J-A26003-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

RACHEL LYNN EDDY,

Appellant No. 1813 WDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 18, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-30-CR-0000184-2014

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., RANSOM, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 7, 2016

Rachel Lynn Eddy appeals from the judgment of sentence of an 

aggregate term of 12 months’ probation, plus $163.20 in restitution, 

imposed after she was convicted of theft by unlawful taking, 18 Pa.C.S. § 

3921(a), conspiracy to commit theft, 18 Pa.C.S. § 903(a)(1), and tampering 

with evidence, 18 Pa.C.S. § 4910(1). After careful review, we reverse 

Eddy’s convictions for theft and conspiracy, but affirm her conviction for 

tampering with evidence.

This Court previously summarized the evidence presented at the joint 

trial of Eddy and her co-defendant, Jesse James Tinsley, as follows:

On April 6, 2014, Brian Yeager (“Yeager”) saw a red truck 

with square headlights, possibly a 1982-era GMC, driving away 

from Levine’s Iron & Metal around 11:00 p.m. See N.T., 3/3/15, 

at 33-34. Yeager testified that the truck did not have its lights 

on, left at a high rate of speed, and appeared to have scrap 

metal in the bed of the truck. Id. at 33-34, 39, 41-42, 45. 
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After Yeager saw the truck head west, he returned inside and 

called the police. Id. at 34. Thereafter, Yeager called Larry 

Levine (“Levine”), owner of Levine’s Iron & Metal, to tell Levine 

what he witnessed. Id. at 34-35, 96-97.

James Babirad (“Trooper Babirad”), a Pennsylvania State 

Trooper, reported to Yeager’s call. Id. at 52-53. Trooper 

Babirad drove toward West Waynesburg to search for the 

reported truck, but did not locate the vehicle in that area. Id. at 

53. As Trooper Babirad was returning to the police station, he 

noticed a truck that matched Yeager’s description parked in front 

of a house. Id. at 54. Trooper Babirad noted some scrap metal 

in the bed of the truck before knocking on the door of the 

residence. Id. Rachel Eddy (“Eddy”), Tinsley’s co-defendant,2

answered the door and told Trooper Babirad she was the only 

person to drive the truck that day, and that she returned home 

around 10:00 p.m. Id. However, Trooper Babirad had not 

observed the truck parked at the house on his way into West 

Waynesburg approximately 15 minutes earlier. Id. at 55. After 

seeing several other people in the home, Trooper Babirad asked 

if Tinsley was home. Id. at 55, 84-85. Tinsley came to the door 

and confirmed that Eddy was the only person who drove the 

truck that day. Id. at 55-56. Trooper Babirad asked Tinsley and 

Eddy about the scrap metal in the truck and advised them of 

why he was asking about the scrap metal. Id. at 58.

2 Tinsley and Eddy live together with Eddy’s family. See 

N.T., 3/3/15, at 162.

Thereafter, Trooper Babirad told Tinsley and Eddy not to do 

anything with the scrap metal, and he returned to the police 

barracks to get a camera in order to photograph the metal in the 

bed of the truck. Id. at 60. The police contacted Levine and 

asked him to come to Eddy and Tinsley’s residence in order to 

view the scrap metal in person. Id. at 60, 97, 104-05. Trooper 

Babirad returned to the residence around 15 minutes later, but 

noticed that some of the scrap metal had been moved out of the 

bed of the truck, and a silver grate that had previously been in 

the truck was missing. Id. at 61, 87. After Tinsley showed 

Trooper Babirad where the missing silver grate was located in 

the basement, Trooper Babirad photographed all of the scrap 

metal, as well as the truck. Id. at 61-62, 77-78. Subsequently, 

Levine arrived at the residence to inspect the scrap metal. Id. 

at 69, 97-98. Although he does not keep an inventory of his 

scrap yard, Levine reported that the material in question 
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appeared to be similar to scrap metal that was dropped off at his 

facility two days prior. Id. at 106, 112-13. Trooper Babirad told 

Tinsley and Eddy not to do anything with the scrap metal until it 

could be investigated further, and left for the night. Id. at 70.

After beginning his usual 4:00 p.m. shift the following day, 

Trooper Babirad noticed Tinsley driving the truck, with Eddy as a 

passenger, around 4:30 p.m. Id. at 70-71, 94. Trooper Babirad 

observed that none of the scrap metal was in the bed of the 

truck, so he turned around and met Tinsley and Eddy at their 

residence to speak with them. Id. at 71. Eddy notified Trooper 

Babirad that she took the scrap metal to a different scrap yard, 

Jack’s Recycling, early that morning to get money. Id. at 72, 

94. Trooper Babirad called Jack’s Recycling and confirmed 

Eddy’s statement. Id. at 123. Trooper Babirad then met Levine 

at Levine’s Iron & Metal, and Trooper Babirad took photos of a 

pile of scrap metal with pieces similar to those found at the 

Tinsley and Eddy residence. Id. at 73-76. Trooper Babirad also 

took photos of tire impressions in the mud located at Levine’s 

Iron & Metal. Id. at 77. 

Commonwealth v. Tinlsey, No. 1776 WDA 2015, unpublished 

memorandum at 1-4 (Pa. Super. filed Aug. 31, 2016).

Based on this evidence, a jury convicted both Eddy and Tinsley of the 

above-stated offenses. On May 18, 2015, Eddy was sentenced to concurrent 

terms of 12 months’ probation for each of her three offenses. The court also 

imposed restitution in the amount of $246 to be paid to Levine’s Iron and 

Metal. Eddy filed a timely post-sentence motion challenging the amount of 

restitution imposed by the court, and also seeking an arrest of judgment 

and/or a new trial. On October 13, 2015, the court denied Eddy’s request 

for an arrest of judgment and/or new trial, but granted her claim regarding 

restitution, amending the original sentencing order to impose $163.20 in 

restitution for Eddy’s theft offense. 
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Eddy filed a timely notice of appeal with this Court, and also timely 

complied with the trial court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal. Herein, she presents three 

questions for our review, which we have reordered for ease of disposition:

1. Was there insufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to 

prove that Appellant Rachel Eddy committed the crimes of Theft 

and Conspiracy to Commit Theft? Was the verdict against the 

weight of the evidence?

2. Was there insufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to 

convict Appellant Rachel Eddy of the crime of Tampering with 

Evidence as there was no evidence of a specific intent to hinder 

a police investigation? Was the verdict against the weight of the

evidence?

3. Where [Eddy] was convicted of a[] [misdemeanor] 3 theft of 

property not greater than $50 in value instead of $203.00 

alleged in the information, where no evidence of value was 

submitted to the jury, did the [c]ourt err and abuse its discretion 

by (a) sentencing [Eddy] to pay [restitution] in the amount of 

$246.00 upon considering a hearsay estimate over objection at 

the sentencing hearing and (b) by modifying the award to 

$163.20?

Eddy’s Brief at 7.

We begin by addressing Eddy’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims.

In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must 

determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, as well as all 

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light 

most favorable to the verdict winner, are sufficient to support all 

elements of the offense. Commonwealth v. Moreno, 14 A.3d 

133 (Pa. Super. 2011). Additionally, we may not reweigh the 

evidence or substitute our own judgment for that of the fact 

finder. Commonwealth v. Hartzell, 988 A.2d 141 (Pa. Super. 

2009). The evidence may be entirely circumstantial as long as it 

links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Moreno, supra at 136.
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Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 996, 1001 (Pa. Super. 2011).

Eddy first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain her 

convictions of theft by unlawful taking and conspiracy to commit theft by 

unlawful taking. Theft by unlawful taking is defined as follows: “A person is 

guilty of theft if he unlawfully takes, or exercises unlawful control over, 

movable property of another with the intent to deprive him thereof.” 18 

Pa.C.S. § 3921(a). Additionally, “[a] person is guilty of conspiracy with 

another person or persons to commit a crime if with the intent of promoting 

or facilitating its commission he ... [] agrees with such other person or 

persons that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct which 

constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime....” 

18 Pa.C.S. § 903(a)(1). This Court has declared that “[t]he essence of a 

criminal conspiracy is the common understanding that a particular criminal 

objective is to be accomplished.” Commonwealth v. Lambert, 795 A.2d 

1010, 1016 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted). “Mere association with the 

perpetrators, mere presence at the scene, or mere knowledge of the crime is 

insufficient” to demonstrate criminal conspiracy. Id. (citation omitted).

Initially, we must address the fact that Eddy’s co-defendant, Tinsley, 

also appealed to this Court from his judgment of sentence, and we filed a 

decision in Tinsley’s case in August of 2016. As in Eddy’s present appeal, 

Tinsley also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support his 

convictions for theft, conspiracy, and tampering with evidence. Ultimately, 

this Court concluded that the evidence failed to prove that Tinsley 
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committed any of those crimes. Specifically, we first concluded that the 

evidence was insufficient to convict Tinsley of theft, stating: 

The uncontroverted evidence suggests that Eddy was the 

only person who drove the truck on April 6, 2014. See N.T., 

3/3/15, at 54, 56. There was no evidence placing Tinsley at the 

scrapyard or handling the scrap metal. Further, the 

Commonwealth did not demonstrate that the scrap metal 

stolen was the same as the scrap metal found in the truck. 

Finally, there was also no evidence that Tinsley was an 

accomplice. Thus, the evidence was insufficient to support a 

conviction of theft by unlawful taking.

Tinsley, No. 177 WDA 2015, at 6-7 (emphasis added). 

Here, even though the evidence was sufficient to show that Eddy 

possessed the scrap metal in the truck she was driving on April 6, 2014, we 

cannot ignore this Court’s conclusion in Tinsley that the Commonwealth 

failed to prove that the scrap metal in her truck was same metal taken from 

Levine’s business. Because this panel is bound by the Tinsley panel’s 

decision on this issue, we must also conclude that the evidence failed to 

prove that Eddy committed theft by unlawful taking.

Likewise, we are also required to reverse Eddy’s conviction for 

conspiracy to commit theft. In reversing Tinsley’s conviction for that 

offense, the Tinsley panel found that,

there [was] no evidence of any agreement between Tinsley and 

Eddy. The fact that Tinsley and Eddy live together, and were 

seen in the truck together the following day, merely evidences 

their association. See [Lambert, 795 A.2d at 1016.] Thus, the 

evidence is insufficient to support a conviction of criminal 

conspiracy to commit theft.
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Tinsley, No. 177 WDA 2015, at 7-8. Again, we are bound by the Tinsley 

panel’s decision; thus, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to 

establish that Eddy agreed with Tinsley to commit theft by unlawful taking. 

Therefore, we reverse Eddy’s conspiracy conviction.

However, we are not bound to reverse Eddy’s conviction for tampering 

with evidence. While we reversed Tinsley’s conviction for that offense, in 

doing so, we stated:

A person is guilty of tampering with physical evidence “if, 

believing that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or 

about to be instituted, he ... alters, destroys, conceals or 

removes any record, document or things with intent to impair its 

verity or availability in such proceeding or investigation.” 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 4910(1).

Here, Trooper Babirad testified that he “just said sit tight” 

when he left to retrieve the camera. N.T., 3/3/15, at 60. 

Subsequently, Trooper Babirad testified that he “advised [Tinsley 

and Eddy] not to do anything with the scrap until [he had 

conducted] further investigation” before leaving the house at the 

end of the night. Id. at 70. Although Trooper Babirad [was] 

uncertain of his “exact words” at certain points, he [knew] he 

“told [Tinsley and Eddy] there was an investigation.” Id. at 86.

Assuming Tinsley knew that the items were under 

investigation, the Commonwealth failed to prove that Tinsley 

participated in the alteration, destruction, concealment or 

removal of the scrap metal in [an] attempt to impair its 

availability. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4910[(1)]. In point of fact, 

Eddy told Trooper Babirad that she took the metal to 

Jack’s Recycling on the morning of April 7, 2014. N.T., 

3/3/15, at 94, 122. There is no evidence that Tinsley assisted or 

knew about Eddy’s actions. As such, the evidence of record is 

insufficient to support a conviction of tampering with physical 

evidence. 

Tinsley, No. 177 WDA 2015, at 8-9.
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Clearly, the Tinsley panel reversed Tinsley’s conviction for tampering 

with evidence because the Commonwealth failed to prove that Tinsley had 

any involvement in selling the scrap metal. The same is not true for Eddy, 

who admitted to Trooper Babirad that she sold the metal to Jack’s Recycling. 

Additionally, Trooper Babirad’s testimony that on April 6, 2014, he told Eddy 

that an investigation regarding the scrap metal was underway was sufficient 

to demonstrate that Eddy knew about the pending investigation when she 

sold the metal on April 7, 2014. Finally, Eddy’s decision to sell the scrap 

metal, despite the trooper’s direction not to do anything with the metal until 

he conducted further investigation, was sufficient to infer that Eddy sold the 

metal “with intent to impair its ... availability” in that investigation. 18 

Pa.C.S. § 4910(1). Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to support 

Eddy’s conviction for tampering with evidence.1 

____________________________________________

1 While Eddy’s “Statement of the Questions Involved” indicates that she is 

also challenging the weight of the evidence to support her conviction of 

tampering with evidence, she does not provide any argument on this issue. 

Accordingly, her weight-of-the-evidence claim is waived. See 

Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“When 

briefing the various issues that have been preserved, it is an appellant’s duty 

to present arguments that are sufficiently developed for our review. ... 

[W]hen defects in a brief impede our ability to conduct meaningful appellate 

review, we may dismiss the appeal entirely or find certain issues to be 

waived.”).
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In Eddy’s final issue, she challenges the legality of her sentence of 

restitution. However, it is apparent that the restitution sentence was 

imposed for Eddy’s theft conviction. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106(a) (“Upon 

conviction for any crime wherein property has been stolen, converted or 

otherwise unlawfully obtained, or its value substantially decreased as a 

direct result of the crime, or wherein the victim suffered personal injury 

directly resulting from the crime, the offender shall be sentenced to make 

restitution in addition to the punishment prescribed therefor.”). Because we 

have reversed Eddy’s theft conviction, her sentence of restitution must be 

vacated, and her claims pertaining to the legality of that sentence are moot. 

In sum, because the evidence was insufficient to support Eddy’s 

convictions of theft by unlawful taking and conspiracy to commit theft by

unlawful taking, we reverse those convictions and vacate her sentences for 

those offenses, including her sentence of restitution. However, we affirm 

Eddy’s conviction for tampering with evidence. Because Eddy received 

concurrent terms of 12 months’ probation for each of her three offenses, our 

vacating two of those terms of probation does not upset the overall 

sentencing scheme of the trial court. Consequently, we need not remand for 

resentencing.

Judgment of sentence reversed in part, affirmed in part. Jurisdiction 

relinquished.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/7/2016