May 11 2015 

NSIR/DPR-ISG-02 

INTERIM STAFF GUIDANCE

EMERGENCY PLANNING EXEMPTION REQUESTS 

FOR DECOMMISSIONING NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 
2 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

1.0 Purpose ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 3 

2.0 Scope --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3 

3.0 Background ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4 

4.0 Overview of Existing Guidance --------------------------------------------------------------------- 6 

5.0 Evaluation of Exemptions to EP Regulations ------------------------------------------------- 9 

Table 1 Exemptions for Consideration ----------------------------------------------------------------- 11 

References ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 31 

Attachment 1 Staff Guidance for Evaluating Permanently Defueled 

Emergency Plans --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 33 

Attachment 2 Previously Approved Licensing Actions ------------------------------------------ 45 

 
3 

1.0 PURPOSE

This interim staff guidance (ISG) provides guidance to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC) staff for conducting the technical review of requests for exemptions from the emergency 

preparedness (EP) requirements for nuclear power reactors that have been permanently shut 

down and defueled or are planning to transition to a decommissioning state. Guidance for the 

staff’s review of associated changes to the licensee’s emergency plan reflecting the EP 

exemptions, as granted, and based on the reactor’s permanently shutdown and defueled 

condition, is also provided in this ISG. 

Licensees must follow the process outlined in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 

CFR) Part 50, “Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities,” Section 50.12, 

“Specific Exemptions,” when applying for exemptions from Part 50 EP regulations. 

Table 1, “Exemptions for Consideration,” of this ISG should be considered by the staff as one 

acceptable means for reviewing the adequacy of the licensee’s request for exemptions from 

portions of 10 CFR 50.47, “Emergency Plans,” and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, “Emergency 

Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities,” submitted for NRC 

approval under 10 CFR 50.12. 

Staff requirements memorandum (SRM) to SECY-08-0024 requires Commission approval for 

any reduction in the effectiveness of a licensee’s emergency plan that requires an exemption 

from the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. SECY-14-0066 

provides an example format to make this request to the Commission. 

Each licensee must evaluate, under 10 CFR 50.54(q), changes to its emergency plan that 

implements proposed exemptions that reflect the plant’s permanently shut down and defueled 

condition to assess whether the changed plan, referred to hereafter as the permanently 

defueled emergency plan (PDEP), constitutes a reduction in effectiveness. Attachment 1, “Staff 

Guidance for Evaluation of Permanently Defueled Emergency Plans,” of this ISG should be 

used by the staff as an acceptable means for reviewing the adequacy of the licensee’s PDEP 

submitted for NRC approval under 10 CFR 50.90, “Application for Amendment of License, 

Construction Permit or Early Site Permit.” 

Changes to a licensee’s emergency action levels (EALs) to reflect the permanently shut down 

and defueled condition of the reactor, should be considered a scheme change per Section 

IV.B.2 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) document 

NEI 99-01, Revision 6, “Development of Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactors” 

(Reference 1), should be used by staff as an acceptable means for reviewing the adequacy of 

EAL scheme changes for permanently shut down and defueled power reactors. 

2.0 SCOPE 

This ISG is applicable to a nuclear power reactor licensee that has: (1) notified the NRC of its 

intent to permanently cease operation and to permanently remove fuel from the reactor vessel; 

(2) fuel currently in “wet” storage onsite in a spent fuel pool (SFP); and (3) a decommissioning 

power reactor that is not co-located on the site of an operating power reactor. If a nuclear 

power reactor designated to undergo decommissioning is co-located on the site of an operating 

nuclear power reactor, the NRC anticipates that the licensee will make changes to the site 

emergency plan, but requests for exemptions from emergency planning regulations are not 

expected because the operating unit licensee will have to maintain its current level of 
4 

emergency preparedness. As the licensee transistions through the decommission process, it is 

expected that the spent fuel will be transferred into a dry cask storage system. The licensee will 

make changes to its emergency plan to relect the dry cask storage, if not previously done. After 

this transfer is completed the licensee may consider change its emergency plan to reflect the 

dry cask system only. This ISG does not provide that guidance. The Office of Nuclear 

Materials Safeguards and Security Spent Fuel Project Office Interim Staff Guidance – 16, 

“Emergency Planning,” provides the appropriate guidance for fuel stored in a dry cask storage 

facility consistent with the EP requirements in 10 CFR 72.32, “Emergency Plan.” It is 

recommended that the licensee discuss these changes with the staff prior to implementation. 

The ISG reflects only exemptions from regulations that have been approved previously for 

decommissioning power reactors. The ISG provides in Table 1, “Exemptions for Consideration,” 

the criteria and process used most recently by NRC staff in its evaluation of exemptions from 

EP regulations in SECY-14-0066, “Request By Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc. for 

Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning Requirements” (Reference 2) and SECY-14-

0118, “Request By Duke Energy Florida, Inc. for Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning 

Requirements” (Reference 3), as approved by the Commission in Staff Requirements 

Memoranda dated August 7, 2014, (Reference 4), and December 30, 2014, (Reference 5), 

respectively. 

3.0 BACKGROUND 

The purposes of the EP requirements in 10 CFR 50.47 and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 are 

to ensure that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be 

taken in the event of a radiological emergency, establish plume exposure and ingestion pathway 

emergency planning zones (EPZs) for nuclear power plants, and ensure that licensees maintain 

effective offsite and onsite emergency plans, with the cooperation and assistance of State and 

local authorities. These requirements continue to apply to a nuclear power reactor licensee 

after permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel. 

There are no explicit regulatory provisions distinguishing EP requirements for a power reactor 

that has been shut down from those for an operating power reactor. 

The regulations in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) provide that the NRC may, on application by a 

licensee or on its own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of the Part 50 

regulations in circumstances in which application of the regulation would not serve the 

underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the 

rule1

. 

The risk of an offsite radiological release is significantly lower, and the types of possible 

accidents are significantly fewer, at a nuclear power reactor that has permanently ceased 

operations and removed fuel from the reactor vessel, than at an operating power reactor. The 

NRC has previously granted exemptions from EP requirements for permanently shut down and 

defueled power reactor licensees. For the Trojan Nuclear Power Plant, Connecticut Yankee 

Nuclear Power Plant, Maine Yankee Nuclear Power Plant, Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant 

and Zion Nuclear Power Station, the technical basis for the approvals of the exemptions was 

 

1 Notwithstanding the special circumstances of the exemption request, 10 CFR 50.12(a)(1) requires that the 

exemption must be authorized by law, not present an undue risk to the public health and safety, and be consistent 

with the common defense and security. 
5 

based on demonstrating that: (1) the radiological consequences of remaining applicable 

design-basis accidents (DBAs) would not exceed the limits of the U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency’s (EPA) Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs) at the exclusion area boundary (EAB); and 

(2) based on site-specific analysis, the fuel stored in the SFP would not reach the zirconium 

ignition temperature in fewer than 10 hours from the time at which the licensee assumed a loss 

of both water and air cooling of the spent fuel. The staff concluded that if a minimum of 10 

hours was available to initiate mitigative actions or, if needed, for offsite authorities to implement 

protective actions using a comprehensive emergency management plan2

 (CEMP) approach, 

formal offsite radiological emergency plans, required under 10 CFR Part 50, are not necessary 

for permanently shutdown and defueled nuclear power reactor licensees.3

 More recently, 

requests for exemptions from specific EP requirements have been granted for Kewaunee Power 

Station and Crystal River Unit 3. In addition to the analyses described above, the technical 

basis for approving these requests also included demonstrations that adequate security remains 

to protect the spent fuel and that adequate mitigation strategies can performed by the on-site 

staff. 

The NRC requires a level of licensee EP commensurate with the risk to public health and safety, 

and common defense and security at the licensee’s site. Under the safety analysis in NUREG1738, “Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power 

Plants,” (Reference 6), the event sequences important to risk at a decommissioning power 

reactor are limited to a large earthquake and cask-drop events. This is an important difference 

relative to an operating power reactor where typically a large number of different initiating 

events make significant contributions to risk. Additionally, physical security for special nuclear 

material at fixed sites, including decommissioning power reactors, is required by 10 CFR Part 

73, “Physical Protection of Plants and Materials.” Decommissioning power reactor licensees 

are required by 10 CFR 73.55(f) to develop target sets for use in the development and 

implementation of security strategies that protect against spent fuel sabotage. While both 

operating and decommissioning power reactors are required to develop target sets, the number 

of target sets at a decommissioning reactor is significantly reduced. Implementation of the 

protective strategy at a decommissioning reactor takes into account this reduction in target sets. 

With the significant reduction in radiological risk for a power reactor undergoing 

decommissioning, the NRC has historically approved exemptions to EP and security 

requirements based on site-specific justifications by licensees as well as consideration of the 

objectives of the regulations. 

 

2 A comprehensive emergency management plan in this context, also referred to as an emergency operations plan 

(EOP), is addressed in the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Comprehensive Preparedness 

Guide (CPG) 101, “Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans”. CPG 101 is the foundation for 

State, territorial, tribal, and local emergency planning in the United States. It promotes a common understanding of 

the fundamentals of risk-informed planning and decisionmaking and helps planners at all levels of government in 

their efforts to develop and maintain viable, all-hazards, all-threats emergency plans. An EOP is flexible enough for 

use in all emergencies. It describes how people and property will be protected; details who is responsible for 

carrying out specific actions; identifies the personnel, equipment, facilities, supplies, and other resources available; 

and outlines how all actions will be coordinated. A CEMP is often referred to as a synonym for “all hazards 

planning.” 

3 Individual States and local governments have the primary authority and responsibility to protect their citizens and 

respond to disasters and emergencies. An exemption, if issued, could create a transitional environment for off-site 

emergency planners in how they consider radiological hazards. The resources available to support State and local 

governments during the transition process include, but are not limited to, the National Preparedness System 

guidance materials (see footnote 2), the Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee, and 

assistance from FEMA headquarters and regional staff. 
6 

Attachment 2, “Previously Approved Licensing Actions,” provides a listing of decommissioning 

power reactors and the bases provided in support of reducing EP requirements in 10 CFR 

Part 50, specifically the elimination of formal offsite radiological emergency plans. 

4.0 OVERVIEW OF EXISTING GUIDANCE 

In August 1997, the NRC published NUREG/CR-6451, “A Safety and Regulatory Assessment of 

Generic Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) and Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) Permanently 

Shutdown Nuclear Power Plants,” (Reference 7) which provided recommendations on 

operationally-based regulations that could be partially or totally removed for decommissioning 

power reactor licensees without impacting public health and safety. It recommended that 

licensees apply for exemptions from the following offsite EP requirements, after the fuel is no 

longer susceptible to substantial zircaloy oxidation and the fuel cladding will remain intact given 

the SFP is drained: 

• early public notification (§50.47(b)(5) and Appendix E, Section IV.D.3);

• the periodic dissemination of emergency planning information to the public (§50.47(b)(7) 

and Appendix E, Section IV.E.8);

• offsite emergency facilities and equipment such as the Emergency Operations Facility 

and the emergency news center (§50.47(b)(8), Appendix E, Section IV.E.8);

• offsite radiological assessment and monitoring capability, including field monitoring 

teams (§50.47(b)(9));

• periodic offsite drills and exercises (§50.47(b)(14), Appendix E, Section IV.F.3); and

• licensee headquarters support personnel training (§50.47(b)(15), Appendix E, Section 

IV.F.b.viii).

The underlying technical basis for exemptions granted for licensees undergoing 

decommissioning in the late 1990s was a case by case demonstration that: (1) the radiological 

consequences of applicable DBAs would not exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at the EAB; 

and (2) the spent fuel stored in the SFP would not reach the zirconium ignition temperature in 

fewer than 10 hours starting from the time at which the licensee assumed a loss of both water 

and air cooling of the spent fuel (referred to as an adiabatic heat-up). The staff concluded that if 

a minimum of 10 hours was available to initiate mitigative actions, or if needed, for offsite 

authorities to implement protective actions using a CEMP approach, formal offsite radiological 

emergency plans, required under 10 CFR Part 50, are not necessary for permanently shut down 

and defueled power reactor licensees. 

The 10 hour time period is based on a heat-up calculation which uses several simplifying 

assumptions (adiabatic conditions). Some of these assumptions are conservative 

(e.g., simplified treatment of the thermal-hydraulic response), while others are nonconservative 

(e.g., no oxidation below 900 degrees Celsius). Weighing the conservatisms and 

nonconservatisms, the staff judges that this calculation reasonably represents conditions that 

may occur in the event of an SFP accident involving the loss of water inventory. In an example 

of a more mechanistic calculation, NUREG-2161, “Consequence Study of a Beyond-DesignBasis Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I Boiling-Water Reactor” 

(Reference 8), considered various cooling mechanisms as well as additional heat from 

oxidation. The study found that a release is not expected to occur at the operating power 

reactor site studied for at least 72 hours following a beyond design-basis seismic event that 

occurs more than 60 days after shutdown. 
7 

In a hypothetical spent fuel pool accident scenario, 10 hours is not the expected amount of time 

it would take for water to drain from the pool. A beyond design-basis accident that results in the 

water draining from the pool (whether a full or partial drain-down) would likely take much longer 

than 10 hours because of the robust construction of the spent fuel pool and the large volume of 

water in the pool. The 10-hour time period is also not intended to represent the time that it 

would take to repair all key safety systems or to repair a large SFP breach. Considering the 

very low probability of beyond-design-basis events affecting the SFP, a minimum of 10 hours 

provides a reasonable time period to implement pre-planned mitigation measures to provide 

makeup or spray to the SFP before the onset of a zirconium cladding ignition and, if a release is 

projected to occur, there is sufficient time for offsite agencies to take protective actions using a 

CEMP to protect the health and safety of the public. 

In January 2001, the NRC published NUREG-1738 as the technical basis for the 

decommissioning rulemaking for permanently shut down nuclear power plants proposed in 

SECY-00-0145, “Integrated Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power Plant Decommissioning” 

(Reference 9). NUREG-1738 contained the results of the staff’s evaluation of the potential 

accident risk for a SFP at a decommissioning power reactor in the United States. Specifically, 

NUREG-1738 stated that fuel assembly geometry and rack configuration are plant specific, and 

both are subject to unpredictable changes after an earthquake or cask drop that drains the pool. 

Therefore, because a non-negligible decay heat source lasts many years and configurations 

ensuring sufficient air flow for cooling cannot be assured, the possibility of reaching the 

zirconium ignition temperature cannot be precluded on a generic basis. 

NUREG-1738 identified a zirconium cladding fire resulting from a substantial loss-of-water from 

the SFP as the only postulated scenario at a decommissioning power reactor that could result in 

a significant radiological release. While unlikely, the consequences of such an accident could 

lead to an offsite dose in excess of the EPA PAGs. Based on spent fuel storage design 

characteristics and operating practices considered in the analysis, the scenarios that lead to this 

condition have very low probabilities of occurrence. Accordingly, these scenarios are 

considered beyond the facility design basis. Furthermore, as the spent fuel ages, the 

generation of decay heat decreases. After a certain amount of time, the overall threat of a 

zirconium fire becomes extremely low because of two factors: (1) the large amount of time 

available for preventative and mitigating actions; and (2) the increased probability that the decay 

heat will be low enough that the fuel will be air-coolable in the post-event configuration. This 

lower risk supports the reduction of EP requirements as described in Table 1 of this ISG. 

The staff recognizes that at the time the exemption is granted, the risk of a significant offsite 

radiological release at a decommissioning power reactor storing irradiated fuel in the SFP is 

lower than the risk from an operating power reactor and its SFP. This is based on the 

consideration of initiating reactor events associated with normal and abnormal operations, DBAs 

and certain beyond DBAs applicable to a decommissioning site. In NUREG-1738, the staff 

found that the event sequences important to risk at decommissioning plants are limited to large 

earthquakes and cask drop events. For EP assessments, this is an important difference relative 

to operating power reactors where typically a large number of different sequences make 

significant contributions to risk. Relaxation of offsite EP a few months after shutdown resulted in 

only a small change in risk. In NUREG-1738, the NRC also stated, “for comparison, at 

operating reactors additional risk-significant accidents for which EP is expected to provide dose 

savings occurs on the order of 1 x 10-5 times per year, while for decommissioning facilities, the 

largest contributor for which EP would provide dose savings occurs about two orders of 

magnitude less frequent (cask drop sequence at 2 x 10-7 per year)” and “consistent with 
8 

[probabilistic risk assessment] limitations and practice, contributions to risk from safeguards 

events are not included in these frequency estimates.” 

As stated in NUREG-1738, due to the expected state of infrastructure in the event of 

earthquakes of the magnitude to damage SFPs, EP is not considered to provide significant dose 

savings in those scenarios. 

Because of the lower comparative risk from a decommissioning power reactor, licensees 

typically request an exemption from certain EP regulations on the basis that those regulations in 

the particular circumstance are not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the EP 

regulations.

In SECY-01-0100, “Policy Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance, and Emergency 

Preparedness Regulations at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants Storing Fuel in Spent 

Fuel Pools” (Reference 10), the staff concluded that there was no immediate safety concern or 

need for immediate regulatory action for existing decommissioning power reactor licensees that 

had been previously granted EP exemptions. These conclusions were based on a review of the 

site-specific conditions at each existing decommissioning plant and the low probability of the 

beyond-design-basis conditions occurring that would be necessary to initiate a zirconium 

cladding fire. The staff proposed regulations for maintaining a level of offsite EP consistent with 

the Commission’s defense-in-depth philosophy while utilizing the risk insights of NUREG-1738. 

However, in a memorandum from the Executive Director for Operations to the Commission 

dated August 16, 2002 (Reference 11), the staff notified the Commission that it had 

discontinued the integrated rulemaking for decommissioning power reactors and generic 

regulatory activities because of the apparent lack of future licensees that would benefit from 

such regulations at that time and the need to devote resources to security related issues 

because of the events of September 11, 2001. Additionally, the staff provided that if any 

operating power reactors were to shutdown permanently, decommissioning regulatory issues 

would continue to be addressed on an ad hoc basis through the exemption process in a manner 

based on the then-current practice. 

In 2013, the NRC completed the “Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake 

Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I Boiling Water Reactor,” which was subsequently 

published as NUREG-2161 (Reference 8). The purpose of this study was to determine if 

accelerated transfer of older, cooler spent fuel from the SFP at a reference plant to dry cask 

storage would significantly reduce risks to public health and safety. The specific reference plant 

used for this study was a General Electric Type 4 BWR with a Mark I containment. This study 

presented a detailed analysis using state-of-the-art, validated, deterministic methods and 

assumptions, as well as probabilistic insights where practical. Previous studies had shown that 

earthquakes present the dominant risk for SFPs, so this analysis considered a severe 

earthquake with ground motion stronger than the maximum earthquake reasonably expected to 

occur for the reference plant, which would challenge the SFP integrity. The study considered 

two spent fuel configurations: high-density and low-density loading. The study also analyzed 

two cases for each scenario: one where mitigation measures of 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2), the 

strategies to maintain or restore SFP cooling in the event of loss of large areas of the plant due 

to fire or explosion, were credited; and one where they were not used or were unsuccessful. 

The study did not consider the post-Fukushima mitigation measures required by Orders EA-12-

049, “Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for 

Beyond-Design-Basis External Events” (Reference 12), and EA-12-051, “Order Modifying 

Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation” (Reference 13). The study 

results showed that successful mitigation reduces the likelihood of a release and that the 
9 

likelihood of a release was equally low for both high- and low-density loading in the SFP. The 

results of NUREG-2161 are consistent with earlier research conclusions that SFPs are robust 

structures that are likely to withstand severe earthquakes without leaking. 

5.0 EVALUATION OF EXEMPTIONS TO EP REGULATIONS 

NRC staff should consider approval for the exemption of EP requirements for decommissioning 

power reactor licensees in cases where the specific site analyses show that: (1) the radiological 

consequences of remaining applicable DBAs would not exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at 

the EAB; (2) in the event of a beyond design basis event resulting in the partial drain down of 

the SFP to the point that cooling is not effective, there is at least 10 hours (assuming an 

adiabatic heatup) from the time that the fuel is no longer being cooled until the hottest fuel 

assembly reaches 900 degrees Celsius; (3) adequate physical security is in place to assure 

implementation of security strategies that protect against spent fuel sabotage; and (4) in the 

unlikely event of a beyond DBA resulting in a loss of all SFP cooling, there is sufficient time to 

implement pre-planned mitigation measures to provide makeup or spray to the SFP before the 

onset of a zirconium cladding ignition. 

The analyses that are expected to be performed by the licensees and reviewed by NRC staff 

are: 

1. Applicable design DBAs (i.e., fuel handling accident in the spent fuel storage facility, 

waste gas system release, and cask handling accident if the cask handling system is not 

licensed as single-failure-proof) (Indicates that any radiological release would not 

exceed the limits of EPA PAGs at EAB); 

2. Complete loss of SFP water inventory with no heat loss (adiabatic heatup) 

demonstrating a minimum of 10 hours is available before any fuel cladding temperature 

reaches 900 degrees Celsius from the time all cooling is lost (Demonstrates sufficient 

time to mitigate events that could lead to a zirconium cladding fire); 

3. Loss of SFP water inventory resulting in radiation exposure at the EAB and control room; 

(Indicates that any release is less than EPA PAGs at EAB); and 

4. Considering the site-specific seismic hazard, either an evaluation demonstrating a high 

confidence of a low-probability (less than 1 x 10-5 per year) of seismic failure of the spent 

fuel storage pool structure or an analysis demonstrating the fuel has decayed sufficiently 

that natural air flow in a completely drained pool would maintain peak cladding 

temperature below 565 degrees Celsius (the point of incipient cladding damage) 

(Indicates that any release is less than EPA PAGs at EAB). 

5. The analyses and conclusions described in NUREG-1738 are predicated on the risk 

reduction measures identified in the study as Industry Decommissioning Commitments 

(IDC) and Staff Decommissioning Assumptions (SDA), listed in Tables 4.1-1 and 4.1-2 of 

that document. The staff should ensure that the licensee has addressed these IDCs and 

SDAs for the decommissioning site if they are storing fuel in an SFP. 

6. Verify that the licensee presents a determination that there is sufficient resources and 

adequately trained personnel available on-shift to initiate mitigative actions within the 10-
10 

hour minimum time period that will prevent an offsite radiological release that exceeds 

the EPA PAGs at the EAB. 

7. Verify that mitigation strategies are consistent with that required by the Permanently 

Defueled Technical Specifications or by retained license conditions. 

Approval of the request for exemption from certain requirements of 10 CFR 50.47 and 

Appendix E to Part 50 allows licensees to submit for NRC prior approval a PDEP and a 

permanently defueled EAL scheme. After approval of the exemption request, the licensee may 

determine that adoption of a PDEP does not constitute a reduction in effectiveness to the 

emergency plan per 10 CFR 50.54(q) because of the change in the licensing basis for the plant, 

and as such, the licensee may opt to implement the change without prior NRC approval. 

Adoption of permanently defueled EALs is considered to be a scheme change, and per the 

requirements of Section IV.B.2 to Appendix E of Part 50, shall be submitted as a license 

amendment request pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90. 

Table 1 of this ISG outlines potential exemption requests, based on the Commission’s Staff 

Requirements Memorandum (SRM) dated August 7, 2014 for SECY-14-0066, “Request By 

Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc., for Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning 

Requirements.” Differences or deviations from Table 1 will be reviewed on a case-by-case 

basis. Licensees should provide site-specific justification for each requirement requested for 

exemption. The information in the “Basis for Change” column is provided to NRC reviewers for 

historical reference and to aid in the review of the information supplied by the licensee.
Table 1 

EXEMPTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION 

Strikethrough text indicates requested exemptions to rule language. 

11 

10 CFR 50.47 Emergency Plans Basis for Change 

(b) The onsite and, except as provided in 

paragraph (d) of this section, offsite

emergency response plans for nuclear power 

reactors must meet the following standards: 

In the Statement of Considerations (SOCs) for the final 

rule for EP requirements for independent spent fuel 

storage installations (ISFSIs) and for monitored 

retrievable storage installations (MRS) (60 FR 32430; 

June 22, 1995), the Commission responded to 

comments concerning offsite emergency planning for 

ISFSIs or MRS and concluded that, “the offsite 

consequences of potential accidents at an ISFSI or an 

MRS would not warrant establishing Emergency 

Planning Zones [EPZs].” 

The low likelihood of any credible accident resulting in a 

radiological release at a decommissioning power 

reactor, together with the time available to initiate 

mitigative actions consistent with plant conditions, and if 

necessary, for offsite authorities to employ their CEMP 

to take protective actions between the initiating event 

and before the onset of a postulated fire, obviate the 

need for formal offsite radiological emergency response 

plans.

In a nuclear power reactor’s permanently defueled state, 

the accident risks are more similar to an ISFSI or MRS 

than an operating nuclear power plant. The EP program 

would be similar to that required for an ISFSI under 10 

CFR 72.32(a) when fuel stored in the SFP has more 

than five years of decay time and would not change 

substantially when all the fuel is transferred from the 

SFP to an onsite ISFSI. Exemptions from offsite EP 

requirements have previously been approved when the 

site-specific analyses show that in a partial drain-down 

event, at least 10 hours is available from the time when 

cooling of the spent fuel is not effective until the hottest 

fuel assembly reaches 900°C. The technical basis that 

underlied the approval of the exemption request is 

based partly on the analysis of a time period that spent 

fuel stored in the SFP is unlikely to reach the zirconium 

ignition temperature in less than 10 hours. This time 

period is based on a heat-up calculation which uses 

several simplifying assumptions. Some of these 

assumptions are conservative (adiabatic conditions), 

while others are non-conservative (no oxidation below 

900°C). Weighing the conservatisms and 

nonconservatisms, the staff judges that this calculation 

reasonably represents conditions which may occur in 

the event of an SFP accident. 

The staff concluded that if 10 hours were available to 

initiate mitigative actions, or if needed, offsite protective 
Table 1 

EXEMPTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION 

Strikethrough text indicates requested exemptions to rule language. 

12 

10 CFR 50.47 Emergency Plans Basis for Change 

actions using CEMP, formal offsite radiological 

emergency plans would not be necessary for a 

permanently defueled nuclear power reactor licensee. 

As supported by the licensee’s SFP analysis, the staff 

believes an exemption from the requirements for formal 

offsite radiological emergency plans is justified for a 

zirconium fire scenario considering the low likelihood of 

this event together with time available to take mitigative 

or protective actions between the initiating event and 

before the onset of a postulated fire. 

(1) Primary responsibilities for emergency 

response by the nuclear facility licensee and 

by State and local organizations within the 

Emergency Planning Zones have been 

assigned, the emergency responsibilities of 

the various supporting organizations have 

been specifically established, and each 

principal response organization has staff to 

respond and to augment its initial response on 

a continuous basis. 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47 (b). 

(3) Arrangements for requesting and 

effectively using assistance resources have 

been made, arrangements to accommodate 

State and local staff at the licensee’s 

Emergency Operations Facility have been 

made, and other organizations capable of 

augmenting the planned response have been 

identified. 

An Emergency Operations Facility is an offsite location 

where effective direction and effective control can be 

exercised in an emergency. Due to the limited 

radiological consequences associated with postulated 

events at a permanently shutdown and defueled power 

reactor and the limited offsite resources considered to 

be necessary in an emergency at the site, a designated 

facility to accommodate State and local staff is no longer 

required. An onsite facility can provide a place for 

effective direction and effective control inan emergency. 

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 

(4) A standard emergency classification and 

action level scheme, the basis of which 

include facility system and effluent 

parameters, is in use by the nuclear facility 

licensee, and State and local response plans 

call for reliance on information provided by 

facility licensees for determinations of 

minimum initial offsite response measures. 

The NEI document NEI 99-01, “Development of 

Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactors” 

(Revision 6), was found to be an acceptable method for 

development of EALs and was endorsed by the NRC in 

a letter dated March 28, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML12346A463). NEI 99-01 provides EALs for nonpassive operating nuclear power reactors, permanently 

defueled reactors and ISFSIs 

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 

(5) Procedures have been established for 

notification, by the licensee, of State and local 

response organizations and for notification of 

emergency personnel by all organizations; the 

content of initial and follow up messages to 

response organizations and the public has 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 
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13 

10 CFR 50.47 Emergency Plans Basis for Change 

been established; and means to provide early 

notification and clear instruction to the 

populace within the plume exposure pathway 

Emergency Planning Zone have been 

established. 

(6) Provisions exist for prompt 

communications among principal response 

organizations to emergency personnel and to 

the public. 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 

(7) Information is made available to the public 

on a periodic basis on how they will be notified 

and what their initial actions should be in an 

emergency (e.g., listening to a local broadcast 

station and remaining indoors), [T]he principal 

points of contact with the news media for 

dissemination of information during an 

emergency (including the physical location or 

locations) are established in advance, and 

procedures for coordinated dissemination of 

information to the public are established. 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 

(9) Adequate methods, systems, and 

equipment for assessing and monitoring actual 

or potential offsite consequences of a 

radiological emergency condition are in use. 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b) 

(10) A range of protective actions has been 

developed for the plume exposure pathway 

EPZ for emergency workers and the public. In 

developing this range of actions, consideration 

has been given to evacuation, sheltering, and, 

as a supplement to these, the prophylactic use 

of potassium iodide (KI), as appropriate. 

Evacuation time estimates have been 

developed by applicants and licensees. 

Licensees shall update the evacuation time 

estimates on a periodic basis. Guidelines for 

the choice of protective actions during an 

emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, 

are developed and in place, and protective 

actions for the ingestion exposure pathway 

EPZ appropriate to the locale have been 

developed.

Licensees are responsible to provide protective actions 

for any emergency workers that may have to respond to 

the site for fire, medical and/or law enforcement 

response. Additionally, the licensee is responsible to 

protect public health and safety in case of an 

emergency within the EAB. 

In the unlikely event of a SFP accident, the iodine 

isotopes which contribute to an off-site dose from an 

operating reactor accident are not present, so 

potassium iodide (KI) distribution off-site would no 

longer serve as an effective or necessary supplemental 

protective action. 

The Commission responded to comments in its SOC for 

the Final Rule for emergency planning requirements for 

ISFSIs and MRS facilities (60 FR 32435; June 22, 

1995), and concluded that, “the offsite consequences of 

potential accidents at an ISFSI or a MRS would not 

warrant establishing Emergency Planning Zones.” 

Additionally, in the Statement of Considerations for the 

Final Rule for EP requirements for ISFSIs and for MRS 

facilities (60 FR 32430), the Commission responded to 

comments concerning site-specific emergency planning 

that includes evacuation of surrounding population for 
Table 1 

EXEMPTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION 

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14 

10 CFR 50.47 Emergency Plans Basis for Change 

an ISFSI not at a reactor site, and concluded that, “The 

Commission does not agree that as a general matter 

emergency plans for an ISFSI must include evacuation 

planning.” 

Because the NRC concludes that evacuation planning is 

not needed for a decommissioning reactor site that 

meets the criteria for an exemption from offsite EP 

requirements as discussed in the exemption from 10 

CFR 50.47(b), evacuation time estimates are also not 

needed. 

(c)(2) Generally, the plume exposure pathway 

EPZ for nuclear power plants shall consist of 

an area about 10 miles (16 km) in radius and 

the ingestion pathway EPZ shall consist of an 

area about 50 miles (80 km) in radius. The 

exact size and configuration of the EPZs 

surrounding a particular nuclear power reactor 

shall be determined in relation to local 

emergency response needs and capabilities 

as they are affected by such conditions as 

demography, topography, land characteristics, 

access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries.

The size of the EPZs also may be determined 

on a case-by-case basis for gas-cooled 

nuclear reactors and for reactors with an 

authorized power level less than 250 MW 

thermal. The plans for the ingestion pathway 

shall focus on such actions as are appropriate 

to protect the food ingestion pathway.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). 
Table 1 

EXEMPTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION 

Strikethrough text indicates requested exemptions to rule language. 

15 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Basis for Change 

1. The applicant's emergency plans shall 

contain, but not necessarily be limited to, 

information needed to demonstrate 

compliance with the elements set forth below, 

i.e., organization for coping with radiological 

emergencies, assessment actions, activation 

of emergency organization, notification 

procedures, emergency facilities and 

equipment, training, maintaining emergency 

preparedness, and recovery, and onsite 

protective actions during hostile action. In 

addition, the emergency response plans 

submitted by an applicant for a nuclear power 

reactor operating license under this Part, or for 

an early site permit (as applicable) or 

combined license under 10 CFR Part 52, shall 

contain information needed to demonstrate 

compliance with the standards described in 

§ 50.47(b), and they will be evaluated against 

those standards. 

The EP Final Rule (76 FR 72560; November 23, 2011), 

amended certain requirements in 10 CFR Part 50. 

Among the changes, the definition of “hostile action” 

was added as an act directed toward a nuclear power 

plant (NPP) or its personnel. This definition is based on 

the definition of “hostile action” provided in NRC Bulletin 

2005-02, “Emergency Preparedness and Response 

Actions for Security-Based Events.” NRC Bulletin 

2005-02 was not applicable to nuclear power reactors 

that have permanently ceased operations and have 

certified that fuel has been removed from the reactor 

vessel. 

The NRC excluded non-power reactors from the 

definition of "hostile action" at the time of the rulemaking 

because, as defined in 10 CFR 50.2, a non-power 

reactor is not considered a nuclear power reactor and a 

regulatory basis had not been developed to support the 

inclusion of non-power reactors in the definition of 

"hostile action." Similarly, a decommissioning power 

reactor or ISFSI is not a “nuclear reactor” as defined in 

the NRC’s regulations. A decommissioning power 

reactor also has a low likelihood of a credible accident 

resulting in radiological releases requiring offsite 

protective measures. For all of these reasons, the staff 

concludes that a decommissioning power reactor is not 

a facility that falls within the definition of “hostile action.” 

Similarly, for security, risk insights can be used to 

determine which targets are important to protect against 

sabotage. A level of security commensurate with the 

consequences of a sabotage event is required and is 

evaluated on a site-specific basis. The severity of the 

consequences declines as fuel ages and, thereby, 

removes over time the underlying concern that a 

sabotage attack, under the current definition, could 

cause offsite radiological consequences. 

Although, this analysis provides a justification for an 

exemption to include the definition for a “hostile action” 

and its related requirements, elements for securitybased events would be maintained. The classification of 

security-based events, notification of offsite authorities 

and coordination with offsite agencies under a CEMP 

would still be required. Other security-related 

requirements in the EP Final Rule would be exempted 

such as, on-shift staffing analysis, emergency response 

organization (ERO) augmentation and alternative 

facilities, protection of onsite personnel, and challenging 
Table 1 

EXEMPTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION 

Strikethrough text indicates requested exemptions to rule language. 

16 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Basis for Change 

drills and exercises due to the reduced radiological risk 

for a decommissioning power reactor. 

2. This nuclear power reactor license applicant 

shall also provide an analysis of the time 

required to evacuate varioussectors and 

distances within the plume exposure pathway 

EPZ for transient andpermanent populations, 

using the most recent U.S. Census Bureau 

data as of the date the applicant submits its 

application to the NRC. 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) 

3. Nuclear power reactor licensees shall use 

NRC approved evacuation time estimates 

(ETEs) and updates to the ETEs in the 

formulation of protective action 

recommendations and shall provide the ETEs 

and ETE updates to State and local 

governmental authorities for use in developing 

offsite protective action strategies.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). 

4. Within 365 days of the later of the date of 

the availability of the most recent decennial 

census data from the U.S. Census Bureau or 

December 23, 2011, nuclear power reactor 

licensees shall develop an ETE analysis using 

this decennial data and submit it under § 50.4 

to the NRC. These licensees shall submit this 

ETE analysis to the NRC at least 180 days 

before using it to form protective action 

recommendations and providing it to State and 

local governmental authorities for use in 

developing offsite protective action strategies

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section 

IV.3. 

5. During the years between decennial 

censuses, nuclear power reactor licensees 

shall estimate EPZ permanent resident 

population changes once a year, but no later 

than 365 days from the date of the previous 

estimate, using the most recent U.S. Census 

Bureau annual resident population estimate 

and State/local government population data, if 

available. These licensees shall maintain 

these estimates so that they are available for 

NRC inspection during the period between 

decennial censuses and shall submit these 

estimates to the NRC with any updated ETE 

analysis.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section 

IV.3. 

6. If at any time during the decennial period, 

the EPZ permanent resident population 

increases such that it causes the longest ETE 

value for the 2-mile zone or 5-mile zone, 

including all affected Emergency Response 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section 

IV.3. 
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17 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Basis for Change 

Planning Areas, or for the entire 10-mile EPZ 

to increase by 25 percent or 30 minutes, 

whichever is less, from the nuclear power 

reactor licensee's currently NRC approved or 

updated ETE, the licensee shall update the 

ETE analysis to reflect the impact of that 

population increase. The licensee shall submit 

the updated ETE analysis to the NRC under 

§ 50.4 no later than 365 days after the 

licensee's determination that the criteria for 

updating the ETE have been met and at least 

180 days before using it to form protective 

action recommendations and providing it to 

State and local governmental authorities for 

use in developing offsite protective action 

strategies. 

A.1. A description of the normal plant 

operating organization. 

Based on the permanently shut down and defueled 

status of the reactor, a decommissioning reactor is not 

authorized to operate under 10 CFR 50.82(a). Because 

the licensee cannot operate the reactors, the licensee 

does not need to have a “plant operating organization.” 

A.3. A description, by position and function to 

be performed, of the licensee's headquarters 

personnel who will be sent to the plant site to 

augment the onsite emergency organization.

The number of staff at decommissioning sites is 

generally small but is commensurate with the need to 

safely store spent fuel at the facility in a manner that is 

protective of public health and safety. Decommissioning 

sites typically have a level of emergency response that 

does not require response by headquarters personnel. 

A. 4. Identification, by position and function to 

be performed, of persons within the licensee 

organization who will be responsible for 

making offsite dose projections, and a 

description of how these projections will be 

made and the results transmitted to State and 

local authorities, NRC, and other appropriate 

governmental entities.

Although, the likelihood of events that would result in 

doses in excess of the EPA PAGs to the public beyond 

the owner controlled area boundary based on the 

permanently shut down and defueled status of the 

reactor is extremely low, the licensee still must be able 

to determine if a radiological release is occurring. If a 

release is occurring, then the licensee staff must 

promptly communicate that information to offsite 

authorities for their consideration. The offsite 

organizations are responsible for deciding what, if any, 

protective actions should be taken based on 

comprehensive emergency planning. 

A. 5. Identification, by position and function to 

be performed, of other employees of the 

licensee with special qualifications for coping 

with emergency conditions that may arise. 

Other persons with special qualifications, such 

as consultants, who are not employees of the 

licensee and who may be called upon for 

assistance for emergencies shall also be 

identified. The special qualifications of these 

persons shall be described.

The number of staff at decommissioning sites is 

generally small but should be commensurate with the 

need to operate the facility in a manner that is protective 

of public health and safety. 
Table 1 

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18 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Basis for Change 

A.7. By June 23, 2014, identification of, and a 

description of the assistance expected from, 

appropriate State, local, and Federal agencies 

with responsibilities for coping with 

emergencies, including hostile action at the 

site. For purposes of this appendix, “hostile 

action” is defined as an act directed toward a 

nuclear power plant or its personnel that 

includes the use of violent force to destroy 

equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidate 

the licensee to achieve an end. This includes 

attack by air, land, or water using guns, 

explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other 

devices used to deliver destructive force. 

Although the NRC has previously exempted 

decommissioning power reactors from “hostile action” 

enhancements, the licensee’s physical security plan 

must continue to provide high assurance against a 

potential security event impacting a designated target 

set. Therefore, some EP requirements for securitybased events are maintained. 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section 

IV.1 and 50.47(b). 

A.8. Identification of the State and/or local 

officials responsible for planning for, ordering 

and controlling appropriate protective actions, 

including evacuations when necessary.

Offsite emergency measures are limited to support 

provided by local police, fire departments, and 

ambulance and hospital services, as appropriate. Due 

to the low probability of design-basis accidents or other 

credible events to exceed the EPA PAGs, protective 

actions such as evacuation should not be required, but 

could be implemented at the discretion of offsite 

authorities using a CEMP. 

Also refer to basis for 50.47(b)(10) 

A.9. By December 24, 2012, for nuclear power 

reactor licensees, a detailed analysis 

demonstrating that on-shift personnel 

assigned emergency plan implementation 

functions are not assigned responsibilities that 

would prevent the timely performance of their 

assigned functions as specified in the 

emergency plan.

Responsibilities should be well defined in the 

emergency plan and procedures, regularly tested 

through drills and exercises, and audited and inspected 

by the licensee and the NRC. The duties of the onshift 

personnel at a decommissioning reactor facility are not 

as complicated and diverse as those for an operating 

power reactor. 

The NRC considered the similarity between the staffing 

levels at a permanently shut down and defueled reactor 

and staffing levels at an operating non-power reactor 

site. The minimal systems and equipment needed to 

maintain the spent nuclear fuel in the SFP or in a dry 

cask storage system in a safe condition requires 

minimal personnel and is governed by Technical 

Specifications. In the EP Final Rule published in the 

Federal Register on November 23, 2011 (76 FR 

72560), the NRC concluded that the staffing analysis 

requirement was not necessary for non-power reactor 

licensees due to the small staffing levels required to 

operate the facility. 

The staff also examined the actions required to mitigate 

the very low probability design basis events for the SFP. 

[the licensee’s description of SFP makeup strategies 
Table 1 

EXEMPTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION 

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19 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Basis for Change 

should be summarized here]

B.1. The means to be used for determining the 

magnitude of, and for continually assessing 

the impact of, the release of radioactive 

materials shall be described, including 

emergency action levels that are to be used as 

criteria for determining the need for notification 

and participation of local and State agencies, 

the Commission, and other Federal agencies, 

and the emergency action levels that are to be 

used for determining when and what type of 

protective measures should be considered 

within and outside the site boundary to protect 

health and safety. The emergency action 

levels shall be based on in-plant conditions 

and instrumentation in addition to onsite and 

offsite monitoring. By June 20, 2012, for 

nuclear power reactor licensees, these action 

levels must include hostile action that may 

adversely affect the nuclear power plant. The 

initial emergency action levels shall be 

discussed and agreed on by the applicant or 

licensee and State and local governmental 

authorities, and approved by the NRC. 

Thereafter, emergency action levels shall be 

reviewed with the State and local 

governmental authorities on an annual basis. 

The NRC found NEI 99-01 to be an acceptable method 

for the development of EALs. Decommissioning power 

reactors present a very low likelihood of any credible 

accident resulting in a radiological release. Together 

with the time available to initiate mitigative actions 

consistent with plant conditions or, if necessary, for 

offsite authorities to employ their CEMP to take 

protective actions between the initiating event and 

before the onset of a postulated fire, classification above 

the Alert level is no longer required, which is consistent 

with ISFSI facilities. 

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.1 and 50.47(b)(10). 

C.1. The entire spectrum of emergency 

conditions that involve the alerting or activating 

of progressively larger segments of the total 

emergency organization shall be described. 

The communication steps to be taken to alert 

or activate emergency personnel under each 

class of emergency shall be described. 

Emergency action levels (based not only on 

onsite and offsite radiation monitoring 

information but also on readings from a 

number of sensors that indicate a potential 

emergency, such as the pressure in 

containment and the response of the 

Emergency Core Cooling System) for 

notification of offsite agencies shall be 

described. The existence, but not the details, 

of a message authentication scheme shall be 

noted for such agencies. The emergency 

classes defined shall include: (1) notification of 

unusual events, (2) alert, (3) site area 

emergency, and (4) general emergency. 

These classes are further discussed in 

Containment parameters do not provide an indication of 

the conditions at a defueled facility and emergency core 

cooling systems are no longer required. Other 

indications such as SFP level or temperature can be 

used at sites where there is spent fuel in the SFPs. 

In the Statement of Considerations for the Final Rule for 

EP requirements for ISFSIs and for MRS facilities (60 

FR 32430; June 22, 1995), the Commission responded 

to comments concerning a general emergency at an 

ISFSI and MRS, and concluded that, “...an essential 

element of a General Emergency is that a release can 

be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective 

Action Guidelines exposure levels off site for more than 

the immediate site area.” 

The probability of a condition reaching the level above 

an emergency classification of Alert is very low. In the 

event of an accident at a defueled facility that meets the 

criteria for an exemption from the NRC’s offsite EP 

requirements, there will be time available to initiate 

mitigative actions consistent with plant conditions, and if 
Table 1 

EXEMPTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION 

Strikethrough text indicates requested exemptions to rule language. 

20 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Basis for Change 

NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1. necessary, for offsite authorities to employ their CEMP 

to take protective actions 

As stated in NUREG-1738, for instances of small SFP 

leaks or loss of cooling scenarios, these events evolve 

very slowly and generally leave many days for recovery 

efforts. Offsite radiation monitoring will be performed as 

the need arises. Due to the decreased risks associated 

with defueled plants, offsite radiation monitoring 

systems are not required. 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section 

IV.B.1. 

C.2. By June 20, 2012, nuclear power reactor 

licensees shall establish and maintain the 

capability to assess, classify, and declare an 

emergency condition within 15 minutes after 

the availability of indications to plant operators 

that an emergency action level has been 

exceeded and shall promptly declare the 

emergency condition as soon as possible 

following identification of the appropriate 

emergency classification level. Licensees shall 

not construe these criteria as a grace period to 

attempt to restore plant conditions to avoid 

declaring an emergency action due to an 

emergency action level that has been 

exceeded. Licensees shall not construe these 

criteria as preventing implementation of 

response actions deemed by the licensee to 

be necessary to protect public health and 

safety provided that any delay in declaration 

does not deny the State and local authorities 

the opportunity to implement measures 

necessary to protect the public health and 

safety. 

As explained in the justification for an exemption from 10 

CFR 50.47(b), a decommissioning power reactor has a 

low likelihood of a credible accident resulting in 

radiological releases requiring offsite protective 

measures. For these reasons, the staff concludes that a 

decommissioning power reactor is not required to assess,

classify and declare an emergency condition within 15 

minutes. 

 [The approved Permanently Defueled Emergency Plans 

for Kewaunee Power Station, and Crystal River Unit 3 

contained commitments to assess, classify and declare 

an emergency as soon as possible and within 30 

minutes]

D.1. Administrative and physical means for 

notifying local, State, and Federal officials and 

agencies and agreements reached with these 

officials and agencies for the prompt 

notification of the public and for public 

evacuation or other protective measures, 

should they become necessary, shall be 

described. This description shall include 

identification of the appropriate officials, by title 

and agency, of the State and local government 

agencies within the EPZs.

[The State and local officials, and agencies to be notified 

are those in which the nuclear power plant is located.] 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 50.47(b)(10). 

D.2. Provisions shall be described for yearly 

dissemination to the public within the plume 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section 

IV.D.1. 
Table 1 

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21 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Basis for Change 

exposure pathway EPZ of basic emergency 

planning information, such as the methods and 

times required for public notification and the 

protective actions planned if an accident 

occurs, general information as to the nature 

and effects of radiation, and a listing of local 

broadcast stations that will be used for 

dissemination of information during an 

emergency. Signs or other measures shall 

also be used to disseminate to any transient 

population within the plume exposure pathway 

EPZ appropriate information that would be 

helpful if an accident occurs.

D.3. A licensee shall have the capability to 

notify responsible State and local 

governmental agencies within 15 minutes after 

declaring an emergency. The licensee shall 

demonstrate that the appropriate 

governmental authorities have the capability to 

make a public alerting and notification decision 

promptly on being informed by the licensee of 

an emergency condition. Prior to initial 

operation greater than 5 percent of rated 

thermal power of the first reactor at the site, 

each nuclear power reactor licensee shall 

demonstrate that administrative and physical 

means have been established for alerting and 

providing prompt instructions to the public with 

the plume exposure pathway EPZ. The 

design objective of the prompt public alert and 

notification system shall be to have the 

capability to essentially complete the initial 

alerting and notification of the public within the 

plume exposure pathway EPZ within about 15 

minutes. The use of this alerting and 

notification capability will range from 

immediate alerting and notification of the 

public (within 15 minutes of the time that State 

and local officials are notified that a situation 

exists requiring urgent action) to the more 

likely events where there is substantial time 

available for the appropriate governmental 

authorities to make a judgment whether or not 

to activate the public alert and notification 

system. The alerting and notification capability 

shall additionally include administrative and 

physical means for a backup method of public 

alerting and notification capable of being used 

in the event the primary method of alerting and 

A specific notification time should be provided and 

justified, as part of the exemption request (e.g. a 

licensee shall have the capability to notify responsible 

State and local governmental agencies as soon as 

possible, not to exceed 60 minutes). 

 

[The responsible State and local governmental agencies 

are the agencies whose jurisdictions include the area 

where the nuclear power plant is located.] 

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 

50.47(b)(10). 
Table 1 

EXEMPTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION 

Strikethrough text indicates requested exemptions to rule language. 

22 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Basis for Change 

notification is unavailable during an 

emergency to alert or notify all or portions of 

the plume exposure pathway EPZ population. 

The backup method shall have the capability 

to alert and notify the public within the plume 

exposure pathway EPZ, but does not need to 

meet the 15 minute design objective for the 

primary prompt public alert and notification 

system. When there is a decision to activate 

the alert and notification system, the 

appropriate governmental authorities will 

determine whether to activate the entire alert 

and notification system simultaneously or in a 

graduated or staged manner. The 

responsibility for activating such a public alert 

and notification system shall remain with the 

appropriate governmental authorities.

D.4. If FEMA has approved a nuclear power 

reactor site's alert and notification design 

report, including the backup alert and 

notification capability, as of December 23, 

2011, then the backup alert and notification 

capability requirements in Section IV.D.3 must 

be implemented by December 24, 2012. If the 

alert and notification design report does not 

include a backup alert and notification 

capability or needs revision to ensure 

adequate backup alert and notification 

capability, then a revision of the alert and 

notification design report must be submitted to 

FEMA for review by June 24, 2013, and the 

FEMA-approved backup alert and notification 

means must be implemented within 365 days 

after FEMA approval. However, the total time 

period to implement a FEMA-approved backup 

alert and notification means must not exceed 

June 22, 2015.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section 

IV D.3. regarding the alert and notification system 

requirements. 

E.8.a.(i) A licensee onsite technical support 

center and an emergency operations facility 

from which effective direction can be given 

and effective control can be exercised during 

an emergency; 

Due to the low probability of design-basis accidents or 

other credible events to exceed the EPA PAGs, the 

significantly reduced staff and the minimal expected 

offsite response required, offsite agency response will 

not be required at an emergency operations facility 

(EOF) and onsite actions may be directed from the 

control room or other location, without the requirements 

imposed on a Technical Support Center (TSC) or EOF. 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3). 

(ii) For nuclear power reactor licensees, a 

licensee onsite operational support center;

NUREG-0696, “Functional Criteria for Emergency 

Response Facilities,” provides that the operational 
Table 1 

EXEMPTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION 

Strikethrough text indicates requested exemptions to rule language. 

23 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Basis for Change 

support center (OSC) is an onsite area separate from 

the control room and the TSC where licensee operations 

support personnel will assemble in an emergency. For 

a defueled power plant, an OSC is no longer required to 

meet its original purpose of an assembly area for plant 

logistical support during an emergency. The OSC 

function can be incorporated into another facility. 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3). 

E.8.b. For a nuclear power reactor licensee's 

emergency operations facility required by 

paragraph 8.a of this section, either a facility 

located between 10 miles and 25 miles of the 

nuclear power reactor site(s), or a primary 

facility located less than 10 miles from the 

nuclear power reactor site(s) and a backup 

facility located between 10 miles and 25 miles 

of the nuclear power reactor site(s). An 

emergency operations facility may serve more 

than one nuclear power reactor site. A 

licensee desiring to locate an emergency 

operations facility more than 25 miles from a 

nuclear power reactor site shall request prior 

Commission approval by submitting an 

application for an amendment to its license. 

For an emergency operations facility located 

more than 25 miles from a nuclear power 

reactor site, provisions must be made for 

locating NRC and offsite responders closer to 

the nuclear power reactor site so that NRC 

and offsite responders can interact face-toface with emergency response personnel 

entering and leaving the nuclear power reactor 

site. Provisions for locating NRC and offsite 

responders closer to a nuclear power reactor 

site that is more than 25 miles from the 

emergency operations facility must include the 

following:

(1) Space for members of an NRC site team 

and Federal, State, and local responders;

(2) Additional space for conducting briefings 

with emergency response personnel;

(3) Communication with other licensee and 

offsite emergency response facilities;

(4) Access to plant data and radiological 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3).
Table 1 

EXEMPTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION 

Strikethrough text indicates requested exemptions to rule language. 

24 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Basis for Change 

information; and

(5) Access to copying equipment and office 

supplies;

E.8.c. By June 20, 2012, for a nuclear power 

reactor licensee's emergency operations 

facility required by paragraph 8.a of this 

section, a facility having the following 

capabilities:

(1) The capability for obtaining and displaying 

plant data and radiological information for 

each reactor at a nuclear power reactor site 

and for each nuclear power reactor site that 

the facility serves;

(2) The capability to analyze plant technical 

information and provide technical briefings on 

event conditions and prognosis to licensee 

and offsite response organizations for each 

reactor at a nuclear power reactor site and for 

each nuclear power reactor site that the facility 

serves; and

(3) The capability to support response to 

events occurring simultaneously at more than 

one nuclear power reactor site if the 

emergency operations facility serves more 

than one site; and

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section

IV.E.8.a(i) and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3).

E.8.d. For nuclear power reactor licensees, an 

alternative facility (or facilities) that would be 

accessible even if the site is under threat of or 

experiencing hostile action, to function as a 

staging area for augmentation of emergency 

response staff and collectively having the 

following characteristics: the capability for 

communication with the emergency operations 

facility, control room, and plant security; the 

capability to perform offsite notifications; and 

the capability for engineering assessment 

activities, including damage control team 

planning and preparation, for use when onsite 

emergency facilities cannot be safely 

accessed during hostile action. The 

requirements in this paragraph 8.d must be 

implemented no later than December 23, 

2014, with the exception of the capability for 

staging emergency response organization 

personnel at the alternative facility (or 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section 

IV.1. regarding hostile action. 
Table 1 

EXEMPTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION 

Strikethrough text indicates requested exemptions to rule language. 

25 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Basis for Change 

facilities) and the capability for 

communications with the emergency 

operations facility, control room, and plant 

security, which must be implemented no later 

than June 20, 2012.

E.8.e. A licensee shall not be subject to the 

requirements of paragraph 8.b of this section 

for an existing emergency operations facility 

approved as of December 23, 2011;

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3).

E.9.a. Provisions for communications with 

contiguous State/local governments within the 

plume exposure pathway EPZ. Such 

communication shall be tested monthly. 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b) and (b)(10). 

[The State and the local governments in which the 

nuclear facility is located need to be informed of events 

and emergencies, so lines of communication must be 

maintained.] 

E.9.c. Provision for communications among 

the nuclear power reactor control room, the 

onsite technical support center, and the 

emergency operations facility; and among the 

nuclear facility, the principal State and local 

emergency operations centers, and the field 

assessment teams. Such communications 

systems shall be tested annually.

Because of the low probability of design-basis accidents 

or other credible events that would be expected to 

exceed the EPA PAGs and the available time to initiate 

mitigative actions consistent with plant conditions, and if 

necessary, for offsite authorities to employ their CEMP 

to take protective actions, licensees that meet the 

criteria for exemptions from offsite EP requirements do 

not need the TSC, EOF, or offsite field assessment 

teams. 

Also refer to justification for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3). 

Communication with State and local Emergency 

Operations Centers (EOCs) is maintained to coordinate 

assistance on site if required. 

E.9.d. Provisions for communications by the 

licensee with NRC Headquarters and the 

appropriate NRC Regional Office Operations 

Center from the nuclear power reactor control 

room, the onsite technical support center, and 

the emergency operations facility. Such 

communications shall be tested monthly. 

The functions of the control room, EOF, TSC and OSC 

may be combined into one or more locations due to the 

smaller facility staff and the greatly reduced required 

interaction with State and local emergency response 

facilities. 

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 

F.1. The program to provide for: (a) The 

training of employees and exercising, by 

periodic drills, of radiation emergency plans to 

ensure that employees of the licensee are 

familiar with their specific emergency response 

duties, and (b) The participation in the training 

and drills by other persons whose assistance 

may be needed in the event of a radiation 

emergency shall be described. This shall 

include a description of specialized initial 

training and periodic retraining programs to be 

provided to each of the following categories of 

emergency personnel: 

Due to the low probability of design-basis accidents or 

other credible events to exceed the EPA PAGs at a 

decommissioning site, and the mitigation strategies 

available for the licensees’ onsite staffs, 

decommissioning sites typically have a level of 

emergency response that does not require response by 

headquarters personnel. Therefore, the NRC considers 

exempting licensee’s headquarters personnel from 

training requirements reasonable. 
Table 1 

EXEMPTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION 

Strikethrough text indicates requested exemptions to rule language. 

26 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Basis for Change 

i. Directors and/or coordinators of the plant 

emergency organization; 

ii. Personnel responsible for accident 

assessment, including control room shift 

personnel; 

iii. Radiological monitoring teams; 

iv. Fire control teams (fire brigades); 

v. Repair and damage control teams; 

vi. First aid and rescue teams; 

vii. Medical support personnel; 

viii. Licensee’s headquarters support 

personnel;

ix. Security personnel. 

In addition, a radiological orientation training 

program shall be made available to local 

services personnel; e.g., local emergency 

services/Civil Defense, local law enforcement 

personnel, local news media persons. 

Due to the low probability of design-basis accidents or 

other credible events to exceed the EPA PAGs, offsite 

emergency measures are limited to support provided by 

local police, fire departments and medical services, as 

appropriate. Local news media personnel no longer 

need radiological orientation training since they will not 

be called upon to support the formal Joint Information 

Center. The term “Civil Defense” is no longer commonly 

used; references to this term in the examples provided 

in the regulation are therefore not needed. 

F.2. The plan shall describe provisions for the 

conduct of emergency preparedness exercises 

as follows: Exercises shall test the adequacy 

of timing and content of implementing 

procedures and methods, test emergency 

equipment and communications networks, test 

the public alert and notification system, and 

ensure that emergency organization personnel 

are familiar with their duties. 

Because of the low probability of design-basis accidents 

or other credible events that would be expected to 

exceed the limits of EPA PAGs and the available time to 

initiate mitigative actions consistent with plant 

conditions, and if necessary, for offsite authorities to 

employ their CEMP to take protective actions, the public 

alert and notification system will not be used and, 

therefore, requires no testing. 

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b) 

F.2.a. A full participation exercise which tests 

as much of the licensee, State, and local 

emergency plans as is reasonably achievable 

without mandatory public participation shall be 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 

The intent of submitting exercise scenarios for use by 

power reactor licensees is to check that licensees utilize 
Table 1 

EXEMPTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION 

Strikethrough text indicates requested exemptions to rule language. 

27 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Basis for Change 

conducted for each site at which a power 

reactor is located. Nuclear power reactor 

licensees shall submit exercise scenarios 

under § 50.4 at least 60 days before use in a 

full participation exercise required by this 

paragraph 2.a.

F.2.a.(i), (ii), and (iii) are not applicable. 

different scenarios in order to prevent the 

preconditioning of responders at power reactors. For 

defueled sites, there are limited events that could occur 

and the previously routine progression to General 

Emergency in power reactor site scenarios is not 

applicable to a decommissioning site. 

The licensee would be exempt from 10 CFR Part 50, 

Appendix E, Section F.2.a.(i)-(iii) because the licensee 

would be exempt from the umbrella provision of 10 CFR 

Part 50, Appendix E, Section F.2.a. 

F.2.b. Each licensee at each site shall conduct 

a subsequent exercise of its onsite emergency 

plan every 2 years. Nuclear power reactor 

licensees shall submit exercise scenarios 

under § 50.4 at least 60 days before use in an 

exercise required by this paragraph 2.b. The 

exercise may be included in the full 

participation biennial exercise required by 

paragraph 2.c. of this section. In addition, the 

licensee shall take actions necessary to 

ensure that adequate emergency response 

capabilities are maintained during the interval 

between biennial exercises by conducting 

drills, including at least one drill involving a 

combination of some of the principal functional 

areas of the licensee's onsite emergency 

response capabilities. The principal functional 

areas of emergency response include 

activities such as management and 

coordination of emergency response, accident 

assessment, event classification, notification of 

offsite authorities, and assessment of the 

onsite and offsite impact of radiological 

releases, protective action recommendation 

development, protective action decision 

making, plant system repair and mitigative 

action implementation. During these drills, 

activation of all of the licensee's emergency 

response facilities (Technical Support Center 

(TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC), and 

the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)) 

would not be necessary, licensees would have 

the opportunity to consider accident 

management strategies, supervised instruction 

would be permitted, operating staff in all 

participating facilities would have the 

opportunity to resolve problems (success 

paths) rather than have controllers intervene, 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section 

section IV.F.2.a. 

The low probability of design-basis accidents or other 

credible events that would exceed the EPA PAGs, the 

available time to initiate mitigative actions consistent 

with plant conditions, and if necessary, for offsite 

authorities to employ their CEMP to take protective 

actions, render a TSC, OSC and EOF unnecessary. 

The principal functions required by regulation can be 

performed at an onsite location that does not meet the 

requirements of the TSC, OSC or EOF. 
Table 1 

EXEMPTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION 

Strikethrough text indicates requested exemptions to rule language. 

28 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Basis for Change 

and the drills may focus on the onsite exercise 

training objectives. 

F.2.c. Offsite plans for each site shall be 

exercised biennially with full participation by 

each offsite authority having a role under the 

radiological response plan. Where the offsite 

authority has a role under a radiological 

response plan for more than one site, it shall 

fully participate in one exercise every two 

years and shall, at least, partially participate in 

other offsite plan exercises in this period. If 

two different licensees each have licensed 

facilities located either on the same site or on 

adjacent, contiguous sites, and share most of 

the elements defining co-located licensees, 

then each licensee shall:

(1) Conduct an exercise biennially of its onsite 

emergency plan;

(2) Participate quadrennially in an offsite 

biennial full or partial participation exercise;

(3) Conduct emergency preparedness 

activities and interactions in the years between 

its participation in the offsite full or partial 

participation exercise with offsite authorities, to 

test and maintain interface among the affected 

State and local authorities and the licensee. 

Co-located licensees shall also participate in 

emergency preparedness activities and 

interaction with offsite authorities for the period 

between exercises;

(4) Conduct a hostile action exercise of its 

onsite emergency plan in each exercise cycle; 

and

(5) Participate in an offsite biennial full or 

partial participation hostile action exercise in 

alternating exercise cycles.

See basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.1 

and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.a. 

F.2.d. Each State with responsibility for 

nuclear power reactor emergency 

preparedness should fully participate in the 

ingestion pathway portion of exercises at least 

once every exercise cycle. In States with 

more than one nuclear power reactor plume 

exposure pathway EPZ, the State should 

rotate this participation from site to site. Each 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). 
Table 1 

EXEMPTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION 

Strikethrough text indicates requested exemptions to rule language. 

29 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Basis for Change 

State with responsibility for nuclear power 

reactor emergency preparedness should fully 

participate in a hostile action exercise at least 

once every cycle and should fully participate in 

one hostile action exercise by December 31, 

2015. States with more than one nuclear 

power reactor plume exposure pathway EPZ 

should rotate this participation from site to site.

F.2.e. Licensees shall enable any State or 

local Government located within the plume 

exposure pathway EPZ to participate in the 

licensee’s drills when requested by such State 

or local Government. 

The responsible State and local governmental agencies 

are the agencies whose jurisdictions include the location 

of the nuclear power plant. Refer to basis for 

10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). 

F.2.f. Remedial exercises will be required if the 

emergency plan is not satisfactorily tested 

during the biennial exercise, such that NRC, in 

consultation with FEMA, cannot (1) find 

reasonable assurance that adequate 

protective measures can and will be taken in 

the event of a radiological emergency or (2) 

determine that the Emergency Response 

Organization (ERO) has maintained key skills 

specific to emergency response. The extent of 

State and local participation in remedial 

exercises must be sufficient to show that 

appropriate corrective measures have been 

taken regarding the elements of the plan not 

properly tested in the previous exercises.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 

is responsible for the evaluation of an offsite response 

exercise. No action is expected from State or local 

government organizations in response to an event at a 

decommissioning site other than firefighting, law 

enforcement and ambulance/medical services. 

Memoranda of understanding should be in place for 

those services. Offsite response organizations will 

continue to take actions on an all-hazards planning 

basis to protect the health and safety of the public as 

they would at any other industrial site. 

F.2.i. Licensees shall use drill and exercise 

scenarios that provide reasonable assurance 

that anticipatory responses will not result from 

preconditioning of participants. Such 

scenarios for nuclear power reactor licensees 

must include a wide spectrum of radiological 

releases and events, including hostile action. 

Exercise and drill scenarios as appropriate 

must emphasize coordination among onsite 

and offsite response organizations. 

Due to the low probability of design-basis accidents or 

other credible events to exceed the EPA PAGs, the 

available time to initiate mitigative actions consistent 

with plant conditions, and if necessary, for offsite 

authorities to employ their CEMP to take protective 

actions, the previously routine progression to General 

Emergency in power reactor site scenarios is not 

applicable to a decommissioning site. Therefore the 

licensee is not expected to demonstrate response to a 

wide spectrum of events. 

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.1 regarding hostile action. 

F.2.j. The exercises conducted under 

paragraph 2 of this section by nuclear power 

reactor licensees must provide the opportunity 

for the ERO to demonstrate proficiency in the 

key skills necessary to implement the principal 

functional areas of emergency response 

identified in paragraph 2.b of this section. 

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section 

IV.F.2. 
Table 1 

EXEMPTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION 

Strikethrough text indicates requested exemptions to rule language. 

30 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV Basis for Change 

Each exercise must provide the opportunity for 

the ERO to demonstrate key skills specific to 

emergency response duties in the control 

room, TSC, OSC, EOF, and joint information 

center. Additionally, in each eight calendar 

year exercise cycle, nuclear power reactor 

licensees shall vary the content of scenarios 

during exercises conducted under paragraph 2 

of this section to provide the opportunity for 

the ERO to demonstrate proficiency in the key 

skills necessary to respond to the following 

scenario elements: hostile action directed at 

the plant site, no radiological release or an 

unplanned minimal radiological release that 

does not require public protective actions, an 

initial classification of or rapid escalation to a 

Site Area Emergency or General Emergency, 

implementation of strategies, procedures, and 

guidance developed under § 50.54(hh)(2), and 

integration of offsite resources with onsite 

justification. The licensee shall maintain a 

record of exercises conducted during each 

eight year exercise cycle that documents the 

content of scenarios used to comply with the 

requirements of this paragraph. Each licensee 

shall conduct a hostile action exercise for each 

of its sites no later than December 31, 2015. 

The first eight-year exercise cycle for a site will 

begin in the calendar year in which the first 

hostile action exercise is conducted. For a site 

licensed under Part 52, the first eight-year 

exercise cycle begins in the calendar year of 

the initial exercise required by Section 

IV.F.2.a.

I. By June 20, 2012, for nuclear power reactor 

licensees, a range of protective actions to 

protect onsite personnel during hostile action 

must be developed to ensure the continued 

ability of the licensee to safely shut down the 

reactor and perform the functions of the 

licensee’s emergency plan.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section 

IV.I. 

Note: Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, section VI.2 exempts permanently or indefinitely 

shutdown plants from the requirement to provide hardware to support the Emergency 

Response Data System (ERDS). Therefore, specific exemptions from Appendix E to 10 

CFR Part 50, sections VI.1, 3, 4 and 10 CFR 50.72.(a)(4) are not required.
31 

References 

1) NEI 99-01, Revision 6 “Methodology for the Development of Emergency Action Levels 

for Non-Passive Reactors,” November 2012 (Agencywide Documents Access and 

Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12326A805). 

2) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Commission Paper SECY-14-0066, “Request By 

Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc. for Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning 

Requirements” June 27, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14072A257). 

3) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Commission Paper SECY-14-0118 “Request By 

Duke Energy Florida, Inc. for Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning 

Requirements” October 29, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14219A444). 

4) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Staff requirements memoranda (SRM) to SECY-

 14-0066, “Request by Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc. for Exemptions from Certain 

 Emergency Planning Requirements,” dated August 7, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. 

 ML14219A366). 

5) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Staff requirements memoranda (SRM) to SECY-

 14-0118, “Request by Duke Energy Florida, Inc. for Exemptions from Certain 

 Emergency Planning Requirements,” dated December 30, 2014 (ADAMS Accession 

 No. ML14364A111). 

6) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-1738, “Technical Study of Spent Fuel 

Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants,” February 2001 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML010430066). 

7) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR-6451, “A Safety and Regulatory 

Assessment of Generic BWR and PWR Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Plants,” 

August 1997 (ADAMS Accession No. ML082260098). 

8) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-2161, “Consequence Study of a BeyondDesign-Basis Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I Boiling Water 

Reactor,” September 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14255A365). 

9) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Commission Paper SECY-00-0145, “Integrated 

Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power Plant Decommissioning,” June 28, 2000 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML003721626). 

10) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Commission Paper SECY-01-0100, “Policy 

Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance, and Emergency Preparedness Regulations at 

Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants Storing Fuel in Spent Fuel Pools,” June 4, 2001 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML011450420). 

11) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Memorandum from Executive Director for 

Operations to the Commission, August 16, 2002 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML030550706). 
32 

12) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, EA-12-049, “Order Modifying Licenses with 

Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External 

Events” (ADAMS Accession No.ML12054A735). 

13) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, EA-12-051, “Order Modifying Licenses with 

Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation” (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML12056A044). 

14) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-1864, “A Pilot Probabilistic Risk 

Assessment of a Dry Cask Storage System at a Nuclear Power Plant,” March 2007 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML071340012). 
Attachment 1 

STAFF GUIDANCE FOR EVALUATION OF PERMANENTLY DEFUELED EMERGENCY PL

33 

The table below provides an acceptable method for the staff’s review of Permanently Defueled Emergency Plandecommissioning. This table was developed from the applicable evaluation criteria in Section II to NUREG-065(Revision 1), based on the exemptions from 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to Part 50 outlined in Table 1, “ExConsideration.”

Regulations (as 

exempted per ISG) 

NUREG-0654 (Revised – 

Decommissioned) Evaluation Criteria 

A 

50.47(b)(1) Primary responsibilities for emergency response by the nuclear facility licensee and by State and local organizations have been assigned, the emergency responsibilities of the various supporting organizations have been specifically established, and each principal response organization has staff to respond and to augment its initial response on a continuous basis. 

Primary responsibilities for emergency response by the nuclear facility licensee and by State and local organizations have been assigned, the emergency responsibilities of the various supporting organizations have been specifically established, and each principal response organization has staff to respond and to augment its initial response on a continuous basis. [E.IV.1; IV.A.1, 2, 4, 7] 

1.b. Each licensee and sub-organization having an o

concept of operations, and its relationship to the 

1.d. Each licensee shall identify a specific individual 

of the emergency response. 

1.e. Each licensee shall provide for 24-hour per day 

including 24-hour per day staffing of communica

4. Each licensee shall be capable of continuous (24

protracted period. 

B

50.47(b)(2) On-shift facility licensee responsibilities for emergency response are unambiguously defined, adequate staffing to provide initial facility accident response in key functional areas is maintained at all times, timely augmentation of 

On-shift facility licensee responsibilities for emergency response are unambiguously defined, adequate staffing to provide initial facility accident response in key functional areas is maintained at all times, timely augmentation of 

1. Each licensee shall specify the onsite emergenc

personnel for all shifts and its relation to the respnormal staff complement. (See Table B-1SD) 

2. Each licensee shall designate an individual who 

and who shall have the authority and responsibilunilaterally initiate any emergency actions. 

4. Each licensee shall establish the functional resp

emergency coordinator. 
Attachment 1 

STAFF GUIDANCE FOR EVALUATION OF PERMANENTLY DEFUELED EMERGENCY PL

34 

Regulations (as 

exempted per ISG) 

NUREG-0654 (Revised – 

Decommissioned) Evaluation Criteria 

response capabilities is available and the interfaces among various onsite response activities and offsite support and response activities are specified. 

response capabilities is available and the interfaces among various onsite response activities and offsite support and response activities are specified. [E.IV.A.1, 2, 4, 9; A.3; C.1] 

5. Each licensee shall specify the positions or title a

performed by the persons to be assigned to the activity. For emergency situations, specific assigshifts and for plant staff members, both onsite anlicensee must be able to augment on-shift capabafter declaration of an emergency. (See Table B

9. Each licensee shall identify the services to be pr

handling emergencies, e.g., police, ambulance, fighting organizations. The licensee shall providtreatment of injured personnel who may also be the arrangements and agreements reached with support agencies shall be appended to the plan. delineate the authorities, responsibilities, and limcontractor, private organization, and local servic
Attachment 1 

STAFF GUIDANCE FOR EVALUATION OF PERMANENTLY DEFUELED EMERGENCY PL

35 

Table B-1SD 

Minimum Staffing Requirements for NRC Licensees for Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plant Emergencies 

* May be provided by shift personnel assigned other functions. Identify if the shift personnel assigned EP functions/tasks are from Firefighti

** Number of additional personnel required to perform site-specific mitigation strategies required for a catastrophic loss in spent fuel pool in

MAJOR FUNCTIONAL AREA MAJOR TASKS EMERGENCY POSITION, TITLE, OR EXPERTISE ON-SHIFT 

Plant Operations and assessment of Operational Aspects 

Plant Operations Shift Supervisor

Shift Operator

1 1 

Emergency Direction and Control Emergency Coordinator Shift Supervisor * Notification/Communication Notify State and Federal personnel and 

maintain communications 

Communicator * 

Radiological Accident Assessment and Support of Operational Accident Assessment 

Onsite Dose Assessment and Monitoring Heath Physics Expertise * 

Protective Actions (In-Plant) In-Plant Surveys Radiation Protection 

a. Access Control b. HP Coverage for Repair, Corrective Actions, 

Search and Rescue, First Aid, and Firefighting 

c. Personnel Monitoring d. Dosimetry 

Health Physics Technician 1 

Engineering Support Technical Direction Technical Expertise Plant Condition Evaluation, Repair and Corrective Action 

Repair, Mitigation and Corrective Action Shift Operators ** 

Firefighting Firefighting Per Fire Protection Plan Rescue Operations/ First Aid Rescue and First Aid * Security Security Per Security Plan 
Attachment 1 

STAFF GUIDANCE FOR EVALUATION OF PERMANENTLY DEFUELED EMERGENCY PL

36 

Regulations (as 

exempted per ISG) 

NUREG-0654 (Revised – 

Decommissioned) Evaluation Criteria 

C 

(b)(3) Arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources have been made and other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response have been identified. 

Arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources have been made and other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response have been identified. [E.IV.A. 7] 

4. Each licensee shall identify nuclear and other fa

individuals which can be relied upon in an emergSuch assistance shall be identified and supporteagreement. 

D 

(b)(4) A standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the basis of which include facility system and effluent parameters, is in use by the nuclear facility licensee. 

A standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the basis of which include facility system and effluent parameters, is in use by the nuclear facility licensee.[E.IV.1; IV.B.1, 2; C.1, 2] 

1. An emergency classification and EAL scheme m

licensee. The specific instruments, parameters shown for establishing each emergency class, in procedures. 

2. The initiating conditions shall include all postulat

facility. 

E 

(b)(5) Procedures have been established for notification, by the licensee, of State and local response organizations and for 

Procedures have been established for notification, by the licensee, of State and local response organizations and for notification of emergency 

1. Each licensee shall establish procedures which 

bases for notification of response organizations classification and action level scheme. 

2. Each licensee shall establish procedures for aler

emergency response personnel. 
Attachment 1 

STAFF GUIDANCE FOR EVALUATION OF PERMANENTLY DEFUELED EMERGENCY PL

37 

Regulations (as 

exempted per ISG) 

NUREG-0654 (Revised – 

Decommissioned) Evaluation Criteria 

notification of emergency personnel by all organizations; the content of initial and follow up organizations has been established. 

personnel by all organizations; the content of initial and follow up messages to response organizations has been established.[E.IV.1; IV.A.6, 7; C.1, 2; D.1, 3; E] 

4. The licensee, in coordination with State and loca

establish the contents of the emergency messagfacility. These messages shall contain the followand appropriate: 

 a. location of incident and name and telephone n

channel identification) of caller; 

 b. date/time of incident;  c. class of emergency;  k. licensee emergency response actions underw m. request for any needed onsite support by offs n. prognosis for worsening or termination of even

information. 

F 

(b)(6) Provisions exist for prompt communications among principal response organizations to emergency personnel. 

Provisions exist for prompt communications among principal response organizations to emergency personnel. [E.IV.1; IV.C.1; D.1, 3; E]

1. Each licensee shall establish reliable primary an

communication from licensees to local and State Such systems should be selected to be compatibplan shall include: 

 a. provision for 24-hour per day notification to an

emergency response network; and at a minimumalternate, including 24-hour per day manning of initiate emergency response actions; 

 b. provision for communications with contiguous  e. provision for alerting or activating emergency 

organization; and 

 f. provision for communication by the licensee w

2. Each licensee shall ensure that a coordinated co

support exists. 
Attachment 1 

STAFF GUIDANCE FOR EVALUATION OF PERMANENTLY DEFUELED EMERGENCY PL

38 

Regulations (as 

exempted per ISG) 

NUREG-0654 (Revised – 

Decommissioned) Evaluation Criteria 

3. Each licensee shall conduct periodic testing of th

communications system (see evaluation criteria 

G 

(b)(7) The principal points of contact with the news media for dissemination of information during an emergency) are established in advance, and procedures for coordinated dissemination of information to the public are established. 

The principal points of contact with the news media for dissemination of information during an emergency are established in advance, and procedures for coordinated dissemination of information to the public are established. [E.IV.A.7; D.2] 

3. a. Each licensee shall designate a point of conta

information to the news media during an emerge

4. a. Each licensee shall designate a spokesperson 

all necessary information. 

 b. Each licensee shall establish arrangements fo

information among designated spokespersons. 

 c. Each licensee shall establish coordinated arra

rumors. 

H 

(b)(8) Adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the emergency response are provided and maintained. 

Adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the emergency response are provided and maintained. [E.IV.1; IV.E; G] 

2. Each licensee shall establish an emergency faci

coordination of all licensee activities related to aout, and from which the licensee shall provide inand local authorities responding to emergencies

4. Each licensee shall provide for timely activation 

described in the plan. 

5. Each licensee shall identify and establish onsite-

to be used to initiate emergency measures as wconducting assessment. 

The equipment should include:  a. geophysical phenomena monitors, (e.g., mete b. radiological monitors, (e.g., process, area, eff

and sampling equipment); 

 d. fire and combustion products detectors. 6. Each licensee shall make provision to acquire da

access to offsite monitoring and analysis equipm

 a. geophysical phenomena monitors, (e.g., mete
Attachment 1 

STAFF GUIDANCE FOR EVALUATION OF PERMANENTLY DEFUELED EMERGENCY PL

39 

Regulations (as 

exempted per ISG) 

NUREG-0654 (Revised – 

Decommissioned) Evaluation Criteria 

10. a. Each licensee should make provisions to insp

operationally check emergency equipment/instrucalendar quarter and after each use. There shalinstruments/equipment to replace those which arkits for calibration or repair. Calibration of equiprecommended by the supplier of the equipment. 

 b. Communication systems shall be functionally 

and NRC (ENS) communication systems shall be 

 This is not the same as a communication drill as 11. Each plan shall include identification of emergen

(protective equipment, communications equipmeequipment, and emergency supplies). 

I 

(b)(9) Adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential consequences of a radiological emergency condition are in use. 

Adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential consequences of a radiological emergency condition are in use. [E.IV.1; IV.A.4; B.1; C.2; E] 

1. Each licensee shall identify plant system and eff

characteristic of a spectrum of off-normal conditiidentify the plant parameter values or other inforthe example initiating conditions. Such parametcorresponding emergency class shall be includeemergency procedures. Facility emergency procof instruments being used and their capabilities. 

2. Onsite capability and resources to provide initial 

assessment throughout the course of an accidenmonitors. 

J 

(b)(10) A range of protective actions has been developed for emergency workers and the public. 

A range of protective actions has been developed for the emergency workers and the public. [IV.1; IV.B.10; IV.C.1; E; I] 

1. Each licensee shall establish the means and tim

onsite individuals and individuals who may be in operator, including: 

 a. employees not having emergency assignmen b. visitors;  c. contractor and construction personnel; and  d. other persons who may be in the public acces

the site or within the owner controlled area. 

2. Each licensee shall make provisions for evacuat

for onsite individuals. 

3. Each licensee shall provide for radiological moni

from the site. 
Attachment 1 

STAFF GUIDANCE FOR EVALUATION OF PERMANENTLY DEFUELED EMERGENCY PL

40 

Regulations (as 

exempted per ISG) 

NUREG-0654 (Revised – 

Decommissioned) Evaluation Criteria 

5. Each licensee shall provide for a capability to ac

at the time of the emergency and ascertain the nwithin 60 minutes of the start of an emergency aindividuals continuously thereafter. 

6. Each licensee shall, for individuals remaining or 

emergency, make provisions for: 

 a. individual respiratory protection; and  b. use of protective clothing. 

K 

(b)(11) Means for controlling radiological exposures, in an emergency, are established for emergency workers. The means for controlling radiological exposures shall include exposure guidelines consistent with EPA Emergency Worker and Lifesaving Activity Protective Action Guides. 

Means for controlling radiological exposures, in an emergency, are established for emergency workers. The means for controlling radiological exposures shall include exposure guidelines consistent with EPA Emergency Worker and Lifesaving Activity Protective Action Guides. [IV.E]

1. Each licensee shall establish onsite exposure gu

Emergency Worker and Lifesaving Activity Prote

 a. removal of injured persons;  b. undertaking corrective actions;  c. performing assessment actions;  d. providing first aid;  e. performing personnel decontamination;  f. providing ambulance service; and  g. providing medical treatment services. 2. Each licensee shall provide an onsite radiation p

implemented during emergencies, including metguidelines. The plan shall identify individual(s), authorize emergency workers to receive doses ilimits. Procedures shall be worked out in advanvolunteers to receive radiation exposures in the lifesaving and other emergency activities. These expeditious decision making and a reasonable c

3. a. Each licensee shall make provision for 24-hou

determine the doses received by emergency pernuclear accident, including volunteers. Each licefor distribution of dosimeters. 

 b. Each licensee shall ensure that dosimeters ar

frequencies and provide for maintaining dose recinvolved in any nuclear accident. 
Attachment 1 

STAFF GUIDANCE FOR EVALUATION OF PERMANENTLY DEFUELED EMERGENCY PL

41 

Regulations (as 

exempted per ISG) 

NUREG-0654 (Revised – 

Decommissioned) Evaluation Criteria 

5. a. Each licensee as appropriate, shall specify ac

need for decontamination. 

 b. Each licensee, as appropriate, shall establish 

decontamination of emergency personnel woundequipment, and for waste disposal. 

6. Each licensee shall provide onsite contamination 

access control; criteria for permitting return of ar

L 

(b)(12) Arrangements are made for medical services for contaminated injured individuals. 

Arrangements are made for medical services for contaminated injured individuals. [E.IV.A.6, 7; E] 

1. Each licensee shall arrange for hospital and med

capability for evaluation of radiation exposure anthat persons providing these services are adequcontaminated individuals. 

2. Each licensee shall provide for onsite first aid ca4. Each licensee shall arrange for transporting victi

medical support facilities. 

M 

(b)(13) General plans for recovery and reentry are developed. 

General plans for recovery and reentry are developed. [IV.1; IV.H] 

1. Each licensee shall develop general plans and p

recovery. This process should consider both ex

2. Each licensee plan shall contain the position/title

of individuals who will fill key positions in the facThis organization shall include technical personndevelop, evaluate and direct recovery and reentr

N 

(b)(14) Periodic exercises are (will be) conducted to evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilities, periodic drills are (will be) conducted to develop and maintain key skills, and deficiencies identified as a result of 

Periodic exercises are (will be) conducted to evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilities, periodic drills are (will be) conducted to develop and maintain key skills, and deficiencies identified as a result of 

1. a. An exercise is an event that tests the integrat

portion of the basic elements existing within EP Exercises shall be conducted as set forth in 10 Caccordance with applicable portion of Section IVExercises) to NSIR/DPR-ISG-01, “Emergency PPlants.” 

 b. The licensee shall provide for a critique of the 

should be varied from year to year such that all mand preparedness organizations are tested. 
Attachment 1 

STAFF GUIDANCE FOR EVALUATION OF PERMANENTLY DEFUELED EMERGENCY PL

42 

Regulations (as 

exempted per ISG) 

NUREG-0654 (Revised – 

Decommissioned) Evaluation Criteria 

exercises or drills are (will be) corrected. 

exercises or drills are (will be) corrected. [E.IV.1; E.9; F] 

2. A drill is a supervised instruction period aimed a

maintaining skills in a particular operation. A driexercise. A drill shall be supervised and evaluatinstructor. Each licensee shall conduct drills, in frequencies indicated below: 

 a. Communication Drills: Communications with 

shall be drilled annually. Communications with tannually. Communication drills shall also includthe content of messages. 

 b. Fire Drills: Fire drills shall be conducted in ac

(nuclear facility) technical specifications. 

 c. Medical Emergency Drills: A medical emerge

contaminated individual which contains provisionsupport services agencies (i.e., ambulance and facility) shall be conducted annually. 

 e. Health Physics Drills: (1) Health Physics drills 

3. Each licensee shall describe how exercises and 

allow free play for decision making and to meet tscenarios for use in exercises and drills shall incfollowing: 

 a. the basic objective(s) of each drill and exercis

criteria; 

 b. the date(s), time period, place(s) and participa c. the simulated events;  d. a time schedule of real and simulated initiating  e. a narrative summary describing the conduct o

include such things as simulated casualties, offsrescue of personnel, use of protective clothing, a

 f. a description of the arrangements for and adva

to official observers. 
Attachment 1 

STAFF GUIDANCE FOR EVALUATION OF PERMANENTLY DEFUELED EMERGENCY PL

43 

Regulations (as 

exempted per ISG) 

NUREG-0654 (Revised – 

Decommissioned) Evaluation Criteria 

4. Official observers from the NRC should observe

required exercises. A critique shall be scheduleexercise to evaluate the ability of licensee to resThe critique shall be conducted as soon as praca formal evaluation should result from the critiqu

5. Each licensee shall establish means for evaluati

comments on areas needing improvement, incluprocedural changes, and for assigning responsibcorrective actions. Each licensee shall establish ensure that corrective actions are implemented. 

O 

(b)(15) Radiological emergency response training is provided to those who may be called on to assist in an emergency. 

Radiological emergency response training is provided to those who may be called on to assist in an emergency. [E.IV.1; IV.F] 

1. Each licensee shall assure the training of approp

a. Each facility shall provide site specific emerge

those offsite emergency organizations who may assistance in the event of an emergency. 

3. Training for individuals assigned to licensee first 

courses equivalent to Red Cross First Aid, CPR, eqivalent. (See L.2) 

5. Each licensee shall provide for the initial and ann

with emergency response responsibilities. 

P 

(b)(16) Responsibilities for plan development and review and for distribution of emergency plans are established, and planners are properly trained. 

Responsibilities for plan development and review and for distribution of emergency plans are established, and planners are properly trained. [IV.1; IV.G] 

1. Each licensee shall provide for the training of ind

planning effort. 

2. Each licensee shall identify by title the individual 

responsibility for radiological emergency respons

3. Each licensee shall designate an Emergency Pla

responsibility for the development and updating coordination of these plans with other response 

4. Each licensee shall update its plan and agreeme

certify it to be current on an annual basis. The uchanges identified by drills and exercises. 
Attachment 1 

STAFF GUIDANCE FOR EVALUATION OF PERMANENTLY DEFUELED EMERGENCY PL

44 

Regulations (as 

exempted per ISG) 

NUREG-0654 (Revised – 

Decommissioned) Evaluation Criteria 

5. The emergency response plans and approved c

forwarded to all organizations and appropriate infor implementation of the plans. Revised pages show where changes have been made. 

7. Each plan shall contain a listing, by title, procedu

plan. The listing shall include the section(s) of theach procedure. 

8. Each plan shall contain a specific table of conten

review should have a cross-reference to the crite

10. Each licensee shall provide for updating telepho

procedures at least quarterly. 
Attachment 2 

PREVIOUSLY APPROVED LICENSING ACTIONS 

45 

Licensee 

Date 

Operations 

Ceased 

Date 

Exemption 

Issued 

Basis for Exemption 

Humbolt 

Bay 

7/2/76 4/29/87 License amendment approved for the 

Decommissioning Emergency Plan – no exemption 

from EP requirements was ever issued. The NRC 

approval of the emergency plan granted a de facto

exemption from offsite emergency preparedness 

requirements. 

The staff evaluated offsite radiological 

consequences of potential accidents involving the 

fuel stored in the SFP including a fuel handling 

accident, a non-mechanistic heavy load drop, and a 

seismically-or otherwise-induced rearrangement of 

the stored fuel assemblies. Other hypothetical 

accident scenarios considered by the staff were a 

non-mechanistic expulsion of all pool water to the 

atmosphere, a spent fuel rupture, and uncontrolled 

release of all contents of the liquid radwaste tanks to 

the discharge canal. The staff concluded that all 

atmospheric releases were well below EPA PAGs. 

La Crosse 4/30/87 7/8/88 License amendment approved for the 

Decommissioning Emergency Plan – no exemption 

from EP requirements was ever issued. The NRC 

approval of the emergency plan granted a de facto

exemption from offsite emergency preparedness 

requirements. 

The staff evaluated the offsite consequences of 

potential accidents to the fuel stored in the spent fuel 

pool. The analysis assumed all fuel rods damaged 

with no iodine filters operating, and no fuel pool 

water missing. In this scenario, the doses at the 

exclusion area boundary would be less than 25% of 

the 10 CFR Part 100 paragraph 11 guideline values, 

i.e., much less than 75 rem for the thyroid and 6 rem 

for whole-body dose. The above dose values are 

the acceptance criteria value from the NRC Standard 

Review Plan (NUREG-800) Section 15.7.5 on spent 

fuel cask drop accidents. Similarly, the calculated 

doses are well below EPA PAGs. 
Attachment 2 

PREVIOUSLY APPROVED LICENSING ACTIONS 

46 

Licensee 

Date 

Operations 

Ceased 

Date 

Exemption 

Issued 

Basis for Exemption 

Fort St. 

Vrain 

8/18/89 12/31/90 Analyzed radiological consequences of potential 

accidents involving a fuel handling accident (dropped 

fuel cask) provided doses offsite less than EPA 

PAGs. 

Rancho 

Seco 

6/7/89 2/22/91 Analyzed radiological consequences of potential 

accidents involving a fuel handling accident (dropped 

fuel cask) provide doses offsite less than EPA PAGs.

Yankee 

Rowe 

10/1/91 10/30/92 Analyzed radiological consequences of potential 

accidents involving a fuel handling accident (dropped 

fuel cask) provide doses offsite less than EPA PAGs.

Trojan 11/2/92 9/30/93 Analyzed radiological consequences of potential 

accidents involving a fuel handling accident (dropped 

fuel cask) provide doses offsite less than EPA PAGs.

The staff concluded that in view of the low likelihood 

of a seismic event > 0.5g and the time elapsed since 

shutdown of the facility, and the configuration of the 

fuel in the spent fuel pool, that there would be 

sufficient time after a postulated loss of water and 

before the initiation of a cladding fire for the licensee 

to implement actions to preclude heat up of the 

spent fuel. 
Attachment 2 

PREVIOUSLY APPROVED LICENSING ACTIONS 

47 

Licensee 

Date 

Operations 

Ceased 

Date 

Exemption 

Issued 

Basis for Exemption 

Haddam 

Neck 

7/22/96 8/28/98 The staff evaluated: 

1. Release of activity from combustible IX resin 

and fuel handling accidents would not exceed 

EPA PAGs. 

2. For gamma radiation due to a loss of spent 

fuel pool level, it would take 2.6 days to 

exceed EPA PAGs. 

3. For a bounding scenario where the fuel is 

totally uncovered, the decay heat would not 

heat up the cladding higher than 565 degrees 

Celsius (C) , therefore the cladding would 

stay intact. 

The staff concluded that the postulated doses to the 

general public from any reasonably conceivable 

accident would not exceed EPA PAGs and, for the 

loss of fuel pool level, the length of time available 

gives confidence that mitigative actions could be 

taken and provides confidence that additional offsite 

measures could be taken without planning. 

Maine 

Yankee 

12/6/96 9/3/98 The staff evaluated: 

1. A fire involving resin and gamma radiation 

due to a loss of spent fuel pool level not 

exceeding EPA PAGs. 

2. A bounding scenario where the fuel is totally 

uncovered and no natural circulation flow 

path exists. The staff calculated that it would 

take ~10 hours to heat up to 900 degrees C. 

The staff concluded that the postulated doses to the 

general public from any reasonably conceivable 

accident would not exceed EPA PAGs and, for the 

bounding accident, the length of time available gives 

confidence that mitigative actions and, if necessary, 

offsite measures for the public could be taken 

without preplanning. 
Attachment 2 

PREVIOUSLY APPROVED LICENSING ACTIONS 

48 

Licensee 

Date 

Operations 

Ceased 

Date 

Exemption 

Issued 

Basis for Exemption 

Big Rock 

Point 

8/29/97 9/30/98 The staff evaluated: 

1. Gap release of activity from a fuel handling 

accident and heavy load drops on spent fuel 

not exceeding EPA PAGs. 

2. A fire involving resin and gamma radiation 

due a loss of spent fuel pool level not 

exceeding EPA PAGs. 

3. A bounding scenario where the fuel is totally 

uncovered and no natural circulation flow 

path exists. The staff calculated that it would 

take ~14 hours to heat up to 900 degrees C. 

The staff concluded that the postulated doses to the 

general public from any reasonably conceivable 

accident would not exceed EPA PAGs and, for the 

bounding accident, the length of time available gives 

confidence that mitigative actions and, if necessary, 

offsite measures for the public could be taken 

without preplanning. 

Zion 2/21/97 8/31/99 The staff concluded that there were no design basis 

accidents or other credible events that would result 

in a radiological dose beyond the exclusion area 

boundary that would exceed EPA PAGs. 

For a bounding scenario where the highest power 

fuel bundle is totally uncovered and assuming an 

adiabatic boundary conditions existed, the decay 

heat would not heat up higher than 482 degrees C; 

therefore the cladding would stay intact. 

Kewaunee 5/7/2013 10/27/2014 No design basis accidents or other credible events 

that would result in a radiological dose beyond the 

exclusion area boundary that would exceed EPA 

PAGs. Adiabatic heatup of spent fuel would take at 

least 10 hours for cladding temperature to reach 900 

degrees C. Multiple SFP makeup strategies could 

be completed by on-shift staff. 
Attachment 2 

PREVIOUSLY APPROVED LICENSING ACTIONS 

49 

Licensee 

Date 

Operations 

Ceased 

Date 

Exemption 

Issued 

Basis for Exemption 

Crystal 

River-3 

9/26/2009 3/ / 2015 No design basis accidents or other credible events 

that would result in a radiological dose beyond the 

exclusion area boundary that would exceed EPA 

PAGs. Adiabatic heatup of spent fuel would take at 

least 19.7 hours for cladding temperature to reach 

900 degrees C. Multiple SFP makeup strategies 

could be completed by on-shift staff.