Vol. 78 Friday, 

No. 178 September 13, 2013 

Part II 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

10 CFR Part 51 

Waste Confidence—Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel; Proposed 

Rule 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS2
56776 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 178 / Friday, September 13, 2013 / Proposed Rules 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

10 CFR Part 51 

[NRC–2012–0246] 

RIN 3150–AJ20 

Waste Confidence—Continued Storage 

of Spent Nuclear Fuel 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Proposed rule. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) proposes revising its 

generic determination on the 

environmental impacts of the continued 

storage of spent nuclear fuel beyond a 

reactor’s licensed life for operation and 

prior to ultimate disposal. The NRC has 

prepared a draft generic environmental 

impact statement to support this 

proposed rule. The Commission 

proposes to conclude that the analysis 

generically addresses the environmental 

impacts of continued storage of spent 

nuclear fuel beyond the licensed life for 

operation of a reactor and supports the 

determinations that it is feasible to 

safely store spent nuclear fuel beyond 

the licensed life for operation of a 

reactor and to have a mined geologic 

repository within 60 years following the 

licensed life for operation of a reactor. 

The proposed rule also would clarify 

that the generic determination applies to 

a license renewal for an independent 

spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI). In 

addition, the proposed rule would make 

conforming amendments to the 

Commission’s 2013 findings on the 

environmental effects of renewing the 

operating license of a nuclear power 

plant to address issues related to the 

storage of spent nuclear fuel after a 

reactor’s licensed life for operation and 

the offsite radiological impacts of spent 

nuclear fuel and high-level waste 

disposal. 

DATES: Submit comments on the 

proposed rule by November 27, 2013. 

Comments received after this date will 

be considered if it is practical to do so, 

but the NRC is able to assure 

consideration only for comments 

received on or before this date. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments 

related to this proposed rule by any of 

the following methods (unless this 

document describes a different method 

for submitting comments on a specific 

subject): 

• Federal rulemaking Web site: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and search 

for Docket ID NRC–2012–0246. Address 

questions about NRC dockets to Carol 

Gallagher; telephone: 301–287–3422; 

email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For 

technical questions, contact the 

individuals listed in the FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION CONTACT section of this 

document. 

• Email comments to: 

Rulemaking.Comments@nrc.gov. If you 

do not receive an automatic email reply 

confirming receipt, then contact us at 

301–415–1677. 

• Fax comments to: Secretary, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission at 301– 

415–1101. 

• Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, DC 20555–0001, ATTN: 

Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff. 

• Hand deliver comments to: 11555 

Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 

20852, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. 

(Eastern Time) Federal workdays; 

telephone: 301–415–1677. 

For additional direction on accessing 

information and submitting comments, 

see ‘‘Accessing Information and 

Submitting Comments’’ in the 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of 

this document. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Merri Horn, Office of Nuclear Material 

Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, Washington, 

DC 20555–0001; telephone: 301–287– 

9167; email: Merri.Horn@nrc.gov; or 

Timothy McCartin, Office of Nuclear 

Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, DC 20555–0001; telephone: 

301–287–9259; email: 

Timothy.McCartin@nrc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Executive Summary 

Purpose of the Regulatory Action 

The purpose of this proposed rule is 

to improve the efficiency of the NRC’s 

licensing process by adopting into the 

NRC’s regulations an analysis of the 

generic environmental impacts of the 

continued storage of spent nuclear fuel 

beyond the licensed life for operations 

of a reactor (continued storage). The 

NRC has prepared a draft generic 

environmental impact statement of the 

environmental impacts of continued 

storage, which provides a regulatory 

basis for the rule. This proposed rule 

would codify the results of the analyses 

from the generic environmental impact 

statement in § 51.23 of Title 10 of the 

Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), 

‘‘Temporary storage of spent nuclear 

fuel after cessation of reactor operationgeneric determination of no significant 

environmental impact.’’ The NRC’s 

licensing proceedings for nuclear 

reactors and ISFSIs have historically 

relied upon the generic determination in 

10 CFR 51.23 to satisfy the agency’s 

obligations under the National 

Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) with 

respect to the narrow area of the 

environmental impacts of continued 

storage. If this proposed rule is adopted 

as a final rule, the NEPA analyses for 

future reactor and spent-fuel-storage 

facility licensing actions would not 

need to consider the environmental 

impacts of continued storage on a site 

specific basis. 

Summary of the Major Rule Changes 

The major proposed changes to the 

rule are summarized as follows: 

• The title of 10 CFR 51.23 would be 

revised to ‘‘Environmental impacts of 

storage of spent nuclear fuel beyond the 

licensed life for operation of a reactor.’’ 

• Paragraph (a) of 10 CFR 51.23 

would be revised to provide the 

Commission’s generic determination on 

continued storage of spent nuclear fuel. 

The proposed amendments would state 

that the Commission has concluded that 

the analysis in NUREG–2157, ‘‘Waste 

Confidence Generic Environmental 

Impact Statement’’ (DGEIS) generically 

supports the environmental impacts of 

continued storage of spent nuclear fuel 

beyond the licensed life for operation of 

a reactor and supports the Commission’s 

determinations that it is feasible to 

safely store spent nuclear fuel beyond 

the licensed life for operation of a 

reactor and to have a mined geologic 

repository within 60 years following the 

licensed life for operation of a reactor. 

• Paragraph (b) of 10 CFR 51.23 

would be revised to clarify that license 

renewals for an ISFSI are included in 

the scope of the generic determination. 

• Conforming changes would be 

made to 10 CFR 51.61, 51.80(b), and 

51.97(a) to clarify that ISFSI license 

renewals are included in the scope of 

the generic determination. 

• The ‘‘Offsite radiological impacts of 

spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste 

disposal’’ issue would be reclassified as 

a Category 1 impact in Table B–1 of 

appendix B of 10 CFR part 51, 

‘‘Summary of Findings on NEPA Issues 

for License Renewal of Nuclear Power 

Plants,’’ and the finding column entry 

would be revised to address continued 

storage. 

• The finding column entry for the 

‘‘Onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel’’ 

issue’’ in Table B–1 appendix B of 

subpart A of 10 CFR part 51 would be 

revised to include the period of 

continued storage beyond the licensed 

life for operation of a reactor. 

Table of Contents 

I. Accessing Information and Submitting 

Comments 


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A. Accessing Information 

B. Submitting Comments 

II. Background 

III. Discussion 

A. General Information 

A1. What action is the NRC taking? 

A2. What is the Waste Confidence 

proceeding? 

A3. Why is the NRC doing this now? 

A4. Whom would this action affect? 

A5. Why is the NRC generically addressing 

the environmental impacts of continued 

storage? 

A6. What types of waste are addressed by 

Waste Confidence? 

A7. What activities are not covered by the 

Waste Confidence DGEIS and proposed 

rule? 

A8. How is spent nuclear fuel stored? 

A9. How can the NRC conduct a generic 

review when spent nuclear fuel is stored 

at specific sites? Why has a site-specific 

review not been conducted? 

A10. Would the waste confidence 

rulemaking authorize the storage of 

spent nuclear fuel at the operating 

reactor site near me? 

A11. What environmental reviews would be 

precluded from a site-specific licensing 

action after the waste confidence 

rulemaking is complete? 

A12. Why is there not a separate Waste 

Confidence Decision document? 

A13. How can the NRC complete the 

environmental impact statement and 

rulemaking in 24 months? 

A14. What is the status of the extended 

storage effort? 

A15. How can the NRC proceed with this 

rulemaking while research on the 

extended storage of spent nuclear fuel is 

ongoing? 

A16. Did the NRC factor in information 

from the Spent Fuel Pool Study in the 

DGEIS? 

A17. Did the NRC address accidents in the 

DGEIS? 

A18. Does the NRC plan to hold public 

meetings on the Waste Confidence 

DGEIS and proposed rule? 

A19. How can I stay informed of Waste 

Confidence activities? 

A20. How frequently does the NRC plan to 

revisit the Waste Confidence GEIS and 

rule? 

A21. What should I consider as I prepare 

to submit my comments to the NRC? 

B. Waste Confidence Rulemaking 

B1. What is the purpose of this Waste 

Confidence Rulemaking? 

B2. What is meant by the phrase ‘‘Licensed 

Life for Operation of a Reactor?’’ 

B3. What timeframes are being considered 

in the DGEIS? 

B4. What is the significance of the levels 

of impact in the DGEIS (SMALL, 

MODERATE, LARGE)? 

B5. What are the environmental impacts of 

at-reactor continued storage? 

B6. What are the environmental impacts of 

away-from-reactor continued storage? 

B7. Does a potentially LARGE impact on 

historic and cultural resources affect the 

generic determination in the waste 

confidence DGEIS? 

B8. How will the proposed rule address the 

impacts from continued storage of spent 

nuclear fuel? 

B9. What are the key assumptions used in 

the DGEIS? 

B10. What did the NRC assume regarding 

the continuation of institutional controls 

and why? 

B11. How would significant changes in 

these assumptions be addressed under 

the NRC’s regulatory framework? 

B12. What is the technical basis for 

concluding that continued storage can 

occur safely? 

B13. If the NRC is considering extending 

the timeframe of safe storage, how is that 

not de facto on site disposal? 

B14. Does the U.S. Department of Energy’s 

motion to withdraw its Yucca Mountain 

application affect the NRC’s conclusion 

that geologic disposal is technically 

feasible? 

B15. What changes are being proposed for 

the timing of a geologic repository? 

B16. Why does the NRC think it is feasible 

that a repository can be available in 60 

years? 

B17. How does this rulemaking relate to 

the licensing of future away-from-reactor 

ISFSIs? 

B18. How does this rulemaking relate to 

the certification of spent fuel storage 

casks and use of the 10 CFR part 72 

general storage license to store spent 

nuclear fuel at operating or 

decommissioned reactor facilities that 

are licensed under 10 CFR parts 50 or 52 

by the NRC? 

B19. How can a future site-specific reactor 

EIS or supplement that references the 

GEIS be used to understand the 

environmental impacts of the no-action 

alternative of not approving nuclear 

power operations at a proposed site? 

B20. What changes are being proposed to 

address continued storage for license 

renewal? 

C. Decision 

C1. Introduction 

C2. Geologic Repository—Technical 

Feasibility and Availability 

C3. Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel 

C3.a. Regulatory Framework 

C3.b. Safe Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel 

C3.b.i. Technical Feasibility of Wet Storage 

C3.b.ii. Technical Feasibility of Dry Storage 

C.3.b.iii. Summary of Technical Feasibility 

of Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage 

IV. Additional Issues for Public Comment 

V. Discussion of Proposed Amendments by 

Section 

VI. Availability of Documents 

VII. Agreement State Compatibility 

VIII. Plain Writing 

IX. Voluntary Consensus Standards 

X. Draft Environmental Impact Statement: 

Availability 

XI. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement 

XII. Regulatory Analysis 

XIII. Regulatory Flexibility Certification 

XIV. Backfitting and Issue Finality 

I. Accessing Information and 

Submitting Comments 

A. Accessing Information 

Please refer to Docket ID NRC–2012– 

0246 when contacting the NRC about 

the availability of information for this 

proposed rule. You may access 

information related to this proposed 

rule, which the NRC possesses and is 

publicly-available, by any of the 

following methods: 

• Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and search 

for Docket ID NRC–2012–0246. 

• NRC’s Agencywide Documents 

Access and Management System 

(ADAMS): You may access publiclyavailable documents online in the NRC 

Library at http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/adams.html. To begin the search, 

select ‘‘ADAMS Public Documents’’ and 

then select ‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS 

Search.’’ For problems with ADAMS, 

please contact the NRC’s Public 

Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 

1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by 

email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The 

ADAMS accession number for each 

document referenced in this proposed 

rule (if that document is available in 

ADAMS) is provided the first time that 

a document is referenced. In addition, 

for the convenience of the reader, the 

ADAMS accession numbers are 

provided in a table in Section VI, 

Availability of Documents, of this 

document. 

• NRC’s PDR: You may examine and 

purchase copies of public documents at 

the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One 

White Flint North, 11555 Rockville 

Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. 

B. Submitting Comments 

Please include Docket ID NRC–2012– 

0246 in the subject line of your 

comment submission, in order to ensure 

that the NRC is able to make your 

comment submission available to the 

public in this docket. 

The NRC cautions you not to include 

identifying or contact information that 

you do not want to be publicly 

disclosed in your comment submission. 

The NRC will post all comment 

submissions at http://

www.regulations.gov as well as enter the 

comment submissions into ADAMS and 

the NRC does not routinely edit 

comment submissions to remove 

identifying or contact information. 

If you are requesting or aggregating 

comments from other persons for 

submission to the NRC, then you should 

inform those persons not to include 

identifying or contact information that 

they do not want to be publicly 

disclosed in their comment submission. 


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56778 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 178 / Friday, September 13, 2013 / Proposed Rules 

1Under the court remand that precipitated the 

initial waste confidence review, the NRC was 

required to consider whether there was reasonable 

assurance that an offsite storage solution would be 

available by the years 2007–2009 and, if not, 

whether there was reasonable assurance that the 

spent fuel could be stored safely at those sites 

beyond those dates. See State of Minnesota v. NRC, 

602 F.2d 412, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 

Your request should state that the NRC 

does not routinely edit comment 

submissions to remove such information 

before making the comment 

submissions available to the public or 

entering the comment into ADAMS. 

II. Background 

In the late 1970s, a number of 

environmental groups and States 

challenged the NRC regarding issues 

related to the storage and disposal of 

spent nuclear fuel beyond a reactor’s 

licensed life for operation. In 1977, the 

Commission denied a petition for 

rulemaking (PRM), PRM–50–18, filed by 

the Natural Resources Defense Council 

(NRDC) that asked the NRC to determine 

whether radioactive wastes generated in 

nuclear power reactors can be disposed 

of without undue risk to public health 

and safety and to refrain from granting 

pending or future requests for reactor 

operating licenses until the NRC made 

such a determination. The Commission 

stated in its denial that, as a matter of 

policy, it ‘‘. . . would not continue to 

license reactors if it did not have 

reasonable confidence that the wastes 

can and will in due course be disposed 

of safely’’ (42 FR 34391, 34393; July 5, 

1977, pet. for rev. dismissed sub nom., 

NRDC v. NRC, 582 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 

1978)). 

At about the same time, interested 

parties challenged license amendments 

that permitted expansion of the capacity 

of spent fuel pools at two nuclear power 

plants, Vermont Yankee and Prairie 

Island. In 1979, the U.S. Court of 

Appeals for the District of Columbia 

Circuit, in Minnesota v. NRC, 602 F.2d 

412 (D.C. Cir. 1979), did not stay or 

vacate the license amendments, but did 

remand to the Commission the question 

of whether an offsite storage or disposal 

solution would be available for the 

spent nuclear fuel at the two facilities at 

the expiration of their licenses—at that 

time scheduled for 2007 and 2009—and, 

if not, whether the spent nuclear fuel 

could be stored safely at those reactor 

sites until an offsite solution became 

available. 

In 1979, the NRC initiated a generic 

rulemaking proceeding that stemmed 

from these challenges and the Court’s 

remand in Minnesota v. NRC. The 

purpose of the Waste Confidence 

rulemaking was to generically assess 

whether the Commission could have 

reasonable assurance that radioactive 

wastes produced by nuclear power 

plants ‘‘can be safely disposed of, to 

determine when such disposal or offsite 

storage will be available, and to 

determine whether radioactive wastes 

can be safely stored onsite past the 

expiration of existing facility licenses 

until offsite disposal or storage is 

available’’ (44 FR 61372, 61373; October 

25, 1979). On August 31, 1984, the 

Commission published the Waste 

Confidence Decision (Decision) (49 FR 

34658) and a final rule (49 FR 34688), 

codified at 10 CFR 51.23. This Decision 

provided an Environmental Assessment 

(EA) and Finding of No Significant 

Impact (FONSI) to support the rule. In 

the 1984 Decision the Commission 

made five Findings: 

1. The Commission finds reasonable 

assurance that safe disposal of 

radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel 

in a mined geologic repository is 

technically feasible; 

2. The Commission finds reasonable 

assurance that one or more mined 

geologic repositories for commercial 

high-level radioactive waste and spent 

nuclear fuel will be available by the 

years 2007–2009 1 and that sufficient 

repository capacity will be available 

within 30 years beyond the expiration of 

any reactor operating license to dispose 

of existing commercial high-level 

radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel 

originating in such reactor and 

generated up to that time; 

3. The Commission finds reasonable 

assurance that high-level radioactive 

waste and spent nuclear fuel will be 

managed in a safe manner until 

sufficient repository capacity is 

available to assure the safe disposal of 

all high-level radioactive waste and 

spent nuclear fuel; 

4. The Commission finds reasonable 

assurance that, if necessary, spent 

nuclear fuel generated in any reactor 

can be stored safely and without 

significant environmental impacts for at 

least 30 years beyond the expiration of 

that reactor’s operating license at that 

reactor’s spent fuel storage basin or at 

either onsite or offsite ISFSIs; and 

5. The Commission finds reasonable 

assurance that safe independent onsite 

or offsite spent fuel storage will be made 

available if such storage capacity is 

needed. 

The rule, 10 CFR 51.23, codified the 

analysis in the Decision and found that 

for at least 30 years beyond the 

expiration of a reactor operating license, 

no significant environmental impacts 

will result from the storage of spent 

nuclear fuel and expressed the 

Commission’s reasonable assurance that 

a repository was likely to be available by 

2007–2009. The rule also stated that, as 

a result of this generic determination, 

the agency did not need to assess the 

site-specific impacts of continuing to 

store the spent nuclear fuel in either an 

onsite or offsite storage facility in new 

reactor licensing environmental impact 

statements (EIS) or EAs beyond the 

expiration dates of reactor licenses (10 

CFR 51.23(b)). The rule also amended 

10 CFR part 50, ‘‘Domestic licensing of 

production and utilization facilities,’’ to 

require operating nuclear power reactor 

licensees to submit their plans for 

managing spent nuclear fuel at their site 

until the fuel is transferred to the U.S. 

Department of Energy (DOE) for 

disposal (see 10 CFR 50.54(bb)). 

The Commission conducted its first 

review of the Decision and rule in 1989– 

1990. This review resulted in the 

revision of the second and fourth 

Findings to reflect revised expectations 

for the date of availability of the first 

repository, and to clarify that the 

expiration of a reactor’s licensed life for 

operation referred to the full 40-year 

initial license for operation and any 

additional term of a revised or renewed 

license. On September 18, 1990, the 

Commission published the revised 

Decision (55 FR 38474) and the 

associated final rule (55 FR 38472). The 

revised Findings 2 and 4 in the 1990 

revised Decision were: 

Finding 2: The Commission finds 

reasonable assurance that at least one 

mined geologic repository will be 

available within the first quarter of the 

twenty-first century, and sufficient 

repository capacity will be available 

within 30 years beyond the licensed life 

for operation (which may include the 

term of a revised or renewed license) of 

any reactor to dispose of the commercial 

high-level radioactive waste and spent 

nuclear fuel originating in such reactor 

and generated up until that time. 

Finding 4: The Commission finds 

reasonable assurance that, if necessary, 

spent nuclear fuel generated at any 

reactor can be stored safely and without 

significant environmental impacts for at 

least 30 years beyond the licensed life 

for operation (which may include the 

term of a revised or renewed license) of 

that reactor at its spent fuel storage 

basin or at either onsite or offsite ISFSIs. 

The Commission also amended 10 

CFR 51.23(a) to reflect the revised 

timing of the availability of a geologic 

repository to the first quarter of the 

twenty-first century. The rule was also 

revised to reflect that the licensed life 

for operation may include the term of a 

revised or renewed license. 

The Commission conducted its 

second review of the Decision and rule 


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Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 178 / Friday, September 13, 2013 / Proposed Rules 56779 

2The Court’s ruling is available at: http://

www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/

57ACA94A8FFAD8AF85257A1700502AA4/$file/

11-1045-1377720.pdf. 

3A Webcast is an Internet-based meeting that 

includes both audio and video feeds. A Webinar is 

an Internet-based meeting that does not include 

video. 

in 1999 and concluded that experience 

and developments after 1990 had 

confirmed the Findings and made a 

comprehensive reevaluation of the 

Decision and rule unnecessary (64 FR 

68005; December 6, 1999). 

In 2008, the Commission decided to 

conduct its third review of the Decision 

and rule as part of an effort to enhance 

the efficiency of upcoming combined 

operating license application 

proceedings. The Commission 

determined that it would be more 

efficient to resolve certain combinedlicense-proceeding issues generically, 

including those related to Waste 

Confidence. This review resulted in a 

revision of the second and fourth 

Findings to reflect revised expectations 

for the date of availability of the first 

repository and that spent nuclear fuel 

can be stored safely for at least 60 years 

beyond the licensed life for operation. 

In December 2010, the Commission 

published its revised Decision (75 FR 

81032; December 23, 2010) and 

associated final rule (75 FR 81037; 

December 23, 2010). The revised 

Findings 2 and 4 in the 2010 Decision 

were: 

Finding 2: The Commission finds 

reasonable assurance that sufficient 

mined geologic repository capacity will 

be available to dispose of the 

commercial high-level radioactive waste 

and spent nuclear fuel generated by any 

reactor when necessary. 

Finding 4: The Commission finds 

reasonable assurance that, if necessary, 

spent nuclear fuel generated in any 

reactor can be stored safely and without 

significant environmental impacts for at 

least 60 years beyond the licensed life 

for operation (which may include the 

term of a revised or renewed license) of 

that reactor in a combination of storage 

in its spent fuel storage basin and either 

onsite or offsite ISFSIs. 

Section 51.23(a) of 10 CFR was 

amended to reflect revised Findings 2 

and 4. The changes reflected that spent 

nuclear fuel could be safely stored for at 

least 60 years beyond the licensed life 

for operation of a reactor and that 

sufficient mined geologic repository 

capacity would be available when 

necessary. 

In response to the 2010 Decision and 

rule, the States of New York, New 

Jersey, Connecticut, and Vermont; 

several public interest groups; and the 

Prairie Island Indian Community filed a 

lawsuit in the U.S. Court of Appeals for 

the District of Columbia Circuit that 

challenged the Commission’s 

compliance with NEPA. On June 8, 

2012, the Court ruled that some aspects 

of the 2010 Decision did not satisfy the 

NRC’s NEPA obligations and vacated 

and remanded the Decision and rule 

(New York v. NRC, 681 F.3d 471 (D.C. 

Cir. 2012) 2). The Court concluded that 

the Waste Confidence rulemaking is a 

major federal action necessitating either 

an EIS or an EA that results in a FONSI. 

In vacating the 2010 Decision and rule, 

the Court identified three specific 

deficiencies in the analysis: 

1. Related to the Commission’s 

conclusion that permanent disposal will 

be available ‘‘when necessary,’’ the 

Court held that the Commission needed 

to include an evaluation of the 

environmental effects of failing to 

secure permanent disposal since there 

was a degree of uncertainty regarding 

whether a repository would be built; 

2. Related to continued storage of 

spent nuclear fuel, the Court concluded 

that the Commission had not adequately 

examined the risk of spent fuel pool 

leaks in a forward-looking fashion; and 

3. Also related to the continued 

storage of spent nuclear fuel, the Court 

concluded that the Commission had not 

adequately examined the consequences 

of potential spent fuel pool fires. 

In response to the Court’s decision, on 

August 7, 2012, the Commission stated 

in Commission Order CLI–12–16 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML12220A094) 

that it would not issue reactor or ISFSI 

licenses dependent upon the Waste 

Confidence Decision and rule until the 

Court’s remand is appropriately 

addressed. The Commission stated, 

however, that this determination 

extends only to final license issuance 

and that all licensing reviews and 

proceedings should continue to move 

forward. 

In the September 6, 2012, Staff 

Requirements Memorandum, ‘‘Staff 

Requirements—COMSECY–12–0016— 

Approach for Addressing Policy Issues 

Resulting from Court Decision to Vacate 

Waste Confidence Decision and Rule’’ 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML12250A032), 

the Commission directed the staff to 

develop a generic EIS to support an 

updated Waste Confidence Decision and 

rule. In response, the NRC formed the 

Waste Confidence Directorate in the 

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and 

Safeguards (NMSS) to oversee the 

development of the generic EIS and an 

update that would replace the previous 

Waste Confidence Decision and rule. 

The NRC began the environmental 

review process by publishing a Notice of 

Intent to prepare an EIS and conduct 

scoping (77 FR 65137; October 25, 

2012). The NRC held one public 

meeting with a live Webcast and one 

Webcast-only meeting in November 

2012, and two Webinars in December 

2012 to obtain public input on the scope 

of the environmental review.3 The 

transcripts for each of these meetings 

are available in ADAMS under 

Accession Nos. ML12331A347, 

ML12331A353, ML12355A174, and 

ML12355A187, respectively. The 

scoping period ended on January 2, 

2013. Starting in January 2013, the NRC 

Waste Confidence Directorate has held 

monthly public teleconferences to 

provide updates on the status of Waste 

Confidence activities. 

The ‘‘Waste Confidence Generic 

Environmental Impact Statement 

Scoping Process Summary Report,’’ 

which is available in ADAMS under 

Accession No. ML13060A128, provides 

a summary of the determinations and 

conclusions reached during the NRC’s 

environmental scoping process. The 

Summary Report also contains a 

summary of comments received during 

the public scoping period and the NRC’s 

responses. A separate document, 

‘‘Scoping Comments on the Waste 

Confidence Generic Environmental 

Impact Statement,’’ lists the scoping 

comments, organized by comment 

category (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML13060A130). The NRC is issuing this 

proposed rule and the draft NUREG– 

2157, ‘‘Waste Confidence Generic 

Environmental Impact Statement’’ 

(DGEIS) (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML13224A106) for public comment. 

III. Discussion 

This discussion section has been 

divided into three subsections to better 

present information on the proposed 

rule and the Waste Confidence 

proceeding. Section A provides general 

information related to the Waste 

Confidence proceeding. Section B 

provides information related to the 

proposed rule changes. Sections A and 

B are in a question and answer format. 

Lastly, Section C ‘‘Decision’’ provides a 

discussion of the issues and conclusions 

addressed in the DGEIS that had 

previously appeared in the Findings 

discussions of prior Waste Confidence 

decisions. 

A. General Information 

A1. What action is the NRC taking? 

The NRC is proposing to issue a rule 

to codify its generic determination on 

the environmental impacts of continued 

storage of spent nuclear fuel at, or away 


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56780 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 178 / Friday, September 13, 2013 / Proposed Rules 

4Mixed oxide fuel (often called MOX fuel) is a 

type of nuclear reactor fuel that contains plutonium 

oxide mixed with either natural or depleted 

uranium oxide in ceramic pellet form. 

from, reactor sites beyond a reactor’s 

licensed life for operation. The analysis 

in the DGEIS provides a regulatory basis 

for the proposed rule. 

A2. What is the Waste Confidence 

proceeding? 

Historically, the Commission’s Waste 

Confidence proceeding represented the 

Commission’s generic determination 

and generic environmental analysis that 

spent nuclear fuel can be stored safely 

and without significant environmental 

impacts for a period of time past the 

licensed life for operation of a reactor. 

This generic environmental analysis 

was reflected in 10 CFR 51.23, which 

addresses the NRC’s NEPA obligations 

with respect to the continued storage of 

spent nuclear fuel beyond the licensed 

life for operation of a reactor but before 

ultimate disposal. 

This proposed rule and the DGEIS 

represent a change in the format of the 

Commission’s Waste Confidence 

proceeding. As discussed in more detail 

in Question A.12, because the 

Commission is preparing a DGEIS, 

which provides a detailed analysis of 

the environmental impacts associated 

with continued storage, it is no longer 

necessary to make a ‘‘finding of no 

significant impact,’’ as that term is used 

in NEPA, associated with continued 

storage. This proposed rule then 

codifies the environmental impacts 

reflected in the DGEIS. 

A3. Why is the NRC doing this now? 

On June 8, 2012, the U.S. Court of 

Appeals for the District of Columbia 

Circuit vacated the Commission’s 2010 

Waste Confidence rulemaking, and 

remanded the rulemaking to the NRC to 

address deficiencies related to the 

NRC’s NEPA analysis. On September 6, 

2012, the Commission instructed NRC 

staff to proceed with a generic EIS to 

analyze the environmental impacts of 

continued storage and address the 

issues raised in the Court’s decision and 

to update the Waste Confidence rule in 

accordance with the analysis in the EIS. 

The DGEIS and this proposed rule 

implement the Commission’s direction. 

A4. Whom would this action affect? 

This proposed rule would affect any 

nuclear power reactor applicant and 

licensee undergoing issuance or renewal 

of an operating license for a nuclear 

power reactor under 10 CFR parts 50 or 

54, ‘‘Requirements for renewal of 

operating licenses for nuclear power 

plants’’; issuance of a combined license 

for a nuclear power reactor under 10 

CFR part 52, ‘‘Licenses, certifications, 

and approvals for nuclear power 

plants’’; or some amendments of a 

license under 10 CFR parts 50 or 52. 

This proposed rule would also affect the 

issuance of an initial, amended, or 

renewed license for storage of spent 

nuclear fuel at an ISFSI under 10 CFR 

part 72, ‘‘Licensing requirements for the 

independent storage of spent nuclear 

fuel, high-level radioactive waste, and 

reactor-related greater than Class C 

waste.’’ The proposed rule could also 

affect participants in any proceeding 

addressing these licensing actions. 

A5. Why is the NRC generically 

addressing the environmental impacts 

of continued storage? 

Since 1984, the NRC has generically 

addressed the environmental impacts of 

continued storage though a generic 

NEPA analysis and rule. Without a 

generic environmental impact analysis, 

site-specific consideration of the 

environmental impacts of continued 

storage would be necessary. The NRC’s 

proposed reliance on a GEIS and rule to 

address environmental impacts of 

continued storage of spent nuclear fuel 

will enhance the NRC’s efficiency in 

individual licensing reviews by 

addressing a set of issues that are the 

same or largely similar or can be 

reasonably predicted based on a well 

understood range of operating 

experience at each power reactor or 

storage site and codifying them. The 

generic determination in 10 CFR 51.23 

would satisfy the NRC’s NEPA 

obligations with respect to the 

environmental impacts of continued 

storage. 

A6. What types of waste are addressed 

by Waste Confidence? 

The environmental analysis in the 

DGEIS and in this proposed rule covers 

low and high burn-up spent nuclear fuel 

generated in light-water nuclear power 

reactors. It also covers mixed oxide 

(MOX) fuel,4 since the MOX fuel would 

be substantially similar to existing lightwater reactor fuel and is, in fact, being 

considered for use in existing lightwater reactors in the United States. It 

also covers spent nuclear fuel from 

small modular reactors. Small modular 

light-water reactors being developed 

will use fuel very similar in form and 

materials to the existing operating 

reactors and will not, therefore, 

introduce new technical challenges to 

the disposal of spent nuclear fuel. Waste 

Confidence also covers the spent 

nuclear fuel from one high-temperature 

gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) built and 

commercially operated: Fort Saint 

Vrain. The spent nuclear fuel from 

Peach Bottom Unit 1 is not covered 

because its fuel has been removed from 

the site and transferred to the control of 

DOE, and the fuel is no longer regulated 

by the NRC (see Section 2.1.1.3 of the 

DGEIS). 

A7. What activities are not covered by 

the Waste Confidence DGEIS and 

proposed rule? 

Waste Confidence does not consider 

transportation of spent nuclear fuel 

during reactor operation, disposal of 

spent nuclear fuel, or storage of spent 

nuclear fuel during the licensed life for 

operation of the power reactor. 

Additionally, Waste Confidence does 

not address foreign spent nuclear fuel, 

non-power reactor spent fuel (e.g., fuel 

from research and test reactors), defense 

waste, Greater-than-Class C low-level 

waste, reprocessing of commercial spent 

nuclear fuel, and the need for nuclear 

power. 

The NRC is participating in preapplication reviews of the DOE’s Next 

Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP). The 

NGNP would use nuclear fuel 

comprised of Tristructural-Isotopiccoated fuel particles contained in either 

fuel pebbles or prismatic fuel 

assemblies. However, because this fuel 

type has not completed fuel 

qualification testing, continued storage 

of spent nuclear fuel from the NGNP 

program is not within the scope of the 

DGEIS and this proposed rule. 

Additionally, the continued storage of 

future HTGR spent nuclear fuels is not 

within the scope of the DGEIS or this 

proposed rule. 

A8. How is spent nuclear fuel stored? 

Spent nuclear fuel is stored in either 

spent fuel pools or in dry cask storage. 

Spent fuel pools are designed to store 

and cool the spent nuclear fuel 

following removal from the reactor. 

Spent fuel pools are massive, 

seismically-designed structures that are 

constructed from thick, reinforced 

concrete walls and slabs that vary 

between 0.7 and 3 meters (2 and 10 feet) 

thick. All spent fuel pools currently in 

operation are lined with stainless steel 

liners that vary in thickness between 6 

and 13 millimeters (0.25 and 0.5 

inches); spent fuel pools have either a 

leak detection system or administrative 

controls to monitor the spent fuel pool 

liner. Leak detection systems are usually 

made up of several channels that can be 

monitored individually or are designed 

in such a way that leakage empties into 

drains that can be monitored. Leaked 

water is directed to a sump, liquid 

radioactive waste treatment system, or 


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other cleanup or collection systems. 

Racks fitted in the spent fuel pools store 

the fuel assemblies in a controlled 

configuration (i.e., so that the fuel is 

both sub-critical and in a coolable 

geometry). Spent fuel pool systems also 

include redundant monitoring, cooling, 

and makeup-water systems. The spent 

nuclear fuel assemblies are positioned 

in racks at the bottom of the pool and 

are typically covered by at least 6 meters 

(20 feet) of water. The water in the pools 

provides radiation shielding, spent 

nuclear fuel assembly cooling, and 

captures radionuclides in case of fuel 

rod leaks. Spent fuel pools are located 

at reactor sites, typically within the fuelhandling building (pressurized-water 

reactor (PWR)) or the reactor building 

(boiling-water reactor). A typical spent 

fuel pool at a light water reactor holds 

(with full core reserve maintained) the 

equivalent of about 6 core loads, or 

about 700 metric tons uranium (MTU). 

There is one away-from-reactor spent 

fuel pool (General Electric-Hitachi 

(GEH)-Morris) licensed under 10 CFR 

part 72 as an ISFSI. Information on the 

spent fuel pools and the quantity of 

spent nuclear fuel that can be stored in 

spent fuel pools is available in 

Appendix G of the DGEIS (see also 

Chapter 2 of the DGEIS). 

Spent nuclear fuel is also stored in 

dry casks at ISFSIs licensed by the NRC 

under either a general license or a 

specific license. Dry cask storage shields 

people and the environment from 

radiation and keeps the spent nuclear 

fuel inside dry and nonreactive. Dry 

cask storage allows spent fuel that has 

already been cooled in the spent fuel 

pool to be surrounded by inert gas 

inside a container called a cask. The 

casks are typically steel cylinders that 

are either welded or bolted closed. The 

steel cylinder provides a leak-tight 

confinement of the spent fuel. Each 

cylinder is surrounded by additional 

steel, concrete, or other material to 

provide radiation shielding to workers 

and members of the public. Dry cask 

storage systems are essentially passive 

systems that rely on natural air 

circulation for cooling during storage of 

the spent nuclear fuel, and are robust 

massive structures that are highly 

damage resistant. There are many 

different dry cask storage systems, but 

most fall into two main categories based 

on how they are loaded. The first is the 

bare fuel, or direct-load, casks in which 

spent nuclear fuel is loaded directly into 

a basket that is integrated into the cask. 

Bare fuel casks, which tend to be all 

metal construction, are generally bolted 

closed. The second is the canister-based 

system in which spent nuclear fuel is 

loaded into a basket inside a relatively 

thin-walled cylinder called a canister. 

The canister is usually loaded while 

inside a transfer cask and then welded 

and transferred vertically into either a 

concrete or metal storage overpack or 

horizontally into a concrete storage 

module. As of the end of 2012, ISFSIs 

were storing spent nuclear fuel in over 

1,700 loaded dry casks. Information on 

the types of casks used to store spent 

nuclear fuel at each ISFSI is available in 

Appendix G of the DGEIS (see also 

Chapter 2 of the DGEIS). 

A9. How can the NRC conduct a generic 

review when spent nuclear fuel is stored 

at specific sites? Why has a site-specific 

review not been conducted? 

Historically, the Commission has 

chosen to generically address continued 

storage, and this approach was validated 

for appropriate circumstances by the 

D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in the 

same decision that vacated and 

remanded the 2010 Waste Confidence 

Decision and rule. Although the 

environmental impacts of spent nuclear 

fuel storage during the licensed life for 

operation may be site specific, the 

impacts of continued storage may be 

assessed generically because: 

(1) Continued storage will involve 

spent nuclear fuel storage facilities for 

which the environmental impacts of 

operation are sufficiently understood as 

a result of lessons learned and 

knowledge gained from operating 

experience. 

(2) Activities associated with 

continued storage are expected to be 

within this well-understood range of 

operating experience; thus, 

environmental impacts can be 

reasonably predicted. 

(3) Changes in the environment 

around spent nuclear fuel storage 

facilities are sufficiently gradual and 

predictable to be addressed generically. 

In evaluating the environmental 

impacts of continued storage of spent 

nuclear fuel, the NRC used existing 

environmental evaluations to help 

inform the impact determinations in the 

DGEIS, such as NUREG–0586, ‘‘Generic 

Environmental Impact Statement on 

Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities 

Supplement 1 Regarding the 

Decommissioning of Nuclear Power 

Reactors Main Report,’’ (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML023500395) and 

NUREG–1437, ‘‘Generic Environmental 

Impact Statement for License Renewal 

of Nuclear Plants’’ Revision 1 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML13106A241 for main 

volume 1, ML13106A242 for volume 2, 

and ML13106A244 for volume 3). The 

NRC also reviewed site-specific EISs 

and EAs for new and operating reactors, 

ISFSIs, and subsequent renewals. The 

NRC staff also looked to other sources 

of information, such as technical 

reports. 

A10. Would the Waste Confidence 

rulemaking authorize the storage of 

spent nuclear fuel at the operating 

reactor site near me? 

No, the Waste Confidence rule does 

not authorize the storage of spent 

nuclear fuel at any site. The Waste 

Confidence rule is a generic 

determination regarding the potential 

environmental impacts from the 

continued storage of spent nuclear fuel 

after the end of a reactor’s licensed life 

for operation and before the spent 

nuclear fuel is placed in a repository. 

The rule reflects only the generic 

environmental analysis of the period of 

spent nuclear fuel storage beyond a 

reactor’s licensed life for operation and 

before disposal in a repository. This 

proceeding is not a substitute for 

licensing actions that typically include 

site-specific NEPA analysis and sitespecific safety analyses (see also 

question A11). 

In addition, the NRC’s DGEIS and 

proposed rule do not pre-approve any 

particular waste storage or disposal site 

technology, nor do they require that a 

specific cask design be used for storage. 

Individual licensees and applicants, 

including any applicant for a high-level 

radioactive waste repository, will have 

to apply for and receive a site-specific 

license from the NRC before storing or 

disposing of any spent nuclear fuel. 

Separately, every 10 CFR part 50 or part 

52 nuclear power reactor licensee 

already holds a general license that 

authorizes storage of spent nuclear fuel 

in cask designs that are approved by the 

NRC. 

A11. What environmental reviews 

would be precluded from a site-specific 

licensing action after the Waste 

Confidence rulemaking is complete? 

The Waste Confidence rule will 

satisfy the NRC’s NEPA obligations with 

respect to continued storage for initial, 

renewed, and amended licenses for 

reactors and ISFSIs. The environmental 

analysis that would accompany the 

initial license or license renewal of 

individual nuclear power reactors or the 

initial license or license renewal of an 

ISFSI would consider the potential 

environmental impacts of storage of 

spent nuclear fuel during the term of the 

license. What would not be considered 

in those proceedings—due to the 

generic determination in 10 CFR 

51.23(a)—is the potential environmental 

impact of continued storage of spent 

nuclear fuel beyond the licensed life for 


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operation of the reactor. The NRC’s 

regulations allow participants in the 

NRC’s licensing proceedings to obtain a 

waiver of a rule if they show special 

circumstances why the rule should not 

apply to the specific proceeding (see 10 

CFR 2.335(b)). 

A12. Why is there not a separate Waste 

Confidence decision document? 

Historically, the Waste Confidence 

Decision contained five ‘‘Findings’’ that 

addressed the technical feasibility of a 

mined geologic repository, the degree of 

assurance that disposal would be 

available by a certain time, and the 

degree of assurance that spent fuel and 

high-level waste could be managed 

safely without significant environmental 

impacts for a certain period beyond the 

expiration of plants’ operating licenses. 

Preparation of and reliance upon a GEIS 

is a fundamental departure from the 

approach used in past Waste Confidence 

proceedings. The DGEIS acknowledges 

the uncertainties inherent in a 

prediction of repository availability and 

provides an environmental analysis of 

reasonably foreseeable timeframes. To 

this end, the DGEIS considers a number 

of possible timeframes for repository 

availability, including the impacts from 

never having a repository. Because a 

GEIS is being issued, findings are no 

longer necessary. 

Section C, ‘‘Decision,’’ provides a 

discussion of the issues and conclusions 

addressed in the DGEIS that had 

previously appeared in the findings 

discussions of prior Waste Confidence 

decisions. To support the analysis in the 

DGEIS and the proposed rule, the 

underlying assumptions in the DGEIS 

address the issues assessed in the 

previous ‘‘Five Findings’’ as 

conclusions regarding the technical 

feasibility and availability of a 

repository and conclusions regarding 

the technical feasibility of safely storing 

spent fuel in an at-reactor or away-fromreactor storage facility. The GEIS will 

fulfill NRC’s NEPA obligations for 

analyzing the environmental impacts of 

continued storage and the related 

uncertainties in repository availability. 

A13. How can the NRC complete the 

environmental impact statement and 

rulemaking in 24 months? 

The Waste Confidence proceeding is a 

high priority for the Commission. 

Following the remand by the Court of 

Appeals, the NRC formed a new 

organization, the Waste Confidence 

Directorate in the Office of Nuclear 

Material Safety and Safeguards, to 

develop the generic EIS and rule. In 

staffing the new Directorate, the NRC 

brought together a team consisting of 

many of the agency’s most experienced 

and knowledgeable NEPA and 

rulemaking practitioners. The 

Directorate is focused on Waste 

Confidence. These focused NRC staff 

resources have enabled the NRC to 

conduct the hard look required by 

NEPA and optimize public participation 

in the process. The resources and 

expertise being devoted to the waste 

confidence proceeding and the schedule 

for public comment support completion 

within 24 months. 

A14. What is the status of the extended 

storage effort? 

The extended storage effort focuses on 

technical and regulatory considerations 

for continued effective regulation of 

spent nuclear fuel storage and 

subsequent transportation over 

extended periods (up to 300 years). 

Presently, the NRC believes that the 

current regulatory framework used to 

renew current licenses can be extended 

to regulate the management of spent 

nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive 

waste for multiple renewal periods. The 

staff is examining technical areas 

associated with multiple renewals of 

fixed-term, dry storage licenses and 

certificates to address age-related 

degradation of dry cask storage systems, 

structures, and components. The NRC 

acknowledges that current licensing 

practices may evolve over time in 

response to improved understanding, 

operational experience, and 

Commission policy direction. As 

technical, regulatory, and policy issues 

are resolved, the NRC will revise 

guidance and staff qualification and 

training accordingly. In the DGEIS, the 

NRC has concluded that sufficient 

information exists to perform an 

analysis of continued storage impacts 

well into the future. Nonetheless, the 

NRC continues to identify and resolve 

potential issues associated with the 

storage and transportation of spent 

nuclear fuel storage for periods beyond 

an ISFSI’s initial licensing and first 

renewal. Completion of the current 

effort is planned for the end of the 

decade. As with any rule, the NRC will 

evaluate any new information that is 

developed during this project to 

determine whether it’s necessary to 

update the Waste Confidence rule. 

A15. How can the NRC proceed with 

this rulemaking while research on the 

extended storage of spent nuclear fuel is 

ongoing? 

The DGEIS and the NRC’s ongoing 

research are two separate efforts that are 

not directly related to each other. If 

completed, this rulemaking would 

result in an update to the NRC’s 

environmental rules in 10 CFR part 51. 

The Waste Confidence GEIS, NUREG– 

2157, which was prepared under NEPA, 

would provide the regulatory basis for 

the rule. Under NEPA, an 

environmental impact statement, such 

as the one prepared to support this 

rulemaking, needs only to consider 

currently available information. As the 

Commission recently stated, ‘‘NEPA 

requires that we conduct our 

environmental review with the best 

information available today. It does not 

require that we wait until inchoate 

information matures into something that 

later might affect our review.’’ 

(Luminant Generation Co. LLC 

(Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, 

Units 3 and 4), et al., CLI–12–7, 75 NRC 

379, 391–92 (March 16, 2012)). Further, 

the United States Court of Appeals for 

the District of Columbia Circuit 

explained that ‘‘creating [the agency’s] 

models with the best information 

available when it began its analysis and 

then checking the assumptions of those 

models as new information became 

available, was a reasonable means of 

balancing . . . competing 

considerations, particularly given the 

many months required to conduct full 

modeling with new data.’’ (Village of 

Bensenville v. Federal Aviation 

Administration, 457 F.3d 52, 71–72 

(D.C. Cir. 2006)). The United States 

Supreme Court held that ‘‘an agency 

need not supplement an EIS every time 

new information comes to light after the 

EIS is finalized. To require otherwise 

would render agency decision making 

intractable, always awaiting updated 

information only to find the new 

information outdated by the time a 

decision is made.’’ (Marsh v. Oregon 

Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 

360, 374 (1989)). 

The ongoing research into the 

extended storage of spent nuclear fuel is 

part of the NRC’s effort to continuously 

evaluate and update its safety 

regulations. The NRC is not aware of 

any deficiencies in its current 

regulations that would challenge the 

continued safe storage of spent nuclear 

fuel in spent fuel pools or dry cask 

systems. 

If, at some time in the future, the NRC 

were to identify a concern with the safe 

storage of spent nuclear fuel, the NRC 

would evaluate the issue and take 

whatever action or make whatever 

change in its regulatory program 

necessary to protect public health and 

safety. The NRC will continue to 

monitor the ongoing research into spent 

fuel storage. If warranted, the NRC will 

consider updating its Waste Confidence 

rule, which would be supported by a 


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new environmental analysis that would 

fully consider any new developments. 

A16. Did the NRC factor in information 

from the Spent Fuel Pool Study in the 

DGEIS? 

The DGEIS does not specifically 

reference the draft ‘‘Consequence Study 

of a Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake 

Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. 

Mark I Boiling Water Reactor’’ (hereafter 

referred to as the Spent Fuel Pool Study 

or Study). If the NRC publishes a final 

Study before the final GEIS is 

published, then a reference to the Spent 

Fuel Pool Study will be added to the 

final GEIS. Although it did not 

specifically reference the draft Study in 

the DGEIS, the staff is aware of the 

conclusions in the draft Study and 

worked closely with the authors who 

developed the draft Study to prepare the 

relevant sections of the draft GEIS. The 

conclusions of the draft Study do not 

contradict the conclusions in the DGEIS 

and are consistent with the 

consequences reported in previous 

studies on spent fuel pool accidents. 

The draft Spent Fuel Pool Study was 

made public for review and comment on 

June 24 in advance of a July public 

Advisory Committee on Reactor 

Safeguards meeting on the draft Study. 

The draft Spent Fuel Pool Study is 

available to the public under ADAMS 

Accession No. ML13133A132. 

A17. Did the NRC address accidents in 

the DGEIS? 

Yes, the DGEIS considered the risk 

and potential consequences of accidents 

and acts of sabotage during continued 

storage of spent nuclear fuel. This 

analysis assessed the environmental 

effects of man-made hazards and natural 

phenomena hazards, including flooding 

and earthquakes. As with all NEPA 

analyses, the DGEIS analyzed 

reasonably-foreseeable events and did 

not consider worst-case scenarios. 

Section 4.18 of the DGEIS discusses the 

environmental impacts of postulated 

accidents, both design-basis and severe 

accidents, during continued at-reactor 

storage and Section 5.18 discusses 

away-from-reactor postulated accidents. 

Appendix F of the DGEIS contains a 

more detailed analysis of spent fuel pool 

fires. Sections 4.19 and 5.19 of the 

DGEIS address impacts resulting from 

acts of terrorism. 

A18. Does the NRC Plan to hold public 

meetings on the Waste Confidence 

DGEIS and proposed rule? 

Yes, the NRC plans to hold eight 

regional public meetings and two 

nationally Webcast meetings at NRC 

headquarters on the DGEIS and 

proposed rule. The regional meetings 

are planned to be held in or near: 

Charlotte, North Carolina; Denver, 

Colorado; Toledo, Ohio; Boston (metro 

area), Massachusetts; New York City 

(metro area), New York; Minneapolis, 

Minnesota; San Clemente, California; 

San Luis Obispo, California; and 

Orlando, Florida. These meetings will 

be held during the public comment 

period on the DGEIS and proposed rule. 

All meetings will be noticed on the 

NRC’s Public Meeting Schedule Web 

site at http://www.nrc.gov/publicinvolve/public-meetings/index.cfm. 

Information on the public meetings will 

also be made available through the 

Federal Register, press releases, blog 

posts, and emails. The NRC will also 

post meeting notices to the Federal 

rulemaking Web site at https://

www.regulations.gov, under Docket ID 

NRC–2012–0246. 

A19. How can I stay informed of Waste 

Confidence activities? 

There are several ways in which 

interested members of the public can 

stay informed and follow the NRC’s 

Waste Confidence activities. The NRC 

staff periodically sends out email 

announcements of new material and 

upcoming events. Anyone may sign up 

to receive emails about the Waste 

Confidence activities by emailing 

WCOutreach@nrc.gov with a request to 

be added to the email list. 

The NRC staff will also periodically 

post updates to the Waste Confidence 

Web site. You can sign up for automatic 

email alerts whenever the Waste 

Confidence Web site is updated using 

GovDelivery. Under Subscriber 

Preferences you can choose the Waste 

Confidence pages on which you would 

like to receive updates. 

You can monitor the docket for the 

Waste Confidence rulemaking on the 

Federal rulemaking Web site, http://

www.regulations.gov, by searching on 

Docket ID NRC–2012–0246. In addition, 

the Federal rulemaking Web site allows 

you to receive alerts when changes or 

additions occur in a docket folder. To 

subscribe: (1) Navigate to the docket 

folder NRC–2012–0246; (2) click the 

‘‘Email Alert’’ link; and (3) enter your 

email address and select how frequently 

you would like to receive emails (daily, 

weekly, or monthly). 

A20. How frequently does the NRC plan 

to revisit the Waste Confidence GEIS 

and rule? 

The Commission has reviewed its 

Waste Confidence rule and supporting 

analysis three times since 1984; in 1990, 

1999, and 2010. The NRC does not have 

a schedule for revisiting the Waste 

Confidence GEIS and rule after this 

current update. The Commission will 

review the Waste Confidence GEIS and 

rule for possible revision when 

warranted by significant events that may 

call into question the appropriateness of 

the rule. 

A21. What should I consider as I 

prepare to submit my comments to the 

NRC? 

Tips for preparing your comments. 

When submitting your comments, 

remember to: 

I. Identify the rulemaking (RIN 3150– 

AJ20; NRC–2012–0246). 

II. Explain why you agree or disagree; 

suggest alternatives and substitute 

language for your requested changes. 

III. Describe any assumptions and 

provide any technical information and/ 

or data that you used. 

IV. If you estimate potential costs or 

burdens, explain how you arrived at 

your estimate in sufficient detail to 

allow for it to be reproduced. 

V. Provide specific examples to 

illustrate your concerns and suggest 

alternatives. 

VI. Explain your views as clearly as 

possible. 

VII. Make sure to submit your 

comments by the comment period 

deadline identified. 

VIII. The NRC is particularly 

interested in your comments concerning 

the following issues discussed in 

Section IV: (1) Issue 1 contains a request 

for comment on whether the 

Commission should remove the timeline 

for repository availability from the rule; 

(2) Issue 2 contains a request for 

comment on whether any statement 

related to the safety of continued spent 

fuel storage should be included in the 

rule; (3) Issue 3 contains a request for 

comment on whether the Discussion 

portion (Section III of this document) of 

the Statement of Considerations should 

be streamlined by removing content that 

is repeated from the DGEIS in order to 

improve clarity of the discussion; and 

(4) Issue 4 contains a request for 

comment on the title of the rule. In 

addition, Section VIII, Plain Writing, of 

this document contains a request for 

comments on the use of plain language, 

and Section X, Draft Environmental 

Impact Statement: Availability, of this 

document contains a request for 

comments on the draft environmental 

impact statement. 

B. Waste Confidence Rulemaking 

B1. What is the purpose of this Waste 

Confidence rulemaking? 

The NRC’s use of a rule to generically 

satisfy its NEPA obligations with respect 


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5The Commission’s regulations provide that 

renewed operating licenses may be subsequently 

renewed, although no licensee has yet submitted an 

application for such a subsequent renewal. The 

DGEIS included two renewals as a conservative 

assumption in evaluating potential environmental 

impacts. 

to continued storage will enhance 

efficiency in individual licensing 

reviews by analyzing the environmental 

impacts of continued storage, which are 

the same or largely similar at each 

nuclear power reactor or storage site, 

and codifying the results of that 

analysis. Part of the environmental 

analysis for a nuclear power reactor or 

storage facility license includes a review 

of the impacts caused by the spent 

nuclear fuel generated in the reactor. 

That analysis must assess the impacts of 

the spent nuclear fuel from generation 

through disposal. If the Commission 

lacks reasonable assurance that a 

disposal solution will be available at the 

end of a reactor’s licensed life for 

operation, NEPA requires that the 

Commission assess the impacts of 

continued storage of the spent nuclear 

fuel pending disposal at a repository. 

The proposed rule would incorporate 

the results of the generic assessment of 

the environmental impacts of continued 

spent nuclear fuel storage beyond the 

end of a reactor’s licensed life for 

operation so that it is not necessary to 

repeat the identical or substantially 

similar analysis in individual licensing 

actions. Although the environmental 

impacts of spent nuclear fuel storage 

during the licensed life for operation 

may be site specific, the impacts of 

continued storage can be generically 

assessed because the impacts during the 

reactor’s licensed life for operation have 

been analyzed, are well understood, and 

the continued storage of spent nuclear 

fuel does not involve any significant 

changes in how the fuel is stored. 

Therefore, the environmental impacts 

that result from continued storage will 

remain essentially the same. A generic 

environmental analysis, such as the one 

conducted in the DGEIS, would apply to 

the issuance of a license, amendment, or 

license renewal of any power reactor or 

of any ISFSI. The analysis in the GEIS 

constitutes a regulatory basis for the 

proposed rule at 10 CFR 51.23, which 

codifies the NRC’s conclusions in the 

GEIS on the environmental impacts of 

continued storage, including the 

Commission’s expectations on the 

availability of a geologic repository. 

B2. What is meant by the phrase 

‘‘licensed life for operation of a 

reactor’’? 

The phrase ‘‘licensed life for 

operation of a reactor’’ describes the 

period during which the NRC licensing 

requirements for reactor facility design, 

construction, and operation provide 

reasonable assurance that a reactor can 

be operated and spent fuel can be stored 

safely. It refers to the term of the license 

to operate a reactor, which in no case 

exceeds a 40-year initial license term. 

For those reactors for which license 

renewal has been granted, the DGEIS 

assumes up to two 20-year license 

extensions 5 could occur, for a total of 

up to 80 years. The phrase, ‘‘beyond 

licensed life for operation of a reactor,’’ 

refers to the period beyond the initial 

term to operate a reactor or, if the 

license is extended, beyond the renewed 

license term. The date of permanent 

cessation of operations does not mark 

the transition to ‘‘beyond licensed life 

for operation.’’ Even if a reactor is shut 

down years before the end of its initial 

or extended operating or combined 

license term, ‘‘licensed life for 

operation’’ continues to refer to the 

initial or renewed license term, and not 

the actual operational period of a 

reactor. Thus, continued storage begins 

at the end of the licensed life for 

operation of a reactor. The starting point 

for continued storage does not depend 

on whether the spent nuclear fuel is 

stored in a spent fuel pool, dry casks 

under a general license, or dry casks 

under a specific license. 

The following examples help 

illustrate the concept of beyond the 

licensed life for operation of a reactor. 

Reactor A received a 40-year license to 

operate in 1965, which means the 

license would have expired in 2005. 

Reactor A renewed its license for a 20- 

year term, which means the license now 

will expire in 2025. Reactor A shuts 

down in 2025. The licensed life for 

operation for Reactor A ends in 2025 

and continued storage begins in 2025. 

Reactor B also received its initial 

license to operate in 1965, which means 

the license would have expired in 2005. 

Reactor B shut down early in 2000. The 

licensed life for operation of Reactor B 

ended in 2005, the original expiration 

date of the license. Continued storage of 

the spent nuclear fuel started in 2005. 

Reactor C received its initial license 

in 1965, which means the license would 

have expired in 2005. Reactor C 

received two 20-year renewals with 

expiration dates of 2025 and 2045. 

Reactor C shut down in 2030. The 

licensed life for operation of Reactor C 

ends in 2045. Continued storage of the 

spent nuclear fuel begins in 2045 for all 

of the spent nuclear fuel from Reactor C. 

In these examples, it is important to 

note that the environmental analysis 

supporting spent nuclear fuel storage 

during the licensed life for operation of 

each reactor covered the full period for 

which the license or license renewal 

was issued, even if operation of the 

reactor ended before the license expired. 

B3. What timeframes are being 

considered in the DGEIS? 

The NRC has analyzed three 

timeframes in the DGEIS that represent 

various scenarios for the length of 

continued storage that may be needed 

before spent fuel is sent to a repository. 

The first timeframe is the short-term 

timeframe, which analyzes 60 years of 

continued storage after the end of a 

reactor’s licensed life for operation. The 

DGEIS also analyzed two additional 

timeframes: long-term and indefinite 

timeframes. The long-term timeframe 

considers the environmental impacts of 

continued storage for a total of 160 years 

after the end of a reactor’s licensed life 

for operation. Finally, the DGEIS 

includes an analysis of an indefinite 

timeframe, which assumes that a 

repository never becomes available. 

By the end of the short-term 

timeframe, some spent nuclear fuel 

could be up to 140 years old. Short-term 

storage of spent nuclear fuel includes: 

• Continued storage of spent fuel in 

spent fuel pools (at-reactor only) and 

ISFSIs, 

• Routine maintenance of spent fuel 

pools and ISFSIs (e.g., maintenance of 

concrete pads), and 

• Handling and transfer of spent fuel 

from spent fuel pools to ISFSIs (all 

spent nuclear fuel is assumed to be 

removed from the spent fuel pool by the 

end of the short-term period). 

Long-term storage is continued 

storage of spent nuclear fuel for an 

additional 100 years after the short-term 

period for a total of 160 years beyond 

the licensed life for operation of a 

reactor. The DGEIS assumes that all 

spent fuel has been transferred from the 

spent fuel pool to an ISFSI by the end 

of the short-term period. The DGEIS also 

assumes that a repository would become 

available by the end of this 160-year 

period. By the end of the long-term 

period, some spent nuclear fuel could 

be up to 240 years old. Long-term 

storage activities include: 

• Continued storage of spent fuel in 

ISFSIs, including routine maintenance; 

• One time replacement of ISFSIs and 

spent fuel canisters and casks; and 

• Construction, operation, and one 

replacement of a dry transfer system 

facility (DTS). 

The third timeframe analyzed by the 

DGEIS is indefinite storage, which 

assumes that a repository does not 

become available. The Commission does 

not believe that this scenario is likely to 

occur, but its inclusion in the analysis 


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6For the purposes of the DGEIS impact analysis, 

the GEH-Morris facility and the DOE TMI–2 ISFSI 

at Idaho Falls, Idaho were considered under the atreactor storage evaluation. 

helps the DGEIS to fully cover any 

likely environmental impacts associated 

with continued storage. The activities 

during the indefinite storage timeframe 

are the same as those that would occur 

for long-term storage; however, without 

a repository these activities would occur 

every 100 years. 

B4. What is the significance of the levels 

of impact in the DGEIS (SMALL, 

MODERATE, LARGE)? 

The NRC describes the affected 

environment in terms of resource areas: 

Land use, socioeconomics, 

environmental justice, air quality, 

climate change, geology and soils, 

surface water, groundwater, terrestrial 

resources, aquatic ecology, special 

status species and habitats, historic and 

cultural resources, noise, aesthetics, 

waste management, transportation, and 

public and occupational health. The 

DGEIS contains analysis of the 

environmental impacts associated with 

each resource area. Additionally, the 

DGEIS considers the impacts on 

resource areas caused by postulated acts 

of terrorism and accidents. The 

significance of the magnitude of the 

impact for most of the resource areas 

evaluated is expressed as SMALL, 

MODERATE, or LARGE. The general 

definitions of significance levels are: 

SMALL: The environmental effects 

are not detectable or are so minor that 

they will neither destabilize nor 

noticeably alter any important attribute 

of the resource. For the purposes of 

assessing radiological impacts, the 

Commission has concluded that 

radiological impacts that do not exceed 

permissible levels in the Commission’s 

regulations are considered small. 

MODERATE: The environmental 

effects are sufficient to alter noticeably, 

but not to destabilize, important 

attributes of the resource. 

LARGE: The environmental effects are 

clearly noticeable and are sufficient to 

destabilize important attributes of the 

resource. 

The DGEIS discussion of each 

resource area includes an explanation of 

how the significance category was 

determined. For issues in which the 

significance determination is based on 

risk (i.e., the probability of occurrence 

as well as the potential consequences), 

the probability of occurrence as well as 

the potential consequences have been 

factored into the determination of 

significance. For some resource areas 

the impact determination language is 

specific to the authorizing regulation or 

statute. 

B5. What are the environmental impacts 

of at-reactor continued storage? 

The environmental impacts of 

continued storage are analyzed in the 

DGEIS. The DGEIS contains a detailed 

analysis of the impacts for short-term 

storage, long-term storage, and 

indefinite storage. The analysis 

considers both at-reactor storage and 

away-from-reactor storage.6 Impacts 

attributable to at-reactor storage are 

addressed here and the impacts from 

away-from-reactor storage are addressed 

in question B6. 

For at-reactor storage, the unavoidable 

adverse environmental impacts for each 

resource area are SMALL for all 

timeframes with the exception of waste 

management impacts, which are SMALL 

to MODERATE for the indefinite storage 

timeframe, and historic and cultural 

impacts, which are SMALL, 

MODERATE, or LARGE for the longterm and indefinite storage timeframes. 

These elevated impact conclusions are 

influenced, in part, by the uncertainties 

regarding the specific circumstances of 

continued storage over long timeframes, 

including site-specific characteristics 

that could affect the intensity of 

potential environmental impacts and 

the resulting analysis assumptions that 

have been made by the NRC as 

documented in detail in Chapter 4 of the 

DGEIS. The moderate wastemanagement impacts are associated 

with the volume of nonhazardous solid 

waste generated by assumed facility 

replacement activities for only the 

indefinite timeframe. The SMALL, 

MODERATE, or LARGE historic and 

cultural impacts are based on a 

combination of the additional surfacedisturbing activities from DTS 

construction and facility replacement 

activities during long-term and 

indefinite timeframes and a range of 

site-specific characteristics that are 

assumed for the purpose of evaluating a 

reasonable range of potential impacts. 

More specifically, these potential 

historic and cultural impacts vary 

depending on whether resources are 

present, the extent of proposed land 

disturbance, if the area has been 

previously surveyed to identify historic 

and cultural resources, and if the 

licensee has management plans and 

procedures that are protective of historic 

and cultural resources. For special 

status species, at-reactor ISFSI storage 

would not be likely to adversely affect 

special status species and habitats, 

whereas spent fuel pool continued 

storage impacts would be based on sitespecific conditions and determined as 

part of an Endangered Species Act 

Section 7 consultation. The NRC 

environmental justice impact analysis 

concluded there would be no 

disproportionately high and adverse 

human health and environmental 

impacts on minority and low-income 

populations. 

The following table provides a 

summary of the environmental impacts 

of continued at-reactor storage. Detailed 

discussion for each resource area can be 

found in Chapter 4 of the DGEIS. 

Cumulative impacts are addressed in 

Chapter 6 of the DGEIS. Chapter 8 of the 

DGEIS provides a summary of the 

impacts. 

TABLE 1—ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF AT-REACTOR CONTINUED STORAGE OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL

Resource area Short-term storage Long-term storage Indefinite storage 

Land Use ....................................... SMALL .......................................... SMALL .......................................... SMALL. 

Socioeconomics ............................. SMALL .......................................... SMALL .......................................... SMALL. 

Environmental Justice .................... No disproportionately high and adverse impacts. 

Air Quality ...................................... SMALL .......................................... SMALL .......................................... SMALL. 

Climate Change ............................. SMALL .......................................... SMALL .......................................... SMALL. 

Geology and Soils ......................... SMALL .......................................... SMALL .......................................... SMALL. 

Surface Water: 

Quality ..................................... SMALL .......................................... SMALL .......................................... SMALL. 

Use ......................................... SMALL .......................................... SMALL .......................................... SMALL. 

Groundwater: 


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TABLE 1—ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF AT-REACTOR CONTINUED STORAGE OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL—Continued 

Resource area Short-term storage Long-term storage Indefinite storage 

Quality ..................................... SMALL .......................................... SMALL .......................................... SMALL. 

Use ......................................... SMALL .......................................... SMALL .......................................... SMALL. 

Terrestrial Resources ..................... SMALL .......................................... SMALL .......................................... SMALL. 

Aquatic Ecology ............................. SMALL .......................................... SMALL .......................................... SMALL. 

Special Status Species and Habitats.Impacts from the spent fuel pool 

would be determined as part of 

Endangered Species Act Section 7 consultation; ISFSI operations are not likely to adversely affect special status 

species and habitats.

Not likely to adversely affect ........ Not likely to adversely affect. 

Historic and Cultural Resources .... SMALL .......................................... SMALL, MODERATE, or LARGE SMALL, MODERATE, or LARGE. 

Noise .............................................. SMALL .......................................... SMALL .......................................... SMALL. 

Aesthetics ...................................... SMALL .......................................... SMALL .......................................... SMALL. 

Waste Management: 

LLW ........................................ SMALL .......................................... SMALL .......................................... SMALL. 

Mixed Waste ........................... SMALL .......................................... SMALL .......................................... SMALL to MODERATE. 

Nonradioactive Waste ............. SMALL .......................................... SMALL .......................................... SMALL to MODERATE. 

Transportation 

Traffic ...................................... SMALL .......................................... SMALL .......................................... SMALL. 

Health impacts ........................ SMALL .......................................... SMALL .......................................... SMALL. 

Public and Occupational Health .... SMALL .......................................... SMALL .......................................... SMALL. 

Accidents ....................................... SMALL. 

Terrorism Considerations ............... SMALL. 

B6. What are the environmental impacts 

of away-from-reactor continued storage? 

The away-from-reactor environmental 

impacts analyzed in the DGEIS include 

the impacts from constructing the ISFSI. 

Although an away-from-reactor ISFSI 

would be subject to a site-specific 

licensing review that includes an 

environmental impact statement that 

would assess the environmental impacts 

due to construction, the impacts due to 

construction are included in the DGEIS 

due to the potential for that construction 

to occur during the timeframes analyzed 

in the DGEIS. For away-from-reactor 

storage, the unavoidable adverse 

environmental impacts for each 

resource area would be SMALL except 

for air quality, terrestrial ecology, 

aesthetics, waste management, and 

transportation where the impacts would 

be SMALL to MODERATE. 

Socioeconomic impacts would range 

from SMALL to beneficial and LARGE 

and historic and cultural impacts could 

be SMALL, MODERATE, or LARGE. 

The potential MODERATE impacts on 

air, terrestrial wildlife, and 

transportation are based on 

construction-related potential fugitive 

dust emissions, terrestrial wildlife direct 

and indirect mortalities, and temporary 

construction traffic impacts. The 

potential MODERATE impacts on 

aesthetics and waste management are 

based on noticeable changes to the 

viewshed from constructing a new 

away-from-reactor ISFSI, and the 

volume of nonhazardous solid waste 

generated by assumed ISFSI and DTS 

replacement activities for only the 

indefinite timeframe. The potential 

beneficial and LARGE impacts on 

socioeconomics would be due to local 

economic tax revenue increases from an 

away-from-reactor ISFSI. The potential 

LARGE impacts on historic and cultural 

and special status species apply to 

assumed site-specific circumstances at 

an away-from-reactor ISFSI involving 

the presence of these resources during 

construction activities and absence of 

effective protection measures. 

Specifically, these potential historic and 

cultural impacts vary depending on 

whether resources are present, the 

extent of proposed land disturbance, 

and whether the licensee has 

management plans and procedures that 

are protective of historic and cultural 

resources. For special status species, 

away-from-reactor ISFSI storage would 

not be likely to adversely affect special 

status species and habitats based on the 

assumption an ISFSI can be sited to 

avoid special status species and 

habitats. Impacts on special status 

species and habitats would be based on 

site-specific conditions and determined 

as part of an Endangered Species Act 

Section 7 consultation. The NRC 

environmental justice impact analysis 

for an away-from-reactor ISFSI 

concluded there would be no 

disproportionately high and adverse 

human health and environmental 

impacts on minority and low-income 

populations. 

The following table provides a 

summary of the environmental impacts 

from away-from-reactor continued 

storage: Detailed discussion for each 

resource area can be found in Chapter 

5 of the DGEIS. Cumulative impacts are 

addressed in Chapter 6 of the DGEIS. 

Chapter 8 of the DGEIS provides a 

summary of the impacts. 

TABLE 2—ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF AWAY-FROM REACTOR CONTINUED STORAGE OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL

Resource area Short-term storage Long-term storage Indefinite storage 

Land Use ....................................... SMALL .......................................... SMALL .......................................... SMALL. 

Socioeconomics ............................. SMALL (adverse) to LARGE (beneficial).SMALL (adverse) to LARGE (beneficial).SMALL (adverse) to LARGE (beneficial). 


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TABLE 2—ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF AWAY-FROM REACTOR CONTINUED STORAGE OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL— 

Continued 

Resource area Short-term storage Long-term storage Indefinite storage 

Environmental Justice .................... No disproportionately high and adverse impacts. 

Air Quality ...................................... SMALL to MODERATE ................ SMALL .......................................... SMALL. 

Climate Change ............................. SMALL .......................................... SMALL .......................................... SMALL. 

Geology and Soils ......................... SMALL .......................................... SMALL .......................................... SMALL. 

Surface Water: SMALL .......................................... SMALL. 

Quality ..................................... SMALL ..........................................

Use ......................................... SMALL ..........................................

Groundwater .................................. SMALL .......................................... SMALL. 

Quality ..................................... SMALL ..........................................

Use ......................................... SMALL ..........................................

Terrestrial Resources ..................... SMALL to MODERATE ................ SMALL .......................................... SMALL. 

Aquatic Ecology ............................. SMALL .......................................... SMALL .......................................... SMALL. 

Special Status Species and Habitats.Impacts from the construction of the ISFSI would be determined as part of Endangered Species Act Section 7 consultation. Assuming the ISFSI can be sited to avoid special status species and habitats, operation and replacement of the ISFSI is not likely to adversely affect special status species and habitats. 

Impacts would be determined as part of Endangered Species Act Section 7 consultation if continued 

storage would affect listed species or critical habitat. 

Historic and Cultural Resources .... SMALL, MODERATE, or LARGE SMALL, MODERATE, or LARGE SMALL, MODERATE, or LARGE. 

Noise .............................................. SMALL .......................................... SMALL .......................................... SMALL. 

Aesthetics ...................................... SMALL to MODERATE ................ SMALL to MODERATE ................ SMALL to MODERATE. 

Waste Management: 

LLW ........................................ SMALL .......................................... SMALL .......................................... SMALL. 

Mixed Waste ........................... SMALL .......................................... SMALL .......................................... SMALL. 

Nonradioactive Waste ............. SMALL .......................................... SMALL .......................................... SMALL to MODERATE. 

Transportation: 

Traffic ...................................... SMALL to MODERATE ................ SMALL to MODERATE ................ SMALL to MODERATE. 

Health ..................................... SMALL ..........................................

Public and Occupational Health .... SMALL .......................................... SMALL .......................................... SMALL. 

Accidents ....................................... SMALL. 

Terrorism Considerations ............... SMALL. 

B7. Does a potentially LARGE impact on 

historic and cultural resources affect the 

generic determination in the Waste 

Confidence DGEIS? 

The generic determination found in 

the DGEIS is not affected by the 

potentially LARGE impact on historic 

and cultural resources. As noted in 

Question A.2, the DGEIS describes a 

range of potential impacts associated 

with continued storage. The impact 

resulting from a specific licensing action 

associated with continued storage (e.g., 

construction of a DTS) would be 

determined by site-specific factors in a 

subsequent NEPA and National Historic 

Preservation Act (NHPA) Section 106 

review. If LARGE impacts were 

determined, under the site-specific 

environmental review and NHPA 

process, consultation would continue as 

the NRC develops and evaluates 

alternatives or modifications to avoid, 

minimize, or mitigate adverse effects to 

historic properties and impacts to other 

historic and cultural resources. An 

agency official must complete the 

Section 106 process before making a 

decision on an undertaking. 

B8. How will the proposed rule address 

the impacts from continued storage of 

spent nuclear fuel? 

The NRC is proposing revisions to 10 

CFR 51.23(a) that reflect the analysis 

and conclusions of the DGEIS (NUREG– 

2157). Proposed 10 CFR 51.23(a) 

provides that: (1) The analysis 

generically addresses the environmental 

impacts of continued storage of spent 

nuclear fuel beyond the licensed life for 

operation of a reactor; and (2) the 

analysis supports the determinations 

that it is feasible to safely store spent 

nuclear fuel beyond the licensed life for 

operation of a reactor and to have a 

mined geologic repository within 60 

years following the licensed life for 

operation of a reactor. 

Paragraph (b) of 10 CFR 51.23 would 

be revised to clarify that ISFSI renewals 

are included in the scope of the generic 

determination. Additionally, 

conforming changes would be made to 

10 CFR 51.61, 51.80(a), and 51.97(a) to 

clarify that ISFSI license renewals are 

included in the scope of waste 

confidence. 

B9. What are the key assumptions used 

in the DGEIS? 

To guide its analysis, the NRC relied 

upon certain reasonably foreseeable 

assumptions regarding storage of spent 

nuclear fuel. A detailed discussion of 

these assumptions is contained in 

Section 1.8.3 of the DGEIS. Key 

assumptions used in the DGEIS include: 

• Institutional controls, the continued 

regulation of spent nuclear fuel, will 

continue. 

• Spent fuel canisters and casks 

would be replaced approximately once 

every 100 years. 

• A DTS would be built at each ISFSI 

location for fuel repackaging and the 

ISFSIs and DTS facilities would be 

replaced approximately once every 100 

years. 

• All spent nuclear fuel would be 

removed from spent fuel pools to dry 

storage by the end of the short-term 

storage timeframe (60 years after 

licensed life). 

• An ISFSI of sufficient size to hold 

all spent nuclear fuel generated during 

licensed life for operation will be 

constructed before the end of the 

licensed life. 


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• The analyses in the DGEIS are 

based on current technology and 

regulations. 

B10. What did the NRC assume 

regarding the continuation of 

institutional controls and why? 

The DGEIS assumes that regulatory 

controls of spent nuclear fuel or 

‘‘institutional controls’’ would continue 

during the time when spent nuclear fuel 

is stored at an ISFSI at either on-site or 

at away from reactor site locations. 

Consistent with the ongoing regulation 

of operating nuclear facilities, the 

DGEIS assumes operating facilities 

would continue to maintain safety 

significant structures, systems, and 

components. For example, spent fuel 

storage casks are assumed to be 

maintained and replaced prior to any 

significant degradation and release of 

spent nuclear fuel (i.e., the DGEIS 

assumes spent fuel storage casks are 

replaced every 100 years). 

Therefore, the storage of spent nuclear 

fuel in any combination of storage 

(spent fuel pool or dry cask) is assumed 

to continue as a licensed activity under 

regulatory controls and oversight. 

Nonetheless, the conclusions reached by 

the NRC in the DGEIS regarding the 

technical feasibility of continued storage 

do not rely solely on the NRC’s 

regulatory framework governing these 

activities. Rather, these conclusions are 

also based on the NRC’s experience with 

the actual storage of spent nuclear fuel 

under this regulatory framework and the 

continued application of proven spent 

nuclear fuel-storage methodologies. 

Decades of operating experience and 

ongoing NRC inspections demonstrate 

that reactor and ISFSI licensees 

continue to meet their obligation to 

safely store spent nuclear fuel in 

accordance with the requirements of 10 

CFR parts 50, 52, and 72. If the NRC 

were to find noncompliance with these 

requirements or otherwise identify a 

concern with the safe storage of the 

spent nuclear fuel, the NRC would 

evaluate the issue and take whatever 

action or change in its regulatory 

program necessary to protect the public 

health and safety and the environment. 

Storage of spent nuclear fuel poses a 

sufficient hazard to the environment 

and to humans that the Commission 

considers it very unlikely that 

regulatory controls and oversight would 

cease to exist. Although disposal 

facilities generally consider the loss of 

institutional controls, such analysis is 

for time periods after the facility is 

permanently closed (i.e., no longer 

operating) and the hazard is 

significantly reduced due to disposal 

deep underground (e.g., on the order of 

1,000 feet underground). Further, at 

some period beyond the closure of the 

disposal facility, there is a potential that 

the knowledge of the intended purpose 

of the facility could be lost, thereby 

increasing the likelihood that an 

inadvertent intrusion could occur. In 

contrast, a dry storage facility is 

typically a visible surface structure 

requiring active maintenance and 

security, making loss of institutional 

control so unlikely that it is a remote 

and speculative occurrence. Given that 

NEPA does not require consideration of 

remote and speculative issues, this 

analysis has not been included in the 

DGEIS. 

While the DOE assumed loss of 

institutional control in the ‘‘Final 

Supplemental Environmental Impact 

Statement for a Geologic Repository for 

the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and 

High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca 

Mountain, Nye County Nevada’’ (Yucca 

Mountain FEIS) (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML081750212), the NRC assumed the 

continuation of institutional controls in 

this DGEIS because the purpose of the 

analysis here is fundamentally different 

from the analysis conducted by the DOE 

for Yucca Mountain. The Waste 

Confidence DGEIS analyzes the 

environmental impacts of continued 

storage of spent nuclear fuel pending 

ultimate disposal in a deep geologic 

repository. In the Yucca Mountain 

documents, the DOE needed to compare 

the no-action alternative of not 

disposing of the fuel with the proposed 

action of disposal at Yucca Mountain. 

Because the proposed action assumed 

that active institutional controls would 

continue for only 100 years after the 

closure of the Yucca Mountain site, DOE 

concluded it was reasonable to analyze 

a no action alternative that assumed a 

similar level of institutional controls. 

The DOE noted, however, that in the 

event Yucca Mountain did not become 

a disposal site for spent nuclear fuel, the 

no-action alternative analyzed in the 

Yucca Mountain FEIS was unlikely 

because the Federal government would 

develop a different disposal plan for the 

spent nuclear fuel that would provide 

better protection of the public and the 

environment than continued on-site 

storage. (Yucca Mountain FEIS 2–56– 

65). 

B11. How would significant changes in 

these assumptions be addressed under 

the NRC’s regulatory framework? 

The NRC has historically reviewed 

the Waste Confidence rule as the policy 

and technological foundations for spent 

nuclear fuel storage and disposal have 

evolved. Technological changes that 

might require revisiting the 

assumptions, such as revisions to the 

NRC’s safety regulations that allow or 

require a shorter or longer period of 

time before repackaging, are likely to 

not affect the overall conclusions in the 

DGEIS that provides a regulatory basis 

for the Waste Confidence rule and, 

accordingly, would not justify an update 

to the rule. These technological changes 

could require licensees to amend their 

licenses, which would be accompanied 

by site specific safety and 

environmental reviews. The NRC will 

continue to monitor changes in National 

policy and developments in spent 

nuclear fuel storage and disposal 

technology. When warranted by a 

change in assumptions that would 

significantly affect the predicted 

impacts of continued storage, the NRC 

will consider updating its Waste 

Confidence rule, which would be 

supported by a new environmental 

analysis that would fully consider any 

new developments. 

B12. What is the technical basis for 

concluding that continued storage can 

occur safely? 

Technical understanding and 

experience continues to support the 

technical feasibility of safe storage of 

spent nuclear fuel in spent fuel pools 

and in dry casks, based on their 

physical integrity over long periods of 

time (e.g., slow degradation of spent fuel 

during storage in spent fuel pools and 

dry casks and engineered features of 

storage pools and dry casks to safely 

withstand accidents caused by either 

natural or human-made phenomena). 

Additionally, regulatory oversight has 

been shown to enhance safety designs 

and operations as concerns and 

information evolve over time (e.g., 

security and safety enhancements made 

after the September 11, 2001, terrorist 

attacks and the March 2011 Fukushima 

Dai-ichi disaster; and corrective actions 

to address spent fuel pool leaks) (see 

Section B.3 of Appendix B of the DGEIS 

and Section III.C.3, Storage of Spent 

Nuclear Fuel at a Storage Facility, of 

this document for additional 

information). 

If necessary, there is no technical 

reason that storage of spent fuel in 

either spent fuel pools or dry casks 

cannot continue beyond 60 years after 

the end of the reactor’s licensed life for 

operation. Storage of spent fuel beyond 

this time would continue under an 

approved aging management program to 

ensure that monitoring and maintenance 

are adequately performed. The DGEIS 

assumes that, at an appropriate time, 

structures, systems, and components of 

the ISFSIs would be replaced as part of 

an approved aging management 


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program. The DGEIS assumes that these 

replacement activities begin during the 

long-term timeframe; however, based on 

current information, there is no 

expectation or requirement for 

replacement to occur at any specific 

time in the future. Continued 

experience with storing spent fuel will 

guide and inform aging management 

plans. At present, replacement activities 

(i.e., large-scale replacement of dry cask 

storage systems) are expected to occur 

no earlier than 60 years after the end of 

the reactor’s licensed life for operation. 

B13. If the NRC is considering extending 

the timeframe of safe storage, how is 

that not de facto on site disposal? 

Nothing in this rulemaking or the 

DGEIS authorizes the continued storage 

of spent nuclear fuel. Storage of spent 

nuclear fuel is authorized in sitespecific licensing actions under 10 CFR 

parts 50, 52, or 72. The general license 

provisions of 10 CFR part 72 also 

authorize storage of spent nuclear fuel 

in dry cask storage systems. The DGEIS 

and this rulemaking are intended to 

generically resolve the NRC’s NEPA 

obligations with respect to the 

continued storage of spent nuclear fuel. 

Although the timeframe for storage of 

spent nuclear fuel is longer than 

originally planned, the national policy 

embodied in the Nuclear Waste Policy 

Act Amendments of 1987 remains 

unchanged: Disposal of spent nuclear 

fuel in a deep geologic repository. Given 

the uncertainties in achieving a national 

consensus for the site of a repository 

that could affect the time it becomes 

available, the NRC has analyzed 

different timeframes for continued 

storage. Conducting this analysis 

enables NRC to comply with its NEPA 

obligations to analyze all reasonably 

foreseeable impacts of its licensing 

actions, even if the short-term storage 

scenario is more likely than long-term or 

indefinite storage. This analysis does 

not constitute an endorsement of an 

extended timeframe for storage of spent 

nuclear fuel. Additionally, the NRC 

does not create national policy for 

disposal of spent nuclear fuel. That 

responsibility lies exclusively with 

Congress and the President and, as 

noted, is presently expressed by the 

Nuclear Waste Policy Act Amendments 

of 1987. Rather, the NRC must 

implement national policy set by 

Congress and the President by 

evaluating, in the context of its licensing 

and regulatory actions, how that policy 

will affect continued storage of spent 

fuel after the licensed life of a reactor’s 

operation. 

B14. Does the U.S. Department of 

Energy’s motion to withdraw its Yucca 

Mountain application affect the NRC’s 

conclusion that geologic disposal is 

technically feasible? 

No. The Waste Confidence proceeding 

has historically addressed the technical 

feasibility of a repository without regard 

to a specific site, such as Yucca 

Mountain. As stated by Congress in the 

Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments of 

1987, the national program for 

permanent spent nuclear fuel disposal 

remains premised on a deep geologic 

repository. The Blue Ribbon 

Commission on America’s Nuclear 

Future in its January 2012 report (the 

‘‘BRC Report’’) (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML120970375) reaffirmed the need and 

feasibility for deep geologic disposal of 

spent nuclear fuel. Further, deep 

geologic disposal is internationally 

recognized as the best solution. (Nuclear 

Energy Agency Organisation for 

Economic Co-operation and 

Development, ‘‘Moving Forward With 

Geological Disposal of Radioactive 

Waste,’’ 2008, http://www.oecd-nea.org/ 

rwm/reports/2008/nea6433- 

statement.pdf.) Other countries are also 

pursuing geologic repositories for 

disposal of spent nuclear fuel and highlevel radioactive waste. The 

Commission’s exhaustive reviews 

supporting its earlier Waste Confidence 

decision have not identified any 

challenge to the technical feasibility of 

deep geologic disposal, and the 

Commission has therefore repeatedly 

affirmed its previous Waste Confidence 

Decision updates that a repository is 

technically feasible. 

B15. What changes are being proposed 

for the timing of a geologic repository? 

The NRC is proposing a change to 10 

CFR 51.23(a) that would reflect the most 

likely timeframe for repository 

availability. Proposed paragraph (a)(2) 

of 10 CFR 51.23 states that it is feasible 

to have a mined geologic repository 

within 60 years following the licensed 

life of operation for a reactor. 

B16. Why does the NRC think it is 

feasible that a repository can be 

available in 60 years? 

As discussed in the DGEIS, the NRC 

has analyzed three timeframes that 

represent various scenarios for the 

length of continued storage that will be 

needed before spent fuel is sent to a 

repository. The first, most likely, 

timeframe is the short-term timeframe, 

which analyzes 60 years of continued 

storage after the end of a reactor’s 

licensed life for operation. As discussed 

in the DGEIS, the NRC has concluded 

this is a likely timeframe, in part, 

because the DOE has expressed its 

intention to provide repository capacity 

by 2048, which is well before the 60 

years after licensed life for operation for 

all currently operating plants, and about 

10 years before the end of this 

timeframe for the oldest spent fuel 

within the scope of this analysis. 

Further, international and domestic 

experience with deep geologic 

repository programs supports a timeline 

of 25–35 years to provide repository 

capacity for the disposal of spent fuel. 

The DOE’s prediction of 2048 is in line 

with this expectation. The NRC 

acknowledges, however, that the shortterm timeframe, although the most 

likely, is not certain. The availability of 

a repository can be substantially 

affected by whatever process is 

employed to achieve a national 

consensus on repository site selection. 

The outcome of a search for a new 

repository location is uncertain. 

Accordingly, the DGEIS also analyzed 

two additional timeframes. The longterm timeframe considers the 

environmental impacts of continued 

storage for a total of 160 years after the 

end of a reactor’s licensed life for 

operation. Finally, although the NRC 

considers it highly unlikely, the DGEIS 

includes an analysis of an indefinite 

timeframe, which assumes that a 

repository does not become available. 

In picking a timeframe by which the 

Commission believes that a geologic 

repository is likely to become available, 

the Commission in no way means to 

imply that it believes that spent fuel 

will need to be stored indefinitely. Nor 

does it imply that a repository is only 

feasible at the end of the 60-year 

timeframe or that any particular 

repository site is precluded under the 

analysis. United States law supports the 

objective of timely disposal of spent 

nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive 

waste in a geologic repository, and the 

DOE is currently the agency responsible 

for carrying out the national policy to 

site and build a repository. However, 

spent nuclear fuel may need to be stored 

for several decades at either reactor sites 

or away-from-reactor sites before 

ultimate disposal is available in a 

geologic repository. Having considered 

all available information, the 

Commission believes that the most 

likely timeframe for repository 

availability is 60 years beyond a 

reactor’s licensed life for operation (see 

also the discussion in Appendix B of the 

DGEIS and Section III.C.2, Geologic 

Repository—Technical Feasibility and 

Availability of this document). 


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B17. How does this rulemaking relate to 

the licensing of future away-fromreactor ISFSIs? 

Future away-from-reactor ISFSI 

applicants must conduct a site-specific 

environmental analysis to support their 

licensing. An away-from-reactor ISFSI 

applicant or licensee cannot use the 

Waste Confidence rule and GEIS or the 

10 CFR part 72 subpart K general license 

as the basis for constructing an awayfrom-reactor ISFSI. If necessary, the sitespecific NEPA analysis for an awayfrom-reactor ISFSI could only rely on 

the analysis in the DGEIS and rule to a 

limited extent to satisfy its NEPA 

obligations with respect to the storage of 

spent nuclear fuel after the expiration of 

the away-from-reactor ISFSI license. 

B18. How does this rulemaking relate to 

the certification of spent fuel storage 

casks and use of the 10 CFR part 72 

general storage license to store spent 

nuclear fuel at operating or 

decommissioned reactor facilities that 

are licensed under 10 CFR parts 50 or 

52 by the NRC? 

The Waste Confidence rulemaking 

does not directly relate to cask 

certification because certifications are 

design reviews that do not consider or 

approve the loading of any specific fuel 

at any specific location. With respect to 

the use of general spent fuel storage 

licenses, these were issued under 10 

CFR 72.210 to all licensees in 

possession of a 10 CFR parts 50 or 52 

license. Licensing actions that have 

already occurred are not altered or 

affected by this rulemaking. 

B19. How can a future site-specific 

reactor EIS or supplement that 

references the GEIS be used to 

understand the environmental impacts 

of the no-action alternative of not 

approving nuclear power operations at a 

proposed site? 

Both site-specific reactor EISs for 

initial licensing and site-specific 

supplements to the license renewal 

GEIS (NUREG–1437) include 

descriptions of the no-action alternative 

of not granting the initial license or not 

renewing the existing license, 

respectively. The description of the noaction alternative in site-specific reactor 

EISs that support initial reactor 

licensing discusses impacts that would 

be avoided if the NRC did not grant the 

license. Similarly, the site-specific 

supplements to the license renewal 

GEIS describe environmental impacts 

that would be avoided should the NRC 

not renew an operating license for an 

existing reactor, and the reactor shut 

down at, or before, the end of its license 

term and began decommissioning. 

For both proposed new reactors and 

proposed reactor license renewals, the 

Waste Confidence GEIS would be of 

limited use in understanding the 

environmental impacts of the no-action 

alternative of not approving the 

requested licenses. If no new license 

were issued, there would be no spent 

nuclear fuel generated (or no additional 

spent nuclear fuel generated in the case 

of a renewal) or stored at the site as a 

result of the proposed actions and 

therefore no environmental impacts 

triggered by those actions. The Waste 

Confidence GEIS would describe the 

impacts of continued storage that could 

be avoided or reduced if the no-action 

alternative were selected. The Waste 

Confidence GEIS would also describe 

the impacts of continued storage of 

already existing spent fuel in the case of 

evaluating the no action alternative 

related to the renewal of a license for an 

already existing facility. 

B20. What changes are being proposed 

to address continued storage for license 

renewal? 

Table B–1, ‘‘Summary of Findings on 

NEPA Issues for License Renewal of 

Nuclear Power Plants’’ addresses the 

environmental impacts of license 

renewal activities by resource area. 

Table B–1 is located in appendix B to 

subpart A of 10 CFR part 51, 

‘‘Environmental Effect of Renewing the 

Operating License of a Nuclear Power 

Plant.’’ When the Commission issued 

the final rule on the environmental 

effects of license renewal, it was not 

able to rely on the Waste Confidence 

rule for two of the issues (78 FR 37282; 

June 20, 2013) (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML13101A059). The Commission noted 

that upon issuance of the GEIS and 

revised Waste Confidence rule, the NRC 

would make any necessary conforming 

changes to the license renewal rule. The 

proposed rule would revise two finding 

column entries to address continued 

storage. The ‘‘Offsite radiological 

impacts of spent nuclear fuel and highlevel waste disposal’’ issue would be 

reclassified as a Category 1 impact and 

the finding column entry revised to 

address continued storage. For the 

‘‘Onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel’’ 

issue, the finding column entry would 

be revised to include the period of 

continued storage. 

C. Decision 

C1. Introduction 

Historically, the Waste Confidence 

Decision contained five ‘‘Findings’’ that 

addressed the technical feasibility of a 

mined geologic repository, the degree of 

assurance that disposal would be 

available by a certain time, and the 

degree of assurance that spent fuel and 

high-level waste could be managed 

safely without significant environmental 

impacts for a certain period beyond the 

expiration of plants’ operating licenses. 

Preparation of and reliance upon a GEIS 

is a fundamental departure from the 

approach used in past Waste Confidence 

proceedings. What had been ‘‘Findings’’ 

in past Decisions are now conclusions 

based on the information that is 

provided in the DGEIS on 

environmental impacts from continued 

storage and the associated assessment of 

spent nuclear fuel storage and disposal 

practices nationally and internationally. 

The DGEIS acknowledges the 

uncertainties inherent in any prediction 

of repository availability and provides 

an environmental analysis of any 

reasonably foreseeable timeframes. To 

this end, the DGEIS considers a number 

of possible timeframes for repository 

availability, including the impacts from 

never having a repository. 

This section provides a discussion of 

the issues and conclusions addressed in 

the DGEIS that had previously appeared 

in the findings discussions of prior 

Waste Confidence decisions. Based on 

the NRC’s analysis in the DGEIS, the 

discussion in this section addresses the 

issues assessed in the ‘‘Five Findings’’ 

as conclusions, regarding the agency’s 

prediction as to the availability of a 

repository (see Section III.C2., Geologic 

Repository—Technical Feasibility and 

Availability, of this document) and 

conclusions regarding the technical 

feasibility of safely storing spent fuel in 

an at-reactor or away-from-reactor 

storage facility (see Section III.C3., 

Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel at a 

Storage Facility, of this document). The 

DGEIS now fulfills NRC’s NEPA 

obligations for analyzing the 

environmental impacts of continued 

storage and the related uncertainties in 

repository availability. Specific sections 

of the DGEIS are referenced, as 

appropriate, throughout Section III.C., 

Decision, of this document. The 

following paragraphs frame the issues 

considered in developing these 

conclusions in terms of the technical 

feasibility and availability of a 

repository and the safe management of 

continued storage of spent nuclear fuel. 

C2. Geologic Repository—Technical 

Feasibility and Availability 

The issue of the technical feasibility 

of a geologic repository was historically 

addressed in Finding 1 of the Waste 

Confidence Decision and the availability 

of a repository was addressed in Finding 


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2. ‘‘Technical feasibility’’ simply means 

whether construction and operation of a 

geologic repository is technically 

possible using existing technology 

without any fundamental breakthroughs 

in science and technology. If technically 

feasible, then the question becomes 

what is a reasonable timeframe for the 

siting, licensing, construction, and 

opening of a geologic repository. 

In past Waste Confidence proceedings 

in 1984, 1990, and 2010, the NRC 

reviewed the technical feasibility of 

deep geologic disposal and each time 

concluded that this method of disposal 

is technically feasible. As discussed in 

more detail in this section, the NRC has 

not found any new information that 

would challenge this determination. In 

fact, new information that has been 

developed since 2010 provides further 

support for the Commission’s 

conclusion that deep geologic disposal 

is technically feasible. 

The DOE’s selection of a suitable site 

is governed by the Nuclear Waste Policy 

Act (NWPA) (96 Stat. 2201 (1983) 

(current version at 42 U.S.C. 10132 

(2006)). The DOE explored potential 

repository sites before the NWPA was 

enacted, but the NWPA set in place a 

formal process and schedule for the 

development of two geologic 

repositories. The following brief 

summary of key provisions of the 

NWPA may assist readers in 

understanding the DOE’s process for 

locating a suitable site. 

As initially enacted, Section 112 of 

the NWPA directed DOE to issue 

guidelines for the recommendation of 

sites; then to nominate at least five sites 

as suitable for site characterization for 

selection as the first repository site; and, 

not later than January 1, 1985, to 

recommend three of those sites to the 

President for characterization as 

candidate sites. Not later than July 1, 

1989, DOE was to again nominate five 

sites and recommend three of them to 

the President for characterization as 

candidate sites for the second 

repository. Section 113 of the NWPA 

directed DOE to carry out site 

characterization activities for the 

approved sites. Following site 

characterization, Section 114 directed 

DOE to recommend sites to the 

President as suitable for development as 

repositories and the President was to 

recommend one site to the Congress by 

March 31, 1987, and another site by 

March 31, 1989, for development as the 

first two repositories. States and affected 

Indian tribes were given the opportunity 

to object, but if the recommendations 

were approved by Congress, DOE was to 

submit applications for a construction 

authorization to the NRC. The NRC was 

given until January 1, 1989, to reach a 

decision on the first application and 

until January 1, 1992, on the second. 

The Commission was directed to 

prohibit the emplacement of more than 

70,000 metric tons heavy metal (MTHM) 

in the first repository until a second 

repository was in operation. In 1987, 

Congress amended the NWPA to restrict 

site characterization solely to a site at 

Yucca Mountain, Nevada and 

terminated the program for a second 

repository. The amended NWPA 

provided that if at any time the DOE 

determines Yucca Mountain to be 

unsuitable for development as a 

repository, the DOE must report to 

Congress its recommendations for 

further action to ensure the safe, 

permanent disposal of spent nuclear 

fuel and high-level radioactive waste, 

including the need for new legislation. 

Support for the feasibility of geologic 

disposal can be drawn from experience 

gained from the review of the DOE’s 

Yucca Mountain license application. 

The DOE made its suitability 

determination for the Yucca Mountain 

site in 2002. On June 3, 2008, the DOE 

submitted an application for a 

construction authorization to the NRC, 

and on September 8, 2008, the NRC staff 

notified the DOE that it found the 

application acceptable for docketing (73 

FR 53284; September 15, 2008) and 

began its review. Although the DOE 

subsequently filed a motion with the 

NRC Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 

seeking permission to withdraw the 

license application for a high-level 

nuclear waste repository at Yucca 

Mountain (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML100621397), the NRC’s review 

continued until September 2011. The 

NRC’s review did not identify any 

issues that would challenge the 

feasibility of geological disposal. This 

conclusion is reflected in two technical 

review documents: NUREG–2108, 

‘‘Technical Evaluation Report on the 

Content of the U.S. Department of 

Energy Yucca Mountain Repository 

License Application—Preclosure 

Volume: Repository Safety Before 

Permanent Closure’’ (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML11250A093), and NUREG–2107, 

‘‘Technical Evaluation Report on the 

Content of the U.S. Department of 

Energy’s Yucca Mountain Repository 

License Application—Postclosure 

Volume: Repository Safety After 

Permanent Closure’’ (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML11223A273). These documents 

contain the NRC staff’s technical 

reviews of the DOE’s license application 

for Yucca Mountain in the areas of 

safety before permanent closure and 

after permanent closure. 

Additionally, the DOE has sited and 

constructed, and is operating, a deep 

geologic repository for defense-related 

transuranic radioactive waste near 

Carlsbad, New Mexico. The Waste 

Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), in 

operation since 1999, is located in the 

Chihuahuan Desert of southeastern New 

Mexico, approximately 26 miles east of 

Carlsbad. At this site, the DOE has 

successfully disposed of transuranic 

waste from nuclear weapons research 

and testing operations. The WIPP 

project provides additional evidence 

that a geologic repository is technically 

feasible. During its 14 years of 

operation, no issues have been 

identified that would challenge the 

feasibility of geologic disposal. 

Today, the consensus within the 

scientific and technical community 

engaged in spent nuclear fuel 

management activities at both a national 

and international level continues to be 

that safe geologic disposal is achievable 

with currently available technology (see, 

e.g., BRC Report (Section 4.3)). Ongoing 

research in the United States and other 

countries supports the conclusion that 

geologic disposal remains viable and 

that acceptable sites can be identified. 

Despite decades of research into various 

geologic media, no insurmountable 

technical or scientific problem has 

emerged to disturb the confidence that 

safe disposal of spent nuclear fuel and 

high-level radioactive waste can be 

achieved in a mined geologic repository. 

There has been significant progress in 

the scientific understanding and 

technological development needed for 

geologic disposal over the past two 

decades. There is now a much better 

understanding of the processes that 

affect the ability of repositories to 

isolate waste over long periods 

(International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA), ‘‘Scientific and Technical Basis 

for the Geologic Disposal of Radioactive 

Wastes, Technical Reports Series No. 

413’’ 2003). The ability to characterize 

and quantitatively assess the 

capabilities of geologic and engineered 

barriers has been repeatedly 

demonstrated (Organisation for 

Economic Cooperation and 

Development, Nuclear Energy Agency, 

‘‘Lessons Learnt From Ten Performance 

Assessment Studies,’’ 1997). Specific 

sites have been investigated and 

extensive experience has been gained in 

underground engineering (IAEA, 

‘‘Radioactive Waste Management 

Studies and Trends, IAEA/WMDB/ST/

4,’’ 2005; IAEA, ‘‘The Use of Scientific 

and Technical Results From 

Underground Research Laboratory 

Investigations for the Geologic Disposal 


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7The three countries with target dates that plan 

direct disposal of spent fuel are: Czech Republic 

(2050), Finland (2020), and Sweden (2025). The 

seven countries with target dates for disposal of 

reprocessed spent fuel and high-level radioactive 

waste are: Belgium (2035), China (2050), France 

(2025), Germany (2025), Japan (2030s), Netherlands 

(2103), and Switzerland (2042). 

of Radioactive Waste, IAEA–TECDOC– 

1243,’’ 2001). These advances and 

others throughout the world continue to 

confirm the soundness of the basic 

concept of deep geologic disposal 

(IAEA, ‘‘Joint Convention on Safety of 

Spent Fuel Management and on Safety 

of Radioactive Waste Management, 

INFCIRC/546,’’ 1997). (Note that copies 

of all IAEA documents are available on 

the IAEA Web site at http://

www.IAEA.org.) 

In the United States, the technical 

approach for safe high-level radioactive 

waste disposal has remained unchanged 

for several decades, i.e., a deep geologic 

repository containing natural barriers to 

hold canisters of high-level radioactive 

waste with additional engineered 

barriers to further retard radionuclide 

release. Although some elements of this 

technical approach have changed in 

response to new knowledge, safe 

disposal is still feasible with current 

technology. 

The BRC Report recommended 

‘‘prompt efforts to develop one or more 

geologic disposal facilities’’ (p vii). The 

BRC Report did not identify any 

obstacles to the technical feasibility of 

siting, constructing, and operating a 

repository. In the DOE ‘‘Strategy for the 

Management and Disposal of Used 

Nuclear Fuel and High-Level 

Radioactive Waste’’ (hereafter referred 

to as the DOE Strategy Report) (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML13011A138), the DOE 

responded to the BRC Report by 

presenting a framework for ‘‘moving 

toward a sustainable program to deploy 

an integrated system capable of 

transporting, storing, and disposing of 

used nuclear fuel and high-level 

radioactive waste from civilian nuclear 

power generation . . . .’’ The new DOE 

strategy includes a nuclear waste 

management system consisting of a pilot 

interim storage facility, a larger fullscale interim storage facility, and a 

geologic repository. No new information 

has emerged that would cause the 

Commission to revisit its conclusions 

from previous Waste Confidence 

rulemakings that deep geologic disposal 

is technically feasible. The Commission 

therefore concludes that deep geologic 

disposal continues to be technically 

feasible. 

Given that geologic repositories 

continue to be technically feasible, the 

question then becomes how long it is 

likely to take to successfully site, 

license, construct, and open a 

repository. In answering this question, 

the Commission has, among other 

things, historically drawn upon 

international experience to inform its 

conclusion of how long it will likely 

take to successfully site, license, 

construct, and open a repository. Of the 

24 countries (other than the United 

States) considering disposal of spent or 

reprocessed nuclear fuel in deep 

geologic repositories, 10 have 

established target dates for the 

availability of a repository. Most of the 

14 countries that have not established 

target dates rely on centralized interim 

storage, which may include a protracted 

period of onsite storage before shipment 

to a centralized facility.7

In 1997, the United Kingdom (UK) 

rejected an application for the 

construction of a rock characterization 

facility at Sellafield, leaving the country 

without a path forward for long-term 

management or disposal of either 

intermediate-level waste or spent 

nuclear fuel. In 1998, an inquiry by the 

UK House of Lords endorsed geologic 

disposal but specified that public 

acceptance was required. As a result, 

the UK Government embraced a 

repository plan based on the principles 

of voluntarism and partnership between 

communities and implementers. This 

led to the initiation of a national public 

consultation and major structural 

reorganization within the UK program. 

The UK Nuclear Decommissioning 

Authority envisions availability of a 

geologic disposal facility for 

intermediate-level waste in 2040 and a 

geologic facility for spent nuclear fuel 

and high-level radioactive waste in 

2075; however, there have been changes 

in societal acceptance in the UK for the 

siting of a geological disposal facility. In 

2007, the Scottish Government officially 

rejected any further consultation with 

the UK Government on deep geologic 

disposal of high-level radioactive waste 

and spent nuclear fuel. This action by 

the Scottish Government effectively 

ended more than 7 years of 

consultations with stakeholders near 

Scottish nuclear installations. In 2013, 

the Cumbria County Council voted to 

withdraw from the UK process to find 

a host community for an underground 

radioactive waste disposal facility and 

to end the site selection process in west 

Cumbria. 

In Germany, a large salt dome at 

Gorleben had been under study since 

1977 as a potential spent nuclear fuel 

repository. After decades of intense 

discussions and protests, the utilities 

and the government reached an 

agreement in 2000 to suspend 

exploration of Gorleben for at least 3, 

and at most 10 years. In 2003, the 

Federal Ministry for the Environment 

set up an interdisciplinary expert group 

to identify, with public participation, 

criteria for selecting new candidate 

sites. In October 2010, Germany 

resumed exploration of Gorleben as a 

potential spent nuclear fuel repository. 

In March 2013, Germany announced 

plans to form a 24-member commission 

to develop siting criteria. The 

Commission will hold public meetings 

through 2015 on the issue of a 

permanent repository for high-level 

nuclear waste. 

Initial efforts in France, during the 

1980s, also failed to identify potential 

repository sites, using solely technical 

criteria. Failure of these attempts led to 

the passage of nuclear waste legislation 

that prescribed a period of 15 years of 

research. Reports on generic disposal 

options in clay and granite media were 

prepared and reviewed by the safety 

authorities in 2005. In 2006, 

conclusions from the public debate on 

disposal options, held in 2005, were 

published. Later that year, the French 

Parliament passed new legislation 

designating a single site for deep 

geologic disposal of intermediate- and 

high-level radioactive waste. This 

facility, to be located in the Bure region 

of northeastern France, is scheduled to 

open in 2025, about 34 years after 

passage of the original Nuclear Waste 

Law of 1991. 

In Switzerland, after detailed site 

investigations in several locations, the 

Swiss National Cooperative for 

Radioactive Waste Disposal proposed, 

in 1993, a deep geologic repository for 

low- and intermediate-level waste at 

Wellenberg. Despite a 1998 finding by 

Swiss authorities that technical 

feasibility of the disposal concept was 

successfully demonstrated, a public 

cantonal referendum rejected the 

proposed repository in 2002. Even after 

more than 25 years of high quality field 

and laboratory research, Swiss 

authorities do not expect that a deep 

geologic repository will be available 

before 2040. 

In 1998, an independent panel 

reported to the Governments of Canada 

and Ontario on its review of Atomic 

Energy of Canada Ltd.’s concept of 

geologic disposal (Canadian Nuclear 

Fuel Waste Disposal Concept 

Environmental Assessment Panel, 

Report of the Nuclear Fuel Waste 

Management and Disposal Concept 

Environmental Assessment Panel, 

February 1998). (Note that reports 

related to the Canadian program are 

available at www.nrcan.gc.ca.) The 

panel found that from a technical 


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perspective, safety of the concept had 

been adequately demonstrated but from 

a social perspective, it had not. The 

panel concluded that broad public 

support is necessary in Canada to 

ensure the acceptability of a concept for 

managing nuclear fuel wastes. The 

panel also found that technical safety is 

a key part, but only one part, of 

acceptability. To be considered 

acceptable in Canada, the panel found 

that a concept for managing nuclear fuel 

wastes must: (1) Have broad public 

support; (2) be safe from both a 

technical and social perspective; (3) 

have been developed within a sound 

ethical and social assessment 

framework; (4) have the support of 

Aboriginal people; (5) be selected after 

comparison with the risks, costs, and 

benefits of other options; and (6) be 

advanced by a stable and trustworthy 

proponent and overseen by a 

trustworthy regulator. Resulting 

legislation mandated a nationwide 

consultation process and widespread 

organizational reform. 

In 2007, the Government of Canada 

announced its selection of the Adaptive 

Phased Management approach and 

directed the Nuclear Waste Management 

Organization (NWMO) to take at least 2 

years to develop a ‘‘collaborative 

community-driven site-selection 

process.’’ The NWMO will use this 

process to open consultations with 

citizens, communities, Aboriginals, and 

other interested parties to find a suitable 

site in a willing host community. For 

financial planning and cost estimation 

purposes only, the NWMO assumes the 

availability of a deep geological 

repository in 2035, 27 years after 

initiating development of new site 

selection criteria, 30 years after 

embarking on a national public 

consultation, and 37 years after rejection 

of the original geologic disposal concept 

(NWMO, Annual Report 2007: Moving 

Forward Together, March 2008). NWMO 

developed a site selection process with 

public input and launched the process 

in 2010. At the end of 2012, 21 

communities had expressed interest in 

learning more about the project 

(NWMO, Annual Report 2012: Learning 

More Together, March 2013). 

Repository development programs in 

Finland and Sweden are further along 

than in other countries but have taken 

time to build support from potential 

host communities. In Finland, 

preliminary site investigations started in 

1986, and detailed characterizations of 

four locations were performed between 

1993 and 2000. In 2001, the Finnish 

Parliament ratified the Government’s 

decision to proceed with a repository 

project at a chosen site only after the 

1999 approval by the municipal council 

of the host community. In December 

2012, Posiva (the nuclear waste 

management company in Finland) 

submitted a construction license 

application for a final repository that 

will hold spent nuclear fuel from 

Finland’s nuclear reactors. Finland 

expects this facility to begin receipt of 

spent nuclear fuel for disposal in 2020, 

34 years after the start of preliminary 

site investigations. 

Between 1993 and 2000, Sweden 

conducted feasibility studies in eight 

municipalities. One site was found 

technically unsuitable, and two sites 

were eliminated by municipal 

referenda. Three of the remaining five 

sites were selected for detailed site 

investigations. Municipalities adjacent 

to two of these sites agreed to be 

potential hosts and one refused. Since 

2007, detailed site investigations were 

conducted at both O ̈ sthammar and 

Oskarshamn, both of which already host 

nuclear power stations. On June 3, 2009, 

the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste 

Management Company, SKB, selected 

the Forsmark Site located in the 

O ̈ sthammar municipality for the 

Swedish spent nuclear fuel repository. 

The SKB submitted a license 

application in spring 2011. A 

government decision is expected in 

2015. If Swedish authorities authorize 

construction, the repository could be 

available for disposal around 2025, 

about 30 years after feasibility studies 

began. 

Based on international experience, 

25–35 years is a reasonable estimate for 

the amount of time necessary to site, 

license, and open a geologic repository. 

The time DOE will need to develop a 

repository site will depend upon a 

variety of factors, including the passage 

of any required enabling legislation and 

budgeted funding. Broader institutional 

issues also bear on the time it takes to 

implement geologic disposal. Given this 

uncertainty, the DGEIS evaluates a range 

of scenarios for the timeframe of the 

development of a repository, including 

indefinite storage. 

The DOE is currently the agency 

responsible for carrying out the national 

policy to site and build a repository, 

which includes designing, constructing, 

operating, and decommissioning the 

repository. The NRC, on the other hand, 

is the agency responsible for reviewing, 

licensing, and overseeing the 

construction and operation of the 

repository. The DOE Strategy Report 

states that it is the Administration’s goal 

to have a repository sited by 2026, 

licensing to be complete by 2042, and 

the repository constructed and open for 

operations by 2048. The total of 35 years 

is consistent with international efforts 

and estimates of between 25 and 35 

years to site, license, construct, and 

open a repository. 

Before DOE can start the development 

of a new site, Congress will need to 

provide additional direction, beyond the 

current NWPA, for the long-term 

management and disposal of spent 

nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive 

waste. Whatever approach Congress 

mandates, international and domestic 

experience since 1990 suggests that 

greater attention needs to be paid to 

developing societal and political 

acceptance in concert with essential 

technical, safety, and security 

assurances. While there is no technical 

basis for making precise estimates of the 

minimum time needed to accomplish 

these objectives, examination of the 

international examples cited previously 

would support a range of between 25 

and 35 years. The Commission believes 

that societal and political acceptance 

must occur before a successful 

repository program can be completed, 

and that this is unlikely to occur until 

a Federal decision is made, whether for 

technical, environmental, political, 

legal, or societal reasons, that will allow 

the licensing and construction of a 

repository to proceed. The BRC Report 

recommended using a siting process 

that is consent-based. In response to the 

BRC report, the DOE Strategy Report 

includes a strategy that includes the 

establishment of a consent-based siting 

process. 

As discussed in this section, geologic 

disposal continues to be the favored 

disposition path both nationally and 

internationally. Moreover, geologic 

disposal has moved significantly 

beyond a theoretical concept as 

demonstrated by: (1) Submission of a 

license application for a potential 

repository at Yucca Mountain and the 

NRC conducting a technical review of 

that application; (2) submission on 

December 28, 2012, of a construction 

license application by Posiva for a final 

repository that will hold spent nuclear 

fuel from Finland’s nuclear reactors; 

and (3) submission in spring 2011, of an 

application by SKB for permission to 

build a repository for spent nuclear fuel 

in Sweden. Additionally, a deep 

geologic repository for defense-related 

transuranic radioactive wastes in 

Carlsbad, New Mexico (WIPP) began 

disposal operations in March 1999. 

Based on all the information in this 

section and Appendix B of the DGEIS, 

the Commission concludes that a 

geologic repository is technically 

feasible. 

In picking a timeframe by which the 

Commission has confidence that a 


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8The Private Fuel Storage (PFS) facility was 

licensed, however, as a result of legal challenges not 

related to the NRC licensing proceeding, the 

proposed PFS ISFSI has not been constructed. On 

December 20, 2012, PFS submitted a request to the 

NRC to terminate its license (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML12356A063). As of publication, that request 

is pending before the agency. 

geologic repository can be available, the 

Commission is not concluding that it 

supports storage of spent nuclear fuel 

for an indefinitely long period. United 

States law supports the objective of 

timely disposal of spent nuclear fuel 

and high-level radioactive waste in a 

geologic repository. However, spent 

nuclear fuel will need to be stored for 

several decades at either reactor sites or 

at away-from-reactor sites beyond the 

licensed life for operations before 

ultimate disposal in a geologic 

repository. Having considered all the 

available information, the Commission 

believes that a reasonable timeframe for 

repository availability is within 60 years 

beyond the licensed life for operation of 

a reactor. Based on international 

experience, this timeframe is still a 

reasonable time for the United States to 

site, license, construct, and open a 

geologic repository and is longer than 

the predicted reasonable period of 25 to 

35 years to site and develop a 

repository. Dresden 1 will be the first 

reactor to reach 60 years beyond 

licensed life for operations in 2059, 

which means that a repository would be 

needed by 2059 to support the shortterm continued storage scenario in the 

GEIS that sufficient repository capacity 

becomes available by 60 years after the 

end of a reactor’s licensed life for 

operation. The 2059 date is several years 

beyond the DOE’s estimate of 2048 to 

site, license, construct, and open a 

repository. For new reactors, 60 years 

beyond the licensed life of the reactor 

would mean that repository capacity 

would be available in 120 to 140 years. 

Therefore, the Commission concludes 

that it is reasonable to assume the 

availability of a mined geologic 

repository is feasible within 60 years 

beyond the licensed life for operating 

and planned new reactors. 

C3. Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel 

Continued storage of spent nuclear 

fuel at-reactor or away-from-reactor sites 

will be necessary until a repository is 

available for permanent disposal. 

During the continued storage period, the 

storage of spent nuclear fuel at a storage 

facility is focused on safe spent nuclear 

fuel management. Safe spent nuclear 

fuel management involves a regulatory 

framework and the technical feasibility 

of safe storage. The regulatory 

framework applicable to both wet (spent 

fuel pool) and dry storage of spent 

nuclear fuel is discussed in Section 

C3.a., Regulatory Framework, of this 

document. The technical feasibility of 

safe storage of spent nuclear fuel in 

spent fuel pools is discussed in Section 

C3.b.i., Technical Feasibility of Wet 

Storage, and in dry cask storage in 

Section C3.b.ii., Technical Feasibility of 

Dry Storage, of this document (see also 

Section B.3 of Appendix B of the 

DGEIS). 

C3.a. Regulatory Framework 

A strong regulatory framework that 

involves regulatory oversight, 

continuous improvement based on 

research and operating experience, and 

licensee compliance with regulatory 

requirements is important to the 

continued safe storage of spent nuclear 

fuel until repository capacity is 

available. The regulatory framework was 

previously addressed in Findings 3 and 

5. Finding 3 analyzed whether highlevel radioactive waste and spent 

nuclear fuel would be safely managed 

until repository capacity is available. 

Finding 5 dealt with whether safe 

storage capacity would be made 

available if necessary. The key question 

of these Findings is whether a 

regulatory framework exists to ensure 

the continued safe management of spent 

nuclear fuel and whether licensees will 

do what is necessary to safely store their 

spent nuclear fuel until repository 

capacity for their spent nuclear fuel is 

available. 

After the end of a reactor’s licensed 

life for operation, the spent nuclear fuel 

is stored in either spent fuel pools or in 

dry cask storage. At-reactor storage of 

spent nuclear fuel in spent fuel pools is 

covered by a licensee’s 10 CFR parts 50 

or 52 license. Monitoring of the 

structural integrity of the spent fuel pool 

is addressed through aging management 

programs. In particular, the aging 

management program focuses on the 

pool’s water chemistry as it relates to 

the integrity of the stainless steel liner, 

spent fuel storage racks, and spent-fuelstorage-racks-neutron-absorbing sheets. 

Currently only one away-from-reactor 

ISFSI stores spent nuclear fuel in a 

spent fuel pool—the GEH-Morris 

facility. The DGEIS assumes that no new 

away-from-reactor spent fuel pool 

storage facilities are constructed. 

Spent nuclear fuel can also be stored 

in dry casks in at-reactor ISFSIs licensed 

by the NRC under either a specific 

license or a general license or in an 

away-from-reactor ISFSI under a 

specific license. Currently there are 69 

ISFSIs licensed to operate in 34 States 

under either specific (15) or general (54) 

10 CFR part 72 licenses.8

A specific license for an ISFSI under 

10 CFR part 72 can be granted by the 

NRC after a review of the safety, 

environmental, and physical security 

aspects of the proposed ISFSI and the 

financial aspects of the licensee. If the 

NRC concludes that the ISFSI can 

operate safely and prepares either an EA 

and FONSI or EIS, then a license can be 

issued. This license contains 

requirements on topics such as leak 

testing and monitoring and specifies the 

quantity and type of material the 

licensee is authorized to store at the site. 

Neither the initial nor renewal license 

terms for an ISFSI are to exceed 40 years 

from the date of issuance. Part 72 of 10 

CFR also contains the regulatory 

framework for licensing a monitored 

retrievable storage facility should the 

need arise. 

A general license under subpart K of 

10 CFR part 72, ‘‘General License for 

Storage of Spent Fuel at Power Reactor 

Sites,’’ authorizes storage of spent fuel 

in casks previously approved by the 

NRC at a site already licensed to possess 

fuel to operate a nuclear power reactor. 

Under 10 CFR 72.210, ‘‘General license 

issued,’’ a general license for the storage 

of spent nuclear fuel in an ISFSI at 

power reactor sites is issued to those 

persons authorized to possess or operate 

nuclear power reactors under 10 CFR 

parts 50 or 52. The general license is 

limited to spent nuclear fuel that the 

general licensee is authorized to possess 

at the site under the 10 CFR parts 50 or 

52 license for the site. The general 

license is further limited to storage of 

spent nuclear fuel in casks approved 

and fabricated under the provisions of 

subpart L of 10 CFR part 72, ‘‘Approval 

of Spent Fuel Storage Casks’’; the 

approved cask designs are listed in 10 

CFR 72.214, ‘‘List of approved spent 

fuel storage casks.’’ The NRC has 

approved 34 designs. The NRC conducts 

a technical review of each cask design 

before approving the design and listing 

it in 10 CFR 72.214. After the NRC staff 

documents its review of the proposed 

cask design in a safety evaluation report, 

the NRC conducts a rulemaking, which 

includes an environmental review, to 

add the design to the list of approved 

cask designs. Licensees that use casks 

with the approved designs must follow 

the terms of the Certificate of 

Compliance and the technical 

specifications for the design. Licensees 

must demonstrate that it is safe to store 

spent fuel in dry casks at their site, 

including analysis of earthquake 

intensity and tornado missiles. 

Licensees also review their programs 

(such as security and emergency 

planning) and make any changes to 


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those programs needed to accommodate 

an ISFSI at their site. 

Parts 50, 52, and 72 of 10 CFR all have 

provisions for site-specific license 

renewal. The current regulatory 

framework for storage of spent nuclear 

fuel allows for multiple license 

renewals subject to aging management 

analysis and planning. An applicant for 

storage license renewal must provide 

appropriate technical bases for 

identifying and addressing aging-related 

effects and develop specific aging 

management plans to justify extended 

operations of ISFSIs under the renewed 

license term. The regulatory framework 

for storage is supported by welldeveloped regulatory guidance; 

voluntary domestic and international 

consensus standards; research and 

analytical studies; and processes for 

implementing licensing reviews, 

inspection programs, and enforcement 

oversight. 

With respect to decommissioning, as 

required under 10 CFR 72.30(b), all 

ISFSI licensees must provide a 

decommissioning funding plan to 

demonstrate reasonable assurance that 

funds will be available to decommission 

the ISFSI. Further, the NRC’s 

regulations require that every nuclear 

power reactor operating license issued 

under 10 CFR part 50 and every 

combined license issued under 10 CFR 

part 52 must contain a condition 

requiring each licensee to submit 

written notification to the Commission 

of the licensee’s plan for managing 

irradiated fuel after reactor shutdown. 

The submittal, required by 10 CFR 

50.54(bb), must include information on 

how the licensee intends to provide 

funding for the management of its spent 

nuclear fuel. 

In accordance with the license 

termination requirements for power 

reactors in 10 CFR 50.82(a)(3) and 

52.110(c), decommissioning is to be 

completed within 60 years of permanent 

cessation of operations. Completion of 

decommissioning beyond 60 years will 

be approved by the NRC only when 

necessary to protect public health and 

safety. Factors that will be considered 

by the Commission include 

unavailability of waste disposal capacity 

and other site-specific factors, including 

the presence of other nuclear facilities at 

the site. Given this regulatory 

framework, it may be reasonably 

assumed that each nuclear power plant, 

including its onsite spent fuel pool, will 

be decommissioned within 60 years of 

permanent cessation of operations. This 

is the basis for assuming in the DGEIS 

that all of the spent nuclear fuel from 

the spent fuel pool is removed from the 

pool by the end of the short-term 

timeframe (see Section 2.2.1.1 of the 

DGEIS for more information on 

decommissioning during the short-term 

period). 

As part of its oversight, the NRC can 

issue orders and new or amended 

regulations to address emerging issues 

that could affect the storage of spent 

nuclear fuel. For example, following the 

terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 

the NRC undertook an extensive 

reexamination of spent nuclear fuel 

safety and security issues. In 2002, the 

NRC issued orders to licensees that 

required power reactors in 

decommissioning, wet ISFSIs, and dry 

storage ISFSIs to enhance security and 

improve their capabilities to respond to, 

and mitigate the consequences of, a 

terrorist attack. These orders required 

additional security measures, including 

increased patrols, augmented security 

forces and capabilities, and more 

restrictive site access controls to reduce 

the likelihood of a successful terrorist 

attack. In 2007, the NRC issued a final 

rule revising the Design Basis Threat, 

which also increased the security 

requirements for power reactors and 

their spent fuel pools (72 FR 12705; 

March 19, 2007). More recently in 

March 2009, the NRC issued a final rule 

to improve security measures at nuclear 

power reactors, including spent fuel 

pools (74 FR 13926; March 27, 2009). 

The NRC also plans to codify enhanced 

security measures at ISFSIs in a future 

rulemaking (74 FR 66589; December 16, 

2009). 

Section 4.19 of the DGEIS describes 

the environmental impacts of potential 

acts of sabotage or terrorism involving 

the continued storage of spent nuclear 

fuel. The section acknowledges that as 

the immediate hazard posed by the high 

radiation levels of spent nuclear fuel 

diminishes over time, so does the 

deterrent to handling by unauthorized 

persons. The NRC will consider this 

type of information in evaluating 

whether additional security 

requirements are warranted in the 

future. 

Other examples of the NRC’s 

oversight are the additional 

requirements that the NRC has imposed 

in response to the March 11, 2011, 

severe earthquake and subsequent 

tsunami that resulted in extensive 

damage to the six-unit Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in Japan. On 

March 12, 2012, the NRC issued 

multiple orders and a request for 

information to all of its nuclear power 

plant licensees. The orders addressed 

mitigating strategies for beyond-design 

basis external events and reliable spent 

fuel pool instrumentation. The request 

for information was designed to gather 

information to allow the NRC to 

reevaluate seismic and flooding hazards 

at operating reactor sites and to 

determine whether appropriate staffing 

and communication can be relied upon 

to coordinate event response during a 

prolonged station blackout event, as was 

experienced at Fukushima Dai-ichi. 

Another aspect of the NRC’s 

regulatory program for continued 

storage, as for reactors and other 

licensed facilities generally, involves 

generic communications. Generic 

communications include, but are not 

limited to, generic letters, bulletins, 

information notices, safeguards 

advisories, and regulatory issue 

summaries. Generic letters request 

licensee actions and information to 

address issues regarding emergent or 

routine matters of safety, security, 

safeguards, or environmental 

significance. Bulletins request licensee 

actions and information to address 

significant issues regarding matters of 

safety, security, safeguards, or 

environmental significance that have 

great urgency. Both generic letters and 

bulletins require a written response 

from the licensee. Information notices 

are used to communicate operating or 

analytical experience to the nuclear 

industry. The industry is expected to 

review the information for applicability 

and consider appropriate actions to 

avoid similar problems. Regulatory 

issue summaries are used to 

communicate and clarify the NRC’s 

technical and policy positions on 

regulatory matters. Neither an 

information notice nor a regulatory 

issue summary requires written 

responses from licensees. 

For example, Information Notice 

2012–20, ‘‘Potential Chloride-Induced 

Stress Corrosion Cracking of Austenitic 

Stainless Steel and Maintenance of Dry 

Cask Storage System Canisters’’ 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML12319A440), 

informed licensees about the potential 

for chloride-induced stress corrosion 

cracking of austenitic stainless steel and 

maintenance of dry cask storage system 

canisters. Although an immediate safety 

concern did not exist, the NRC alerted 

licensees and certificate holders that 

their monitoring programs need to 

address this concern as part of an aging 

management program so that 

appropriate actions (e.g., maintenance) 

would be taken to avoid the potential 

problem. 

As demonstrated by these examples, 

the NRC’s regulatory framework allows 

the Agency to respond to emerging 

events and take appropriate action to 

continue to protect the public health 

and safety and the environment. 


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To date, the NRC has renewed five 

specific 10 CFR part 72 ISFSI licenses. 

These renewals include the 10 CFR part 

72 specific licenses for the General 

Electric Morris Operation (the only wet, 

or pool-type, ISFSI), as well as the 

Surry, H.B. Robinson, Oconee, and Fort 

St. Vrain ISFSIs. Specific licenses for all 

but one of the ISFSIs will expire by 

2048. It is expected that license 

renewals will be requested by the 

licensees of these facilities, unless a 

permanent repository or some other 

interim storage option is made available. 

The NRC has received renewal 

applications for the Calvert Cliffs and 

Prairie Island ISFSIs. Similarly, 

renewals will be required for certificates 

of compliance for storage cask designs 

approved for use by general licensees in 

accordance with 10 CFR part 72. 

In addition, issuance of Materials 

License No. SNM–2513 for the Private 

Fuel Storage, LLC (PFS) facility has 

confirmed the feasibility of licensing an 

away-from-reactor ISFSI under 10 CFR 

part 72. Although there were several 

issues that prevented the PFS ISFSI 

from being built and operated, the 

extensive review of safety, security, and 

environmental issues associated with 

licensing the PFS facility provides 

additional confidence that spent nuclear 

fuel can be safely stored at an away from 

reactor ISFSI for long periods after 

storage at a reactor site. 

The NRC will continue its regulatory 

control and oversight of spent nuclear 

fuel storage at both operating and 

decommissioned reactor sites for both 

specific and general 10 CFR part 72 

licenses and 10 CFR parts 50 or 52 

licenses. Decades of operating 

experience and ongoing NRC 

inspections demonstrate that these 

reactor and ISFSI licensees continue to 

meet their obligation to safely store 

spent fuel in accordance with the 

requirements of 10 CFR parts 50 and 72. 

If the NRC were to find noncompliance 

with these requirements or otherwise 

identify a concern with the safe storage 

of the spent fuel, the NRC would 

evaluate the issue and take action to 

protect the public health and safety and 

the environment. 

As noted in the preceding paragraphs, 

licensees have continued to develop and 

successfully use onsite spent nuclear 

fuel storage capacity in the form of 

spent fuel pool and dry cask storage. 

Based on the preceding discussion, 

licensees should have the necessary 

resources to meet obligations related to 

the storage of any spent nuclear fuel 

after reactor operations cease. The 

Commission concludes that the 

regulatory framework exists to support 

the conclusion that spent nuclear fuel 

can be managed in a safe manner until 

sufficient repository capacity is 

available. 

C3.b. Safe Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel 

Finding 4 assessed the safe storage of 

spent nuclear fuel pending ultimate 

disposal at a repository. Issues related to 

storage focus on the technical feasibility 

of safe storage of spent nuclear fuel. To 

address the feasibility of long-term safe 

storage, the Commission needs to 

evaluate: (1) The technical feasibility of 

safe wet storage; and (2) the technical 

feasibility of safe dry storage. The 

Commission also needs to evaluate the 

potential risks of accidents and acts of 

sabotage at spent nuclear fuel storage 

facilities. Although the DGEIS does not 

primarily evaluate safety, it does 

include evaluations of the 

environmental impacts attributable to 

accidents, public health, and safeguards 

for three different timeframes and 

contains a discussion on the technical 

feasibility of safe storage, which support 

the conclusion in the proposed rule that 

fuel can be safely stored. The technical 

feasibility of safe storage beyond a 

reactor’s licensed life for operation is 

addressed in the following sections. 

C3.b.i. Technical Feasibility of Wet 

Storage 

The technical feasibility of continued 

safe wet storage is supported by a 

number of technical considerations. 

First, the integrity of spent fuel and 

cladding under the controlled water 

chemistry within the spent fuel pool is 

supported by operating experience as 

well as a number of scientific studies. 

Further, the spent fuel pool’s robust 

technical design protects against a range 

of natural and human-induced 

challenges. These considerations are 

discussed in the following paragraphs. 

The Commission found in 1984 that 

research and experience in the United 

States and other countries confirmed 

that long-term storage could be safely 

undertaken (49 FR 34681–34682; 

August 31, 1984). In 1990, the 

Commission determined that experience 

with water storage of spent nuclear fuel 

continued to confirm that pool storage 

is a benign environment for spent 

nuclear fuel that does not lead to 

significant degradation of spent nuclear 

fuel integrity and that the pools in 

which the assemblies are stored will 

remain safe for extended periods. 

Further, degradation mechanisms are 

well understood and allow time for 

appropriate remedial action (55 FR 

38509–38511; September 18, 1990). In 

sum, based on both experience and 

scientific studies, the Commission 

found wet storage to be a fullydeveloped technology with no 

associated major technical problems. 

Almost 30 years of additional 

experience has been gained since the 

publication of the Waste Confidence 

rulemaking in 1984 during which time 

the technical basis for very slow 

degradation rates of spent nuclear fuel 

in spent fuel pools has continued to 

grow. For example, several studies have 

supported the low degradation of 

cladding material (IAEA TECDOC–1012, 

Durability of Spent Nuclear Fuels and 

Facility Components in Wet Storage, 

1988; IAEA TECDOC–1343, Spent Fuel 

Performance Assessment and Research: 

Final Report of a Cordinated Research 

Project on Spent Fuel Performance 

Assessment and Research (SPAR) 1997– 

2001, 2003; IAEA Technical Report 

Series No. 443, Understanding and 

Managing Ageing of Materials in Spent 

Fuel Storage Facilities, 2006). The IAEA 

TECDOC–1012 noted that ‘‘[t]he 

zirconium alloys represent a class of 

materials that is highly resistant to 

degradation in wet storage, including 

some experience in aggressive waters. 

The only adverse experience involves 

Zircaloy clad metallic uranium where 

mechanical damage to the cladding was 

a prominent factor during reactor 

discharge, exposing the uranium metal 

fuel to aqueous corrosion. Otherwise, 

the database for the zirconium alloys 

supports a judgment of satisfactory wet 

storage in the time frame of 50 to 100 

years or more’’ (p. 5). The IAEA 

TECDOC 1343, in discussing spent 

nuclear fuel storage experience, 

reported on a detailed review of the 

degradation mechanisms of spent 

nuclear fuel under wet storage and 

stated that ‘‘wet storage of spent fuel 

only appears to be limited by adverse 

pool chemistry conditions or the 

deterioration of the fuel storage pool 

structure.’’ 

The IAEA Technical Report Series No. 

443 stated that ‘‘[d]estructive and nondestructive examinations of fuel rods, 

visual evidence and coupon studies [11, 

13, 54–58] all support resistance to 

aqueous corrosion. There have been no 

reports of fission gas evolution, 

indicative of cladding failure in wet 

storage. Rod consolidation campaigns 

have been conducted without any 

indication of storage induced 

degradation. There is a sufficient 

database to indicate that wet storage of 

fuel with zirconium alloy cladding can 

be extended for at least several 

decades.’’ 

Based on available information and 

operating experience, degradation of the 

fuel cladding occurs slowly over time in 

the spent fuel pool environment. 

Degradation of the spent nuclear fuel 


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should be minimal, particularly over the 

short-term storage period. Therefore, the 

NRC expects that only routine 

maintenance will be needed over the 

short-term storage period. The DGEIS 

assumes that the spent fuel pool will be 

decommissioned before the end of the 

short-term storage period. However, the 

NRC is not aware of any information 

that would call into question the 

technical feasibility of continued safe 

storage of spent fuel in spent fuel pools 

beyond the short-term storage period 

(see Section B.3.1 of Appendix B of the 

DGEIS). 

In its initial Waste Confidence 

Decision, the Commission found that 

the risks of major accidents at spent fuel 

pools resulting in offsite consequences 

were remote because of the secure and 

stable character of the spent nuclear fuel 

in the storage pool environment and the 

absence of reactive phenomena that 

might result in dispersal of radioactive 

material. The Commission noted that 

storage pools and ISFSIs are designed to 

safely withstand accidents caused by 

either natural or man-made phenomena 

(49 FR 34658; pp. 34684–34685; August 

31, 1984). By 1990, the NRC staff had 

spent several years studying the 

potential for a catastrophic loss of 

reactor spent fuel pool water, which 

could lead to a fuel fire. The NRC 

concluded that, because of the large 

inherent safety margins in the design 

and construction of a spent fuel pool, no 

action was needed to further reduce the 

risk (55 FR 38472; p. 38511; September 

18, 1990). 

The NRC has continued its 

examination of spent fuel pool storage 

to ensure that adequate safety is 

maintained and that there are no 

adverse environmental effects from the 

storage of spent nuclear fuel in spent 

fuel pools. In 1997, the safety and 

environmental effects of spent fuel pool 

storage were addressed in conjunction 

with regulatory assessments of 

permanently shutdown nuclear plants 

and decommissioning nuclear power 

plants in NUREG/CR–6451, ‘‘A Safety 

and Regulatory Assessment of Generic 

BWR and PWR Permanently Shutdown 

Nuclear Power Plants’’ (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML082260098). The 

study provided reasonably bounding 

estimates of fuel coolability and offsite 

consequences for the most severe 

accidents, which would involve 

draining of the spent fuel pool. 

In 2001, the NRC issued NUREG– 

1738, ‘‘Technical Study of Spent Fuel 

Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning 

Nuclear Power Plants’’ (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML010430066), which 

examined spent fuel pool accident risk 

at decommissioning nuclear power 

plants and provides a newer and more 

robust analysis of the safety and 

environmental effects of spent fuel pool 

storage. This study provided the results 

of the NRC staff’s latest evaluation of the 

accident risk in a spent fuel pool at 

decommissioning plants. The NUREG– 

1738 found that a postulated accident 

causing a zirconium cladding fire could 

result in unacceptable offsite doses; 

however, the likelihood for such an 

accident to occur was estimated to be 

less than three chances in one million 

(p. 3–29). The NUREG–1738 states: 

‘‘[T]he risk at decommissioning plants is 

low and well within the Commission’s 

safety goals. The risk is low because of 

the very low likelihood of a zirconium 

fire even though the consequences from 

a zirconium fire could be serious.’’ (p. 

5–3). In arriving at this conclusion, 

NUREG–1738 considered a wide range 

of initiating events (pp. 3–2, 3–3), 

including, but not limited to, events that 

might lead to rapid loss of pool water, 

such as seismic events, cask drop, 

aircraft impact, and missiles generated 

by tornados. The low probability for 

these varied events to initiate a rapid 

loss of water from the pool is a direct 

result of the robustness of the structural 

design of the spent fuel pool. The 

results of NUREG–1738, as well as other 

studies, are discussed in more detail in 

Appendix F of the DGEIS. Appendix F 

also contains information on actions 

that the NRC has required licensees to 

take in response to significant events 

including the September 11, 2001, 

terrorist attack and the March 11, 2011, 

Fukushima Dai-ichi event in Japan. 

Given the physical robustness of the 

pools, the physical security measures, 

and the spent fuel pool mitigation 

measures, and based upon the NRC’s 

site evaluations of every spent fuel pool 

in the United States, the NRC has 

determined that the risk of a spent fuel 

pool zirconium fire, whether caused by 

an accident or a terrorist attack, is very 

low. In addition, the NRC has approved 

license amendments and issued safety 

evaluations to incorporate mitigation 

measures into the plant licensing bases 

of all operating nuclear power plants in 

the United States (see 73 FR 46207– 

46208; August 8, 2008; and Sections 

4.18, 4.19, 5.18, 5.19, and Appendix F 

of the DGEIS). 

Monitoring of the structural integrity 

of the spent fuel pool is addressed 

through aging management programs. 

All nuclear power plants and GEHMorris have specific aging management 

programs to inspect, monitor, detect, 

and trend the aging of the spent fuel 

pool structure concrete, liner plate, and 

structural steel that support different 

commodities. The aging management 

program also focuses on the pool’s water 

chemistry as it relates to the integrity of 

the stainless steel liner, spent fuel 

storage racks, and spent-fuel-storageracks-neutron-absorbing sheets. 

Another issue related to storage of 

spent nuclear fuel in a spent fuel pool 

is possible leakage of water from the 

pool into the environment. The spent 

fuel pool liner and the leakage 

collection system normally prevent 

spent fuel pool water from leaking into 

the environment. However, leaks can 

occur. Available data indicate that spent 

fuel pool leakage has occurred at several 

nuclear power plant sites. The DGEIS 

provides a detailed description and 

evaluation of the historical data on 

spent fuel leakage and the offsite 

environmental impacts that may occur 

during the period of continued storage. 

In particular, Appendix E determined 

the impact to public health from spent 

fuel pool leakage would be SMALL (see 

Appendix E of the DGEIS for 

information on spent fuel pool leaks). 

In summary, spent fuel pools are 

massive, seismically-designed structures 

that are constructed from thick, 

reinforced concrete walls and slabs 

designed to be seismically robust. Thus, 

the likelihood of major accidents at 

spent fuel pools resulting in offsite 

consequences is remote. The NRC is not 

aware of any additional studies that 

would question the low probability of 

spent fuel pool accidents and thereby 

also question the technical feasibility of 

continued safe storage of spent nuclear 

fuel in spent fuel pools for the 60 years 

after licensed life for operation 

considered in the DGEIS. Further, as 

described in Appendix E of the DGEIS, 

the public health Impacts from potential 

spent fuel pool leaks is SMALL. 

C3.b.ii. Technical Feasibility of Dry 

Storage 

The feasibility of safe dry cask storage 

is supported by years of experience as 

well as technical studies and the NRC’s 

reviews that have examined and 

confirmed the integrity of spent nuclear 

fuel and cladding under the controlled 

and relatively benign environment 

within dry cask storage systems and the 

robustness of the structural design of the 

dry cask storage system against a variety 

of challenges both natural and humaninduced. Those features are addressed 

in the following paragraphs and in 

Section B.3.2 of Appendix B of the 

DGEIS. 

In 1984, the Commission based its 

findings regarding the safety of dry 

storage on an understanding of the 

material degradation processes, derived 

largely from technical studies, together 

with the recognition that dry storage 


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systems are simple and easy to maintain 

(49 FR 34683–34684; August 31, 1984). 

By 1990, the NRC and ISFSI licensees 

had considerable experience with dry 

storage. The NRC staff’s safety reviews 

of topical reports on storage system 

designs, the licensing and inspection of 

dry storage at two nuclear power plant 

sites under 10 CFR part 72, and the 

NRC’s promulgation of an amendment 

to 10 CFR part 72 that incorporated a 

monitored retrievable storage 

installation (a dry storage facility) into 

the regulations confirmed the 1984 

conclusions on the safety of dry storage 

(55 FR 38509–38513; September 18, 

1990). 

Spent fuel has been safely stored in 

dry casks for more than 25 years. As 

with wet storage, the overall experience 

with dry cask storage of similar fuel 

types, including the cladding, has been 

similar—slow degradation. Spent 

nuclear fuel is allowed to cool in a spent 

fuel pool before being transferred into 

dry cask storage, which reduces the 

potential for significant degradation. 

Recent studies have confirmed the 

reliability of dry cask storage. For 

example, a dry cask storage 

characterization project examined and 

tested a dry cask storage system. The 

2003 Argonne National Laboratories 

report prepared for the NRC, NUREG/

CR–6831, ‘‘Examination of Spent PWR 

Fuel Rods after 15 Years in Dry Storage’’ 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML032731021), 

suggested that the spent fuel cladding 

could viably remain as a barrier to 

fission product release during extended 

storage up to 100 years in a dry cask 

environment (p. xi). These results were 

for spent fuel with a burnup limit of 35 

gigawatt days per metric ton Uranium 

(GWd/MTU). The IAEA Technical 

Report Series No. 443 stated that 

‘‘[p]ower reactor fuel with zirconium 

alloy cladding has been placed into dry 

storage in approximately a dozen 

countries. The technical basis for 

satisfactory dry storage of fuel clad with 

zirconium alloys includes hot cell tests 

on single rods, whole assembly tests, 

demonstrations using casks loaded with 

irradiated fuel assemblies and 

theoretical analysis.’’ 

Although the current record for dry 

cask storage supports the technical 

feasibility of continued safe storage, the 

NRC constantly works to investigate and 

monitor the behavior of the spent fuel 

storage systems to identify any 

unexpected and deleterious safety 

conditions before a problem develops. 

The NRC is aware of concerns regarding 

the potential detrimental effects of 

hydride reorientation on cladding 

behavior, such as reduced ductility. 

Reduced ductility, making the cladding 

more brittle, increases the difficulty of 

keeping spent nuclear fuel assemblies 

intact during handling operations and 

transportation. Research performed in 

Japan and the United States indicated 

that: (1) Hydrides could reorient at a 

significantly lower stress than 

previously believed and (2) high burnup fuel could exhibit a higher ductileto-brittle transition temperature due to 

the presence of radial hydrides (Billone, 

M.C., T.A. Burtseva, and R.E. 

Einziger.2013 ‘‘Ductile-to-Brittle 

Transition Temperature for HighBurnup Cladding Alloys Exposed to 

Simulated Drying-Storage Conditions.’’ 

Journal of Nuclear Materials 433(1–3): 

431–448 (available at http://

www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/

pii/S0022311512005181)). This 

phenomenon could influence the 

approach used for re-packaging spent 

nuclear fuel, but the NRC is not aware 

of information that would require the 

NRC to conclude that high burn-up fuel 

would need to be repackaged during the 

short-term time period in the DGEIS. 

Should spent fuel cladding be more 

brittle, greater care could be required 

during handling operations, regardless 

of when repackaging would occur, to 

limit the potential for damage to spent 

nuclear fuel assemblies that could affect 

easy retrievability of the spent nuclear 

fuel and complicate repackaging 

operations. 

Based on available information and 

operating experience, degradation of the 

spent nuclear fuel should be minimal 

over the short-term storage period, if the 

conditions inside the canister are 

appropriately maintained (i.e., 

consistent with the technical 

specifications for storage). Thus, as 

discussed in more detail in the DGEIS, 

it is expected that only routine 

maintenance will be needed over the 

short-term storage period and no repackaging is anticipated during that 

timeframe (i.e., no large-scale repacking 

of dry cask storage systems). The DGEIS 

assumes that the repackaging of spent 

nuclear fuel would occur every 100 

years if storage continues beyond the 

short-term storage period, which may 

include different approaches for 

repackaging at times significantly 

beyond the short-term storage period 

(e.g., placement of damaged spent 

nuclear fuel in smaller canisters). The 

NRC is not aware of any additional 

studies that would question the 

technical feasibility of continued safe 

storage of spent nuclear fuel in dry 

casks for the time periods considered in 

the DGEIS. 

In 2007, the NRC published a pilot 

probabilistic risk assessment 

methodology that assessed the risk to 

the public and identified the dominant 

contributors to risk associated with a 

welded canister dry spent fuel storage 

system at a specific boiling water reactor 

site (NUREG–1864, ‘‘A Pilot 

Probabilistic Risk Assessment of a Dry 

Cask Storage System at a Nuclear Power 

Plant’’ March 2007 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML071340012)). The NRC study 

developed and assessed a 

comprehensive list of initiating events, 

including dropping the cask during 

handling and external events during 

onsite storage (such as earthquakes, 

floods, high winds, lightning strikes, 

accidental aircraft crashes, and pipeline 

explosions) and reported that the 

analyses indicate that the risk is solely 

from latent cancer fatalities and that the 

overall risk of dry cask storage was 

found to be extremely low. (The NRC 

determined that the estimated aggregate 

risk is an individual probability of a 

latent cancer fatality of 1.8 × 10¥12

during the period encompassing the 

initial cask loading and first year of 

service and 3.2 × 10¥14 per year during 

subsequent years of storage (p. 9–2).) 

Several characteristics of dry cask 

storage contribute to the low risk 

associated with dry cask storage. First, 

these systems are passive. Second, they 

rely on natural air circulation for 

cooling during storage of the spent 

nuclear fuel. Third, they are inherently 

robust, massive concrete and steel 

structures that are highly damage 

resistant. The robustness of these dry 

cask storage systems has been tested by 

significant challenges, such as the 2011 

Mineral, Virginia earthquake that 

affected North Anna Nuclear Plant and 

the 2011 earthquake and tsunami that 

damaged the Fukushima Dai-ichi 

Nuclear Power Plant. Neither event 

resulted in significant damage to or the 

release of radionuclides from the dry 

cask storage containers. The NRC and 

licensee experience to date with ISFSIs 

and with certification of casks indicates 

that interim storage of spent nuclear fuel 

at reactor sites can be safely and 

effectively conducted using passive dry 

storage technology. Although routine 

inspections have identified several 

performance issues for individual dry 

storage components (such as problems 

with cask seals and concrete cracking), 

prompt mitigation of these issues has 

prevented any safety problems from 

occurring. If problems were to occur, the 

NRC would take appropriate action to 

address the problem and verify that 

licensees take corrective actions to 

prevent recurrence. 

Therefore, technical studies and 

practical operating experience to date 

confirm the physical integrity of dry 

cask storage structures and thereby 


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demonstrate the technical feasibility of 

continued safe storage of spent nuclear 

fuel in dry cask storage systems for the 

time periods considered in the DGEIS. 

The DGEIS conservatively assumes that 

the dry casks would need to be replaced 

if storage continues beyond the shortterm time period. The DGEIS considers 

replacement of dry casks after 100 years 

of service life, even though studies and 

experience to date do not preclude a 

longer service life. The NRC continues 

to perform technical studies, evaluate 

aging management programs, and 

provide oversight of dry cask storage 

operations. The NRC will be able to 

update its service life conclusions as 

necessary and consider any 

circumstances that might require 

repackaging of spent fuel earlier than 

anticipated. 

C3.b.iii. Summary of Technical 

Feasibility of Spent Nuclear Fuel 

Storage 

In summary, storage of spent nuclear 

fuel will be necessary until a repository 

is available for permanent disposal. The 

storage of spent nuclear fuel in any 

combination of storage in spent fuel 

pools or dry casks will continue as a 

licensed activity under regulatory 

controls and oversight. Licensees 

continue to develop and successfully 

use onsite spent nuclear fuel storage 

capacity in the form of spent fuel pools 

and dry cask storage in a safe and 

environmentally sound fashion. 

Technical understanding and 

experience continues to support the 

technical feasibility of safe storage of 

spent nuclear fuel in spent fuel pools 

and in dry casks, based on their 

physical integrity over long periods of 

time (e.g., slow degradation of spent fuel 

during storage in spent fuel pools and 

dry casks and engineered features of 

storage pools and dry casks to safely 

withstand accidents caused by either 

natural or man-made phenomena). 

Additionally, regulatory oversight has 

been shown to enhance safety designs 

and operations as concerns and 

information evolve over time (e.g., 

security and safety enhancements made 

after the September 11, 2001, terrorist 

attacks and the March 2011 Fukushima 

Dai-ichi disaster and corrective actions 

to address spent fuel pool leaks are 

discussed in Appendix E of the DGEIS). 

Based on the technical information 

and the national and international 

experience with wet and dry storage of 

spent fuel, the NRC believes that it is 

technically feasible to safely and 

securely store spent fuel in either wet or 

dry storage for at least 60 years beyond 

a reactor’s licensed life for operation 

with only routine maintenance (i.e., no 

large-scale replacement of spent fuel 

pools or dry cask storage systems). This 

time period represents a potential 

service life for the spent fuel pools and 

dry cask storage systems on the order of 

100 to 140 years when considering any 

storage that occurs during reactor 

operations. The Commission concludes 

that spent fuel can continue to be safely 

managed in spent fuel pools and dry 

casks and that regulatory oversight 

exists to ensure the aging management 

programs continue to be updated to 

address the monitoring and 

maintenance of structures, systems, and 

components that are important to safety. 

Based on all of the information set forth 

in Appendix B of the DGEIS and Section 

III.C3., Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, of 

this document, the Commission 

concludes that spent nuclear fuel can be 

safely managed in spent fuel pools in 

the short-term timeframe and dry casks 

during the short-term, long-term, and 

indefinite timeframes evaluated in the 

DGEIS. 

IV. Additional Issues for Public 

Comment 

The Commission is specifically 

seeking comment on four issues: 

Issue 1: The Commission seeks 

comment on whether specific policy 

statements regarding the timeline for 

repository availability should be 

removed from the rule text. The 

Commission’s proposed revisions to 10 

CFR 51.23 include statements regarding 

the feasibility of safe continued spent 

nuclear fuel storage and the timeframe 

for the availability of a repository. These 

conclusions are supported by the 

analysis contained in Appendix B of the 

DGEIS. Although conclusions about 

repository availability have been 

included in Waste Confidence 

proceedings since 1984, these 

statements are not necessary to the 

environmental review or for fulfilling 

the NRC’s NEPA obligations. There are 

national policy decisions, and societal 

and political factors that can 

significantly influence the actual timing 

of the availability of mined geologic 

repository, and these policy decisions 

are outside the Commission’s control. 

Issue 2: The Commission seeks public 

comment on whether specific policy 

statements regarding the safety of 

continued spent fuel storage should be 

made in the rule text given the 

expansive and detailed information in 

the DGEIS. Historically, a policy 

statement related to the safety of 

continued storage has been included in 

the Waste Confidence proceedings since 

1984. However, the policy statement on 

safety is not related to, or necessary for, 

the generic determination on 

environmental impacts of continued 

storage, nor does it provide the safety 

analysis for storage in a particular dry 

cask or storage at a particular site: A 

safety evaluation is still required to 

support approval of new cask designs, 

to support a site-specific license for dry 

storage, or to store spent nuclear fuel in 

a spent fuel pool. 

The DGEIS analyzes the impacts from 

continued storage of spent nuclear fuel 

and makes generic determinations of the 

foreseeable environmental impacts 

stemming from continued storage; the 

proposed rule codifies the conclusions 

from the DGEIS so that those 

determinations do not need to be made 

in individual actions. This rule is not a 

licensing decision for nuclear power 

plants or ISFSIs, or for the renewal of 

those licenses. The rule does not 

authorize the storage of spent nuclear 

fuel in spent fuel pools or ISFSIs. 

Issue 3: The Commission seeks public 

comment on whether the Discussion 

portion (Section III of this document) of 

the Statement of Considerations should 

be streamlined by removing content that 

is repeated from the DGEIS in order to 

improve clarity of the discussion, now 

that the NRC has prepared an EIS to 

support the rule. 

Issue 4: Finally, the Commission is 

seeking specific comment on whether 

the title of the rule should be changed 

in light of a GEIS being issued instead 

of a separate Waste Confidence 

Decision. 

V. Discussion of Proposed Amendments 

by Section 

Section 51.23 Environmental Impacts 

of Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel Beyond 

the Licensed Life for Operation of a 

Reactor 

The title of the section would be 

revised to reflect that the section is no 

longer based on an EA and FONSI, but 

on an EIS and that environmental effects 

of continued storage are included in the 

section. 

Paragraph (a) of 10 CFR 51.23 would 

be revised to provide the Commission’s 

generic determination on the continued 

storage of spent nuclear fuel. The 

proposed amendments would state that 

the Commission has developed a 

generic environmental impact statement 

(NUREG–2157). The proposed rule 

would further indicate that the 

Commission has concluded that the 

analysis generically addresses the 

environmental impacts of continued 

storage of spent nuclear fuel beyond the 

licensed life for operation of a reactor 

and supports the determinations that it 

is feasible to safely store spent nuclear 

fuel beyond the licensed life for 


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operation of a reactor and to have a 

mined geologic repository within 60 

years following the licensed life for 

operation of a reactor. 

Paragraph (b)(1) of 10 CFR 51.23 

would be revised to clarify that ISFSI 

license renewals are included in the 

scope of the generic determination. 

Section 51.61 Environmental Report— 

Independent Spent Fuel Storage 

Installation (ISFSI) or Monitored 

Retrievable Storage Installation (MRS) 

License 

Section 51.61 of 10 CFR would be 

revised to clarify that ISFSI renewals are 

included in the scope of the generic 

determination in 10 CFR 51.23. 

Section 51.80 Draft Environmental 

Impact Statement—Materials License 

Paragraph (b) of 10 CFR 51.80 would 

be revised to clarify that ISFSI renewals 

are included in the scope of the generic 

determination in 10 CFR 51.23. 

Section 51.97 Final Environmental 

Impact Statement—Materials License 

Paragraph (a) of 10 CFR 51.97 would 

be revised to clarify that ISFSI renewals 

are included in the scope of the generic 

determination in 10 CFR 51.23. 

Table B–1—Summary of Findings on 

NEPA Issues for License Renewal of 

Nuclear Power Plants 

Table B–1 addresses the 

environmental impacts of license 

renewal activities by resource area. 

When the Commission issued the final 

rule on the environmental effects of 

license renewal (78 FR 37282; June 20, 

2013), it was not able to rely on the 

Waste Confidence rule for two of the 

issues. The Commission noted that 

upon issuance of the GEIS and rule, the 

NRC would make any necessary 

conforming changes to the license 

renewal rule. This proposed rule would 

revise these two Table B–1 finding 

column entries to address Waste 

Confidence. The ‘‘Offsite radiological 

impacts of spent nuclear fuel and highlevel waste disposal’’ issue would be 

reclassified as a Category 1 impact and 

the finding column entry would be 

revised to address Waste Confidence. 

For the ‘‘Onsite storage of spent nuclear 

fuel’’ issue, the finding column entry 

would be revised to include the period 

of continued storage beyond the 

licensed life for operation of a reactor. 

Additionally footnote 7 of Table B–1 

would be removed. While footnotes 1, 2, 

and 3 are laid out in the regulatory text, 

they are not being amended but are 

included to meet an Office of the 

Federal Register publication 

requirement. 

VI. Availability of Documents 

The NRC is making the documents 

identified in the following table 

available to interested persons through 

one or more of the methods provided in 

Section I.A., Accessing Information, of 

this document, as indicated. 

References are also available through 

the Waste Confidence Decision Web site 

at www.nrc.gov. References are 

organized by the document in which the 

reference appears (DGEIS chapter and 

appendix and the proposed rule Federal 

Register notice), and in alphabetical 

order by author with links to 

electronically available documents. 

Document PDR 

Web 

(www.regulations.gov unless otherwise indicated) ADAMS 

Waste Confidence Related Documents 

Federal Register notice—Notice of Intent Consideration of 

Environmental Impacts of Temporary Storage of Spent 

Fuel After Cessation of Reactor Operation (77 FR 65137; 

October 25, 2012).

X X ML12305A035. 

Draft NUREG-2157, ‘‘Waste Confidence Generic Environmental Impact Statement’’.X X ML13224A106. 

‘‘Waste Confidence Generic Environmental Impact Statement Scoping Process Summary Report’’.X X ML13060A128. 

‘‘Scoping Comments on the Waste Confidence Generic Environmental Impact Statement’’.X X ML13060A130. 

Transcript of November 14, 2012, Waste Confidence 

Scoping Meeting—Afternoon Session.

X X ML12331A347. 

Transcript of November 14, 2012, Waste Confidence 

Scoping Meeting—Evening Session 9pm–12am.

X X ML12331A353. 

Transcript of Scoping Meeting for the Waste Confidence Environmental Impact Statement: Webinar December 5, 

2012.

X X ML12355A174. 

December 6, 2012 Waste Confidence Scoping Webinar 

Transcript.

X X ML12355A187. 

Minnesota v. NRC, 602 F.2d 412 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ................ ................ http://scholar.google.com/scholar_

case?case=155447492178518

99941.

Note: this link directs the reader to 

an unofficial copy of this case.

(New York v. NRC, 681 F.3d 471 (D.C. Cir. 2012) ............... ................ http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/57ACA94A8

FFAD8AF85257A1700502AA4/

$file/11-1045-1377720.pdf.

Federal Register notice announcing generic proceeding on 

Waste Confidence (44 FR 61372, 61373; October 25, 

1979).

X 

Federal Register notice—1984 Waste Confidence Final 

Rule (49 FR 34688; August 31, 1984).

X ............................................................ ML033000242. 


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Document PDR 

Web 

(www.regulations.gov unless otherwise indicated) ADAMS 

Federal Register notice—1984 Final Waste Confidence Decision (49 FR 34658; August 31, 1984).X ............................................................ ML033000242. 

Federal Register notice—1990 Waste Confidence Final 

Rule (55 FR 38472; September 18, 1990).

X ............................................................ ML031700063. 

Federal Register notice—1990 Waste Confidence Decision 

(55 FR 38474; September 18, 1990).

X ............................................................ ML031700063. 

Federal Register notice—1999 Waste Confidence Decision 

Review (64 FR 68005; December 6, 1999).

X ............................................................ ML003676331. 

Federal Register notice—2010 Waste Confidence Final 

Rule (75 FR 81037; December 23, 2010).

X ............................................................ ML103350175. 

Federal Register notice—2010 Waste Confidence Decision 

Update (75 FR 81032; December 23, 2010).

X ............................................................ ML120970147. 

Commission Order CLI–12–16 ............................................... X ............................................................ ML12220A094. 

SRM–COMSECY–12–0016—Approach for Addressing Policy Issues Resulting from Court Decision to Vacate Waste 

Confidence Decision and Rule.

X ............................................................ ML12250A032. 

Waste Confidence References—NRC Documents 

Federal Register notice announcing the 1977 Denial of 

PRM–50–18 (42 FR 34391; July 5, 1977).

X 

Federal Register notice—Final Rule to Amend 10 CFR 

73.1: Design Basis Threat (72 FR 12705; March 19, 

2007).

X ............................................................ ML070520692. 

Federal Register notice—Power Reactor Security Requirements Final Rule (74 FR 13926; March 27, 2009).X ............................................................ ML083380546. 

Federal Register notice—Denial of Petitions for Rulemaking (PRM–51–10 and PRM–51–12) (73 FR 46204: 

August 8, 2008).

X ............................................................ ML081890124. 

Federal Register notice—‘‘Draft Technical Basis for Rulemaking Revising Security Requirements for Facilities Storing SNF and HLW; Notice of Availability and Solicitation 

of Public Comments’’ (74 FR 66589; December 16, 2009).

X ............................................................ ML093340103. 

Federal Register notice—Decommissioning Planning Rule 

(76 FR 35512; June 17, 2011).

X ............................................................ ML103510117. 

Federal Register notice—License Renewal GEIS Final 

Rule (78 FR 37282: June, 20, 2013).

X ............................................................ ML13101A059. 

Department of Energy; Notice of Acceptance for Docketing 

of a License Application for Authority to Construct a Geologic Repository at a Geologic Repository Operations 

Area at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (73 FR 53284; September 15, 2008).

X ............................................................ ML082490757. 

NUREG–0586,’’Generic Environmental Impact Statement on 

Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities, Supplement 1: Regarding the Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Reactors,’’ Volume 1 Main report. November 2002.

X ............................................................ ML023500395. 

NUREG–1437, ‘‘Generic Environmental Impact Statement 

for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants’’ 2013.

................ ............................................................ ML13106A241 for main volume 1, ML13106A242 for 

volume 2, and 

ML13106A244 for volume 

3. 

NUREG–1738, ‘‘Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants’’.X ............................................................ ML010430066. 

NUREG–1864, ‘‘A Pilot Probabilistic Risk Assessment of a 

Dry Cask Storage System at a Nuclear Power Plant’’.

X ............................................................ ML071340012. 

NUREG–2107, ‘‘Technical Evaluation Report on the Content 

of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Yucca Mountain Repository License Application—Postclosure Volume: Repository Safety After Permanent Closure’’.

X ............................................................ ML11223A273. 

NUREG–2108, ‘‘Technical Evaluation Report on the Content 

of the U.S. Department of Energy Yucca Mountain Repository License Application—Preclosure Volume: Repository Safety Before Permanent Closure’’.

X ............................................................ ML11250A093. 

NUREG/CR–6451, ‘‘A Safety and Regulatory Assessment of 

Generic BWR and PWR Permanently Shutdown Nuclear 

Power Plants’’.

................ http://www.osti.gov/bridge/servlets/

purl/510336-qmwPBP/

webviewable/510336.pdf.

NUREG/CR–6831, ‘‘Examination of Spent PWR Fuel Rods 

after 15 Years in Dry Storage’’.

................ ............................................................ ML032731021. 

Regulatory Guide 4.22, Decommissioning Planning During 

Operations.

X ............................................................ ML12158A361. 


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Document PDR 

Web 

(www.regulations.gov unless otherwise indicated) ADAMS 

NRC Information Notice IN 2012–20, ‘‘Potential Chloride-Induced Stress Corrosion Cracking of Austenitic Stainless 

Steel and Maintenance of Dry Cask Storage System Canisters’’.

X ............................................................ ML12319A440. 

NRC Order Number EA–12–049, Issuance of Order to Modify Licenses With Regard to Requirements for Mitigation 

Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events.

................ ............................................................ ML12054A735. 

NRC Order EA-12-051, Issuance of Order to Modify Licenses With Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation................. ............................................................ ML12054A679. 

Luminant Generation Co. LLC (Comanche Peak Nuclear 

Power Plant, Units 3 and 4), et al., CLI–12–7, 75 NRC 

379, 391–92 (March 16, 2012).

X ............................................................ ML12076A190. 

Waste Confidence References—Non-NRC Documents 

NRDC v. NRC, 582 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1978) ......................... ................ http://scholar.google.com/scholar_

case?case=1292280692394

324643.

Note: This link directs the reader to 

an unofficial copy of this case.

Village of Bensenville v. Federal Aviation Administration, 

457 F.3d 52, 71–72 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

................ http://scholar.google.com/scholar_

case?case=6559910666

849441800.

Note: This link directs the reader to 

an unofficial copy of this case.

Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 

374 (1989).

................ http://scholar.google.com/scholar_

case?case=10887052189

863115558&q.

Note: This link directs the reader to 

an unofficial copy of this case.

Nuclear Waste Policy Act 96 Stat. 2201 (1983) (current 

version at 42 U.S.C. 10132 (2006)).

................ http://www.epw.senate.gov/

nwpa82.pdf.

Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, Report to the Secretary of Energy.X ............................................................ ML120970375. 

DOE, Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used 

Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste.

X ............................................................ ML13011A138. 

DOE Yucca Mountain FEIS, ‘‘Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for a Geologic Repository for 

the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County Nevada’’ 

(Yucca Mountain FEIS)).

X ............................................................ ML081750212. 

Letter from J M Maddox, Eddy-Lea Energy Alliance, LLC, to 

C Haney, NMSS, re Notice of Intent to Submit a License 

Application for Consolidated Used Nuclear Fuel Storage 

Facility, February 26, 2013.

X ............................................................ ML13067A278. 

DOE Motion to Withdraw Application for Yucca Mountain .... X ............................................................ ML100621397. 

Request for Termination of NRC License No. SNM–2513 for 

Private Fuel Storage LLC.

X ............................................................ ML12356A063. 

Billone, M.C., T.A. Burtseva, and R.E. Einziger. 2013 ‘‘Ductile-to-Brittle Transition Temperature for High-Burnup 

Cladding Alloys Exposed to Simulated Drying-Storage 

Conditions.’’ Journal of Nuclear Materials 433(1–3): 431– 

448.

................ http://www.sciencedirect.com/

science/article/pii/

S0022311512005181.

IAEA, ‘‘Scientific and Technical Basis for the Geologic Disposal of Radioactive Wastes, Technical Reports Series 

No. 413’’.

................ http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/TRS413_web.pdf.

IAEA Technical Report Series No. 443, ‘‘Understanding and 

Managing Ageing of Materials in Spent Fuel Storage Facilities’’.

................ http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/TRS443_web.pdf.

IAEA, ‘‘Radioactive Waste Management Studies and 

Trends, IAEA/WMDB/ST/4’’.

................ http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/WMDB-ST-4.pdf.

IAEA TECDOC–1012, ‘‘Durability of Spent Nuclear Fuels 

and Facility Components in Wet Storage’’.

................ http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/te_1012_prn.pdf.

IAEA, ‘‘The Use of Scientific and Technical Results from 

Underground Research Laboratory Investigations for the 

Geologic Disposal of Radioactive Waste, IAEA– 

TECDOC–1243’’.

................ http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/te_1243_prn.pdf.


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Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 178 / Friday, September 13, 2013 / Proposed Rules 56803 

Document PDR 

Web 

(www.regulations.gov unless otherwise indicated) ADAMS 

IAEA TECDOC1343, ‘‘Spent Fuel Performance Assessment 

and Research: Final Report of a Cordinated Research 

Project on Spent Fuel Performance Assessment and Research (SPAR).

1997–2001’’ ............................................................................

................ http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/te_1343_web.pdf.

IAEA, ‘‘Joint Convention on Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, 

INFCIRC/546’’.

................ http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1997/infcirc546.pdf.

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 

Nuclear Energy Agency, ‘‘Lessons Learnt from Ten Performance Assessment Studies,’’ 1997.

................ http://www.oecd-nea.org/rwm/reports/

1997/ipag.pdf.

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 

Nuclear Energy Agency, ‘‘Moving Forward with Geological 

Disposal of Radioactive Waste,’’ 2008.

................ http://www.oecd-nea.org/rwm/reports/

2008/nea6433-statement.pdf.

Canadian Nuclear Fuel Waste Disposal Concept Environmental Assessment Panel, Report of the Nuclear Fuel 

Waste Management and Disposal Concept Environmental 

Assessment Panel.

................ http://www.ceaa.gc.ca/default.

asp?lang=En&n=0B83BD43-1&

xml=0B83BD43-93AA-4652-9929-

3DD8DA4DE486&toc=show.

NWMO, Annual Report 2007: Moving Forward Together ...... ................ http://www.nwmo.ca/uploads_managed/MediaFiles/327_NWMO_

2007_Annual_Report_E.pdf.

NWMO, Learning More Together—Annual Report for 2012 .. ................ http://nwmo.ca/uploads_managed/

MediaFiles/2089_ar2012_english_

web.pdf.

VII. Agreement State Compatibility 

Under the ‘‘Policy Statement on 

Adequacy and Compatibility of 

Agreement State Programs’’ approved by 

the Commission on June 30, 1997, and 

published in the Federal Register (62 

FR 46517; September 3, 1997), this 

proposed rule would be classified as 

Compatibility Category ‘‘NRC.’’ The 

NRC program elements in this category 

are those that relate directly to areas of 

regulation reserved to the NRC by the 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 

or the provisions of Title 10 of the CFR. 

These program elements are not adopted 

by Agreement States. 

VIII. Plain Writing 

The Plain Writing Act of 2010 (Pub. 

L. 111–274) requires Federal agencies to 

write documents in a clear, concise, and 

well-organized manner. The NRC has 

written this document to be consistent 

with the Plain Writing Act as well as the 

Presidential Memorandum, ‘‘Plain 

Language in Government Writing,’’ 

published June 10, 1998 (63 FR 31883). 

The NRC requests comment on the 

proposed rule with respect to the clarity 

and effectiveness of the language used. 

IX. Voluntary Consensus Standards 

The National Technology Transfer 

and Advancement Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 

104–113) requires that Federal agencies 

use technical standards that are 

developed or adopted by voluntary 

consensus standards bodies unless the 

use of such a standard is inconsistent 

with applicable law or otherwise 

impractical. In this proposed rule, the 

NRC would modify its generic 

determination on the consideration of 

environmental impacts of continued 

storage of spent nuclear fuel beyond the 

licensed life for reactor operations. The 

NRC is not aware of any voluntary 

consensus standards that address the 

proposed subject matter of this 

proposed rule. The NRC will consider 

using a voluntary consensus standard if 

an appropriate standard is identified. If 

a voluntary consensus standard is 

identified for consideration, the 

submittal should explain why the 

standard should be used. 

X. Draft Environmental Impact 

Statement: Availability 

As required by the National 

Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as 

amended, and the NRC’s regulations in 

subpart A of 10 CFR part 51, the NRC 

has prepared a Draft Generic 

Environmental Impact Statement 

(NUREG–2157) to support this proposed 

rule. Concurrently with this proposed 

rule, the NRC published a document 

requesting comment on NUREG–2157 

(same NRC Docket ID as this proposed 

rule, NRC–2012–0246) in the Proposed 

Rule section of this issue of the Federal 

Register. In addition, an interested 

person may access this environmental 

impact statement as indicated under 

Section VI of this document, 

‘‘Availability of Documents.’’ 

The NRC requests public comment on 

the DGEIS. The NRC has sent a copy of 

the DGEIS and this proposed rule to 

every State Liaison Officer and 

requested their comments on the draft 

statement. 

XI. Paperwork Reduction Act 

Statement 

This proposed rule does not contain 

new or amended information collection 

requirements subject to the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 

et seq.). Existing requirements were 

approved by the Office of Management 

and Budget, approval number 3150– 

0021. 

Public Protection Notification 

The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, 

and a person is not required to respond 

to, a request for information or an 

information collection requirement 

unless the requesting document 

displays a currently valid Office of 

Management and Budget control 

number. 

XII. Regulatory Analysis 

A draft regulatory analysis has not 

been prepared for this proposed 

regulation because this regulation does 

not establish any requirements that 

would place a burden on licensees. A 

cost-benefit analysis of the alternatives 

considered in the DGEIS was prepared 

as part of the DGEIS (Chapter 7). If 

continued storage of spent nuclear fuel 

beyond the licensed life for operations 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS2
56804 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 178 / Friday, September 13, 2013 / Proposed Rules 

must be assessed in site-specific 

licensing actions, the primary costs 

accrue to the NRC and to licensees and 

license applicants. Licensees and 

license applicants ultimately shoulder 

the majority of costs incurred to the 

NRC in the course of licensing actions 

through the NRC’s license-fee program. 

Costs also accrue through the NRC’s 

adjudicatory activities, which affect the 

NRC, licensees, license applicants, and 

petitioners or intervenors. The DGEIS 

contains an estimate that it could cost 

over $24 million to address continued 

storage in site-specific proceedings. 

XIII. Regulatory Flexibility 

Certification 

In accordance with the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), 

the Commission certifies that this rule 

would not, if promulgated, have a 

significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities. 

The proposed rule would modify the 

generic determination on the 

consideration of environmental impacts 

of continued storage of spent nuclear 

fuel beyond the end of the licensed life 

for reactor operations. This generic 

determination provides that no 

discussion of any environmental impact 

of spent nuclear fuel storage in reactor 

facility storage pools or ISFSIs for the 

period following the term of the reactor 

operating license or amendment or 

initial ISFSI license or amendment for 

which application is made is required in 

any environmental report, 

environmental impact statement, 

environmental assessment, or other 

analysis prepared in connection with 

certain actions. The proposed rule 

would affect only the licensing of 

nuclear power plants or ISFSIs. Entities 

seeking or holding NRC licenses for 

these facilities do not fall within the 

scope of the definition of ‘‘small 

entities’’ set forth in the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act or the size standards 

established by the NRC at 10 CFR 2.810. 

XIV. Backfitting and Issue Finality 

The NRC has determined that the 

backfit rules (§§ 50.109, 70.76, 72.62, or 

76.76) and the issue finality provisions 

in 10 CFR part 52 do not apply to this 

proposed rule because this amendment 

does not involve any provisions that 

will either impose backfits as defined in 

10 CFR chapter I, or represent noncompliance with the issue finality of 

provisions in 10 CFR part 52. Therefore, 

a backfit analysis is not required for this 

proposed rule, and the NRC did not 

prepare a backfit analysis for this 

proposed rule. 

List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 51 

Administrative practice and 

procedure, Environmental impact 

statement, Nuclear materials, Nuclear 

power plants and reactors, Reporting 

and recordkeeping requirements. 

For the reasons set out in the 

preamble and under the authority of the 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; 

the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 

as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 553; the NRC 

is proposing to adopt the following 

amendments to 10 CFR part 51. 

PART 51—ENVIRONMENTAL 

PROTECTION REGULATIONS FOR 

DOMESTIC LICENSING AND RELATED 

REGULATORY FUNCTIONS 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 51 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: Atomic Energy Act sec. 161, 

1701 (42 U.S.C. 2201, 2297f); Energy 

Reorganization Act secs. 201, 202, 211 (42 

U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5851); Government 

Paperwork Elimination Act sec. 1704 (44 

U.S.C. 3504 note). Subpart A also issued 

under National Environmental Policy Act 

secs. 102, 104, 105 (42 U.S.C. 4332, 4334, 

4335); Pub. L. 95–604, Title II, 92 Stat. 3033– 

3041; Atomic Energy Act sec. 193 (42 U.S.C. 

2243). Sections 51.20, 51.30, 51.60, 51.80. 

and 51.97 also issued under Nuclear Waste 

Policy Act secs. 135, 141, 148 (42 U.S.C. 

10155, 10161, 10168). Section 51.22 also 

issued under Atomic Energy Act sec. 274 (42 

U.S.C. 2021) and under Nuclear Waste Policy 

Act sec. 121 (42 U.S.C. 10141). Sections 

51.43, 51.67, and 51.109 also issued under 

Nuclear Waste Policy Act sec. 114(f) (42 

U.S.C. 10134(f)). 

■ 2. In § 51.23, revise the section 

heading and paragraphs (a) and (b) to 

read as follows: 

§ 51.23 Environmental impacts of storage 

of spent nuclear fuel beyond the licensed 

life for operation of a reactor. 

(a) The Commission has developed a 

generic environmental impact statement 

(NUREG–2157) analyzing the 

environmental impacts of storage of 

spent nuclear fuel beyond the licensed 

life for operation of a reactor. The 

Commission has concluded the 

following: 

(1) The analysis in NUREG–2157 

generically addresses the environmental 

impacts of storage of spent nuclear fuel 

beyond the licensed life for operation of 

a reactor; and 

(2) The analysis in NUREG–2157 

supports the Commission’s 

determinations that it is feasible to: 

(i) Safely store spent nuclear fuel 

following the licensed life for operation 

of a reactor and 

(ii) have a mined geologic repository 

within 60 years following the licensed 

life for operation of a reactor. 

(b) As provided in §§ 51.30(b), 51.53, 

51.61, 51.80(b), 51.95, and 51.97(a), and 

within the scope of the generic 

determinations in paragraph (a) of this 

section, no discussion of environmental 

impacts of spent nuclear fuel storage in 

reactor facility storage pool or an 

independent spent fuel storage 

installations (ISFSI) for the period 

following the term of the reactor 

operating license or amendment, reactor 

combined license or amendment, or 

ISFSI license, renewal, or amendment 

for which application is made, is 

required in any environmental report, 

environmental impact statement, 

environmental assessment, or other 

analysis prepared in connection with 

the issuance or amendment of an 

operating license for a nuclear power 

reactor under parts 50 and 54 of this 

chapter, or issuance or amendment of a 

combined license for a nuclear power 

reactor under parts 52 and 54 of this 

chapter, or the issuance of a license for 

storage of spent nuclear fuel at an ISFSI, 

or any amendment thereto. 

* * * * * 

■ 3. Section 51.61 is revised to read as 

follows: 

§ 51.61 Environmental report— 

independent spent fuel storage installation 

(ISFSI) or monitored retrievable storage 

installation (MRS) license. 

Each applicant for issuance of a 

license for storage of spent fuel in an 

independent spent fuel storage 

installation (ISFSI) or for the storage of 

spent fuel and high-level radioactive 

waste in a monitored retrievable storage 

installation (MRS) pursuant to part 72 of 

this chapter shall submit with its 

application to: ATTN: Document 

Control Desk, Director, Office of Nuclear 

Material Safety and Safeguards, a 

separate document entitled, 

‘‘Applicant’s Environmental Report— 

ISFSI License;’’ or ‘‘Applicant’s 

Environmental Report—MRS License,’’ 

as appropriate. If the applicant is the 

U.S. Department of Energy, the 

environmental report may be in the 

form of either an environmental impact 

statement or an environmental 

assessment, as appropriate. The 

environmental report shall contain the 

information specified in § 51.45 and 

shall address the siting evaluation 

factors contained in subpart E of part 72 

of this chapter. Unless otherwise 

required by the Commission, in 

accordance with the generic 

determination in § 51.23(a) and the 

provisions in § 51.23(b), no discussion 

of the environmental impact of the 

storage of spent fuel at an ISFSI beyond 

the term of the license or amendment 

applied for is required in an 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 178 / Friday, September 13, 2013 / Proposed Rules 56805 

environmental report submitted by an 

applicant for an initial license for 

storage of spent fuel in an ISFSI, or any 

amendment or renewal thereto. 

■ 4. In § 51.80, paragraph (b)(1) is 

revised to read as follows: 

§ 51.80 Draft environmental impact 

statement—materials license. 

* * * * * 

(b)(1) Independent spent fuel storage 

installation (ISFSI). Unless otherwise 

determined by the Commission and in 

accordance with the generic 

determination in § 51.23(a) and the 

provisions of § 51.23(b), a draft 

environmental impact statement on the 

issuance of an initial license for storage 

of spent fuel at an ISFSI or any 

amendment thereto, will address 

environmental impacts of spent fuel 

only for the term of the license, 

amendment, or renewal applied for. 

* * * * * 

■ 5. In § 51.97, paragraph (a) is revised 

to read as follows: 

§ 51.97 Final environmental impact 

statement—materials license. 

(a) Independent spent fuel storage 

installation (ISFSI). Unless otherwise 

determined by the Commission, and in 

accordance with the generic 

determination in § 51.23(a) and the 

provisions of § 51.23(b), a final 

environmental impact statement on the 

issuance of an initial license for the 

storage of spent fuel at an ISFSI or any 

amendment or renewal thereto, will 

address environmental impacts of spent 

fuel storage only for the term of the 

license or amendment applied for. 

* * * * * 

■ 6. In appendix B to subpart A of part 

51, footnote 7 is being removed from the 

table and the entries for ‘‘Onsite storage 

of spent nuclear fuel’’ and ‘‘Offsite 

radiological impacts of spent nuclear 

fuel and high-level waste disposal’’ 

under the ‘‘Waste Management’’ section 

of Table B–1 are revised to read as 

follows: 

Appendix B to Subpart A of Part 51— 

Environmental Effect of Renewing the 

Operating License of a Nuclear Power 

Plant 

* * * * * 

TABLE B–1—SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ON NEPA ISSUES FOR LICENSE RENEWAL OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 1

Issue Category 2 Finding 3

*******

Waste Management 

*******

Onsite storage of spent nuclear 

fuel.

1 SMALL. The expected increase in the volume of spent fuel from an additional 20 years of operation can be safely accommodated onsite with small environmental effects through dry or 

pool storage at all plants, if a permanent repository or monitored retrievable storage is not 

available. 

Offsite radiological impacts of 

spent nuclear fuel and highlevel waste disposal.

1 For the high-level waste and spent-fuel disposal component of the fuel cycle, the EPA established a dose limit of 15 millirem (0.15 mSv) per year for the first 10,000 years and 100 

millirem (1.0 mSv) per year between 10,000 years and 1 million years for offsite releases of 

radionuclides at the proposed repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. 

The Commission concludes that the impacts would not be sufficiently large to require the NEPA 

conclusion, for any plant, that the option of extended operation under 10 CFR part 54 should 

be eliminated. Accordingly, while the Commission has not assigned a single level of significance for the impacts of spent fuel and high level waste disposal, this issue is considered 

Category 1. 

* * * * * * * 

1 Data supporting this table are contained in NUREG–1437, Revision 1, ‘‘Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants’’ (June 2013). 2The numerical entries in this column are based on the following category definitions: 

Category 1: For the issue, the analysis reported in the Generic Environmental Impact Statement has shown: 

(1) The environmental impacts associated with the issue have been determined to apply either to all plants or, for some issues, to plants having a specific type of cooling system or other specified plant or site characteristic; 

(2) A single significance level (i.e., small, moderate, or large) has been assigned to the impacts (except for Offsite radiological impacts—collective impacts from other than the disposal of spent fuel and high-level waste l); and 

(3) Mitigation of adverse impacts associated with the issue has been considered in the analysis, and it has been determined that additional 

plant-specific mitigation measures are not likely to be sufficiently beneficial to warrant implementation. 

The generic analysis of the issue may be adopted in each plant-specific review. 

Category 2: For the issue, the analysis reported in the Generic Environmental Impact Statement has shown that one or more of the criteria of 

Category 1 cannot be met, and therefore additional plant-specific review is required. 3The impact findings in this column are based on the definitions of three significance levels. Unless the significance level is identified as beneficial, the impact is adverse, or in the case of ‘‘small,’’ may be negligible. The definitions of significance follow: 

SMALL—For the issue, environmental effects are not detectable or are so minor that they will neither destabilize nor noticeably alter any important attribute of the resource. For the purposes of assessing radiological impacts, the Commission has concluded that those impacts that do 

not exceed permissible levels in the Commission’s regulations are considered small as the term is used in this table. 

MODERATE—For the issue, environmental effects are sufficient to alter noticeably, but not to destabilize, important attributes of the resource. 

LARGE—For the issue, environmental effects are clearly noticeable and are sufficient to destabilize important attributes of the resource. 

For issues where probability is a key 

consideration (i.e., accident consequences), 

probability was a factor in determining 

significance. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 30th day 

of August, 2013. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Kenneth R. Hart, 

Acting Secretary of the Commission. 

[FR Doc. 2013–21708 Filed 9–12–13; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS2