Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Lacy, Hassell, and 

Keenan, JJ., and Poff, Senior Justice 

MELVIN C. MOORE, JR. 

OPINION BY JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 

v. Record No. 961500 

 June 6, 1997 

VIRGINIA INTERNATIONAL TERMINALS, INC. 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

 The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Court of 

Appeals erred in ruling that Code § 65.2-520 (a part of the 

Virginia Workers' Compensation Act, Code § 65.2-100 et seq. (the 

Virginia Act)) grants an employer a "dollar-for-dollar," as 

opposed to a "week-for-week," credit for benefits paid to an 

injured employee under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' 

Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (the Longshore Act), 

which exceeded the employer's obligations under the Virginia Act. 

 The facts are undisputed. On November 10, 1986, Melvin C. 

Moore, Jr., sustained injuries to both wrists while working as a 

longshoreman with Virginia International Terminals, Inc. (VIT). 

It is conceded that Moore's injury was compensable under both the 

Longshore Act and the Virginia Act. 

 Moore initially sought disability benefits under the 

Longshore Act. As a result of his injuries, Moore received 

temporary total disability benefits under the Longshore Act from 

November 11, 1986, through April 7, 1987; from April 14, 1987, 

through November 22, 1987; and from November 25, 1987, through 

February 15, 1988. Moore also received temporary partial 

disability benefits from February 16, 1988, through April 17, 

1988; temporary total disability benefits from April 18, 1988, 
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through July 27, 1988; and permanent partial disability benefits 

from July 28, 1988, through August 31, 1990. In addition, Moore 

received temporary total disability benefits from June 7, 1993, 

through October 11, 1993. 

 On May 5, 1988, while receiving temporary total disability 

benefits under the Longshore Act, Moore filed an application for 

benefits with the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission (the 

Commission). Moore sought temporary total disability benefits 

beginning September 1, 1990. 

 The parties stipulated that VIT was entitled to a credit for 

compensation it paid to Moore under the Longshore Act during the 

periods of Moore's disability through November 19, 1989, and from 

June 7, 1993, to August 18, 1993. The parties disagreed, 

however, regarding the method of calculating the credit pursuant 

to Code § 65.2-520. 

 VIT paid a total of $128,578.60 to Moore under the Longshore 

Act, and it contended that it is entitled to a "dollar-fordollar" credit in the amount of $16,062.06; i.e., that portion of 

the sum it paid which exceeds its obligation under the Virginia 

Act. Moore contended, on the other hand, that VIT is entitled to 

credit on a "week-for-week" basis, whereby credit is awarded 

based upon the number of weeks during which benefits were paid by 

VIT under the Longshore Act. 

 The Commission, affirming its Deputy Commissioner, adopted 

Moore's "week-for-week" contention. Specifically, the Commission 
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held that VIT "is entitled to set off the number of weeks that 

benefits were paid under [the Longshore Act] rather than the 

total amount . . . of compensation paid under [the Longshore 

Act]." Thus, any weekly amounts VIT paid to Moore under the 

Longshore Act which exceeded what was due under the Virginia Act 

were not credited against VIT's liability under the Virginia Act. 

 The Court of Appeals reversed that part of the Commission's 

order relating to the amount of the credit. The Court held that 

"the [C]ommission erred in concluding that [VIT] was not entitled 

to credit for the amount [VIT] paid under the [Longshore Act] 

that exceeded its obligation under the Virginia Act." Virginia 

Intern. Terminals v. Moore, 22 Va. App. 396, 405-06, 470 S.E.2d 

574, 579 (1996). We awarded Moore an appeal, having determined 

that the Court of Appeals' decision involves a matter of 

significant precedential value. Code § 17-116.07(B). 

 Where, as here, a worker is covered by both the federal 

Longshore Act and a state workers' compensation statute, 

concurrent jurisdiction exists, and the injured worker may 

proceed under either or both statutes. The claimant, however, is 

entitled to only a single recovery for his injuries. Calbeck v. 

Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114, 131 (1962); accord American 

Foods v. Ford, 221 Va. 557, 561, 272 S.E.2d 187, 190 (1980). 

 In Calbeck, an employer contended that its employee's 

acceptance of benefits under a state compensation act constituted 

an election of remedies which barred prosecution of his claim 
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under the Longshore Act. The Supreme Court held that the injured 

employee's acceptance of state disability benefits did not 

constitute an election of remedies under state law that would 

preclude recovery under the Longshore Act. In so holding, the 

Supreme Court noted that, in the commissioner's order directing 

payment of compensation under the Longshore Act, "the full amount 

of all payments made by the employer [under the state act] was 

credited against the [Longshore Act] award, and no impermissible 

double recovery is possible." 370 U.S. at 131. Consistent with 

Calbeck, the Supreme Court, in Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 

447 U.S. 715, 725 n.8 (1980), concluded that "there is no danger 

of double recovery under concurrent jurisdiction since employers' 

awards under one compensation scheme would be credited against 

any recovery under the second scheme." 

 In American Foods, we considered the issue of concurrent 

jurisdiction and stated that "both the federal and the state 

governments are constitutionally competent to provide [workers'] 

compensation remedies to [workers] who are killed or injured on 

navigable waters in Virginia." 221 Va. at 561, 272 S.E.2d at 

190. We also stated that "[d]ouble recovery under concurrent 

jurisdiction will not be allowed, because an employer receives 

credit for prior state compensation awards in any subsequent 

award under [the Longshore Act]." Id. 

 The Code section at issue in the present case, Code § 65.2-

520, entitled "Voluntary payment by employer," reads as follows: 

 Any payments made by the employer to the injured 
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employee during the period of his disability, or to his 

dependents, which by the terms of this title were not 

due and payable when made, may, subject to the approval 

of the Commission, be deducted from the amount to be 

paid as compensation provided that, in the case of 

disability, such deductions shall be made by shortening 

the period during which compensation must be paid and 

not by reducing the amount of the weekly payment. 

(Emphasis added.) 

 We think, in enacting Code § 65.2-520, the General Assembly 

intended that an employer should be given a "dollar-for-dollar" 

credit. Indeed, the statute states that "[a]ny payments . . . 

may . . . be deducted from the amount to be paid as 

compensation." Payments are made in dollars, and compensation is 

paid in dollars. Any other reading of Code § 65.2-520 would 

allow a double recovery by an injured employee, and, as we said 

in American Foods, "[d]ouble recovery under concurrent 

jurisdiction will not be allowed." 221 Va. at 561, 272 S.E.2d at 

190. Moreover, had the General Assembly intended a "week-forweek" credit, the directive against "reducing the amount of the 

weekly payment" would have been unnecessary. 

 Moore correctly points out that the Commission in a number 

of cases has uniformly interpreted and applied the credit 

provision of Code § 65.2-520 "to provide for credit measured by 

the period of disability and corresponding payments, as opposed 

to offsetting the total dollar amount paid against the dollar 

amount to which the claimant would otherwise be entitled under 

the Virginia Act." Moore also correctly states that "[a] basic 

tenet of interpretation and application of the Virginia Act is 
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that the construction given to the Act by the . . . Commission is 

to be accorded great weight." Nevertheless, when the 

Commission's interpretation of a statute runs counter to what we 

perceive to be the clear intent of the General Assembly as well 

as our decisions, the former must yield. This is such a case. 

 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of 

Appeals. In accordance with the Court of Appeals' opinion, the 

case will be remanded to the Court of Appeals, with direction 

that it remand the case to the Commission for a determination 

consistent with this opinion. 

Affirmed.