis documents to ensure that 

NextEra was identifying and properly evaluating performance problems within the scope 

of the MR. For each sample selected, the inspectors verified that the SSC was properly 

scoped into the MR in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 and verified that the (a)(2) 

performance criteria established by NextEra staff was reasonable. As applicable, for 

SSCs classified as (a)(1), the inspectors assessed the adequacy of goals and corrective 

actions to return these SSCs to (a)(2). Additionally, the inspectors ensured that NextEra 

staff was identifying and addressing common cause failures that occurred within and 

across MR system boundaries. 
10

Enclosure

 Chemical and volume control system

 Evaluation of stroke time changes on EDG SW heat exchanger outlet isolation valve, 

SW-V-16

 Evaluation of EDG entry fire door latch failures

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13 – 4 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed station evaluation and management of plant risk for the 

maintenance and emergent work activities listed below to verify that NextEra performed 

the appropriate risk assessments prior to removing equipment for work. The inspectors 

selected these activities based on potential risk significance relative to the reactor safety 

cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that NextEra 

personnel performed risk assessments as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and that the 

assessments were accurate and complete. When NextEra performed emergent work, 

the inspectors verified that operations personnel promptly assessed and managed plant 

risk. The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work and discussed the results 

of the assessment with the station’s probabilistic risk analyst to verify plant conditions 

were consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed the TS 

requirements and inspected portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to 

verify risk analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met.

 Battery cross-tie on October 7, 2013

 ‘B’ RHR pump slave relay testing on November 26, 2013

 Chemical volume and control system surveillance testing and SW system 

maintenance on December 10, 2013

 Safety Bus 5 degraded voltage relay testing and charging system maintenance on 

December 13, 2013

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments (71111.15 – 4 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed operability determinations for the following degraded or nonconforming conditions:

 Operability of 1B 125 VDC battery on October 3, 2012

 Cooling tower SW pump P-110A oil fill cap found ajar on October 22, 2013

 Refueling water storage tank aligned to a not fully qualified seismic pipe on 

November 8, 2013

 SW-P-41A in-service test flow band incorrect on November 13, 2013
11

Enclosure

The inspectors selected these issues based on the risk significance of the associated 

components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the 

operability determinations to assess whether technical specification operability was 

properly justified and the subject component or system remained available such that 

no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability 

and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the TSs and UFSAR to NextEra’s 

evaluations to determine whether the components or systems were operable. Where 

compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors 

determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were 

properly controlled by NextEra. The inspectors determined, where appropriate, 

compliance with bounding limitations associated with the evaluations.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18 – 4 samples)

.1 Temporary Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the temporary modifications listed below to determine whether 

the modifications affected the safety functions of systems that are important to safety. 

The inspectors reviewed 10 CFR 50.59 documentation and post-modification testing 

results, as applicable, and conducted field walkdowns of the modifications to verify that 

the temporary modifications did not degrade the design bases, licensing bases, and 

performance capability of the affected systems. 

 1-RC-TB-451 temporary setpoint change for a pressurizer low temperature alarm 

 Engineering change (EC) 278785, SW pipe support modification in support of OR16

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Permanent Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the permanent modifications listed below, and verified that the 

design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the affected systems were 

not degraded by the modifications. In addition, the inspectors reviewed applicable 

modification documents, including associated engineering changes, correspondence 

with the vendor, industry operating experience, environmental and seismic qualifications, 

as well as the 10 CFR 50.59 documentation and post-modification testing results, as 

applicable.

 EC 274301, Emergency Power System power supply overvoltage protection

 EC 271074, replacement of GE synchronization check relay
12

Enclosure

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19 – 5 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the post-maintenance tests for the maintenance activities 

listed below to verify that procedures and test activities ensured system operability 

and functional capability. The inspectors reviewed the test procedure to verify that the 

procedure adequately tested the safety functions that may have been affected by the 

maintenance activity, that the acceptance criteria in the procedure was consistent with 

the information in the applicable licensing basis and/or design basis documents, and 

that the procedure had been properly reviewed and approved. The inspectors also 

witnessed the test or reviewed test data to verify that the test results adequately 

demonstrated restoration of the affected safety functions.

 1-RH-FCV-618 positioner replacement on October 16, 2013

 Loop ‘B’ SW basin level indicator calibration on October 31, 2013

 1C battery charger maintenance and RTS on November 22, 2013

 ‘A’ EDG SW heat exchanger isolation valve maintenance on November 22, 2013

 Primary air handler damper actuator rebuild on November 26, 2013

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22 – 2 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed performance of surveillance tests and/or reviewed test data of 

selected risk-significant SSCs to assess whether test results satisfied TSs, the UFSAR, 

and NextEra procedure requirements. The inspectors verified that test acceptance 

criteria were clear, tests demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with 

design documentation, test instrumentation had current calibrations and the range and 

accuracy for the application, tests were performed as written, and applicable test 

prerequisites were satisfied. Upon test completion, the inspectors considered whether 

the test results supported that equipment was capable of performing the required safety 

functions. The inspectors reviewed the following surveillance tests:

 ‘A’ SW discharge valve quarterly in-service surveillance test (IST) on October 17, 

2013 (IST)

 Reactor coolant system (RCS) leak rate surveillance test on October 24, 2013 (RCS 

leak rate) 

b. Findings

No findings were identified.
13

Enclosure

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06 – 1 sample)

Emergency Preparedness Drill Observation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the conduct of a routine NextEra emergency drill on October 9, 

2013 to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in the classification, notification, and 

protective action recommendation development activities. The inspectors observed 

emergency response operations in the simulator, technical support center, and 

emergency operations facility to determine whether the event classification, notifications, 

and protective action recommendations were performed in accordance with 

procedures. The inspectors also attended the station drill critique to compare inspector 

observations with those identified by NextEra staff in order to evaluate NextEra’s critique

and to verify whether NextEra staff was properly identifying weaknesses and entering 

them into the CAP.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2. RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety

2RS6 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment (71124.06 – 1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

During the period December 2 to December 5, 2013, the inspectors verified that 

gaseous and liquid effluent processing systems are maintained so radioactive 

discharges are properly reduced, monitored, and released. The inspectors also verified 

the accuracy of the calculations for effluent releases and public doses. 

The inspectors used the requirements in 10 CFR Part 20; 10 CFR 50.35(a) TSs; 

10 CFR Part 50 Appendix A - Criterion 60 Control of Release of Radioactivity to the 

Environment and Criterion 64 Monitoring Radioactive Releases; 10 CFR 50 Appendix I 

Numerical Guides for Design Objectives and Limiting Conditions for Operations to Meet 

the Criterion “As Low as is Reasonably Achievable” (ALARA) for Radioactive Material 

in Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Reactor Effluents; 10 CFR 50.75(g) Reporting and 

Recordkeeping for Decommissioning Planning; 40 CFR Part 141 Maximum Contaminant 

Levels for Radionuclides; 40 CFR Part 190 Environmental Radiation Protection 

Standards for Nuclear Power Operations; RG 1.109 Calculation of Annual Doses to 

Man from Routine Releases of Reactor Effluents; RG 1.21 Measuring, Evaluating, 

Reporting Radioactive Material in Liquid and Gaseous Effluents and Solid Waste; RG 

4.1 Radiological Environmental Monitoring for Nuclear Power Plants; RG 4.15 Quality 

Assurance for Radiological Monitoring Programs; NUREG 1301 Offsite Dose Calculation 
14

Enclosure

Manual (ODCM) Guidance: Standard Radiological Effluent Controls; applicable Industry 

standards; and licensee procedures required by TSs/ODCM as criteria for determining 

compliance. 

The inspectors observed the collection and preparation of one environmental sample 

from an on-site groundwater monitoring well. The inspectors selected two SSCs (storm 

drains and spent fuel leak detection system) that could interface with ground water. The 

inspectors assessed whether NextEra has implemented a sampling and monitoring 

program sufficient to provide early detection of leakage from these SSCs to ground 

water. 

The inspectors reviewed any significant changes made by NextEra to the ODCM as the 

result of changes to the land census, long-term meteorological conditions (three year 

average), or modifications to the sampler stations since the last inspection. The 

inspectors reviewed technical justifications for any changed sampling locations to verify 

that NextEra performed the required reviews.

The inspectors reviewed the results of the NextEra Analytical Laboratory vendor’s interlaboratory and intra-laboratory comparison program to verify the adequacy of 

environmental sample analyses performed by the vendor laboratory. The inspectors 

assessed whether the results included the media/radionuclide mix were appropriate for 

the facility.

Problem Identification and Resolution

Inspectors assessed whether problems associated with the effluent monitoring and 

control program are being identified by NextEra at an appropriate threshold and are 

properly addressed for resolution in the CAP. In addition, the inspectors evaluated the 

appropriateness of the corrective actions for a selected sample of problems 

documented. One corrective action involving the Groundwater Protection Program 

(GWPP) was not completed in a timely manner and is described in Section 4OA5 of 

this report.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS7 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (71124.07 – 1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

During the period December 2 to December 5, 2013, the inspectors verified that the 

radiological environmental monitoring program (REMP) quantifies the impact of 

radioactive effluent releases to the environment and sufficiently validates the integrity 

of the radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent release program.

The inspectors used the requirements in 10 CFR Part 20; 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix A 

Criterion 60 - Control of Release of Radioactivity to the Environment; 10 CFR 50 

Appendix I Numerical Guides for Design Objectives and Limiting Conditions for 

Operations to Meet the Criterion ALARA for Radioactive Material in Light-Water-Cooled 

Nuclear Power Reactor Effluents; 40 CFR Part 190 Environmental Radiation Protection 
15

Enclosure

Standards for Nuclear Power Operations; 40 CFR Part 141 Maximum Contaminant 

Levels for Radionuclides; the guidance in RGs 1.23 Meteorological Measurements 

Program for Nuclear Power Plants, RG 4.1 Radiological Environmental Monitoring 

Programs for Nuclear Power Plants; RG 4.15 Quality Assurance for Radiological 

Monitoring Programs; NUREG 1301 ODCM Guidance: Standard Radiological Effluent 

Controls; applicable industry standards; and licensee procedures as criteria for 

determining compliance.

The inspectors determined if NextEra has made significant changes to their effluent 

release points.

Records of any abnormal gaseous or liquid tank discharges were reviewed to ensure the 

abnormal discharges were monitored by the discharge point effluent monitor. When 

discharges were made with inoperable effluent radiation monitors, or if unmonitored 

leakage occurred, the inspectors ensured that an evaluation was performed, as required.

For unmonitored spills, leaks, or unexpected liquid or gaseous discharges, the 

inspectors ensured that an evaluation was performed to determine the type and amount 

of radioactive material that was discharged. The inspectors verified that surveys were 

performed to include consideration of hard-to-detect radionuclides. The inspectors 

determined whether or not NextEra had completed offsite notifications (State, local, and 

if appropriate, the NRC), as provided in the Groundwater Protection Initiative’s 

implementing procedures.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

.1 Safety System Functional Failures (1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled NextEra’s submittals for the Safety System Functional Failures 

performance indicator (PI) for the period of October 1, 2012 to September 30, 2013. To 

determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods, inspectors used 

definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, “Regulatory Assessment 

Performance Indicator Guideline,” Revision 7, and NUREG-1022, “Event Reporting 

Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73.” The inspectors reviewed NextEra’s MR 

records, maintenance WOs, CRs, event reports and NRC integrated inspection reports 

to validate the accuracy of the submittals.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.
16

Enclosure

.2 Mitigating Systems Performance Index (2 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed NextEra’s submittal of the Mitigating Systems Performance 

Index for the following systems for the period of October 1, 2012 to September 30, 2013:

 Residual heat removal system (MS09)

 MSPI cooling water system (MS10)

To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods, the inspectors 

used definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, “Regulatory 

Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline,” Revision 7. The inspectors also 

reviewed NextEra’s condition reports, mitigating systems performance index derivation 

reports, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports to validate the accuracy of 

the submittals. 

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness (1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

During the period of December 2 to December 5, 2013, the inspectors sampled 

NextEra’s submittals for the occupational exposure control effectiveness PI for the 

period of the fourth quarter 2012 through the third quarter 2013. The inspectors used PI 

definitions and guidance contained in the Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, 

“Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline,” Revision 7, to determine the 

accuracy of the PI data reported. 

To assess the adequacy of the licensee’s PI data collection and analyses, the inspectors 

discussed with radiation protection staff, the scope and breadth of its data review and 

the results of those reviews. The inspectors independently reviewed condition reports, 

electronic personal dosimetry dose alarms, dose reports, and dose assignments for any 

intakes that occurred during the time period reviewed to determine if there were 

potentially unrecognized PI occurrences.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.4 Radiological Effluent Occurrences (1 sample)

Inspection Scope

During the period of December 2 to December 5, 2013, the inspectors sampled 

NextEra’s submittals for the radiological effluent TS/ODCM radiological effluent 

occurrences PI for the period from the fourth quarter 2012 through the third quarter 

2013. The inspectors used PI definitions and guidance contained in the Nuclear Energy 
17

Enclosure

Institute Document 99-02, “Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline,” 

Revision 7, dated August 31, 2013, to determine the accuracy of the PI data reported. 

The inspectors reviewed NextEra’s corrective action report database and selected 

individual reports generated since this indicator was last reviewed, to identify any 

potential occurrences such as unmonitored, uncontrolled, or improperly calculated 

effluent releases that may have impacted offsite dose. The inspectors also reviewed 

NextEra’s methods for quantifying gaseous and liquid effluents and determining effluent 

dose. 

Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152 – 3 samples)

.1 Routine Review of Problem Identification and Resolution Activities

a. Inspection Scope

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, “Problem Identification and Resolution,” the 

inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant 

status reviews to verify that NextEra entered issues into the CAP at an appropriate 

threshold, gave adequate attention to timely corrective actions, and identified and 

addressed adverse trends. In order to assist with the identification of repetitive 

equipment failures and specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors 

performed a daily screening of items entered into the CAP and periodically attended 

condition report screening meetings. 

b. Findings 

No findings were identified.

.2 Annual Sample: Review of Corrective Actions for Alkali-Silica Reaction Affected

Structures

a. Inspection Scope

Between November 12 to November 14, 2013, NRC inspectors from Region I and 

a reactor engineer from the Division of License Renewal, NRR, witnessed testing 

conducted at the Ferguson Structural Engineering Laboratory (FSEL) at the University of 

Texas - Austin in support of the Seabrook Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Project Corrective 

Action Plan. Specifically, the inspectors witnessed strength testing of anchor bolts in a 

large-scale ASR-affected concrete specimen performed in accordance with MPR Anchor 

Testing Procedure 09, “Conduct Unconfined Tension Test on Expansion Anchors.” 

The inspectors also observed installation of a number of anchor bolts conducted in 

accordance with MPR Anchor Testing Procedure 03, “Install Hilti Kwik Bolt Expansion 

Anchors,” and Procedure 12, “Install Drillco Maxi-Bolt Undercut Anchors.” Following the 

completion of anchor bolt testing, the inspectors witnessed the cutting of large-scale 

anchor test specimen AN-02 into four sections to investigate the depth/progression of 

observed bifurcation cracking induced by ASR expansion.
18

Enclosure

During the week of November 18, 2013, inspectors were on-site to review the results of 

the June 2013 Combined Crack Indexing (CCI) measurements. Inspectors reviewed 

and discussed with the responsible Seabrook engineers the collected data and 

engineering evaluations associated with the June 2012 six-month interval monitoring 

results. Data sheets and associated records are attachments to internal Seabrook 

document Foreign Print (FP) 100831, Revision 0, “ASR Expansion Measurements.” 

b. Findings and Observations 

No findings were identified.

The inspectors observed proper procedural adherence and appropriate quality 

assurance oversight of testing conducted at the FSEL facility. Testing was performed 

by graduate students and supervised by a UT-Austin research assistant. Quality control 

engineering oversight was performed by an MPR project engineer responsible for 

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, implementation and periodic audits and assessments of testing 

activities. The inspectors witnessed formal communications and independent 

reader/verifier and performer coordination by testing personnel. All test results were 

electronically recorded and overseen by FSEL and MPR supervisory personnel.

The preliminary results of this first stage of ASR-affected specimen anchor testing (ASRaffected specimens fabricated on May 24, 2012 and displaying CCIs values of between 

1.0 and 1.31 mm/m) identified no significant degradation from the control anchor test 

results taken in November 2012, on specimen AN-07. Segmentation of anchor test 

specimen AN-02, which was performed to investigate the depth of the bifurcation 

cracking, identified that the surface cracks terminated approximately 8-9 inches into the 

specimen. In discussions with NextEra staff, inspectors determined that the bifurcation 

cracking was not unanticipated, based upon the specimen design (absence of throughwall steel bar reinforcements/stirrups). However, inspectors determined that the growth 

and depth of these types of surface cracks will continue to be monitored by NextEra for 

both impact on test specimen performance and possible implications for Seabrook 

Station ASR-affected structures.

The June 2013 CCI data analysis and conclusions are summarized in FP 100831 and 

below:

 416 of 445 measurement lines (93%) show crack length changes of 0.002 inch or 

less compared to baseline measurements. 

 17 (3%) show length changes of 0.003 inch (5 vertical and 4 horizontal on exterior 

surfaces, 8 vertical on interior wall locations. 

 9 (1.6%) measurements show length changes of 0.004 inch or greater (3 vertical and 

1 horizontal exterior and 4 vertical on interior walls. 

 The average maximum expansion of 0.02% or less (from the baseline measurement, 

using the combined crack index) represents 1/10th of 0.20% strain value associated 

with published expansion strain limits for a typical concrete structures. 

 3 measurement lines show length changes of contraction between 0.007 and 0.008 

inch compared to the baseline. The negative change measurements appear to be 

the result of gage pin displacement.
19

Enclosure

Based upon the above data analysis, NextEra staff concluded: 1) no significant changes 

have occurred in the 26 monitored locations after 18 months of data collection; 2) the 

type of structure on site does not significantly impact the observed variations in 

measured expansion; 3) thermal effects on seasonal measurements are noticeable; and 

4) continued monitoring is warranted to assess trends.

Inspector review of the data identified no additional issues or concerns. As noted in 

FP100831, based upon examination of eight new locations under the Phase 3 ASR 

walkdowns, four new locations were added to the six-month CCI monitoring program 

due to CCI values exceeding the 1.0 mm/m threshold. In accordance with the Structures 

Monitoring Program, EDS 36180, Revision 4, these four locations will require a structural 

evaluation to assess available margin.

.3 Semi-Annual Trend Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a semi-annual review of site issues, as required by Inspection 

Procedure 71152, “Problem Identification and Resolution,” to identify trends that might 

indicate the existence of more significant safety issues. In this review, the inspectors 

included repetitive or closely-related issues that may have been documented by NextEra 

outside of the CAP, such as trend reports, PIs, major equipment problem lists, system 

health reports, MR assessments, and maintenance or CAP backlogs. The inspectors 

also reviewed NextEra’s CAP database for the third and fourth quarters of 2013 to 

assess CRs written in various subject areas (equipment problems, human performance 

issues, etc.), as well as individual issues identified during the NRCs daily condition 

report review (Section 4OA2.1). The inspectors reviewed NextEra’s quarterly trend 

report for the third quarter of 2013, and selected departmental reports conducted under 

procedure PI-AA-207-1000, “Station Self-Evaluation and Trending Analysis,” Revision 0, 

to verify that NextEra personnel were appropriately evaluating and trending adverse 

conditions in accordance with this and other applicable procedures.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings were identified.

The inspectors evaluated a sample of departments that provide input into the quarterly 

trend reports, which included maintenance and engineering departments. This review 

included a sample of issues and events that occurred over the course of the past two 

quarters to objectively determine whether issues were appropriately determined to be 

newly identified as open or continued to be tracked as open adverse trends, potential 

adverse trends, or management awareness areas. The inspectors verified that these 

issues were addressed within the scope of the CAP, or through department review and 

documentation in the quarterly trend report for overall assessment. For example, the 

inspectors noted that consistent with the occurrence of a significant service water leak 

in the third quarter associated with Strainer No. 11, NextEra had appropriately identified 

this issue under the “degraded component” section of the trend report based on 

exceeding a statistical control threshold. However, the inspectors noted that other 

NextEra processes had captured the underlying issues related to service water system 

challenges including associated corrective actions, and was therefore consistent with the 

trend report not warranting additional evaluation. 
20

Enclosure

Additionally, based on previous issues that had been identified and tracked in the 

corrective action database, the inspectors noted an apparent trend in procedure use and 

adherence. More importantly, NextEra had appropriately captured the increase in 

human performance issues associated with procedure use and adherence as a potential 

adverse trend in their trending analysis report for increased attention.

.4 Annual Sample: Follow-up of Corrective Actions for the Loss of Bus 5 during OR15

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed an in-depth review of NextEra’s root cause analysis and 

corrective actions associated with condition report AR 1808492, loss of Bus 5 during 

clearance, which occurred during refueling outage OR15, in October 2012. 

The inspectors assessed NextEra’s problem identification threshold, cause analyses, 

extent of condition reviews, compensatory actions, and the prioritization and timeliness 

of corrective actions to determine whether NextEra personnel were appropriately 

identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with this issue and 

whether the planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate. The inspectors 

compared the actions taken to the requirements of PI-AA-205, Condition Evaluation and 

Corrective Action and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. 

b. Findings and Observations

No findings were identified. 

The inspectors reviewed selected CAP records and did not identify any additional 

issues. The inspectors determined NextEra’s overall response to the issue was 

commensurate with the safety significance, was generally timely, and included 

appropriate compensatory actions. The inspectors determined that the actions taken 

were reasonable to resolve both the initial clearance deficiencies and subsequent loss of 

emergency response communication data due to other unrelated failures that occurred 

due to the loss of safety Bus 5.

Additionally, the inspectors noted that NextEra’s quarterly trend reports have captured 

adverse trending related to clearance requests. This identification, as evidenced by 

exceeding a statistical threshold of condition reports associated with clearance requests 

throughout 2013, resulted in additional assessment within the CAP and the station 

trending program. The inspectors verified the additional corrective action reviews were 

appropriate for the circumstances to address the specific adverse conditions associated 

with the tagging and clearance deficiencies identified by NextEra personnel. The 

inspectors verified that the issues that caused the identification of the adverse trend 

associated with clearance requests, were not related to the original cause of the loss of 

safety Bus 5, and did not invalidate the corrective actions implemented to prevent 

recurrence.

4OA5 Other Activities

.1 Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) Report Review

a. Inspection Scope
21

Enclosure

The inspectors reviewed the final report of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s 

OSART follow-up visit to Seabrook Station that occurred on June 3 to June 7, 2013. 

The June 2013 visit was the follow-up assessment from the original review of Seabrook 

that was conducted in June 2011. The inspectors reviewed this report to ensure that 

any issues identified were consistent with NRC perspectives of NextEra performance 

and to determine if the OSART team identified any significant safety issues that required 

further NRC follow-up under the Reactor Oversight Process.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Groundwater Protection Initiative (GPI)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed reported groundwater monitoring results and changes to 

NextEra‘s written program for identifying and controlling contaminated spills/leaks to 

groundwater to determine if NextEra has implemented the GPI as intended.

b. Findings and Observations

No Findings were identified. 

One observation was identified concerning compliance with the voluntary Nuclear 

Energy Institute GPI.

NEI 07-07 Industry Initiative Groundwater Protection Program dated August 2007 

contains an acceptance criteria 1.1.e which states “UFSAR to be updated with 

information from Hydrological Investigation Report.” NextEra’s Fleet procedure 

EV-AA-100-1001 step 4.2 2.B c requires that “Each site shall ensure that the Updated 

Safety Analysis Report is in agreement with the characteristics of the site hydrology and 

geology. (NEI 07-07 1.1 e).” NextEra updated the Seabrook Station Groundwater 

Completion Report on August 22, 2012. A subsequent review was performed of the 

Hydrological Investigation Report and it was determined by the licensee that an update 

to UFSAR was needed. No update to the UFSAR has been performed (AR 01924442). 

This issue is considered minor as it does not affect safety-related SSCs nor impact any 

radiological monitoring requirements. 

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On January 17, 2014, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Kevin 

Walsh, Site Vice President, and other members of the Seabrook Station staff. The 

inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or 

documented in this report.

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violation

The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by NextEra 

and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement 

Policy for being dispositioned as a NCV.
22

Enclosure

 10 CFR Part 50.65, paragraph a(4), “Requirement for Monitoring the Effectiveness of 

Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants’, states, in part, that the licensee shall assess 

and manage the increase in risk that may result from the proposed maintenance 

activities. NextEra procedure WM 10.1. “On-Line Maintenance”, Section 3.3.1, 

requires that an evaluation of the risk impact of planned maintenance tasks be 

performed. Contrary to the above, on September 24, 2012, NextEra failed to 

adequately assess and manage the impact to plant risk during a planned 

maintenance activity. Specifically, NextEra identified during internal reviews that 

they had failed to recognize an elevated online maintenance risk level (Yellow) 

during the performance of the 1-EDE-B-1-B Battery Service Test due to incorrect 

coding in NextEra’s PRAX risk model program. The inspectors determined 

NextEra’s failure to assess and manage risk during the period when the Battery 

Service Test was reasonably within NextEra’s ability to foresee and correct, and was 

identified as a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than 

minor, and considered a finding, because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems 

cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and affected the cornerstone 

objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond 

to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Because this finding 

represents a violation of 10 CFR Part 50.65 “Requirements for Monitoring the 

Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants”, Section a(4), the inspectors 

used IMC 0609, Appendix K, Flowchart 1 “Assessment of Risk Deficit,” to analyze 

the finding. The regional Senior Reactor Analyst determined 

the incremental core damage probability (ICDP) for the surveillance period (~5-10 

minutes) to be several orders of magnitude below the 1E-6 threshold due to the short 

duration of the systems’ unavailability. As this finding is not related to Risk 

Management Actions only, and the ICDP Risk Deficit is not >1E-6, the inspectors 

determined that the finding is of very low safety significance (Green). The issue was 

entered into NextEra’s CAP as AR 1906782.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
A-1

Attachment

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

K. Walsh, Site Vice President

T. Vehec, Plant General Manager

V. Brown, Senior Licensing Engineer

M. Chevalier, Radiation Protection Supervisor

J. Connolly, Site Engineering Director

K. Douglas, Maintenance Director

P. Dullea, Principal Chemist Specialist

D. Flahardy, Radiation Protection Manager

A. Giotas, Chemistry Specialist

M. Lake, Chemistry Technician

M. Leone, Operations Training Supervisor - Continuing

M. Ossing, Licensing Manager

V. Pascucci, Nuclear Oversight Manager

D. Robinson, Chemistry Manager

D. Strands, Chemistry Supervisor

M. Strum, Principal Radiological Engineer, AREVA

S. Wellhoffer, Nurse Manager RN

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED

None

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection

Procedures

ON1490.06 Winter Readiness Surveillance, Revision 12

ON1090.13, Response to Natural Phenomena Affecting Plant Operations, Revision 1

OP-AA-102-1002, Seasonal Readiness, Revision 1

OS1200.03, Severe Weather Conditions, Revision 20

OS1090.09, Station Cold Weather Operations, Revision 2

Condition Reports

01879206 01904449 1918322 1888495 1634911

Maintenance Orders/Work Orders

40197808

Miscellaneous

Evaluation of Beyond-Design-Basis External Flooding at Protective Features Identified as 

Having Small Available Physical Margin, Revision 1

Seasonal Readiness Memo to Mano Nazar dated 9/24/13
A-2

Attachment

Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment

Procedures

OS1048.13, Vital Bus 11A Operation, Revision 8

OX1413.03, B Train RHR, Revision 10

OX1416.04A, Service Water Quarterly Pump and Discharge Valve Test and Comprehensive 

Pump Test, Revision 18

Condition Reports 

01793891 01923437

Maintenance Orders/Work Orders

40227849 40284358

Drawings

1-NHY-310042

PID-1-SW-B20795, Service Water System Nuclear Detail, Revision 40

PID-1-SW-D20795, Service Water System Nuclear Detail, Revision 42

Section 1R05: Fire Protection

Miscellaneous

Seabrook Station Fire Protection Pre-Fire Strategies, Volume I, PAB F-1A-Z 7’/-6’/-26’

Unit No. 1 Diesel Generator Building Pre-Fire Strategies DG-F-1A-A, DG-F-2A-A, DG-F-3E-A, 

DG-F-3C-A, and DG-F-3A-Z, Revision 2

Section 1R06: Flood Protection Measures

Miscellaneous

BTP MEB 3.1 Determination of Rupture Locations and Dynamic Effects Associated With the 

Postulated Rupture of Piping

Calculation 9763-F-FS-01, Flooding Study for Primary Auxiliary Building – Moderate Energy 

Lines

Seabrook Station Moderate Energy Line Break Study

Drawings

1-WLD-D20216 1-WLD-D20226 1-WLD-D20229 9763-F-805669

9763-F-805793

Section 1R07: Heat Sink Performance

Procedures

ES1850.017, SW Heat Exchanger Program, Revision 1

PEG-268, Heat Exchanger and NRC GL 89-13 Program, Revision 0

Maintenance Orders/Work Orders

40103638 40235240

Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program

Procedures

NT 5702, Administration of Requal Program Annual Exams, Revision 23

OX1426.05, DG 1B Monthly Operability Surveillance, Revision 28

TR-AA-104, NEXTERA Energy Fleet Licensed Operator Continuing Training Program, Revision 4

TR-AA-230-1007, Conduct of Simulator Training and Evaluation, Revision 1

Training Group LORT Training Program Description, December 2012
A-3

Attachment

Condition Reports

1699285 1702114 1714783 1752327 1830734 1833538

1841980 1879841 1889829 1915426

Miscellaneous

E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Revision 50

Requalification Training Program Annual Examination Sample Plan 2012-2013

Simulator Examination, Demonstrative Examination on October 23, 2013, Revision 14

Simulator Action Request:

TWR01818481

Simulator-Related Test Documents:

‘C’ Feed Reg Valve Failed Closed Plant Trip, 11/28/12

Closure of All MSIVs, 8/22/13

Main Turbine Trip below P-9, 8/22/13

Manual Rx Trip, 8/22/13

Simultaneous Trip of All RCPs, 8/22/13

Steady State Operability Testing, 11/19/12

Trip of a single RCP, 8/22/13

Trip of All FW Pumps, 8/22/13

Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness

Procedures

MS0519.129, Bettis Air Actuator Maintenance for 1-SW-V-16 and 1-SW-V-18, Revision 0

PEG-40, Scoping Changes and Program Interfaces, Revision 5

PEG-45, Maintenance Rule Program Monitoring Activities, Revision 17

Condition Reports

1921691 1927198 1927831 1904565 1926696 1902366

Maintenance Orders/Work Orders

40200892 94082141

Miscellaneous

Chemical and Volume Control System Health Report

ER-AA-100-2002 Form F01, Revision 1, Maintenance Rule Functional Failure

Form 36180, Structural Monitoring Program Form 2, Revision 1

NEI-99-02, Revision 7

System Health Report (10/1-2013 – 12/31/2013) for the Fire Protection System

System Health Report (10/1-2013 – 12/31/2013) for Service Water System

Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Procedures

PRA-301, MR (a)(4) Process for On-Line Maintenance Group Instruction, Revision 0

WM-AA-100-1000, Work Activity Risk Management, Revision 0

Maintenance Orders/Work Orders

40227849 40227820 40281251
A-4

Attachment

Miscellaneous

Engineering Evaluation EE-13-007, Maintenance Rule (a)(4) Fire Implementation, Revision 0

Maintenance Rule a(4) Assessment Report for Work Week 1347

Maintenance Rule a(4) Assessment Report for Work Week 1349

Section 1R15: Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Procedures

EN-AA-203-1001, Operability Determinations / Functionality Assessments, Revisions 12 & 13

OS1006.05, RWST and SFP Silica/Activity Clean Up Operations, Revision 6

OX1416.04 Service Water Quarterly Pump and Discharge Valve Test and Comprehensive Test, 

Revision 18

Condition Reports

1755671 1909051 1918208 1918332 1919255 1920352

1920353 1920354 1914280

Maintenance Orders/Work Orders

40222427

Miscellaneous

SW-P-41A IST Pump Data Log

Section 1R18: Plant Modifications

Procedures

EN-AA-100, Design Change Program, Revision 1

EN-AA-100-1003, Control of Design Interfaces, Revision 1

EN-AA-205-1100, Design Change Packages, Revision 9

ES0815.004, Welding of Carbon Steel Materials (P-1 to P-1), Revision 1

LS0563.141, SWG-5 25R Synchronization Check Relay Inspection, Testing and PM, Revision 0

LS0568.21, Wiring Verification and Functional Checks, Revision 4

OS1000.01, Heatup from Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown, Revision 39

OX1426.03, Emergency Power Sequencer 18 Month Operability Test, Revision 7

OX1446.02, Bus E5 and E6 18 Month Offsite Power Supply Transfer Operability Test,

Revision 7

Condition Reports

01669517 1692863

Maintenance Orders/Work Orders

40233633 40233635 40040243 40090976

Miscellaneous

Calculation C-S-1-45886, Service Water Return Piping from CC-E-17-A&B Qualification, 

Revision 2

Calculation 9763-3-ED-00-23-F, Medium Voltage Protection Relay Coordination, Revision 0

EC 274301, EPS Power Supply Overvoltage Protection

EC 279413, Modifications in Support of OR16 32” SW Tee Replacement, Revision 1

EC 278785, SW Pipe Support Modifications in Support of OR16, Revision 2

Engineering Change (EC) 272542, 1-RC-TB-451 Temporary Setpoint Change 
A-5

Attachment

FP 36550, Environmental and Seismic Qualification Dedication Test Procedure and Test Report 

for GE Relay P/N 12SLJ21A1A, Revision 0

UFSAR 8.3.1.1.e.b

Westinghouse Comparator Calculations

Drawings

310108

801815S, Sheet 1 of 2, Support No. 1815-SG-51, Revision 1

1-NHY-310102, Sheet A52, Control Wiring Diagram 4160V Bus 1-E5 RAT Incoming Line, 

Revision 3

1-NHY-310102, Sheet A53a, 4160V Bus 1-E5 PT’s Three Line Diagram, Revision 14

1-NHY-310231, Sheet 11c, Miscellaneous Relays 4.16kV Switchgear Bus 1-EDE-SWG-5, 

Revision 7

SK-274863-2001

Section 1R19: Post-Maintenance Testing

Procedures

IS1672.211, 1-SW-L-6139 Service Water Cooling Tower Basin Water Level Loop B Calibration, 

Revision 9

OX1413.01, A Train RHR Quarterly Flow and Valve Stroke Test and 18 Month Valve Stroke 

Observation, Revision 18

OX1456.81, Operability Testing of IST Valves, Revision 18

Condition Reports

1915871 1897370 1916203 1916204 1908426 1926696

1927845 1921678 1921938

Maintenance Orders/Work Orders

40177013 40177017 40270845 40037987 40267058 40273297

40221056 40200892 40284268 40238117

Drawings

1-NHY-310107, Sheet D88a, 125 VDC Bus 11C 1-SWG-11C Three Line Diagram, Revision 11

1-NHY-310107, Sheet D88b, 1-SWG-11C Battery Charger Supply 1-BC-1C Schematic 

Diagram, Revision 2

1-NHY-503956, SW to DG WTR Jacket Hx Logic Diagram, Revision 6

Foreign Print (FP) 92380, Fisher Butterfly Valve

G25163, 16” Type 7620 Valve Bettis T-316-SR2 Rotary Actuator, Revision H

Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing

Procedures

OX1416.06 Service Water Discharge Valves Quarterly Test and 18 Month Position Verification, 

Revision 9

Condition Reports

01913220 01916357 1914416

Maintenance Orders/Work Orders

40222447
A-6

Attachment

Miscellaneous

Containment Sump ‘A’ and ‘B’ level trends

Unidentified Leak Rate trends

Section 2RS6: Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment

Procedures 

CD0904.11, Split and Cross Check Analysis, Revision 5

CDI-015, Sampling of Groundwater Monitoring Wells, Revision 3

CP 8.1, Verification of Analytical Systems Performance, Revision 23

CS0908.01, Off-site Dose Assessment, Revision 15

CS0910.11, Wide Range Gas Monitor Sampling, Revision 1

CS0917.02, Gaseous Effluent Releases, Revision 13

CS0917.03, Unmonitored Plant Releases, Revision 10

CS0917.04, Monitoring Plant Systems for Radioactivity, Revision 1

CX0917.01, Liquid Effluent Releases, Revision 20

Condition Reports

01634121 01876200 01876873 01876972 01876868 01898430

01891531 01924442 01924764

Miscellaneous

GEW Permit 13-150 Containment Purge, 4/4/13

GEW Permit 13-165 Continuous Plant Vent Releases, 4/9/13

HPOG 38 Dry Fuel Storage - Monitoring Plan for Kr-85 Release, August 14, 2013

HPSTID Number 13-005, Calculated Radiological Conditions Caused by the Release of Kr-85

during Dry Fuel Storage Campaign, August 14, 2013

LEW Permit 13-198 ASDA, 4/25/13

LEW Permit 13-149 Waste Test Tank B, 4/2/13

LEW Permit 13-194 Steam Generator Blowdown Flash Tank 4/10/13

LEW Permit 13-181 Turbine Building Sump, 4/3/13

SB Inter Laboratory Radiochemistry QC Report 2012

Seabrook 1 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report

Teledyne Brown Engineering Laboratory, CARR No. 120306-667, March 6, 2013

Teledyne Brown Engineering Laboratory, CARR No. 120831-715, August 31, 2012

Teledyne Brown Engineering Laboratory, CARR No. 120726-698, July 26, 2012

Teledyne Brown Engineering Laboratory, CARR No. 121127-742, November 27, 2012

Teledyne Brown Engineering Laboratory, CARR No.121109-744, November 9, 2012

Section 2RS7: Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program

Procedures 

CD05-01-01, YSI 556 MPS Operations Manual, Revision 3 

CDI-015, Sampling Groundwater Monitoring Wells, Revision 3

EV-AA-100-1000, Groundwater Protection Program Communications/Notification Plan,

Revision 4

EV-AA-100-1001, Fleet Groundwater Protection Program Implementing Guideline, Revision 2

LI-AA-102-1001, Regulatory Reporting, Revision 0

NARC 3-1.1, Periodic and Special Regulatory Reports, Revision 148

ON1244.01, Spill Response, Revision 24

OP 4.1, Effluent Surveillance Program, Revision 24
A-7

Attachment

Condition Reports 

01891529 01891530 01891531 01891515

Miscellaneous

Seabrook 1 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report

Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator Verification

Procedures 

CS0917.02, Gaseous Effluent Releases, Revision 14

CX0917.01, Liquid Effluent Releases, Revision 20

HD0958.33, Performance of Radiation Protection Supervisory Plant Walkdowns, Revision 6

JD0999.910, Reporting Key Performance Indicators per NEI 99-02, Revision 6

NAP-206, NRC Performance Indicators, Revision 6

Audits, Self-Assessments, and Surveillances 

Quick Hit Assessment Report 1914767, HP Performance Indicator Verification, November 1, 

2013

Condition Reports 

01856230

Miscellaneous

CHL-219 Reactor Coolant Specific Activity and RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrence

KPIs, November 14, 2013

CHL-219 Reactor Coolant Specific Activity and RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrence

KPIs, October 2, 2013

CHL-219 Reactor Coolant Specific Activity and RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrence

KPIs, September 4, 2013

CHL-219 Reactor Coolant Specific Activity and RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrence

KPIs, August 12, 2013

CHL-219 Reactor Coolant Specific Activity and RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrence

KPIs, July 3, 2013

CHL-219 Reactor Coolant Specific Activity and RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrence

KPIs, June 6, 2013 

CHL-219 Reactor Coolant Specific Activity and RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrence

KPIs, May 7, 2013

CHL-219 Reactor Coolant Specific Activity and RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrence

KPIs, April 5, 2013

CHL-219 Reactor Coolant Specific Activity and RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrence

KPIs, March 8, 2013

CHL-219 Reactor Coolant Specific Activity and RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrence

KPIs, February 7, 2013

CHL-219 Reactor Coolant Specific Activity and RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrence

KPIs, January 14, 2013

CHL-219 Reactor Coolant Specific Activity and RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrence

KPIs, December 5, 2012 

CHL-219 Reactor Coolant Specific Activity and RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrence

KPIs, November 13, 2012

CS0908.01 Form A, Dose Calculation for Liquid Effluent Release, Permit Number 13-395

CS0908.01 Form A, Dose Calculation for Liquid Effluent Release, Permit Number 13-106
A-8

Attachment

CS0908.01 Form A, Dose Calculation for Liquid Effluent Release, Permit Number 13-096

CS0908.01 Form F, Radioactive Effluent Dose Assessment Report, November 14, 2013

JD0999.910, Figure 1, Occupational Exposure Occurrence, October 10, 2013

JD0999.910, Figure 1, Occupational Exposure Occurrence, July 10, 2013

JD0999.910, Figure 1, Occupational Exposure Occurrence, April 4, 2013

LIC-13037, Documentation Supporting the Seabrook Station NRC 3rd Quarter 2013 

Performance Indicator Submittal

LIC-13036, Documentation Supporting the Seabrook Station NRC 2nd Quarter 2013 

Performance Indicator Submittal

LIC-13017, Documentation Supporting the Seabrook Station NRC 1st Quarter 2013 

Performance Indicator Submittal

LIC-13003, Documentation Supporting the Seabrook Station NRC 4th Quarter 2012 

Performance Indicator Submittal

MSPI Derivation Reports

Section 4OA2: Problem Identification and Resolution

Procedures

OP-AA-101-1000, Clearance and Tagging, Revision 9

PI-AA-204, Condition Evaluation and Corrective Action, Revision 23

Miscellaneous

Engineering Department Trend Report Input

Maintenance Department Trend Report Input

Operations Department Trend Report Input

Performance Improvement Weekly Updates (various)

Seabrook Station Self-Evaluation and Trending Analysis Report for 3rd Quarter 2013

System Health Report, EDE 4.16kV (10/1/13 – 12/31/13)
A-9

Attachment

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADAMS Agencywide Documents Access and Management System

ALARA as low as is reasonably achievable

AR action request

ASR Alkali-Silica Reaction

CAP corrective action program

CCI Combined Crack Indexing

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CR condition report

CY CY calendar year 

EC engineering change

EDG emergency diesel generator

FP Foreign Print

FSEL Ferguson Structural Engineering Laboratory

GPI groundwater protection initiative

GW groundwater

GWPP groundwater protection program

IMC Inspection Manual Chapter

JPM job performance measures

LER licensee event report

MR Maintenance Rule

NCV non-cited violation

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

ODCM offsite dose calculation manual

PAB Primary Auxiliary Building

PARS Publicly Available Records

PI performance indicator

RCS reactor coolant system

REMP Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program

RG Regulatory Guide

RHR residual heat removal

SDP significance determination process

SSC structure, system, or component

SW service water

TS Technical Specification

UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report

URI unresolved item

WO work order