Transport Transports

Canada Canada FLIGHT TEST DEBRIEF NOTE P age 1 of 3

A/C S/N Flight No. Date

DHC

– 6 / 400 434

– C

- F DHT TC 5 / TC 6 / TC7

(VAL 4.3.041/42/43 ) May 27 / 28

2015

Transport Canada Flight Test certification fight and ground testing of Vikin g Air Limited’s Phase

2 avionic upgrade.

This formal Certificatio n assessment consisted of three flights, at both forward heavy and light aft

loadings. This activity was in addition to two previous visits to Viking Air during 2014, where

Transport Canada participated in familiarization assessments during the developmen t process. In total,

seven assessment flights were flown by Transport Canada with approximately 20 hours of test. Debrief

notes were also written during the familiarization assessment flights.

This Debrief Note summarises comments, operating anomalies, review of data requirements, major

recommendations, possible certification items and certification items arising from the subject flight test

evaluation. Written responses are required and all items, except comments, must be resolved prior to

airworthine ss approval.

The test flight s summarised below were flown on May 27/28, 2015 from Victoria, BC.

TC5 (VAL 4.3.041) Handling Flight

Ground Test

• Certification standard controllers / switches

• FMS Changes

• Electronic Checklist

• GH 3900 Standby ESIS

• IOS from P hase I

• Nuisance messages

• AFCS Preflight Check (AFMS procedure)

• YD functionality

– Taxi Ops

• Takeoff using TOGA bars

• Inner Loops stability checks

• Inner Loops accel/ deccel performance

• Vsw disconnect

• YD performance

• Mis trim engagements

• AP disengage forces

• Mi s trim forces

• Simulated landing with AP On

• Overspeed Protection

• OEI performance

• Circuits

- FamiliarizationTransport Transports

Canada Canada FLIGHT TEST DEBRIEF NOTE P age 2 of 3

TC6 (VAL 4.3.042) AFCS Performance Flight

• Takeoff with FD TOGA options

• Ongoing FD mode assessment

• Control Wheel Steering

• Trim Master Switch

• GA mod e AFCS disconnect

• GH 3900 ESIS

• GA pitch targets relative to 60% Ng

• Advisory VNAV descent with constraints

• RNAV arrival to ILS

• LNAV Baro VNAV approach

• LPV approach

• Flap 37 ILS

– no hazard

• NDB approach

TC 7 (VAL 4.3. 043) AFCS Miscellaneous Flight

• GA Pitch Targets

– 60%

• Takeoff with FD TOGA options

• Ongoing FD mode assessment

• GH 3900 ESIS

• VNAV descent

• Back course Approaches

• VOR Approaches

• SVS / TAWS Assessment

• AFCS / FD Transfer awareness and Mode Changes

• FAA Displays

• High Altitude AFCS Performance

• LPV approa ches with GPS sensor failures

Reference Summary Category

1 Landing with Autopilot On:

A simulated approach and landing was performed as part of the Transport

Canada evaluation and it was determined that the tests were inconclusive.

Transport Canada as k s that Viking perform this test on an actual landing to

demonstrate no hazard. Certification

2 SPD Mode:

As noted during previous TC assessments, the SPD FD mode is really a

flight level change mode.

During a simulated engine climb (with Ng greater t han 60%) , with SPD

mode set to best single engine rate of climb, it was noted that the flight CommentTransport Transports

Canada Canada FLIGHT TEST DEBRIEF NOTE P age 3 of 3

Reference Summary Category

director appeared not command a climb. This was later determined to be a

possibly be the result of not setting the altitude selector to a higher altitude

during the test maneuver. This functionality is traditionally associated with

a flight level change mode.

The scenario tested, with an altitude selector inadvertently left at a n MDA

setting, is not an improbable scenario during a go

- around following an

engine f ailure.

Transport Canada is concerned that the intended function of the SPD mode

is not conducive to a single engine climb in all cases.

It is not understood why the FGC panel does not label this mode as a

FLCH mode to clearly indicate to the crew the co mplexity inherent in this

FD mode.

3 Mode Change Awareness:

As noted in previous TC assessments, the mode awareness during

uncommanded FD mode changes is not strong.

There are a multitude of Apex system changes which can affect the current

FD m odes, any of which could result in a mode change without significant

pilot awareness.

Viking is encouraged to increase the attention getting qualities of the Apex

system during uncommanded mode changes for this single pilot aircraft

being flown by pilots of low experience. Comment

4 Pitch Trim Inhibit:

The functionality of the pitch trim inhibit switch relative to autopilot

disconnect was inconsistent and dependent upon whether or not a servo

load was on the autopilot. Comment

5 FAA Mandated Gauge Mod ification:

The green FAA gauges were judged to comply with 23.1549 during flight

in American airspace. Comment

Philip Lamont Don Stephen

Transport Canada Flight Test Transport Canada Flight Test