NTSB/AAB-02/03 

E PLURIBUS UNUM

NATIONAL TRA S PORTATION

B OARD

SAFE T Y

N

National Transportation Safety Board 

Washington, D.C. 20594 

Aircraft Accident Brief 

Accident Number: DCA01MA034 

Operator: Avjet Corporation 

Aircraft and Registration: Gulfstream III, N303GA 

Location: Aspen, Colorado 

Date: March 29, 2001 

HISTORY OF FLIGHT 

 On March 29, 2001, about 1901:57 mountain standard time,1

 a Gulfstream III, 

N303GA, owned by Airbourne Charter, Inc., and operated by Avjet Corporation of 

Burbank, California, crashed while on final approach to runway 15 at Aspen-Pitkin 

County Airport (ASE), Aspen, Colorado. The charter flight had departed Los Angeles 

International Airport (LAX) about 1711 with 2 pilots, 1 flight attendant, and 

15 passengers. The airplane crashed into sloping terrain about 2,400 feet short of the 

runway threshold. All of the passengers and crewmembers were killed, and the airplane 

was destroyed. The flight was being operated on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight 

plan under 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135. 

 The captain and first officer for the charter flight reported to the Avjet facility at 

the Burbank-Glendale Pasadena Airport (BUR), Burbank, California, sometime before 

1300 (1200 Pacific standard time) on the day of the accident.2 An Avjet captain stated, in 

a postaccident interview, that he saw the captain checking the ASE weather on a 

computer display and discussing the ASE weather with an Avjet charter department 

scheduler while at BUR. Another Avjet captain stated, in a postaccident interview, that 

he saw the first officer performing what appeared to be a routine airplane preflight 

inspection on N303GA on the ramp at BUR. 

 About 1200 (1100 Pacific standard time), the first officer contacted the 

Hawthorne, California, Automated Flight Service Station (AFSS) specialist for a weather 

briefing. A review of the audiotape indicated that the specialist informed the first officer 

of three National Weather Service (NWS) AIRMETs [Airmanís Meteorological 

 1

 Unless otherwise indicated, all times are mountain standard time, based on a 24-hour clock. 

2

 The exact times that the flight crewmembers reported for duty could not be determined because 

Avjet does not use sign-in sheets for its pilots. The time frame for crew check-in was based on information 

from postaccident interviews and, for the first officer, the time that he contacted the Hawthorne, California, 

Automated Flight Service Station for a weather briefing. 
 

NTSB/AAB-02/03 

2

Information]3 pertinent to the flight to ASE, an 1141 weather observation for ASE, and 

the ASE forecast for 1300 to 1900.4 The specialist also informed the first officer that the 

approach procedure had been updated and that circling minimums were no longer 

authorized at night.5

 During the briefing, the first officer filed the flight plan, identifying 

Garfield County Regional Airport in Rifle, Colorado, as the alternate airport. 

 The captain and first officer departed BUR at 1538 (1438 Pacific standard time) 

for a positioning flight to LAX, arriving there 11 minutes later. While at LAX, the 

captain and a charter department scheduler discussed the status of the passengersí arrivals 

(none were at the airport when the airplane arrived) and the weather currently being 

forecast for the flightís arrival time at ASE. Also, the captain and another Avjet captain 

discussed the nighttime landing restriction at ASE that required the airplane to land 

within 30 minutes after sunset.6 ASEís nighttime airport operating hours, according to an 

airport chart dated November 1, 1994, indicated that aircraft that did not meet FAA 

stage III noise criteria were not authorized to land at the airport on March 29 after 1858. 

 

 The airplaneís departure from LAX at 1711 (1611 Pacific standard time) was 

41 minutes later than originally scheduled because of the late arrival of the passengers, 

including the charter customer. The flight was planned for 1 hour 35 minutes, so the 

estimated arrival time at ASE was 1846ó12 minutes before the airportís nighttime 

landing curfew. 

 Statements early in the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recording indicated that the 

flight crew was aware of the nighttime landing restriction at ASE. The CVR transcript 

indicated that, about 1831:06, the captain stated, ìwell, thereís the edge of night right 

here.î About 1831:24, the first officer asked the captain about the time of official sunset 

for ASE. The captain replied ìsix twenty eightî and then stated, ìso we get thirty 

minutes after sunset. so six fifty eightÖaboutÖseven oíclock.î 

About 1837:04, the first officer called for the approach briefing.7 The captain 

then stated, ìweíreÖprobably gonna make it a visualÖif we donít get the airport over 

here weíll go ahead and shoot that approachî and ìweíre not going to have a bunch of 

extra gas so we only get to shoot it once and then weíre going to Rifle.î8 The first officer 

 3

 An AIRMET is an in-flight weather advisory issued by the NWS Aviation Weather Center in 

Kansas City, Missouri. An AIRMET advisory indicates weather that may be hazardous to single-engine 

and other light aircraft and visual flight rules (VFR) pilots. Operators of large aircraft may also be 

concerned with the information included in an AIRMET. 4

 For more information on this weather briefing, see the section of this brief titled, ìAutomated 

Flight Service Station Briefing,î under the heading titled, ìMeteorological Information.î 5

 For more information on the updated approach procedure, see the section of this brief titled, 

ìNotice to Airmen,î under the heading titled, ìAirport Information.î 6

 ASE is closed from 2300 to 0700. Aircraft that do not meet FAA stage III noise criteria must 

land within 30 minutes after sunset because of local noise restrictions. N303GA was a stage II aircraft. 7

 According to Avjetís Operations Manual, the captain is required to conduct an approach briefing 

as part of the descent checklist. For more information on this briefing, see the section of this brief titled, 

ìFlight Manual,î under the heading titled, ìAdditional Information.î 8

 N303GAís flight log indicated that, between March 26 and 29, 2001, the airplane was on the 

ramp at BUR with 4,000 pounds of fuel. The airplane received an additional 8,710 pounds of fuel before 
 

NTSB/AAB-02/03 

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acknowledged this information. About 1839:56, the flight crew began to receive 

automated terminal information service (ATIS) information Hotel.9 Afterward, the first 

officer read back the wind, visibility, sky condition, and temperature information, and the 

captain acknowledged this information. 

About 1844:22, the first officer made initial contact with ASE approach control. 

About 1844:43, the flight crew heard, over the ASE approach control frequency, the 

request of a Canadair Challenger 600 airplane, N527JA, for another approach to ASE. 

The approach controller then cleared N527JA to continue on the published missed 

approach procedure. About 1845:00, the first officer stated, ìI hope heís doing practice 

approaches.î About 3 seconds later, the captain asked the controller whether the pilot of 

N527JA was practicing or had actually missed the approach. The controller replied that 

the pilot had missed the approach and indicated that he had seen the airplane at 

10,400 feet.10 The controller also informed the captain that two other airplanes were on 

approach to ASE. About 1845:32, the controller instructed the flight crew to turn to a 

360o heading for vectors for the approach sequence. 

While the airplane was descending into the terminal area, the CVR recorded the 

flight crew discussing the location of a highway near the airport. About 1845:45, the 

captain stated, ìwhereís thatÖhighway? can we get down in there?î About 11 seconds 

later, the captain stated, ìcan you see?î and the first officer stated, ìIím looking Iím 

lookingÖno.î About 1846:26, the captain indicated, ìI got it,î and, about 2 seconds 

later, he asked the first officer, ìcanít really see up there can ya?î The first officer 

replied, over the next several seconds, ìnope not reallyî and ìI see a river but I donít see 

nothing else.î About 1847:19, the first officer stated, ìI seeÖsome towns over here and 

the highwayís leading that way but Iím not sure.î 

About 1847:30, the approach controller made a blanket broadcast that the pilot of 

an airplane (a Cessna Citation, N900MF) saw the airport at 10,400 feet and was making a 

straight-in approach, to which the first officer stated, ìah, thatís good.î (This airplane 

landed without incident at the airport about 10 minutes before the accident.) About 

1847:41, the captain informed the controller that, ìI can almost see up the canyon from 

here but I donít know the terrain well enough or Iíd take the visual.î About 1847:51, the 

 

departing for LAX. A page from N303GAís flight log that was found in the wreckage indicated that, on 

March 29, the airplane landed at LAX with 10,700 pounds of fuel remaining. The airplane received an 

additional 1,750 pounds of fuel before departing for ASE. After the accident, Gulfstream generated sample 

flight plans that were based on the accident airplaneís cruising altitude, historical winds, and known fuel 

quantity. The sample flight plans showed that the amount of fuel aboard the accident airplane would have 

exceeded the amount required by 14 CFR 135.223 (that is, IFR aircraft must carry enough fuel to complete 

the flight to the destination airport, a flight from the destination airport to the alternate airport, and 

45 additional minutes of flight at normal cruising speed). 9

 ATIS information Hotel was based on the 1753 local weather observation and stated that the 

wind was from 030o at 4 knots, visibility was 10 miles, sky condition was scattered clouds at 2,000 feet 

with a ceiling of 5,500 feet broken and 9,000 feet broken, temperature was 2o C, dew point was -3o C, and 

altimeter setting was 29.86 inches of mercury (Hg). Visibility is expressed in statute miles; all other 

references to miles in this brief are expressed in nautical miles. 10 Unless otherwise indicated, all altitudes are mean sea level (msl). According to air traffic 

control (ATC) radar data, N527JA did not descend below 10,300 feet. 
 

NTSB/AAB-02/03 

4

first officer stated, ìcould do a contact[11] butÖI donít know,î followed by his statement, 

ìprobably we could notÖ.î The first officer also stated, about 1848:04, ìremember that 

crazy guy in this Lear[jet] when we wereÖon the ground in Aspen last time and he 

[stated that he could] see the airport but he couldnít see it.î The captain did not respond 

to either of the first officerís statements. 

 About 1848:51, the captain stated, ìthereís the highway right there.î The first 

officer then asked the captain if he wanted to be set up on the approach, and the captain 

indicated that he was ready. About 1849:28, the captain asked the first officer whether he 

could see the highway, to which the first officer replied, ìno itís clouds over here on this 

area I donít see it.î About 1850:42, the captain stated, ìbut itís right there.î About 

6 seconds later, he stated, ìoh I mean weíll shoot it from here I mean weíre here but we 

only get to do it once.î About 1850:54, the captain indicated to the flight attendant that, 

if the attempt to execute the approach was not successful, they would have to go to Rifle 

because ìitís too late in the evening then to come around.î 

About 1851:54, the approach controller instructed the flight crew to turn to a 

heading of 050o. About 1853:09, the approach controller instructed the flight crew to 

turn to a heading of 140o to intercept the final approach course and maintain an altitude of 

16,000 feet. Afterward, the controller made a blanket broadcast that the last airplane 

(a Canadair Challenger 600, N898R) had missed the approach, to which the first officer 

remarked, ìthatísÖnotÖgood.î 

About 1853:57, the flight attendant asked whether a male passenger could sit on 

the jumpseat in the cockpit. About 11 seconds later, the flight attendant instructed that 

passenger to make sure his seatbelt was on, and the CVR recorded a sound consistent 

with a seatbelt buckle. About 1855:05, the flight crew heard, over the approach control 

frequency, the pilot of N898R transmit his intention to execute a missed approach. 

Afterward, the captain stated, ìthe weatherís gone down theyíre not making it in,î and an 

unidentified male voice in the cockpit stated, ìoh really.î12 The approach controller 

subsequently cleared N898R to continue on the missed approach procedure. 

About 1856:06, the approach controller cleared the flight crew for the 

VOR/DME-C approach,13 advised the crew that the airplane was 5 miles from the Red 

 11 A contact approach is a procedure in which an aircraft on an IFR flight plan proceeds to the 

destination airport by visual reference with the surface. ATC only authorizes this approach when requested 

by the pilot and when the reported ground visibility at the airport is at least 1 mile. The pilot must remain 

clear of clouds and have a reasonable expectation of continuing to the destination airport under this 

condition. 12 According to 14 CFR 135.100, flight crewmembers cannot engage in any activity that could 

distract them from their duties or interfere in any way with the proper conduct of those duties once the 

airplane has descended below 10,000 feet msl, including engaging in nonessential conversations within the 

cockpit. N303GA was above that altitude at the time. 13 The VOR/DME [very high frequency omnidirectional radio range/distance measuring 

equipment]-C approach is the only public use standard instrument approach procedure at ASE. The 

ìCî part of the approach title indicates that the approach does not have straight-in landing minimums 

because it does not meet the criteria for the maximum descent gradient. This approach is also referred to as 

the VOR/DME or GPS-C procedure, which indicates that the approach procedure is included in approved 
 

NTSB/AAB-02/03 

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Table VOR (the initial approach fix), and instructed the crew to cross the VOR at or 

above an altitude of 14,000 feet. The first officer acknowledged this information. 

Figure 1 shows the ASE approach plate, dated February 18, 2000, that was in effect at the 

time of the accident. 

About 1856:23, the first officer said, ìafter VOR you are cleared to twelve 

thousand seven hundred.î About 1856:42, the approach controller made a blanket 

broadcast that ATIS information India14 was current and that the visibility north of the 

airport was 2 miles.15 The approach controller then instructed the flight crew to contact 

ASE local control, and the crew established contact with the local controller about 

1857:28. The local controller informed the flight crewmembers that they were following 

a Challenger airplane (N527JA) that was 2 miles from the runway, reported the wind at 

240o at 5 knots, and cleared the airplane to land on runway 15. About 1857:55, the first 

officer acknowledged the clearance to land. The captain then asked the first officer for 

the DME16 at the 12,700-foot step-down fix. The first officer replied, 3 DME (south of 

the Red Table VOR). 

 About 1858:00, the local controller asked the pilot of N527JA whether he had the 

airport in sight, to which he replied, ìnegative, going around.î About 1858:13, an 

unidentified male voice in the cockpit asked, ìare we clear?î The captain replied, ìnot 

yetî and ìthe guy in front of us didnít make it either.î About 1858:27, the captain asked 

the first officer about the next step-down altitude, and he answered that it was 

12,200 feet. The first officer also indicated that the next step-down fix was at 6 DME 

(south of the Red Table VOR). (This step-down fix, ALLIX, is the final approach fix and 

the beginning of the final approach segment.) About 1859:11, the captain asked the first 

officer about the next step-down altitude, and the first officer answered, 10,400 feet. 

About 1859:30, the captain called for the landing gear, and the CVR recorded the 

sound of two ìclunksî and an increase in background noise immediately afterward. The 

captain called for landing flaps about 1859:34, and the CVR recorded a ìclickî and a 

ìclunkî sound about 2 seconds later. About 1859:39, the first officer indicated that the 

step-down fix at 10,400 feet was 9.5 DME (south of the Red Table VOR). About 

1859:46, the first officer stated, ìthree greens.î About 1900:04, the first officer indicated 

that the missed approach point was 11 DME (south of the Red Table VOR). About 

1900:08, an unidentified male voice in the cockpit stated, ìsnow.î About 1900:22, when 

 global positioning system (GPS) receiver databases. Minimum visibility is 3 statute miles for category C 

aircraft, such as the Gulfstream III. (Aircraft in category C have approach speeds of 121 knots or greater 

but less than 141 knots. These speeds are based on 1.3 times the power-off stall speed at the aircraftís 

maximum certificated landing weight in the landing configuration. According to Gulfstream Aerospaceís 

GIII Flight Manual, the Gulfstream III has a stall speed of 106 knots in this configuration; 1.3 times this 

stall speed is 138 knots.) 14 ATIS information India, which was mostly based on the 1853 local weather observation, 

indicated that the wind was from 250o at 3 knots, visibility was 10 miles in light snow, sky condition was a 

few clouds at 1,500 feet with a ceiling of 2,500 feet broken and 5,000 feet broken, temperature was 1o C, 

dew point was -3o C, and altimeter setting was 29.89 inches of Hg. 15 The Safety Board notes that the 3-mile category C minimum visibility requirement was met 

because the controlling visibility for the approach was 10 miles, as reported in ATIS information India. 16 DME is expressed in nautical miles. 
 

NTSB/AAB-02/03 

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Figure 1. Jeppesen approach plate for ASE. 
 

NTSB/AAB-02/03 

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the airplane was at an altitude of 10,400 feet, the captain stated, ìokayÖIím breaking 

out,î and asked the local controller, about 5 seconds later, whether the runway lights 

were all the way up. The controller indicated, ìaffirmative theyíre on high.î About 

1900:30, the first officer said, ìokay you can goÖten thousand two hundred [the 

minimum descent altitude].î17 

About 1900:43, the captain asked the first officer whether he could see the 

runway, and the CVR recorded an unintelligible statement made by the first officer about 

2 seconds later. About 1900:46, when the airplane was at an altitude of 10,000 feet, the 

captain asked the first officer whether he could see the highway, and he replied, about 

1 second later, ìsee highway.î The local controller asked the flight crewmembers, about 

1900:49, whether they had the runway in sight. About 2 seconds later, the first officer 

stated, ìaffirmative,î and the captain stated, ìyes now yeah we do.î About 1 second 

afterward, the first officer advised the controller that the runway was in sight. About 

1901:13, the first officer stated, ìÖto the right is good.î According to radar data, the 

airport was to the left of the airplane at this time. 

About 1901:21, the CVR recorded a sound consistent with the airplaneís 

configuration alarm, which continued for 9 seconds. About 1901:28, the CVR recorded 

the airplaneís flight profile advisory (FPA) unit announce the 1,000-foot callout,18 and 

the first officer stated, ìone thousand to go.î About 1901:31 and 1901:34, the CVR 

recorded the sound of the FPAís 900- and 800-foot callouts, respectively. About 

1901:36, the captain stated, ìwhereís it at?î The CVR recorded the FPAís 700- and 

600-foot callouts about 1901:38 and 1901:42, respectively. About 1901:42, the first 

officer stated, ìto the right,î which the captain repeated about 1 second later. Radar data 

indicated that the airport was still to the left of the airplane at this point. 

About 1901:45, the CVR recorded the airplaneís GPWS and FPA unit 

simultaneously announce the 500-foot callout. According to radar data, the airplane 

started a turn to the left about 1901:47. About 1901:49, the GPWS announced a sink rate 

alert,19 and the FPA announced the 400-foot callout. About 1901:52, the CVR again 

recorded a GPWS sink rate alert and the FPA 400-foot callout. Also, the CVR recorded a 

rumbling noise that continued until the end of the recording.20 According to the CVR 

Sound Spectrum Study performed for this accident, the engines increased to maximum 

power about 1901:53. The FPA 300-foot callout was recorded about 1901:54, and the 

GPWS and FPA 200-foot callouts were recorded about 1 and 2 seconds later, 

respectively. About 1901:57, the CVR recorded the GPWS bank angle alert when the 

airplane was banked about 40o left wing down.21 

 17 This altitude is 2,385 feet above airport elevation. 

18 All FPA and ground proximity warning system (GPWS) altitude callouts are expressed as feet 

above ground level. 19 The sink rate alert indicates a rate of descent that exceeds predetermined thresholds. 

20 For more information on this noise, see the section of this brief titled, ìCockpit Voice Recorder 

Sound Spectrum Study,î under the heading titled, ìTests and Research.î 21 The bank angle alert occurs when the airplane enters a steep bank angle; the threshold for the 

alert ranges from 50o of bank at 190 feet above ground level to 15o of bank at ground level. 
 

NTSB/AAB-02/03 

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 The airplane crashed into terrain while in a steep left bank about 2,400 feet short 

of the runway 15 threshold, 300 feet to the right (west) of the runway centerline and 

100 feet above the runway threshold elevation.22 The accident occurred at 39o 

14.315 minutes north latitude and 106o 52.637 minutes west longitude. The time of the 

accident was 34 minutes after official sunset. The CVR stopped recording about 

1901:58. 

 

DAMAGE TO AIRPLANE 

 The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and, in isolated areas, postcrash fire. 

According to Avjet, the airplane was valued at $10 million. 

PERSONNEL INFORMATION 

The Captain 

The captain, age 44, was hired by Avjet in October 2000. He held a Federal 

Aviation Administration (FAA) Airline Transport Pilot certificate and a first-class 

medical certificate dated October 16, 2000, with a limitation that required lenses to 

correct for near vision. The captain received his initial Gulfstream III type rating in 

January 1990. 

According to Avjet employment records, the captain had accumulated 9,900 hours 

total flying time, including 7,900 hours as pilot-in-command and 1,475 hours in the 

Gulfstream III (175 of which were with Avjet as a pilot-in-command). He had flown 

approximately 87, 21, and 2 hours in the 90 days, 30 days, and 24 hours, respectively, 

before the accident. According to FAA records, the captainís last recurrent ground 

training occurred on November 9, 2000, and his last proficiency check occurred on 

December 8, 2000. FAA records also indicated no accident history23 or enforcement 

action, and a search of the National Driver Register database indicated no record of 

driverís license suspension or revocation. 

In a postaccident interview, the captainís fiancÈe indicated that he was in good 

health and was not taking any medications. She also indicated that he was a ìlightî 

smoker who was in the process of quitting and that he consumed alcoholic beverages 

occasionally. Further, the captainís fiancÈe stated that, on the morning of the accident, he 

awoke about 0700 (Pacific standard time) and that he had no sleeping difficulties. 

According to the Avjet Director of Operations, the captain had been paired with 

the first officer for 5 months, and they had flown to ASE two times before the accident 

flight. These flights were reported to have occurred during daylight conditions. 

 22 The approach end of runway 15 is at an elevation of 7,674 feet, and its opposite end is at an 

elevation of 7,815 feet, which gives the runway an upward slope. 23 FAA records indicated that the captain had been involved in an incident on January 20, 1999. 

The captain was landing a Gulfstream 1159-series airplane at Chino, California, but the airplane departed 

the end of the runway and went 150 feet into the paved overrun area. No action was taken against the 

captain. 
 

NTSB/AAB-02/03 

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The First Officer 

 

The first officer, age 38, was hired by Avjet in November 2000. He held an FAA 

Airline Transport Pilot certificate and a first-class medical certificate dated December 8, 

2000, with no limitations. He received his initial Gulfstream III type rating on 

February 9, 2001. 

According to Avjet employment records, the first officer had accumulated 

5,500 hours total flying time, including 4,612 hours as pilot-in-command and 913 hours 

in the Gulfstream II and III (110 of which were with Avjet as a Gulfstream III second-incommand). He had flown approximately 49, 10, and 2 hours in the 90 days, 30 days, and 

24 hours, respectively, before the accident. According to FAA records, the first officerís 

initial ground training occurred on November 9, 2000, and his last proficiency check 

occurred on February 9, 2001.24 FAA records also indicated no accident or incident 

history or enforcement action, and a search of the National Driver Register database 

indicated no record of driverís license suspension or revocation. 

In a postaccident interview, the first officerís wife indicated that he was in good 

health and was not taking any medications. She also indicated that he was a nonsmoker 

and consumed alcoholic beverages infrequently. Further, the first officerís wife stated 

that, on the night before the accident, he went to sleep about 2330 (Pacific standard time) 

and that, on the morning of the accident, he awoke about 0745 (Pacific standard time). 

AIRPLANE INFORMATION 

 The accident airplane, serial number 303, was manufactured in 1980 by 

Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation and was issued an Export Airworthiness Certificate 

and Ivory Coast registration number TU-VAF. The airplaneís records indicated that it 

had been substantially damaged in Africa in 1988,25 shipped to the manufacturer for 

repairs, and placed back in service in October 1989 with a U.S. airworthiness certificate 

and registration number N1716W. In April 1990, Gulfstream sold the airplane to 

Airbourne Charter, Inc., which changed the registration number to N303GA. At the time 

of the accident, the airplane had accumulated 7,266 flight hours and 3,507 cycles.26 

 24 FAA records for the first officer indicated the following information: On June 2, 1993, the first 

officer failed his first check ride for an instrument rating in the areas of ATC and navigation systems; he 

passed his second check ride the next day. On June 27, 1994, the first officer failed his first check ride for 

a flight instructor rating in the areas of ground reference maneuvers and approach and landing; he passed 

his second check ride on June 30, 1994. On May 24, 1998, the first officer failed his first check ride for an 

Airline Transport Pilot certificate in the area of VOR and circling approaches; he passed his second check 

ride on June 13, 1998. On March 25, 1999, the first officer was performing a GIII simulator competency 

check ride, during which time it was determined that he needed additional training to gain proficiency in 

normal takeoff, takeoff with engine failure, and nonprecision approaches. 25 According to Gulfstream, the airplaneís landing gear was torn off and its wings were damaged 

after landing on a closed runway and going through a ditch. 26 A cycle is one complete takeoff and landing sequence. 
 

NTSB/AAB-02/03 

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 The airplane was equipped with two Rolls-Royce Spey MK 511-8 turbofan 

engines. These two-shaft engines have a 5-stage low-pressure compressor driven by a 

2-stage low-pressure turbine and a 12-stage high-pressure compressor driven by a 2-stage 

high-pressure turbine. The left engine, serial number 11005, had a time since new of 

7,116 hours (3,499 cycles). The right engine, serial number 11006, had a time since new 

of 7,563 hours (3,822 cycles). Both engines had a time since overhaul (in December 

1995) of 2,368 hours (2,572 cycles). The airplane was also equipped with a Garrett 

Model GTCP36-100 auxiliary power unit, which had accumulated 3,942 hours time since 

new. 

The airplane was equipped with a Collins FPA-80 unit. The FPA unit was 

designed to announce radio altitudes every 100 feet between 1,000 and 100 feet above the 

ground and deviations from a selected altitude. The airplane was also equipped with an 

AlliedSignal Mark VI GPWS computer. The GPWS was designed to announce the 500- 

and 200-foot radio altitude callouts and alerts for excessive descent rate, excessive 

closure rate to terrain, insufficient terrain clearance, and excessive bank angle. The CVR 

indicated that the FPA and the GPWS provided overlapping callouts at the 500- and 

200-foot altitudes. 

Maintenance Records 

The airplane was maintained in accordance with an FAA-approved program that 

consisted of four regularly scheduled operations inspections. Operations inspection 

number 1 was to be accomplished every 150 flight hours; it was last accomplished when 

the accident airplane had accumulated 7,176 flight hours (90 flight hours before the time 

of the accident). Operations inspection number 2 was to be accomplished every 

12 months; it was last accomplished on the accident airplane on March 23, 2001. 

Operations inspections numbers 3 and 4 were to be accomplished every 24 months; they 

were last accomplished on the accident airplane on February 11, 2000, and March 23, 

2001, respectively. A review of the scheduled maintenance items revealed that no 

inspections were overdue. 

 

The airplaneís maintenance records for scheduled maintenance for January 

through March 2001 and unscheduled maintenance for March 2001 showed no 

discrepancies. The maintenance records also showed that all of the airplaneís applicable 

FAA airworthiness directives had been accomplished. 

The airplaneís interior was refurbished on March 24, 2001. According to the 

maintenance records, the airplaneís weight and balance and center of gravity were 

recalculated and found to be within limits. 

 

METEROLOGICAL INFORMATION 

 Weather observations at ASE are made by an Automated Surface Observing 

System (ASOS), which is maintained by the NWS. The ASOS anemometers are located 

east of the approach end of runway 15. The ASOS continuously measures wind, 
 

NTSB/AAB-02/03 

11

visibility, precipitation and obstructions to vision, cloud height, sky cover, dew point, and 

altimeter setting. The measurements are backed up and augmented by air traffic 

controllers who have been certified in weather observation. These controllers can 

provide observations for any other operationally significant information. The controllers 

can also override the automated mode if it malfunctions or provides unrepresentative 

values. 

 The ASOS transmits an official Meteorological Aerodrome Report (known as a 

METAR) about 53 minutes past each hour and a special weather observation (known as a 

SPECI) as conditions warrant. The ASOS hourly observations for 1753:26 and 1853:26 

were the source for ATIS information Hotel and India, respectively (see the History of 

Flight section).27 The ASOS transmitted a SPECI at 1912:26 (10 1⁄2 minutes after the 

accident), indicating that the visibility had decreased to 1 æ miles in light snow. At 

1920:26 (18 1⁄2 minutes after the accident), the ASOS transmitted another SPECI, 

indicating that the visibility had increased to 3 miles in light snow and mist. The ASOS 

5-minute observations surrounding the time of the accident (1900:31 and 1905:31) 

indicated that the visibility was 9 and 6 miles in light snow, respectively. The ASOS 

1-minute visibility value about the time of the accident was 8 miles. In addition, at 1902 

the ASOS reported that the wind was 277o at 1 knot. 

 Weather observations at the airport at Rifle (the alternate destination airport) are 

also made by an ASOSóbut only in the automated mode. The ASOS observation for 

1853 indicated that the wind was from 190o at 5 knots, sky condition was clear at or 

below 12,000 feet, visibility was 10 miles, temperature was 4o C, dew point was 2o C, and 

altimeter setting was 29.86 inches of Hg. 

The NWS office in Grand Junction, Colorado, operates a Weather Surveillance 

Radar 1988 Doppler (WSR-88D) system. The WSR-88Dís 0.5o elevation angle at 1857 

and 1902 showed weak weather radar echoes at or near the Red Table VOR and along the 

accident airplaneís flight track from about 8 to 4 miles from the approach end of runway 

15. These images also indicated that the weak weather echoes in the airport area were 

moving to the southeast. 

Two AIRMETs were issued by the NWS Aviation Weather Center on March 29, 

2001, at 1345 and were valid until 2000 for an area that included ASE. One AIRMET 

indicated the following: ìmountains occasionally obscured in clouds and precipitation.î 

The other AIRMET warned of ìoccasional moderate rime or mixed icing in cloud and in 

precipitation above the freezing level to FL [flight level] 180.î 

In addition, the NWS Aviation Weather Center issued an area forecast for 

Colorado (mountains and west section) on March 29, 2001, at 1345 that was valid until 

March 30, 2001, at 0200. The area forecast indicated the following: 

 27 The 1753:26 METAR indicated that a trace of precipitation (less than 0.01 inch) had been 

recorded since the time of the preceding hourly observation. The 1853:26 METAR indicated that snow had 

begun at 1851 and that a trace of precipitation had been recorded since the time of the preceding hourly 

observation. 
 

NTSB/AAB-02/03 

12

Clouds 8,000 to 10,000 broken to overcast. Tops to FL 180. Broken cirrus. Widely 

scattered light rain and snow showers. Isolated thunderstorms, light rain, lowering 

ceilings/visibilities 1,500 feet overcast to 2,500 feet overcast with visibility 3 to 5 

miles. Becoming March 29, 2001 at 2000 to March 30, 2001 at 0200, isolated light 

rain and snow showers. Cumulonimbus tops to FL 310. 

Automated Flight Service Station Briefing 

 Three NWS AIRMETs pertinent to the flight to ASE were provided to the first 

officer during the AFSS weather briefing. These AIRMETs were issued on the day of the 

accident at 0745 and were valid until 1400. One AIRMET warned of ìoccasional 

moderate turbulence below 15,000 feet. Another AIRMET warned of ìoccasional 

moderate rime or mixed icing in cloud and in precipitation above the freezing level to 

FL 180.î The last AIRMET indicated the following: ìmountains occasionally obscured 

in clouds and precipitation.î 

 

The 1141 ASE weather observation indicated that the wind was variable at 

3 knots; visibility was 7 miles in light snow; sky condition was a few clouds at 1,100 feet, 

scattered clouds at 1,600 feet, and a ceiling of 3,000 feet overcast; temperature was 1o C; 

dew point was -2o C; and altimeter setting was 29.85 inches of Hg. The AFSS specialist 

informed the first officer that the visibility reported in this observation had recently 

increased from 1 mile in heavier snow showers. 

The ASE forecast for 1300 to 1900 indicated that the wind was 330o at 10 knots, 

visibility was greater than 6 miles with showers in the vicinity, and sky condition was 

scattered clouds at 3,000 feet with a ceiling of 5,000 feet broken. This forecast also 

included a report of temporary conditions (known as a TEMPO), indicating that the wind 

was variable at 10 knots with gusts to 15 knots, visibility was 3 miles in light snow 

showers, and sky condition was a ceiling of 2,500 feet broken and 5,000 feet overcast. 

AIRPORT INFORMATION 

 ASE, also known as Sardy Field, is owned and operated by Pitkin County, 

Colorado. The airport is located about 3 miles northwest of the city of Aspen at an 

elevation of 7,815 feet msl and is surrounded on all sides by high terrain. The airport has 

only one runway, 15/33. Figure 2 shows the final approach course to runway 15 and the 

surrounding terrain. 

 

 Runway 15/33 is constructed of asphalt with a porous friction course overlay. 

The runway is 7,006 feet long and 100 feet wide and is equipped with medium intensity 

runway lights (MIRL) and threshold lights. Runway end identifier lights (REIL) are 

installed at the threshold of runway 15.28 Also, runway 15 is painted with nonprecision 

 28 The three intensity settings for the MIRL and REIL are controlled in the tower by a single 

switch. The ASE air traffic control towerís (ATCT) standard operating procedure manual indicates that the 

lights are to be operated in accordance with FAA Order 7110.65, ìAir Traffic Control.î Paragraph 3-4-1-3 
 

NTSB/AAB-02/03 

13

instrument runway markings and is equipped with a precision approach path indicator 

system for visual glideslope guidance. 

The airport is certified by the FAA as an aircraft rescue and fire fighting (ARFF) 

index B facility.29 ASE has one four-wheel-drive ARFF vehicle (radio call sign ìARFF 

699î) with the capacity to carry 1,500 gallons of water and 205 gallons of aqueous film 

forming foam (AFFF). It also carries 500 pounds of Purple-K dry chemical fire-fighting 

agent. 

The most recent FAA annual airport certification inspection before the accident 

occurred on July 26 and 27, 2000. The most recent triennial full-scale disaster drill was 

held on September 23, 2000. 

 

of the FAA order states that the MIRL should be set at step 3 (the highest intensity) when visibility is less 

than 2 miles or when the pilot requests this setting. 29 According to 14 CFR 139.315, the index determination of an airport is derived from the number 

of daily departures of aircraft of a certain size. Because ASE has an average of five or more daily 

departures of air carrier aircraft that are at least 90 feet but less than 126 feet in length, the airport meets the 

criteria for an index B facility. Title 14 CFR 139.317 requires index B facilities to have one or two ARFF 

vehicles carrying a combined minimum of 1,500 gallons of water and AFFF, and one of these vehicles is 

required to carry a minimum of 500 pounds of sodium-based dry chemical or halon 1211. 

 

Figure 2. Airborne view of runway 15. 

NOT TO BE USED FOR NAVIGATION. 
 

NTSB/AAB-02/03 

14

Instrument Approach Procedure 

According to FAA file information, the VOR/DME-C instrument approach does 

not include straight-in minimums because of excessive descent gradients. However, the 

approach does meet the FAAís straight-in alignment criteria. 

Change 17 to FAA Order 8260.3B, ìTerminal and Enroute Proceduresî (also 

known as TERPS), states that, to establish straight-in minimums, the final approach 

course must be aligned within 30o of the runway extended centerline and intercept it no 

more than 3,000 feet from the threshold. ASEís final approach course for runway 15 is 

aligned within 16o of the runway extended centerline and intercepts it 2,912 feet from the 

threshold. However, TERPS paragraph 252 indicates that, for straight-in minimums, the 

maximum gradient between the final approach fix minimum altitude and the runway 

threshold crossing height must be no more than 400 feet per mile and that, if this value is 

exceeded, only circling minimums may be established regardless of the course alignment. 

The descent gradient between ALLIX (the final approach fix at an altitude of 12,200 feet) 

and the threshold crossing height at the end of runway 15 (55 feet above ground level, or 

7,729 feet msl) is 700 feet per mile. Thus, straight-in minimums cannot be included as 

part of the instrument approach procedure. 

The FAAís Aeronautical Information Manual, paragraph 5-4-18d, states the 

following: 

The fact that a straight-in minimum is not published does not preclude pilots 

from landing straight-in if they have the active runway in sight and have 

sufficient time to make a normal approach for landing. Under such conditions 

and when ATC [air traffic control] has cleared them for landing on that runway, 

pilots are not expected to circle even though only circling minimums are 

published. If they decide to circle, they should advise ATC. 

Notice to Airmen 

On March 21, 2001, a flight inspection crew from the FAAís Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma, Flight Inspection Field Office performed a commissioning flight check at 

ASE to support a proposed GPS standard instrument approach procedure to runway 15. 

After the inspection, the flight inspection crew noted, on the procedural control form, that 

circling should not be allowed at night30 because areas of unlighted terrain conflicted 

with traffic patterns and circling descent maneuvers near the airport. Afterward, the 

flight inspection crew provided its comments to FAA staff at the National Flight 

Procedures Office in Oklahoma City. 

The National Flight Procedures Office decided to add a restriction on nighttime 

operations to the VOR/DME-C procedure and issued a permanent Notice to Airmen 

 30 When the ASE VOR/DME-C approach was first established in December 1988, the procedure 

was not authorized at night. According to postaccident interviews with staff from the FAAís Flight 

Standards Service, the night restriction on the approach was removed in October 1994 because of 

complaints from user groups. 
 

NTSB/AAB-02/03 

15

(NOTAM) that stated, ìcircling NA [not authorized] at night.î According to FAA flight 

procedures specialists, the NOTAM eliminated all circling minimums at night and 

therefore implied that the entire procedure was not authorized because no straight-in 

minimums are published.31 The NOTAM was sent to the U.S. NOTAM Office in 

Herndon, Virginia; the National Flight Data Center in Washington, D.C.; and the Seattle, 

Washington, Flight Procedures Office on March 27, 2001. The Denver Air Route Traffic 

Control Center (ARTCC) Flight Data Communications position received the NOTAM 

the same day. The specialist at this position was responsible for distributing NOTAMs to 

affected ARTCC sectors and associated towers and facilities, including the ASE ATCT. 

The Denver ARTCC specialist did not send this particular NOTAM to the ASE ATCT 

(because of human error), but the NOTAM was received at the Hawthorne, California, 

AFSS and was included in the first officerís preflight briefing. 

After the accident, the FAA became concerned about potential pilot confusion 

regarding the wording of the NOTAM issued on March 27, 2001. Specifically, the FAA 

was concerned that pilots might infer that straight-in landings to runway 15 were 

authorized at night. As a result, a revised NOTAM was issued on March 30, 2001, which 

stated, ìprocedure NA at night.î 

Title 14 CFR 1.1 defines ìnightî as ìthe time between the end of evening civil 

twilight and the beginning of morning civil twilight.î The U.S. Naval Observatory 

explains ìevening civil twilightî as follows: ìto end in the evening when the center of 

the Sun is geometrically 6 degrees below the horizon. This is the limit at which twilight 

illumination is sufficient, under good weather conditions, for terrestrial objects to be 

clearly distinguishedÖ. Complete darkness, howeverÖbegins sometime after the end of 

evening civil twilight.î On the night of the accident, evening civil twilight officially 

ended at ASE at 1855, 27 minutes after sunset and about 7 minutes before the accident. 

Air Traffic Control Tower Information 

The ASE ATCT is a combined tower cab and terminal radar approach control 

(TRACON). The ATCT is located about 2,500 feet southeast of the approach end of 

runway 15. 

The ATCT is equipped with a BI-5 beacon radar system (also known as 

secondary radar); transponder equipment on board aircraft actively replies to signals from 

the ground station with a four-digit code. (No primary radar coverage is available.) The 

beacon interrogator is located about 2,000 feet west of the approach end of runway 15. 

Coverage exists out to about 50 miles from the airport, but low-altitude coverage is 

masked in many areas because of the high terrain. The beacon information is processed 

by an Automated Radar Terminal Systems 2E system and is displayed on two Digital 

Bright Radar Indicator Tower Equipment units in the tower. A Minimum Safe Altitude 

 31 FAA Order 8260.19C, ìFlight Procedures and Airspace,î paragraph 226b, states that the 

NOTAM text should use ìplain languageî and that ìspecialists must keep in mind that the NOTAM is 

directed to the pilot, and should be worded so that the intended change will not be misinterpreted.î 
 

NTSB/AAB-02/03 

16

Warning System is not installed at the ATCT because of the high number of false alarms 

that would be created by the high terrain surrounding ASE. 

The ATCT operates between 0700 and 2300 each day, corresponding with the 

airportís hours of operation. The Denver ARTCC assumes responsibility for ATC 

services for the airspace surrounding ASE during the time that the ATCT and airport are 

not in operation. 

The air traffic controllers are trained to closely monitor the progress of airplanes 

executing the VOR/DME-C approach. The training concentrates on ensuring that the 

controllers pay close attention to an airplaneís proximity to the required minimum 

step-down fix altitudes published in the approach procedure. Controllers are trained to 

advise pilots immediately when they see an aircraft pass below a required step-down 

minimum altitude. In postaccident interviews, controllers at the ATCT indicated that, 

when they observe an airplaneís altitude about 200 feet lower than the published altitude 

(to account for altimeter or transponder error), they ask the pilot whether the runway is in 

sight. If the pilot does not report the runway in sight, the controller issues a low-altitude 

alert and may issue missed approach instructions. 

Four controllers were on duty on the night of the accidentóthe local controller, 

the radar approach controller, a ground controller, and a controller-in-charge. The local 

controller was certified in all positions except radar approach control. (She was in 

training for that position.) She began her ATC career in 1981 at Elmendorf Air Force 

Base in Alaska and started work with the FAA in March 1986 as an air traffic assistant at 

the ATCT at Anchorage International Airport, Alaska. Between 1990 and 1997, she 

worked at various flight service stations in Alaska and, in October 1997, began working 

at the Denver Flight Service Station. She started as a terminal controller at ASE in 

August 1999. 

During a postaccident interview, the local controller stated that her first 

interaction with N303GA was when one of its pilots reported on frequency. (She 

indicated that the airplane was near the Red Table VOR about that time.) The local 

controller also stated that, after clearing the airplane to land, she saw it descend below a 

step-down altitude. (Radar data indicated that this altitude was 10,400 feet). During the 

exchange with the pilots regarding whether they had the runway in sight, the local 

controller was not able to see the airplane. About 1 minute later, she saw the airplane 

ìcome out of the snow, pointed at Shale [Bluffs].î (Shale Bluffs is located northwest of 

ASE and the runway.) The local controller said that the airplane appeared low and to the 

right of the centerline. She indicated that the pilot then apparently ìgot the runway and 

turned toward it.î She noted that the airplane looked as if it were accelerating, with its 

lights pointed directly at the tower, and that the airplane was rolling rapidly to its left. 

The local controller thought the airplane was going to crash and immediately reached for 

the crash phone. As she saw the explosion, she immediately hit the emergency siren 

switch to alert ARFF. 
 

NTSB/AAB-02/03 

17

FLIGHT RECORDERS 

 The accident airplane was equipped with a Fairchild A100A CVR, serial number 

54667. The exterior CVR case was slightly dented but was intact. The crash-survivable 

interior box did not appear to have sustained any structural damage, but the tape 

assembly unit within it had detached. The tape was contained on its spool and was intact. 

The CVR exterior, interior, and tape did not exhibit heat or fire damage. 

The CVR was sent to the Safety Boardís audio laboratory in Washington, D.C., 

for readout and evaluation. The CVR recording started about 1830:18 and continued 

until 1901:58. A transcript was prepared for the entire 31-minute 40-second recording. 

The recording consisted of three channels of ìgood qualityî audio information.32 The 

three channels contained the captainís audio panel information, the cockpit area 

microphone (CAM), and the first officerís audio panel information. 

The airplane was not equipped with a flight data recorder. Title 14 CFR Parts 91 

and 135 did not require the airplane to be so equipped. 

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION 

A ground scar indicated that the left wing tip made the initial impact with the 

terrain. Measurements obtained from tree strikes near the ground scar showed that the 

airplane initially impacted terrain in a 49o left-wing-down attitude, with a flightpath angle 

of -15o. The ground scar was about 72 feet long. 

Airplane debris was spread over a 300-foot-long path that began at the initial 

impact point, continued through a 40-foot ravine, and ended with the airplaneís tail 

section.33 The debris path followed a 147o heading. The impact subjected the airplane to 

severe accordion-type crushing, causing components to separate and structure to fracture. 

The fuselage was destroyed by impact forces. 

The left wing was fractured about 9 feet from the wingtip. The left wing was also 

fractured from the separated tip inboard to the main portion of the wing box, but the wing 

was intact from the fractured tip to the wing box. The right wing was fractured about 

30 feet inboard from the wing tip. About 12 feet of the right wing and its inboard wing 

root were attached to the wing box. Both airplane flaps were separated from the wing in 

the full-down (39o) position.34 Both ailerons had separated from the wing.35 

 32 The Safety Board ranks the quality of CVR recordings in five categories: excellent, good, fair, 

poor, and unusable. For a recording to be considered good quality, most of the crew conversations need to 

be accurately and easily understood. The transcript developed from the recording might indicate several 

words or phrases that were not intelligible; such losses are attributed to minor technical deficiencies or 

momentary dropouts in the recording system or simultaneous cockpit/radio transmissions that obscure one 

another. 33 The location of the main wreckage was 39o 14.278 minutes north latitude and 106o 52.621 

minutes west longitude. 34 The Gulfstream III has one single-slotted trailing flap on each wing. Each flap can be moved to 

one of four positions: 0o (up), 10o (takeoff), 20o (approach), and 39o (down). 
 

NTSB/AAB-02/03 

18

The airplaneís left and right engines had separated from their pylons, and neither 

engine showed any signs of any uncontainments or fires. The fan and compressor blades 

were bent opposite the direction of rotation of the compressor rotor. The second-stage 

low-pressure turbine blades and second-stage low-pressure turbine nozzles were all intact 

and undamaged with metal spray on the blades and nozzles. 

The horizontal stabilizer remained attached to the vertical stabilizer and was in an 

approximately 6o leading-edge-down position.36 Both elevators were attached to the 

horizontal stabilizer, and the rudder was attached to the vertical stabilizer. The trailing 

edges of the elevators and rudder sustained minor damage. 

The left and right main landing gear were mostly undamaged and were found in 

their wheel wells. The nose gear fractured in two places: the shock strut piston fractured 

below the steering unit, and the steering shock strut cylinder fractured near the upper 

trunnion attachment point. The landing gear handle was not located. The landing gear 

handle knob, which contains lights that illuminate when the landing gear is in transit, was 

located. However, examination by the Safety Board did not provide conclusive evidence 

whether the lights were illuminated at the time of impact. 

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION 

Fluid specimens from the captain and the first officer were sent to the FAAís 

Civil Aerospace Medical Institute in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for toxicological 

analysis. The specimens tested negative for major drugs of abuse and prescription and 

over-the-counter medications. The specimens also tested negative for ethanol. 

SURVIVAL ASPECTS 

 Autopsy results for the captain, first officer, and flight attendant indicated that all 

died from multiple blunt force injuries. According to the Pitkin County Coroner, the 

cause of death for all of the passengers was massive blunt force trauma. 

 

EMERGENCY RESPONSE 

As previously stated, the local controller indicated that she immediately reached 

for the crash phone as she saw the airplane roll to the left and that she hit the emergency 

siren switch after she saw the explosion. The crash phone simultaneously connects the 

ATCT with the ARFF communications center, the airport operations office, and the 

Aspen-Pitkin County Communications Center. The emergency siren is located atop the 

ARFF building and is activated by a toggle switch in the tower cab. 

 35 The Gulfstream III has one aileron on each wing located just outboard of the flap. 

36 The Gulfstream IIIís horizontal stabilizer moves only as a function of flap position. With the 

flaps in the full-down position, the horizontal stabilizer moves to 6o leading edge down (±oo). 
 

NTSB/AAB-02/03 

19

 According to a timed audiotape from the Aspen-Pitkin County Communications 

Center, the initial Alert 3 notification37 was received from the tower cab at 1901:53.38 

The audiotape also indicated that a radio call from the dispatch office to all Aspen fire 

and ambulance units (including ARFF 699) occurred at 1903:41. 

 The ARFF crew chief at the time of the accident stated that she immediately 

departed the station in ARFF 699 and proceeded toward the standard staging site. An 

off-duty airport firefighter, who was working in the main terminal building when the 

alarm sounded, was also aboard ARFF 699. About 1903:28, the crew chief contacted the 

ATCT ground controller, asking for emergency information. She was provided with the 

Alert 3 status, the airplane type and registration number, and an approximate location of 

the accident site (the Shale Bluffs area). About 1904:22, the crew chief stated, ìARFF 

699, roger, we will respond.î The crew chief proceeded to a perimeter gate, rather than 

continuing to the staging area, after learning that the accident site was north of the airport 

area. 

The on-duty ASE Airport Operations Officer was in the ARFF station when the 

crash alarm sounded. He followed ARFF 699 in a separate airport vehicle. About 

1904:57, the on-duty airport operations officer radioed that ARFF 699 should ìstand 

downî because the accident site, although on airport property, was outside of the airport 

operations area (the portion of the airport that is contained within the perimeter fencing 

and considered a controlled access area).39 The crew chief stated that she then asked the 

on-duty airport operations officer to call the ASE Director of Aviation for authorization 

for ARFF 699 to leave the airport. She reported that, about 3 minutes later, ARFF 699 

received clearance to proceed to the accident site.40

The Aspen Fire Protection District maintains a four-wheel-drive vehicle (radio 

call sign ìTender Oneî) at the airport with a capacity to carry 3,000 gallons of water and 

30 gallons of AFFF. The vehicle is staffed by members of the all-volunteer force. Two 

Aspen volunteer firefighters staffed Tender One on the night of the accident. The ASE 

Airside Operations Supervisor/Fire Chief stated that the second firefighter aboard ARFF 

699 reported that he observed Tender One traveling toward the accident scene at the time 

that ARFF 699 was awaiting permission to leave the airport. About 1908:28, ARFF 699 

radioed ATCT ground control, stating that the vehicle was off the airport. When ARFF 

699 arrived at the accident site, Tender One was the only other fire truck on scene. 

 37 ìAlert 3î indicates that an aircraft has been or is expected to be involved in an accident near or 

on the airport. It is the most serious of the three alert categories. 38 The times in this section could not be correlated with ATC and CVR transcript times and radar 

data information. 39 The ASE Airside Operations Supervisor/Fire Chief stated that ARFF crews had been trained to 

respond to off-airport emergencies but that, about October 2000, the Pitkin County Sheriffís Office notified 

airport officials that the airport had no jurisdiction beyond the airport perimeter. As a result, the airport 

began instructing ARFF crews that they were not to leave the airport without first receiving permission 

from the airport director. 40 On April 5, 2001, the ARFF Fire Chief issued a memorandum to all ARFF staff. The 

memorandum stated that, ìeffective immediately, ARFF 699 may leave the Airport Operations Area for 

downed aircraft emergencies at the discretion of the Crew Chief, with permission of the on-duty Operations 

Officer (Airport Director approval is not required).î 
 

NTSB/AAB-02/03 

20

The fire was extinguished about 10 minutes after ARFF 699 arrived on scene. 

According to Aspen Fire Protection District records and Aspen-Pitkin County 

Communications Center transcripts, 5 fire-fighting units, 2 rescue vehicles, 1 jeep, at 

least 2 medical units, and 30 Aspen Fire Protection District personnel responded to the 

accident. 

 

TESTS AND RESEARCH 

Airplane Performance Study 

 The Safety Board conducted an airplane performance study to develop the time 

history of the airplaneís motion and to calculate various performance and orientation 

parameters. To perform the study, several sources of information were used, including 

information from the CVR and ATC transcripts, Airport Surveillance Radar (ASR) radar 

data from the ASE TRACON, National Track Analysis Program (NTAP) radar data from 

the Denver ARTCC, aerodynamic data from the airplaneís manufacturer, and upper-level 

wind data from Grand Junction (located about 77 miles west of the accident site). The 

times for the ASR and NTAP data and the CVR and ATC transcript information were 

correlated. Figure 3 shows a profile view of the airplaneís approach to ASE. 

12 10 8 6 4 2 0

8000

9000

10000

11000

12000

13000

14000

Altitude (ft msl)

MDA

1901:36 HOT-1 "...where's it at?"

1901:13 HOT-2 "...yeah to the right is good"

1858:04 RDO "one five clearedto land three golf alpha"

1900:49 TWR "...you have the runway in sight?"

1900:54 TWR "Gulfstream three Golf Alpha cleared visu Roger."

1900:52 RDO "Runway insight three Golf Alpha"

D11.0

MAP

D9.5

ALLIX

D6.0

Red D3.0

Table

VOR

North Range (nm)

Figure 3. Profile view of N303GAís approach to ASE. 

RDO, radio communication transmitted to and from N303GA; TWR, radio transmission from

ASE local controller; HOT-2, first officerís audio panel information; MAP, missed approach

point; HOT-1, captainís audio panel information; MDA, minimum descent altitude.
 

NTSB/AAB-02/03 

21

According to the study, N303GA crossed the Red Table VOR (the initial 

approach fix) about 1857:49 at an altitude of 14,000 feet, a magnetic heading of 168o, and 

an airspeed of about 160 knots.41 The airplane crossed the step-down fix located 3 DME 

south of the Red Table VOR about 1858:40 at an altitude of 12,700 feet and an airspeed 

of about 150 knots. About 1859:00, the airplane started to level off near 12,200 feet, and 

the airplaneís speed decreased to approximately 125 knots by about 1859:30. About 

10 seconds later, the airplane crossed ALLIX (the final approach fix) at an altitude of 

12,100 feet (about 100 feet below the minimum altitude for ALLIX). 

 After passing ALLIX, N303GA maintained a descent rate of about 2,200 feet per 

minute and an airspeed of about 125 knots. (The reference airspeed for landing [Vref] for 

the airplaneís weight was 123 knots indicated airspeed.) The airplane leveled off at an 

altitude of 10,100 feet (about 300 feet below the minimum specified altitude for the 

9.5 DME step-down fix) about 1900:39 but began to descend again about 10 seconds 

later. At that point, the airplaneís heading increased about 15o as the airplane turned 

slightly to the right. (About that time, the CVR recorded the exchange between the 

controller and the flight crewmembers regarding whether they had the runway in sight.) 

The airplane continued its descent at a rate of about 2,200 feet per minute and an 

airspeed of about 125 knots. The airplane passed the step-down fix located 9.5 DME 

south of the Red Table VOR about 1901:00 at an altitude of 9,500 feet (900 feet below 

the minimum specified altitude). About 1901:13, the airplaneís heading started to 

decrease slightly while the airplane was at an altitude of 9,000 feet. (At this time, the 

CVR recorded the first officerís comment, ìÖto the right is good.î) Radar data showed 

that, at this time, the airport was to the left of the airplane. 

The FPAís 1,000-foot callout (about 1901:28) occurred when the airplane was at 

an altitude of 8,600 feet. At the time of the FPAís 800-foot callout (about 6 seconds 

later), the airplaneís bank angle started to increase in the right-wing-down direction, and 

the airplaneís magnetic heading of about 185o started to increase. When the CVR 

recorded the captain asking, ìwhereís it at?î about 1901:36, the airplane was banked to 

the right with its heading increasing. When the first officerís response ìto the rightî was 

recorded by the CVR about 6 seconds later, the airplane was still banked to the right, but 

the bank angle was decreasing. 

N303GA was flying on a 200o magnetic heading when the 500-foot callout was 

announced by both the FPA and GPWS about 1901:45. The airplane started to turn to the 

left about 1901:47. At the time of the FPAís 400-foot callout about 1901:49, the airplane 

was banked 10o left wing down with its heading starting to decrease. The last recorded 

radar return occurred at 1901:50 when the airplane was at an altitude of 8,000 feet. The 

GPWSí 200-foot callout was recorded about 1901:55 when the airplane was at an altitude 

of about 7,900 feet. At the time of the GPWSí bank angle alert (about 1901:57), the 

airplaneís bank angle exceeded 40o left wing down, consistent with the ground scar and 

tree strike evidence found at the accident scene. 

 41 The airspeeds in this section are calibrated airspeeds that were calculated from radar 

groundspeed and track data, wind data, magnetic variation, and atmospheric data. 
 

NTSB/AAB-02/03 

22

As indicated in the History of Flight section, the CVR recorded two 400-foot 

callouts about 1901:48 and 1901:52. The Airplane Performance Study determined that, 

during this part of the approach, the airplaneís descent rate was mostly constant, but the 

terrain below the airplane changed. Specifically, at the time of the second 400-foot 

callout, the airplane was crossing a riverbed, and the terrain dropped 140 feet in elevation 

from the bank to the lowest point in the riverbed. The terrain rose again as the airplane 

crossed the riverbed, during which time the 300- and 200-foot callouts were recorded on 

the CVR. After the FPAís 200-foot callout (recorded 1 second after the GPWSí 200-foot 

callout), the terrain rose another 25 feet (the elevation of the accident site). 

Cockpit Voice Recorder Sound Spectrum Study 

 A CVR sound spectrum study was performed to (1) determine if sounds similar to 

landing gear retraction could be heard toward the end of the CVR recording, (2) confirm 

the cockpit aural advisories and warnings that were transcribed from the CVR recording, 

(3) investigate the unidentified rumbling noise at the end of the CVR recording, and 

(4) document the recorded engine signatures. The results of this study are discussed in 

the following paragraphs. 

 First, as stated in the History of Flight section, the captain called for the landing 

gear about 1859:30, and the sound of two clunks and an increase in background noise 

followed immediately. Two sections of the CAM channel recording were reviewed: the 

landing gear movement series of noises and the time of the FPAís 1,000-foot callout 

through the end of the recording (from about 1901:28 to about 1901:58). An aural and 

spectral comparison of the two sections of the recording indicated the last 30 seconds of 

the recording did not contain any acoustic evidence of landing gear movement or 

operation. 

 Second, the Gulfstream III aural advisories and warnings were identified, and 

the aural advisories and warnings recorded on the accident airplaneís CVR were 

confirmed. The GPWS and FPA unit aural advisories and warnings recorded by the CVR 

were distinctly identifiable: the GPWS voice gender was male, whereas the FPA unit 

voice gender was female. The GPWSí advisories and warnings were consistently 

recorded on the CAM channel only, and the FPA unitís advisories and warnings were 

consistently recorded on the captainís and first officerís channels and the CAM channel 

until the 500-foot callout. At that point, the GPWSí 500-foot callout was recorded on the 

CAM channel, and the FPAís 500-foot callout was recorded only on the flight crew 

channels. The FPAís 400-foot callouts were not recorded on the CAM channel but 

continued to be recorded on the flight crew channels, the 300-foot callout was partially 

recorded on the captainís channel (recorded as ìthree hunî and followed by sounds 

indicative of a microphone key that continued to the end of the recording) and fully 

recorded on the first officerís channel, and the 200-foot callout was recorded only on the 

first officerís channel. In addition, the frequencies of the system tones recorded by the 

accident airplaneís CVR were confirmed. 
 

NTSB/AAB-02/03 

23

 Third, the CVR transcript indicated that a rumbling noise began about 1901:52, 

blended into the background about 1901:57, and continued until the end of the 

recording.42 A spectrogram (a graphic depiction of signal frequency and energy versus 

time) of the last 7 seconds of the CAM channel recording indicated a broadband noise 

with a cycle of 16.5 Hertz (Hz). The stick shakers from a similar Gulfstream III stall 

warning system were recorded during a ground test. Spectrograms of the two stick 

shaker systems from the test airplaneís CAM channel recording contained characteristics 

similar to the rumbling noise on the accident airplaneís recording. Specifically, one stick 

shaker system produced a broadband noise with a cycle of 16.1 Hz, and the other stick 

shaker system produced the same noise but with a cycle of 17.2 Hz. (The stick shaker 

motor operates between 13.3 and 23.3 Hz.) 

 Fourth, the spectrogram of the last 6 minutes of the CAM channel recording 

indicated a signature that ranged between about 260 and 510 Hz. According to the 

airplane and engine manufacturers, such a signature recorded by the CAM channel is 

typically associated with the engine-driven hydraulic pump; as a result, it was possible to 

determine the corresponding engine speeds (N2).43 A spectrogram of the last 6 minutes 

of the CAM channel recording showed two separate signatures, which indicated that the 

two engines were operating independently. Also, the spectrogram indicated that the 

engine speeds ranged from about 53 to 102 percent N2, with both engines indicating 

102 percent N2 at the end of the CVR recording. 

 

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

Company Information 

 According to Avjetís Director of Operations, the company was formed in 1977. 

All of the airplanes managed by Avjet are privately owned. When the owners are not 

using the airplanes under 14 CFR Part 91, they are available for on-demand charter 

flights conducted under 14 CFR Part 135. The Director of Operations also stated that all 

cockpit crews are assigned to a specific airplane and owner and that most pilots are 

certified under both Parts 91 and 135. The director further stated that, at the time of the 

accident, the company employed 55 pilots and 4 check airmen, all of whom were 

full-time employees. At the time of the accident, the companyís Part 135 certificate 

listed 18 airplanes, 15 of which were Gulfstream airplanes. 

 According to Avjetís Director of Operations, the company considered ASE to be 

a special airport. He explained that, for operations into special airports, the charter 

manager would discuss the flight crewís qualifications with upper managers and might 

not assign a captain to an airport with which he/she was not familiar. 

 42 Calculated airspeeds between 1901:52 and 1901:57 ranged from 120 to 127 knots. At 40o of 

bank and the airplaneís weight at the time of the accident, the stall speed was about 134 knots. 43 N2 is the rotational speed of the high-pressure spool in a gas turbine engine. 
 

NTSB/AAB-02/03 

24

Operations Manual 

 The Avjet Operations Manual in effect at the time of the accident was dated 

July 15, 2000. Page 3-6 states that the pilot-in-command ìwill ensure that the flight is 

conducted in complete compliance with all Federal, Local, and Company regulations and 

policies.î 

Page 4-4 indicates that, during the descent, the captain is responsible for 

conducting an approach briefing after leaving 18,000 feet but before reaching 

10,000 feet. The manual instructs the captain to emphasize the following: configuration; 

approach speed; final approach fix altitude; decision height/minimum descent altitude; 

visual descent point; circling maneuver; missed approach heading, altitude, and 

intentions; runway information; and abnormal conditions. The manual indicates that the 

first officer is responsible for calling ìone thousand to goî at 1,000 feet above the 

assigned altitude. 

 Pages 4-4 and 4-5 indicate the flight crew callouts that are required during the 

final approach segment of an instrument approach. The captain is responsible for 

announcing his intentions at the decision height or missed approach point. The first 

officer is responsible for the following: 

• When intercepting the final approach course: call ìNeedle alive.î 

• At initial downward movement of the glideslope indicator: call 

ìGlideslope alive.î 

• At FAF [final approach fix]: Call ìOuter markerî or ìFinal fix.î Start 

timing. Visually cross-check altimeters. Then call ìAltimeters check, 

no flags.î 

• At 1000 feet above minimums: Call ì1000 to go, no flags.î 

• At 500 feet above minimums: Call ì500 to go.î 

• At 100 feet above minimums: Call ìApproaching minimums.î 

• At MDA (Non-precision): Call ìAt minimums (time) (distance) to 

go.î 

• At MAP (Non-precision): Call ìMissed approach point, runway in 

sightî or ìMissed approach point, runway not in sight.î 

Training Manual 

The Avjet Part 135 Training Manual that was in effect at the time of the accident 

was dated November 30, 2000. Appendix C of the manual, pages C-53 through C-67, 

describes the Gulfstream G1159 series recurrent training program. According to the 

manual, the recurrent ground training consists of 13 general operational subjects, aircraft 

systems, and systems integration. The manual also states that the recurrent flight training 

consists of aircraft orientation and normal procedures, abnormal and emergency 

procedures, and an instrument proficiency and competency check in the flight simulator 

and/or the airplane. (These same areas are covered during initial ground and flight 
 

NTSB/AAB-02/03 

25

training but in more detail.) Avjet requires its pilots to receive recurrent flight training 

every 12 months. 

Section 2 of the manual, pages 2-32 and 2-33, describes the companyís controlled 

flight into terrain (CFIT) training module. The manual lists the following CFIT ground 

training module items: CFIT hazards, enhancement of situational awareness, recognition 

and evaluation of potential dangers, risk assessment/reduction factors, and GPWS. Also, 

the manual states that the CFIT flight simulator module consists of the ground proximity 

escape maneuver. Avjet pilots receive 3 hours of initial CFIT training. Pilots receive 

recurrent CFIT training as required, but the manual stipulates that the ground proximity 

escape maneuver must be practiced every 24 months. Simufliteóone of Avjetís 

FAA-approved contractors for pilot trainingóprovided the captain with his most recent 

recurrent training and the first officer with his initial company training. Simufliteís 

training form indicated numerous curriculum segments that were covered during ground 

and flight training, but CFIT training was not specifically cited on this list. 

 

In addition, Appendix C of the Avjet Training Manual, pages C-56 and C-58, 

indicates that crew resource management (CRM) is 1 of 13 general operational subjects 

addressed during Gulfstream G1159 series initial and recurrent ground training. The 

manual did not indicate any stand-alone CRM module. Although the FAA mandated 

CRM training in 1997 for 14 CFR Part 121 operators and 14 CFR Part 135 commuter 

operators that conduct scheduled operations with aircraft requiring 2 pilots or having 

10 or more passenger seats, CRM training is currently not required for pilots conducting 

14 CFR Part 135 on-demand operations.44 As a result, Avjet was not required to 

establish an FAA-approved CRM training program for its pilots. 

Postaccident Actions 

 On April 10, 2001, Avjetís Director of Operations issued a memorandum to all 

company flight crews and charter department schedulers, informing them that airport 

operations at ASE and three other mountain airports were now prohibited between sunset 

and sunrise.45 This prohibition applies to all Part 91 and 135 IFR and VFR operations. 

The memorandum states that 

if you cannot accomplish a landing and be on the ground at one of these airports 

before sunset you must divert to a suitable alternate. All passengers for one of these 

destinations must be informed of this policy. Flight crew members must report any 

violation of this policy or pressure from passengers to violate this policy to the 

Director of Operations or Chief Pilot. 

 44 To address this issue, the Safety Board adopted Safety Recommendation A-02-12 on June 11, 

2002. Safety Recommendation A-02-12 asked the FAA to ìrevise 14 CFR Part 135 to require on-demand 

charter operators that conduct operations with aircraft requiring two or more pilots to establish an 

FAA-approved crew resource management training program for its flight crews in accordance with 14 CFR 

Part 121, subparts N and O.î 45 The three other mountain airports are Telluride, Colorado; Eagle, Colorado; and Hailey (Sun 

Valley), Idaho. 
 

NTSB/AAB-02/03 

26

According to the memorandum, its contents and additional guidance regarding 

weather minimums for mountain operations would be incorporated in the next revision of 

the Avjet Operations Manual. This revision has not yet been issued. 

 On October 10, 2001, the Van Nuys, California, Flight Standards District Office 

revised the Operations Specifications of the 12 turbojet air carriers for which the office 

provides oversight (one of which was Avjet). The revised Operations Specifications 

dealt specifically with ASE and indicated that, ìbefore beginning the VOR-DME 

approach, reported weather must be at least ceiling 4400 feet and visibility 5 miles.î The 

specifications also indicated that ìthe flying pilot must be type rated in the aircraft and 

have made a takeoff and landing at this airport within the previous twelve (12) calendar 

months in a turbojet airplane.î 

On December 19, 2001, Avjet issued revisions to its Standard Operating 

Procedures. Page 4-1 of the Avjet Operations Manual was revised to state the following: 

Sterile Cockpit 

Whenever the aircraft is moving on the ground or during flight below 10,000 feet 

msl, the crew shall limit conversation to matters concerning the operation of the 

aircraft only. At airports with a field elevation of 5,000 feet or higher, sterile cockpit 

procedures shall apply from 18,000 feet msl to the ground. 

Cockpit Observers Seat (Jump Seat) 

Only an Avjet assigned crewmember, check airman, or FAA observer may occupy 

the observerís seat (jump seat) in any Avjet aircraft. Charter passengers shall never 

be allowed to occupy the observerís seat at any time. 

Manufacturer Information 

Gulfstream Aerospaceís GIII Flight Manual, section 1, ìLimitations,î page 1-16, 

dated December 3, 1991, indicates that, ìspeed brakes [spoilers] may be extended with 

flaps at 10o and 20o but may not be extended with flaps at 39o or with landing gear 

extended.î Section 2, ìNormal Procedures,î page 2-22, dated October 14, 1999, states 

that, for high-pressure rpm, ìmaintain power levers at or above the minimum approach 

high pressure RPM (64%) until crossing runway threshold in order to obtain prompt 

engine acceleration and thrust used in landing climb performance should a go-around be 

necessary.î 

Federal Aviation Administration Oversight 

The FAA Principal Operations Inspector (POI) assigned to the Avjet certificate 

had been in that position since December 1999. At the time of the accident, he had 

oversight responsibilities for 7 operators (including Avjet), which had a total of 

85 airplanes, 270 pilots, and 19 check airmen. He had an assistant until the fall of 2000. 
 

NTSB/AAB-02/03 

27

Records provided by the POI indicated that, in the 2 years before the accident, he 

performed 6 surveillance inspections of Avjet and 23 technical or administrative 

activities for the company, including evaluating initial training and technical documents 

and approving minimum equipment lists and revisions to operations specifications. FAA 

records indicated that other FAA operations inspectors performed 4 surveillance 

inspections of Avjet and 18 technical and administrative activities for the company, 

including check rides and line checks, in the 2 years before the accident. 

Landing Minimums 

According to 14 CFR 91.175(c), ìOperating Below DH or MDA,î no pilot may 

operate an aircraft at any airport below the authorized MDA (or continue an approach 

below the DH) unless the following requirements are met: 

(1) The aircraft is continuously in a position from which a descent to a landing on the 

intended runway can be made at a normal rate of descent using normal maneuvers, 

and for approaches conducted under part 121 or part 135 unless that descent rate will 

allow touchdown to occur within the touchdown zone of the runway of intended 

landing; 

(2) The flight visibility is not less than the visibility prescribed in the standard 

instrument approach being used; and 

(3) Except for a Category II or Category III approach where any necessary visual 

reference requirements are specified by the [FAA] Administrator, at least one of the 

following visual references for the intended runway is distinctly visible and 

identifiable to the pilot: 

(i) The approach light system, except that the pilot may not descend below 

100 feet above the touchdown zone elevation using the approach lights 

as reference unless the red terminating bars or the red side row bars are 

also distinctly visible and identifiable. 

(ii) The threshold. 

(iii) The threshold markings. 

(iv) The threshold lights. 

(v) The runway end identifier lights. 

(vi) The visual approach slope indicator. 

(vii) The touchdown zone or touchdown zone markings. 

(viii) The touchdown zone lights. 

(ix) The runway or runway markings. 

(x) The runway lights.

Charter Information 

The business assistant of the client who chartered N303GA stated, in a 

postaccident interview, that his employer had chartered the airplane because he was 

hosting a party in Aspen. The business assistant indicated that Avjet called him about 

1630 and informed him that the passengers were not at the airport and that the latest time 

the airplane could depart was 1655. He stated that he immediately began to track down 

the passengers and found out that all but two (including his employer) were in the airport 

parking lot. The charter department scheduler who handled N303GA on the day of the 
 

NTSB/AAB-02/03 

28

accident indicated that she told the business assistant that the flight would instead have to 

go to the airport at Rifle if the two passengers did not arrive shortly. 

According to the business assistant, the passengers that had arrived boarded the 

airplane. The business assistant indicated that one of the pilots had spoken to one or 

more passengers and stated that the airplane might not be able to land at ASE because of 

the nighttime landing curfew. The charter customer, upon learning about this 

conversation, instructed his business assistant to call Avjet and relay a message to the 

pilot that he should ìkeep his comments to himself.î 

The business assistant stated that, when he told his employer about the possibility 

that the flight might have to divert, his employer became ìirate.î According to the 

business assistant, he was told to call Avjet and tell the company that the airplane was not 

going to be redirected.46 Specifically, he was told to say that his employer had flown into 

ASE at night and was going to do it again. The business assistant stated that he called 

Avjet to express his employerís displeasure about the possibility of not landing in ASE. 

The charter department scheduler who handled N303GA on the day of the 

accident indicated that the captain stated, during an en route conversation about 1830, 

that it was important to land at ASE because ìthe customer spent a substantial amount of 

money on dinner.î 

 46 In a postaccident interview, an Avjet pilot stated that the company would have placed no 

pressure on the captain to land at ASE. 
 

NTSB/AAB-02/03 

29

ANALYSIS 

General 

 The captain and the first officer were properly certificated and qualified under 

Federal and company requirements. No evidence indicates any preexisting medical or 

behavioral conditions that might have adversely affected the flight crewís performance 

during the accident flight. Also, no evidence indicates that fatigue was a factor in this 

accident. 

The accident airplane was properly certified, equipped, and maintained in 

accordance with Federal regulations. No evidence indicated any preexisting engine or 

system failures. The substantial damage to the airplaneís structure that resulted from a 

1988 landing accident in Africa was not a factor in this accident. 

Navigational aids (the VOR and DME) and airport lighting systems (the runway 

end identifier lights, the medium intensity runway lights, and the precision approach path 

indicator) were also not factors in this accident. The accident was not survivable for any 

of the airplane occupants because they were subjected to impact forces that exceeded the 

limits of human tolerance. 

 

This analysis focuses on the flight crewís performance in conducting the 

instrument approach procedure to Aspen-Pitkin County Airport (ASE), including 

operational and human factors that may have played a role in the flight crewís decision to 

continue the approach to an intended landing. This analysis also discusses visual factors 

that affected the flight crewís ability to see and safely avoid the mountainous terrain. 

Accident Sequence 

The accident airplane was required to land at ASE no later than 30 minutes after 

sunset because of a local regulation regarding noise restrictions. Sunset on the day of the 

accident occurred at 1828, so the airplane had to land by 1858 to comply with the 

regulation. CVR evidence early in the recording and postaccident interviews indicated 

that the flight crew was aware of the landing restriction. 

The FAA issued a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) on March 27, 2001, stating 

ìcircling NA [not authorized] at nightî for runway 15 at ASE. The NOTAM was 

intended to mean that the instrument approach procedure was no longer authorized at 

night because only circling minimums were authorized for that procedure. Thus, the 

NOTAM was vaguely worded because pilots could infer that an approach without a 

circle-to-land maneuver to runway 15 was still authorized. The first officer received the 

NOTAM during his preflight briefing with a specialist at the Hawthorne, California, 
 

NTSB/AAB-02/03 

30

Automated Flight Service Station (AFSS).47 The first officer did not ask for further 

clarification of the NOTAM. According to the Federal Aviation Regulations, night 

begins at the end of evening civil twilight (when the center of the sun is geometrically 6o 

below the horizon), which occurred at 1855 on the day of the accident. The U.S. Naval 

Observatory publishes the precise times for the end of evening civil twilight; however, 

flight crews do not have a practical method for accessing this information. As a result, 

many flight crews estimate the end of evening civil twilight as 30 minutes after sunset. 

CVR evidence early in the recording indicated that the flight crew expected to 

encounter visual conditions during the approach and to have only one attempt to execute 

the approach. For example, the captainís approach briefing indicated, ìweíreÖprobably 

gonna make it a visualÖif we donít get the airport over here weíll go ahead and shoot 

that approachî and ìweíre not going to have a bunch of extra gas so we only get to shoot 

it once and then weíre going to Rifle.î48 Also, the captain later indicated to the flight 

attendant that, if the attempt to execute the approach was not successful, the airplane 

would have to go to Rifle because it was too late in the evening. 

The CVR indicated that the captain did not discuss the instrument approach 

procedure during his approach briefing, as required by the Avjet Operations Manual. The 

CVR also indicated that the captain did not brief the missed approach procedure, even 

though he discussed the possibility that the airplane might have to go to the alternate 

airport because of the landing restriction and the fuel status. Thus, the flight crew was 

not adequately prepared to perform ASEís instrument and missed approach procedures. 

In addition, Avjetís manual indicates that the captain was to brief the airplaneís 

configuration and approach speed, final approach fix altitude, minimum descent altitude 

(MDA), visual descent point, circling maneuver, runway information, and abnormal 

conditions. The CVR did not record the captain briefing any of this information. 

While the airplane was descending into the terminal area, the flight crew 

attempted to locate a specific highway because a visual approach to the airport follows 

parallel to this highway, but that effort was mostly unsuccessful. Afterward, the captain 

informed the approach controller, ìI can almost see up the canyon from here but I donít 

know the terrain well enough or Iíd take the visual.î The controller acknowledged this 

information and provided the flight crew with instructions for intercepting the final 

approach course. 

According to Doppler weather radar and weather satellite information, the cloud 

tops were near 16,000 feet while the airplane was on approach to ASE. After descending 

through this altitude, the airplane was in and out of the clouds. 

 47 The AFSS specialist did not read the NOTAM verbatim and told the first officer that circling 

minimums were not authorized at night. The addition of the word ìminimumsî made the information 

conform somewhat closer to the intent of the NOTAM because the NOTAM modified the VOR/DME-C 

procedure and not the landing maneuver. 48 As stated in the ìHistory of Flightî section, the sample flight plans provided by Gulfstream 

showed that the amount of fuel aboard the accident airplane would have exceeded the amount required by 

the Federal Aviation Regulations. 
 

NTSB/AAB-02/03 

31

Execution of the Instrument Approach Procedure 

According to the intent of the NOTAM, the instrument approach procedure to 

ASE was not authorized after 1855. As a result, the flight crew should not have been 

attempting this procedure to the airport. The CVR did not record any discussion between 

the flight crewmembers about the NOTAM. However, the flight crew was likely not 

aware that official nighttime began 3 minutes before the 1858 landing restriction at ASE. 

Also, the flight crewmembers might have believed that the NOTAM, because of its 

unclear wording, did not apply to a flight that would not have to execute a circling 

maneuver to runway 15. If the FAA had worded the NOTAM more clearly (as in the 

revision issued the day after the accident), it might have made more of an impression on 

the first officer when he received the preflight briefing from the Hawthorne AFSS and 

might have affected the conduct of the flight. Finally, it is also possible that the first 

officer did not brief the captain about the NOTAM and, therefore, that the captain might 

not have been aware of the NOTAM. 

About 1856:06, the approach controller cleared the flight crew for the 

VOR/DME-C instrument approach procedure. The controller did not know about the 

NOTAM because the Denver Center had not sent a copy to the ASE tower. If the tower 

had received the NOTAM, the controller would have been required to notify the flight 

crew of the NOTAM either verbally or on the ATIS broadcast.49 About 1856:42, the 

controller informed all airplanes on frequency that the visibility north of the airport was 

2 miles. 

The VOR/DME-C instrument approach procedure required the flight crew to 

maintain at least 14,000 feet until passing the Red Table VOR, the initial approach fix, 

and 12,700 feet until passing the intermediate step-down fix located 3 DME miles south 

of the Red Table VOR. (See figure 1.) The Airplane Performance Study for this accident 

indicated that N303GA crossed the Red Table VOR and the intermediate step-down fix at 

the altitudes specified by the approach procedure. (See figure 3.) The airplane crossed 

the Red Table VOR about 1857:49 at an airspeed of 160 knots and then crossed the 

step-down fix about 1858:40 at an airspeed of 150 knots. However, by this time, the 

flight crew could no longer comply with the local regulation that required the airplane to 

be on the ground by 1858. In addition, the captain was no longer in compliance with 

Avjetís policy that required the pilot-in-command to ensure that the flight was conducted 

ìin complete complianceî with local regulations. 

About 1858:03, the pilot of N527JA (a Canadair Challenger 600 airplane, which 

was preceding the accident airplane into ASE) reported that he did not have the airport in 

sight and that he would be going around. (Two previous reports of missed approaches 

had been transmitted over the ASE approach control frequency, one about 1844:43 and 

one about 1853:35.) The three reports of missed approaches and the deteriorating 

 49 FAA Order 7110.65, paragraph 4-7-12(b), states that, ìon first contact or as soon as possible 

thereafter, and subsequently as changes occur, inform an aircraftÖof destination airport conditions that you 

know of which might restrict an approach or landing. This information may be omitted if it is contained in 

the ATIS broadcast and the pilot states the appropriate ATIS code.î 
 

NTSB/AAB-02/03 

32

visibility to the north should have alerted the flight crewmembers that they might also 

need to execute a missed approach because of the weather. However, the CVR did not 

record any discussion between the crewmembers at this point regarding a possible missed 

approach. 

The final approach segment required the flight crew to maintain 12,200 feet until 

passing ALLIX, the final approach fix located 6 DME south of the Red Table VOR; 

10,400 feet until passing a step-down fix located 9.5 DME south of the Red Table VOR; 

and 10,200 feet until passing the missed approach point located 11 DME south of the Red 

Table VOR. (See figure 1.) The Airplane Performance Study indicated that the airplane 

crossed ALLIX about 1859:40 at an altitude of 12,100 feet, 100 feet below the minimum 

specified altitude (see figure 3), and at a speed of about 125 knots. 

 After passing ALLIX, the airplane maintained a descent rate of about 2,200 feet 

per minute and an airspeed of about 125 knots. When the airplane reached altitudes of 

11,200, 10,700, and 10,300 feet, Avjetís Operations Manual required the first officer to 

call out, ì1000 to go [until landing minimums],î ì500 to go,î and ìapproaching 

minimums,î respectively. However, the CVR did not record any of these callouts. 

About 1900:22, when the airplane was at an altitude of 10,400 feet and was about 

4.4 miles north of the airport, the captain stated, ìokayÖIím breaking out,î which was 

the first indication that the captain might have made visual contact with the ground. 

About 5 seconds later, the captain asked the controller whether the lights were all the way 

up. Postaccident interviews and CVR evidence determined that, by this time, the ground 

controller had set the airport lights at their highest intensity; thus, the captainís query 

could suggest that he did not have the runway or its environment in sight. It is also 

possible that the captain could have perceived the lights as dim because of an obscuration 

and wanted to make sure the lights remained visible. 

The airplane leveled off about 1900:39 at an altitude of 10,100 feet and about 

3.7 miles north of the airport. The CVR did not record any announcement by the first 

officer that the airplane was 300 feet below the minimum step-down altitude of 

10,400 feet. Also, the airplane was now operating below the 10,200-foot MDA without 

any indication, according to the CVR, that either pilot had made visual contact with the 

runway or its environment. The CVR indicated that the first officer did not verbally 

challenge the captain, and radar data showed that the captain did not correct the descent 

or initiate a missed approach. 

About 1900:43, the captain asked the first officer whether he could see the 

runway, but the CVR recorded an unintelligible statement made by the first officer about 

2 seconds later. About 1900:46, the captain asked the first officer whether he could see 

the highway. (The highway, as viewed from the approach, was located slightly to the 

right of the runway extended centerline and thus would have been more easily visible on 

the first officerís side of the cockpit.) The CVR recorded the first officerís statement 

ìsee highwayî 1 second later, but this statement does not clearly indicate whether he 

actually had the highway in sight. Because the first officer provided no specific 
 

NTSB/AAB-02/03 

33

information about the highwayís location, it is possible that he was repeating the 

captainís words while looking for the highway. The captain made no statements about 

this time to indicate that he had established visual reference with either the runway or the 

highway. 

The airplane began to descend again about 1900:49 at a rate of 2,200 feet per 

minute. The local controller noticed that the airplane had prematurely descended below 

the 10,400-foot step-down altitude and asked the flight crewmembers whether they had 

the runway in sight. About 1900:51, the first officer and the captain stated, almost 

simultaneously, ìaffirmativeî and ìyes now yeah we do,î respectively. These statements 

were communicated only to the other pilot, but, about 1 second later, the first officer 

informed the controller that the runway was in sight. Radar data indicated that the 

airplane was at an altitude of 9,750 feet at the time but that it had not started maneuvering 

toward the airport. 

Evidence indicated that, at that point, the flight crew probably did not have the 

runway in sight or had it in sight only briefly. Specifically, the CVR did not record any 

previous independent indication from either flight crewmember that he had visually 

identified the runway; both pilots stated that they saw the runway only after being queried 

by the controller. Also, the CVR did not record any further discussion throughout the 

rest of the flight that would be consistent with a flight crew that could see a runway. 

Neither flight crewmember commented about the threshold or its markings or lights; the 

runway end identifier lights; the precision approach path indicator; the touchdown zone 

or its markings or lights; or the runway or its markings or lightsóone of which needed to 

be in sight to make a landing in accordance with 14 CFR 91.175(c)(3). In addition, the 

local controller stated that she did not see the airplane when the pilot reported the runway 

in sight. Further, the airplane would have had to make a left turn to align with the 

runway, but radar data showed that the airplane was turning slightly to the right (2.5o 

right wing down). 

The airplane passed the step-down fix located 9.5 DME south of the Red Table 

VOR about 1901:00 at an altitude of 9,500 feet, 900 feet below the specified minimum 

altitude (see figure 3). Because the airplane was still in instrument meteorological 

conditions, the first officer should have announced this altitude deviation to the captain, 

but the CVR did not record any such callout. 

The 1853 Automated Surface Observing System hourly observation indicated that 

the lowest cloud base was near 9,315 feet. Once the airplane had descended below this 

altitude, the pilots were likely encountering visibilities of about 2 miles in light snow 

showers. The airplane was 2.7 miles from the airport at this time. 

About 1901:13, the CVR recorded the first officerís statement, ìÖto the right is 

good.î Radar data indicated that the airplane was at an altitude of 9,000 feet. It is not 

apparent what the first officer could see from the cockpit when he made his statement 

because the runway would have been to the left of the nose of the airplane. It is possible 

that the first officer could have seen the runway at this point; however, the captain did not 
 

NTSB/AAB-02/03 

34

verbally acknowledge the first officerís directional guidance, and radar data indicated that 

the airplane did not make a turn to the right. The airplane continued on its heading, 

which would have still positioned the airplane to the right of the runway. 

About 1901:21, the CVR recorded a sound, which continued for 9 seconds, that 

was consistent with the airplaneís configuration alarm. This warning indicated that the 

captain had deployed the spoilers after the landing gear had been extended and the final 

landing flaps had been selected.50 Also, the CVR Sound Spectrum Study determined 

that, while the spoilers were deployed, engine power was set to 55 percent N2. The 

captain likely extended the spoilers and reduced engine power to increase the airplaneís 

rate of descent to get below the snow showers and visually acquire the runway. 

However, these actions were contrary to spoiler information in the Gulfstream GIII Flight 

Manual, which indicates that the spoilers are not to be extended with flaps in the landing 

configuration (39o) or with the landing gear extended and that the high-pressure rpm 

power setting on final approach should not be below 64 percent N2 to meet FAA-required 

go-around standards. 

 

About 1901:34, the airplaneís attitude started to increase in the right-wing-down 

direction. (The airplane should have been turning to the left to align with the runway.) 

The airplane passed the missed approach point about 1901:36 at an altitude of about 

8,300 feet, 485 feet above field elevation rather than the specified 2,385 feet above field 

elevation (see figure 3). The first officer was required to call out, ìmissed approach 

point, runway in sightî or ìmissed approach point, runway not in sight,î and the captain 

was required to announce his intentions. However, the CVR did not record either of 

these callouts. 

About the same time as the airplane passed the missed approach point, the captain 

asked, ìwhereís it at?î This statement suggests that the captain had not identified, or had 

lost visual contact with, the runway. At this point, the captain should have abandoned the 

approach, especially because the airplane was close to the ground in mountainous 

terrain.51 The first officer stated, ìto the right,î about 6 seconds after the captainís 

query.52 Again, it is not apparent what the first officer could see from the cockpit when 

he made this statement. After the first officerís response, the captain stated, ìto the 

right,î but calculations from radar data indicated that the airplaneís right bank angle was 

 50 The CVR indicated that the captain had called for the landing gear and landing flaps about 

1859:30 and 1859:34, respectively. (The airplane was at an altitude of 12,200 feet when the captain called 

for the landing gear.) The first officerís statement, ìthree greens,î about 1859:46 indicated that the landing 

gear was in the down and locked position. 51 The captain and the first officer should have realized the proximity of the airplane to the ground 

because the flight profile advisory (FPA) unit had announced the 1,000-, 900-, and 800-foot callouts before 

the captainís question about the location of the runway. Although the airplane was less than 500 feet above 

airport elevation at the time of the captainís question, the ground proximity warning system (GPWS) and 

FPA 500-foot altitude were not announced then because, according to the Airplane Performance Study, the 

airplane was flying over a river valley at that point and the terrain elevation directly below the aircraft was 

7,600 feetóover 700 feet lower than the airport elevation. The terrain below the airplane dropped some 

more and then rose slightly as the airplane continued its descent. 52 The FPA announced the 700- and 600-foot callouts before the first officerís response. 
 

NTSB/AAB-02/03 

35

decreasing.53 At this point, the airplane was at an altitude of 8,100 feet and was 1.2 miles 

from the runway. 

Title 14 CFR 91.175(c)(3) states that at least one specified visual reference for the 

intended runway needs to be ìdistinctly visible and identifiable to the pilotî for the 

airplane to operate below the MDA. The captainís statement ìwhereís it at?î indicated 

that he did not see any of these visual references. Even if the first officer had the runway 

in sight at this point, the captain, as the flying pilot, should not have been relying on the 

first officer for directional guidance during the visual transition from the instrument 

approach to the landing. 

Radar data indicated that, about 1901:47, the airplane stopped turning to the right 

and began turning to the left. The Safety Board regards this maneuver as the first clear 

indication that the captain may have seen the runway after the MDA. About 1901:49, the 

airplane was at an altitude of 8,000 feet, was about 0.9 miles north of the runway, and 

was descending at a rate of 900 feet per minute. At that point, the airplane was banked 

10o left wing down. The airplaneís bank angle continued to increase.54 The local 

controller saw the airplane emerge from a snow shower (at a low altitude and west of the 

runway extended centerline) and rapidly enter a steep left bank. On the basis of the ATC 

voice recordings and information from a postaccident interview, the Board estimates that 

the airplane crashed about 5 seconds after the controller saw the airplane. 

At the time of the accident (1901:57), the airplane was banked more than 40o left 

wing down, and the left wing tip was the first airplane part that struck the terrain. The 

CVR contained no indication regarding why the airplane was turning so steeply to the 

left. It is possible that the captain saw the runway or the highway and was making a 

steep turn to align the airplane with the runway without a substantial overshoot.55 It is 

also possible that the captain was starting to see terrain that had been obscured by the 

darkness and the weather conditions and was banking the airplane to avoid the terrain. 

 

 The left and right main landing gear were found in their wheel wells. However, 

no evidence on the CVR and from the CVR Sound Spectrum Study indicated that the 

gear was being raised for a missed approach. In addition, the airplane manufacturer 

stated that a warning horn would sound if the gear were being raised while the flaps were 

in the landing configuration. The CVR did not record the sound of this warning horn. 

 53 While the airplane was still banked to the right, the GPWS and FPA announced the 500-foot 

altitude callout. 54 As the airplaneís left bank angle was increasing, the FPA announced the 400-, 300- and 200-

foot altitude callouts, and the GPWS announced the 200-foot callout, two sink rate alerts, and one bank 

angle alert. 55 Radar data showed that the airplane was substantially to the right of the runway extended 

centerline. 
 

NTSB/AAB-02/03 

36

Summary of the Flight Crewís Performance 

During the final 2 minutes of the approach, the flight crewmembers were 

apparently focusing more of their attention outside, rather than inside, the cockpit as they 

tried to locate the runway and the highway. As a result, the captain continued flight 

below the authorized MDA after failing to establish or maintain visual contact with the 

runway. The first officer did not challenge the captainís actions. 

In addition to their numerous errors during the instrument approach procedure, the 

flight crewmembers demonstrated poor crew coordination during the accident flight. 

Specifically, the captain and the first officer did not make required instrument approach 

callouts,56 the captain provided an incomplete approach briefing, and he did not follow 

Gulfstreamís procedures regarding in-flight spoiler operation and minimum engine power 

during an approach. 

The flight crewmembers should have abandoned the approach because the 

airplane descended below the MDA without an adequate visual reference of the runway. 

Also, the flight crew should have considered diverting to an alternate airport after 

receiving information about the deteriorating visibility along the approach course and the 

three reports of missed approaches. Operational and human factors that may have played 

a role in the flight crewís decision to continue the approach to an intended landing are 

discussed in the next section. Visual factors affecting the flight crewís ability to see and 

avoid the terrain are discussed later. 

Operational and Human Factors 

The flight crew was dealing with various sources of operational pressure during 

the accident flight. These sources were the airplaneís late departure from LAX, the ASE 

nighttime landing curfew, and the charter customerís strong desire to land at ASE. 

Because of the late arrival of the passengers (including the charter customer), the 

airplane was not able to depart LAX until 1711ó41 minutes later than scheduled. The 

late departure delayed the flightís estimated arrival at ASE to 1846óonly 12 minutes 

before the airportís landing curfew. These factors would not have allowed the flight crew 

to perform a second approach if the first one had to be abandoned. (The captain 

recognized this fact, as demonstrated by his approach briefing to the first officer.) As a 

result, the flight crewmembers initially tried to establish and maintain contact with 

ground references so that they would be able to fly visually to the airport. 

After the captain informed the controller that he did not know the terrain well 

enough to ìtake the visual,î the first officer indicated, ìcould do a contact butÖI donít 

know,î but then stated, ìprobably we could not.î A contact approach would have 

exposed the flight to greater risk because of that approachís 1-mile visibility requirement 

 56 In addition to the callouts previously discussed in the ìExecution of the Instrument Approach 

Procedureî section, the first officer also did not call out required course, fix, and altimeter information. 
 

NTSB/AAB-02/03 

37

and the mountainous terrain surrounding ASE. However, the first officer likely 

considered this approach as an option, albeit briefly, because of the limited time available 

to arrive at the airport. 

The charter customerís communications both before and during the flight, 

stressing the importance of landing at ASE, most likely heightened the pressure on the 

flight crew. According to the charter customerís business assistant, his employer became 

ìirateî when he was informed about the possible diversion to an alternate airport. The 

business assistant also stated that he was told to call Avjet and emphasize that the 

airplane was not going to be redirected. The Avjet charter department scheduler 

indicated that the captain felt that it was important to land at ASE because of the 

substantial amount of money that the customer spent for a dinner party. 

 

In addition, the CVR indicated that, about 1853:57, the flight attendant escorted 

an unidentified male passenger to the jumpseat, which he occupied for the remainder of 

the flight. Comments by the captain indicated that he likely felt the need to explain the 

status of the approach to the passenger.57 For example, about 1855:14, the captain stated, 

ìthe weatherís gone down theyíre not making it in,î to which this passenger replied, ìoh 

really.î Also, when this passenger asked ìare we clear?î about 1858:13, the captain 

responded, ìnot yetî and ìthe guy in front of us [N898R] didnít make it in either.î This 

passenger again replied, ìoh really.î The CVR did not record any other comments by 

this passenger, except for an unintelligible comment about 1900:08 regarding the snow. 

However, the presence of this passenger in the cockpit, especially if it were the charter 

customer, most likely further heightened the pressure on the flight crew to land at ASE. 

The operational pressure on the flight crew probably resulted in the crewís intent 

to continue with its original plan to land at ASE. FAA Advisory Circular 60-22, 

ìAeronautical Decision Making,î indicates that pilots, particularly those with 

considerable experience, try to complete flights as planned, please passengers, and meet 

schedules, which can compromise safety and impose an unrealistic assessment of piloting 

skills under stressful conditions. Also, human performance researchers have noted that 

pilots tend to adhere to their original plan of action, which interferes with critical analysis 

processes that are needed to adequately reevaluate the suitability of the original plan and 

explore an alternate course of action. As a result, ìplan continuation errorsî occur; that 

is, pilots elect to continue with an original plan of action despite the presence of cues 

suggesting that the course of action needs to be modified.58 In addition, research has 

demonstrated that individuals, when faced with a choice between alternatives, generally 

seek out information that confirms a chosen hypothesis and ignore or fail to fully 

 57 As previously indicated, 14 CFR 135.100 did not prohibit the captain from allowing this 

passenger to sit on the jumpseat and from conversing with him because the airplane had not yet reached the 

sterile cockpit altitude of 10,000 feet msl. 58 J. Orasanu, ìPlan Continuation Errors: A Factor in Aviation Accidents?î Proceedings of the 

Fourteenth Triennial Congress of the International Ergonomics Association and Forty-forth Annual 

Meeting of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society (Santa Monica, CA: Human Factors and 

Ergonomics Society, 2000). 
 

NTSB/AAB-02/03 

38

consider contradictory information, particularly when workload is high and time 

constraints are imposed.59 

 

In this accident, the flight crew focused on cues that supported the goal of landing 

at ASE, such as occasional breaks in the clouds and the report of one airplane (N900MF) 

that had landed at the airport without incident. By focusing on such cues, the crew did 

not adequately consider information that supported a change of plans, such as the 

deteriorating visibility, the three reports of missed approaches (the last of which, 

involving N527JA, occurred after the accident airplane passed the Red Table VOR), and 

the failure to establish and maintain visual contact with the runway environment as the 

approach proceeded. Instead, the flight crewmembers might have viewed this 

information as a barrier to achieving their intended goal of landing at ASE, causing them 

not to recognize the increasing evidence supporting the need for an alternate course of 

action. 

Visual Factors 

When the VOR/DME-C instrument approach procedure was first established at 

ASE in December 1988, the procedure was not authorized at night. The FAA removed 

the night restriction from the procedure in October 1994 because of complaints from user 

groups. In March 2001, the instrument approach procedure was again restricted at night 

after an FAA flight inspection determined that areas of unlighted terrain conflicted with 

traffic patterns and circling descent maneuvers near the airport. 

 

The night restriction on the VOR/DME-C instrument approach procedure did not 

restrict the procedure during evening civil twilight. However, the decrease in ambient 

illumination during civil twilight results in a decrease in contrast between objects and the 

background scene, which diminishes a pilotís ability to visually distinguish between 

terrain features and the sky and to visually detect unlighted objects. 

The amount of ambient light decreases by two orders of magnitude (that is, about 

100 times) from the beginning to the end of evening civil twilight. Also, the sky during 

civil twilight can be much brighter than terrain features, and pilots may be exposed to 

higher ambient light levels at altitude before descent. Pilots may also experience rapid 

decreases in ambient illumination during approach and descent, especially in 

mountainous areas where terrain features may rise above the horizon and reduce the 

amount of ambient illumination at lower elevations. The mountainous terrain 

surrounding ASE reduces the amount of ambient lighting during evening civil twilight at 

lower elevations, including positions on and near the airfield. 

 

Although this accident occurred only 7 minutes after the end of evening civil 

twilight and the beginning of night, the mountainous terrain created twilight and 

nighttime conditions much earlier. The controller-in-charge stated, in a postaccident 

interview, that the sky was ìvery darkî in the minutes before the accident. In fact, the 

 59 C.D. Wickens, Engineering Psychology and Human Performance, 2nd ed. New York: Harper 

Collins, 1992. 
 

NTSB/AAB-02/03 

39

Safety Board calculated that the sun had set below the mountainous terrain about 

25 minutes before the official sunset time60 and that evening civil twilight ended about 

1830 rather than 1855. Also, the shadow for the ridge immediately to the west of the 

accident site would have crossed the accident site 79 minutes earlier than official sunset. 

As a result, the dark conditions would have significantly degraded the flight crewís 

ability to see and safely avoid terrain while making the visual transition from the 

instrument approach to an intended landing. The reduced visibility and light snow 

showers near the airport would have further degraded the flight crewís ability to see and 

safely avoid the terrain. 

This accident reveals that the aeronautical definition of night does not adequately 

take into account darkness in mountainous terrain. Specifically, because pilots do not 

have sufficient ambient lighting to see and safely avoid unlighted terrain during periods 

of darkness before official night, the night restriction on the VOR/DME-C approach is 

not enough to ensure safety of flight. Thus, nighttime restrictions may not sufficiently 

mitigate potential hazards associated with flight operations into ASE and other airports 

with mountainous terrain during periods of darkness.61 

 60 On February 21, 2002, an ASE tower controller observed the sun fully set behind the terrain 

about 1725. At that time, the elevation of the sun was 4.2o, resulting in a visible sunset that was about 26 

minutes earlier than the official sunset of 1751. On the night of the accident, the sun was at an elevation of 

4.2o about 1803, resulting in a visible sunset that was about 25 minutes earlier than official sunset. 61 To address this issue, the Safety Board issued Safety Recommendation A-02-08 on April 15, 

2002. Safety Recommendation A-02-08 asked the FAA to ìrevise any restrictions and prohibitions that 

currently reference or address ënightí or ënighttimeí flight operations in mountainous terrain so that those 

restrictions and prohibitions account for the entire potential period of darkness or insufficient ambient light 

conditions, and establish a method to clearly communicate to flight crews when such restrictions and 

prohibitions apply.î 
 

NTSB/AAB-02/03 

40

SUMMARY 

1. The flight crew made numerous procedural errors and deviations during 

the final approach segment of the VOR/DME approach to Aspen (ASE). 

 

• The flight crew crossed step-down fixes below the minimum specified 

altitudes. 

• The flight crew descended below the minimum descent altitude (MDA), 

even though airplane maneuvers and comments on the cockpit voice 

recorder (CVR) indicated that neither pilot had established or maintained 

visual contact with the runway or its environment. 

• Contrary to the airplane manufacturerís procedures, the captain deployed 

the spoilers after the landing gear had been extended and the final landing 

flaps had been selected, and he set engine power to 55 percent N2 rather 

than 64 percent N2. 

• When the airplane was 1.4 miles from the runway (about 21 seconds 

before the accident), the captain asked, ìwhereís it at?î but did not 

abandon the approach, even though he had not identified, or had lost 

visual contact with, the runway. 

• Radar data and CVR comments indicated that, until the airplane began 

turning to the left about 10 seconds before the accident, the flight crew 

probably did not have the runway or its environment in sight. 

2. The crew demonstrated poor crew coordination during the accident 

flight. 

 

• The captain did not discuss the instrument approach procedure, the missed 

approach procedure, and other required elements during his approach 

briefing because he expected to execute a visual approach to the airport. 

• The captain and the first officer did not make required instrument 

approach callouts, and the first officer did not call out required course, fix, 

and altimeter information. 

• The flight crew did not discuss a missed approach after receiving a third 

report of a missed approach to the airport and a report of deteriorating 

visibility in the direction of the approach course. 

3. The flight crew was under pressure to land at ASE. 

 

• Because of the flightís delayed departure from Los Angeles International 

Airport and the landing curfew at ASE, the flight crew could attempt only 

one approach to the airport before having to divert to the alternate airport. 

• The charter customer had a strong desire to land at ASE, and his 

communications before and during the flight most likely heightened the 

pressure on the flight crew. 
 

NTSB/AAB-02/03 

41

• The presence of a passenger on the jumpseat, especially if it were the 

charter customer, most likely further heightened the pressure on the flight 

crew to land at ASE. 

4. Darkness, reduced visibility, and light snow showers near the airport at 

the time of the accident significantly degraded the flight crewís ability to 

see and safely avoid terrain. 

5. The March 27, 2001, Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) regarding the 

nighttime restriction on the VOR/DME-C approach was vaguely worded 

and ineffectively distributed. 

 

• The NOTAM stated, ìcircling NA [not authorized] at night,î but the 

intended meaning of the NOTAM was to prohibit the entire instrument 

approach procedure at night. 

• Pilots might have inferred that an approach without a circle-to-land 

maneuver to runway 15 was still authorized. 

• If the FAA had worded the first NOTAM more clearly, it might have 

made more of an impression on the first officer when he received the 

preflight briefing from the Automated Flight Service Station and might 

have affected the conduct of the flight. 

• The local controller could not notify the flight crew of the NOTAM 

because the Denver Center had not sent a copy to the ASE tower. 

PROBABLE CAUSE 

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of 

this accident was the flight crewís operation of the airplane below the minimum descent 

altitude without an appropriate visual reference for the runway. 

Contributing to the cause of the accident were the Federal Aviation 

Administrationís (FAA) unclear wording of the March 27, 2001, Notice to Airmen 

regarding the nighttime restriction for the VOR/DME-C approach to the airport and the 

FAAís failure to communicate this restriction to the Aspen tower; the inability of the 

flight crew to adequately see the mountainous terrain because of the darkness and the 

weather conditions; and the pressure on the captain to land from the charter customer and 

because of the airplaneís delayed departure and the airportís nighttime landing restriction.