(Notation Vote) 

October 29, 2014 SECY-14-0118

FOR: The Commissioners 

FROM: Mark A. Satorius

Executive Director for Operations 

SUBJECT: REQUEST BY DUKE ENERGY FLORIDA, INC., FOR EXEMPTIONS 

FROM CERTAIN EMERGENCY PLANNING REQUIREMENTS 

PURPOSE: 

The purpose of this paper is to seek Commission approval for the staff to grant Duke Energy 

Florida, Inc.’s (DEF’s) request for exemptions from certain emergency planning (EP) 

requirements of Part 50, “Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities,” of Title 10 

of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR). DEF’s proposed exemptions would result in 

elimination of the requirements placed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on 

the licensee for formal offsite radiological emergency plans at the Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) 

site, but would require the maintenance of certain onsite capabilities to communicate and 

coordinate with offsite response authorities. This paper does not address any new 

commitments or resource implications. 

SUMMARY: 

The EP requirements of 10 CFR 50.47, “Emergency Plans,” and Appendix E, “Emergency 

Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities,” to 10 CFR Part 50 

continue to apply to a nuclear power reactor after permanent cessation of operations and 

removal of fuel from the reactor vessel. There are no explicit regulatory provisions 

distinguishing EP requirements for a power reactor that has been shut down from those for an 

operating power reactor. 

CONTACTS: Michael Norris, NSIR/DPR 

 (301) 287-3754 

POLICY ISSUE
The Commissioners - 2 -

To modify their emergency plans to reflect the risk commensurate with power reactors that have 

been permanently shut down, power reactor licensees transitioning to decommissioning must 

seek exemptions from certain EP regulatory requirements before amending these plans. 

The staff has reviewed the technical basis for DEF’s requested exemptions and is 

recommending the Commission approve the staff’s proposal to grant the requested EP 

exemptions, as detailed in the enclosure. 

BACKGROUND: 

The regulations in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) provide that the NRC may, on application by a 

licensee or on its own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of the regulations in 

circumstances in which application of the regulation would not serve the underlying purpose of 

the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule1

. The risk of an offsite 

radiological release is significantly lower, and the types of possible accidents are significantly 

fewer, at a nuclear power reactor that has permanently ceased operations and removed fuel 

from the reactor vessel than at an operating power reactor. 

On this basis, the NRC has previously granted similar exemptions from EP requirements for 12 

permanently shut down and defueled power reactor licensees. The staff provided an exemption 

request for the Kewaunee Power Station to the Commission in SECY-14-0066 (Agencywide 

Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML14072A257), which 

was approved by the Commission in the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) to SECY-14-

0066 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14219A366). Before the Kewaunee Power Station, the last 

approved exemptions that eliminated the requirements for formal offsite radiological EP were for 

the Zion facility in 1999 (ADAMS Legacy Accession No. 9908260192). The underlying technical 

basis for the approval of the Zion facility exemptions was based on demonstrating that the 

radiological consequences of design-basis accidents (DBAs) would not exceed the limits of the 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) Protective Action Guides (PAGs) at the 

exclusion area boundary and that the spent fuel stored in the spent fuel pool (SFP) would not 

reach the zirconium ignition temperature in fewer than 10 hours based on analysis that assumes 

no water or air cooling of the fuel. The staff concluded that if 10 hours was available to initiate 

mitigative actions or, if needed, offsite protective actions using a comprehensive emergency 

management plan (CEMP)2

 formal offsite radiological emergency plans are not necessary for 

permanently defueled nuclear power reactor licensees. In addition to CR-3, San Onofre 

Nuclear Generating Station and Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station have also applied for 

exemptions from certain EP requirements. The exemption requests by CR-3, as described in 

 

1 Notwithstanding the special circumstances of the exemption request, 10 CFR 50.12(a)(1) requires that the 

exemption must be authorized by law, not present an undue risk to the public health and safety, and be consistent 

with the common defense and security. 

2 A CEMP, in this context, also referred to as an emergency operations plan (EOP), is addressed in the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101, “Developing and 

Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans.” CPG 101 is the foundation for State, territorial, Tribal, and local EP in the 

United States. It promotes a common understanding of the fundamentals of risk-informed planning and 

decisionmaking and helps planners at all levels of government in their efforts to develop and maintain viable, allhazards, all-threats emergency plans. An EOP is flexible enough for use in all emergencies. It describes how people 

and property will be protected; details who is responsible for carrying out specific actions; identifies the personnel, 

equipment, facilities, supplies and other resources available; and outlines how all actions will be coordinated. A 

CEMP is often referred to as a synonym for “all hazards planning.” 
The Commissioners - 3 - 

this paper, are consistent with those approved by the Commission in the SRM to SECY-14-

0066. 

The NRC requires a level of licensee EP commensurate with the potential consequences to 

public health and safety and common defense and security at the licensee’s site. Under the 

current safety analysis in NUREG-1738, “Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at 

Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants” (ADAMS Accession No. ML010430066), the event 

sequences important to risk at a decommissioning power reactor are limited to a large 

earthquake and cask-drop events. This is an important difference relative to an operating power 

reactor where typically a large number of different initiating events make significant contributions 

to risk. Additionally, physical security for special nuclear material at fixed sites, including 

decommissioning power reactors, is required by 10 CFR Part 73, “Physical Protection of Plants 

and Materials.” Decommissioning power reactor licensees are required by 10 CFR 73.55(f) to 

develop target sets for use in the development and implementation of security strategies that 

protect against spent fuel sabotage. While both operating and decommissioning power reactors 

are required to develop target sets, the number of target sets at a decommissioning reactor is 

significantly reduced. Implementation of the protective strategy at a decommissioning reactor 

takes into account this reduction in target sets. With the significant reduction in radiological risk 

for a power reactor undergoing decommissioning, the NRC has historically approved 

exemptions to EP and security requirements based on site-specific evaluations and the 

objectives of the regulations. 

The NRC prepared NUREG-1738 to provide a technical basis for SECY-00-0145, “Integrated 

Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power Plant Decommissioning” (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML003721626). The proposed rulemaking was later deferred in light of higher priority work after 

the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Nonetheless, NUREG-1738 provides insights that 

the staff continues to find helpful for the evaluation of exemption requests regarding 

EP requirements. Specifically, NUREG-1738 identified a zirconium fire resulting from a 

substantial loss-of-water inventory in the SFP as the only postulated scenario at a 

decommissioning power reactor that, while highly unlikely, might result in a significant offsite 

release. 

Previously granted exemptions from EP regulations reduced EP requirements for 

decommissioning power reactors to those consistent with the standards of: (1) 10 CFR 50.47(d), 

which states the requirements for a license authorizing fuel loading and low power testing only; 

and (2) 10 CFR 72.32(a), which establishes the information required in an emergency plan for 

an independent spent fuel storage installation. Examples of previously granted exemptions 

from EP regulations for decommissioning power reactors include: setting the highest 

emergency plan classification as an “Alert”; extending the timing requirements for notification of 

offsite authorities; requiring only onsite exercises with the opportunity for offsite response 

organization participation; and only maintaining arrangements for offsite response organizations 

(i.e., law enforcement, fire and medical services) that may respond to onsite emergencies. The 

existence of formal offsite radiological emergency plans is no longer a binding requirement on 

the licensee. 

While the staff considers the exemptions from certain EP requirements, as requested by DEF 

and described above, to be reasonable for a power reactor that has been permanently shut 

down and defueled, the resulting set of EP requirements could be viewed as a reduction in 

effectiveness when compared to the operating reactor emergency plan currently in effect at 
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CR-3. In the SRM to SECY-08-0024, “Delegation of Commission Authority to Staff to Approve 

or Deny Emergency Plan Changes That Represent a Decrease in Effectiveness,” dated 

May 19, 2008 (ADAMS Accession No. ML081400510), the Commission directed that the staff 

should request Commission approval for any reduction in effectiveness of a licensee’s 

emergency plan that requires an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 

Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. In a manner consistent with the SRM’s direction, this paper 

seeks Commission approval for the staff to process and grant, as appropriate, DEF’s requested 

exemptions from the EP requirements as detailed in the enclosure, which provides a summary 

of DEF’s exemption request and a brief description of the staff’s basis for recommending 

approval. 

DISCUSSION: 

DEF is the holder of Operating License No. DPR-72, issued under the Atomic Energy Act of 

1954, as amended, and 10 CFR Part 50, which authorizes the licensee to possess and store 

spent nuclear fuel and greater-than-class C radioactive waste at the CR-3 facility, which has 

been permanently shut down and defueled. On September 26, 2009, the CR-3 reactor 

permanently ceased power generation. All fuel assemblies were removed from the reactor 

vessel and placed in the SFP on May 28, 2011. 

By letter dated February 20, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13056A005), DEF submitted 

certifications to the NRC of permanent cessation of power operations at CR-3 and that fuel has 

been permanently removed from the CR-3 reactor vessel, under 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and 10 

CFR 50.82(a)(1)(ii). Upon docketing of these certifications, the 10 CFR Part 50 license for CR-3 

no longer authorized operation of the reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel into the reactor 

vessel, as specified in 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). 

By letter dated September 26, 2013, “Request for Exemption to Certain Radiological Emergency 

Response Plan Requirements Defined by 10 CFR 50” (ADAMS Accession No. ML13274A584), 

DEF requested exemptions from specific EP requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 for CR-3. The 

staff issued a request for additional information (RAI) in an e-mail dated February 20, 2014 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML14118A287). In a letter dated March 28, 2014 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML14098A072), DEF provided a response to the RAI. The exemptions requested by DEF 

and the staff’s review are detailed in the enclosure. 

The staff also sent RAIs for an associated proposed change to technical specifications, 

specifically in reference to the license condition for 10 CFR 50.54(h)(h) mitigation strategies, in 

an e-mail dated April 10, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14114A279). In a letter dated May 7, 

2014, DEF provided a response to those RAIs (ADAMS Accession No. ML14139A006), which 

contained information applicable to the SFP inventory makeup strategies for mitigating the lossof-water inventory. In an e-mail, also dated April 10, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML14113A363), the staff delivered RAIs in reference to the proposed permanently defueled 

emergency plan and emergency action level scheme change. In a letter dated May 23, 2014 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML14154A408), DEF provided responses to those RAIs. The 

information provided by DEF included justifications for each exemption requested. The staff 

found the application complete and the licensee’s associated technical justification provides a 

basis for the Commission’s consideration of the requested exemption. 

In Enclosure 6 to the September 26, 2013, letter, “Crystal River Unit 3 – License Amendment 
The Commissioners - 5 - 

Request #315, Revision 0, Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level 

Scheme, and Request for Exemption to Certain Radiological Emergency Response Plan 

Requirements Defined by 10 CFR 50” (ADAMS Accession No. ML13274A584), DEF provided 

the accident analyses associated with DBAs and beyond DBAs as a basis for justifying the 

request for approval of the CR-3 Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan. DEF’s exemption 

request included radiological analyses to show that the radiological consequences of DBAs will 

not exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. Additionally, DEF 

performed analyses for beyond DBA loss-of-coolant inventory events for the SFP. These 

analyses show that for events in which the SFP is drained, air cooling will currently prevent the 

fuel from reaching the lowest temperature at which incipient cladding failure may occur (565 

degrees Celsius (C)). 

In the unlikely event that air cooling is not possible, 19.7 hours is available, from the time the 

fuel is uncovered until it reaches a temperature of 900 degrees C, to initiate mitigative actions 

consistent with plant conditions and, if necessary, for offsite authorities to employ their CEMP to 

take protective actions. In addition, significant decay of short-lived radionuclides has occurred 

since the September 2009 shutdown. As indicated by the results of research conducted for 

NUREG-1738 and more recently NUREG-2161, “Consequence Study of a Beyond-DesignBasis Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I Boiling Water Reactor” 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML14255A365), while other consequences can be extensive, accidents 

from SFPs with significant decay time have little potential to cause offsite early fatalities. 

As noted above, DEF furnished information in its exemption request concerning its SFP 

inventory makeup strategies. Several sources of makeup to the pool are available, such as the 

fire service system, using the diesel driven fire service pump for loss of electrical power. If 

available fresh water sources are depleted, salt water sources with inexhaustible inventory from 

the CR-3 intake and discharge canal, using portable diesel powered pumps, is available. Pool 

inventory addition can be implemented without accessing the elevation of the pool deck. In a 

letter dated May 7, 2014, “Crystal River Unit 3 - Response to Requests for Additional 

Information and Supplement 1 to License Amendment Request #316, Revision 0” (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML14139A006), DEF withdrew its request to remove License Condition 2.C.(14), 

“Mitigation Strategy License Condition”, from its Facility Operating License. This license 

condition requires CR-3 to maintain its SFP inventory makeup strategies as discussed above. 

In the unlikely situation that a radiological release is expected, elements of the revised 

emergency plan would facilitate the ability of offsite authorities to take protective actions under a 

CEMP. The licensee must still maintain an ability to determine if a radiological release is 

occurring, and if a release is occurring or expected to occur, promptly communicate that 

information to offsite authorities. The licensee staff uses the State Hot Ring Down (SHRD) 

telephone system to notify the State Watch Office, who will assume the responsibility for 

notifying the State Emergency Management Department and County agencies of a declared 

emergency. The Florida Nuclear Plant Emergency Notification Form was developed to facilitate 

timely notifications, and contains information that identifies the station, date and time of the 

event, emergency classification, emergency action level, weather data, release 

status/significance and SFP status. 

The staff reviewed DEF’s exemption request against the requirements in 10 CFR 50.47, 

Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, and 10 CFR 72.32, “Emergency Plan.” The review considered 

the status of the facility, which is permanently shut down and defueled, and the low likelihood of 
The Commissioners - 6 - 

any credible accident resulting in radiological releases requiring offsite protective measures. 

The staff based its evaluation of the DEF request for exemptions from EP requirements on 

site-specific analyses provided. The staff verified DEF’s analyses and its calculations. The 

analysis provides reasonable assurance that in granting the requested exemption to DEF: 

(1) an offsite radiological release will not exceed the EPA PAGs at the site boundary for a DBA; 

and (2) in the unlikely event of a beyond DBA resulting in a loss of all SFP cooling, there is 

sufficient time to initiate appropriate mitigating actions; and if a release is projected to occur, 

there is sufficient time for offsite agencies to take protective actions using a CEMP to protect the 

health and safety of the public. 

Consistent with the June 17, 1993, memorandum of understanding between the NRC and the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), contained in Appendix A to 44 CFR 353, the 

staff has discussed and coordinated our review of requests for exemptions to EP regulations 

with FEMA. As part of the staff’s evaluation of the recent EP exemption request for the 

Kewaunee Power Station, the staff provided FEMA with a copy of SECY-14-0066 and the 

opportunity to ask questions, obtain clarification, and comment on the paper prior to the 

Commission receiving it for review. FEMA provided the following comments in response to the 

EP exemption proposed in SECY-14-0066: 

FEMA is not taking a position on the technical arguments presented by the licensee or 

the NRC’s assessments. FEMA recognizes the NRC’s role to analyze the possibility of 

incidents that could result in offsite dose impacts. FEMA acknowledges that individual 

states and local governments have the primary authority and responsibility to protect 

their citizens and respond to disasters and emergencies. The exemption, if issued, 

could create a transitional environment for off-site emergency planners in how they 

consider radiological hazards. FEMA will continue to support offsite organizations as 

they adjust their plans, capabilities, and resources to the changing radiological threat. 

Among the resources available to support FEMA stakeholders during the transition 

process include, but are not limited to, the National Preparedness System guidance 

materials, the Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee, and 

assistance from FEMA Headquarters and Regional Staff. 

The NRC staff considered FEMA’s comments as part of SECY-14-0066 and believes that the 

technical and safety basis for the exemption demonstrates reasonable assurance in the two 

areas mentioned above. 

The staff offered FEMA an opportunity to review a copy of this paper prior to the Commission 

receiving it for review. FEMA advised the staff that their review was not necessary since the 

evaluation of the CR-3 EP exemption request was consistent with that used in SECY-14-0066 

for Kewaunee. As such, FEMA’s comments as described above for Kewaunee are applicable to 

CR-3. 

The decommissioning facility, at the time the exemption is granted, would pose significantly less 

of a radiological risk to public health and safety than an operating power reactor, which should 

result in a straightforward transition to a more streamlined CEMP. Aspects of existing offsite 

radiological emergency preparedness plans may remain in place, at the State’s discretion, prior 

to completion of any adjustments to State and local CEMPs that are appropriate for the reduced 

radiological risk and can be adopted to minimize burden on the State and local governments. 

DEF will still be required to maintain an onsite emergency plan, which would provide for the 
The Commissioners - 7 - 

notification of, and coordination with, offsite organizations commensurate with the approved 

exemptions. 

The staff’s exemption recommendation, if approved by the Commission, would not affect the 

authority that FEMA has under its regulations in 44 CFR Chapter I for overall emergency 

management and assistance to State and local response organizations, nor would it affect the 

responsibilities of State and local governments to establish and maintain CEMPs. The NRC 

would base its finding of reasonable assurance on its review of licensee onsite emergency 

preparedness and would not require a finding from FEMA on the adequacy of State and local 

CEMPs. Under its role as described in the National Response Framework, the NRC remains 

ready to support FEMA by providing it and State and local governments technical advice related 

to the safety and security of operations at the plant. 

In the September 26, 2013, letter referenced above, DEF also requested a license amendment 

to approve its emergency plan implementing changes that reflect the permanently shut down 

and defueled status of CR-3. The revised emergency plan also includes changes consistent 

with the proposed exemptions discussed in this paper. The staff is awaiting a decision on this 

paper before issuing a decision on the amendment request. 

CONCLUSION: 

The NRC staff concludes that granting the exemption request, as provided in the enclosure, 

would provide: (1) an adequate basis for an acceptable state of emergency preparedness; and 

(2) in conjunction with arrangements made with offsite response agencies, reasonable 

assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a 

radiological emergency at CR-3. 

 

The NRC has determined that pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12,”Specific Exemptions,” the exemptions 

described in the enclosure are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the public 

health and safety, and will be consistent with the common defense and security, and special 

circumstances are present. 
The Commissioners - 8 - 

RECOMMENDATION: 

The exemption request is consistent with previously granted exemptions and SECY-14-0066 for 

the Kewaunee Power Station, and is commensurate with the risk associated with the facility. 

The changes in regulatory requirements are appropriate because the traditional accident 

sequences that dominate operating reactor risk are no longer applicable. Continued application 

of the regulation to the licensee, to maintain its current level of EP, is not necessary to achieve 

the underlying purpose of the regulation. Therefore, the staff recommends that the 

Commission: 

Approve: The staff’s proposal to grant DEF’s requested EP exemptions from 

certain requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 

consistent with the discussion above. 

COORDINATION: 

The Office of the General Counsel reviewed this paper and has no legal objection. The Office 

of the Chief Financial Officer reviewed this paper for resource implications and has no objection. 

 /RA/ 

Mark A. Satorius 

Executive Director 

 for Operations 

Enclosure: 

Exemptions to Rule Language
The Commissioners - 8 - 

RECOMMENDATION:

The exemption request is consistent with previously granted exemptions and SECY-14-0066 for 

the Kewaunee Power Station, and is commensurate with the risk associated with the facility. 

The changes in regulatory requirements are appropriate because the traditional accident 

sequences that dominate operating reactor risk are no longer applicable. Continued application 

of the regulation to the licensee, to maintain its current level of EP, is not necessary to achieve 

the underlying purpose of the regulation. Therefore, the staff recommends that the 

Commission: 

Approve: The staff’s proposal to grant DEF’s requested EP exemptions from certain 

requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 consistent with the 

discussion above. 

COORDINATION: 

The Office of the General Counsel reviewed this paper and has no legal objection. 

 /RA/ 

Mark A. Satorius 

Executive Director 

 for Operations 

Enclosure: 

Exemptions to Rule Language 

ADAMS ACCESSION No.: ML14219A444 * via email 

OFFICE: DD:NSIR/DPR D:NSIR/DPR RI RII OGC NSIR/DPR 

NAME: JAndersen RLewis MFerdas* BBonser* HBenowitz* JWiggins 

DATE: 08/ 19 /14 08/ 19 /14 09/ 05 /14 09/ 05 /14 09/ 30 /14 10/14/14 

OFFICE: RES FSME NRR Tech Editor EDO 

NAME: BSheron* BHolian* JUhle* JDougherty* MSatorius 

Date 09/0/14 09/04/14 09/05/14 09/22/14 10/29/14 

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
Exemptions to Rule Language 

Strikethrough text indicates requested exemptions to rule language.

Enclosure 

10 CFR 50.47 Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

(b) The onsite and, except as provided in 

paragraph (d) of this section, offsite

emergency response plans for nuclear 

power reactors must meet the following 

standards: 

In the Statement of Considerations (SOC) for the 

final rule for emergency planning (EP) 

requirements for independent spent fuel storage 

installations (ISFSIs) and for monitor retrievable 

storage (MRS) facilities (60 FR [Federal Register] 

32430; June 22, 1995), the Commission 

responded to comments concerning offsite EP for 

ISFSIs or an MRS and concluded that, “the offsite 

consequences of potential accidents at an ISFSI 

or an MRS would not warrant establishing 

Emergency Planning Zones [EPZs].” In a nuclear 

power reactor’s permanently defueled state, the 

accident risks are more similar to an ISFSI than 

an operating nuclear power plant. The EP 

program would be similar to that required for an 

ISFSI under Section 72.32(a) of Title 10 of the 

Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) when fuel 

stored in the spent fuel pool (SFP) and would not 

change substantially when all the fuel is 

transferred from the SFP to an onsite ISFSI. 

Exemptions from offsite EP requirements have 

previously been approved when the site-specific 

analyses show that at least 10 hours is available 

from a partial drain-down event where cooling of 

the spent fuel is not effective until the hottest fuel 

assembly reaches 900°C. The technical basis 

that underlied the approval of the exemption 

request is based partly on the analysis of a time 

period that spent fuel stored in the SFP is unlikely 

to reach the zirconium ignition temperature in less 

than 10 hours. This time period is based on a 

heat-up calculation which uses several simplifying 

assumptions. Some of these assumptions are 

conservative (adiabatic conditions), while others 

are non-conservative (no oxidation below 900°C). 

Weighing the conservatisms and nonconservatisms, the staff judges that this 

calculation reasonably represents conditions 

which may occur in the event of an SFP accident. 
2 

10 CFR 50.47 Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

The staff concluded that if 10 hours is available 

to initiate mitigative actions or, if needed, offsite 

protective actions using a comprehensive 

emergency management plan (CEMP), formal 

offsite radiological emergency plans are not 

necessary for these permanently defueled 

nuclear power reactor licensees. 

As supported by the licensee’s SFP analysis, the 

staff believes an exemption to the requirements 

for formal offsite radiological emergency plans is 

justified for a zirconium fire scenario considering 

the low likelihood of this event together with time 

available to take mitigative or protective actions 

between the initiating event and before the onset 

of a postulated fire. 

The Duke Energy Florida (DEF) analysis has 

demonstrated that due to the considerable time 

since shutdown, approximately 4 years, the 

radiological consequences of design-basis 

accidents will not exceed the limits of the U.S. 

Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) 

Protective Action Guides (PAGs) at the exclusion 

area boundary. These analyses also show that, 

for beyond design basis events where the SFP is 

drained, air cooling will prevent the fuel from 

reaching the lowest temperature where incipient 

cladding failure may occur (565°C). In the event 

that air cooling is not possible, 19.7 hours is 

available to take mitigative or, if needed, offsite 

protective actions using a CEMP from the time 

the fuel is uncovered until it reaches the autoignition temperature of 900°C. 

DEF has also furnished information on its SFP 

inventory makeup strategies for mitigating the 

loss of water inventory. Several sources of 

makeup to the pools are available, such as the 

fire service system, using the diesel driven fire 

service pump for loss of electrical power. If 

available fresh water sources are depleted, salt 

water sources with inexhaustible inventory from 

the Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) intake and 

discharge canal, using portable diesel powered 

pumps are available. 
3 

10 CFR 50.47 Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

 Pool inventory addition can be implemented 

without accessing the elevation of the pool deck. 

In a letter dated May 7, 2014, “Crystal River 

Unit 3 - Response to Requests for Additional 

Information and Supplement 1 to License 

Amendment Request #316, Revision 0” (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML14139A006), DEF withdrew its 

request to remove License Condition 2.C.(14), 

“Mitigation Strategy License Condition,” from its 

Facility Operating License. This license condition 

requires CR-3 to maintain its SFP inventory 

makeup strategies as discussed above 

(1) Primary responsibilities for emergency 

response by the nuclear facility licensee 

and by State and local organizations 

within the Emergency Planning Zones

have been assigned, the emergency 

responsibilities of the various supporting 

organizations have been specifically 

established, and each principal response 

organization has staff to respond and to 

augment its initial response on a 

continuous basis. 

Refer to basis for 50.47(b). 

(3) Arrangements for requesting and 

effectively using assistance resources 

have been made, arrangements to 

accommodate State and local staff at the 

licensee’s Emergency Operations Facility 

have been made, and other organizations 

capable of augmenting the planned 

response have been identified. 

Decommissioning power reactors present a low 

likelihood of any credible accident resulting in a 

radiological release together with the time 

available to take mitigative or, if needed, offsite 

protective actions using a CEMP between the 

initiating event and before the onset of a 

postulated fire. As such, an emergency 

operations facility would not be required. The 

“nuclear island,” control room, or other onsite 

location can provide for the communication and 

coordination with offsite organizations for the 

level of support required. 

Also refer to basis for 50.47(b). 
4 

10 CFR 50.47 Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

(4) A standard emergency classification 

and action level scheme, the basis of 

which include facility system and effluent 

parameters, is in use by the nuclear 

facility licensee, and State and local 

response plans call for reliance on 

information provided by facility licensees 

for determinations of minimum initial

offsite response measures. 

Decommissioning power reactors present a low 

likelihood of any credible accident resulting in a 

radiological release together with the time 

available to take mitigative or, if needed, offsite 

protective actions using a CEMP between the 

initiating event and before the onset of a 

postulated fire. As such, formal offsite 

radiological emergency response plans are not 

required. 

The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) document 

NEI 99-01, “Development of Emergency Action 

Levels for Non-Passive Reactors” (Revision 6), 

was found to be an acceptable method for 

development of emergency action levels (EALs) 

and was endorsed by the U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC) in a letter dated 

March 28, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML12346A463). NEI 99-01 provides EALs for 

non-passive operating nuclear power reactors, 

permanently defueled reactors and ISFSIs. 

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 

(5) Procedures have been established for 

notification, by the licensee, of State and 

local response organizations and for 

notification of emergency personnel by all 

organizations; the content of initial and 

follow up messages to response 

organizations and the public has been 

established; and means to provide early 

notification and clear instruction to the 

populace within the plume exposure 

pathway Emergency Planning Zone have 

been established. 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 

(6) Provisions exist for prompt 

communications among principal 

response organizations to emergency 

personnel and to the public. 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 
5 

10 CFR 50.47 Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

(7) Information is made available to the 

public on a periodic basis on how they will 

be notified and what their initial actions 

should be in an emergency (e.g., listening 

to a local broadcast station and remaining 

indoors), [T]he principal points of contact 

with the news media for dissemination of 

information during an emergency 

(including the physical location or 

locations) are established in advance, and 

procedures for coordinated dissemination 

of information to the public are 

established. 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 

(9) Adequate methods, systems, and 

equipment for assessing and monitoring 

actual or potential offsite consequences of 

a radiological emergency condition are in 

use. 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 

(10) A range of protective actions has 

been developed for the plume exposure 

pathway EPZ for emergency workers and 

the public. In developing this range of 

actions, consideration has been given to 

evacuation, sheltering, and, as a 

supplement to these, the prophylactic use 

of potassium iodide (KI), as appropriate. 

Evacuation time estimates have been 

developed by applicants and licensees. 

Licensees shall update the evacuation 

time estimates on a periodic basis. 

Guidelines for the choice of protective 

actions during an emergency, consistent 

with Federal guidance, are developed and 

in place, and protective actions for the 

ingestion exposure pathway EPZ 

appropriate to the locale have been 

developed.

In the unlikely event of an SFP accident, the 

iodine isotopes, which contribute to an off-site 

dose from an operating reactor accident, are not 

present, so potassium iodide distribution would 

no longer serve as an effective or necessary 

supplemental protective action. 

The Commission responded to comments in its 

SOC for the final rule for EP requirements for 

ISFSIs and MRS facilities (60 FR 32435), and 

concluded that, “the offsite consequences of 

potential accidents at an ISFSI or an MRS would 

not warrant establishing emergency planning 

zones.” Additionally, in the SOC for the final rule 

for EP requirements for ISFSIs and for MRS 

facilities (60 FR 32430), the Commission 

responded to comments concerning site-specific 

EP that includes evacuation of surrounding 

population for an ISFSI not at a reactor site, and 

concluded that, “The Commission does not agree 

that as a general matter emergency plans for an 

ISFSI must include evacuation planning.” 

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 
6 

10 CFR 50.47 Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

(c)(2) Generally, the plume exposure 

pathway EPZ for nuclear power plants 

shall consist of an area about 10 miles 

(16 km) in radius and the ingestion 

pathway EPZ shall consist of an area 

about 50 miles (80 km) in radius. The 

exact size and configuration of the EPZs 

surrounding a particular nuclear power 

reactor shall be determined in relation to 

local emergency response needs and 

capabilities as they are affected by such 

conditions as demography, topography, 

land characteristics, access routes, and 

jurisdictional boundaries. The size of the 

EPZs also may be determined on a caseby-case basis for gas-cooled nuclear 

reactors and for reactors with an 

authorized power level less than 250 MW 

thermal. The plans for the ingestion 

pathway shall focus on such actions as 

are appropriate to protect the food 

ingestion pathway.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). 
7

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

1. The applicant's emergency plans shall 

contain, but not necessarily be limited to, 

information needed to demonstrate 

compliance with the elements set forth 

below, i.e., organization for coping with 

radiological emergencies, assessment 

actions, activation of emergency 

organization, notification procedures, 

emergency facilities and equipment, 

training, maintaining emergency 

preparedness, and recovery, and onsite 

protective actions during hostile action. In 

addition, the emergency response plans 

submitted by an applicant for a nuclear 

power reactor operating license under this 

Part, or for an early site permit (as 

applicable) or combined license under 

10 CFR Part 52, shall contain information 

needed to demonstrate compliance with 

the standards described in § 50.47(b), 

and they will be evaluated against those 

standards. 

The EP rule published in the Federal Register 

(76 FR 72560; November 23, 2011) amended 

certain requirements in 10 CFR Part 50. Among 

the changes, the definition of “hostile action” was 

added as an act directed toward a nuclear power 

plant or its personnel. This definition is based on 

the definition of “hostile action” provided in NRC 

Bulletin 2005-02, “Emergency Preparedness and 

Response Actions for Security-Based Events.” 

NRC Bulletin 2005-02 was not applicable to 

nuclear power reactors that had permanently 

ceased operations and had certified that fuel has 

been removed from the reactor vessel. 

The NRC excluded non-power reactors from the 

definition of "hostile action" at the time of the 

rulemaking because, as defined in 10 CFR 50.2, a 

non-power reactor is not considered a nuclear 

power reactor and a regulatory basis had not been 

developed to support the inclusion of non-power 

reactors in the definition of "hostile action." 

Similarly, a decommissioning power reactor or 

ISFSI is not a “nuclear reactor” as defined in the 

NRC’s regulations. A decommissioning power 

reactor also has a low likelihood of a credible 

accident resulting in radiological releases requiring 

offsite protective measures. For all of these 

reasons, the staff concludes that a 

decommissioning power reactor is not a facility that 

falls within the definition of “hostile action.” 

Similarly, for security, risk insights can be used to 

determine which targets are important to protect 

against sabotage. A level of security 

commensurate with the consequences of a 

sabotage event is required and is evaluated on a 

site-specific basis. The severity of the 

consequences declines as fuel ages and, thereby, 

removes over time the underlying concern that a 

sabotage attack could cause offsite radiological 

consequences. 

Although this analysis provides a justification for 

exempting CR-3 from “hostile action” related 

requirements, some EP requirements for securitybased events are maintained. The classification of 
8

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

security-based events, notification of offsite 

authorities and coordination with offsite agencies 

under a CEMP concept are still required. 

2. This nuclear power reactor license 

applicant shall also provide an analysis of 

the time required to evacuate various 

sectors and distances within the plume 

exposure pathway EPZ for transient and 

permanent populations, using the most 

recent U.S. Census Bureau data as of the 

date the applicant submits its application 

to the NRC.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). 

 

3. Nuclear power reactor licensees shall 

use NRC approved evacuation time 

estimates (ETEs) and updates to the 

ETEs in the formulation of protective 

action recommendations and shall provide 

the ETEs and ETE updates to State and 

local governmental authorities for use in 

developing offsite protective action 

strategies.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.2. 

4. Within 365 days of the later of the date 

of the availability of the most recent 

decennial census data from the U.S. 

Census Bureau or December 23, 2011, 

nuclear power reactor licensees shall 

develop an ETE analysis using this 

decennial data and submit it under § 50.4 

to the NRC. These licensees shall submit 

this ETE analysis to the NRC at least 

180 days before using it to form protective 

action recommendations and providing it 

to State and local governmental 

authorities for use in developing offsite 

protective action strategies

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.2. 

5. During the years between decennial 

censuses, nuclear power reactor 

licensees shall estimate EPZ permanent 

resident population changes once a year, 

but no later than 365 days from the date 

of the previous estimate, using the most 

recent U.S. Census Bureau annual 

resident population estimate and 

State/local government population data, if 

available. These licensees shall maintain 

these estimates so that they are available 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.2. 
9

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

for NRC inspection during the period 

between decennial censuses and shall 

submit these estimates to the NRC with 

any updated ETE analysis.

6. If at any time during the decennial 

period, the EPZ permanent resident 

population increases such that it causes 

the longest ETE value for the 2-mile zone 

or 5-mile zone, including all affected 

Emergency Response Planning Areas, or 

for the entire 10-mile EPZ to increase by 

25 percent or 30 minutes, whichever is 

less, from the nuclear power reactor 

licensee's currently NRC approved or 

updated ETE, the licensee shall update 

the ETE analysis to reflect the impact of 

that population increase. The licensee 

shall submit the updated ETE analysis to 

the NRC under § 50.4 no later than 365 

days after the licensee's determination 

that the criteria for updating the ETE have 

been met and at least 180 days before 

using it to form protective action 

recommendations and providing it to State 

and local governmental authorities for use 

in developing offsite protective action 

strategies. 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.2. 

A.1. A description of the normal plant 

operating organization. 

 

Based on the permanently shut down and defueled 

status of the reactor, a decommissioning reactor is 

not authorized to operate under 10 CFR 50.82(a). 

Because the licensee cannot operate the reactor, 

the licensee does not have a “plant operating 

organization.” 

A.3. A description, by position and 

function to be performed, of the licensee's 

headquarters personnel who will be sent 

to the plant site to augment the onsite 

emergency organization.

The number of staff at decommissioning sites is 

generally small but is commensurate with the need 

to safely store spent fuel at the facility in a manner 

that is protective of public health and safety. 

Decommissioning sites typically have a level of 

emergency response that does not require 

response by the licensee’s headquarters 

personnel. 

A. 4. Identification, by position and 

function to be performed, of persons 

within the licensee organization who will 

be responsible for making offsite dose 

projections, and a description of how 

Although the likelihood of events that would result 

in doses in excess of the EPA PAGs to the public 

beyond the owner controlled area boundary based 

on the permanently shut down and defueled status 

of the reactor is extremely low, the licensee still 
10

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

these projections will be made and the 

results transmitted to State and local 

authorities, NRC, and other appropriate 

governmental entities. 

must be able to determine if a radiological release 

is occurring. If a release is occurring, then the 

licensee staff should promptly communicate that 

information to offsite authorities for their 

consideration. The offsite organizations are 

responsible for deciding what, if any, protective 

actions should be taken based on comprehensive 

EP. 

A. 5. Identification, by position and 

function to be performed, of other 

employees of the licensee with special 

qualifications for coping with emergency 

conditions that may arise. Other persons 

with special qualifications, such as 

consultants, who are not employees of the 

licensee and who may be called upon for 

assistance for emergencies shall also be 

identified. The special qualifications of 

these persons shall be described.

The number of staff at decommissioning sites is 

generally small but should be commensurate with 

the need to operate the facility in a manner that is 

protective of public health and safety. 

A.7. By June 23, 2014, identification of, 

and a description of the assistance 

expected from, appropriate State, local, 

and Federal agencies with responsibilities 

for coping with emergencies, including 

hostile action at the site. For purposes of 

this appendix, “hostile action” is defined 

as an act directed toward a nuclear power 

plant or its personnel that include the use 

of violent force to destroy equipment, take 

hostages, and/or intimidate the licensee to 

achieve an end. This includes attack by 

air, land, or water using guns, explosives, 

projectiles, vehicles, or other devices 

used to deliver destructive force. 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.1. 

A.8. Identification of the State and/or local 

officials responsible for planning for, 

ordering and controlling appropriate 

protective actions, including evacuations 

when necessary.

Offsite emergency measures are limited to support 

provided by local police, fire departments, and 

ambulance and hospital services, as appropriate. 

Due to the low probability of design-basis accidents 

or other credible events to exceed the EPA PAGs, 

protective actions such as evacuation should not 

be required, but could be implemented at the 

discretion of offsite authorities using a CEMP. 

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). 
11

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

A.9. By December 24, 2012, for nuclear 

power reactor licensees, a detailed 

analysis demonstrating that on-shift 

personnel assigned emergency plan 

implementation functions are not assigned 

responsibilities that would prevent the 

timely performance of their assigned 

functions as specified in the emergency 

plan.

Responsibilities should be well defined in the 

emergency plan and procedures, regularly tested 

through drills and exercises audited and inspected 

by the licensee and the NRC. The duties of the 

onshift personnel at a decommissioning reactor 

facility are not as complicated and diverse as those 

for an operating power reactor. 

The staff considered the similarity between the 

staffing levels at a permanently shut down and 

defueled reactor and staffing levels at an operating 

power reactor site. The minimal systems and 

equipment needed to maintain the spent nuclear 

fuel in the SFP or in a dry cask storage system in a 

safe condition requires minimal personnel and is 

governed by Technical Specifications. In the EP 

final rule published in the Federal Register 

(76 FR 72560; November 23, 2011), the NRC 

concluded that the staffing analysis requirement 

was not necessary for non-power reactor licensees 

due to the small staffing levels required to operate 

the facility. 

The staff also examined the actions required to 

mitigate the very low probability design-basis 

events for the SFP. Several sources of makeup to 

the pools are available, such as the fire service 

system, using the diesel driven fire service pump 

for loss of electrical power. If available fresh water 

sources are depleted, salt water sources with 

inexhaustible inventory from the CR-3 intake and 

discharge canal, using portable diesel powered 

pumps are available. Pool inventory addition can 

be implemented without accessing the elevation of 

the pool deck. DEF believes these diverse 

strategies provide defense-in-depth and ample 

time to provide makeup or spray to the SFP prior to 

the onset of zirconium cladding ignition when 

considering very low probability beyond designbasis events affecting the SFP. In a letter dated 

May 7, 2014, “Crystal River Unit 3 - Response to 

Requests for Additional Information and 

Supplement 1 to License Amendment Request 

#316, Revision 0” (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML14139A006), DEF withdrew its request to 

remove License Condition 2.C.(14), “Mitigation 
12

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

Strategy License Condition,” from its Facility 

Operating License. This license condition requires 

CR-3 to maintain its SFP inventory makeup 

strategies as discussed above. 

B.1. The means to be used for 

determining the magnitude of, and for 

continually assessing the impact of, the 

release of radioactive materials shall be 

described, including emergency action 

levels that are to be used as criteria for 

determining the need for notification and 

participation of local and State agencies, 

the Commission, and other Federal 

agencies, and the emergency action 

levels that are to be used for determining 

when and what type of protective 

measures should be considered within 

and outside the site boundary to protect 

health and safety. The emergency action 

levels shall be based on in-plant 

conditions and instrumentation in addition 

to onsite and offsite monitoring. By June 

20, 2012, for nuclear power reactor 

licensees, these action levels must 

include hostile action that may adversely 

affect the nuclear power plant. The initial 

emergency action levels shall be 

discussed and agreed on by the applicant 

or licensee and State and local 

governmental authorities, and approved 

by the NRC. Thereafter, emergency 

action levels shall be reviewed with the 

State and local governmental authorities 

on an annual basis. 

NEI 99-01 was found to be an acceptable method 

for development of EALs. No offsite protective 

actions are anticipated to be necessary, so 

classification above the alert level is no longer 

required, which is consistent with ISFSI facilities. 

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, 

Appendix E, Section IV.1. 

C.1. The entire spectrum of emergency 

conditions that involve the alerting or 

activating of progressively larger 

segments of the total emergency 

organization shall be described. The 

communication steps to be taken to alert 

or activate emergency personnel under 

each class of emergency shall be 

described. Emergency action levels 

(based not only on onsite and offsite

radiation monitoring information but also 

on readings from a number of sensors 

Containment parameters do not provide an 

indication of the conditions at a defueled facility 

and emergency core cooling systems are no longer 

required. Other indications, such as SFP level or 

temperature, can be used at sites where there is 

spent fuel in the SFPs. 

In the SOC for the final rule for EP requirements for 

ISFSIs and for MRS facilities (60 FR 32430), the 

Commission responded to comments concerning a 

general emergency at an ISFSI and MRS, and 

concluded that, “...an essential element of a 
13

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

that indicate a potential emergency, such 

as the pressure in containment and the 

response of the Emergency Core Cooling 

System) for notification of offsite agencies 

shall be described. The existence, but not 

the details, of a message authentication 

scheme shall be noted for such agencies. 

The emergency classes defined shall 

include: (1) notification of unusual events, 

(2) alert, (3) site area emergency, and 

(4) general emergency. These classes 

are further discussed in NUREG0654/FEMA-REP-1. 

General Emergency is that a release can be 

reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective 

Action Guidelines exposure levels off site for more 

than the immediate site area.” 

The probability of a condition reaching the level 

above an emergency classification of alert is very 

low. In the event of an accident at a defueled 

facility that meets the conditions for exemption 

from formal offsite EP requirements, there will be 

available time for event mitigation and, if 

necessary, implementation of offsite protective 

actions using a CEMP. 

NEI 99-01 was found to be an acceptable method 

for development of EALs. No offsite protective 

actions are anticipated to be necessary, so 

classification above the alert level is no longer 

required. 

C.2. By June 20, 2012, nuclear power 

reactor licensees shall establish and 

maintain the capability to assess, classify, 

and declare an emergency condition 

within 15 minutes after the availability of 

indications to plant operators that an 

emergency action level has been 

exceeded and shall promptly declare the 

emergency condition as soon as possible 

following identification of the appropriate 

emergency classification level. Licensees 

shall not construe these criteria as a 

grace period to attempt to restore plant 

conditions to avoid declaring an 

emergency action due to an emergency 

action level that has been exceeded. 

Licensees shall not construe these criteria 

as preventing implementation of response 

actions deemed by the licensee to be 

necessary to protect public health and 

safety provided that any delay in 

declaration does not deny the State and 

local authorities the opportunity to 

implement measures necessary to protect 

the public health and safety. 

In the EP rule published in the Federal Register 

(76 FR 72560), non-power reactor licensees were 

not required to assess, classify and declare an 

emergency condition within 15 minutes. An SFP 

and an ISFSI are also not nuclear power reactors as 

defined in the NRC’s regulations. A 

decommissioning power reactor has a low likelihood 

of a credible accident resulting in radiological 

releases requiring offsite protective measures. For 

these reasons, the staff concludes that a 

decommissioning power reactor should not be 

required to assess, classify and declare an 

emergency condition within 15 minutes. 
14

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

D.1. Administrative and physical means 

for notifying local, State, and Federal 

officials and agencies and agreements 

reached with these officials and agencies 

for the prompt notification of the public 

and for public evacuation or other 

protective measures, should they become 

necessary, shall be described. This 

description shall include identification of 

the appropriate officials, by title and 

agency, of the State and local government 

agencies within the EPZs.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 

10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). 

D.2. Provisions shall be described for 

yearly dissemination to the public within 

the plume exposure pathway EPZ of basic 

emergency planning information, such as 

the methods and times required for public 

notification and the protective actions 

planned if an accident occurs, general 

information as to the nature and effects of 

radiation, and a listing of local broadcast 

stations that will be used for dissemination 

of information during an emergency. 

Signs or other measures shall also be 

used to disseminate to any transient 

population within the plume exposure 

pathway EPZ appropriate information that 

would be helpful if an accident occurs.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.D.1. 

D.3. A licensee shall have the capability to 

notify responsible State and local 

governmental agencies within 15 minutes 

after declaring an emergency. The 

licensee shall demonstrate that the 

appropriate governmental authorities have 

the capability to make a public alerting 

and notification decision promptly on 

being informed by the licensee of an 

emergency condition. Prior to initial 

operation greater than 5 percent of rated 

thermal power of the first reactor at the 

site, each nuclear power reactor licensee 

shall demonstrate that administrative and 

physical means have been established for 

alerting and providing prompt instructions 

to the public with the plume exposure 

pathway EPZ. The design objective of the 

While the capability needs to exist for the 

notification of offsite government agencies within a 

specified time period, previous exemptions have 

allowed for extending the State and local 

government agencies’ notification time up to 

60 minutes based on the site-specific justification 

provided. 

DEF’s exemption request provides that CR-3 will 

make notifications to the State of Florida and the 

NRC within 60 minutes of declaration of an event. 

The State Watch Office will perform the notification 

to the County (Citrus), as well as the Florida 

Department of Emergency Management. In the 

permanently defueled condition of the reactor, the 

rapidly developing scenarios associated with 

events initiated during reactor power operation are 

no longer credible. 
15

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

prompt public alert and notification system 

shall be to have the capability to 

essentially complete the initial alerting and 

notification of the public within the plume 

exposure pathway EPZ within about 

15 minutes. The use of this alerting and 

notification capability will range from 

immediate alerting and notification of the 

public (within 15 minutes of the time that 

State and local officials are notified that a 

situation exists requiring urgent action) to 

the more likely events where there is 

substantial time available for the 

appropriate governmental authorities to 

make a judgment whether or not to 

activate the public alert and notification 

system. The alerting and notification 

capability shall additionally include 

administrative and physical means for a 

backup method of public alerting and 

notification capable of being used in the 

event the primary method of alerting and 

notification is unavailable during an 

emergency to alert or notify all or portions 

of the plume exposure pathway EPZ 

population. The backup method shall 

have the capability to alert and notify the 

public within the plume exposure pathway 

EPZ, but does not need to meet the 

15 minute design objective for the primary 

prompt public alert and notification 

system. When there is a decision to 

activate the alert and notification system, 

the appropriate governmental authorities 

will determine whether to activate the 

entire alert and notification system 

simultaneously or in a graduated or 

staged manner. The responsibility for 

activating such a public alert and 

notification system shall remain with the 

appropriate governmental authorities.

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 

10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). 

D.4. If FEMA has approved a nuclear 

power reactor site's alert and notification 

design report, including the backup alert 

and notification capability, as of 

December 23, 2011, then the backup alert 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.D.3 regarding the alert and notification 

system requirements. 
16

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

and notification capability requirements in 

Section IV.D.3 must be implemented by 

December 24, 2012. If the alert and 

notification design report does not include 

a backup alert and notification capability 

or needs revision to ensure adequate 

backup alert and notification capability, 

then a revision of the alert and notification 

design report must be submitted to FEMA 

for review by June 24, 2013, and the 

FEMA-approved backup alert and 

notification means must be implemented 

within 365 days after FEMA approval. 

However, the total time period to 

implement a FEMA-approved backup alert 

and notification means must not exceed 

June 22, 2015.

E.8.a.(i) A licensee onsite technical 

support center and an emergency 

operations facility from which effective 

direction can be given and effective 

control can be exercised during an 

emergency; 

Due to the low probability of design-basis accidents 

or other credible events to exceed the EPA PAGs 

at the site boundary, the available time for event 

mitigation at a decommissioning reactor and, if 

needed, to implement offsite protective actions 

using a CEMP, an emergency operations facility 

(EOF) would not be required to support offsite 

agency response. Onsite actions may be directed 

from the control room or other location, without the 

requirements imposed on a technical support 

center (TSC). 

E.8.a. (ii) For nuclear power reactor 

licensees, a licensee onsite operational 

support center;

NUREG-0696, “Functional Criteria for Emergency 

Response Facilities,” provides that the operational 

support center (OSC) is an onsite area separate 

from the control room and the TSC where licensee 

operations support personnel will assemble in an 

emergency. For a decommissioning power 

reactor, an OSC is no longer required to meet its 

original purpose of an assembly area for plant 

logistical support during an emergency. The OSC 

function can be incorporated into another facility. 

E.8.b. For a nuclear power reactor 

licensee's emergency operations facility 

required by paragraph 8.a of this section, 

either a facility located between 10 miles 

and 25 miles of the nuclear power reactor 

site(s), or a primary facility located less 

than 10 miles from the nuclear power 

reactor site(s) and a backup facility 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3). 
17

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

located between 10 miles and 25 miles of 

the nuclear power reactor site(s). An 

emergency operations facility may serve 

more than one nuclear power reactor site. 

A licensee desiring to locate an

emergency operations facility more than 

25 miles from a nuclear power reactor site 

shall request prior Commission approval 

by submitting an application for an 

amendment to its license. For an 

emergency operations facility located 

more than 25 miles from a nuclear power 

reactor site, provisions must be made for 

locating NRC and offsite responders 

closer to the nuclear power reactor site so 

that NRC and offsite responders can 

interact face-to-face with emergency 

response personnel entering and leaving 

the nuclear power reactor site. Provisions 

for locating NRC and offsite responders 

closer to a nuclear power reactor site that 

is more than 25 miles from the emergency 

operations facility must include the 

following:

(1) Space for members of an NRC site 

team and Federal, State, and local 

responders;

(2) Additional space for conducting 

briefings with emergency response 

personnel;

(3) Communication with other licensee 

and offsite emergency response facilities;

(4) Access to plant data and radiological 

information; and

(5) Access to copying equipment and 

office supplies;

E.8.c. By June 20, 2012, for a nuclear 

power reactor licensee's emergency 

operations facility required by paragraph 

8.a of this section, a facility having the 

following capabilities:

(1) The capability for obtaining and 

displaying plant data and radiological 

information for each reactor at a nuclear 

power reactor site and for each nuclear 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3). 
18

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

power reactor site that the facility serves;

(2) The capability to analyze plant 

technical information and provide 

technical briefings on event conditions 

and prognosis to licensee and offsite 

response organizations for each reactor at 

a nuclear power reactor site and for each 

nuclear power reactor site that the facility 

serves; and

(3) The capability to support response to 

events occurring simultaneously at more 

than one nuclear power reactor site if the 

emergency operations facility serves more 

than one site; and

E.8.d. For nuclear power reactor 

licensees, an alternative facility (or 

facilities) that would be accessible even if 

the site is under threat of or experiencing 

hostile action, to function as a staging 

area for augmentation of emergency 

response staff and collectively having the 

following characteristics: the capability for 

communication with the emergency 

operations facility, control room, and plant 

security; the capability to perform offsite 

notifications; and the capability for 

engineering assessment activities, 

including damage control team planning 

and preparation, for use when onsite 

emergency facilities cannot be safely 

accessed during hostile action. The 

requirements in this paragraph 8.d must 

be implemented no later than December 

23, 2014, with the exception of the 

capability for staging emergency response 

organization personnel at the alternative 

facility (or facilities) and the capability for 

communications with the emergency 

operations facility, control room, and plant 

security, which must be implemented no 

later than June 20, 2012.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.1 regarding hostile action. 

E.8.e. A licensee shall not be subject to 

the requirements of paragraph 8.b of this 

section for an existing emergency 

operations facility approved as of 

December 23, 2011;

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3). 
19

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

E.9.a. Provisions for communications with 

contiguous State/local governments within 

the plume exposure pathway EPZ. Such 

communication shall be tested monthly. 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 

10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). 

The State and the local governments in which the 

nuclear facility is located need to be informed of 

events and emergencies, so lines of 

communication must be maintained. 

E.9.c. Provision for communications 

among the nuclear power reactor control 

room, the onsite technical support center, 

and the emergency operations facility; 

and among the nuclear facility, the 

principal State and local emergency 

operations centers, and the field 

assessment teams. Such 

communications systems shall be tested 

annually.

Because of the low probability of design-basis 

accidents or other credible events that would be 

expected to exceed the EPA PAGs and the 

available time for event mitigation and, if needed, 

implementation of offsite protective actions using a 

CEMP, there is no need for the TSC, EOF, or 

offsite field assessment teams. 

Also refer to justification for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3). 

Communication with State and local emergency 

operations centers is maintained to coordinate 

assistance on site if required. 

E.9.d. Provisions for communications by 

the licensee with NRC Headquarters and 

the appropriate NRC Regional Office 

Operations Center from the nuclear power 

reactor control room, the onsite technical 

support center, and the emergency 

operations facility. Such communications 

shall be tested monthly. 

The functions of the control room, EOF, TSC, and 

OSC may be combined into one or more locations 

due to the smaller facility staff and the greatly 

reduced required interaction with State and local 

emergency response facilities. 

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 
20

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

F.1. The program to provide for: (a) The 

training of employees and exercising, by 

periodic drills, of radiation emergency 

plans to ensure that employees of the 

licensee are familiar with their specific 

emergency response duties, and (b) The 

participation in the training and drills by 

other persons whose assistance may be 

needed in the event of a radiation 

emergency shall be described. This shall 

include a description of specialized initial 

training and periodic retraining programs 

to be provided to each of the following 

categories of emergency personnel: 

i. Directors and/or coordinators of the 

plant emergency organization; 

ii. Personnel responsible for accident 

assessment, including control room shift 

personnel; 

iii. Radiological monitoring teams; 

iv. Fire control teams (fire brigades); 

v. Repair and damage control teams; 

vi. First aid and rescue teams; 

vii. Medical support personnel; 

viii. Licensee’s headquarters support 

personnel;

ix. Security personnel. 

In addition, a radiological orientation 

training program shall be made available 

to local services personnel; e.g., local 

emergency services/Civil Defense, local 

law enforcement personnel, local news 

media persons. 

Decommissioning power reactor sites typically 

have a level of emergency response that does not 

require additional response by the licensee’s 

headquarters personnel. Therefore, the staff 

considers exempting licensee’s headquarters 

personnel from training requirements to be 

reasonable. 

Due to the low probability of design-basis accidents 

or other credible events to exceed the EPA PAGs, 

offsite emergency measures are limited to support 

provided by local police, fire departments, and 

ambulance and hospital services, as appropriate. 

Local news media personnel no longer need 

radiological orientation training since they will not 

be called upon to support the formal Joint 

Information Center. The term “Civil Defense” is no 

longer commonly used; references to this term in 

the examples provided in the regulation are, 

therefore, not needed.
21

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

F.2. The plan shall describe provisions for 

the conduct of emergency preparedness 

exercises as follows: Exercises shall test 

the adequacy of timing and content of 

implementing procedures and methods, 

test emergency equipment and 

communications networks, test the public 

alert and notification system, and ensure 

that emergency organization personnel 

are familiar with their duties. 

Because of the low probability of design-basis 

accidents or other credible events that would be 

expected to exceed the limits of EPA PAGs and 

the available time for event mitigation and offsite 

protective actions from a CEMP, the public alert 

and notification system will not be used and, 

therefore, requires no testing. 

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 

F.2.a. A full participation exercise which 

tests as much of the licensee, State, and 

local emergency plans as is reasonably 

achievable without mandatory public 

participation shall be conducted for each 

site at which a power reactor is located. 

Nuclear power reactor licensees shall 

submit exercise scenarios under § 50.4 at 

least 60 days before use in a full 

participation exercise required by this 

paragraph 2.a.

F.2.a.(i), (ii), and (iii) are not applicable. 

Due to the low probability of design-basis accidents 

or other credible events that would be expected to 

exceed the limits of EPA PAGs, the available time 

for event mitigation and, if necessary, 

implementation of offsite protective actions using a 

CEMP, no formal offsite radiological emergency 

plans are required. 

The intent of submitting exercise scenarios at an 

operating power reactor site is to check that 

licensees utilize different scenarios in order to 

prevent the preconditioning of responders at power 

reactors. For decommissioning power reactor 

sites, there are limited events that could occur and, 

as such, the previously routine progression to 

general emergency in an operating power reactor 

site scenario is not applicable. 

The licensee would be exempt from 10 CFR 

Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.a.(i)-(iii) 

because the licensee would be exempt from the 

umbrella provision of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.F.2.a. 

F.2.b. Each licensee at each site shall 

conduct a subsequent exercise of its 

onsite emergency plan every 2 years. 

Nuclear power reactor licensees shall 

submit exercise scenarios under § 50.4 at 

least 60 days before use in an exercise 

required by this paragraph 2.b. The 

exercise may be included in the full 

participation biennial exercise required by 

paragraph 2.c. of this section. In addition, 

the licensee shall take actions necessary 

to ensure that adequate emergency 

response capabilities are maintained 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.F.2.a. 

The low probability of design-basis accidents or 

other credible events that would exceed the EPA 

PAGs, the available time for event mitigation and, if 

necessary, implementation of offsite protective 

actions using a CEMP, render a TSC, OSC and 

EOF unnecessary. The principal functions 

required by regulation can be performed at an 

onsite location that does not meet the requirements 

of the TSC, OSC or EOF. 
22

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

during the interval between biennial 

exercises by conducting drills, including at 

least one drill involving a combination of 

some of the principal functional areas of 

the licensee's onsite emergency response 

capabilities. The principal functional 

areas of emergency response include 

activities such as management and 

coordination of emergency response, 

accident assessment, event classification, 

notification of offsite authorities, and 

assessment of the onsite and offsite

impact of radiological releases, protective 

action recommendation development, 

protective action decision making, plant 

system repair and mitigative action 

implementation. During these drills, 

activation of all of the licensee's 

emergency response facilities (Technical 

Support Center (TSC), Operations 

Support Center (OSC), and the 

Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)) 

would not be necessary, licensees would 

have the opportunity to consider accident 

management strategies, supervised 

instruction would be permitted, operating 

staff in all participating facilities would 

have the opportunity to resolve problems 

(success paths) rather than have 

controllers intervene, and the drills may 

focus on the onsite exercise training 

objectives. 

F.2.c. Offsite plans for each site shall be 

exercised biennially with full participation 

by each offsite authority having a role 

under the radiological response plan. 

Where the offsite authority has a role 

under a radiological response plan for 

more than one site, it shall fully participate 

in one exercise every two years and shall, 

at least, partially participate in other offsite 

plan exercises in this period. If two 

different licensees each have licensed 

facilities located either on the same site or 

on adjacent, contiguous sites, and share 

most of the elements defining co-located 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.F.2.a. 
23

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

licensees, then each licensee shall:

(1) Conduct an exercise biennially of its 

onsite emergency plan;

(2) Participate quadrennially in an offsite 

biennial full or partial participation 

exercise;

(3) Conduct emergency preparedness 

activities and interactions in the years 

between its participation in the offsite full 

or partial participation exercise with offsite 

authorities, to test and maintain interface 

among the affected State and local 

authorities and the licensee. Co-located 

licensees shall also participate in 

emergency preparedness activities and 

interaction with offsite authorities for the 

period between exercises;

(4) Conduct a hostile action exercise of its 

onsite emergency plan in each exercise 

cycle; and

(5) Participate in an offsite biennial full or 

partial participation hostile action exercise 

in alternating exercise cycles.

F.2.d. Each State with responsibility for 

nuclear power reactor emergency 

preparedness should fully participate in 

the ingestion pathway portion of exercises 

at least once every exercise cycle. In 

States with more than one nuclear power 

reactor plume exposure pathway EPZ, the 

State should rotate this participation from 

site to site. Each State with responsibility 

for nuclear power reactor emergency 

preparedness should fully participate in a 

hostile action exercise at least once every 

cycle and should fully participate in one 

hostile action exercise by 

December 31, 2015. States with more 

than one nuclear power reactor plume 

exposure pathway EPZ should rotate this 

participation from site to site.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.2. 
24

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

F.2.e. Licensees shall enable any State or 

local Government located within the 

plume exposure pathway EPZ to 

participate in the licensee’s drills when 

requested by such State or local 

Government. 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.2. 

F.2.f. Remedial exercises will be required 

if the emergency plan is not satisfactorily 

tested during the biennial exercise, such 

that NRC, in consultation with FEMA,

cannot (1) find reasonable assurance that 

adequate protective measures can and 

will be taken in the event of a radiological 

emergency or (2) determine that the 

Emergency Response Organization 

(ERO) has maintained key skills specific 

to emergency response. The extent of 

State and local participation in remedial 

exercises must be sufficient to show that 

appropriate corrective measures have 

been taken regarding the elements of the 

plan not properly tested in the previous 

exercises.

The U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency 

is responsible for evaluating the adequacy of offsite 

response during an exercise. No action is 

expected from State or local government 

organizations in response to an event at a 

decommissioning power reactor site other than 

onsite firefighting, law enforcement and 

ambulance/medical services support. A 

memoranda of understanding should be in place 

for those services. Offsite response organizations 

will continue to take actions on a comprehensive 

EP basis to protect the health and safety of the 

public as they would at any other industrial site. 

F.2.i. Licensees shall use drill and 

exercise scenarios that provide 

reasonable assurance that anticipatory 

responses will not result from 

preconditioning of participants. Such 

scenarios for nuclear power reactor 

licensees must include a wide spectrum of 

radiological releases and events, 

including hostile action. Exercise and drill 

scenarios as appropriate must emphasize 

coordination among onsite and offsite 

response organizations. 

Due to the low probability of design-basis accidents 

or other credible events to exceed the EPA PAGs, 

the available time for event mitigation and, if 

needed, implementation of offsite protective 

actions using a CEMP, the previously routine 

progression to general emergency in power reactor 

site scenarios is not applicable to a 

decommissioning site. Therefore, the licensee is 

not expected to demonstrate response to a wide 

spectrum of events. 

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.1 regarding hostile action. 

F.2.j. The exercises conducted under 

paragraph 2 of this section by nuclear 

power reactor licensees must provide the 

opportunity for the ERO to demonstrate 

proficiency in the key skills necessary to 

implement the principal functional areas of 

emergency response identified in 

paragraph 2.b of this section. Each 

exercise must provide the opportunity for 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.F.2. 
25

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Staff Review of Licensee Justification 

the ERO to demonstrate key skills specific 

to emergency response duties in the 

control room, TSC, OSC, EOF, and joint 

information center. Additionally, in each 

eight calendar year exercise cycle, 

nuclear power reactor licensees shall vary 

the content of scenarios during exercises 

conducted under paragraph 2 of this 

section to provide the opportunity for the 

ERO to demonstrate proficiency in the key 

skills necessary to respond to the 

following scenario elements: hostile action 

directed at the plant site, no radiological 

release or an unplanned minimal 

radiological release that does not require 

public protective actions, an initial 

classification of or rapid escalation to a 

Site Area Emergency or General 

Emergency, implementation of strategies, 

procedures, and guidance developed 

under § 50.54(hh)(2), and integration of 

offsite resources with onsite justification. 

The licensee shall maintain a record of 

exercises conducted during each eight 

year exercise cycle that documents the 

content of scenarios used to comply with 

the requirements of this paragraph. Each 

licensee shall conduct a hostile action 

exercise for each of its sites no later than 

December 31, 2015. The first eight-year 

exercise cycle for a site will begin in the 

calendar year in which the first hostile 

action exercise is conducted. For a site 

licensed under Part 52, the first eight-year 

exercise cycle begins in the calendar year 

of the initial exercise required by Section 

IV.F.2.a.

I. By June 20, 2012, for nuclear power 

reactor licensees, a range of protective 

actions to protect onsite personnel during 

hostile action must be developed to 

ensure the continued ability of the 

licensee to safely shut down the reactor 

and perform the functions of the 

licensee’s emergency plan.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.E.8.d.