J-S18023-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MATTHEW J. VASQUEZ 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1392 WDA 2023

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 16, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-63-MD-0000309-2020

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED: September 3, 2024

Matthew J. Vasquez appeals from the order denying his Post Conviction 

Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We vacate and 

remand for the court to reinstate Vasquez’s direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc. 

A jury found Vasquez guilty of aggravated assault, conspiracy to commit 

aggravated assault, and simple assault. See Opinion, filed 1/6/22, at 2. The 

court ordered that Vasquez “have no contact with any of the victims, witnesses 

or co-conspirators” relating to his convictions. See id. at 1. Vasquez violated 

the order by contacting his co-conspirator. See id. at 2-3. Following a hearing, 

the court found Vasquez guilty of six counts of indirect criminal contempt 

pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4132(2).1 The court sentenced Vasquez to an 

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1 The PCRA court notes that “[a]lthough the UJS Portal docket erroneously 

depicts [Vasquez’s] charges as filed under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5947 §§ F, criminal 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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aggregate term of 18 to 36 months of incarceration. Vasquez filed a postsentence motion which the trial court denied. See Order, filed 1/4/21. The 

order denying the post-sentence motion did not inform Vasquez of his

appellate rights. Vasquez did not file a direct appeal. 

In May 2021, Vasquez filed his first pro se PCRA petition related to his 

criminal contempt convictions. The court dismissed the petition and Vasquez 

appealed. We vacated the court’s order and remanded for the court to appoint 

counsel. See Commonwealth v. Vasquez, No. 887 WDA 2021, 2022 WL 

2763717 at *1 (Pa.Super. filed July 15, 2022) (unpublished mem.). On 

remand, the court appointed counsel. However, Vasquez requested to proceed 

pro se. See Waiver of Right to Counsel, filed 9/13/22. He also filed a second 

pro se PCRA petition requesting reinstatement of his direct appeal rights nunc 

pro tunc and claiming that the court had imposed an illegal sentence. See

PCRA Petition, filed 9/13/22; Memorandum of Law i[n] Support of Petitioner, 

filed 9/13/22, at ¶¶ 1, 2. Following a Grazier2 hearing, the court permitted 

Vasquez to proceed pro se and accepted Vasquez’s second PCRA petition as 

an amendment to his first petition. See Order of Court, filed 10/12/22

(treating second petition “as the operative Petition to be considered by the 

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contempt for violation of an immunity order, this mistaken docket entry does 

not appear anywhere else in the record.” Rule 1925(a) Opinion, filed 

12/27/23, at 7 n.11; see Police Criminal Complaint, filed 5/4/20, at 2 (listing 

charges for six counts of indirect criminal contempt pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 4132(2)). 

2 Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998). 
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[c]ourt”). The court issued notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without 

a hearing and ultimately dismissed Vasquez’s petition. See Order of Dismissal 

of PCRA Petition, filed 11/16/23. This timely appeal followed. 

Vasquez raises the following issues:

1. Did the P.C.R.A. Court err when it refused to reinstate 

[Vasquez’s] Direct Appeal Rights nunc pro tunc?

2. Did the P.C.R.A. Court err when it refused to correct 

[Vasquez’s] Illegal Sentence?

Vasquez’s Br. at 1-2 (suggested answer omitted and issues reordered for 

purposes of disposition). 

“On appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, our standard of review calls 

for us to determine whether the ruling of the PCRA court is supported by the 

record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Wharton, 263 A.3d 561, 

567 (Pa. 2021) (citation omitted). “We apply a de novo standard of review to 

the PCRA court's legal conclusions.” Id.

Vasquez challenges the PCRA court’s denial of his request for nunc pro 

tunc relief. Vasquez maintains that he was “never informed [of] his Direct 

Appeal rights, in violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(4).” Vasquez’s Br. at 9. He 

concedes that the trial court advised him of his appellate rights at the 

sentencing hearing but notes that the order denying his post-sentence motion

did not inform him of his appellate rights pursuant to Rule 720(4) of the 

Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. He asserts that the court’s 

advisement at sentencing “does not excuse the [t]rial [c]ourt’s failure to 

comply with Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(4).” Vasquez’s Br. at 10. 
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When sought in a timely PCRA petition, “nunc pro tunc relief is a deeply 

established means of remedying a breakdown in the prior process caused by 

an error of constitutional magnitude.” Commonwealth v. Koehler, 229 A.3d 

915, 931 (Pa. 2020). “An award of nunc pro tunc relief is intended to put the 

petitioner in the same position he or she was in just prior to the alleged 

constitutional deprivation.” Id. When a criminal defendant’s constitutional 

right to appeal a conviction is denied, it is considered an error “of 

constitutional magnitude.” Id. at 932; Pa. Const. art. V, § 9.

In support of his argument, Vasquez cites Commonwealth v. 

Patterson, 940 A.2d 493 (Pa.Super. 2007), and Commonwealth v. 

McAleer, No. 2381 EDA 2019, 2020 WL 6128012, at *2 (Pa.Super. 2020) 

(unpublished mem.). We find Patterson controlling.

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In Patterson, the trial court informed Patterson orally of his appellate 

rights at the sentencing hearing. Patterson, 940 A.2d at 499. Patterson filed

an untimely post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied. 940 A.2d at 

497. The order denying the post-sentence motion did not inform Patterson 

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3

In McCleer, we vacated the PCRA court’s order denying McCleer’s PCRA 

petition and remanded for the court to reinstate McCleer’s appeal rights nunc 

pro tunc. We determined “that there was a breakdown in the operations of the 

court that prevented [the appellant] from timely pursuing an appeal from the 

order dismissing his first PCRA petition[,]” where the court’s order failed to 

inform the appellant of his appellate rights or the time limits to file an appeal 

pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(4). Id. at *3; see Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(4) (“When 

the petition is dismissed without a hearing, the judge promptly shall issue an 

order to that effect and shall advise the defendant by certified mail, return 

receipt requested, of the right to appeal from the final order disposing of the 

petition and of the time limits within which the appeal must be filed”).
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that “he had to file an appeal within thirty days of the imposition of sentence.” 

Id. at 499. Patterson then filed an untimely appeal. We noted that

Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B) requires that an order denying a post-sentence motion 

include written notice of the defendant’s right to appeal and the time limits to 

file an appeal. Id. at 497, 499. We pointed out that the purpose of the rule is 

“to ensure adequate notice to the defendant given the routine delay between 

the sentencing and the disposition of the post-sentence motion.” Id. at 499

(quoting comment to Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(4)(a)). We concluded that the court 

failed to comply with Rule 720(B) when it entered an order that did not inform 

Patterson of his appellate rights. We also found that the trial court’s informing 

Patterson of his appellate rights at the sentencing hearing did not excuse its 

non-compliance with Rule 720(B)(4). Id. We thus concluded that “the trial 

court’s failure to comply with [Pa.R.Crim.P.] 720 constitute[d] a breakdown” 

that excused Patterson’s untimely filing of his appeal. Id.

Here, the PCRA court found Vasquez’s claim “disingenuous.” Rule 

1925(a) Op. at 6. The court pointed out that it sentenced Vasquez “on the 

same date and time” for both his aggravated assault and criminal contempt 

convictions, and that Vasquez filed an appeal for the aggravated assault case. 

It concluded that “[Vasquez’s] failure to perfect one appeal while perfecting 

the other does not meet the standard of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ that 

would entitle him to [nunc pro tunc] relief.” Id. We disagree.

Pursuant to Patterson, the PCRA court should have reinstated 

Vasquez’s direct appeal rights. The trial court’s order failed to comply with 
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Rule 720(B)(4). This rule provides that an order denying a post-sentence 

motion “shall include notice to the defendant” of the following:

(a) the right to appeal and the time limits within which the 

appeal must be filed;

(b) the right to assistance of counsel in the preparation of 

the appeal;

(c) the rights, if the defendant is indigent, to appeal in forma 

pauperis and to proceed with assigned counsel as provided 

in Rule 122; and

(d) the qualified right to bail under Rule 521(B).

Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(4) (emphasis added). Rule 720(B)(4) “protects the 

defendant’s right to appeal by requiring” the court’s order to “contain written

notice of the defendant’s appeal rights.” Id. at comment (emphasis added). 

“This requirement ensures adequate notice to the defendant, which is 

important given the potential time lapse between the notice provided at 

sentencing and the resolution of the post-sentence motion.” Id.

In the instant case, the order did not meet the mandatory requirements 

of Rule 720(B)(4). It did not include notice of Vasquez’s right to appeal, the 

time limit within which to appeal, or the remaining requirements of Rule 

720(B)(4). Furthermore, under Patterson, neither Vasquez’s filing an appeal 

in his aggravated assault case nor the court’s notifying Vasquez of his

appellate rights at sentencing excuses the noncompliance with Rule 720. See 

Patterson, 940 A.2d at 499. The court’s failure to comply with Rule 720(B)(4) 

resulted in a breakdown in court operations that warrants nunc pro tunc relief.

See id.; Koehler, 229 A.3d at 931. As such, we vacate the order denying 
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Vasquez’s PCRA petition and remand for reinstatement of Vasquez’s direct 

appeal rights nunc pro tunc. See Patterson, 940 A.2d at 499; Koehler, 229 

A.3d at 931, 932. Considering our disposition, we do not address Vasquez’s

remaining claim. 

Order vacated. Case remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction 

relinquished. 

DATE: 9/3/2024