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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 13, 2003 Decided August 19, 2003

No. 02-3078

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

JAMAL STEVEN HANSON,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 99cr00208–01)

Douglas Wham, appointed by the court, argued the cause

and filed the briefs for appellant.

Thomas S. Rees, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With him on the brief were Roscoe C. Howard,

Jr., U.S. Attorney, and John R. Fisher and Elizabeth Trosman, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.
2

Before: SENTELLE, HENDERSON, and GARLAND, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: Defendant Jamal Hanson pled

guilty to distributing fifty grams or more of cocaine base.

Before sentencing, Hanson moved to withdraw his plea on the

ground that his counsel had miscalculated the appropriate

sentencing range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The district court denied the motion and sentenced

Hanson to 262 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Hanson

contends that the court abused its discretion in denying his

motion to withdraw the plea. We conclude that the court did

not abuse its discretion, and we therefore affirm its judgment.

I

On May 20, 1999, Hanson spoke by telephone to a prospective purchaser concerning the sale of two ounces of cocaine

base (‘‘crack’’). Unbeknownst to Hanson, the purchaser was

an undercover officer of the Metropolitan Police Department,

Detective David Dessin, and the conversation was electronically recorded. After the conversation, the two met in the

700 block of G Street, N.W. in Washington, D.C. Hanson sat

in the front passenger seat of Dessin’s car and handed the

detective a brown paper bag filled with more than fifty grams

of crack; Dessin gave Hanson $1,600 in exchange. The

conversations and transaction were recorded on audio- and

videotape, and two days later Hanson was arrested. A grand

jury subsequently returned a two-count indictment, charging

Hanson with distributing fifty grams or more of cocaine base

on May 20, 1999, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and

(b)(1)(A)(iii), and with distributing additional cocaine base to

Dessin the previous month, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(iii).

This was not Hanson’s first arrest. Indeed, he had been

arrested on several previous occasions. Two of those arrests,

in 1993 and 1994, resulted in convictions in Maryland state

court for possession with intent to distribute narcotics. The
3

1993 conviction involved over fifty grams of cocaine and three

pounds of marijuana.

Attorney Charles Daum was assigned to represent Hanson,

and after consulting with Daum, Hanson signed a written plea

agreement with the government. Hanson agreed to plead

guilty to the May 20th distribution of fifty grams or more of

cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and

(b)(1)(A)(iii), and to cooperate with law enforcement authorities ‘‘in any matter as to which the Government deem[ed] his

cooperation relevant.’’ Plea Agreement ¶¶ 1, 3(a) (Sept. 21,

1999). In return, the government promised, inter alia, to

dismiss the other count of the indictment and to file a motion

for a downward sentencing departure under United States

Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) § 5K1.1 if it determined

that Hanson provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person. The agreement noted

the offense’s mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment and statutory maximum sentence of life, and

stated that Hanson’s sentence would be ‘‘imposed in accordance with the United States Sentencing Commission’s

Guidelines Manual.’’ Plea Agreement ¶¶ 1, 12. The plea

agreement also recited Hanson’s ‘‘underst[anding] that the

sentence to be imposed is a matter solely within the discretion of the Court,’’ id. ¶ 12, and that Hanson would ‘‘not be

allowed to withdraw the guilty plea TTT solely because of the

harshness of the sentence imposed,’’ id. ¶ 4.

On September 21, 1999, the district court held the plea

hearing required by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure. Hanson admitted to engaging in the May 20th

drug deal and that his other relevant conduct made him

accountable for a total of 146.5 grams of cocaine base. Daum

summarized the plea agreement, and stated that ‘‘the government had also agreed that [it] would not file any enhancement

notification’’ — a reference to the notice that the government

must file under 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1) for a defendant to

receive the mandatory life sentence prescribed for an individual who distributes fifty grams or more of cocaine base after

two previous felony drug convictions, see 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(b)(1)(A).
4

The court advised Hanson of the statutory minimum (ten

years) and maximum (life) sentences applicable to the offense

to which he was about to plead. 9/21/99 Tr. at 5–6. In

addition, the court discussed the import of the Sentencing

Guidelines. In particular, the judge asked the defendant

whether he understood that the court ‘‘won’t actually determine your sentence in your case until after TTT [the] presentence report,’’ and that the court had authority ‘‘to impose a

sentence that’s more severe or less severe than the sentence

called for by the guidelines.’’ Id. at 6. Hanson said he

understood. The judge also expressly warned the defendant

against relying on ‘‘any prediction or promise as to what

sentence you’ll receive in this case,’’ because ‘‘the Court

doesn’t know itself right now until after a presentence report

is prepared.’’ Id. at 10. Again, Hanson said he understood.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court accepted Hanson’s plea and released him on the condition that he maintain

weekly contact with the government. Id. at 12–13. As

contemplated in the plea agreement, sentencing was to be

delayed until Hanson completed his promised cooperation.

After his release, however, Hanson ceased cooperating and

broke off all contact with the government. He later explained that he had ceased cooperating because of concern for

his safety and that of his family — a concern that the district

court described as ‘‘legitimate.’’ 8/2/02 Tr. at 7.

The United States Probation Office prepared Hanson’s

Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) on December 12,

2000. The PSR calculated Hanson’s base offense level as 32,

and gave him a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. But it also categorized Hanson as a career

offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, which increased both his

offense level and his criminal history category, and resulted

in a guidelines sentencing range of 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment.

That range was well beyond what Hanson had been told to

expect by his attorney, Daum, who had calculated Hanson’s

guidelines sentencing range as 121–151 months. The error

was apparently due to Daum’s misunderstanding of the effect
5

of the two Maryland convictions. On the scheduled sentencing date, January 24, 2001, Hanson discharged Daum. The

court continued the sentencing and appointed a new attorney

to represent the defendant. On July 31, 2001, Hanson filed

the first of three motions to withdraw his guilty plea. This

motion, under then-effective Rule 32(e) of the Federal Rules

of Criminal Procedure, asked permission to withdraw the plea

based on Daum’s ineffective assistance in giving erroneous

advice regarding the guidelines sentencing range.

At the hearing on this first motion, Hanson testified that

Daum had told him that ‘‘my guidelines were 121 to 151

months, and if I cooperated, possibly it could be cut by twothirds.’’ 11/9/01 Tr. at 16. Hanson insisted that Daum had

never mentioned the possibility of a sentence higher than 151

months. Hanson also testified that Daum had not discussed

any possible defenses with him. On cross-examination, Hanson admitted that he had taken part in the May 1999 drug

deal. He also admitted that he had known at the time he

pled that he would have faced a substantial risk if he had

gone to trial; but he denied knowing that a conviction would

have meant a mandatory life sentence. Finally, he acknowledged knowing that a guilty plea would result in his release

pending sentencing, and that a downward departure for cooperation could result in a sentence below the guidelines range.

Id. at 32–33.

On December 10, 2001, the district court denied Hanson’s

motion to withdraw his plea. Applying the test set forth in

United States v. Taylor, 139 F.3d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1998), the

court noted that the government had ‘‘conceded that it

[would] suffer no prejudice’’ if Hanson were to be newly tried,

a factor that ‘‘slightly favor[ed] Hanson’s motion.’’ United

States v. Hanson, No. 99–0208, slip op. at 6 (D.D.C. Dec. 10,

2001). But the court also determined that Hanson had

‘‘asserted no viable claim of innocence,’’ id. at 15, and that

although Daum had rendered ineffective assistance, his deficient performance had not prejudiced Hanson. The court

further noted that it had advised Hanson of the impossibility

of predicting the applicable sentencing range prior to preparation of the PSR, that the evidence against Hanson was
6

‘‘overwhelming’’ and that he had ‘‘provided no specificity at all

with respect to his purported potential defenses to the

charges,’’ and that by pleading guilty Hanson had obtained

not only the dismissal of the other count but also the opportunity to earn a downward departure from the guidelines and

statutory mandatory minimum sentence. Id. at 14–15. Thus,

the court concluded, the defendant had ‘‘made a rational

choice to plead guilty,’’ id. at 14, and there was ‘‘nothing

unfair or unjust in holding Hanson to his plea agreement,’’ id.

at 16.

On December 27, 2001, Hanson filed another request to

withdraw his plea, this time in the form of a pro se motion.

In this motion, Hanson asserted that he ‘‘fully intended to

make a viable claim of innocence,’’ on the basis of discovery

violations by the prosecution and defects in the chain of

custody of the government’s evidence. Mot. to Amend Original Compl. at 3, 6. He blamed his second lawyer, whom he

had dismissed in the interim, for failing to raise these defenses in the preceding motion. On March 7, 2002, the district

court denied this second request to withdraw, noting that,

‘‘with respect to a viable claim of innocence,’’ the defendant

had ‘‘merely referred to ‘possible’ issues TTT but ha[d] again

failed to substantiate the claim with sufficient specificity and

evidentiary support.’’ United States v. Hanson, No. 99–0208,

slip op. at 2 (Mar. 7, 2002).

Hanson then hired a third attorney, who filed a third

request to withdraw. This request asserted, for the first

time, that Hanson had an entrapment defense that he would

have raised had the case proceeded to trial. On May 30,

2002, the district court held another evidentiary hearing.

Hanson testified that he had gotten involved in the transactions at issue through his interactions with a man named

Seay, the government’s confidential informant and the boyfriend of Hanson’s neighbor, Dominique. According to the

defendant, Seay pressed him to sell the crack to Detective

Dessin, preying on Hanson’s sympathies for Dominique, who

Seay said was pregnant and in financial difficulties. Dominique, Hanson said, was ‘‘like family’’ to him, and he engaged
7

in the drug deals to help Seay provide for her. 5/30/02 Tr. at

19.

The district court issued an opinion denying this third

request on June 19, 2002. The court found it suspicious that

Hanson had failed to bring up or substantiate the entrapment

allegations earlier; the late-raised argument, the court said,

‘‘appear[ed] contrived.’’ United States v. Hanson, No. 99–

0208, slip op. at 13 (June 19, 2002). The court thought it

likely ‘‘that Hanson carefully reviewed this Court[’s] prior

decision and retooled his approach by particularly zeroing in

on the Court’s prior statement that ‘Defense counsel reiterated this general claim of a potential defense TTT but provided

no further specificity or support for it.’ ’’ Id. at 14. Furthermore, the court held, Hanson’s entrapment defense was not

viable because ‘‘the Court finds that while Hanson may have

taken some prodding before agreeing to engage in the narcotics transactions in this case, Seay’s persistence was ultimately

successful because it appealed to Hanson’s self-interest as

well as his altruism. The Court thus is unconvinced that

Seay’s appeal to Hanson’s sympathies toward Dominique

overcame Hanson’s will to otherwise obey the lawTTTT’’ Id.

at 17.

Having denied Hanson’s third attempt to withdraw his plea,

the court sentenced the defendant to 262 months in prison,

the bottom of the guidelines range. This appeal followed.

II

Hanson poses a single issue for our review: ‘‘[w]hether the

district court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Hanson’s

pre-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea.’’ Appellant’s

Br. at 1. The court’s decision on Hanson’s withdrawal motion

was governed by former Rule 32(e) of the Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure, which provided: ‘‘If a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is made before

sentence is imposed, the court may permit the plea to be

withdrawn if the defendant shows any fair and just reason.’’
8

FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(e) (2001) (emphasis added).1

 In reviewing

the denial of a motion to withdraw, we consider three factors:

‘‘ ‘(1) whether the defendant has asserted a viable claim of

innocence; (2) whether the delay between the guilty plea and

the motion to withdraw has substantially prejudiced the government’s ability to prosecute the case; and (3) whether the

guilty plea was somehow tainted.’ ’’ United States v. McCoy,

215 F.3d 102, 106 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Taylor, 139 F.3d

at 929). As both parties agree, we review a district court’s

refusal to permit the withdrawal of a plea before a sentence

has been imposed only for an abuse of discretion. United

States v. Cray, 47 F.3d 1203, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

The government does not contend that its ability to prosecute would have been substantially prejudiced if withdrawal

had been permitted, a factor that in any event has never been

dispositive in our cases. See id. at 1208 (noting that ‘‘prejudice to the Government has never been a determinative factor

in our decision to affirm the district court’s decision to deny a

motion to withdraw a guilty plea’’). Hanson argues, however,

that he had a viable claim of innocence based on his entrapment defense, and that his guilty plea was tainted because it

resulted from Daum’s incorrect advice regarding the guidelines sentencing range he would face if he pled. We therefore turn to an examination of those two factors.

III

Hanson contends that, had he gone to trial, he would have

had a viable defense of entrapment. The district court

disagreed, concluding that Hanson did not have a viable

defense and making clear that it thought Hanson had fabricated the claim in response to the court’s statements. Although we think it a close question whether Hanson’s defense

can be characterized as not ‘‘viable,’’ there is no question but

that it would have been extremely weak. We therefore

1 Effective December 1, 2002, the provision governing plea withdrawals was amended and moved to Rule 11(d). See FED. R. CRIM.

P. 11(d) (2003).
9

cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in

deciding that the proffered entrapment defense added little

weight on the side of permitting withdrawal.

The defense of entrapment ‘‘has two related elements:

government inducement of the crime, and a lack of predisposition on the part of the defendant to engage in the criminal

conduct.’’ Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988);

see also United States v. Evans, 216 F.3d 80, 90 (D.C. Cir.

2000); United States v. Glover, 153 F.3d 749, 754 (D.C. Cir.

1998). When a defendant claims entrapment, he first bears

the burden of showing ‘‘that he was induced by the Government to commit a crime he otherwise would not have committed.’’ United States v. Ramsey, 165 F.3d 980, 985 n.6 (D.C.

Cir. 1999). If the defendant is successful, ‘‘the burden then

shifts to the government to prove the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime.’’ Glover, 153 F.3d at 754; see

also Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548–49 (1992).

Hanson argues that the inducement requirement was satisfied because the government’s informant, Seay, repeatedly

pressed him to sell drugs to Dessin. Hanson also asserts

that Seay ‘‘play[ed] on [Hanson’s] considerable sympathies for

Seay’s pregnant girlfriend, Dominique,’’ the neighbor whom

Hanson regarded as ‘‘ ‘like family.’ ’’ Appellant’s Br. at 18.

Hanson testified that he had sold the drugs ‘‘[s]trictly to help

out Seay and Dominique’s situation.’’ 5/30/02 Tr. at 51.

This claim of inducement is quite weak. ‘‘[R]epeated government solicitations do not establish inducement unless the

requests are coupled with persuasive overtures, or unless

there is evidence of reluctance on the defendant’s part demonstrating that the repetition of the requests may have moved

an otherwise unwilling person to commit a criminal act.’’

Glover, 153 F.3d at 754 (internal quotation marks omitted).

And ‘‘[a]lthough we have TTT indicated that ‘pleas based on

TTT friendship’ can satisfy the inducement prong TTT, we have

never found such a plea sufficiently strong to do so.’’ Evans,

216 F.3d at 90 (citations omitted). Moreover, Hanson’s asser-
10

tion that his motive was friendship is belied by his admission

that he had a profit motive as well,2

 an admission that is

hardly mitigated by his protestation that friendship was the

greater of the two motivating factors. And as the district

court noted, the fact that it took Hanson thirty-two months

and three lawyers before he asserted that Seay had entrapped him was a significant strike against the credibility of

his claim of inducement.

But we need not tarry over the inducement prong, because

the government had extremely strong evidence of Hanson’s

predisposition to commit the drug deal. During the preceding six years, Hanson had been arrested on narcotics charges

multiple times and was twice convicted of possession with

intent to distribute.3

 Indeed, he was still on probation for

one of those convictions when he was arrested for the offense

that is the subject of this appeal. PSR ¶¶ 29–32, 36. That

conviction involved more than fifty grams of crack and more

than three pounds of marijuana, with a total street value

exceeding $40,000. PSR ¶ 29. Moreover, Hanson’s testimony at the second evidentiary hearing ‘‘described his ability to

obtain significant quantities of drugs quickly,’’ his ‘‘independent knowledge (i.e., apart from Seay and Detective Dessin)

of where to obtain the narcotics at issue,’’ and his ‘‘thorough

understanding of the current market prices for various quantities of narcotics.’’ Hanson, slip op. at 18 (June 19, 2002).

On cross-examination, Hanson further recounted that he

2 See 5/30/02 Tr. at 41 (‘‘[N]o person in his right mind would take

a chance and endanger his life and not make nothing out [of] the

deal. So, yeah, if I can help him out and make something on the

side, I have to. I wouldn’t just go get the drugs and then give it to

him for freeTTTT’’).

3 See United States v. Haire, 103 F.3d 697, 699 (10th Cir. 1996)

(holding that ‘‘[p]rior distribution of illegal drugs TTT constitutes

predisposition’’); United States v. Tyson, 470 F.2d 381, 384 (D.C.

Cir. 1972) (holding that evidence of prior conviction for transferring

marijuana was evidence of predisposition to rebut defense of entrapment).
11

knew in advance the price at which he would be able to

purchase the crack that he intended to sell to Seay and

Dessin, as well as the going price for resale on the street.4

In sum, Hanson’s belated claim of entrapment was extremely weak, and we cannot say that the district court

abused its discretion in declining to give it much weight as a

factor favoring the withdrawal of Hanson’s guilty plea.

IV

The remaining factor to consider is whether Hanson’s

guilty plea was tainted. Hanson maintains that it was, by

Daum’s erroneous advice regarding the guidelines sentencing

range that would govern Hanson’s case if he accepted the

plea. In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985), the Supreme Court held that a claim that the ineffective assistance

of counsel rendered a plea not voluntary and intelligent must

be evaluated under the general test for ineffective assistance

set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

Such a claim requires two showings. ‘‘First, the defendant

must show that counsel’s performance was deficientTTTT

Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.’’ Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

The government does not dispute that Daum’s failure to

take into account the career offender provisions of U.S.S.G.

§ 4B1.1 — and hence to recognize that Hanson’s post-plea

sentencing range would be 262 to 327 months rather than 121

to 151 — was constitutionally deficient. See United States v.

Booze, 293 F.3d 516, 518 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (‘‘This circuit has

held that a lawyer who advises his client whether to accept a

plea offer falls below the threshold of reasonable performance

if the lawyer makes a plainly incorrect estimate of the likely

sentence due to ignorance of applicable law of which he

should have been aware.’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).

We therefore proceed to the question of whether counsel’s

4 In addition, in a pre-plea interview with the prosecution, Hanson

discussed his familiarity with several drug suppliers, provided information that ranged from their cell phone numbers to particulars of

their drug operations, and stated that he had purchased narcotics

from them. See Hanson, slip op. at 18 (June 19, 2002).
12

deficient performance prejudiced Hanson. Where the defendant attacks a plea bargain, the prejudice inquiry ‘‘focuses on

whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process.’’ Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.

‘‘[I]n order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and

would have insisted on going to trial.’’ Id. We do not believe

that Hanson has made that required showing.

First, the district court’s admonition at the plea hearing

that Hanson should not rely on sentencing predictions weakens the defendant’s claim that those predictions were at the

root of his decision to plead guilty. The court warned

Hanson that it wouldn’t ‘‘actually determine your guidelines

sentence in your case until after TTT [the] presentence report,’’ 9/21/99 Tr. at 6, that the court had authority ‘‘to impose

a sentence that’s more severe or less severe than the sentence called for by the guidelines,’’ id., and that Hanson

shouldn’t rely on ‘‘any prediction or promise as to what

sentence you’ll receive in this case’’ because ‘‘the Court

doesn’t know itself right now until after a presentence report

is prepared,’’ id. at 10. Hanson assured the court that he

understood. In United States v. Horne, this circuit relied on

a virtually identical set of warnings as a factor in concluding

that the district court had not abused its discretion in denying

a motion to withdraw a plea, notwithstanding the fact that —

as was true here — defense counsel had substantially underestimated his client’s guidelines range by misunderstanding

the import of a prior Maryland felony conviction. 987 F.2d

833, 834–38 (D.C. Cir. 1993).5

Second, even if counsel had told Hanson that the applicable

guidelines range was 262 to 327 months if he pled, Hanson

5 See also United States v. Watley, 987 F.2d 841, 847 n.10 (D.C.

Cir. 1993) (vacating a guilty plea, but noting that the case contrasted with Horne because ‘‘[i]n Horne, the district judge expressly told

the defendant, before accepting his plea, that ‘he should not rely

upon any [sentencing] estimate made by his counsel or anyone

else’ ’’ (quoting Horne, 987 F.2d at 836)).
13

would nonetheless have had reason to expect a sentence

below that. As Hanson’s plea agreement makes clear, he

anticipated providing substantial assistance to the government in other narcotics investigations, which would have

qualified him for a departure below both the guidelines range

and the statutory minimum sentence. Plea Agreement

¶ 10(e); see U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). Although

Hanson ultimately broke his agreement to provide such assistance out of concern for his and his family’s safety, we must

evaluate what his likely decision would have been at the time

of the plea — albeit with the hypothetical benefit of competent advice. And it is reasonable to expect that a competent

attorney would have advised Hanson that he stood a good

chance of obtaining a sentence well below the (correctly

calculated) guidelines range if he followed through on his

pledge of cooperation.

Third, had Hanson proceeded to trial and been convicted,

his prior convictions would have dictated a mandatory life

sentence. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Although Hanson

asserts that his counsel did not tell him and that he did not

know he faced a life sentence at the time he agreed to plead

guilty, there is evidence to the contrary.6

 In any event, in

order to satisfy the prejudice requirement, Hanson must

show that it is reasonably likely he would have insisted on

going to trial ‘‘but for counsel’s errors,’’ Hill, 474 U.S. at 59,

which means all of counsel’s errors, not just some of them.

6 This includes Daum’s statement at the plea hearing that the

government had agreed not to file an enhancement notice (which

would have made the mandatory life provision applicable). It also

includes the testimony of a police officer that, after Hanson’s arrest,

the officer told Hanson that he was facing ‘‘letters’’ not ‘‘numbers’’ — meaning a life sentence rather than a term of years — and

that on hearing that information Hanson had lowered his head and

‘‘slouched.’’ 11/9/01 Tr. at 60–61. On cross-examination, Hanson

acknowledged that he knew what the phrase ‘‘letters not numbers’’

meant, but denied that anyone had told him that was what he faced.

Id. at 40–41.
14

The Hill/Strickland inquiry focuses on what the defendant

would have done had he been advised by a competent attorney, not one who was merely partially incompetent. And

there is no question but that a competent attorney would

have advised Hanson of the mandatory minimum sentence he

faced. See Booze, 293 F.3d at 518–19.7

Finally, any competent attorney would also have advised

Hanson that he stood little chance of obtaining an acquittal at

trial. The evidence of his participation in the two drug

transactions with which he was charged was overwhelming,

while his only defense — entrapment — was exceedingly

weak. To be sure, Hanson does not need to show that he

would have prevailed at trial, only that there was a reasonable probability that he ‘‘would have gone to trial.’’ McCoy,

215 F.3d at 108 (emphasis added). But any rational decision

regarding the latter would have required a realistic assessment of the former. And we think it extremely doubtful that,

had he been advised that the sentencing range for conviction

after a guilty plea was 262 to 327 months, with a reasonable

reduction anticipated for cooperation, Hanson (who was only

25 years old) would have chosen to go to trial despite the

overwhelming likelihood that as a consequence he would

spend the rest of his life in jail.

We conclude that Hanson has failed to show that ‘‘there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would

not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to

trial.’’ Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. Accordingly, the district court

7 As the defendant correctly notes, we reversed a district court’s

refusal to withdraw a guilty plea in McCoy, where the defendant

also faced the risk of a mandatory life sentence if he lost at trial.

But the defendant in McCoy did not have Hanson’s advantage on

the other side of the ledger: the opportunity for a reduced sentence

if he pled guilty and cooperated with the government. In addition,

in McCoy the district court not only did not warn the defendant

against relying on sentencing predictions, it failed to advise him of

the maximum statutory penalty. See McCoy, 215 F.3d at 105, 106,

108.
15

did not err in holding that Hanson’s guilty plea was not

tainted by the ineffective assistance of his counsel.

V

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district

court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hanson’s motion

to withdraw his guilty plea. The judgment of that court is

therefore

Affirmed.